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BOOK I

THE DEFINITION OF MATTER

THE MIND AND THE BRAIN[1]

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This book is a prolonged effort to establish a distinction between what is called
mind and what is called matter. Nothing is more simple than to realise this
distinction when you do not go deeply into it; nothing is more difficult when you
analyse it a little. At first sight, it seems impossible to confuse things so far apart
as a thought and a block of stone; but on reflection this great contrast vanishes,
and other differences have to be sought which are less apparent and of which one
has not hitherto dreamed.
First let us say how the question presents itself to us. The fact which we must
take as a starting point, for it is independent of every kind of theory, is that there
exists something which is "knowable." Not only science, but ordinary life and
our everyday conversation, imply that there are things that we know. It is with
regard to these things that we have to ask ourselves if some belong to what we
call the mind and others to what we call matter.
Let us suppose, by way of hypothesis, the knowable to be entirely and absolutely
homogeneous. In that case we should be obliged to set aside the question as one
already decided. Where everything is homogeneous, there is no distinction to be
drawn. But this hypothesis is, as we all know, falsified by observation. The
whole body of the knowable is formed from an agglomeration of extremely
varied elements, amongst which it is easy to distinguish a large number of
divisions. Things may be classified according to their colour, their shape, their
weight, the pleasure they give us, their quality of being alive or dead, and so on;
one much given to classification would only be troubled by the number of
possible distinctions.
Since so many divisions are possible, at which shall we stop and say: this is the
one which corresponds exactly to the opposition of mind and matter? The choice
is not easy to make; for we shall see that certain authors put the distinction
between the physical and the mental in one thing, others in another. Thus there
have been a very large number of distinctions proposed, and their number is
much greater than is generally thought. Since we propose to make ourselves
judges of these distinctions, since, in fact, we shall reject most of them in order
to suggest entirely new ones, it must be supposed that we shall do so by means of

a criterion. Otherwise, we should only be acting fantastically. We should be
saying peremptorily, "In my opinion this is mental," and there would be no more
ground for discussion than, if the assertion were "I prefer the Romanticists to the
Classicists," or "I consider prose superior to poetry."
The criterion which I have employed, and which I did not analyse until the
unconscious use I had made of it revealed its existence to me, is based on the two
following rules:—
1. A Rule of Method.—The distinction between mind and matter must not only
apply to the whole of the knowable, but must be the deepest which can divide the
knowable, and must further be one of a permanent character. A priori, there is
nothing to prove the existence of such a distinction; it must be sought for and,
when found, closely examined.
2. An Indication of the Direction in which the Search must be Made.—Taking
into account the position already taken up by the majority of philosophers, the
manifestation of mind, if it exists, must be looked for in the domain of facts dealt
with by psychology, and the manifestation of matter in the domain explored by
physicists.
I do not conceal from myself that there may be much that is arbitrary in my own
criterion; but this does not seem to me possible to avoid. We must therefore
appeal to psychology, and ask whether it is cognisant of any phenomenon
offering a violent, lasting, and ineffaceable contrast with all the rest of the
knowable.
The Method of Concepts and the Method of Enumeration.—Many authors are
already engaged in this research, and employ a method which I consider very bad
and very dangerous—the method of concepts. This consists in looking at real and
concrete phenomena in their most abstract form. For example, in studying the
mind, they use this word "mind" as a general idea which is supposed to contain
all the characteristics of psychical phenomena; but they do not wait to enumerate
these characteristics or to realise them, and they remain satisfied with the
extremely vague idea springing from an unanalysed concept. Consequently they
use the word "mind" with the imprudence of a banker who should discount a
trade bill without ascertaining whether the payment of that particular piece of
paper had been provided for. This amounts to saying that the discussion of
philosophical problems takes especially a verbal aspect; and the more complex
the phenomena a concept thus handled, contains, the more dangerous it is. A
concept of the colour red has but a very simple content, and by using it, this

content can be very clearly represented. But how can the immense meaning of
the word "mind" be realised every time that it is used? For example, to define
mind and to separate it from the rest of the knowable which is called matter, the
general mode of reasoning is as follows: all the knowable which is apparent to
our senses is essentially reduced to motion; "mind," that something which lives,
feels, and judges, is reduced to "thought." To understand the difference between
matter and mind, it is necessary to ask one's self whether there exists any analogy
in nature between motion and thought. Now this analogy does not exist, and what
we comprehend, on the contrary, is their absolute opposition. Thought is not a
movement, and has nothing in common with a movement. A movement is never
anything else but a displacement, a transfer, a change of place undergone by a
particle of matter. What relation of similarity exists between this geometrical fact
and a desire, an emotion, a sensation of bitterness? Far from being identical,
these two facts are as distinct as any facts can be, and their distinction is so deep
that it should be raised to the height of a principle, the principle of heterogeneity.
This is almost exactly the reasoning that numbers of philosophers have repeated
for several years without giving proof of much originality. This is what I term the
metaphysics of concept, for it is a speculation which consists in juggling with
abstract ideas. The moment that a philosopher opposes thought to movement, I
ask myself under what form he can think of a "thought," I suppose he must very
poetically and very vaguely represent to himself something light and subtle
which contrasts with the weight and grossness of material bodies. And thus our
philosopher is punished in the sinning part; his contempt of the earthly has led
him into an abuse of abstract reasoning, and this abuse has made him the dupe of
a very naïve physical metaphor.
At bottom I have not much faith in the nobility of many of our abstract ideas. In
a former psychological study[2] I have shown that many of our abstractions are
nothing else than embryonic, and, above all, loosely defined concrete ideas,
which can satisfy only an indolent mind, and are, consequently, full of snares.
The opposition between mind and matter appears to me to assume a very
different meaning if, instead of repeating ready-made formulas and wasting time
on the game of setting concept against concept, we take the trouble to return to
the study of nature, and begin by drawing up an inventory of the respective
phenomena of mind and matter, examining with each of these phenomena the
characteristics in which the first-named differ from the second. It is this last
method, more slow but more sure than the other, that we shall follow; and we
will commence by the study of matter.

FOOTNOTES:
[1] L'Ame et la Corps.—Disagreeable as it is to alter an author's title, the words "Soul
and Body" had to be abandoned because of their different connotation in English. The
title "Mind and Body" was also preoccupied by Bain's work of that name in this
series. The title chosen has M. Binet's approval.—ED.
[2] Étude experímentale de l'Intelligence. Paris: Schleicher.

CHAPTER II
OUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS IS ONLY
SENSATIONS
Of late years numerous studies have been published on the conception of matter,
especially by physicists, chemists, and mathematicians. Among these recent
contributions to science I will quote the articles of Duhem on the Evolution of
Mechanics published in 1903 in the Revue générale des Sciences, and other
articles by the same author, in 1904, in the Revue de Philosophie. Duhem's views
have attracted much attention, and have dealt a serious blow at the whole theory
of the mechanics of matter. Let me also quote that excellent work of Dastre, La
Vie et la Mort, wherein the author makes so interesting an application to biology
of the new theories on energetics; the discussion between Ostwald and Brillouin
on matter, in which two rival conceptions find themselves engaged in a veritable
hand-to-hand struggle (Revue générale des Sciences, Nov. and Dec. 1895); the
curious work of Dantec on les Lois Naturelles, in which the author ingeniously
points out the different sensorial districts into which science is divided, although,
through a defect in logic, he accepts mechanics as the final explanation of things.
And last, it is impossible to pass over, in silence, the rare works of Lord Kelvin,
so full, for French readers, of unexpected suggestions, for they show us the
entirely practical and empirical value which the English attach to mechanical
models.
My object is not to go through these great studies in detail. It is the part of
mathematical and physical philosophers to develop their ideas on the inmost
nature of matter, while seeking to establish theories capable of giving a
satisfactory explanation of physical phenomena. This is the point of view they
take up by preference, and no doubt they are right in so doing. The proper rôle of
the natural sciences is to look at phenomena taken by themselves and apart from
the observer.
My own intention, in setting forth these same theories on matter, is to give
prominence to a totally different point of view. Instead of considering physical
phenomena in themselves, we shall seek to know what idea one ought to form of
their nature when one takes into account that they are observed phenomena.
While the physicist withdraws from consideration the part of the observer in the

verification of physical phenomena, our rôle is to renounce this abstraction, to reestablish things in their original complexity, and to ascertain in what the
conception of matter consists when it is borne in mind that all material
phenomena are known only in their relation to ourselves, to our bodies, our
nerves, and our intelligence.
This at once leads us to follow, in the exposition of the facts, an order which the
physicist abandons. Since we seek to know what is the physical phenomenon we
perceive, we must first enunciate this proposition, which will govern the whole
of our discussion: to wit—
Of the outer world we know nothing except our sensations.
Before demonstrating this proposition, let us develop it by an example which will
at least give us some idea of its import. Let us take as example one of those
investigations in which, with the least possible recourse to reasoning, the most
perfected processes of observation are employed, and in which one imagines that
one is penetrating almost into the very heart of nature. We are, let us suppose,
dissecting an animal. After killing it, we lay bare its viscera, examine their
colour, form, dimensions, and connections; then we dissect the organs in order to
ascertain their internal nature, their texture, structure, and function; then, not
content with ocular anatomy, we have recourse to the perfected processes of
histology: we take a fragment of the tissues weighing a few milligrammes, we fix
it, we mount it, we make it into strips of no more than a thousandth of a
millimetre thick, we colour it and place it under the microscope, we examine it
with the most powerful lenses, we sketch it, and we explain it. All this work of
complicated and refined observation, sometimes lasting months and years, results
in a monograph containing minute descriptions of organs, of cells, and of intracellular structures, the whole represented and defined in words and pictures.
Now, these descriptions and drawings are the display of the various sensations
which the zoologist has experienced in the course of his labours; to those
sensations are added the very numerous interpretations derived from the memory,
reasoning, and often, also, from the imagination on the part of the scholar, the
last a source at once of errors and of discoveries. But everything properly
experimental in the work of the zoologist proceeds from the sensations he has
felt or might have felt, and in the particular case treated of, these sensations are
almost solely visual.
This observation might be repeated with regard to all objects of the outer world
which enter into relation with us. Whether the knowledge of them be of the
common-place or of a scientific order matters little. Sensation is its limit, and all

objects are known to us by the sensations they produce in us, and are known to
us solely in this manner. A landscape is nothing but a cluster of sensations. The
outward form of a body is simply sensation; and the innermost and most delicate
material structure, the last visible elements of a cell, for example, are all, in so far
as we observe them with the microscope, nothing but sensation.
This being understood, the question is, why we have just admitted—with the
majority of authors—that we cannot really know a single object as it is in itself,
and in its own nature, otherwise than by the intermediary of the sensations it
provokes in us? This comes back to saying that we here require explanations on
the two following points: why do we admit that we do not really perceive the
objects, but only something intermediate between them and us; and why do we
call this something intermediate a sensation? On this second point I will offer, for
the time being, one simple remark: we use the term sensation for lack of any
other to express the intermediate character of our perception of objects; and this
use does not, on our part, imply any hypothesis. Especially do we leave
completely in suspense the question whether sensation is a material phenomenon
or a state of being of the mind. These are questions we will deal with later. For
the present it must be understood that the word sensation is simply a term for the
something intermediate between the object and our faculty of cognition.[3] We
have, therefore, simply to state why we have admitted that the external
perception of objects is produced mediately or by procuration.
There are a few philosophers, and those not of the lowest rank, who have thought
that this intermediate character of all perception was so evident that there was no
need to insist further upon it. John Stuart Mill, who was certainly and perhaps
more than anything a careful logician, commences an exposition of the idealist
thesis to which he was so much attached, by carelessly saying: "It goes without
saying that objects are known to us through the intermediary of our senses.... The
senses are equivalent to our sensations;"[4] and on those propositions he rears his
whole system, "It goes without saying ..." is a trifle thoughtless. I certainly think
he was wrong in not testing more carefully the solidity of his starting point.
In the first place, this limit set to our knowledge of the objects which stimulate
our sensations is only accepted without difficulty by well-informed persons; it
much astonishes the uninstructed when first explained to them. And this
astonishment, although it may seem so, is not a point that can be neglected, for it
proves that, in the first and simple state of our knowledge, we believe we directly
perceive objects as they are. Now, if we, the cultured class, have, for the most
part,[5] abandoned this primitive belief, we have only done so on certain implicit

conditions, of which we must take cognisance. This is what I shall now
demonstrate as clearly as I can.
Take the case of an unlearned person. To prove to him that he knows sensations
alone and not the bodies which excite them, a very striking argument may be
employed which requires no subtle reasoning and which appeals to his
observation. This is to inform him, supposing he is not aware of the fact, that,
every time he has the perception of an exterior object, there is something
interposed between the object and himself, and that that something is his nervous
system.
If we were not acquainted with the existence of our nervous system, we should
unhesitatingly admit that our perception of objects consisted in some sort of
motion towards the places in which they were fixed. Now, a number of
experiments prove to us that objects are known to us as excitants of our nervous
system which only act on this system by entering into communication, or coming
into contact with, its terminal extremities. They then produce, in the interior of
this system, a peculiar modification which we are not yet able to define. It is this
modification which follows the course of the nerves and is carried to the central
parts of the system. The speed of the propagation of this nerve modification has
been measured by certain precise experiments in psychometry; the journey is
made slowly, at the rate of 20 to 30 metres per second, and it is of interest that
this rate of speed lets us know at what moment and, consequently, by what
organic excitement, the phenomenon of consciousness is produced. This happens
when the cerebral centres are affected; the phenomenon of consciousness is
therefore posterior to the fact of the physical excitement.
I believe it has required a long series of accepted observations for us to have
arrived at this idea, now so natural in appearance, that the modifications
produced within our nervous system are the only states of which we can have a
direct consciousness; and as experimental demonstration is always limited, there
can be no absolute certainty that things never happen otherwise, that we never go
outside ourselves, and that neither our consciousness nor our nervous influx can
exteriorise itself, shoot beyond our material organs, and travel afar in pursuit of
objects in order to know or to modify them.

Before going further, we must make our terminology more precise. We have just
seen the necessity of drawing a distinction between the sensations of which we

are conscious and the unknown cause which produces these sensations by acting
on our nervous systems. This exciting cause I have several times termed, in order
to be understood, the external object. But under the name of external object are
currently designated groups of sensations, such as those which make up for us a
chair, a tree, an animal, or any kind of body. I see a dog pass in the street. I call
this dog an external object; but, as this dog is formed, for me who am looking at
it, of my sensations, and as these sensations are states of my nervous centres, it
happens that the term external object has two meanings. Sometimes it designates
our sensations; at another, the exciting cause of our sensations. To avoid all
confusion we will call this exciting cause, which is unknown to us, the X of
matter.
It is, however, not entirely unknown, for we at least know two facts with regard
to it. We know, first, that this X exists, and in the second place, that its image
must not be sought in the sensations it excites in us. How can we doubt, we say,
that it exists? The same external observation proves to us at once that there exists
an object distinct from our nerves, and that our nerves separate us from it. I insist
on this point, for the reason that some authors, after having unreservedly
admitted that our knowledge is confined to sensations, have subsequently been
hard put to it to demonstrate the reality of the excitant distinct from the
sensations.[6] Of this we need no demonstration, and the testimony of our senses
suffices. We have seen the excitant, and it is like a friend who should pass before
us in disguise so well costumed and made up that we can attribute to his real self
nothing of what we see of him, but yet we know that it is he.
And, in fact, let us remember what it is that we have argued upon—viz. on an
observation. I look at my hand, and I see an object approaching it which gives
me a sensation of feeling. I at first say that this object is an excitant. It is pointed
out to me that I am in error. This object, which appears to me outside my nervous
system, is composed, I am told, of sensations. Be it so, I have the right to answer;
but if all that I perceive is sensation, my nervous system itself is a sensation; if it
is only that, it is no longer an intermediary between the excitant and myself, and
it is the fact that we perceive things as they are. For it to be possible to prove that
I perceive, not the object, but that tertium quid which is sensation, it has to be
admitted that the nervous system is a reality external to sensation and that objects
which assume, in relation to it, the rôle of excitants and of which we perceive the
existence, are likewise realities external to sensation.
This is what is demonstrated by abstract reasoning, and this reasoning is further
supported by a common-sense argument. The outer world cannot be summarised
in a few nervous systems suspended like spiders in empty space. The existence

of a nervous system implies that of a body in which it is lodged. This body must
have complicated organs; its limbs presuppose the soil on which the animal rests,
its lungs the existence of oxygen vivifying its blood, its digestive tube, aliments
which it digests and assimilates to its substance, and so on. We may indeed admit
that this outer world is not, in itself, exactly as we perceive it; but we are
compelled to recognise that it exists by the same right as the nervous system, in
order to put it in its proper place.
The second fact of observation is that the sensations we feel do not give us the
true image of the material X which produces them. The modification made in our
substance by this force X does not necessarily resemble in its nature the nature of
that force. This is an assertion opposed to our natural opinions, and must
consequently be demonstrated. It is generally proved by the experiments which
reveal what is called "the law of the specific energy of the nerves." This is an
important law in physiology discovered by Müller two centuries ago, and
consequences of a philosophical order are attached to it. The facts on which this
law is based are these. It is observed that, if the sensory nerves are agitated by an
excitant which remains constant, the sensations received by the patient differ
according to the nerve affected. Thus, the terminals of an electric current applied
to the ball of the eye give the sensation of a small luminous spark; to the auditory
apparatus, the current causes a crackling sound; to the hand, the sensation of a
shock; to the tongue, a metallic flavour. Conversely, excitants wholly different,
but affecting the same nerve, give similar sensations; whether a ray of light is
projected into the eye, or the eyeball be excited by the pressure of a finger;
whether an electric current is directed into the eye, or, by a surgical operation, the
optic nerve is severed by a bistoury, the effect is always the same, in the sense
that the patient always receives a sensation of light. To sum up, in addition to the
natural excitant of our sensory nerves, there are two which can produce the same
sensory effects, that is to say, the mechanical and the electrical excitants. Whence
it has been concluded that the peculiar nature of the sensation felt depends much
less on the nature of the excitant producing it than on that of the sensory organ
which collects it, the nerve which propagates it, or the centre which receives it. It
would perhaps be going a little too far to affirm that the external object has no
kind of resemblance to the sensations it gives us. It is safer to say that we are
ignorant of the degree in which the two resemble or differ from each other.
On thinking it over, it will be found that this contains a very great mystery, for
this power of distinction (specificité) of our nerves is not connected with any
detail observable in their structure. It is very probably the receiving centres
which are specific. It is owing to them and to their mechanism that we ought to

feel, from the same excitant, a sensation of sound or one of colour, that is to say,
impressions which appear, when compared, as the most different in the world.
Now, so far as we can make out, the histological structure of our auditory centre
is the same as that of our visual centre. Both are a collection of cells diverse in
form, multipolar, and maintained by a conjunctive pellicule (stroma). The
structure of the fibres and cells varies slightly in the motor and sensory regions,
but no means have yet been discovered of perceiving a settled difference between
the nerve-cells of the optic centre and those of the auditory centre. There should
be a difference, as our mind demands it; but our eye fails to note it.
Let us suppose, however, that to-morrow, or several centuries hence, an
improved technique should show us a material difference between the visual and
the auditory neurone. There is no absurdity in this supposition; it is a possible
discovery, since it is of the order of material facts. Such a discovery, however,
would lead us very far, for what terribly complicates this problem is that we
cannot directly know the structure of our nervous system. Though close to us,
though, so to speak, inside us, it is not known to us otherwise than is the object
we hold in our hands, the ground we tread, or the landscape which forms our
horizon.
For us it is but a sensation, a real sensation when we observe it in the dissection
of an animal, or the autopsy of one of our own kind; an imaginary and transposed
sensation, when we are studying anatomy by means of an anatomical chart; but
still a sensation. It is by the intermediary of our nervous system that we have to
perceive and imagine what a nervous system is like; consequently we are
ignorant as to the modification impressed on our perceptions and imaginations by
this intermediary, the nature of which we are unable to grasp.
Therefore, when we attempt to understand the inmost nature of the outer world,
we stand before it as before absolute darkness. There probably exists in nature,
outside of ourselves, neither colour, odour, force, resistance, space, nor anything
that we know as sensation. Light is produced by the excitement of the optic
nerve, and it shines only in our brain; as to the excitement itself, there is nothing
to prove that it is luminous; outside of us is profound darkness, or even worse,
since darkness is the correlation of light. In the same way, all the sonorous
excitements which assail us, the creakings of machines, the sounds of nature, the
words and cries of our fellows are produced by excitements of our acoustic
nerve; it is in our brain that noise is produced, outside there reigns a dead silence.
The same may be said of all our other senses.

Not one of our senses, absolutely none, is the revealer of external reality. From
this point of view there is no higher and no lower sense. The sensations of sight,
apparently so objective and so searching, no more take us out of ourselves than
do the sensations of taste which are localised in the tongue.
In short, our nervous system, which enables us to communicate with objects,
prevents us, on the other hand, from knowing their nature. It is an organ of
relation with the outer world; it is also, for us, a cause of isolation. We never go
outside ourselves. We are walled in. And all we can say of matter and of the
outer world is, that it is revealed to us solely by the sensations it affords us, that it
is the unknown cause of our sensations, the inaccessible excitant of our organs of
the senses, and that the ideas we are able to form as to the nature and the
properties of that excitant, are necessarily derived from our sensations, and are
subjective to the same degree as those sensations themselves.
But we must make haste to add that this point of view is the one which is reached
when we regard the relations of sensation with its unknown cause the great X of
matter.[7] Positive science and practical life do not take for an objective this
relation of sensation with the Unknowable; they leave this to metaphysics. They
distribute themselves over the study of sensation and examine the reciprocal
relations of sensations with sensations. Those last, condemned as misleading
appearances when we seek in them the expression of the Unknowable, lose this
illusory character when we consider them in their reciprocal relations. Then they
constitute for us reality, the whole of reality and the only object of human
knowledge. The world is but an assembly of present, past, and possible
sensations; the affair of science is to analyse and co-ordinate them by separating
their accidental from their constant relations.

FOOTNOTES:
[3] Connaissance.—The word cognition is used throughout as the English
equivalent of this, except in places where the context shows that it means
acquaintance merely.—ED.
[4] J. S. MILL, An Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy, pp. 5 and 6.
London. 1865.
[5] A few subtle philosophers have returned to it, as I shall show later in chapter
iv.
[6] Thus, the perplexity in which John Stuart Mill finds himself is very curious.
Having admitted unreservedly that our knowledge is confined to sensations, he
is powerless to set up a reality outside this, and acknowledges that the principle
of causality cannot legitimately be used to prove that our sensations have a cause
which is not a sensation, because this principle cannot be applied outside the
world of phenomena.
[7] See p. 18, sup.—ED.

CHAPTER III
THE MECHANICAL THEORIES OF MATTER ARE ONLY
SYMBOLS
If we keep firmly in mind the preceding conclusion—a conclusion which is
neither exclusively my own, nor very new—we shall find a certain
satisfaction in watching the discussions of physicists on the essence of
matter, on the nature of force and of energy, and on the relations of
ponderable and imponderable matter. We all know how hot is the fight
raging on this question. At the present time it is increasing in intensity, in
consequence of the disturbance imported into existing theories by the new
discoveries of radio-activity.[8] We psychologists can look on very calmly at
these discussions, with that selfish pleasure we unavowedly feel when we
see people fighting while ourselves safe from knocks. We have, in fact, the
feeling that, come what may from the discussions on the essence of matter,
there can be no going beyond the truth that matter is an excitant of our
nervous system, and is only known in connection with, the perception we
have of this last.
If we open a work on physics or physiology we shall note with
astonishment how the above considerations are misunderstood. Observers
of nature who seek, and rightly, to give the maximum of exactness to their
observations, show that they are obsessed by one constant prejudice: they
mistrust sensation.
A great part of their efforts consists, by what they say, in reducing the rôle
of sensation to its fitting part in science; and the invention of mechanical
aids to observation is constantly held up as a means of remedying the
imperfection of our senses. In physics the thermometer replaces the
sensation of heat that our skin—our hand, for example—experiences by the
measurable elevation of a column of mercury, and the scale-pan of a precise
balance takes the place of the vague sensation of trifling weights; in
physiology a registering apparatus replaces the sensation of the pulse which
the doctor feels with the end of his forefinger by a line on paper traced with

indelible ink, of which the duration and the intensity, as well as the varied
combinations of these two elements, can be measured line by line.
Learned men who pride themselves on their philosophical attainments vaunt
in very eloquent words the superiority of the physical instrument over mere
sensation. Evidently, however, the earnestness of this eulogy leads them
astray. The most perfect registering apparatus must, in the long-run, after its
most scientific operations, address itself to our senses and produce in us
some small sensation. The reading of the height reached by the column of
mercury in a thermometer when heated is accomplished by a visual
sensation, and it is by the sight that the movements of the balance are
controlled; and that the traces of the sphygmograph are analysed. We may
readily admit to physicists and physiologists all the advantages of these
apparatus. This is not the question. It simply proves that there are sensations
and sensations, and that certain of these are better and more precise than
others. The visual sensation of relation in space seems to be par excellence
the scientific sensation which it is sought to substitute for all the rest. But,
after all, it is but a sensation.
Let us recognise that there is, in all this contempt on the part of physicists
for sensation, only differences in language, and that a paraphrase would
suffice to correct them without leaving any trace. Be it so. But something
graver remains. When one is convinced that our knowledge of the outer
world is limited to sensations, we can no longer understand how it is
possible to give oneself up, as physicists do, to speculations upon the
constitution of matter.
Up to the present there have been three principal ways of explaining the
physical phenomena of the universe. The first, the most abstract, and the
furthest from reality, is above all verbal. It consists in the use of formulas in
which the quality of the phenomena is replaced by their magnitude, in
which this magnitude, ascertained by the most precise processes of
measurement, becomes the object of abstract reasoning which allows its
modifications to be foreseen under given experimental conditions. This is
pure mathematics, a formal science depending upon logic. Another
conception, less restricted than the above, and of fairly recent date, consists
in treating all manifestations of nature as forms of energy. This term
"energy" has a very vague content. At the most it expresses but two things:

first, it is based on a faint recollection of muscular force, and it reminds one
dimly of the sensation experienced when clenching the fists; and, secondly,
it betrays a kind of very natural respect for the forces of nature which, in all
the images man has made of them, constantly appear superior to his own.
We may say "the energy of nature;" but we should never say, what would be
experimentally correct; "the weakness of nature." The word "weakness" we
reserve for ourselves. Apart from these undecided suggestions, the term
energy is quite the proper term to designate phenomena, the intimate nature
of which we do not seek to penetrate, but of which we only wish to
ascertain the laws and measure the degrees.
A third conception, more imaginative and bolder than the others, is the
mechanical or kinetic theory. This last absolutely desires that we should
represent to ourselves, that we should imagine, how phenomena really take
place; and in seeking for the property of nature the most clearly perceived,
the easiest to define and analyse, and the most apt to lend itself to
measurement and calculation, it has chosen motion. Consequently all the
properties of matter have been reduced to this one, and in spite of the
apparent contradiction of our senses, it has been supposed that the most
varied phenomena are produced, in the last resort, by the displacement of
material particles. Thus, sound, light, heat, electricity, and even the nervous
influx would be due to vibratory movements, varying only by their
direction and their periods, and all nature is thus explained as a problem of
animated geometry. This last theory, which has proved very fertile in
explanations of the most delicate phenomena of sound and light, has so
strongly impressed many minds that it has led them to declare that the
explanation of phenomena by the laws of mechanics alone has the character
of a scientific explanation. Even recently, it seemed heresy to combat these
ideas.
Still more recently, however, a revulsion of opinion has taken place.
Against the physicists, the mathematicians in particular have risen up, and
taking their stand on science, have demonstrated that all the mechanisms
invented have crowds of defects. First, in each particular case, there is such
a complication that that which is defined is much more simple than the
definition; then there is such a want of unity that quite special mechanisms
adapted to each phenomenal detail have to be imagined; and, lastly—most
serious argument of all—so much comprehensiveness and suppleness is

employed, that no experimental law is found which cannot be understood
mechanically, and no fact of observation which shows an error in the
mechanical explanation—a sure proof that this mode of explanation has no
meaning.
My way of combating the mechanical theory starts from a totally different
point of view. Psychology has every right to say a few words here, as upon
the value of every kind of scientific theory; for it is acquainted with the
nature of the mental needs of which these theories are the expression and
which these theories seek to satisfy. It has not yet been sufficiently noticed
that psychology does not allow itself to be confined, like physics or
sociology, within the logical table of human knowledge, for it has, by a
unique privilege, a right of supervision over the other sciences. We shall see
that the psychological discussion of mechanics has a wider range than that
of the mathematicians.
Since our cognition cannot go beyond sensation, shall we first recall what
meaning can be given to an explanation of the inmost nature of matter? It
can only be an artifice, a symbol, or a process convenient for classification
in order to combine the very different qualities of things in one unifying
synthesis—a process having nearly the same theoretical value as a memoria
technica, which, by substituting letters for figures, helps us to retain the
latter in our minds. This does not mean that figures are, in fact, letters, but it
is a conventional substitution which has a practical advantage. What
memoria technica is to the ordinary memory, the theory of mechanics
should be for our needed unification.
Unfortunately, this is not so. The excuse we are trying to make for the
mechanicians is illusory. There is no mistaking their ambition,
Notwithstanding the prudence of some and the equivocations in which
others have rejoiced, they have drawn their definition in the absolute and
not in the relative. To take their conceptions literally, they have thought the
movement of matter to be something existing outside our eye, our hands,
and our sense; in a word, something noumenal, as Kant would have said.
The proof that this is their real idea, is that movement is presented to us as
the true outer and explanatory cause of our sensations, the external
excitement to our nerves. The most elementary works on physics are
impregnated with this disconcerting conception. If we open a description of

acoustics, we read that sound and noise are subjective states which have no
reality outside our auditory apparatus; that they are sensations produced by
an external cause, which is the vibratory movement of sonorous bodies—
whence the conclusion that this vibratory movement is not itself a
sensation. Or, shall we take another proof, still more convincing. This is the
vibratory and silent movement which is invoked by physicists to explain the
peculiarities of subjective sensation; so that the interferences, the pulsations
of sound, and, in fine, the whole physiology of the ear, is treated as a
problem in kinematics, and is explained by the composition of movements.
What kind of reality do physicists then allow to the displacements of
matter? Where do they place them, since they recognise otherwise that the
essence of matter is unknown to us? Are we to suppose that, outside the
world of noumena, outside the world of phenomena and sensations, there
exists a third world, an intermediary between the two former, the world of
atoms and that of mechanics?
A short examination will, moreover, suffice to show of what this
mechanical model is formed which is presented to us as constituting the
essence of matter. This can be nothing else than the sensations, since we are
incapable of perceiving or imagining anything else. It is the sensations of
sight, of touch, and even of the muscular sense. Motion is a fact seen by the
eye, felt by the hand; it enters into us by the perception we have of the solid
masses visible to the naked eye which exist in our field of observation, of
their movements and their equilibrium and the displacement we ourselves
effect with our bodies. Here is the sensory origin, very humble and very
gross, of all the mechanics of the atoms. Here is the stuff of which our lofty
conception is formed. Our mind can, it is true, by a work of purification,
strip movement of most of its concrete qualities, separate it even from the
perception of the object in motion, and make of it a something or other ideal
and diagrammatic; but there will still remain a residuum of visual, tactile,
and muscular sensations, and consequently it is still nothing else than a
subjective state, bound to the structure of our organs. We are, for the rest, so
wrapped up in sensations that none of our boldest conceptions can break
through the circle.
But it is not the notion of movement alone which proceeds from sensation.
There is also that of exteriority, of space, of position, and, by opposition,

that of external or psychological events. Without declaring it to be certain, I
will remind you that it is infinitely probable that these notions are derived
from our muscular experience. Free motion, arrested motion, the effort, the
speed, and the direction of motion, such are the sensorial elements, which,
in all probability, constitute the foundation of our ideas on space and its
properties. And those are so many subjective notions which we have no
right to treat as objects belonging to the outer world.
What is more remarkable, also, is that even the ideas of object, of body, and
of matter, are derived from visual and tactile sensations which have been
illegitimately set up as entities. We have come, in fact, to consider matter as
a being separate from sensations, superior to our sensations, distinct from
the properties which enable us to know it, and binding together these
properties, as it were, in a sheaf. Here again is a conception at the base of
visualisation and muscularisation; it consists in referring to the visual and
other sensations, raised for the occasion to the dignity of external and
permanent causes, the other sensations which are considered as the effects
of the first named upon our organs of sense.
It demands a great effort to clear our minds of these familiar conceptions
which, it is plain are nothing but naïve realism. Yes! the mechanical
conception of the universe is nothing but naïve realism.
To recapitulate our idea, and, to make it more plain by an illustration, here
is a tuning-fork on the table before me. With a vigorous stroke of the bow I
set it vibrating. The two prongs separate, oscillate rapidly, and a sound of a
certain tone is heard. I connect this tuning-fork, by means of electric wires,
with a Déprez recording apparatus which records the vibrations on the
blackened surface of a revolving cylinder; and we can thus, by an
examination of the trace made under our eyes, ascertain all the details of the
movement which animates it. We see, parallel to each other, two different
orders of phenomena; the visual phenomena which show us that the tuningfork is vibrating, and the auditory phenomena which convey to us the fact
that it is making a sound.
The physicist, asked for an explanation of all this, will answer: "It is the
vibration of the tuning-fork which, transmitted by the air, is carried to our
auditory apparatus, causes a vibration in the tympanum, the movements of

which are communicated to the small bones of the middle ear, thence
(abridging details) to the terminations of the auditory nerve, and so
produces in us the subjective sensation of sound." Well, in so saying, the
physicist commits an error of interpretation; outside our ears there exists
something we do not know which excites them; this something cannot be
the vibratory movement of the tuning-fork, for this vibratory movement
which we can see is likewise a subjective sensation; it no more exists
outside our sight than sound exists outside our ears. In any case, it is as
absurd to explain a sensation of sound by one of sight, as a sensation of
sight by one of sound.
One would be neither further from nor nearer to the truth if we answered
that physicist as follows: "You give the preponderance to your eye; I myself
give it to my ear. This tuning-fork appears to you to vibrate. Wrong! This is
how the thing occurs. This tuning-fork produces a sound which, by exciting
our retina, gives us a sense of movement. This visual sensation of vibration
is a purely subjective one, the external cause of the phenomenon is the
sound. The outer world is a concert of sounds which rises in the immensity
of space. Matter is noise and nothingness is silence."
This theory of the above experiment is not absurd; but, as a matter of fact, it
is probable that no one would or could accept it, except verbally for
amusement, as a challenge, or for the pleasure of talking metaphysics. The
reason is that all our evolution, for causes which would take too long to
detail, has established the hegemony of certain of our senses over the
others. We have, above all, become visual and manual beings. It is the eye
and the hand which give us the perceptions of the outer world of which we
almost exclusively make use in our sciences; and we are now almost
incapable of representing to ourselves the foundation of phenomena
otherwise than by means of these organs. Thus all the preceding experiment
from the stroke of the bow to the final noise presents itself to us in visual
terms, and further, these terms are not confined to a series of detached
sensations.
Visual sensation combines with the tactile and muscular sensations, and
forms sensorial constructions which succeed each, other, continue, and
arrange themselves logically: in lieu of sensations, there are objects and
relations of space between these objects, and the actions which connect

them, and the phenomena which pass from one to the other. All that is only
sensation, if you will; but merely as the agglutinated molecules of cement
and of stone are a palace.
Thus the whole series of visual events which compose our experiment with
the tuning-fork can be coherently explained. One understands that It is the
movement of my hand equipped with the bow which is communicated to
the tuning-fork. One understands that this movement passing into the fork
has changed its form and rhythm, that the waves produced by the fork
transmit themselves, by the oscillations of the air-molecules, to our
tympanum, and so on. There is in all this series of experiments an admirable
continuity which fully satisfies our minds. However much we might be
convinced by the theoretical reasons given above, that we have quite as
much right to represent the same series of events in an auditory form, we
should be incapable of realising that form to ourselves.
What would be the structure of the ear to any one who only knew it through
the sense of hearing? What would become of the tympanum, the small
bones, the cochlea, and the terminations of the acoustic nerve, if it were
only permitted to represent them in the language of sound? It is very
difficult to imagine.
Since, however, we are theorising, let us not be stopped by a few difficulties
of comprehension. Perhaps a little training might enable us to overcome
them. Perhaps musicians, who discern as much reality in what one hears as
in what one sees, would be more apt than other folk to understand the
necessary transposition. Some of them, in their autobiographies, have made,
by the way, very suggestive remarks on the importance they attribute to
sound: and, moreover, the musical world, with its notes, its intervals, and its
orchestration, lives and develops in a manner totally independent of
vibration.
Perhaps we can here quote one or two examples which may give us a lead.
To measure the length of a body instead of applying to it a yard-wand, one
might listen to its sound; for the pitch of the sound given by two cords
allows us to deduce their difference of length, and even the absolute length
of each. The chemical composition of a body might be noted by its electric
resistance and the latter verified by the telephone; that is to say, by the ear.

Or, to take a more subtle example. We might make calculations with sounds
of which we have studied the harmonic relations as we do nowadays with
figures. A sum in rule of three might even be solved sonorously; for, given
three sounds, the ear can find a fourth which should have the same relation
to the third as the second to the first. Every musical ear performs this
operation easily; now, this fourth sound, what else is it but the fourth term
in a rule of three? And by taking into consideration the number of its
vibrations a numerical solution would be found to the problem. This novel
form of calculating machine might serve to fix the price of woollen stuffs,
to calculate brokerages and percentages, and the solution would be obtained
without the aid of figures, without calculation, without visualisation, and by
the ear alone.
By following up this idea, also, we might go a little further. We might arrive
at the conviction that our present science is human, petty, and contingent;
that it is closely linked with the structure of our sensory organs; that this
structure results from the evolution which fashioned these organs; that this
evolution has been an accident of history; that in the future it may be
different; and that, consequently, by the side or in the stead of our modern
science, the work of our eyes and hands—and also of our words—there
might have been constituted, there may still be constituted, sciences entirely
and extraordinarily new—auditory, olfactory, and gustatory sciences, and
even others derived from other kinds of sensations which we can neither
foresee nor conceive because they are not, for the moment, differentiated in
us. Outside the matter we know, a very special matter fashioned of vision
and touch, there may exist other matter with totally different properties.
But let us bring our dream to an end. The interest of our discussion does not
lie in the hypothetical substitution of hearing or any other sense for sight. It
lies in the complete suppression of all explanation of the noumenal object in
terms borrowed from the language of sensation. And that is our last word.
We must, by setting aside the mechanical theory, free ourselves from a too
narrow conception of the constitution of matter. And this liberation will be
to us a great advantage which we shall soon reap. We shall avoid the error
of believing that mechanics is the only real thing and that all that cannot be
explained by mechanics must be incomprehensible. We shall then gain
more liberty of mind for understanding what the union of the soul with the
body[9] may be.

FOOTNOTES:
[8] I would draw attention to a recent volume by GUSTAVE LE BON, on Evolution
de la Matière, a work full of original and bold ideas.
[9] See [Note 1] on p. 3 .—ED.

CHAPTER IV
ANSWERS TO SOME OBJECTIONS, AND SUMMARY
I have set forth the foregoing ideas by taking the road which to me seemed
the best. On reflection it has occurred to me that my manner of exposition
and demonstration may be criticised much more than my conclusion. Now,
as it is the conclusion alone which here is of importance, it is expedient not
to make it responsible for the arguments by which I have supported it.
These arguments resolve themselves into the attestation that between
objects and our consciousness there exists an intermediary, our nervous
system. We have even established that the existence of this intermediary is
directly proved by observation, and from this I have concluded that we do
not directly perceive the object itself but a tertium quid, which is our
sensations.
Several objections to this might be made. Let us enumerate them.
1. It is not inconceivable that objects may act directly on our consciousness
without taking the intermediary of our nervous system. Some authors, the
spiritualists notably, believe in the possibility of disembodied souls, and
they admit by implication that these souls remain in communication with
the terrestrial world, witness our actions, and hear our speech. Since they no
longer have organs of sense, we must suppose that these wandering souls, if
they exist, can directly perceive material objects. It is evident that such
hypotheses have, up till now, nothing scientific in them, and that the
demonstrations of them which are given raise a feeling of scepticism more
than anything else. Nevertheless, we have not the right to exclude, by a
priori argument, the possibility of this category of phenomena.
2. Several German authors have maintained in recent years, that if the
nervous system intervenes in the perception of external objects, it is a
faithful intermediary which should not work any change on those physical
actions which it gathers from outside to transmit to our consciousness.
From this, point of view colour would exist as colour, outside our eyes,

sound would exist as sound, and in a general way there would not be, in
matter, any mysterious property left, since we should perceive matter as it
is. This is a very unexpected interpretation, by which men of science have
come to acknowledge the correctness of the common belief: they
rehabilitate an opinion which philosophers have till now turned to ridicule,
under the name of naïve realism. All which proves that the naïveté of some
may be the excessive refinement of others.
To establish scientifically this opinion they batter down the theory of the
specific energy of the nerves. I have recalled in a previous page[10] of what
this theory consists. I have shown that if, by mechanical or electrical means,
our different sensory nerves are excited, notwithstanding the identity of the
excitant, a different sensation is provoked in each case—light when the
optic nerve is stimulated, sound when the acoustic, and so on. It is now
answered to this argument based on fact that the nature of these excitants
must be complex. It is not impossible, it is thought, that the electric force
contains within itself both luminous and sonorous actions; it is not
impossible that a mechanical excitement should change the electric state of
the nerve affected, and that, consequently, these subsidiary effects explain
how one and the same agent may, according to the nerves employed,
produce different effects.
3. After the spiritualists and the experimentalists, let us take the
metaphysicians. Among them one has always met with the most varying
specimens of opinions and with arguments for and against all possible
theories.
Thus it is, for example, with the external perception. Some have supposed it
indirect, others, on the contrary, that it acts directly on the object. Those
who uphold the direct theory are inspired by Berkeley, who asserts that the
sensitive qualities of the body have no existence but in our own minds, and
consist really in representative ideas. This doctrine is expressly based on
this argument—that thought differs too much in nature from matter for one
to be able to suppose any link between these two substances. In this
particular, some authors often make an assertion without endeavouring to
prove it. They are satisfied with attesting, or even with supposing, that mind
can have no consciousness of anything but its own states. Other
philosophers, as I have said, maintain that "things which have a real

existence are the very things we perceive." It is Thomas Reid who has
upheld, in some passages of his writings at all events, the theory of
instantaneous perception, or intuition. It has also been defended by
Hamilton in a more explicit manner.[11] It has been taken up again in recent
years, by a profound and subtle philosopher, M. Bergson, who, unable to
admit that the nervous system is a substratum of knowledge and serves us as
a percipient, takes it to be solely a motor organ, and urges that the sensory
parts of the system—that is to say, the centripetal, optic, acoustic, &c.,
nerves—do not call forth, when excited, any kind of sensation, their sole
purpose being to convey disturbances from periphery to periphery, or, say,
from external objects to the muscles of the body. This hypothesis, surely a
little difficult to comprehend, places, if I mistake not, the mind, as a power
of perception and representation, within the interval comprised between the
external object and the body, so that the mind is in direct contact with
external objects and knows them as they are.
It will be noticed that these three interpretations, the spiritualistic, the
experimental, and the metaphysical, are in formal opposition with that
which I have set forth earlier in these pages. They deny the supposition that
the nervous system serves us as an intermediary with nature, and that it
transforms nature before bringing it to our consciousness. And it might
seem that by contradicting my fundamental proposition, those three new
hypotheses must lead to a totally different conclusion.
Now, this is not so at all. The conclusion I have enunciated remains entirely
sound, notwithstanding this change in the starting point, and for the
following reason. It is easy to see that we cannot represent to ourselves the
inner structure of matter by using all our sensations without distinction,
because it is impossible to bring all these sensations within one single and
identical synthetic construction: for this they are too dissimilar. Thus, we
should try in vain to unite in any kind of scheme a movement of molecules
and an odour; these elements are so heterogeneous that there is no way of
joining them together and combining them.
The physicists have more or less consciously perceived this, and, not being
able to overcome by a frontal attack the difficulty created by the
heterogeneity of our sensations, they have turned its flank. The ingenious
artifice they have devised consists in retaining only some of these

sensations, and in rejecting the remainder; the first being considered as
really representing the essence of matter, and the latter as the effects of the
former on our organs of sense; the first being reputed to be true, we may
say, and the second being reputed false—that is subjective, that is not
representing the X of matter.[12] I have refuted this argument by showing
that all our sensations without exception are subjective and equally false in
regard to the X of matter, and that no one of them, consequently, has any
claim to explain the others.
Now, by a new interpretation; we are taught that all sensations are equally
true, and that all faithfully represent the great X. If they be all equally true,
it is absolutely the same as if they were all false; no one sensation can have
any privilege over the others, none can be truer than the others, none can be
capable of explaining the others, none can usurp to itself the sole right of
representing the essence of matter; and we thus find ourselves, in this case,
as in the preceding, in presence of the insurmountable difficulty of creating
a synthesis with heterogeneous elements.
All that has been said above is summed up in the following points:—
1. Of the external world, we only know our sensations. All the physical
properties of matter resolve themselves for us into sensations, present, past,
or possible. We may not say that it is by the intermediary, by the means of
sensation, that we know these properties, for that would mean that the
properties are distinct from the sensations. Objects are to us in reality only
aggregates of sensations.
2. The sensations belong to the different organs of the senses—sight,
hearing, touch, the muscular sense, &c. Whatever be the sense affected, one
sensation has the same rights as the others, from the point of view of the
cognition of external objects. It is impossible to distinguish them into
subjective and objective, by giving to this distinction the meaning that
certain sensations represent objects as they are, while certain others simply
represent our manner of feeling. This is an illegitimate distinction, since all
sensations have the same physiological condition, the excitement of a
sensory nerve, and result from the properties of this nerve when stimulated.
3. Consequently, it is impossible for us to form a conception of matter in
terms of movement, and to explain by the modalities of movement the

properties of bodies; for this theory amounts to giving to certain sensations,
especially those of the muscular sense, the hegemony over the others. We
cannot explain, we have not the right to explain, one sensation by another,
and the mechanical theory of matter has simply the value of a symbol.

FOOTNOTES:
[10] See p. 22, sup.—ED.
[11] See J. S. MILL'S Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy, chap. x. p.
176, et. seq.
[12] See p. 18, sup.—ED.

BOOK II

THE DEFINITION OF MIND

CHAPTER I
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COGNITION[13] AND ITS
OBJECT
After having thus studied matter and reduced it to sensations, we shall apply
the same method of analysis to mind, and inquire whether mind possesses
any characteristic which allows it to be distinguished from matter.
Before going any further, let me clear up an ambiguity. All the first part of
this work has been devoted to the study of what is known to us in and by
sensation; and I have taken upon myself, without advancing any kind of
justifying reason, to call that which is known to us, by this method, by the
name of matter, thus losing sight of the fact that matter only exists by
contra-distinction and opposition to mind, and that if mind did not exist,
neither would matter. I have thus appeared to prejudge the question to be
resolved.
The whole of this terminology must now be considered as having simply a
conventional value, and must be set aside for the present. These are the
precise terms in which this question presents itself to my mind. A part of
the knowable consists in sensations. We must, therefore, without troubling
to style this aggregate of sensations matter rather than mind, make an
analysis of the phenomena known by the name of mind, and see whether
they differ from the preceding ones. Let us, therefore, make an inventory of
mind. By the process of enumeration, we find quoted as psychological
phenomena, the sensations, the perceptions, the ideas, the recollections, the
reasonings, the emotions, the desires, the imaginations, and the acts of
attention and of will. These appear to be, at the first glance, the elements of
mind; but, on reflection, one perceives that these elements belong to two
distinct categories, of which it is easy to recognise the duality, although, in
fact and in reality, these two elements are constantly combined. The first of
these elements may receive the generic name of objects of cognition, or
objects known, and the second that of acts of cognition.

Here are a few examples of concrete facts, which only require a rapid
analysis to make their double nature plain. In a sensation which we feel are
two things: a particular state, or an object which one knows, and the act of
knowing it, of feeling it, of taking cognisance of it; in other words, every
sensation comprises an impression and a cognition. In a recollection there
is, in like manner, a certain image of the past and the fact consisting in the
taking cognisance of this image. It is, in other terms, the distinction between
the intelligence and the object. Similarly, all reasoning has an object; there
must be matter on which to reason, whether this matter be supplied by the
facts or the ideas. Again, a desire, a volition, an act of reflection, has need
of a point of application. One does not will in the air, one wills something;
one does not reflect in the void, one reflects over a fact or over some
difficulty.
We may then provisionally distinguish in an inventory of the mind a
something which is perceived, understood, desired, or willed, and, beyond
that, the fact of perceiving, of understanding, or desiring, or of willing.
To illustrate this distinction by an example, I shall say that an analogous
separation can be effected in an act of vision, by showing that the act of
vision, which is a concrete operation, comprises two distinct elements: the
object seen and the eye which sees. But this is, of course, only a rough
comparison, of which we shall soon see the imperfections when we are
further advanced in the study of the question.
To this activity which exists and manifests itself in the facts of feeling,
perceiving, &c., we can give a name in order to identify and recognise it:
we will call it the consciousness[14] (la conscience), and we will call object
everything which is not the act of consciousness.
After this preliminary distinction, to which we shall often refer, we will go
over the principal manifestations of the mind, and we will first study the
objects of cognition, reserving for another chapter the study of the acts of
cognition—that is to say, of consciousness. We will thus examine
successively sensation, idea, emotion, and will.
It has been often maintained that the peculiar property of mind is to
perceive sensations. It has also been said that thought—that is, the property
of representing to one's self that which does not exist—distinguishes mind

from matter. Lastly, it has not failed to be affirmed that one thing which the
mind brings into the material world is its power of emotion; and moralists,
choosing somewhat arbitrarily among certain emotions, have said that the
mind is the creator of goodness. We will endeavour to analyse these
different affirmations.

FOOTNOTES:
[13] See [Note 3], sup. on p. 15.—ED.
[14] The word "conscience" is one of those which has been used in the greatest
number of different meanings. Let it be, at least, understood that I use it here in
an intellectual and not a moral sense. I do not attach to the conscience the idea of
a moral approbation or disapprobation, of a duty, of a remorse. The best example
to illustrate conscience has, perhaps, been formed by LADD. It is the contrast
between a person awake and sleeping a dreamless sleep. The first has
consciousness of a number of things; the latter has consciousness of nothing. Let
me now add that we distinguish from consciousness that multitude of things of
which one has consciousness of. Of these we make the object of consciousness.
[Conscience has throughout been rendered "consciousness."—ED.]

CHAPTER II
DEFINITION OF SENSATION
When making the analysis of matter we impliedly admitted two
propositions: first, that sensation is the tertium quid which is interposed
between the excitant of our sensory nerves and ourselves; secondly, that the
aggregate of our sensations is all we can know of the outer world, so that it
is correct to define this last as the collection of our present, past, and
possible sensations. It is not claimed that the outer world is nothing else
than this, but it is claimed with good reason that the outer world is nothing
else to us.
It would be possible to draw from the above considerations a clear
definition of sensation, and especially it would be possible to decide
henceforth from the foregoing whether sensation is a physical or a mental
phenomenon, and whether it belongs to matter or to mind. This is the
important point, the one which we now state, and which we will endeavour
to resolve. To make the question clearer, we will begin it afresh, as if it
were new, and as if the facts hitherto analysed did not already prejudge the
solution. Let us begin by giving a definition of sensation from the point of
view of experimental psychology.
Sensation, then, is the phenomenon which is produced and which one
experiences when an excitant has just acted on one of our organs of sense.
This phenomenon is therefore composed of two parts: an action exercised
from outside by some body or other on our nervous substance; and, then,
the fact of feeling this action.
This fact of feeling, this state of consciousness, is necessary to constitute
sensation; when it does not exist, it is preferable to give the phenomenon
another name, otherwise the fault is committed of mixing up separate facts.
Physiologists have, on this point, some faults of terminology with which to
reproach themselves: for they have employed the word sensibility with too
little of the critical spirit. Sensibility, being capacity for sensation,

presupposes, like sensation itself, consciousness. It has, therefore, been
wrong, in physiology, to speak of the sensibility of the tissues and organs,
which, like the vegetable tissues or the animal organs of vegetative life,
properly speaking, feel nothing, but react by rapid or slow movements to
the excitements they are made to receive. Reaction, by a movement or any
kind of modification, to an excitement, does not constitute a sensation
unless consciousness is joined with it, and, consequently, it would be wiser
to give unfelt excitements and reactions the name of excitability.
The clearest examples of sensation are furnished by the study of man, and
are taken from cases where we perceive an external object. The object
produces upon us an action, and this action is felt; only, in such cases, the
fact of sensation comprises but a very small part of the event. It only
corresponds, by definition, to the actual action of the object. Analysis after
analysis has shown that we constantly perceive far beyond this actual action
of objects. Our mind, as we say, outruns our senses. To our sensations,
images come to attach themselves which result from sensations anteriorly
felt in analogous circumstances. These images produce in us an illusion,
and we take them for sensations, so that we think we perceive something
which is but a remembrance or an idea; the reason being that our mind
cannot remain in action in the presence of a sensation, but unceasingly
labours to throw light upon it, to sound it, and to arrive at its meaning, and
consequently alters it by adding to it. This addition is so constant, so
unavoidable, that the existence of an isolated sensation which should be
perceived without the attachment of images, without modification or
interpretation, is well-nigh unrealisable in the consciousness of an adult. It
is a myth.
Let us, however, imagine this isolation to be possible, and that we have
before us a sensation free from any other element. What is this sensation?
Does it belong to the domain of physical or of moral things? Is it a state of
matter or of mind?
I can neither doubt nor dispute that sensation is, in part, a psychological
phenomenon, since I have admitted, by the very definition I have given of
it, that sensation implies consciousness. We must, therefore, acknowledge
those who define it as a state of consciousness to be right, but it would be
more correct to call it the consciousness of a state, and it is with regard to

the nature of this state that the question presents itself. It is only this state
which we will now take into consideration. It is understood that sensation
contains both an impression and a cognition. Let us leave till later the study
of the act of cognition, and deal with the impression. Is this impression now
of a physical or a mental nature? Both the two opposing opinions have been
upheld. In this there is nothing astonishing, for in metaphysics one finds the
expression of every possible opinion. But a large, an immense majority of
philosophers has declared in favour of the psychological nature of the
impression. Without even making the above distinction between the
impression and the act of cognition, it has been admitted that the entire
sensation, taken en bloc, is a psychological phenomenon, a modification of
our consciousness and a peculiar state of our minds. Descartes has even
employed this very explicit formula: "The objects we perceive are within
our understanding." It is curious to see how little trouble authors take to
demonstrate this opinion; they declare it to be self-evident, which is a
convenient way of avoiding all proof. John Stuart Mill has no hesitation in
affirming that: "The mind, in perceiving external objects, can only take
notice of its own conditions." And Renouvier expresses the same arbitrary
assertion with greater obscurity when he writes: "The monad is constituted
by this relation: the connection of the subject with the object within the
subject."[15] In other words, it is laid down as an uncontrovertible principle
that "the mental can only enter into direct relations with the mental." That is
what may be called "the principle of Idealism."
This principle seems to me very disputable, and it is to me an astonishing
thing that the most resolute of sceptics—Hume, for example—should have
accepted it without hesitation. I shall first enunciate my personal opinion,
then make known another which only differs from mine by a difference of
words, and finally I will discuss a third opinion, which seems to me
radically wrong.
My personal opinion is that sensation is of a mixed nature. It is psychical in
so far as it implies an act of consciousness, and physical otherwise. The
impression on which the act of cognition operates, that impression which is
directly produced by the excitant of the nervous system, seems to me,
without any doubt, to be of an entirely physical nature. This opinion, which
I make mine own, has only been upheld by very few philosophers—

Thomas Reid perhaps, and William Hamilton for certain; but neither has
perceived its deep-lying consequences.
What are the arguments on which I rely? They are of different orders, and
are arguments of fact and arguments of logic. I shall first appeal to the
natural conviction of those who have never ventured into metaphysics. So
long as no endeavour has been made to demonstrate the contrary to them,
they believe, with a natural and naïve belief, that matter is that which is
seen, touched and felt, and that, consequently, matter and our senses are
confounded. They would be greatly astonished to be informed that when we
appear to perceive the outer world, we simply perceive our ideas; that when
we take the train for Lyons we enter into one state of consciousness in order
to attain another state of consciousness.
Now, the adherents of this natural and naïve opinion have, as they say in the
law, the right of possession (possession d'état); they are not plaintiffs but
defendants; it is not for them to prove they are in the right, it has to be
proved against them that they are in the wrong. Until this proof is
forthcoming they have a presumption in their favour.
Are we here making use of the argument of common opinion of mankind,
of which ancient philosophy made so evident an abuse? Yes, and no. Yes,
for we here adopt the general opinion. No, for we only adopt it till the
contrary be proved. But who can exhibit this proof to the contrary? On a
close examination of the question, it will be perceived that sensation, taken
as an object of cognition, becomes confused with the properties of physical
nature, and is identified with them, both by its mode of apparition and by its
content. By its mode of apparition, sensation holds itself out as independent
of us, for it is at every instant an unexpected revelation, a source of fresh
cognitions, and it offers a development which takes place without and in
spite of our will; while its laws of co-existence and of succession declare to
us the order and march of the material universe. Besides, by its content,
sensation is confounded with matter. When a philosopher seeks to represent
to himself the properties of a material object,—of a brain, for example—in
order to contrast them with the properties of a psychical activity, it is the
properties of sensation that he describes as material; and, in fact, it is by
sensation, and sensation alone, that we know these properties. Sensation is
so little distinct from them that it is an error to consider it as a means, a

process, an instrument for the knowledge of matter. All that we know of
matter is not known in or by sensation, but constitutes sensation itself; it is
not by the aid of sensation that we know colour; colour is a sensation, and
the same may be said of form, resistance, and the whole series of the
properties of matter. They are only our sensations clothed with external
bodies. It is therefore absolutely legitimate to consider a part of our
sensations, the object part, as being of physical nature. This is the opinion
to which I adhere.
We come to the second opinion we have formulated. It is, in appearance at
least, very different from the first. Its supporters agree that the entire
sensation, taken en bloc and unanalysed, is to be termed a psychological
phenomenon. In this case, the act of consciousness, included in the
sensation, continues to represent a psychical element. They suppose,
besides, that the object on which this act operates is psychical; and finally,
they suppose that this object or this impression was provoked in us by a
physical reality which is kept in concealment, which we do not perceive,
and which remains unknowable.
This opinion is nowise absurd in itself: but let us examine its consequences.
If we admit this thesis, that sensations are manifestations of mind which,
although provoked by material causes, are of a purely mental nature, we are
forced to the conclusion that we know none of the properties of material
bodies, since we do not enter into relations with these bodies. The object we
apprehend by perception is, according to this hypothesis, solely mental. To
draw therefrom any notion on material objects, it would have to be
supposed that, by some mysterious action, the mental which we know
resembles the physical which we do not know, that it retains the reflection
of it, or even that it allows its colour and form to pass, like a transparent
pellicle applied on the contour of bodies. Here are hypotheses very odd in
their realism. Unless we accept them, how is it comprehensible that we can
know anything whatever of physical nature? We should be forced to
acknowledge, following the example of several philosophers, that the
perception of the physical is an illusion.
As a compensation, that which this system takes from matter it attributes to
mind, which turns our familiar conceptions upside down. The qualities of
sensation detached from matter will, when applied to mind, change its

physiognomy. There are sensations of extent, weight, space, and form. If
these sensations are turned into psychical events, we shall have to grant to
these events, to these manifestations of the mind, the properties of extent, of
weight, of form. We shall have to say that mind is a resisting thing, and that
it has colour.
It may be said that this fantasy of language is not very serious. So be it. But
then what remains of the dualism of mind and matter? It is at least
singularly compromised. We may continue to suppose that matter exists,
and even that it is matter which provokes in our mind those events which
we call our sensations; but we cannot know if by its nature, its essence, this
matter differs from that of mind, since we shall be ignorant of all its
properties. Our ignorance on this point will be so complete that we shall not
even be able to know whether any state which we call mental may not be
physical. The distinction between physical and mental will have lost its
raison d'être, since the existence of the physical is necessary to give a
meaning to the existence of the mental. We are brought, whether we like it
or not, to an experimental monism, which is neither psychical nor physical;
panpsychism and panmaterialism will have the same meaning.[16]
But this monism can be only transitory, for it is more in the words than in
the thing itself. It is brought about by the terminology adopted, by the
resolution to call mental all the phenomena that it is possible to know.
Luckily, our speculations are not at the mercy of such trifling details as the
details of language. Whatever names may be given to this or that, it will
remain none the less true that nature will continue to present to us a contrast
between phenomena which are flints, pieces of iron, clods of earth, brains—
and some other phenomena which we call states of consciousness.
Whatever be the value of this dualism, it will have to be discussed even in
the hypothesis of panpsychism.[17] As for myself, I shall also continue to
make a distinction between what I have called objects of cognition and acts
of cognition, because this is the most general distinction that can be traced
in the immense field of our cognitions. There is no other which succeeds, to
the same degree, in dividing this field into two, moreover, this distinction is
derived directly from observation, and does not depend for its validity on
the physical or mental nature of the objects. Here is, then, a duality, and this
duality, even when it does not bear the names physical and moral, should

necessarily play the same part, since it corresponds to the same distinction
of fact.
In the end, nothing will be changed, and this second opinion must gradually
merge into the one first stated by me, and of which I take the responsibility.
We may, therefore, put it out of consideration.
I have mentioned a third opinion, stating that it appeared to me to be
radically false. Outwardly it is the same as the last; looked at superficially it
seems even confused with it; but, in reality it is of a totally different nature.
It supposes that sensation is an entirely psychological phenomenon. Then,
having laid down this thesis, it undertakes to demonstrate it by asserting
that sensation differs from the physical fact, which amounts to supposing
that we cannot know anything but sensations, and that physical facts are
known to us directly and by another channel. This is where the
contradiction comes in. It is so apparent that one wonders how it has been
overlooked by so many excellent minds. In order to remove it, it will be
sufficient to recollect that we do not know anything other than sensations; it
is therefore impossible to make any distinction between the physical object
and the object of cognition contained in every sensation. The line of
demarcation between the physical and the moral cannot pass this way, since
it would separate facts which are identical.
We can, therefore, only deplore the error of all those who, to express the
difference between mind and matter, have sought a contrast between
sensation and physical facts. Physiologists, with hardly an exception, have
fallen into this error; when contemplating in imagination the material
working of the brain, they have thought that between the movement of
cerebral matter and sensation there was a gulf fixed. The comparison, to
have been correct, required to be presented in quite another way. A parallel,
for instance, should have been drawn between a certain cerebral movement
and the act of consciousness, and there should have been said: "The cerebral
motion is the physical phenomenon, the act of consciousness the psychical."
But this distinction has not been made. It is sensation en bloc which is
compared to the cerebral movement, as witness a few passages I will quote
as a matter of curiosity, which are borrowed from philosophers and,
especially, from physiologists.

While philosophers take as a principle of idealism, that the mental can only
know the mental, physiologists take, as a like principle, the heterogeneity
existing, or supposed to exist, between the nerve impression and the
sensation. "However much we may follow the excitement through the
whole length of the nerve," writes Lotze,[18] "or cause it to change its form
a thousand times and to metamorphose itself into more and more delicate
and subtle movements, we shall never succeed in showing that a movement
thus produced can, by its very nature, cease to exist as movement and be
reborn in the shape of sensation...." It will be seen that it is on the
opposition between molecular movement and sensation, that Lotze insists.
In like manner Ferrier: "But how is it that the molecular modifications in
the cerebral cells coincide with the modifications of the consciousness;
how, for instance, do luminous vibrations falling upon the retina excite the
modification of consciousness called visual sensation? These are problems
we cannot solve. We may succeed in determining the exact nature of the
molecular changes which take place in the cerebral cells when a sensation is
felt, but this will not bring us an inch nearer to the explanation of the
fundamental nature of sensation." Finally, Du Bois Reymond, in his famous
discussion in 1880, on the seven enigmas of the world, speaks somewhat as
follows: "The astronomical knowledge of the encephalon, that is, the most
intimate to which we can aspire, only reveals to us matter in motion. But no
arrangement nor motion of material particles can act as a bridge by which
we can cross over into the domain of intelligence.... What imaginable link is
there between certain movements of certain molecules in my brain, on the
one hand, and on the other hand primitive, undefinable, undeniable facts
such as: I have the sensation of softness, I smell the odour of a rose, I hear
the sound of an organ, I see a red colour, &c...."
These three quotations show very conclusively that their authors thought
they could establish the heterogeneity of the two phenomena by opposing
matter to sensation. It must be recognised that they have fallen into a
singular error; for matter, whatever it may be, is for us nothing but
sensation; matter in motion, I have often repeated, is only a quite special
kind of sensation; the organic matter of the brain, with its whirling
movements of atoms, is only sensation. Consequently, to oppose the
molecular changes in the brain to the sensation of red, blue, green, or to an
undefined sensation of any sort, is not crossing a gulf, and bringing together

things which cannot be compared, it is simply comparing one sensation to
another sensation.
There is evidently something equivocal in all this; and I pointed this out
when outlining and discussing the different theories of matter. It consists in
taking from among the whole body of sensations certain of them which are
considered to be special, and which are then invested with the privilege of
being more important than the rest and the causes of all the others. This is
about as illegitimate as to choose among men a few individuals to whom is
attributed the privilege of commanding others by divine right. These
privileged sensations which belong to the sight, the touch, and the muscular
sense, and which are of large extent, are indeed extensive. They have been
unduly considered as objective and as representing matter because they are
better known and measurable, while the other sensations, the unextensive
sensations of the other senses, are considered as subjective for the reasons
that they are less known and less measurable: and they are therefore looked
on as connected with our sensibility, our Ego, and are used to form the
moral world.
We cannot subscribe to this way of establishing the contrast between matter
and thought, since it is simply a contrast between two categories of
sensations, and I have already asserted that the partitioning-out of
sensations into two groups having different objective values, is arbitrary.

FOOTNOTES:
[15] CH. RENOUVIER et L. PRAT, La Nouvelle Monadologie, p. 148.
[16] An American author, MORTON PRINCE, lately remarked this: Philosophical
Review, July 1904, p. 450.
[17] This FLOURNOY recently has shown very wittily. See in Arch. de Psychol.,
Nov. 1904, his article on Panpsychism.
[18] This extract, together with the two subsequent, are borrowed from an
excellent lecture by FLOURNOY, on Métaphysique et Physiologie. Georg: Geneva,
1890.

CHAPTER III
DEFINITION OF THE IMAGE
Going on with our inventory, after sensations come images, ideas, and
concepts; in fact, quite a collection of phenomena, which, are generally
considered as essentially psychological.
So long as one does not carefully analyse the value of ideas, one remains
under the impression that ideas form a world apart, which is sharply
distinguished from the physical world, and behaves towards it as an
antithesis. For is not conception the contrary of perception? and is not the
ideal in opposition to reality?
Thoughts have some characteristics of fancy, of freedom, even of unreality,
which are wanting to the prosaicness of heavy material things. Thoughts
sport with the relations of time and space; they fly in a moment across the
gulf between the most distant objects; they travel back up the course of
time; they bring near to us events centuries away; they conceive objects
which are unreal; they imagine combinations which upset all physical laws,
and, further, these conceptions remain invisible to others as well as to
ourselves. They are outside the grip of reality, and constitute a world which
becomes, for any one with the smallest imagination, as great and as
important as the world called real. One may call in evidence the poets,
novelists, artists, and the dreamers of all kinds. When life becomes too hard
for us, we fly to the ideal world, there to seek forgetfulness or
compensation.
It is, therefore, easy to understand, that it should have been proposed to
carry into ideation the dichotomy between the physical and the moral.
Many excellent authors have made the domain of the mind begin in the
ideal. Matter is that which does not think. Descartes, in his Discours de la
Méthode (4th part), remarking that he may pretend "not to have a body, and
that there is no world or place in which he exists, but that he cannot pretend
that he does not think," concludes by saying that the mind is "a substance,

all whose essence or nature is merely to think, and which has no need of
either place or any other material thing, in order to exist;" in short, that "the
soul is absolutely distinct from the body."[19]
Let us, then, examine in what measure this separation between perception
and ideation can be legitimately established. If we accept this separation,
we must abandon the distinction I proposed between acts and objects of
cognition, or, at least, admit that this distinction does not correspond to that
between the physical and the moral, since thoughts, images, recollections,
and even the most abstract conceptions, all constitute, in a certain sense,
objects of cognition. They are phenomena which, when analysed, are
clearly composed of two parts, an object and a cognition. Their logical
composition is, indeed, that of an external perception, and there is in
ideation exactly the same duality as in sensation. Consequently, if we
maintain the above distinction as a principle of classification for all
knowable phenomena, we shall be obliged to assign the same position to
ideas as to sensations.
The principal difference we notice between sensation and idea is, it would
seem, the character of unreality in the last named; but this opposition has
not the significance we imagine. Our mental vision only assumes this
wholly special character of unreality under conditions in which it is unable
to harmonise with the real vision. Taine has well described the phases of the
reduction of the image by sensation: it is at the moment when it receives the
shock of an image which contradicts it, that the image appears as illusory.
[20] Let us suppose that we are sitting down dreaming and watching the
passing by of our images. If, at this moment, a sudden noise calls us back to
reality, the whole of our mental phantasmagoria disappears as if by the
wave of a magic wand, and it is by thus vanishing that the image shows its
falsity. It is false because it does not accord with the present reality.
But, when we do not notice a disagreement between these two modes of
cognition, both alike give us the impression of reality. If I evoke a
reminiscence and dwell attentively on the details, I have the impression that
I am in face of the reality itself. "I feel as if I were there still," is a common
saying; and, among the recollections I evoke, there are some which give me
the same certitude as the perception of the moment. Certain witnesses

would write their depositions with their blood. One does not see this every
day; but still one does see it.
Further, there are thousands of circumstances where the ideation is neither
in conflict with the perception nor isolated from it, but in logical continuity
with it. This continuity must even be considered as the normal condition.
We think in the direction of that which we perceive. The image seems to
prepare the adaptation of the individual to his surroundings; it creates the
foresight, the preparation of the means, and, in a word, everything which
constitutes for us a final cause. Now, it is very necessary that the image
appear real to be usefully the substitute of the sensation past or to come.
Let us establish one thing more. Acting as a substitute, the image not only
appears as real as the sensation, it appears to be of the same nature; and the
proof is that they are confounded one with the other, and that those who are
not warned of the fact take one for the other. Every time a body is
perceived, as I previously explained, there are images which affix
themselves to the sensation unnoticed. We think we perceive when we are
really remembering or imagining. This addition of the image to the
sensation is not a petty and insignificant accessory; it forms the major part,
perhaps nine-tenths, of perception. Hence arise the illusions of the senses,
which are the result, not of sensations but of ideas. From this also comes the
difficulty of knowing exactly what, under certain circumstances, is
observation or perception, where the fact perceived ends, and where
conjecture begins. Once acquainted with all these possibilities of errors,
how can we suppose a radical separation between the sensation and the
image?
Examined more closely, images appear to us to be divisible into as many
kinds as sensations: visual images correspond to visual sensations, tactile to
tactile, and so on with all the senses.
That which we experience in the form of sensation, we can experience over
again in the form of image, and the repetition, generally weaker in intensity
and poorer in details, may, under certain favourable circumstances, acquire
an exceptional intensity, and even equal reality: as is shown by
hallucinations. Here, certainly, are very sound reasons for acknowledging
that the images which are at the bottom of our thoughts, and form the object

of them, are the repetition, the modification, the transposition, the analysis
or the synthesis of sensations experienced in the past, and possessing, in
consequence, all the characteristics of bodily states. I believe that there is
neither more nor less spirituality in the idea than in the sensation. That
which forms its spirituality is the implied act of cognition; but its object is
material.
I foresee a final objection: I shall be told that even when the unreality of the
image is not the rule, and appears only under certain circumstances, it
nevertheless exists. This is an important fact. It has been argued from the
unreality of dreams and hallucinations in which we give a body to our
ideas, that we do not in reality perceive external bodies, but simply
psychical states and modifications of our souls. If our ideas consist—
according to the hypothesis I uphold—in physical impressions which are
felt, we shall be told that these particular impressions must participate in the
nature of everything physical; that they are real, and always real; that they
cannot be unreal, fictitious, and mendacious, and that, consequently, the
fictitious character of ideation becomes inexplicable.
Two words of answer are necessary to this curious argument, which is
nothing less than an effort to define the mental by the unreal, and to
suppose that an appearance cannot be physical. No doubt, we say, every
image, fantastical as it may seem as signification, is real in a certain sense,
since it is the perception of a physical impression; but this physical nature
of images does not prevent our making a distinction between true and false
images. To take an analogous example: we are given a sheet of proofs to
correct, we delete certain redundant letters, and, although they are printed
with the same type as the other letters, we have the right to say they are
false. Again, in a musical air, we may hear a false note, though it is as real
as the others, since it has been played. This distinction between reality and
truth ought to be likewise applied to mental images. All are real, but some
are false. They are false when they do not accord with the whole reality;
they are true when they agree; and every image is partly false because,
being an image, it does not wholly accord with the actual perceptions. It
creates a belief in a perception which does not occur; and by developing
these ideas we could easily demonstrate how many degrees of falsehood
there are.

Physiologically, we may very easily reconcile the falsity of the image with
the physical character of the impression on which it is based. The image
results from a partial cerebral excitement, which sensation results from an
excitement which also acts upon the peripheral sensory nerves, and
corresponds to an external object—an excitant which the image does not
possess. This difference explains how it is that the image, while resulting
from a physical impression, may yet be in a great number of cases declared
false—that is to say, may be recognised as in contradiction to the
perceptions.
To other minds, perhaps, metaphysical reasoning will be more satisfactory.
For those, we propose to make a distinction between two notions, Existence
or Reality, on the one hand, and Truth, on the other.
Existence or Reality is that of which we have an immediate apprehension.
This apprehension occurs in several ways. In perception, in the first place. I
perceive the reality of my body, of a table, the sky, the earth, in proportion
to my perception of them. They exist, for if they did not, I could not
perceive them. Another way of understanding reality is conception or
thought. However much I may represent a thing to myself as imaginary, it
nevertheless exists in a certain manner, since I can represent it to myself. I
therefore, in this case, say that it is real or it exists. It is of course
understood, that in these definitions I am going against the ordinary
acceptation of the terms; I am taking the liberty of proposing new
meanings. This reality is, then, perceived in one case and conceived in the
other. Perceptibility or conceivability are, then, the two forms which reality
may assume. But reality is not synonymous with truth; notwithstanding the
custom to the contrary, we may well introduce a difference between these
two terms. Reality is that which is perceived or conceived; truth is that
which accords with the whole of our knowledge. Reality is a function of the
senses or of ideation; truth is a function of reasoning or of the reason.
For cognition to be complete, it requires the aid of all these functions. And,
in fact, what does conception by itself give? It allows us to see if a thing is
capable of representation. This is not a common-place thing, I will observe
in passing; for many things we name are not capable of representation, and
there is often a criticism to be made; we think we are representing, and we
are not. What is capable of representation exists as a representation, but is it

true? Some philosophers have imagined so, but they are mistaken; what we
succeed in conceiving is alone possible.
Let us now take the Perceptible. Is what one perceives true? Yes, in most
cases it is so in fact; but an isolated perception may be false, and disturbed
by illusions of all kinds. It is all very well to say, "I see, I touch." There is
no certainty through the senses alone in many circumstances that the truth
has been grasped. If I am shown the spirit of a person I know to be dead, I
shall not, notwithstanding the testimony of my eyes, believe it to be true,
for this apparition would upset all my system of cognitions.
Truth is that which, being deemed conceivable, and being really perceived,
has also the quality of finding its place, its relation, and its confirmation in
the whole mass of cognitions previously acquired.
These distinctions,[21] if developed, would readily demonstrate that the
advantages of observation are not eclipsed by those of speculation; and that
those of speculation, in their turn, do not interfere with those of observation.
But we have not time to develop these rules of logic; it will be sufficient to
point out their relation to the question of the reality of mental images. Here
are my conclusions in two words. Physical phenomena and images are
always real, since they are perceived or conceived; what is sometimes
wanting to them, and makes them false, is that they do not accord with the
rest of our cognitions.[22]
Thus, then, are all objections overruled, in my opinion at least. We can now
consider the world of ideas as a physical world; but it is one of a peculiar
nature, which is not, like the other, accessible to all, and is subject to its
own laws, which are laws of association. By these very different
characteristics, it separates itself so sharply from the outer world that all
endeavour to bring the two together seems shocking; and it is very easy to
understand that many minds should wish to remain faithful to the
conception that ideas form a mental or moral world. No metaphysical
reasoning could prevail against this sentiment, and we must give up the idea
of destroying it. But we think we have shown that idea, like sensation,
comprises at the same time the physical and the mental.

FOOTNOTES:

[19] Let me say, in passing, that this separation that DESCARTES thinks he can
establish between perception and ideation, is only conceivable on condition that
it be not too closely examined, and that no exact definition of ideation be given.
If we remark, in fact, that all thought is a reproduction, in some degree, of a
sensation, we arrive at this conclusion: that a thought operated by a soul distinct
from the body would be a thought completely void and without object, it would
be the thought of nothingness. It is not, therefore, conceivable. Consequently the
criterion, already so dangerous, which DESCARTES constantly employs—to wit:
that what we clearly conceive is true—cannot apply to thought, if we take the
trouble to analyse it and to replace a purely verbal conception by intuition.
[20] I somewhat regret that TAINE fell into the common-place idea of the
opposition of the brain and thought; he took up again this old idea without
endeavouring to analyse it, and only made it his own by the ornamentation of his
style. And as his was a mind of powerful systematisation, the error which he
committed led him into much wider consequences than the error of a more
common mind would have done.
[21] I have just come across them again in an ingenious note of C. L. HERRICK:
The Logical and Psychological Distinction between the True and the Real
(Psych. Rev., May 1904). I entirely agree with this author. But it is not he who
exercised a suggestion over my mind; it was M. BERGSON. See Matière et
Mémoire, p. 159.
[22] In order to remain brief, I have not thought fit to allude in the text to a
question of metaphysics which closely depends on the one broached by me: the
existence of an outer world. Philosophers who define sensation as a modality of
our Ego are much embarrassed later in demonstrating the existence of an outer
world. Having first admitted that our perception of it is illusory, since, when we
think we perceive this world, we have simply the feeling of the modalities of our
Ego, they find themselves powerless to demonstrate that this illusion
corresponds to a truth, and invoke in despair, for the purpose of their
demonstration, instinct, hallucination, or some a priori law of the mind. The
position we have taken in the discussion is far more simple. Since every
sensation is a fragment of matter perceived by a mind, the aggregate of
sensations constitutes the aggregate of matter. There is in this no deceptive
appearance, and consequently no need to prove a reality distinct from
appearances. As to the argument drawn from dreams and hallucinations which
might be brought against this, I have shown how it is set aside by a distinction
between perceptibility and truth. It is no longer a matter of perception, but of
reasoning. In other words, all that we see, even in dreams, is real, but is not in its
due place.

CHAPTER IV
DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS
After sensations and images, we have to name among the phenomena of
consciousness, the whole series of affective states—our pleasures and our
pains, our joys and our griefs, our sentiments, our emotions, and our
passions. It is universally admitted that these states are of a mental nature,
for several reasons. (1) We never objectivate them as we do our sensations,
but we constantly consider them as indwelling or subjective states. This
rule, however, allows an exception for the pleasure and the pain termed
physical, which are often localised in particular parts of our bodies,
although the position attributed to them is less precise than with indifferent
sensations. (2) We do not alienate them as we do our indifferent sensations.
The sensations of weight, of colour, and of form serve us for the
construction of bodies which appear to us as perceived by us, but as being
other than ourselves. On the contrary, we constantly and without hesitation
refer our emotional states to our Ego. It is I who suffer, we say, I who
complain, I who hope. It is true that this attribution is not absolutely
characteristic of mental phenomena, for it happens that we put a part of our
Ego into material objects, such as our bodies, and even into objects separate
from our bodies, and whose sole relation to us is that of a legal
proprietorship. We must guard against the somewhat frequent error of
identifying the Ego with the psychical.
These two reasons sufficiently explain the tendency to see only
psychological states in the emotional ones; and, in fact, those authors who
have sought to oppose mind to matter have not failed to introduce emotion
into their parallel as representing the essence of mind. On this point I will
recall the fine ironical image used by Tyndall, the illustrious English
physicist, to show the abyss which separates thought from the molecular
states of the brain. "Let us suppose," he says, "that the sentiment love, for
example, corresponds to a right-hand spiral movement of the molecules of
the brain and the sentiment hatred to a left-hand spiral movement. We
should then know that when we love, a movement is produced in one

direction, and when we hate, in another. But the Why would remain without
an answer."
The question of knowing what place in our metaphysical theory we ought to
secure for emotion seems difficult to resolve, and we even find some
pleasure in leaving it in suspense, in order that it may be understood that a
metaphysician is not compelled to explain everything. Besides, the
difficulties which atop us here are peculiarly of a psychological order. They
proceed from the fact that studies on the nature of the emotions are still
very little advanced. The physical conditions of these states are pretty well
known, and their psychical and social effects have been abundantly
described; but very little is known as to what distinguishes an emotion from
a thought.
Two principal opinions may be upheld in the actual state of our
acquaintance with the psychology of the feelings. When we endeavour to
penetrate their essential and final nature, we have a choice between two
contrary theories.
The first and traditional one consists in seeing in emotion a phenomenon sui
generis; this is very simple, and leaves nothing more to be said.
The second bears the name of the intellectualist theory. It consists in
expunging the characteristic of the affective states. We consider them as
derivative forms of particular modes of cognition, and they are only
"confused intelligence." This intellectualist thesis is of early date; it will be
found in Herbart, who, by-the-by, gave it a peculiar form, by causing the
play of images to intervene in the formation of the feelings. However, this
particular point is of slight Importance. The intellectualist theory is more
vast than Herbartism; it exists in all doctrines in which the characteristic
difference between thought and feeling is expunged and feeling is brought
back to thought. One of the clearest means of so doing consists in only
seeing in the feeling the fact of perceiving something. To perceive is, in
fact, the property of intelligence; to reason, to imagine, to judge, to
understand, is always, in a certain sense, to perceive. It has been imagined
that emotion is nothing else than a perception of a certain kind, an
intellectual act strictly comparable to the contemplation of a landscape.
Only, in the place of a landscape with placid features you must put a storm,

a cataclysm of nature; and, instead of supposing this storm outside us, let it
burst within us, let it reach us, not by the outer senses of sight and
condition, but by the inner senses. What we then perceive will be an
emotion.
Such is the theory that two authors—W. James and Lange—happened to
discover almost at the same time, Lange treating it as a physiologist and W.
James as a philosopher. Their theory, at first sight, appears singular, like
everything which runs counter to our mental habits. It lays down that the
symptoms which we all till now have considered as the physiological
consequence, the translation, and the distant effects of the emotions,
constitute their essential base. These effects are: the expression of the
physiognomy, the gesture, the cry, and the speech; or the reflex action on
the circulation, the pallor or blushing, the heat mounting to the head, or the
cold of the shiver which passes over the body. Or it is the heart, which
hastens or slackens its beats, or makes them irregular, or enfeebles, or
augments them. Or the respiration, which changes its rhythm, or increases,
or is suspended. Or else it is the secretion of the saliva or of the sweat,
which flows in abundance or dries up. Or the muscular force, which is
increased or decays. Or the almost undefinable organic troubles revealed to
us by the singing in the ears, constriction of the epigastrium, the jerks, the
trembling, vertigo, or nausea—all this collection of organic troubles which
comes more or less confusedly to our consciousness under the form of
tactile, muscular, thermal, and other sensations. Until now this category of
phenomena has been somewhat neglected, because we saw in it effects and
consequences of which the rôle in emotion itself seemed slight, since, if
they could have been suppressed, it was supposed that emotion would still
remain. The new theory commences by changing the order of events. It
places the physical symptoms of the emotions at the very beginning, and
considers them the direct effects of the external excitant, which is expressed
by this elegant formula: "It used to be said, 'I perceive a danger; I am
frightened, I tremble.' Now we must say, 'I tremble before a danger, first,
and it is after having trembled that I am frightened.'" This is not a change in
order only; it is something much more serious. The change is directed to the
nature of emotion. It is considered to exist in the organic derangements
indicated above. These derangements are the basis of emotion, its physical
basis, and to be moved is to perceive them. Take away from the

consciousness this physical reflex, and emotion ceases. It is no longer
anything but an idea.
This theory has at least the merit of originality. It also pleases one by its
great clearness—an entirely intellectual clearness, we may say; for it
renders emotion comprehensible by enunciating it in terms of cognition. It
eliminates all difference which may exist between a perception and an
emotion. Emotion is no longer anything but a certain kind of perception, the
perception of the organic sensations.
This reduction, if admitted, would much facilitate the introduction of
emotion into our system, which, being founded on the distinction between
the consciousness and the object, is likewise an intellectualist system. The
definition of emotion, as it is taught by W. James, seems expressly made for
us who are seeking to resolve all intellectual states into physical
impressions accompanied by consciousness.
By the side of emotion we may place, as demanding the same analytical
study, the feeling of effort. We ought to inquire with effort, as has been
done with emotion, what is the psychological nature of this phenomenon;
and in the same way that there exists an intellectualist theory of the
emotions, viz. that of James, who reduces all the history of the emotions to
intelligence, so there exists an intellectualist theory of effort, which likewise
tends to bring back, all will to intelligence. It is again the same author, that
true genius, W. James, who has attempted this reduction. I do not know
whether he has taken into account the parallelism of the two theories, but it
is nevertheless evident. Effort, that basis of activity, that state of
consciousness which so many psychologists have described as something
sui generis, becomes to James a phenomenon of perception. It is the
perception of sensations proceeding from the muscles, the tendons, the
articulations, the skin, and from all the organs directly or indirectly
concerned in the execution of movement. To be conscious of an effort
would then be nothing else than to receive all these centripetal sensations;
and what proves this is, that the consciousness of effort when most clearly
manifested is accompanied by some muscular energy, some strong
contraction, or some respiratory trouble, and yields if we render the
respiration again regular and put the muscles back into repose.

To my great regret I can state nothing very clear regarding these problems.
The attempt to intellectualise all psychical problems is infinitely interesting,
and leads to a fairly clear conception, by which everything is explained by a
mechanism reflected in a mirror, which is the consciousness. But we remain
perplexed, and we ask ourselves whether this clearness of perception is not
somewhat artificial, whether affectivity, emotivity, tendency, will, are really
all reduced to perceptions, or whether they are not rather irreducible
elements which should be added to the consciousness. Does not, for
instance, desire represent a complement of the consciousness? Do not desire
and consciousness together represent a something which does not belong to
the physical domain and which forms the moral world? This question I
leave unanswered.

CHAPTER V
DEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS—THE
RELATION SUBJECT-OBJECT
After having separated from the consciousness that which it is not, let us try
to define what it is. This and the two following chapters are devoted to this
study.
A theory has often been maintained with regard to the consciousness;
namely, that it supposes a relation between two terms—a subject and an
object, and that it consists exactly in the feeling of this relation. By subject
is understood the something that has consciousness; the object is the
something of which we are conscious. Every thought, we are told, implies
subject and object, the representer and the represented, the sentiens and the
sensum—the one active, the other passive, the active acting on the passive,
the ego opposed to the non ego.
This opinion is almost legitimised by current language. When speaking of
our states of consciousness, we generally say, "I am conscious; it is I who
have consciousness," and we attribute to our I, to our Ego, to our
personality, the rôle of subject. But this is not a peremptory argument in
favour of the above opinion; it is only a presumption, and, closely
examined, this presumption seems very weak.
Hitherto, when analysing the part of mind, we have employed noncommittal terms: we have said that sensation implied consciousness, and
not that sensation implied something which is conscious.[23] The difference
may appear too subtle, but it is not; it consists in taking from consciousness
the notion of a subject being conscious and replacing it by the very act of
consciousness.
My description applies very exactly, I think, to the facts. When we are
engaged in a sensation, or when we perceive something, a phenomenon
occurs which simply consists in having consciousness of a thing. If to this

we add the idea of the subject, which has consciousness, we distort the
event. At the very moment when it is taking place, it is not so complicated;
we complicate it by adding to it the work of reflection. It is reflection which
constructs the notion of the subject, and it is this which afterwards
introduces this construction into the states of consciousness; in this way the
state of consciousness, by receiving this notion of subject, acquires a
character of duality it did not previously possess. There are, in short, two
separate acts of consciousness, and one is made the subject of the other.
"Primitively," says Rabier, "there is neither representative nor represented;
there are sensations, representations, facts of consciousness, and that is all.
Nothing is more exact, in my opinion, than this view of Condillac's:—that
primitively, the inanimate statue is entirely the sensation that it feels. To
itself it is all odour and all savour; it is nothing more, and this sensation
includes no duality for the consciousness. It is of an absolute simplicity."
Two arguments may be advanced in favour of this opinion. The first is one
of logic. We have divided all knowledge into two groups—objects of
cognition, and acts of cognition. What is the subject of cognition? Does it
form a new group? By no means; it forms part of the first group, of the
object group; for it is something to be known.
Our second argument is one of fact. It consists in remembering that which
in practice we understand by the subject of cognition; or rather,
metaphorically we represent this subject to ourselves as an organ—the eye
that sees or the hand that touches—and we represent to ourselves the
relation subject-object in the shape of a material relation between two
distinct bodies which are separated by an interval and between which some
action is produced which unites them. Or else, confusing the subject and the
Ego, which are nevertheless two different notions, we place the Ego in the
consciousness of the muscular effort struggling against something which
resists. Or, finally and still more frequently, we represent the subject to
ourselves by confusing it with our own personality; it is a part of our
biography, our name, our profession, our social status, our body, our past
life foreshortened, our character, or, in a word, our civil personality, which
becomes the subject of the relation subject-object. We artificially endow
this personality with the faculty of having consciousness; and it results from
this that the entity consciousness, so difficult to define and to imagine,
profits by all this factitious addition and becomes a person, visible and even

very large, in flesh and bone, distinct from the object of cognition, and
capable of living a separate life.
It is not difficult to explain that all this clearness in the representation of
ideas is acquired by a falsification of the facts. So sensorial a representation
of consciousness is very unfaithful; for our biography does not represent
what we have called acts of consciousness, but a large slice of our past
experience—that is to say, a synthesis of bygone sensations and images, a
synthesis of objects of consciousness; therefore a complete confusion
between the acts of consciousness and their objects. The formation of the
personality seems to me to have, above all, a legal and social importance.
[24] It is a peculiar grouping of states of consciousness imposed by our
relations with other individuals. But, metaphysically, the subject thus
understood is not distinguished from the object, and there is nothing to add
to our distinction between the object and the act of consciousness.
Those who defend the existence of the subject point out that this subject
properly constitutes the Ego, and that the distinction of the subject and the
object corresponds to the distinction of the Ego and non-Ego, and furnishes
the separation between the physical and the moral so long sought.
It is evidently very enticing to make of the Ego thus a primitive notion of
the consciousness; but this view of the Ego as opposed to the non-Ego in no
way corresponds to that of the mental and the physical. The notion of the
Ego is much larger, much more extensible, than that of the mental; it is as
encroaching as human pride, it grasps in its conquering talons all that
belongs to us; for we do not, in life, make any great difference between
what is we and what is ours—an insult to our dog, our dwelling, or our
work wounds us as much as an insult to ourselves. The possessive pronoun
expresses both possession and possessor. In fact, we consider our body as
being ourselves.
Here, then, are numbers of material things introducing themselves into the
category of mental things. If we wished to expel them and to reduce the
domain of the Ego to the domain of the mental, we could only do so if we
already possessed the criterion of what is essentially mental. The notion of
the Ego cannot therefore supply us with this criterion.

Another opinion consists in making of the subject a spiritual substance, of
which the consciousness becomes a faculty. By substance is understood an
entity which possesses the two following principal characteristics, unity and
identity, this latter merging into unity, for it is nothing else but the
persistence of unity through the course of time. Certain philosophers have
asserted that through intuition we can all establish that we are a spiritual
substance. I am compelled to reject this idea, because I think the expression
spiritual substance has no meaning; nothing but the sonorous value of six
syllables. It has also been supposed, that there exists a corporeal substance
hidden under the sensations, in which are implanted the qualities of bodies,
as the various organs of a flower are in its calyx. I will return later to this
conception of a material substance. That of a spiritual substance cannot be
defended, and the chief and fatal argument I urge against it is, that we
cannot represent it to our minds, we cannot think it, and we cannot see in
these words "spiritual substance" any intelligible idea; for that which is
mental is limited to "that which is of the consciousness." So soon as we
endeavour to go beyond the fact of having consciousness to imagine a
particular state which must be mental, one of two things happen; either we
only grasp the void, or else we construct a material and persistent object in
which we recognise psychical attributes. These are two conclusions which
ought to be rejected.

FOOTNOTES:
[23] This second method of expression, which I consider inexact, is constantly
found in DESCARTES. Different philosophers have explicitly admitted that every
act of cognition implies a relation subject-object. This is one of the corner-stones
of the neo-criticism of RENOUVIER. He asserts that all representation is doublefaced, and that what is known to us presents itself in the character of both
representative and represented. He follows this up by describing separately the
phenomena and laws of the representative and of the represented respectively.
[24] The preceding ten lines in the text I wrote after reading a recent article of
WILLIAM JAMES, who wishes to show that the consciousness does not exist, but
results simply from the relation or the opposition raised between one part of our
experience (the actual experience, for instance, in the example of the perception
of an object) and another part, the remembrance of our person. But the argument
of JAMES goes too far; he is right in contesting the relation subject-object, but not
in contesting the existence of the consciousness (W. JAMES: "Does consciousness
exist?" in J. of Philosophy, &c., Sept. 1904).

CHAPTER VI
DEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS—CATEGORIES
OF THE UNDERSTANDING
It has often been said that the rôle of intelligence consists in uniting or
grasping the relations of things. An important question, therefore, to put, is,
if we know whereof these relations consist, and what is the rôle of the mind
in the establishment of a relation?
It now and then happens to us to perceive an isolated object, without
comparing it with any other, or endeavouring to find out whether it differs
from or resembles another, or presents with any other a relation of cause to
effect, or of sign to thing signified, or of co-existence in time and space.
Thus, I may see a red colour, and occupy all the intellect at my disposal in
the perception of this colour, seeing nothing but it, and thinking of nothing
but it. Theoretically, this is not impossible to conceive, and, practically, I
ask myself if these isolated and solitary acts of consciousness do not
sometimes occur.
It certainly seems to me that I have noticed in myself moments of
intellectual tonelessness, when in the country, during the vacation, I look at
the ground, or the grass, without thinking of anything—or at least, of
anything but what I am looking at, and without comparing my sensation
with anything. I do not think we should admit in principle, as do many
philosophers, that "we take no cognisance save of relations." This is the
principle of relativity, to which so much attention has been given. Taken in
this narrow sense, it seems to me in no way imperative for our thoughts. We
admit that it is very often applied, but without feeling obliged to admit that
it is of perpetual and necessary application.
These reserves once made, it remains to remark, that the objects we
perceive very rarely present themselves in a state of perfect isolation. On
the contrary, they are brought near to other objects by manifold relations of
resemblance, of difference, or of connection in time or space; and, further,

they are compared with the ideas which define them best. We do not have
consciousness of an object, but of the relations existing between several
objects. Relation is the new state produced by the fact that one perceives a
plurality of objects, and perceives them in a group.
Show me two colours in juxtaposition, and I do not see two colours only,
but, in addition, their resemblance in colour or value. Show me two lines,
and I do not see only their respective lengths but their difference in length.
Show me two points marked on a white sheet of paper, and I do not see
only the colour, form, and dimension of the points, but their distance from
each other. In our perceptions, as in our conceptions, we have perpetually to
do with the relations between things. The more we reflect, the more we
understand things, the more clearly we see their relations; the multiplication
of relations is the measure of the depth of cognition.[25]
The nature of these relations is more difficult to ascertain than that of
objects. It seems to be more subtle. When two sounds make themselves
heard in succession, there is less difficulty in making the nature of these two
sounds understood than the nature of the fact that one occurs before the
other. It would appear that, in the perception of objects, our mind is passive
and reduced to the state of reception, working like a registering machine or
a sensitive surface, while in the perception of relations it assumes a more
important part.
Two principal theories have been advanced, of which one puts the relations
in the things perceived, and the other makes them a work of the mind. Let
us begin with this last opinion. It consists in supposing that the relations are
given to things by the mind itself. These relations have been termed
categories. The question of categories plays an important part in the history
of philosophy. Three great philosophers, Aristotle, Kant, and Renouvier
have drawn up a list, or, as it is called, a table of them, and this table is very
long. To give a slight idea of it, I will quote a few examples, such as time,
space, being, resemblance, difference, causality, becoming, finality, &c.
By making the categories the peculiar possession of the mind, we attribute
to these cognitions the essential characteristic of being anterior to sensation,
or, as it is also termed, of existing a priori: we are taught that not only are
they not derived from experience, nor taught us by observation, but further

that they are presupposed by all observation, for they set up, in scholastic
jargon, the conditions which make experience possible. They represent the
personal contribution of the mind to the knowledge of nature, and,
consequently, to admit them is to admit that the mind is not, in the presence
of the world, reduced to the passive state of a tabula rasa, and that the
faculties of the mind are not a transformation of sensation. Only these
categories do not supplement sensation, they do not obviate it, nor allow it
to be conjectured beforehand. They remain empty forms so long as they are
not applied to experience; they are the rules of cognition and not the objects
of cognition, the means of knowing and not the things known; they render
knowledge possible, but do not of themselves constitute it, Experience
through the senses still remains a necessary condition to the knowledge of
the external world. It may be said that the senses give the matter of
knowledge, and that the categories of the understanding give the form of it.
Matter cannot exist without form, nor form without matter; it is the union of
the two which produces cognition.
Such is the simplest idea that can be given of the Kantian theory of
categories, or, if it is preferred to employ the term often used and much
discussed, such is the theory of the Kantian idealism, This theory, I will say
frankly, hardly harmonises with the ideas I have set forth up to this point.
To begin with, let us scrutinise the relation which can exist between the
subject and the object. We have seen that the existence of the subject is
hardly admissible, for it could only be an object in disguise. Cognition is
composed in reality of an object and an act of consciousness. Now, how can
we know if this act of consciousness, by adding itself to the object, modifies
it and causes it to appear other than it is?
This appears to me an insoluble question, and probably, even, a factitious
one. The idea that an object can be modified in its nature or in its aspect
comes to us through the perception of bodies. We see that, by attacking a
metal with acids, this metal is modified, and that by heating a body its
colour and form become changed; or that by electrifying a thread it acquires
new properties; or that when we place glasses before our eyes we change
the visible aspect of objects; or that, if we have inflammation of the eyelids,
light is painful, and so on. All these familiar experiments represent to us the
varied changes that a body perceived can undergo; but it must be carefully
remarked that in cases of this kind the alteration in the body is produced by

the action of a second body, that the effect is due to an intercourse between
two objects. On the contrary, when we take the Kantian hypothesis, that the
consciousness modifies that which it perceives, we are attributing to the
consciousness an action which has been observed in the case of the objects,
and are thus transporting into one domain that which belongs to a different
one; and we are falling into the very common error which consists in losing
sight of the proper nature of the consciousness and making out of it an
object.
If we set aside this incorrect assimilation, there no longer remains any
reason for refusing to admit that we perceive things as they are, and that the
consciousness, by adding itself to objects, does not modify them.
Phenomena and appearances do not, then, strictly speaking, exist. Till proof
to the contrary, we shall admit that everything we perceive is real, that we
perceive things always as they are, or, in other words, that we always
perceive noumena.[26]
After having examined the relations of the consciousness with its objects,
let us see what concerns the perception, by the consciousness, of the
relations existing between these objects themselves. The question is to
ascertain whether the a priorists are right in admitting that the
establishment of these relations is the work of the consciousness. The rôle
of synthetic power that is thus attributed to consciousness is difficult to
conceive unless we alter the definition of consciousness to fit the case. In
accordance with the definition we have given and the idea we have of it, the
consciousness makes us acquainted with what a thing is, but it adds nothing
to it. It is not a power which begets objects, nor is it a power which begets
relations.
Let us carefully note the consequence at which we should arrive, if, while
admitting, on the one hand, that our consciousness lights up and reveals the
objects without creating them, we were, on the other hand, to admit that it
makes up for this passivity by creating relations between objects. We dare
not go so far as to say that this creation of relations is arbitrary and
corresponds in no way to reality; or that, when we judge two neighbouring
or similar objects, the relations of contiguity and resemblance are pure

inventions of our consciousness, and that these objects are really neither
contiguous nor similar.
It must therefore be supposed that the relation is already, in some manner,
attracted into the objects; it must be admitted that our intelligence does not
apply its categories haphazard or from the caprice of the moment; and it
must be admitted that it is led to apply them because it has perceived in the
objects themselves a sign and a reason which are an invitation to this
application, and its justification. On this hypothesis, therefore, contiguity
and resemblance must exist in the things themselves, and must be
perceived; for without this we should run the risk of finding similar that
which is different, and contiguous that which has no relation of time or
space. Whence it results, evidently, that our consciousness cannot create the
connection completely, and then we are greatly tempted to conclude that it
only possesses the faculty of perceiving it when it exists in the objects.[27]
According to this conception, the rôle of the consciousness in the
perception of a connection is that of a witness, as in the perception of
objects. The consciousness does not create, but it verifies. Resemblance is a
physical property of objects, like colour; and contiguity is a physical
property of objects, like form. The connections between the objects form
part of the group object and not of the group consciousness, and they are
just as independent of consciousness as are the objects themselves.
Against this conclusion we must anticipate several objections. One of them
will probably consist in accentuating the difference existing between the
object and the connection from the dynamical point of view. That the object
may be passively contemplated by the consciousness can be understood, it
will be said; but the relation is not only an object of perception—it is,
further, a principle of action, a power of suggestion, and an agent of change.
It might, then, he supposed that the consciousness here finds a
compensation for the rôle that has been withdrawn from it. If it is not the
thing that creates the relation, it will be said, at least it is that which creates
its efficacity of suggestion. Many psychologists have supposed that a
relation has the power of evocation only when it has been perceived. The
perception of resemblance precedes the action of resemblance. It is

consequently the consciousness which assembles the ideas and gives them
birth by perceiving their relations.
This error, for it is one, has long been wide-spread—indeed, it still persists.
[28] We have, however, no difficulty in understanding that the perception of
a resemblance between two terms supposes them to be known; so long as
only one of the terms is present to the consciousness, this perception does
not exist; it cannot therefore possess the property of bringing to light the
second term. Suggestion is therefore distinct from recognition; it is when
suggestion has acted, when the resemblance in fact has brought the two
terms together, that the consciousness, taking cognisance of the work
accomplished, verifies the existence of a resemblance, and that this
resemblance explains the suggestion.
Second objection: we are told that the relations between the objects—that
is, the principal categories—must be of a mental nature, because they are a
priori. That they are a priori means that they are at once anterior and
superior to the experience. Let us see what this argument is worth.
It appears that it is somewhat misused. With regard to many of the
categories, we are content to lay down the necessity of an abstract idea in
order to explain the comprehension of a concrete one. It is said, for
example: how can it be perceived that two sensations are successive, if we
do not already possess the idea of time? The argument is not very
convincing, because, for every kind of concrete perception it is possible to
establish an abstract category.
It might be said of colour that it is impossible to perceive it unless it is
known beforehand what colour is; and so on for a heap of other things. A
more serious argument consists in saying that relations are a priori because
they have a character of universality and of necessity which is not explained
by experience, this last being always contingent and peculiar. But it is not
necessary that a function should be mental for it to be a priori. The
identification of the a priori with the mental is entirely gratuitous. We
should here draw a distinction between the two senses of the a priori:
anteriority and superiority.
A simple physical mechanism may be a priori, in the sense of anteriority. A
house is a priori, in regard to the lodgers it receives; this book is a priori, in

regard to its future readers. There is no difficulty in imagining the structure
of our nervous system to be a priori, in regard to the excitements which are
propagated in it. A nerve cell is formed, with its protoplasm, its nucleus and
its nucleoli before being irritated; its properties precede its functions. If it be
possible to admit that as a consequence of ancestral experiences the
function has created the organ, the latter is now formed, and this it is which
in its turn becomes anterior to the function. The notion of a priori has
therefore nothing in it which is repugnant to physical nature.
Let us now take the a priori in the sense of superiority. Certain judgments
of ours are, we are told, universal and necessary, and through this double
character go beyond the evidence of experience. This is an exact fact which
deserves to be explained, but it is not indispensable to explain it by
allowing to the consciousness a source of special cognitions. The English
school of philosophy have already attacked this problem in connection with
the origin of axioms. The principle of their explanation lies in the virtue of
what they have termed "inseparable association." They have supposed that
when an association is often repeated it creates a habit of thought against
which no further strife is possible. The mechanism of association itself
should then add a special virtue to the contingency of facts. A hundred
repetitions of related facts, for example, would give rise to so firm an
association, that no further repetition would increase it.
I consider this explanation a very sound one in principle. It is right to put
into association something more than into experience. I would only suggest
a slight correction in detail. It is not the association forged by repetition
which has this virtue of conveying the idea of necessity and universality, it
is simply the uncontradicted association. It has been objected, in fact, and
with reason, to the solution of Mill, that it insists on a long duration of
experience, while axioms appear to be of an irresistible and universal
truthfulness the moment they are conceived. And this is quite just. I should
prefer to lay down as a law that every representation appears true, and that
every link appears necessary and universal as soon as it is formed. This is
its character from the first. It preserves it so long as no contradiction in fact,
in reasoning, or in idea, comes to destroy it.[29]
What seems to stand out most clearly after all these explanations is the rôle
which we ought to attribute to the consciousness. Two rival theories have

been maintained: that of the mirror-consciousness and that of the focusconsciousness. It would seem—I merely say it would seem—that the first
of these best harmonises with the preceding facts. For what seems most
probable is, that the consciousness illuminates and reveals but does not act.
The theory of the focus-consciousness adapts itself less to the mechanism of
the association of ideas.
From this we come quite naturally to see in the intelligence only an inactive
consciousness; at one moment it apprehends an object, and it is a perception
or an idea; at another time it perceives a connection, and it is a judgment; at
yet another, it perceives connections between connections, and it is an act of
reason. But however subtle the object it contemplates may become, it does
not depart from its contemplative attitude, and cognition is but a
consciousness.
One step further, and we should get so far as to admit that the consciousness
serves no purpose whatever, and that it is a useless luxury, since, if all
efficacious virtue is to be found in the sensations and the ideas which we
consider as material facts, the consciousness which reveals them adds
nothing to, takes nothing from and modifies nothing in them; and
everything would go on the same, nor would anything in this world be
changed, if one day the light of consciousness were, by chance, to be put
out. We might imagine a collection of automatons forming a human society
as complicated as, and not different in appearance from, that of conscious
beings; these automatons would make the same gestures, utter the same
words as ourselves, would dispute, complain, cry, and make love like us;
we might even imagine them capable, like us, of psychology. This is the
thesis of the epiphenomenal consciousness which Huxley has boldly carried
to its uttermost conclusions.
I indicate here these possible conclusions, without discussing them. It is a
question I prefer to leave in suspense; it seems to me that one can do
nothing on this subject but form hypotheses.

FOOTNOTES:
[25] At the risk of being deemed too subtle, I ask whether we are conscious of a
relation between objects, or whether that which occurs is not rather the
perception of an object which has been modified in its nature by its relation with
another object.
[26] This conclusion may seem contradictory to that which I enunciated when
studying the constitution of matter. I then asserted that we only know our
sensations and not the excitants which produce them. But these sensations are
matter; they are matter modified by other matter, viz. our nervous centres.
We therefore take up very distinctly an opposite standpoint to the principle of
relativity: in other terms, we reject the phenomenism of Berkeley.
When we go into metaphysics we are continually astounded to see how different
conceptions of things which have a classic value are independent of each other.
In general, phenomenism is opposed to substantialism, and it is supposed that
those who do not accept the former doctrine must accept the latter, while, on the
contrary, those who reject substantialism must be phenomenists. We know that it
is in this manner that Berkeley conquered corporeal substantialism and taught
phenomenism; while Hume, more radical than he, went so far as to question the
substantialism of mind. On reflection, it seems to me that, after having rejected
phenomenism, we are in no way constrained to accept substance. By saying that
we perceive things as they are, and not through a deluding veil, we do not force
ourselves to acknowledge that we perceive the substance of bodies—that is to
say, that something which should be hidden beneath its qualities and should be
distinct from it. The distinction between the body and its qualities is a thing
useful in practice, but it answers to no perception or observation. The body is
only a group, a sheaf of qualities. If the qualities seem unable to exist of
themselves and to require a subject, this is only a grammatical difficulty, which
is due to the fact that, while calling certain sensations qualities, we suppose a
subject to be necessary. On the other hand, the representation which we make to
ourselves of a material substance and its rôle as the support of the qualities, is a
very naïve and mechanical representation, thanks to which certain sensations
become the supports of other and less important sensations. It would suffice to
insist on the detail of this representation and on its origin to show its artificial
character. The notion we have of the stability of bodies and of the persistence of
their identity, notwithstanding certain superficial changes, is the reason for
which I thought proper to attribute a substance to them, that is to say, an
invariable element. But we can attain the same end without this useless
hypothesis; we have only to remark that the identity of the object lies in the
aggregate of its properties, including the name it bears. If the majority of its
properties, especially of those most important to us, subsists without alteration,
or if this alteration, though of very great extent, takes place insensibly and by
slow degrees, we decide that the object remains the same. We have no need for
that purpose to give it a substance one and indestructible. Thus we are neither
adherents of phenomenism, nor of substantialism.

[27] I borrow from RABIER this argument, which has thoroughly convinced me
(see Psychologie, p. 281).
[28] PILON is the psychologist who has the most forcibly demonstrated that
resemblance acts before being perceived. I refer the readers to my Psychologie
du Raisonnement, where I have set forth this little problem in detail.
[29] We think spontaneously of the general and the necessary. It is this which
serves as a basis for the suggestion and the catchword (réclame), and it explains
how minds of slender culture always tend towards absolute assertions and hasty
generalisations.

CHAPTER VII
DEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS—THE
SEPARABILITY OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS FROM ITS
OBJECT—DISCUSSION OF IDEALISM
One last question suggests itself with regard to the consciousness. In what
measure is it separable from the object? Do the consciousness and its object
form two things or only one?
Under observation these two terms constantly show themselves united. We
experience a sensation and have consciousness of it; it is the same fact
expressed in two different ways. All facts of our perception thus present
themselves, and they are one. But our reason may outstrip our observation.
We are able to make a distinction between the two elements being and
being perceived. This is not an experimental but an ideological distinction,
and an abstraction that language makes easy.
Can we go further, and suppose one of the parts thus analysed capable of
existing without the other? Can sensation exist as physical expression, as an
object; without being illuminated by the consciousness? Can the
consciousness exist without having an object?
Let us first speak of the existence of the object when considered as
separated from the consciousness. The problem is highly complicated.
It has sometimes been connected with the idealist thesis according to which
the object of consciousness, being itself a modality of the consciousness,
cannot exist apart from it—that is to say, outside the periods in which it is
perceived. It would therefore result from this that this separation between
existence and perception might be made, when it is admitted (contrary to
the idealist hypothesis) that the object perceived is material and the
consciousness which perceives it mental. In this case, it will be thought,
there is no link of solidarity between the consciousness and its continuity.
But I am not of that opinion. The union of the consciousness and its object

is one of fact, which presents itself outside any hypothesis on the nature of
the object. It is observation which demonstrates to us that we must perceive
an object to be assured of its existence; the reason, moreover, confirms the
necessity of this condition, which remains true whatever may be the "stuff"
of the object.
Having stated this, the question is simply to know whether this observation
of fact should be generalised or not. We may, it seems to me, decline to
generalise it without falling into a contradiction in terms. It may be
conceived that the objects which we are looking at continue to exist,
without change, during the moments when we have lost sight of them. This
seems reasonable enough, and is the opinion of "common" sense.[30]
The English philosophers, Bain and Mill, have combated this proposition
with extraordinary ardour, like believers combating a heresy. But
notwithstanding their attacks it remains intelligible, and the distinction
between being and being perceived preserves its logical legitimacy. This
may be represented, or may be thought; but can it be realised?
So far as regards external objects, I think we all, in fact, admit it. We all
admit a distinction, between the existence of the outer world and the
perception we have of it; its existence is one thing, and our perception of it
is another. The existence of the world continues without interruption; our
perception is continually interrupted by the most fortuitous causes, such as
change of position, or even the blinking of the eyes; its existence is general,
universal, independent of time and space; our perception is partial,
particular, local, limited by the horizon of our senses, determined by the
geographical position of our bodies, riddled by the distractions of our
intelligence, deceived by the illusions of our minds, and above all
diminished by the infirmity of our intelligence, which is able to
comprehend so little of what it perceives. This is what we all admit in
practice; the smallest of our acts implies the belief in something perceptible
which is wider and more durable than our astonished perceptions. I could
not write these lines unless I implicitly supposed that my inkstand, my
paper, my pen, my room, and the surrounding world subsist when I do not
see them. It is a postulate of practical life. It is also a postulate of science,
which requires for its explanations of phenomena the supposition in them of
an indwelling continuity. Natural science would become unintelligible if we

were forced to suppose that with every eclipse of our perceptions material
actions were suspended. There would be beginnings without sequences, and
ends without beginnings.
Let us note also that acquired notions on the working of our nervous system
allow us to give this postulate a most precise form: the external object is
distinct from the nervous system and from the phenomena of perception
which are produced when the nervous system is excited; it is therefore very
easy to understand that this object continues to exist and to develop its
properties, even when no brain vibrates in its neighbourhood.
Might we not, with the view of strengthening this conclusion as to the
continuous existence of things, dispense with this postulate, which seems to
have the character of a grace, of an alms granted to us? Might not this
continuous existence of objects during the eclipses of our acts of
consciousness, be demonstrated? It does not seem to me impossible. Let us
suppose for a moment the correctness of the idealist thesis: all our
legitimate knowledge of objects is contained within the narrow limits of
actual sensation; then, we may ask, of what use is the reason? What is the
use of the memory? These functions have precisely for their object the
enlarging of the sphere of our sensations, which is limited in two principal
ways, by time and by space. Thanks to the reason, we manage to see in
some way that which our senses are unable to perceive, either because it is
too distant from us, or because there are obstacles between us and the
object, or because it is a past event or an event which has not yet taken
place which is in question.
That the reason may be deceived is agreed. But will it be asserted that it is
always deceived? Shall we go so far as to believe that this is an illegitimate
mode of cognition? The idealist thesis, if consistent, cannot refuse to extend
itself to this extreme conclusion; for a reasoned conclusion contains, when
it has a meaning, a certain assertion on the order of nature, and this
assertion is not a perception, since its precise object is to fill up the gaps in
our perceptions. Not being a perception, it must be rejected, if one is an
idealist.
The idealist will therefore keep strictly to the perception of the moment, and
this is so small a thing when deprived of all the conjectures which enrich it,

that the world, if reduced to this alone, would be but the skeleton of a
world. There would then be no more science, no possibility of knowledge.
But who could make up his mind thus to shut himself up in perception?
I suppose, indeed, that there will here be quibbling. This objection will be
made: that in the hypothesis of a discontinuous existence of things, reason
may continue to do its work, provided the intervention of a possible
perception be supposed. Thus, I notice this morning, on going into my
garden, that the pond which was dry yesterday is full of water. I conclude
from this, "It has rained in the night." To be consistent with idealism, one
must simply add: "If some one had been in the garden last night, he would
have seen it rain." In this manner one must re-establish every time the rights
of perception.
Be it so. But let us notice that this addition has no more importance than a
prescribed formula in a notarial act; for instance, the presence of a second
notary prescribed by the law, but always dispensed with in practice. This
prescribed formula can always be imagined or even understood. We shall be
in accord with idealism by the use of this easy little formula, "If some one
had been there," or even by saying, "For a universal consciousness...." The
difference of the realist and idealist theory becomes then purely verbal. This
amounts to saying that it disappears. But there is always much verbalism in
idealism.
One more objection: if this witness—the consciousness—suffices to give
objects a continuity of existence, we may content ourselves with a less
important witness. Why a man? The eyes of a mollusc would suffice, or
those of infusoria, or even of a particle of protoplasm: living matter would
become a condition of the existence of dead matter. This, we must
acknowledge, is a singular condition, and this conclusion condemns the
doctrine.

FOOTNOTES:
[30] That is to say, the sense of the multitude.—ED.

CHAPTER VIII
DEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS—THE
SEPARATION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS FROM ITS
OBJECT—THE UNCONSCIOUS
I ask myself whether it is possible, by going further along this road of the
separation between the consciousness and its object, to admit that ideas may
subsist during the periods when we are not conscious of them. It is the
problem of unconsciousness that I am here stating.
One of the most simple processes of reasoning consists in treating ideas in
the same manner as we have treated the external objects. We have admitted
that the consciousness is a thing superadded to the external objects, like the
light which lights up a landscape, but does not constitute it and may be
extinguished without destroying it. We continue the same interpretation by
saying that ideas prolong their existence while they are not being thought,
in the same way and for the same motive that material bodies continue
theirs while they are not being perceived. All that it seems permissible to
say is that this conception is not unrealisable.
Let us now place ourselves at the point of view of the consciousness. We
have supposed up to the present the suppression of the consciousness, and
have seen that we can still imagine the object continuing to exist. Is the
converse possible? Let us suppose that the object is suppressed. Can the
consciousness then continue to exist? On this last point it seems that doubt
is not possible, and we must answer in the negative. A consciousness
without an object, an empty consciousness, in consequence, cannot be
conceived; it would be a zero—a pure nothingness; it could not manifest
itself. We might admit, in strictness, that such a consciousness might exist
virtually as a power which is not exercised, a reserve, a potentiality, or a
possibility of being; but we cannot comprehend that this power can realise
or actualize itself. There is therefore no actual consciousness without an
object.

The problem we have just raised, that of the separability of the elements
which compose an act of consciousness, is continued by another problem—
that of unconsciousness. It is almost the same problem, for to ask one's self
what becomes of a known thing when we separate from it the consciousness
which at first accompanied it, is to ask one's self in what an unconscious
phenomenon consists.
We have, till now, considered the two principal forms of unconsciousness—
that in nature and that in thought. The first named unconsciousness does not
generally bear that name, but is rather discussed under the name of idealism
and realism. Whatever be their names, these two kinds of unconsciousness
are conceivable, and the more so that they both belong to physical nature.
If we allow ourselves to be guided by the concept of separability, we shall
now find that we have exhausted the whole series of possible problems, for
we have examined all the possible separations between the consciousness
and its objects; but if we use another concept, that of unconsciousness, we
can go further and propound a new problem: can the consciousness become
unconscious? But it is proper first to make a few distinctions. It is the rôle
of metaphysics to make distinctions.[31]
Unconsciousness presupposes a death of the consciousness; but this death
has its degrees, and before complete extinction we may conceive it to
undergo many attenuations. There is, first, the diminution of consciousness.
Consciousness is a magnitude capable of increase and decrease, like
sensation itself. According to the individual, consciousness may have a very
large or a very small field, and may embrace at the same time a variable
number of objects. I can pay attention to several things at the same time, but
when I am tired it becomes more difficult to me. I lose in extension, or, as is
still said, the field of consciousness is restricted. It may also lose not only in
extent of surface, but in depth. We have all of us observed in our own selves
moments of obscure consciousness when we understand dimly, and
moments of luminous consciousness which carry one almost to the very
bottom of things. It is difficult to consider those in the wrong who admit,
with Leibnitz, the existence of small states of consciousness. The lessening
of the consciousness is already our means of understanding the
unconscious; unconsciousness is the limit of this reduction.[32]

This singular fact has also been noticed, that, in the same individual there
may co-exist several kinds of consciousness which do not enter into
communication with each other and which are not acquainted with each
other. There is a principal consciousness which speaks, and, in addition,
accessory kinds of consciousness which do not speak, but reveal their
existence by the use of other modes of expression, of which the most
frequent is writing.
This doubling or fractionation of the consciousness and personality have
often been described in the case of hysterical subjects. They sometimes
occur quite spontaneously, but mostly they require a little suggestion and
cultivation. In any case, that they are produced in one way or other proves
that they are possible, and, for the theory, this possibility is essential. Facts
of this kind do not lead to a theory of the unconscious, but they enable us to
understand how certain phenomena, unconscious in appearance, are
conscious to themselves, because they belong to states of consciousness
which have been separated from each other.
A third thesis, more difficult of comprehension than the other two, supposes
that the consciousness may be preserved in an unconscious form. This is
difficult to admit, because unconsciousness is the negation of
consciousness. It is like saying that light can be preserved when darkness is
produced, or that an object still exists when, by the hypothesis, it has been
radically destroyed. This idea conveys no intelligible meaning, and there is
no need to dwell on it.
We have not yet exhausted all the concepts whereby we may get to
unconsciousness. Here is another, the last I shall quote, without, however,
claiming that it is the last which exists. We might call it the physiological
concept, for it is the one which the physiologists employ for choice. It is
based upon the observation of the phenomena which are produced in the
nervous system during our acts of consciousness; these phenomena precede
consciousness as a rule, and condition it. According to a convenient figure
which has been long in use, the relations of the physiological phenomenon
to the consciousness are represented as follows: the physiological
phenomenon consists in an excitement which, at one time, follows a direct
and short route from the door by which it enters the nervous system to the
door by which it makes its exit. In this case, it works like a simple

mechanical phenomenon; but sometimes it makes a longer journey, and
takes a circuitous road by which it passes into the higher nerve centres, and
it is at the moment when it takes this circuitous road that the phenomenon
of consciousness is produced. The use of this figure does not prejudge any
important question.
Going further, many contemporary authors do not content themselves with
the proposition that the consciousness is conditioned by the nervous
phenomenon, but suggest also that it is continually accompanied by it.
Every psychical fact of perception, of emotion, or of idea should have, it is
supposed, a physiological basis. It would therefore be, taken in its entirety,
psycho-physiological. This is called the parallelist theory.
We cannot discuss this here, as we shall meet with it again in the third part
of this book. It has the advantage of leading to a very simple definition of
unconsciousness. The unconscious is that which is purely physiological. We
represent to ourselves the mechanical part of the total phenomenon
continuing to produce itself, in the absence of the consciousness, as if this
last continued to follow and illuminate it.
Such are the principal conceptions that may be formed of the unconscious.
They are probably not the only ones, and our list is not exhaustive.
After having indicated what the unconscious is, we will terminate by
pointing out what it is not and what it cannot be.
We think, or at least we have impliedly supposed in the preceding
definitions, that the unconscious is only something unknown, which may
have been known, or which might become known under certain conditions,
and which only differs from the known by the one characteristic of not
being actually known. If this notion be correct, one has really not the right
to arm this unconsciousness with formidable powers. It has the power of the
reality to which it corresponds, but its character of unconsciousness adds
nothing to this. It is the same with it as with the science of the future. No
scholar will hesitate to admit that that science will be deeper and more
refined than that already formed. But it is not from the fact that it is
unknown that it will deserve its superiority: it is from the phenomena that it
will embrace. To give to that which is unconscious, as we here understand
it, an overwhelming superiority over the conscious as such, we must admit

that the consciousness is not only a useless luxury, but the dethronement of
the forces that it accompanies.
In the next place, I decline to admit that the consciousness itself can
become unconscious, and yet continue in some way under an unconscious
form. This would be, in my opinion, bringing together two conceptions
which contradict each other, and thus denying after having affirmed. From
the moment that the consciousness dies, there remains nothing of it, unless
it be the conditions of its appearance, conditions which are distinct from
itself. Between two moments of consciousness separated by time or by a
state of unconsciousness, there does not and cannot exist any link. I feel
incapable of imagining of what this link could be composed, unless it were
material—that is to say, unless it were supplied from the class of objects. I
have already said that the substantialist thesis endeavours to establish a
continuity between one consciousness and another separated by time, by
supposing a something durable, of which the consciousness would be a
property of intermittent manifestation. They would thus explain the
interruptions of consciousness as the interruptions in the light of a lamp.
When the light is extinguished, the lamp remains in darkness, but is still
capable of being lighted. Let us discard this metaphor, which may lead to
illusion. The concept of consciousness can furnish no link and no mental
state which remains when the consciousness is not made real; if this link
exists, it is in the permanence of the material objects and of the nervous
organism which allows the return of analogous conditions of matter.

FOOTNOTES:
[31] In metaphysics we reason, not on facts, but most often on conceptions. Now
just as facts are precise so conceptions are vague in outline. Facts are like
crystallised bodies, ideas like liquids and gases. We think we have an idea, and it
changes form without our perceiving it. We fancy we recognise one idea, and it
is but another, which differs slightly from the preceding one. By means of
distinctions we ought to struggle against this flowing away and flight of ideas.
[32] I think I have come across in ARISTOTLE the ingenious idea that the
enfeeblement of the consciousness and its disorder may be due to the
enfeeblement and disorder of the object. It is a theory which is by no means
improbable.

CHAPTER IX
DEFINITIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY
Let us resume the study of the preceding ideas in another form. Since,
moreover, to define mind is at the same time to define psychology, let us
seek for the truth which we can glean from the definitions of this science.
Our object is not to discover an exact definition, but to make use of those
already existing.
To define psychology is to describe the features of the domain over which
this science holds sway, and at the same time to indicate the boundaries
which separate it from its neighbours. At first sight this is an affair of
geometric survey, presenting no kind of difficulty; for psychology does not
merge by insensible transitions into the neighbouring sciences, as physics
does with chemistry, for example, or chemistry with biology.
To all the sciences of external nature psychology offers the violent
opposition of the moral to the physical world. It cannot be put in line with
the physical sciences. It occupies, on the contrary, a position apart. It is the
starting point, the most abstract and simple of the moral sciences; and it
bears the same relation to them that mechanics does to the physical.
All this is doubtless true; and yet a very great difficulty has been
experienced in condensing into a clear definition the essence of psychology.
This is proved by the multiplicity of definitions attempted. They are so
many because none of them has proved completely satisfactory. Their
abundance shows their insufficiency. I will try to introduce a little order into
these attempts, and propose to distribute the definitions of psychology into
the following categories:—
The definition by substance; the metaphysical definition par
excellence.
2. The definition by enumeration.
1.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

"
"
"
"
"

"
"
"
"
"

method.
degree of certainty.
content.
point of view.
the peculiar nature of mental laws.

We will rapidly run through this series of efforts at definition, and shall
criticise and reject nearly the whole of them; for the last alone seems exact
—that is to say, in harmony with the ideas laid down above.
Metaphysical definition has to-day taken a slightly archaistic turn.
Psychology used to be considered as the science of the soul. This is quite
abandoned. Modern authors have adopted the expression and also the idea
of Lange,[33] who was, I think, the first to declare that we ought to cultivate
a soulless psychology. This categorical declaration caused an uproar, and a
few ill-informed persons interpreted it to mean that the new psychology
which has spread in France under cover of the name of Ribot, sought to
deny the existence of the soul, and was calculated to incline towards
materialism. This is an error.
It is very possible, indeed, that several adepts of the new or experimental
psychology may be materialists from inward conviction. The exclusive
cultivation of external facts, of phenomena termed material, evidently tends
—this is a mystery to none—to incline the mind towards the metaphysical
doctrine of materialism. But, after making this avowal, it is right to add at
once that psychology, as a science of facts, is the vassal of no metaphysical
doctrine. It is neither spiritualist, materialist, nor monist, but a science of
facts solely. Ribot and his pupils have proclaimed this aloud at every
opportunity. Consequently it must be recognised that the rather
amphibological expression "soulless psychology" implies no negation of the
existence of the soul. It is—and this is quite a different thing—rather an
attitude of reserve in regard to this problem. We do not solve this problem;
we put it on one side.
And, certainly, we are right to do so. The soul, viewed as a substance—that
is, as a something distinct from psychical phenomena, which, while being
their cause and support, yet remains inaccessible to our direct means of

cognition—is only an hypothesis, and it cannot serve as objective to a
science of facts. This would imply a contradiction in terms.
Unfortunately; we must confess that if it be right to relegate to metaphysics
the discussion on the concept of the soul, it does not really suffice to purge
our minds of all metaphysics; and a person who believes himself to be a
simple and strict experimentalist is often a metaphysician without knowing
it. These excommunications of metaphysics also seem rather childish at the
present day. There is less risk than some years ago in declaring that: "Here
metaphysics commence and positive science ends, and I will go no further."
There is even a tendency in modern psychologists to interest themselves in
the highest philosophical problems, and to take up a certain position with
regard to them.
The second kind of definition is, we have said, that by enumeration. It
consists in placing before the eyes of the reader an assortment of
psychological phenomena and then saying: "These are the things
psychology studies." One will take readily as samples the ideas, reasonings,
emotions, and other manifestations of mental life. If this is only a strictly
provisional definition, a simple introduction to the subject, we accept it
literally. It may serve to give us a first impression of things, and to refresh
the memories of those who, by a rather extraordinary chance, would not
doubt that psychology studies our thoughts. But whatever may be the
number of these deeply ignorant persons, they constitute, I think, a
negligible quantity; and, after these preliminaries, we must come to a real
definition and not juggle with the problem, which consists in indicating in
what the spiritual is distinguished from the material. Let us leave on one
side, therefore, the definitions by enumeration.
Now comes the definition by method. Numbers of authors have supposed
that it is by its method that psychology is distinguished from the other
sciences.
To the mind is attached the idea of the within, to nature the idea of being
without the mind, of constituting a "without" (un dehors). It is a vague idea,
but becomes precise in a good many metaphors, and has given rise to
several forms of speech. Since the days of Locke, we have always spoken
of the internal life of the mind as contrasted with the external life, of

subjective reality as contrasted with objective reality; and in the same way
we oppose the external senses to the inner sense (the internal perception),
which it has at times been proposed to erect into a sixth sense. Though no
longer quite the Cartesian dualism, this is still a dualism.
It has also been said that psychology is the science of introspection, and, in
addition, that scientific psychology is a controlled introspection. This
science of the "internal facts of man" would thus be distinguished from the
other natural sciences which are formed by the use of our outer senses, by
external observation—that is to say, to use a neologism, by externospection.
This verbal symmetry may satisfy for a moment minds given to words, but
on reflection it is perceived that the distinction between introspection and
externospection does not correspond to a fundamental and constant
difference in the nature of things or in the processes of cognition. I
acknowledge it with some regret, and thus place myself in contradiction
with myself; for I for a long time believed, and have even said in print, that
psychology is the science of introspection. My error arose from my having
made too many analyses of detail, and not having mounted to a sufficiently
wide-reaching conception.
The definition I have given of consciousness is the implied condemnation
of the above ideas. Consciousness, being nothing but an act of revelation,
has neither a within nor a without; it does not correspond to a special
domain which would be an inner one with regard to another domain.
Every consideration on the position of things is borrowed from the sphere
of the object, and remains foreign to the sphere of the consciousness. It is
by an abuse of language that we speak of the outer world in relation to the
world of consciousness, and it is pure imagination on the part of
philosophers to have supposed that our sensations are first perceived as
internal states and states of consciousness, and are subsequently projected
without to form the outer world. The notion of internal and external is only
understood for certain objects which we compare by position to certain
others.
In fact, we find that the opposition between an external and an internal
series is generally founded on two characteristics: sensation is considered
external in relation to the idea, and an object of cognition is considered as

internal when it is accessible only to ourselves. When these two
characteristics are isolated from each other, one may have doubts; but when
they co-exist, then the outwardness or inwardness appears fully evidenced.
We see then that this distinction has nothing to do with the value of
consciousness, and has nothing mental about it.
It is thus that our ideas are judged from internal events. It is our microcosm
opposed to the macrocosm. It is the individual opposed to the social.
Looking at an external object, we remain in communion with our fellows,
for we receive, or think we receive, identical sensations. At all events, we
receive corresponding sensations. On the other hand, my thought is mine,
and is known to me alone; it is my sanctuary, my private closet, where
others do not enter. Every one can see what I see, but no one knows what I
think.
But this difference in the accessibility of phenomena is not due to their
peculiar nature. It is connected with a different fact, with the modes of
excitement which call them forth. If the visual sensation is common to all, it
is because the exciting cause of the sensation is an object external to our
nervous systems, and acting at a distance on all.[34] The tactile sensation is
at the beginning more personal to the one who experiences it, since it
requires contact; and the lower sensations are in this intimacy still in
progress. And then, the same object can give rise, in common-place
circumstances, to a sensation either common to all beings or special to one
alone. The capsule of antipyrine which I swallow is, before my doing so,
visible to all eyes; once in my mouth, I am the only one to perceive it. It is
therefore possible that the same sensation, according to the displacements
of the object which excites it, may make part of the internal or of the
external series; and as all psychic life is sensation, even effort, and, as we
are assured, emotion, it follows that our argument extends to all the
psychical elements.
Finally, the internal or external character of events, which might be called
their geographical position, is a characteristic which has no influence upon
the method destined to take cognisance of it. The method remains one.
Introspection does not represent a source of cognition distinct from
externospection, for the same faculties of the mind—reason, attention, and
reflection—act on sensation, the source of the so-called external sciences,

and on the idea, the source of the so-called inner science. A fact can be
studied by essentially the same process, whether regarded by the eyes or
depicted by the memory. The consciousness changes its object and
orientation, not its nature. It is as if, with the same opera-glass, we looked
in turn at the wall of the room and through the window.
I can even quote on this point a significant fact: there are observers who are
organised in such a way that they especially observe by memory. Placed
before the sensorial phenomenon which strikes their senses, they are
sometimes amazed, as if hypnotised; they require to get away from it to
regain consciousness of themselves, to analyse the fact, and to master it,
and it is by means of the memory that they study it, on condition, of course,
of afterwards coming back to verify their conclusions by a fresh observation
from nature. Will it be said that the physicist, the chemist, or the biologist
who follows this slow method, and who thus observes retroactively,
practises physics and biology by introspection? Evidently this would be
ridiculous.
Conversely, introspection may, in certain cases, adopt the procedure of
externospection. No doubt it would be inexact to say that the perception of
one of our ideas always takes place through the same mechanism as the
perception of one of our sensations. To give an account of what we think
does not imply the same work as in the case of what we see; for, generally,
our thoughts and our images do not appear to us spontaneously. They are
first sought for by us, and are only realised after having been wished for.
We go from the vague to the precise, from the confused to the clear; the
direction of thought precedes, then, its realisation in images; and the latter,
being expected, is necessarily comprehended when it is formed. But we
may come across curious circumstances in which it is the image which has
precedence over its appearance, and in that case it is exact to say that this
uninvoked image must be interpreted and recognised as if it were an
external object. In cases of this kind, there passes through our mind
something which surprises us. I see, by internal vision, a face with a red
nose, and I have to search my memory for a long time, even for days, in
order to give precision to the vague feeling that I have seen it before, so as
to finally say with confidence, "It is So and So!" Or else I hear in my inner
ear a certain voice, with a metallic tone and authoritative inflections: this
voice pronounces scientific phrases, gives a series of lectures, but I know

not to whom it belongs, and it costs me a long effort to reach the
interpretation: it is the voice of M. Dastre! There is, then, a certain space of
time, more or less long, in which we can correctly assert that we are not
aware of what we are thinking; we are in the presence of a thought in the
same state of uncertainty as in that of an external, unknown, and novel
object. The labour of classification and of interpretation cast upon us is of
the same order; and, when this labour is effected incorrectly, it may end in
an illusion. Therefore illusions of thought are quite as possible as illusions
of the senses, though rarer for the reasons above stated. But the question of
frequency has no theoretical importance.
I have shown elsewhere, by experiments on hysterics, that it is possible by
the intermediary of their insensibility to touch to suggest ideas on the value
of which the patients make mistakes. For instance, you take the finger in
which they have no sensation, you touch it, you bend it. The patient, not
seeing what is done, does not feel it, but the tactile sensation unfelt by their
principal consciousness somehow awakes the visual image of the finger;
this enters into the field of consciousness, and most often is not recognised
by the subject, who describes the occurrence in his own way; he claims, for
instance, that he thinks of sticks or of columns. In reality he does not know
of what he is thinking, and we know better than he. He is thinking of his
finger, and does not recognise it.
All these examples show that the clearly defined characteristics into which
it is sought to divide extrospection and introspection do not exist. There is,
however, a reason for preserving the distinction, because it presents a real
interest for the psychology of the individual. These two words introspection
and extrospection admirably convey the difference in the manner of
thinking between those who from preference look, and those who from
preference reflect. On the one hand, the observers, who are often men of
action; on the other, the speculators, who are often mystics. But it would be
no more legitimate by this means to separate psychology and physics than
to say, for instance, "There are two kinds of geology: one is the geology of
France, for one is acquainted with it without going from home, and the
other is that of the rest of the world, because in order to know it one must
cross the frontier."

We reject, therefore, the definition drawn from the difference of method. At
bottom there is no difference of method, but only differences of process, of
technique. The method is always the same, for it is derived from the
application of a certain number of laws to the objects of cognition, and
these laws remain the same in all spheres of application.
Here is another difference of method which, if it were true, would have an
incalculable importance. Psychology, we are told, is a science of direct and
immediate experiment; it studies facts as they present themselves to our
consciousness, while the natural sciences are sciences of indirect and
mediate experiment, for they are compelled to interpret the facts of
consciousness and draw from them conclusions on nature. It has also been
said, in a more ambitious formula, "The science of physical objects is
relative; logical science is absolute."
Let us examine this by the rapid analysis of any perception taken at
haphazard. What I perceive directly, immediately, we are told, is not the
object, it is my state of consciousness; the object is inferred; concluded, and
taken cognisance of through the intermediary of my state of consciousness.
We only know it, says Lotze, circa rem. It is therefore apprehended less
immediately, and every natural science employs a more roundabout method
than that of psychology. This last, by studying states of consciousness,
which alone are known to us directly, comprehends reality itself, absolute
reality. "There is more absolute reality," M. Rabier boldly says, "in the
simple feeling that a man, or even an animal, has of its pain when beaten
than in all the theories of physics, for, beyond these theories, it can be
asked, what are the things that exist. But it is an absurdity to ask one's self
if, beyond the pain of which one is conscious, there be not another pain
different from that one."[35]
Let us excuse in psychologists this petty and common whim for
exaggerating the merit of the science they pursue. But here the limit is
really passed, and no scholar will admit that the perception and
representation of a body, as it may take place in the brain of a Berthelot, can
present any inferiority as a cognition of the absolute, to the pain felt by the
snail I crush under my foot. Nobody except metaphysicians will
acknowledge that psychology is a more precise and certain science than
physics or chemistry.

The criterion furnished by the development of the respective sciences
would prove just the contrary. The observations of psychology are always
rather unprecise. Psychological phenomena, notwithstanding the efforts of
Fechner and his school, are not yet measured with the same strictness and
ease as the tangible reality. To speak plainly, the psychologist who vaunts
the superiority of his method, and only shows inferior results, places
himself in a somewhat ridiculous and contradictory position; he deserves to
be compared to those spiritualists who claim the power of evoking the souls
of the illustrious dead and only get from them platitudes.
In the main the arguments of the metaphysicians given above appear to me
to contain a grave error. This consists in supposing that the natural sciences
study the reality hidden beneath sensation, and only make use of this fact as
of a sign which enables them to get back from effect to cause. This is quite
inexact. That the natural sciences are limited by sensation is true; but they
do not go outside it, they effect their constructions with sensation alone.
And the reason is very simple: it is the only thing they know. To the
metaphysical psychologist, who claims sensation as his own property,
saying, "But this sensation is a state of my consciousness, it is mine, it is
myself," the physicist has the right to answer: "I beg your pardon! this
sensation is the external object that I am studying; it is my column of
mercury, my spring, my precipitate, my amœba; I comprehend these objects
directly, and I want no other." Psychology finds itself, therefore, exactly on
the same footing as the other sciences in the degree in which it studies
sensations that it considers as its own property. I have already said that the
sensations proper to psychology are hardly represented otherwise than by
the emotional sensations produced by the storms in the apparatus of organic
life.
We now come to the definitions by content. They have been numerous, but
we shall only quote a few. The most usual consists in saying, that
Psychology studies the facts of consciousness. This formula passes, in
general, as satisfactory. The little objection raised against it is, that it
excludes the unconscious facts which play so important a part in explaining
the totality of mental life; but it only requires some usual phrase to repair
this omission. One might add, for instance, to the above formula: conscious
facts and those which, while unconscious under certain conditions, are yet
conscious in others.

This is not, however, the main difficulty, which is far more serious. On
close examination, it is seen that the term, fact of consciousness, is very
elastic, and that for a reason easy to state. This is, that all facts which exist
and are revealed to us reach us by the testimony of the consciousness, and
are, consequently, facts of consciousness. If I look at a locomotive, and
analyse its machinery, I act like a mechanic; if I study under the microscope
the structure of infusoria, I practise biology; and yet the sight of the
locomotive, the perception of the infusoria, are just facts of consciousness,
and should belong to psychology, if one takes literally the above definition,
which is so absolute that it absorbs the entire world into the science of the
mind. It might, indeed, be remarked that certain phenomena would remain
strictly psychological, such as, for instance, the emotions, the study of
which would not be disputed by any physical science; for the world of
nature offers us nothing comparable to an emotion or an effort of will,
while, on the other hand, everything which is the object of physical science
—that is, everything which can be perceived by our external senses—may
be claimed by psychology. Therefore, it is very evident the above definition
is much too wide, and does not agree with solo definito. It does not succeed
in disengaging the essential characteristic of physics. This characteristic
indeed exists, and we foresee it, but we do not formulate it.
Another definition by content has not been much more happy. To separate
the material from the moral, the conception of Descartes was remembered,
and we were told that: "Psychology is the science of what exists only in
time, while physics is the science of what exists at once in time and in
space."
To this theoretical reasoning it might already be objected that, in fact, and in
the life we lead, we never cease to localise in space, though somewhat
vaguely, our thought, our Ego, and our intellectual whole. At this moment I
am considering myself, and taking myself as an example. I am writing these
lines in my study, and no metaphysical argument can cause me to abandon
my firm conviction that my intellectual whole is in this room, on the second
floor of my house at Meudon. I am here, and not elsewhere. My body is
here; and my soul, if I have one, is here. I am where my body is; I believe
even that I am within my body.

This localisation, which certainly has not the exactness nor even the
characteristics of the localisation of a material body in space, seems to me
to result from the very great importance we attach, to the existence of our
body in perception and in movement. Our body accompanies all our
perceptions; its changes of position cause these perceptions to vary; the
accidents which happen to it bring us pleasure or pain. Some of its
movements are under our orders; we observe that others are the
consequences of our thoughts and our emotions. It occupies, therefore,
among the objects of cognition a privileged place, which renders it more
intimate and more dear to us than other objects. There is no need to inquire
here whether, in absolute reality, I am lodged within it, for this "I" is an
artificial product manufactured from memories. I have before explained
what is the value of the relation subject-object. It is indisputable that in the
manufacture of the subject we bring in the body. This is too important an
element for it not to have the right to form part of the synthesis; it is really
its nucleus. As, on the other hand, all the other elements of the synthesis are
psychical, invisible, and reduced to being faculties and powers, it may be
convenient to consider them as occupying the centre of the body or of the
brain. There is no need to discuss this synthesis, for it is one of pure
convenience. As well inquire whether the personality of a public company
is really localised at its registered offices, round the green baize cover
which adorns the table in the boardroom.
Another definition of psychology, which is at once a definition by content
and a definition by method, has often been employed by philosophers and
physiologists. It consists in supposing that there really exist two ways of
arriving at the cognition of objects: the within and the without. These two
ways are as opposed to each other as the right and wrong side of a stuff. It is
in this sense that psychology is the science of the within and looks at the
wrong side of the stuff, while the natural sciences look at the right side. And
it is so true, they add, that the same phenomenon appears under two
radically different forms according as we look at it from the one or the other
point of view. Thus, it is pointed out to us, every one of our thoughts is in
correlation with a particular state of our cerebral matter; our thought is the
subjective and mental face; the corresponding cerebral process is the
objective and material face.

Then the difference between representation, which is a purely psychological
phenomenon, and a cerebral state which is a material one, and reducible to
movement, is insisted upon; and it is declared that these two orders of
phenomena are separated by irreducible differences.
Lastly, to take account of the meaning of these differences, and to explain
them, it is pointed out that they are probably connected with the modes of
cognition which intervene to comprehend the mental and the physical. The
mental phenomenon, we are told, is comprehended by itself, and as it is; it
is known without any mystery, and in its absolute reality. The physical
phenomenon, on the contrary, only reaches us through the intermediary of
our nerves, more or less transformed in consequence by the handling in
transport. It is an indirect cognition which causes us to comprehend matter;
we have of this last only a relative and apparent notion, which sufficiently
explains how it may differ from a phenomenon of thought.
I have already had occasion to speak of this dualism, when we were
endeavouring to define sensation. We return to its criticism once more, for it
is a conception which in these days has become classic; and it is only by
repeatedly attacking it that it will be possible to demonstrate its error.
To take an example: I look at the plain before me, and see a flock of sheep
pass over it. At the same time an observer is by my side and is not looking
at the same thing as myself. It is not at the plain that he looks; it is, I will
suppose, within my brain. Armed with a microscope à la Jules Verne, he
succeeds in seeing what is passing beneath my skull, and he notices within
my fibres and nerve cells those phenomena of undulation which
physiologists have hitherto described hypothetically. This observer notices
then, that, while I am looking over the plain, my optic nerve conveys a
certain kind of movements—these are, I suppose, displacements of
molecules which execute a complicated kind of dance. The movement
follows the course of the optic nerve, traverses the chiasma, goes along the
fascia, passes the internal capsule, and finally arrives at the visual centres of
the occipital region. Here, then, are the two terms of comparison
constituted: on the one hand, we have a certain representation—that is, my
own; and on the other hand, coinciding with this representation we have the
dynamic changes in the nerve centres. These are the two things constituting
the right and wrong side of the stuff. We shall be told: "See how little

similarity there is here! A representation is a physical fact, a movement of
molecules a material fact." And further, "If these two facts are so little like
each other, it is because they reach us by two different routes."
I think both these affirmations equally disputable. Let us begin with the
second. Where does one see that we possess two different sources of
knowledge? Or that we can consider an object under two different aspects?
Where are our duplicate organs of the senses, of which the one is turned
inward and the other outward? In the example chosen for this discussion, I
have supposed two persons, each of whom experiences a visual perception.
One looks at one object, the other at another; but both are looking with the
same organs of sense, that is, with their eyes. How is it possible to
understand that these eyes can, in turn, according to the necessity of the
moment, see the two faces, physical and mental, of the same object?
They are the two faces of an identical object, is the answer made to us,
because the two visions, although applied to the same object, are essentially
different. On the one hand is a sensation of displacement, of movement, of a
dance executed by the molecules of some proteid substance; on the other
hand is a flock of sheep passing over the plain at a distance of a hundred
metres away.
It seems to me that here also the argument advanced is not sound. In the
first place, it is essential to notice that not only are the two paths of
cognition identical, but also that the perceptions are of the same nature.
There is in this no opposition between the physical and the mental. What is
compared are the two phenomena, which are both mixed and are physicomental—physical, through the object to which they are applied, mental,
through the act of cognition they imply. To perceive an object in the plain
and to perceive a dynamic state of the brain are two operations which each
imply an act of cognition; and, in addition, the object of this knowledge is
as material in the one as in the other case. A flock of sheep is matter just as
much as my brain.
No doubt, here are objects which differ; my observer and myself have not
the same perception. I acknowledge, but do not wonder at it. How could our
two perceptions be similar? I look at the sheep, and he at the interior of my
brain. It is not astonishing that, looking at such different objects, we should

receive images also different. Or, again, if this other way of putting it be
preferred, I would say: the individual A looks at the flock through the
intermediary of his nervous system, while B looks at it through that of two
nervous systems, put as it were end to end (though not entirely), his own
nervous system first, and then that of A. How, then, could they experience
the same sensation?
They could only have an identical sensation if the idea of the ancients were
to be upheld, who understood the external perception of bodies to result
from particles detaching themselves from their bodies, and after a more or
less lengthy flight, striking and entering into our organs of sense.[36]
Let us imagine, just for a moment, one of our nerves—the optic nerve, for
instance—transformed into a hollow tube, along which the emissions of
miniatures should wend their way. In this case, evidently, if so strange a
disposition were to be realised, and if B could see what was flowing in the
optic nerve of A, he would experience a sensation almost analogous to that
of A. Whenever the latter saw a dog, a sheep, or a shepherd, B would
likewise see in the optic canal minute dogs, microscopic sheep, and
Lilliputian shepherds. At the cost of such a childish conception, a parity of
content in the sensations of our two spectators A and B might be supposed.
But I will not dwell on this.
The above considerations seem to me to explain the difference generally
noticed between thought and the physiological process. It is not a difference
of nature, an opposition of two essences, or of two worlds—it is simply a
difference of object; just that which separates my visual perception of a tree
and my visual perception of a dog. There remains to know in what manner
we understand the relation of these two processes: this is another problem
which we will examine later.
Since the content does not give us the differentiation we desire, we will
abandon the definitions of psychology by content. What now remains? The
definitions from the point of view. The same fact may he looked at, like a
landscape, from different points of view, and appears different with the
changes therein. It is so with the facts we consider psychical, and the
autonomy of psychology would thus be a matter of point of view.

It has, then, been supposed—and this is a very important proposition—that
the distinctive feature of psychical facts does not consist in their forming a
class of particular events. On the contrary, their characteristic is to be
studied in their dependency on the persons who bring them about. This
interesting affirmation is not new: it may be read in the works of Mach,
Külpe, Münsterberg, and, especially, of Ebbinghaus, from whom I quote the
following lines of quite remarkable clearness: "Psychology is not
distinguished from sciences like physics and biology, which are generally
and rightly opposed to it, by a different content, in the way that, for
instance, zoology is distinguished from mineralogy or astronomy. It has the
same content, but considers it from a different point of view and with a
different object. It is the science, not of a given part of the world, but of the
whole world, considered, however, in a certain relation. It studies, in the
world, those formations, processes, and relations, the properties of which
are essentially determined by the properties and functions of an organism,
of an organised individual.... Psychology, in short, considers the world from
an individual and subjective point of view, while the science of physics
studies it as if it were independent of us."
Over these definitions by point of view, one might quibble a little; for those
who thus define psychology are not always consistent with themselves. In
other passages of their writings they do not fail to oppose psychical to
physiological phenomena, and they proclaim the irreducible heterogeneity
of these two orders of phenomena and the impossibility of seeing in physics
the producing cause of the moral. Ebbinghaus is certainly one of the
modern writers who have most strongly insisted on this idea of opposition
between the physiological and the psychical, and he is a convinced dualist.
Now I do not very clearly understand in what the principle of heterogeneity
can consist to a mind which admits, on the other hand, that psychology does
not differ from the physical sciences by its content.
However, I confine myself here to criticising the consequences and not the
starting point. The definition of the psychical phenomenon by the point of
view seems to me correct, although it has more concision than clearness; for
it rests especially upon a material metaphor, and the expression "point of
view" hardly applies except to the changes of perspective furnished by
visible objects.

It would be more exact to say that psychology specially studies certain
objects of cognition, such as those which have the character of
representations (reminiscences, ideas, concepts), the emotions, the
volitions, and the reciprocal influences of these objects among themselves.
It studies, then, a part of the material world, of that world which till now
has been called psychological, because it does not come under the senses,
and because it is subjective and inaccessible to others than ourselves; it
studies the laws of those objects, which laws have been termed mental.[37]
These laws are not recognised, popularly speaking, either in physics or in
biology; they constitute for us a cognition apart from that of the natural
world. Association by resemblance, for example, is a law of consciousness;
it is a psychological law which has no application nor counterpart in the
world of physics or biology. We may therefore sum up what has been said
by the statement that psychology is the study of a certain number of laws,
relations, and connections.
As to the particular feature which distinguishes mental from physical laws,
we can formulate it, as does William James, by saying that the essence of a
mental law is to be teleological, or, if the phrase be preferred, we can say
that mental activity is a finalistic activity, which expends itself as will in the
pursuit of future ends, and as intelligence in the choice of the means
deemed capable of serving those ends. An act of intelligence is recognised
by the fact of its aiming at an end, and employing for this end one means
chosen out of many. Finality and intelligence are thus synonymous. In
opposition to mental law, physical law is mechanical, by which expression
is simply implied the absence of finality. Finality opposed to mechanism;
such is the most concise and truest expression in which must be sought the
distinctive attribute of psychology and of the moral sciences, the essential
characteristic by which psychological are separated from physical facts.
I think it may be useful to dwell a little on the mental laws which I have just
opposed to the physical, and whose object is to assure preadaptation and
form a finality.[38] Their importance cannot be exaggerated. Thanks to his
power of preadaptation, the being endowed with intelligence acquires an
enormous advantage over everything which does not reason. No doubt, as
has been shrewdly remarked, natural selection resembles a finality, for it
ends in an adaptation of beings to their surroundings. There is therefore,

strictly speaking, such a thing as finality without intelligence. But the
adaptation resulting therefrom is a crude one, and proceeds by the
elimination of all that does not succeed in adapting itself; it is a butchery.
Real finalism saves many deaths, many sufferings, and many abortions.[39]
Let us examine, then, the process of preadaptation; it will enable us to
thoroughly comprehend, not only the difference between the physical and
the psychical laws, but the reason why the psychical manages in some
fashion to mould itself upon the physical law.
Now, the means employed by preadaptation is, if we take the matter in its
simplest form, to be aware of sensations before they are experienced. If we
reflect that all prevision implies a previous knowledge of the probable trend
of events, it will be understood that the part played by intelligence consists
in becoming imbued with the laws of nature, for the purpose of imitating its
workings. By the laws of nature, we understand here only that order of real
sensations, the knowledge of which is sufficient to fulfil the wants of
practical life. To us there are always gaps in this order, because the
sensation it is important for us to know is separated from us either by the
barriers of time or of space, or by the complication of useless sensations.
Thence the necessity of interpolations. That which we do not perceive
directly by our senses, we are obliged to represent to ourselves by our
intelligence; the image does the work of sensation, and supplements the
halting sensation in everything which concerns adaptation.
To replace the inaccessible sensation by the corresponding image, is
therefore to create in ourselves a representation of the outer world which is,
on all the points most useful to us, more complete than the direct and
sensorial presentation of the moment. There is in us a power of creation,
and this power exercises itself in the imitation of the work of nature; it
imitates its order, it reconstitutes on the small scale adapted to our minds,
the great external order of events. Now, this work of imitation is only really
possible if the imitator has some means at his disposal analogous to those of
the model.
Our minds could not divine the designs of nature, if the laws of images had
nothing in common with the laws of nature. We are thus led to confront
these two orders of laws with each other; but, before doing so, one more

preliminary word is necessary. We have up till now somewhat limited the
problem, in order to understand it. We have reduced the psychological
being to one single function, the intellectual, and to one single object of
research, the truth. This is, however, an error which has often been
committed, which is now known and catalogued, called intellectualism, or
the abuse of intellectualism. It is committed for this very simple reason, that
it is the intellectual part of our being which best allows itself to be
understood, and, so to speak, intellectualised. But this leaves out of the
question a part of our entire mental being so important and so eminent, that
if this part be suppressed, the intelligence would cease to work and would
have no more utility than a machine without motive power. Our own motive
power is the will, the feeling, or the tendency. Will is perhaps the most
characteristic psychical function, since, as I have already had occasion to
say, nothing analogous to it is met with in the world of nature. Let us
therefore not separate the will from the intelligence, let us incarnate them
one in the other; and, instead of representing the function of the mind as
having for its aim knowledge, foresight, the combination of means, and
self-adaptation, we shall be much nearer the truth in representing to
ourselves a being who wills to know, wills to foresee, and wills to adapt
himself, for, after all, he wills to live.
Having said this, let us compare the psychological law and that of nature.
Are they identical? We shall be told that they are not, since, as a fact, errors
are committed at every moment by the sudden failures of human reason.
This is the first idea which arises. Human error, it would seem, is the best
proof that the two laws in question are not alike, and we will readily add
that a falling stone does not mistake its way, that the crystal, in the course of
formation does not miss taking the crystalline shape, because they form part
of physical nature, and are subject in consequence to its determinism. But
this is faulty reasoning, and a moment of reflection demonstrates it in the
clearest possible manner; for adaptation may miss its aim without the being
who adapts himself and his surroundings necessarily obeying different laws.
When the heat of a too early spring causes buds to burst forth prematurely
which are afterwards destroyed by frost, there is produced a fault of
adjustment which resembles an error of adaptation, and the bringing
forward of this error does not necessarily imply that the tree and the whole
of physical nature are obeying different laws. Moreover, the difference

between the laws of nature and those of the understanding does not need
deduction by reasoning from an abstract principle; it is better to say that it is
directly observable, and this is how I find that it presents itself to us.
The essential law of nature is relatively easy to formulate, as it is comprised
in the very definition of law. It simply consists in the sentence: uniformity
under similar conditions. We might also say: a constant relation between
two or several phenomena, which can also be expressed in a more abstract
way by declaring that the law of nature rests on the combination of two
notions, identity and constancy.
On the other hand, the laws of our psychical activity partly correspond to
the same tendencies, and it would be easy to demonstrate that the
microcosm of our thoughts is governed by laws which are also an
expression of these two combined notions of constancy and identity. It is,
above all, in the working of the intellectual machine, the best known and
the most clearly analysed up till now, that we see the application of this
mental law which resembles, as we say, on certain sides, the physical law:
and the best we can do for our demonstration will doubtless be to dissect
our reasoning powers. Reason, a process essential to thought in action, is
developed in accordance with a law which resembles in the most curious
manner a physical law. It resembles it enough to imitate it, to conform to it,
and, so to speak, to mould itself on it.

Now, the reason does not follow the caprices of thought, it is subject to
rules; it results from the properties of the images, those properties which we
have above referred to, the material character of which we have recognised,
and which are two in number—similarity and contiguity, as they are termed
in the jargon of the schools. They are properties which have for their aim to
bring things together, to unite, and to synthetise. They are unceasingly at
work, and so apparent in their labour that they have long been known. We
know, since the time of Aristotle, that two facts perceived at the same time
reproduce themselves together in the memory—this is the law of contiguity;
and that two facts perceived separately, but which are similar, are brought
together in our mind—this is the law of similarity.
Now, similarity and contiguity form by combination the essential part of all
kinds of reasoning, and this reasoning, thus understood, works in a fashion
which much resembles (we shall see exactly in what degree) a physical law.
I wish to show this in a few words. What renders my demonstration difficult
and perhaps obscure is, that we shall be obliged to bring together rather
unexpectedly categories of phenomena which are generally considered
separate.
The distinctive attribute of the reason consists, as I have said, in the setting
to work of these two elementary properties, similarity and contiguity. It
consists, in fact, in extending continuity by similarity; in endowing with
identical properties and similar accompaniments things which resemble
each other; in other words, it consists in impliedly asserting that the
moment two things are identical in one point they are so for all the rest.
This will be fairly well understood by imagining what takes place when
mental images having the above-mentioned properties meet. Suppose that B
is associated with C, and that A resembles B. In consequence of their
resemblance the passing from A to B is easy; and then B suggesting C by
contiguity, it happens that this C is connected with A connected, though, in
reality, they have never been tried together. I say they are associated on the
basis of their relation to B, which is the rallying point. It is thus that, on
seeing a piece of red-hot iron (A), I conclude it is hot (C), because I
recollect distinctly or unconsciously another piece of red-hot iron (B), of
which I once experienced the heat. It is this recollection B which logicians,
in their analysis of logical, verbal, and formal argument, call the middle

term. Our representation of the process of reasoning is not special to
argument. It also expresses the process of invention, and every kind of
progress from the known to the unknown. It is an activity which creates
relations, which assembles and binds together, and the connections made
between different representations are due to their partial identities, which
act as solder to two pieces of metal.
It will now be understood that these relations between the images curiously
resemble the external order of things, the order of our sensations, the order
of nature, the physical law. This is because this physical law also has the
same character and expresses itself similarly. We might say "all things
which resemble each other have the same properties," or "all things alike on
one point resemble each other on all other points." But immediately we do
so, the difference between the physical and the mental law becomes
apparent. The formula we have given is only true on condition that many
restrictions and distinctions are made.
The process of nature is so to do that the same phenomenon always unfolds
itself in the same order. But this process is not always comprehended in real
life, for it is hidden from our eyes by the manifold combinations of chance;
in the reality that we perceive there is a crowd of phenomena which
resemble each other but are not really the same. There are a number of
phenomena which co-exist or follow each other without this order of coexistence or succession being necessary or constant. In other words, there
are resemblances which are the marks of something, as a logician would
say, and others which are not the marks of anything; there are relations of
time and space which are the expression of a law; there are some which are
accidental, and may possibly never be reproduced.
It would be a wonderful advantage if every scientific specialist would make
out a list of the non-significant properties that he recognises in matter. The
chemist, for example, would show us that specific weight has hardly any
value in diagnosis, that the crystalline form of a salt is often not its own,
that its colour especially is almost negligible because an immense number
of crystals are white or colourless, that precipitation by a given substance
does not ordinarily suffice to characterise a body, and so on. The botanist,
on his part, would show us that, in determining plants, absolute dimension
is less important than proportion, colour less important than form, certain

structures of organs less important than others. The pathologist would teach
us that most pathological symptoms have but a trivial value; the cries, the
enervation, the agitation of a patient, even the delirium which so affects the
bystanders, are less characteristic of fever than the rate of his pulse, and the
latter less than the temperature of the armpit or the dryness of the tongue,
&c. At every moment the study of science reveals resemblances of facts and
contiguities of facts which must be neglected for the sake of others. And if
we pass from this profound knowledge of the objects to the empirical
knowledge, to the external perception of bodies, it is in immense number
that one espies around one traps laid by nature. The sound we hear
resembles several others, all produced by different causes; many of our
visual sensations likewise lend themselves to the most varied
interpretations; by the side of the efficient cause of an event we find a
thousand entangled contingencies which appear so important that to
disentangle them we are as much perplexed as the savage, who, unable to
discriminate between causes and coincidences, returns to drink at the well
which has cured him, carefully keeping to the same hour, the same gestures,
and the same finery.
The reason of this is that the faculty of similarity and the faculty of
contiguity do not give the distinction, necessary as it is, between
resemblances and co-existences which are significant and those which are
not. The causal nexus between two phenomena is not perceived as
something apart and sui generis; it is not even perceived at all. We perceive
only their relation in time and space, and it is our mind which raises a
succession to the height of a causal connection, by intercalating between
cause and effect something of what we ourselves feel when we voluntarily
order the execution of a movement. This is not the place to inquire what are
the experimental conditions in which we subject phenomena to this
anthropomorphic transformation; it will suffice for us to repeat here that, in
perception, a chance relation between phenomena impresses us in the same
way as when it is the expression of a law.
Our intellectual machine sometimes works in accord with the external law
and at others makes mistakes and goes the wrong way. Then we are obliged
to correct it, and to try a better adjustment, either by profounder
experimenting with nature (methods of concordance, discordance,
variations, &c.), or by a comparison of different judgments and arguments

made into a synthesis; and this collaboration of several concordant activities
ends in a conclusion which can never represent the truth, but only the
probable truth. The study of the laws of the mind shows us too clearly, in
fact, their fluidity with regard to the laws of nature for us not to accept
probabilism. There exists no certitude—only very varied degrees of
probability. Daily practice contents itself with a very low degree of
probability; judicial logic demands a rather higher one, especially when it is
a question of depriving one of our fellow-creatures of liberty or life.
Science claims one higher still. But there is never anything but differences
of degrees in probability and conjecture.
This, then, is the definition of psychology that we propose. It studies a
certain number of laws which we term mental, in opposition to those of
external nature, from which they differ, but which, properly speaking, do
not deserve the qualification of mental, since they are—or at least the best
known of them are—laws of the images, and the images are material
elements. Although it may seem absolutely paradoxical, psychology is a
science of matter—the science of a part of matter which has the property of
preadaptation.

FOOTNOTES:
[33] LANGE, Histoire du Matérialisme, II., 2me. partie, chap. iii.
[34] Let us remark, in passing, how badly nature has organised the system of
communication between thinking beings. In what we experience we have
nothing in common with our fellows; each one experiences his own sensations
and not those of others. The only meeting point of different minds is found in the
inaccessible domain of the noumena.
[35] E. RABIER, Leçons de Philosophie, "Psychologie," p. 33.
[36] This seems to have been the opinion of Democritus. The modern doctrine of
radiation from the human body, if established, would go nearly as far as the
supposition in the text. Up till now, however, it lacks confirmation.—ED.
[37] I am compelled, much against my will, to use throughout this passage an
equivocal expression, that of "mental law," or law of consciousness, or
psychological law. I indicate by this the laws of contiguity and of similarity; as
they result from the properties of the images, and as these are of a material
nature, they are really physical and material laws like those of external nature.
But how can all these laws be called physical laws without running the risk of
confusing them one with the other?

[38] Finality seems to be here used in the sense of the doctrine which regards
perfection as the final cause of existence.—ED.
[39] See a very interesting article by E. GOBLOT, "La Finalité sans Intelligence,"
Revue de Métaphysique, July 1900.

BOOK III

THE UNION OF THE SOUL[40] AND THE
BODY

CHAPTER I
THE MIND HAS AN INCOMPLETE LIFE
The problem of the union of the mind and the body is not one of those
which present themselves in pure speculation; it has its roots in
experimental facts, and is forced upon us by the necessity of explaining
observations such as those we are about to quote.
The force of our consciousness, the correctness of our judgments, our
tempers and our characters, the state of health of our minds, and also their
troubles, their weaknesses, and even their existence, are all in a state of
strict dependence on the condition of our bodies, more precisely with that of
our nervous systems, or, more precisely still, with the state of those three
pounds of proteid substance which each of us has at the back of his
forehead, and which are called our brains. This is daily demonstrated by
thousands upon thousands of observations.
The question is to know how this union of the body with the consciousness
is to be explained, it being assumed that the two terms of this union present
a great difference in their nature. The easier it seems to demonstrate that
this union exists, the more difficult it appears to explain how it is realised;
and the proof of this difficulty is the number of divergent interpretations
given to it. Were it a simple question of fact, the perpetual discussions and
controversies upon it would not arise.
Many problems here present themselves. The first is that of the genesis or
origin of the consciousness. It has to be explained how a psychical
phenomenon can appear in the midst of material ones. In general, one
begins by supposing that the material phenomena are produced first; they
consist, for instance, in the working of the nervous centres. All this is
physical or chemical, and therefore material. Then at a given moment, after
this mechanical process, a quite different phenomenon emerges. This is
thought, consciousness, emotion. Then comes the question whether this
production of thought in the midst of physical phenomena is capable of

explanation, and how thought is connected with its physical antecedents.
What is the nature of the link between them? Is it a relation of cause to
effect, of genesis? or a coincidence? or the interaction of two distinct
forces? Is this relation constant or necessary? Can the mind enjoy an
existence independent of the brain? Can it survive the death of the brain?
The second question is that of knowing what is the rôle, the utility, and the
efficacity of the psychical phenomenon. Once formed, this phenomenon
evolves in a certain direction and assumes to us who have consciousness of
it a very great importance. What is its action on the material phenomena of
the brain which surround it? Does it develop according to laws of its own,
which have no relation to the laws of brain action? Does it exercise any
action on these intra-cerebral functions? Does it exercise any action on the
centrifugal currents which go to the motor nerves? Is it capable of exciting a
movement? or is it deprived of all power of creating effect?
We will briefly examine the principal solutions which the imagination of
mankind has found for these very difficult problems. Some of the best
known of these solutions bear the names of spiritualism, materialism,
parallelism, and monism. We will speak of these and of some others also.
Before beginning our critical statement, let us recall some of the results of
our previous analyses which here intrude themselves, to use the ambitious
language of Kant, as the prolegomena to every future solution which claims
the title of science. In fact, we are now no longer at the outset of our
investigation. We have had to acknowledge the exactness of certain facts,
and we are bound to admit their consequences. Notably, the definition of
psychical phenomena at which we arrived, not without some trouble, will
henceforth play a rather large part in our discussion. It will force us to
question a great metaphysical principle which, up till now, has been almost
universally considered as governing the problem of the union of the mind
with the body.
This principle bears the name of the axiom of heterogeneity, or the principle
of psycho-physical dualism. No philosopher has more clearly formulated it,
and more logically deduced its consequences, than Flournoy. This author
has written a little pamphlet called Métaphysique et Psychologie, wherein
he briefly sets forth all the known systems of metaphysics by reducing them

to the so-called principle of heterogeneity; after this, the same principle
enables him to "execute" them. He formulates it in the following terms:
"body and mind, consciousness and the molecular cerebral movement of the
brain, the psychical fact and the physical fact, although simultaneous, are
heterogeneous, unconnected, irreducible, and obstinately two."[41] The same
author adds: "this is evident of itself, and axiomatic. Every physical,
chemical, or physiological event, in the last resort, simply consists,
according to science, in a more or less rapid displacement of a certain
number of material elements, in a change of their mutual distances or of
their modes of grouping. Now, what can there be in common, I ask you,
what analogy can you see, between this drawing together or moving apart
of material masses in space, and the fact of having a feeling of joy, the
recollection of an absent friend, the perception of a gas jet, a desire, or of an
act of volition of any kind?" And further on: "All that we can say to connect
two events so absolutely dissimilar is, that they take place at the same
time.... This does not mean that we wish to reduce them to unity, or to join
them together by the link of causality ... it is impossible to conceive any real
connection, any internal relation between these two unconnected things."
Let us not hesitate to denounce as false this proposition which is presented
to us as an axiom. On looking closely into it, we shall perceive that the
principle of heterogeneity does not contain the consequences it is sought to
ascribe to it. It seems to me it should be split up into two propositions of
very unequal value: 1, the mind and body are heterogeneous; 2, by virtue of
this heterogeneity it is not possible to understand any direct relation
between the two.
Now, if the first proposition is absolutely correct, in the sense that
consciousness and matter are heterogeneous, the second proposition seems
to us directly contrary to the facts, which show us that the phenomena of
consciousness are incomplete phenomena. The consciousness is not
sufficient for itself; as we have said, it cannot exist by itself. This again, if
you like, is an axiom, or rather it is a fact shown by observation and
confirmed by reflection. Mind and matter brought down to the essential, to
the consciousness and its object, form a natural whole, and the difficulty
does not consist in uniting but in separating them. Consider the following
fact: "I experience a sensation, and I have consciousness of it." This is the
coupling of two things—a sensation and a cognition.

The two elements, if we insist upon it, are heterogeneous, and they differ
qualitatively; but notwithstanding the existing prejudice by reason of which
no direct relation, no commerce, can be admitted between heterogeneous
facts, the alliance of the consciousness and the sensation is the natural and
primitive fact. They can only be separated by analysis, and a scrupulous
mind might even ask whether one has the right to separate them. I have a
sensation, and I have consciousness of it. If not two facts, they are one and
the same. Now, sensation is matter and my consciousness is mind. If I am
judging an assortment of stuffs, this assortment, or the sensation I have of
them, is a particle of matter, a material state, and my judgment on this
sensation is the psychical phenomenon. We can neither believe, nor desire,
nor do any act of our intelligence without realising this welding together of
mind and matter. They are as inseparable as motion and the object that
moves; and this comparison, though far-fetched, is really very convenient.
Motion cannot exist without a mobile object; and an object, on the other
hand, can exist without movement. In the same way, sensation may exist
without the consciousness; but the converse proposition, consciousness
without sensation, without an object, an empty consciousness or a "pure
thought," cannot be understood.
Let us mark clearly how this union is put forward by us. We describe it after
nature. It is observation which reveals to us the union and the fusion of the
two terms into one. Or, rather, we do not even perceive their union until the
moment when, by a process of analysis, we succeed in convincing ourselves
that that which we at first considered single is really double, or, if you like,
can be made into two by the reason, without being so in reality. Thus it
happens that we bring this big problem in metaphysics on to the field of
observation.
Our solution vaguely resembles that which has sometimes been presented
under the ancient name of physical influx, or under the more modern name
of inter-actionism. There are many authors who maintain that the soul can
act directly on the body and modify it, and this is what is called interactionism. Thereby is understood, if I mistake not, an action from cause to
effect, produced between two terms which enjoy a certain independence
with regard to each other. This interpretation is indubitably close to ours,
though not to be confused with it. My personal interpretation sets aside the

idea of all independence of the mind, since it attributes to the mind an
incomplete and, as it were, a virtual existence.
If we had to seek paternity for ideas I would much rather turn to Aristotle. It
was not without some surprise that I was able to convince myself that the
above theory of the relations between the soul and the body is to be found
almost in its entirety in the great philosopher. It is true that it is mixed up
with many accessory ideas which are out of date and which we now reject;
but the essential of the theory is there very clearly formulated, and that is
the important point. A few details on this subject will not be out of place. I
give them, not from the original source, which I am not erudite enough to
consult direct, but from the learned treatise which Bain has published on the
psychology of Aristotle, as an appendix to his work on the Senses and the
Intelligence.
The whole metaphysics of Aristotle is dominated by the distinction between
form and matter. This distinction is borrowed from the most familiar fact in
the sensible world—the form of solid objects. We may name a substance
without troubling ourselves as to the form it possesses, and we may name
the form without regard to the substance that it clothes. But this distinction
is a purely abstract one, for there can be no real separation of form from
matter, no form without matter, and no matter without form. The two terms
are correlative; each one implies the other, and neither can be realised or
actualised without the other. Every individual substance can be considered
from a triple point of view: 1st, form; 2nd, matter; and 3rd, the compound
or aggregate of form and matter, the inseparable Ens, which transports us
out of the domain of logic and abstraction into that of reality.
Aristotle recognises between these two logical correlatives a difference in
rank. Form is superior, nobler, the higher in dignity, nearer to the perfect
entity; matter is inferior, more modest, more distant from perfection. On
account of its hierarchical inferiority, matter is often presented as the
second, or correlatum, and form as the first, or relatum. This difference in
rank is so strongly marked, that these two correlations are likewise
conceived in a different form—that of the potential and the actual. Matter is
the potential, imperfect, roughly outlined element which is not yet actual,
and may perhaps never become so. Form is the actual, the energy, the
entelechy which actualises the potential and determines the final compound.

These few definitions will make clear the singularly ingenious idea of
Aristotle on the nature of the body, the soul, and of their union. The body is
matter which is only intelligible as the correlatum of form; it can neither
exist by itself nor be known by itself—that is to say, when considered
outside this relation. The soul is form, the actual. By uniting with the body
it constitutes the living subject. The soul is the relatum, and is unintelligible
and void of sense without its correlatum. "The soul," says Aristotle, "is not
a variety of body, but it could not exist without a body: the soul is not a
body, but something which belongs or is relative to a body." The animated
subject is a form plunged and engaged in matter, and all its actions and
passions are so likewise. Each has its formal side which concerns the soul,
and its material side which concerns the body. The emotion which belongs
to the animated subject or aggregate of soul and body is a complex fact
having two aspects logically distinguishable from each other, each of which
is correlative to the other and implies it. It is thus not only with our
passions, but also with our perceptions, our imaginations, reminiscences,
reasonings, and efforts of attention to learn. Intelligence, like emotion, is a
phenomenon not simply of the corporeal organism nor of the Νους only, but
of the commonalty or association of which they are members, and when the
intelligence weakens it is not because the Νους is altered, but because the
association is destroyed by the ruin of the corporeal organism.
These few notes, which I have taken in their integrity from Bain's text,
allow us thoroughly to comprehend the thought of Aristotle, and it seems to
me that the Greek philosopher, by making of the soul and body two
correlative terms, has formed a comparison of great exactness. I also much
admire his idea according to which it is through the union of the body and
soul that the whole, which till then was only possible, goes forth from the
domain of logic and becomes actual. The soul actualises the body, and
becomes, as he said, its entelechy.
These views are too close to those I have myself just set forth for it to be
necessary to dwell on their resemblance. The latter would become still
stronger if we separated from the thought of Aristotle a few developments
which are not essential, though he allowed them great importance: I refer to
the continual comparison he makes with the form and matter of corporeal
objects. Happy though it may be, this comparison is but a metaphor which
perhaps facilitates the understanding of Aristotle's idea, but is not essential

to his theory. For my part, I attach far greater importance to the character of
relatum, and correlatum ascribed to the two terms mind and matter, and to
the actualisation[42] produced by their union.
Let me add another point of comparison. Aristotle's theory recalls in a
striking manner that of Kant on the a priori forms of thought. The form of
thought, or the category, is nothing without the matter of cognition, and the
latter is nothing without the application of form. "Thoughts without content
given by sensation are empty; intuitions without concept furnished by the
understanding are blind." There is nothing astonishing in finding here the
same illustration, since there is throughout a question of describing the
same phenomenon,—the relation of mind to matter.
There remains to us to review the principal types of metaphysical systems.
We shall discuss these by taking as our guide the principle we have just
evolved, and which may be thus formulated: The phenomena of
consciousness constitute an incomplete mode of existence.

FOOTNOTES:
[40] See [Note 1] on p. 3.
[41] For reference, see [Note 18] on p. 73. —ED.
[42] i.e. rendering actual.—ED.

CHAPTER II
SPIRITUALISM[43] AND IDEALISM
Flournoy has somewhere written that the chief interest of the systems of
metaphysics lies less in the intellectual constructions they raise than in the
aspirations of the mind and of the heart to which they correspond. Without
taking literally this terribly sceptical opinion, it would be highly useful to
begin the study of any metaphysical system by the psychology of its author.
The value of each system would be better understood, and their reasons
would be comprehended.
This book is too short to permit us to enter into such biographical details. I
am obliged to take the metaphysical systems en bloc, as if they were
anonymous works, and to efface all the shades, occasionally so curious, that
the thought of each author has introduced into them. Yet, however brief our
statement, it seems indispensable to indicate clearly the physical or moral
idea concealed within each system.

SPIRITUALISM
It is known that spiritualism is a doctrine which has for its chief aim the
raising of the dignity of man, by recognising in him faculties superior to the
properties of matter. We constantly meet, in spiritualism, with the notion of
superior and inferior, understood not only in an intellectual sense but also in
the sense of moral worth.
It will also be remarked, as a consequence of the above principle, that a
spiritualist does not confine himself to discussing the ideas of his habitual
adversary, the materialist; he finds them not only false, but dangerous, and
is indignant with them; some persons even ingenuously acknowledge that
they hold firmly to certain principles because they fear to be converted to
materialism. I can also discern in this system a very natural horror of death,
which inspires in so many people, of whom I am one, both hatred and
disgust. The spiritualist revolts against the prospect of a definitive

annihilation of thought, and the system he adopts is largely explained as an
effort towards immortality.
This effort has led to the theory of two substances, the soul and the body,
which are represented as being as thoroughly separated as possible. The
soul has not its origin in the body, and it derives none of its properties from
its fellow; it is a substance created in complete independence relatively to
the body; the soul, in its essence, has nothing in common with matter. The
essence of the soul, said Descartes, is thought; the essence of the body is
extent. It follows from this that the soul, in its determinations and actions, is
liberated from the laws and necessities of the corporeal nature; it is a free
power, a power of indetermination, capable of choice, capable of
introducing new, unforeseen, and unforeseeable actions, and on this point
opposes itself to corporeal phenomena, which are all subject to a
determinism so rigorous that any event could be foreseen if its antecedents
were known. Another consequence of spiritualism is the admission of the
immortality of the soul, which, being widely distinct from the body, is not
affected by its dissolution; it is, on the contrary, liberated, since death cuts
the link which binds them together.
But there is a link, and the explanation of this link brings with it the ruin of
the whole system. One is forced to admit that this principle of the
separation of body and soul is liable, in fact, to many exceptions. Even if
they are two isolated powers, the necessities of life oblige them to enter
continually into communication with each other. In the case of perceptions,
it is the body which acts on the soul and imparts sensations to it; in
movements, it is the soul, on the contrary, which acts on the body, to make
it execute its desires and its will.
Spiritualists must acknowledge that they are at some trouble to explain this
traffic between the two substances; for, with their respect for the principle
of heterogeneity mentioned above, they do not manage to conceive how
that contact of the physical and the mental can be made which is constantly
necessary in the life of relation. By what means, have they long asked
themselves, can that which is only extent act on that which is only thought?
How can we represent to ourselves this local union of matter with an
immaterial principle, which, by its essence, does not exist in space? The
two substances have been so completely separated, to insure the liberty of

the soul and its superiority over the body, that it has become impossible to
bring them together. The scission has been too complete. They cannot be
sewn together again.
Such are the principal objections raised against spiritualism. These
objections are derived from points of view which are not ours, and we have
therefore no need to estimate their value.
From our point of view, the spiritualist conception has chosen an excellent
starting point. By establishing the consciousness and the object of cognition
as two autonomous powers, neither of which is the slave of the other,
spiritualism has arrived at an opinion of irreproachable exactness; it is
indeed thus that the relations of these two terms must be stated; each has the
same importance and the right to the same autonomy.[44]
Yet, spiritualism has not rested there, and, by a lamentable exaggeration, it
has thought that the consciousness, which it calls the soul, could exercise its
functions in complete independence of the object of cognition, which it
calls matter. There is the error. It consists in misunderstanding the
incomplete and, as it were, virtual existence of the consciousness. This
refutation is enough as regards spiritualism. Nothing more need be added.

IDEALISM
Idealism is an exceedingly complex system, varying much with varying
authors, very polymorphous, and consequently very difficult to discuss.
The ancient hylozoism, the monadism of Leibnitz, and the recent
panpsychism of M. Strong are only different forms of the same doctrine.
Like spiritualism, with which it is connected by many ties, idealism is a
philosophy which expresses some disdain for matter, but the thoughts
which have sought to shelter themselves under this philosophy are so varied
that it would be perilous to try to define them briefly.
There can be discussed in idealism a certain number of affirmations which
form the basis of the system. None of these affirmations is, strictly
speaking, demonstrated or demonstrable; but they offer very different
degrees of probability, and it is for this reason that we shall notice them.

Amongst these affirmations there are some that we have already met with in
our study of the definition of sensation; others will be newer to us.
1. Here is one which seems to arise directly from the facts, and appears for
a long time to have constituted an impregnable position for idealists. It may
be expressed in three words: esse est percipi.
Starting with the observation that every time we bear witness to the
existence of the external world, it is because we perceive it, idealists admit
that the existence of this external world shares exactly the lot of our
perception, and that like it it is discontinuous and intermittent. When we
close our eyes, it ceases to exist, like a torch which is extinguished, and
lights up again when we open them. We have already discussed this
proposition, and have shown that it contains nothing imperative; and we
may very well decline to subscribe to it.
2. There follows a second proposition, barely distinct from the previous
one. There should be nothing else in objects but that which we perceive,
and that of which we have consciousness should be, in the fullest possible
acceptation of the words, the measure of what is. Consequently there should
be no need to seek, under the object perceived, another and larger reality, a
source from which might flow wider knowledge than that we at present
possess. This is as disputable as the preceding affirmation, and for the same
reasons.
3. The third proposition is the heart of the idealist thesis. It is sometimes
presented as a deduction from the foregoing, but it is nevertheless
thoroughly distinct from it, and the preceding affirmations might
legitimately be accepted and this new one rejected. This proposition may be
expressed thus: Everything that is perceived is psychical.
It is not only idealists who subscribe to this opinion, however, and we have
seen, when dealing with the definition of matter, that it is widely spread. We
understand by it that the objects we perceive exist in the consciousness, are
of the consciousness, and are constituted by ideas; the whole world is
nothing but idea and representation; and, since our mind is taken to be of a
psychical nature, the result is that everything, absolutely everything, the
person who knows and the thing known, are all psychical. This is
panpsychism. Flournoy, on this point, says, with a charm coloured by irony:

"We henceforth experience a sweet family feeling, we find ourselves, so to
speak, at home in the midst of this universe ..."[45] We have demonstrated
above that the unity here attained is purely verbal, since we cannot succeed
in suppressing the essential differences of things.
4. Now comes an affirmation on the genesis of things. After having
admitted that the object is an idea of the mind, one of its manifestations, or
one of its moods, the idealists go so far as to say that the consciousness is
the generating power of ideas, and, consequently, the generating cause of
the universe. It is thought which creates the world. That is the final
conclusion.
I indicated, beforehand, in the chapters on the definition of sensation and on
the distinction between the consciousness and the object, the reasons which
lead me to reject the premises of idealism. It will be sufficient to offer here
a criticism on its last conclusion: "It is the mind that creates the world."
This thesis strikes at the duality—consciousness and object; it gives the
supremacy to the consciousness by making of the object an effect or
property of the former. We can object that this genesis cannot be clearly
represented, and that for the very simple reason that it is impossible to
clearly accept "mind" as a separate entity and distinct from matter. It is easy
to affirm this separation, thanks to the psittacism of the words, which are
here used like counterfeit coin, but we cannot represent it to ourselves, for it
corresponds to nothing. The consciousness constitutes all that is mental in
the world; nothing else can be described as mental. Now this consciousness
only exists as an act; it is, in other terms, an incomplete form of existence,
which does not exist apart from its object, of which the true name is matter.
It is therefore very difficult to understand this affirmation, "It is the mind
that creates the world," since to be able to do so, we should have to imagine
a consciousness without an object.
Moreover, should we even succeed in doing so, we should be none the more
disposed, on that account, to give assent to this proposition. Consciousness
and matter represent to us the most different and antithetical terms of the
whole of the knowable. Were the hypothesis to be advanced that one of
these elements is capable of engendering the other, we should immediately
have to ask ourselves why this generating power and this pre-eminence

should be attributed to one rather than to the other element. Who can claim
that one solution is more clear, more reasonable, or more probable than the
other?
One of the great advantages of the history of philosophy here asserts itself.
This history shows us that different minds when reflecting on the same
problems have come to conceive solutions which have appeared to them
clear, and consequently were possible; now, as these solutions are often
contradictory, nothing shows better than their collation the distance between
possibility and fact. Thus the materialists, who, like the idealists, have put
forward a genetic theory of the mind, have conceived mind as produced by
matter;—a conception diametrically opposed to that of the idealists. It may
be said that these two conceptions, opposed in sense, annul each other, and
that each of these two philosophical systems has rendered us service by
demonstrating the error of the opposing system.

FOOTNOTES:
[43] It is, perhaps, needless to point out that by "spiritualism" M. Binet does not
mean the doctrine of the spirit-rappers, whom he, like other scientific writers,
designates as "spiritists," but the creed of all those who believe in disembodied
spirits or existences.—ED.
[44] I do not insist on the difference between my conception and the
spiritualistic conception; my distinction between consciousness and matter does
not correspond, it is evident, to that of "facts of consciousness" and "physical
facts" which spiritualism sets up.
[45] Archives de Psychologie, vol. iv. No. 14, Nov. 1904, p. 132 (article on
Panpsychism).

CHAPTER III
MATERIALISM AND PARALLELISM
MATERIALISM
Materialism is a very ancient doctrine. It is even the most ancient of all,
which simply proves that amongst the different explanations given of our
double physico-mental nature, this doctrine is the easiest to understand. The
origin of materialism is to be found in the beliefs of savage tribes, and is
again found, very clearly defined, in the philosophy of those ancient Greeks
who philosophized before Plato and Aristotle. A still stranger fact is that the
thoughts of a great number of the Fathers of the Church inclined towards
the philosophy of matter. Then, in the course of its evolution, there occurred
a moment of eclipse, and materialism ceased to attract attention till the
contemporary period in which we assist at its re-birth, Nowadays, it
constitutes a powerful doctrine, the more so that it has surreptitiously crept
into the thoughts of many learned men without their being clearly conscious
of it. There are many physicists and physiologists who think and speak as
materialists, though they have made up their minds to remain on the battleground of observed facts and have a holy horror of metaphysics. In a certain
sense, it may be said that materialism is the metaphysics of those who
refuse to be metaphysicians.
It is very evident that in the course of its long history, materialism has often
changed its skin. Like all knowledge, it has been subject to the law of
progress; and, certainly, it would not have been of a nature to satisfy the
intellectual wants of contemporary scholars, had it not stripped itself of the
rude form under which it first manifested itself in the mind of primitive
man. Yet what has enabled the doctrine to keep its unity through all its
changes is that it manifests a deeply human tendency to cling by preference
to everything visible and tangible.
Whatever strikes the eyes, or can be felt by the hand, seems to us in the
highest degree endowed with reality or existence. It is only much later, after

an effort of refined thought, that we come to recognise an existence in
everything that can be perceived in any way whatever, even in an idea. It is
still later that we understand that existence is not only that which is
perceived but also that which is linked logically with the rest of our
knowledge. A good deal of progress has been necessary to reach this point.
As I have not the slightest intention of giving even an abridged history of
materialism, let us come at once to the present day, and endeavour to say in
what consists the scientific form this doctrine has assumed. Its fundamental
basis has not changed. It still rests on our tendency to give chief importance
to what can be seen and touched; and it is an effect of the hegemony of
three of our senses, the visual, the tactile, and the muscular.
The extraordinary development of the physical sciences has no doubt given
an enormous encouragement to materialism, and it may be said that in the
philosophy of nature it occupies a principal place, and that it is there in its
own domain and unassailable.
It has become the expression of the idea that everything that can be
explained scientifically, everything susceptible of being measured, is a
material phenomenon. It is the representation of the material explanation
pushed to its last limits, and all experiments, all calculations, all inductions
resting on the grand principle of the conservation of matter and energy
plead in its favour.
We will examine with some precision how far such a doctrine solves the
problem of the existence of the intellectual functions.
The doctrine has understood this connection as being purely material, and
has sought its image in other phenomena which are entirely so. Thus, it has
borrowed from physiology the principle of its explanation, it has
transported into the domain of thought the idea of function, and it has
supposed that the soul is to the body in the relation of function to organ.
Intelligence would thus be a cerebral function. To explain intelligence,
materialists link it with matter, turn it into a property of matter, and
compare it to a movement of matter, and sometimes even to a secretion. So
Karl Vogt, the illustrious Genevan naturalist, one day declared, to the great
scandal of every one, that the brain secretes the thought as the kidney does
urine. This bold comparison seemed shocking, puerile, and false, for a

secretion is a material thing while thought is not. Karl Vogt also employed
another comparison: the brain produces the thought as the muscle produces
movement, and it at once seems less offensive to compare the thought to a
movement than to compare it to a liquid secretion. At the present day, an
illustration still more vague would be used, such as that of a transformation
of energy: chemical energy disengaged by the nerve centres would be thus
looked upon as transformed into psychical energy.
However, it matters little what metaphors are applied to for help in
explaining the passage from the physical to the mental. What characterises
materialist philosophy is its belief in the possibility of such a passage, and
its considering it as the genesis of thought. "One calls materialist," says
Renouvier, with great exactness, "every philosophy which defines thought
as the product of a compound whose elements do not imply thought." A
sweeping formula which allows us to foresee all the future avatars of the
materialist doctrine, and to class them beforehand in the same category.
The criticisms which have been directed against materialism are all, or
nearly all, variations of the principle of heterogeneity. We will not dwell
long on this, but simply recollect that, according to this principle, it is
impossible to attribute to the brain the capacity of generating consciousness.
Physical force can indeed generate physical force under the same or a
different form, and it thus produces all the effects which are determined by
the laws of nature. But it is impossible to comprehend how physical force
can enrich itself at a given moment by a conscious force. Physical force is
reduced to movements of bodies and to displacements of atoms; how could
a change of position in any inert objects give rise to a judgment, a
reasoning, or any phenomenon of the consciousness? It is further said: this
idea of function, which materialists here introduce to render more
comprehensible the passage from a material body to a spiritual action,
contains only an empty explanation, for the function is not essentially
distinct by its nature from the organ; it is simply "the organ in activity," it
adds to the organ taken in a state of repose but one change, viz. activity, that
is to say movement, and, consequently, the function of an organ is material
by the same right as the organ. When a muscle contracts, this contraction,
which is the proper function of the muscular fibre, consists in a
condensation of the muscular protoplasm, and this condensation is a
material fact. When a gland enters into activity, a certain quantity of liquid

flows into the channels of the gland, and this liquid is caused by a physical
and chemical modification of the cellular protoplasm; it is a melting, or a
liquefaction, which likewise is material. The function of the nerve cell is to
produce movement, or to preserve it, or to direct it; ii is material like the
cells. There is therefore nothing in all those functional phenomena which
might lead us to understand how a material cause should be capable of
engendering a conscious effect.
It seems that all materialists have acknowledged that here is the vulnerable
point in their theory, for it is the principle of heterogeneity which they have
especially combated. But their defence is wanting in frankness, and
principally consists in subterfuges.
In brief, it affirms that we are surrounded with mystery, that we are not
sufficiently learned to have the right to impose limits to the power of
matter, and to say to it: "Thou shalt not produce this phenomenon." A
materialist theologian declares that he sees no impossibility in stones
thinking and arguing, if God, in His infinite power, has decided to unite
thought with brute matter. This argument is not really serious; it demands
the intervention of so powerful a Deus ex machina, that it can be applied
equally to all problems; to solve all is to solve none.
Modern materialists rightly do not bring God into the question. Their mode
of argument takes another form; but it remains to be seen if, at bottom, it is
not the same as the other. It simply consists in affirming that up till now we
know certain properties of matter only, but that science every day discovers
new ones; that matter is a reservoir of unknown forces, and that it is not
impossible that the origin of psychical forces may yet be discovered in
matter. This idea is clearly hinted at by Littré. The physicist Tyndall gave it
a definite formula when he uttered at the Belfast Congress this phrase so
often quoted: "If I look back on the limits of experimental science, I can
discern in the bosom of that matter (which, in our ignorance, while at the
same time professing our respect for its Creator, we have, till now, treated
with opprobrium) the promise and the power of all forms and qualities of
life."
The opponents of the doctrine have not ceased to answer that the matter of
to-morrow, like the matter of to-day, can generate none but material effects,

and that a difficulty is not solved by putting off its solution to some
indefinite date in our scientific evolution: and it certainly seems that the
counter-stroke is decisive, if we admit the principle of heterogeneity with its
natural consequence.
We will now criticise the above doctrine by making use of the ideas I have
above enunciated. The criticism we have to apply to materialism is not the
same as that just summarised. The axis of the discussion changes its
position.
In the first place, I reproach materialism with presenting itself as a theory of
the generation of the consciousness by the object. We have already
reproached idealism with putting itself forward as a theory of the generation
of the object by the consciousness. The error of the two systems is produced
in a converse direction, but is of the same gravity. The consciousness and its
object, we say yet again, constitute the widest division it is possible to
effect in the domain of cognition; it is quite as illegitimate to reduce the first
term to the second as to reduce the second to the first. To reduce one to the
other, by way of affiliation or otherwise, there must first be discovered,
then, an identity of nature which does not exist.
In the second place, when one examines closely the explanation materialism
has imagined in order to derive thought from an action of matter, it is seen
that this representation is rendered completely impossible by all we know of
the nature of thought. For the materialist to suppose for one moment that
thought is a cerebral function, he must evidently make an illusion for
himself as to what thought is, and must juggle with concepts. Perhaps,
could we penetrate into his own inmost thought, we should discover that at
the moment he supposes a mere cell can manufacture the phenomena of
consciousness, some vague image suggests itself to him whereby he
identifies these phenomena with a light and subtle principle escaping from
the nerve cell, something which resembles an electric effluve, or a will-ofthe-wisp, or the flame from a punch-bowl.[46]
I cannot, of course, tell whether my supposition is correct. But what I assert,
with the calmness of perfect certitude, is that the materialist has not taken
the pains to analyse attentively what he calls the phenomenon of
consciousness. Had he made this analysis and kept the elements in his

mind, he would have seen that it is almost impossible to hook in any way a
phenomenon of consciousness on to a material molecule.
In fact, also, to take this into account, we will not remain within the
vagueness of the concept, but will take a particular example to argue upon,
viz. that of an external perception. I open my window on a fine day, and I
see before me a sunny plain, with, as far as the eye can reach, houses
amongst the trees, and again more houses, the most distant of which are
outlined against my far-off horizon. This is my mental phenomenon. And
while I am at my window, my eyes fixed on the view, the anatomist declares
that, starting from my retina, molecular vibrations travel along the optic
nerve, cross each other at the chiasma, enter into the fascia, pass through
the internal capsule and reach the hemispheres, or rather the occipital
regions, of the brain, where, for the moment, we agree to localise the centre
of projection of the visual sensations. This is my physical phenomenon. It
now becomes the question of passing from this physical phenomena to the
mental one. And here we are stopped by a really formidable difficulty.
My mental phenomenon is not entirely mental, as is usually supposed from
the deceitful brevity of the phrase. It is in great part physical, for it can be
decomposed into two elements, a consciousness and its object; and this
object of the consciousness, this group of little houses I see in the plain,
belongs to sensation—that is to say, to something physical—or, in other
words, to matter.
Let us examine in its turn the physical process which is supposed to be
discovered in my nervous centres while I am in course of contemplating the
landscape. This pretended physical process itself, quite as much as my
conscious perception of the landscape, is a physico-psychical phenomenon;
for my cerebral movements are perceived, hypothetically at least, by an
observer. This is a perception, consequently it can be decomposed into two
things, a consciousness and its object. As a further consequence, when we
wish, by a metaphysical effort, to attach the consciousness to a material
state of the brain and to establish a link between the two events, it will be
found that we wrongly hook one physico-mental phenomenon on to
another.

But, evidently, this objection is not a refutation. We may if we choose
suppose that the so-called cerebral process is capable of subsisting at
moments when no one perceives it, and that it exists of itself, is sufficient
for itself, and is entirely physical. But can we subject the mental process of
perception to the same purification? Can we separate these two elements,
the consciousness and its object, retain the element consciousness and reject
the element object, which is physical, thus constituting a phenomenon
entirely mental, which might then be possibly placed beside the entirely
physical phenomenon, so as to study their relation to each other? This is
quite impossible, and the impossibility is double, for it exists de facto and
de jure.
De jure, because we have already established that a consciousness empty
and without object cannot be conceived. De facto, because the existence of
the object that consciousness carries with it is very embarrassing for the
materialist; for this object is material, and as real and material as the fibres
and cells of the brain. It might, indeed, be supposed that by transformation
or otherwise there goes forth from the cerebral convolution a purely
psychical phenomenon resembling a wave. But how can we conceive the
transformation of this convolution into a semi-material phenomenon? How
can we comprehend that there should issue from this convolution the
material object of a perception—for example, a plain dotted with houses?
An English histologist remarked one day, with some eloquence, how little
the most minute study of the brain aided us to understand thought. He was
thus answering Auguste Comte, who, in a moment of aberration, claimed
that psychology, in order to become a science, ought to reject the testimony
of the consciousness, and to use exclusively as its means of study the
histology of the nerve centres and the measurement of the cranium. Our
histologist, who had passed part of his life examining, under the
microscope, fragments of cerebral matter, in following the forms of the
cells, the course of the fibres, and the grouping and distribution of the
fascia, made the following remark: "It is the fact that the study, however
patient, minute, and thorough it might be, of this nerve-skein can never
enable us to know what a state of consciousness is, if we do not know it
otherwise; for never across the field of the microscope is there seen to pass
a memory, an emotion, or an act of volition." And, he added, "he who
confines himself to peering into these material structures remains as

ignorant of the phenomena of the mind as the London cabman who, for ever
travelling through the streets of the great city, is ignorant of what is said and
what is going on in the interior of the houses." This picturesque
comparison, the truth of which has never been questioned, is based on this
supposition, that the psychical act is entirely immaterial and invisible, and
therefore escapes the piercing eye of the microscope. But a deeper analysis
of the mind shows how little exact is this assertion. From the moment each
psychical act implies a material object, we can ask ourselves two things: (1)
Why is it that the anatomist does not discover these material objects in the
interior of the brain? We ought to see them, for they are material, and
therefore visible. We ought to see them with their aspect and colour, or be
able to explain why they are not seen. In general, all that is described to us
in the brain is the molecular vibrations. But we are not conscious of them.
Where, then, is that of which we are conscious? (2) It should next be
explained to us by what elaboration, transmutation, or metamorphosis a
molecular disturbance, which is material, can transform itself into the
objects which are equally material.
This is the criticism we have to address to materialism. Until proof to the
contrary, I hold it to be irrefutable.

PARALLELISM
For this exposition to follow the logical order of ideas, the discussion on
materialism should be immediately succeeded by that on parallelism. These
two doctrines are near akin; they resemble each other as the second edition
of a book, revised and corrected, resembles the first. Parallelism is the
materialist doctrine of those forewarned folk, who have perceived the errors
committed and endeavour to avoid them, while cherishing all that can be
saved of the condemned doctrine. That which philosophers criticised in
materialism was the misunderstanding of the principle of heterogeneity. The
parallelists have seen this mistake, and have taken steps to respect this
principle: we shall see in what way. They are especially prudent, and they
excel in avoiding being compromised. They put forth their hypothesis as a
provisional one, and they vaunt its convenience. It is, say they, a practical
method of avoiding many difficulties; it becomes for philosophers an

equivalent of that phrase which so many timorous ministers repeat: "Above
all, no scrapes!"
Let us study the exact point on which parallelism has amended materialism.
We have seen that every materialist doctrine is the expression of this idea,
that physical phenomena are the only ones that are determined, measurable,
explicable, and scientific. This idea does wonders in the natural sciences,
but is at fault when, from the physical, we pass into the moral world, and
we have seen how the materialistic doctrine fails when it endeavours to
attach the physical to the mental. There are then two great difficulties which
the materialistic explanation finds before it; one is a difficulty of
mechanism and the other of genesis. By connecting the mind with the brain,
like a function to its organ, this doctrine seeks to solve these two problems,
and with what little success we have seen.
Parallelism, has tried to avoid these two problems; not only does it not
solve them, but it arranges so as not to propound them. The expedient
adopted consists in avoiding the meeting of the physical and the mental;
instead of placing them end to end and welding one to the other, they are
placed in parallel fashion side by side. To explain their correlation, which so
many observations vaguely demonstrate, the following hypothesis is
advanced. Physical and psychical life form two parallel currents, which
never mingle their waters; to every state of definite consciousness there
corresponds the counterpart of an equally definite state of the nerve centres;
the fact of consciousness has its antecedents and its consequences in the
consciousness; and the physical fact equally takes its place in a chain of
physical facts. The two series are thus evolved, and correspond strictly to
each other according to a necessary law; so that the scholar who was
perfectly instructed, and to whom one of these states was presented, could
describe its fellow. But never does any of the terms of one series influence
the terms of the other.
Observation and the testimony of the consciousness seem to attest this dual
progress; but they are, according to the parallelist hypothesis, illusions.
When I move my arm by a voluntary act, it is not my will, qua act of
consciousness, which determines the movement of the arm—for this is a
material fact. The movement is produced by the coming into play of groups
of muscles. Each muscle, composed of a semi-fluid substance, being

excited, contracts in the direction of its greatest length. The excitant of the
muscles is also a material fact, a material influx which starts from the motor
cells of the encephalon, and of which we know the course down through the
pyramidal fascium, the anterior roots of the spinal cord, and the nerves of
the periphery to its termination in the motor plates of the muscles. It is this
excitement which is the physical, direct, and veritable cause of voluntary
movements. And it is the same with all acts and signs, all expressions of our
conscious states; the trembling of fear, the redness of anger, the movements
of walking, down to the words we utter—all these are physical effects
produced by physical processes, which act physically, and of which the
mental counterpart has in itself no effective action.
Let it be understood that I am here pointing out one of the forms, and that
the most usual, of the parallelist theory. Each author varies it according to
his fancy; some widen the correspondence between the physical and the
moral, others prefer to narrow it. At one time a vague relation is supposed
which is only true on a large scale, and is a union rather than an
equivalence. At another, it is an exact counterpart, a complete duplicate in
which the smallest physical event corresponds to a mental one.
In one of the forms of this theory that has been recently invented,
parallelists have gone so far as to assert that there exists no real cohesion in
the mental chain, and that no mental phenomenon can have the property of
provoking another mental phenomenon by an act of true causality. It is
within the nervous tissue, they say, that the nexus of psychic states should
be enclosed. These should succeed in time without being directly connected
with one another; they should succeed because the physical basis of them is
excited in succession. Some of them would be like an air on the piano: the
notes follow each other and arrange themselves into melodies, not by any
affinity proper to themselves, but because the keys of the instrument are
struck in the required order.
I said a little while ago that parallelism was a perfected materialism. The
reason of this will be understood. It is a doctrine which preserves the
determinism of physical facts while avoiding the compromising of itself in
the difficult explanation of the connection between the soul and the body. It
remains scientific without raising a metaphysical heresy.

Bain is one of those who have most clearly expressed, not only the
advantages, but also the aspirations of this theory (Mind and Body, p. 130):
—
"We have every reason for believing," he says, "that there is in company
with all our mental processes, an unbroken material succession. From the
ingress of a sensation, to the outgoing responses in action, the mental
succession is not for an instant dissevered from a physical succession. A
new prospect bursts upon the view; there is mental result of sensation,
emotion, thought—terminating in outward displays of speech or gesture.
Parallel to this mental series is the physical series of facts, the successive
agitation of the physical organs, called the eye, the retina, the optic nerve,
optic centres, cerebral hemispheres, outgoing nerves, muscles, &c. While
we go the round of the mental circle of sensation, emotion, and thought,
there is an unbroken physical circle of effects. It would be incompatible
with everything we know of the cerebral action, to suppose that the physical
chain ends abruptly in a physical void, occupied by an immaterial
substance; which immaterial substance, after working alone, imparts its
results to the other edge of the physical break, and determines the active
response—two shores of the material with an intervening ocean of the
immaterial. There is, in fact, no rupture of nervous continuity. The only
tenable supposition is, that mental and physical proceed together, as
undivided twins."
On reading this passage it is easy to see the idea which forms the basis of
the doctrine. It is, as I have already said, the fetichism of mechanics:
parallelism takes its inspiration from this quite as directly as does
materialism, but with more skill, inasmuch as it avoids the most dangerous
question, that of the interaction of physics and morals, and replaces it by an
hypothesis much resembling Leibnitz's hypothesis of the pre-established
harmony, On the other hand, a second merit of this prudent doctrine is the
avoiding the question of genesis. It does not seek for the origin of thought,
but places this last in a relation of parallelism with the manifestations of
matter; and in the same way that parallel lines prolonged ad infinitum never
meet, so the partisans of this doctrine announce their resolution not to
inquire how the actual state of things has been formed, nor how it will end
if, for example, one of the terms should disappear by the death of the bodily
organism.

Notwithstanding so many precautions, criticisms have not been wanting;
only they would seem not to have touched the weak part of the doctrine and
not to be decisive. We will only run through them briefly.
It has been said: there is no logical necessity which forces us to refuse to the
consciousness the privilege of acting in complete independence of the
nervous mechanism.
It has also been said: it is by no means certain that any nervous mechanism
can be invented which imitates and, if need were, could replace an
intellectual act. For instance, what association of nerve cells, what
molecular action, can imitate an act of comparison which enables us to see
a resemblance between two objects? Let it be supposed, for example, that
the resemblance of two impressions come from a partial identity, and that
the latter has for material support an identity in the seat or the form of the
corresponding nervous influx. But what is identity? How can it be
conceived without supposing resemblance, of which it is but a form? How,
then, can the one be explained by the other? Thus, for instance, at the
bottom of all our intellectual acts, there is a certain degree of belief. Can
any material combination be found which corresponds thereto?
There is one last objection, the most serious of all. Parallelism, by
establishing a fixed and invariable relation between the physical and the
moral, ends by denying the rôle of this last, since the physical mechanism is
sufficient to draw to itself all the effects which general belief attributes to
the moral. The parallelists on this point go very much further than the
materialists; the latter at least concede that the consciousness is of some
use, since they compared it to a function or a secretion, and, after all, a
secretion is a useful liquid. The parallelists are so strongly convinced that
mechanism is alone efficacious that they come to deny any rôle to thought.
The consciousness for them has no purpose: yet it keeps company with its
object. The metaphors which serve to define it, part of which have been
imagined by Huxley, are all of a passive nature. Such is the light, or the
whistling noise which accompanies the working of an engine, but does not
act on its machinery. Or, the shadow which dogs the steps of the traveller.
Or a phosphorescence lighting up the traces of the movements of the brain.

It has also been said that the consciousness is a useless luxury. Some have
even gone further, and the fine and significant name of epiphenomenon, that
has been given to thought, well translates that conception, according to
which semi-realities may exist in nature.
All these objections certainly carry great weight, but they are not capable of
killing the doctrine—they only scotch it.
I think there is a radical vice in parallelism, which till now has not been
sufficiently indicated, and I ask what can really remain of the whole edifice
when this vice has been once exposed?
Parallelism implies a false idea, which we have already come across when
discussing materialism. It is the idea that a phenomenon of consciousness
constitutes one complete whole.
The error proceeds from the use of concepts which cause the reality to be
lost sight of. The reality shows that every phenomenon of consciousness
consists in a mode of activity, an aggregate of faculties which require an
object to fasten on to and so realise themselves, and that this object is
furnished by matter. What we always note in intuition is the union, the
incarnation of consciousness-matter. Our thoughts, our memories, our
reasonings have as object sensations, images—that is to say, things which,
strictly speaking, are as material as our own brains. It is therefore rather
childish to put all these workings of the spirit on another plane and in
another world than the workings of the brain since they are in great part of
the same nature as the last named and they contain so many material
elements. Now if we re-establish facts as they are, if we admit a parallelism
between physical phenomena, on the one hand, and phenomena at once
physical and psychical, on the other, the parallelist hypothesis loses every
sort of meaning. It ceases to present to us the image of two phenomena of
an absolutely different order, which are found coupled together like the two
faces of a unity, the front and back of a page, the right and wrong side of a
stuff. If there is anything material in the psychical part, the opposition of
nature no longer exists between the two terms; they become identical.
Very often, certain parallelists, after thinking they have discovered the
duality of nature, endeavour to bring it back to unity by supposing that the

two faces of the reality are as two effects of one unique reality, inaccessible
to our senses and underlying appearances. Why go so far afield to seek
unity? It is trouble in vain: for it is to be found in the phenomenon itself.

FOOTNOTES:
[46] I can quote two observations in support of this. M. BRIEUX, to whom I was
relating this part of my argument, stopped me, saying, "You have guessed right; I
represent to myself thought issuing from brain in the form of an electric gleam."
Dr. SIMON also informed me, during the reading of my manuscript, that he saw
"thought floating over the brain like an ignis fatuus."

CHAPTER IV
MODERN THEORIES
It may be thought that the objection taken above to parallelism and
materialism is personal to myself, because I have put it forward as the
consequence of my analysis of the respective shares of thought and matter
in every act of cognition. This is not so. I am here in harmony with other
philosophers who arrived at the same conclusions long before me, and it
may be useful to quote them.
We will begin with the prince of idealists, Berkeley. "'Everything you know
or conceive other than spirits,' says Philonous to Hylas, 'is but your ideas;
so then when you say that all ideas are occasioned by impressions made in
the brain, either you conceive this brain or you do not. If you conceive it,
you are in that case talking of ideas imprinted in an idea which is the cause
of this very idea, which is absurd. If you do not conceive it, you are talking
unintelligibly, you are not forming a reasonable hypothesis.' 'How can it be
reasonable,' he goes on to say, 'to think that the brain, which is a sensible
thing, i.e. which can be apprehended by the senses—an idea consequently
which only exists in the mind—is the cause of our other ideas?'"[47]
Thus, in the reasoning of Berkeley, the function of the brain cannot explain
the production of ideas, because the brain itself is an idea, and an idea
cannot be the cause of all our other ideas.
M. Bergson's argument is quite similar, although he takes a very different
standpoint from that of idealism. He takes the word image in the vaguest
conceivable sense. To explain the meaning of this word he simply says:
"images which are perceived when I open my senses, and unperceived
when I close them." He also remarks that the external objects are images,
and that the brain and its molecular disturbances are likewise images. And
he adds, "For this image which I call cerebral disturbance to generate the
external images, it would have to contain them in one way or another, and
the representation of the whole material universe would have to be

implicated in that of this molecular movement. Now, it is enough to
enunciate such a proposition to reveal its absurdity."[48]
It will be seen that this reasoning is the same as Berkeley's, though the two
authors are reasoning on objects that are different; according to Berkeley,
the brain and the states of conscience are psychical states; according to
Bergson, the definition of the nature of these two objects designated by the
term image is more comprehensive, but the essential of his argument is
independent of this definition. It is enough that the two terms should be of
similar nature for one to be unable to generate the other.
My own argument in its turn comes rather near the preceding ones. For the
idea of Berkeley, and the image of Bergson, I substitute the term matter. I
say that the brain is matter, and that the perception of any object is
perception of matter, and I think it is not easy to explain how from this
brain can issue this perception, since that would be to admit that from one
matter may come forth another matter. There is certainly here a great
difficulty.
M. Bergson has thought to overcome it by attacking it in the following way.
He has the very ingenious idea of changing the position of the
representation in relation to the cerebral movement. The materialist places
the representation after this movement and derives it from the movement;
the parallelist places it by the side of the movement and in equivalence to it.
M. Bergson places it before the movement, and supposes it to play with
regard to it the part of exciting cause, or simply that of initiator. This
cerebral movement becomes an effect of the representation and a motor
effect. Consequently the nervous system passes into the state of motor
organ: the sensory nerves are not, as supposed, true sensory nerves, but they
are the commencements of motor nerves, the aim of which is to lead the
motor excitements to the centres which play the part of commutators and
direct the current, sometimes by one set of nerves, sometimes by others.
The nervous system is like a tool held in the hand: it is a vehicle for action,
we are told, and not a substratum for cognition. I cannot here say with what
ingenuity, with what powerful logic, and with what close continuity of ideas
M. Bergson develops his system, nor with what address he braves its
difficulties.

His mind is remarkable alike for its power of systematisation and its
suppleness of adaptation. Before commencing to criticise him, I am anxious
to say how much I admire him, how much I agree with him throughout the
critical part of his work, and how much I owe to the perusal of his book,
Matière et Mémoire. Though I was led into metaphysics by private needs,
though some of the ideas I have set forth above were conceptions of my
own (for example, the criticism of the mechanical theory of matter, and the
definition of sensation), before I had read M. Bergson's book, it cannot be
denied that its perusal has so strongly modified my ideas that a great part of
these are due to him without my feeling capable of exactly discerning
which; for ideas have a much more impersonal character than observations
and experiments. It would therefore have been ungrateful to criticise him
before having rendered him this tribute.
There are, in M. Bergson's theory, a few assertions which surprise us a little,
like everything which runs counter to old habits. It has always been
supposed that our body is the receptacle of our psychological phenomena.
We store our reminiscences in our nerve centres; we put the state of our
emotions in the perturbations of certain apparatus; we find the physical
basis of our efforts of will and of attention in the sensations of muscular
tension born in our limbs or trunk. Directly we believe that the nervous
system is no longer the depository of these states, we must change their
domicile; and where are they to be placed? Here the theory becomes
obscure and vague, and custom renders it difficult to understand the
situation of the mind outside the body. M. Bergson places memory in planes
of consciousness far removed from action, and perception he places in the
very object we perceive.
If I look at my bookcase, my thought is in my books; if I look at the sky, my
thought is in a star.[49] It is very difficult to criticise ideas such as these,
because one is never certain that one understands them. I will therefore not
linger over them, notwithstanding the mistrust which they inspire in me.
But what seems to me to require proof is the function M. Bergson is led to
attribute to the sensory nerves. To his mind, it is not exact to say that the
excitement of a sensory nerve excites sensation. This would be a wrong
description, for, according to him, every nerve, even a sensory one, serves
as a motor; it conducts the disturbance which, passing through the central

commutator, flows finally into the muscles. But then, whence comes it that
I think I feel a sensation when my sensory nerve is touched? Whence comes
it that a pressure on the epitrochlear nerve gives me a tingling in the hand?
Whence comes it that a blow on the eyeball gives me a fleeting impression
of light? One must read the page where M. Bergson struggles against what
seems to me the evidence of the facts. "If, for one reason or another," he
says, "the excitement no longer passes, it would be strange if the
corresponding perception took place, since this perception would then put
our body in relation with points of space which would no longer invite it to
make a choice. Divide the optic nerve of any animal; the disturbance
starting from the luminous point is no longer transmitted to the brain, and
thence to the motor nerves. The thread which connected the external object
to the motor mechanism of the animal by enveloping the optic nerve, is
severed; the visual perception has therefore become powerless, and in this
powerlessness consists unconsciousness." This argument is more clever
than convincing. It is not convincing, because it consists in exaggerating
beyond all reason a very real fact, that of the relation which can be
discovered between our sensations and our movements. We believe, with
M. Bergson, that it is absolutely correct to see in action the end and the
raison d'être of our intelligence and our sensibility. But does it follow that
every degree, every shade, every detail of sensation, even the most
insignificant, has any importance for the action? The variations of
sensibility are much more numerous than those of movements and of
adaptation; very probably, as is seen in an attentive study of infancy,
sensibility precedes the power of motion in its differentiations. A child
shows an extraordinary acuteness of perception at an age when its hand is
still very clumsy. The correlation, then, is not absolute. And then even if it
were so, it would not follow that the suppression of any movement would
produce by rebound the suppression of the sensation to which this
movement habitually corresponds. On this hypothesis, a sensation which
loses its motor effect becomes useless. Be it so; but this does not prove that
the uselessness of a sensation is synonymous with insensibility. I can very
well imagine the movement being suppressed and the useless sensation
continuing to evoke images and to be perceived. Does not this occur daily?
There are patients who, after an attack of paralysis remain paralysed in one
limb, which loses the voluntary movement, but does not necessarily lose its

sensibility. Many clear cases are observed in which this dissociation takes
place.
I therefore own that I cannot follow M. Bergson in his deduction. As a
physiologist, I am obliged to believe firmly in the existence of the sensory
nerves, and therefore I continue to suppose that our conscious sensations
are consequent to the excitement of these nerves and subordinate to their
integrity. Now, as therein lies, unless I mistake, the essential postulate, the
heart of M. Bergson's theory, by not admitting it I must regretfully reject the
whole.

FOOTNOTES:
[47] I borrow this quotation from RENOUVIER, Le Personnellisme, p. 263.
[48] Matière et Mémoire, p. 3. The author has returned to this point more at
length in a communication to the Congrès de Philosophie de Génève, in 1904.
See Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Nov. 1904, communication from H.
BERGSON entitled "Le Paralogisme psycho-physiologique." Here is a passage
from this article which expresses the same idea: "To say that the image of the
surrounding world issues from this image (from the cerebral movement), or that
it expresses itself by this image, or that it arises as soon as this image is
suggested, or that one gives it to one's self by giving one's self this image, would
be to contradict one's self; since these two images, the outer world and the intracerebral movement, have been supposed to be of the same nature, and the second
image is, by the hypothesis, an infinitesimal part of the field of representation,
while the first fills the whole of it."
[49] Matière et Mémoire, p. 31

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
A few convinced materialists and parallelists, to whom I have read the
above criticisms on their systems, have found no answer to them; my
criticisms have appeared to them just, but nevertheless they have continued
to abide by their own systems, probably because they were bound to have
one. We do not destroy an erroneous idea when we do not replace it by
another.
This has decided me to set forth some personal views which, provisionally,
and for want of better, might be substituted for the old doctrines. Before
doing this, I hasten to explain their character, and to state openly that they
are only hypotheses.
I know that metaphysicians rarely make avowals of this kind. They present
their systems as a well-connected whole, and they set forth its different
parts, even the boldest of them, in the same dogmatic tone, and without
warning that we ought to attach very unequal degrees of confidence to these
various parts. This is a deplorable method, and to it is perhaps due the kind
of disdain that observers and experimentalists feel for metaphysics—a
disdain often without justification, for all is not false, and everything is not
hypothetical, in metaphysics. There are in it demonstrations, analyses, and
criticisms, especially the last, which appear to me as exact and as certain as
an observation or experiment. The mistake lies in mixing up together in a
statement, without distinction, the certain with the probable, and the
probable with the possible.
Metaphysicians are not wholly responsible for this fault of method; and I
am much inclined to think that it is the natural consequence of the abuse of
speculation. It is especially by the cultivation of the sciences of observation
that we foster in ourselves the precious sense of proof, because we can
check it any minute by experimental verification. When we are working at a
distance from the facts, this sense of proof gets thinner, and there is lost that

feeling of responsibility and fear of seeing one's assertions contradicted by a
decisive countervailing observation, which is felt by every observer. One
acquires the unbearable pride which I note in Kant, and one abandons one's
self to the spirit of construction. I am speaking from personal experience. I
have several times detected within me this bad spirit of construction, I have
been seeking to group several facts of observation under the same idea, and
then I have discovered that I was belittling and depreciating those facts
which did not fit in with the idea.
The hypothesis I now present on the relations of the mind and the brain has,
for me, the advantage of bringing to light the precise conditions which a
solution of this great problem must satisfy for this solution to be worthy of
discussion.
These conditions are very numerous. I shall not indicate them all
successively; but here are two which are particularly important.
1. The manifestations of the consciousness are conditioned by the brain. Let
us suspend, by any means, the activity of the encephalic mass, by arresting
the circulation of the blood for example, and the psychic function is at once
inhibited. Compress the carotid, and you obtain the clouding-over of the
intellect. Or, instead of a total abolition, you can have one in detail; sever a
sensory nerve with the bistoury, and all the sensations which that nerve
transmits to the brain are suppressed. Consciousness appears only when the
molecular disturbance reaches the nerve centres; everything takes place in
the same way as if this disturbance released the consciousness.
Consciousness also accompanies or follows certain material states of the
nerve centres, such as the waves which traverse the sensory nerves, which
exercise reflex action in the cells, and which propagate themselves in the
motor nerves. It is to the production, the distribution, and the integrity of
this nervous influx that the consciousness is closely linked. It there finds
one of the conditions of its apparition.
2. On the other hand, the consciousness remains in complete ignorance of
these intra-cerebral phenomena. It does not perceive the nerve-wave which
sets it in motion, it knows nothing of its peculiarities, of its trajectory, or the
length of its course. In this sense it may be said that it is in no degree an
anatomist; it has no idea of all the peculiarities of the nerve-wave which

form part of its cerebral history from the moment when these peculiarities
are out of relation with the properties of external objects.
One sometimes wonders that our consciousness is not aware that the objects
we perceive with our two eyes correspond to a double undulation, namely,
that of the right and that of the left, and that the image is reversed on the
retina, so that it is the rods of the right which are impressed by objects on
our left, and the rods of the upper part by objects below our eyes. These are,
it has been very justly said, factitious problems, imaginary difficulties
which do not exist. There is no need to explain, for instance, direct vision
by a reversed image, because our consciousness is not aware that the image
on the retina is reversed. In order to take account of this, we should require
another eye to see this image. This answer appears particularly to the point.
It will be found that it is absolutely correct if we reflect that this case of the
unfelt inversion of the image on the retina is but one example of the
anatomical ignorance of the consciousness.
It might also be declared, in the same order of ideas, that our consciousness
is ignorant, that excitements of the eye cross each other at the level of the
chiasma, and pass through the internal capsule, and that the majority of the
visual excitements of an eye are received by the opposite hemisphere.
A rather confused notion of these facts has formed itself in the minds of
several critics, and I can discern the proof of this in the language they use. It
will be said, for example, that the idea exists in the consciousness or in the
mind, and phrases like the following will be avoided: "I think with my
brain"—the suggestion consists in introducing an idea in the brain—"The
nerve cell perceives and reasons, &c." Ordinarily these forms of speech are
criticised because they appear to have the defect of establishing a confusion
between two irreducible elements, the physical and the mental. I think the
error of language proceeds from another cause, since I do not admit this
distinction between the physical and the mental. I think that the error
consists in supposing vaguely that the consciousness comprehends intracerebral phenomena, whereas it ignores them.
Let me repeat that there is no such thing as intra-cerebral sensibility. The
consciousness is absolutely insensitive with regard to the dispositions of the
cerebral substance and its mode of work. It is not the nervous undulation

which our consciousness perceives, but the exciting cause of this wave—
that is, the external object. The consciousness does not feel that which is
quite close to it, but is informed of that which passes much further off.
Nothing that is produced inside the cranium interests it; it is solely occupied
with objects of which the situation is extra-cranial. It does not penetrate into
the brain, we might say, but spreads itself like a sheet over the periphery of
the body, and thence springs into the midst of the external objects.
There is, therefore, I do not say a contradiction, but a very striking contrast
between these two facts. The consciousness is conditioned, kept up, and
nourished by the working of the cerebral substance, but knows nothing of
what passes in the interior of that substance. This consciousness might itself
be compared to a parasitical organism which plunges its tap roots into the
nerve centres, and of which the organs of perception, borne on long stalks,
emerge from the cranium and perceive everything outside that cranium. But
this is, of course, only a rough image.
Strictly, it is possible to explain this distribution of the conscience, singular
as it is at first sight, by those reasons of practical utility which are so
powerful in the history of evolution.
A living being has to know the world external to himself in order to adapt
and preadapt himself to it, for it is in this outer world that he finds food,
shelter, beings of his own species, and the means of work, and it is on this
world of objects that he acts in every possible way by the contractions of
his muscles. But with regard to intracephalic actions, they are outside the
ordinary sphere of our actions. There is no daily need to know them, and we
can understand that the consciousness has not found very pressing
utilitarian motives for development in that direction. One must be an
histologist or a surgeon to find an appreciable interest in studying the
structure of the nerve cell or the topography of the cerebral centres.
We can therefore explain well enough, by the general laws of adaptation,
the reason of the absence of what might be called "cerebral sensibility," but,
here as elsewhere, the question of the "Why" is much easier to solve than
that of the "How."
The question of the "How" consists in explaining that the consciousness,
directly aroused by a nerve-wave, does not perceive this undulation, but in

its stead the external object. Let us first note that between the external
object and the nervous influx there is the relation of cause to effect. It is
only the effect which reaches us, our nerve cells, and our consciousness.
What must be explained is how a cognition (if such a word may be
employed here) of the effect can excite the consciousness of the cause. It is
clear that the effect does not resemble the cause, as quality: the orange I am
looking at has no resemblance with the brain wave which at this moment is
traversing my optic nerve; but this effect contains everything which was in
the cause, or, more exactly, all that part of the cause of which we have
perception. Since it is only by the intermediary of our nervous system that
we perceive the object, all the properties capable of being perceived are
communicated to our nervous system and inscribed in the nerve wave. The
effect produced therefore is the measure of our perception of the cause. This
is absolutely certain. All bodies possess an infinity of properties which
escape our cognitions; because, as excitants of our organism, these
properties are wanting in the intensity or the quality necessary to make it
vibrate; they have not been tuned in unison with our nervous chords. And,
inversely, all we perceive of the mechanical, physical, and chemical
properties of a body is contained in the vibration this body succeeds in
propagating through our cerebral atmosphere. There is in this a
phenomenon of transmission analogous to that which is produced when an
air of music is sent along a wire; the whole concert heard at the other
extremity of the wire has travelled in the form of delicate vibrations.
There must therefore exist, though unperceived by our senses, a sort of
kinship between the qualities of the external objects and the vibrations of
our nerves. This is sometimes forgotten. The theory of the specific energy
of the nerves causes it to be overlooked. As we see that the quality of the
sensation depends on the nerve that is excited, one is inclined to minimise
the importance of the excitant. It is relegated to the position of a proximate
cause with regard to the vibration of the nerve, as the striking of a key on
the piano is the proximate cause of the vibration of a string, which always
gives the same degree of sound whether struck by the forefinger or third
finger, or by a pencil or any other body. It will be seen at once that this
comparison is inexact. The specific property of our nerves does not prevent
our knowing the form of the excitant, and our nerves are only comparable

to piano strings if we grant to these the property of vibrating differently
according to the nature of the bodies which strike them.
How is it that the nerve wave, if it be the depository of the whole of the
physical properties perceived in the object, resembles it so little? It is
because—this is my hypothesis—these properties, if they are in the
undulation, are not there alone. The undulation is the work of two
collaborators: it expresses both the nature of the object which provokes it
and that of the nervous apparatus which is its vehicle. It is like the furrow
traced in the wax of the phonograph which expresses the collaboration of an
aërial vibration with a stylus, a cylinder, and a clock-work movement. This
engraved line resembles, in short, neither the phonographic apparatus nor
the aërial vibration, although it results from the combination of the two.
Similarly, I suppose that if the nervous vibration resembles so little the
excitant which gives it birth, it is because the factor nervous system adds its
effect to the factor external object. Each of these factors represents a
different property: the external object represents a cognition and the
nervous system an excitement.
Let us imagine that we succeed in separating these two effects. It will be
conceived, theoretically, that a separation of this kind will lay bare the
hidden resemblances, giving to each collaborator the part which belongs to
it. The excitement, for instance, will be suppressed, and the cognition will
be retained. Is it possible to make, or at least to imagine, such an analysis?
Perhaps: for, of these two competing activities, one is variable, since it
depends on the constantly changing nature of the objects which come into
relation with us; the other, on the contrary, is a constant, since it expresses
the contribution of our nerve substance, and, though this last is of very
unstable composition, it necessarily varies much less than the series of
excitants. We consequently see faintly that these two elements differ
sufficiently in character for us to be able to suppose that they are separable
by analysis.
But how could this analysis be made? Evidently not by chemical or
physical means: we have no need here of reagents, prisms, centrifugal
apparatus, permeable membranes, or anything of that kind. It will suffice to
suppose that it is the consciousness itself that is the dialyser. It acts by

virtue of its own laws—that is to say, by changes in intensity. Supposing
that sensibility increases for the variable elements of the undulation, and
becomes insensible for the constant elements. The effect will be the same as
a material dissociation by chemical analysis: there will be an elimination of
certain elements and the retention of others.
Now, all we know of the consciousness authorises us to entrust this rôle to
it, for it is within the range of its habits. We know that change is the law of
consciousness, that it is effaced when the excitements are uniform, and is
renewed by their differences or their novelty. A continued or too often
repeated excitement ceases in time to be perceived. It is to condense these
facts into a formula that Bain speaks of the law of relativity of cognition,
and, in spite of a few ambiguities on the part of Spencer and of Bain
himself in the definition of this law,[50] the formula with the sense I have
just indicated is worth preserving.
Let us see what becomes of it, when my hypothesis is adopted. It explains
how certain excitements proceeding from the objects—that is to say,
forming part of the variable element—cease to be perceived when they are
repeated and tend to become constant. A fortiori, it seems to me, should the
same law explain how the constant element par excellence, the one which
never varies from the first hour, is never perceived. There is, in the concert
of the sounds of nature, an accompaniment so monotonous that it is no
longer perceived; and the melody alone continues to be heard.
It is in this precisely that my hypothesis consists. We will suppose a nerve
current starting from one of the organs of the senses, when it is excited by
some object or other, and arriving at the centre of the brain. This current
contains all the properties of the object, its colour, its form, its size, its
thousand details of structure, its weight, its sonorous qualities, &c., &c.,
properties combined with and connected by the properties of the nerveorgan in which the current is propagated. The consciousness remains
insensible to those nervous properties of the current which are so often
repeated that they are annulled; it perceives, on the contrary, its variable and
accidental properties which express the nature of the excitant. By this
partial sensibility, the consciousness lays bare that which, in the nerve
current, represents the object—that is to say, a cognition; and this operation
is equivalent to a transformation of the current into a perception, image, or

idea. There is not, strictly speaking, a transformation, but an analysis; only,
the practical result is the same as that of a transformation, and is obtained
without its being necessary to suppose the transmutation of a physical into a
mental phenomenon.
Let us place ourselves now at the moment when the analysis I am supposing
to be possible has just been effected. Our consciousness then assists at the
unrolling of representations which correspond to the outer world. These
representations are not, or do not appear to be, lodged in the brain; and it is
not necessary to suppose a special operation which, taking them in the
brain, should project them to the periphery of our nerves. This transport
would be useless, since for the consciousness the brain does not exist: the
brain, with its fibres and cells, is not felt; it therefore supplies no datum to
enable us to judge whether the representation is external or internal with
regard to it. In other words, the representation is only localised in relation to
itself; there is no determinate position other than that of one representation
in relation to another. We may therefore reject as inexact the pretended law
of eccentricity of the physiologists, who suppose that sensation is first
perceived as it were centrally, and then, by an added act, is localised at the
peripheric extremity of the nerve. This argument would only be correct if
we admitted that the brain is perceived by the consciousness of the brain. I
have already said that the consciousness is not an anatomist, and that
therefore this problem does not present itself.
Such as it is, this hypothesis appears to me to present the advantage of
explaining the reason why our consciousness coincides, in certain
circumstances, with the actions of the brain, and, in others, does not come
near them. In other words, it contains an explanation of the unconscious. I
can show this by quoting certain exact facts, of which the explanation has
been hitherto thought to present difficulties, but which become very easy to
understand on the present hypothesis. The first of these facts relates to the
psychology of the motor current. This current has been a great feature in the
studies which have been made on the feeling of effort and on the physical
basis of the will. The motor current is that which, starting from the cerebral
cells of the motor region, travels by way of the fibres of the pyramidal tract
into the muscles of the body; and it is centrifugal in direction. Researches
have been made as to whether we are or may be conscious of this current;
or rather, the question has been put in somewhat different terms. It has been

asked whether a psychological state can be the counterpart of this motor
current,—if, for example, the feeling of mental effort produced in us at the
moment of executing a difficult act or of taking a grave resolution, might
not have this motor current for a basis.
The opinion which has prevailed is in the negative. We have recognised—a
good deal on the faith of experiment, and a little also for theoretical reasons
—that no sensation is awakened by the centrifugal current. As to the
sensation of effort, it has been agreed to place it elsewhere. We put it among
the centripetal sensations which, are produced as the movement outlines
itself, and which proceed from the contracted muscles, the stretched
ligaments, and the frictional movements of the articulations. Effort would
therefore form part of all the psychical phenomenology, which is the
duplicate of those sensory currents which are centripetal in direction.
In the long run, I can see no sort of theoretical reason for subordinating the
consciousness to the direction of the nerve current, and for supposing that
the consciousness is aroused when this current is centripetal, and that it
cannot follow the centrifugal current. But this point matters little. My
hypothesis would fairly well explain why the motor current remains
unconscious; it explains the affair by taking into consideration the nature of
this current and not its direction. This current is a motor one because it is
born in the central cells, because it is a discharge from these cells, and is of
entirely nervous origin. Since it does not correspond with the perception of
an object—the ever varying object—it is always the same by nature. It does
not carry with it in its monotonous course the débris of an object, as does
the sensory current. Thus it can flow without consciousness.
This same kind of hypothesis supplies us with the reasons why a given
sensory current may be, according to circumstances, either conscious or
unconscious. The consciousness resulting from the analysis of the
molecular wave is, as it were, a supplementary work which may be
subsequently added to the realised wave. The propagation of the wave is the
essential fact—there is always time to become conscious of it afterwards. It
is thus that we happen, in moments of abstraction, to remain insensible to
certain even very powerful excitements. Our nervous system registers them,
nevertheless, and we can find them again, later on, within the memory. This
is the effect of a belated analysis.

The converse phenomenon occurs much more frequently. We remark many
actions and perceptions which occur the first time with consciousness,
emotion, and effort. Then, when they are repeated, as coordination becomes
stronger and easier, the reflex consciousness of the operation becomes
feebler. This is the law of habit, which slowly carries us towards
automatism. These observations have even been extended, and the
endeavour made to apply them to the explanation of the origin of reflex
actions and of instincts which have all started with consciousness. This is a
rather bold attempt, for it meets with many serious difficulties in execution;
but the idea seems fairly correct, and is acceptable if we may limit it. It is
certain that the consciousness accompanies the effort towards the untried,
and perishes as soon as it is realised. Whence comes this singular dilemma
propounded to it by nature: to create something new or perish? It really
seems that my hypothesis explains this. Every new act is produced by nerve
currents, which contain many of those variable elements which the
consciousness perceives; but, in proportion as the action of the brain repeats
itself and becomes more precise and more exact, this variable element
becomes attenuated, falls to its lowest pitch, and may even disappear in the
fixation of habit and instinct.
My hypothesis much resembles the system of parallelism. It perfects it, as it
seems to me, as much as the latter has perfected materialism. We indeed
admit a kind of parallelism between the consciousness and the object of
cognition; but these two series are not independent, not simply placed in
juxtaposition as is possible in ordinary parallelism; they are united and
fused together so as to complete each other. This new theory appears to me
to represent a better form of the series of attempts which have been inspired
by the common necessity of making the phenomena of consciousness
accord with the determinism of physical facts.
I hold fast to this physical determinism, and accept a strictly mechanical
conception of the functions of the nervous system. In my idea, the currents
which pass through the cerebral mass follow each other without
interruption, from the sensorial periphery to the motor periphery; it is they,
and they alone, which excite the movements of the body by acting on the
muscles. Parallelism recognises all these things, and I do likewise.

Let us now see the advantages of this new system. First, it contains no
paralogism, no logical or psychological error, since it does not advance the
supposition that the mental differs by its nature from the physical
phenomenon. We have discussed above the consequences of this error,
They are here avoided. In the second place, it is explanatory, at least in a
certain measure, since the formula we employ allows us to understand,
better than by the principle of a simple juxtaposition, why certain nerve
currents flow in the light of consciousness, while others are plunged into the
darkness of unconsciousness. This law of consciousness, which Bain called
the law of relativity, becomes, when embodied with my theory of the
relations of the physical to the moral, an explanation of the distribution of
consciousness through the actions of the brain.
I ask myself whether the explanation I have devised ought to be literally
preserved. Perhaps not. I have endeavoured less to present a ready-made
solution than to indicate the direction in which we ought to look for one.
The law of consciousness which I have used to explain the transformation
of a nerve current into perception and images is only an empirical law
produced by the generalisation of particular observations. Until now there
has been, so far as I know, no attempt to ascertain whether this law of
consciousness, notwithstanding the general nature which some authors
incline to ascribe to it, might not explain itself by some more general facts,
and might not fit, as a particular case, into a more comprehensive frame. To
be brief, this is very possible. I have not troubled myself about it, and I have
made a transcendental use of this empirical law; for I have impliedly
supposed it to be a first principle, capable of accounting for the
development of the consciousness, but itself incapable of explanation.
If other observers discover that that which to me has appeared inexplicable,
may be explained by quite peculiar causes, it is clear that my theory must be
abandoned or modified. New theories must then be sought for, which will
probably consist in recognising different properties in the consciousness. A
little thought will discover several, I have no doubt. By way of suggestion, I
will indicate one of these hypothetical possibilities: "The consciousness has
the faculty of reading in the effect that which existed in the cause." It is not
rash to believe that by working out this idea, a certain solution would be
discovered. Moreover, the essential is, I repeat, less to find a solution than
to take account of the point which requires one; and metaphysics seem to

me especially useful when it shows us where the gap in our knowledge
exists and what are the conditions required to fill this gap.
Above all, I adhere to this idea, which has been one of the guiding forces of
this book: there exists at the bottom of all the phenomena of the
intelligence, a duality. To form a true phenomenon, there must be at once a
consciousness and an object. According to passing tendencies, either of
temperament or of fashion, preponderance has been given sometimes to one
of the terms of this couple, sometimes to the other. The idealist declares:
"Thought creates the world." The materialist answers: "The matter of the
brain creates thought." Between these two extreme opinions, the one as
unjustifiable as the other in the excesses they commit, we take up an
intermediate position. Looking at the balance, we see no argument capable
of being placed in the scale of the consciousness which may not be
neutralised by an argument placed in the scale of the object; and if we had
to give our final verdict we should say: "The consciousness and matter have
equal rights," thus leaving to every one the power to place, in this
conception of an equality of rights, the hopes of survival of which his heart
has need.

FOOTNOTES:
[50] The équivoque perpetrated by BAIN and SPENCER consists in supposing that
the consciousness bears solely on differences. This is going too far. I confine
myself to admitting that, if sensation is not changed from time to time, the
consciousness becomes weaker and disappears.

CHAPTER VI
RECAPITULATION
I ask permission to reproduce here a communication made by me in
December 1904 to the Société Française de Philosophie. I there set forth
briefly the ideas which I have just developed in this book. This succinct
exposé may be useful as a recapitulation of the argument.
Description of Matter.—The physicists who are seeking for a conception of
the Inmost structure of matter in order to explain the very numerous
phenomena they perceive, fancy they can connect them with other
phenomena, less numerous, but of the same order. They thus consider
matter in itself.
We psychologists add to matter something more, viz. the observer. We
consider matter and define it by its relations to our modes of knowledge—
that is to say, by bearing in mind that it is conditioned by our external
perception. These are two different points of view.
In developing our own standpoint, we note that of the outer world we are
acquainted with nothing but our sensations: if we propound this limit, it is
because many observations and experiments show that, between the
external object and ourselves, there is but one intermediary, the nervous
system, and that we only perceive the modifications which the external
object, acting as an excitant, provokes in this system.
Let us provisionally apply to these modifications the term sensations,
without settling the question of their physical or mental nature.
Other experiments, again, prove to us that our sensations are not necessarily
similar to the objects which excite them; for the quality of each sensation
depends on what is called the specific energy of the nerve excited. Thus,
whether the optic nerve be appealed to by a ray of light, an electric current,
or a mechanical shock, it always gives the same answer, and this answer is
the sensation of light.

It follows that our nervous system itself is only known to us as regards its
structure by the intermediary of sensations, and we are not otherwise more
informed upon its nature than upon that of any other object whatever.
In the second place, a much more serious consequence is that all our
sensations being equally false, so far as they are copies of the excitants
which provoke them, one has no right to use any of these sensations to
represent to ourselves the inmost structure of matter. The theories to which
many physicists still cling, which consist in explaining all the modalities of
matter by different combinations of movement, start from false premises.
Their error consists in explaining the whole body of our sensations by
certain particular sensations of the eye, of the touch, and of the muscular
sense, in which analysis discovers the elements and the source of the
representation of motion. Now these particular sensations have no more
objective value than those of the tongue, of the nose, and of the ear; in so
far as they are related to the external excitant of which it is sought to
penetrate the inmost nature, one of them is as radically false as the other.
It is true that a certain number of persons will think to escape from our
conclusion, because they do not accept our starting point. There exist, in
fact, several systems which propound that the outer world is known to us
directly without the intermediary of a tertium quid, that is, of sensation. In
the first place, the spiritists are convinced that disembodied souls can
remain spectators of terrestrial life, and, consequently, can perceive it
without the interposition of organs. On the other hand, some German
authors have recently maintained, by rather curious reasoning, that the
specific energy of our nervous system does not transform the excitants, and
that our sensations are the faithful copies of that which causes them.
Finally, various philosophers, Reid, Hamilton, and, in our own days, the
deep and subtle mind of M. Bergson, have proposed to admit that by direct
comprehension we have cognisance of the objects without mystery and as
they are. Let this be admitted. It will change nothing in our conclusions, and
for the following reasons.
We have said that no kind of our sensations—neither the visual, the tactile,
nor the muscular—permits us to represent to ourselves the inmost structure
of matter, because all sensations, without exception, are false, as copies of
material objects. We are now assured that we are mistaken, and that our

sensations are all true—that is to say, are faithful copies of the objects. If all
are true, it comes to the same thing as if all are false. If all are true, it is
impossible to make any choice among them, to retain only the sensations of
sight and touch, and to use them in the construction of a mechanical theory,
to the exclusion of the others. For it is impossible for us to explain some by
the others. If all are equally true, they all have the same right to represent
the structure of matter, and, as they are irreconcilable, no theory can be
formed from their synthesis.
Let us, consequently, conclude this: whatever hypothesis may be built up on
the relations possibly existing between matter and our sensations, we are
forbidden to make a theory of matter in the terms of our sensations.
That is what I think of matter, understood as the inmost structure of bodies
—of unknowable and metaphysical matter. I shall not speak of it again; and
henceforth when I use the word matter, it will be in quite a different
acceptation—it will be empirical and physical matter, such as it appears to
us in our sensations. It must therefore be understood that from this moment
we change our ground. We leave the world of noumena and enter that of
phenomena.
Definition of Mind.—Generally, to define the mind, we oppose the concept
of mind to the concept of matter, with the result that we get extremely
vague images in our thoughts. It is preferable to replace the concepts by
facts, and to proceed to an inventory of all mental phenomena.
Now, in the course of this inventory, we perceive that we have continually
to do with two orders of elements, which are united in reality, but which our
thought may consider as isolated. One of these elements is represented by
those states which we designate by the name of sensations, images,
emotions, &c.; the other element is the consciousness of these sensations,
the cognition of these images, the fact of experiencing these emotions. It is,
in other words, a special activity of which these states are the object and, as
it were, the point of application—an activity which consists in perceiving,
judging, comparing, understanding, and willing. To make our inventory
orderly, let us deal with these two elements separately and begin with the
first.

We will first examine sensation: let us put aside that which is the fact of
feeling, and retain that which is felt. Thus defined and slightly condensed,
what is sensation? Until now we have employed the word in the very vague
sense of a tertium quid interposed between the object and ourselves. Now
we have to be more precise, and to inquire whether sensation is a physical
or a mental thing. I need not tell you that on this point every possible
opinion has been held. My own opinion is that sensation should be
considered as a physical phenomenon; sensation, be it understood, in the
sense of impression felt, and not in that of capacity to feel.
Here are the arguments I invoke for the support of my thesis: in the first
place, popular opinion, which identifies matter with what we see, and with
what we touch—that is to say, with sensation. This popular opinion
represents a primitive attitude, a family possession which we have the right
to retain, so long as it is not proved to us to be false: next, this remark, that
by its mode of apparition at once unexpected, the revealer of new
cognitions, and independent of our will, as well as by its content, sensation
sums up for us all we understand by matter, physical state, outer world.
Colour, form, extent, position in space, are known to us as sensations only.
Sensation is not a means of knowing these properties of matter, it is these
properties themselves.
What objections can be raised against my conclusion? One has evidently
the right to apply the term psychological to the whole sensation, taken en
bloc, and comprising in itself both impression and consciousness. The result
of this terminology will be that, as we know nothing except sensations, the
physical will remain unknowable, and the distinction between the physical
and the mental will vanish. But it will eventually be re-established under
other names by utilising the distinction I have made between objects of
cognition and acts of cognition;—a distinction which is not verbal, and
results from observation.
What is not permissible is to declare that sensation is a psychological
phenomenon, and to oppose this phenomenon to physical reality, as if this
latter could be known to us by any other method than sensation.
If the opinion I uphold be accepted, if we agree to see in sensation,
understood in a certain way, a physical state, it will be easy to extend this

interpretation to a whole series of different phenomena. To the images, first,
which proceed from sensations, since they are recurring sensations; to the
emotions also, which, according to recent theories, result from the
perception of the movements which are produced in the heart, the vessels,
and the muscles; and finally, to effort, whether of will or of attention, which
is constituted by the muscular sensations perceived, and consequently also
results from corporeal states. The consequences must be clearly remarked.
To admit that sensation is a physical state, is to admit, by that very fact, that
the image, idea, emotion, and effort—all those manifestations generally
ascribed to the mind alone—are also physical states.
What, then, is the mind? And what share remains to it in all these
phenomena, from which it seems we are endeavouring to oust it? The mind
is in that special activity which is engaged in sensation, image, idea,
emotion, and effort. For a sensation to be produced; there must be, as I said
a little time ago, two elements: the something felt—a tree, a house, an
animal, a titillation, an odour,—and also the fact of feeling this something,
the consciousness of it, the judgment passed on it, the reasoning applied to
it—in other terms, the categories which comprehend it. From this point of
view, the dualism contained in sensation is clearly expressed. Sensation as a
thing felt, that is, the physical part, or matter; sensation as the fact of feeling
or of judging, that is, the mind.
Mark the language I use. We say that matter is the something felt; but we do
not say for the sake of symmetry, that the mind is the something which
feels. I have used a more cautious, and, I think, a more just formula, which
places the mind in the fact of feeling. Let me repeat again, at the risk of
appearing too subtle: the mind is the act of consciousness; it is not a subject
which has consciousness. For a subject, let it be noted, a subject which
feels, is an object of cognition—it forms part of the other group of
elements, the group of sensations. In practice we represent by mind a
fragment of our own biography, and by dint of pains we attribute to this
fragment the faculty of having a consciousness; we make it the subject of
the relation subject-object. But this fragment, being constituted of memories
and sensations, does not exactly represent the mind, and does not
correspond to our definition; it would rather represent the mind
sensationalised or materialised.

From this follows the curious consequence that the mind is endowed with
an incomplete existence; it is like form, which can only be realised by its
application to matter of some kind. One may fancy a sensation continuing
to exist, to live and to provoke movements, even after ceasing to be
perceived. Those who are not uncompromising idealists readily admit this
independence of the objects with regard to our consciousness, but the
converse is not true. It is impossible to understand a consciousness existing
without an object, a perception without a sensation to be perceived, an
attention without a point of application, an empty wish which should have
nothing to wish for; in a word, a spiritual activity acting without matter on
which to act, or more briefly still—mind without matter. Mind and matter
are correlative terms; and, on this point, I firmly believe that Aristotle was
much closer to the truth than many modern thinkers.
I have convinced myself that the definition of mind at which we have just
arrived is, in its exactness and soberness, the only one which permits
psychology to be distinguished from the sciences nearest to it. You know
that it has been discovered in our days that there exists a great difficulty in
effecting this delimitation. The definitions of psychology hitherto proposed
nearly all have the defect of not agreeing with the one thing defined. Time
fails us to review them all, but I shall point out one at least, because our
discussion on this particular formula will serve as a preparation for taking
in hand the last question that remains to be examined—the relation of the
mind to the body.
According to the definition I am aiming at, psychology would be the
science of internal facts, while the other sciences deal with the external.
Psychology, it has also been said, has as its instrument introspection, while
the natural sciences work with the eye, the touch, the ear—that is to say,
with the senses of extrospection.
To this distinction, I reply that in all sciences there exist but two things:
sensations and the consciousness which accompanies them. A sensation
may belong to the inner or the outer world through accidental reasons,
without any change in its nature; the sensation of the outer world is the
social sensation which we share with our fellows. If the excitant which
provokes it is included in our nervous system, it is the sensation which
becomes individual, hidden to all except ourselves, and constituting a

microcosm by the side of a macrocosm. What importance can this have,
since all the difference depends on the position occupied by the excitant?
But we are persistently told: there are in reality two ways of arriving at the
cognition of objects—from within and from without. These two ways are as
opposite as the right and wrong side of a stuff. It is in this sense that
psychology is the science of the within and looks at the wrong side, while
the natural sciences reckon, weigh, and measure the right side. And this is
so true, they add, that the same phenomenon absolutely appears under two
forms radically different from each other according as they are looked at
from one or the other of the two points of view. Every one of our thoughts,
they point out to us, is in correlation with a particular state of our cerebral
matter; our thought is the subjective and mental face, the corresponding
cerebral process is the objective and material face.
Though this dualism is frequently presented as an observed truth, I think it
is possible to show its error. Take an example: I look at the plain before me,
and see a flock of sheep pass through it. At the same time an observer,
armed with a microscope à la Jules Verne, looks into my brain and observes
there a certain molecular dance which accompanies my visual perception.
Thus, on the one hand, is my representation; on the other, a dynamic state of
the nerve cells. This is what constitutes the right and the wrong sides of the
stuff. We are told, "See how little resemblance there is in this; a
representation is a psychical, and a movement of molecules a material,
thing."
But I, on the contrary, think there is a great resemblance. When I see the
flock passing, I have a visual perception. The observer who, by the
hypothesis, is at that moment looking into my brain, also experiences a
visual perception. Granted, they are not the same perception. How could
they be the same? I am looking at the sheep, he is looking at the interior of
my brain; it is not astonishing that, looking at objects so different, we
should receive images also very different. But, notwithstanding their
difference of object—that is, of content—there are here two visual
perceptions composed in the same way; and I do not see by what right it can
be said that one represents a material, the other a physical, phenomenon. In
reality, each of these perceptions has a two-fold and psycho-physical value
—physical in regard to the object to which it applies, and psychical

inasmuch as it is an act of perception, that is to say, of consciousness. For
one is just as much psychical as the other, and as much material, for a flock
of sheep is as material a thing as is my brain. If we keep this conclusion in
our minds, when we come to make a critical examination of certain
philosophical systems, we shall easily see the mistake they make.
Spiritualism[51] rests on the conception that the mind can subsist and work
in total independence of any tie to matter. It is true that, in details,
spiritualists make some modification in this absolute principle in order to
explain the perceptions of the senses and the execution of the orders of the
will; but the duality, the independence, and the autonomy of the soul and
the body remain, in any case, the peculiar dogma of the system. This dogma
appears to me utterly false; the mind cannot exist without matter to which it
is applied; and to the principle of heterogeneity, so often invoked to forbid
all commerce between the two substances, I reply by appealing to intuition,
which shows us the consciousness and its different forms, comparison,
judgment, and reasoning, so closely connected with sensation that they
cannot be imagined as existing with an isolated life.
Materialism, we know, argues quite differently; it imagines that a particular
state of the nerve centres has the virtue of generating a psychical
phenomenon, which represents, according to various metaphors, property,
function, effect, and even secretion. Critics have often asked how, with
matter in motion, a phenomenon of thought could be explained or
fabricated. It is very probable that those who admit this material genesis of
thought, represent it to themselves under the form of something subtle, like
an electric spark, a puff of wind, a will-of-the-wisp, or an alcoholic flame.
Materialists are not alone responsible for these inadequate metaphors,
which proceed from a metaphysics constructed of concepts. Let us recollect
exactly what a psychical phenomenon is. Let us banish the will-o'-thewisps, replace them by a precise instance, and return to the visual
perception we took as an example a little while back: without intending a
pun, "revenons à nos moutons." These sheep which I see in the plain are as
material, as real, as the cerebral movement which accompanies my
perception. How, then, is it possible that this cerebral movement, a primary
material fact, should engender this secondary material fact, this collection
of complicated beings which form a flock?

Before going any further, let us invite another philosophical system to take
a place within the circle of our discussion; for the same answer will suffice
for it as well as for the preceding one, and it will be as well to deal with
both at once. This new system, parallelism, in great favour at the present
day, appears to me to be a materialism perfected especially in the direction
of caution. To escape the mystery of the genesis of the mind from matter,
this new system places them parallel to each other and side by side, we
might almost say experimentally, so much do parallelists try to avoid
talking metaphysics. But their position is untenable, and they likewise are
the victims of the mirage of concepts; for they consider the mental as
capable of being parallel to the physical without mingling with it, and of
subsisting by itself and with a life of its own. Such a hypothesis is only
possible by reason of the insufficient definition given to the mind. If it be
recognised that the mind has an incomplete existence and is only realised
by its incarnation in matter, the figure which is the basis of parallelism
becomes indefensible. There is no longer on the one hand the physical, and
on the other the mental, but on one side the physical and the mental
combined, and on the other the same combination; which amounts to saying
that the two faces to a reality, which it was thought had been made out to be
so distinct, are identical. There are not two faces, but one face; and the
monism, which certain metaphysicians struggle to arrive at by a mysterious
reconciliation of the phenomenal duality within the unity of the noumenon,
need not be sought so far afield, since we already discover it in the
phenomenon itself.
The criticisms I have just pointed out to you, only too briefly, are to be
found in several philosophers, confusedly in Berkeley, and with more
precision in M. Bergson's book on Matière et Mémoire. The latter author,
remarking that our brain and the outer world are to us images of the same
order, refuses to admit that the brain, which is only a very small part of
these images, can explain and contain the other and much larger part, which
comprises the vast universe. This would amount to saying that the whole is
comprised in the part. I believe that this objection is analogous to the one
just stated with less ingenuity.
It is interesting to see how M. Bergson gets out of the difficulty which he
himself raised. Being unwilling to bring forth from the molecular
movement of the brain the representation of the world, or to superpose the

representation on this movement as in the parallelist hypothesis, he has
arrived at a theory, very ingenious but rather obscure, which consists in
placing the image of the world outside the brain, this latter being reduced to
a motor organ which executes the orders of the mind.
We thus have four philosophical theories, which, while trying to reconcile
mind with matter, give to the representation a different position in regard to
cerebral action. The spiritualist asserts the complete independence of the
representation in relation to cerebral movement; the materialist places it
after, the parallelist by the side of, the cerebral movement; M. Bergson puts
it in front.
I must confess that the last of these systems, that of M. Bergson, presents
many difficulties. As he does not localise the mind in the body, he is
obliged to place our perception—that is to say, a part of ourselves—in the
objects perceived; for example, in the stars when we are looking at them.
The memory is lodged in distant planes of consciousness which are not
otherwise defined. We understand with difficulty these emigrations, these
crumblings into morsels of our mind. This would not matter if our author
did not go so far as to maintain that the sensory nerves of the brain are not
sensory nerves, and that the severance of them does not suppress sensations,
but simply the motor efforts of these sensations. All the physiologist in me
protests against the rashness of these interpretations.
The principal difficulties of the problem of the union between the mind and
the body proceed from the two following facts, which seem incompatible.
On the one hand, our thought is conditioned by a certain intra-cerebral
movement of molecules and atoms; and, on the other hand, this same
thought has no consciousness of this molecular movement. It does not know
the path of the wave in our nerves; it does not suspect, for example, that the
image of the objects is reversed in the retina, or that the excitements of the
right eye for the most part go into the left hemisphere. In a word, it is no
anatomist. It is a very curious thing that our consciousness enters into
relation only with the extra-cerebral, the external objects, and the
superficies of our bodies.
From this, this exact question suggests itself: a molecular wave must come
as far as our visual cerebral centre for us to have the perception of the

object before our eyes; how is it that our consciousness is unaware of this
physiological event from which it depends, and is borne towards the distant
object as if it sprang forth outside our nervous system?
Let us first remark, that if we do not perceive this wave, yet it must contain
all we know of the external object, for it is evident that we only know of it
that part of its properties which it transmits to our nerves and our nerve
centres. All the known substance of the external object is, then, implied in
this vibration; it is there, but it is not there by itself. The vibration is the
work of two collaborators; it expresses at once the nature of the object
which provokes it, and the nature of the nerve apparatus which transports it,
as the furrow traced in the wax of the phonograph implies the joint action of
an aërial vibration with a stylus, a cylinder, and, a clock-work apparatus.
I therefore suppose—and this is, I say it plainly, but an hypothesis—that if
the nervous vibration so little resembles the external excitant which
generates it, it is because the factor nervous system superadds its effect to
the factor excitant. Let us imagine, now, that we have managed to separate
these two effects, and we shall understand that then the nervous event so
analysed might resemble only the object, or only the nervous system. Now,
of these two effects, one is constant, that one which represents the action of
the nervous system; there is another which varies with each new perception,
and even with every moment of the same perception—that is to say, the
object. It is not impossible to understand that the consciousness remains
deaf to the constant and sensitive to the variable element. There is a law of
consciousness which has often been described, and fresh applications of
which are met with daily: this is, that the consciousness only maintains
itself by change, whether this change results from the exterior by
impressions received, or is produced from the interior by movements of the
attention. Let us here apply this empirical law, and admit that it contains a
first principle. It will then be possible for us to understand that the
consciousness formed into a dialyser of the undulation may reject that
constant element which expresses the contribution of the nervous system,
and may lay bare the variable element which corresponds to the object: so
that an intestinal movement of the cerebral substance, brought to light by
this analytical consciousness, may become the perception of an object. By
accepting this hypothesis, we restore to the sensory nerves and to the
encephalic centres their property of being the substrata of representation,

and avoid the objection made above against materialism and parallelism,
that they did not explain how a cerebral movement, which is material, can
engender the perception of an object which differs greatly from it and is yet
as material as the movement itself. There is not here, properly speaking,
either generation, transformation, or metamorphosis. The object to be
perceived is contained in the nerve current. It is, as it were, rolled up in it;
and it must be made to go forth from the wave to be seen. This last is the
work of the consciousness.

FOOTNOTES:
[51] See [Note 43] on p. 191.
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INTRODUCTION
The medical profession is justly conservative. Human life should not be
considered as the proper material for wild experiments.
Conservatism, however, is too often a welcome excuse for lazy minds, loath
to adapt themselves to fast changing conditions.
Remember the scornful reception which first was accorded to Freud's
discoveries in the domain of the unconscious.
When after years of patient observations, he finally decided to appear
before medical bodies to tell them modestly of some facts which always
recurred in his dream and his patients' dreams, he was first laughed at and
then avoided as a crank.
The words "dream interpretation" were and still are indeed fraught with
unpleasant, unscientific associations. They remind one of all sorts of
childish, superstitious notions, which make up the thread and woof of
dream books, read by none but the ignorant and the primitive.
The wealth of detail, the infinite care never to let anything pass
unexplained, with which he presented to the public the result of his
investigations, are impressing more and more serious-minded scientists, but
the examination of his evidential data demands arduous work and
presupposes an absolutely open mind.
This is why we still encounter men, totally unfamiliar with Freud's writings,
men who were not even interested enough in the subject to attempt an
interpretation of their dreams or their patients' dreams, deriding Freud's
theories and combatting them with the help of statements which he never
made.
Some of them, like Professor Boris Sidis, reach at times conclusions which
are strangely similar to Freud's, but in their ignorance of psychoanalytic

literature, they fail to credit Freud for observations antedating theirs.
Besides those who sneer at dream study, because they have never looked
into the subject, there are those who do not dare to face the facts revealed
by dream study. Dreams tell us many an unpleasant biological truth about
ourselves and only very free minds can thrive on such a diet. Self-deception
is a plant which withers fast in the pellucid atmosphere of dream
investigation.
The weakling and the neurotic attached to his neurosis are not anxious to
turn such a powerful searchlight upon the dark corners of their psychology.
Freud's theories are anything but theoretical.
He was moved by the fact that there always seemed to be a close
connection between his patients' dreams and their mental abnormalities, to
collect thousands of dreams and to compare them with the case histories in
his possession.
He did not start out with a preconceived bias, hoping to find evidence
which might support his views. He looked at facts a thousand times "until
they began to tell him something."
His attitude toward dream study was, in other words, that of a statistician
who does not know, and has no means of foreseeing, what conclusions will
be forced on him by the information he is gathering, but who is fully
prepared to accept those unavoidable conclusions.
This was indeed a novel way in psychology. Psychologists had always been
wont to build, in what Bleuler calls "autistic ways," that is through methods
in no wise supported by evidence, some attractive hypothesis, which sprung
from their brain, like Minerva from Jove's brain, fully armed.
After which, they would stretch upon that unyielding frame the hide of a
reality which they had previously killed.
It is only to minds suffering from the same distortions, to minds also
autistically inclined, that those empty, artificial structures appear acceptable

molds for philosophic thinking.
The pragmatic view that "truth is what works" had not been as yet
expressed when Freud published his revolutionary views on the psychology
of dreams.
Five facts of first magnitude were made obvious to the world by his
interpretation of dreams.
First of all, Freud pointed out a constant connection between some part of
every dream and some detail of the dreamer's life during the previous
waking state. This positively establishes a relation between sleeping states
and waking states and disposes of the widely prevalent view that dreams are
purely nonsensical phenomena coming from nowhere and leading nowhere.
Secondly, Freud, after studying the dreamer's life and modes of thought,
after noting down all his mannerisms and the apparently insignificant
details of his conduct which reveal his secret thoughts, came to the
conclusion that there was in every dream the attempted or successful
gratification of some wish, conscious or unconscious.
Thirdly, he proved that many of our dream visions are symbolical, which
causes us to consider them as absurd and unintelligible; the universality of
those symbols, however, makes them very transparent to the trained
observer.
Fourthly, Freud showed that sexual desires play an enormous part in our
unconscious, a part which puritanical hypocrisy has always tried to
minimize, if not to ignore entirely.
Finally, Freud established a direct connection between dreams and insanity,
between the symbolic visions of our sleep and the symbolic actions of the
mentally deranged.
There were, of course, many other observations which Freud made while
dissecting the dreams of his patients, but not all of them present as much
interest as the foregoing nor were they as revolutionary or likely to wield as
much influence on modern psychiatry.

Other explorers have struck the path blazed by Freud and leading into man's
unconscious. Jung of Zurich, Adler of Vienna and Kempf of Washington,
D.C., have made to the study of the unconscious, contributions which have
brought that study into fields which Freud himself never dreamt of
invading.
One fact which cannot be too emphatically stated, however, is that but for
Freud's wishfulfillment theory of dreams, neither Jung's "energic theory,"
nor Adler's theory of "organ inferiority and compensation," nor Kempf's
"dynamic mechanism" might have been formulated.
Freud is the father of modern abnormal psychology and he established the
psychoanalytical point of view. No one who is not well grounded in
Freudian lore can hope to achieve any work of value in the field of
psychoanalysis.
On the other hand, let no one repeat the absurd assertion that Freudism is a
sort of religion bounded with dogmas and requiring an act of faith.
Freudism as such was merely a stage in the development of psychoanalysis,
a stage out of which all but a few bigoted camp followers, totally lacking in
originality, have evolved. Thousands of stones have been added to the
structure erected by the Viennese physician and many more will be added in
the course of time.
But the new additions to that structure would collapse like a house of cards
but for the original foundations which are as indestructible as Harvey's
statement as to the circulation of the blood.
Regardless of whatever additions or changes have been made to the original
structure, the analytic point of view remains unchanged.
That point of view is not only revolutionising all the methods of diagnosis
and treatment of mental derangements, but compelling the intelligent, upto-date physician to revise entirely his attitude to almost every kind of
disease.
The insane are no longer absurd and pitiable people, to be herded in
asylums till nature either cures them or relieves them, through death, of

their misery. The insane who have not been made so by actual injury to
their brain or nervous system, are the victims of unconscious forces which
cause them to do abnormally things which they might be helped to do
normally.
Insight into one's psychology is replacing victoriously sedatives and rest
cures.
Physicians dealing with "purely" physical cases have begun to take into
serious consideration the "mental" factors which have predisposed a patient
to certain ailments.
Freud's views have also made a revision of all ethical and social values
unavoidable and have thrown an unexpected flood of light upon literary and
artistic accomplishment.
But the Freudian point of view, or more broadly speaking, the
psychoanalytic point of view, shall ever remain a puzzle to those who, from
laziness or indifference, refuse to survey with the great Viennese the field
over which he carefully groped his way. We shall never be convinced until
we repeat under his guidance all his laboratory experiments.
We must follow him through the thickets of the unconscious, through the
land which had never been charted because academic philosophers,
following the line of least effort, had decided a priori that it could not be
charted.
Ancient geographers, when exhausting their store of information about
distant lands, yielded to an unscientific craving for romance and, without
any evidence to support their day dreams, filled the blank spaces left on
their maps by unexplored tracts with amusing inserts such as "Here there
are lions."
Thanks to Freud's interpretation of dreams the "royal road" into the
unconscious is now open to all explorers. They shall not find lions, they
shall find man himself, and the record of all his life and of his struggle with
reality.

And it is only after seeing man as his unconscious, revealed by his dreams,
presents him to us that we shall understand him fully. For as Freud said to
Putnam: "We are what we are because we have been what we have been."
Not a few serious-minded students, however, have been discouraged from
attempting a study of Freud's dream psychology.
The book in which he originally offered to the world his interpretation of
dreams was as circumstantial as a legal record to be pondered over by
scientists at their leisure, not to be assimilated in a few hours by the average
alert reader. In those days, Freud could not leave out any detail likely to
make his extremely novel thesis evidentially acceptable to those willing to
sift data.
Freud himself, however, realized the magnitude of the task which the
reading of his magnum opus imposed upon those who have not been
prepared for it by long psychological and scientific training and he
abstracted from that gigantic work the parts which constitute the essential of
his discoveries.
The publishers of the present book deserve credit for presenting to the
reading public the gist of Freud's psychology in the master's own words,
and in a form which shall neither discourage beginners, nor appear too
elementary to those who are more advanced in psychoanalytic study.
Dream psychology is the key to Freud's works and to all modern
psychology. With a simple, compact manual such as Dream Psychology
there shall be no longer any excuse for ignorance of the most revolutionary
psychological system of modern times.
ANDRE TRIDON.
121 Madison Avenue, New York.
November, 1920.
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I
DREAMS HAVE A MEANING
In what we may term "prescientific days" people were in no uncertainty
about the interpretation of dreams. When they were recalled after
awakening they were regarded as either the friendly or hostile manifestation
of some higher powers, demoniacal and Divine. With the rise of scientific
thought the whole of this expressive mythology was transferred to
psychology; to-day there is but a small minority among educated persons
who doubt that the dream is the dreamer's own psychical act.
But since the downfall of the mythological hypothesis an interpretation of
the dream has been wanting. The conditions of its origin; its relationship to
our psychical life when we are awake; its independence of disturbances
which, during the state of sleep, seem to compel notice; its many
peculiarities repugnant to our waking thought; the incongruence between its
images and the feelings they engender; then the dream's evanescence, the
way in which, on awakening, our thoughts thrust it aside as something
bizarre, and our reminiscences mutilating or rejecting it—all these and
many other problems have for many hundred years demanded answers
which up till now could never have been satisfactory. Before all there is the
question as to the meaning of the dream, a question which is in itself
double-sided. There is, firstly, the psychical significance of the dream, its
position with regard to the psychical processes, as to a possible biological
function; secondly, has the dream a meaning—can sense be made of each
single dream as of other mental syntheses?
Three tendencies can be observed in the estimation of dreams. Many
philosophers have given currency to one of these tendencies, one which at
the same time preserves something of the dream's former over-valuation.
The foundation of dream life is for them a peculiar state of psychical
activity, which they even celebrate as elevation to some higher state.
Schubert, for instance, claims: "The dream is the liberation of the spirit
from the pressure of external nature, a detachment of the soul from the

fetters of matter." Not all go so far as this, but many maintain that dreams
have their origin in real spiritual excitations, and are the outward
manifestations of spiritual powers whose free movements have been
hampered during the day ("Dream Phantasies," Scherner, Volkelt). A large
number of observers acknowledge that dream life is capable of
extraordinary achievements—at any rate, in certain fields ("Memory").
In striking contradiction with this the majority of medical writers hardly
admit that the dream is a psychical phenomenon at all. According to them
dreams are provoked and initiated exclusively by stimuli proceeding from
the senses or the body, which either reach the sleeper from without or are
accidental disturbances of his internal organs. The dream has no greater
claim to meaning and importance than the sound called forth by the ten
fingers of a person quite unacquainted with music running his fingers over
the keys of an instrument. The dream is to be regarded, says Binz, "as a
physical process always useless, frequently morbid." All the peculiarities of
dream life are explicable as the incoherent effort, due to some physiological
stimulus, of certain organs, or of the cortical elements of a brain otherwise
asleep.
But slightly affected by scientific opinion and untroubled as to the origin of
dreams, the popular view holds firmly to the belief that dreams really have
got a meaning, in some way they do foretell the future, whilst the meaning
can be unravelled in some way or other from its oft bizarre and enigmatical
content. The reading of dreams consists in replacing the events of the
dream, so far as remembered, by other events. This is done either scene by
scene, according to some rigid key, or the dream as a whole is replaced by
something else of which it was a symbol. Serious-minded persons laugh at
these efforts—"Dreams are but sea-foam!"
One day I discovered to my amazement that the popular view grounded in
superstition, and not the medical one, comes nearer to the truth about
dreams. I arrived at new conclusions about dreams by the use of a new
method of psychological investigation, one which had rendered me good
service in the investigation of phobias, obsessions, illusions, and the like,
and which, under the name "psycho-analysis," had found acceptance by a
whole school of investigators. The manifold analogies of dream life with

the most diverse conditions of psychical disease in the waking state have
been rightly insisted upon by a number of medical observers. It seemed,
therefore, a priori, hopeful to apply to the interpretation of dreams methods
of investigation which had been tested in psychopathological processes.
Obsessions and those peculiar sensations of haunting dread remain as
strange to normal consciousness as do dreams to our waking consciousness;
their origin is as unknown to consciousness as is that of dreams. It was
practical ends that impelled us, in these diseases, to fathom their origin and
formation. Experience had shown us that a cure and a consequent mastery
of the obsessing ideas did result when once those thoughts, the connecting
links between the morbid ideas and the rest of the psychical content, were
revealed which were heretofore veiled from consciousness. The procedure I
employed for the interpretation of dreams thus arose from psychotherapy.
This procedure is readily described, although its practice demands
instruction and experience. Suppose the patient is suffering from intense
morbid dread. He is requested to direct his attention to the idea in question,
without, however, as he has so frequently done, meditating upon it. Every
impression about it, without any exception, which occurs to him should be
imparted to the doctor. The statement which will be perhaps then made, that
he cannot concentrate his attention upon anything at all, is to be countered
by assuring him most positively that such a blank state of mind is utterly
impossible. As a matter of fact, a great number of impressions will soon
occur, with which others will associate themselves. These will be invariably
accompanied by the expression of the observer's opinion that they have no
meaning or are unimportant. It will be at once noticed that it is this selfcriticism which prevented the patient from imparting the ideas, which had
indeed already excluded them from consciousness. If the patient can be
induced to abandon this self-criticism and to pursue the trains of thought
which are yielded by concentrating the attention, most significant matter
will be obtained, matter which will be presently seen to be clearly linked to
the morbid idea in question. Its connection with other ideas will be
manifest, and later on will permit the replacement of the morbid idea by a
fresh one, which is perfectly adapted to psychical continuity.
This is not the place to examine thoroughly the hypothesis upon which this
experiment rests, or the deductions which follow from its invariable

success. It must suffice to state that we obtain matter enough for the
resolution of every morbid idea if we especially direct our attention to the
unbidden associations which disturb our thoughts—those which are
otherwise put aside by the critic as worthless refuse. If the procedure is
exercised on oneself, the best plan of helping the experiment is to write
down at once all one's first indistinct fancies.
I will now point out where this method leads when I apply it to the
examination of dreams. Any dream could be made use of in this way. From
certain motives I, however, choose a dream of my own, which appears
confused and meaningless to my memory, and one which has the advantage
of brevity. Probably my dream of last night satisfies the requirements. Its
content, fixed immediately after awakening, runs as follows:
"Company; at table or table d'hôte.... Spinach is served. Mrs. E.L., sitting
next to me, gives me her undivided attention, and places her hand familiarly
upon my knee. In defence I remove her hand. Then she says: 'But you have
always had such beautiful eyes.'.... I then distinctly see something like two
eyes as a sketch or as the contour of a spectacle lens...."
This is the whole dream, or, at all events, all that I can remember. It appears
to me not only obscure and meaningless, but more especially odd. Mrs. E.L.
is a person with whom I am scarcely on visiting terms, nor to my
knowledge have I ever desired any more cordial relationship. I have not
seen her for a long time, and do not think there was any mention of her
recently. No emotion whatever accompanied the dream process.
Reflecting upon this dream does not make it a bit clearer to my mind. I will
now, however, present the ideas, without premeditation and without
criticism, which introspection yielded. I soon notice that it is an advantage
to break up the dream into its elements, and to search out the ideas which
link themselves to each fragment.
Company; at table or table d'hôte. The recollection of the slight event with
which the evening of yesterday ended is at once called up. I left a small
party in the company of a friend, who offered to drive me home in his cab.
"I prefer a taxi," he said; "that gives one such a pleasant occupation; there is
always something to look at." When we were in the cab, and the cab-driver

turned the disc so that the first sixty hellers were visible, I continued the
jest. "We have hardly got in and we already owe sixty hellers. The taxi
always reminds me of the table d'hôte. It makes me avaricious and selfish
by continuously reminding me of my debt. It seems to me to mount up too
quickly, and I am always afraid that I shall be at a disadvantage, just as I
cannot resist at table d'hôte the comical fear that I am getting too little, that
I must look after myself." In far-fetched connection with this I quote:
"To earth, this weary earth, ye bring us,
To guilt ye let us heedless go."
Another idea about the table d'hôte. A few weeks ago I was very cross with
my dear wife at the dinner-table at a Tyrolese health resort, because she was
not sufficiently reserved with some neighbors with whom I wished to have
absolutely nothing to do. I begged her to occupy herself rather with me than
with the strangers. That is just as if I had been at a disadvantage at the table
d'hôte. The contrast between the behavior of my wife at the table and that of
Mrs. E.L. in the dream now strikes me: "Addresses herself entirely to me."
Further, I now notice that the dream is the reproduction of a little scene
which transpired between my wife and myself when I was secretly courting
her. The caressing under cover of the tablecloth was an answer to a wooer's
passionate letter. In the dream, however, my wife is replaced by the
unfamiliar E.L.
Mrs. E.L. is the daughter of a man to whom I owed money! I cannot help
noticing that here there is revealed an unsuspected connection between the
dream content and my thoughts. If the chain of associations be followed up
which proceeds from one element of the dream one is soon led back to
another of its elements. The thoughts evoked by the dream stir up
associations which were not noticeable in the dream itself.
Is it not customary, when some one expects others to look after his interests
without any advantage to themselves, to ask the innocent question
satirically: "Do you think this will be done for the sake of your beautiful
eyes?" Hence Mrs. E.L.'s speech in the dream. "You have always had such
beautiful eyes," means nothing but "people always do everything to you for
love of you; you have had everything for nothing." The contrary is, of

course, the truth; I have always paid dearly for whatever kindness others
have shown me. Still, the fact that I had a ride for nothing yesterday when
my friend drove me home in his cab must have made an impression upon
me.
In any case, the friend whose guests we were yesterday has often made me
his debtor. Recently I allowed an opportunity of requiting him to go by. He
has had only one present from me, an antique shawl, upon which eyes are
painted all round, a so-called Occhiale, as a charm against the Malocchio.
Moreover, he is an eye specialist. That same evening I had asked him after a
patient whom I had sent to him for glasses.
As I remarked, nearly all parts of the dream have been brought into this new
connection. I still might ask why in the dream it was spinach that was
served up. Because spinach called up a little scene which recently occurred
at our table. A child, whose beautiful eyes are really deserving of praise,
refused to eat spinach. As a child I was just the same; for a long time I
loathed spinach, until in later life my tastes altered, and it became one of
my favorite dishes. The mention of this dish brings my own childhood and
that of my child's near together. "You should be glad that you have some
spinach," his mother had said to the little gourmet. "Some children would
be very glad to get spinach." Thus I am reminded of the parents' duties
towards their children. Goethe's words—
"To earth, this weary earth, ye bring us,
To guilt ye let us heedless go"—
take on another meaning in this connection.
Here I will stop in order that I may recapitulate the results of the analysis of
the dream. By following the associations which were linked to the single
elements of the dream torn from their context, I have been led to a series of
thoughts and reminiscences where I am bound to recognize interesting
expressions of my psychical life. The matter yielded by an analysis of the
dream stands in intimate relationship with the dream content, but this
relationship is so special that I should never have been able to have inferred
the new discoveries directly from the dream itself. The dream was
passionless, disconnected, and unintelligible. During the time that I am

unfolding the thoughts at the back of the dream I feel intense and wellgrounded emotions. The thoughts themselves fit beautifully together into
chains logically bound together with certain central ideas which ever repeat
themselves. Such ideas not represented in the dream itself are in this
instance the antitheses selfish, unselfish, to be indebted, to work for nothing.
I could draw closer the threads of the web which analysis has disclosed, and
would then be able to show how they all run together into a single knot; I
am debarred from making this work public by considerations of a private,
not of a scientific, nature. After having cleared up many things which I do
not willingly acknowledge as mine, I should have much to reveal which had
better remain my secret. Why, then, do not I choose another dream whose
analysis would be more suitable for publication, so that I could awaken a
fairer conviction of the sense and cohesion of the results disclosed by
analysis? The answer is, because every dream which I investigate leads to
the same difficulties and places me under the same need of discretion; nor
should I forgo this difficulty any the more were I to analyze the dream of
some one else. That could only be done when opportunity allowed all
concealment to be dropped without injury to those who trusted me.
The conclusion which is now forced upon me is that the dream is a sort of
substitution for those emotional and intellectual trains of thought which I
attained after complete analysis. I do not yet know the process by which the
dream arose from those thoughts, but I perceive that it is wrong to regard
the dream as psychically unimportant, a purely physical process which has
arisen from the activity of isolated cortical elements awakened out of sleep.
I must further remark that the dream is far shorter than the thoughts which I
hold it replaces; whilst analysis discovered that the dream was provoked by
an unimportant occurrence the evening before the dream.
Naturally, I would not draw such far-reaching conclusions if only one
analysis were known to me. Experience has shown me that when the
associations of any dream are honestly followed such a chain of thought is
revealed, the constituent parts of the dream reappear correctly and sensibly
linked together; the slight suspicion that this concatenation was merely an
accident of a single first observation must, therefore, be absolutely
relinquished. I regard it, therefore, as my right to establish this new view by

a proper nomenclature. I contrast the dream which my memory evokes with
the dream and other added matter revealed by analysis: the former I call the
dream's manifest content; the latter, without at first further subdivision, its
latent content. I arrive at two new problems hitherto unformulated: (1)
What is the psychical process which has transformed the latent content of
the dream into its manifest content? (2) What is the motive or the motives
which have made such transformation exigent? The process by which the
change from latent to manifest content is executed I name the dream-work.
In contrast with this is the work of analysis, which produces the reverse
transformation. The other problems of the dream—the inquiry as to its
stimuli, as to the source of its materials, as to its possible purpose, the
function of dreaming, the forgetting of dreams—these I will discuss in
connection with the latent dream-content.
I shall take every care to avoid a confusion between the manifest and the
latent content, for I ascribe all the contradictory as well as the incorrect
accounts of dream-life to the ignorance of this latent content, now first laid
bare through analysis.
The conversion of the latent dream thoughts into those manifest deserves
our close study as the first known example of the transformation of
psychical stuff from one mode of expression into another. From a mode of
expression which, moreover, is readily intelligible into another which we
can only penetrate by effort and with guidance, although this new mode
must be equally reckoned as an effort of our own psychical activity. From
the standpoint of the relationship of latent to manifest dream-content,
dreams can be divided into three classes. We can, in the first place,
distinguish those dreams which have a meaning and are, at the same time,
intelligible, which allow us to penetrate into our psychical life without
further ado. Such dreams are numerous; they are usually short, and, as a
general rule, do not seem very noticeable, because everything remarkable or
exciting surprise is absent. Their occurrence is, moreover, a strong
argument against the doctrine which derives the dream from the isolated
activity of certain cortical elements. All signs of a lowered or subdivided
psychical activity are wanting. Yet we never raise any objection to
characterizing them as dreams, nor do we confound them with the products
of our waking life.

A second group is formed by those dreams which are indeed self-coherent
and have a distinct meaning, but appear strange because we are unable to
reconcile their meaning with our mental life. That is the case when we
dream, for instance, that some dear relative has died of plague when we
know of no ground for expecting, apprehending, or assuming anything of
the sort; we can only ask ourself wonderingly: "What brought that into my
head?" To the third group those dreams belong which are void of both
meaning and intelligibility; they are incoherent, complicated, and
meaningless. The overwhelming number of our dreams partake of this
character, and this has given rise to the contemptuous attitude towards
dreams and the medical theory of their limited psychical activity. It is
especially in the longer and more complicated dream-plots that signs of
incoherence are seldom missing.
The contrast between manifest and latent dream-content is clearly only of
value for the dreams of the second and more especially for those of the third
class. Here are problems which are only solved when the manifest dream is
replaced by its latent content; it was an example of this kind, a complicated
and unintelligible dream, that we subjected to analysis. Against our
expectation we, however, struck upon reasons which prevented a complete
cognizance of the latent dream thought. On the repetition of this same
experience we were forced to the supposition that there is an intimate bond,
with laws of its own, between the unintelligible and complicated nature of
the dream and the difficulties attending communication of the thoughts
connected with the dream. Before investigating the nature of this bond, it
will be advantageous to turn our attention to the more readily intelligible
dreams of the first class where, the manifest and latent content being
identical, the dream work seems to be omitted.
The investigation of these dreams is also advisable from another standpoint.
The dreams of children are of this nature; they have a meaning, and are not
bizarre. This, by the way, is a further objection to reducing dreams to a
dissociation of cerebral activity in sleep, for why should such a lowering of
psychical functions belong to the nature of sleep in adults, but not in
children? We are, however, fully justified in expecting that the explanation
of psychical processes in children, essentially simplified as they may be,

should serve as an indispensable preparation towards the psychology of the
adult.
I shall therefore cite some examples of dreams which I have gathered from
children. A girl of nineteen months was made to go without food for a day
because she had been sick in the morning, and, according to nurse, had
made herself ill through eating strawberries. During the night, after her day
of fasting, she was heard calling out her name during sleep, and adding:
"Tawberry, eggs, pap." She is dreaming that she is eating, and selects out of
her menu exactly what she supposes she will not get much of just now.
The same kind of dream about a forbidden dish was that of a little boy of
twenty-two months. The day before he was told to offer his uncle a present
of a small basket of cherries, of which the child was, of course, only
allowed one to taste. He woke up with the joyful news: "Hermann eaten up
all the cherries."
A girl of three and a half years had made during the day a sea trip which
was too short for her, and she cried when she had to get out of the boat. The
next morning her story was that during the night she had been on the sea,
thus continuing the interrupted trip.
A boy of five and a half years was not at all pleased with his party during a
walk in the Dachstein region. Whenever a new peak came into sight he
asked if that were the Dachstein, and, finally, refused to accompany the
party to the waterfall. His behavior was ascribed to fatigue; but a better
explanation was forthcoming when the next morning he told his dream: he
had ascended the Dachstein. Obviously he expected the ascent of the
Dachstein to be the object of the excursion, and was vexed by not getting a
glimpse of the mountain. The dream gave him what the day had withheld.
The dream of a girl of six was similar; her father had cut short the walk
before reaching the promised objective on account of the lateness of the
hour. On the way back she noticed a signpost giving the name of another
place for excursions; her father promised to take her there also some other
day. She greeted her father next day with the news that she had dreamt that
her father had been with her to both places.

What is common in all these dreams is obvious. They completely satisfy
wishes excited during the day which remain unrealized. They are simply
and undisguisedly realizations of wishes.
The following child-dream, not quite understandable at first sight, is
nothing else than a wish realized. On account of poliomyelitis a girl, not
quite four years of age, was brought from the country into town, and
remained over night with a childless aunt in a big—for her, naturally, huge
—bed. The next morning she stated that she had dreamt that the bed was
much too small for her, so that she could find no place in it. To explain this
dream as a wish is easy when we remember that to be "big" is a frequently
expressed wish of all children. The bigness of the bed reminded Miss LittleWould-be-Big only too forcibly of her smallness. This nasty situation
became righted in her dream, and she grew so big that the bed now became
too small for her.
Even when children's dreams are complicated and polished, their
comprehension as a realization of desire is fairly evident. A boy of eight
dreamt that he was being driven with Achilles in a war-chariot, guided by
Diomedes. The day before he was assiduously reading about great heroes. It
is easy to show that he took these heroes as his models, and regretted that
he was not living in those days.
From this short collection a further characteristic of the dreams of children
is manifest—their connection with the life of the day. The desires which are
realized in these dreams are left over from the day or, as a rule, the day
previous, and the feeling has become intently emphasized and fixed during
the day thoughts. Accidental and indifferent matters, or what must appear
so to the child, find no acceptance in the contents of the dream.
Innumerable instances of such dreams of the infantile type can be found
among adults also, but, as mentioned, these are mostly exactly like the
manifest content. Thus, a random selection of persons will generally
respond to thirst at night-time with a dream about drinking, thus striving to
get rid of the sensation and to let sleep continue. Many persons frequently
have these comforting dreams before waking, just when they are called.
They then dream that they are already up, that they are washing, or already
in school, at the office, etc., where they ought to be at a given time. The

night before an intended journey one not infrequently dreams that one has
already arrived at the destination; before going to a play or to a party the
dream not infrequently anticipates, in impatience, as it were, the expected
pleasure. At other times the dream expresses the realization of the desire
somewhat indirectly; some connection, some sequel must be known—the
first step towards recognizing the desire. Thus, when a husband related to
me the dream of his young wife, that her monthly period had begun, I had
to bethink myself that the young wife would have expected a pregnancy if
the period had been absent. The dream is then a sign of pregnancy. Its
meaning is that it shows the wish realized that pregnancy should not occur
just yet. Under unusual and extreme circumstances, these dreams of the
infantile type become very frequent. The leader of a polar expedition tells
us, for instance, that during the wintering amid the ice the crew, with their
monotonous diet and slight rations, dreamt regularly, like children, of fine
meals, of mountains of tobacco, and of home.
It is not uncommon that out of some long, complicated and intricate dream
one specially lucid part stands out containing unmistakably the realization
of a desire, but bound up with much unintelligible matter. On more
frequently analyzing the seemingly more transparent dreams of adults, it is
astonishing to discover that these are rarely as simple as the dreams of
children, and that they cover another meaning beyond that of the realization
of a wish.
It would certainly be a simple and convenient solution of the riddle if the
work of analysis made it at all possible for us to trace the meaningless and
intricate dreams of adults back to the infantile type, to the realization of
some intensely experienced desire of the day. But there is no warrant for
such an expectation. Their dreams are generally full of the most indifferent
and bizarre matter, and no trace of the realization of the wish is to be found
in their content.
Before leaving these infantile dreams, which are obviously unrealized
desires, we must not fail to mention another chief characteristic of dreams,
one that has been long noticed, and one which stands out most clearly in
this class. I can replace any of these dreams by a phrase expressing a desire.
If the sea trip had only lasted longer; if I were only washed and dressed; if I

had only been allowed to keep the cherries instead of giving them to my
uncle. But the dream gives something more than the choice, for here the
desire is already realized; its realization is real and actual. The dream
presentations consist chiefly, if not wholly, of scenes and mainly of visual
sense images. Hence a kind of transformation is not entirely absent in this
class of dreams, and this may be fairly designated as the dream work. An
idea merely existing in the region of possibility is replaced by a vision of its
accomplishment.

II
THE DREAM MECHANISM
We are compelled to assume that such transformation of scene has also
taken place in intricate dreams, though we do not know whether it has
encountered any possible desire. The dream instanced at the
commencement, which we analyzed somewhat thoroughly, did give us
occasion in two places to suspect something of the kind. Analysis brought
out that my wife was occupied with others at table, and that I did not like it;
in the dream itself exactly the opposite occurs, for the person who replaces
my wife gives me her undivided attention. But can one wish for anything
pleasanter after a disagreeable incident than that the exact contrary should
have occurred, just as the dream has it? The stinging thought in the analysis,
that I have never had anything for nothing, is similarly connected with the
woman's remark in the dream: "You have always had such beautiful eyes."
Some portion of the opposition between the latent and manifest content of
the dream must be therefore derived from the realization of a wish.
Another manifestation of the dream work which all incoherent dreams have
in common is still more noticeable. Choose any instance, and compare the
number of separate elements in it, or the extent of the dream, if written
down, with the dream thoughts yielded by analysis, and of which but a trace
can be refound in the dream itself. There can be no doubt that the dream
working has resulted in an extraordinary compression or condensation. It is
not at first easy to form an opinion as to the extent of the condensation; the
more deeply you go into the analysis, the more deeply you are impressed by
it. There will be found no factor in the dream whence the chains of
associations do not lead in two or more directions, no scene which has not
been pieced together out of two or more impressions and events. For
instance, I once dreamt about a kind of swimming-bath where the bathers
suddenly separated in all directions; at one place on the edge a person stood
bending towards one of the bathers as if to drag him out. The scene was a
composite one, made up out of an event that occurred at the time of puberty,
and of two pictures, one of which I had seen just shortly before the dream.

The two pictures were The Surprise in the Bath, from Schwind's Cycle of
the Melusine (note the bathers suddenly separating), and The Flood, by an
Italian master. The little incident was that I once witnessed a lady, who had
tarried in the swimming-bath until the men's hour, being helped out of the
water by the swimming-master. The scene in the dream which was selected
for analysis led to a whole group of reminiscences, each one of which had
contributed to the dream content. First of all came the little episode from
the time of my courting, of which I have already spoken; the pressure of a
hand under the table gave rise in the dream to the "under the table," which I
had subsequently to find a place for in my recollection. There was, of
course, at the time not a word about "undivided attention." Analysis taught
me that this factor is the realization of a desire through its contradictory and
related to the behavior of my wife at the table d'hôte. An exactly similar and
much more important episode of our courtship, one which separated us for
an entire day, lies hidden behind this recent recollection. The intimacy, the
hand resting upon the knee, refers to a quite different connection and to
quite other persons. This element in the dream becomes again the startingpoint of two distinct series of reminiscences, and so on.
The stuff of the dream thoughts which has been accumulated for the
formation of the dream scene must be naturally fit for this application.
There must be one or more common factors. The dream work proceeds like
Francis Galton with his family photographs. The different elements are put
one on top of the other; what is common to the composite picture stands out
clearly, the opposing details cancel each other. This process of reproduction
partly explains the wavering statements, of a peculiar vagueness, in so
many elements of the dream. For the interpretation of dreams this rule holds
good: When analysis discloses uncertainty, as to either—or read and,
taking each section of the apparent alternatives as a separate outlet for a
series of impressions.
When there is nothing in common between the dream thoughts, the dream
work takes the trouble to create a something, in order to make a common
presentation feasible in the dream. The simplest way to approximate two
dream thoughts, which have as yet nothing in common, consists in making
such a change in the actual expression of one idea as will meet a slight
responsive recasting in the form of the other idea. The process is analogous

to that of rhyme, when consonance supplies the desired common factor. A
good deal of the dream work consists in the creation of those frequently
very witty, but often exaggerated, digressions. These vary from the common
presentation in the dream content to dream thoughts which are as varied as
are the causes in form and essence which give rise to them. In the analysis
of our example of a dream, I find a like case of the transformation of a
thought in order that it might agree with another essentially foreign one. In
following out the analysis I struck upon the thought: I should like to have
something for nothing. But this formula is not serviceable to the dream.
Hence it is replaced by another one: "I should like to enjoy something free
of cost."1 The word "kost" (taste), with its double meaning, is appropriate to
a table d'hôte; it, moreover, is in place through the special sense in the
dream. At home if there is a dish which the children decline, their mother
first tries gentle persuasion, with a "Just taste it." That the dream work
should unhesitatingly use the double meaning of the word is certainly
remarkable; ample experience has shown, however, that the occurrence is
quite usual.
Through condensation of the dream certain constituent parts of its content
are explicable which are peculiar to the dream life alone, and which are not
found in the waking state. Such are the composite and mixed persons, the
extraordinary mixed figures, creations comparable with the fantastic animal
compositions of Orientals; a moment's thought and these are reduced to
unity, whilst the fancies of the dream are ever formed anew in an
inexhaustible profusion. Every one knows such images in his own dreams;
manifold are their origins. I can build up a person by borrowing one feature
from one person and one from another, or by giving to the form of one the
name of another in my dream. I can also visualize one person, but place him
in a position which has occurred to another. There is a meaning in all these
cases when different persons are amalgamated into one substitute. Such
cases denote an "and," a "just like," a comparison of the original person
from a certain point of view, a comparison which can be also realized in the
dream itself. As a rule, however, the identity of the blended persons is only
discoverable by analysis, and is only indicated in the dream content by the
formation of the "combined" person.

The same diversity in their ways of formation and the same rules for its
solution hold good also for the innumerable medley of dream contents,
examples of which I need scarcely adduce. Their strangeness quite
disappears when we resolve not to place them on a level with the objects of
perception as known to us when awake, but to remember that they represent
the art of dream condensation by an exclusion of unnecessary detail.
Prominence is given to the common character of the combination. Analysis
must also generally supply the common features. The dream says simply:
All these things have an "x" in common. The decomposition of these mixed
images by analysis is often the quickest way to an interpretation of the
dream. Thus I once dreamt that I was sitting with one of my former
university tutors on a bench, which was undergoing a rapid continuous
movement amidst other benches. This was a combination of lecture-room
and moving staircase. I will not pursue the further result of the thought.
Another time I was sitting in a carriage, and on my lap an object in shape
like a top-hat, which, however, was made of transparent glass. The scene at
once brought to my mind the proverb: "He who keeps his hat in his hand
will travel safely through the land." By a slight turn the glass hat reminded
me of Auer's light, and I knew that I was about to invent something which
was to make me as rich and independent as his invention had made my
countryman, Dr. Auer, of Welsbach; then I should be able to travel instead
of remaining in Vienna. In the dream I was traveling with my invention,
with the, it is true, rather awkward glass top-hat. The dream work is
peculiarly adept at representing two contradictory conceptions by means of
the same mixed image. Thus, for instance, a woman dreamt of herself
carrying a tall flower-stalk, as in the picture of the Annunciation (ChastityMary is her own name), but the stalk was bedecked with thick white
blossoms resembling camellias (contrast with chastity: La dame aux
Camelias).
A great deal of what we have called "dream condensation" can be thus
formulated. Each one of the elements of the dream content is
overdetermined by the matter of the dream thoughts; it is not derived from
one element of these thoughts, but from a whole series. These are not
necessarily interconnected in any way, but may belong to the most diverse
spheres of thought. The dream element truly represents all this disparate
matter in the dream content. Analysis, moreover, discloses another side of

the relationship between dream content and dream thoughts. Just as one
element of the dream leads to associations with several dream thoughts, so,
as a rule, the one dream thought represents more than one dream element.
The threads of the association do not simply converge from the dream
thoughts to the dream content, but on the way they overlap and interweave
in every way.
Next to the transformation of one thought in the scene (its "dramatization"),
condensation is the most important and most characteristic feature of the
dream work. We have as yet no clue as to the motive calling for such
compression of the content.
In the complicated and intricate dreams with which we are now concerned,
condensation and dramatization do not wholly account for the difference
between dream contents and dream thoughts. There is evidence of a third
factor, which deserves careful consideration.
When I have arrived at an understanding of the dream thoughts by my
analysis I notice, above all, that the matter of the manifest is very different
from that of the latent dream content. That is, I admit, only an apparent
difference which vanishes on closer investigation, for in the end I find the
whole dream content carried out in the dream thoughts, nearly all the dream
thoughts again represented in the dream content. Nevertheless, there does
remain a certain amount of difference.
The essential content which stood out clearly and broadly in the dream
must, after analysis, rest satisfied with a very subordinate rôle among the
dream thoughts. These very dream thoughts which, going by my feelings,
have a claim to the greatest importance are either not present at all in the
dream content, or are represented by some remote allusion in some obscure
region of the dream. I can thus describe these phenomena: During the
dream work the psychical intensity of those thoughts and conceptions to
which it properly pertains flows to others which, in my judgment, have no
claim to such emphasis. There is no other process which contributes so
much to concealment of the dream's meaning and to make the connection
between the dream content and dream ideas irrecognizable. During this
process, which I will call the dream displacement, I notice also the
psychical intensity, significance, or emotional nature of the thoughts

become transposed in sensory vividness. What was clearest in the dream
seems to me, without further consideration, the most important; but often in
some obscure element of the dream I can recognize the most direct
offspring of the principal dream thought.
I could only designate this dream displacement as the transvaluation of
psychical values. The phenomena will not have been considered in all its
bearings unless I add that this displacement or transvaluation is shared by
different dreams in extremely varying degrees. There are dreams which take
place almost without any displacement. These have the same time,
meaning, and intelligibility as we found in the dreams which recorded a
desire. In other dreams not a bit of the dream idea has retained its own
psychical value, or everything essential in these dream ideas has been
replaced by unessentials, whilst every kind of transition between these
conditions can be found. The more obscure and intricate a dream is, the
greater is the part to be ascribed to the impetus of displacement in its
formation.
The example that we chose for analysis shows, at least, this much of
displacement—that its content has a different center of interest from that of
the dream ideas. In the forefront of the dream content the main scene
appears as if a woman wished to make advances to me; in the dream idea
the chief interest rests on the desire to enjoy disinterested love which shall
"cost nothing"; this idea lies at the back of the talk about the beautiful eyes
and the far-fetched allusion to "spinach."
If we abolish the dream displacement, we attain through analysis quite
certain conclusions regarding two problems of the dream which are most
disputed—as to what provokes a dream at all, and as to the connection of
the dream with our waking life. There are dreams which at once expose
their links with the events of the day; in others no trace of such a connection
can be found. By the aid of analysis it can be shown that every dream,
without any exception, is linked up with our impression of the day, or
perhaps it would be more correct to say of the day previous to the dream.
The impressions which have incited the dream may be so important that we
are not surprised at our being occupied with them whilst awake; in this case
we are right in saying that the dream carries on the chief interest of our

waking life. More usually, however, when the dream contains anything
relating to the impressions of the day, it is so trivial, unimportant, and so
deserving of oblivion, that we can only recall it with an effort. The dream
content appears, then, even when coherent and intelligible, to be concerned
with those indifferent trifles of thought undeserving of our waking interest.
The depreciation of dreams is largely due to the predominance of the
indifferent and the worthless in their content.
Analysis destroys the appearance upon which this derogatory judgment is
based. When the dream content discloses nothing but some indifferent
impression as instigating the dream, analysis ever indicates some significant
event, which has been replaced by something indifferent with which it has
entered into abundant associations. Where the dream is concerned with
uninteresting and unimportant conceptions, analysis reveals the numerous
associative paths which connect the trivial with the momentous in the
psychical estimation of the individual. It is only the action of displacement
if what is indifferent obtains recognition in the dream content instead of
those impressions which are really the stimulus, or instead of the things of
real interest. In answering the question as to what provokes the dream, as to
the connection of the dream, in the daily troubles, we must say, in terms of
the insight given us by replacing the manifest latent dream content: The
dream does never trouble itself about things which are not deserving of our
concern during the day, and trivialities which do not trouble us during the
day have no power to pursue us whilst asleep.
What provoked the dream in the example which we have analyzed? The
really unimportant event, that a friend invited me to a free ride in his cab.
The table d'hôte scene in the dream contains an allusion to this indifferent
motive, for in conversation I had brought the taxi parallel with the table
d'hôte. But I can indicate the important event which has as its substitute the
trivial one. A few days before I had disbursed a large sum of money for a
member of my family who is very dear to me. Small wonder, says the
dream thought, if this person is grateful to me for this—this love is not costfree. But love that shall cost nothing is one of the prime thoughts of the
dream. The fact that shortly before this I had had several drives with the
relative in question puts the one drive with my friend in a position to recall
the connection with the other person. The indifferent impression which, by

such ramifications, provokes the dream is subservient to another condition
which is not true of the real source of the dream—the impression must be a
recent one, everything arising from the day of the dream.
I cannot leave the question of dream displacement without the consideration
of a remarkable process in the formation of dreams in which condensation
and displacement work together towards one end. In condensation we have
already considered the case where two conceptions in the dream having
something in common, some point of contact, are replaced in the dream
content by a mixed image, where the distinct germ corresponds to what is
common, and the indistinct secondary modifications to what is distinctive.
If displacement is added to condensation, there is no formation of a mixed
image, but a common mean which bears the same relationship to the
individual elements as does the resultant in the parallelogram of forces to its
components. In one of my dreams, for instance, there is talk of an injection
with propyl. On first analysis I discovered an indifferent but true incident
where amyl played a part as the excitant of the dream. I cannot yet vindicate
the exchange of amyl for propyl. To the round of ideas of the same dream,
however, there belongs the recollection of my first visit to Munich, when
the Propylœa struck me. The attendant circumstances of the analysis render
it admissible that the influence of this second group of conceptions caused
the displacement of amyl to propyl. Propyl is, so to say, the mean idea
between amyl and propylœa; it got into the dream as a kind of compromise
by simultaneous condensation and displacement.
The need of discovering some motive for this bewildering work of the
dream is even more called for in the case of displacement than in
condensation.
Although the work of displacement must be held mainly responsible if the
dream thoughts are not refound or recognized in the dream content (unless
the motive of the changes be guessed), it is another and milder kind of
transformation which will be considered with the dream thoughts which
leads to the discovery of a new but readily understood act of the dream
work. The first dream thoughts which are unravelled by analysis frequently
strike one by their unusual wording. They do not appear to be expressed in
the sober form which our thinking prefers; rather are they expressed

symbolically by allegories and metaphors like the figurative language of the
poets. It is not difficult to find the motives for this degree of constraint in
the expression of dream ideas. The dream content consists chiefly of visual
scenes; hence the dream ideas must, in the first place, be prepared to make
use of these forms of presentation. Conceive that a political leader's or a
barrister's address had to be transposed into pantomime, and it will be easy
to understand the transformations to which the dream work is constrained
by regard for this dramatization of the dream content.
Around the psychical stuff of dream thoughts there are ever found
reminiscences of impressions, not infrequently of early childhood—scenes
which, as a rule, have been visually grasped. Whenever possible, this
portion of the dream ideas exercises a definite influence upon the modelling
of the dream content; it works like a center of crystallization, by attracting
and rearranging the stuff of the dream thoughts. The scene of the dream is
not infrequently nothing but a modified repetition, complicated by
interpolations of events that have left such an impression; the dream but
very seldom reproduces accurate and unmixed reproductions of real scenes.
The dream content does not, however, consist exclusively of scenes, but it
also includes scattered fragments of visual images, conversations, and even
bits of unchanged thoughts. It will be perhaps to the point if we instance in
the briefest way the means of dramatization which are at the disposal of the
dream work for the repetition of the dream thoughts in the peculiar
language of the dream.
The dream thoughts which we learn from the analysis exhibit themselves as
a psychical complex of the most complicated superstructure. Their parts
stand in the most diverse relationship to each other; they form backgrounds
and foregrounds, stipulations, digressions, illustrations, demonstrations, and
protestations. It may be said to be almost the rule that one train of thought is
followed by its contradictory. No feature known to our reason whilst awake
is absent. If a dream is to grow out of all this, the psychical matter is
submitted to a pressure which condenses it extremely, to an inner shrinking
and displacement, creating at the same time fresh surfaces, to a selective
interweaving among the constituents best adapted for the construction of
these scenes. Having regard to the origin of this stuff, the term regression

can be fairly applied to this process. The logical chains which hitherto held
the psychical stuff together become lost in this transformation to the dream
content. The dream work takes on, as it were, only the essential content of
the dream thoughts for elaboration. It is left to analysis to restore the
connection which the dream work has destroyed.
The dream's means of expression must therefore be regarded as meager in
comparison with those of our imagination, though the dream does not
renounce all claims to the restitution of logical relation to the dream
thoughts. It rather succeeds with tolerable frequency in replacing these by
formal characters of its own.
By reason of the undoubted connection existing between all the parts of
dream thoughts, the dream is able to embody this matter into a single scene.
It upholds a logical connection as approximation in time and space, just as
the painter, who groups all the poets for his picture of Parnassus who,
though they have never been all together on a mountain peak, yet form
ideally a community. The dream continues this method of presentation in
individual dreams, and often when it displays two elements close together
in the dream content it warrants some special inner connection between
what they represent in the dream thoughts. It should be, moreover, observed
that all the dreams of one night prove on analysis to originate from the same
sphere of thought.
The causal connection between two ideas is either left without presentation,
or replaced by two different long portions of dreams one after the other.
This presentation is frequently a reversed one, the beginning of the dream
being the deduction, and its end the hypothesis. The direct transformation
of one thing into another in the dream seems to serve the relationship of
cause and effect.
The dream never utters the alternative "either-or," but accepts both as
having equal rights in the same connection. When "either-or" is used in the
reproduction of dreams, it is, as I have already mentioned, to be replaced by
"and."
Conceptions which stand in opposition to one another are preferably
expressed in dreams by the same element.2 There seems no "not" in dreams.

Opposition between two ideas, the relation of conversion, is represented in
dreams in a very remarkable way. It is expressed by the reversal of another
part of the dream content just as if by way of appendix. We shall later on
deal with another form of expressing disagreement. The common dream
sensation of movement checked serves the purpose of representing
disagreement of impulses—a conflict of the will.
Only one of the logical relationships—that of similarity, identity, agreement
—is found highly developed in the mechanism of dream formation. Dream
work makes use of these cases as a starting-point for condensation, drawing
together everything which shows such agreement to a fresh unity.
These short, crude observations naturally do not suffice as an estimate of
the abundance of the dream's formal means of presenting the logical
relationships of the dream thoughts. In this respect, individual dreams are
worked up more nicely or more carelessly, our text will have been followed
more or less closely, auxiliaries of the dream work will have been taken
more or less into consideration. In the latter case they appear obscure,
intricate, incoherent. When the dream appears openly absurd, when it
contains an obvious paradox in its content, it is so of purpose. Through its
apparent disregard of all logical claims, it expresses a part of the intellectual
content of the dream ideas. Absurdity in the dream denotes disagreement,
scorn, disdain in the dream thoughts. As this explanation is in entire
disagreement with the view that the dream owes its origin to dissociated,
uncritical cerebral activity, I will emphasize my view by an example:
"One of my acquaintances, Mr. M____, has been attacked by no less a
person than Goethe in an essay with, we all maintain, unwarrantable
violence. Mr. M____ has naturally been ruined by this attack. He complains
very bitterly of this at a dinner-party, but his respect for Goethe has not
diminished through this personal experience. I now attempt to clear up the
chronological relations which strike me as improbable. Goethe died in
1832. As his attack upon Mr. M____ must, of course, have taken place
before, Mr. M____ must have been then a very young man. It seems to me
plausible that he was eighteen. I am not certain, however, what year we are
actually in, and the whole calculation falls into obscurity. The attack was,
moreover, contained in Goethe's well-known essay on 'Nature.'"

The absurdity of the dream becomes the more glaring when I state that Mr.
M____ is a young business man without any poetical or literary interests.
My analysis of the dream will show what method there is in this madness.
The dream has derived its material from three sources:
1. Mr. M____, to whom I was introduced at a dinner-party, begged me one
day to examine his elder brother, who showed signs of mental trouble. In
conversation with the patient, an unpleasant episode occurred. Without the
slightest occasion he disclosed one of his brother's youthful escapades. I
had asked the patient the year of his birth (year of death in dream), and led
him to various calculations which might show up his want of memory.
2. A medical journal which displayed my name among others on the cover
had published a ruinous review of a book by my friend F____ of Berlin,
from the pen of a very juvenile reviewer. I communicated with the editor,
who, indeed, expressed his regret, but would not promise any redress.
Thereupon I broke off my connection with the paper; in my letter of
resignation I expressed the hope that our personal relations would not suffer
from this. Here is the real source of the dream. The derogatory reception of
my friend's work had made a deep impression upon me. In my judgment, it
contained a fundamental biological discovery which only now, several
years later, commences to find favor among the professors.
3. A little while before, a patient gave me the medical history of her brother,
who, exclaiming "Nature, Nature!" had gone out of his mind. The doctors
considered that the exclamation arose from a study of Goethe's beautiful
essay, and indicated that the patient had been overworking. I expressed the
opinion that it seemed more plausible to me that the exclamation "Nature!"
was to be taken in that sexual meaning known also to the less educated in
our country. It seemed to me that this view had something in it, because the
unfortunate youth afterwards mutilated his genital organs. The patient was
eighteen years old when the attack occurred.
The first person in the dream-thoughts behind the ego was my friend who
had been so scandalously treated. "I now attempted to clear up the
chronological relation." My friend's book deals with the chronological
relations of life, and, amongst other things, correlates Goethe's duration of
life with a number of days in many ways important to biology. The ego is,

however, represented as a general paralytic ("I am not certain what year we
are actually in"). The dream exhibits my friend as behaving like a general
paralytic, and thus riots in absurdity. But the dream thoughts run ironically.
"Of course he is a madman, a fool, and you are the genius who understands
all about it. But shouldn't it be the other way round?" This inversion
obviously took place in the dream when Goethe attacked the young man,
which is absurd, whilst any one, however young, can to-day easily attack
the great Goethe.
I am prepared to maintain that no dream is inspired by other than egoistic
emotions. The ego in the dream does not, indeed, represent only my friend,
but stands for myself also. I identify myself with him because the fate of his
discovery appears to me typical of the acceptance of my own. If I were to
publish my own theory, which gives sexuality predominance in the ætiology
of psychoneurotic disorders (see the allusion to the eighteen-year-old
patient—"Nature, Nature!"), the same criticism would be leveled at me, and
it would even now meet with the same contempt.

When I follow out the dream thoughts closely, I ever find only scorn and
contempt as correlated with the dream's absurdity. It is well known that the
discovery of a cracked sheep's skull on the Lido in Venice gave Goethe the
hint for the so-called vertebral theory of the skull. My friend plumes
himself on having as a student raised a hubbub for the resignation of an
aged professor who had done good work (including some in this very
subject of comparative anatomy), but who, on account of decrepitude, had
become quite incapable of teaching. The agitation my friend inspired was
so successful because in the German Universities an age limit is not
demanded for academic work. Age is no protection against folly. In the
hospital here I had for years the honor to serve under a chief who, long
fossilized, was for decades notoriously feebleminded, and was yet permitted
to continue in his responsible office. A trait, after the manner of the find in
the Lido, forces itself upon me here. It was to this man that some youthful
colleagues in the hospital adapted the then popular slang of that day: "No
Goethe has written that," "No Schiller composed that," etc.
We have not exhausted our valuation of the dream work. In addition to
condensation, displacement, and definite arrangement of the psychical
matter, we must ascribe to it yet another activity—one which is, indeed, not
shared by every dream. I shall not treat this position of the dream work
exhaustively; I will only point out that the readiest way to arrive at a
conception of it is to take for granted, probably unfairly, that it only
subsequently influences the dream content which has already been built up.
Its mode of action thus consists in so coördinating the parts of the dream
that these coalesce to a coherent whole, to a dream composition. The dream
gets a kind of façade which, it is true, does not conceal the whole of its
content. There is a sort of preliminary explanation to be strengthened by
interpolations and slight alterations. Such elaboration of the dream content
must not be too pronounced; the misconception of the dream thoughts to
which it gives rise is merely superficial, and our first piece of work in
analyzing a dream is to get rid of these early attempts at interpretation.
The motives for this part of the dream work are easily gauged. This final
elaboration of the dream is due to a regard for intelligibility—a fact at once
betraying the origin of an action which behaves towards the actual dream

content just as our normal psychical action behaves towards some proffered
perception that is to our liking. The dream content is thus secured under the
pretense of certain expectations, is perceptually classified by the
supposition of its intelligibility, thereby risking its falsification, whilst, in
fact, the most extraordinary misconceptions arise if the dream can be
correlated with nothing familiar. Every one is aware that we are unable to
look at any series of unfamiliar signs, or to listen to a discussion of
unknown words, without at once making perpetual changes through our
regard for intelligibility, through our falling back upon what is familiar.
We can call those dreams properly made up which are the result of an
elaboration in every way analogous to the psychical action of our waking
life. In other dreams there is no such action; not even an attempt is made to
bring about order and meaning. We regard the dream as "quite mad,"
because on awaking it is with this last-named part of the dream work, the
dream elaboration, that we identify ourselves. So far, however, as our
analysis is concerned, the dream, which resembles a medley of
disconnected fragments, is of as much value as the one with a smooth and
beautifully polished surface. In the former case we are spared, to some
extent, the trouble of breaking down the super-elaboration of the dream
content.
All the same, it would be an error to see in the dream façade nothing but the
misunderstood and somewhat arbitrary elaboration of the dream carried out
at the instance of our psychical life. Wishes and phantasies are not
infrequently employed in the erection of this façade, which were already
fashioned in the dream thoughts; they are akin to those of our waking life
—"day-dreams," as they are very properly called. These wishes and
phantasies, which analysis discloses in our dreams at night, often present
themselves as repetitions and refashionings of the scenes of infancy. Thus
the dream façade may show us directly the true core of the dream, distorted
through admixture with other matter.
Beyond these four activities there is nothing else to be discovered in the
dream work. If we keep closely to the definition that dream work denotes
the transference of dream thoughts to dream content, we are compelled to
say that the dream work is not creative; it develops no fancies of its own, it

judges nothing, decides nothing. It does nothing but prepare the matter for
condensation and displacement, and refashions it for dramatization, to
which must be added the inconstant last-named mechanism—that of
explanatory elaboration. It is true that a good deal is found in the dream
content which might be understood as the result of another and more
intellectual performance; but analysis shows conclusively every time that
these intellectual operations were already present in the dream thoughts,
and have only been taken over by the dream content. A syllogism in the
dream is nothing other than the repetition of a syllogism in the dream
thoughts; it seems inoffensive if it has been transferred to the dream without
alteration; it becomes absurd if in the dream work it has been transferred to
other matter. A calculation in the dream content simply means that there
was a calculation in the dream thoughts; whilst this is always correct, the
calculation in the dream can furnish the silliest results by the condensation
of its factors and the displacement of the same operations to other things.
Even speeches which are found in the dream content are not new
compositions; they prove to be pieced together out of speeches which have
been made or heard or read; the words are faithfully copied, but the
occasion of their utterance is quite overlooked, and their meaning is most
violently changed.
It is, perhaps, not superfluous to support these assertions by examples:
1. A seemingly inoffensive, well-made dream of a patient. She was going to
market with her cook, who carried the basket. The butcher said to her when
she asked him for something: "That is all gone," and wished to give her
something else, remarking; "That's very good." She declines, and goes to
the greengrocer, who wants to sell her a peculiar vegetable which is bound
up in bundles and of a black color. She says: "I don't know that; I won't take
it."
The remark "That is all gone" arose from the treatment. A few days before I
said myself to the patient that the earliest reminiscences of childhood are all
gone as such, but are replaced by transferences and dreams. Thus I am the
butcher.
The second remark, "I don't know that" arose in a very different connection.
The day before she had herself called out in rebuke to the cook (who,

moreover, also appears in the dream): "Behave yourself properly; I don't
know that"—that is, "I don't know this kind of behavior; I won't have it."
The more harmless portion of this speech was arrived at by a displacement
of the dream content; in the dream thoughts only the other portion of the
speech played a part, because the dream work changed an imaginary
situation into utter irrecognizability and complete inoffensiveness (while in
a certain sense I behave in an unseemly way to the lady). The situation
resulting in this phantasy is, however, nothing but a new edition of one that
actually took place.
2. A dream apparently meaningless relates to figures. "She wants to pay
something; her daughter takes three florins sixty-five kreuzers out of her
purse; but she says: 'What are you doing? It only cost twenty-one
kreuzers.'"
The dreamer was a stranger who had placed her child at school in Vienna,
and who was able to continue under my treatment so long as her daughter
remained at Vienna. The day before the dream the directress of the school
had recommended her to keep the child another year at school. In this case
she would have been able to prolong her treatment by one year. The figures
in the dream become important if it be remembered that time is money. One
year equals 365 days, or, expressed in kreuzers, 365 kreuzers, which is three
florins sixty-five kreuzers. The twenty-one kreuzers correspond with the
three weeks which remained from the day of the dream to the end of the
school term, and thus to the end of the treatment. It was obviously financial
considerations which had moved the lady to refuse the proposal of the
directress, and which were answerable for the triviality of the amount in the
dream.
3. A lady, young, but already ten years married, heard that a friend of hers,
Miss Elise L____, of about the same age, had become engaged. This gave
rise to the following dream:
She was sitting with her husband in the theater; the one side of the stalls
was quite empty. Her husband tells her, Elise L____ and her fiancé had
intended coming, but could only get some cheap seats, three for one florin
fifty kreuzers, and these they would not take. In her opinion, that would not
have mattered very much.

The origin of the figures from the matter of the dream thoughts and the
changes the figures underwent are of interest. Whence came the one florin
fifty kreuzers? From a trifling occurrence of the previous day. Her sister-inlaw had received 150 florins as a present from her husband, and had quickly
got rid of it by buying some ornament. Note that 150 florins is one hundred
times one florin fifty kreuzers. For the three concerned with the tickets, the
only link is that Elise L____ is exactly three months younger than the
dreamer. The scene in the dream is the repetition of a little adventure for
which she has often been teased by her husband. She was once in a great
hurry to get tickets in time for a piece, and when she came to the theater one
side of the stalls was almost empty. It was therefore quite unnecessary for
her to have been in such a hurry. Nor must we overlook the absurdity of the
dream that two persons should take three tickets for the theater.
Now for the dream ideas. It was stupid to have married so early; I need not
have been in so great a hurry. Elise L____'s example shows me that I
should have been able to get a husband later; indeed, one a hundred times
better if I had but waited. I could have bought three such men with the
money (dowry).
Footnote 1: "Ich möchte gerne etwas geniessen ohne 'Kosten' zu haben." A a pun upon the word
"kosten," which has two meanings—"taste" and "cost." In "Die Traumdeutung," third edition, p. 71
footnote, Professor Freud remarks that "the finest example of dream interpretation left us by the
ancients is based upon a pun" (from "The Interpretation of Dreams," by Artemidorus Daldianus).
"Moreover, dreams are so intimately bound up with language that Ferenczi truly points out that every
tongue has its own language of dreams. A dream is as a rule untranslatable into other languages."—
TRANSLATOR.
Footnote 2: It is worthy of remark that eminent philologists maintain that the oldest languages used
the same word for expressing quite general antitheses. In C. Abel's essay, "Ueber den Gegensinn der
Urworter" (1884, the following examples of such words in England are given: "gleam—gloom"; "to
lock—loch"; "down—The Downs"; "to step—to stop." In his essay on "The Origin of Language"
("Linguistic Essays," p. 240), Abel says: "When the Englishman says 'without,' is not his judgment
based upon the comparative juxtaposition of two opposites, 'with' and 'out'; 'with' itself originally
meant 'without,' as may still be seen in 'withdraw.' 'Bid' includes the opposite sense of giving and of
proffering." Abel, "The English Verbs of Command," "Linguistic Essays," p. 104; see also Freud,
"Ueber den Gegensinn der Urworte"; Jahrbuch für Psychoanalytische und Psychopathologische
Forschungen, Band II., part i., p. 179).—TRANSLATOR.

III
WHY THE DREAM DISGUISES THE DESIRES
In the foregoing exposition we have now learnt something of the dream
work; we must regard it as a quite special psychical process, which, so far
as we are aware, resembles nothing else. To the dream work has been
transferred that bewilderment which its product, the dream, has aroused in
us. In truth, the dream work is only the first recognition of a group of
psychical processes to which must be referred the origin of hysterical
symptoms, the ideas of morbid dread, obsession, and illusion.
Condensation, and especially displacement, are never-failing features in
these other processes. The regard for appearance remains, on the other
hand, peculiar to the dream work. If this explanation brings the dream into
line with the formation of psychical disease, it becomes the more important
to fathom the essential conditions of processes like dream building. It will
be probably a surprise to hear that neither the state of sleep nor illness is
among the indispensable conditions. A whole number of phenomena of the
everyday life of healthy persons, forgetfulness, slips in speaking and in
holding things, together with a certain class of mistakes, are due to a
psychical mechanism analogous to that of the dream and the other members
of this group.
Displacement is the core of the problem, and the most striking of all the
dream performances. A thorough investigation of the subject shows that the
essential condition of displacement is purely psychological; it is in the
nature of a motive. We get on the track by thrashing out experiences which
one cannot avoid in the analysis of dreams. I had to break off the relations
of my dream thoughts in the analysis of my dream on p. 8 because I found
some experiences which I do not wish strangers to know, and which I could
not relate without serious damage to important considerations. I added, it
would be no use were I to select another instead of that particular dream; in
every dream where the content is obscure or intricate, I should hit upon
dream thoughts which call for secrecy. If, however, I continue the analysis
for myself, without regard to those others, for whom, indeed, so personal an

event as my dream cannot matter, I arrive finally at ideas which surprise
me, which I have not known to be mine, which not only appear foreign to
me, but which are unpleasant, and which I would like to oppose
vehemently, whilst the chain of ideas running through the analysis intrudes
upon me inexorably. I can only take these circumstances into account by
admitting that these thoughts are actually part of my psychical life,
possessing a certain psychical intensity or energy. However, by virtue of a
particular psychological condition, the thoughts could not become
conscious to me. I call this particular condition "Repression." It is therefore
impossible for me not to recognize some casual relationship between the
obscurity of the dream content and this state of repression—this incapacity
of consciousness. Whence I conclude that the cause of the obscurity is the
desire to conceal these thoughts. Thus I arrive at the conception of the
dream distortion as the deed of the dream work, and of displacement
serving to disguise this object.
I will test this in my own dream, and ask myself, What is the thought
which, quite innocuous in its distorted form, provokes my liveliest
opposition in its real form? I remember that the free drive reminded me of
the last expensive drive with a member of my family, the interpretation of
the dream being: I should for once like to experience affection for which I
should not have to pay, and that shortly before the dream I had to make a
heavy disbursement for this very person. In this connection, I cannot get
away from the thought that I regret this disbursement. It is only when I
acknowledge this feeling that there is any sense in my wishing in the dream
for an affection that should entail no outlay. And yet I can state on my
honor that I did not hesitate for a moment when it became necessary to
expend that sum. The regret, the counter-current, was unconscious to me.
Why it was unconscious is quite another question which would lead us far
away from the answer which, though within my knowledge, belongs
elsewhere.
If I subject the dream of another person instead of one of my own to
analysis, the result is the same; the motives for convincing others is,
however, changed. In the dream of a healthy person the only way for me to
enable him to accept this repressed idea is the coherence of the dream
thoughts. He is at liberty to reject this explanation. But if we are dealing

with a person suffering from any neurosis—say from hysteria—the
recognition of these repressed ideas is compulsory by reason of their
connection with the symptoms of his illness and of the improvement
resulting from exchanging the symptoms for the repressed ideas. Take the
patient from whom I got the last dream about the three tickets for one florin
fifty kreuzers. Analysis shows that she does not think highly of her
husband, that she regrets having married him, that she would be glad to
change him for some one else. It is true that she maintains that she loves her
husband, that her emotional life knows nothing about this depreciation (a
hundred times better!), but all her symptoms lead to the same conclusion as
this dream. When her repressed memories had rewakened a certain period
when she was conscious that she did not love her husband, her symptoms
disappeared, and therewith disappeared her resistance to the interpretation
of the dream.
This conception of repression once fixed, together with the distortion of the
dream in relation to repressed psychical matter, we are in a position to give
a general exposition of the principal results which the analysis of dreams
supplies. We learnt that the most intelligible and meaningful dreams are
unrealized desires; the desires they pictured as realized are known to
consciousness, have been held over from the daytime, and are of absorbing
interest. The analysis of obscure and intricate dreams discloses something
very similar; the dream scene again pictures as realized some desire which
regularly proceeds from the dream ideas, but the picture is unrecognizable,
and is only cleared up in the analysis. The desire itself is either one
repressed, foreign to consciousness, or it is closely bound up with repressed
ideas. The formula for these dreams may be thus stated: They are concealed
realizations of repressed desires. It is interesting to note that they are right
who regard the dream as foretelling the future. Although the future which
the dream shows us is not that which will occur, but that which we would
like to occur. Folk psychology proceeds here according to its wont; it
believes what it wishes to believe.
Dreams can be divided into three classes according to their relation towards
the realization of desire. Firstly come those which exhibit a non-repressed,
non-concealed desire; these are dreams of the infantile type, becoming ever
rarer among adults. Secondly, dreams which express in veiled form some

repressed desire; these constitute by far the larger number of our dreams,
and they require analysis for their understanding. Thirdly, these dreams
where repression exists, but without or with but slight concealment. These
dreams are invariably accompanied by a feeling of dread which brings the
dream to an end. This feeling of dread here replaces dream displacement; I
regarded the dream work as having prevented this in the dream of the
second class. It is not very difficult to prove that what is now present as
intense dread in the dream was once desire, and is now secondary to the
repression.
There are also definite dreams with a painful content, without the presence
of any anxiety in the dream. These cannot be reckoned among dreams of
dread; they have, however, always been used to prove the unimportance and
the psychical futility of dreams. An analysis of such an example will show
that it belongs to our second class of dreams—a perfectly concealed
realization of repressed desires. Analysis will demonstrate at the same time
how excellently adapted is the work of displacement to the concealment of
desires.
A girl dreamt that she saw lying dead before her the only surviving child of
her sister amid the same surroundings as a few years before she saw the
first child lying dead. She was not sensible of any pain, but naturally
combatted the view that the scene represented a desire of hers. Nor was that
view necessary. Years ago it was at the funeral of the child that she had last
seen and spoken to the man she loved. Were the second child to die, she
would be sure to meet this man again in her sister's house. She is longing to
meet him, but struggles against this feeling. The day of the dream she had
taken a ticket for a lecture, which announced the presence of the man she
always loved. The dream is simply a dream of impatience common to those
which happen before a journey, theater, or simply anticipated pleasures. The
longing is concealed by the shifting of the scene to the occasion when any
joyous feeling were out of place, and yet where it did once exist. Note,
further, that the emotional behavior in the dream is adapted, not to the
displaced, but to the real but suppressed dream ideas. The scene anticipates
the long-hoped-for meeting; there is here no call for painful emotions.

There has hitherto been no occasion for philosophers to bestir themselves
with a psychology of repression. We must be allowed to construct some
clear conception as to the origin of dreams as the first steps in this unknown
territory. The scheme which we have formulated not only from a study of
dreams is, it is true, already somewhat complicated, but we cannot find any
simpler one that will suffice. We hold that our psychical apparatus contains
two procedures for the construction of thoughts. The second one has the
advantage that its products find an open path to consciousness, whilst the
activity of the first procedure is unknown to itself, and can only arrive at
consciousness through the second one. At the borderland of these two
procedures, where the first passes over into the second, a censorship is
established which only passes what pleases it, keeping back everything else.
That which is rejected by the censorship is, according to our definition, in a
state of repression. Under certain conditions, one of which is the sleeping
state, the balance of power between the two procedures is so changed that
what is repressed can no longer be kept back. In the sleeping state this may
possibly occur through the negligence of the censor; what has been hitherto
repressed will now succeed in finding its way to consciousness. But as the
censorship is never absent, but merely off guard, certain alterations must be
conceded so as to placate it. It is a compromise which becomes conscious in
this case—a compromise between what one procedure has in view and the
demands of the other. Repression, laxity of the censor, compromise—this is
the foundation for the origin of many another psychological process, just as
it is for the dream. In such compromises we can observe the processes of
condensation, of displacement, the acceptance of superficial associations,
which we have found in the dream work.
It is not for us to deny the demonic element which has played a part in
constructing our explanation of dream work. The impression left is that the
formation of obscure dreams proceeds as if a person had something to say
which must be agreeable for another person upon whom he is dependent to
hear. It is by the use of this image that we figure to ourselves the conception
of the dream distortion and of the censorship, and ventured to crystallize
our impression in a rather crude, but at least definite, psychological theory.
Whatever explanation the future may offer of these first and second
procedures, we shall expect a confirmation of our correlate that the second

procedure commands the entrance to consciousness, and can exclude the
first from consciousness.
Once the sleeping state overcome, the censorship resumes complete sway,
and is now able to revoke that which was granted in a moment of weakness.
That the forgetting of dreams explains this in part, at least, we are
convinced by our experience, confirmed again and again. During the
relation of a dream, or during analysis of one, it not infrequently happens
that some fragment of the dream is suddenly forgotten. This fragment so
forgotten invariably contains the best and readiest approach to an
understanding of the dream. Probably that is why it sinks into oblivion—
i.e., into a renewed suppression.
Viewing the dream content as the representation of a realized desire, and
referring its vagueness to the changes made by the censor in the repressed
matter, it is no longer difficult to grasp the function of dreams. In
fundamental contrast with those saws which assume that sleep is disturbed
by dreams, we hold the dream as the guardian of sleep. So far as children's
dreams are concerned, our view should find ready acceptance.
The sleeping state or the psychical change to sleep, whatsoever it be, is
brought about by the child being sent to sleep or compelled thereto by
fatigue, only assisted by the removal of all stimuli which might open other
objects to the psychical apparatus. The means which serve to keep external
stimuli distant are known; but what are the means we can employ to depress
the internal psychical stimuli which frustrate sleep? Look at a mother
getting her child to sleep. The child is full of beseeching; he wants another
kiss; he wants to play yet awhile. His requirements are in part met, in part
drastically put off till the following day. Clearly these desires and needs,
which agitate him, are hindrances to sleep. Every one knows the charming
story of the bad boy (Baldwin Groller's) who awoke at night bellowing out,
"I want the rhinoceros." A really good boy, instead of bellowing, would
have dreamt that he was playing with the rhinoceros. Because the dream
which realizes his desire is believed during sleep, it removes the desire and
makes sleep possible. It cannot be denied that this belief accords with the
dream image, because it is arrayed in the psychical appearance of

probability; the child is without the capacity which it will acquire later to
distinguish hallucinations or phantasies from reality.
The adult has learnt this differentiation; he has also learnt the futility of
desire, and by continuous practice manages to postpone his aspirations,
until they can be granted in some roundabout method by a change in the
external world. For this reason it is rare for him to have his wishes realized
during sleep in the short psychical way. It is even possible that this never
happens, and that everything which appears to us like a child's dream
demands a much more elaborate explanation. Thus it is that for adults—for
every sane person without exception—a differentiation of the psychical
matter has been fashioned which the child knew not. A psychical procedure
has been reached which, informed by the experience of life, exercises with
jealous power a dominating and restraining influence upon psychical
emotions; by its relation to consciousness, and by its spontaneous mobility,
it is endowed with the greatest means of psychical power. A portion of the
infantile emotions has been withheld from this procedure as useless to life,
and all the thoughts which flow from these are found in the state of
repression.
Whilst the procedure in which we recognize our normal ego reposes upon
the desire for sleep, it appears compelled by the psycho-physiological
conditions of sleep to abandon some of the energy with which it was wont
during the day to keep down what was repressed. This neglect is really
harmless; however much the emotions of the child's spirit may be stirred,
they find the approach to consciousness rendered difficult, and that to
movement blocked in consequence of the state of sleep. The danger of their
disturbing sleep must, however, be avoided. Moreover, we must admit that
even in deep sleep some amount of free attention is exerted as a protection
against sense-stimuli which might, perchance, make an awakening seem
wiser than the continuance of sleep. Otherwise we could not explain the fact
of our being always awakened by stimuli of certain quality. As the old
physiologist Burdach pointed out, the mother is awakened by the
whimpering of her child, the miller by the cessation of his mill, most people
by gently calling out their names. This attention, thus on the alert, makes
use of the internal stimuli arising from repressed desires, and fuses them
into the dream, which as a compromise satisfies both procedures at the

same time. The dream creates a form of psychical release for the wish
which is either suppressed or formed by the aid of repression, inasmuch as
it presents it as realized. The other procedure is also satisfied, since the
continuance of the sleep is assured. Our ego here gladly behaves like a
child; it makes the dream pictures believable, saying, as it were, "Quite
right, but let me sleep." The contempt which, once awakened, we bear the
dream, and which rests upon the absurdity and apparent illogicality of the
dream, is probably nothing but the reasoning of our sleeping ego on the
feelings about what was repressed; with greater right it should rest upon the
incompetency of this disturber of our sleep. In sleep we are now and then
aware of this contempt; the dream content transcends the censorship rather
too much, we think, "It's only a dream," and sleep on.
It is no objection to this view if there are borderlines for the dream where its
function, to preserve sleep from interruption, can no longer be maintained
—as in the dreams of impending dread. It is here changed for another
function—to suspend the sleep at the proper time. It acts like a
conscientious night-watchman, who first does his duty by quelling
disturbances so as not to waken the citizen, but equally does his duty quite
properly when he awakens the street should the causes of the trouble seem
to him serious and himself unable to cope with them alone.
This function of dreams becomes especially well marked when there arises
some incentive for the sense perception. That the senses aroused during
sleep influence the dream is well known, and can be experimentally
verified; it is one of the certain but much overestimated results of the
medical investigation of dreams. Hitherto there has been an insoluble riddle
connected with this discovery. The stimulus to the sense by which the
investigator affects the sleeper is not properly recognized in the dream, but
is intermingled with a number of indefinite interpretations, whose
determination appears left to psychical free-will. There is, of course, no
such psychical free-will. To an external sense-stimulus the sleeper can react
in many ways. Either he awakens or he succeeds in sleeping on. In the latter
case he can make use of the dream to dismiss the external stimulus, and
this, again, in more ways than one. For instance, he can stay the stimulus by
dreaming of a scene which is absolutely intolerable to him. This was the
means used by one who was troubled by a painful perineal abscess. He

dreamt that he was on horseback, and made use of the poultice, which was
intended to alleviate his pain, as a saddle, and thus got away from the cause
of the trouble. Or, as is more frequently the case, the external stimulus
undergoes a new rendering, which leads him to connect it with a repressed
desire seeking its realization, and robs him of its reality, and is treated as if
it were a part of the psychical matter. Thus, some one dreamt that he had
written a comedy which embodied a definite motif; it was being performed;
the first act was over amid enthusiastic applause; there was great clapping.
At this moment the dreamer must have succeeded in prolonging his sleep
despite the disturbance, for when he woke he no longer heard the noise; he
concluded rightly that some one must have been beating a carpet or bed.
The dreams which come with a loud noise just before waking have all
attempted to cover the stimulus to waking by some other explanation, and
thus to prolong the sleep for a little while.
Whosoever has firmly accepted this censorship as the chief motive for the
distortion of dreams will not be surprised to learn as the result of dream
interpretation that most of the dreams of adults are traced by analysis to
erotic desires. This assertion is not drawn from dreams obviously of a
sexual nature, which are known to all dreamers from their own experience,
and are the only ones usually described as "sexual dreams." These dreams
are ever sufficiently mysterious by reason of the choice of persons who are
made the objects of sex, the removal of all the barriers which cry halt to the
dreamer's sexual needs in his waking state, the many strange reminders as
to details of what are called perversions. But analysis discovers that, in
many other dreams in whose manifest content nothing erotic can be found,
the work of interpretation shows them up as, in reality, realization of sexual
desires; whilst, on the other hand, that much of the thought-making when
awake, the thoughts saved us as surplus from the day only, reaches
presentation in dreams with the help of repressed erotic desires.
Towards the explanation of this statement, which is no theoretical postulate,
it must be remembered that no other class of instincts has required so vast a
suppression at the behest of civilization as the sexual, whilst their mastery
by the highest psychical processes are in most persons soonest of all
relinquished. Since we have learnt to understand infantile sexuality, often so
vague in its expression, so invariably overlooked and misunderstood, we

are justified in saying that nearly every civilized person has retained at
some point or other the infantile type of sex life; thus we understand that
repressed infantile sex desires furnish the most frequent and most powerful
impulses for the formation of dreams.1
If the dream, which is the expression of some erotic desire, succeeds in
making its manifest content appear innocently asexual, it is only possible in
one way. The matter of these sexual presentations cannot be exhibited as
such, but must be replaced by allusions, suggestions, and similar indirect
means; differing from other cases of indirect presentation, those used in
dreams must be deprived of direct understanding. The means of
presentation which answer these requirements are commonly termed
"symbols." A special interest has been directed towards these, since it has
been observed that the dreamers of the same language use the like symbols
—indeed, that in certain cases community of symbol is greater than
community of speech. Since the dreamers do not themselves know the
meaning of the symbols they use, it remains a puzzle whence arises their
relationship with what they replace and denote. The fact itself is undoubted,
and becomes of importance for the technique of the interpretation of
dreams, since by the aid of a knowledge of this symbolism it is possible to
understand the meaning of the elements of a dream, or parts of a dream,
occasionally even the whole dream itself, without having to question the
dreamer as to his own ideas. We thus come near to the popular idea of an
interpretation of dreams, and, on the other hand, possess again the
technique of the ancients, among whom the interpretation of dreams was
identical with their explanation through symbolism.
Though the study of dream symbolism is far removed from finality, we now
possess a series of general statements and of particular observations which
are quite certain. There are symbols which practically always have the same
meaning: Emperor and Empress (King and Queen) always mean the
parents; room, a woman2, and so on. The sexes are represented by a great
variety of symbols, many of which would be at first quite incomprehensible
had not the clews to the meaning been often obtained through other
channels.

There are symbols of universal circulation, found in all dreamers, of one
range of speech and culture; there are others of the narrowest individual
significance which an individual has built up out of his own material. In the
first class those can be differentiated whose claim can be at once recognized
by the replacement of sexual things in common speech (those, for instance,
arising from agriculture, as reproduction, seed) from others whose sexual
references appear to reach back to the earliest times and to the obscurest
depths of our image-building. The power of building symbols in both these
special forms of symbols has not died out. Recently discovered things, like
the airship, are at once brought into universal use as sex symbols.
It would be quite an error to suppose that a profounder knowledge of dream
symbolism (the "Language of Dreams") would make us independent of
questioning the dreamer regarding his impressions about the dream, and
would give us back the whole technique of ancient dream interpreters.
Apart from individual symbols and the variations in the use of what is
general, one never knows whether an element in the dream is to be
understood symbolically or in its proper meaning; the whole content of the
dream is certainly not to be interpreted symbolically. The knowledge of
dream symbols will only help us in understanding portions of the dream
content, and does not render the use of the technical rules previously given
at all superfluous. But it must be of the greatest service in interpreting a
dream just when the impressions of the dreamer are withheld or are
insufficient.
Dream symbolism proves also indispensable for understanding the so-called
"typical" dreams and the dreams that "repeat themselves." Dream
symbolism leads us far beyond the dream; it does not belong only to
dreams, but is likewise dominant in legend, myth, and saga, in wit and in
folklore. It compels us to pursue the inner meaning of the dream in these
productions. But we must acknowledge that symbolism is not a result of the
dream work, but is a peculiarity probably of our unconscious thinking,
which furnishes to the dream work the matter for condensation,
displacement, and dramatization.
Footnote 1: Freud, "Three Contributions to Sexual Theory," translated by A.A. Brill (Journal of
Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, New York).

Footnote 2: The words from "and" to "channels" in the next sentence is a short summary of the
passage in the original. As this book will be read by other than professional people the passage has
not been translated, in deference to English opinion.—TRANSLATOR.

IV
DREAM ANALYSIS
Perhaps we shall now begin to suspect that dream interpretation is capable
of giving us hints about the structure of our psychic apparatus which we
have thus far expected in vain from philosophy. We shall not, however,
follow this track, but return to our original problem as soon as we have
cleared up the subject of dream-disfigurement. The question has arisen how
dreams with disagreeable content can be analyzed as the fulfillment of
wishes. We see now that this is possible in case dream-disfigurement has
taken place, in case the disagreeable content serves only as a disguise for
what is wished. Keeping in mind our assumptions in regard to the two
psychic instances, we may now proceed to say: disagreeable dreams, as a
matter of fact, contain something which is disagreeable to the second
instance, but which at the same time fulfills a wish of the first instance.
They are wish dreams in the sense that every dream originates in the first
instance, while the second instance acts towards the dream only in
repelling, not in a creative manner. If we limit ourselves to a consideration
of what the second instance contributes to the dream, we can never
understand the dream. If we do so, all the riddles which the authors have
found in the dream remain unsolved.
That the dream actually has a secret meaning, which turns out to be the
fulfillment of a wish, must be proved afresh for every case by means of an
analysis. I therefore select several dreams which have painful contents and
attempt an analysis of them. They are partly dreams of hysterical subjects,
which require long preliminary statements, and now and then also an
examination of the psychic processes which occur in hysteria. I cannot,
however, avoid this added difficulty in the exposition.
When I give a psychoneurotic patient analytical treatment, dreams are
always, as I have said, the subject of our discussion. It must, therefore, give
him all the psychological explanations through whose aid I myself have
come to an understanding of his symptoms, and here I undergo an

unsparing criticism, which is perhaps not less keen than that I must expect
from my colleagues. Contradiction of the thesis that all dreams are the
fulfillments of wishes is raised by my patients with perfect regularity. Here
are several examples of the dream material which is offered me to refute
this position.
"You always tell me that the dream is a wish fulfilled," begins a clever lady
patient. "Now I shall tell you a dream in which the content is quite the
opposite, in which a wish of mine is not fulfilled. How do you reconcile
that with your theory? The dream is as follows:—
"I want to give a supper, but having nothing at hand except some smoked
salmon, I think of going marketing, but I remember that it is Sunday
afternoon, when all the shops are closed. I next try to telephone to some
caterers, but the telephone is out of order.... Thus I must resign my wish to
give a supper."
I answer, of course, that only the analysis can decide the meaning of this
dream, although I admit that at first sight it seems sensible and coherent,
and looks like the opposite of a wish-fulfillment. "But what occurrence has
given rise to this dream?" I ask. "You know that the stimulus for a dream
always lies among the experiences of the preceding day."
Analysis.—The husband of the patient, an upright and conscientious
wholesale butcher, had told her the day before that he is growing too fat,
and that he must, therefore, begin treatment for obesity. He was going to get
up early, take exercise, keep to a strict diet, and above all accept no more
invitations to suppers. She proceeds laughingly to relate how her husband at
an inn table had made the acquaintance of an artist, who insisted upon
painting his portrait because he, the painter, had never found such an
expressive head. But her husband had answered in his rough way, that he
was very thankful for the honor, but that he was quite convinced that a
portion of the backside of a pretty young girl would please the artist better
than his whole face1. She said that she was at the time very much in love
with her husband, and teased him a good deal. She had also asked him not
to send her any caviare. What does that mean?

As a matter of fact, she had wanted for a long time to eat a caviare
sandwich every forenoon, but had grudged herself the expense. Of course,
she would at once get the caviare from her husband, as soon as she asked
him for it. But she had begged him, on the contrary, not to send her the
caviare, in order that she might tease him about it longer.
This explanation seems far-fetched to me. Unadmitted motives are in the
habit of hiding behind such unsatisfactory explanations. We are reminded of
subjects hypnotized by Bernheim, who carried out a posthypnotic order, and
who, upon being asked for their motives, instead of answering: "I do not
know why I did that," had to invent a reason that was obviously inadequate.
Something similar is probably the case with the caviare of my patient. I see
that she is compelled to create an unfulfilled wish in life. Her dream also
shows the reproduction of the wish as accomplished. But why does she
need an unfulfilled wish?
The ideas so far produced are insufficient for the interpretation of the
dream. I beg for more. After a short pause, which corresponds to the
overcoming of a resistance, she reports further that the day before she had
made a visit to a friend, of whom she is really jealous, because her husband
is always praising this woman so much. Fortunately, this friend is very lean
and thin, and her husband likes well-rounded figures. Now of what did this
lean friend speak? Naturally of her wish to become somewhat stouter. She
also asked my patient: "When are you going to invite us again? You always
have such a good table."
Now the meaning of the dream is clear. I may say to the patient: "It is just
as though you had thought at the time of the request: 'Of course, I'll invite
you, so you can eat yourself fat at my house and become still more pleasing
to my husband. I would rather give no more suppers.' The dream then tells
you that you cannot give a supper, thereby fulfilling your wish not to
contribute anything to the rounding out of your friend's figure. The
resolution of your husband to refuse invitations to supper for the sake of
getting thin teaches you that one grows fat on the things served in
company." Now only some conversation is necessary to confirm the
solution. The smoked salmon in the dream has not yet been traced. "How
did the salmon mentioned in the dream occur to you?" "Smoked salmon is

the favorite dish of this friend," she answered. I happen to know the lady,
and may corroborate this by saying that she grudges herself the salmon just
as much as my patient grudges herself the caviare.
The dream admits of still another and more exact interpretation, which is
necessitated only by a subordinate circumstance. The two interpretations do
not contradict one another, but rather cover each other and furnish a neat
example of the usual ambiguity of dreams as well as of all other
psychopathological formations. We have seen that at the same time that she
dreams of the denial of the wish, the patient is in reality occupied in
securing an unfulfilled wish (the caviare sandwiches). Her friend, too, had
expressed a wish, namely, to get fatter, and it would not surprise us if our
lady had dreamt that the wish of the friend was not being fulfilled. For it is
her own wish that a wish of her friend's—for increase in weight—should
not be fulfilled. Instead of this, however, she dreams that one of her own
wishes is not fulfilled. The dream becomes capable of a new interpretation,
if in the dream she does not intend herself, but her friend, if she has put
herself in the place of her friend, or, as we may say, has identified herself
with her friend.
I think she has actually done this, and as a sign of this identification she has
created an unfulfilled wish in reality. But what is the meaning of this
hysterical identification? To clear this up a thorough exposition is
necessary. Identification is a highly important factor in the mechanism of
hysterical symptoms; by this means patients are enabled in their symptoms
to represent not merely their own experiences, but the experiences of a great
number of other persons, and can suffer, as it were, for a whole mass of
people, and fill all the parts of a drama by means of their own personalities
alone. It will here be objected that this is well-known hysterical imitation,
the ability of hysteric subjects to copy all the symptoms which impress
them when they occur in others, as though their pity were stimulated to the
point of reproduction. But this only indicates the way in which the psychic
process is discharged in hysterical imitation; the way in which a psychic act
proceeds and the act itself are two different things. The latter is slightly
more complicated than one is apt to imagine the imitation of hysterical
subjects to be: it corresponds to an unconscious concluded process, as an
example will show. The physician who has a female patient with a

particular kind of twitching, lodged in the company of other patients in the
same room of the hospital, is not surprised when some morning he learns
that this peculiar hysterical attack has found imitations. He simply says to
himself: The others have seen her and have done likewise: that is psychic
infection. Yes, but psychic infection proceeds in somewhat the following
manner: As a rule, patients know more about one another than the physician
knows about each of them, and they are concerned about each other when
the visit of the doctor is over. Some of them have an attack to-day: soon it is
known among the rest that a letter from home, a return of lovesickness or
the like, is the cause of it. Their sympathy is aroused, and the following
syllogism, which does not reach consciousness, is completed in them: "If it
is possible to have this kind of an attack from such causes, I too may have
this kind of an attack, for I have the same reasons." If this were a cycle
capable of becoming conscious, it would perhaps express itself in fear of
getting the same attack; but it takes place in another psychic sphere, and,
therefore, ends in the realization of the dreaded symptom. Identification is
therefore not a simple imitation, but a sympathy based upon the same
etiological claim; it expresses an "as though," and refers to some common
quality which has remained in the unconscious.
Identification is most often used in hysteria to express sexual community.
An hysterical woman identifies herself most readily—although not
exclusively—with persons with whom she has had sexual relations, or who
have sexual intercourse with the same persons as herself. Language takes
such a conception into consideration: two lovers are "one." In the hysterical
phantasy, as well as in the dream, it is sufficient for the identification if one
thinks of sexual relations, whether or not they become real. The patient,
then, only follows the rules of the hysterical thought processes when she
gives expression to her jealousy of her friend (which, moreover, she herself
admits to be unjustified, in that she puts herself in her place and identifies
herself with her by creating a symptom—the denied wish). I might further
clarify the process specifically as follows: She puts herself in the place of
her friend in the dream, because her friend has taken her own place relation
to her husband, and because she would like to take her friend's place in the
esteem of her husband2.

The contradiction to my theory of dreams in the case of another female
patient, the most witty among all my dreamers, was solved in a simpler
manner, although according to the scheme that the non-fulfillment of one
wish signifies the fulfillment of another. I had one day explained to her that
the dream is a wish of fulfillment. The next day she brought me a dream to
the effect that she was traveling with her mother-in-law to their common
summer resort. Now I knew that she had struggled violently against
spending the summer in the neighborhood of her mother-in-law. I also knew
that she had luckily avoided her mother-in-law by renting an estate in a fardistant country resort. Now the dream reversed this wished-for solution;
was not this in the flattest contradiction to my theory of wish-fulfillment in
the dream? Certainly, it was only necessary to draw the inferences from this
dream in order to get at its interpretation. According to this dream, I was in
the wrong. It was thus her wish that I should be in the wrong, and this wish
the dream showed her as fulfilled. But the wish that I should be in the
wrong, which was fulfilled in the theme of the country home, referred to a
more serious matter. At that time I had made up my mind, from the material
furnished by her analysis, that something of significance for her illness
must have occurred at a certain time in her life. She had denied it because it
was not present in her memory. We soon came to see that I was in the right.
Her wish that I should be in the wrong, which is transformed into the
dream, thus corresponded to the justifiable wish that those things, which at
the time had only been suspected, had never occurred at all.
Without an analysis, and merely by means of an assumption, I took the
liberty of interpreting a little occurrence in the case of a friend, who had
been my colleague through the eight classes of the Gymnasium. He once
heard a lecture of mine delivered to a small assemblage, on the novel
subject of the dream as the fulfillment of a wish. He went home, dreamt
that he had lost all his suits—he was a lawyer—and then complained to me
about it. I took refuge in the evasion: "One can't win all one's suits," but I
thought to myself: "If for eight years I sat as Primus on the first bench,
while he moved around somewhere in the middle of the class, may he not
naturally have had a wish from his boyhood days that I, too, might for once
completely disgrace myself?"

In the same way another dream of a more gloomy character was offered me
by a female patient as a contradiction to my theory of the wish-dream. The
patient, a young girl, began as follows: "You remember that my sister has
now only one boy, Charles: she lost the elder one, Otto, while I was still at
her house. Otto was my favorite; it was I who really brought him up. I like
the other little fellow, too, but of course not nearly as much as the dead one.
Now I dreamt last night that I saw Charles lying dead before me. He was
lying in his little coffin, his hands folded: there were candles all about, and,
in short, it was just like the time of little Otto's death, which shocked me so
profoundly. Now tell me, what does this mean? You know me: am I really
bad enough to wish my sister to lose the only child she has left? Or does the
dream mean that I wish Charles to be dead rather than Otto, whom I like so
much better?"
I assured her that this interpretation was impossible. After some reflection I
was able to give her the interpretation of the dream, which I subsequently
made her confirm.
Having become an orphan at an early age, the girl had been brought up in
the house of a much older sister, and had met among the friends and visitors
who came to the house, a man who made a lasting impression upon her
heart. It looked for a time as though these barely expressed relations were to
end in marriage, but this happy culmination was frustrated by the sister,
whose motives have never found a complete explanation. After the break,
the man who was loved by our patient avoided the house: she herself
became independent some time after little Otto's death, to whom her
affection had now turned. But she did not succeed in freeing herself from
the inclination for her sister's friend in which she had become involved. Her
pride commanded her to avoid him; but it was impossible for her to transfer
her love to the other suitors who presented themselves in order. Whenever
the man whom she loved, who was a member of the literary profession,
announced a lecture anywhere, she was sure to be found in the audience;
she also seized every other opportunity to see him from a distance
unobserved by him. I remembered that on the day before she had told me
that the Professor was going to a certain concert, and that she was also
going there, in order to enjoy the sight of him. This was on the day of the
dream; and the concert was to take place on the day on which she told me

the dream. I could now easily see the correct interpretation, and I asked her
whether she could think of any event which had happened after the death of
little Otto. She answered immediately: "Certainly; at that time the Professor
returned after a long absence, and I saw him once more beside the coffin of
little Otto." It was exactly as I had expected. I interpreted the dream in the
following manner: "If now the other boy were to die, the same thing would
be repeated. You would spend the day with your sister, the Professor would
surely come in order to offer condolence, and you would see him again
under the same circumstances as at that time. The dream signifies nothing
but this wish of yours to see him again, against which you are fighting
inwardly. I know that you are carrying the ticket for to-day's concert in your
bag. Your dream is a dream of impatience; it has anticipated the meeting
which is to take place to-day by several hours."
In order to disguise her wish she had obviously selected a situation in which
wishes of that sort are commonly suppressed—a situation which is so filled
with sorrow that love is not thought of. And yet, it is very easily probable
that even in the actual situation at the bier of the second, more dearly loved
boy, which the dream copied faithfully, she had not been able to suppress
her feelings of affection for the visitor whom she had missed for so long a
time.
A different explanation was found in the case of a similar dream of another
female patient, who was distinguished in her earlier years by her quick wit
and her cheerful demeanors and who still showed these qualities at least in
the notion, which occurred to her in the course of treatment. In connection
with a longer dream, it seemed to this lady that she saw her fifteen-year-old
daughter lying dead before her in a box. She was strongly inclined to
convert this dream-image into an objection to the theory of wishfulfillment, but herself suspected that the detail of the box must lead to a
different conception of the dream.3 In the course of the analysis it occurred
to her that on the evening before, the conversation of the company had
turned upon the English word "box," and upon the numerous translations of
it into German, such as box, theater box, chest, box on the ear, &c. From
other components of the same dream it is now possible to add that the lady
had guessed the relationship between the English word "box" and the
German Büchse, and had then been haunted by the memory that Büchse (as

well as "box") is used in vulgar speech to designate the female genital
organ. It was therefore possible, making a certain allowance for her notions
on the subject of topographical anatomy, to assume that the child in the box
signified a child in the womb of the mother. At this stage of the explanation
she no longer denied that the picture of the dream really corresponded to
one of her wishes. Like so many other young women, she was by no means
happy when she became pregnant, and admitted to me more than once the
wish that her child might die before its birth; in a fit of anger following a
violent scene with her husband she had even struck her abdomen with her
fists in order to hit the child within. The dead child was, therefore, really the
fulfillment of a wish, but a wish which had been put aside for fifteen years,
and it is not surprising that the fulfillment of the wish was no longer
recognized after so long an interval. For there had been many changes
meanwhile.
The group of dreams to which the two last mentioned belong, having as
content the death of beloved relatives, will be considered again under the
head of "Typical Dreams." I shall there be able to show by new examples
that in spite of their undesirable content, all these dreams must be
interpreted as wish-fulfillments. For the following dream, which again was
told me in order to deter me from a hasty generalization of the theory of
wishing in dreams, I am indebted, not to a patient, but to an intelligent jurist
of my acquaintance. "I dream," my informant tells me, "that I am walking
in front of my house with a lady on my arm. Here a closed wagon is waiting,
a gentleman steps up to me, gives his authority as an agent of the police,
and demands that I should follow him. I only ask for time in which to
arrange my affairs. Can you possibly suppose this is a wish of mine to be
arrested?" "Of course not," I must admit. "Do you happen to know upon
what charge you were arrested?" "Yes; I believe for infanticide."
"Infanticide? But you know that only a mother can commit this crime upon
her newly born child?" "That is true."4 "And under what circumstances did
you dream; what happened on the evening before?" "I would rather not tell
you that; it is a delicate matter." "But I must have it, otherwise we must
forgo the interpretation of the dream." "Well, then, I will tell you. I spent
the night, not at home, but at the house of a lady who means very much to
me. When we awoke in the morning, something again passed between us.
Then I went to sleep again, and dreamt what I have told you." "The woman

is married?" "Yes." "And you do not wish her to conceive a child?" "No;
that might betray us." "Then you do not practice normal coitus?" "I take the
precaution to withdraw before ejaculation." "Am I permitted to assume that
you did this trick several times during the night, and that in the morning you
were not quite sure whether you had succeeded?" "That might be the case."
"Then your dream is the fulfillment of a wish. By means of it you secure the
assurance that you have not begotten a child, or, what amounts to the same
thing, that you have killed a child. I can easily demonstrate the connecting
links. Do you remember, a few days ago we were talking about the distress
of matrimony (Ehenot), and about the inconsistency of permitting the
practice of coitus as long as no impregnation takes place, while every
delinquency after the ovum and the semen meet and a fœtus is formed is
punished as a crime? In connection with this, we also recalled the mediæval
controversy about the moment of time at which the soul is really lodged in
the fœtus, since the concept of murder becomes admissible only from that
point on. Doubtless you also know the gruesome poem by Lenau, which
puts infanticide and the prevention of children on the same plane."
"Strangely enough, I had happened to think of Lenau during the afternoon."
"Another echo of your dream. And now I shall demonstrate to you another
subordinate wish-fulfillment in your dream. You walk in front of your
house with the lady on your arm. So you take her home, instead of spending
the night at her house, as you do in actuality. The fact that the wishfulfillment, which is the essence of the dream, disguises itself in such an
unpleasant form, has perhaps more than one reason. From my essay on the
etiology of anxiety neuroses, you will see that I note interrupted coitus as
one of the factors which cause the development of neurotic fear. It would be
consistent with this that if after repeated cohabitation of the kind mentioned
you should be left in an uncomfortable mood, which now becomes an
element in the composition of your dream. You also make use of this
unpleasant state of mind to conceal the wish-fulfillment. Furthermore, the
mention of infanticide has not yet been explained. Why does this crime,
which is peculiar to females, occur to you?" "I shall confess to you that I
was involved in such an affair years ago. Through my fault a girl tried to
protect herself from the consequences of a liaison with me by securing an
abortion. I had nothing to do with carrying out the plan, but I was naturally
for a long time worried lest the affair might be discovered." "I understand;

this recollection furnished a second reason why the supposition that you had
done your trick badly must have been painful to you."
A young physician, who had heard this dream of my colleague when it was
told, must have felt implicated by it, for he hastened to imitate it in a dream
of his own, applying its mode of thinking to another subject. The day before
he had handed in a declaration of his income, which was perfectly honest,
because he had little to declare. He dreamt that an acquaintance of his came
from a meeting of the tax commission and informed him that all the other
declarations of income had passed uncontested, but that his own had
awakened general suspicion, and that he would be punished with a heavy
fine. The dream is a poorly-concealed fulfillment of the wish to be known
as a physician with a large income. It likewise recalls the story of the young
girl who was advised against accepting her suitor because he was a man of
quick temper who would surely treat her to blows after they were married.
The answer of the girl was: "I wish he would strike me!" Her wish to be
married is so strong that she takes into the bargain the discomfort which is
said to be connected with matrimony, and which is predicted for her, and
even raises it to a wish.
If I group the very frequently occurring dreams of this sort, which seem
flatly to contradict my theory, in that they contain the denial of a wish or
some occurrence decidedly unwished for, under the head of "counter wishdreams," I observe that they may all be referred to two principles, of which
one has not yet been mentioned, although it plays a large part in the dreams
of human beings. One of the motives inspiring these dreams is the wish that
I should appear in the wrong. These dreams regularly occur in the course of
my treatment if the patient shows a resistance against me, and I can count
with a large degree of certainty upon causing such a dream after I have once
explained to the patient my theory that the dream is a wish-fulfillment.5 I
may even expect this to be the case in a dream merely in order to fulfill the
wish that I may appear in the wrong. The last dream which I shall tell from
those occurring in the course of treatment again shows this very thing. A
young girl who has struggled hard to continue my treatment, against the
will of her relatives and the authorities whom she had consulted, dreams as
follows: She is forbidden at home to come to me any more. She then

reminds me of the promise I made her to treat her for nothing if necessary,
and I say to her: "I can show no consideration in money matters."
It is not at all easy in this case to demonstrate the fulfillment of a wish, but
in all cases of this kind there is a second problem, the solution of which
helps also to solve the first. Where does she get the words which she puts
into my mouth? Of course I have never told her anything like that, but one
of her brothers, the very one who has the greatest influence over her, has
been kind enough to make this remark about me. It is then the purpose of
the dream that this brother should remain in the right; and she does not try
to justify this brother merely in the dream; it is her purpose in life and the
motive for her being ill.
The other motive for counter wish-dreams is so clear that there is danger of
overlooking it, as for some time happened in my own case. In the sexual
make-up of many people there is a masochistic component, which has
arisen through the conversion of the aggressive, sadistic component into its
opposite. Such people are called "ideal" masochists, if they seek pleasure
not in the bodily pain which may be inflicted upon them, but in humiliation
and in chastisement of the soul. It is obvious that such persons can have
counter wish-dreams and disagreeable dreams, which, however, for them
are nothing but wish-fulfillment, affording satisfaction for their masochistic
inclinations. Here is such a dream. A young man, who has in earlier years
tormented his elder brother, towards whom he was homosexually inclined,
but who had undergone a complete change of character, has the following
dream, which consists of three parts: (1) He is "insulted" by his brother. (2)
Two adults are caressing each other with homosexual intentions. (3) His
brother has sold the enterprise whose management the young man reserved
for his own future. He awakens from the last-mentioned dream with the
most unpleasant feelings, and yet it is a masochistic wish-dream, which
might be translated: It would serve me quite right if my brother were to
make that sale against my interest, as a punishment for all the torments
which he has suffered at my hands.
I hope that the above discussion and examples will suffice—until further
objection can be raised—to make it seem credible that even dreams with a
painful content are to be analyzed as the fulfillments of wishes. Nor will it

seem a matter of chance that in the course of interpretation one always
happens upon subjects of which one does not like to speak or think. The
disagreeable sensation which such dreams arouse is simply identical with
the antipathy which endeavors—usually with success—to restrain us from
the treatment or discussion of such subjects, and which must be overcome
by all of us, if, in spite of its unpleasantness, we find it necessary to take the
matter in hand. But this disagreeable sensation, which occurs also in
dreams, does not preclude the existence of a wish; every one has wishes
which he would not like to tell to others, which he does not want to admit
even to himself. We are, on other grounds, justified in connecting the
disagreeable character of all these dreams with the fact of dream
disfigurement, and in concluding that these dreams are distorted, and that
the wish-fulfillment in them is disguised until recognition is impossible for
no other reason than that a repugnance, a will to suppress, exists in relation
to the subject-matter of the dream or in relation to the wish which the dream
creates. Dream disfigurement, then, turns out in reality to be an act of the
censor. We shall take into consideration everything which the analysis of
disagreeable dreams has brought to light if we reword our formula as
follows: The dream is the (disguised) fulfillment of a (suppressed,
repressed) wish.
Now there still remain as a particular species of dreams with painful
content, dreams of anxiety, the inclusion of which under dreams of wishing
will find least acceptance with the uninitiated. But I can settle the problem
of anxiety dreams in very short order; for what they may reveal is not a new
aspect of the dream problem; it is a question in their case of understanding
neurotic anxiety in general. The fear which we experience in the dream is
only seemingly explained by the dream content. If we subject the content of
the dream to analysis, we become aware that the dream fear is no more
justified by the dream content than the fear in a phobia is justified by the
idea upon which the phobia depends. For example, it is true that it is
possible to fall out of a window, and that some care must be exercised when
one is near a window, but it is inexplicable why the anxiety in the
corresponding phobia is so great, and why it follows its victims to an extent
so much greater than is warranted by its origin. The same explanation, then,
which applies to the phobia applies also to the dream of anxiety. In both

cases the anxiety is only superficially attached to the idea which
accompanies it and comes from another source.
On account of the intimate relation of dream fear to neurotic fear,
discussion of the former obliges me to refer to the latter. In a little essay on
"The Anxiety Neurosis,"6 I maintained that neurotic fear has its origin in
the sexual life, and corresponds to a libido which has been turned away
from its object and has not succeeded in being applied. From this formula,
which has since proved its validity more and more clearly, we may deduce
the conclusion that the content of anxiety dreams is of a sexual nature, the
libido belonging to which content has been transformed into fear.
Footnote 1: To sit for the painter. Goethe: "And if he has no backside, how can the nobleman sit?"
Footnote 2: I myself regret the introduction of such passages from the psychopathology of hysteria,
which, because of their fragmentary representation and of being torn from all connection with the
subject, cannot have a very enlightening influence. If these passages are capable of throwing light
upon the intimate relations between the dream and the psychoneuroses, they have served the purpose
for which I have taken them up.
Footnote 3: Something like the smoked salmon in the dream of the deferred supper.
Footnote 4: It often happens that a dream is told incompletely, and that a recollection of the omitted
portions appear only in the course of the analysis. These portions subsequently fitted in, regularly
furnish the key to the interpretation. Cf. below, about forgetting in dreams.
Footnote 5: Similar "counter wish-dreams" have been repeatedly reported to me within the last few
years by my pupils who thus reacted to their first encounter with the "wish theory of the dream."
Footnote 6: See Selected Papers on Hysteria and other Psychoneuroses, p. 133, translated by A.A.
Brill, Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases, Monograph Series.

V
SEX IN DREAMS
The more one is occupied with the solution of dreams, the more willing one
must become to acknowledge that the majority of the dreams of adults treat
of sexual material and give expression to erotic wishes. Only one who
really analyzes dreams, that is to say, who pushes forward from their
manifest content to the latent dream thoughts, can form an opinion on this
subject—never the person who is satisfied with registering the manifest
content (as, for example, Näcke in his works on sexual dreams). Let us
recognize at once that this fact is not to be wondered at, but that it is in
complete harmony with the fundamental assumptions of dream explanation.
No other impulse has had to undergo so much suppression from the time of
childhood as the sex impulse in its numerous components, from no other
impulse have survived so many and such intense unconscious wishes,
which now act in the sleeping state in such a manner as to produce dreams.
In dream interpretation, this significance of sexual complexes must never be
forgotten, nor must they, of course, be exaggerated to the point of being
considered exclusive.
Of many dreams it can be ascertained by a careful interpretation that they
are even to be taken bisexually, inasmuch as they result in an irrefutable
secondary interpretation in which they realize homosexual feelings—that is,
feelings that are common to the normal sexual activity of the dreaming
person. But that all dreams are to be interpreted bisexually, seems to me to
be a generalization as indemonstrable as it is improbable, which I should
not like to support. Above all I should not know how to dispose of the
apparent fact that there are many dreams satisfying other than—in the
widest sense—erotic needs, as dreams of hunger, thirst, convenience, &c.
Likewise the similar assertions "that behind every dream one finds the
death sentence" (Stekel), and that every dream shows "a continuation from
the feminine to the masculine line" (Adler), seem to me to proceed far
beyond what is admissible in the interpretation of dreams.

We have already asserted elsewhere that dreams which are conspicuously
innocent invariably embody coarse erotic wishes, and we might confirm
this by means of numerous fresh examples. But many dreams which appear
indifferent, and which would never be suspected of any particular
significance, can be traced back, after analysis, to unmistakably sexual
wish-feelings, which are often of an unexpected nature. For example, who
would suspect a sexual wish in the following dream until the interpretation
had been worked out? The dreamer relates: Between two stately palaces
stands a little house, receding somewhat, whose doors are closed. My wife
leads me a little way along the street up to the little house, and pushes in
the door, and then I slip quickly and easily into the interior of a courtyard
that slants obliquely upwards.
Any one who has had experience in the translating of dreams will, of
course, immediately perceive that penetrating into narrow spaces, and
opening locked doors, belong to the commonest sexual symbolism, and will
easily find in this dream a representation of attempted coition from behind
(between the two stately buttocks of the female body). The narrow slanting
passage is of course the vagina; the assistance attributed to the wife of the
dreamer requires the interpretation that in reality it is only consideration for
the wife which is responsible for the detention from such an attempt.
Moreover, inquiry shows that on the previous day a young girl had entered
the household of the dreamer who had pleased him, and who had given him
the impression that she would not be altogether opposed to an approach of
this sort. The little house between the two palaces is taken from a
reminiscence of the Hradschin in Prague, and thus points again to the girl
who is a native of that city.
If with my patients I emphasize the frequency of the Oedipus dream—of
having sexual intercourse with one's mother—I get the answer: "I cannot
remember such a dream." Immediately afterwards, however, there arises the
recollection of another disguised and indifferent dream, which has been
dreamed repeatedly by the patient, and the analysis shows it to be a dream
of this same content—that is, another Oedipus dream. I can assure the
reader that veiled dreams of sexual intercourse with the mother are a great
deal more frequent than open ones to the same effect.

There are dreams about landscapes and localities in which emphasis is
always laid upon the assurance: "I have been there before." In this case the
locality is always the genital organ of the mother; it can indeed be asserted
with such certainty of no other locality that one "has been there before."
A large number of dreams, often full of fear, which are concerned with
passing through narrow spaces or with staying, in the water, are based upon
fancies about the embryonic life, about the sojourn in the mother's womb,
and about the act of birth. The following is the dream of a young man who
in his fancy has already while in embryo taken advantage of his opportunity
to spy upon an act of coition between his parents.
"He is in a deep shaft, in which there is a window, as in the Semmering
Tunnel. At first he sees an empty landscape through this window, and then
he composes a picture into it, which is immediately at hand and which fills
out the empty space. The picture represents a field which is being
thoroughly harrowed by an implement, and the delightful air, the
accompanying idea of hard work, and the bluish-black clods of earth make
a pleasant impression. He then goes on and sees a primary school opened
... and he is surprised that so much attention is devoted in it to the sexual
feelings of the child, which makes him think of me."
Here is a pretty water-dream of a female patient, which was turned to
extraordinary account in the course of treatment.
At her summer resort at the ... Lake, she hurls herself into the dark water at
a place where the pale moon is reflected in the water.
Dreams of this sort are parturition dreams; their interpretation is
accomplished by reversing the fact reported in the manifest dream content;
thus, instead of "throwing one's self into the water," read "coming out of the
water," that is, "being born." The place from which one is born is
recognized if one thinks of the bad sense of the French "la lune." The pale
moon thus becomes the white "bottom" (Popo), which the child soon
recognizes as the place from which it came. Now what can be the meaning
of the patient's wishing to be born at her summer resort? I asked the
dreamer this, and she answered without hesitation: "Hasn't the treatment
made me as though I were born again?" Thus the dream becomes an

invitation to continue the cure at this summer resort, that is, to visit her
there; perhaps it also contains a very bashful allusion to the wish to become
a mother herself.1
Another dream of parturition, with its interpretation, I take from the work of
E. Jones. "She stood at the seashore watching a small boy, who seemed to
be hers, wading into the water. This he did till the water covered him, and
she could only see his head bobbing up and down near the surface. The
scene then changed to the crowded hall of a hotel. Her husband left her, and
she 'entered into conversation with' a stranger." The second half of the
dream was discovered in the analysis to represent a flight from her husband,
and the entering into intimate relations with a third person, behind whom
was plainly indicated Mr. X.'s brother mentioned in a former dream. The
first part of the dream was a fairly evident birth phantasy. In dreams as in
mythology, the delivery of a child from the uterine waters is commonly
presented by distortion as the entry of the child into water; among many
others, the births of Adonis, Osiris, Moses, and Bacchus are well-known
illustrations of this. The bobbing up and down of the head in the water at
once recalled to the patient the sensation of quickening she had experienced
in her only pregnancy. Thinking of the boy going into the water induced a
reverie in which she saw herself taking him out of the water, carrying him
into the nursery, washing him and dressing him, and installing him in her
household.
The second half of the dream, therefore, represents thoughts concerning the
elopement, which belonged to the first half of the underlying latent content;
the first half of the dream corresponded with the second half of the latent
content, the birth phantasy. Besides this inversion in order, further
inversions took place in each half of the dream. In the first half the child
entered the water, and then his head bobbed; in the underlying dream
thoughts first the quickening occurred, and then the child left the water (a
double inversion). In the second half her husband left her; in the dream
thoughts she left her husband.
Another parturition dream is related by Abraham of a young woman
looking forward to her first confinement. From a place in the floor of the
house a subterranean canal leads directly into the water (parturition path,

amniotic liquor). She lifts up a trap in the floor, and there immediately
appears a creature dressed in a brownish fur, which almost resembles a seal.
This creature changes into the younger brother of the dreamer, to whom she
has always stood in maternal relationship.
Dreams of "saving" are connected with parturition dreams. To save,
especially to save from the water, is equivalent to giving birth when
dreamed by a woman; this sense is, however, modified when the dreamer is
a man.
Robbers, burglars at night, and ghosts, of which we are afraid before going
to bed, and which occasionally even disturb our sleep, originate in one and
the same childish reminiscence. They are the nightly visitors who have
awakened the child to set it on the chamber so that it may not wet the bed,
or have lifted the cover in order to see clearly how the child is holding its
hands while sleeping. I have been able to induce an exact recollection of the
nocturnal visitor in the analysis of some of these anxiety dreams. The
robbers were always the father, the ghosts more probably corresponded to
feminine persons with white night-gowns.
When one has become familiar with the abundant use of symbolism for the
representation of sexual material in dreams, one naturally raises the
question whether there are not many of these symbols which appear once
and for all with a firmly established significance like the signs in
stenography; and one is tempted to compile a new dream-book according to
the cipher method. In this connection it may be remarked that this
symbolism does not belong peculiarly to the dream, but rather to
unconscious thinking, particularly that of the masses, and it is to be found in
greater perfection in the folklore, in the myths, legends, and manners of
speech, in the proverbial sayings, and in the current witticisms of a nation
than in its dreams.
The dream takes advantage of this symbolism in order to give a disguised
representation to its latent thoughts. Among the symbols which are used in
this manner there are of course many which regularly, or almost regularly,
mean the same thing. Only it is necessary to keep in mind the curious
plasticity of psychic material. Now and then a symbol in the dream content
may have to be interpreted not symbolically, but according to its real

meaning; at another time the dreamer, owing to a peculiar set of
recollections, may create for himself the right to use anything whatever as a
sexual symbol, though it is not ordinarily used in that way. Nor are the most
frequently used sexual symbols unambiguous every time.
After these limitations and reservations I may call attention to the
following: Emperor and Empress (King and Queen) in most cases really
represent the parents of the dreamer; the dreamer himself or herself is the
prince or princess. All elongated objects, sticks, tree-trunks, and umbrellas
(on account of the stretching-up which might be compared to an erection!
all elongated and sharp weapons, knives, daggers, and pikes, are intended to
represent the male member. A frequent, not very intelligible, symbol for the
same is a nail-file (on account of the rubbing and scraping?). Little cases,
boxes, caskets, closets, and stoves correspond to the female part. The
symbolism of lock and key has been very gracefully employed by Uhland
in his song about the "Grafen Eberstein," to make a common smutty joke.
The dream of walking through a row of rooms is a brothel or harem dream.
Staircases, ladders, and flights of stairs, or climbing on these, either
upwards or downwards, are symbolic representations of the sexual act.
Smooth walls over which one is climbing, façades of houses upon which
one is letting oneself down, frequently under great anxiety, correspond to
the erect human body, and probably repeat in the dream reminiscences of
the upward climbing of little children on their parents or foster parents.
"Smooth" walls are men. Often in a dream of anxiety one is holding on
firmly to some projection from a house. Tables, set tables, and boards are
women, perhaps on account of the opposition which does away with the
bodily contours. Since "bed and board" (mensa et thorus) constitute
marriage, the former are often put for the latter in the dream, and as far as
practicable the sexual presentation complex is transposed to the eating
complex. Of articles of dress the woman's hat may frequently be definitely
interpreted as the male genital. In dreams of men one often finds the cravat
as a symbol for the penis; this indeed is not only because cravats hang down
long, and are characteristic of the man, but also because one can select them
at pleasure, a freedom which is prohibited by nature in the original of the
symbol. Persons who make use of this symbol in the dream are very
extravagant with cravats, and possess regular collections of them. All
complicated machines and apparatus in dream are very probably genitals, in

the description of which dream symbolism shows itself to be as tireless as
the activity of wit. Likewise many landscapes in dreams, especially with
bridges or with wooded mountains, can be readily recognized as
descriptions of the genitals. Finally where one finds incomprehensible
neologisms one may think of combinations made up of components having
a sexual significance. Children also in the dream often signify the genitals,
as men and women are in the habit of fondly referring to their genital organ
as their "little one." As a very recent symbol of the male genital may be
mentioned the flying machine, utilization of which is justified by its relation
to flying as well as occasionally by its form. To play with a little child or to
beat a little one is often the dream's representation of onanism. A number of
other symbols, in part not sufficiently verified are given by Stekel, who
illustrates them with examples. Right and left, according to him, are to be
conceived in the dream in an ethical sense. "The right way always signifies
the road to righteousness, the left the one to crime. Thus the left may
signify homosexuality, incest, and perversion, while the right signifies
marriage, relations with a prostitute, &c. The meaning is always determined
by the individual moral view-point of the dreamer." Relatives in the dream
generally play the rôle of genitals. Not to be able to catch up with a wagon
is interpreted by Stekel as regret not to be able to come up to a difference in
age. Baggage with which one travels is the burden of sin by which one is
oppressed. Also numbers, which frequently occur in the dream, are assigned
by Stekel a fixed symbolical meaning, but these interpretations seem neither
sufficiently verified nor of general validity, although the interpretation in
individual cases can generally be recognized as probable. In a recently
published book by W. Stekel, Die Sprache des Traumes, which I was unable
to utilize, there is a list of the most common sexual symbols, the object of
which is to prove that all sexual symbols can be bisexually used. He states:
"Is there a symbol which (if in any way permitted by the phantasy) may not
be used simultaneously in the masculine and the feminine sense!" To be
sure the clause in parentheses takes away much of the absoluteness of this
assertion, for this is not at all permitted by the phantasy. I do not, however,
think it superfluous to state that in my experience Stekel's general statement
has to give way to the recognition of a greater manifoldness. Besides those
symbols, which are just as frequent for the male as for the female genitals,
there are others which preponderately, or almost exclusively, designate one
of the sexes, and there are still others of which only the male or only the

female signification is known. To use long, firm objects and weapons as
symbols of the female genitals, or hollow objects (chests, pouches, &c.), as
symbols of the male genitals, is indeed not allowed by the fancy.
It is true that the tendency of the dream and the unconscious fancy to utilize
the sexual symbol bisexually betrays an archaic trend, for in childhood a
difference in the genitals is unknown, and the same genitals are attributed to
both sexes.
These very incomplete suggestions may suffice to stimulate others to make
a more careful collection.
I shall now add a few examples of the application of such symbolisms in
dreams, which will serve to show how impossible it becomes to interpret a
dream without taking into account the symbolism of dreams, and how
imperatively it obtrudes itself in many cases.
1. The hat as a symbol of the man (of the male genital): (a fragment from
the dream of a young woman who suffered from agoraphobia on account of
a fear of temptation).
"I am walking in the street in summer, I wear a straw hat of peculiar shape,
the middle piece of which is bent upwards and the side pieces of which
hang downwards (the description became here obstructed), and in such a
fashion that one is lower than the other. I am cheerful and in a confidential
mood, and as I pass a troop of young officers I think to myself: None of you
can have any designs upon me."
As she could produce no associations to the hat, I said to her: "The hat is
really a male genital, with its raised middle piece and the two downward
hanging side pieces." I intentionally refrained from interpreting those
details concerning the unequal downward hanging of the two side pieces,
although just such individualities in the determinations lead the way to the
interpretation. I continued by saying that if she only had a man with such a
virile genital she would not have to fear the officers—that is, she would
have nothing to wish from them, for she is mainly kept from going without
protection and company by her fancies of temptation. This last explanation

of her fear I had already been able to give her repeatedly on the basis of
other material.
It is quite remarkable how the dreamer behaved after this interpretation. She
withdrew her description of the hat, and claimed not to have said that the
two side pieces were hanging downwards. I was, however, too sure of what
I had heard to allow myself to be misled, and I persisted in it. She was quiet
for a while, and then found the courage to ask why it was that one of her
husband's testicles was lower than the other, and whether it was the same in
all men. With this the peculiar detail of the hat was explained, and the
whole interpretation was accepted by her. The hat symbol was familiar to
me long before the patient related this dream. From other but less
transparent cases I believe that the hat may also be taken as a female
genital.
2. The little one as the genital—to be run over as a symbol of sexual
intercourse (another dream of the same agoraphobic patient).
"Her mother sends away her little daughter so that she must go alone. She
rides with her mother to the railroad and sees her little one walking directly
upon the tracks, so that she cannot avoid being run over. She hears the
bones crackle. (From this she experiences a feeling of discomfort but no
real horror.) She then looks out through the car window to see whether the
parts cannot be seen behind. She then reproaches her mother for allowing
the little one to go out alone." Analysis. It is not an easy matter to give here
a complete interpretation of the dream. It forms part of a cycle of dreams,
and can be fully understood only in connection with the others. For it is not
easy to get the necessary material sufficiently isolated to prove the
symbolism. The patient at first finds that the railroad journey is to be
interpreted historically as an allusion to a departure from a sanatorium for
nervous diseases, with the superintendent of which she naturally was in
love. Her mother took her away from this place, and the physician came to
the railroad station and handed her a bouquet of flowers on leaving; she felt
uncomfortable because her mother witnessed this homage. Here the mother,
therefore, appears as a disturber of her love affairs, which is the rôle
actually played by this strict woman during her daughter's girlhood. The
next thought referred to the sentence: "She then looks to see whether the

parts can be seen behind." In the dream façade one would naturally be
compelled to think of the parts of the little daughter run over and ground up.
The thought, however, turns in quite a different direction. She recalls that
she once saw her father in the bath-room naked from behind; she then
begins to talk about the sex differentiation, and asserts that in the man the
genitals can be seen from behind, but in the woman they cannot. In this
connection she now herself offers the interpretation that the little one is the
genital, her little one (she has a four-year-old daughter) her own genital.
She reproaches her mother for wanting her to live as though she had no
genital, and recognizes this reproach in the introductory sentence of the
dream; the mother sends away her little one so that she must go alone. In
her phantasy going alone on the street signifies to have no man and no
sexual relations (coire = to go together), and this she does not like.
According to all her statements she really suffered as a girl on account of
the jealousy of her mother, because she showed a preference for her father.
The "little one" has been noted as a symbol for the male or the female
genitals by Stekel, who can refer in this connection to a very widespread
usage of language.
The deeper interpretation of this dream depends upon another dream of the
same night in which the dreamer identifies herself with her brother. She was
a "tomboy," and was always being told that she should have been born a
boy. This identification with the brother shows with special clearness that
"the little one" signifies the genital. The mother threatened him (her) with
castration, which could only be understood as a punishment for playing
with the parts, and the identification, therefore, shows that she herself had
masturbated as a child, though this fact she now retained only in memory
concerning her brother. An early knowledge of the male genital which she
later lost she must have acquired at that time according to the assertions of
this second dream. Moreover the second dream points to the infantile sexual
theory that girls originate from boys through castration. After I had told her
of this childish belief, she at once confirmed it with an anecdote in which
the boy asks the girl: "Was it cut off?" to which the girl replied, "No, it's
always been so."

The sending away of the little one, of the genital, in the first dream
therefore also refers to the threatened castration. Finally she blames her
mother for not having been born a boy.
That "being run over" symbolizes sexual intercourse would not be evident
from this dream if we were not sure of it from many other sources.
3. Representation of the genital by structures, stairways, and shafts. (Dream
of a young man inhibited by a father complex.)
"He is taking a walk with his father in a place which is surely the Prater, for
the Rotunda may be seen in front of which there is a small front structure to
which is attached a captive balloon; the balloon, however, seems quite
collapsed. His father asks him what this is all for; he is surprised at it, but
he explains it to his father. They come into a court in which lies a large
sheet of tin. His father wants to pull off a big piece of this, but first looks
around to see if any one is watching. He tells his father that all he needs to
do is to speak to the watchman, and then he can take without any further
difficulty as much as he wants to. From this court a stairway leads down
into a shaft, the walls of which are softly upholstered something like a
leather pocketbook. At the end of this shaft there is a longer platform, and
then a new shaft begins...."
Analysis. This dream belongs to a type of patient which is not favorable
from a therapeutic point of view. They follow in the analysis without
offering any resistances whatever up to a certain point, but from that point
on they remain almost inaccessible. This dream he almost analyzed himself.
"The Rotunda," he said, "is my genital, the captive balloon in front is my
penis, about the weakness of which I have worried." We must, however,
interpret in greater detail; the Rotunda is the buttock which is regularly
associated by the child with the genital, the smaller front structure is the
scrotum. In the dream his father asks him what this is all for—that is, he
asks him about the purpose and arrangement of the genitals. It is quite
evident that this state of affairs should be turned around, and that he should
be the questioner. As such a questioning on the side of the father has never
taken place in reality, we must conceive the dream thought as a wish, or
take it conditionally, as follows: "If I had only asked my father for sexual

enlightenment." The continuation of this thought we shall soon find in
another place.
The court in which the tin sheet is spread out is not to be conceived
symbolically in the first instance, but originates from his father's place of
business. For discretionary reasons I have inserted the tin for another
material in which the father deals, without, however, changing anything in
the verbal expression of the dream. The dreamer had entered his father's
business, and had taken a terrible dislike to the questionable practices upon
which profit mainly depends. Hence the continuation of the above dream
thought ("if I had only asked him") would be: "He would have deceived me
just as he does his customers." For the pulling off, which serves to represent
commercial dishonesty, the dreamer himself gives a second explanation—
namely, onanism. This is not only entirely familiar to us, but agrees very
well with the fact that the secrecy of onanism is expressed by its opposite
("Why one can do it quite openly"). It, moreover, agrees entirely with our
expectations that the onanistic activity is again put off on the father, just as
was the questioning in the first scene of the dream. The shaft he at once
interprets as the vagina by referring to the soft upholstering of the walls.
That the act of coition in the vagina is described as a going down instead of
in the usual way as a going up, I have also found true in other instances2.
The details that at the end of the first shaft there is a longer platform and
then a new shaft, he himself explains biographically. He had for some time
consorted with women sexually, but had then given it up because of
inhibitions and now hopes to be able to take it up again with the aid of the
treatment. The dream, however, becomes indistinct toward the end, and to
the experienced interpreter it becomes evident that in the second scene of
the dream the influence of another subject has begun to assert itself; in this
his father's business and his dishonest practices signify the first vagina
represented as a shaft so that one might think of a reference to the mother.
4. The male genital symbolized by persons and the female by a landscape.
(Dream of a woman of the lower class, whose husband is a policeman,
reported by B. Dattner.)

... Then some one broke into the house and anxiously called for a
policeman. But he went with two tramps by mutual consent into a church,3
to which led a great many stairs;4 behind the church there was a mountain,5
on top of which a dense forest.6 The policeman was furnished with a
helmet, a gorget, and a cloak.7 The two vagrants, who went along with the
policeman quite peaceably, had tied to their loins sack-like aprons.8 A road
led from the church to the mountain. This road was overgrown on each side
with grass and brushwood, which became thicker and thicker as it reached
the height of the mountain, where it spread out into quite a forest.
5. A stairway dream.
(Reported and interpreted by Otto Rank.)
For the following transparent pollution dream, I am indebted to the same
colleague who furnished us with the dental-irritation dream.
"I am running down the stairway in the stair-house after a little girl, whom I
wish to punish because she has done something to me. At the bottom of the
stairs some one held the child for me. (A grown-up woman?) I grasp it, but
do not know whether I have hit it, for I suddenly find myself in the middle
of the stairway where I practice coitus with the child (in the air as it were).
It is really no coitus, I only rub my genital on her external genital, and in
doing this I see it very distinctly, as distinctly as I see her head which is
lying sideways. During the sexual act I see hanging to the left and above me
(also as if in the air) two small pictures, landscapes, representing a house on
a green. On the smaller one my surname stood in the place where the
painter's signature should be; it seemed to be intended for my birthday
present. A small sign hung in front of the pictures to the effect that cheaper
pictures could also be obtained. I then see myself very indistinctly lying in
bed, just as I had seen myself at the foot of the stairs, and I am awakened by
a feeling of dampness which came from the pollution."
Interpretation. The dreamer had been in a book-store on the evening of the
day of the dream, where, while he was waiting, he examined some pictures
which were exhibited, which represented motives similar to the dream
pictures. He stepped nearer to a small picture which particularly took his

fancy in order to see the name of the artist, which, however, was quite
unknown to him.
Later in the same evening, in company, he heard about a Bohemian servantgirl who boasted that her illegitimate child "was made on the stairs." The
dreamer inquired about the details of this unusual occurrence, and learned
that the servant-girl went with her lover to the home of her parents, where
there was no opportunity for sexual relations, and that the excited man
performed the act on the stairs. In witty allusion to the mischievous
expression used about wine-adulterers, the dreamer remarked, "The child
really grew on the cellar steps."
These experiences of the day, which are quite prominent in the dream
content, were readily reproduced by the dreamer. But he just as readily
reproduced an old fragment of infantile recollection which was also utilized
by the dream. The stair-house was the house in which he had spent the
greatest part of his childhood, and in which he had first become acquainted
with sexual problems. In this house he used, among other things, to slide
down the banister astride which caused him to become sexually excited. In
the dream he also comes down the stairs very rapidly—so rapidly that,
according to his own distinct assertions, he hardly touched the individual
stairs, but rather "flew" or "slid down," as we used to say. Upon reference to
this infantile experience, the beginning of the dream seems to represent the
factor of sexual excitement. In the same house and in the adjacent residence
the dreamer used to play pugnacious games with the neighboring children,
in which he satisfied himself just as he did in the dream.
If one recalls from Freud's investigation of sexual symbolism9 that in the
dream stairs or climbing stairs almost regularly symbolizes coitus, the
dream becomes clear. Its motive power as well as its effect, as is shown by
the pollution, is of a purely libidinous nature. Sexual excitement became
aroused during the sleeping state (in the dream this is represented by the
rapid running or sliding down the stairs) and the sadistic thread in this is, on
the basis of the pugnacious playing, indicated in the pursuing and
overcoming of the child. The libidinous excitement becomes enhanced and
urges to sexual action (represented in the dream by the grasping of the child
and the conveyance of it to the middle of the stairway). Up to this point the

dream would be one of pure, sexual symbolism, and obscure for the
unpracticed dream interpreter. But this symbolic gratification, which would
have insured undisturbed sleep, was not sufficient for the powerful
libidinous excitement. The excitement leads to an orgasm, and thus the
whole stairway symbolism is unmasked as a substitute for coitus. Freud
lays stress on the rhythmical character of both actions as one of the reasons
for the sexual utilization of the stairway symbolism, and this dream
especially seems to corroborate this, for, according to the express assertion
of the dreamer, the rhythm of a sexual act was the most pronounced feature
in the whole dream.
Still another remark concerning the two pictures, which, aside from their
real significance, also have the value of "Weibsbilder" (literally womanpictures, but idiomatically women). This is at once shown by the fact that
the dream deals with a big and a little picture, just as the dream content
presents a big (grown up) and a little girl. That cheap pictures could also be
obtained points to the prostitution complex, just as the dreamer's surname
on the little picture and the thought that it was intended for his birthday,
point to the parent complex (to be born on the stairway—to be conceived in
coitus).
The indistinct final scene, in which the dreamer sees himself on the
staircase landing lying in bed and feeling wet, seems to go back into
childhood even beyond the infantile onanism, and manifestly has its
prototype in similarly pleasurable scenes of bed-wetting.
6. A modified stair-dream.
To one of my very nervous patients, who was an abstainer, whose fancy was
fixed on his mother, and who repeatedly dreamed of climbing stairs
accompanied by his mother, I once remarked that moderate masturbation
would be less harmful to him than enforced abstinence. This influence
provoked the following dream:
"His piano teacher reproaches him for neglecting his piano-playing, and for
not practicing the Etudes of Moscheles and Clementi's Gradus ad
Parnassum." In relation to this he remarked that the Gradus is only a
stairway, and that the piano itself is only a stairway as it has a scale.

It is correct to say that there is no series of associations which cannot be
adapted to the representation of sexual facts. I conclude with the dream of a
chemist, a young man, who has been trying to give up his habit of
masturbation by replacing it with intercourse with women.
Preliminary statement.—On the day before the dream he had given a
student instruction concerning Grignard's reaction, in which magnesium is
to be dissolved in absolutely pure ether under the catalytic influence of
iodine. Two days before, there had been an explosion in the course of the
same reaction, in which the investigator had burned his hand.
Dream I. He is to make phenylmagnesium-bromid; he sees the apparatus
with particular clearness, but he has substituted himself for the magnesium.
He is now in a curious swaying attitude. He keeps repeating to himself,
"This is the right thing, it is working, my feet are beginning to dissolve and
my knees are getting soft." Then he reaches down and feels for his feet, and
meanwhile (he does not know how) he takes his legs out of the crucible, and
then again he says to himself, "That cannot be.... Yes, it must be so, it has
been done correctly." Then he partially awakens, and repeats the dream to
himself, because he wants to tell it to me. He is distinctly afraid of the
analysis of the dream. He is much excited during this semi-sleeping state,
and repeats continually, "Phenyl, phenyl."
II. He is in ....ing with his whole family; at half-past eleven. He is to be at
the Schottenthor for a rendezvous with a certain lady, but he does not wake
up until half-past eleven. He says to himself, "It is too late now; when you
get there it will be half-past twelve." The next instant he sees the whole
family gathered about the table—his mother and the servant girl with the
soup-tureen with particular clearness. Then he says to himself, "Well, if we
are eating already, I certainly can't get away."
Analysis: He feels sure that even the first dream contains a reference to the
lady whom he is to meet at the rendezvous (the dream was dreamed during
the night before the expected meeting). The student to whom he gave the
instruction is a particularly unpleasant fellow; he had said to the chemist:
"That isn't right," because the magnesium was still unaffected, and the latter
answered as though he did not care anything about it: "It certainly isn't
right." He himself must be this student; he is as indifferent towards his

analysis as the student is towards his synthesis; the He in the dream,
however, who accomplishes the operation, is myself. How unpleasant he
must seem to me with his indifference towards the success achieved!
Moreover, he is the material with which the analysis (synthesis) is made.
For it is a question of the success of the treatment. The legs in the dream
recall an impression of the previous evening. He met a lady at a dancing
lesson whom he wished to conquer; he pressed her to him so closely that
she once cried out. After he had stopped pressing against her legs, he felt
her firm responding pressure against his lower thighs as far as just above his
knees, at the place mentioned in the dream. In this situation, then, the
woman is the magnesium in the retort, which is at last working. He is
feminine towards me, as he is masculine towards the woman. If it will work
with the woman, the treatment will also work. Feeling and becoming aware
of himself in the region of his knees refers to masturbation, and corresponds
to his fatigue of the previous day.... The rendezvous had actually been set
for half-past eleven. His wish to oversleep and to remain with his usual
sexual objects (that is, with masturbation) corresponds with his resistance.
Footnote 1: It is only of late that I have learned to value the significance of fancies and unconscious
thoughts about life in the womb. They contain the explanation of the curious fear felt by so many
people of being buried alive, as well as the profoundest unconscious reason for the belief in a life
after death which represents nothing but a projection into the future of this mysterious life before
birth. The act of birth, moreover, is the first experience with fear, and is thus the source and model of
the emotion of fear.
Footnote 2: Cf. Zentralblatt für psychoanalyse, I.
Footnote 3: Or chapel—vagina.
Footnote 4: Symbol of coitus.
Footnote 5: Mons veneris.
Footnote 6: Crines pubis.
Footnote 7: Demons in cloaks and capucines are, according to the explanation of a man versed in the
subject, of a phallic nature.
Footnote 8: The two halves of the scrotum.
Footnote 9: See Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, vol. i., p. 2.

VI
THE WISH IN DREAMS
That the dream should be nothing but a wish-fulfillment surely seemed
strange to us all—and that not alone because of the contradictions offered
by the anxiety dream.
After learning from the first analytical explanations that the dream conceals
sense and psychic validity, we could hardly expect so simple a
determination of this sense. According to the correct but concise definition
of Aristotle, the dream is a continuation of thinking in sleep (in so far as
one sleeps). Considering that during the day our thoughts produce such a
diversity of psychic acts—judgments, conclusions, contradictions,
expectations, intentions, &c.—why should our sleeping thoughts be forced
to confine themselves to the production of wishes? Are there not, on the
contrary, many dreams that present a different psychic act in dream form,
e.g., a solicitude, and is not the very transparent father's dream mentioned
above of just such a nature? From the gleam of light falling into his eyes
while asleep the father draws the solicitous conclusion that a candle has
been upset and may have set fire to the corpse; he transforms this
conclusion into a dream by investing it with a senseful situation enacted in
the present tense. What part is played in this dream by the wish-fulfillment,
and which are we to suspect—the predominance of the thought continued
from, the waking state or of the thought incited by the new sensory
impression?
All these considerations are just, and force us to enter more deeply into the
part played by the wish-fulfillment in the dream, and into the significance
of the waking thoughts continued in sleep.
It is in fact the wish-fulfillment that has already induced us to separate
dreams into two groups. We have found some dreams that were plainly
wish-fulfillments; and others in which wish-fulfillment could not be
recognized, and was frequently concealed by every available means. In this

latter class of dreams we recognized the influence of the dream censor. The
undisguised wish dreams were chiefly found in children, yet fleeting openhearted wish dreams seemed (I purposely emphasize this word) to occur
also in adults.
We may now ask whence the wish fulfilled in the dream originates. But to
what opposition or to what diversity do we refer this "whence"? I think it is
to the opposition between conscious daily life and a psychic activity
remaining unconscious which can only make itself noticeable during the
night. I thus find a threefold possibility for the origin of a wish. Firstly, it
may have been incited during the day, and owing to external circumstances
failed to find gratification, there is thus left for the night an acknowledged
but unfulfilled wish. Secondly, it may come to the surface during the day
but be rejected, leaving an unfulfilled but suppressed wish. Or, thirdly, it
may have no relation to daily life, and belong to those wishes that originate
during the night from the suppression. If we now follow our scheme of the
psychic apparatus, we can localize a wish of the first order in the system
Forec. We may assume that a wish of the second order has been forced back
from the Forec. system into the Unc. system, where alone, if anywhere, it
can maintain itself; while a wish-feeling of the third order we consider
altogether incapable of leaving the Unc. system. This brings up the question
whether wishes arising from these different sources possess the same value
for the dream, and whether they have the same power to incite a dream.
On reviewing the dreams which we have at our disposal for answering this
question, we are at once moved to add as a fourth source of the dream-wish
the actual wish incitements arising during the night, such as thirst and
sexual desire. It then becomes evident that the source of the dream-wish
does not affect its capacity to incite a dream. That a wish suppressed during
the day asserts itself in the dream can be shown by a great many examples.
I shall mention a very simple example of this class. A somewhat sarcastic
young lady, whose younger friend has become engaged to be married, is
asked throughout the day by her acquaintances whether she knows and what
she thinks of the fiancé. She answers with unqualified praise, thereby
silencing her own judgment, as she would prefer to tell the truth, namely,
that he is an ordinary person. The following night she dreams that the same
question is put to her, and that she replies with the formula: "In case of

subsequent orders it will suffice to mention the number." Finally, we have
learned from numerous analyses that the wish in all dreams that have been
subject to distortion has been derived from the unconscious, and has been
unable to come to perception in the waking state. Thus it would appear that
all wishes are of the same value and force for the dream formation.
I am at present unable to prove that the state of affairs is really different, but
I am strongly inclined to assume a more stringent determination of the
dream-wish. Children's dreams leave no doubt that an unfulfilled wish of
the day may be the instigator of the dream. But we must not forget that it is,
after all, the wish of a child, that it is a wish-feeling of infantile strength
only. I have a strong doubt whether an unfulfilled wish from the day would
suffice to create a dream in an adult. It would rather seem that as we learn
to control our impulses by intellectual activity, we more and more reject as
vain the formation or retention of such intense wishes as are natural to
childhood. In this, indeed, there may be individual variations; some retain
the infantile type of psychic processes longer than others. The differences
are here the same as those found in the gradual decline of the originally
distinct visual imagination.
In general, however, I am of the opinion that unfulfilled wishes of the day
are insufficient to produce a dream in adults. I readily admit that the wish
instigators originating in conscious like contribute towards the incitement of
dreams, but that is probably all. The dream would not originate if the
foreconscious wish were not reinforced from another source.
That source is the unconscious. I believe that the conscious wish is a dream
inciter only if it succeeds in arousing a similar unconscious wish which
reinforces it. Following the suggestions obtained through the
psychoanalysis of the neuroses, I believe that these unconscious wishes are
always active and ready for expression whenever they find an opportunity
to unite themselves with an emotion from conscious life, and that they
transfer their greater intensity to the lesser intensity of the latter.1 It may
therefore seem that the conscious wish alone has been realized in a dream;
but a slight peculiarity in the formation of this dream will put us on the
track of the powerful helper from the unconscious. These ever active and,
as it were, immortal wishes from the unconscious recall the legendary

Titans who from time immemorial have borne the ponderous mountains
which were once rolled upon them by the victorious gods, and which even
now quiver from time to time from the convulsions of their mighty limbs; I
say that these wishes found in the repression are of themselves of an
infantile origin, as we have learned from the psychological investigation of
the neuroses. I should like, therefore, to withdraw the opinion previously
expressed that it is unimportant whence the dream-wish originates, and
replace it by another, as follows: The wish manifested in the dream must be
an infantile one. In the adult it originates in the Unc., while in the child,
where no separation and censor as yet exist between Forec. and Unc., or
where these are only in the process of formation, it is an unfulfilled and
unrepressed wish from the waking state. I am aware that this conception
cannot be generally demonstrated, but I maintain nevertheless that it can be
frequently demonstrated, even when it was not suspected, and that it cannot
be generally refuted.
The wish-feelings which remain from the conscious waking state are,
therefore, relegated to the background in the dream formation. In the dream
content I shall attribute to them only the part attributed to the material of
actual sensations during sleep. If I now take into account those other
psychic instigations remaining from the waking state which are not wishes,
I shall only adhere to the line mapped out for me by this train of thought.
We may succeed in provisionally terminating the sum of energy of our
waking thoughts by deciding to go to sleep. He is a good sleeper who can
do this; Napoleon I. is reputed to have been a model of this sort. But we do
not always succeed in accomplishing it, or in accomplishing it perfectly.
Unsolved problems, harassing cares, overwhelming impressions continue
the thinking activity even during sleep, maintaining psychic processes in the
system which we have termed the foreconscious. These mental processes
continuing into sleep may be divided into the following groups: 1, That
which has not been terminated during the day owing to casual prevention;
2, that which has been left unfinished by temporary paralysis of our mental
power, i.e. the unsolved; 3, that which has been rejected and suppressed
during the day. This unites with a powerful group (4) formed by that which
has been excited in our Unc. during the day by the work of the
foreconscious. Finally, we may add group (5) consisting of the indifferent
and hence unsettled impressions of the day.

We should not underrate the psychic intensities introduced into sleep by
these remnants of waking life, especially those emanating from the group of
the unsolved. These excitations surely continue to strive for expression
during the night, and we may assume with equal certainty that the sleeping
state renders impossible the usual continuation of the excitement in the
foreconscious and the termination of the excitement by its becoming
conscious. As far as we can normally become conscious of our mental
processes, even during the night, in so far we are not asleep. I shall not
venture to state what change is produced in the Forec. system by the
sleeping state, but there is no doubt that the psychological character of sleep
is essentially due to the change of energy in this very system, which also
dominates the approach to motility, which is paralyzed during sleep. In
contradistinction to this, there seems to be nothing in the psychology of the
dream to warrant the assumption that sleep produces any but secondary
changes in the conditions of the Unc. system. Hence, for the nocturnal
excitation in the Force, there remains no other path than that followed by
the wish excitements from the Unc. This excitation must seek reinforcement
from the Unc., and follow the detours of the unconscious excitations. But
what is the relation of the foreconscious day remnants to the dream? There
is no doubt that they penetrate abundantly into the dream, that they utilize
the dream content to obtrude themselves upon consciousness even during
the night; indeed, they occasionally even dominate the dream content, and
impel it to continue the work of the day; it is also certain that the day
remnants may just as well have any other character as that of wishes; but it
is highly instructive and even decisive for the theory of wish-fulfillment to
see what conditions they must comply with in order to be received into the
dream.
Let us pick out one of the dreams cited above as examples, e.g., the dream
in which my friend Otto seems to show the symptoms of Basedow's
disease. My friend Otto's appearance occasioned me some concern during
the day, and this worry, like everything else referring to this person, affected
me. I may also assume that these feelings followed me into sleep. I was
probably bent on finding out what was the matter with him. In the night my
worry found expression in the dream which I have reported, the content of
which was not only senseless, but failed to show any wish-fulfillment. But I
began to investigate for the source of this incongruous expression of the

solicitude felt during the day, and analysis revealed the connection. I
identified my friend Otto with a certain Baron L. and myself with a
Professor R. There was only one explanation for my being impelled to
select just this substitution for the day thought. I must have always been
prepared in the Unc. to identify myself with Professor R., as it meant the
realization of one of the immortal infantile wishes, viz. that of becoming
great. Repulsive ideas respecting my friend, that would certainly have been
repudiated in a waking state, took advantage of the opportunity to creep into
the dream, but the worry of the day likewise found some form of expression
through a substitution in the dream content. The day thought, which was no
wish in itself but rather a worry, had in some way to find a connection with
the infantile now unconscious and suppressed wish, which then allowed it,
though already properly prepared, to "originate" for consciousness. The
more dominating this worry, the stronger must be the connection to be
established; between the contents of the wish and that of the worry there
need be no connection, nor was there one in any of our examples.
We can now sharply define the significance of the unconscious wish for the
dream. It may be admitted that there is a whole class of dreams in which the
incitement originates preponderatingly or even exclusively from the
remnants of daily life; and I believe that even my cherished desire to
become at some future time a "professor extraordinarius" would have
allowed me to slumber undisturbed that night had not my worry about my
friend's health been still active. But this worry alone would not have
produced a dream; the motive power needed by the dream had to be
contributed by a wish, and it was the affair of the worriment to procure for
itself such wish as a motive power of the dream. To speak figuratively, it is
quite possible that a day thought plays the part of the contractor
(entrepreneur) in the dream. But it is known that no matter what idea the
contractor may have in mind, and how desirous he may be of putting it into
operation, he can do nothing without capital; he must depend upon a
capitalist to defray the necessary expenses, and this capitalist, who supplies
the psychic expenditure for the dream is invariably and indisputably a wish
from the unconscious, no matter what the nature of the waking thought may
be.

In other cases the capitalist himself is the contractor for the dream; this,
indeed, seems to be the more usual case. An unconscious wish is produced
by the day's work, which in turn creates the dream. The dream processes,
moreover, run parallel with all the other possibilities of the economic
relationship used here as an illustration. Thus, the entrepreneur may
contribute some capital himself, or several entrepreneurs may seek the aid
of the same capitalist, or several capitalists may jointly supply the capital
required by the entrepreneur. Thus there are dreams produced by more than
one dream-wish, and many similar variations which may readily be passed
over and are of no further interest to us. What we have left unfinished in
this discussion of the dream-wish we shall be able to develop later.
The "tertium comparationis" in the comparisons just employed—i.e. the
sum placed at our free disposal in proper allotment—admits of still finer
application for the illustration of the dream structure. We can recognize in
most dreams a center especially supplied with perceptible intensity. This is
regularly the direct representation of the wish-fulfillment; for, if we undo
the displacements of the dream-work by a process of retrogression, we find
that the psychic intensity of the elements in the dream thoughts is replaced
by the perceptible intensity of the elements in the dream content. The
elements adjoining the wish-fulfillment have frequently nothing to do with
its sense, but prove to be descendants of painful thoughts which oppose the
wish. But, owing to their frequently artificial connection with the central
element, they have acquired sufficient intensity to enable them to come to
expression. Thus, the force of expression of the wish-fulfillment is diffused
over a certain sphere of association, within which it raises to expression all
elements, including those that are in themselves impotent. In dreams having
several strong wishes we can readily separate from one another the spheres
of the individual wish-fulfillments; the gaps in the dream likewise can often
be explained as boundary zones.
Although the foregoing remarks have considerably limited the significance
of the day remnants for the dream, it will nevertheless be worth our while to
give them some attention. For they must be a necessary ingredient in the
formation of the dream, inasmuch as experience reveals the surprising fact
that every dream shows in its content a connection with some impression of
a recent day, often of the most indifferent kind. So far we have failed to see

any necessity for this addition to the dream mixture. This necessity appears
only when we follow closely the part played by the unconscious wish, and
then seek information in the psychology of the neuroses. We thus learn that
the unconscious idea, as such, is altogether incapable of entering into the
foreconscious, and that it can exert an influence there only by uniting with a
harmless idea already belonging to the foreconscious, to which it transfers
its intensity and under which it allows itself to be concealed. This is the fact
of transference which furnishes an explanation for so many surprising
occurrences in the psychic life of neurotics.
The idea from the foreconscious which thus obtains an unmerited
abundance of intensity may be left unchanged by the transference, or it may
have forced upon it a modification from the content of the transferring idea.
I trust the reader will pardon my fondness for comparisons from daily life,
but I feel tempted to say that the relations existing for the repressed idea are
similar to the situations existing in Austria for the American dentist, who is
forbidden to practise unless he gets permission from a regular physician to
use his name on the public signboard and thus cover the legal requirements.
Moreover, just as it is naturally not the busiest physicians who form such
alliances with dental practitioners, so in the psychic life only such
foreconscious or conscious ideas are chosen to cover a repressed idea as
have not themselves attracted much of the attention which is operative in
the foreconscious. The unconscious entangles with its connections
preferentially either those impressions and ideas of the foreconscious which
have been left unnoticed as indifferent, or those that have soon been
deprived of this attention through rejection. It is a familiar fact from the
association studies confirmed by every experience, that ideas which have
formed intimate connections in one direction assume an almost negative
attitude to whole groups of new connections. I once tried from this principle
to develop a theory for hysterical paralysis.
If we assume that the same need for the transference of the repressed ideas
which we have learned to know from the analysis of the neuroses makes its
influence felt in the dream as well, we can at once explain two riddles of the
dream, viz. that every dream analysis shows an interweaving of a recent
impression, and that this recent element is frequently of the most indifferent
character. We may add what we have already learned elsewhere, that these

recent and indifferent elements come so frequently into the dream content
as a substitute for the most deep-lying of the dream thoughts, for the further
reason that they have least to fear from the resisting censor. But while this
freedom from censorship explains only the preference for trivial elements,
the constant presence of recent elements points to the fact that there is a
need for transference. Both groups of impressions satisfy the demand of the
repression for material still free from associations, the indifferent ones
because they have offered no inducement for extensive associations, and the
recent ones because they have had insufficient time to form such
associations.
We thus see that the day remnants, among which we may now include the
indifferent impressions when they participate in the dream formation, not
only borrow from the Unc. the motive power at the disposal of the
repressed wish, but also offer to the unconscious something indispensable,
namely, the attachment necessary to the transference. If we here attempted
to penetrate more deeply into the psychic processes, we should first have to
throw more light on the play of emotions between the foreconscious and the
unconscious, to which, indeed, we are urged by the study of the
psychoneuroses, whereas the dream itself offers no assistance in this
respect.
Just one further remark about the day remnants. There is no doubt that they
are the actual disturbers of sleep, and not the dream, which, on the contrary,
strives to guard sleep. But we shall return to this point later.
We have so far discussed the dream-wish, we have traced it to the sphere of
the Unc., and analyzed its relations to the day remnants, which in turn may
be either wishes, psychic emotions of any other kind, or simply recent
impressions. We have thus made room for any claims that may be made for
the importance of conscious thought activity in dream formations in all its
variations. Relying upon our thought series, it would not be at all
impossible for us to explain even those extreme cases in which the dream as
a continuer of the day work brings to a happy conclusion and unsolved
problem possess an example, the analysis of which might reveal the
infantile or repressed wish source furnishing such alliance and successful
strengthening of the efforts of the foreconscious activity. But we have not

come one step nearer a solution of the riddle: Why can the unconscious
furnish the motive power for the wish-fulfillment only during sleep? The
answer to this question must throw light on the psychic nature of wishes;
and it will be given with the aid of the diagram of the psychic apparatus.
We do not doubt that even this apparatus attained its present perfection
through a long course of development. Let us attempt to restore it as it
existed in an early phase of its activity. From assumptions, to be confirmed
elsewhere, we know that at first the apparatus strove to keep as free from
excitement as possible, and in its first formation, therefore, the scheme took
the form of a reflex apparatus, which enabled it promptly to discharge
through the motor tracts any sensible stimulus reaching it from without. But
this simple function was disturbed by the wants of life, which likewise
furnish the impulse for the further development of the apparatus. The wants
of life first manifested themselves to it in the form of the great physical
needs. The excitement aroused by the inner want seeks an outlet in motility,
which may be designated as "inner changes" or as an "expression of the
emotions." The hungry child cries or fidgets helplessly, but its situation
remains unchanged; for the excitation proceeding from an inner want
requires, not a momentary outbreak, but a force working continuously. A
change can occur only if in some way a feeling of gratification is
experienced—which in the case of the child must be through outside help—
in order to remove the inner excitement. An essential constituent of this
experience is the appearance of a certain perception (of food in our
example), the memory picture of which thereafter remains associated with
the memory trace of the excitation of want.
Thanks to the established connection, there results at the next appearance of
this want a psychic feeling which revives the memory picture of the former
perception, and thus recalls the former perception itself, i.e. it actually reestablishes the situation of the first gratification. We call such a feeling a
wish; the reappearance of the perception constitutes the wish-fulfillment,
and the full revival of the perception by the want excitement constitutes the
shortest road to the wish-fulfillment. We may assume a primitive condition
of the psychic apparatus in which this road is really followed, i.e. where the
wishing merges into an hallucination, This first psychic activity therefore

aims at an identity of perception, i.e. it aims at a repetition of that
perception which is connected with the fulfillment of the want.
This primitive mental activity must have been modified by bitter practical
experience into a more expedient secondary activity. The establishment of
the identity perception on the short regressive road within the apparatus
does not in another respect carry with it the result which inevitably follows
the revival of the same perception from without. The gratification does not
take place, and the want continues. In order to equalize the internal with the
external sum of energy, the former must be continually maintained, just as
actually happens in the hallucinatory psychoses and in the deliriums of
hunger which exhaust their psychic capacity in clinging to the object
desired. In order to make more appropriate use of the psychic force, it
becomes necessary to inhibit the full regression so as to prevent it from
extending beyond the image of memory, whence it can select other paths
leading ultimately to the establishment of the desired identity from the outer
world. This inhibition and consequent deviation from the excitation
becomes the task of a second system which dominates the voluntary
motility, i.e. through whose activity the expenditure of motility is now
devoted to previously recalled purposes. But this entire complicated mental
activity which works its way from the memory picture to the establishment
of the perception identity from the outer world merely represents a detour
which has been forced upon the wish-fulfillment by experience.2 Thinking
is indeed nothing but the equivalent of the hallucinatory wish; and if the
dream be called a wish-fulfillment this becomes self-evident, as nothing but
a wish can impel our psychic apparatus to activity. The dream, which in
fulfilling its wishes follows the short regressive path, thereby preserves for
us only an example of the primary form of the psychic apparatus which has
been abandoned as inexpedient. What once ruled in the waking state when
the psychic life was still young and unfit seems to have been banished into
the sleeping state, just as we see again in the nursery the bow and arrow, the
discarded primitive weapons of grown-up humanity. The dream is a
fragment of the abandoned psychic life of the child. In the psychoses these
modes of operation of the psychic apparatus, which are normally
suppressed in the waking state, reassert themselves, and then betray their
inability to satisfy our wants in the outer world.

The unconscious wish-feelings evidently strive to assert themselves during
the day also, and the fact of transference and the psychoses teach us that
they endeavor to penetrate to consciousness and dominate motility by the
road leading through the system of the foreconscious. It is, therefore, the
censor lying between the Unc. and the Forec., the assumption of which is
forced upon us by the dream, that we have to recognize and honor as the
guardian of our psychic health. But is it not carelessness on the part of this
guardian to diminish its vigilance during the night and to allow the
suppressed emotions of the Unc. to come to expression, thus again making
possible the hallucinatory regression? I think not, for when the critical
guardian goes to rest—and we have proof that his slumber is not profound
—he takes care to close the gate to motility. No matter what feelings from
the otherwise inhibited Unc. may roam about on the scene, they need not be
interfered with; they remain harmless because they are unable to put in
motion the motor apparatus which alone can exert a modifying influence
upon the outer world. Sleep guarantees the security of the fortress which is
under guard. Conditions are less harmless when a displacement of forces is
produced, not through a nocturnal diminution in the operation of the critical
censor, but through pathological enfeeblement of the latter or through
pathological reinforcement of the unconscious excitations, and this while
the foreconscious is charged with energy and the avenues to motility are
open. The guardian is then overpowered, the unconscious excitations
subdue the Forec.; through it they dominate our speech and actions, or they
enforce the hallucinatory regression, thus governing an apparatus not
designed for them by virtue of the attraction exerted by the perceptions on
the distribution of our psychic energy. We call this condition a psychosis.
We are now in the best position to complete our psychological construction,
which has been interrupted by the introduction of the two systems, Unc. and
Forec. We have still, however, ample reason for giving further consideration
to the wish as the sole psychic motive power in the dream. We have
explained that the reason why the dream is in every case a wish realization
is because it is a product of the Unc., which knows no other aim in its
activity but the fulfillment of wishes, and which has no other forces at its
disposal but wish-feelings. If we avail ourselves for a moment longer of the
right to elaborate from the dream interpretation such far-reaching
psychological speculations, we are in duty bound to demonstrate that we are

thereby bringing the dream into a relationship which may also comprise
other psychic structures. If there exists a system of the Unc.—or something
sufficiently analogous to it for the purpose of our discussion—the dream
cannot be its sole manifestation; every dream may be a wish-fulfillment, but
there must be other forms of abnormal wish-fulfillment beside this of
dreams. Indeed, the theory of all psychoneurotic symptoms culminates in
the proposition that they too must be taken as wish-fulfillments of the
unconscious. Our explanation makes the dream only the first member of a
group most important for the psychiatrist, an understanding of which means
the solution of the purely psychological part of the psychiatric problem. But
other members of this group of wish-fulfillments, e.g., the hysterical
symptoms, evince one essential quality which I have so far failed to find in
the dream. Thus, from the investigations frequently referred to in this
treatise, I know that the formation of an hysterical symptom necessitates the
combination of both streams of our psychic life. The symptom is not merely
the expression of a realized unconscious wish, but it must be joined by
another wish from the foreconscious which is fulfilled by the same
symptom; so that the symptom is at least doubly determined, once by each
one of the conflicting systems. Just as in the dream, there is no limit to
further over-determination. The determination not derived from the Unc. is,
as far as I can see, invariably a stream of thought in reaction against the
unconscious wish, e.g., a self-punishment. Hence I may say, in general, that
an hysterical symptom originates only where two contrasting wishfulfillments, having their source in different psychic systems, are able to
combine in one expression. (Compare my latest formulation of the origin of
the hysterical symptoms in a treatise published by the Zeitschrift für
Sexualwissenschaft, by Hirschfeld and others, 1908). Examples on this
point would prove of little value, as nothing but a complete unveiling of the
complication in question would carry conviction. I therefore content myself
with the mere assertion, and will cite an example, not for conviction but for
explication. The hysterical vomiting of a female patient proved, on the one
hand, to be the realization of an unconscious fancy from the time of
puberty, that she might be continuously pregnant and have a multitude of
children, and this was subsequently united with the wish that she might
have them from as many men as possible. Against this immoderate wish
there arose a powerful defensive impulse. But as the vomiting might spoil
the patient's figure and beauty, so that she would not find favor in the eyes

of mankind, the symptom was therefore in keeping with her punitive trend
of thought, and, being thus admissible from both sides, it was allowed to
become a reality. This is the same manner of consenting to a wishfulfillment which the queen of the Parthians chose for the triumvir Crassus.
Believing that he had undertaken the campaign out of greed for gold, she
caused molten gold to be poured into the throat of the corpse. "Now hast
thou what thou hast longed for." As yet we know of the dream only that it
expresses a wish-fulfillment of the unconscious; and apparently the
dominating foreconscious permits this only after it has subjected the wish to
some distortions. We are really in no position to demonstrate regularly a
stream of thought antagonistic to the dream-wish which is realized in the
dream as in its counterpart. Only now and then have we found in the dream
traces of reaction formations, as, for instance, the tenderness toward friend
R. in the "uncle dream." But the contribution from the foreconscious, which
is missing here, may be found in another place. While the dominating
system has withdrawn on the wish to sleep, the dream may bring to
expression with manifold distortions a wish from the Unc., and realize this
wish by producing the necessary changes of energy in the psychic
apparatus, and may finally retain it through the entire duration of sleep.3

This persistent wish to sleep on the part of the foreconscious in general
facilitates the formation of the dream. Let us refer to the dream of the father
who, by the gleam of light from the death chamber, was brought to the
conclusion that the body has been set on fire. We have shown that one of
the psychic forces decisive in causing the father to form this conclusion,
instead of being awakened by the gleam of light, was the wish to prolong
the life of the child seen in the dream by one moment. Other wishes
proceeding from the repression probably escape us, because we are unable
to analyze this dream. But as a second motive power of the dream we may
mention the father's desire to sleep, for, like the life of the child, the sleep of
the father is prolonged for a moment by the dream. The underlying motive
is: "Let the dream go on, otherwise I must wake up." As in this dream so
also in all other dreams, the wish to sleep lends its support to the
unconscious wish. We reported dreams which were apparently dreams of
convenience. But, properly speaking, all dreams may claim this designation.
The efficacy of the wish to continue to sleep is the most easily recognized
in the waking dreams, which so transform the objective sensory stimulus as
to render it compatible with the continuance of sleep; they interweave this
stimulus with the dream in order to rob it of any claims it might make as a
warning to the outer world. But this wish to continue to sleep must also
participate in the formation of all other dreams which may disturb the
sleeping state from within only. "Now, then, sleep on; why, it's but a
dream"; this is in many cases the suggestion of the Forec. to consciousness
when the dream goes too far; and this also describes in a general way the
attitude of our dominating psychic activity toward dreaming, though the
thought remains tacit. I must draw the conclusion that throughout our entire
sleeping state we are just as certain that we are dreaming as we are certain
that we are sleeping. We are compelled to disregard the objection urged
against this conclusion that our consciousness is never directed to a
knowledge of the former, and that it is directed to a knowledge of the latter
only on special occasions when the censor is unexpectedly surprised.
Against this objection we may say that there are persons who are entirely
conscious of their sleeping and dreaming, and who are apparently endowed
with the conscious faculty of guiding their dream life. Such a dreamer,
when dissatisfied with the course taken by the dream, breaks it off without
awakening, and begins it anew in order to continue it with a different turn,

like the popular author who, on request, gives a happier ending to his play.
Or, at another time, if placed by the dream in a sexually exciting situation,
he thinks in his sleep: "I do not care to continue this dream and exhaust
myself by a pollution; I prefer to defer it in favor of a real situation."
Footnote 1: They share this character of indestructibility with all psychic acts that are really
unconscious—that is, with psychic acts belonging to the system of the unconscious only. These paths
are constantly open and never fall into disuse; they conduct the discharge of the exciting process as
often as it becomes endowed with unconscious excitement To speak metaphorically they suffer the
same form of annihilation as the shades of the lower region in the Odyssey, who awoke to new life
the moment they drank blood. The processes depending on the foreconscious system are destructible
in a different way. The psychotherapy of the neuroses is based on this difference.
Footnote 2: Le Lorrain justly extols the wish-fulfilment of the dream: "Sans fatigue sérieuse, sans
être obligé de recourir à cette lutte opinâtre et longue qui use et corrode les jouissances poursuivies."
Footnote 3: This idea has been borrowed from The Theory of Sleep by Liébault, who revived
hypnotic investigation in our days. (Du Sommeil provoqué, etc.; Paris, 1889.)

VII
THE FUNCTION OF THE DREAM
Since we know that the foreconscious is suspended during the night by the
wish to sleep, we can proceed to an intelligent investigation of the dream
process. But let us first sum up the knowledge of this process already
gained. We have shown that the waking activity leaves day remnants from
which the sum of energy cannot be entirely removed; or the waking activity
revives during the day one of the unconscious wishes; or both conditions
occur simultaneously; we have already discovered the many variations that
may take place. The unconscious wish has already made its way to the day
remnants, either during the day or at any rate with the beginning of sleep,
and has effected a transference to it. This produces a wish transferred to the
recent material, or the suppressed recent wish comes to life again through a
reinforcement from the unconscious. This wish now endeavors to make its
way to consciousness on the normal path of the mental processes through
the foreconscious, to which indeed it belongs through one of its constituent
elements. It is confronted, however, by the censor, which is still active, and
to the influence of which it now succumbs. It now takes on the distortion
for which the way has already been paved by its transference to the recent
material. Thus far it is in the way of becoming something resembling an
obsession, delusion, or the like, i.e. a thought reinforced by a transference
and distorted in expression by the censor. But its further progress is now
checked through the dormant state of the foreconscious; this system has
apparently protected itself against invasion by diminishing its excitements.
The dream process, therefore, takes the regressive course, which has just
been opened by the peculiarity of the sleeping state, and thereby follows the
attraction exerted on it by the memory groups, which themselves exist in
part only as visual energy not yet translated into terms of the later systems.
On its way to regression the dream takes on the form of dramatization. The
subject of compression will be discussed later. The dream process has now
terminated the second part of its repeatedly impeded course. The first part
expended itself progressively from the unconscious scenes or phantasies to
the foreconscious, while the second part gravitates from the advent of the

censor back to the perceptions. But when the dream process becomes a
content of perception it has, so to speak, eluded the obstacle set up in the
Forec. by the censor and by the sleeping state. It succeeds in drawing
attention to itself and in being noticed by consciousness. For consciousness,
which means to us a sensory organ for the reception of psychic qualities,
may receive stimuli from two sources—first, from the periphery of the
entire apparatus, viz. from the perception system, and, secondly, from the
pleasure and pain stimuli, which constitute the sole psychic quality
produced in the transformation of energy within the apparatus. All other
processes in the system, even those in the foreconscious, are devoid of any
psychic quality, and are therefore not objects of consciousness inasmuch as
they do not furnish pleasure or pain for perception. We shall have to assume
that those liberations of pleasure and pain automatically regulate the outlet
of the occupation processes. But in order to make possible more delicate
functions, it was later found necessary to render the course of the
presentations more independent of the manifestations of pain. To
accomplish this the Forec. system needed some qualities of its own which
could attract consciousness, and most probably received them through the
connection of the foreconscious processes with the memory system of the
signs of speech, which is not devoid of qualities. Through the qualities of
this system, consciousness, which had hitherto been a sensory organ only
for the perceptions, now becomes also a sensory organ for a part of our
mental processes. Thus we have now, as it were, two sensory surfaces, one
directed to perceptions and the other to the foreconscious mental processes.
I must assume that the sensory surface of consciousness devoted to the
Forec. is rendered less excitable by sleep than that directed to the Psystems. The giving up of interest for the nocturnal mental processes is
indeed purposeful. Nothing is to disturb the mind; the Forec. wants to sleep.
But once the dream becomes a perception, it is then capable of exciting
consciousness through the qualities thus gained. The sensory stimulus
accomplishes what it was really destined for, namely, it directs a part of the
energy at the disposal of the Forec. in the form of attention upon the
stimulant. We must, therefore, admit that the dream invariably awakens us,
that is, it puts into activity a part of the dormant force of the Forec. This
force imparts to the dream that influence which we have designated as
secondary elaboration for the sake of connection and comprehensibility.

This means that the dream is treated by it like any other content of
perception; it is subjected to the same ideas of expectation, as far at least as
the material admits. As far as the direction is concerned in this third part of
the dream, it may be said that here again the movement is progressive.
To avoid misunderstanding, it will not be amiss to say a few words about
the temporal peculiarities of these dream processes. In a very interesting
discussion, apparently suggested by Maury's puzzling guillotine dream,
Goblet tries to demonstrate that the dream requires no other time than the
transition period between sleeping and awakening. The awakening requires
time, as the dream takes place during that period. One is inclined to believe
that the final picture of the dream is so strong that it forces the dreamer to
awaken; but, as a matter of fact, this picture is strong only because the
dreamer is already very near awakening when it appears. "Un rêve c'est un
réveil qui commence."
It has already been emphasized by Dugas that Goblet was forced to
repudiate many facts in order to generalize his theory. There are, moreover,
dreams from which we do not awaken, e.g., some dreams in which we
dream that we dream. From our knowledge of the dream-work, we can by
no means admit that it extends only over the period of awakening. On the
contrary, we must consider it probable that the first part of the dream-work
begins during the day when we are still under the domination of the
foreconscious. The second phase of the dream-work, viz. the modification
through the censor, the attraction by the unconscious scenes, and the
penetration to perception must continue throughout the night. And we are
probably always right when we assert that we feel as though we had been
dreaming the whole night, although we cannot say what. I do not, however,
think it necessary to assume that, up to the time of becoming conscious, the
dream processes really follow the temporal sequence which we have
described, viz. that there is first the transferred dream-wish, then the
distortion of the censor, and consequently the change of direction to
regression, and so on. We were forced to form such a succession for the
sake of description; in reality, however, it is much rather a matter of
simultaneously trying this path and that, and of emotions fluctuating to and
fro, until finally, owing to the most expedient distribution, one particular
grouping is secured which remains. From certain personal experiences, I am

myself inclined to believe that the dream-work often requires more than one
day and one night to produce its result; if this be true, the extraordinary art
manifested in the construction of the dream loses all its marvels. In my
opinion, even the regard for comprehensibility as an occurrence of
perception may take effect before the dream attracts consciousness to itself.
To be sure, from now on the process is accelerated, as the dream is
henceforth subjected to the same treatment as any other perception. It is like
fireworks, which require hours of preparation and only a moment for
ignition.
Through the dream-work the dream process now gains either sufficient
intensity to attract consciousness to itself and arouse the foreconscious,
which is quite independent of the time or profundity of sleep, or, its
intensity being insufficient it must wait until it meets the attention which is
set in motion immediately before awakening. Most dreams seem to operate
with relatively slight psychic intensities, for they wait for the awakening.
This, however, explains the fact that we regularly perceive something
dreamt on being suddenly aroused from a sound sleep. Here, as well as in
spontaneous awakening, the first glance strikes the perception content
created by the dream-work, while the next strikes the one produced from
without.
But of greater theoretical interest are those dreams which are capable of
waking us in the midst of sleep. We must bear in mind the expediency
elsewhere universally demonstrated, and ask ourselves why the dream or
the unconscious wish has the power to disturb sleep, i.e. the fulfillment of
the foreconscious wish. This is probably due to certain relations of energy
into which we have no insight. If we possessed such insight we should
probably find that the freedom given to the dream and the expenditure of a
certain amount of detached attention represent for the dream an economy in
energy, keeping in view the fact that the unconscious must be held in check
at night just as during the day. We know from experience that the dream,
even if it interrupts sleep, repeatedly during the same night, still remains
compatible with sleep. We wake up for an instant, and immediately resume
our sleep. It is like driving off a fly during sleep, we awake ad hoc, and
when we resume our sleep we have removed the disturbance. As
demonstrated by familiar examples from the sleep of wet nurses, &c., the

fulfillment of the wish to sleep is quite compatible with the retention of a
certain amount of attention in a given direction.
But we must here take cognizance of an objection that is based on a better
knowledge of the unconscious processes. Although we have ourselves
described the unconscious wishes as always active, we have, nevertheless,
asserted that they are not sufficiently strong during the day to make
themselves perceptible. But when we sleep, and the unconscious wish has
shown its power to form a dream, and with it to awaken the foreconscious,
why, then, does this power become exhausted after the dream has been
taken cognizance of? Would it not seem more probable that the dream
should continually renew itself, like the troublesome fly which, when
driven away, takes pleasure in returning again and again? What justifies our
assertion that the dream removes the disturbance of sleep?
That the unconscious wishes always remain active is quite true. They
represent paths which are passable whenever a sum of excitement makes
use of them. Moreover, a remarkable peculiarity of the unconscious
processes is the fact that they remain indestructible. Nothing can be brought
to an end in the unconscious; nothing can cease or be forgotten. This
impression is most strongly gained in the study of the neuroses, especially
of hysteria. The unconscious stream of thought which leads to the discharge
through an attack becomes passable again as soon as there is an
accumulation of a sufficient amount of excitement. The mortification
brought on thirty years ago, after having gained access to the unconscious
affective source, operates during all these thirty years like a recent one.
Whenever its memory is touched, it is revived and shows itself to be
supplied with the excitement which is discharged in a motor attack. It is just
here that the office of psychotherapy begins, its task being to bring about
adjustment and forgetfulness for the unconscious processes. Indeed, the
fading of memories and the flagging of affects, which we are apt to take as
self-evident and to explain as a primary influence of time on the psychic
memories, are in reality secondary changes brought about by painstaking
work. It is the foreconscious that accomplishes this work; and the only
course to be pursued by psychotherapy is the subjugate the Unc, to the
domination of the Forec.

There are, therefore, two exits for the individual unconscious emotional
process. It is either left to itself, in which case it ultimately breaks through
somewhere and secures for once a discharge for its excitation into motility;
or it succumbs to the influence of the foreconscious, and its excitation
becomes confined through this influence instead of being discharged. It is
the latter process that occurs in the dream. Owing to the fact that it is
directed by the conscious excitement, the energy from the Forec., which
confronts the dream when grown to perception, restricts the unconscious
excitement of the dream and renders it harmless as a disturbing factor.
When the dreamer wakes up for a moment, he has actually chased away the
fly that has threatened to disturb his sleep. We can now understand that it is
really more expedient and economical to give full sway to the unconscious
wish, and clear its way to regression so that it may form a dream, and then
restrict and adjust this dream by means of a small expenditure of
foreconscious labor, than to curb the unconscious throughout the entire
period of sleep. We should, indeed, expect that the dream, even if it was not
originally an expedient process, would have acquired some function in the
play of forces of the psychic life. We now see what this function is. The
dream has taken it upon itself to bring the liberated excitement of the Unc.
back under the domination of the foreconscious; it thus affords relief for the
excitement of the Unc. and acts as a safety-valve for the latter, and at the
same time it insures the sleep of the foreconscious at a slight expenditure of
the waking state. Like the other psychic formations of its group, the dream
offers itself as a compromise serving simultaneously both systems by
fulfilling both wishes in so far as they are compatible with each other. A
glance at Robert's "elimination theory," will show that we must agree with
this author in his main point, viz. in the determination of the function of the
dream, though we differ from him in our hypotheses and in our treatment of
the dream process.
The above qualification—in so far as the two wishes are compatible with
each other—contains a suggestion that there may be cases in which the
function of the dream suffers shipwreck. The dream process is in the first
instance admitted as a wish-fulfillment of the unconscious, but if this
tentative wish-fulfillment disturbs the foreconscious to such an extent that
the latter can no longer maintain its rest, the dream then breaks the
compromise and fails to perform the second part of its task. It is then at

once broken off, and replaced by complete wakefulness. Here, too, it is not
really the fault of the dream, if, while ordinarily the guardian of sleep, it is
here compelled to appear as the disturber of sleep, nor should this cause us
to entertain any doubts as to its efficacy. This is not the only case in the
organism in which an otherwise efficacious arrangement became
inefficacious and disturbing as soon as some element is changed in the
conditions of its origin; the disturbance then serves at least the new purpose
of announcing the change, and calling into play against it the means of
adjustment of the organism. In this connection, I naturally bear in mind the
case of the anxiety dream, and in order not to have the appearance of trying
to exclude this testimony against the theory of wish-fulfillment wherever I
encounter it, I will attempt an explanation of the anxiety dream, at least
offering some suggestions.
That a psychic process developing anxiety may still be a wish-fulfillment
has long ceased to impress us as a contradiction. We may explain this
occurrence by the fact that the wish belongs to one system (the Unc.), while
by the other system (the Forec.), this wish has been rejected and suppressed.
The subjection of the Unc. by the Forec. is not complete even in perfect
psychic health; the amount of this suppression shows the degree of our
psychic normality. Neurotic symptoms show that there is a conflict between
the two systems; the symptoms are the results of a compromise of this
conflict, and they temporarily put an end to it. On the one hand, they afford
the Unc. an outlet for the discharge of its excitement, and serve it as a sally
port, while, on the other hand, they give the Forec. the capability of
dominating the Unc. to some extent. It is highly instructive to consider, e.g.,
the significance of any hysterical phobia or of an agoraphobia. Suppose a
neurotic incapable of crossing the street alone, which we would justly call a
"symptom." We attempt to remove this symptom by urging him to the
action which he deems himself incapable of. The result will be an attack of
anxiety, just as an attack of anxiety in the street has often been the cause of
establishing an agoraphobia. We thus learn that the symptom has been
constituted in order to guard against the outbreak of the anxiety. The phobia
is thrown before the anxiety like a fortress on the frontier.
Unless we enter into the part played by the affects in these processes, which
can be done here only imperfectly, we cannot continue our discussion. Let

us therefore advance the proposition that the reason why the suppression of
the unconscious becomes absolutely necessary is because, if the discharge
of presentation should be left to itself, it would develop an affect in the Unc.
which originally bore the character of pleasure, but which, since the
appearance of the repression, bears the character of pain. The aim, as well
as the result, of the suppression is to stop the development of this pain. The
suppression extends over the unconscious ideation, because the liberation of
pain might emanate from the ideation. The foundation is here laid for a very
definite assumption concerning the nature of the affective development. It is
regarded as a motor or secondary activity, the key to the innervation of
which is located in the presentations of the Unc. Through the domination of
the Forec. these presentations become, as it were, throttled and inhibited at
the exit of the emotion-developing impulses. The danger, which is due to
the fact that the Forec. ceases to occupy the energy, therefore consists in the
fact that the unconscious excitations liberate such an affect as—in
consequence of the repression that has previously taken place—can only be
perceived as pain or anxiety.
This danger is released through the full sway of the dream process. The
determinations for its realization consist in the fact that repressions have
taken place, and that the suppressed emotional wishes shall become
sufficiently strong. They thus stand entirely without the psychological realm
of the dream structure. Were it not for the fact that our subject is connected
through just one factor, namely, the freeing of the Unc. during sleep, with
the subject of the development of anxiety, I could dispense with discussion
of the anxiety dream, and thus avoid all obscurities connected with it.
As I have often repeated, the theory of the anxiety belongs to the
psychology of the neuroses. I would say that the anxiety in the dream is an
anxiety problem and not a dream problem. We have nothing further to do
with it after having once demonstrated its point of contact with the subject
of the dream process. There is only one thing left for me to do. As I have
asserted that the neurotic anxiety originates from sexual sources, I can
subject anxiety dreams to analysis in order to demonstrate the sexual
material in their dream thoughts.

For good reasons I refrain from citing here any of the numerous examples
placed at my disposal by neurotic patients, but prefer to give anxiety dreams
from young persons.
Personally, I have had no real anxiety dream for decades, but I recall one
from my seventh or eighth year which I subjected to interpretation about
thirty years later. The dream was very vivid, and showed me my beloved
mother, with peculiarly calm sleeping countenance, carried into the room
and laid on the bed by two (or three) persons with birds' beaks. I awoke
crying and screaming, and disturbed my parents. The very tall figures—
draped in a peculiar manner—with beaks, I had taken from the illustrations
of Philippson's bible; I believe they represented deities with heads of
sparrowhawks from an Egyptian tomb relief. The analysis also introduced
the reminiscence of a naughty janitor's boy, who used to play with us
children on the meadow in front of the house; I would add that his name
was Philip. I feel that I first heard from this boy the vulgar word signifying
sexual intercourse, which is replaced among the educated by the Latin
"coitus," but to which the dream distinctly alludes by the selection of the
birds' heads. I must have suspected the sexual significance of the word from
the facial expression of my worldly-wise teacher. My mother's features in
the dream were copied from the countenance of my grandfather, whom I
had seen a few days before his death snoring in the state of coma. The
interpretation of the secondary elaboration in the dream must therefore have
been that my mother was dying; the tomb relief, too, agrees with this. In
this anxiety I awoke, and could not calm myself until I had awakened my
parents. I remember that I suddenly became calm on coming face to face
with my mother, as if I needed the assurance that my mother was not dead.
But this secondary interpretation of the dream had been effected only under
the influence of the developed anxiety. I was not frightened because I
dreamed that my mother was dying, but I interpreted the dream in this
manner in the foreconscious elaboration because I was already under the
domination of the anxiety. The latter, however, could be traced by means of
the repression to an obscure obviously sexual desire, which had found its
satisfying expression in the visual content of the dream.
A man twenty-seven years old who had been severely ill for a year had had
many terrifying dreams between the ages of eleven and thirteen. He thought

that a man with an ax was running after him; he wished to run, but felt
paralyzed and could not move from the spot. This may be taken as a good
example of a very common, and apparently sexually indifferent, anxiety
dream. In the analysis the dreamer first thought of a story told him by his
uncle, which chronologically was later than the dream, viz. that he was
attacked at night by a suspicious-looking individual. This occurrence led
him to believe that he himself might have already heard of a similar episode
at the time of the dream. In connection with the ax he recalled that during
that period of his life he once hurt his hand with an ax while chopping
wood. This immediately led to his relations with his younger brother, whom
he used to maltreat and knock down. In particular, he recalled an occasion
when he struck his brother on the head with his boot until he bled,
whereupon his mother remarked: "I fear he will kill him some day." While
he was seemingly thinking of the subject of violence, a reminiscence from
his ninth year suddenly occurred to him. His parents came home late and
went to bed while he was feigning sleep. He soon heard panting and other
noises that appeared strange to him, and he could also make out the position
of his parents in bed. His further associations showed that he had
established an analogy between this relation between his parents and his
own relation toward his younger brother. He subsumed what occurred
between his parents under the conception "violence and wrestling," and thus
reached a sadistic conception of the coitus act, as often happens among
children. The fact that he often noticed blood on his mother's bed
corroborated his conception.
That the sexual intercourse of adults appears strange to children who
observe it, and arouses fear in them, I dare say is a fact of daily experience.
I have explained this fear by the fact that sexual excitement is not mastered
by their understanding, and is probably also inacceptable to them because
their parents are involved in it. For the same son this excitement is
converted into fear. At a still earlier period of life sexual emotion directed
toward the parent of opposite sex does not meet with repression but finds
free expression, as we have seen before.
For the night terrors with hallucinations (pavor nocturnus) frequently found
in children, I would unhesitatingly give the same explanation. Here, too, we
are certainly dealing with the incomprehensible and rejected sexual

feelings, which, if noted, would probably show a temporal periodicity, for
an enhancement of the sexual libido may just as well be produced
accidentally through emotional impressions as through the spontaneous and
gradual processes of development.
I lack the necessary material to sustain these explanations from observation.
On the other hand, the pediatrists seem to lack the point of view which
alone makes comprehensible the whole series of phenomena, on the somatic
as well as on the psychic side. To illustrate by a comical example how one
wearing the blinders of medical mythology may miss the understanding of
such cases I will relate a case which I found in a thesis on pavor nocturnus
by Debacker, 1881. A thirteen-year-old boy of delicate health began to
become anxious and dreamy; his sleep became restless, and about once a
week it was interrupted by an acute attack of anxiety with hallucinations.
The memory of these dreams was invariably very distinct. Thus, he related
that the devil shouted at him: "Now we have you, now we have you," and
this was followed by an odor of sulphur; the fire burned his skin. This
dream aroused him, terror-stricken. He was unable to scream at first; then
his voice returned, and he was heard to say distinctly: "No, no, not me; why,
I have done nothing," or, "Please don't, I shall never do it again."
Occasionally, also, he said: "Albert has not done that." Later he avoided
undressing, because, as he said, the fire attacked him only when he was
undressed. From amid these evil dreams, which menaced his health, he was
sent into the country, where he recovered within a year and a half, but at the
age of fifteen he once confessed: "Je n'osais pas l'avouer, mais j'éprouvais
continuellement des picotements et des surexcitations aux parties; à la fin,
cela m'énervait tant que plusieurs fois, j'ai pensé me jeter par la fenêtre au
dortoir."
It is certainly not difficult to suspect: 1, that the boy had practiced
masturbation in former years, that he probably denied it, and was threatened
with severe punishment for his wrongdoing (his confession: Je ne le ferai
plus; his denial: Albert n'a jamais fait ça). 2, That under the pressure of
puberty the temptation to self-abuse through the tickling of the genitals was
reawakened. 3, That now, however, a struggle of repression arose in him,
suppressing the libido and changing it into fear, which subsequently took
the form of the punishments with which he was then threatened.

Let us, however, quote the conclusions drawn by our author. This
observation shows: 1, That the influence of puberty may produce in a boy
of delicate health a condition of extreme weakness, and that it may lead to a
very marked cerebral anæmia.
2. This cerebral anæmia produces a transformation of character,
demonomaniacal hallucinations, and very violent nocturnal, perhaps also
diurnal, states of anxiety.
3. Demonomania and the self-reproaches of the day can be traced to the
influences of religious education which the subject underwent as a child.
4. All manifestations disappeared as a result of a lengthy sojourn in the
country, bodily exercise, and the return of physical strength after the
termination of the period of puberty.
5. A predisposing influence for the origin of the cerebral condition of the
boy may be attributed to heredity and to the father's chronic syphilitic state.
The concluding remarks of the author read: "Nous avons fait entrer cette
observation dans le cadre des délires apyrétiques d'inanition, car c'est à
l'ischémie cérébrale que nous rattachons cet état particulier."

VIII
THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PROCESS
—REGRESSION
In venturing to attempt to penetrate more deeply into the psychology of the
dream processes, I have undertaken a difficult task, to which, indeed, my
power of description is hardly equal. To reproduce in description by a
succession of words the simultaneousness of so complex a chain of events,
and in doing so to appear unbiassed throughout the exposition, goes fairly
beyond my powers. I have now to atone for the fact that I have been unable
in my description of the dream psychology to follow the historic
development of my views. The view-points for my conception of the dream
were reached through earlier investigations in the psychology of the
neuroses, to which I am not supposed to refer here, but to which I am
repeatedly forced to refer, whereas I should prefer to proceed in the
opposite direction, and, starting from the dream, to establish a connection
with the psychology of the neuroses. I am well aware of all the
inconveniences arising for the reader from this difficulty, but I know of no
way to avoid them.
As I am dissatisfied with this state of affairs, I am glad to dwell upon
another view-point which seems to raise the value of my efforts. As has
been shown in the introduction to the first chapter, I found myself
confronted with a theme which had been marked by the sharpest
contradictions on the part of the authorities. After our elaboration of the
dream problems we found room for most of these contradictions. We have
been forced, however, to take decided exception to two of the views
pronounced, viz. that the dream is a senseless and that it is a somatic
process; apart from these cases we have had to accept all the contradictory
views in one place or another of the complicated argument, and we have
been able to demonstrate that they had discovered something that was
correct. That the dream continues the impulses and interests of the waking
state has been quite generally confirmed through the discovery of the latent
thoughts of the dream. These thoughts concern themselves only with things

that seem important and of momentous interest to us. The dream never
occupies itself with trifles. But we have also concurred with the contrary
view, viz., that the dream gathers up the indifferent remnants from the day,
and that not until it has in some measure withdrawn itself from the waking
activity can an important event of the day be taken up by the dream. We
found this holding true for the dream content, which gives the dream
thought its changed expression by means of disfigurement. We have said
that from the nature of the association mechanism the dream process more
easily takes possession of recent or indifferent material which has not yet
been seized by the waking mental activity; and by reason of the censor it
transfers the psychic intensity from the important but also disagreeable to
the indifferent material. The hypermnesia of the dream and the resort to
infantile material have become main supports in our theory. In our theory of
the dream we have attributed to the wish originating from the infantile the
part of an indispensable motor for the formation of the dream. We naturally
could not think of doubting the experimentally demonstrated significance of
the objective sensory stimuli during sleep; but we have brought this
material into the same relation to the dream-wish as the thought remnants
from the waking activity. There was no need of disputing the fact that the
dream interprets the objective sensory stimuli after the manner of an
illusion; but we have supplied the motive for this interpretation which has
been left undecided by the authorities. The interpretation follows in such a
manner that the perceived object is rendered harmless as a sleep disturber
and becomes available for the wish-fulfillment. Though we do not admit as
special sources of the dream the subjective state of excitement of the
sensory organs during sleep, which seems to have been demonstrated by
Trumbull Ladd, we are nevertheless able to explain this excitement through
the regressive revival of active memories behind the dream. A modest part
in our conception has also been assigned to the inner organic sensations
which are wont to be taken as the cardinal point in the explanation of the
dream. These—the sensation of falling, flying, or inhibition—stand as an
ever ready material to be used by the dream-work to express the dream
thought as often as need arises.
That the dream process is a rapid and momentary one seems to be true for
the perception through consciousness of the already prepared dream
content; the preceding parts of the dream process probably take a slow,

fluctuating course. We have solved the riddle of the superabundant dream
content compressed within the briefest moment by explaining that this is
due to the appropriation of almost fully formed structures from the psychic
life. That the dream is disfigured and distorted by memory we found to be
correct, but not troublesome, as this is only the last manifest operation in
the work of disfigurement which has been active from the beginning of the
dream-work. In the bitter and seemingly irreconcilable controversy as to
whether the psychic life sleeps at night or can make the same use of all its
capabilities as during the day, we have been able to agree with both sides,
though not fully with either. We have found proof that the dream thoughts
represent a most complicated intellectual activity, employing almost every
means furnished by the psychic apparatus; still it cannot be denied that
these dream thoughts have originated during the day, and it is indispensable
to assume that there is a sleeping state of the psychic life. Thus, even the
theory of partial sleep has come into play; but the characteristics of the
sleeping state have been found not in the dilapidation of the psychic
connections but in the cessation of the psychic system dominating the day,
arising from its desire to sleep. The withdrawal from the outer world retains
its significance also for our conception; though not the only factor, it
nevertheless helps the regression to make possible the representation of the
dream. That we should reject the voluntary guidance of the presentation
course is uncontestable; but the psychic life does not thereby become
aimless, for we have seen that after the abandonment of the desired endpresentation undesired ones gain the mastery. The loose associative
connection in the dream we have not only recognized, but we have placed
under its control a far greater territory than could have been supposed; we
have, however, found it merely the feigned substitute for another correct
and senseful one. To be sure we, too, have called the dream absurd; but we
have been able to learn from examples how wise the dream really is when it
simulates absurdity. We do not deny any of the functions that have been
attributed to the dream. That the dream relieves the mind like a valve, and
that, according to Robert's assertion, all kinds of harmful material are
rendered harmless through representation in the dream, not only exactly
coincides with our theory of the twofold wish-fulfillment in the dream, but,
in his own wording, becomes even more comprehensible for us than for
Robert himself. The free indulgence of the psychic in the play of its
faculties finds expression with us in the non-interference with the dream on

the part of the foreconscious activity. The "return to the embryonal state of
psychic life in the dream" and the observation of Havelock Ellis, "an
archaic world of vast emotions and imperfect thoughts," appear to us as
happy anticipations of our deductions to the effect that primitive modes of
work suppressed during the day participate in the formation of the dream;
and with us, as with Delage, the suppressed material becomes the
mainspring of the dreaming.
We have fully recognized the rôle which Scherner ascribes to the dream
phantasy, and even his interpretation; but we have been obliged, so to
speak, to conduct them to another department in the problem. It is not the
dream that produces the phantasy but the unconscious phantasy that takes
the greatest part in the formation of the dream thoughts. We are indebted to
Scherner for his clew to the source of the dream thoughts, but almost
everything that he ascribes to the dream-work is attributable to the activity
of the unconscious, which is at work during the day, and which supplies
incitements not only for dreams but for neurotic symptoms as well. We
have had to separate the dream-work from this activity as being something
entirely different and far more restricted. Finally, we have by no means
abandoned the relation of the dream to mental disturbances, but, on the
contrary, we have given it a more solid foundation on new ground.
Thus held together by the new material of our theory as by a superior unity,
we find the most varied and most contradictory conclusions of the
authorities fitting into our structure; some of them are differently disposed,
only a few of them are entirely rejected. But our own structure is still
unfinished. For, disregarding the many obscurities which we have
necessarily encountered in our advance into the darkness of psychology, we
are now apparently embarrassed by a new contradiction. On the one hand,
we have allowed the dream thoughts to proceed from perfectly normal
mental operations, while, on the other hand, we have found among the
dream thoughts a number of entirely abnormal mental processes which
extend likewise to the dream contents. These, consequently, we have
repeated in the interpretation of the dream. All that we have termed the
"dream-work" seems so remote from the psychic processes recognized by
us as correct, that the severest judgments of the authors as to the low
psychic activity of dreaming seem to us well founded.

Perhaps only through still further advance can enlightenment and
improvement be brought about. I shall pick out one of the constellations
leading to the formation of dreams.
We have learned that the dream replaces a number of thoughts derived from
daily life which are perfectly formed logically. We cannot therefore doubt
that these thoughts originate from our normal mental life. All the qualities
which we esteem in our mental operations, and which distinguish these as
complicated activities of a high order, we find repeated in the dream
thoughts. There is, however, no need of assuming that this mental work is
performed during sleep, as this would materially impair the conception of
the psychic state of sleep we have hitherto adhered to. These thoughts may
just as well have originated from the day, and, unnoticed by our
consciousness from their inception, they may have continued to develop
until they stood complete at the onset of sleep. If we are to conclude
anything from this state of affairs, it will at most prove that the most
complex mental operations are possible without the coöperation of
consciousness, which we have already learned independently from every
psychoanalysis of persons suffering from hysteria or obsessions. These
dream thoughts are in themselves surely not incapable of consciousness; if
they have not become conscious to us during the day, this may have various
reasons. The state of becoming conscious depends on the exercise of a
certain psychic function, viz. attention, which seems to be extended only in
a definite quantity, and which may have been withdrawn from the stream of
thought in Question by other aims. Another way in which such mental
streams are kept from consciousness is the following:—Our conscious
reflection teaches us that when exercising attention we pursue a definite
course. But if that course leads us to an idea which does not hold its own
with the critic, we discontinue and cease to apply our attention. Now,
apparently, the stream of thought thus started and abandoned may spin on
without regaining attention unless it reaches a spot of especially marked
intensity which forces the return of attention. An initial rejection, perhaps
consciously brought about by the judgment on the ground of incorrectness
or unfitness for the actual purpose of the mental act, may therefore account
for the fact that a mental process continues until the onset of sleep
unnoticed by consciousness.

Let us recapitulate by saying that we call such a stream of thought a
foreconscious one, that we believe it to be perfectly correct, and that it may
just as well be a more neglected one or an interrupted and suppressed one.
Let us also state frankly in what manner we conceive this presentation
course. We believe that a certain sum of excitement, which we call
occupation energy, is displaced from an end-presentation along the
association paths selected by that end-presentation. A "neglected" stream of
thought has received no such occupation, and from a "suppressed" or
"rejected" one this occupation has been withdrawn; both have thus been left
to their own emotions. The end-stream of thought stocked with energy is
under certain conditions able to draw to itself the attention of
consciousness, through which means it then receives a "surplus of energy."
We shall be obliged somewhat later to elucidate our assumption concerning
the nature and activity of consciousness.
A train of thought thus incited in the Forec. may either disappear
spontaneously or continue. The former issue we conceive as follows: It
diffuses its energy through all the association paths emanating from it, and
throws the entire chain of ideas into a state of excitement which, after
lasting for a while, subsides through the transformation of the excitement
requiring an outlet into dormant energy.1 If this first issue is brought about
the process has no further significance for the dream formation. But other
end-presentations are lurking in our foreconscious that originate from the
sources of our unconscious and from the ever active wishes. These may
take possession of the excitations in the circle of thought thus left to itself,
establish a connection between it and the unconscious wish, and transfer to
it the energy inherent in the unconscious wish. Henceforth the neglected or
suppressed train of thought is in a position to maintain itself, although this
reinforcement does not help it to gain access to consciousness. We may say
that the hitherto foreconscious train of thought has been drawn into the
unconscious.
Other constellations for the dream formation would result if the
foreconscious train of thought had from the beginning been connected with
the unconscious wish, and for that reason met with rejection by the
dominating end-occupation; or if an unconscious wish were made active for
other—possibly somatic—reasons and of its own accord sought a

transference to the psychic remnants not occupied by the Forec. All three
cases finally combine in one issue, so that there is established in the
foreconscious a stream of thought which, having been abandoned by the
foreconscious occupation, receives occupation from the unconscious wish.
The stream of thought is henceforth subjected to a series of transformations
which we no longer recognize as normal psychic processes and which give
us a surprising result, viz. a psychopathological formation. Let us
emphasize and group the same.
1. The intensities of the individual ideas become capable of discharge in
their entirety, and, proceeding from one conception to the other, they thus
form single presentations endowed with marked intensity. Through the
repeated recurrence of this process the intensity of an entire train of ideas
may ultimately be gathered in a single presentation element. This is the
principle of compression or condensation. It is condensation that is mainly
responsible for the strange impression of the dream, for we know of nothing
analogous to it in the normal psychic life accessible to consciousness. We
find here, also, presentations which possess great psychic significance as
junctions or as end-results of whole chains of thought; but this validity does
not manifest itself in any character conspicuous enough for internal
perception; hence, what has been presented in it does not become in any
way more intensive. In the process of condensation the entire psychic
connection becomes transformed into the intensity of the presentation
content. It is the same as in a book where we space or print in heavy type
any word upon which particular stress is laid for the understanding of the
text. In speech the same word would be pronounced loudly and deliberately
and with emphasis. The first comparison leads us at once to an example
taken from the chapter on "The Dream-Work" (trimethylamine in the dream
of Irma's injection). Historians of art call our attention to the fact that the
most ancient historical sculptures follow a similar principle in expressing
the rank of the persons represented by the size of the statue. The king is
made two or three times as large as his retinue or the vanquished enemy. A
piece of art, however, from the Roman period makes use of more subtle
means to accomplish the same purpose. The figure of the emperor is placed
in the center in a firmly erect posture; special care is bestowed on the
proper modelling of his figure; his enemies are seen cowering at his feet;

but he is no longer represented a giant among dwarfs. However, the bowing
of the subordinate to his superior in our own days is only an echo of that
ancient principle of representation.
The direction taken by the condensations of the dream is prescribed on the
one hand by the true foreconscious relations of the dream thoughts, an the
other hand by the attraction of the visual reminiscences in the unconscious.
The success of the condensation work produces those intensities which are
required for penetration into the perception systems.
2. Through this free transferability of the intensities, moreover, and in the
service of condensation, intermediary presentations—compromises, as it
were—are formed (cf. the numerous examples). This, likewise, is
something unheard of in the normal presentation course, where it is above
all a question of selection and retention of the "proper" presentation
element. On the other hand, composite and compromise formations occur
with extraordinary frequency when we are trying to find the linguistic
expression for foreconscious thoughts; these are considered "slips of the
tongue."
3. The presentations which transfer their intensities to one another are very
loosely connected, and are joined together by such forms of association as
are spurned in our serious thought and are utilized in the production of the
effect of wit only. Among these we particularly find associations of the
sound and consonance types.
4. Contradictory thoughts do not strive to eliminate one another, but remain
side by side. They often unite to produce condensation as if no
contradiction existed, or they form compromises for which we should never
forgive our thoughts, but which we frequently approve of in our actions.
These are some of the most conspicuous abnormal processes to which the
thoughts which have previously been rationally formed are subjected in the
course of the dream-work. As the main feature of these processes we
recognize the high importance attached to the fact of rendering the
occupation energy mobile and capable of discharge; the content and the
actual significance of the psychic elements, to which these energies adhere,
become a matter of secondary importance. One might possibly think that

the condensation and compromise formation is effected only in the service
of regression, when occasion arises for changing thoughts into pictures. But
the analysis and—still more distinctly—the synthesis of dreams which lack
regression toward pictures, e.g. the dream "Autodidasker—Conversation
with Court-Councilor N.," present the same processes of displacement and
condensation as the others.
Hence we cannot refuse to acknowledge that the two kinds of essentially
different psychic processes participate in the formation of the dream; one
forms perfectly correct dream thoughts which are equivalent to normal
thoughts, while the other treats these ideas in a highly surprising and
incorrect manner. The latter process we have already set apart as the dreamwork proper. What have we now to advance concerning this latter psychic
process?
We should be unable to answer this question here if we had not penetrated
considerably into the psychology of the neuroses and especially of hysteria.
From this we learn that the same incorrect psychic processes—as well as
others that have not been enumerated—control the formation of hysterical
symptoms. In hysteria, too, we at once find a series of perfectly correct
thoughts equivalent to our conscious thoughts, of whose existence,
however, in this form we can learn nothing and which we can only
subsequently reconstruct. If they have forced their way anywhere to our
perception, we discover from the analysis of the symptom formed that these
normal thoughts have been subjected to abnormal treatment and have been
transformed into the symptom by means of condensation and compromise
formation, through superficial associations, under cover of contradictions,
and eventually over the road of regression. In view of the complete identity
found between the peculiarities of the dream-work and of the psychic
activity forming the psychoneurotic symptoms, we shall feel justified in
transferring to the dream the conclusions urged upon us by hysteria.
From the theory of hysteria we borrow the proposition that such an
abnormal psychic elaboration of a normal train of thought takes place only
when the latter has been used for the transference of an unconscious wish
which dates from the infantile life and is in a state of repression. In
accordance with this proposition we have construed the theory of the dream

on the assumption that the actuating dream-wish invariably originates in the
unconscious, which, as we ourselves have admitted, cannot be universally
demonstrated though it cannot be refuted. But in order to explain the real
meaning of the term repression, which we have employed so freely, we
shall be obliged to make some further addition to our psychological
construction.
We have above elaborated the fiction of a primitive psychic apparatus,
whose work is regulated by the efforts to avoid accumulation of excitement
and as far as possible to maintain itself free from excitement. For this
reason it was constructed after the plan of a reflex apparatus; the motility,
originally the path for the inner bodily change, formed a discharging path
standing at its disposal. We subsequently discussed the psychic results of a
feeling of gratification, and we might at the same time have introduced the
second assumption, viz. that accumulation of excitement—following certain
modalities that do not concern us—is perceived as pain and sets the
apparatus in motion in order to reproduce a feeling of gratification in which
the diminution of the excitement is perceived as pleasure. Such a current in
the apparatus which emanates from pain and strives for pleasure we call a
wish. We have said that nothing but a wish is capable of setting the
apparatus in motion, and that the discharge of excitement in the apparatus is
regulated automatically by the perception of pleasure and pain. The first
wish must have been an hallucinatory occupation of the memory for
gratification. But this hallucination, unless it were maintained to the point
of exhaustion, proved incapable of bringing about a cessation of the desire
and consequently of securing the pleasure connected with gratification.
Thus there was required a second activity—in our terminology the activity
of a second system—which should not permit the memory occupation to
advance to perception and therefrom to restrict the psychic forces, but
should lead the excitement emanating from the craving stimulus by a
devious path over the spontaneous motility which ultimately should so
change the outer world as to allow the real perception of the object of
gratification to take place. Thus far we have elaborated the plan of the
psychic apparatus; these two systems are the germ of the Unc. and Forec,
which we include in the fully developed apparatus.

In order to be in a position successfully to change the outer world through
the motility, there is required the accumulation of a large sum of
experiences in the memory systems as well as a manifold fixation of the
relations which are evoked in this memory material by different endpresentations. We now proceed further with our assumption. The manifold
activity of the second system, tentatively sending forth and retracting
energy, must on the one hand have full command over all memory material,
but on the other hand it would be a superfluous expenditure for it to send to
the individual mental paths large quantities of energy which would thus
flow off to no purpose, diminishing the quantity available for the
transformation of the outer world. In the interests of expediency I therefore
postulate that the second system succeeds in maintaining the greater part of
the occupation energy in a dormant state and in using but a small portion for
the purposes of displacement. The mechanism of these processes is entirely
unknown to me; any one who wishes to follow up these ideas must try to
find the physical analogies and prepare the way for a demonstration of the
process of motion in the stimulation of the neuron. I merely hold to the idea
that the activity of the first Ψ-system is directed to the free outflow of the
quantities of excitement, and that the second system brings about an
inhibition of this outflow through the energies emanating from it, i.e. it
produces a transformation into dormant energy, probably by raising the
level. I therefore assume that under the control of the second system as
compared with the first, the course of the excitement is bound to entirely
different mechanical conditions. After the second system has finished its
tentative mental work, it removes the inhibition and congestion of the
excitements and allows these excitements to flow off to the motility.
An interesting train of thought now presents itself if we consider the
relations of this inhibition of discharge by the second system to the
regulation through the principle of pain. Let us now seek the counterpart of
the primary feeling of gratification, namely, the objective feeling of fear. A
perceptive stimulus acts on the primitive apparatus, becoming the source of
a painful emotion. This will then be followed by irregular motor
manifestations until one of these withdraws the apparatus from perception
and at the same time from pain, but on the reappearance of the perception
this manifestation will immediately repeat itself (perhaps as a movement of
flight) until the perception has again disappeared. But there will here

remain no tendency again to occupy the perception of the source of pain in
the form of an hallucination or in any other form. On the contrary, there will
be a tendency in the primary apparatus to abandon the painful memory
picture as soon as it is in any way awakened, as the overflow of its
excitement would surely produce (more precisely, begin to produce) pain.
The deviation from memory, which is but a repetition of the former flight
from perception, is facilitated also by the fact that, unlike perception,
memory does not possess sufficient quality to excite consciousness and
thereby to attract to itself new energy. This easy and regularly occurring
deviation of the psychic process from the former painful memory presents
to us the model and the first example of psychic repression. As is generally
known, much of this deviation from the painful, much of the behavior of the
ostrich, can be readily demonstrated even in the normal psychic life of
adults.
By virtue of the principle of pain the first system is therefore altogether
incapable of introducing anything unpleasant into the mental associations.
The system cannot do anything but wish. If this remained so the mental
activity of the second system, which should have at its disposal all the
memories stored up by experiences, would be hindered. But two ways are
now opened: the work of the second system either frees itself completely
from the principle of pain and continues its course, paying no heed to the
painful reminiscence, or it contrives to occupy the painful memory in such a
manner as to preclude the liberation of pain. We may reject the first
possibility, as the principle of pain also manifests itself as a regulator for the
emotional discharge of the second system; we are, therefore, directed to the
second possibility, namely, that this system occupies a reminiscence in such
a manner as to inhibit its discharge and hence, also, to inhibit the discharge
comparable to a motor innervation for the development of pain. Thus from
two starting points we are led to the hypothesis that occupation through the
second system is at the same time an inhibition for the emotional discharge,
viz. from a consideration of the principle of pain and from the principle of
the smallest expenditure of innervation. Let us, however, keep to the fact—
this is the key to the theory of repression—that the second system is capable
of occupying an idea only when it is in position to check the development
of pain emanating from it. Whatever withdraws itself from this inhibition
also remains inaccessible for the second system and would soon be

abandoned by virtue of the principle of pain. The inhibition of pain,
however, need not be complete; it must be permitted to begin, as it indicates
to the second system the nature of the memory and possibly its defective
adaptation for the purpose sought by the mind.
The psychic process which is admitted by the first system only I shall now
call the primary process; and the one resulting from the inhibition of the
second system I shall call the secondary process. I show by another point
for what purpose the second system is obliged to correct the primary
process. The primary process strives for a discharge of the excitement in
order to establish a perception identity with the sum of excitement thus
gathered; the secondary process has abandoned this intention and
undertaken instead the task of bringing about a thought identity. All
thinking is only a circuitous path from the memory of gratification taken as
an end-presentation to the identical occupation of the same memory, which
is again to be attained on the track of the motor experiences. The state of
thinking must take an interest in the connecting paths between the
presentations without allowing itself to be misled by their intensities. But it
is obvious that condensations and intermediate or compromise formations
occurring in the presentations impede the attainment of this end-identity; by
substituting one idea for the other they deviate from the path which
otherwise would have been continued from the original idea. Such
processes are therefore carefully avoided in the secondary thinking. Nor is
it difficult to understand that the principle of pain also impedes the progress
of the mental stream in its pursuit of the thought identity, though, indeed, it
offers to the mental stream the most important points of departure. Hence
the tendency of the thinking process must be to free itself more and more
from exclusive adjustment by the principle of pain, and through the
working of the mind to restrict the affective development to that minimum
which is necessary as a signal. This refinement of the activity must have
been attained through a recent over-occupation of energy brought about by
consciousness. But we are aware that this refinement is seldom completely
successful even in the most normal psychic life and that our thoughts ever
remain accessible to falsification through the interference of the principle of
pain.

This, however, is not the breach in the functional efficiency of our psychic
apparatus through which the thoughts forming the material of the secondary
mental work are enabled to make their way into the primary psychic
process—with which formula we may now describe the work leading to the
dream and to the hysterical symptoms. This case of insufficiency results
from the union of the two factors from the history of our evolution; one of
which belongs solely to the psychic apparatus and has exerted a
determining influence on the relation of the two systems, while the other
operates fluctuatingly and introduces motive forces of organic origin into
the psychic life. Both originate in the infantile life and result from the
transformation which our psychic and somatic organism has undergone
since the infantile period.
When I termed one of the psychic processes in the psychic apparatus the
primary process, I did so not only in consideration of the order of
precedence and capability, but also as admitting the temporal relations to a
share in the nomenclature. As far as our knowledge goes there is no psychic
apparatus possessing only the primary process, and in so far it is a theoretic
fiction; but so much is based on fact that the primary processes are present
in the apparatus from the beginning, while the secondary processes develop
gradually in the course of life, inhibiting and covering the primary ones,
and gaining complete mastery over them perhaps only at the height of life.
Owing to this retarded appearance of the secondary processes, the essence
of our being, consisting in unconscious wish feelings, can neither be seized
nor inhibited by the foreconscious, whose part is once for all restricted to
the indication of the most suitable paths for the wish feelings originating in
the unconscious. These unconscious wishes establish for all subsequent
psychic efforts a compulsion to which they have to submit and which they
must strive if possible to divert from its course and direct to higher aims. In
consequence of this retardation of the foreconscious occupation a large
sphere of the memory material remains inaccessible.
Among these indestructible and unincumbered wish feelings originating
from the infantile life, there are also some, the fulfillments of which have
entered into a relation of contradiction to the end-presentation of the
secondary thinking. The fulfillment of these wishes would no longer
produce an affect of pleasure but one of pain; and it is just this

transformation of affect that constitutes the nature of what we designate as
"repression," in which we recognize the infantile first step of passing
adverse sentence or of rejecting through reason. To investigate in what way
and through what motive forces such a transformation can be produced
constitutes the problem of repression, which we need here only skim over.
It will suffice to remark that such a transformation of affect occurs in the
course of development (one may think of the appearance in infantile life of
disgust which was originally absent), and that it is connected with the
activity of the secondary system. The memories from which the
unconscious wish brings about the emotional discharge have never been
accessible to the Forec., and for that reason their emotional discharge
cannot be inhibited. It is just on account of this affective development that
these ideas are not even now accessible to the foreconscious thoughts to
which they have transferred their wishing power. On the contrary, the
principle of pain comes into play, and causes the Forec. to deviate from
these thoughts of transference. The latter, left to themselves, are
"repressed," and thus the existence of a store of infantile memories, from
the very beginning withdrawn from the Forec., becomes the preliminary
condition of repression.
In the most favorable case the development of pain terminates as soon as
the energy has been withdrawn from the thoughts of transference in the
Forec., and this effect characterizes the intervention of the principle of pain
as expedient. It is different, however, if the repressed unconscious wish
receives an organic enforcement which it can lend to its thoughts of
transference and through which it can enable them to make an effort
towards penetration with their excitement, even after they have been
abandoned by the occupation of the Forec. A defensive struggle then
ensues, inasmuch as the Forec. reinforces the antagonism against the
repressed ideas, and subsequently this leads to a penetration by the thoughts
of transference (the carriers of the unconscious wish) in some form of
compromise through symptom formation. But from the moment that the
suppressed thoughts are powerfully occupied by the unconscious wishfeeling and abandoned by the foreconscious occupation, they succumb to
the primary psychic process and strive only for motor discharge; or, if the
path be free, for hallucinatory revival of the desired perception identity. We
have previously found, empirically, that the incorrect processes described

are enacted only with thoughts that exist in the repression. We now grasp
another part of the connection. These incorrect processes are those that are
primary in the psychic apparatus; they appear wherever thoughts
abandoned by the foreconscious occupation are left to themselves, and can
fill themselves with the uninhibited energy, striving for discharge from the
unconscious. We may add a few further observations to support the view
that these processes designated "incorrect" are really not falsifications of the
normal defective thinking, but the modes of activity of the psychic
apparatus when freed from inhibition. Thus we see that the transference of
the foreconscious excitement to the motility takes place according to the
same processes, and that the connection of the foreconscious presentations
with words readily manifest the same displacements and mixtures which are
ascribed to inattention. Finally, I should like to adduce proof that an
increase of work necessarily results from the inhibition of these primary
courses from the fact that we gain a comical effect, a surplus to be
discharged through laughter, if we allow these streams of thought to come to
consciousness.
The theory of the psychoneuroses asserts with complete certainty that only
sexual wish-feelings from the infantile life experience repression
(emotional transformation) during the developmental period of childhood.
These are capable of returning to activity at a later period of development,
and then have the faculty of being revived, either as a consequence of the
sexual constitution, which is really formed from the original bisexuality, or
in consequence of unfavorable influences of the sexual life; and they thus
supply the motive power for all psychoneurotic symptom formations. It is
only by the introduction of these sexual forces that the gaps still
demonstrable in the theory of repression can be filled. I will leave it
undecided whether the postulate of the sexual and infantile may also be
asserted for the theory of the dream; I leave this here unfinished because I
have already passed a step beyond the demonstrable in assuming that the
dream-wish invariably originates from the unconscious.2 Nor will I further
investigate the difference in the play of the psychic forces in the dream
formation and in the formation of the hysterical symptoms, for to do this we
ought to possess a more explicit knowledge of one of the members to be
compared. But I regard another point as important, and will here confess
that it was on account of this very point that I have just undertaken this

entire discussion concerning the two psychic systems, their modes of
operation, and the repression. For it is now immaterial whether I have
conceived the psychological relations in question with approximate
correctness, or, as is easily possible in such a difficult matter, in an
erroneous and fragmentary manner. Whatever changes may be made in the
interpretation of the psychic censor and of the correct and of the abnormal
elaboration of the dream content, the fact nevertheless remains that such
processes are active in dream formation, and that essentially they show the
closest analogy to the processes observed in the formation of the hysterical
symptoms. The dream is not a pathological phenomenon, and it does not
leave behind an enfeeblement of the mental faculties. The objection that no
deduction can be drawn regarding the dreams of healthy persons from my
own dreams and from those of neurotic patients may be rejected without
comment. Hence, when we draw conclusions from the phenomena as to
their motive forces, we recognize that the psychic mechanism made use of
by the neuroses is not created by a morbid disturbance of the psychic life,
but is found ready in the normal structure of the psychic apparatus. The two
psychic systems, the censor crossing between them, the inhibition and the
covering of the one activity by the other, the relations of both to
consciousness—or whatever may offer a more correct interpretation of the
actual conditions in their stead—all these belong to the normal structure of
our psychic instrument, and the dream points out for us one of the roads
leading to a knowledge of this structure. If, in addition to our knowledge,
we wish to be contented with a minimum perfectly established, we shall say
that the dream gives us proof that the suppressed, material continues to
exist even in the normal person and remains capable of psychic activity.
The dream itself is one of the manifestations of this suppressed material;
theoretically, this is true in all cases; according to substantial experience it
is true in at least a great number of such as most conspicuously display the
prominent characteristics of dream life. The suppressed psychic material,
which in the waking state has been prevented from expression and cut off
from internal perception by the antagonistic adjustment of the
contradictions, finds ways and means of obtruding itself on consciousness
during the night under the domination of the compromise formations.
"Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo."

At any rate the interpretation of dreams is the via regia to a knowledge of
the unconscious in the psychic life.
In following the analysis of the dream we have made some progress toward
an understanding of the composition of this most marvelous and most
mysterious of instruments; to be sure, we have not gone very far, but
enough of a beginning has been made to allow us to advance from other socalled pathological formations further into the analysis of the unconscious.
Disease—at least that which is justly termed functional—is not due to the
destruction of this apparatus, and the establishment of new splittings in its
interior; it is rather to be explained dynamically through the strengthening
and weakening of the components in the play of forces by which so many
activities are concealed during the normal function. We have been able to
show in another place how the composition of the apparatus from the two
systems permits a subtilization even of the normal activity which would be
impossible for a single system.
Footnote 1: Cf. the significant observations by J. Bueuer in our Studies on Hysteria, 1895, and 2nd
ed. 1909.
Footnote 2: Here, as in other places, there are gaps in the treatment of the subject, which I have left
intentionally, because to fill them up would require on the one hand too great effort, and on the other
hand an extensive reference to material that is foreign to the dream. Thus I have avoided stating
whether I connect with the word "suppressed" another sense than with the word "repressed." It has
been made clear only that the latter emphasizes more than the former the relation to the unconscious.
I have not entered into the cognate problem why the dream thoughts also experience distortion by the
censor when they abandon the progressive continuation to consciousness and choose the path of
regression. I have been above all anxious to awaken an interest in the problems to which the further
analysis of the dreamwork leads and to indicate the other themes which meet these on the way. It was
not always easy to decide just where the pursuit should be discontinued. That I have not treated
exhaustively the part played in the dream by the psychosexual life and have avoided the
interpretation of dreams of an obvious sexual content is due to a special reason which may not come
up to the reader's expectation. To be sure, it is very far from my ideas and the principles expressed by
me in neuropathology to regard the sexual life as a "pudendum" which should be left unconsidered
by the physician and the scientific investigator. I also consider ludicrous the moral indignation which
prompted the translator of Artemidoros of Daldis to keep from the reader's knowledge the chapter on
sexual dreams contained in the Symbolism of the Dreams. As for myself, I have been actuated solely
by the conviction that in the explanation of sexual dreams I should be bound to entangle myself
deeply in the still unexplained problems of perversion and bisexuality; and for that reason I have
reserved this material for another connection.

IX
THE UNCONSCIOUS AND CONSCIOUSNESS
—REALITY
On closer inspection we find that it is not the existence of two systems near
the motor end of the apparatus but of two kinds of processes or modes of
emotional discharge, the assumption of which was explained in the
psychological discussions of the previous chapter. This can make no
difference for us, for we must always be ready to drop our auxiliary ideas
whenever we deem ourselves in position to replace them by something else
approaching more closely to the unknown reality. Let us now try to correct
some views which might be erroneously formed as long as we regarded the
two systems in the crudest and most obvious sense as two localities within
the psychic apparatus, views which have left their traces in the terms
"repression" and "penetration." Thus, when we say that an unconscious idea
strives for transference into the foreconscious in order later to penetrate
consciousness, we do not mean that a second idea is to be formed situated
in a new locality like an interlineation near which the original continues to
remain; also, when we speak of penetration into consciousness, we wish
carefully to avoid any idea of change of locality. When we say that a
foreconscious idea is repressed and subsequently taken up by the
unconscious, we might be tempted by these figures, borrowed from the idea
of a struggle over a territory, to assume that an arrangement is really broken
up in one psychic locality and replaced by a new one in the other locality.
For these comparisons we substitute what would seem to correspond better
with the real state of affairs by saying that an energy occupation is
displaced to or withdrawn from a certain arrangement so that the psychic
formation falls under the domination of a system or is withdrawn from the
same. Here again we replace a topical mode of presentation by a dynamic;
it is not the psychic formation that appears to us as the moving factor but
the innervation of the same.
I deem it appropriate and justifiable, however, to apply ourselves still
further to the illustrative conception of the two systems. We shall avoid any

misapplication of this manner of representation if we remember that
presentations, thoughts, and psychic formations should generally not be
localized in the organic elements of the nervous system, but, so to speak,
between them, where resistances and paths form the correlate
corresponding to them. Everything that can become an object of our
internal perception is virtual, like the image in the telescope produced by
the passage of the rays of light. But we are justified in assuming the
existence of the systems, which have nothing psychic in themselves and
which never become accessible to our psychic perception, corresponding to
the lenses of the telescope which design the image. If we continue this
comparison, we may say that the censor between two systems corresponds
to the refraction of rays during their passage into a new medium.
Thus far we have made psychology on our own responsibility; it is now
time to examine the theoretical opinions governing present-day psychology
and to test their relation to our theories. The question of the unconscious, in
psychology is, according to the authoritative words of Lipps, less a
psychological question than the question of psychology. As long as
psychology settled this question with the verbal explanation that the
"psychic" is the "conscious" and that "unconscious psychic occurrences" are
an obvious contradiction, a psychological estimate of the observations
gained by the physician from abnormal mental states was precluded. The
physician and the philosopher agree only when both acknowledge that
unconscious psychic processes are "the appropriate and well-justified
expression for an established fact." The physician cannot but reject with a
shrug of his shoulders the assertion that "consciousness is the indispensable
quality of the psychic"; he may assume, if his respect for the utterings of the
philosophers still be strong enough, that he and they do not treat the same
subject and do not pursue the same science. For a single intelligent
observation of the psychic life of a neurotic, a single analysis of a dream
must force upon him the unalterable conviction that the most complicated
and correct mental operations, to which no one will refuse the name of
psychic occurrences, may take place without exciting the consciousness of
the person. It is true that the physician does not learn of these unconscious
processes until they have exerted such an effect on consciousness as to
admit communication or observation. But this effect of consciousness may
show a psychic character widely differing from the unconscious process, so

that the internal perception cannot possibly recognize the one as a substitute
for the other. The physician must reserve for himself the right to penetrate,
by a process of deduction, from the effect on consciousness to the
unconscious psychic process; he learns in this way that the effect on
consciousness is only a remote psychic product of the unconscious process
and that the latter has not become conscious as such; that it has been in
existence and operative without betraying itself in any way to
consciousness.
A reaction from the over-estimation of the quality of consciousness
becomes the indispensable preliminary condition for any correct insight into
the behavior of the psychic. In the words of Lipps, the unconscious must be
accepted as the general basis of the psychic life. The unconscious is the
larger circle which includes within itself the smaller circle of the conscious;
everything conscious has its preliminary step in the unconscious, whereas
the unconscious may stop with this step and still claim full value as a
psychic activity. Properly speaking, the unconscious is the real psychic; its
inner nature is just as unknown to us as the reality of the external world,
and it is just as imperfectly reported to us through the data of consciousness
as is the external world through the indications of our sensory organs.
A series of dream problems which have intensely occupied older authors
will be laid aside when the old opposition between conscious life and dream
life is abandoned and the unconscious psychic assigned to its proper place.
Thus many of the activities whose performances in the dream have excited
our admiration are now no longer to be attributed to the dream but to
unconscious thinking, which is also active during the day. If, according to
Scherner, the dream seems to play with a symboling representation of the
body, we know that this is the work of certain unconscious phantasies
which have probably given in to sexual emotions, and that these phantasies
come to expression not only in dreams but also in hysterical phobias and in
other symptoms. If the dream continues and settles activities of the day and
even brings to light valuable inspirations, we have only to subtract from it
the dream disguise as a feat of dream-work and a mark of assistance from
obscure forces in the depth of the mind (cf. the devil in Tartini's sonata
dream). The intellectual task as such must be attributed to the same psychic
forces which perform all such tasks during the day. We are probably far too

much inclined to over-estimate the conscious character even of intellectual
and artistic productions. From the communications of some of the most
highly productive persons, such as Goethe and Helmholtz, we learn, indeed,
that the most essential and original parts in their creations came to them in
the form of inspirations and reached their perceptions almost finished.
There is nothing strange about the assistance of the conscious activity in
other cases where there was a concerted effort of all the psychic forces. But
it is a much abused privilege of the conscious activity that it is allowed to
hide from us all other activities wherever it participates.
It will hardly be worth while to take up the historical significance of dreams
as a special subject. Where, for instance, a chieftain has been urged through
a dream to engage in a bold undertaking the success of which has had the
effect of changing history, a new problem results only so long as the dream,
regarded as a strange power, is contrasted with other more familiar psychic
forces; the problem, however, disappears when we regard the dream as a
form of expression for feelings which are burdened with resistance during
the day and which can receive reinforcements at night from deep emotional
sources. But the great respect shown by the ancients for the dream is based
on a correct psychological surmise. It is a homage paid to the unsubdued
and indestructible in the human mind, and to the demoniacal which
furnishes the dream-wish and which we find again in our unconscious.
Not inadvisedly do I use the expression "in our unconscious," for what we
so designate does not coincide with the unconscious of the philosophers,
nor with the unconscious of Lipps. In the latter uses it is intended to
designate only the opposite of conscious. That there are also unconscious
psychic processes beside the conscious ones is the hotly contested and
energetically defended issue. Lipps gives us the more far-reaching theory
that everything psychic exists as unconscious, but that some of it may exist
also as conscious. But it was not to prove this theory that we have adduced
the phenomena of the dream and of the hysterical symptom formation; the
observation of normal life alone suffices to establish its correctness beyond
any doubt. The new fact that we have learned from the analysis of the
psychopathological formations, and indeed from their first member, viz.
dreams, is that the unconscious—hence the psychic—occurs as a function
of two separate systems and that it occurs as such even in normal psychic

life. Consequently there are two kinds of unconscious, which we do not as
yet find distinguished by the psychologists. Both are unconscious in the
psychological sense; but in our sense the first, which we call Unc., is
likewise incapable of consciousness, whereas the second we term "Forec."
because its emotions, after the observance of certain rules, can reach
consciousness, perhaps not before they have again undergone censorship,
but still regardless of the Unc. system. The fact that in order to attain
consciousness the emotions must traverse an unalterable series of events or
succession of instances, as is betrayed through their alteration by the censor,
has helped us to draw a comparison from spatiality. We described the
relations of the two systems to each other and to consciousness by saying
that the system Forec. is like a screen between the system Unc. and
consciousness. The system Forec. not only bars access to consciousness, but
also controls the entrance to voluntary motility and is capable of sending
out a sum of mobile energy, a portion of which is familiar to us as attention.
We must also steer clear of the distinctions superconscious and
subconscious which have found so much favor in the more recent literature
on the psychoneuroses, for just such a distinction seems to emphasize the
equivalence of the psychic and the conscious.
What part now remains in our description of the once all-powerful and allovershadowing consciousness? None other than that of a sensory organ for
the perception of psychic qualities. According to the fundamental idea of
schematic undertaking we can conceive the conscious perception only as
the particular activity of an independent system for which the abbreviated
designation "Cons." commends itself. This system we conceive to be
similar in its mechanical characteristics to the perception system P, hence
excitable by qualities and incapable of retaining the trace of changes, i.e. it
is devoid of memory. The psychic apparatus which, with the sensory organs
of the P-system, is turned to the outer world, is itself the outer world for the
sensory organ of Cons.; the teleological justification of which rests on this
relationship. We are here once more confronted with the principle of the
succession of instances which seems to dominate the structure of the
apparatus. The material under excitement flows to the Cons, sensory organ
from two sides, firstly from the P-system whose excitement, qualitatively
determined, probably experiences a new elaboration until it comes to

conscious perception; and, secondly, from the interior of the apparatus
itself, the quantitative processes of which are perceived as a qualitative
series of pleasure and pain as soon as they have undergone certain changes.
The philosophers, who have learned that correct and highly complicated
thought structures are possible even without the coöperation of
consciousness, have found it difficult to attribute any function to
consciousness; it has appeared to them a superfluous mirroring of the
perfected psychic process. The analogy of our Cons. system with the
systems of perception relieves us of this embarrassment. We see that
perception through our sensory organs results in directing the occupation of
attention to those paths on which the incoming sensory excitement is
diffused; the qualitative excitement of the P-system serves the mobile
quantity of the psychic apparatus as a regulator for its discharge. We may
claim the same function for the overlying sensory organ of the Cons.
system. By assuming new qualities, it furnishes a new contribution toward
the guidance and suitable distribution of the mobile occupation quantities.
By means of the perceptions of pleasure and pain, it influences the course
of the occupations within the psychic apparatus, which normally operates
unconsciously and through the displacement of quantities. It is probable that
the principle of pain first regulates the displacements of occupation
automatically, but it is quite possible that the consciousness of these
qualities adds a second and more subtle regulation which may even oppose
the first and perfect the working capacity of the apparatus by placing it in a
position contrary to its original design for occupying and developing even
that which is connected with the liberation of pain. We learn from
neuropsychology that an important part in the functional activity of the
apparatus is attributed to such regulations through the qualitative excitation
of the sensory organs. The automatic control of the primary principle of
pain and the restriction of mental capacity connected with it are broken by
the sensible regulations, which in their turn are again automatisms. We
learn that the repression which, though originally expedient, terminates
nevertheless in a harmful rejection of inhibition and of psychic domination,
is so much more easily accomplished with reminiscences than with
perceptions, because in the former there is no increase in occupation
through the excitement of the psychic sensory organs. When an idea to be
rejected has once failed to become conscious because it has succumbed to

repression, it can be repressed on other occasions only because it has been
withdrawn from conscious perception on other grounds. These are hints
employed by therapy in order to bring about a retrogression of
accomplished repressions.
The value of the over-occupation which is produced by the regulating
influence of the Cons. sensory organ on the mobile quantity, is
demonstrated in the teleological connection by nothing more clearly than by
the creation of a new series of qualities and consequently a new regulation
which constitutes the precedence of man over the animals. For the mental
processes are in themselves devoid of quality except for the excitements of
pleasure and pain accompanying them, which, as we know, are to be held in
check as possible disturbances of thought. In order to endow them with a
quality, they are associated in man with verbal memories, the qualitative
remnants of which suffice to draw upon them the attention of consciousness
which in turn endows thought with a new mobile energy.
The manifold problems of consciousness in their entirety can be examined
only through an analysis of the hysterical mental process. From this
analysis we receive the impression that the transition from the
foreconscious to the occupation of consciousness is also connected with a
censorship similar to the one between the Unc. and the Forec. This
censorship, too, begins to act only with the reaching of a certain
quantitative degree, so that few intense thought formations escape it. Every
possible case of detention from consciousness, as well as of penetration to
consciousness, under restriction is found included within the picture of the
psychoneurotic phenomena; every case points to the intimate and twofold
connection between the censor and consciousness. I shall conclude these
psychological discussions with the report of two such occurrences.
On the occasion of a consultation a few years ago the subject was an
intelligent and innocent-looking girl. Her attire was strange; whereas a
woman's garb is usually groomed to the last fold, she had one of her
stockings hanging down and two of her waist buttons opened. She
complained of pains in one of her legs, and exposed her leg unrequested.
Her chief complaint, however, was in her own words as follows: She had a
feeling in her body as if something was stuck into it which moved to and fro

and made her tremble through and through. This sometimes made her
whole body stiff. On hearing this, my colleague in consultation looked at
me; the complaint was quite plain to him. To both of us it seemed peculiar
that the patient's mother thought nothing of the matter; of course she herself
must have been repeatedly in the situation described by her child. As for the
girl, she had no idea of the import of her words or she would never have
allowed them to pass her lips. Here the censor had been deceived so
successfully that under the mask of an innocent complaint a phantasy was
admitted to consciousness which otherwise would have remained in the
foreconscious.
Another example: I began the psychoanalytic treatment of a boy of fourteen
years who was suffering from tic convulsif, hysterical vomiting, headache,
&c., by assuring him that, after closing his eyes, he would see pictures or
have ideas, which I requested him to communicate to me. He answered by
describing pictures. The last impression he had received before coming to
me was visually revived in his memory. He had played a game of checkers
with his uncle, and now saw the checkerboard before him. He commented
on various positions that were favorable or unfavorable, on moves that were
not safe to make. He then saw a dagger lying on the checker-board, an
object belonging to his father, but transferred to the checker-board by his
phantasy. Then a sickle was lying on the board; next a scythe was added;
and, finally, he beheld the likeness of an old peasant mowing the grass in
front of the boy's distant parental home. A few days later I discovered the
meaning of this series of pictures. Disagreeable family relations had made
the boy nervous. It was the case of a strict and crabbed father who lived
unhappily with his mother, and whose educational methods consisted in
threats; of the separation of his father from his tender and delicate mother,
and the remarrying of his father, who one day brought home a young
woman as his new mamma. The illness of the fourteen-year-old boy broke
out a few days later. It was the suppressed anger against his father that had
composed these pictures into intelligible allusions. The material was
furnished by a reminiscence from mythology, The sickle was the one with
which Zeus castrated his father; the scythe and the likeness of the peasant
represented Kronos, the violent old man who eats his children and upon
whom Zeus wreaks vengeance in so unfilial a manner. The marriage of the
father gave the boy an opportunity to return the reproaches and threats of

his father—which had previously been made because the child played with
his genitals (the checkerboard; the prohibitive moves; the dagger with
which a person may be killed). We have here long repressed memories and
their unconscious remnants which, under the guise of senseless pictures
have slipped into consciousness by devious paths left open to them.
I should then expect to find the theoretical value of the study of dreams in
its contribution to psychological knowledge and in its preparation for an
understanding of neuroses. Who can foresee the importance of a thorough
knowledge of the structure and activities of the psychic apparatus when
even our present state of knowledge produces a happy therapeutic influence
in the curable forms of the psychoneuroses? What about the practical value
of such study some one may ask, for psychic knowledge and for the
discovering of the secret peculiarities of individual character? Have not the
unconscious feelings revealed by the dream the value of real forces in the
psychic life? Should we take lightly the ethical significance of the
suppressed wishes which, as they now create dreams, may some day create
other things?
I do not feel justified in answering these questions. I have not thought
further upon this side of the dream problem. I believe, however, that at all
events the Roman Emperor was in the wrong who ordered one of his
subjects executed because the latter dreamt that he had killed the Emperor.
He should first have endeavored to discover the significance of the dream;
most probably it was not what it seemed to be. And even if a dream of
different content had the significance of this offense against majesty, it
would still have been in place to remember the words of Plato, that the
virtuous man contents himself with dreaming that which the wicked man
does in actual life. I am therefore of the opinion that it is best to accord
freedom to dreams. Whether any reality is to be attributed to the
unconscious wishes, and in what sense, I am not prepared to say offhand.
Reality must naturally be denied to all transition—and intermediate
thoughts. If we had before us the unconscious wishes, brought to their last
and truest expression, we should still do well to remember that more than
one single form of existence must be ascribed to the psychic reality. Action
and the conscious expression of thought mostly suffice for the practical
need of judging a man's character. Action, above all, merits to be placed in

the first rank; for many of the impulses penetrating consciousness are
neutralized by real forces of the psychic life before they are converted into
action; indeed, the reason why they frequently do not encounter any psychic
obstacle on their way is because the unconscious is certain of their meeting
with resistances later. In any case it is instructive to become familiar with
the much raked-up soil from which our virtues proudly arise. For the
complication of human character moving dynamically in all directions very
rarely accommodates itself to adjustment through a simple alternative, as
our antiquated moral philosophy would have it.
And how about the value of the dream for a knowledge of the future? That,
of course, we cannot consider. One feels inclined to substitute: "for a
knowledge of the past." For the dream originates from the past in every
sense. To be sure the ancient belief that the dream reveals the future is not
entirely devoid of truth. By representing to us a wish as fulfilled the dream
certainly leads us into the future; but this future, taken by the dreamer as
present, has been formed into the likeness of that past by the indestructible
wish.
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MY DEAR FRIEND
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CRITIQUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.

PREFACE.

[Pg v]

The treatise which follows has in the main grown up in connection with the author's classroom instruction in Psychology, although it is true that some of the chapters are more
'metaphysical,' and others fuller of detail, than is suitable for students who are going over
the subject for the ﬁrst time. The consequence of this is that, in spite of the exclusion of the
important subjects of pleasure and pain, and moral and æsthetic feelings and judgments, the
work has grown to a length which no one can regret more than the writer himself. The man
must indeed be sanguine who, in this crowded age, can hope to have many readers for
fourteen hundred continuous pages from his pen. But wer Vieles bringt wird Manchem
etwas bringen; and, by judiciously skipping according to their several needs, I am sure that
many sorts of readers, even those who are just beginning the study of the subject, will ﬁnd
my book of use. Since the beginners are most in need of guidance, I suggest for their behoof
that they omit altogether on a ﬁrst reading chapters 6, 7, 8, 10 (from page 330 to page 371),
12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 21, and 28. The better to awaken the neophyte's interest, it is possible that
the wise order would be to pass directly from chapter 4 to chapters 23, 24, 25, and 26, and
thence to return to the ﬁrst volume again. Chapter 20, on Space-perception, is a terrible
thing, which, unless written with all that detail, could not be fairly treated at all. An
abridgment of it, called 'The Spatial Quale,' which appeared in the Journal of Speculative
Philosophy, vol. xiii, p. 64, may be found by some persons a useful substitute for the entire
chapter.
I have kept close to the point of view of natural science throughout the book. Every natural
science assumes certain data uncritically, and declines to challenge the elements between [Pg vi]
which its own 'laws' obtain, and from which its own deductions are carried on. Psychology,
the science of ﬁnite individual minds, assumes as its data (1) thoughts and feelings, and (2)
a physical world in time and space with which they coexist and which (3) they know. Of
course these data themselves are discussable; but the discussion of them (as of other
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elements) is called metaphysics and falls outside the province of this book. This book,
assuming that thoughts and feelings exist and are vehicles of knowledge, thereupon
contends that psychology when she has ascertained the empirical correlation of the various
sorts of thought or feeling with deﬁnite conditions of the brain, can go no farther—can go
no farther, that is, as a natural science. If she goes farther she becomes metaphysical. All
attempts to explain our phenomenally given thoughts as products of deeper-lying entities
(whether the latter be named 'Soul,' 'Transcendental Ego,' 'Ideas,' or 'Elementary Units of
Consciousness') are metaphysical. This book consequently rejects both the associationist
and the spiritualist theories; and in this strictly positivistic point of view consists the only
feature of it for which I feel tempted to claim originality. Of course this point of view is
anything but ultimate. Men must keep thinking; and the data assumed by psychology, just
like those assumed by physics and the other natural sciences, must some time be overhauled.
The effort to overhaul them clearly and thoroughly is metaphysics; but metaphysics can
only perform her task well when distinctly conscious of its great extent. Metaphysics
fragmentary, irresponsible, and half-awake, and unconscious that she is metaphysical, spoils
two good things when she injects herself into a natural science. And it seems to me that the
theories both of a spiritual agent and of associated 'ideas' are, as they ﬁgure in the
psychology-books, just such metaphysics as this. Even if their results be true, it would be as
well to keep them, as thus presented, out of psychology as it is to keep the results of
idealism out of physics.
I have therefore treated our passing thoughts as integers, and regarded the mere laws of their [Pg vii]
coexistence with brain-states as the ultimate laws for our science. The reader will in vain
seek for any closed system in the book. It is mainly a mass of descriptive details, running
out into queries which only a metaphysics alive to the weight of her task can hope
successfully to deal with. That will perhaps be centuries hence; and meanwhile the best
mark of health that a science can show is this unﬁnished-seeming front.
The completion of the book has been so slow that several chapters have been published
successively in Mind, the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, the Popular Science Monthly,
and Scribner's Magazine. Acknowledgment is made in the proper places.
The bibliography, I regret to say, is quite unsystematic. I have habitually given my authority
for special experimental facts; but beyond that I have aimed mainly to cite books that would
probably be actually used by the ordinary American college-student in his collateral reading.
The bibliography in W. Volkmann von Volkmar's Lehrbuch der Psychologie (1875) is so
complete, up to its date, that there is no need of an inferior duplicate. And for more recent
references, Sully's Outlines, Dewey's Psychology, and Baldwin's Handbook of Psychology
may be advantageously used.
Finally, where one owes to so many, it seems absurd to single out particular creditors; yet I
cannot resist the temptation at the end of my ﬁrst literary venture to record my gratitude for
the inspiration I have got from the writings of J. S. Mill, Lotze, Renouvier, Hodgson, and
Wundt, and from the intellectual companionship (to name only ﬁve names) of Chauncey
Wright and Charles Peirce in old times, and more recently of Stanley Hall, James Putnam,
and Josiah Royce.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, August 1890.
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PSYCHOLOGY.

[Pg 1]

CHAPTER I.

THE SCOPE OF PSYCHOLOGY.
Psychology is the Science of Mental Life, both of its phenomena and of their conditions.
The phenomena are such things as we call feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings,
decisions, and the like; and, superﬁcially considered, their variety and complexity is such as
to leave a chaotic impression on the observer. The most natural and consequently the earliest
way of unifying the material was, ﬁrst, to classify it as well as might be, and, secondly, to
afﬁliate the diverse mental modes thus found, upon a simple entity, the personal Soul, of
which they are taken to be so many facultative manifestations. Now, for instance, the Soul
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm
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manifests its faculty of Memory, now of Reasoning, now of Volition, or again its
Imagination or its Appetite. This is the orthodox 'spiritualistic' theory of scholasticism and
of common-sense. Another and a less obvious way of unifying the chaos is to seek common
elements in the divers mental facts rather than a common agent behind them, and to explain
them constructively by the various forms of arrangement of these elements, as one explains
houses by stones and bricks. The 'associationist' schools of Herbart in Germany, and of
Hume the Mills and Bain in Britain have thus constructed a psychology without a soul by
taking discrete 'ideas,' faint or vivid, and showing how, by their cohesions, repulsions, and
forms of succession, such things as reminiscences, perceptions, emotions, volitions, [Pg 2]
passions, theories, and all the other furnishings of an individual's mind may be engendered.
The very Self or ego of the individual comes in this way to be viewed no longer as the preexisting source of the representations, but rather as their last and most complicated fruit.
Now, if we strive rigorously to simplify the phenomena in either of these ways, we soon
become aware of inadequacies in our method. Any particular cognition, for example, or
recollection, is accounted for on the soul-theory by being referred to the spiritual faculties of
Cognition or of Memory. These faculties themselves are thought of as absolute properties of
the soul; that is, to take the case of memory, no reason is given why we should remember a
fact as it happened, except that so to remember it constitutes the essence of our Recollective
Power. We may, as spiritualists, try to explain our memory's failures and blunders by
secondary causes. But its successes can invoke no factors save the existence of certain
objective things to be remembered on the one hand, and of our faculty of memory on the
other. When, for instance, I recall my graduation-day, and drag all its incidents and emotions
up from death's dateless night, no mechanical cause can explain this process, nor can any
analysis reduce it to lower terms or make its nature seem other than an ultimate datum,
which, whether we rebel or not at its mysteriousness, must simply be taken for granted if we
are to psychologize at all. However the associationist may represent the present ideas as
thronging and arranging themselves, still, the spiritualist insists, he has in the end to admit
that something, be it brain, be it 'ideas,' be it 'association,' knows past time as past, and ﬁlls it
out with this or that event. And when the spiritualist calls memory an 'irreducible faculty,' he
says no more than this admission of the associationist already grants.
And yet the admission is far from being a satisfactory simpliﬁcation of the concrete facts.
For why should this absolute god-given Faculty retain so much better the events of
yesterday than those of last year, and, best of all, those of an hour ago? Why, again, in old [Pg 3]
age should its grasp of childhood's events seem ﬁrmest? Why should illness and exhaustion
enfeeble it? Why should repeating an experience strengthen our recollection of it? Why
should drugs, fevers, asphyxia, and excitement resuscitate things long since forgotten? If we
content ourselves with merely afﬁrming that the faculty of memory is so peculiarly
constituted by nature as to exhibit just these oddities, we seem little the better for having
invoked it, for our explanation becomes as complicated as that of the crude facts with which
we started. Moreover there is something grotesque and irrational in the supposition that the
soul is equipped with elementary powers of such an ingeniously intricate sort. Why should
our memory cling more easily to the near than the remote? Why should it lose its grasp of
proper sooner than of abstract names? Such peculiarities seem quite fantastic; and might, for
aught we can see a priori, be the precise opposites of what they are. Evidently, then, the
faculty does not exist absolutely, but works under conditions; and the quest of the conditions
becomes the psychologist's most interesting task.
However ﬁrmly he may hold to the soul and her remembering faculty, he must acknowledge
that she never exerts the latter without a cue, and that something must always precede and
remind us of whatever we are to recollect. "An idea," says the associationist, "an idea
associated with the remembered thing; and this explains also why things repeatedly met
with are more easily recollected, for their associates on the various occasions furnish so
many distinct avenues of recall." But this does not explain the effects of fever, exhaustion,
hypnotism, old age, and the like. And in general, the pure associationist's account of our
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mental life is almost as bewildering as that of the pure spiritualist. This multitude of ideas,
existing absolutely, yet clinging together, and weaving an endless carpet of themselves, like
dominoes in ceaseless change, or the bits of glass in a kaleidoscope,—whence do they get
their fantastic laws of clinging, and why do they cling in just the shapes they do?
For this the associationist must introduce the order of experience in the outer world. The
dance of the ideas is a copy, somewhat mutilated and altered, of the order of phenomena. [Pg 4]
But the slightest reﬂection shows that phenomena have absolutely no power to inﬂuence our
ideas until they have ﬁrst impressed our senses and our brain. The bare existence of a past
fact is no ground for our remembering it. Unless we have seen it, or somehow undergone it,
we shall never know of its having been. The expediences of the body are thus one of the
conditions of the faculty of memory being what it is. And a very small amount of reﬂection
on facts shows that one part of the body, namely, the brain, is the part whose experiences are
directly concerned. If the nervous communication be cut off between the brain and other
parts, the experiences of those other parts are non-existent for the mind. The eye is blind, the
ear deaf, the hand insensible and motionless. And conversely, if the brain be injured,
consciousness is abolished or altered, even although every other organ in the body be ready
to play its normal part. A blow on the head, a sudden subtraction of blood, the pressure of an
apoplectic hemorrhage, may have the ﬁrst effect; whilst a very few ounces of alcohol or
grains of opium or hasheesh, or a whiff of chloroform or nitrous oxide gas, are sure to have
the second. The delirium of fever, the altered self of insanity, are all due to foreign matters
circulating through the brain, or to pathological changes in that organ's substance. The fact
that the brain is the one immediate bodily condition of the mental operations is indeed so
universally admitted nowadays that I need spend no more time in illustrating it, but will
simply postulate it and pass on. The whole remainder of the book will be more or less of a
proof that the postulate was correct.
Bodily experiences, therefore, and more particularly brain-experiences, must take a place
amongst those conditions of the mental life of which Psychology need take account. The
spiritualist and the associationist must both be 'cerebralists', to the extent at least of
admitting that certain peculiarities in the way of working of their own favorite principles are
explicable only by the fact that the brain laws are a codeterminant of the result. Our ﬁrst [Pg 5]
conclusion, then, is that a certain amount of brain-physiology must be presupposed or
included in Psychology.[1]

In still another way the psychologist is forced to be something of a nerve-physiologist.
Mental phenomena are not only conditioned a parte ante by bodily processes; but they lead
to them a parte post. That they lead to acts is of course the most familiar of truths, but I do
not merely mean acts in the sense of voluntary and deliberate muscular performances.
Mental states occasion also changes in the calibre of blood-vessels, or alteration in the heartbeats, or processes more subtle still, in glands and viscera. If these are taken into account, as
well as acts which follow at some remote period because the mental state was once there, it
will be safe to lay down the general law that no mental modiﬁcation ever occurs which is
not accompanied or followed by a bodily change. The ideas and feelings, e.g., which these
present printed characters excite in the reader's mind not only occasion movements of his
eyes and nascent movements of articulation in him, but will some day make him speak, or
take sides in a discussion, or give advice, or choose a book to read, differently from what
would have been the case had they never impressed his retina. Our psychology must
therefore take account not only of the conditions antecedent to mental states, but of their
resultant consequences as well.
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But actions originally prompted by conscious intelligence may grow so automatic by dint of
habit as to be apparently unconsciously performed. Standing, walking, buttoning and
unbuttoning, piano-playing, talking, even saying one's prayers, may be done when the mind
is absorbed in other things. The performances of animal instinct seem semi-automatic, and
the reﬂex acts of self-preservation certainly are so. Yet they resemble intelligent acts in
bringing about the same ends at which the animals' consciousness, on other occasions,
deliberately aims. Shall the study of such machine-like yet purposive acts as these be [Pg 6]
included in Psychology?
The boundary-line of the mental is certainly vague. It is better not to be pedantic, but to let
the science be as vague as its subject, and include such phenomena as these if by so doing
we can throw any light on the main business in hand. It will ere long be seen, I trust, that we
can; and that we gain much more by a broad than by a narrow conception of our subject. At
a certain stage in the development of every science a degree of vagueness is what best
consists with fertility. On the whole, few recent formulas have done more real service of a
rough sort in psychology than the Spencerian one that the essence of mental life and of
bodily life are one, namely, 'the adjustment of inner to outer relations.' Such a formula is
vagueness incarnate; but because it takes into account the fact that minds inhabit
environments which act on them and on which they in turn react; because, in short, it takes
mind in the midst of all its concrete relations, it is immensely more fertile than the oldfashioned 'rational psychology,' which treated the soul as a detached existent, sufﬁcient unto
itself, and assumed to consider only its nature and properties. I shall therefore feel free to
make any sallies into zoology or into pure nerve-physiology which may seem instructive for
our purposes, but otherwise shall leave those sciences to the physiologists.

Can we state more distinctly still the manner in which the mental life seems to intervene
between impressions made from without upon the body, and reactions of the body upon the
outer world again? Let us look at a few facts.
If some iron ﬁlings be sprinkled on a table and a magnet brought near them, they will ﬂy
through the air for a certain distance and stick to its surface. A savage seeing the
phenomenon explains it as the result of an attraction or love between the magnet and the
ﬁlings. But let a card cover the poles of the magnet, and the ﬁlings will press forever against
its surface without its ever occurring to them to pass around its sides and thus come into [Pg 7]
more direct contact with the object of their love. Blow bubbles through a tube into the
bottom of a pail of water, they will rise to the surface and mingle with the air. Their action
may again be poetically interpreted as due to a longing to recombine with the motheratmosphere above the surface. But if you invert a jar full of water over the pail, they will
rise and remain lodged beneath its bottom, shut in from the outer air, although a slight
deﬂection from their course at the outset, or a re-descent towards the rim of the jar when
they found their upward course impeded, would easily have set them free.
If now we pass from such actions as these to those of living things, we notice a striking
difference. Romeo wants Juliet as the ﬁlings want the magnet; and if no obstacles intervene
he moves towards her by as straight a line as they. But Romeo and Juliet, if a wall be built
between them, do not remain idiotically pressing their faces against its opposite sides like
the magnet and the ﬁlings with the card. Romeo soon ﬁnds a circuitous way, by scaling the
wall or otherwise, of touching Juliet's lips directly. With the ﬁlings the path is ﬁxed; whether
it reaches the end depends on accidents. With the lover it is the end which is ﬁxed, the path
may be modiﬁed indeﬁnitely.
Suppose a living frog in the position in which we placed our bubbles of air, namely, at the
bottom of a jar of water. The want of breath will soon make him also long to rejoin the
mother-atmosphere, and he will take the shortest path to his end by swimming straight
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upwards. But if a jar full of water be inverted over him, he will not, like the bubbles,
perpetually press his nose against its unyielding roof, but will restlessly explore the
neighborhood until by re-descending again he has discovered a path round its brim to the
goal of his desires. Again the ﬁxed end, the varying means!
Such contrasts between living and inanimate performances end by leading men to deny that
in the physical world ﬁnal purposes exist at all. Loves and desires are to-day no longer
imputed to particles of iron or of air. No one supposes now that the end of any activity
which they may display is an ideal purpose presiding over the activity from its outset and [Pg 8]
soliciting or drawing it into being by a sort of vis a fronte. The end, on the contrary, is
deemed a mere passive result, pushed into being a tergo, having had, so to speak, no voice
in its own production. Alter the pre-existing conditions, and with inorganic materials you
bring forth each time a different apparent end. But with intelligent agents, altering the
conditions changes the activity displayed, but not the end reached; for here the idea of the
yet unrealized end co-operates with the conditions to determine what the activities shall be.

The pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment are thus the mark
and criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenomenon. We all use this test to
discriminate between an intelligent and a mechanical performance. We impute no mentality
to sticks and stones, because they never seem to move for the sake of anything, but always
when pushed, and then indifferently and with no sign of choice. So we unhesitatingly call
them senseless.
Just so we form our decision upon the deepest of all philosophic problems: Is the Kosmos
an expression of intelligence rational in its inward nature, or a brute external fact pure and
simple? If we ﬁnd ourselves, in contemplating it, unable to banish the impression that it is a
realm of ﬁnal purposes, that it exists for the sake of something, we place intelligence at the
heart of it and have a religion. If, on the contrary, in surveying its irremediable ﬂux, we can
think of the present only as so much mere mechanical sprouting from the past, occurring
with no reference to the future, we are atheists and materialists.
In the lengthy discussions which psychologists have carried on about the amount of
intelligence displayed by lower mammals, or the amount of consciousness involved in the
functions of the nerve-centres of reptiles, the same test has always been applied: Is the
character of the actions such that we must believe them to be performed for the sake of their
result? The result in question, as we shall hereafter abundantly see, is as a rule a useful one,
—the animal is, on the whole, safer under the circumstances for bringing it forth. So far the
action has a teleological character; but such mere outward teleology as this might still be the [Pg 9]
blind result of vis a tergo. The growth and movements of plants, the processes of
development, digestion, secretion, etc., in animals, supply innumerable instances of
performances useful to the individual which may nevertheless be, and by most of us are
supposed to be, produced by automatic mechanism. The physiologist does not conﬁdently
assert conscious intelligence in the frog's spinal cord until he has shown that the useful
result which the nervous machinery brings forth under a given irritation remains the same
when the machinery is altered. If, to take the stock instance, the right knee of a headless frog
be irritated with acid, the right foot will wipe it off. When, however, this foot is amputated,
the animal will often raise the left foot to the spot and wipe the offending material away.
Pﬂüger and Lewes reason from such facts in the following way: If the ﬁrst reaction were the
result of mere machinery, they say; if that irritated portion of the skin discharged the right
leg as a trigger discharges its own barrel of a shot-gun; then amputating the right foot would
indeed frustrate the wiping, but would not make the left leg move. It would simply result in
the right stump moving through the empty air (which is in fact the phenomenon sometimes
observed). The right trigger makes no effort to discharge the left barrel if the right one be
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unloaded; nor does an electrical machine ever get restless because it can only emit sparks,
and not hem pillow-cases like a sewing-machine.
If, on the contrary, the right leg originally moved for the purpose of wiping the acid, then
nothing is more natural than that, when the easiest means of effecting that purpose prove
fruitless, other means should be tried. Every failure must keep the animal in a state of
disappointment which will lead to all sorts of new trials and devices; and tranquillity will
not ensue till one of these, by a happy stroke, achieves the wished-for end.
In a similar way Goltz ascribes intelligence to the frog's optic lobes and cerebellum. We
alluded above to the manner in which a sound frog imprisoned in water will discover an
outlet to the atmosphere. Goltz found that frogs deprived of their cerebral hemispheres
would often exhibit a like ingenuity. Such a frog, after rising from the bottom and ﬁnding [Pg 10]
his farther upward progress checked by the glass bell which has been inverted over him, will
not persist in butting his nose against the obstacle until dead of suffocation, but will often
re-descend and emerge from under its rim as if, not a deﬁnite mechanical propulsion
upwards, but rather a conscious desire to reach the air by hook or crook were the mainspring of his activity. Goltz concluded from this that the hemispheres are not the sole seal of
intellect in frogs. He made the same inference from observing that a brainless frog will turn
over from his back to his belly when one of his legs is sewed up, although the movements
required are then very different from those excited under normal circumstances by the same
annoying position. They seem determined, consequently, not merely by the antecedent
irritant, but by the ﬁnal end,—though the irritant of course is what makes the end desired.
Another brilliant German author, Liebmann,[2] argues against the brain's mechanism
accounting for mental action, by very similar considerations. A machine as such, he says,
will bring forth right results when it is in good order, and wrong results if out of repair. But
both kinds of result ﬂow with equally fatal necessity from their conditions. We cannot
suppose the clock-work whose structure fatally determines it to a certain rate of speed,
noticing that this speed is too slow or too fast and vainly trying to correct it. Its conscience,
if it have any, should be as good as that of the best chronometer, for both alike obey equally
well the same eternal mechanical laws—laws from behind. But if the brain be out of order
and the man says "Twice four are two," instead of "Twice four are eight," or else "I must go
to the coal to buy the wharf," instead of "I must go to the wharf to buy the coal," instantly
there arises a consciousness of error. The wrong performance, though it obey the same
mechanical law as the right, is nevertheless condemned,—condemned as contradicting the
inner law—the law from in front, the purpose or ideal for which the brain should act,
whether it do so or not.
We need not discuss here whether these writers in drawing their conclusion have done [Pg 11]
justice to all the premises I involved in the cases they treat of. We quote their arguments
only to show how they appeal to the principle that no actions but such as are done for an
end, and show a choice of means, can be called indubitable expressions of Mind.
I shall then adopt this as the criterion by which to circumscribe the subject-matter of this
work so far as action enters into it. Many nervous performances will therefore be
unmentioned, as being purely physiological. Nor will the anatomy of the nervous system
and organs of sense be described anew. The reader will ﬁnd in H. N. Martin's 'Human Body,'
in G. T. Ladd's 'Physiological Psychology,' and in all the other standard Anatomies and
Physiologies, a mass of information which we must regard as preliminary and take for
granted in the present work.[3] Of the functions of the cerebral hemispheres, however, since
they directly subserve consciousness, it will be well to give some little account.
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[1]

Cf. Geo. T. Ladd: Elements of Physiological Psychology (1887), pt. iii, chap. iii,
§§ 9, 12.

[2]

Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit, p. 489.

[3]

Nothing is easier than to familiarize one's self with the mammalian brain. Get a
sheep's head, a small saw, chisel, scalpel and forceps (all three can best be had
from a surgical-instrument maker), and unravel its parts either by the aid of a
human dissecting book, such as Holden's 'Manual of Anatomy,' or by the speciﬁc
directions ad hoc given in such books as Foster and Langley's 'Practical
Physiology' (Macmillan) or Morrell's 'Comparative Anatomy and Dissection of
Mammalia' (Longmans).

CHAPTER II.

[Pg 12]

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN.
If I begin chopping the foot of a tree, its branches are unmoved by my act, and its leaves
murmur as peacefully as ever in the wind. If, on the contrary, I do violence to the foot of a
fellow-man, the rest of his body instantly responds to the aggression by movements of alarm
or defence. The reason of this difference is that the man has a nervous system whilst the tree
has none; and the function of the nervous system is to bring each part into harmonious cooperation with every other. The afferent nerves, when excited by some physical irritant, be
this as gross in its mode of operation as a chopping axe or as subtle as the waves of light,
conveys the excitement to the nervous centres. The commotion set up in the centres does not
stop there, but discharges itself, if at all strong, through the efferent nerves into muscles and
glands, exciting movements of the limbs and viscera, or acts of secretion, which vary with
the animal, and with the irritant applied. These acts of response have usually the common
character of being of service. They ward off the noxious stimulus and support the beneﬁcial
one; whilst if, in itself indifferent, the stimulus be a sign of some distant circumstance of
practical importance, the animal's acts are addressed to this circumstance so as to avoid its
perils or secure its beneﬁts, as the case may be. To take a common example, if I hear the
conductor calling 'All aboard!' as I enter the depot, my heart ﬁrst stops, then palpitates, and
my legs respond to the air-waves falling on my tympanum by quickening their movements.
If I stumble as I run, the sensation of falling provokes a movement of the hands towards the
direction of the fall, the effect of which is to shield the body from too sudden a shock. If a
cinder enter my eye, its lids close forcibly and a copious ﬂow of tears tends to wash it out.
These three responses to a sensational stimulus differ, however, in many respects. The [Pg 13]
closure of the eye and the lachrymation are quite involuntary, and so is the disturbance of
the heart. Such involuntary responses we know as 'reﬂex' acts. The motion of the arms to
break the shock of falling may also be called reﬂex, since it occurs too quickly to be
deliberately intended. Whether it be instinctive or whether it result from the pedestrian
education of childhood may be doubtful; it is, at any rate, less automatic than the previous
acts, for a man might by conscious effort learn to perform it more skilfully, or even to
suppress it altogether. Actions of this kind, into which instinct and volition enter upon equal
terms, have been called 'semi-reﬂex.' The act of running towards the train, on the other hand,
has no instinctive element about it. It is purely the result of education, and is preceded by a
consciousness of the purpose to be attained and a distinct mandate of the will. It is a
'voluntary act.' Thus the animal's reﬂex and voluntary performances shade into each other
gradually, being connected by acts which may often occur automatically, but may also be
modiﬁed by conscious intelligence.
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An outside observer, unable to perceive the accompanying consciousness, might be wholly
at a loss to discriminate between the automatic acts and those which volition escorted. But if
the criterion of mind's existence be the choice of the proper means for the attainment of a
supposed end, all the acts seem to be inspired by intelligence, for appropriateness
characterizes them all alike. This fact, now, has led to two quite opposite theories about the
relation to consciousness of the nervous functions. Some authors, ﬁnding that the higher
voluntary ones seem to require the guidance of feeling, conclude that over the lowest
reﬂexes some such feeling also presides, though it may be a feeling of which we remain
unconscious. Others, ﬁnding that reﬂex and semi-automatic acts may, notwithstanding their
appropriateness, take place with an unconsciousness apparently complete, ﬂy to the opposite
extreme and maintain that the appropriateness even of voluntary actions owes nothing to the
fact that consciousness attends them. They are, according to these writers, results of
physiological mechanism pure and simple. In a near chapter we shall return to this [Pg 14]
controversy again. Let us now look a little more closely at the brain and at the ways in
which its states may be supposed to condition those of the mind.
THE FROG'S NERVE-CENTRES.
Both the minute anatomy and the detailed physiology of the brain are achievements of the
present generation, or rather we may say (beginning with Meynert) of the past twenty years.
Many points are still obscure and subject to controversy; but a general way of conceiving
the organ has been reached on all hands which in its main feature seems not unlikely to
stand, and which even gives a most plausible scheme of the way in which cerebral and
mental operations go hand in hand.

FIG. 1.—C H,
cerebral
Hemispheres; O
Th, Optic Thalami;
O L, Optic Lobes;
Cb, Cerebellum;
M O, Medulla
Oblongata; S C,
Spinal cord.

The best way to enter the subject will be to take a lower creature, like a
frog, and study by the vivisectional method the functions of his
different nerve-centres. The frog's nerve-centres are ﬁgured in the
accompanying diagram, which needs no further explanation. I will ﬁrst
proceed to state what happens when various amounts of the anterior
parts are removed, in different frogs, in the way in which an ordinary
student removes them; that is, with no extreme precautions as to the
purity of the operation. We shall in this way reach a very simple
conception of the functions of the various centres, involving the
strongest possible contrast between the cerebral hemispheres and the
lower lobes. This sharp conception will have didactic advantages, for it
is often very instructive to start with too simple a formula and correct it
later on. Our ﬁrst formula, as we shall later see, will have to be
softened down somewhat by the results of more careful
experimentation both on frogs and birds, and by those of the most
recent observations on dogs, monkeys, and man. But it will put us, [Pg 15]
from the outset, in clear possession of some fundamental notions and
distinctions which we could otherwise not gain so well, and none of
which the later more completed view will overturn.

If, then, we reduce the frog's nervous system to the spinal cord alone,
by making a section behind the base of the skull, between the spinal
cord and the medulla oblongata, thereby cutting off the brain from all
connection with the rest of the body, the frog will still continue to live, but with a very
peculiarly modiﬁed activity. It ceases to breathe or swallow; it lies ﬂat on its belly, and does
not, like a normal frog, sit up on its fore paws, though its hind legs are kept, as usual, folded
against its body and immediately resume this position if drawn out. If thrown on its back, it
lies there quietly, without turning over like a normal frog. Locomotion and voice seem
entirely abolished. If we suspend it by the nose, and irritate different portions of its skin by
acid, it performs a set of remarkable 'defensive' movements calculated to wipe away the
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irritant. Thus, if the breast be touched, both fore paws will rub it vigorously; if we touch the
outer side of the elbow, the hind foot of the same side will rise directly to the spot and wipe
it. The back of the foot will rub the knee if that be attacked, whilst if the foot be cut away,
the stump will make ineffectual movements, and then, in many frogs, a pause will come, as
if for deliberation, succeeded by a rapid passage of the opposite unmutilated foot to the
acidulated spot.
The most striking character of all these movements, after their teleological appropriateness,
is their precision. They vary, in sensitive frogs and with a proper amount of irritation, so
little as almost to resemble in their machine-like regularity the performances of a jumpingjack, whose legs must twitch whenever you pull the string. The spinal cord of the frog thus
contains arrangements of cells and ﬁbres ﬁtted to convert skin irritations into movements of
defence. We may call it the centre for defensive movements in this animal. We may indeed
go farther than this, and by cutting the spinal cord in various places ﬁnd that its separate
segments are independent mechanisms, for appropriate activities of the head and of the arms
and legs respectively. The segment governing the arms is especially active, in male frogs, in [Pg 16]
the breeding season; and these members alone with the breast and back appertaining to
them, everything else being cut away, will then actively grasp a ﬁnger placed between them
and remain hanging to it for a considerable time.
The spinal cord in other animals has analogous powers. Even in man it makes movements of
defence. Paraplegics draw up their legs when tickled; and Robin, on tickling the breast of a
criminal an hour after decapitation, saw the arm and hand move towards the spot. Of the
lower functions of the mammalian cord, studied so ably by Goltz and others, this is not the
place to speak.
If, in a second animal, the cut be made just behind the optic lobes so that the cerebellum and
medulla oblongata remain attached to the cord, then swallowing, breathing, crawling, and a
rather enfeebled jumping and swimming are added to the movements previously observed.
[4] There are other reﬂexes too. The animal, thrown on his back, immediately turns over to
his belly. Placed in a shallow bowl, which is ﬂoated on water and made to rotate, he
responds to the rotation by ﬁrst turning his head and then waltzing around with his entire
body, in the opposite direction to the whirling of the bowl. If his support be tilted so that his
head points downwards, he points it up; he points it down if it be pointed upwards, to the
right if it be pointed to the left, etc. But his reactions do not go farther than these movements
of the head. He will not, like frogs whose thalami are preserved, climb up a board if the
latter be tilted, but will slide off it to the ground.
If the cut be made on another frog between the thalami and the optic lobes, the locomotion
both on land and water becomes quite normal, and, in addition to the reﬂexes already shown
by the lower centres, he croaks regularly whenever he is pinched under the arms. He
compensates rotations, etc., by movements of the head, and turns over from his back; but
still drops off his tilted board. As his optic nerves are destroyed by the usual operation, it is [Pg 17]
impossible to say whether he will avoid obstacles placed in his path.
When, ﬁnally, a frog's cerebral hemispheres alone are cut off by a section between them and
the thalami which preserves the latter, an unpractised observer would not at ﬁrst suspect
anything abnormal about the animal. Not only is he capable, on proper instigation, of all the
acts already described, but he guides himself by sight, so that if an obstacle be set up
between him and the light, and he be forced to move forward, he either jumps over it or
swerves to one side. He manifests sexual passion at the proper season, and, unlike an
altogether brainless frog, which embraces anything placed between his arms, postpones this
reﬂex act until a female of his own species is provided. Thus far, as aforesaid, a person
unfamiliar with frogs might not suspect a mutilation; but even such a person would soon
remark the almost entire absence of spontaneous motion—that is, motion unprovoked by
any present incitation of sense. The continued movements of swimming, performed by the
creature in the water, seem to be the fatal result of the contact of that ﬂuid with its skin.
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They cease when a stick, for example, touches his hands. This is a sensible irritant towards
which the feet are automatically drawn by reﬂex action, and on which the animal remains
sitting. He manifests no hunger, and will suffer a ﬂy to crawl over his nose unsnapped at.
Fear, too, seems to have deserted him. In a word, he is an extremely complex machine
whose actions, so far as they go, tend to self-preservation; but still a machine, in this sense
—that it seems to contain no incalculable element. By applying the right sensory stimulus to
him we are almost as certain of getting a ﬁxed response as an organist is of hearing a certain
tone when he pulls out a certain stop.
But now if to the lower centres we add the cerebral hemispheres, or if, in other words, we
make an intact animal the subject of our observations, all this is changed. In addition to the
previous responses to present incitements of sense, our frog now goes through long and
complex acts of locomotion spontaneously, or as if moved by what in ourselves we should [Pg 18]
call an idea. His reactions to outward stimuli vary their form, too. Instead of making simple
defensive movements with his hind legs like a headless frog if touched, or of giving one or
two leaps and then sitting still like a hemisphereless one, he makes persistent and varied
efforts at escape, as if, not the mere contact of the physiologist's hand, but the notion of
danger suggested by it were now his spur. Led by the feeling of hunger, too, he goes in
search of insects, ﬁsh, or smaller frogs, and varies his procedure with each species of victim.
The physiologist cannot by manipulating him elicit croaking, crawling up a board,
swimming or stopping, at will. His conduct has become incalculable. We can no longer
foretell it exactly. Effort to escape is his dominant reaction, but he may do anything else,
even swell up and become perfectly passive in our hands.

Such are the phenomena commonly observed, and such the impressions which one naturally
receives. Certain general conclusions follow irresistibly. First of all the following:
The acts of all the centres involve the use of the same muscles. When a headless frog's hind
leg wipes the acid, he calls into play all the leg-muscles which a frog with his full medulla
oblongata and cerebellum uses when he turns from his back to his belly. Their contractions
are, however, combined differently in the two cases, so that the results vary widely. We must
consequently conclude that speciﬁc arrangements of cells and ﬁbres exist in the cord for
wiping, in the medulla for turning over, etc. Similarly they exist in the thalami for jumping
over seen obstacles and for balancing the moved body; in the optic lobes for creeping
backwards, or what not. But in the hemispheres, since the presence of these organs brings
no new elementary form of movement with it, but only determines differently the occasions
on which the movements shall occur, making the usual stimuli less fatal and machine-like;
we need suppose no such machinery directly co-ordinative of muscular contractions to exist.
We may rather assume, when the mandate for a wiping-movement is sent forth by the [Pg 19]
hemispheres, that a current goes straight to the wiping-arrangement in the spinal cord,
exciting this arrangement as a whole. Similarly, if an intact frog wishes to jump over a stone
which he sees, all he need do is to excite from the hemispheres the jumping-centre in the
thalami or wherever it may be, and the latter will provide for the details of the execution. It
is like a general ordering a colonel to make a certain movement, but not telling him how it
shall be done.[5]
The same muscle, then, is repeatedly represented at different heights; and at each it enters
into a different combination with other muscles to co-operate in some special form of
concerted movement. At each height the movement is discharged by some particular form of
sensorial stimulus. Thus in the cord, the skin alone occasions movements; in the upper part
of the optic lobes, the eyes are added; in the thalami, the semi-circular canals would seem to
play a part; whilst the stimuli which discharge the hemispheres would seem not so much to
be elementary sorts of sensation, as groups of sensations forming determinate objects or
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things. Prey is not pursued nor are enemies shunned by ordinary hemisphereless frogs.
Those reactions upon complex circumstances which we call instinctive rather than reﬂex,
are already in this animal dependent on the brain's highest lobes, and still more is this the
case with animals higher in the zoological scale.
The results are just the same if, instead of a frog, we take a pigeon, and cut out his
hemispheres as they are ordinarily cut out for a lecture-room demonstration. There is not a
movement natural to him which this brainless bird cannot perform if expressly excited
thereto; only the inner promptings seem deﬁcient, and when left to himself he spends most
of his time crouched on the ground with his head sunk between his shoulders as if asleep.
[Pg 20]

GENERAL NOTION OF HEMISPHERES.
All these facts lead us, when we think about them, to some such explanatory conception as
this: The lower centres act from present sensational stimuli alone; the hemispheres act from
perceptions and considerations, the sensations which they may receive serving only as
suggesters of these. But what are perceptions but sensations grouped together? and what are
considerations but expectations, in the fancy, of sensations which will be felt one way or
another according as action takes this course or that? If I step aside on seeing a rattlesnake,
from considering how dangerous an animal he is, the mental materials which constitute my
prudential reﬂection are images more or less vivid of the movement of his head, of a sudden
pain in my leg, of a state of terror, a swelling of the limb, a chill, delirium, unconsciousness,
etc., etc., and the ruin of my hopes. But all these images are constructed out of my past
experiences. They are reproductions of what I have felt or witnessed. They are, in short,
remote sensations; and the difference between the hemisphereless animal and the whole one
may be concisely expressed by saying that the one obeys absent, the other only present,
objects.
The hemispheres would then seem to be the seat of memory. Vestiges of past experience
must in some way be stored up in them, and must, when aroused by present stimuli, ﬁrst
appear as representations of distant goods and evils; and then must discharge into the
appropriate motor channels for warding off the evil and securing the beneﬁts of the good. If
we liken the nervous currents to electric currents, we can compare the nervous system, C,
below the hemispheres to a direct circuit from sense-organ to muscle along the line S ... C ...
M of Fig. 2. The hemisphere, H, adds the long circuit or loop-line through which the current
may pass when for any reason the direct line is not used.
Thus, a tired wayfarer on a hot day throws himself on the damp earth
beneath a maple-tree. The sensations of delicious rest and coolness
pouring themselves through the direct line would naturally discharge
into the muscles of complete extension: he would abandon himself to
the dangerous repose. But the loop-line being open, part of the current
is drafted along it, and awakens rheumatic or catarrhal reminiscences,
which prevail over the instigations of sense, and make the man arise
and pursue his way to where he may enjoy his rest more safely.
Presently we shall examine the manner in which the hemispheric
loop-line may be supposed to serve as a reservoir for such
reminiscences as these. Meanwhile I will ask the reader to notice
some corollaries of its being such a reservoir.

[Pg 21]

FIG. 2.

First, no animal without it can deliberate, pause, postpone, nicely weigh one motive against
another, or compare. Prudence, in a word, is for such a creature an impossible virtue.
Accordingly we see that nature removes those functions in the exercise of which prudence is
a virtue from the lower centres and hands them over to the cerebrum. Wherever a creature
has to deal with complex features of the environment, prudence is a virtue. The higher
animals have so to deal; and the more complex the features, the higher we call the animals.
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The fewer of his acts, then, can such an animal perform without the help of the organs in
question. In the frog many acts devolve wholly on the lower centres; in the bird fewer; in the
rodent fewer still; in the dog very few indeed; and in apes and men hardly any at all.
The advantages of this are obvious. Take the prehension of food as an example and suppose
it to be a reﬂex performance of the lower centres. The animal will be condemned fatally and
irresistibly to snap at it whenever presented, no matter what the circumstances may be; he
can no more disobey this prompting than water can refuse to boil when a ﬁre is kindled
under the pot. His life will again and again pay the forfeit of his gluttony. Exposure to [Pg 22]
retaliation, to other enemies, to traps, to poisons, to the dangers of repletion, must be regular
parts of his existence. His lack of all thought by which to weigh the danger against the
attractiveness of the bait, and of all volition to remain hungry a little while longer, is the
direct measure of his lowness in the mental scale. And those ﬁshes which, like our cunners
and sculpins, are no sooner thrown back from the hook into the water, than they
automatically seize the hook again, would soon expiate the degradation of their intelligence
by the extinction of their type, did not their exaggerated fecundity atone for their
imprudence. Appetite and the acts it prompts have consequently become in all higher
vertebrates functions of the cerebrum. They disappear when the physiologist's knife has left
the subordinate centres alone in place. The brainless pigeon will starve though left on a
corn-heap.
Take again the sexual function. In birds this devolves exclusively upon the hemispheres.
When these are shorn away the pigeon pays no attention to the billings and cooings of its
mate. And Goltz found that a bitch in heat would excite no emotion in male dogs who had
suffered large loss of cerebral tissue. Those who have read Darwin's 'Descent of Man' know
what immense importance in the amelioration of the breed in birds this author ascribes to
the mere fact of sexual selection. The sexual act is not performed until every condition of
circumstance and sentiment is fulﬁlled, until time, place, and partner all are ﬁt. But in frogs
and toads this passion devolves on the lower centres. They show consequently a machinelike obedience to the present incitement of sense, and an almost total exclusion of the power
of choice. Copulation occurs per fas aut nefas, occasionally between males, often with dead
females, in puddles exposed on the highway, and the male may be cut in two without letting
go his hold. Every spring an immense sacriﬁce of batrachian life takes place from these
causes alone.
No one need be told how dependent all human social elevation is upon the prevalence of
chastity. Hardly any factor measures more than this the difference between civilisation and [Pg 23]
barbarism. Physiologically interpreted, chastity means nothing more than the fact that
present solicitations of sense are overpowered by suggestions of æsthetic and moral ﬁtness
which the circumstances awaken in the cerebrum; and that upon the inhibitory or permissive
inﬂuence of these alone action directly depends.
Within the psychic life due to the cerebrum itself the same general distinction obtains,
between considerations of the more immediate and considerations of the more remote. In all
ages the man whose determinations are swayed by reference to the most distant ends has
been held to possess the highest intelligence. The tramp who lives from hour to hour; the
bohemian whose engagements are from day to day; the bachelor who builds but for a single
life; the father who acts for another generation; the patriot who thinks of a whole
community and many generations; and ﬁnally, the philosopher and saint whose cares are for
humanity and for eternity,—these range themselves in an unbroken hierarchy, wherein each
successive grade results from an increased manifestation of the special form of action by
which the cerebral centres are distinguished from all below them.
In the 'loop-line' along which the memories and ideas of the distant are supposed to lie, the
action, so far as it is a physical process, must be interpreted after the type of the action in the
lower centres. If regarded here as a reﬂex process, it must be reﬂex there as well. The
current in both places runs out into the muscles only after it has ﬁrst run in; but whilst the
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path by which it runs out is determined in the lower centres by reﬂections few and ﬁxed
amongst the cell-arrangements, in the hemispheres the reﬂections are many and instable.
This, it will be seen, is only a difference of degree and not of kind, and does not change the
reﬂex type. The conception of all action as conforming to this type is the fundamental
conception of modern nerve-physiology. So much for our general preliminary conception of
the nerve-centres! Let us deﬁne it more distinctly before we see how well physiological
observation will bear it out in detail.
THE EDUCATION OF THE HEMISPHERES.

[Pg 24]

Nerve-currents run in through sense-organs, and whilst provoking reﬂex acts in the lower
centres, they arouse ideas in the hemispheres, which either permit the reﬂexes in question,
check them, or substitute others for them. All ideas being in the last resort reminiscences,
the question to answer is: How can processes become organized in the hemispheres which
correspond to reminiscences in the mind?[6]
Nothing is easier than to conceive a possible way in which this might be done, provided four
assumptions be granted. These assumptions (which after all are inevitable in any event) are:
1) The same cerebral process which, when aroused from without by a sense-organ, gives the
perception of an object, will give an idea of the same object when aroused by other cerebral
processes from within.
2) If processes 1, 2, 3, 4 have once been aroused together or in immediate succession, any
subsequent arousal of any one of them (whether from without or within) will tend to arouse
the others in the original order. [This is the so-called law of association.]
3) Every sensorial excitement propagated to a lower centre tends to spread upwards and
arouse an idea.
4) Every idea tends ultimately either to produce a movement or to check one which
otherwise would be produced.
Suppose now (these assumptions being granted) that we have a baby
[Pg 25]
before us who sees a candle-ﬂame for the ﬁrst time, and, by virtue of a
reﬂex tendency common in babies of a certain age, extends his hand to
grasp it, so that his ﬁngers get burned. So far we have two reﬂex
currents in play: ﬁrst, from the eye to the extension movement, along
the line 1—1—1—1 of Fig. 3; and second, from the ﬁnger to the
movement of drawing back the hand, along the line 2—2—2—2. If
this were the baby's whole nervous system, and if the reﬂexes were
once for all organic, we should have no alteration in his behavior, no
FIG. 3.
matter how often the experience recurred. The retinal image of the
ﬂame would always make the arm shoot forward, the burning of the
ﬁnger would always send it back. But we know that 'the burnt child dreads the ﬁre,' and that
one experience usually protects the ﬁngers forever. The point is to see how the hemispheres
may bring this result to pass.

FIG. 4.—The
dotted lines stand

We must complicate our diagram (see Fig. 4). Let the current 1—1,
from the eye, discharge upward as well as downward when it reaches
the lower centre for vision, and arouse the perceptional process s1 in
the hemispheres; let the feeling of the arm's extension also send up a
current which leaves a trace of itself, m1; let the burnt ﬁnger leave an
analogous trace, s2; and let the movement of retraction leave m2. These
four processes will now, by virtue of assumption 2), be associated
together by the path s1—m1—s2—m2, running from the ﬁrst to the last,
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for afferent paths,
the broken lines
for paths between
the centres; the
entire lines for
efferent paths.

so that if anything touches off s1, ideas of the extension, of the burnt
ﬁnger, and of the retraction will pass in rapid succession through the [Pg 26]
mind. The effect on the child's conduct when the candle-ﬂame is next
presented is easy to imagine. Of course the sight of it arouses the
grasping reﬂex; but it arouses simultaneously the idea thereof, together
with that of the consequent pain, and of the ﬁnal retraction of the hand;
and if these cerebral processes prevail in strength over the immediate sensation in the
centres below, the last idea will be the cue by which the ﬁnal action is discharged. The
grasping will be arrested in mid-career, the hand drawn back, and the child's ﬁngers saved.
In all this we assume that the hemispheres do not natively couple any particular senseimpression with any special motor discharge. They only register, and preserve traces of,
such couplings as are already organized in the reﬂex centres below. But this brings it
inevitably about that, when a chain of experiences has been already registered and the ﬁrst
link is impressed once again from without, the last link will often be awakened in idea long
before it can exist in fact. And if this last link were previously coupled with a motion, that
motion may now come from the mere ideal suggestion without waiting for the actual
impression to arise. Thus an animal with hemispheres acts in anticipation of future things;
or, to use our previous formula, he acts from considerations of distant good and ill. If we
give the name of partners to the original couplings of impressions with motions in a reﬂex
way, then we may say that the function of the hemispheres is simply to bring about
exchanges among the partners. Movement mn, which natively is sensation sn's partner,
becomes through the hemispheres the partner of sensation s1, s2, or s3. It is like the great
commutating switch-board at a central telephone station. No new elementary process is
involved; no impression nor any motion peculiar to the hemispheres; but any number of
combinations impossible to the lower machinery taken alone, and an endless consequent
increase in the possibilities of behavior on the creature's part.
All this, as a mere scheme,[7] is so clear and so concordant with the general look of the facts [Pg 27]
as almost to impose itself on our belief; but it is anything but clear in detail. The brainphysiology of late years has with great effort sought to work out the paths by which these
couplings of sensations with movements take place, both in the hemispheres and in the
centres below.
So we must next test our scheme by the facts discovered m this direction. We shall
conclude, I think, after taking them all into account, that the scheme probably makes the
lower centres too machine-like and the hemispheres not quite machine-like enough, and
must consequently be softened down a little. So much I may say in advance. Meanwhile,
before plunging into the details which await us, it will somewhat clear our ideas if we
contrast the modern way of looking at the matter with the phrenological conception which
but lately preceded it.
THE PHRENOLOGICAL CONCEPTION.
In a certain sense Gall was the ﬁrst to seek to explain in detail how the brain could subserve
our mental operations. His way of proceeding was only too simple. He took the facultypsychology as his ultimatum on the mental side, and he made no farther psychological
analysis. Wherever he found an individual with some strongly-marked trait of character he
examined his head; and if he found the latter prominent in a certain region, he said without
more ado that that region was the 'organ' of the trait or faculty in question. The traits were of
very diverse constitution, some being simple sensibilities like 'weight' or 'color;' some being
instinctive tendencies like 'alimentiveness' or 'amativeness;' and others, again, being
complex resultants like 'conscientiousness,' 'individuality.' Phrenology fell promptly into
disrepute among scientiﬁc men because observation seemed to show that large faculties and [Pg 28]
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large 'bumps' might fail to coexist; because the scheme of Gall was so vast as hardly to
admit of accurate determination at all—who of us can say even of his own brothers whether
their perceptions of weight and of time are well developed or not?—because the followers of
Gall and Spurzheim were unable to reform these errors in any appreciable degree; and,
ﬁnally, because the whole analysis of faculties was vague and erroneous from a psychologic
point of view. Popular professors of the lore have nevertheless continued to command the
admiration of popular audiences; and there seems no doubt that Phrenology, however little it
satisfy our scientiﬁc curiosity about the functions of different portions of the brain, may still
be, in the hands of intelligent practitioners, a useful help in the art of reading character. A
hooked nose and a ﬁrm jaw are usually signs of practical energy; soft, delicate hands are
signs of reﬁned sensibility. Even so may a prominent eye be a sign of power over language,
and a bull-neck a sign of sensuality. But the brain behind the eye and neck need no more be
the organ of the signiﬁed faculty than the jaw is the organ of the will or the hand the organ
of reﬁnement. These correlations between mind and body are, however, so frequent that the
'characters' given by phrenologists are often remarkable for knowingness and insight.
Phrenology hardly does more than restate the problem. To answer the question, "Why do I
like children?" by saying, "Because you have a large organ of philoprogenitiveness," but
renames the phenomenon to be explained. What is my philoprogenitiveness? Of what
mental elements does it consist? And how can a part of the brain be its organ? A science of
the mind must reduce such complex manifestations as 'philoprogenitiveness' to their
elements. A science of the brain must point out the functions of its elements. A science of
the relations of mind and brain must show how the elementary ingredients of the former
correspond to the elementary functions of the latter. But phrenology, except by occasional
coincidence, takes no account of elements at all. Its 'faculties,' as a rule, are fully equipped
persons in a particular mental attitude. Take, for example, the 'faculty' of language. It
involves in reality a host of distinct powers. We must ﬁrst have images of concrete things [Pg 29]
and ideas of abstract qualities and relations; we must next have the memory of words and
then the capacity so to associate each idea or image with a particular word that, when the
word is heard, the idea shall forthwith enter our mind. We must conversely, as soon as the
idea arises in our mind, associate with it a mental image of the word, and by means of this
image we must innervate our articulatory apparatus so as to reproduce the word as physical
sound. To read or to write a language other elements still must be introduced. But it is plain
that the faculty of spoken language alone is so complicated as to call into play almost all the
elementary powers which the mind possesses, memory, imagination, association, judgment,
and volition. A portion of the brain competent to be the adequate seat of such a faculty
would needs be an entire brain in miniature,—just as the faculty itself is really a
speciﬁcation of the entire man, a sort of homunculus.
Yet just such homunculi are for the most part the phrenological organs. As Lange says:
"We have a parliament of little men together, each one of whom, as happens
also in a real parliament, possesses but a single idea which he ceaselessly
strives to make prevail"—benevolence, ﬁrmness, hope, and the rest. "Instead of
one soul, phrenology gives us forty, each alone as enigmatic as the full
aggregate psychic life can be. Instead of dividing the latter into effective
elements, she divides it into personal beings of peculiar character.... 'Herr
Pastor, sure there be a horse inside,' called out the peasants to X after their
spiritual shepherd had spent hours in explaining to them the construction of the
locomotive. With a horse inside truly everything becomes clear, even though it
be a queer enough sort of horse—the horse itself calls for no explanation!
Phrenology takes a start to get beyond the point of view of the ghost-like soul
entity, but she ends by populating the whole skull with ghosts of the same
order."[8]
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Modern Science conceives of the matter in a very different way. Brain and mind alike
consist of simple elements, sensory and motor. "All nervous centres," says Dr. Hughlings
Jackson,[9] "from the lowest to the very highest (the substrata of consciousness), are made [Pg 30]
up of nothing else than nervous arrangements, representing impressions and movements.... I
do not see of what other materials the brain can be made." Meynert represents the matter
similarly when he calls the cortex of the hemispheres the surface of projection for every
muscle and every sensitive point of the body. The muscles and the sensitive points are
represented each by a cortical point, and the brain is nothing but the sum of all these cortical
points, to which, on the mental side, as many ideas correspond. Ideas of sensation, ideas of
motion are, on the other hand, the elementary factors out of which the mind is built up by the
associationists in psychology. There is a complete parallelism between the two analyses, the
same diagram of little dots, circles, or triangles joined by lines symbolizes equally well the
cerebral and mental processes: the dots stand for cells or ideas, the lines for ﬁbres or
associations. We shall have later to criticise this analysis so far as it relates to the mind; but
there is no doubt that it is a most convenient, and has been a most useful, hypothesis,
formulating the facts in an extremely natural way.
If, then, we grant that motor and sensory ideas variously associated are the materials of the
mind, all we need do to get a complete diagram of the mind's and the brain's relations should
be to ascertain which sensory idea corresponds to which sensational surface of projection,
and which motor idea to which muscular surface of projection. The associations would then
correspond to the ﬁbrous connections between the various surfaces. This distinct cerebral
localization of the various elementary sorts of idea has been treated as a 'postulate' by many
physiologists (e.g. Munk); and the most stirring controversy in nerve-physiology which the
present generation has seen has been the localization-question.
THE LOCALIZATION OF FUNCTIONS IN THE HEMISPHERES.
Up to 1870, the opinion which prevailed was that which the experiments of Flourens on
pigeons' brains had made plausible, namely, that the different functions of the hemispheres [Pg 31]
were not locally separated, but carried on each by the aid of the whole organ. Hitzig in 1870
showed, however, that in a dog's brain highly specialized movements could be produced by
electric irritation of determinate regions of the cortex; and Ferrier and Munk, half a dozen
years later, seemed to prove, either by irritations or excisions or both, that there were
equally determinate regions connected with the senses of sight, touch, hearing, and smell.
Munk's special sensorial localizations, however, disagreed with Ferrier's; and Goltz, from
his extirpation-experiments, came to a conclusion adverse to strict localization of any kind.
The controversy is not yet over. I will not pretend to say anything more of it historically, but
give a brief account of the condition in which matters at present stand.
The one thing which is perfectly well established is this, that the 'central' convolutions, on
either side of the ﬁssure of Rolando, and (at least in the monkey) the calloso-marginal
convolution (which is continuous with them on the mesial surface where one hemisphere is
applied against the other), form the region by which all the motor incitations which leave the
cortex pass out, on their way to those executive centres in the region of the pons, medulla,
and spinal cord from which the muscular contractions are discharged in the last resort. The
existence of this so-called 'motor zone' is established by the lines of evidence successively
given below:
(1) Cortical Irritations. Electrical currents of small intensity applied to the surface of the
said convolutions in dogs, monkeys, and other animals, produce well-deﬁned movements in
face, fore-limb, hind-limb, tail, or trunk, according as one point or another of the surface is
irritated. These movements affect almost invariably the side opposite to the brain irritations:
If the left hemisphere be excited, the movement is of the right leg, side of face, etc. All the
objections at ﬁrst raised against the validity of these experiments have been overcome. The
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movements are certainly not due to irritations of the base of the brain by the downward
spread of the current, for: a) mechanical irritations will produce them, though less easily
than electrical; b) shifting the electrodes to a point close by on the surface changes the [Pg 32]
movement in ways quite inexplicable by changed physical conduction of the current; c) if
the cortical 'centre' for a certain movement be cut under with a sharp knife but left in situ,
although the electric conductivity is physically unaltered by the operation, the physiological
conductivity is gone and currents of the same strength no longer produce the movements
which they did; d) the time-interval between the application of the electric stimulus to the
cortex and the resultant movement is what it would be if the cortex acted physiologically
and not merely physically in transmitting the irritation. It is namely a well-known fact that
when a nerve-current has to pass through the spinal cord to excite a muscle by reﬂex action,
the time is longer than if it passes directly down the motor nerve: the cells of the cord take a
certain time to discharge. Similarly, when a stimulus is applied directly to the cortex the
muscle contracts two or three hundredths of a second later than it does when the place on
the cortex is cut away and the electrodes are applied to the white ﬁbres below.[10]
(2) Cortical Ablations. When the cortical spot which is found to produce a movement of the
fore-leg, in a dog, is excised (see spot 5 in Fig. 5), the leg in question becomes peculiarly
affected. At ﬁrst it seems paralyzed. Soon, however, it is used with the other legs, but badly.
The animal does not bear his weight on it, allows it to rest on its dorsal surface, stands with
it crossing the other leg, does not remove it if it hangs over the edge of a table, can no longer
'give the paw' at word of command if able to do so before the operation, does not use it for
scratching the ground, or holding a bone as formerly, lets it slip out when running on a
smooth surface or when shaking himself, etc., etc. Sensibility of all kinds seems diminished [Pg 33]
as well as motility, but of this I shall speak later on. Moreover the dog tends in voluntary
movements to swerve towards the side of the brain-lesion instead of going straight forward.
All these symptoms gradually decrease, so that even with a very severe brain-lesion the dog
may be outwardly indistinguishable from a well dog after eight or ten weeks. Still, a slight
chloroformization will reproduce the disturbances, even then. There is a certain appearance
of ataxic in-coordination in the movements—the dog lifts his fore-feet high and brings them
down with more strength than usual, and yet the trouble is not ordinary lack of coordination. Neither is there paralysis. The strength of whatever movements are made is as
great as ever—dogs with extensive destruction of the motor zone can jump as high and bite
as hard as ever they did, but they seem less easily moved to do anything with the affected
parts. Dr. Loeb, who has studied the motor disturbances of dogs more carefully than any
one, conceives of them en masse as effects of an increased inertia in all the processes of
innervation towards the side opposed to the lesion. All such movements require an
unwonted effort for their execution; and when only the normally usual effort is made they
fall behind in effectiveness.[11]

FIG. 5.—Left Hemisphere of Dog's Brain, after Ferrier. A, the
fissure of Sylvius. B, the crucial sulcus. O, the olfactory bulb. I,
II, III, IV, indicate the first, second, third, and fourth external
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convolutions respectively. (1), (4), and (5) are on the sigmoid
gyrus.
[Pg 34]

FIG. 6.—Left Hemisphere of Monkey's Brain. Outer Surface.

Even when the entire motor zone of a dog is removed, there is no permanent paralysis of
any part, but only this curious sort of relative inertia when the two sides of the body are
compared; and this itself becomes hardly noticeable after a number of weeks have elapsed.
Prof. Goltz has described a dog whose entire left hemisphere was destroyed, and who
retained only a slight motor inertia on the right half of the body. In particular he could use
his right paw for holding a bone whilst gnawing it, or for reaching after a piece of meat. Had
he been taught to give his paw Before the operations, it would have been curious to see
whether that faculty also came back. His tactile sensibility was permanently diminished on
the right side.[12] In monkeys a genuine paralysis follows upon ablations of the cortex in the
motor region. This paralysis affects parts of the body which vary with the brain-parts
removed. The monkey's opposite arm or leg hangs ﬂaccid, or at most takes a small part in
associated movements. When the entire region is removed there is a genuine and permanent
hemiplegia in which the arm is more affected than the leg; and this is followed months later [Pg 35]
by contracture of the muscles, as in man after inveterate hemiplegia.[13] According to
Schaefer and Horsley, the trunk-muscles also become paralyzed after destruction of the
marginal convolution on both sides (see Fig. 7). These differences between dogs and
monkeys show the danger of drawing general conclusions from experiments done on any
one sort of animal. I subjoin the ﬁgures given by the last-named authors of the motor
regions in the monkey's brain.[14]
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FIG. 7.—Left Hemisphere of Monkey's Brain. Mesial Surface.

In man we are necessarily reduced to the observation post-mortem of cortical ablations
produced by accident or disease (tumor, hemorrhage, softening, etc.). What results during
life from such conditions is either localized spasm, or palsy of certain muscles of the
opposite side. The cortical regions which invariably produce these results are homologous
with those which we have just been studying in the dog, cat, ape, etc. Figs. 8 and 9 show the
result of 169 cases carefully studied by Exner. The parts shaded are regions where lesions [Pg 36]
produced no motor disturbance. Those left white were, on the contrary, never injured
without motor disturbances of some sort. Where the injury to the cortical substance is
profound in man, the paralysis is permanent and is succeeded by muscular rigidity in the
paralyzed parts, just as it may be in the monkey.

FIG. 8.—Right Hemisphere of Human Brain. Lateral Surface.
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FIG. 9.—Right Hemisphere of Human Brain. Mesial Surface.

(3) Descending degenerations show the intimate connection of the rolandic regions of the [Pg 37]
cortex with the motor tracts of the cord. When, either in man or in the lower animals, these
regions are destroyed, a peculiar degenerative change known as secondary sclerosis is found
to extend downwards through the white ﬁbrous substance of the brain in a perfectly deﬁnite
manner, affecting certain distinct strands which pass through the inner capsule, crura, and
pons, into the anterior pyramids of the medulla oblongata, and from thence (partly crossing
to the other side) downwards into the anterior (direct) and lateral (crossed) columns of the
spinal cord.
(4) Anatomical proof of the continuity of the rolandic regions with these motor columns of
the cord is also clearly given. Flechsig's 'Pyramidenbahn' forms an uninterrupted strand
(distinctly traceable in human embryos, before its ﬁbres have acquired their white
'medullary sheath') passing upwards from the pyramids of the medulla, and traversing the
internal capsule and corona radiata to the convolutions in question (Fig. 10). None of the
inferior gray matter of the brain seems to have any connection with this important ﬁbrous
strand. It passes directly from the cortex to the motor arrangements in the cord, depending
for its proper nutrition (as the facts of degeneration show) on the inﬂuence of the cortical
cells, just as motor nerves depend for their nutrition on that of the cells of the spinal cord.
Electrical stimulation of this motor strand in any accessible part of its course has been
shown in dogs to produce movements analogous to those which excitement of the cortical
surface calls forth.
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FIG. 10.—Schematic Transverse Section of Brain showing
Motor Strand.—After Edinger.

One of the most instructive proofs of motor localization in the cortex is that furnished by the
disease now called aphemia, or motor Aphasia. Motor aphasia is neither loss of voice nor
paralysis of the tongue or lips. The patient's voice is as strong as ever, and all the
innervations of his hypoglossal and facial nerves, except those necessary for speaking, may
go on perfectly well. He can laugh and cry, and even sing; but he either is unable to utter
any words at all; or a few meaningless stock phrases form his only speech; or else he speaks
incoherently and confusedly, mispronouncing, misplacing, and misusing his words in [Pg 38]
various degrees. Sometimes his speech is a mere broth of unintelligible syllables. In cases of
pure motor aphasia the patient recognizes his mistakes and suffers acutely from them. Now
whenever a patient dies in such a condition as this, and an examination of his brain is
permitted, it is found that the lowest frontal gyrus (see Fig. 11) is the seat of injury. Broca [Pg 39]
ﬁrst noticed this fact in 1861, and since then the gyrus has gone by the name of Broca's
convolution. The injury in right-handed people is found on the left hemisphere, and in lefthanded people on the right hemisphere. Most people, in fact, are left-brained, that is, all
their delicate and specialized movements are handed over to the charge of the left
hemisphere. The ordinary right-handedness for such movements is only a consequence of
that fact, a consequence which shows outwardly on account of that extensive decussation of
the ﬁbres whereby most of those from the left hemisphere pass to the right half of the body
only. But the left-brainedness might exist in equal measure and not show outwardly. This
would happen wherever organs on both sides of the body could be governed by the left
hemisphere; and just such a case seems offered by the vocal organs, in that highly delicate
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and special motor service which we call speech. Either hemisphere can innervate them
bilaterally, just as either seems able to innervate bilaterally the muscles of the trunk, ribs,
and diaphragm. Of the special movements of speech, however, it would appear (from the [Pg 40]
facts of aphasia) that the left hemisphere in most persons habitually takes exclusive charge.
With that hemisphere thrown out of gear, speech is undone; even though the opposite
hemisphere still be there for the performance of less specialized acts, such as the various
movements required in eating.

FIG. 11.—Schematic Profile of Left Hemisphere, with the parts
shaded whose destruction causes motor ('Broca') and sensory
('Wernicke') Aphasia.

It will be noticed that Broca's region is homologous with the parts ascertained to produce
movements of the lips, tongue, and larynx when excited by electric currents in apes (cf. Fig.
6). The evidence is therefore as complete as it well can be that the motor incitations to these
organs leave the brain by the lower frontal region.
Victims of motor aphasia generally have other disorders. One which interests us in this
connection has been called agraphia: they have lost the power to write. They can read
writing and understand it; but either cannot use the pen at all or make egregious mistakes
with it. The seat of the lesion here is less well determined, owing to an insufﬁcient number
of good cases to conclude from.[15] There is no doubt, however, that it is (in right-handed
people) on the left side, and little doubt that it consists of elements of the hand-and-arm
region specialized for that service, The symptom may exist when there is little or no
disability in the hand for other uses. If it does not get well, the patient usually educates his
right hemisphere, i.e. learns to write with his left hand. In other cases of which we shall say
more a few pages later on, the patient can write both spontaneously and at dictation, but
cannot read even what he has himself written! All these phenomena are now quite clearly
explained by separate brain-centres for the various feelings and movements and tracts for
associating these together. But their minute discussion belongs to medicine rather than to
general psychology, and I can only use them here to illustrate the principles of motor
localization.[16] Under the heads of sight and hearing I shall have a little more to say.
The different lines of proof which I have taken up establish conclusively the proposition that [Pg 41]
all the motor impulses which leave the cortex pass out, in healthy animals, from the
convolutions about the ﬁssure of Rolando.
When, however, it comes to deﬁning precisely what is involved in a motor impulse leaving
the cortex, things grow more obscure. Does the impulse start independently from the
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convolutions in question, or does it start elsewhere and merely ﬂow through? And to what
particular phase of psychic activity does the activity of these centres correspond? Opinions
and authorities here divide; but it will be better, before entering into these deeper aspects of
the problem, to cast a glance at the facts which have been made out concerning the relations
of the cortex to sight, hearing, and smell.
Sight.
Ferrier was the ﬁrst in the ﬁeld here. He found, when the angular convolution (that lying
between the 'intra parietal' and 'external occipital' ﬁssures, and bending round the top of the
ﬁssure of Sylvius, in Fig. 6) was excited in the monkey, that movements of the eyes and
head as if for vision occurred; and that when it was extirpated, what he supposed to be total
and permanent blindness of the opposite eye followed. Munk almost immediately declared
total and permanent blindness to follow from destruction of the occipital lobe in monkeys as
well as dogs, and said that the angular gyrus had nothing to do with sight, but was only the
centre for tactile sensibility of the eyeball. Hunk's absolute tone about his observations and
his theoretic arrogance have led to his ruin as an authority. But he did two things of
permanent value. He was the ﬁrst to distinguish in these vivisections between sensorial and
psychic blindness, and to describe the phenomenon of restitution of the visual function after
its ﬁrst impairment by an operation; and the ﬁrst to notice the hemiopic character of the
visual disturbances which result when only one hemisphere is injured. Sensorial blindness is
absolute insensibility to light; psychic blindness is inability to recognize the meaning of the
optical impressions, as when we see a page of Chinese print but it suggests nothing to us. A [Pg 42]
hemiopic disturbance of vision is one in which neither retina is affected in its totality, but in
which, for example, the left portion of each retina is blind, so that the animal sees nothing
situated in space towards its right. Later observations have corroborated this hemiopic
character of all the disturbances of sight from injury to a single hemisphere in the higher
animals; and the question whether an animal's apparent blindness is sensorial or only
psychic has, since Munk's ﬁrst publications, been the most urgent one to answer, in all
observations relative to the function of sight.
Goltz almost simultaneously with Ferrier and Munk reported experiments which led him to
deny that the visual function was essentially bound up with any one localized portion of the
hemispheres. Other divergent results soon came in from many quarters, so that, without
going into the history of the matter any more, I may report the existing state of the case as
follows:[17]
In ﬁshes, frogs, and lizards vision persists when the hemispheres are entirely removed. This
is admitted for frogs and ﬁshes even by Munk, who denies it for birds.
All of Munk's birds seemed totally blind (blind sensorially) after removal of the
hemispheres by his operation. The following of a candle by the head and winking at a
threatened blow, which are ordinarily held to prove the retention of crude optical sensations
by the lower centres in supposed hemisphereless pigeons, are by Munk ascribed to vestiges
of the visual sphere of the cortex left behind by the imperfection of the operation. But
Schrader, who operated after Munk and with every apparent guarantee of completeness,
found that all his pigeons saw after two or three weeks had elapsed, and the inhibitions
resulting from the wound had passed away. They invariably avoided even the slightest
obstacles, ﬂew very regularly towards certain perches, etc., differing toto cœlo in these
respects with certain simply blinded pigeons who were kept with them for comparison. They [Pg 43]
did not pick up food strewn on the ground, however. Schrader found that they would do this
if even a small part of the frontal region of the hemispheres was left, and ascribes their nonself-feeding when deprived of their occipital cerebrum not to a visual, but to a motor, defect,
a sort of alimentary aphasia.[18]
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In presence of such discord as that between Munk and his opponents one must carefully
note how differently signiﬁcant is loss, from preservation, of a function after an operation
on the brain. The loss of the function does not necessarily show that it is dependent on the
part cut out; but its preservation does show that it is not dependent: and this is true though
the loss should be observed ninety-nine times and the preservation only once in a hundred
similar excisions. That birds and mammals can be blinded by cortical ablation is undoubted;
the only question is, must they be so? Only then can the cortex be certainly called the 'seat
of sight.' The blindness may always be due to one of those remote effects of the wound on
distant parts, inhibitions, extensions of inﬂammation,—interferences, in a word,—upon
which Brown-Séquard and Goltz have rightly insisted, and the importance of which
becomes more manifest every day. Such effects are transient; whereas the symptoms of
deprivation (Ausfallserscheinungen, as Goltz calls them) which come from the actual loss of
the cut-out region must from the nature of the case be permanent. Blindness in the pigeons,
so far as it passes away, cannot possibly be charged to their seat of vision being lost, but
only to some inﬂuence which temporarily depresses the activity of that seat. The same is
true mutatis mutandis of all the other effects of operations, and as we pass to mammals we
shall see still more the importance of the remark.
In rabbits loss of the entire cortex seems compatible with the preservation of enough sight
to guide the poor animals' movements, and enable them to avoid obstacles. Christiani's
observations and discussions seem conclusively to have established this, although Munk [Pg 44]
found that all his animals were made totally blind.[19]
In dogs also Munk found absolute stone-blindness after ablation of the occipital lobes. He
went farther and mapped out determinate portions of the cortex thereupon, which he
considered correlated with deﬁnite segments of the two retinæ, so that destruction of given
portions of the cortex produces blindness of the retinal centre, top, bottom, or right or left
side, of the same or opposite eye. There seems little doubt that this deﬁnite correlation is
mythological. Other observers, Hitzig, Goltz, Luciani, Loeb, Exner, etc., ﬁnd, whatever part
of the cortex may be ablated on one side, that there usually results a hemiopic disturbance of
both eyes, slight and transient when the anterior lobes are the parts attacked, grave when an
occipital lobe is the seat of injury, and lasting in proportion to the latter's extent. According
to Loeb, the defect is a dimness of vision ('hemiamblyopia') in which (however severe) the
centres remain the best seeing portions of the retina, just as they are in normal dogs. The
lateral or temporal part of each retina seems to be in exclusive connection with the cortex of
its own side. The centre and nasal part of each seems, on the contrary, to be connected with
the cortex of the opposite hemispheres. Loeb, who takes broader views than any one,
conceives the hemiamblyopia as he conceives the motor disturbances, namely, as the
expression of an increased inertia in the whole optical machinery, of which the result is to
make the animal respond with greater effort to impressions coming from the half of space
opposed to the side of the lesion. If a dog has right hemiamblyopia, say, and two pieces of
meat are hung before him at once, he invariably turns ﬁrst to the one on his left. But if the
lesion be a slight one, shaking slightly the piece of meat on his right (this makes of it a
stronger stimulus) makes him seize upon it ﬁrst. If only one piece of meat be offered, he
takes it, on whichever side it be.
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FIGS. 12 and 13. The Dog's visual centre according to Munk,
the entire striated region, A, A, being the exclusive seat of
vision, and the dark central circle, A1, being correlated with the
retinal centre of the opposite eye.

When both occipital lobes are extensively destroyed total blindness may result. Munk maps
out his 'Sehsphäre' deﬁnitely, and says that blindness must result when the entire shaded [Pg 45]
part, marked A, A, in Figs. 12 and 13, is involved in the lesion. Discrepant reports of other
observations he explains as due to incomplete ablation. Luciani, Goltz, and Lannegrace,
however, contend that they have made complete bilateral extirpations of Munk's Sehsphäre
more than once, and found a sort of crude indiscriminating sight of objects to return in a few
weeks.[20] The question whether a dog is blind or not is harder to solve than would at ﬁrst
appear; for simply blinded dogs, in places to which they are accustomed, show little of their
loss and avoid all obstacles; whilst dogs whose occipital lobes are gone may run against
things frequently and yet see notwithstanding. The best proof that they may see is that which
Goltz's dogs furnished: they carefully avoided, as it seemed, strips of sunshine or paper on
the ﬂoor, as if they were solid obstacles. This no really blind dog would do. Luciani tested
his dogs when hungry (a condition which sharpens their attention) by strewing pieces of [Pg 46]
meat and pieces of cork before them. If they went straight at them, they saw; and if they
chose the meat and left the cork, they saw discriminatingly. The quarrel is very acrimonious;
indeed the subject of localization of functions in the brain seems to have a peculiar effect on
the temper of those who cultivate it experimentally. The amount of preserved vision which
Goltz and Luciani report seems hardly to be worth considering, on the one hand; and on the
other, Munk admits in his penultimate paper that out of 85 dogs he only 'succeeded' 4 times
in his operation of producing complete blindness by complete extirpation of his
'Sehsphäre.'[21] The safe conclusion for us is that Luciani's diagram, Fig. 14, represents
something like the truth. The occipital lobes are far more important for vision than any other
part of the cortex, so that their complete destruction makes the animal almost blind. As for
the crude sensibility to light which may then remain, nothing exact is known either about its
nature or its seat.
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FIG. 14.—Distribution of the Visual Function in the Cortex,
according to Luciani.

In the monkey, doctors also disagree. The truth seems, however, to be that the occipital lobes
in this animal also are the part connected most intimately with the visual function. The
function would seem to go on when very small portions of them are left, for Ferrier found
no 'appreciable impairment' of it after almost complete destruction of them on both sides.
On the other hand, he found complete and permanent blindness to ensue when they and the
angular gyri in addition were destroyed on both sides. Munk, as well as Brown and [Pg 47]
Schaefer, found no disturbance of sight from destroying the angular gyri alone, although
Ferrier found blindness to ensue. This blindness was probably due to inhibitions exerted in
distans, or to cutting of the white optical ﬁbres passing under the angular gyri on their way
to the occipital lobes. Brown and Schaefer got complete and permanent blindness in one
monkey from total destruction of both occipital lobes. Luciani and Seppili, performing this
operation on two monkeys, found that the animals were only mentally, not sensorially, blind.
After some weeks they saw their food, but could not distinguish by sight between ﬁgs and
pieces of cork. Luciani and Seppili seem, however, not to have extirpated the entire lobes.
When one lobe only is injured the affection of sight is hemiopic in monkeys: in this all
observers agree. On the whole, then, Munk's original location of vision in the occipital lobes
is conﬁrmed by the later evidence.[22]
In man we have more exact results, since we are not driven to interpret the vision from the
outward conduct. On the other hand, however, we cannot vivisect, but must wait for
pathological lesions to turn up. The pathologists who have discussed these (the literature is
tedious ad libitum) conclude that the occipital lobes are the indispensable part for vision in
man. Hemiopic disturbance in both eyes comes from lesion of either one of them, and total
blindness, sensorial as well as psychic, from destruction of both.
Hemiopia may also result from lesion in other parts, especially the neighboring angular and
supra-marginal gyri, and it may accompany extensive injury in the motor region of the
cortex. In these cases it seems probable that it is due to an actio in distans, probably to the
interruption of ﬁbres proceeding from the occipital lobe. There seem to be a few cases on [Pg 48]
record where there was injury to the occipital lobes without visual defect. Ferrier has
collected as many as possible to prove his localization in the angular gyrus.[23] A strict
application of logical principles would make one of these cases outweigh one hundred
contrary ones. And yet, remembering how imperfect observations may be, and how
individual brains may vary, it would certainly be rash for their sake to throw away the
enormous amount of positive evidence for the occipital lobes. Individual variability is
always a possible explanation of an anomalous case. There is no more prominent anatomical
fact than that of the 'decussation of the pyramids,' nor any more usual pathological fact than
its consequence, that left-handed hemorrhages into the motor region produce right-handed
paralyses. And yet the decussation is variable in amount, and seems sometimes to be absent
altogether.[24] If, in such a case as this last, the left brain were to become the seat of
apoplexy, the left and not the right half of the body would be the one to suffer paralysis.
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The schema below [Fig. 15], copied from Dr. Seguin, expresses, on the whole, the probable
truth about the regions concerned in vision. Not the entire occipital lobes, but the so-called
cunei, and the ﬁrst convolutions, are the cortical parts most intimately concerned. Nothnagel
agrees with Seguin in this limitation of the essential tracts.[25]

FIG. 15.—Scheme of the mechanism of vision, after Seguin.
The cuneus convolution (Cu) of the right occipital lobe is
supposed to be injured, and all the parts which lead to it are
darkly shaded to show that they fail to exert their function. F.
O. are the intra-hemispheric optical fibres. P. O. C. is the
region of the lower optic centres (corpora geniculata and
quadrigemina). T. O. D. is the right optic tract; C, the chiasma;
F. L. D. are the fibres going to the lateral or temporal half T of
the right retina; and F. C. S. are those going to the central or
nasal half of the left retina. O. D. is the right, and O. S. the left
eyeball. The rightward half of each is therefore blind: in other
words, the right nasal field, R. N. F., and the left temporal field
L. T. F., have become invisible to the subject with the lesion at
Cu.

A most interesting effect of cortical disorder is mental blindness. This consists not so much
in insensibility to optical impressions, as in inability to understand them. Psychologically it
is interpretable as loss of associations between optical sensations and what they signify; and
any interruption of the paths between the optic centres and the centres for other ideas ought
to bring it about. Thus, printed letters of the alphabet, or words, signify certain sounds and [Pg 49]
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certain articulatory movements. If the connection between the articulating or auditory
centres, on the one hand, and the visual centres on the other, be ruptured we ought a priori
to expect that the sight of words would fail to awaken the idea of their sound, or the
movement for pronouncing them. We ought, in short, to have alexia, or inability to read: and
this is just what we do have in many cases of extensive injury about the fronto-temporal [Pg 50]
regions, as a complication of aphasic disease. Nothnagel suggests that whilst the cuneus is
the seat of optical sensations, the other parts of the occipital lobe may be the ﬁeld of optical
memories and ideas, from the loss of which mental blindness should ensue. In fact, all the
medical authors speak of mental blindness as if it must consist in the loss of visual images
from the memory. It seems to me, however, that this is a psychological misapprehension. A
man whose power of visual imagination has decayed (no unusual phenomenon in its lighter
grades) is not mentally blind in the least, for he recognizes perfectly all that he sees. On the
other hand, he may be mentally blind, with his optical imagination well preserved; as in the
interesting case published by Wilbrand in 1887.[26] In the still more interesting case of
mental blindness recently published by Lissauer,[27] though the patient made the most
ludicrous mistakes, calling for instance a clothes-brush a pair of spectacles, an umbrella a
plant with ﬂowers, an apple a portrait of a lady, etc. etc., he seemed, according to the
reporter, to have his mental images fairly well preserved. It is in fact the momentary loss of
our non-optical images which makes us mentally blind, just as it is that of our non-auditory
images which makes us mentally deaf. I am mentally deaf if, hearing a bell, I can't recall
how it looks; and mentally blind if, seeing it, I can't recall its sound or its name. As a matter
of fact, I should have to be not merely mentally blind, but stone-blind, if all my visual
images were lost. For although I am blind to the right half of the ﬁeld of view if my left
occipital region is injured, and to the left half if my right region is injured, such hemianopsia
does not deprive me of visual images, experience seeming to show that the unaffected
hemisphere is always sufﬁcient for production of these. To abolish them entirely I should
have to be deprived of both occipital lobes, and that would deprive me not only of my
inward images of sight, but of my sight altogether.[28] Recent pathological annals seem to [Pg 51]
offer a few such cases.[29] Meanwhile there are a number of cases of mental blindness,
especially for written language, coupled with hemianopsia, usually of the rightward ﬁeld of
view. These are all explicable by the breaking down, through disease, of the connecting
tracts between the occipital lobes and other parts of the brain, especially those which go to
the centres for speech in the frontal and temporal regions of the left hemisphere. They are to
be classed among disturbances of conduction or of association; and nowhere can I ﬁnd any
fact which should force us to believe that optical images need[30] be lost in mental
blindness, or that the cerebral centres for such images are locally distinct from those for
direct sensations from the eyes.[31]
Where an object fails to be recognized by sight, it often happens that the patient will
recognize and name it as soon as he touches it with his hand. This shows in an interesting [Pg 52]
way how numerous the associative paths are which all end by running out of the brain
through the channel of speech. The hand-path is open, though the eye-path be closed. When
mental blindness is most complete, neither sight, touch, nor sound avails to steer the patient,
and a sort of dementia which has been called asymbolia or apraxia is the result. The
commonest articles are not understood. The patient will put his breeches on one shoulder
and his hat upon the other, will bite into the soap and lay his shoes on the table, or take his
food into his hand and throw it down again, not knowing what to do with it, etc. Such
disorder can only come from extensive brain-injury.[32]
The method of degeneration corroborates the other evidence localizing the tracts of vision.
In young animals one gets secondary degeneration of the occipital regions from destroying
an eyeball, and, vice versâ, degeneration of the optic nerves from destroying the occipital
regions. The corpora geniculata, thalami, and subcortical ﬁbres leading to the occipital lobes
are also found atrophied in these cases. The phenomena are not uniform, but are
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indisputable;[33] so that, taking all lines of evidence together, the special connection of
vision with the occipital lobes is perfectly made out. It should be added, that the occipital
lobes have frequently been found shrunken in cases of inveterate blindness in man.
Hearing.
Hearing is hardly as deﬁnitely localized as sight. In the dog, Luciani's diagram will show the
regions which directly or indirectly affect it for the worse when injured. As with sight, onesided lesions produce symptoms on both sides. The mixture of black dots and gray dots in
the diagram is meant to represent this mixture of 'crossed' and 'uncrossed' connections,
though of course no topographical exactitude is aimed at. Of all the region, the temporal
lobe is the most important part; yet permanent absolute deafness did not result in a dog of [Pg 53]
Luciani's, even from bilateral destruction of both temporal lobes in their entirety.[34]

FIG. 16.—Luciani's Hearing Region.

In the monkey, Ferrier and Yeo once found permanent deafness to follow destruction of the
upper temporal convolution (the one just below the ﬁssure of Sylvius in Fig. 6) on both
sides. Brown and Schaefer found, on the contrary, that in several monkeys this operation
failed to noticeably affect the hearing. In one animal, indeed, both entire temporal lobes
were destroyed. After a week or two of depression of the mental faculties this beast
recovered and became one of the brightest monkeys possible, domineering over all his
mates, and admitted by all who saw him to have all his senses, including hearing, 'perfectly
acute.'[35] Terrible recriminations have, as usual, ensued between the investigators, Ferrier
denying that Brown and Schaefer's ablations were complete,[36] Schaefer that Ferrier's
monkey was really deaf.[37] In this unsatisfactory condition the subject must be left,
although there seems no reason to doubt that Brown and Schaefer's observation is the more
important of the two.
In man the temporal lobe is unquestionably the seat of the hearing function, and the superior
convolution adjacent to the sylvian ﬁssure is its most important part. The phenomena of
aphasia show this. We studied motor aphasia a few pages back; we must now consider
sensory aphasia. Our knowledge of this disease has had three stages: we may talk of the [Pg 54]
period of Broca, the period of Wernicke, and the period of Charcot. What Broca's discovery
was we have seen. Wernicke was the ﬁrst to discriminate those cases in which the patient
can not even understand speech from those in which he can understand, only not talk; and to
ascribe the former condition to lesion of the temporal lobe.[38] The condition in question is
word-deafness, and the disease is auditory aphasia. The latest statistical survey of the
subject is that by Dr. Allen Starr.[39] In the seven cases of pure word-deafness which he has
collected, cases in which the patient could read, talk, and write, but not understand what was
said to him, the lesion was limited to the ﬁrst and second temporal convolutions in their
posterior two thirds. The lesion (in right-handed, i.e. left-brained, persons) is always on the
left side, like the lesion in motor aphasia. Crude hearing would not be abolished, even were
the left centre for it utterly destroyed; the right centre would still provide for that. But the
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linguistic use of hearing appears bound up with the integrity of the left centre more or less
exclusively. Here it must be that words heard enter into association with the things which
they represent, on the one hand, and with the movements necessary for pronouncing them,
on the other. In a large majority of Dr. Starr's ﬁfty cases, the power either to name objects or
to talk coherently was impaired. This shows that in most of us (as Wernicke said) speech
must go on from auditory cues; that is, it must be that our ideas do not innervate our motor
centres directly, but only after ﬁrst arousing the mental sound of the words. This is the
immediate stimulus to articulation; and where the possibility of this is abolished by the
destruction of its usual channel in the left temporal lobe, the articulation must suffer. In the
few cases in which the channel is abolished with no bad effect on speech we must suppose
an idiosyncrasy. The patient must innervate his speech-organs either from the corresponding
portion of the other hemisphere or directly from the centres of ideation, those, namely, of [Pg 55]
vision, touch, etc., without leaning on the auditory region. It is the minuter analysis of the
facts in the light of such individual differences as these which constitutes Charcot's
contribution towards clearing up the subject.
Every nameable thing, act, or relation has numerous properties, qualities, or aspects. In our
minds the properties of each thing, together with its name, form an associated group. If
different parts of the brain are severally concerned with the several properties, and a farther
part with the hearing, and still another with the uttering, of the name, there must inevitably
be brought about (through the law of association which we shall later study) such a dynamic
connection amongst all these brain-parts that the activity of any one of them will be likely to
awaken the activity of all the rest. When we are talking as we think, the ultimate process is
that of utterance. If the brain-part for that be injured, speech is impossible or disorderly,
even though all the other brain-parts be intact: and this is just the condition of things which,
on page 37, we found to be brought about by limited lesion of the left inferior frontal
convolution. But back of that last act various orders of succession are possible in the
associations of a talking man's ideas. The more usual order seems to be from the tactile,
visual, or other properties of the things thought-about to the sound of their names, and then
to the latter's utterance. But if in a certain individual the thought of the look of an object or
of the look of its printed name be the process which habitually precedes articulation, then
the loss of the hearing centre will pro tanto not affect that individual's speech. He will be
mentally deaf, i.e. his understanding of speech will suffer, but he will not be aphasic. In this
way it is possible to explain the seven cases of pure word-deafness which ﬁgure in Dr.
Starr's table.
If this order of association be ingrained and habitual in that individual, injury to his visual
centres will make him not only word-blind, but aphasic as well. His speech will become
confused in consequence of an occipital lesion. Naunyn, consequently, plotting out on a
diagram of the hemisphere the 71 irreproachably reported cases of aphasia which he was [Pg 56]
able to collect, ﬁnds that the lesions concentrate themselves in three places: ﬁrst, on Broca's
centre; second, on Wernicke's; third, on the supra-marginal and angular gyri under which
those ﬁbres pass which connect the visual centres with the rest of the brain[40] (see Fig. 17).
With this result Dr. Starr's analysis of purely sensory cases agrees.
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FIG. 17.

In a later chapter we shall again return to these differences in the effectiveness of the
sensory spheres in different individuals. Meanwhile few things show more beautifully than
the history of our knowledge of aphasia how the sagacity and patience of many banded
workers are in time certain to analyze the darkest confusion into an orderly display.[41]
There is no 'centre of Speech' in the brain any more than there is a faculty of Speech in the
mind. The entire brain, more or less, is at work in a man who uses language. The subjoined
diagram, from Boss, shows the four parts most critically concerned, and, in the light of our
text, needs no farther explanation (see Fig. 18).
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FIG. 18.

Smell.

[Pg 57]

Everything conspires to point to the median descending part of the temporal lobes as being
the organs of smell. Even Ferrier and Munk agree on the hippocampal gyrus, though Ferrier
restricts olfaction, as Munk does not, to the lobule or uncinate process of the convolution,
reserving the rest of it for touch. Anatomy and pathology also point to the hippocampal
gyrus; but as the matter is less interesting from the point of view of human psychology than
were sight and hearing, I will say no more, but simply add Luciani and Seppili's diagram of
the dog's smell-centre.[42] Of
Taste

[Pg 58]

we know little that is deﬁnite. What little there is points to the lower temporal regions again.
Consult Ferrier as below.

FIG. 19.—Luciani's Olfactory Region in the Dog.

Touch.
Interesting problems arise with regard to the seat of tactile and muscular sensibility. Hitzig,
whose experiments on dogs' brains ﬁfteen years ago opened the entire subject which we are
discussing, ascribed the disorders of motility observed after ablations of the motor region to
a loss of what he called muscular consciousness. The animals do not notice eccentric
positions of their limbs, will stand with their legs crossed, with the affected paw resting on
its back or hanging over a table's edge, etc.; and do not resist our bending and stretching of
it as they resist with the unaffected paw. Goltz, Munk, Schiff, Herzen, and others promptly
ascertained an equal defect of cutaneous sensibility to pain, touch, and cold. The paw is not
withdrawn when pinched, remains standing in cold water, etc. Ferrier meanwhile denied that
there was any true anæsthesia produced by ablations in the motor zone, and explains the
appearance of it as an effect of the sluggish motor responses of the affected side.[43]
Munk[44] and Schiff[45], on the contrary, conceive of the 'motor zone' as essentially sensory, [Pg 59]
and in different ways explain the motor disorders as secondary results of the anæsthesia
which is always there, Munk calls the motor zone the Fühlsphäre of the animal's limbs, etc.,
and makes it coördinate with the Sehsphäre, the Hörsphäre, etc., the entire cortex being,
according to him, nothing but a projection-surface for sensations, with no exclusively or
essentially motor part. Such a view would be important if true, through its bearings on the
psychology of volition. What is the truth? As regards the fact of cutaneous anæsthesia from
motor-zone ablations, all other observers are against Ferrier, so that he is probably wrong in
denying it. On the other hand, Munk and Schiff are wrong in making the motor symptoms
depend on the anæsthesia, for in certain rare cases they have been observed to exist not only
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without insensibility, but with actual hyperæsthesia of the parts.[46] The motor and sensory
symptoms seem, therefore, to be independent variables.
In monkeys the latest experiments are those of Horsley and Schaefer,[47] whose results
Ferrier accepts. They ﬁnd that excision of the hippocampal convolution produces transient
insensibility of the opposite side of the body, and that permanent insensibility is produced
by destruction of its continuation upwards above the corpus callosum, the so-called gyrus
fornicatus (the part just below the 'calloso-marginal ﬁssure' in Fig. 7). The insensibility is at
its maximum when the entire tract comprising both convolutions is destroyed. Ferrier says
that the sensibility of monkeys is 'entirely unaffected' by ablations of the motor zone,[48] and
Horsley and Schaefer consider it by no means necessarily abolished.[49] Luciani found it [Pg 60]
diminished in his three experiments on apes.[50]

FIG. 20.—Luciani's Tactile Region in the Dog.

In man we have the fact that one-sided paralysis from disease of the opposite motor zone
may or may not be accompanied with anæsthesia of the parts. Luciani, who believes that the
motor zone is also sensory, tries to minimize the value of this evidence by pointing to the
insufﬁciency with which patients are examined. He himself believes that in dogs the tactile
sphere extends backwards and forwards of the directly excitable region, into the frontal and
parietal lobes (see Fig. 20). Nothnagel considers that pathological evidence points in the
same direction;[51] and Dr. Mills, carefully reviewing the evidence, adds the gyri fornicatus
and hippocampi to the cutaneo-muscular region in man.[52] If one compare Luciani's
diagrams together (Figs. 14, 16, 19, 20) one will see that the entire parietal region of the
dog's skull is common to the four senses of sight, hearing, smell, and touch, including
muscular feeling. The corresponding region in the human brain (upper parietal and supramarginal gyri—see Fig. 17) seems to be a somewhat similar place of conﬂux. Optical
aphasias and motor and tactile disturbances all result from its injury, especially when that is
on the left side.[53] The lower we go in the animal scale the less differentiated the functions [Pg 61]
of the several brain-parts seem to be.[54] It may be that the region in question still represents
in ourselves something like this primitive condition, and that the surrounding parts, in
adapting themselves more and more to specialized and narrow functions, have left it as a
sort of carrefour through which they send currents and converse. That it should be
connected with musculo-cutaneous feeling is, however, no reason why the motor zone
proper should not be so connected too. And the cases of paralysis from the motor zone with
no accompanying anæsthesia may be explicable without denying all sensory function to that
region. For, as my colleague Dr. James Putnam informs me, sensibility is always harder to
kill than motility, even where we know for a certainty that the lesion affects tracts that are
both sensory and motor. Persons whose hand is paralyzed in its movements from
compression of arm-nerves during sleep, still feel with their ﬁngers; and they may still feel
in their feet when their legs are paralyzed by bruising of the spinal cord. In a similar way,
the motor cortex might be sensitive as well as motor, and yet by this greater subtlety (or
whatever the peculiarity may be) in the sensory currents, the sensibility might survive an
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amount of injury there by which the motility was destroyed. Nothnagel considers that there
are grounds for supposing the muscular sense to be exclusively connected with the parietal
lobe and not with the motor zone. "Disease of this lobe gives pure ataxy without palsy, and
of the motor zone pure palsy without loss of muscular sense."[55] He fails, however, to
convince more competent critics than the present writer,[56] so I conclude with them that as
yet we have no decisive grounds for locating muscular and cutaneous feeling apart. Much
still remains to be learned about the relations between musculo-cutaneous sensibility and the
cortex, but one thing is certain: that neither the occipital, the forward frontal, nor the
temporal lobes seem to have anything essential to do with it in man. It is knit up with the [Pg 62]
performances of the motor zone and of the convolutions backwards and midwards of them.
The reader must remember this conclusion when we come to the chapter on the Will.

I must add a word about the connection of aphasia with the tactile sense. On p. 40 I spoke of
those cases in which the patient can write but not read his own writing. He cannot read by
his eyes; but he can read by the feeling in his ﬁngers, if he retrace the letters in the air. It is
convenient for such a patient to have a pen in hand whilst reading in this way, in order to
make the usual feeling of writing more complete.[57] In such a case we must suppose that
the path between the optical and the graphic centres remains open, whilst that between the
optical and the auditory and articulatory centres is closed. Only thus can we understand how
the look of the writing should fail to suggest the sound of the words to the patient's mind,
whilst it still suggests the proper movements of graphic imitation. These movements in their
turn must of course be felt, and the feeling of them must be associated with the centres for
hearing and pronouncing the words. The injury in cases like this where very special
combinations fail, whilst others go on as usual, must always be supposed to be of the nature
of increased resistance to the passage of certain currents of association. If any of the
elements of mental function were destroyed the incapacity would necessarily be much more
formidable. A patient who can both read and write with his ﬁngers most likely uses an
identical 'graphic' centre, at once sensory and motor, for both operations.

I have now given, as far as the nature of this book will allow, a
complete account of the present state of the localization-question. In
its main outlines it stands ﬁrm, though much has still to be discovered.
The anterior frontal lobes, for example, so far as is yet known, have
no deﬁnite functions. Goltz ﬁnds that dogs bereft of them both are
incessantly in motion, and excitable by every small stimulus. They are [Pg 63]
irascible and amative in an extraordinary degree, and their sides grow
bare with perpetual reﬂex scratching; but they show no local troubles
of either motion or sensibility. In monkeys not even this lack of
inhibitory ability is shown, and neither stimulation nor excision of the
prefrontal lobes produces any symptoms whatever. One monkey of
Horsley and Schaefer's was as tame, and did certain tricks as well,
after as before the operation.[58] It is probable that we have about
reached the limits of what can be learned about brain-functions from
vivisecting inferior animals, and that we must hereafter look more
exclusively to human pathology for light. The existence of separate
speech and writing centres in the left hemisphere in man; the fact that
palsy from cortical injury is so much more complete and enduring in
man and the monkey than in dogs; and the farther fact that it seems
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Dog's motor
centres, right
hemisphere,
according to
Paneth.—The
points of the motor
region are
correlated as
follows with
muscles: the loops
with the orbicularis
palpebrarum; the
plain crosses with
the flexor, the
crosses inscribed
in circles with the
extensor, digitorum
communis of the
fore-paw; the plain
circles with the
abductor pollicis
longus; the double
crosses with the
extensor communis
of the hind-limb.

more difﬁcult to get complete sensorial blindness from cortical
ablations in the lower animals than in man, all show that functions get
more specially localized as evolution goes on. In birds localization
seems hardly to exist, and in rodents it is much less conspicuous than
in carnivora. Even for man, however, Munk's way of mapping out the
cortex into absolute areas within which only one movement or
sensation is represented is surely false. The truth seems to be rather
that, although there is a correspondence of certain regions of the brain
to certain regions of the body, yet the several parts within each bodily
region are represented throughout the whole of the corresponding
brain-region like pepper and salt sprinkled from the same caster. This,
however, does not prevent each 'part' from having its focus at one spot
within the brain-region. The various brain-regions merge into each
other in the same mixed way. As Mr. Horsley says: "There are border
centres, and the area of representation of the face merges into that for
the representation of the upper limb. If there was a focal lesion at that
point, you would have the movements of these two parts starting
together."[59] The accompanying ﬁgure from Paneth shows just how [Pg 64]
the matter stands in the dog.[60]

I am speaking now of localizations breadthwise over the brainsurface. It is conceivable that there might be also localizations
depthwise through the cortex. The more superﬁcial cells are smaller,
the deepest layer of them is large; and it has been suggested that the
superﬁcial cells are sensorial, the deeper ones motor;[61] or that the superﬁcial ones in the
motor region are correlated with the extremities of the organs to be moved (ﬁngers, etc.), the
deeper ones with the more central segments (wrist, elbow, etc.).[62] It need hardly be said
that all such theories are as yet but guesses.
We thus see that the postulate of Meynert and Jackson which we started with on p. 30 is on
the whole most satisfactorily corroborated by subsequent objective research. The highest
centres do probably contain nothing but arrangements for representing impressions and
movements, and other arrangements for coupling the activity Of these arrangements
together.[63] Currents pouring in from the sense-organs ﬁrst excite some arrangements, [Pg 65]
which in turn excite others, until at last a motor discharge downwards of some sort occurs.
When this is once clearly grasped there remains little ground for keeping up that old
controversy about the motor zone, as to whether it is in reality motor or sensitive. The whole
cortex, inasmuch as currents run through it, is both. All the currents probably have feelings
going with them, and sooner or later bring movements about. In one aspect, then, every
centre is afferent, in another efferent, even the motor cells of the spinal cord having these
two aspects inseparably conjoined. Marique,[64] and Exner and Paneth[65] have shown that
by cutting round a 'motor' centre and so separating it from the inﬂuence of the rest of the
cortex, the same disorders are produced as by cutting it out, so that really it is only the
mouth of the funnel, as it were, through which the stream of innervation, starting from
elsewhere, pours;[66] consciousness accompanying the stream, and being mainly of things
seen if the stream is strongest occipitally, of things heard if it is strongest temporally, of
things felt, etc., if the stream occupies most intensely the 'motor zone.' It seems to me that
some broad and vague formulation like this is as much as we can safely venture on in the
present state of science; and in subsequent chapters I expect to give conﬁrmatory reasons for
my view.
MAN'S CONSCIOUSNESS LIMITED TO THE HEMISPHERES.
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But is the consciousness which accompanies the activity of the cortex the only consciousness
that man has? or are his lower centres conscious as well?
This is a difﬁcult question to decide, how difﬁcult one only learns when one discovers that
the cortex-consciousness itself of certain objects can be seemingly annihilated in any good
hypnotic subject by a bare wave of his operator's hand, and yet be proved by circumstantial [Pg 66]
evidence to exist all the while in a split-off condition, quite as 'ejective'[67] to the rest of the
subject's mind as that mind is to the mind of the bystanders.[68] The lower centres
themselves may conceivably all the while have a split-off consciousness of their own,
similarly ejective to the cortex-consciousness; but whether they have it or not can never be
known from merely introspective evidence. Meanwhile the fact that occipital destruction in
man may cause a blindness which is apparently absolute (no feeling remaining either of
light or dark over one half of the ﬁeld of view), would lead us to suppose that if our lower
optical centres, the corpora quadrigemina, and thalami, do have any consciousness, it is at
all events a consciousness which does not mix with that which accompanies the cortical
activities, and which has nothing to do with our personal Self. In lower animals this may not
be so much the case. The traces of sight found (supra, p. 46) in dogs and monkeys whose
occipital lobes were entirely destroyed, may possibly have been due to the fact that the
lower centres of these animals saw, and that what they saw was not ejective but objective to
the remaining cortex, i.e. it formed part of one and the same inner world with the things
which that cortex perceived. It may be, however, that the phenomena were due to the fact
that in these animals the cortical 'centres' for vision reach outside of the occipital zone, and
that destruction of the latter fails to remove them as completely as in man. This, as we know,
is the opinion of the experimenters themselves. For practical purposes, nevertheless, and
limiting the meaning of the word consciousness to the personal self of the individual, we can
pretty conﬁdently answer the question preﬁxed to this paragraph by saying that the cortex is
the sole organ of consciousness in man.[69] If there be any consciousness pertaining to the [Pg 67]
lower centres, it is a consciousness of which the self knows nothing.
THE RESTITUTION OF FUNCTION.
Another problem, not so metaphysical, remains. The most general and striking fact
connected with cortical injury is that of the restoration of function. Functions lost at ﬁrst are
after a few days or weeks restored. How are we to understand this restitution?
Two theories are in the ﬁeld:
1) Restitution is due to the vicarious action either of the rest of the cortex or of centres lower
down, acquiring functions which until then they had not performed;
2) It is due to the remaining centres (whether cortical or 'lower') resuming functions which
they had always had, but of which the wound had temporarily inhibited the exercise. This is
the view of which Goltz and Brown-Séquard are the most distinguished defenders.
Inhibition is a vera causa, of that there can be no doubt. The pneumogastric nerve inhibits
the heart, the splanchnic inhibits the intestinal movements, and the superior laryngeal those
of inspiration. The nerve-irritations which may inhibit the contraction of arterioles are
innumerable, and reﬂex actions are often repressed by the simultaneous excitement of other
sensory nerves. For all such facts the reader must consult the treatises on physiology. What
concerns us here is the inhibition exerted by different parts of the nerve-centres, when
irritated, on the activity of distant parts. The ﬂaccidity of a frog from 'shock,' for a minute or
so after his medulla oblongata is cut, is an inhibition from the seat of injury which quickly
passes away.
What is known as 'surgical shock '(unconsciousness, pallor, dilatation of splanchnic bloodvessels, and general syncope and collapse) in the human subject is an inhibition which lasts
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a longer time. Goltz, Freusberg, and others, cutting the spinal cord in dogs, proved that there
were functions inhibited still longer by the wound, but which re-established themselves
ultimately if the animal was kept alive. The lumbar region of the cord was thus found to
contain independent vaso-motor centres, centres for erection, for control of the sphincters, [Pg 68]
etc., which could be excited to activity by tactile stimuli and as readily reinhibited by others
simultaneously applied.[70] We may therefore plausibly suppose that the rapid reappearance
of motility, vision, etc., after their ﬁrst disappearance in consequence of a cortical
mutilation, is due to the passing off of inhibitions exerted by the irritated surface of the
wound. The only question is whether all restorations of function must be explained in this
one simple way, or whether some part of them may not be owing to the formation of entirely
new paths in the remaining centres, by which they become 'educated' to duties which they
did not originally possess. In favor of an indeﬁnite extension of the inhibition theory facts
may be cited such as the following: In dogs whose disturbances due to cortical lesion have
disappeared, they may in consequence of some inner or outer accident reappear in all their
intensity for 24 hours or so and then disappear again.[71] In a dog made half blind by an
operation, and then shut up in the dark, vision comes back just as quickly as in other similar
dogs whose sight is exercised systematically every day.[72] A dog which has learned to beg
before the operation recommences this practice quite spontaneously a week after a doublesided ablation of the motor zone.[73] Occasionally, in a pigeon (or even, it is said, in a dog)
we see the disturbances less marked immediately after the operation than they are half an
hour later.[74] This would be impossible were they due to the subtraction of the organs
which normally carried them on. Moreover the entire drift of recent physiological and
pathological speculation is towards enthroning inhibition as an ever-present and
indispensable condition of orderly activity. We shall see how great is its importance, in the
chapter on the Will. Mr. Charles Mercier considers that no muscular contraction, once
begun, would ever stop without it, short of exhaustion of the system;[75] and Brown-Séquard [Pg 69]
has for years been accumulating examples to show how far its inﬂuence extends.[76] Under
these circumstances it seems as if error might more probably lie in curtailing its sphere too
much than in stretching it too far as an explanation of the phenomena following cortical
lesion.[77]
On the other hand, if we admit no re-education of centres, we not only ﬂy in the face of an a
priori probability, but we ﬁnd ourselves compelled by facts to suppose an almost incredible
number of functions natively lodged in the centres below the thalami or even in those below
the corpora quadrigemina. I will consider the a priori objection after ﬁrst taking a look at
the facts which I have in mind. They confront us the moment we ask ourselves just which
are the parts which perform the functions abolished by an operation after sufﬁcient time has
elapsed for restoration to occur?
The ﬁrst observers thought that they must be the corresponding parts of the opposite or
intact hemisphere. But as long ago as 1875 Carville and Duret tested this by cutting out the
fore-leg-centre on one side, in a dog, and then, after waiting till restitution had occurred,
cutting it out on the opposite side as well. Goltz and others have done the same thing.[78] If
the opposite side were really the seat of the restored function, the original palsy should have
appeared again and been permanent. But it did not appear at all; there appeared only a palsy
of the hitherto unaffected side. The next supposition is that the parts surrounding the cut-out
region learn vicariously to perform its duties. But here, again, experiment seems to upset the
hypothesis, so far as the motor zone goes at least; for we may wait till motility has returned
in the affected limb, and then both irritate the cortex surrounding the wound without [Pg 70]
exciting the limb to movement, and ablate it, without bringing back the vanished palsy.[79] It
would accordingly seem that the cerebral centres below the cortex must be the seat of the
regained activities. But Goltz destroyed a dog's entire left hemisphere, together with the
corpus striatum and the thalamus on that side, and kept him alive until a surprisingly small
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amount of motor and tactile disturbance remained.[80] These centres cannot here have
accounted for the restitution. He has even, as it would appear,[81] ablated both the
hemispheres of a dog, and kept him alive 51 days, able to walk and stand. The corpora
striata and thalami in this dog were also practically gone. In view of such results we seem
driven, with M. François-Franck,[82] to fall back on the ganglia lower still, or even on the
spinal cord as the 'vicarious' organ of which we are in quest. If the abeyance of function
between the operation and the restoration was due exclusively to inhibition, then we must
suppose these lowest centres to be in reality extremely accomplished organs. They must
always have done what we now ﬁnd them doing after function is restored, even when the
hemispheres were intact. Of course this is conceivably the case; yet it does not seem very
plausible. And the a priori considerations which a moment since I said I should urge, make
it less plausible still.
For, in the ﬁrst place, the brain is essentially a place of currents, which run in organized
paths. Loss of function can only mean one of two things, either that a current can no longer
run in, or that if it runs in, it can no longer run out, by its old path. Either of these inabilities
may come from a local ablation; and 'restitution' can then only mean that, in spite of a
temporary block, an inrunning current has at last become enabled to ﬂow out by its old path
again—e.g., the sound of 'give your paw' discharges after some weeks into the same canine [Pg 71]
muscles into which it used to discharge before the operation. As far as the cortex itself goes,
since one of the purposes for which it actually exists is the production of new paths,[83] the
only question before us is: Is the formation of these particular 'vicarious' paths too much to
expect of its plastic powers? It would certainly be too much to expect that a hemisphere
should receive currents from optic ﬁbres whose arriving-place within it is destroyed, or that
it should discharge into ﬁbres of the pyramidal strand if their place of exit is broken down.
Such lesions as these must be irreparable within that hemisphere. Yet even then, through the
other hemisphere, the corpus callosum, and the bilateral connections in the spinal cord, one
can imagine some road by which the old muscles might eventually be innervated by the
same incoming currents which innervated them before the block. And for all minor
interruptions, not involving the arriving-place of the 'cortico-petal' or the place of exit of the
'cortico-fugal' ﬁbres, roundabout paths of some sort through the affected hemisphere itself
must exist, for every point of it is, remotely at least, in potential communication with every
other point. The normal paths are only paths of least resistance. If they get blocked or cut,
paths formerly more resistant become the least resistant paths under the changed conditions.
It must never be forgotten that a current that runs in has got to run out somewhere; and if it
only once succeeds by accident in striking into its old place of exit again, the thrill of
satisfaction which the consciousness connected with the whole residual brain then receives
will reinforce and ﬁx the paths of that moment and make them more likely to be struck into
again. The resultant feeling that the old habitual act is at last successfully back again,
becomes itself a new stimulus which stamps all the existing currents in. It is matter of
experience that such feelings of successful achievement do tend to ﬁx in our memory
whatever processes have led to them; and we shall have a good deal more to say upon the [Pg 72]
subject when we come to the Chapter on the Will.
My conclusion then is this: that some of the restitution of function (especially where the
cortical lesion is not too great) is probably due to genuinely vicarious function on the part of
the centres that remain; whilst some of it is due to the passing off of inhibitions. In other
words, both the vicarious theory and the inhibition theory are true in their measure. But as
for determining that measure, or saying which centres are vicarious, and to what extent they
can learn new tricks, that is impossible at present.
FINAL CORRECTION OF THE MEYNERT SCHEME.
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And now, after learning all these facts, what are we to think of the child and the candleﬂame, and of that scheme which provisionally imposed itself on our acceptance after
surveying the actions of the frog? (Cf. pp. 25-6, supra.) It will be remembered that we then
considered the lower centres en masse as machines for responding to present senseimpressions exclusively, and the hemispheres as equally exclusive organs of action from
inward considerations or ideas; and that, following Meynert, we supposed the hemispheres
to have no native tendencies to determinate activity, but to be merely superadded organs for
breaking up the various reﬂexes performed by the lower centres, and combining their motor
and sensory elements in novel ways. It will also be remembered that I prophesied that we
should be obliged to soften down the sharpness of this distinction after we had completed
our survey of the farther facts. The time has now come for that correction to be made.
Wider and completer observations show us both that the lower centres are more
spontaneous, and that the hemispheres are more automatic, than the Meynert scheme allows.
Schrader's observations in Goltz's Laboratory on hemisphereless frogs[84] and pigeons[85]
give an idea quite different from the picture of these creatures which is classically current.
Steiner's[86] observations on frogs already went a good way in the same direction, showing, [Pg 73]
for example, that locomotion is a well-developed function of the medulla oblongata. But
Schrader, by great care in the operation, and by keeping the frogs a long time alive, found
that at least in some of them the spinal cord would produce movements of locomotion when
the frog was smartly roused by a poke, and that swimming and croaking could sometimes be
performed when nothing above the medulla oblongata remained.[87] Schrader's
hemisphereless frogs moved spontaneously, ate ﬂies, buried themselves in the ground, and
in short did many things which before his observations were supposed to be impossible
unless the hemispheres remained. Steiner[88] and Vulpian have remarked an even greater
vivacity in ﬁshes deprived of their hemispheres. Vulpian says of his brainless carps[89] that
three days after the operation one of them darted at food and at a knot tied on the end of a
string, holding the latter so tight between his jaws that his head was drawn out of water.
Later, "they see morsels of white of egg; the moment these sink through the water in front of
them, they follow and seize them, sometimes after they are on the bottom, sometimes before
they have reached it. In capturing and swallowing this food they execute just the same
movements as the intact carps which are in the same aquarium. The only difference is that
they seem to see them at less distance, seek them with less impetuosity and less
perseverance in all the points of the bottom of the aquarium, but they struggle (so to speak)
sometimes with the sound carps to grasp the morsels. It is certain that they do not confound
these bits of white of egg with other white bodies, small pebbles for example, which are at
the bottom of the water. The same carp which, three days after operation, seized the knot on
a piece of string, no longer snaps at it now, but if one brings it near her, she draws away
from it by swimming backwards before it comes into contact with her mouth."[90] Already [Pg 74]
on pp. 9-10, as the reader may remember, we instanced those adaptations of conduct to new
conditions, on the part of the frog's spinal cord and thalami, which led Pﬂüger and Lewes on
the one hand and Goltz on the other to locate in these organs an intelligence akin to that of
which the hemispheres are the seat.
When it comes to birds deprived of their hemispheres, the evidence that some of their acts
have conscious purpose behind them is quite as persuasive. In pigeons Schrader found that
the state of somnolence lasted only three or four days, after which time the birds began
indefatigably to walk about the room. They climbed out of boxes in which they were put,
jumped over or ﬂew up upon obstacles, and their sight was so perfect that neither in walking
nor ﬂying did they ever strike any object in the room. They had also deﬁnite ends or
purposes, ﬂying straight for more convenient perching places when made uncomfortable by
movements imparted to those on which they stood; and of several possible perches they
always chose the most convenient. "If we give the dove the choice of a horizontal bar (Reck)
or an equally distant table to ﬂy to, she always gives decided preference to the table. Indeed
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she chooses the table even if it is several meters farther off than the bar or the chair." Placed
on the back of a chair, she ﬂies ﬁrst to the seat and then to the ﬂoor, and in general "will
forsake a high position, although it give her sufﬁciently ﬁrm support, and in order to reach
the ground will make use of the environing objects as intermediate goals of ﬂight, showing a
perfectly correct judgment of their distance. Although able to ﬂy directly to the ground, she
prefers to make the journey in successive stages.... Once on the ground, she hardly ever rises
spontaneously into the air."[91]
Young rabbits deprived of their hemispheres will stand, run, start at noises, avoid obstacles
in their path, and give responsive cries of suffering when hurt. Rats will do the same, and
throw themselves moreover into an attitude of defence. Dogs never survive such an
operation if performed at once. But Goltz's latest dog, mentioned on p. 70, which is said to [Pg 75]
have been kept alive for ﬁfty-one days after both hemispheres had been removed by a series
of ablations and the corpora striata and thalami had softened away, shows how much the
mid-brain centres and the cord can do even in the canine species. Taken together, the
number of reactions shown to exist in the lower centres by these observations make out a
pretty good case for the Meynert scheme, as applied to these lower animals. That scheme
demands hemispheres which shall be mere supplements or organs of repetition, and in the
light of these observations they obviously are so to a great extent. But the Meynert scheme
also demands that the reactions of the lower centres shall all be native, and we are not
absolutely sure that some of those which we have been considering may not have been
acquired after the injury; and it furthermore demands that they should be machine-like,
whereas the expression of some of them makes us doubt whether they may not be guided by
an intelligence of low degree.
Even in the lower animals, then, there is reason to soften down that opposition between the
hemispheres and the lower centres which the scheme demands. The hemispheres may, it is
true, only supplement the lower centres, but the latter resemble the former in nature and
have some small amount at least of 'spontaneity' and choice.
But when we come to monkeys and man the scheme well-nigh breaks down altogether; for
we ﬁnd that the hemispheres do not simply repeat voluntarily actions which the lower
centres perform as machines. There are many functions which the lower centres cannot by
themselves perform at all. When the motor cortex is injured in a man or a monkey genuine
paralysis ensues, which in man is incurable, and almost or quite equally so in the ape. Dr.
Seguin knew a man with hemi-blindness, from cortical injury, which had persisted unaltered
for twenty-three years. 'Traumatic inhibition' cannot possibly account for this. The blindness
must have been an 'Ausfallserscheinung,' due to the loss of vision's essential organ. It would
seem, then, that in these higher creatures the lower centres must be less adequate than they
are farther down in the zoological scale; and that even for certain elementary combinations [Pg 76]
of movement and impression the co-operation of the hemispheres is necessary from the
start. Even in birds and dogs the power of eating properly is lost when the frontal lobes are
cut off.[92]
The plain truth is that neither in man nor beast are the hemispheres the virgin organs which
our scheme called them. So far from being unorganized at birth, they must have native
tendencies to reaction of a determinate sort.[93] These are the tendencies which we know as
emotions and instincts, and which we must study with some detail in later chapters of this
book. Both instincts and emotions are reactions upon special sorts of objects of perception;
they depend on the hemispheres; and they are in the ﬁrst instance reﬂex, that is, they take
place the ﬁrst time the exciting object is met, are accompanied by no forethought or
deliberation, and are irresistible. But they are modiﬁable to a certain extent by experience,
and on later occasions of meeting the exciting object, the instincts especially have less of the
blind impulsive character which they had at ﬁrst. All this will be explained at some length in
Chapter XXIV. Meanwhile we can say that the multiplicity of emotional and instinctive
reactions in man, together with his extensive associative power, permit of extensive
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recouplings of the original sensory and motor partners. The consequences of one instinctive
reaction often prove to be the inciters of an opposite reaction, and being suggested on later
occasions by the original object, may then suppress the ﬁrst reaction altogether, just as in the
case of the child and the ﬂame. For this education the hemispheres do not need to be tabulæ [Pg 77]
rasæ at ﬁrst, as the Meynert scheme would have them; and so far from their being educated
by the lower centres exclusively, they educate themselves.[94]
We have already noticed the absence of reactions from fear and hunger in the ordinary
brainless frog. Schrader gives a striking account of the instinctless condition of his brainless
pigeons, active as they were in the way of locomotion and voice. "The hemisphereless
animal moves in a world of bodies which ... are all of equal value for him.... He is, to use
Goltz's apt expression, impersonal.... Every object is for him only a space-occupying mass,
he turns out of his path for an ordinary pigeon no otherwise than for a stone. He may try to
climb over both. All authors agree that they never found any difference, whether it was an
inanimate body, a cat, a dog, or a bird of prey which came in their pigeon's way. The
creature knows neither friends nor enemies, in the thickest company it lives like a hermit.
The languishing cooing of the male awakens no more impression than the rattling of the
peas, or the call-whistle which in the days before the injury used to make the birds hasten to
be fed. Quite as little as the earlier observers have I seen hemisphereless she-birds answer
the courting of the male. A hemisphereless male will coo all day long and show distinct
signs of sexual excitement, but his activity is without any object, it is entirely indifferent to
him whether the she-bird be there or not. If one is placed near him, he leaves her
unnoticed.... As the male pays no attention to the female, so she pays none to her young.
The brood may follow the mother ceaselessly calling for food, but they might as well ask it
from a stone.... The hemisphereless sphereless pigeon is in the highest degree tame, and [Pg 78]
fears man as little as cat or bird of prey."[95]
Putting together now all the facts and reﬂections which we have been through, it seems to
me that we can no longer hold strictly to the Meynert scheme. If anywhere, it will apply to
the lowest animals; but in them especially the lower centres seem to have a degree of
spontaneity and choice. On the whole, I think that we are driven to substitute for it some
such general conception as the following, which allows for zoological differences as we
know them, and is vague and elastic enough to receive any number of future discoveries of
detail.
CONCLUSION.
All the centres, in all animals, whilst they are in one aspect mechanisms, probably are, or at
least once were, organs of consciousness in another, although the consciousness is doubtless
much more developed in the hemispheres than it is anywhere else. The consciousness must
everywhere prefer some of the sensations which it gets to others; and if it can remember
these in their absence, however dimly, they must be its ends of desire. If, moreover, it can
identify in memory any motor discharges which may have led to such ends, and associate
the latter with them, then these motor discharges themselves may in turn become desired as
means. This is the development of will; and its realization must of course be proportional to
the possible complication of the consciousness. Even the spinal cord may possibly have
some little power of will in this sense, and of effort towards modiﬁed behavior in
[Pg 79]
consequence of new experiences of sensibility.[96]
All nervous centres have then in the ﬁrst instance one essential function, that of 'intelligent'
action. They feel, prefer one thing to another, and have 'ends.' Like all other organs,
however, they evolve from ancestor to descendant, and their evolution takes two directions,
the lower centres passing downwards into more unhesitating automatism, and the higher
ones upwards into larger intellectuality.[97] Thus it may happen that those functions which
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can safely grow uniform and fatal become least accompanied by mind, and that their organ,
the spinal cord, becomes a more and more soulless machine; whilst on the contrary those
functions which it beneﬁts the animal to have adapted to delicate environing variations pass
more and more to the hemispheres, whose anatomical structure and attendant consciousness
grow more and more elaborate as zoological evolution proceeds. In this way it might come
about that in man and the monkeys the basal ganglia should do fewer things by themselves
than they can do in dogs, fewer in dogs than in rabbits, fewer in rabbits than in hawks,[98]
fewer in hawks than in pigeons, fewer in pigeons than in frogs, fewer in frogs than in ﬁshes,
and that the hemispheres should correspondingly do more. This passage of functions
forward to the ever-enlarging hemispheres would be itself one of the evolutive changes, to
be explained like the development of the hemispheres themselves, either by fortunate
variation or by inherited effects of use. The reﬂexes, on this view, upon which the education
of our human hemispheres depends, would not be due to the basal ganglia alone. They [Pg 80]
would be tendencies in the hemispheres themselves, modiﬁable by education, unlike the
reﬂexes of the medulla oblongata, pons, optic lobes and spinal cord. Such cerebral reﬂexes,
if they exist, form a basis quite as good as that which the Meynert scheme offers, for the
acquisition of memories and associations which may later result in all sorts of 'changes of
partners' in the psychic world. The diagram of the baby and the candle (see page 25) can be
re-edited, if need be, as an entirely cortical transaction. The original tendency to touch will
be a cortical instinct; the burn will leave an image in another part of the cortex, which, being
recalled by association, will inhibit the touching tendency the next time the candle is
perceived, and excite the tendency to withdraw—so that the retinal picture will, upon that
next time, be coupled with the original motor partner of the pain. We thus get whatever
psychological truth the Meynert scheme possesses without entangling ourselves on a
dubious anatomy and physiology.
Some such shadowy view of the evolution of the centres, of the relation of consciousness to
them, and of the hemispheres to the other lobes, is, it seems to me, that in which it is safest
to indulge. If it has no other advantage, it at any rate makes us realize how enormous are the
gaps in our knowledge, the moment we try to cover the facts by any one formula of a
general kind.

[4]

It should be said that this particular cut commonly proves fatal. The text refers to
the rare cases which survive.

[5]

I conﬁne myself to the frog for simplicity's sake. In higher animals, especially the
ape and man, it would seem as if not only determinate combinations of muscles,
but limited groups or even single muscles could be innervated from the
hemispheres.

[6]

I hope that the reader will take no umbrage at my so mixing the physical and
mental, and talking of reﬂex acts and hemispheres and reminiscences in the same
breath, as if they were homogeneous quantities and factors of one causal chain. I
have done so deliberately; for although I admit that from the radically physical
point of view it is easy to conceive of the chain of events amongst the cells and
ﬁbres as complete in itself, and that whilst so conceiving it one need make no
mention of 'ideas,' I yet suspect that point of view of being an unreal abstraction.
Reﬂexes in centres may take place even where accompanying feelings or ideas
guide them. In another chapter I shall try to show reasons for not abandoning this
common-sense position; meanwhile language lends itself so much more easily to
the mixed way of describing, that I will continue to employ the latter. The more
radical-minded reader can always read 'ideational process' for 'idea.'

[7]

I shall call it hereafter for shortness 'the Meynert scheme;' for the child-and-ﬂame
example, as well as the whole general notion that the hemispheres are a
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supernumerary surface for the projection and association of sensations and
movements natively coupled in the centres below, is due to Th. Meynert, the
Austrian anatomist. For a popular account of his views, see his pamphlet 'Zur
Mechanik des Gehirnbaues,' Vienna, 1874. His most recent development of them
is embodied in his 'Psychiatry,' a clinical treatise on diseases of the forebrain,
translated by B. Sachs, New York, 1885.
[8]

Geschichte des Materialismus, 2d ed., ii, p. 345.

[9]

West Riding Asylum Reports, 1876, p. 267.

[10]

For a thorough discussion of the various objections, see Ferrier's 'Functions of the
Brain,' 2d ed., pp. 227-234, and François-Franck's 'Leçons sur les Fonctions
Motrices du Cerveau' (1887), Leçon 31. The most minutely accurate experiments
on irritation of cortical points are those of Paneth, in Pﬂüger's Archiv, vol 37, p.
528.—Recently the skull has been fearlessly opened by surgeons, and operations
upon the human brain performed, sometimes with the happiest results. In some of
these operations the cortex has been electrically excited for the purpose of more
exactly localizing the spot, and the movements ﬁrst observed in dogs and
monkeys have then been veriﬁed in men.

[11]

J. Loeb: Beiträge zur Physiologie des Grosshirns; Pﬂüger's Archiv, xxxix, 293. I
simplify the author's statement.

[12]

Goltz: Pﬂüger's Archiv, xlii, 419.

[13]

'Hemiplegia' means one-sided palsy.

[14]

Philosophical Transactions, vol. 179, pp. 6, 10 (1888). In a later paper (ibid. p.
205) Messrs. Beevor and Horsley go into the localization still more minutely,
showing spots from which single muscles or single digits can be made to contract.

[15]

Nothnagel und Naunyn; Die Localization in den Gehirnkrankheiten (Wiesbaden,
1887), p. 34.

[16]

An accessible account of the history of our knowledge of motor aphasia is in W.
A. Hammond's 'Treatise on the Diseases of the Nervous System,' chapter vii.

[17]

The history up to 1885 may be found in A. Christiani: Zur Physiologie des
Gehirnes (Berlin, 1885).

[18]

Pﬂüger's Archiv, vol. 44, p. 176. Munk (Berlin Academy Sitzsungberichte, 1889,
xxxi) returns to the charge, denying the extirpations of Schrader to be complete:
"Microscopic portions of the Sehsphäre must remain."

[19]

A. Christiani; Zur Physiol. d. Gehirnes (Berlin, 1885), chaps. ii, iii, iv, H. Munk:
Berlin Akad. Stzgsb. 1884, xxiv.

[20]

Luciani und Seppili: Die Functions-Localization auf der Grosshirnrinde (Deutsch
von Fraenkel), Leipzig, 1886, Dogs M, N, and S. Goltz in Pﬂüger's Archiv, vol.
34, pp. 490-6; vol. 42, p. 454. Cf. also Munk: Berlin Akad. Stzgsb. 1886, vii, viii,
pp. 113-121, and Loeb: Pﬂüger's Archiv, vol. 39, p. 337.

[21]

Berlin Akad. Sitzungsberichte, 1886, vii, viii, p. 124.

[22]

H. Munk: Functionen der Grosshirnrinde (Berlin, 1881), pp. 36-40. Ferrier:
Functions, etc., 2d ed., chap, ix, pt. i. Brown and Schaefer, Philos. Transactions,
vol. 179, p. 321. Luciani u. Seppili, op. cit. pp. 131-138. Lannegrace found traces
of sight with both occipital lobes destroyed, and in one monkey even when
angular gyri and occipital lobes were destroyed altogether. His paper is in the
Archives de Médecine Expérimentale for January and March, 1889. I only know
it from the abstract in the Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1889, pp. 108-420. The
reporter doubts the evidence of vision in the monkey. It appears to have consisted
in avoiding obstacles and in emotional disturbance in the presence of men.

[23]

Localization of Cerebral Disease (1878), pp. 117-8.
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[24]

For cases see Flechsig: Die Leitungsbahnen in Gehirn u. Rückenmark (Leipzig,
1876), pp. 112, 272; Exner's Untersuchungen, etc., p. 83; Ferrier's Localization,
etc., p. 11; François-Franck's Cerveau Moteur, p. 63, note.

[25]

E. C. Seguin: Hemianopsia of Cerebral Origin, in Journal of Nervous and Mental
Disease, vol. xiii, p. 30. Nothnagel und Naunyn: Ueber die Localization der
Gehirnkrankheiten (Wiesbaden, 1887), p. 16.

[26]

Die Seelenblindheit, etc., p. 51 ff. The mental blindness was in this woman's case
moderate in degree.

[27]

Archiv f. Psychiatrie, vol. 21, p. 222.

[28]

Nothnagel (loc. cit. p. 22) says: "Dies trifft aber nicht zu." He gives, however, no
case in support of his opinion that double-sided cortical lesion may make one
stone-blind and yet not destroy one's visual images; so that I do not know whether
it is an observation of fact or an a priori assumption.

[29]

In a case published by C. S. Freund: Archiv f. Psychiatrie, vol. xx, the occipital
lobes were injured, but their cortex was not destroyed, on both sides. There was
still vision. Cf. pp. 291-5.

[30]

I say 'need,' for I do not of course deny the possible coexistence of the two
symptoms. Many a brain-lesion might block optical associations and at the same
time impair optical imagination, without entirely stopping vision. Such a case
seems to have been the remarkable one from Charcot which I shall give rather
fully in the chapter on Imagination.

[31]

Freund (in the article cited above 'Ueber optische Aphasie und Seelenblindheit')
and Bruns ('Ein Fall von Alexie,' etc., in the Neurologisches Centralblatt for 1888,
pp. 581, 509) explain their cases by broken-down conduction. Wilbrand, whose
painstaking monograph on mental blindness was referred to a moment ago, gives
none but a priori reasons for his belief that the optical 'Erinnerungsfeld' must be
locally distinct from the Wahrnehmungsfeld (cf. pp. 84, 93). The a priori reasons
are really the other way. Mauthner ('Gehirn u. Auge' (1881), p. 487 ff.) tries to
show that the 'mental blindness' of Munk's dogs and apes after occipital mutilation
was not such, but real dimness of sight. The best case of mental blindness yet
reported is that by Lissauer, as above. The reader will also do well to read
Bernard: De l'Aphasie (1885) chap. v; Ballet: Le Langage Intérieur (1886), chap.
viii; and Jas. Boss's little book on Aphasia (1887), p. 74.

[32]

For a case see Wernicke's Lehrb. d. Gehirnkrankheiten, vol. ii, p. 554 (1881).

[33]

The latest account of them is the paper 'Über die optischen Centren u. Bahnen' by
von Monakow in the Archiv für Psychiatrie, vol. xx, p. 714.

[34]

Die Functions-Localization, etc., Dog X; see also p. 161.

[35]

Philos. Trans., vol. 179, p. 312.

[36]

Brain, vol. xi, p. 10.

[37]

Ibid. p. 147.

[38]

Der aphasische Symptomencomplex (1874). See in Fig. 11 the convolution
marked WERNICKE.

[39]

'The Pathology of Sensory Aphasia,' 'Brain,' July, 1889.

[40]

Nothnagel und Naunyn; op. cit. plates.

[41]

Ballet's and Bernard's works cited on p. 51 are the most accessible documents of
Charcot's school. Bastian's book on the Brain as an Organ of Mind (last three
chapters) is also good.

[42]

For details, see Ferrier's 'Functions,' chap. ix, pt. iii, and Chas. K. Mills:
Transactions of Congress of American Physicians and Surgeons, 1888, vol. i, p.

https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

50/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

278.
[43]

Functions of the Brain, chap. x, § 14.

[44]

Ueber die Functionen d. Grosshirnrinde (1881), p. 50.

[45]

Lezioni di Fisiologia sperimentale sul sistema nervoso encefalico (l. 73), p. 527 ff.
Also 'Brain,' vol. ix, p. 298.

[46]

Bechterew (Pﬂüger's Archiv, vol. 35, p. 137) found no anæsthesia in a cat with
motor symptoms from ablation of sigmoid gyrus. Luciani got hyperæsthesia
coexistent with cortical motor defect in a dog, by simultaneously hemisecting the
spinal cord (Luciani u. Seppili, op. cit. p. 234). Goltz frequently found
hyperæsthesia of the whole body to accompany motor defect after ablation of
both frontal lobes, and he once found it after ablating the motor zone (Pﬂüger's
Archiv, vol. 34, p. 471).

[47]

Philos. Transactions, vol. 179, p. 20 ff.

[48]

Functions, p. 375.

[49]

Pp. 15-17.

[50]

Luciani u. Seppili, op. cit. pp. 275-288.

[51]

Op. cit. p. 18.

[52]

Trans. of Congress, etc., p. 272.

[53]

See Exner's Unters. üb. Localization, plate xxv.

[54]

Cf. Ferrier's Functions, etc., chap. iv, and chap. x, §§ 6 to 9.

[55]

Op. cit. p. 17.

[56]

E.g. Starr, loc. cit. p. 272; Leyden, Beiträge zur Lehre v. d. Localization im
Gehirn (1888), p. 72.

[57]

Bernard, op. cit. p. 84.

[58]

Philos. Trans., vol. 179, p. 3.

[59]

Trans. of Congress of Am. Phys. and Surg. 1888, vol. i, p. 343. Beevor and
Horsley's paper on electric stimulation of the monkey's brain is the most beautiful
work yet done for precision. See Phil. Trans., vol. 179, p. 205, especially the
plates.

[60]

Pﬂüger's Archiv, vol. 37, p. 523 (1885).

[61]

By Luys in his generally preposterous book 'The Brain'; also by Horsley.

[62]

C. Mercier: The Nervous System and the Mind, p. 124.

[63]

The frontal lobes as yet remain a puzzle. Wundt tries to explain them as an organ
of 'apperception' (Grundzüge d. Physiologischen Psychologie, 3d ed., vol. i, p.
233 ff.), but I confess myself unable to apprehend clearly the Wundtian
philosophy so far as this word enters into it, so must be contented with this bare
reference.—Until quite recently it was common to talk of an 'ideational centre' as
of something distinct from the aggregate of other centres. Fortunately this custom
is already on the wane.

[64]

Rech. Exp. sur le Fonctionnement des Centres Psycho-moteurs (Brussels, 1885).

[65]

Pﬂüger's Archiv, vol. 44, p. 544.

[66]

I ought to add, however, that François-Franck (Fonctions Motrices, p. 370) got, in
two dogs and a cat, a different result from this sort of 'circumvallation.'

[67]

For this word, see T. K. Clifford's Lectures and Essays (1879), vol. ii, p. 72.

[68]

See below, Chapter VIII.

https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

51/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

[69]

Cf. Ferrier's Functions, pp. 120, 147, 414. See also Vulpian: Leçons sur la
Physiol. du Syst. Nerveux, p. 548; Luciani u. Seppili, op. cit. pp. 404-5; H.
Maudsley: Physiology of Mind (1876), pp. 138 ff., 197 ff., and 241 ff. In G. H.
Lewes's Physical Basis of Mind, Problem IV: 'The Reﬂex Theory,' a very full
history of the question is given.

[70]

Goltz: Pﬂüger's Archiv, vol. 8, p. 460; Freusberg: ibid. vol. 10, p. 174.

[71]

Goltz: Verrichtungen des Grosshirns, p. 78.

[72]

Loeb: Pﬂüger's Archiv, vol. 89, p. 276.

[73]

Ibid. p. 289.

[74]

Schrader: ibid. vol. 44, p. 218.

[75]

The Nervous System and the Mind (1888), chaps. iii, vi; also in Brain, vol. xi, p.
361.

[76]

Brown-Séquard has given a resume of his opinions in the Archives de Physiologie
for Oct. 1889, 5me. Série, vol. i, p 751.

[77]

Goltz ﬁrst applied the inhibition theory to the brain in his 'Verrichtungen des
Grosshirns,' p. 39 ff. On the general philosophy of Inhibition the reader may
consult Brunton's 'Pharmakology and Therapeutics,' p. 154 ff., and also 'Nature,'
vol. 27, p. 419 ff.

[78]

E.g. Herzen, Herman u. Schwalbe's Jahres-bericht for 1886, Physiol. Abth. p. 38.
(Experiments on new-born puppies.)

[79]

François-Franck: op. cit. p. 382. Results are somewhat contradictory.

[80]

Pﬂüger's Archiv, vol. 42, p. 419.

[81]

Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1889, p. 372.

[82]

Op. cit. p. 387. See pp. 378 to 388 for a discussion of the whole question.
Compare also Wundt's Physiol. Psych., 3d ed., i, 225 ff., and Luciani u. Seppili,
pp. 243, 293.

[83]

The Chapters on Habit, Association, Memory, and Perception will change our
present preliminary conjecture that that is one of its essential uses, into an
unshakable conviction.

[84]

Pﬂüger's Archiv, vol. 41, p. 75 (1887).

[85]

Ibid. vol. 44, p. 175 (1889).

[86]

Untersuchungen über die Physiologie des Froschhirns. 1885.

[87]

Loc. cit. pp. 80, 82-3. Schrader also found a biting-reﬂex developed when the
medulla oblongata is cut through just behind the cerebellum.

[88]

Berlin Akad. Sitzungsberichte for 1886.

[89]

Comptes Rendus, vol. 102, p. 90.

[90]

Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. d. Sciences, vol. 102, p. 1530.

[91]

Loc. cit. p. 210.

[92]

Goltz: Pﬂüger's Archiv, vol. 42, p. 447; Schrader: ibid. vol. 44, p. 219 ff. It is
possible that this symptom may be an effect of traumatic inhibition, however.

[93]

A few years ago one of the strongest arguments for the theory that the
hemispheres are purely supernumerary was Soltmann's often-quoted observation
that in new-born puppies the motor zone of the cortex is not excitable by
electricity and only becomes so in the course of a fortnight, presumably after the
experiences of the lower centres have educated it to motor duties. Paneth's later
observations, however, seem to show that Soltmann may have been misled
through overnarcotizing his victims (Pﬂüger's Archiv, vol. 37, p. 202). In the
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Neurologisches Centralblatt for 1889, p. 513, Bechterew returns to the subject on
Soltmann's side without, however, noticing Paneth's work.
[94]

Münsterberg (Die Willenshandlung, 1888, p. 134) challenges Meynert's scheme in
toto, saying that whilst we have in our personal experience plenty of examples of
acts which were at ﬁrst voluntary becoming secondarily automatic and reﬂex, we
have no conscious record of a single originally reﬂex act growing voluntary.—As
far as conscious record is concerned, we could not possibly have it even if the
Meynert scheme were wholly true, for the education of the hemispheres which
that scheme postulates must in the nature of things antedate recollection. But it
seems to me that Münsterberg's rejection of the scheme may possibly be correct
as regards reﬂexes from the lower centres. Everywhere in this department of
psychogenesis we are made to feel how ignorant we really are.

[95]

Pﬂüger's Archiv, vol. 44, p. 230-1.

[96]

Naturally, as Schiff long ago pointed out (Lehrb. d. Muskel-u. Nervenphysiologie,
1859, p. 213 ff.), the 'Rückenmarksseele,' if it now exist, can have no higher
sense-consciousness, for its incoming currents are solely from the skin. But it
may, in its dim way, both feel, prefer, and desire. See, for the view favorable to
the text: G. H. Lewes, The Physiology of Common Life (1860), chap. ix. Goltz
(Nervencentren des Frosches 1869, pp. 102-130) thinks that the frog's cord has no
adaptative power. This may be the case in such experiments as his, because the
beheaded frog's short span of life does not give it time to learn the new tricks
asked for. But Rosenthal (Biologisches Centralblatt, vol. iv, p. 247) and
Mendelssohn (Berlin Akad. Sitzungsberichte, 1885, p. 107) in their investigations
on the simple reﬂexes of the frog's cord, show that there is some adaptation to
new conditions, inasmuch as when usual paths of conduction are interrupted by a
cut, new paths are taken. According to Rosenthal, these grow more pervious (i.e.
require a smaller stimulus) in proportion as they are more often traversed.

[97]

Whether this evolution takes place through the inheritance of habits acquired, or
through the preservation of lucky variations, is an alternative which we need not
discuss here. We shall consider it in the last chapter in the book. For our present
purpose the modus operandi of the evolution makes no difference, provided it be
admitted to occur.

[98]

See Schrader's Observations, loc. cit.

CHAPTER III.

[Pg 81]

ON SOME GENERAL CONDITIONS OF BRAIN-ACTIVITY.
The elementary properties of nerve-tissue on which the brain-functions depend are far from
being satisfactorily made out. The scheme that suggests itself in the ﬁrst instance to the
mind, because it is so obvious, is certainly false: I mean the notion that each cell stands for
an idea or part of an idea, and that the ideas are associated or 'bound into bundles' (to use a
phrase of Locke's) by the ﬁbres. If we make a symbolic diagram on a blackboard, of the
laws of association between ideas, we are inevitably led to draw circles, or closed ﬁgures of
some kind, and to connect them by lines. When we hear that the nerve-centres contain cells
which send off ﬁbres, we say that Nature has realized our diagram for us, and that the
mechanical substratum of thought is plain. In some way, it is true, our diagram must be
realized in the brain; but surely in no such visible and palpable way as we at ﬁrst suppose.
[99] An enormous number of the cellular bodies in the hemispheres are ﬁbreless. Where
ﬁbres are sent off they soon divide into untraceable ramiﬁcations; and nowhere do we see a
simple coarse anatomical connection, like a line on the blackboard, between two cells. Too
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much anatomy has been found to order for theoretic purposes, even by the anatomists; and
the popular-science notions of cells and ﬁbres are almost wholly wide of the truth. Let us
therefore relegate the subject of the intimate workings of the brain to the physiology of the [Pg 82]
future, save in respect to a few points of which a word must now be said. And ﬁrst of
THE SUMMATION OF STIMULI
in the same nerve-tract. This is a property extremely important for the understanding of a
great many phenomena of the neural, and consequently of the mental, life; and it behooves
us to gain a clear conception of what it means before we proceed any farther.
The law is this, that a stimulus which would be inadequate by itself to excite a nerve-centre
to effective discharge may, by acting with one or more other stimuli (equally ineffectual by
themselves alone) bring the discharge about. The natural way to consider this is as a
summation of tensions which at last overcome a resistance. The ﬁrst of them produce a
'latent excitement' or a 'heightened irritability'—the phrase is immaterial so far as practical
consequences go; the last is the straw which breaks the camel's back. Where the neural
process is one that has consciousness for its accompaniment, the ﬁnal explosion would in all
cases seem to involve a vivid state of feeling of a more or less substantive kind. But there is
no ground for supposing that the tensions whilst yet submaximal or outwardly ineffective,
may not also have a share in determining the total consciousness present in the individual at
the time. In later chapters we shall see abundant reason to suppose that they do have such a
share, and that without their contribution the fringe of relations which is at every moment a
vital ingredient of the mind's object, would not come to consciousness at all.
The subject belongs too much to physiology for the evidence to be cited in detail in these
pages. I will throw into a note a few references for such readers as may be interested in
following it out,[100] and simply say that the direct electrical irritation of the cortical centres [Pg 83]
sufﬁciently proves the point. For it was found by the earliest experimenters here that
whereas it takes an exceedingly strong current to produce any movement when a single
induction-shock is used, a rapid succession of induction-shocks ('faradization') will produce
movements when the current is comparatively weak. A single quotation from an excellent
investigation will exhibit this law under further aspects:
"If we continue to stimulate the cortex at short intervals with the strength of
current which produces the minimal muscular contraction [of the dog's digital
extensor muscle], the amount of contraction gradually increases till it reaches
the maximum. Each earlier stimulation leaves thus an effect behind it, which
increases the efﬁcacy of the following one. In this summation of the stimuli....
the following points may be noted: 1) Single stimuli entirely inefﬁcacious when
alone may become efﬁcacious by sufﬁciently rapid reiteration. If the current
used is very much less than that which provokes the ﬁrst beginning of
contraction, a very large number of successive shocks may be needed before the
movement appears—20, 50, once 106 shocks were needed. 2) The summation
takes place easily in proportion to the shortness of the interval between the
stimuli. A current too weak to give effective summation when its shocks are 3
seconds apart will be capable of so doing when the interval is shortened to 1
second. 3) Not only electrical irritation leaves a modiﬁcation which goes to
swell the following stimulus, but every sort of irritant which can produce a
contraction does so. If in any way a reﬂex contraction of the muscle
experimented on has been produced, or if it is contracted spontaneously by the
animal (as not unfrequently happens 'by sympathy,' during a deep inspiration), it
is found that an electrical stimulus, until then inoperative, operates energetically
if immediately applied."[101]
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Furthermore:
"In a certain stage of the morphia-narcosis an ineffectively weak shock will
become powerfully effective, if, immediately before its application to the motor
centre, the skin of certain parts of the body is exposed to gentle tactile
stimulation.... If, having ascertained the subminimal strength of current and
convinced one's self repeatedly of its inefﬁcacy, we draw our hand a single time
lightly over the skin of the paw whose cortical centre is the object of
stimulation, we ﬁnd the current at once strongly effective. The increase of
irritability lasts some seconds before it disappears. Sometimes the effect of a
single light stroking of the paw is only sufﬁcient to make the previously
ineffectual current produce a very weak contraction. Repeating the tactile
stimulation will then, as a rule, increase the contraction's extent."[102]

[Pg 84]

We constantly use the summation of stimuli in our practical appeals. If a car-horse balks, the
ﬁnal way of starting him is by applying a number of customary incitements at once. If the
driver uses reins and voice, if one bystander pulls at his head, another lashes his hind
quarters, and the conductor rings the bell, and the dismounted passengers shove the car, all
at the same moment, his obstinacy generally yields, and he goes on his way rejoicing. If we
are striving to remember a lost name or fact, we think of as many 'cues' as possible, so that
by their joint action they may recall what no one of them can recall alone. The sight of a
dead prey will often not stimulate a beast to pursuit, but if the sight of movement be added
to that of form, pursuit occurs. "Brücke noted that his brainless hen, which made no attempt
to peck at the grain under her very eyes, began pecking if the grain were thrown on the
ground with force, so as to produce a rattling sound."[103] "Dr. Allen Thomson hatched out
some chickens on a carpet, where he kept them for several days. They showed no inclination
to scrape,... but when Dr. Thomson sprinkled a little gravel on the carpet,... the chickens
immediately began their scraping movements."[104] A strange person, and darkness, are both
of them stimuli to fear and mistrust in dogs (and for the matter of that, in men). Neither
circumstance alone may awaken outward manifestations, but together, i.e. when the strange [Pg 85]
man is met in the dark, the dog will be excited to violent deﬁance.[105] Street-hawkers well
know the efﬁcacy of summation, for they arrange themselves in a line upon the sidewalk,
and the passer often buys from the last one of them, through the effect of the reiterated
solicitation, what he refused to buy from the ﬁrst in the row. Aphasia shows many examples
of summation. A patient who cannot name an object simply shown him, will name it if he
touches as well as sees it, etc.
Instances of summation might be multiplied indeﬁnitely, but it is hardly worth while to
forestall subsequent chapters. Those on Instinct, the Stream of Thought, Attention,
Discrimination, Association, Memory, Æsthetics, and Will, will contain numerous
exempliﬁcations of the reach of the principle in the purely psychological ﬁeld.
REACTION-TIME.
One of the lines of experimental investigation most diligently followed of late years is that
of the ascertainment of the time occupied by nervous events. Helmholtz led off by
discovering the rapidity of the current in the sciatic nerve of the frog. But the methods he
used were soon applied to the sensory nerves and the centres, and the results caused much
popular scientiﬁc admiration when described as measurements of the 'velocity of thought.'
The phrase 'quick as thought' had from time immemorial signiﬁed all that was wonderful
and elusive of determination in the line of speed; and the way in which Science laid her
doomful hand upon this mystery reminded people of the day when Franklin ﬁrst 'eripuit
cœlo fulmen,' foreshadowing the reign of a newer and colder race of gods. We shall take up [Pg 86]
the various operations measured, each in the chapter to which it more naturally pertains. I
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may say, however, immediately, that the phrase 'velocity of thought' is misleading, for it is
by no means clear in any of the cases what particular act of thought occurs during the time
which is measured. 'Velocity of nerve-action' is liable to the same criticism, for in most
cases we do not know what particular nerve-processes occur. What the times in question
really represent is the total duration of certain reactions upon stimuli. Certain of the
conditions of the reaction are prepared beforehand; they consist in the assumption of those
motor and sensory tensions which we name the expectant state. Just what happens during
the actual time occupied by the reaction (in other words, just what is added to the preexistent tensions to produce the actual discharge) is not made out at present, either from the
neural or from the mental point of view.
The method is essentially the same in all these investigations. A signal of some sort is
communicated to the subject, and at the same instant records itself on a time-registering
apparatus. The subject then makes a muscular movement of some sort, which is the
'reaction,' and which also records itself automatically. The time found to have elapsed
between the two records is the total time of that observation. The time-registering
instruments are of various types. One type is that of the revolving drum covered with
smoked paper, on which one electric pen traces a line which the signal breaks and the
'reaction' draws again; whilst another electric pen (connected with a pendulum or a rod of
metal vibrating at a known rate) traces alongside of the former line a 'time-line' of which [Pg 87]
each undulation or link stands for a certain fraction of a second, and against which the break
in the reaction-line can be measured. Compare Fig. 21, where the line is broken by the
signal at the ﬁrst arrow, and continued again by the reaction at the second. Ludwig's
Kymograph, Marey's Chronograph are good examples of this type of instrument.

FIG. 21.

Another type of instrument is represented by the stopwatch, of which the most perfect form
is Hipp's Chronoscope. The hand on the dial measures intervals as short as 1/1000 of a
second. The signal (by an appropriate electric connection) starts it; the reaction stops it; and
by reading off its initial and terminal positions we have immediately and with no farther
trouble the time we seek. A still simpler instrument, though one not very satisfactory in its
working, is the 'psychodometer' of Exner & Obersteiner, of which I picture a modiﬁcation
devised by my colleague Professor H. P. Bowditch, which works very well.
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FIG. 22.—Bowditch's Reaction-timer. F, tuning-fork
carrying a little plate which holds the paper on which the
electric pen M makes the tracing, and sliding in grooves
on the base-board. P, a plug which spreads the prongs of
the fork apart when it is pushed forward to its extreme
limit, and releases them when it is drawn back to a certain
point. The fork then vibrates, and, its backward
movement continuing, an undulating line is drawn on the
smoked paper by the pen. At T is a tongue ﬁxed to the
carriage of the fork, and at K an electric key which the
tongue opens and with which the electric pen is connected.
At the instant of opening, the pen changes its place and
the undulating line is drawn at a different level on the
paper. The opening can be made to serve as a signal to the
reacter in a variety of ways, and his reaction can be made
to close the pen again, when the line returns to its ﬁrst
level. The reaction time = the number of undulations
traced at the second level.
The manner in which the signal and reaction are connected with the chronographic
apparatus varies indeﬁnitely in different experiments. Every new problem requires some [Pg 88]
new electric or mechanical disposition of apparatus.[106]
The least complicated time-measurement is that known as simple reaction-time, in which
there is but one possible signal and one possible movement, and both are known in advance.
The movement is generally the closing of an electric key with the hand. The foot, the jaw,
the lips, even the eyelid, have been in turn made organs of reaction, and the apparatus has
been modiﬁed accordingly.[107] The time usually elapsing between stimulus and movement
lies between one and three tenths of a second, varying according to circumstances which
will be mentioned anon.
The subject of experiment, whenever the reactions are short and regular, is in a state of
extreme tension, and feels, when the signal comes, as if it started the reaction, by a sort of
fatality, and as if no psychic process of perception or volition had a chance to intervene. The
whole succession is so rapid that perception seems to be retrospective, and the time-order of
events to be read off in memory rather than known at the moment. This at least is my own
personal experience in the matter, and with it I ﬁnd others to agree. The question is, What
happens inside of us, either in brain or mind? and to answer that we must analyze just what
processes the reaction involves. It is evident that some time is lost in each of the following
stages:
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1. The stimulus excites the peripheral sense-organ adequately for a current to pass into the
sensory nerve;
2. The sensory nerve is traversed;
3. The transformation (or reﬂection) of the sensory into a motor current occurs in the
centres;
4. The spinal cord and motor nerve are traversed;
5. The motor current excites the muscle to the contracting point.
Time is also lost, of course, outside the muscle, in the joints, skin, etc., and between the [Pg 89]
parts of the apparatus; and when the stimulus which serves as signal is applied to the skin of
the trunk or limbs, time is lost in the sensorial conduction through the spinal cord.
The stage marked 3 is the only one that interests us here. The other stages answer to purely
physiological processes, but stage 3 is psycho-physical; that is, it is a higher-central process,
and has probably some sort of consciousness accompanying it. What sort?
Wundt has little difﬁculty in deciding that it is consciousness of a quite elaborate kind. He
distinguishes between two stages in the conscious reception of an impression, calling one
perception, and the other apperception, and likening the one to the mere entrance of an
object into the periphery of the ﬁeld of vision, and the other to its coming to occupy the
focus or point of view. Inattentive awareness of an object, and attention to it, are, it seems to
me, equivalents for perception and apperception, as Wundt uses the words. To these two
forms of awareness of the impression Wundt adds the conscious volition to react, gives to
the trio the name of 'psycho-physical' processes, and assumes that they actually follow upon
each other in the succession in which they have been named.[108] So at least I understand
him. The simplest way to determine the time taken up by this psycho-physical stage No. 3
would be to determine separately the duration of the several purely physical processes, 1, 2,
4, and 5, and to subtract them from the total reaction-time. Such attempts have been made.
[109] But the data for calculation are too inaccurate for use, and, as Wundt himself admits, [Pg 90]
[110] the precise duration of stage 3 must at present be left enveloped with that of the other
processes, in the total reaction-time.
My own belief is that no such succession of conscious feelings as Wundt describes takes
place during stage 3. It is a process of central excitement and discharge, with which
doubtless some feeling coexists, but what feeling we cannot tell, because it is so fugitive and
so immediately eclipsed by the more substantive and enduring memory of the impression as
it came in, and of the executed movement of response. Feeling of the impression, attention
to it, thought of the reaction, volition to react, would, undoubtedly, all be links of the process
under other conditions,[111] and would lead to the same reaction—after an indeﬁnitely
longer time. But these other conditions are not those of the experiments we are discussing;
and it is mythological psychology (of which we shall see many later examples) to conclude
that because two mental processes lead to the same result they must be similar in their
inward subjective constitution. The feeling of stage 3 is certainly no articulate perception. It
can be nothing but the mere sense of a reﬂex discharge. The reaction whose time is
measured is, in short, a reﬂex action pure and simple, and not a psychic act. A foregoing
psychic condition is, it is true, a prerequisite for this reﬂex action. The preparation of the
attention and volition; the expectation of the signal and the readiness of the hand to move,
the instant it shall come; the nervous tension in which the subject waits, are all conditions of
the formation in him for the time being of a new path or arc of reﬂex discharge. The tract
from the sense-organ which receives the stimulus, into the motor centre which discharges
the reaction, is already tingling with premonitory innervation, is raised to such a pitch of
heightened irritability by the expectant attention, that the signal is instantaneously sufﬁcient
to cause the overﬂow.[112] No other tract of the nervous system is, at the moment, in this [Pg 91]
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hair-trigger condition. The consequence is that one sometimes responds to a wrong signal,
especially if it be an impression of the same kind with the signal we expect.[113] But if by
chance we are tired, or the signal is unexpectedly weak, and we do not react instantly, but
only after an express perception that the signal has come, and an express volition, the time
becomes quite disproportionately long (a second or more, according to Exner[114]), and we
feel that the process is in nature altogether different.
In fact, the reaction-time experiments are a case to which we can immediately apply what
we have just learned about the summation of stimuli. 'Expectant attention' is but the
subjective name for what objectively is a partial stimulation of a certain pathway, the
pathway from the 'centre' for the signal to that for the discharge. In Chapter XI we shall see
that all attention involves excitement from within of the tract concerned in feeling the
objects to which attention is given. The tract here is the excito-motor arc about to be
traversed. The signal is but the spark from without which touches off a train already laid.
The performance, under these conditions, exactly resembles any reﬂex action. The only
difference is that whilst, in the ordinarily so-called reﬂex acts, the reﬂex arc is a permanent
[Pg 92]
result of organic growth, it is here a transient result of previous cerebral conditions.[115]
I am happy to say that since the preceding paragraphs (and the notes thereto appertaining)
were written, Wundt has himself become converted to the view which I defend. He now
admits that in the shortest reactions "there is neither apperception nor will, but that they are
merely brain-reﬂexes due to practice."[116] The means of his conversion are certain
experiments performed in his laboratory by Herr L. Lange,[117] who was led to distinguish
between two ways of setting the attention in reacting on a signal, and who found that they
gave very different time-results. In the 'extreme sensorial' way, as Lange calls it, of reacting, [Pg 93]
one keeps one's mind as intent as possible upon the expected signal, and 'purposely
avoids'[118] thinking of the movement to be executed; in the 'extreme muscular' way one
'does not think at all'[119] of the signal, but stands as ready as possible for the movement.
The muscular reactions are much shorter than the sensorial ones, the average difference
being in the neighborhood of a tenth of a second. Wundt accordingly calls them 'shortened
reactions' and, with Lange, admits them to be mere reﬂexes; whilst the sensorial reactions he
calls 'complete,' and holds to his original conception as far as they are concerned. The facts,
however, do not seem to me to warrant even this amount of ﬁdelity to the original Wundtian
position. When we begin to react in the 'extreme sensorial' way, Lange says that we get
times so very long that they must be rejected from the count as non-typical. "Only after the
reacter has succeeded by repeated and conscientious practice in bringing about an extremely
precise co-ordination of his voluntary impulse with his sense-impression do we get times
which can be regarded as typical sensorial reaction-times."[120] Now it seems to me that
these excessive and 'untypical' times are probably the real 'complete times,' the only ones in
which distinct processes of actual perception and volition occur (see above, pp. 88-9). The
typical sensorial time which is attained by practice is probably another sort of reﬂex, less
perfect than the reﬂexes prepared by straining one's attention towards the movement.[121]
The times are much more variable in the sensorial way than in the muscular. The several
muscular reactions differ little from each other. Only in them does the phenomenon occur of
reacting on a false signal, or of reacting before the signal. Times intermediate between these
two types occur according as the attention fails to turn itself exclusively to one of the
extremes. It is obvious that Herr Lange's distinction between the two types of reaction is a
highly important one, and that the 'extreme muscular method,' giving both the shortest times [Pg 94]
and the most constant ones, ought to be aimed at in all comparative investigations. Herr
Lange's own muscular time averaged 0''.123; his sensorial time, 0''.230.
These reaction-time experiments are then in no sense measurements of the swiftness of
thought. Only when we complicate them is there a chance for anything like an intellectual
operation to occur. They may be complicated in various ways. The reaction may be withheld
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until the signal has consciously awakened a distinct idea (Wundt's discrimination-time,
association-time) and then performed. Or there may be a variety of possible signals, each
with a different reaction assigned to it, and the reacter may be uncertain which one he is
about to receive. The reaction would then hardly seem to occur without a preliminary
recognition and choice. We shall see, however, in the appropriate chapters, that the
discrimination and choice involved in such a reaction are widely different from the
intellectual operations of which we are ordinarily conscious under those names. Meanwhile
the simple reaction-time remains as the starting point of all these superinduced
complications. It is the fundamental physiological constant in all time-measurements. As
such, its own variations have an interest, and must be brieﬂy passed in review.[122]
The reaction-time varies with the individual and his age. An individual may have it
particularly long in respect of signals of one sense (Buccola, p. 147), but not of others. Old
and uncultivated people have it long (nearly a second, in an old pauper observed by Exner,
Pﬂüger's Archiv, vii, 612-4). Children have it long (half a second, Herzen in Buccola, p.
152).
Practice shortens it to a quantity which is for each individual a minimum beyond which no
farther reduction can be made. The aforesaid old pauper's time was, after much practice,
reduced to 0.1866 sec. (loc. cit. p. 626).
Fatigue lengthens it.

[Pg 95]

Concentration of attention shortens it. Details will be given in the chapter on Attention.
The nature of the signal makes it vary.[123] Wundt writes:
"I found that the reaction-time for impressions on the skin with electric stimulus
is less than for true touch-sensations, as the following averages show:
Sound
Light
Electric skin-sensation
Touch-sensations

Average.
0.167 sec.
0.222 sec.
0.201 sec.
0.213 sec.

Average Variation
0.0221 sec.
0.0219 sec.
0.0115 sec.
0.0134 sec.

"I here bring together the averages which have been obtained by some other
observers:
Hirsch.
Sound
0.149
Light
0.200
Skin-sensation 0.182

Hankel.
0.1505
0.2246
0.1546

Exner.
0.1360
0.1506
0.1337"[124]

Thermic reactions have been lately measured by A. Goldscheider and by Vintschgau (1887),
who ﬁnd them slower than reactions from touch. That from heat especially is very slow,
more so than from cold, the differences (according to Goldscheider) depending on the
nerve-terminations in the skin.
Gustatory reactions were measured by Vintschgau. They differed according to the
substances used, running up to half a second as a maximum when identiﬁcation took place.
The mere perception of the presence of the substance on the tongue varied from 0''.159 to
0''.219 (Pﬂüger's Archiv, xiv, 529).
Olfactory reactions have been studied by Vintschgau, Buccola, and Beaunis. They are slow, [Pg 96]
averaging about half a second (cf. Beaunis, Recherches exp. sur l'Activité Cérébrale, 1884,
p. 49 ff.).
It will be observed that sound is more promptly reacted on than either sight or touch. Taste
and smell are slower than either. One individual, who reacted to touch upon the tip of the
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tongue in 0''.125, took 0''.993 to react upon the taste of quinine applied to the same spot. In
another, upon the base of the tongue, the reaction to touch being 0''.141, that to sugar was
0''.552 (Vintschgau, quoted by Buccola, p. 103). Buccola found the reaction to odors to vary
from 0''.334 to 0''.681, according to the perfume used and the individual.
The intensity of the signal makes a difference. The intenser the stimulus the shorter the time.
Herzen (Grundlinien einer allgem. Psychophysiologie, p. 101) compared the reaction from a
corn on the toe with that from the skin of the hand of the same subject. The two places were
stimulated simultaneously, and the subject tried to react simultaneously with both hand and
foot, but the foot always went quickest. When the sound skin of the foot was touched
instead of the corn, it was the hand which always reacted ﬁrst. Wundt tries to show that
when the signal is made barely perceptible, the time is probably the same in all the senses,
namely, about 0.332'' (Physiol. Psych., 2d ed., ii, 224).
Where the signal is of touch, the place to which it is applied makes a difference in the
resultant reaction-time. G. S. Hall and V. Kries found (Archiv f. Anat. u. Physiol., 1879) that
when the ﬁnger-tip was the place the reaction was shorter than when the middle of the upper
arm was used, in spite of the greater length of nerve-trunk to be traversed in the latter case.
This discovery invalidates the measurements of the rapidity of transmission of the current in
human nerves, for they are all based on the method of comparing reaction-times from places
near the root and near the extremity of a limb. The same observers found that signals seen
by the periphery of the retina gave longer times than the same signals seen by direct vision.
The season makes a difference, the time being some hundredths of a second shorter on cold [Pg 97]
winter days (Vintschgau apud Exner, Hermann's Hdbh., p. 270).
Intoxicants alter the time. Coffee and tea appear to shorten it. Small doses of wine and
alcohol ﬁrst shorten and then lengthen it; but the shortening stage tends to disappear if a
large dose be given immediately. This, at least, is the report of two German observers. Dr. J.
W. Warren, whose observations are more thorough than any previous ones, could ﬁnd no
very decided effects from ordinary doses (Journal of Physiology, viii, 311). Morphia
lengthens the time. Amyl-nitrite lengthens it, but after the inhalation it may fall to less than
the normal. Ether and chloroform lengthen it (for authorities, etc., see Buccola, p. 189).
Certain diseased states naturally lengthen the time.
The hypnotic trance has no constant effect, sometimes shortening and sometimes
lengthening it (Hall, Mind, viii, 170; James, Proc. Am. Soc. for Psych. Research, 246).
The time taken to inhibit a movement (e.g. to cease contraction of jaw-muscles) seems to be
about the same as to produce one (Gad, Archiv f. (Anat. u.) Physiol., 1887, 468; Orchansky,
ibid.1889, 1885).
An immense amount of work has been done on reaction-time, of which I have cited but a
small part. It is a sort of work which appeals particularly to patient and exact minds, and
they have not failed to proﬁt by the opportunity.
CEREBRAL BLOOD-SUPPLY.
The next point to occupy our attention is the changes of circulation which accompany
cerebral activity.
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FIG. 23.—Sphymographic pulse-tracing. A, during intellectual
repose; B, during intellectual activity. (Mosso.)

All parts of the cortex, when electrically excited, produce alterations both of respiration and
circulation. The blood-pressure rises, as a rule, all over the body, no matter where the
cortical irritation is applied, though the motor zone is the most sensitive region for the
purpose. Elsewhere the current must be strong enough for an epileptic attack to be produced.
[125] Slowing and quickening of the heart are also observed, and are independent of the
vaso-constrictive phenomenon. Mosso, using his ingenious 'plethysmograph' as an indicator, [Pg 98]
discovered that the blood-supply to the arms diminished during intellectual activity, and
found furthermore that the arterial tension (as shown by the sphygmograph) was increased
in these members (see Fig. 23). So slight an emotion as that produced by the entrance of
Professor Ludwig into the laboratory was instantly followed by a shrinkage of the arms.[126]
The brain itself is an excessively vascular organ, a sponge full of blood, in fact; and another
of Mosso's inventions showed that when less blood went to the arms, more went to the head.
The subject to be observed lay on a delicately balanced table which could tip downward
either at the head or at the foot if the weight of either end were increased. The moment
emotional or intellectual activity began in the subject, down went the balance at the headend, in consequence of the redistribution of blood in his system. But the best proof of the
immediate afﬂux of blood to the brain during mental activity is due to Mosso's observations
on three persons whose brain had been laid bare by lesion of the skull. By means of
apparatus described in his book,[127] this physiologist was enabled to let the brain-pulse
record itself directly by a tracing. The intra-cranial blood-pressure rose immediately
whenever the subject was spoken to, or when he began to think actively, as in solving a
problem in mental arithmetic. Mosso gives in his work a large number of reproductions of
tracings which show the instantaneity of the change of blood-supply, whenever the mental
activity was quickened by any cause whatever, intellectual or emotional. He relates of his [Pg 99]
female subject that one day whilst tracing her brain-pulse he observed a sudden rise with no
apparent outer or inner cause. She however confessed to him afterwards that at that moment
she had caught sight of a skull on top of a piece of furniture in the room, and that this had
given her a slight emotion.
The ﬂuctuations of the blood supply to the brain were independent of respiratory changes,
[128] and followed the quickening of mental activity almost immediately. We must suppose a
very delicate adjustment whereby the circulation follows the needs of the cerebral activity.
Blood very likely may rush to each region of the cortex according as it is most active, but of
this we know nothing. I need hardly say that the activity of the nervous matter is the primary
phenomenon, and the afﬂux of blood its secondary consequence. Many popular writers talk
as if it were the other way about, and as if mental activity were due to the afﬂux of blood.
But, as Professor H. N. Martin has well said, "that belief has no physiological foundation
whatever; it is even directly opposed to all that we know of cell life."[129] A chronic
pathological congestion may, it is true, have secondary consequences, but the primary
congestions which we have been considering follow the activity of the brain-cells by an
adaptive reﬂex vaso-motor mechanism doubtless as elaborate as that which harmonizes
blood-supply with cell-action in any muscle or gland.
Of the changes in the cerebral circulation during sleep I will speak in the chapter which
treats of that subject.
CEREBRAL THERMOMETRY.
Brain-activity seems accompanied by a local disengagement of heat. The earliest careful
work in this direction was by Dr. J. S. Lombard in 1867. Dr. Lombard's latest results include
the records of over 60,000 observations.[130] He noted the changes in delicate thermometers [Pg 100]
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and electric piles placed against the scalp in human beings, and found that any intellectual
effort, such as computing, composing, reciting poetry silently or aloud, and especially that
emotional excitement such as an anger ﬁt, caused a general rise of temperature, which rarely
exceeded a degree Fahrenheit. The rise was in most cases more marked in the middle region
of the head than elsewhere. Strange to say, it was greater in reciting poetry silently than in
reciting it aloud. Dr. Lombard's explanation is that "in internal recitation an additional
portion of energy, which in recitation aloud was converted into nervous and muscular force,
now appears as heat."[131] I should suggest rather, if we must have a theory, that the surplus
of heat in recitation to one's self is due to inhibitory processes which are absent when we
recite aloud. In the chapter on the Will we shall see that the simple central process is to
speak when we think; to think silently involves a check in addition. In 1870 the
indefatigable Schiff took up the subject, experimenting on live dogs and chickens, plunging
thermo-electric needles into the substance of their brain, to eliminate possible errors from
vascular changes in the skin when the thermometers were placed upon the scalp. After
habituation was established, he tested the animals with various sensations, tactile, optic,
olfactory, and auditory. He found very regularly an immediate deﬂection of the
galvanometer, indicating an abrupt alteration of the intra-cerebral temperature. When, for
instance, he presented an empty roll of paper to the nose of his dog as it lay motionless,
there was a small deﬂection, but when a piece of meat was in the paper the deﬂection was
much greater. Schiff concluded from these and other experiments that sensorial activity
heats the brain-tissue, but he did not try to localize the increment of heat beyond ﬁnding that
it was in both hemispheres, whatever might be the sensation applied.[132] Dr. R. W. Amidon
in 1880 made a farther step forward, in localizing the heat produced by voluntary muscular
contractions. Applying a number of delicate surface-thermometers simultaneously against [Pg 101]
the scalp, he found that when different muscles of the body were made to contract
vigorously for ten minutes or more, different regions of the scalp rose in temperature, that
the regions were well focalized, and that the rise of temperature was often considerably over
a Fahrenheit degree. As a result of his investigations he gives a diagram in which numbered
regions represent the centres of highest temperature for the various special movements
which were investigated. To a large extent they correspond to the centres for the same
movements assigned by Ferrier and others on other grounds; only they cover more of the
skull.[133]
Phosphorus and Thought.
Chemical action must of course accompany brain-activity. But little deﬁnite is known of its
exact nature. Cholesterin and creatin are both excrementitious products, and are both found
in the brain. The subject belongs to chemistry rather than to psychology, and I only mention
it here for the sake of saying a word about a wide-spread popular error about brain-activity
and phosphorus. 'Ohne Phosphor, kein Gedanke,' was a noted war-cry of the 'materialists'
during the excitement on that subject which ﬁlled Germany in the '60s. The brain, like every
other organ of the body, contains phosphorus, and a score of other chemicals besides. Why
the phosphorus should be picked out as its essence, no one knows. It would be equally true
to say 'Ohne Wasser kein Gedanke,' or 'Ohne Kochsalz kein Gedanke'; for thought would
stop as quickly if the brain should dry up or lose its NaCl as if it lost its phosphorus. In
America the phosphorus-delusion has twined itself round a saying quoted (rightly or
wrongly) from Professor L. Agassiz, to the effect that ﬁshermen are more intelligent than
farmers because they eat so much ﬁsh, which contains so much phosphorus. All the facts
may be doubted.
The only straight way to ascertain the importance of phosphorus to thought would be to ﬁnd [Pg 102]
whether more is excreted by the brain during mental activity than during rest. Unfortunately
we cannot do this directly, but can only gauge the amount of PO5 in the urine, which
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represents other organs as well as the brain, and this procedure, as Dr. Edes says, is like
measuring the rise of water at the mouth of the Mississippi to tell where there has been a
thunder-storm in Minnesota.[134] It has been adopted, however, by a variety of observers,
some of whom found the phosphates in the urine diminished, whilst others found them
increased, by intellectual work. On the whole, it is impossible to trace any constant relation.
In maniacal excitement less phosphorus than usual seems to be excreted. More is excreted
during sleep. There are differences between the alkaline and earthy phosphates into which I
will not enter, as my only aim is to show that the popular way of looking at the matter has
no exact foundation.[135] The fact that phosphorus-preparations may do good in nervous
exhaustion proves nothing as to the part played by phosphorus in mental activity. Like iron,
arsenic, and other remedies it is a stimulant or tonic, of whose intimate workings in the
system we know absolutely nothing, and which moreover does good in an extremely small
number of the cases in which it is prescribed.
The phosphorus-philosophers have often compared thought to a secretion. "The brain
secretes thought, as the kidneys secrete urine, or as the liver secretes bile," are phrases
which one sometimes hears. The lame analogy need hardly be pointed out. The materials
which the brain pours into the blood (cholesterin, creatin, xanthin, or whatever they may be)
are the analogues of the urine and the bile, being in fact real material excreta. As far as these
matters go, the brain is a ductless gland. But we know of nothing connected with liver-and
kidney-activity which can be in the remotest degree compared with the stream of thought [Pg 103]
that accompanies the brain's material secretions.
There remains another feature of general brain-physiology, and indeed for psychological
purposes the most important feature of all. I refer to the aptitude of the brain for acquiring
habits. But I will treat of that in a chapter by itself.

[99]

I shall myself in later places indulge in much of this schematization. The reader
will understand once for all that it is symbolic; and that the use of it is hardly
more than to show what a deep congruity there is between mental processes and
mechanical processes of some kind, not necessarily of the exact kind portrayed.

[100]

Valentin: Archiv f. d. gesammt. Physiol., 1873, p. 458. Stirling: Leipzig Acad.
Berichte, 1875, p. 372 (Journal of Physiol., 1875). J. Ward: Archiv f. (Anat. u.)
Physiol., 1880, p. 72. H. Sewall: Johns Hopkins Studies, 1880, p. 30. Kronecker
u. Nicolaides: Archiv f. (Anat. u.) Physiol., 1880, p. 437. Exner: Archiv f. die ges.
Physiol., Bd. 28, p. 487 (1882). Eckhard: in Hermann's Hdbch. d. Physiol., Bd. I,
Thl. ii, p. 31. François-Franck: Leçons sur les Fonctions motrices du Cerveau, p.
51 ff., 339.—For the process of summation in nerves and muscles, cf. Hermann:
ibid. Thl. i, p. 109, and vol. i, p. 40. Also Wundt: Physiol. Psych., i, 243 ff.;
Richet: Travaux du Laboratoire de Marey, 1877, p. 97; L'Homme et l'Intelligence,
pp. 24 ff., 468; Revue Philosophique, t. xxi, p. 564. Kronecker u. Hall: Archiv f.
(Anat. u.) Physiol., 1879; Schönlein: ibid.1882, p. 357. Sertoli (Hofmann and
Schwalbe's Jahres-bericht), 1882, p. 25. De Watteville: Neurologisches
Centralblatt, 1883, No. 7. Grünhagen: Arch. f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. 34, p. 301
(1884).

[101]

Bubnoff und Heidenhain: Ueber Erregungs- und Hemmungsvorgänge innerhalb
der motorischen Hirncentren. Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. 26, p. 156 (1881).

[102]

Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. 26, p. 176 (1881). Exner thinks (ibid. Bd. 28, p. 497
(1882)) that the summation here occurs in the spinal cord. It makes no difference
where this particular summation occurs, so far as the general philosophy of
summation goes.
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[103]

G H. Lewes: Physical Basis of Mind, p. 479, where many similar examples are
given, 487-9.

[104]

Romanes: Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 168.

[105]

See a similar instance in Mach: Beiträge zur Analyse der Empﬁndungen, p. 36, a
sparrow being the animal. My young children are afraid of their own pug-dog, if
he enters their room after they are in bed and the lights are out. Compare this
statement also: "The ﬁrst question to a peasant seldom proves more than a ﬂapper
to rouse the torpid adjustments of his ears. The invariable answer of a Scottish
peasant is, 'What's your wull?'—that of the English, a vacant stare. A second and
even a third question may be required to elicit an answer." (R. Fowler; Some
Observations on the Mental State of the Blind, and Deaf, and Dumb (Salisbury,
1843), p. 14.)

[106]

The reader will ﬁnd a great deal about chronographic apparatus in J. Marey: La
Méthode Graphique, pt. ii, chap. ii. One can make pretty fair measurements with
no other instrument than a watch, by making a large number of reactions, each
serving as a signal for the following one, and dividing the total time they take by
their number. Dr. O. W. Holmes ﬁrst suggested this method, which has been
ingeniously elaborated and applied by Professor Jastrow. See 'Science' for
September 10, 1886.

[107]

See, for a few modiﬁcations, Cattell, Mind, xi, 220 ff.

[108]

Physiol. Psych., ii, 221-2. Cf. also the ﬁrst edition, 728-9. I must confess to
ﬁnding all Wundt's utterances about 'apperception' both vacillating and obscure. I
see no use whatever for the word, as he employs it, in Psychology. Attention,
perception, conception, volition, are its ample equivalents. Why we should need a
single word to denote all these things by turns, Wundt fails to make clear.
Consult, however, his pupil Staude's article, 'Ueber den Begriff der Apperception,'
etc., in Wundt's periodical Philosophische Studien, i, 149, which may be supposed
ofﬁcial. For a minute criticism of Wundt's 'apperception,' see Marty:
Vierteljahrschrift f. wiss. Philos., x, 346.

[109]

By Exner, for example, Pﬂüger's Archiv, vii, 628 ff.

[110]

P. 222. Cf. also Richet, Rev. Philos., vi, 395-6.

[111]

For instance, if, on the previous day, one had resolved to act on a signal when it
should come, and it now came whilst we were engaged in other things, and
reminded us of the resolve.

[112]

"I need hardly mention that success in these experiments depends in a high degree
on our concentration of attention. If inattentive, one gets very discrepant ﬁgures....
This concentration of the attention is in the highest degree exhausting. After some
experiments in which I was concerned to get results as uniform as possible, I was
covered with perspiration and excessively fatigued although I had sat quietly in
my chair all the while." (Exner, loc. cit. vii, 618.)

[113]

Wundt, Physiol. Psych., ii, 226

[114]

Pﬂüger's Archiv, vii, 616.

[115]

In short, what M. Delbœuf calls an 'organe adventice.' The reaction-time,
moreover, is quite compatible with the reaction itself being of a reﬂex order. Some
reﬂexes (sneezing, e.g.) are very slow. The only time-measurement of a reﬂex act
in the human subject with which I am acquainted is Exner's measurement of
winking (in Pﬂüger's Archiv f. d. gesammt. Physiol., Bd. viii, p. 526, 1874). He
found that when the stimulus was a ﬂash of light it took the wink 0.2168 sec. to
occur. A strong electric shock to the cornea shortened the time to 0.0578 sec. The
ordinary 'reaction-time' is midway between these values. Exner 'reduces' his times
by eliminating the physiological process of conduction. His 'reduced minimum
winking-time' is then 0.0471 (ibid. 531), whilst his reduced reaction-time is
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0.0828 (ibid. vii, 637). These ﬁgures have really no scientiﬁc value beyond that of
showing, according to Exner's own belief (vii, 531), that reaction-time and reﬂextime measure processes of essentially the same order. His description, moreover,
of the process is an excellent description of a reﬂex act. "Every one," says he,
"who makes reaction-time experiments for the ﬁrst time is surprised to ﬁnd how
little he is master of his own movements, so soon as it becomes a question of
executing them with a maximum of speed. Not only does their energy lie, as it
were, outside the ﬁeld of choice, but even the time in which the movement occurs
depends only partly upon ourselves. We jerk our arm, and we can afterwards tell
with astonishing precision whether we have jerked it quicker or slower than
another time, although we have no power to jerk it exactly at the wished-for
moment."—Wundt himself admits that when we await a strong signal with tense
preparation there is no consciousness of any duality of 'apperception' and motor
response; the two are continuous (Physiol. Psych., ii, 226).—Mr. Cattell's view is
identical with the one I defend. "I think," he says, "that if the processes of
perception and willing are present at all they are very rudimentary.... The subject,
by a voluntary effort [before the signal comes], puts the lines of communication
between the centre for" the stimulus "and the centre for the co-ordination of
motions ... in a state of unstable equilibrium. When, therefore, a nervous impulse
reaches the" former centre, "it causes brain-changes in two directions; an impulse
moves along to the cortex and calls forth there a perception corresponding to the
stimulus, while at the same time an impulse follows a line of small resistance to
the centre for the co-ordination of motions, and the proper nervous impulse,
already prepared and waiting for the signal, is sent from the centre to the muscle
of the hand. When the reaction has often been made the entire cerebral process
becomes automatic, the impulse of itself takes the well-travelled way to the motor
centre, and releases the motor impulse." (Mind, xi, 232-3.)—Finally, Prof. Lipps
has, in his elaborate way (Grundtatsachen, 179-188), made mince-meat of the
view that stage 3 involves either conscious perception or conscious will.
[116]

Physiol. Psych., 3d edition (1887), vol. ii, p. 266.

[117]

Philosophische Studien, vol. iv, p. 479 (1888).

[118]

Loc. cit. p. 488.

[119]

Loc. cit. p. 487.

[120]

Loc. cit. p. 489.

[121]

Lange has an interesting hypothesis as to the brain-process concerned in the latter,
for which I can only refer to his essay.

[122]

The reader who wishes to know more about the matter will ﬁnd a most faithful
compilation of all that has been done, together with much original matter, in G.
Buccola's 'Legge del Tempo,' etc. See also chapter xvi of Wundt's Physiol.
Psychology; Exner in Hermann's Hdbch., Bd. 2, Thl. ii, pp. 252-280; also Ribot's
Contemp. Germ. Psych. chap. viii.

[123]

The nature of the movement also seems to make it vary. Mr. B. I. Gilman and I
reacted to the same signal by simply raising our hand, and again by carrying our
hand towards our back. The moment registered was always that at which the hand
broke an electric contact in starting to move. But it started one or two hundredths
of a second later when the more extensive movement was the one to be made.
Orchansky, on the other hand, experimenting on contractions of the masseter
muscle, found (Archiv f. (Anat. u.) Physiol., 1889, p. 187) that the greater the
amplitude of contraction intended, the shorter grew the time of reaction. He
explains this by the fact that a more ample contraction makes a greater appeal to
the attention, and that this shortens the times.

[124]

Physiol. Psych., ii, 223.

[125]

François-Franck, Fonctions Motrices, Leçon xxii.
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[126]

La Paura (1884), p. 117.

[127]

Ueber den Kreislauf des Blutes im menschlichen Gehirn (1881), chap. ii. The
Introduction gives the history of our previous knowledge of the subject.

[128]

In this conclusion M. Gley (Archives de Physiologie, 1881, p. 742) agrees with
Professor Mosso. Gley found his pulse rise 1-3 beats, his carotid dilate, and his
radial artery contract during hard mental work.

[129]

Address before Med. and Chirurg. Society of Maryland, 1879.

[130]

See his book; "Experimental Researches on the Regional Temperature of the
Head" (London, 1879).

[131]

Loc. cit. p. 195.

[132]

The most convenient account of Schiff's experiments is by Prof. Hierzen, in the
Revue Philosophique, vol. iii, p. 36.

[133]

A New Study of Cerebral Cortical Localization (N. Y., Putnam, 1880), pp. 48-53.

[134]

Archives of Medicine, vol. x, No. 1 (1883).

[135]

Without multiplying references, I will simply cite Mendel (Archiv f. Psychiatrie,
vol. iii, 1871), Mairet (Archives de Neurologie, vol. ix, 1885), and Beaunis (Rech.
Expérimentales sur l'Activité Cérébrale, 1887). Richet gives a partial bibliography
in the Revue Scientiﬁque, vol. 38, p. 788 (1886).

CHAPTER IV.[136]

[Pg 104]

HABIT.
When we look at living creatures from an outward point of view, one of the ﬁrst things that
strike us is that they are bundles of habits. In wild animals, the usual round of daily behavior
seems a necessity implanted at birth; in animals domesticated, and especially in man, it
seems, to a great extent, to be the result of education. The habits to which there is an innate
tendency are called instincts; some of those due to education would by most persons be
called acts of reason. It thus appears that habit covers a very large part of life, and that one
engaged in studying the objective manifestations of mind is bound at the very outset to
deﬁne clearly just what its limits are.
The moment one tries to deﬁne what habit is, one is led to the fundamental properties of
matter. The laws of Nature are nothing but the immutable habits which the different
elementary sorts of matter follow in their actions and reactions upon each other. In the
organic world, however, the habits are more variable than this. Even instincts vary from one
individual to another of a kind; and are modiﬁed in the same individual, as we shall later
see, to suit the exigencies of the case. The habits of an elementary particle of matter cannot
change (on the principles of the atomistic philosophy), because the particle is itself an
unchangeable thing; but those of a compound mass of matter can change, because they are
in the last instance due to the structure of the compound, and either outward forces or
inward tensions can, from one hour to another, turn that structure into something different
from what it was. That is, they can do so if the body be plastic enough to maintain its [Pg 105]
integrity, and be not disrupted when its structure yields.
The change of structure here spoken of need not involve the outward shape; it may be
invisible and molecular, as when a bar of iron becomes magnetic or crystalline through the
action of certain outward causes, or India-rubber becomes friable, or plaster 'sets.' All these
changes are rather slow; the material in question opposes a certain resistance to the
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modifying cause, which it takes time to overcome, but the gradual yielding whereof often
saves the material from being disintegrated altogether. When the structure has yielded, the
same inertia becomes a condition of its comparative permanence in the new form, and of the
new habits the body then manifests. Plasticity, then, in the wide sense of the word, means
the possession of a structure weak enough to yield to an inﬂuence, but strong enough not to
yield all at once. Each relatively stable phase of equilibrium in such a structure is marked by
what we may call a new set of habits. Organic matter, especially nervous tissue, seems
endowed with a very extraordinary degree of plasticity of this sort; so that we may without
hesitation lay down as our ﬁrst proposition the following, that the phenomena of habit in
living beings are due to the plasticity[137] of the organic materials of which their bodies are
composed.
But the philosophy of habit is thus, in the ﬁrst instance, a chapter in physics rather than in
physiology or psychology. That it is at bottom a physical principle is admitted by all good
recent writers on the subject. They call attention to analogues of acquired habits exhibited
by dead matter. Thus, M. Léon Dumont, whose essay on habit is perhaps the most
philosophical account yet published, writes:
"Every one knows how a garment, after having been worn a certain time, clings
to the shape of the body better than when it was new; there has been a change in
the tissue, and this change is a new habit of cohesion. A lock works better after
being used some time; at the outset more force was required to overcome
certain roughnesses in the mechanism. The overcoming of their resistance is a
phenomenon of habituation. It costs less trouble to fold a paper when it has
been folded already. This saving of trouble is due to the essential nature of
habit, which brings it about that, to reproduce the effect, a less amount of the
outward cause is required. The sounds of a violin improve by use in the hands
of an able artist, because the ﬁbres of the wood at last contract habits of
vibration conformed to harmonic relations. This is what gives such inestimable
value to instruments that have belonged to great masters. Water, in ﬂowing,
hollows out for itself a channel, which grows broader and deeper; and, after
having ceased to ﬂow, it resumes, when it ﬂows again, the path traced by itself
before. Just so, the impressions of outer objects fashion for themselves in the
nervous system more and more appropriate paths, and these vital phenomena
recur under similar excitements from without, when they have been interrupted
a certain time."[138]

[Pg 106]

Not in the nervous system alone. A scar anywhere is a locus minoris resistentiæ, more liable
to be abraded, inﬂamed, to suffer pain and cold, than are the neighboring parts. A sprained
ankle, a dislocated arm, are in danger of being sprained or dislocated again; joints that have
once been attacked by rheumatism or gout, mucous membranes that have been the seat of
catarrh, are with each fresh recurrence more prone to a relapse, until often the morbid state
chronically substitutes itself for the sound one. And if we ascend to the nervous system, we
ﬁnd how many so-called functional diseases seem to keep themselves going simply because
they happen to have once begun; and how the forcible cutting short by medicine of a few
attacks is often sufﬁcient to enable the physiological forces to get possession of the ﬁeld
again, and to bring the organs back to functions of health. Epilepsies, neuralgias, convulsive
affections of various sorts, insomnias, are so many cases in point. And, to take what are
more obviously habits, the success with which a 'weaning' treatment can often be applied to
the victims of unhealthy indulgence of passion, or of mere complaining or irascible
disposition, shows us how much the morbid manifestations themselves were due to the mere
inertia of the nervous organs, when once launched on a false career.
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Can we now form a notion of what the inward physical changes may be like, in organs
whose habits have thus struck into new paths? In other words, can we say just what [Pg 107]
mechanical facts the expression 'change of habit' covers when it is applied to a nervous
system? Certainly we cannot in anything like a minute or deﬁnite way. But our usual
scientiﬁc custom of interpreting hidden molecular events after the analogy of visible
massive ones enables us to frame easily an abstract and general scheme of processes which
the physical changes in question may be like. And when once the possibility of some kind of
mechanical interpretation is established, Mechanical Science, in her present mood, will not
hesitate to set her brand of ownership upon the matter, feeling sure that it is only a question
of time when the exact mechanical explanation of the case shall be found out.
If habits are due to the plasticity of materials to outward agents, we can immediately see to
what outward inﬂuences, if to any, the brain-matter is plastic. Not to mechanical pressures,
not to thermal changes, not to any of the forces to which all the other organs of our body are
exposed; for nature has carefully shut up our brain and spinal cord in bony boxes, where no
inﬂuences of this sort can get at them. She has ﬂoated them in ﬂuid so that only the severest
shocks can give them a concussion, and blanketed and wrapped them about in an altogether
exceptional way. The only impressions that can be made upon them are through the blood,
on the one hand, and through the sensory nerve-roots, on the other; and it is to the inﬁnitely
attenuated currents that pour in through these latter channels that the hemispherical cortex
shows itself to be so peculiarly susceptible. The currents, once in, must ﬁnd a way out. In
getting out they leave their traces in the paths which they take. The only thing they can do,
in short, is to deepen old paths or to make new ones; and the whole plasticity of the brain
sums itself up in two words when we call it an organ in which currents pouring in from the
sense-organs make with extreme facility paths which do not easily disappear. For, of course,
a simple habit, like every other nervous event—the habit of snufﬂing, for example, or of
putting one's hands into one's pockets, or of biting one's nails—is, mechanically, nothing but
a reﬂex discharge; and its anatomical substratum must be a path in the system. The most [Pg 108]
complex habits, as we shall presently see more fully, are, from the same point of view,
nothing but concatenated discharges in the nerve-centres, due to the presence there of
systems of reﬂex paths, so organized as to wake each other up successively—the impression
produced by one muscular contraction serving as a stimulus to provoke the next, until a ﬁnal
impression inhibits the process and closes the chain. The only difﬁcult mechanical problem
is to explain the formation de novo of a simple reﬂex or path in a pre-existing nervous
system. Here, as in so many other cases, it is only the premier pas qui coûte. For the entire
nervous system is nothing but a system of paths between a sensory terminus a quo and a
muscular, glandular, or other terminus ad quem. A path once traversed by a nerve-current
might be expected to follow the law of most of the paths we know, and to be scooped out
and made more permeable than before;[139] and this ought to be repeated with each new
passage of the current. Whatever obstructions may have kept it at ﬁrst from being a path
should then, little by little, and more and more, be swept out of the way, until at last it might
become a natural drainage-channel. This is what happens where either solids or liquids pass
over a path; there seems no reason why it should not happen where the thing that passes is a
mere wave of rearrangement in matter that does not displace itself, but merely changes
chemically or turns itself round in place, or vibrates across the line. The most plausible
views of the nerve-current make it out to be the passage of some such wave of
rearrangement as this. If only a part of the matter of the path were to 'rearrange' itself, the
neighboring parts remaining inert, it is easy to see how their inertness might oppose a
friction which it would take many waves of rearrangement to break down and overcome. If
we call the path itself the 'organ,' and the wave of rearrangement the 'function,' then it is
[Pg 109]
obviously a case for repeating the celebrated French formula of 'La fonction fait l'organe.'
So nothing is easier than to imagine how, when a current once has traversed a path, it should
traverse it more readily still a second time. But what made it ever traverse it the ﬁrst time?
[140] In answering this question we can only fall back on our general conception of a
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

69/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

nervous system as a mass of matter whose parts, constantly kept in states of different
tension, are as constantly tending to equalize their states. The equalization between any two
points occurs through whatever path may at the moment be most pervious. But, as a given
point of the system may belong, actually or potentially, to many different paths, and, as the
play of nutrition is subject to accidental changes, blocks may from time to time occur, and
make currents shoot through unwonted lines. Such an unwonted line would be a newcreated path, which if traversed repeatedly, would become the beginning of a new reﬂex arc.
All this is vague to the last degree, and amounts to little more than saying that a new path
may be formed by the sort of chances that in nervous material are likely to occur. But, vague
as it is, it is really the last word of our wisdom in the matter.[141]
It must be noticed that the growth of structural modiﬁcation in living matter may be more
rapid than in any lifeless mass, because the incessant nutritive renovation of which the
living matter is the seat tends often to corroborate and ﬁx the impressed modiﬁcation, rather [Pg 110]
than to counteract it by renewing the original constitution of the tissue that has been
impressed. Thus, we notice after exercising our muscles or our brain in a new way, that we
can do so no longer at that time; but after a day or two of rest, when we resume the
discipline, our increase in skill not seldom surprises us. I have often noticed this in learning
a tune; and it has led a German author to say that we learn to swim during the winter and to
skate during the summer.
Dr. Carpenter writes:[142]
"It is a matter of universal experience that every kind of training for special
aptitudes is both far more effective, and leaves a more permanent impress,
when exerted on the growing organism than when brought to bear on the adult.
The effect of such training is shown in the tendency of the organ to 'grow to' the
mode in which it is habitually exercised; as is evidenced by the increased size
and power of particular sets of muscles, and the extraordinary ﬂexibility of
joints, which are acquired by such as have been early exercised in gymnastic
performances.... There is no part of the organism of man in which the
reconstructive activity is so great, during the whole period of life, as it is in the
ganglionic substance of the brain. This is indicated by the enormous supply of
blood which it receives.... It is, moreover, a fact of great signiﬁcance that the
nerve-substance is specially distinguished by its reparative power. For while
injuries of other tissues (such as the muscular) which are distinguished by the
speciality of their structure and endowments, are repaired by substance of a
lower or less specialized type, those of nerve-substance are repaired by a
complete reproduction of the normal tissue; as is evidenced in the sensibility of
the newly forming skin which is closing over an open wound, or in the recovery
of the sensibility of a piece of 'transplanted' skin, which has for a time been
rendered insensible by the complete interruption of the continuity of its nerves.
The most remarkable example of this reproduction, however, is afforded by the
results of M. Brown-Séquard's[143] experiments upon the gradual restoration of
the functional activity of the spinal cord after its complete division; which takes
place in a way that indicates rather a reproduction of the whole, or the lower
part of the cord and of the nerves proceeding from it, than a mere reunion of
divided surfaces. This reproduction is but a special manifestation of the
reconstructive change which is always taking place in the nervous system; it
being not less obvious to the eye of reason that the 'waste' occasioned by its
functional activity must be constantly repaired by the production of new tissue,
than it is to the eye of sense that such reparation supplies an actual loss of
substance by disease or injury.
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"Now, in this constant and active reconstruction of the nervous system, we
recognize a most marked conformity to the general plan manifested in the
nutrition of the organism as a whole. For, in the ﬁrst place, it is obvious that
there is a tendency to the production of a determinate type of structure; which
type is often not merely that of the species, but some special modiﬁcation of it
which characterized one or both of the progenitors. But this type is peculiarly
liable to modiﬁcation during the early period of life; in which the functional
activity of the nervous system (and particularly of the brain) is extraordinarily
great, and the reconstructive process proportionally active. And this
modiﬁability expresses itself in the formation of the mechanism by which those
secondarily automatic modes of movement come to be established, which, in
man, take the place of those that are congenital in most of the animals beneath
him; and those modes of sense-perception come to be acquired, which are
elsewhere clearly instinctive. For there can be no reasonable doubt that, in both
cases, a nervous mechanism is developed in the course of this self-education,
corresponding with that which the lower animals inherit from their parents. The
plan of that rebuilding process, which is necessary to maintain the integrity of
the organism generally, and which goes on with peculiar activity in this portion
of it, is thus being incessantly modiﬁed; and in this manner all that portion of it
which ministers to the external life of sense and motion that is shared by man
with the animal kingdom at large, becomes at adult age the expression of the
habits which the individual has acquired during the period of growth and
development. Of these habits, some are common to the race generally, while
others are peculiar to the individual; those of the former kind (such as walking
erect) being universally acquired, save where physical inability prevents; while
for the latter a special training is needed, which is usually the more effective the
earlier it is begun—as is remarkably seen in the case of such feats of dexterity
as require a conjoint education of the perceptive and of the motor powers. And
when thus developed during the period of growth, so as to have become a part
of the constitution of the adult, the acquired mechanism is thenceforth
maintained in the ordinary course of the nutritive operations, so as to be ready
for use when called upon, even after long inaction.
"What is so clearly true of the nervous apparatus of animal life can scarcely be
otherwise than true of that which ministers to the automatic activity of the
mind. For, as already shown, the study of psychology has evolved no more
certain result than that there are uniformities of mental action which are so
entirely conformable to those of bodily action as to indicate their intimate
relation to a 'mechanism of thought and feeling,' acting under the like
conditions with that of sense and motion. The psychical principles of
association, indeed, and the physiological principles of nutrition, simply
express—the former in terms of mind, the latter in terms of brain—the
universally admitted fact that any sequence of mental action which has been
frequently repeated tends to perpetuate itself; so that we ﬁnd ourselves
automatically prompted to think, feel, or do what we have been before
accustomed to think, feel, or do, under like circumstances, without any
consciously formed purpose, or anticipation of results. For there is no reason to
regard the cerebrum as an exception to the general principle that, while each
part of the organism tends to form itself in accordance with the mode in which it
is habitually exercised, this tendency will be especially strong in the nervous
apparatus, in virtue of that incessant regeneration which is the very condition of
its functional activity. It scarcely, indeed, admits of doubt that every state of
ideational consciousness which is either very strong or is habitually repeated
leaves an organic impression on the cerebrum; in virtue of which that same
state may be reproduced at any future time, in respondence to a suggestion
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ﬁtted to excite it.... The 'strength of early association' is a fact so universally
recognized that the expression of it has become proverbial; and this precisely
accords with the physiological principle that, during the period of growth and
development, the formative activity of the brain will be most amenable to
directing inﬂuences. It is in this way that what is early 'learned by heart'
becomes branded in (as it were) upon the cerebrum; so that its 'traces' are never
lost, even though the conscious memory of it may have completely faded out.
For, when the organic modiﬁcation has been once ﬁxed in the growing brain, it
becomes a part of the normal fabric, and is regularly maintained by nutritive
substitution; so that it may endure to the end of life, like the scar of a wound."
Dr. Carpenter's phrase that our nervous system grows to the modes in which it has been
exercised expresses the philosophy of habit in a nutshell. We may now trace some of the
practical applications of the principle to human life.
The ﬁrst result of it is that habit simpliﬁes the movements required to achieve a given result,
makes them more accurate and diminishes fatigue.
"The beginner at the piano not only moves his ﬁnger up and down in order to
depress the key, he moves the whole hand, the forearm and even the entire
body, especially moving its least rigid part, the head, as if he would press down
the key with that organ too. Often a contraction of the abdominal muscles
occurs as well. Principally, however, the impulse is determined to the motion of
the hand and of the single ﬁnger. This is, in the ﬁrst place, because the
movement of the ﬁnger is the movement thought of and, in the second place,
because its movement and that of the key are the movements we try to perceive,
along with the results of the latter on the ear. The more often the process is
repeated, the more easily the movement follows, on account of the increase in
permeability of the nerves engaged.

[Pg 113]

"But the more easily the movement occurs, the slighter is the stimulus required
to set it up; and the slighter the stimulus is, the more its effect is conﬁned to the
ﬁngers alone.
"Thus, an impulse which originally spread its effects over the whole body, or at
least over many of its movable parts, is gradually determined to a single deﬁnite
organ, in which it effects the contraction of a few limited muscles. In this
change the thoughts and perceptions which start the impulse acquire more and
more intimate causal relations with a particular group of motor nerves.
"To recur to a simile, at least partially apt, imagine the nervous system to
represent a drainage-system, inclining, on the whole, toward certain muscles,
but with the escape thither somewhat clogged. Then streams of water will, on
the whole, tend most to ﬁll the drains that go towards these muscles and to
wash out the escape. In case of a sudden 'ﬂushing,' however, the whole system
of channels will ﬁll itself, and the water overﬂow everywhere before it escapes.
But a moderate quantity of water invading the system will ﬂow through the
proper escape alone.
"Just so with the piano-player. As soon as his impulse, which has gradually
learned to conﬁne itself to single muscles, grows extreme, it overﬂows into
larger muscular regions. He usually plays with his ﬁngers, his body being at
rest. But no sooner does he get excited than his whole body becomes 'animated,'
and he moves his head and trunk, in particular, as if these also were organs with
which he meant to belabor the keys."[144]
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Man is born with a tendency to do more things than he has ready-made arrangements for in
his nerve-centres. Most of the performances of other animals are automatic. But in him the
number of them is so enormous, that most of them must be the fruit of painful study. If
practice did not make perfect, nor habit economize the expense of nervous and muscular
energy, he would therefore be in a sorry plight. As Dr. Maudsley says:[145]
"If an act became no easier after being done several times, if the careful
direction of consciousness were necessary to its accomplishment on each
occasion, it is evident that the whole activity of a lifetime might be conﬁned to
one or two deeds—that no progress could take place in development. A man
might be occupied all day in dressing and undressing himself; the attitude of his
body would absorb all his attention and energy; the washing of his hands or the
fastening of a button would be as difﬁcult to him on each occasion as to the
child on its ﬁrst trial; and he would, furthermore, be completely exhausted by
his exertions. Think of the pains necessary to teach a child to stand, of the many
efforts which it must make, and of the ease with which it at last stands,
unconscious of any effort. For while secondarily automatic acts are
accomplished with comparatively little weariness—in this regard approaching
the organic movements, or the original reﬂex movements—the conscious effort
of the will soon produces exhaustion. A spinal cord without ... memory would
simply be an idiotic spinal cord.... It is impossible for an individual to realize
how much he owes to its automatic agency until disease has impaired its
functions."

[Pg 114]

The next result is that habit diminishes the conscious attention with which our acts are
performed.
One may state this abstractly thus: If an act require for its execution a chain, A, B, C, D, E,
F, G, etc., of successive nervous events, then in the ﬁrst performances of the action the
conscious will must choose each of these events from a number of wrong alternatives that
tend to present themselves; but habit soon brings it about that each event calls up its own
appropriate successor without any alternative offering itself, and without any reference to
the conscious will, until at last the whole chain, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, rattles itself off as soon
as A occurs, just as if A and the rest of the chain were fused into a continuous stream. When
we are learning to walk, to ride, to swim, skate, fence, write, play, or sing, we interrupt
ourselves at every step by unnecessary movements and false notes. When we are proﬁcients,
on the contrary, the results not only follow with the very minimum of muscular action
requisite to bring them forth, they also follow from a single instantaneous 'cue.' The
marksman sees the bird, and, before he knows it, he has aimed and shot. A gleam in his
adversary's eye, a momentary pressure from his rapier, and the fencer ﬁnds that he has
instantly made the right parry and return. A glance at the musical hieroglyphics, and the
pianist's ﬁngers have rippled through a cataract of notes. And not only is it the right thing at
the right time that we thus involuntarily do, but the wrong thing also, if it be an habitual [Pg 115]
thing. Who is there that has never wound up his watch on taking off his waistcoat in the
daytime, or taken his latch-key out on arriving at the door-step of a friend? Very absentminded persons in going to their bedroom to dress for dinner have been known to take off
one garment after another and ﬁnally to get into bed, merely because that was the habitual
issue of the ﬁrst few movements when performed at a later hour. The writer well remembers
how, on revisiting Paris after ten years' absence, and, ﬁnding himself in the street in which
for one winter he had attended school, he lost himself in a brown study, from which he was
awakened by ﬁnding himself upon the stairs which led to the apartment in a house many
streets away in which he had lived during that earlier time, and to which his steps from the
school had then habitually led. We all of us have a deﬁnite routine manner of performing
certain daily ofﬁces connected with the toilet, with the opening and shutting of familiar
cupboards, and the like. Our lower centres know the order of these movements, and show
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their knowledge by their 'surprise' if the objects are altered so as to oblige the movement to
be made in a different way. But our higher thought-centres know hardly anything about the
matter. Few men can tell off-hand which sock, shoe, or trousers-leg they put on ﬁrst. They
must ﬁrst mentally rehearse the act; and even that is often insufﬁcient—the act must be
performed. So of the questions, Which valve of my double door opens ﬁrst? Which way
does my door swing? etc. I cannot tell the answer; yet my hand never makes a mistake. No
one can describe the order in which he brushes his hair or teeth; yet it is likely that the order
is a pretty ﬁxed one in all of us.
These results may be expressed as follows:
In action grown habitual, what instigates each new muscular contraction to take place in its
appointed order is not a thought or a perception, but the sensation occasioned by the
muscular contraction just ﬁnished. A strictly voluntary act has to be guided by idea,
perception, and volition, throughout its whole course. In an habitual action, mere sensation
is a sufﬁcient guide, and the upper regions of brain and mind are set comparatively free. A [Pg 116]
diagram will make the matter clear:

FIG. 24.

Let A, B, C, D, E, F, G represent an habitual chain of muscular contractions, and let a, b, c,
d, e, f stand for the respective sensations which these contractions excite in us when they are
successively performed. Such sensations will usually be of the muscles, skin, or joints of the
parts moved, but they may also be effects of the movement upon the eye or the ear. Through
them, and through them alone, we are made aware whether the contraction has or has not
occurred. When the series, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, is being learned, each of these sensations
becomes the object of a separate perception by the mind. By it we test each movement, to
see if it be right before advancing to the next. We hesitate, compare, choose, revoke, reject,
etc., by intellectual means; and the order by which the next movement is discharged is an
express order from the ideational centres after this deliberation has been gone through.
In habitual action, on the contrary, the only impulse which the centres of idea or perception
need send down is the initial impulse, the command to start. This is represented in the
diagram by V; it may be a thought of the ﬁrst movement or of the last result, or a mere
perception of some of the habitual conditions of the chain, the presence, e.g., of the
keyboard near the hand. In the present case, no sooner has the conscious thought or volition
instigated movement A, than A, through the sensation a of its own occurrence, awakens B
reﬂexly; B then excites C through b, and so on till the chain is ended, when the intellect
generally takes cognizance of the ﬁnal result. The process, in fact, resembles the passage of
a wave of 'peristaltic' motion down the bowels. The intellectual perception at the end is [Pg 117]
indicated in the diagram by the effect of G being represented, at G', in the ideational centres
above the merely sensational line. The sensational impressions, a, b, c, d, e, f, are all
supposed to have their seat below the ideational lines. That our ideational centres, if
involved at all by a, b, c, d, e, f, are involved in a minimal degree, is shown by the fact that
the attention may be wholly absorbed elsewhere. We may say our prayers, or repeat the
alphabet, with our attention far away.
"A musical performer will play a piece which has become familiar by repetition
while carrying on an animated conversation, or while continuously engrossed
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

74/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

by some train of deeply interesting thought; the accustomed sequence of
movements being directly prompted by the sight of the notes, or by the
remembered succession of the sounds (if the piece is played from memory),
aided in both cases by the guiding sensations derived from the muscles
themselves. But, further, a higher degree of the same 'training' (acting on an
organism specially ﬁtted to proﬁt by it) enables an accomplished pianist to play
a difﬁcult piece of music at sight; the movements of the hands and ﬁngers
following so immediately upon the sight of the notes that it seems impossible to
believe that any but the very shortest and most direct track can be the channel
of the nervous communication through which they are called forth. The
following curious example of the same class of acquired aptitudes, which differ
from instincts only in being prompted to action by the will, is furnished by
Robert Houdin:
"'With a view of cultivating the rapidity of visual and tactile perception, and the
precision of respondent movements, which are necessary for success in every
kind of prestidigitation, Houdin early practised the art of juggling with balls in
the air; and having, after a month's practice, become thorough master of the art
of keeping up four balls at once, he placed a book before him, and, while the
balls were in the air, accustomed himself to read without hesitation. 'This,' he
says, 'will probably seem to my readers very extraordinary; but I shall surprise
them still more when I say that I have just amused myself with repeating this
curious experiment. Though thirty years have elapsed since the time I was
writing, and though I have scarcely once touched the balls during that period, I
can still manage to read with ease while keeping three balls up.'"
(Autobiography, p. 26.)[146]
We have called a, b, c, d, e, f, the antecedents of the successive muscular attractions, by the
name of sensations. Some authors seem to deny that they are even this. If not even this, they [Pg 118]
can only be centripetal nerve-currents, not sufﬁcient to arouse feeling, but sufﬁcient to
arouse motor response.[147] It may be at once admitted that they are not distinct volitions.
The will, if any will be present, limits itself to a permission that they exert their motor
effects. Dr. Carpenter writes:
"There may still be metaphysicians who maintain that actions which were
originally prompted by the will with a distinct intention, and which are still
entirely under its control, can never cease to be volitional; and that either an
inﬁnitesimally small amount of will is required to sustain them when they have
been once set going, or that the will is in a sort of pendulum-like oscillation
between the two actions—the maintenance of the train of thought, and the
maintenance of the train of movement. But if only an inﬁnitesimally small
amount of will is necessary to sustain them, is not this tantamount to saying that
they go on by a force of their own? And does not the experience of the perfect
continuity of our train of thought during the performance of movements that
have become habitual, entirely negative the hypothesis of oscillation? Besides,
if such an oscillation existed, there must be intervals in which each action goes
on of itself; so that its essentially automatic character is virtually admitted. The
physiological explanation, that the mechanism of locomotion, as of other
habitual movements, grows to the mode in which it is early exercised, and that
it then works automatically under the general control and direction of the will,
can scarcely be put down by any assumption of an hypothetical necessity,
which rests only on the basis of ignorance of one side of our composite nature."
[148]
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But if not distinct acts of will, these immediate antecedents of each movement of the chain
are at any rate accompanied by consciousness of some kind. They are sensations to which
we are usually inattentive, but which immediately call our attention if they go wrong.
Schneider's account of these sensations deserves to be quoted. In the act of walking, he says,
even when our attention is entirely off,
"we are continuously aware of certain muscular feelings; and we have,
moreover, a feeling of certain impulses to keep our equilibrium and to set down
one leg after another. It is doubtful whether we could preserve equilibrium if no
sensation of our body's attitude were there, and doubtful whether we should
advance our leg if we had no sensation of its movement as executed, and not
even a minimal feeling of impulse to set it down. Knitting appears altogether
mechanical, and the knitter keeps up her knitting even while she reads or is
engaged in lively talk. But if we ask her how this be possible, she will hardly
reply that the knitting goes on of itself. She will rather say that she has a feeling
of it, that she feels in her hands that she knits and how she must knit, and that
therefore the movements of knitting are called forth and regulated by the
sensations associated therewithal, even when the attention is called away.

[Pg 119]

"So of every one who practises, apparently automatically, a long-familiar
handicraft. The smith turning his tongs as he smites the iron, the carpenter
wielding his plane, the lace-maker with her bobbin, the weaver at his loom, all
will answer the same question in the same way by saying that they have a
feeling of the proper management of the implement in their hands.
"In these cases, the feelings which are conditions of the appropriate acts are
very faint. But none the less are they necessary. Imagine your hands not feeling;
your movements could then only be provoked by ideas, and if your ideas were
then diverted away, the movements ought to come to a standstill, which is a
consequence that seldom occurs."[149]
Again:
"An idea makes you take, for example, a violin into your left hand. But it is not
necessary that your idea remain ﬁxed on the contraction of the muscles of the
left hand and ﬁngers in order that the violin may continue to be held fast and
not let fall. The sensations themselves which the holding of the instrument
awakens in the hand, since they are associated with the motor impulse of
grasping, are sufﬁcient to cause this impulse, which then lasts as long as the
feeling itself lasts, or until the impulse is inhibited by the idea of some
antagonistic motion."
And the same may be said of the manner in which the right hand holds the bow:
"It sometimes happens, in beginning these simultaneous combinations, that one
movement or impulse will cease if the consciousness turn particularly toward
another, because at the outset the guiding sensations must all be strongly felt.
The bow will perhaps slip from the ﬁngers, because some of the muscles have
relaxed. But the slipping is a cause of new sensations starting up in the hand, so
that the attention is in a moment brought back to the grasping of the bow.
"The following experiment shows this well: When one begins to play on the
violin, to keep him from raising his right elbow in playing a book is placed
under his right armpit, which he is ordered to hold fast by keeping the upper
arm tight against his body. The muscular feelings, and feelings of contact
connected with the book, provoke an impulse to press it tight. But often it
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happens that the beginner, whose attention gets absorbed in the production of
the notes, lets drop the book. Later, however, this never happens; the faintest
sensations of contact sufﬁce to awaken the impulse to keep it in its place, and
the attention may be wholly absorbed by the notes and the ﬁngering with the
left hand. The simultaneous combination of movements is thus in the ﬁrst
instance conditioned by the facility with which in us, alongside of intellectual
processes, processes of inattentive feeling may still go on."[150]
This brings us by a very natural transition to the ethical implications of the law of habit.
They are numerous and momentous. Dr. Carpenter, from whose 'Mental Physiology' we
have quoted, has so prominently enforced the principle that our organs grow to the way in
which they have been exercised, and dwelt upon its consequences, that his book almost
deserves to be called a work of ediﬁcation, on this account alone. We need make no apology,
then, for tracing a few of these consequences ourselves:
"Habit a second nature! Habit is ten times nature," the Duke of Wellington is said to have
exclaimed; and the degree to which this is true no one can probably appreciate as well as
one who is a veteran soldier himself. The daily drill and the years of discipline end by
fashioning a man completely over again, as to most of the possibilities of his conduct.
"There is a story, which is credible enough, though it may not be true, of a
practical joker, who, seeing a discharged veteran carrying home his dinner,
suddenly called out, 'Attention!' whereupon the man instantly brought his hands
down, and lost his mutton and potatoes in the gutter. The drill had been
thorough, and its effects had become embodied in the man's nervous structure."
[151]

Riderless cavalry-horses, at many a battle, have been seen to come together and go through
their customary evolutions at the sound of the bugle-call. Most trained domestic animals,
dogs and oxen, and omnibus- and car-horses, seem to be machines almost pure and simple, [Pg 121]
undoubtingly, unhesitatingly doing from minute to minute the duties they have been taught,
and giving no sign that the possibility of an alternative ever suggests itself to their mind.
Men grown old in prison have asked to be readmitted after being once set free. In a railroad
accident to a travelling menagerie in the United States some time in 1881, a tiger, whose
cage had broken open, is said to have emerged, but presently crept back again, as if too
much bewildered by his new responsibilities, so that he was without difﬁculty secured.
Habit is thus the enormous ﬂy-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It
alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune
from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive
walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the ﬁsherman
and the deck-hand at sea through the winter; it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the
countryman to his log-cabin and his lonely farm through all the months of snow; it protects
us from invasion by the natives of the desert and the frozen zone. It dooms us all to ﬁght out
the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a
pursuit that disagrees, because there is no other for which we are ﬁtted, and it is too late to
begin again. It keeps different social strata from mixing. Already at the age of twenty-ﬁve
you see the professional mannerism settling down on the young commercial traveller, on the
young doctor, on the young minister, on the young counsellor-at-law. You see the little lines
of cleavage running through the character, the tricks of thought, the prejudices, the ways of
the 'shop,' in a word, from which the man can by-and-by no more escape than his coatsleeve can suddenly fall into a new set of folds. On the whole, it is best he should not
escape. It is well for the world that in most of us, by the age of thirty, the character has set
like plaster, and will never soften again.
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If the period between twenty and thirty is the critical one in the formation of intellectual and
professional habits, the period below twenty is more important still for the ﬁxing of [Pg 122]
personal habits, properly so called, such as vocalization and pronunciation, gesture, motion,
and address. Hardly ever is a language learned after twenty spoken without a foreign accent;
hardly ever can a youth transferred to the society of his betters unlearn the nasality and other
vices of speech bred in him by the associations of his growing years. Hardly ever, indeed, no
matter how much money there be in his pocket, can he even learn to dress like a gentlemanborn. The merchants offer their wares as eagerly to him as to the veriest 'swell,' but he
simply cannot buy the right things. An invisible law, as strong as gravitation, keeps him
within his orbit, arrayed this year as he was the last; and how his better-bred acquaintances
contrive to get the things they wear will be for him a mystery till his dying day.
The great thing, then, in all education, is to make our nervous system our ally instead of our
enemy. It is to fund and capitalize our acquisitions, and live at ease upon the interest of the
fund. For this we must make automatic and habitual, as early as possible, as many useful
actions as we can, and guard against the growing into ways that are likely to be
disadvantageous to us, as we should guard against the plague. The more of the details of our
daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody of automatism, the more our higher
powers of mind will be set free for their own proper work. There is no more miserable
human being than one in whom nothing is habitual but indecision, and for whom the
lighting of every cigar, the drinking of every cup, the time of rising and going to bed every
day, and the beginning of every bit of work, are subjects of express volitional deliberation.
Full half the time of such a man goes to the deciding, or regretting, of matters which ought
to be so ingrained in him as practically not to exist for his consciousness at all. If there be
such daily duties not yet ingrained in any one of my readers, let him begin this very hour to
set the matter right.
In Professor Bain's chapter on 'The Moral Habits' there are some admirable practical
remarks laid down. Two great maxims emerge from his treatment. The ﬁrst is that in the [Pg 123]
acquisition of a new habit, or the leaving off of an old one, we must take care to launch
ourselves with as strong and decided an initiative as possible. Accumulate all the possible
circumstances which shall re-enforce the right motives; put yourself assiduously in
conditions that encourage the new way; make engagements incompatible with the old; take
a public pledge, if the case allows; in short, envelop your resolution with every aid you
know. This will give your new beginning such a momentum that the temptation to break
down will not occur as soon as it otherwise might; and every day during which a breakdown
is postponed adds to the chances of its not occurring at all.
The second maxim is: Never suffer an exception to occur till the new habit is securely
rooted in your life. Each lapse is like the letting fall of a ball of string which one is carefully
winding up; a single slip undoes more than a great many turns will wind again. Continuity
of training is the great means of making the nervous system act infallibly right. As Professor
Bain says:
"The peculiarity of the moral habits, contradistinguishing them from the
intellectual acquisitions, is the presence of two hostile powers, one to be
gradually raised into the ascendant over the other. It is necessary, above all
things, in such a situation, never to lose a battle. Every gain on the wrong side
undoes the effect of many conquests on the right. The essential precaution,
therefore, is so to regulate the two opposing powers that the one may have a
series of uninterrupted successes, until repetition has fortiﬁed it to such a degree
as to enable it to cope with the opposition, under any circumstances. This is the
theoretically best career of mental progress."
The need of securing success at the outset is imperative. Failure at ﬁrst is apt to dampen the
energy of all future attempts, whereas past experience of success nerves one to future vigor.
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

78/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

Goethe says to a man who consulted him about an enterprise but mistrusted his own powers:
"Ach! you need only blow on your hands!" And the remark illustrates the effect on Goethe's
spirits of his own habitually successful career. Prof. Baumann, from whom I borrow the
anecdote,[152] says that the collapse of barbarian nations when Europeans come among them [Pg 124]
is due to their despair of ever succeeding as the new-comers do in the larger tasks of life.
Old ways are broken and new ones not formed.
The question of 'tapering-off,' in abandoning such habits as drink and opium-indulgence,
comes in here, and is a question about which experts differ within certain limits, and in
regard to what may be best for an individual case. In the main, however, all expert opinion
would agree that abrupt acquisition of the new habit is the best way, if there be a real
possibility of carrying it out. We must be careful not to give the will so stiff a task as to
insure its defeat at the very outset; but, provided one can stand it, a sharp period of
suffering, and then a free time, is the best thing to aim at, whether in giving up a habit like
that of opium, or in simply changing one's hours of rising or of work. It is surprising how
soon a desire will die of inanition if it be never fed.
"One must ﬁrst learn, unmoved, looking neither to the right nor left, to walk
ﬁrmly on the straight and narrow path, before one can begin 'to make one's self
over again.' He who every day makes a fresh resolve is like one who, arriving at
the edge of the ditch he is to leap, forever stops and returns for a fresh run.
Without unbroken advance there is no such thing as accumulation of the ethical
forces possible, and to make this possible, and to exercise us and habituate us in
it, is the sovereign blessing of regular work."[153]
A third maxim may be added to the preceding pair: Seize the very ﬁrst possible opportunity
to act on every resolution you make, and on every emotional prompting you may experience
in the direction of the habits you aspire to gain. It is not in the moment of their forming, but
in the moment of their producing motor effects, that resolves and aspirations communicate
the new 'set' to the brain. As the author last quoted remarks:
"The actual presence of the practical opportunity alone furnishes the fulcrum
upon which the lever can rest, by means of which the moral will may multiply
its strength, and raise itself aloft. He who has no solid ground to press against
will never get beyond the stage of empty gesture-making."
No matter how full a reservoir of maxims one may possess, and no matter how good one's [Pg 125]
sentiments may be, if one have not taken advantage of every concrete opportunity to act,
one's character may remain entirely unaffected for the better. With mere good intentions,
hell is proverbially paved. And this is an obvious consequence of the principles we have laid
down. A 'character,' as J. S. Mill says, 'is a completely fashioned will'; and a will, in the
sense in which he means it, is an aggregate of tendencies to act in a ﬁrm and prompt and
deﬁnite way upon all the principal emergencies of life. A tendency to act only becomes
effectively ingrained in us in proportion to the uninterrupted frequency with which the
actions actually occur, and the brain 'grows' to their use. Every time a resolve or a ﬁne glow
of feeling evaporates without bearing practical fruit is worse than a chance lost; it works so
as positively to hinder future resolutions and emotions from taking the normal path of
discharge. There is no more contemptible type of human character than that of the nerveless
sentimentalist and dreamer, who spends his life in a weltering sea of sensibility and
emotion, but who never does a manly concrete deed. Rousseau, inﬂaming all the mothers of
France, by his eloquence, to follow Nature and nurse their babies themselves, while he
sends his own children to the foundling hospital, is the classical example of what I mean.
But every one of us in his measure, whenever, after glowing for an abstractly formulated
Good, he practically ignores some actual case, among the squalid 'other particulars' of which
that same Good lurks disguised, treads straight on Rousseau's path. All Goods are disguised
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by the vulgarity of their concomitants, in this work-a-day world; but woe to him who can
only recognize them when he thinks them in their pure and abstract form! The habit of
excessive novel-reading and theatre-going will produce true monsters in this line. The
weeping of a Russian lady over the ﬁctitious personages in the play, while her coachman is
freezing to death on his seat outside, is the sort of thing that everywhere happens on a less
glaring scale. Even the habit of excessive indulgence in music, for those who are neither
performers themselves nor musically gifted enough to take it in a purely intellectual way, [Pg 126]
has probably a relaxing effect upon the character. One becomes ﬁlled with emotions which
habitually pass without prompting to any deed, and so the inertly sentimental condition is
kept up. The remedy would be, never to suffer one's self to have an emotion at a concert,
without expressing it afterward in some active way.[154] Let the expression be the least thing
in the world—speaking genially to one's aunt, or giving up one's seat in a horse-car, if
nothing more heroic offers—but let it not fail to take place.
These latter cases make us aware that it is not simply particular lines of discharge, but also
general forms of discharge, that seem to be grooved out by habit in the brain. Just as, if we
let our emotions evaporate, they get into a way of evaporating; so there is reason to suppose
that if we often ﬂinch from making an effort, before we know it the effort-making capacity
will be gone; and that, if we suffer the wandering of our attention, presently it will wander
all the time. Attention and effort are, as we shall see later, but two names for the same
psychic fact. To what brain-processes they correspond we do not know. The strongest reason
for believing that they do depend on brain-processes at all, and are not pure acts of the spirit,
is just this fact, that they seem in some degree subject to the law of habit, which is a material
law. As a ﬁnal practical maxim, relative to these habits of the will, we may, then, offer
something like this: Keep the faculty of effort alive in you by a little gratuitous exercise
every day. That is, be systematically ascetic or heroic in little unnecessary points, do every
day or two something for no other reason than that you would rather not do it, so that when
the hour of dire need draws nigh, it may ﬁnd you not unnerved and untrained to stand the
test. Asceticism of this sort is like the insurance which a man pays on his house and goods.
The tax does him no good at the time, and possibly may never bring him a return. But if the
ﬁre does come, his having paid it will be his salvation from ruin. So with the man who has [Pg 127]
daily inured himself to habits of concentrated attention, energetic volition, and self-denial in
unnecessary things. He will stand like a tower when everything rocks around him, and when
his softer fellow-mortals are winnowed like chaff in the blast.
The physiological study of mental conditions is thus the most powerful ally of hortatory
ethics. The hell to be endured hereafter, of which theology tells, is no worse than the hell we
make for ourselves in this world by habitually fashioning our characters in the wrong way.
Could the young but realize how soon they will become mere walking bundles of habits,
they would give more heed to their conduct while in the plastic state. We are spinning our
own fates, good or evil, and never to be undone. Every smallest stroke of virtue or of vice
leaves its never so little scar. The drunken Rip Van Winkle, in Jefferson's play, excuses
himself for every fresh dereliction by saying, 'I won't count this time!' Well! he may not
count it, and a kind Heaven may not count it; but it is being counted none the less. Down
among his nerve-cells and ﬁbres the molecules are counting it, registering and storing it up
to be used against him when the next temptation comes. Nothing we ever do is, in strict
scientiﬁc literalness, wiped out. Of course, this has its good side as well as its bad one. As
we become permanent drunkards by so many separate drinks, so we become saints in the
moral, and authorities and experts in the practical and scientiﬁc spheres, by so many
separate acts and hours of work. Let no youth have any anxiety about the upshot of his
education, whatever the line of it may be. If he keep faithfully busy each hour of the
working-day, he may safely leave the ﬁnal result to itself. He can with perfect certainty
count on waking up some ﬁne morning, to ﬁnd himself one of the competent ones of his
generation, in whatever pursuit he may have singled out. Silently, between all the details of
his business, the power of judging in all that class of matter will have built itself up within
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him as a possession that will never pass away. Young people should know this truth in
advance. The ignorance of it has probably engendered more discouragement and faintheartedness in youths embarking on arduous careers than all other causes put together.

[136]

This chapter has already appeared in the Popular Science Monthly for February
1887.

[137]

In the sense above explained, which applies to inner structure as well as to outer
form.

[138]

Revue Philosophique, i, 324.

[139]

Some paths, to be sure, are banked up by bodies moving through them under too
great pressure, and made impervious. These special cases we disregard.

[140]

We cannot say the will, for, though many, perhaps most, human habits were once
voluntary actions, no action, as we shall see in a later chapter, can be primarily
such. While an habitual action may once have been voluntary, the voluntary
action must before that, at least once, have been impulsive or reﬂex. It is this very
ﬁrst occurrence of all that we consider in the text.

[141]

Those who desire a more deﬁnite formulation may consult J. Fiske's 'Cosmic
Philosophy,' vol. ii, pp. 142-146 and Spencer's 'Principles of Biology,' sections
302 and 303, and the part entitled 'Physical Synthesis' of his 'Principles of
Psychology.' Mr. Spencer there tries, not only to show how new actions may arise
in nervous systems and form new reﬂex arcs therein, but even how nervous tissue
may actually be born by the passage of new waves of isometric transformation
through an originally indifferent mass. I cannot help thinking that Mr. Spencer's
data, under a great show of precision, conceal vagueness and improbability, and
even self-contradiction.

[142]

'Mental Physiology' (1874) pp. 339-345.

[143]

[See, later, Masius in Van Benedens' and Van Bambeke's 'Archives de Biologie,'
vol. i (Liège, 1880).—W. J.]

[144]

G. H. Schneider: 'Der menschliche Wille' (1882), pp. 417-419 (freely translated).
For the drain-simile, see also Spencer's 'Psychology,' part v, chap. viii.

[145]

Physiology of Mind, p. 155.

[146]

Carpenter's 'Mental Physiology' (1874), pp. 217, 218.

[147]

Von Hartmann devotes a chapter of his 'Philosophy of the Unconscious' (English
translation, vol. i, p. 72) to proving that they must be both ideas and unconscious.

[148]

'Mental Physiology,' p. 20.

[149]

'Der menschliche Wille,' pp. 447, 448.

[150]

'Der menschliche Wille,' p. 439. The last sentence is rather freely translated—the
sense is unaltered.

[151]

Huxley's 'Elementary Lessons in Physiology,' lesson xii.

[152]

See the admirable passage about success at the outset, in his Handbuch der Moral
(1878), pp. 38-43.

[153]

J. Bahnsen: 'Beiträge zu Charakterologie' (1867), vol i, p. 209.

[154]

See for remarks on this subject a readable article by Miss V. Scudder on 'Musical
Devotees and Morals,' in the Andover Review for January. 1887.
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CHAPTER V.

[Pg 128]

THE AUTOMATON-THEORY.
In describing the functions of the hemispheres a short way back, we used language derived
from both the bodily and the mental life, saying now that the animal made indeterminate and
unforeseeable reactions, and anon that he was swayed by considerations of future good and
evil; treating his hemispheres sometimes as the seat of memory and ideas in the psychic
sense, and sometimes talking of them as simply a complicated addition to his reﬂex
machinery. This sort of vacillation in the point of view is a fatal incident of all ordinary talk
about these questions; but I must now settle my scores with those readers to whom I already
dropped a word in passing (see Footnote 6) and who have probably been dissatisﬁed with
my conduct ever since.
Suppose we restrict our view to facts of one and the same plane, and let that be the bodily
plane: cannot all the outward phenomena of intelligence still be exhaustively described?
Those mental images, those 'considerations,' whereof we spoke,—presumably they do not
arise without neural processes arising simultaneously with them, and presumably each
consideration corresponds to a process sui generis, and unlike all the rest. In other words,
however numerous and delicately differentiated the train of ideas may be, the train of brainevents that runs alongside of it must in both respects be exactly its match, and we must
postulate a neural machinery that offers a living counterpart for every shading, however
ﬁne, of the history of its owner's mind. Whatever degree of complication the latter may
reach, the complication of the machinery must be quite as extreme, otherwise we should
have to admit that there may be mental events to which no brain-events correspond. But [Pg 129]
such an admission as this the physiologist is reluctant to make. It would violate all his
beliefs. 'No psychosis without neurosis,' is one form which the principle of continuity takes
in his mind.
But this principle forces the physiologist to make still another step. If neural action is as
complicated as mind; and if in the sympathetic system and lower spinal cord we see what,
so far as we know, is unconscious neural action executing deeds that to all outward intent
may be called intelligent; what is there to hinder us from supposing that even where we
know consciousness to be there, the still more complicated neural action which we believe
to be its inseparable companion is alone and of itself the real agent of whatever intelligent
deeds may appear? "As actions of a certain degree of complexity are brought about by mere
mechanism, why may not actions of a still greater degree of complexity be the result of a
more reﬁned mechanism?" The conception of reﬂex action is surely one of the best
conquests of physiological theory; why not be radical with it? Why not say that just as the
spinal cord is a machine with few reﬂexes, so the hemispheres are a machine with many, and
that that is all the difference? The principle of continuity would press us to accept this view.
But what on this view could be the function of the consciousness itself? Mechanical
function it would have none. The sense-organs would awaken the brain-cells; these would
awaken each other in rational and orderly sequence, until the time for action came; and then
the last brain-vibration would discharge downward into the motor tracts. But this would be a
quite autonomous chain of occurrences, and whatever mind went with it would be there only
as an 'epiphenomenon,' an inert spectator, a sort of 'foam, aura, or melody' as Mr. Hodgson
says, whose opposition or whose furtherance would be alike powerless over the occurrences
themselves. When talking, some time ago, we ought not, accordingly, as physiologists, to
have said anything about 'considerations' as guiding the animal. We ought to have said 'paths
left in the hemispherical cortex by former currents,' and nothing more.
Now so simple and attractive is this conception from the consistently physiological point of [Pg 130]
view, that it is quite wonderful to see how late it was stumbled on in philosophy, and how
few people, even when it has been explained to them, fully and easily realize its import.
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Much of the polemic writing against it is by men who have as yet failed to take it into their
imaginations. Since this has been the case, it seems worth while to devote a few more words
to making it plausible, before criticising it ourselves.
To Descartes belongs the credit of having ﬁrst been bold enough to conceive of a completely
self-sufﬁcing nervous mechanism which should be able to perform complicated and
apparently intelligent acts. By a singularly arbitrary restriction, however, Descartes stopped
short at man, and while contending that in beasts the nervous machinery was all, he held that
the higher acts of man were the result of the agency of his rational soul. The opinion that
beasts have no consciousness at all was of course too paradoxical to maintain itself long as
anything more than a curious item in the history of philosophy. And with its abandonment
the very notion that the nervous system per se might work the work of intelligence, which
was an integral, though detachable part of the whole theory, seemed also to slip out of men's
conception, until, in this century, the elaboration of the doctrine of reﬂex action made it
possible and natural that it should again arise. But it was not till 1870, I believe, that Mr.
Hodgson made the decisive step, by saying that feelings, no matter how intensely they may
be present, can have no causal efﬁcacy whatever, and comparing them to the colors laid on
the surface of a mosaic, of which the events in the nervous system are represented by the
stones.[155] Obviously the stones are held in place by each other and not by the several
colors which they support.
About the same time Mr. Spalding, and a little later Messrs. Huxley and Clifford, gave great
publicity to an identical doctrine, though in their case it was backed by less reﬁned
[Pg 131]
metaphysical considerations.[156]
A few sentences from Huxley and Clifford may be subjoined to make the matter entirely
clear. Professor Huxley says:
"The consciousness of brutes would appear to be related to the mechanism of
their body simply as a collateral product of its working, and to be as completely
without any power of modifying that working as the steam-whistle which
accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without inﬂuence on its
machinery. Their volition, if they have any, is an emotion indicative of physical
changes, not a cause of such changes.... The soul stands related to the body as
the bell of a clock to the works, and consciousness answers to the sound which
the bell gives out when it is struck.... Thus far I have strictly conﬁned myself to
the automatism of brutes.... It is quite true that, to the best of my judgment, the
argumentation which applies to brutes holds equally good of men; and,
therefore, that all states of consciousness in us, as in them, are immediately
caused by molecular changes of the brain-substance. It seems to me that in men,
as in brutes, there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of
change in the motion of the matter of the organism. If these positions are well
based, it follows that our mental conditions are simply the symbols in
consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organism;
and that, to take an extreme illustration, the feeling we call volition is not the
cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the
immediate cause of that act. We are conscious automata."
Professor Clifford writes:
"All the evidence that we have goes to show that the physical world gets along
entirely by itself, according to practically universal rules.... The train of
physical facts between the stimulus sent into the eye, or to any one of our
senses, and the exertion which follows it, and the train of physical facts which
goes on in the brain, even when there is no stimulus and no exertion,—these are
perfectly complete physical trams, and every step is fully accounted for by
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mechanical conditions.... The two things are on utterly different platforms—the
physical facts go along by themselves, and the mental facts go along by
themselves. There is a parallelism between them, but there is no interference of
one with the other. Again, if anybody says that the will inﬂuences matter, the
statement is not untrue, but it is nonsense. Such an assertion belongs to the
crude materialism of the savage. The only thing which inﬂuences matter is the
position of surrounding matter or the motion of surrounding matter.... The
assertion that another man's volition, a feeling in his consciousness that I cannot
perceive, is part of the train of physical facts which I may perceive,—this is
neither true nor untrue, but nonsense; it is a combination of words whose
corresponding ideas will not go together.... Sometimes one series is known
better, and sometimes the other; so that in telling a story we speak sometimes of
mental and sometimes of material facts. A feeling of chill made a man run;
strictly speaking, the nervous disturbance which coexisted with that feeling of
chill made him run, if we want to talk about material facts; or the feeling of
chill produced the form of sub-consciousness which coexists with the motion of
legs, if we want to talk about mental facts.... When, therefore, we ask: 'What is
the physical link between the ingoing message from chilled skin and the
outgoing message which moves the leg? 'and the answer is, 'A man's will,' we
have as much right to be amused as if we had asked our friend with the picture
what pigment was used in painting the cannon in the foreground, and received
the answer, 'Wrought iron.' It will be found excellent practice in the mental
operations required by this doctrine to imagine a train, the fore part of which is
an engine and three carriages linked with iron couplings, and the hind part three
other carriages linked with iron couplings; the bond between the two parts
being made up out of the sentiments of amity subsisting between the stoker and
the guard."

[Pg 132]

To comprehend completely the consequences of the dogma so conﬁdently enunciated, one
should unﬂinchingly apply it to the most complicated examples. The movements of our
tongues and pens, the ﬂashings of our eyes in conversation, are of course events of a
material order, and as such their causal antecedents must be exclusively material. If we
knew thoroughly the nervous system of Shakespeare, and as thoroughly all his environing
conditions, we should be able to show why at a certain period of his life his hand came to
trace on certain sheets of paper those crabbed little black marks which we for shortness' sake
call the manuscript of Hamlet. We should understand the rationale of every erasure and
alteration therein, and we should understand all this without in the slightest degree
acknowledging the existence of the thoughts in Shakespeare's mind. The words and
sentences would be taken, not as signs of anything beyond themselves, but as little outward
facts, pure and simple. In like manner we might exhaustively write the biography of those
two hundred pounds, more or less, of warmish albuminoid matter called Martin Luther, [Pg 133]
without ever implying that it felt.
But, on the other hand, nothing in all this could prevent us from giving an equally complete
account of either Luther's or Shakespeare's spiritual history, an account in which every
gleam of thought and emotion should ﬁnd its place. The mind-history would run alongside
of the body-history of each man, and each point in the one would correspond to, but not
react upon, a point in the other. So the melody ﬂoats from the harp-string, but neither checks
nor quickens its vibrations; so the shadow runs alongside the pedestrian, but in no way
inﬂuences his steps.
Another inference, apparently more paradoxical still, needs to be made, though, as far as I
am aware, Dr. Hodgson is the only writer who has explicitly drawn it. That inference is that
feelings, not causing nerve-actions, cannot even cause each other. To ordinary common
sense, felt pain is, as such, not only the cause of outward tears and cries, but also the cause
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of such inward events as sorrow, compunction, desire, or inventive thought. So the
consciousness of good news is the direct producer of the feeling of joy, the awareness of
premises that of the belief in conclusions. But according to the automaton-theory, each of
the feelings mentioned is only the correlate of some nerve-movement whose cause lay
wholly in a previous nerve-movement. The ﬁrst nerve-movement called up the second;
whatever feeling was attached to the second consequently found itself following upon the
feeling that was attached to the ﬁrst. If, for example, good news was the consciousness
correlated with the ﬁrst movement, then joy turned out to be the correlate in consciousness
of the second. But all the while the items of the nerve series were the only ones in causal
continuity; the items of the conscious series, however inwardly rational their sequence, were
simply juxtaposed.
REASONS FOR THE THEORY.
The 'conscious automaton-theory,' as this conception is generally called, is thus a radical and
simple conception of the manner in which certain facts may possibly occur. But between [Pg 134]
conception and belief, proof ought to lie. And when we ask, 'What proves that all this is
more than a mere conception of the possible?' it is not easy to get a sufﬁcient reply. If we
start from the frog's spinal cord and reason by continuity, saying, as that acts so intelligently,
though unconscious, so the higher centres, though conscious, may have the intelligence they
show quite as mechanically based; we are immediately met by the exact counter-argument
from continuity, an argument actually urged by such writers as Pﬂüger and Lewes, which
starts from the acts of the hemispheres, and says: "As these owe their intelligence to the
consciousness which we know to be there, so the intelligence of the spinal cord's acts must
really be due to the invisible presence of a consciousness lower in degree." All arguments
from continuity work in two ways: you can either level up or level down by their means.
And it is clear that such arguments as these can eat each other up to all eternity.
There remains a sort of philosophic faith, bred like most faiths from an æsthetic demand.
Mental and physical events are, on all hands, admitted to present the strongest contrast in
the entire ﬁeld of being. The chasm which yawns between them is less easily bridged over
by the mind than any interval we know. Why, then, not call it an absolute chasm, and say not
only that the two worlds are different, but that they are independent? This gives us the
comfort of all simple and absolute formulas, and it makes each chain homogeneous to our
consideration. When talking of nervous tremors and bodily actions, we may feel secure
against intrusion from an irrelevant mental world. When, on the other hand, we speak of
feelings, we may with equal consistency use terms always of one denomination, and never
be annoyed by what Aristotle calls 'slipping into another kind.' The desire on the part of men
educated in laboratories not to have their physical reasonings mixed up with such
incommensurable factors as feelings is certainly very strong. I have heard a most intelligent
biologist say: "It is high time for scientiﬁc men to protest against the recognition of any such
thing as consciousness in a scientiﬁc investigation." In a word, feeling constitutes the [Pg 135]
'unscientiﬁc' half of existence, and any one who enjoys calling himself a 'scientist' will be
too happy to purchase an untrammelled homogeneity of terms in the studies of his
predilection, at the slight cost of admitting a dualism which, in the same breath that it allows
to mind an independent status of being, banishes it to a limbo of causal inertness, from
whence no intrusion or interruption on its part need ever be feared.
Over and above this great postulate that matters must be kept simple, there is, it must be
confessed, still another highly abstract reason for denying causal efﬁcacity to our feelings.
We can form no positive image of the modus operandi of a volition or other thought
affecting the cerebral molecules.
"Let us try to imagine an idea, say of food, producing a movement, say of
carrying food to the mouth.... What is the method of its action? Does it assist
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the decomposition of the molecules of the gray matter, or does it retard the
process, or does it alter the direction in which the shocks are distributed? Let us
imagine the molecules of the gray matter combined in such a way that they will
fall into simpler combinations on the impact of an incident force. Now suppose
the incident force, in the shape of a shock from some other centre, to impinge
upon these molecules. By hypothesis it will decompose them, and they will fall
into the simpler combination. How is the idea of food to prevent this
decomposition? Manifestly it can do so only by increasing; the force which
binds the molecules together. Good! Try to imagine the idea of a beefsteak
binding two molecules together. It is impossible. Equally impossible is it to
imagine a similar idea loosening the attractive force between two molecules."
[157]

This passage from an exceedingly clever writer expresses admirably the difﬁculty to which I
allude. Combined with a strong sense of the 'chasm' between the two worlds, and with a
lively faith in reﬂex machinery, the sense of this difﬁculty can hardly fail to make one turn
consciousness out of the door as a superﬂuity so far as one's explanations go. One may bow
her out politely, allow her to remain as an 'epiphenomenon' (invaluable word!), but one
insists that matter shall hold all the power.
"Having thoroughly recognized the fathomless abyss that separates mind from
matter, and having so blended the very notion into his very nature that there is
no chance of his ever forgetting it or failing to saturate with it all his
meditations, the student of psychology has next to appreciate the association
between these two orders of phenomena.... They are associated in a manner so
intimate that some of the greatest thinkers consider them different aspects of the
same process.... When the rearrangement of molecules takes place in the higher
regions of the brain, a change of consciousness simultaneously occurs.... The
change of consciousness never takes place without the change in the brain; the
change in the brain never ... without the change in consciousness. But why the
two occur together, or what the link is which connects them, we do not know,
and most authorities believe that we never shall and never can know. Having
ﬁrmly and tenaciously grasped these two notions, of the absolute separateness
of mind and matter, and of the invariable concomitance of a mental change with
a bodily change, the student will enter on the study of psychology with half his
difﬁculties surmounted."[158]

[Pg 136]

Half his difﬁculties ignored, I should prefer to say. For this 'concomitance' in the midst of
'absolute separateness' is an utterly irrational notion. It is to my mind quite inconceivable
that consciousness should have nothing to do with a business which it so faithfully attends.
And the question, 'What has it to do?' is one which psychology has no right to 'surmount,'
for it is her plain duty to consider it. The fact is that the whole question of interaction and
inﬂuence between things is a metaphysical question, and cannot be discussed at all by those
who are unwilling to go into matters thoroughly. It is truly enough hard to imagine the 'idea
of a beefsteak binding two molecules together;' but since Hume's time it has been equally
hard to imagine anything binding them together. The whole notion of 'binding' is a mystery,
the ﬁrst step towards the solution of which is to clear scholastic rubbish out of the way.
Popular science talks of 'forces,' 'attractions' or 'afﬁnities' as binding the molecules; but clear
science, though she may use such words to abbreviate discourse, has no use for the
conceptions, and is satisﬁed when she can express in simple 'laws' the bare space-relations
of the molecules as functions of each other and of time. To the more curiously inquiring
mind, however, this simpliﬁed expression of the bare facts is not enough; there must be a [Pg 137]
'reason' for them, and something must 'determine' the laws. And when one seriously sits
down to consider what sort of a thing one means when one asks for a 'reason,' one is led so
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far aﬁeld, so far away from popular science and its scholasticism, as to see that even such a
fact as the existence or non-existence in the universe of 'the idea of a beefsteak' may not be
wholly indifferent to other facts in the same universe, and in particular may have something
to do with determining the distance at which two molecules in that universe shall lie apart. If
this is so, then common-sense, though the intimate nature of causality and of the connection
of things in the universe lies beyond her pitifully bounded horizon, has the root and gist of
the truth in her hands when she obstinately holds to it that feelings and ideas are causes.
However inadequate our ideas of causal efﬁcacy may be, we are less wide of the mark when
we say that our ideas and feelings have it, than the Automatists are when they say they
haven't it. As in the night all cats are gray, so in the darkness of metaphysical criticism all
causes are obscure. But one has no right to pull the pall over the psychic half of the subject
only, as the automatists do, and to say that that causation is unintelligible, whilst in the same
breath one dogmatizes about material causation as if Hume, Kant, and Lotze had never been
born. One cannot thus blow hot and cold. One must be impartially naif or impartially
critical. If the latter, the reconstruction must be thorough-going or 'metaphysical,' and will
probably preserve the common-sense view that ideas are forces, in some translated form.
But Psychology is a mere natural science, accepting certain terms uncritically as her data,
and stopping short of metaphysical reconstruction. Like physics, she must be naive; and if
she ﬁnds that in her very peculiar ﬁeld of study ideas seem to be causes, she had better
continue to talk of them as such. She gains absolutely nothing by a breach with commonsense in this matter, and she loses, to say the least, all naturalness of speech. If feelings are
causes, of course their effects must be furtherances and checkings of internal cerebral
motions, of which in themselves we are entirely without knowledge. It is probable that for [Pg 138]
years to come we shall have to infer what happens in the brain either from our feelings or
from motor effects which we observe. The organ will be for us a sort of vat in which
feelings and motions somehow go on stewing together, and in which innumerable things
happen of which we catch but the statistical result. Why, under these circumstances, we
should be asked to forswear the language of our childhood I cannot well imagine, especially
as it is perfectly compatible with the language of physiology. The feelings can produce
nothing absolutely new, they can only reinforce and inhibit reﬂex currents which already
exist, and the original organization of these by physiological forces must always be the
ground-work of the psychological scheme.
My conclusion is that to urge the automaton-theory upon us, as it is now urged, on purely a
priori and quasi-metaphysical grounds, is an unwarrantable impertinence in the present
state of psychology.
REASONS AGAINST THE THEORY.
But there are much more positive reasons than this why we ought to continue to talk in
psychology as if consciousness had causal efﬁcacy. The particulars of the distribution of
consciousness, so far as we know them, point to its being efﬁcacious. Let us trace some of
them.
It is very generally admitted, though the point would be hard to prove, that consciousness
grows the more complex and intense the higher we rise in the animal kingdom. That of a
man must exceed that of an oyster. From this point of view it seems an organ, superadded to
the other organs which maintain the animal in the struggle for existence; and the
presumption of course is that it helps him in some way in the struggle, just as they do. But it
cannot help him without being in some way efﬁcacious and inﬂuencing the course of his
bodily history. If now it could be shown in what way consciousness might help him, and if,
moreover, the defects of his other organs (where consciousness is most developed) are such
as to make them need just the kind of help that consciousness would bring provided it were
efﬁcacious; why, then the plausible inference would be that it came just because of its [Pg 139]
efﬁcacy—in other words, its efﬁcacy would be inductively proved.
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Now the study of the phenomena of consciousness which we shall make throughout the rest
of this book will show us that consciousness is at all times primarily a selecting agency.[159]
Whether we take it in the lowest sphere of sense, or in the highest of intellection, we ﬁnd it
always doing one thing, choosing one out of several of the materials so presented to its
notice, emphasizing and accentuating that and suppressing as far as possible all the rest. The
item emphasized is always in close connection with some interest felt by consciousness to
be paramount at the time.
But what are now the defects of the nervous system in those animals whose consciousness
seems most highly developed? Chief among them must be instability. The cerebral
hemispheres are the characteristically 'high' nerve-centres, and we saw how indeterminate
and unforeseeable their performances were in comparison with those of the basal ganglia
and the cord. But this very vagueness constitutes their advantage. They allow their possessor
to adapt his conduct to the minutest alterations in the environing circumstances, any one of
which may be for him a sign, suggesting distant motives more powerful than any present
solicitations of sense. It seems as if certain mechanical conclusions should be drawn from
this state of things. An organ, swayed by slight impressions is an organ whose natural state
is one of unstable equilibrium. We may imagine the various lines of discharge in the
cerebrum to be almost on a par in point of permeability—what discharge a given small
impression will produce may be called accidental, in the sense in which we say it is a matter
of accident whether a rain-drop falling on a mountain ridge descend the eastern or the
western slope. It is in this sense that we may call it a matter of accident whether a child be a
boy or a girl. The ovum is so unstable a body that certain causes too minute for our
apprehension may at a certain moment tip it one way or the other. The natural law of an
organ constituted after this fashion can be nothing but a law of caprice. I do not see how one [Pg 140]
could reasonably expect from it any certain pursuance of useful lines of reaction, such as the
few and fatally determined performances of the lower centres constitute within their narrow
sphere. The dilemma in regard to the nervous system seems, in short, to be of the following
kind. We may construct one which will react infallibly and certainly, but it will then be
capable of reacting to very few changes in the environment—it will fail to be adapted to all
the rest. We may, on the other hand, construct a nervous system potentially adapted to
respond to an inﬁnite variety of minute features in the situation; but its fallibility will then
be as great as its elaboration. We can never be sure that its equilibrium will be upset in the
appropriate direction. In short, a high brain may do many things, and may do each of them
at a very slight hint. But its hair-trigger organization makes of it a happy-go-lucky, hit-ormiss affair. It is as likely to do the crazy as the sane thing at any given moment. A low brain
does few things, and in doing them perfectly forfeits all other use. The performances of a
high brain are like dice thrown forever on a table. Unless they be loaded, what chance is
there that the highest number will turn up oftener than the lowest?
All this is said of the brain as a physical machine pure and simple. Can consciousness
increase its efﬁciency by loading its dice? Such is the problem.
Loading its dice would mean bringing a more or less constant pressure to bear in favor of
those of its performances which make for the most permanent interests cf the brain's owner;
it would mean a constant inhibition of the tendencies to stray aside.
Well, just such pressure and such inhibition are what consciousness seems to be exerting all
the while. And the interests in whose favor it seems to exert them are its interests and its
alone, interests which it creates, and which, but for it, would have no status in the realm of
being whatever. We talk, it is true, when we are darwinizing, as if the mere body that owns
the brain had interests; we speak about the utilities of its various organs and how they help
or hinder the body's survival; and we treat the survival as if it were an absolute end, existing [Pg 141]
as such in the physical world, a sort of actual should-be, presiding over the animal and
judging his reactions, quite apart from the presence of any commenting intelligence outside.
We forget that in the absence of some such superadded commenting intelligence (whether it
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be that of the animal itself, or only ours or Mr. Darwin's), the reactions cannot be properly
talked of as 'useful' or 'hurtful' at all. Considered merely physically, all that can be said of
them is that if they occur in a certain way survival will as a matter of fact prove to be their
incidental consequence. The organs themselves, and all the rest of the physical world, will,
however, all the time be quite indifferent to this consequence, and would quite as cheerfully,
the circumstances changed, compass the animal's destruction. In a word, survival can enter
into a purely physiological discussion only as an hypothesis made by an onlooker, about the
future. But the moment you bring a consciousness into the midst, survival ceases to be a
mere hypothesis. No longer is it, "if survival is to occur, then so and so must brain and other
organs work." It has now become an imperative decree: "Survival shall occur, and therefore
organs must so work!" Real ends appear for the ﬁrst time now upon the world's stage. The
conception of consciousness as a purely cognitive form of being, which is the pet way of
regarding it in many idealistic schools, modern as well as ancient, is thoroughly antipsychological, as the remainder of this book will show. Every actually existing
consciousness seems to itself at any rate to be a ﬁghter for ends, of which many, but for its
presence, would not be ends at all. Its powers of cognition are mainly subservient to these
ends, discerning which facts further them and which do not.
Now let consciousness only be what it seems to itself, and it will help an instable brain to
compass its proper ends. The movements of the brain per se yield the means of attaining
these ends mechanically, but only out of a lot of other ends, if so they may be called, which
are not the proper ones of the animal, but often quite opposed. The brain is an instrument of
possibilities, but of no certainties. But the consciousness, with its own ends present to it, and [Pg 142]
knowing also well which possibilities lead thereto and which away, will, if endowed with
causal efﬁcacy, reinforce the favorable possibilities and repress the unfavorable or
indifferent ones. The nerve-currents, coursing through the cells and ﬁbres, must in this case
be supposed strengthened by the fact of their awaking one consciousness and dampened by
awaking another. How such reaction of the consciousness upon the currents may occur must
remain at present unsolved: it is enough for my purpose to have shown that it may not
uselessly exist, and that the matter is less simple than the brain-automatists hold.
All the facts of the natural history of consciousness lend color to this view. Consciousness,
for example, is only intense when nerve-processes are hesitant. In rapid, automatic, habitual
action it sinks to a minimum. Nothing could be more ﬁtting than this, if consciousness have
the teleological function we suppose; nothing more meaningless, if not. Habitual actions are
certain, and being in no danger of going astray from their end, need no extraneous help. In
hesitant action, there seem many alternative possibilities of ﬁnal nervous discharge. The
feeling awakened by the nascent excitement of each alternative nerve-tract seems by its
attractive or repulsive quality to determine whether the excitement shall abort or shall
become complete. Where indecision is great, as before a dangerous leap, consciousness is
agonizingly intense. Feeling, from this point of view, may be likened to a cross-section of
the chain of nervous discharge, ascertaining the links already laid down, and groping among
the fresh ends presented to it for the one which seems best to ﬁt the case.

The phenomena of 'vicarious function' which we studied in Chapter II seem to form another
bit of circumstantial evidence. A machine in working order acts fatally in one way. Our
consciousness calls this the right way. Take out a valve, throw a wheel out of gear or bend a
pivot, and it becomes a different machine, acting just as fatally in another way which we call
the wrong way. But the machine itself knows nothing of wrong or right: matter has no ideals
to pursue. A locomotive will carry its train through an open drawbridge as cheerfully as to [Pg 143]
any other destination.
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A brain with part of it scooped out is virtually a new machine, and during the ﬁrst days after
the operation functions in a thoroughly abnormal manner. As a matter of fact, however, its
performances become from day to day more normal, until at last a practised eye may be
needed to suspect anything wrong. Some of the restoration is undoubtedly due to
'inhibitions' passing away. But if the consciousness which goes with the rest of the brain, be
there not only in order to take cognizance of each functional error, but also to exert an
efﬁcient pressure to check it if it be a sin of commission, and to lend a strengthening hand if
it be a weakness or sin of omission,—nothing seems more natural than that the remaining
parts, assisted in this way, should by virtue of the principle of habit grow back to the old
teleological modes of exercise for which they were at ﬁrst incapacitated. Nothing, on the
contrary, seems at ﬁrst sight more unnatural than that they should vicariously take up the
duties of a part now lost without those duties as such exerting any persuasive or coercive
force. At the end of Chapter XXVI I shall return to this again.

There is yet another set of facts which seem explicable on the supposition that
consciousness has causal efﬁcacy. It is a well-known fact that pleasures are generally
associated with beneﬁcial, pains with detrimental, experiences. All the fundamental vital
processes illustrate this law. Starvation, suffocation, privation of food, drink and sleep, work
when exhausted, burns, wounds, inﬂammation, the effects of poison, are as disagreeable as
ﬁlling the hungry stomach, enjoying rest and sleep after fatigue, exercise after rest, and a
sound skin and unbroken bones at all times, are pleasant. Mr. Spencer and others have
suggested that these coincidences are due, not to any pre-established harmony, but to the
mere action of natural selection which would certainly kill off in the long-run any breed of
creatures to whom the fundamentally noxious experience seemed enjoyable. An animal that
should take pleasure in a feeling of suffocation would, if that pleasure were efﬁcacious [Pg 144]
enough to make him immerse his head in water, enjoy a longevity of four or ﬁve minutes.
But if pleasures and pains have no efﬁcacy, one does not see (without some such a priori
rational harmony as would be scouted by the 'scientiﬁc' champions of the automaton-theory)
why the most noxious acts, such as burning, might not give thrills of delight, and the most
necessary ones, such as breathing, cause agony. The exceptions to the law are, it is true,
numerous, but relate to experiences that are either not vital or not universal. Drunkenness,
for instance, which though noxious, is to many persons delightful, is a very exceptional
experience. But, as the excellent physiologist Pick remarks, if all rivers and springs ran
alcohol instead of water, either all men would now be born to hate it or our nerves would
have been selected so as to drink it with impunity. The only considerable attempt, in fact,
that has been made to explain the distribution of our feelings is that of Mr. Grant Allen in
his suggestive little work Physiological Æsthetics; and his reasoning is based exclusively on
that causal efﬁcacy of pleasures and pains which the 'double-aspect' partisans so strenuously
deny.

Thus, then, from every point of view the circumstantial evidence against that theory is
strong. A priori analysis of both brain-action and conscious action shows us that if the latter
were efﬁcacious it would, by its selective emphasis, make amends for the indeterminateness
of the former; whilst the study a posteriori of the distribution of consciousness shows it to
be exactly such as we might expect in an organ added for the sake of steering a nervous
system grown too complex to regulate itself. The conclusion that it is useful is, after all this,
quite justiﬁable. But, if it is useful, it must be so through its causal efﬁcaciousness, and the
automaton-theory must succumb to the theory of common-sense. I, at any rate (pending
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

90/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

metaphysical reconstructions not yet successfully achieved), shall have no hesitation in
using the language of common-sense throughout this book.

[155]

The Theory of Practice, vol. i, p. 416 ff.

[156]

The present writer recalls how in 1869, when still a medical student, he began to
write an essay showing how almost every one who speculated about brainprocesses illicitly interpolated into his account of them links derived from the
entirely heterogeneous universe of Feeling. Spencer, Hodgson (in his Time and
Space), Maudsley, Lockhart Clarke, Bain, Dr. S. Carpenter, and other authors
were cited as having been guilty of the confusion. The writing was soon stopped
because he perceived that the view which he was upholding against these authors
was a pure conception, with no proofs to be adduced of its reality. Later it seemed
to him that whatever proofs existed really told in favor of their view.

[157]

Chas. Mercier: The Nervous System and the Mind (1888), p. 9.

[158]

Op. cit. p. 11.

[159]

See in particular the end of Chapter IX.

CHAPTER VI.

[Pg 145]

THE MIND-STUFF THEORY.
The reader who found himself swamped with too much metaphysics in the last chapter will
have a still worse time of it in this one, which is exclusively metaphysical. Metaphysics
means nothing but an unusually obstinate effort to think clearly. The fundamental
conceptions of psychology are practically very clear to us, but theoretically they are very
confused, and one easily makes the obscurest assumptions in this science without realizing,
until challenged, what internal difﬁculties they involve. When these assumptions have once
established themselves (as they have a way of doing in our very descriptions of the
phenomenal facts) it is almost impossible to get rid of them afterwards or to make any one
see that they are not essential features of the subject. The only way to prevent this disaster is
to scrutinize them beforehand and make them give an articulate account of themselves
before letting them pass. One of the obscurest of the assumptions of which I speak is the
assumption that our mental states are composite in structure, made up of smaller states
conjoined. This hypothesis has outward advantages which make it almost irresistibly
attractive to the intellect, and yet it is inwardly quite unintelligible. Of its unintelligibility,
however, half the writers on psychology seem unaware. As our own aim is to understand if
possible, I make no apology for singling out this particular notion for very explicit treatment
before taking up the descriptive part of our work. The theory of 'mind-stuff' is the theory that
our mental states are compounds, expressed in its most radical form.
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY DEMANDS A MIND-DUST.

[Pg 146]

In a general theory of evolution the inorganic comes ﬁrst, then the lowest forms of animal
and vegetable life, then forms of life that possess mentality, and ﬁnally those like ourselves
that possess it in a high degree. As long as we keep to the consideration of purely outward
facts, even the most complicated facts of biology, our task as evolutionists is comparatively
easy. We are dealing all the time with matter and its aggregations and separations; and
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although our treatment must perforce be hypothetical, this does not prevent it from being
continuous. The point which as evolutionists we are bound to hold fast to is that all the new
forms of being that make their appearance are really nothing more than results of the
redistribution of the original and unchanging materials. The self-same atoms which,
chaotically dispersed, made the nebula, now, jammed and temporarily caught in peculiar
positions, form our brains; and the 'evolution' of the brains, if understood, would be simply
the account of how the atoms came to be so caught and jammed. In this story no new
natures, no factors not present at the beginning, are introduced at any later stage.
But with the dawn of consciousness an entirely new nature seems to slip in, something
whereof the potency was not given in the mere outward atoms of the original chaos.
The enemies of evolution have been quick to pounce upon this undeniable discontinuity in
the data of the world and many of them, from the failure of evolutionary explanations at this
point, have inferred their general incapacity all along the line. Every one admits the entire
incommensurability of feeling as such with material motion as such. "A motion became a
feeling!"—no phrase that our lips can frame is so devoid of apprehensible meaning.
Accordingly, even the vaguest of evolutionary enthusiasts, when deliberately comparing
material with mental facts, have been as forward as any one else to emphasize the 'chasm'
between the inner and the outer worlds.
"Can the oscillations of a molecule," says Mr. Spencer, "be represented side by
side with a nervous shock [he means a mental shock], and the two be
recognized as one? No effort enables us to assimilate them. That a unit of
feeling has nothing in common with a unit of motion becomes more than ever
manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposition."[160]

[Pg 147]

And again:
"Suppose it to have become quite clear that a shock in consciousness and a
molecular motion are the subjective and objective faces of the same thing; we
continue utterly incapable of uniting the two, so as to conceive that reality of
which they are the opposite faces."[161]
In other words, incapable of perceiving in them any common character. So Tyndall, in that
lucky paragraph which has been quoted so often that every one knows it by heart:
"The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of
consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a deﬁnite thought and a deﬁnite
molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously; we do not possess the
intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would
enable us to pass, by a process of reasoning, from one to the other."[162]
Or in this other passage:
"We can trace the development of a nervous system and correlate with it the
parallel phenomena of sensation and thought. We see with undoubting certainty
that they go hand in hand. But we try to soar in a vacuum the moment we seek
to comprehend the connection between them.... There is no fusion possible
between the two classes of facts—no motor energy in the intellect of man to
carry it without logical rupture from the one to the other."[163]
None the less easily, however, when the evolutionary afﬂatus is upon them, do the very
same writers leap over the breach whose ﬂagrancy they are the foremost to announce, and
talk as if mind grew out of body in a continuous way. Mr. Spencer, looking back on his
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review of mental evolution, tells us how "in tracing up the increase we found ourselves [Pg 148]
passing without break from the phenomena of bodily life to the phenomena of mental life."
[164] And Mr. Tyndall, in the same Belfast Address from which we just quoted, delivers his
other famous passage:
"Abandoning all disguise, the confession that I feel bound to make before you
is that I prolong the vision backward across the boundary of the experimental
evidence, and discern in that matter which we, in our ignorance and
notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered
with opprobrium the promise and potency of every form and quality of life."
[165]

—mental life included, as a matter of course.
So strong a postulate is continuity! Now this book will tend to show that mental postulates
are on the whole to be respected. The demand for continuity has, over large tracts of
science, proved itself to possess true prophetic power. We ought therefore ourselves
sincerely to try every possible mode of conceiving the dawn of consciousness so that it may
not appear equivalent to the irruption into the universe of a new nature, non-existent until
then.
Merely to call the consciousness 'nascent' will not serve our turn.[166] It is true that the word
signiﬁes not yet quite born, and so seems to form a sort of bridge between existence and [Pg 149]
nonentity. But that is a verbal quibble. The fact is that discontinuity comes in if a new nature
comes in at all. The quantity of the latter is quite immaterial. The girl in 'Midshipman Easy'
could not excuse the illegitimacy of her child by saying, 'it was a little small one.' And
Consciousness, however little, is an illegitimate birth in any philosophy that starts without
it, and yet professes to explain all facts by continuous evolution.
If evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have been present at the
very origin of things. Accordingly we ﬁnd that the more clear-sighted evolutionary
philosophers are beginning to posit it there. Each atom of the nebula, they suppose, must
have had an aboriginal atom of consciousness linked with it; and, just as the material atoms
have formed bodies and brains by massing themselves together, so the mental atoms, by an
analogous process of aggregation, have fused into those larger consciousnesses which we
know in ourselves and suppose to exist in our fellow-animals. Some such doctrine of
atomistic hylozoism as this is an indispensable part of a thorough-going philosophy of
evolution. According to it there must be an inﬁnite number of degrees of consciousness, [Pg 150]
following the degrees of complication and aggregation of the primordial mind-dust. To
prove the separate existence of these degrees of consciousness by indirect evidence, since
direct intuition of them is not to be had, becomes therefore the ﬁrst duty of psychological
evolutionism.
SOME ALLEGED PROOFS THAT MIND-DUST EXISTS.
Some of this duty we ﬁnd already performed by a number of philosophers who, though not
interested at all in evolution, have nevertheless on independent grounds convinced
themselves of the existence of a vast amount of sub-conscious mental life. The criticism of
this general opinion and its grounds will have to be postponed for a while. At present let us
merely deal with the arguments assumed to prove aggregation of bits of mind-stuff into
distinctly sensible feelings. They are clear and admit of a clear reply.
The German physiologist A. Fick, in 1862, was, so far as I know, the ﬁrst to use them. He
made experiments on the discrimination of the feelings of warmth and of touch, when only a
very small portion of the skin was excited through a hole in a card, the surrounding parts
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being protected by the card. He found that under these circumstances mistakes were
frequently made by the patient,[167] and concluded that this must be because the number of [Pg 151]
sensations from the elementary nerve-tips affected was too small to sum itself distinctly into
either of the qualities of feeling in question. He tried to show how a different manner of the
summation might give rise in one case to the heat and in another to the touch.
"A feeling of temperature," he says, "arises when the intensities of the units of
feeling are evenly gradated, so that between two elements a and b no other unit
can spatially intervene whose intensity is not also between that of a and b. A
feeling of contact perhaps arises when this condition is not fulﬁlled. Both kinds
of feeling, however, are composed of the same units."
But it is obviously far clearer to interpret such a gradation of intensities as a brain-fact than
as a mind-fact. If in the brain a tract were ﬁrst excited in one of the ways suggested by Prof.
Fick, and then again in the other, it might very well happen, for aught we can say to the
contrary, that the psychic accompaniment in the one case would be heat, and in the other
pain. The pain and the heat would, however, not be composed of psychic units, but would
each be the direct result of one total brain-process. So long as this latter interpretation
remains open, Fick cannot be held to have proved psychic summation.
Later, both Spencer and Taine, independently of each other, took up the same line of
thought. Mr. Spencer's reasoning is worth quoting in extenso. He writes:
"Although the individual sensations and emotions, real or ideal, of which
consciousness is built up, appear to be severally simple, homogeneous,
unanalyzable, or of inscrutable natures, yet they are not so. There is at least one
kind of feeling which, as ordinarily experienced, seems elementary, that is
demonstrably not elementary. And after resolving it into its proximate
components, we can scarcely help suspecting that other apparently-elementary
feelings are also compound, and may have proximate components like those
which we can in this one instance identify.
"Musical sound is the name we give to this seemingly simple feeling which is
clearly resolvable into simpler feelings. Well-known experiments prove that
when equal blows or taps are made one after another at a rate not exceeding
some sixteen per second, the effect of each is perceived as a separate noise; but
when the rapidity with which the blows follow one another exceeds this, the
noises are no longer identiﬁed in separate states of consciousness, and there
arises in place of them a continuous state of consciousness, called a tone. In
further increasing the rapidity of the blows, the tone undergoes the change of
quality distinguished as rise in pitch; and it continues to rise in pitch as the
blows continue to increase in rapidity, until it reaches an acuteness beyond
which it is no longer appreciable as a tone. So that out of units of feeling of the
same kind, many feelings distinguishable from one another in quality result,
according as the units are more or less integrated.

[Pg 152]

"This is not all. The inquiries of Professor Helmholtz have shown that when,
along with one series of these rapidly-recurring noises, there is generated
another series in which the noises are more rapid though not so loud, the effect
is a change in that quality known as its timbre. As various musical instruments
show us, tones which are alike in pitch and strength are distinguishable by their
harshness or sweetness, their ringing or their liquid characters; and all their
speciﬁc peculiarities are proved to arise from the combination of one, two,
three, or more, supplementary series of recurrent noises with the chief series of
recurrent noises. So that while the unlikenesses of feeling known as differences
of pitch in tones are due to differences of integration among the recurrent noises
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of one series, the unlikenesses of feeling known as differences of timbre, are
due to the simultaneous integration with this series of other series having other
degrees of integration. And thus an enormous number of qualitativelycontrasted kinds of consciousness that seem severally elementary prove to be
composed of one simple kind of consciousness, combined and recombined with
itself in multitudinous ways.
"Can we stop short here? If the different sensations known as sounds are built
out of a common unit, is it not to be rationally inferred that so likewise are the
different sensations known as tastes, and the different sensations known as
odors, and the different sensations known as colors? Nay, shall we not regard it
as probable that there is a unit common to all these strongly-contrasted classes
of sensations? If the unlikenesses among the sensations of each class may be
due to unlikenesses among the modes of aggregation of a unit of consciousness
common to them all; so too may the much greater unlikenesses between the
sensations of each class and those of other classes. There may be a single
primordial element of consciousness, and the countless kinds of consciousness
may be produced by the compounding of this element with itself and the
recompounding of its compounds with one another in higher and higher
degrees: so producing increased multiplicity, variety, and complexity.
"Have we any clue to this primordial element? I think we have. That simple
mental impression which proves to be the unit of composition of the sensation
of musical tone, is allied to certain other simple mental impressions differently
originated. The subjective effect produced by a crack or noise that has no
appreciable duration is little else than a nervous shock. Though we distinguish
such a nervous shock as belonging to what we call sounds, yet it does not differ
very much from nervous shocks of other kinds. An electric discharge sent
through the body causes a feeling akin to that which a sudden loud report
causes. A strong unexpected impression made through the eyes, as by a ﬂash of
lightning, similarly gives rise to a start or shock; and though the feeling so
named seems, like the electric shock, to have the body at large for its seat, and
may therefore be regarded as the correlative rather of the efferent than of the
afferent disturbance, yet on remembering the mental change that results from
the instantaneous transit of an object across the ﬁeld of vision, I think it may be
perceived that the feeling accompanying the efferent disturbance is itself
reduced very nearly to the same form. The state of consciousness so generated
is, in fact, comparable in quality to the initial state of consciousness caused by a
blow (distinguishing it from the pain or other feeling that commences the
instant after); which state of consciousness caused by a blow may be taken as
the primitive and typical form of the nervous shock. The fact that sudden brief
disturbances thus set up by different stimuli through different sets of nerves
cause feelings scarcely distinguishable in quality will not appear strange when
we recollect that distinguishableness of feeling implies appreciable duration;
and that when the duration is greatly abridged, nothing more is known than that
some mental change has occurred and ceased. To have a sensation of redness, to
know a tone as acute or grave, to be conscious of a taste as sweet, implies in
each case a considerable continuity of state. If the state does not last long
enough to admit of its being contemplated, it cannot be classed as of this or that
kind; and becomes a momentary modiﬁcation very similar to momentary
modiﬁcations otherwise caused.

[Pg 153]

"It is possible, then—may we not even say probable?—that something of the
same order as that which we call a nervous shock is the ultimate unit of
consciousness; and that all the unlikenesses among our feelings result from
unlike modes of integration of this ultimate unit. I say of the same order,
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because there are discernible differences among nervous shocks that are
differently caused; and the primitive nervous shock probably differs somewhat
from each of them. And I say of the same order, for the further reason that
while we may ascribe to them a general likeness in nature, we must suppose a
great unlikeness in degree. The nervous shocks recognized as such are violent
—must be violent before they can be perceived amid the procession of
multitudinous vivid feelings suddenly interrupted by them. But the rapidlyrecurring nervous shocks of which the different forms of feeling consist, we
must assume to be of comparatively moderate, or even of very slight intensity.
Were our various sensations and emotions composed of rapidly-recurring
shocks as strong as those ordinarily called shocks, they would be unbearable;
indeed life would cease at once. We must think of them rather as successive
faint pulses of subjective change, each having the same quality as the strong
pulse of subjective change distinguished as a nervous shock."[168]
INSUFFICIENCY OF THESE PROOFS.

[Pg 154]

FIG. 25.
Convincing as this argument of Mr. Spencer's may appear on a ﬁrst reading, it is singular
how weak it really is.[169] We do, it is true, when we study the connection between a
musical note and its outward cause, ﬁnd the note simple and continuous while the cause is
multiple and discrete. Somewhere, then, there is a transformation, reduction, or fusion. The
question is, Where?—in the nerve-world or in the mind-world? Really we have no
experimental proof by which to decide; and if decide we must, analogy and a priori [Pg 155]
probability can alone guide us. Mr. Spencer assumes that the fusion must come to pass in
the mental world, and that the physical processes get through air and ear, auditory nerve and
medulla, lower brain and hemispheres, without their number being reduced. Figure 25 will
make the point clear.
Let the line a—b represent the threshold of consciousness: then everything drawn below that
line will symbolize a physical process, everything above it will mean a fact of mind. Let the
crosses stand for the physical blows, the circles for the events in successively higher orders
of nerve-cells, and the horizontal marks for the facts of feeling. Spencer's argument implies
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

96/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

that each order of cells transmits just as many impulses as it receives to the cells above it; so
that if the blows come at the rate of 20,000 in a second the cortical cells discharge at the
same rate, and one unit of feeling corresponds to each one of the 20,000 discharges. Then,
and only then, does 'integration' occur, by the 20,000 units of feeling 'compounding with
themselves' into the 'continuous state of consciousness' represented by the short line at the
top of the ﬁgure.
Now such an interpretation as this ﬂies in the face of physical analogy, no less than of
logical intelligibility. Consider physical analogy ﬁrst,
A pendulum may be deﬂected by a single blow, and swing back. Will it swing back the more
often the more we multiply the blows? No; for if they rain upon the pendulum too fast, it
will not swing at all but remain deﬂected in a sensibly stationary state. In other words,
increasing the cause numerically need not equally increase numerically the effect. Blow
through a tube: you get a certain musical note; and increasing the blowing increases for a
certain time the loudness of the note. Will this be true indeﬁnitely? No; for when a certain
force is reached, the note, instead of growing louder, suddenly disappears and is replaced by
its higher octave. Turn on the gas slightly and light it: you get a tiny ﬂame. Turn on more
gas, and the breadth of the ﬂame increases. Will this relation increase indeﬁnitely? No,
again; for at a certain moment up shoots the ﬂame into a ragged streamer and begins to hiss.
Send slowly through the nerve of a frog's gastrocnemius muscle a succession of galvanic [Pg 156]
shocks: you get a succession of twitches. Increasing the number of shocks does not increase
the twitching; on the contrary, it stops it, and we have the muscle in the apparently
stationary state of contraction called tetanus. This last fact is the true analogue of what must
happen between the nerve-cell and the sensory ﬁbre. It is certain that cells are more inert
than ﬁbres, and that rapid vibrations in the latter can only arouse relatively simple processes
or states in the former. The higher cells may have even a slower rate of explosion than the
lower, and so the twenty thousand supposed blows of the outer air may be 'integrated' in the
cortex into a very small number of cell-discharges in a second. This other diagram will serve
to contrast this supposition with Spencer's.
In Fig. 26 all 'integration' occurs below the threshold of
consciousness. The frequency of cell-events becomes more and more
reduced as we approach the cells to which feeling is most directly
attached, until at last we come to a condition of things symbolized by
the larger ellipse, which may be taken to stand for some rather
massive and slow process of tension and discharge in the cortical
centres, to which, as a whole, the feeling of musical tone symbolized
by the line at the top of the diagram simply and totally corresponds. It
FIG. 26.
is as if a long ﬁle of men were to start one after the other to reach a
distant point. The road at ﬁrst is good and they keep their original
distance apart. Presently it is intersected by bogs each worse than the last, so that the front
men get so retarded that the hinder ones catch up with them before the journey is done, and
all arrive together at the goal.[170]
On this supposition there are no unperceived units of mind-stuff preceding and composing [Pg 157]
the full consciousness. The latter is itself an immediate psychic fact and bears an immediate
relation to the neural state which is its unconditional accompaniment. Did each neural shock
give rise to its own psychic shock, and the psychic shocks then combine, it would be
impossible to understand why severing one part of the central nervous system from another
should break up the integrity of the consciousness. The cut has nothing to do with the
psychic world. The atoms of mind-stuff ought to ﬂoat off from the nerve-matter on either
side of it, and come together over it and fuse, just as well as if it had not been made. We
know, however, that they do not; that severance of the paths of conduction between a man's
left auditory centre or optical centre and the rest of his cortex will sever all communication
between the words which he hears or sees written and the rest of his ideas.
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Moreover, if feelings can mix into a tertium quid, why do we not take a feeling of greenness
and a feeling of redness, and make a feeling of yellowness out of them? Why has optics
neglected the open road to truth, and wasted centuries in disputing about theories of colorcomposition which two minutes of introspection would have settled forever[171] We cannot
mix feelings as such, though we may mix the objects we feel, and from their mixture get
new feelings. We cannot even (as we shall later see) have two feelings in our mind at once.
At most we can compare together objects previously presented to us in distinct feelings; but
then we ﬁnd each object stubbornly maintaining its separate identity before consciousness, [Pg 158]
whatever the verdict of the comparison may be.[172]
SELF-COMPOUNDING OF MENTAL FACTS IS INADMISSIBLE.
But there is a still more fatal objection to the theory of mental units 'compounding with
themselves' or 'integrating.' It is logically unintelligible; it leaves out the essential feature of
all the 'combinations' we actually know.
All the 'combinations' which we actually know are EFFECTS, wrought by the units said to be
'combined,' UPON SOME ENTITY OTHER THAN THEMSELVES. Without this feature of a medium or
vehicle, the notion of combination has no sense.
"A multitude of contractile units, by joint action, and by being all connected,
for instance, with a single tendon, will pull at the same, and will bring about a
dynamical effect which is undoubtedly the resultant of their combined
individual energies.... On the whole, tendons are to muscular ﬁbres, and bones
are to tendons, combining recipients of mechanical energies. A medium of
composition is indispensable to the summation of energies. To realize the
complete dependence of mechanical resultants on a combining substratum, one
may fancy for a moment all the individually contracting muscular elements
severed from their attachments. They might then still be capable of contracting
with the same energy as before, yet no co-operative result would be
accomplished. The medium of dynamical combination would be wanting. The
multiple energies, singly exerted on no common recipient, would lose
themselves on entirely isolated and disconnected efforts."[173]
In other words, no possible number of entities (call them as you like, whether forces,
material particles, or mental elements) can sum themselves together. Each remains, in the
sum, what it always was; and the sum itself exists only for a bystander who happens to
overlook the units and to apprehend the sum as such; or else it exists in the shape of some [Pg 159]
other effect on an entity external to the sum itself. Let it not be objected that H2 and O
combine of themselves into 'water,' and thenceforward exhibit new properties. They do not.
The 'water' is just the old atoms in the new position, H-O-H; the 'new properties' are just
their combined effects, when in this position, upon external media, such as our sense-organs
and the various reagents on which water may exert its properties and be known.
"Aggregations are organized wholes only when they behave as such in the
presence of other things. A statue is an aggregation of particles of marble, but
as such it has no unity. For the spectator it is one; in itself it is an aggregate; just
as, to the consciousness of an ant crawling over it, it may again appear a mere
aggregate. No summing up of parts can make an unity of a mass of discrete
constituents, unless this unity exist for some other subject, not for the mass
itself."[174]
Just so, in the parallelogram of forces, the 'forces' themselves do not combine into the
diagonal resultant; a body is needed on which they may impinge, to exhibit their resultant
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effect. No more do musical sounds combine per se into concords or discords. Concord and
discord are names for their combined effects on that external medium, the ear.
Where the elemental units are supposed to be feelings, the case is in no wise altered. Take a [Pg 160]
hundred of them, shufﬂe them and pack them as close together as you can (whatever that
may mean); still each remains the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin,
windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There would be a hundredand-ﬁrst feeling there, if, when a group or series of such feelings were set up, a
consciousness belonging to the group as such should emerge. And this 101st feeling would
be a totally new fact; the 100 original feelings might, by a curious physical law, be a signal
for its creation, when they came together; but they would have no substantial identity with
it, nor it with them, and one could never deduce the one from the others, or (in any
intelligible sense) say that they evolved it.
Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then
stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as
he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence.[175] We talk of the
'spirit of the age,' and the 'sentiment of the people,' and in various ways we hypostatize
'public opinion.' But we know this to be symbolic speech, and never dream that the spirit,
opinion, sentiment, etc., constitute a consciousness other than, and additional to, that of the
several individuals whom the words 'age,' 'people,' or 'public' denote. The private minds do
not agglomerate into a higher compound mind. This has always been the invincible
contention of the spiritualists against the associationists in Psychology,—a contention which
we shall take up at greater length in Chapter X. The associationists say the mind is
constituted by a multiplicity of distinct 'ideas' associated into a unity. There is, they say, an [Pg 161]
idea of a, and also an idea of b. Therefore, they say, there is an idea of a + b, or of a and b
together. Which is like saying that the mathematical square of a plus that of b is equal to the
square of a + b, a palpable untruth. Idea of a + idea of b is not identical with idea of (a + b).
It is one, they are two; in it, what knows a also knows b; in them, what knows a is expressly
posited as not knowing b; etc. In short, the two separate ideas can never by any logic be
made to ﬁgure as one and the same thing as the 'associated' idea.
This is what the spiritualists keep saying; and since we do, as a matter of fact, have the
'compounded' idea, and do know a and b together, they adopt a farther hypothesis to explain
that fact. The separate ideas exist, they say, but affect a third entity, the soul. This has the
'compounded' idea, if you please so to call it; and the compounded idea is an altogether new
psychic fact to which the separate ideas stand in the relation, not of constituents, but of
occasions of production.
This argument of the spiritualists against the associationists has never been answered by the
latter. It holds good against any talk about self-compounding amongst feelings, against any
'blending,' or 'complication,' or 'mental chemistry,' or 'psychic synthesis,' which supposes a
resultant consciousness to ﬂoat off from the constituents per se, in the absence of a
supernumerary principle of consciousness which they may affect. The mind-stuff theory, in
short, is unintelligible. Atoms of feeling cannot compose higher feelings, any more than
atoms of matter can compose physical things! The 'things,' for a clear-headed atomistic
evolutionist, are not. Nothing is but the everlasting atoms. When grouped in a certain way,
we name them this 'thing' or that; but the thing we name has no existence out of our mind.
So of the states of mind which are supposed to be compound because they know many
different things together. Since indubitably such states do exist, they must exist as single
new facts, effects, possibly, as the spiritualists say, on the Soul (we will not decide that point [Pg 162]
here), but at any rate independent and integral, and not compounded of psychic atoms.[176]
CAN STATES OF MIND BE UNCONSCIOUS?
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The passion for unity and smoothness is in some minds so insatiate that, in spite of the
logical clearness of these reasonings and conclusions, many will fail to be inﬂuenced by
them. They establish a sort of disjointedness in things which in certain quarters will appear
intolerable. They sweep away all chance of 'passing without break' either from the material [Pg 163]
to the mental, or from the lower to the higher mental; and they thrust us back into a
pluralism of consciousnesses—each arising discontinuously in the midst of two
disconnected worlds, material and mental—which is even worse than the old notion of the
separate creation of each particular soul. But the malcontents will hardly try to refute our
reasonings by direct attack. It is more probable that, turning their back upon them altogether,
they will devote themselves to sapping and mining the region roundabout until it is a bog of
logical liquefaction, into the midst of which all deﬁnite conclusions of any sort may be
trusted ere long to sink and disappear.
Our reasonings have assumed that the 'integration' of a thousand psychic units must be
either just the units over again, simply rebaptized, or else something real, but then other than
and additional to those units; that if a certain existing fact is that of a thousand feelings, it
cannot at the same time be that of ONE feeling; for the essence of feeling is to be felt, and as
a psychic existent feels, so it must be. If the one feeling feels like no one of the thousand, in
what sense can it be said to be the thousand? These assumptions are what the monists will
seek to undermine. The Hegelizers amongst them will take high ground at once, and say that
the glory and beauty of the psychic life is that in it all contradictions ﬁnd their
reconciliation; and that it is just because the facts we are considering are facts of the self
that they are both one and many at the same time. With this intellectual temper I confess that
I cannot contend. As in striking at some unresisting gossamer with a club, one but
overreaches one's self, and the thing one aims at gets no harm. So I leave this school to its
devices.
The other monists are of less deliquescent frame, and try to break down distinctness among
mental states by making a distinction. This sounds paradoxical, but it is only ingenious. The
distinction is that between the unconscious and the conscious being of the mental state. It is
the sovereign means for believing what one likes in psychology, and of turning what might
become a science into a tumbling-ground for whimsies. It has numerous champions, and [Pg 164]
elaborate reasons to give for itself. We must therefore accord it due consideration. In
discussing the question:
DO UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL STATES EXIST?
it will be best to give the list of so-called proofs as brieﬂy as possible, and to follow each by
its objection, as in scholastic books.[177]
First Proof. The minimum visibile, the minimum audibile, are objects composed of parts.
How can the whole affect the sense unless each part does? And yet each part does so
without being separately sensible. Leibnitz calls the total consciousness an 'aperception,' the
supposed insensible consciousness by the name of 'petites perceptions.'
"To judge of the latter," he says, "I am accustomed to use the example of the
roaring of the sea with which one is assailed when near the shore. To hear this
noise as one does, one must hear the parts which compose its totality, that is, the
noise of each wave,... although this noise would not be noticed if its wave were
alone. One must be affected a little by the movement of one wave, one must
have some perception of each several noise, however small it be. Otherwise one
would not hear that of 100,000 waves, for of 100,000 zeros one can never make
a quantity."[178]
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Reply. This is an excellent example of the so-called 'fallacy of division,' or predicating what
is true only of a collection, of each member of the collection distributively. It no more
follows that if a thousand things together cause sensation, one thing alone must cause it,
than it follows that if one pound weight moves a balance, then one ounce weight must move
it too, in less degree. One ounce weight does not move it at all; its movement begins with [Pg 165]
the pound. At most we can say that each ounce affects it in some way which helps the
advent of that movement. And so each infra-sensible stimulus to a nerve no doubt affects the
nerve and helps the birth of sensation when the other stimuli come. But this affection is a
nerve-affection, and there is not the slightest ground for supposing it to be a 'perception'
unconscious of itself. "A certain quantity of the cause may be a necessary condition to the
production of any of the effect,"[179] when the latter is a mental state.
Second Proof. In all acquired dexterities and habits, secondarily automatic performances as
they are called, we do what originally required a chain of deliberately conscious perceptions
and volitions. As the actions still keep their intelligent character, intelligence must still
preside over their execution. But since our consciousness seems all the while elsewhere
engaged, such intelligence must consist of unconscious perceptions, inferences, and
volitions.
Reply. There is more than one alternative explanation in accordance with larger bodies of
fact. One is that the perceptions and volitions in habitual actions may be performed
consciously, only so quickly and inattentively that no memory of them remains. Another is
that the consciousness of these actions exists, but is split-off from the rest of the
consciousness of the hemispheres. We shall ﬁnd in Chapter X numerous proofs of the reality
of this split-off condition of portions of consciousness. Since in man the hemispheres
indubitably co-operate in these secondarily automatic acts, it will not do to say either that
they occur without consciousness or that their consciousness is that of the lower centres,
which we know nothing about. But either lack of memory or split-off cortical consciousness
will certainly account for all of the facts.[180]
Third Proof. Thinking of A, we presently ﬁnd ourselves thinking of C. Now B is the natural
logical link between A and C, but we have no consciousness of having thought of B. It must
[Pg 166]
have been in our mind 'unconsciously,' and in that state affected the sequence of our ideas.
Reply. Here again we have a choice between more plausible explanations. Either B was
consciously there, but the next instant forgotten, or its brain-tract alone was adequate to do
the whole work of coupling A with C, without the idea B being aroused at all, whether
consciously or 'unconsciously.'
Fourth Proof. Problems unsolved when we go to bed are found solved in the morning when
we wake. Somnambulists do rational things. We awaken punctually at an hour
predetermined overnight, etc. Unconscious thinking, volition, time-registration, etc., must
have presided over these acts.
Reply. Consciousness forgotten, as in the hypnotic trance.
Fifth Proof. Some patients will often, in an attack of epileptiform unconsciousness, go
through complicated processes, such as eating a dinner in a restaurant and paying for it, or
making a violent homicidal attack. In trance, artiﬁcial or pathological, long and complex
performances, involving the use of the reasoning powers, are executed, of which the patient
is wholly unaware on coming to.
Reply. Rapid and complete oblivescence is certainly the explanation here. The analogue
again is hypnotism. Tell the subject of an hypnotic trance, during his trance, that he will
remember, and he may remember everything perfectly when he awakes, though without
your telling him no memory would have remained. The extremely rapid oblivescence of
common dreams is a familiar fact.
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Sixth Proof. In a musical concord the vibrations of the several notes are in relatively simple
ratios. The mind must unconsciously count the vibrations, and be pleased by the simplicity
which it ﬁnds.
Reply. The brain-process produced by the simple ratios may be as directly agreeable as the
conscious process of comparing them would be. No counting, either conscious or
'unconscious,' is required.
Seventh Proof. Every hour we make theoretic judgments and emotional reactions, and
exhibit practical tendencies, for which we can give no explicit logical justiﬁcation, but [Pg 167]
which are good inferences from certain premises. We know more than we can say. Our
conclusions run ahead of our power to analyze their grounds. A child, ignorant of the axiom
that two things equal to the same are equal to each other, applies it nevertheless in his
concrete judgments unerringly. A boor will use the dictum de omni et nullo who is unable to
understand it in abstract terms.
"We seldom consciously think how our house is painted, what the shade of it is,
what the pattern of our furniture is, or whether the door opens to the right or
left, or out or in. But how quickly should we notice a change in any of these
things! Think of the door you have most often opened, and tell, if you can,
whether it opens to the right or left, out or in. Yet when you open the door you
never put the hand on the wrong side to ﬁnd the latch, nor try to push it when it
opens with a pull.... What is the precise characteristic in your friend's step that
enables you to recognize it when he is coming? Did you ever consciously think
the idea, 'if I run into a solid piece of matter I shall get hurt, or be hindered in
my progress'? and do you avoid running into obstacles because you ever
distinctly conceived, or consciously acquired and thought, that idea?"[181]
Most of our knowledge is at all times potential. We act in accordance with the whole drift of
what we have learned, but few items rise into consciousness at the time. Many of them,
however, we may recall at will. All this co-operation of unrealized principles and facts, of
potential knowledge, with our actual thought is quite inexplicable unless we suppose the
perpetual existence of an immense mass of ideas in an unconscious state, all of them
exerting a steady pressure and inﬂuence upon our conscious thinking, and many of them in
such continuity with it as ever and anon to become conscious themselves.
Reply. No such mass of ideas is supposable. But there are all kinds of short-cuts in the brain;
and processes not aroused strongly enough to give any 'idea' distinct enough to be a premise,
may, nevertheless, help to determine just that resultant process of whose psychic
accompaniment the said idea would be a premise, if the idea existed at all. A certain
overtone may be a feature of my friend's voice, and may conspire with the other tones [Pg 168]
thereof to arouse in my brain the process which suggests to my consciousness his name.
And yet I may be ignorant of the overtone per se, and unable, even when he speaks, to tell
whether it be there or no. It leads me to the idea of the name; but it produces in me no such
cerebral process as that to which the idea of the overtone would correspond. And similarly
of our learning. Each subject we learn leaves behind it a modiﬁcation of the brain, which
makes it impossible for the latter to react upon things just as it did before; and the result of
the difference may be a tendency to act, though with no idea, much as we should if we were
consciously thinking about the subject. The becoming conscious of the latter at will is
equally readily explained as a result of the brain-modiﬁcation. This, as Wundt phrases it, is a
'predisposition' to bring forth the conscious idea of the original subject, a predisposition
which other stimuli and brain-processes may convert into an actual result. But such a
predisposition is no 'unconscious idea;' it is only a particular collocation of the molecules in
certain tracts of the brain.
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Eighth Proof. Instincts, as pursuits of ends by appropriate means, are manifestations of
intelligence; but as the ends are not foreseen, the intelligence must be unconscious.
Reply. Chapter XXIV will show that all the phenomena of instinct are explicable as actions
of the nervous system, mechanically discharged by stimuli to the senses.
Ninth Proof. In sense-perception we have results in abundance, which can only be explained
as conclusions drawn by a process of unconscious inference from data given to sense. A
small human image on the retina is referred, not to a pygmy, but to a distant man of normal
size. A certain gray patch is inferred to be a white object seen in a dim light. Often the
inference leads us astray: e.g., pale gray against pale green looks red, because we take a
wrong premise to argue from. We think a green ﬁlm is spread over everything; and knowing
that under such a ﬁlm a red thing would look gray, we wrongly infer from the gray
appearance that a red thing must be there. Our study of space-perception in Chapter XVIII
will give abundant additional examples both of the truthful and illusory percepts which have [Pg 169]
been explained to result from unconscious logic operations.
Reply. That chapter will also in many cases refute this explanation. Color-and light-contrast
are certainly purely sensational affairs, in which inference plays no part. This has been
satisfactorily proved by Hering,[182] and shall be treated of again in Chapter XVII. Our
rapid judgments of size, shape, distance, and the like, are best explained as processes of
simple cerebral association. Certain sense-impressions directly stimulate brain-tracts, of
whose activity ready-made conscious percepts are the immediate psychic counterparts. They
do this by a mechanism either connate or acquired by habit. It is to be remarked that Wundt
and Helmholtz, who in their earlier writings did more than any one to give vogue to the
notion that unconscious inference is a vital factor in sense-perception, have seen ﬁt on later
occasions to modify their views and to admit that results like those of reasoning may accrue
without any actual reasoning process unconsciously taking place.[183] Maybe the excessive
and riotous applications made by Hartmann of their principle have led them to this change.
It would be natural to feel towards him as the sailor in the story felt towards the horse who
got his foot into the stirrup,—"If you're going to get on, I must get off."
Hartmann fairly boxes the compass of the universe with the principle of unconscious
thought. For him there is no namable thing that does not exemplify it. But his logic is so lax
and his failure to consider the most obvious alternatives so complete that it would, on the
whole, be a waste of time to look at his arguments in detail. The same is true of
Schopenhauer, in whom the mythology reaches its climax. The visual perception, for
example, of an object in space results, according to him, from the intellect performing the
following operations, all unconscious. First, it apprehends the inverted retinal image and
turns it right side up, constructing ﬂat space as a preliminary operation; then it computes [Pg 170]
from the angle of convergence of the eyeballs that the two retinal images must be the
projection of but a single object; thirdly, it constructs the third dimension and sees this
object solid; fourthly, it assigns its distance; and ﬁfthly, in each and all of these operations it
gets the objective character of what it 'constructs' by unconsciously inferring it as the only
possible cause of some sensation which it unconsciously feels.[184] Comment on this seems
hardly called for. It is, as I said, pure mythology.
None of these facts, then, appealed to so conﬁdently in proof of the existence of ideas in an
unconscious state, prove anything of the sort. They prove either that conscious ideas were
present which the next instant were forgotten; or they prove that certain results, similar to
results of reasoning, may be wrought out by rapid brain-processes to which no ideation
seems attached. But there is one more argument to be alleged, less obviously insufﬁcient
than those which we have reviewed, and demanding a new sort of reply.
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Tenth Proof. There is a great class of experiences in our mental life which may be described
as discoveries that a subjective condition which we have been having is really something
different from what we had supposed. We suddenly ﬁnd ourselves bored by a thing which
we thought we were enjoying well enough; or in love with a person whom we imagined we
only liked. Or else we deliberately analyze our motives, and ﬁnd that at bottom they contain
jealousies and cupidities which we little suspected to be there. Our feelings towards people
are perfect wells of motivation, unconscious of itself, which introspection brings to light.
And our sensations likewise: we constantly discover new elements in sensations which we
have been in the habit of receiving all our days, elements, too, which have been there from
the ﬁrst, since otherwise we should have been unable to distinguish the sensations
containing them from others nearly allied. The elements must exist, for we use them to
discriminate by; but they must exist in an unconscious state, since we so completely fail to [Pg 171]
single them out.[185] The books of the analytic school of psychology abound in examples of
the kind. Who knows the countless associations that mingle with his each and every
thought? Who can pick apart all the nameless feelings that stream in at every moment from
his various internal organs, muscles, heart, glands, lungs, etc., and compose in their totality
his sense of bodily life? Who is aware of the part played by feelings of innervation and
suggestions of possible muscular exertion in all his judgments of distance, shape, and size?
Consider, too, the difference between a sensation which we simply have and one which we
attend to. Attention gives results that seem like fresh creations; and yet the feelings and
elements of feeling which it reveals must have been already there—in an unconscious state.
We all know practically the difference between the so-called sonant and the so-called surd
consonants, between D, B, Z, G, V, and T, P, S, K, F, respectively. But comparatively few
persons know the difference theoretically, until their attention has been called to what it is,
when they perceive it readily enough. The sonants are nothing but the surds plus a certain
element, which is alike in all, superadded. That element is the laryngeal sound with which
they are uttered, surds having no such accompaniment. When we hear the sonant letter, both
its component elements must really be in our mind; but we remain unconscious of what they
really are, and mistake the letter for a simple quality of sound until an effort of attention
teaches us its two components. There exist a host of sensations which most men pass
through life and never attend to, and consequently have only in an unconscious way. The
feelings of opening and closing the glottis, of making tense the tympanic membrane, of
accommodating for near vision, of intercepting the passage from the nostrils to the throat,
are instances of what I mean. Every one gets these feelings many times an hour; but few
readers, probably, are conscious of exactly what sensations are meant by the names I have
just used. All these facts, and an enormous number more, seem to prove conclusively that, in [Pg 172]
addition to the fully conscious way in which an idea may exist in the mind, there is also an
unconscious way; that it is unquestionably the same identical idea which exists in these two
ways; and that therefore any arguments against the mind-stuff theory, based on the notion
that esse in our mental life is sentiri, and that an idea must consciously be felt as what it is,
fall to the ground.
Objection. These reasonings are one tissue of confusion. Two states of mind which refer to
the same external reality, or two states of mind the later one of which refers to the earlier,
are described as the same state of mind, or 'idea,' published as it were in two editions; and
then whatever qualities of the second edition are found openly lacking in the ﬁrst are
explained as having really been there, only in an 'unconscious' way. It would be difﬁcult to
believe that intelligent men could be guilty of so patent a fallacy, were not the history of
psychology there to give the proof. The psychological stock-in-trade of some authors is the
belief that two thoughts about one thing are virtually the same thought, and that this same
thought may in subsequent reﬂections become more and more conscious of what it really
was all along from the ﬁrst. But once make the distinction between simply having an idea at
the moment of its presence and subsequently knowing all sorts of things about it; make
moreover that between a state of mind itself, taken as a subjective fact, on the one hand, and
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the objective thing it knows, on the other, and one has no difﬁculty in escaping from the
labyrinth.
Take the latter distinction ﬁrst: Immediately all the arguments based on sensations and the
new features in them which attention brings to light fall to the ground. The sensations of the
B and the V when we attend to these sounds and analyze out the laryngeal contribution
which makes them differ from P and F respectively, are different sensations from those of
the B and the V taken in a simple way. They stand, it is true, for the same letters, and thus
mean the same outer realities; but they are different mental affections, and certainly depend
on widely different processes of cerebral activity. It is unbelievable that two mental states so [Pg 173]
different as the passive reception of a sound as a whole, and the analysis of that whole into
distinct ingredients by voluntary attention, should be due to processes at all similar. And the
subjective difference does not consist in that the ﬁrst-named state is the second in an
'unconscious' form. It is an absolute psychic difference, even greater than that between the
states to which two different surds will give rise. The same is true of the other sensations
chosen as examples. The man who learns for the ﬁrst time how the closure of his glottis
feels, experiences in this discovery an absolutely new psychic modiﬁcation, the like of
which he never had before. He had another feeling before, a feeling incessantly renewed,
and of which the same glottis was the organic starting point; but that was not the later
feeling in an 'unconscious' state; it was a feeling sui generis altogether, although it took
cognizance of the same bodily part, the glottis. We shall see, hereafter, that the same reality
can be cognized by an endless number of psychic states, which may differ toto cœlo among
themselves, without ceasing on that account to refer to the reality in question. Each of them
is a conscious fact: none of them has any mode of being whatever except a certain way of
being felt at the moment of being present. It is simply unintelligible and fantastical to say,
because they point to the same outer reality, that they must therefore be so many editions of
the same 'idea,' now in a conscious and now in an 'unconscious' phase. There is only one
'phase' in which an idea can be, and that is a fully conscious condition. If it is not in that
condition, then it is not at all. Something else is, in its place. The something else may be a
merely physical brain-process, or it may be another conscious idea. Either of these things
may perform much the same function as the ﬁrst idea, refer to the same object, and roughly
stand in the same relations to the upshot of our thought. But that is no reason why we should
throw away the logical principle of identity in psychology, and say that, however it may fare
in the outer world, the mind at any rate is a place in which a thing can be all kinds of other
things without ceasing to be itself as well.
Now take the other cases alleged, and the other distinction, that namely between having a [Pg 174]
mental state and knowing all about it. The truth is here even simpler to unravel. When I
decide that I have, without knowing it, been for several weeks in love, I am simply giving a
name to a state which previously I have not named, but which was fully conscious; which
had no residual mode of being except the manner in which it was conscious; and which,
though it was a feeling towards the same person for whom I now have a much more
inﬂamed feeling, and though it continuously led into the latter, and is similar enough to be
called by the same name, is yet in no sense identical with the latter, and least of all in an
'unconscious' way. Again, the feelings from our viscera and other dimly-felt organs, the
feelings of innervation (if such there be), and those of muscular exertion which, in our
spatial judgments, are supposed unconsciously to determine what we shall perceive, are just
exactly what we feel them, perfectly determinate conscious states, not vague editions of
other conscious states. They may be faint and weak; they may be very vague cognizers of
the same realities which other conscious states cognize and name exactly; they may be
unconscious of much in the reality which the other states are conscious of. But that does not
make them in themselves a whit dim or vague or unconscious. They are eternally as they
feel when they exist, and can, neither actually nor potentially, be identiﬁed with anything
else than their own faint selves. A faint feeling may be looked back upon and classiﬁed and
understood in its relations to what went before or after it in the stream of thought. But it, on
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the one hand, and the later state of mind which knows all these things about it, on the other,
are surely not two conditions, one conscious and the other 'unconscious,' of the same
identical psychic fact. It is the destiny of thought that, on the whole, our early ideas are
superseded by later ones, giving fuller accounts of the same realities. But none the less do
the earlier and the later ideas preserve their own several substantive identities as so many
several successive states of mind. To believe the contrary would make any deﬁnite science
of psychology impossible. The only identity to be found among our successive ideas is their
similarity of cognitive or representative function as dealing with the same objects. Identity [Pg 175]
of being, there is none; and I believe that throughout the rest of this volume the reader will
reap the advantages of the simpler way of formulating the facts which is here begun.[186]

So we seem not only to have ascertained the unintelligibility of the notion that a mental fact
can be two things at once, and that what seems like one feeling, of blueness for example, or
of hatred, may really and 'unconsciously' be ten thousand elementary feelings which do not
resemble blueness or hatred at all, but we ﬁnd that we can express all the observed facts in
other ways. The mind-stuff theory, however, though scotched, is, we may be sure, not killed. [Pg 176]
If we ascribe consciousness to unicellular animalcules, then single cells can have it, and
analogy should make us ascribe it to the several cells of the brain, each individually taken.
And what a convenience would it not be for the psychologist if, by the adding together of
various doses of this separate-cell-consciousness, he could treat thought as a kind of stuff or
material, to be measured out in great or small amount, increased and subtracted from, and
baled about at will! He feels an imperious craving to be allowed to construct synthetically
the successive mental states which he describes. The mind-stuff theory so easily admits of
the construction being made, that it seems certain that 'man's unconquerable mind' will
devote much future pertinacity and ingenuity to setting it on its legs again and getting it into
some sort of plausible working-order. I will therefore conclude the chapter with some
consideration of the remaining difﬁculties which beset the matter as it at present stands.
DIFFICULTY OF STATING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MIND AND BRAIN.
It will be remembered that in our criticism of the theory of the integration of successive
conscious units into a feeling of musical pitch, we decided that whatever integration there
was was that of the air-pulses into a simpler and simpler sort of physical effect, as the
propagations of material change got higher and higher in the nervous system. At last, we
said (p. 23), there results some simple and massive process in the auditory centres of the
hemispherical cortex, to which, as a whole, the feeling of musical pitch directly
corresponds. Already, in discussing the localization of functions in the brain, I had said (pp.
158-9) that consciousness accompanies the stream of innervation through that organ and
varies in quality with the character of the currents, being mainly of things seen if the
occipital lobes are much involved, of things heard if the action is focalized in the temporal
lobes, etc., etc.; and I had added that a vague formula like this was as much as one could
safely venture on in the actual state of physiology. The facts of mental deafness and [Pg 177]
blindness, of auditory and optical aphasia, show us that the whole brain must act together if
certain thoughts are to occur. The consciousness, which is itself an integral thing not made
of parts, 'corresponds' to the entire activity of the brain, whatever that may be, at the
moment. This is a way of expressing the relation of mind and brain from which I shall not
depart during the remainder of the book, because it expresses the bare phenomenal fact with
no hypothesis, and is exposed to no such logical objections as we have found to cling to the
theory of ideas in combination.
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Nevertheless, this formula which is so unobjectionable if taken vaguely, positivistically, or
scientiﬁcally, as a mere empirical law of concomitance between our thoughts and our brain,
tumbles to pieces entirely if we assume to represent anything more intimate or ultimate by
it. The ultimate of ultimate problems, of course, in the study of the relations of thought and
brain, is to understand why and how such disparate things are connected at all. But before
that problem is solved (if it ever is solved) there is a less ultimate problem which must ﬁrst
be settled. Before the connection of thought and brain can be explained, it must at least be
stated in an elementary form; and there are great difﬁculties about so stating it. To state it in
elementary form one must reduce it to its lowest terms and know which mental fact and
which cerebral fact are, so to speak, in immediate juxtaposition. We must ﬁnd the minimal
mental fact whose being reposes directly on a brain-fact; and we must similarly ﬁnd the
minimal brain-event which will have a mental counterpart at all. Between the mental and the
physical minima thus found there will be an immediate relation, the expression of which, if
we had it, would be the elementary psycho-physic law.
Our own formula escapes the unintelligibility of psychic atoms by taking the entire thought
(even of a complex object) as the minimum with which it deals on the mental side. But in
taking the entire brain-process as its minimal fact on the material side it confronts other
difﬁculties almost as bad.
In the ﬁrst place, it ignores analogies on which certain critics will insist, those, namely, [Pg 178]
between the composition of the total brain-process and that of the object of the thought. The
total brain-process is composed of parts, of simultaneous processes in the seeing, the
hearing, the feeling, and other centres. The object thought of is also composed of parts,
some of which are seen, others heard, others perceived by touch and muscular manipulation.
"How then," these critics will say, "should the thought not itself be composed of parts, each
the counterpart of a part of the object and of a part of the brain-process?" So natural is this
way of looking at the matter that it has given rise to what is on the whole the most
ﬂourishing of all psychological systems—that of the Lockian school of associated ideas—of
which school the mind-stuff theory is nothing but the last and subtlest offshoot.
The second difﬁculty is deeper still. The 'entire brain-process' is not a physical fact at all. It
is the appearance to an onlooking mind of a multitude of physical facts. 'Entire brain' is
nothing but our name for the way in which a million of molecules arranged in certain
positions may affect our sense. On the principles of the corpuscular or mechanical
philosophy, the only realities are the separate molecules, or at most the cells. Their
aggregation into a 'brain' is a ﬁction of popular speech. Such a ﬁction cannot serve as the
objectively real counterpart to any psychic state whatever. Only a genuinely physical fact
can so serve. But the molecular fact is the only genuine physical fact—whereupon we seem,
if we are to have an elementary psycho-physic law at all, thrust right back upon something
like the mind-stuff theory, for the molecular fact, being an element of the 'brain,' would
seem naturally to correspond, not to the total thoughts, but to elements in the thought.
What shall we do? Many would ﬁnd relief at this point in celebrating the mystery of the
Unknowable and the 'awe' which we should feel at having such a principle to take ﬁnal
charge of our perplexities. Others would rejoice that the ﬁnite and separatist view of things
with which we started had at last developed its contradictions, and was about to lead us [Pg 179]
dialectically upwards to some 'higher synthesis' in which inconsistencies cease from
troubling and logic is at rest. It may be a constitutional inﬁrmity, but I can take no comfort
in such devices for making a luxury of intellectual defeat. They are but spiritual chloroform.
Better live on the ragged edge, better gnaw the ﬁle forever!
THE MATERIAL-MONAD THEORY.
The most rational thing to do is to suspect that there may be a third possibility, an alternative
supposition which we have not considered. Now there is an alternative supposition—a
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supposition moreover which has been frequently made in the history of philosophy, and
which is freer from logical objections than either of the views we have ourselves discussed.
It may be called the theory of polyzoism or multiple monadism; and it conceives the matter
thus:
Every brain-cell has its own individual consciousness, which no other cell knows anything
about, all individual consciousnesses being 'ejective' to each other. There is, however,
among the cells one central or pontiﬁcal one to which our consciousness is attached. But the
events of all the other cells physically inﬂuence this arch-cell; and through producing their
joint effects on it, these other cells may be said to 'combine.' The arch-cell is, in fact, one of
those 'external media' without which we saw that no fusion or integration of a number of
things can occur. The physical modiﬁcations of the arch-cell thus form a sequence of results
in the production whereof every other cell has a share, so that, as one might say, every other
cell is represented therein. And similarly, the conscious correlates to these physical
modiﬁcations form a sequence of thoughts or feelings, each one of which is, as to its
substantive being, an integral and uncompounded psychic thing, but each one of which may
(in the exercise of its cognitive function) be aware of THINGS many and complicated in
proportion to the number of other cells that have helped to modify the central cell.
By a conception of this sort, one incurs neither of the internal contradictions which we [Pg 180]
found to beset the other two theories. One has no unintelligible self-combining of psychic
units to account for on the one hand; and on the other hand, one need not treat as the
physical counterpart of the stream of consciousness under observation, a 'total brain-activity'
which is non-existent as a genuinely physical fact. But, to offset these advantages, one has
physiological difﬁculties and improbabilities. There is no cell or group of cells in the brain
of such anatomical or functional pre-eminence as to appear to be the keystone or centre of
gravity of the whole system. And even if there were such a cell, the theory of multiple
monadism would, in strictness of thought, have no right to stop at it and treat it as a unit.
The cell is no more a unit, materially considered, than the total brain is a unit. It is a
compound of molecules, just as the brain is a compound of cells and ﬁbres. And the
molecules, according to the prevalent physical theories, are in turn compounds of atoms.
The theory in question, therefore, if radically carried out, must set up for its elementary and
irreducible psycho-physic couple, not the cell and its consciousness, but the primordial and
eternal atom and its consciousness. We are back at Leibnitzian monadism, and therewith
leave physiology behind us and dive into regions inaccessible to experience and veriﬁcation;
and our doctrine, although not self-contradictory, becomes so remote and unreal as to be
almost as bad as if it were. Speculative minds alone will take an interest in it; and
metaphysics, not psychology, will be responsible for its career. That the career may be a
successful one must be admitted as a possibility—a theory which Leibnitz, Herbart, and
Lotze have taken under their protection must have some sort of a destiny.
THE SOUL-THEORY.
But is this my last word? By no means. Many readers have certainly been saying to
themselves for the last few pages: "Why on earth doesn't the poor man say the Soul and
have done with it?" Other readers, of anti-spiritualistic training and prepossessions,
advanced thinkers, or popular evolutionists, will perhaps be a little surprised to ﬁnd this [Pg 181]
much-despised word now sprung upon them at the end of so physiological a train of
thought. But the plain fact is that all the arguments for a 'pontiﬁcal cell' or an 'arch-monad'
are also arguments for that well-known spiritual agent in which scholastic psychology and
common-sense have always believed. And my only reason for beating the bushes so, and not
bringing it in earlier as a possible solution of our difﬁculties, has been that by this procedure
I might perhaps force some of these materialistic minds to feel the more strongly the logical
respectability of the spiritualistic position. The fact is that one cannot afford to despise any
of these great traditional objects of belief. Whether we realize it or not, there is always a
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

108/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

great drift of reasons, positive and negative, towing us in their direction. If there be such
entities as Souls in the universe, they may possibly be affected by the manifold occurrences
that go on in the nervous centres. To the state of the entire brain at a given moment they may
respond by inward modiﬁcations of their own. These changes of state may be pulses of
consciousness, cognitive of objects few or many, simple or complex. The soul would be thus
a medium upon which (to use our earlier phraseology) the manifold brain-processes
combine their effects. Not needing to consider it as the 'inner aspect' of any arch-molecule or
brain-cell, we escape that physiological improbability; and as its pulses of consciousness are
unitary and integral affairs from the outset, we escape the absurdity of supposing feelings
which exist separately and then 'fuse together' by themselves. The separateness is in the
brain-world, on this theory, and the unity in the soul-world; and the only trouble that
remains to haunt us is the metaphysical one of understanding how one sort of world or
existent thing can affect or inﬂuence another at all. This trouble, however, since it also exists
inside of both worlds, and involves neither physical improbability nor logical contradiction,
is relatively small.
I confess, therefore, that to posit a soul inﬂuenced in some mysterious way by the brainstates and responding to them by conscious affections of its own, seems to me the line of
least logical resistance, so far as we yet have attained.
If it does not strictly explain anything, it is at any rate less positively objectionable than [Pg 182]
either mind-stuff or a material-monad creed. The bare PHENOMENON, however, the IMMEDIATELY
KNOWN thing which on the mental side is in apposition with the entire brain-process is the
state of consciousness and not the soul itself. Many of the stanchest believers in the soul
admit that we know it only as an inference from experiencing its states. In Chapter X,
accordingly, we must return to its consideration again, and ask ourselves whether, after all,
the ascertainment of a blank unmediated correspondence, term for term, of the succession of
states of consciousness with the succession of total brain-processes, be not the simplest
psycho-physic formula, and the last word of a psychology which contents itself with
veriﬁable laws, and seeks only to be clear, and to avoid unsafe hypotheses. Such a mere
admission of the empirical parallelism will there appear the wisest course. By keeping to it,
our psychology will remain positivistic and non-metaphysical; and although this is certainly
only a provisional halting-place, and things must some day be more thoroughly thought out,
we shall abide there in this book, and just as we have rejected mind-dust, we shall take no
account of the soul. The spiritualistic reader may nevertheless believe in the soul if he will;
whilst the positivistic one who wishes to give a tinge of mystery to the expression of his
positivism can continue to say that nature in her unfathomable designs has mixed us of clay
and ﬂame, of brain and mind, that the two things hang indubitably together and determine
each other's being, but how or why, no mortal may ever know.

[160]

Psychol. § 62.

[161]

Ibid. § 272.

[162]

Fragments of Science, 5th ed., p. 420.

[163]

Belfast Address, 'Nature,' August 20, 1874, p. 318. I cannot help remarking that
the disparity between motions and feelings on which these authors lay so much
stress, is somewhat less absolute than at ﬁrst sight it seems. There are categories
common to the two worlds. Not only temporal succession (as Helmholtz admits,
Physiol. Optik, p. 445), but such attributes as intensity, volume, simplicity or
complication, smooth or impeded change, rest or agitation, are habitually
predicated of both physical facts and mental facts. Where such analogies obtain,
the things do have something in common.
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[164]

Psychology, § 131

[165]

'Nature,' as above, 317-8.

[166]

'Nascent' is Mr. Spencer's great word. In showing how at a certain point
consciousness must appear upon the evolving scene this author fairly outdoes
himself in vagueness.
"In its higher forms, Instinct is probably accompanied by a rudimentary
consciousness. There cannot be co-ordination of many stimuli without some
ganglion through which they are all brought into relation. In the process of
bringing them into relation, this ganglion must be subject to the inﬂuence of each
—must undergo many changes. And the quick succession of changes in a
ganglion, implying as it does perpetual experiences of differences and likenesses,
constitutes the raw material of consciousness. The implication is that as fast as
Instinct is developed, some kind of consciousness becomes nascent."
(Psychology, § 195.)
The words 'raw material' and 'implication' which I have italicized are the words
which do the evolving. They are supposed to have all the rigor which the
'synthetic philosophy' requires. In the following passage, when 'impressions' pass
through a common 'centre of communication' in succession (much as people
might pass into a theatre through a turnstile) consciousness, non-existent until
then, is supposed to result:
"Separate impressions are received by the senses—by different parts of the body.
If they go no further than the places at which they are received, they are useless.
Or if only some of them are brought into relation with one another, they are
useless. That an effectual adjustment may be made, they must be all brought into
relation with one another. But this implies some centre of communication
common to them all, through which they severally pass; and as they cannot pass
through it simultaneously, they must pass through it in succession. So that as the
external phenomena responded to become greater in number and more
complicated in kind, the variety and rapidity of the changes to which this common
centre of communication is subject must increase—there must result an unbroken
series of these changes-there must arise a consciousness.
"Hence the progress of the correspondence between the organism and its
environment necessitates a gradual reduction of the sensorial changes to a
succession; and by so doing evolves a distinct consciousness—a consciousness
that becomes higher as the succession becomes more rapid and the
correspondence more complete." (Ibid. § 179.)
It is true that in the Fortnightly Review (vol. xiv, p. 716) Mr. Spencer denies that
he means by this passage to tell us anything about the origin of consciousness at
all. It resembles, however, too many other places in his Psychology (e.g. §§ 43,
110, 244) not to be taken as a serious attempt to explain how consciousness must
at a certain point be 'evolved.' That, when a critic calls his attention to the inanity
of his words, Mr. Spencer should say he never meant anything particular by them,
is simply an example of the scandalous vagueness with which this sort of
'chromo-philosophy' is carried on.

[167]

His own words are: "Mistakes are made in the sense that he admits having been
touched, when in reality it was radiant heat that affected his skin. In our own
before-mentioned experiments there was never any deception on the entire palmar
side of the hand or on the face. On the back of the hand in one case in a series of
60 stimulations 4 mistakes occurred, in another case 2 mistakes in 45
stimulations. On the extensor side of the upper arm 3 deceptions out of 48
stimulations were noticed, and in the case of another individual, 1 out of 31. In
one case over the spine 3 deceptions in a series of 11 excitations were observed;
in another, 4 out of 19. On the lumbar spine 6 deceptions came among 29
stimulations, and again 4 out of 7. There is certainly not yet enough material on
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which to rest a calculation of probabilities, but any one can easily convince
himself that on the back there is no question of even a moderately accurate
discrimination between warmth and a light pressure so far as but small portions of
skin come into play. It has been as yet impossible to make corresponding
experiments with regard to sensibility to cold." (Lehrb. d. Anat. u. Physiol. d.
Sinnesorgane (1862), p. 29.)
[168]

Principles of Psychology, § 60.

[169]

Oddly enough, Mr. Spencer seems quite unaware of the general function of the
theory of elementary units of mind-stuff in the evolutionary philosophy. We have
seen it to be absolutely indispensable, if that philosophy is to work, to postulate
consciousness in the nebula,—-the simplest way being, of course, to suppose
every atom animated. Mr. Spencer, however, will have it (e.g. First Principles, §
71) that consciousness is only the occasional result of the 'transformation' of a
certain amount of 'physical force' to which it is 'equivalent.' Presumably a brain
must already be there before any such 'transformation' can take place; and so the
argument quoted in the text stands as a mere local detail, without general
bearings.

[170]

The compounding of colors may be dealt with in an identical way. Helmholtz has
shown that if green light and red light fall simultaneously on the retina, we see the
color yellow. The mind-stuff theory would interpret this as a ease where the
feeling green and the feeling red 'combine' into the tertium quid of feeling, yellow.
What really occurs is no doubt that a third kind of nerve-process is set up when
the combined lights impinge on the retina,—not simply the process of red plus the
process of green, but something quite different from both or either. Of course,
then, there are no feelings, either of red or of green, present to the mind at all; but
the feeling of yellow which is there, answers as directly to the nerve-process
which momentarily then exists, as the feelings of green and red would answer to
their respective nerve-processes did the latter happen to be taking place.

[171]

Cf. Mill's Logic, book vi, chap. iv, § 3.

[172]

I ﬁnd in my students an almost invincible tendency to think that we can
immediately perceive that feelings do combine. "What!" they say, "is not the taste
of lemonade composed of that of lemon plus that of sugar?" This is taking the
combining of objects for that of feelings. The physical lemonade contains both the
lemon and the sugar, but its taste does not contain their tastes, for if there are any
two things which are certainly not present in the taste of lemonade, those are the
lemon-sour on the one hand and the sugar-sweet on the other. These tastes are
absent utterly. The entirely new taste which is present resembles, it is true, both
those tastes; but in Chapter XIII we shall see that resemblance can not always be
held to involve partial identity.

[173]

E. Montgomery, in 'Mind,' v, 18-19. See also pp. 24-5.

[174]

J. Royce, 'Mind,' vi, p. 376. Lotze has set forth the truth of this law more clearly
and copiously than any other writer. Unfortunately he is too lengthy to quote. See
his Microcosmus, bk. ii, ch. i, § 5; Metaphysik, §§ 242, 260; Outlines of
Metaphysics, part ii, chap. i, §§ 3, 4, 5. Compare also Reid's Intellectual Powers,
essay v, chap. iii, ad ﬁn.; Bowne's Metaphysics, pp. 361-76; St. J. Mivart: Nature
and Thought, pp. 98-101; E. Gurney: 'Monism,' in 'Mind,' vi, 153; and the article
by Prof. Royce, just quoted, on 'Mind-stuff and Reality.'
In defence of the mind-stuff view, see W. K. Clifford: 'Mind,' iii, 57 (reprinted in
his 'Lectures and Essays,' ii, 71); G. T. Fechner, Psychophysik, Bd. ii, cap. xlv; H.
Taine: on Intelligence, bk. iii; E. Haeckel: 'Zellseelen u. Seelenzellen' in
Gesammelte pop. Vorträge, Bd. i, p. 143; W. S. Duncan: Conscious Matter,
passim; H. Zöllner: Natur d. Cometen, pp. 320 ff.; Alfred Barratt: 'Physical Ethic'
and 'Physical Metempiric,' passim; J. Soury: 'Hylozoismus,' in 'Kosmos,' V.
Jahrg., Heft x, p. 241; A. Main: 'Mind,' i, 292, 431, 566; ii, 129, 402; Id. Revue
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Philos., ii, 86, 88, 419; iii, 51, 502; iv, 402; F. W. Frankland: 'Mind,' vi, 116;
Whittaker: 'Mind,' vi, 498 (historical); Morton Prince: The Nature of Mind and
Human Automatism (1885); A. Riehl: Der philosophische Kriticismus, Bd. ii,
Theil 2, 2ter Abschnitt, 2tes Cap. (1887). The clearest of all these Statements is,
as far as it goes, that of Prince.
[175]

"Someone might say that although it is true that neither a blind man nor a deaf
man by himself can compare sounds with colors, yet since one hears and the other
sees they might do so both together.... But whether they are apart or close together
makes no difference; not even if they permanently keep house together; no, not if
they were Siamese twins, or more than Siamese twins, and were inseparably
grown together, would it make the assumption any more possible. Only when
sound and color are represented in the same reality is it thinkable that they should
be compared." (Brentano: Psychologie, p. 209.)

[176]

The reader must observe that we are reasoning altogether about the Logic of the
mind-stuff theory, about whether it can exist in the constitution of higher mental
states by viewing them as identical with lower ones summed together. We say the
two sorts of fact are not identical: a higher state is not a lot of lower states; it is
itself. When, however, a lot of lower states have come together, or when certain
brain-conditions occur together which, if they occurred separately, would produce
a lot of lower states, we have not for a moment pretended that a higher state may
not emerge. In fact it does emerge under those conditions; and our Chapter IX
will be mainly devoted to the proof of this fact. But such emergence is that of a
new psychic entity, and is toto cœlo different from such an 'integration' of the
lower states as the mind-stuff theory afﬁrms.
It may seem strange to suppose that anyone should mistake criticism of a certain
theory about a fact for doubt of the fact itself. And yet the confusion is made in
high quarters enough to justify our remarks. Mr. J. Ward, in his article Psychology
in the Encyclopædia Britannica, speaking of the hypothesis that "a series of
feelings can be aware of itself as a series," says (p. 39): "Paradox is too mild a
word for it, even contradiction will hardly sufﬁce." Whereupon, Professor Bain
takes him thus to task: "As to 'a series of states being aware of itself,' I confess I
see no insurmountable difﬁculty. It may be a fact, or not a fact; it may be a very
clumsy expression for what it is applied to; but it is neither paradox nor
contradiction. A series merely contradicts an individual, or it may be two or more
individuals as coexisting; but that is too general to exclude the possibility of selfknowledge. It certainly does not bring the property of self-knowledge into the
foreground, which, however, is not the same as denying it. An algebraic series
might know itself, without any contradiction: the only thing against it is the want
of evidence of the fact." ('Mind,' xi, 459). Prof. Bain thinks, then, that all the
bother is about the difﬁculty of seeing how a series of feelings can have the
knowledge of itself added to it!!! As if anybody ever was troubled about that.
That, notoriously enough, is a fact: our consciousness is a series of feelings to
which every now and then is added a retrospective consciousness that they have
come and gone. What Mr. Ward and I are troubled about is merely the silliness of
the mind-stufﬁsts and associationists continuing to say that the 'series of states' is
the 'awareness of itself;' that if the states be posited severally, their collective
consciousness is eo ipso given; and that we need no farther explanation, or
'evidence of the fact.'

[177]

The writers about 'unconscious cerebration' seem sometimes to mean that and
sometimes unconscious thought. The arguments which follow are culled from
various quarters. The reader will ﬁnd them most systematically urged by E. von
Hartmann: Philosophy of the Unconscious, vol. i; and by E. Colsenet: La Vie
Inconsciente de l'Esprit (1880). Consult also T. Laycock: Mind and Brain, vol. i,
chap. v (1860); W. B. Carpenter: Mental Physiology, chap. xiii; F. P. Cobbe:
Darwinism in Morals and other Essays, essay xi, Unconscious Cerebration
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(1872); F. Bowen: Modern Philosophy, pp. 428-480; R. H. Hutton: Contemporary
Review, vol. xxiv, p. 201; J. S. Mill: Exam. of Hamilton, chap. xv; G. H. Lewes:
Problems of Life and Mind, 3d series, Prob. ii, chap. x, and also Prob. iii, chap. ii;
D. G. Thompson: A System of Psychology, chap. xxxiii; J. M. Baldwin,
Handbook of Psychology, chap. iv.
[178]

Nouveaux Essais, Avant-propos.

[179]

J. S. Mill, Exam. of Hamilton, chap. xv.

[180]

Cf. Dugald Stewart, Elements, chap. ii.

[181]

J. E. Maude: 'The Unconscious in Education,' in 'Education,' vol. i, p. 401 (1882).

[182]

Zur Lehre vor Lichtsinne (1878).

[183]

Cf. Wundt: Ueber den Einﬂuss der Philosophie, etc.—Antrittsrede (1876), pp. 1011;—Helmholtz: Die Thatsachen in der Wahrnehmung (1879), p. 27.

[184]

Cf. Satz vom Grunde, pp. 59-65. Compare also F. Zöllner's Natur der Kometen,
pp. 342 ff. and 425.

[185]

Cf. the statements from Helmholtz to be found later in Chapter XIII.

[186]

The text was written before Professor Lipps's Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens
(1883) came into my hands. In Chapter III of that book the notion of unconscious
thought is subjected to the clearest and most searching criticism which it has yet
received. Some passages are so similar to what I have myself written that I must
quote them in a note. After proving that dimness and clearness, incompleteness
and completeness do not pertain to a state of mind as such—since every state of
mind must be exactly what it is, and nothing else—but only pertain to the way in
which states of mind stand for objects, which they more or less dimly, more or
less clearly, represent; Lipps takes the case of those sensations which attention is
said to make more clear. "I perceive an object," he says, "now in clear daylight,
and again at night. Call the content of the day-perception a, and that of the
evening-perception a1. There will probably be a considerable difference between
a and a1. The colors of a will be varied and intense, and will be sharply bounded
by each other; those of a1 will be less luminous, and less strongly contrasted, and
will approach a common gray or brown, and merge more into each other. Both
percepts, however, as such, are completely determinate and distinct from all
others. The colors of a1 appear before my eye neither more nor less decidedly
dark and blurred than the colors of a appear bright and sharply bounded. But now
I know, or believe I know, that one and the same real Object A corresponds to
both a and a1. I am convinced, moreover, that a represents A better than does a1.
Instead, however, of giving to my conviction this, its only correct, expression, and
keeping the content of my consciousness and the real object, the representation
and what it means, distinct from each other, I substitute the real object for the
content of the consciousness, and talk of the experience as if it consisted in one
and the same object (namely, the surreptitiously introduced real one), constituting
twice over the content of my consciousness, once in a clear and distinct, the other
time in an obscure and vague fashion. I talk now of a distincter and of a less
distinct consciousness of A, whereas I am only justiﬁed in talking of two
consciousnesses, a and a1, equally distinct in se, but to which the supposed
external object A corresponds with different degrees of distinctness." (P. 38-9.)

CHAPTER VII.

[Pg 183]

THE METHODS AND SNARES OF PSYCHOLOGY
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We have now ﬁnished the physiological preliminaries of our subject and must in the
remaining chapters study the mental states themselves whose cerebral conditions and
concomitants we have been considering hitherto. Beyond the brain, however, there is an
outer world to which the brain-states themselves 'correspond.' And it will be well, ere we
advance farther, to say a word about the relation of the mind to this larger sphere of physical
fact.
PSYCHOLOGY IS A NATURAL SCIENCE.
That is, the mind which the psychologist studies is the mind of distinct individuals
inhabiting deﬁnite portions of a real space and of a real time. With any other sort of mind,
absolute Intelligence, Mind unattached to a particular body, or Mind not subject to the
course of time, the psychologist as such has nothing to do. 'Mind,' in his mouth, is only a
class name for minds. Fortunate will it be if his more modest inquiry result in any
generalizations which the philosopher devoted to absolute Intelligence as such can use.
To the psychologist, then, the minds he studies are objects, in a world of other objects. Even
when he introspectively analyzes his own mind, and tells what he ﬁnds there, he talks about
it in an objective way. He says, for instance, that under certain circumstances the color gray
appears to him green, and calls the appearance an illusion. This implies that he compares
two objects, a real color seen under certain conditions, and a mental perception which he
believes to represent it, and that he declares the relation between them to be of a certain
kind. In making this critical judgment, the psychologist stands as much outside of the
perception which he criticises as he does of the color. Both are his objects. And if this is true
of him when he reﬂects on his own conscious states, how much truer is it when he treats of [Pg 184]
those of others! In German philosophy since Kant the word Erkenntnisstheorie, criticism of
the faculty of knowledge, plays a great part. Now the psychologist necessarily becomes such
an Erkenntnisstheoretiker. But the knowledge he theorizes about is not the bare function of
knowledge which Kant criticises—he does not inquire into the possibility of knowledge
überhaupt. He assumes it to be possible, he does not doubt its presence in himself at the
moment he speaks. The knowledge he criticises is the knowledge of particular men about
the particular things that surround them. This he may, upon occasion, in the light of his own
unquestioned knowledge, pronounce true or false, and trace the reasons by which it has
become one or the other.
It is highly important that this natural-science point of view should be understood at the
outset. Otherwise more may be demanded of the psychologist than he ought to be expected
to perform.
A diagram will exhibit more emphatically what the assumptions of Psychology must be:
1. The
Psychologist

2. The Thought
Studied

3. The Thought's
Object

4. The Psychologist's
Reality

These four squares contain the irreducible data of psychology. No. 1, the psychologist,
believes Nos. 2, 3, and 4, which together form his total object, to be realities, and reports
them and their mutual relations as truly as he can without troubling himself with the puzzle
of how he can report them at all. About such ultimate puzzles he in the main need trouble
himself no more than the geometer, the chemist, or the botanist do, who make precisely the
same assumptions as he.[187]
Of certain fallacies to which the psychologist is exposed by reason of his peculiar point of
view—that of being a reporter of subjective as well as of objective facts, we must presently [Pg 185]
speak. But not until we have considered the methods he uses for ascertaining what the facts
in question are.
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THE METHODS OF INVESTIGATION.
Introspective Observation is what we have to rely on ﬁrst and foremost and always. The
word introspection need hardly be deﬁned—it means, of course, the looking into our own
minds and reporting what we there discover. Every one agrees that we there discover states
of consciousness. So far as I know, the existence of such states has never been doubted by
any critic, however sceptical in other respects he may have been. That we have cogitations
of some sort is the inconcussum in a world most of whose other facts have at some time
tottered in the breath of philosophic doubt. All people unhesitatingly believe that they feel
themselves thinking, and that they distinguish the mental state as an inward activity or
passion, from all the objects with which it may cognitively deal. I regard this belief as the
most fundamental of all the postulates of Psychology, and shall discard all curious inquiries
about its certainty as too metaphysical for the scope of this book.

A Question of Nomenclature. We ought to have some general term by which to designate all
states of consciousness merely as such, and apart from their particular quality or cognitive
function. Unfortunately most of the terms in use have grave objections. 'Mental state,' 'state
of consciousness,' 'conscious modiﬁcation,' are cumbrous and have no kindred verbs. The
same is true of 'subjective condition.' 'Feeling' has the verb 'to feel,' both active and neuter,
and such derivatives as 'feelingly,' 'felt,' 'feltness,' etc., which make it extremely convenient.
But on the other hand it has speciﬁc meanings as well as its generic one, sometimes standing
for pleasure and pain, and being sometimes a synonym of 'sensation' as opposed to thought;
whereas we wish a term to cover sensation and thought indifferently. Moreover, 'feeling' has [Pg 186]
acquired in the hearts of platonizing thinkers a very opprobrious set of implications; and
since one of the great obstacles to mutual understanding in philosophy is the use of words
eulogistically and disparagingly, impartial terms ought always, if possible, to be preferred.
The word psychosis has been proposed by Mr. Huxley. It has the advantage of being
correlative to neurosis (the name applied by the same author to the corresponding nerveprocess), and is moreover technical and devoid of partial implications. But it has no verb or
other grammatical form allied to it. The expressions 'affection of the soul,' 'modiﬁcation of
the ego,' are clumsy, like 'state of consciousness,' and they implicitly assert theories which it
is not well to embody in terminology before they have been openly discussed and approved.
'Idea' is a good vague neutral word, and was by Locke employed in the broadest generic
way; but notwithstanding his authority it has not domesticated itself in the language so as to
cover bodily sensations, and it moreover has no verb. 'Thought' would be by far the best
word to use if it could be made to cover sensations. It has no opprobrious connotation such
as 'feeling' has, and it immediately suggests the omnipresence of cognition (or reference to
an object other than the mental state itself), which we shall soon see to be of the mental life's
essence. But can the expression 'thought of a toothache' ever suggest to the reader the actual
present pain itself? It is hardly possible; and we thus seem about to be forced back on some
pair of terms like Hume's 'impression and idea,' or Hamilton's 'presentation and
representation,' or the ordinary 'feeling and thought,' if we wish to cover the whole ground.
In this quandary we can make no deﬁnitive choice, but must, according to the convenience
of the context, use sometimes one, sometimes another of the synonyms that have been
mentioned. My own partiality is for either FEELING or THOUGHT. I shall probably often use
both words in a wider sense than usual, and alternately startle two classes of readers by their
unusual sound; but if the connection makes it clear that mental states at large, irrespective of [Pg 187]
their kind, are meant, this will do no harm, and may even do some good.[188]
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The inaccuracy of introspective observation has been made a subject of debate. It is
important to gain some ﬁxed ideas on this point before we proceed.
The commonest spiritualistic opinion is that the Soul or Subject of the mental life is a
metaphysical entity, inaccessible to direct knowledge, and that the various mental states and
operations of which we reﬂectively become aware are objects of an inner sense which does
not lay hold of the real agent in itself, any more than sight or hearing gives us direct
knowledge of matter in itself. From, this point of view introspection is, of course,
incompetent to lay hold of anything more than the Soul's phenomena. But even then the
question remains, How well can it know the phenomena themselves?
Some authors take high ground here and claim for it a sort of infallibility. Thus Ueberweg:
"When a mental image, as such, is the object of my apprehension, there is no
meaning in seeking to distinguish its existence in my consciousness (in me)
from its existence out of my consciousness (in itself); for the object
apprehended is, in this case, one which does not even exist, as the objects of
external perception do, in itself outside of my consciousness. It exists only
within me."[189]
And Brentano:
"The phenomena inwardly apprehended are true in themselves. As they appear
—of this the evidence with which they are apprehended is a warrant—so they
are in reality. Who, then, can deny that in this a great superiority of Psychology
over the physical sciences comes to light?"
And again:
"No one can doubt whether the psychic condition he apprehends in himself be,
and be so, as he apprehends it. Whoever should doubt this would have reached
that ﬁnished doubt which destroys itself in destroying every ﬁxed point from
which to make an attack upon knowledge."[190]
Others have gone to the opposite extreme, and maintained that we can have no introspective
cognition of our own minds at all. A deliverance of Auguste Comte to this effect has been so [Pg 188]
often quoted as to be almost classical; and some reference to it seems therefore
indispensable here.
Philosophers, says Comte,[191] have
"in these latter days imagined themselves able to distinguish, by a very singular
subtlety, two sorts of observation of equal importance, one external, the other
internal, the latter being solely destined for the study of intellectual
phenomena.... I limit myself to pointing out the principal consideration which
proves clearly that this pretended direct contemplation of the mind by itself is a
pure illusion.... It is in fact evident that, by an invincible necessity, the human
mind can observe directly all phenomena except its own proper states. For by
whom shall the observation of these be made? It is conceivable that a man
might observe himself with respect to the passions that animate him, for the
anatomical organs of passion are distinct from those whose function is
observation. Though we have all made such observations on ourselves, they can
never have much scientiﬁc value, and the best mode of knowing the passions
will always be that of observing them from without; for every strong state of
passion ... is necessarily incompatible with the state of observation. But, as for
observing in the same way intellectual phenomena at the time of their actual
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presence, that is a manifest impossibility. The thinker cannot divide himself into
two, of whom one reasons whilst the other observes him reason. The organ
observed and the organ observing being, in this case, identical, how could
observation take place? This pretended psychological method is then radically
null and void. On the one hand, they advise you to isolate yourself, as far as
possible, from every external sensation, especially every intellectual work,—for
if you were to busy yourself even with the simplest calculation, what would
become of internal observation?—on the other hand, after having with the
utmost care attained this state of intellectual slumber, you must begin to
contemplate the operations going on in your mind, when nothing there takes
place! Our descendants will doubtless see such pretensions some day ridiculed
upon the stage. The results of so strange a procedure harmonize entirely with its
principle. For all the two thousand years during which metaphysicians have
thus cultivated psychology, they are not agreed about one intelligible and
established proposition. 'Internal observation' gives almost as many divergent
results as there are individuals who think they practise it."
Comte hardly could have known anything of the English, and nothing of the German,
empirical psychology. The 'results' which he had in mind when writing were probably [Pg 189]
scholastic ones, such as principles of internal activity, the faculties, the ego, the liberum
arbitrium indifferentiæ, etc. John Mill, in replying to him,[192] says:
"It might have occurred to M. Comte that a fact may be studied through the
medium of memory, not at the very moment of our perceiving it, but the
moment after: and this is really the mode in which our best knowledge of our
intellectual acts is generally acquired. We reﬂect on what we have been doing
when the act is past, but when its impression in the memory is still fresh. Unless
in one of these ways, we could not have acquired the knowledge which nobody
denies us to have, of what passes in our minds. M. Comte would scarcely have
afﬁrmed that we are not aware of our own intellectual operations. We know of
our observings and our reasonings, either at the very time, or by memory the
moment after; in either case, by direct knowledge, and not (like things done by
us in a state of somnambulism) merely by their results. This simple fact
destroys the whole of M. Comte's argument. Whatever we are directly aware of,
we can directly observe."
Where now does the truth lie? Our quotation from Mill is obviously the one which expresses
the most of practical truth about the matter. Even the writers who insist upon the absolute
veracity of our immediate inner apprehension of a conscious state have to contrast with this
the fallibility of our memory or observation of it, a moment later. No one has emphasized
more sharply than Brentano himself the difference between the immediate feltness of a
feeling, and its perception by a subsequent reﬂective act. But which mode of consciousness
of it is that which the psychologist must depend on? If to have feelings or thoughts in their
immediacy were enough, babies in the cradle would be psychologists, and infallible ones.
But the psychologist must not only have his mental states in their absolute veritableness, he
must report them and write about them, name them, classify and compare them and trace
their relations to other things. Whilst alive they are their own property; it is only postmortem that they become his prey.[193] And as in the naming, classing, and knowing of [Pg 190]
things in general we are notoriously fallible, why not also here? Comte is quite right in
laying stress on the fact that a feeling, to be named, judged, or perceived, must be already
past. No subjective state, whilst present, is its own object; its object is always something
else. There are, it is true, cases in which we appear to be naming our present feeling, and so
to be experiencing and observing the same inner fact at a single stroke, as when we say 'I
feel tired,' 'I am angry,' etc. But these are illusory, and a little attention unmasks the illusion.
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The present conscious state, when I say 'I feel tired,' is not the direct state of tire; when I say
'I feel angry,' it is not the direct state of anger. It is the state of saying-I-feel-tired, of sayingI-feel-angry,—entirely different matters, so different that the fatigue and anger apparently
included in them are considerable modiﬁcations of the fatigue and anger directly felt the
previous instant. The act of naming them has momentarily detracted from their force.[194]
The only sound grounds on which the infallible veracity of the introspective judgment might
be maintained are empirical. If we had reason to think it has never yet deceived us, we
might continue to trust it. This is the ground actually maintained by Herr Mohr.
"The illusions of our senses," says this author, "have undermined our belief in
the reality of the outer world; but in the sphere of inner observation our
conﬁdence is intact, for we have never found ourselves to be in error about the
reality of an act of thought or feeling. We have never been misled into thinking
we were not in doubt or in anger when these conditions were really states of our
consciousness."[195]

[Pg 191]

But sound as the reasoning here would be, were the premises correct, I fear the latter cannot
pass. However it may be with such strong feelings as doubt or anger, about weaker feelings,
and about the relations to each other of all feelings, we ﬁnd ourselves in continual error and
uncertainty so soon as we are called on to name and class, and not merely to feel. Who can
be sure of the exact order of his feelings when they are excessively rapid? Who can be sure,
in his sensible perception of a chair, how much comes from the eye and how much is
supplied out of the previous knowledge of the mind? Who can compare with precision the
quantities of disparate feelings even where the feelings are very much alike? For instance,
where an object is felt now against the back and now against the cheek, which feeling is
most extensive? Who can be sure that two given feelings are or are not exactly the same?
Who can tell which is briefer or longer than the other when both occupy but an instant of
time? Who knows, of many actions, for what motive they were done, or if for any motive at
all? Who can enumerate all the distinct ingredients of such a complicated feeling as anger?
and who can tell off-hand whether or no a perception of distance be a compound or a simple
state of mind? The whole mind-stuff controversy would stop if we could decide
conclusively by introspection that what seem to us elementary feelings are really elementary
and not compound.
Mr. Sully, in his work on Illusions, has a chapter on those of Introspection from which we
might now quote. But, since the rest of this volume will be little more than a collection of
illustrations of the difﬁculty of discovering by direct introspection exactly what our feelings
and their relations are, we need not anticipate our own future details, I but just state our
general conclusion that introspection is difﬁcult and fallible; and that the difﬁculty is simply
that of all observation of whatever kind. Something is before us; we do our best to tell what [Pg 192]
it is, but in spite of our good will we may go astray, and give a description more applicable
to some other sort of thing. The only safeguard is in the ﬁnal consensus of our farther
knowledge about the thing in question, later views correcting earlier ones, until at last the
harmony of a consistent system is reached. Such a system, gradually worked out, is the best
guarantee the psychologist can give for the soundness of any particular psychologic
observation which he may report. Such a system we ourselves must strive, as far as may be,
to attain.
The English writers on psychology, and the school of Herbart in Germany, have in the main
contented themselves with such results as the immediate introspection of single individuals
gave, and shown what a body of doctrine they may make. The works of Locke, Hume, Reid,
Hartley, Stewart, Brown, the Mills, will always be classics in this line; and in Professor
Bain's Treatises we have probably the last word of what this method taken mainly by itself
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can do—the last monument of the youth of our science, still untechnical and generally
intelligible, like the Chemistry of Lavoisier, or Anatomy before the microscope was used.

The Experimental Method. But psychology is passing into a less simple phase. Within a few
years what one may call a microscopic psychology has arisen in Germany, carried on by
experimental methods, asking of course every moment for introspective data, but
eliminating their uncertainty by operating on a large scale and taking statistical means. This
method taxes patience to the utmost, and could hardly have arisen in a country whose
natives could be bored. Such Germans as Weber, Fechner, Vierordt, and Wundt obviously
cannot; and their success has brought into the ﬁeld an array of younger experimental
psychologists, bent on studying the elements of the mental life, dissecting them out from the
gross results in which they are embedded, and as far as possible reducing them to
quantitative scales. The simple and open method of attack having done what it can, the
method of patience, starving out, and harassing to death is tried; the Mind must submit to a [Pg 193]
regular siege, in which minute advantages gained night and day by the forces that hem her
in must sum themselves up at last into her overthrow. There is little of the grand style about
these new prism, pendulum, and chronograph-philosophers. They mean business, not
chivalry. What generous divination, and that superiority in virtue which was thought by
Cicero to give a man the best insight into nature, have failed to do, their spying and
scraping, their deadly tenacity and almost diabolic cunning, will doubtless some day bring
about.
No general description of the methods of experimental psychology would be instructive to
one unfamiliar with the instances of their application, so we will waste no words upon the
attempt. The principal ﬁelds of experimentation so far have been: 1) the connection of
conscious states with their physical conditions, including the whole of brain-physiology, and
the recent minutely cultivated physiology of the sense-organs, together with what is
technically known as 'psycho-physics,' or the laws of correlation between sensations and the
outward stimuli by which they are aroused; 2) the analysis of space-perception into its
sensational elements; 3) the measurement of the duration of the simplest mental processes;
4) that of the accuracy of reproduction in the memory of sensible experiences and of
intervals of space and time; 5) that of the manner in which simple mental states inﬂuence
each other, call each other up, or inhibit each other's reproduction; 6) that of the number of
facts which consciousness can simultaneously discern; ﬁnally, 7) that of the elementary laws
of oblivescence and retention. It must be said that in some of these ﬁelds the results have as
yet borne little theoretic fruit commensurate with the great labor expended in their
acquisition. But facts are facts, and if we only get enough of them they are sure to combine.
New ground will from year to year be broken, and theoretic results will grow. Meanwhile
the experimental method has quite changed the face of the science so far as the latter is a
record of mere work done.

The comparative method, ﬁnally, supplements the introspective and experimental methods. [Pg 194]
This method presupposes a normal psychology of introspection to be established in its main
features. But where the origin of these features, or their dependence upon one another, is in
question, it is of the utmost importance to trace the phenomenon considered through all its
possible variations of type and combination. So it has come to pass that instincts of animals
are ransacked to throw light on our own; and that the reasoning faculties of bees and ants,
the minds of savages, infants, madmen, idiots, the deaf and blind, criminals, and eccentrics,
are all invoked in support of this or that special theory about some part of our own mental
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life. The history of sciences, moral and political institutions, and languages, as types of
mental product, are pressed into the same service. Messrs. Darwin and Galton have set the
example of circulars of questions sent out by the hundred to those supposed able to reply.
The custom has spread, and it will be well for us in the next generation if such circulars be
not ranked among the common pests of life. Meanwhile information grows, and results
emerge. There are great sources of error in the comparative method. The interpretation of
the 'psychoses' of animals, savages, and infants is necessarily wild work, in which the
personal equation of the investigator has things very much its own way. A savage will be
reported to have no moral or religious feeling if his actions shock the observer unduly. A
child will be assumed without self-consciousness because he talks of himself in the third
person, etc., etc. No rules can be laid down in advance. Comparative observations, to be
deﬁnite, must usually be made to test some pre-existing hypothesis; and the only thing then
is to use as much sagacity as you possess, and to be as candid as you can.
THE SOURCES OF ERROR IN PSYCHOLOGY.
The ﬁrst of them arises from the Misleading Inﬂuence of Speech. Language was originally
made by men who were not psychologists, and most men to-day employ almost exclusively
the vocabulary of outward things. The cardinal passions of our life, anger, love, fear, hate,
hope, and the most comprehensive divisions of our intellectual activity, to remember, [Pg 195]
expect, think, know, dream, with the broadest genera of æsthetic feeling, joy, sorrow,
pleasure, pain, are the only facts of a subjective order which this vocabulary deigns to note
by special words. The elementary qualities of sensation, bright, loud, red, blue, hot, cold,
are, it is true, susceptible of being used in both an objective and a subjective sense. They
stand for outer qualities and for the feelings which these arouse. But the objective sense is
the original sense; and still to-day we have to describe a large number of sensations by the
name of the object from which they have most frequently been got. An orange color, an
odor of violets, a cheesy taste, a thunderous sound, a ﬁery smart, etc., will recall what I
mean. This absence of a special vocabulary for subjective facts hinders the study of all but
the very coarsest of them. Empiricist writers are very fond of emphasizing one great set of
delusions which language inﬂicts on the mind. Whenever we have made a word, they say, to
denote a certain group of phenomena, we are prone to suppose a substantive entity existing
beyond the phenomena, of which the word shall be the name. But the lack of a word quite as
often leads to the directly opposite error. We are then prone to suppose that no entity can be
there; and so we come to overlook phenomena whose existence would be patent to us all,
had we only grown up to hear it familiarly recognized in speech.[196] It is hard to focus our
attention on the nameless, and so there results a certain vacuousness in the descriptive parts
of most psychologies.
But a worse defect than vacuousness comes from the dependence of psychology on common
speech. Naming our thought by its own objects, we almost all of us assume that as the
objects are, so the thought must be. The thought of several distinct things can only consist of
several distinct bits of thought, or 'ideas;' that of an abstract or universal object can only be
an abstract or universal idea. As each object may come and go, be forgotten and then [Pg 196]
thought of again, it is held that the thought of it has a precisely similar independence, selfidentity, and mobility. The thought of the object's recurrent identity is regarded as the
identity of its recurrent thought; and the perceptions of multiplicity, of coexistence, of
succession, are severally conceived to be brought about only through a multiplicity, a
coexistence, a succession, of perceptions. The continuous ﬂow of the mental stream is
sacriﬁced, and in its place an atomism, a brickbat plan of construction, is preached, for the
existence of which no good introspective grounds can be brought forward, and out of which
presently grow all sorts of paradoxes and contradictions, the heritage of woe of students of
the mind.
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These words are meant to impeach the entire English psychology derived from Locke and
Hume, and the entire German psychology derived from Herbart, so far as they both treat
'ideas' as separate subjective entities that come and go. Examples will soon make the matter
clearer. Meanwhile our psychologic insight is vitiated by still other snares.
'The Psychologist's Fallacy.' The great snare of the psychologist is the confusion of his own
standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report. I shall hereafter
call this the 'psychologist's fallacy' par excellence. For some of the mischief, here too,
language is to blame. The psychologist, as we remarked above (p. 183), stands outside of
the mental state he speaks of. Both itself and its object are objects for him. Now when it is a
cognitive state (percept, thought, concept, etc.), he ordinarily has no other way of naming it
than as the thought, percept, etc., of that object. He himself, meanwhile, knowing the selfsame object in his way, gets easily led to suppose that the thought, which is of it, knows it in
the same way in which he knows it, although this is often very far from being the case.[197]
The most ﬁctitious puzzles have been introduced into our science by this means. The socalled question of presentative or representative perception, of whether an object is present [Pg 197]
to the thought that thinks it by a counterfeit image of itself, or directly and without any
intervening image at all; the question of nominalism and conceptualism, of the shape in
which things are present when only a general notion of them is before the mind; are
comparatively easy questions when once the psychologist's fallacy is eliminated from their
treatment,—as we shall ere long see (in Chapter XII).
Another variety of the psychologist's fallacy is the assumption that the mental state studied
must be conscious of itself as the psychologist is conscious of it. The mental state is aware of
itself only from within; it grasps what we call its own content, and nothing more. The
psychologist, on the contrary, is aware of it from without, and knows its relations with all
sorts of other things. What the thought sees is only its own object; what the psychologist
sees is the thought's object, plus the thought itself, plus possibly all the rest of the world. We
must be very careful therefore, in discussing a state of mind from the psychologist's point of
view, to avoid foisting into its own ken matters that are only there for ours. We must avoid
substituting what we know the consciousness is, for what it is a consciousness of, and
counting its outward, and so to speak physical, relations with other facts of the world, in
among the objects of which we set it down as aware. Crude as such a confusion of
standpoints seems to be when abstractly stated, it is nevertheless a snare into which no
psychologist has kept himself at all times from falling, and which forms almost the entire
stock-in-trade of certain schools. We cannot be too watchful against its subtly corrupting
inﬂuence.
Summary. To sum up the chapter, Psychology assumes that thoughts successively occur, and
that they know objects in a world which the psychologist also knows. These thoughts are the
subjective data of which he treats, and their relations to their objects, to the brain, and to
the rest of the world constitute the subject-matter of psychologic science. Its methods are
introspection, experimentation, and comparison. But introspection is no sure guide to truths
about our mental states; and in particular the poverty of the psychological vocabulary leads [Pg 198]
us to drop out certain states from our consideration, and to treat others as if they knew
themselves and their objects as the psychologist knows both, which is a disastrous fallacy in
the science.

[187]

On the relation between Psychology and General Philosophy, see G. C.
Robertson, 'Mind,' vol. viii, p. 1, and J. Ward, ibid. p. 153; J. Dewey ibid. vol. ix,
p. 1.

[188]

Compare some remarks in Mill's Logic, bk. i, chap. iii, §§ 2, 3.
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[189]

Logic, § 40.

[190]

Psychologie, bk. ii, chap. iii, §§ 1, 2.

[191]

Cours de Philosophie Positive, i, 34-8.

[192]

Auguste Comte and Positivism, 3d edition (1882), p. 64.

[193]

Wundt says: "The ﬁrst rule for utilizing inward observation consists in taking, as
far as possible, experiences that are accidental, unexpected, and not intentionally
brought about.... First it is best as far as possible to rely on Memory and not on
immediate Apprehension.... Second, internal observation is better ﬁtted to grasp
clearly conscious states, especially voluntary mental acts: such inner processes as
are obscurely conscious and involuntary will almost entirely elude it, because the
effort to observe interferes with them, and because they seldom abide in memory."
(Logik, ii, 432.)

[194]

In cases like this, where the state outlasts the act of naming it, exists before it, and
recurs when it is past, we probably run little practical risk of error when we talk as
if the state knew itself. The state of feeling and the state of naming the feeling are
continuous, and the infallibility of such prompt introspective judgments is
probably great. But even here the certainty of our knowledge ought not to be
argued on the a priori ground that percipi and esse are in psychology the same.
The states are really two; the naming state and the named state are apart; 'percipi
is esse' is not the principle that applies.

[195]

J. Mohr: Grundlage der Empirischen Psychologie (Leipzig, 1882), p. 47.

[196]

In English we have not even the generic distinction between the-thing-thought-of
and the-thought-thinking-it, which in German is expressed by the opposition
between Gedachtes and Gedanke, in Latin by that between cogitatum and
cogitatio.

[197]

Compare B. P. Bowne's Metaphysics (1882), p. 408.

CHAPTER VIII.

[Pg 199]

THE RELATIONS OF MINDS TO OTHER THINGS.
Since, for psychology, a mind is an object in a world of other objects, its relation to those
other objects must next be surveyed. First of all, to its
TIME-RELATIONS.
Minds, as we know them, are temporary existences. Whether my mind had a being prior to
the birth of my body, whether it shall have one after the latter's decease, are questions to be
decided by my general philosophy or theology rather than by what we call 'scientiﬁc facts'—
I leave out the facts of so-called spiritualism, as being still in dispute. Psychology, as a
natural science, conﬁnes itself to the present life, in which every mind appears yoked to a
body through which its manifestations appear. In the present world, then, minds precede,
succeed, and coexist with each other in the common receptacle of time, and of their
collective relations to the latter nothing more can be said. The life of the individual
consciousness in time seems, however, to be an interrupted one, so that the question:
Are we ever wholly unconscious?
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becomes one which must be discussed. Sleep, fainting, coma, epilepsy, and other
'unconscious' conditions are apt to break in upon and occupy large durations of what we
nevertheless consider the mental history of a single man. And, the fact of interruption being
admitted, is it not possible that it may exist where we do not suspect it, and even perhaps in
an incessant and ﬁne-grained form?
This might happen, and yet the subject himself never know it. We often take ether and have
operations performed without a suspicion that our consciousness has suffered a breach. The [Pg 200]
two ends join each other smoothly over the gap; and only the sight of our wound assures us
that we must have been living through a time which for our immediate consciousness was
non-existent. Even in sleep this sometimes happens: We think we have had no nap, and it
takes the clock to assure us that we are wrong.[198] We thus may live through a real outward
time, a time known by the psychologist who studies us, and yet not feel the time, or infer it
from any inward sign. The question is, how often does this happen? Is consciousness really
discontinuous, incessantly interrupted and recommencing (from the psychologist's point of
view)? and does it only seem continuous to itself by an illusion analogous to that of the
zoetrope? Or is it at most times as continuous outwardly as it inwardly seems?
It must be confessed that we can give no rigorous answer to this question. Cartesians, who
hold that the essence of the soul is to think, can of course solve it a priori, and explain the
appearance of thoughtless intervals either by lapses in our ordinary memory, or by the
sinking of consciousness to a minimal state, in which perhaps all that it feels is a bare
existence which leaves no particulars behind to be recalled. If, however, one have no
doctrine about the soul or its essence, one is free to take the appearances for what they seem
to be, and to admit that the mind, as well as the body, may go to sleep.
Locke was the ﬁrst prominent champion of this latter view, and the pages in which he
attacks the Cartesian belief are as spirited as any in his Essay. "Every drowsy nod shakes
their doctrine who teach that their soul is always thinking." He will not believe that men so
easily forget. M. Jouffroy and Sir W. Hamilton, attacking the question in the same empirical
way, are led to an opposite conclusion. Their reasons, brieﬂy stated, are these:
In somnambulism, natural or induced, there is often a great display of intellectual activity, [Pg 201]
followed by complete oblivion of all that has passed.[199]
On being suddenly awakened from a sleep, however profound, we always catch ourselves in
the middle of a dream. Common dreams are often remembered for a few minutes after
waking, and then irretrievably lost.
Frequently, when awake and absent-minded, we are visited by thoughts and images which
the next instant we cannot recall.
Our insensibility to habitual noises, etc., whilst awake, proves that we can neglect to attend
to that which we nevertheless feel. Similarly in sleep, we grow inured, and sleep soundly in
presence of sensations of sound, cold, contact, etc., which at ﬁrst prevented our complete
repose. We have learned to neglect them whilst asleep as we should whilst awake. The mere
sense-impressions are the same when the sleep is deep as when it is light; the difference
must lie in a judgment on the part of the apparently slumbering mind that they are not worth
noticing.
This discrimination is equally shown by nurses of the sick and mothers of infants, who will
sleep through much noise of an irrelevant sort, but waken at the slightest stirring of the
patient or the babe. This last fact shows the sense-organ to be pervious for sounds.
Many people have a remarkable faculty of registering when asleep the ﬂight of time. They
will habitually wake up at the same minute day after day, or will wake punctually at an
unusual hour determined upon overnight. How can this knowledge of the hour (more
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accurate often than anything the waking consciousness shows) be possible without mental
activity during the interval?
Such are what we may call the classical reasons for admitting that the mind is active even
when the person afterwards ignores the fact.[200] Of late years, or rather, one may say, of [Pg 202]
late months, they have been reinforced by a lot of curious observations made on hysterical
and hypnotic subjects, which prove the existence of a highly developed consciousness in
places where it has hitherto not been suspected at all. These observations throw such a novel
light upon human nature that I must give them in some detail. That at least four different and
in a certain sense rival observers should agree in the same conclusion justiﬁes us in
accepting the conclusion as true.
'Unconsciousness' in Hysterics.
One of the most constant symptoms in persons suffering from hysteric disease in its extreme
forms consists in alterations of the natural sensibility of various parts and organs of the
body. Usually the alteration is in the direction of defect, or anæsthesia. One or both eyes are
blind, or color-blind, or there is hemianopsia (blindness to one half the ﬁeld of view), or the
ﬁeld is contracted. Hearing, taste, smell may similarly disappear, in part or in totality. Still
more striking are the cutaneous anæsthesias. The old witch-ﬁnders looking for the 'devil's
seals' learned well the existence of those insensible patches on the skin of their victims, to
which the minute physical examinations of recent medicine have but recently attracted
attention again. They may be scattered anywhere, but are very apt to affect one side of the
body. Not infrequently they affect an entire lateral half, from head to foot; and the insensible
skin of, say, the left side will then be found separated from the naturally sensitive skin of the
right by a perfectly sharp line of demarcation down the middle of the front and back.
Sometimes, most remarkable of all, the entire skin, hands, feet, face, everything, and the
mucous membranes, muscles and joints so far as they can be explored, become completely [Pg 203]
insensible without the other vital functions becoming gravely disturbed.
These hysterical anæsthesias can be made to disappear more or less completely by various
odd processes. It has been recently found that magnets, plates of metal, or the electrodes of a
battery, placed against the skin, have this peculiar power. And when one side is relieved in
this way, the anæsthesia is often found to have transferred itself to the opposite side, which
until then was well. Whether these strange effects of magnets and metals be due to their
direct physiological action, or to a prior effect on the patient's mind ('expectant attention' or
'suggestion') is still a mooted question. A still better awakener of sensibility is the hypnotic
trance, into which many of these patients can be very easily placed, and in which their lost
sensibility not infrequently becomes entirely restored. Such returns of sensibility succeed
the times of insensibility and alternate with them. But Messrs. Pierre Janet[201] and A.
Binet[202] have shown that during the times of anæsthesia, and coexisting with it, sensibility
to the anæsthetic parts is also there, in the form of a secondary consciousness entirely cut
off from the primary or normal one, but susceptible of being tapped and made to testify to
its existence in various odd ways.
Chief amongst these is what M. Janet calls 'the method of distraction.' These hysterics are
apt to possess a very narrow ﬁeld of attention, and to be unable to think of more than one
thing at a time. When talking with any person they forget everything else. "When Lucie
talked directly with any one," says M. Janet, "she ceased to be able to hear any other person.
You may stand behind her, call her by name, shout abuse into her ears, without making her
turn round; or place yourself before her, show her objects, touch her, etc., without attracting
her notice. When ﬁnally she becomes aware of you, she thinks you have just come into the
room again, and greets you accordingly. This singular forgetfulness makes her liable to tell
all her secrets aloud, unrestrained by the presence of unsuitable auditors."
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Now M. Janet found in several subjects like this that if he came up behind them whilst they [Pg 204]
were plunged in conversation with a third party, and addressed them in a whisper, telling
them to raise their hand or perform other simple acts, they would obey the order given,
although their talking intelligence was quite unconscious of receiving it. Leading them from
one thing to another, he made them reply by signs to his whispered questions, and ﬁnally
made them answer in writing, if a pencil were placed in their hand. The primary
consciousness meanwhile went on with the conversation, entirely unaware of these
performances on the hand's part. The consciousness which presided over these latter
appeared in its turn to be quite as little disturbed by the upper consciousness's concerns.
This proof by 'automatic' writing, of a secondary consciousness's existence, is the most
cogent and striking one; but a crowd of other facts prove the same thing. If I run through
them rapidly, the reader will probably be convinced.
The apparently anæsthetic hand of these subjects, for one thing, will often adapt itself
discriminatingly to whatever object may be put into it. With a pencil it will make writing
movements; into a pair of scissors it will put its ﬁngers and will open and shut them, etc.,
etc. The primary consciousness, so to call it, is meanwhile unable to say whether or no
anything is in the hand, if the latter be hidden from sight. "I put a pair of eyeglasses into
Léonie's anæsthetic hand, this hand opens it and raises it towards the nose, but half way
thither it enters the ﬁeld of vision of Léonie, who sees it and stops stupeﬁed: 'Why,' says she,
'I have an eye-glass in my left hand!'" M. Binet found a very curious sort of connection
between the apparently anæsthetic skin and the mind in some Salpétrière-subjects. Things
placed in the hand were not felt, but thought of (apparently in visual terms) and in no wise
referred by the subject to their starting point in the hand's sensation. A key, a knife, placed
in the hand occasioned ideas of a key or a knife, but the hand felt nothing. Similarly the
subject thought of the number 3, 6, etc., if the hand or ﬁnger was bent three or six times by
the operator, or if he stroked it three, six, etc., times.
In certain individuals there was found a still odder phenomenon, which reminds one of that [Pg 205]
curious idiosyncrasy of 'colored hearing' of which a few cases have been lately described
with great care by foreign writers. These individuals, namely, saw the impression received
by the hand, but could not feel it; and the thing seen appeared by no means associated with
the hand, but more like an independent vision, which usually interested and surprised the
patient. Her hand being hidden by a screen, she was ordered to look at another screen and to
tell of any visual image which might project itself thereon. Numbers would then come,
corresponding to the number of times the insensible member was raised, touched, etc.
Colored lines and ﬁgures would come, corresponding to similar ones traced on the palm; the
hand itself or its ﬁngers would come when manipulated and ﬁnally objects placed in it
would come; but on the hand itself nothing would ever be felt. Of course simulation would
not be hard here; but M. Binet disbelieves this (usually very shallow) explanation to be a
probable one in cases in question.[203]
The usual way in which doctors measure the delicacy of our touch is by the compass-points.
Two points are normally felt as one whenever they are too close together for discrimination;
but what is 'too close' on one part of the skin may seem very far apart on another. In the
middle of the back or on the thigh, less than 3 inches may be too close; on the ﬁnger-tip a
tenth of an inch is far enough apart. Now, as tested in this way, with the appeal made to the
primary consciousness, which talks through the mouth and seems to hold the ﬁeld alone, a
certain person's skin may be entirely anæsthetic and not feel the compass-points at all; and
yet this same skin will prove to have a perfectly normal sensibility if the appeal be made to
that other secondary or sub-consciousness, which expresses itself automatically by writing
or by movements of the hand. M. Binet, M. Pierre Janet, and M. Jules Janet have all found
this. The subject, whenever touched, would signify 'one point' or 'two points,' as accurately [Pg 206]
as if she were a normal person. She would signify it only by these movements; and of the
movements themselves her primary self would be as unconscious as of the facts they
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signiﬁed, for what the submerged consciousness makes the hand do automatically is
unknown to the consciousness which uses the mouth.
Messrs. Bernheim and Pitres have also proved, by observations too complicated to be given
in this spot, that the hysterical blindness is no real blindness at all. The eye of an hysteric
which is totally blind when the other or seeing eye is shut, will do its share of vision
perfectly well when both eyes are open together. But even where both eyes are semi-blind
from hysterical disease, the method of automatic writing proves that their perceptions exist,
only cut off from communication with the upper consciousness. M. Binet has found the
hand of his patients unconsciously writing down words which their eyes were vainly
endeavoring to 'see,' i.e., to bring to the upper consciousness. Their submerged
consciousness was of course seeing them, or the hand could not have written as it did.
Colors are similarly perceived by the sub-conscious self, which the hysterically color-blind
eyes cannot bring to the normal consciousness. Pricks, burns, and pinches on the anæsthetic
skin, all unnoticed by the upper self, are recollected to have been suffered, and complained
of, as soon as the under self gets a chance to express itself by the passage of the subject into
hypnotic trance.
It must be admitted, therefore, that in certain persons, at least, the total possible
consciousness may be split into parts which coexist but mutually ignore each other, and
share the objects of knowledge between them. More remarkable still, they are
complementary. Give an object to one of the consciousnesses, and by that fact you remove it
from the other or others. Barring a certain common fund of information, like the command
of language, etc., what the upper self knows the under self is ignorant of, and vice versâ. M.
Janet has proved this beautifully in his subject Lucie. The following experiment will serve
as the type of the rest: In her trance he covered her lap with cards, each bearing a number.
He then told her that on waking she should not see any card whose number was a multiple [Pg 207]
of three. This is the ordinary so-called 'post-hypnotic suggestion,' now well known, and for
which Lucie was a well-adapted subject. Accordingly, when she was awakened and asked
about the papers on her lap, she counted and said she saw those only whose number was not
a multiple of 3. To the 12, 18, 9, etc., she was blind. But the hand, when the sub-conscious
self was interrogated by the usual method of engrossing the upper self in another
conversation, wrote that the only cards in Lucie's lap were those numbered 12, 18, 9, etc.,
and on being asked to pick up all the cards which were there, picked up these and let the
others lie. Similarly when the sight of certain things was suggested to the sub-conscious
Lucie, the normal Lucie suddenly became partially or totally blind. "What is the matter? I
can't see!" the normal personage suddenly cried out in the midst of her conversation, when
M. Janet whispered to the secondary personage to make use of her eyes. The anæsthesias,
paralyses, contractions and other irregularities from which hysterics suffer seem then to be
due to the fact that their secondary personage has enriched itself by robbing the primary one
of a function which the latter ought to have retained. The curative indication is evident: get
at the secondary personage, by hypnotization or in whatever other way, and make her give
up the eye, the skin, the arm, or whatever the affected part may be. The normal self
thereupon regains possession, sees, feels, or is able to move again. In this way M. Jules
Janet easily cured the well-known subject of the Salpétrière, Wit...., of all sorts of afﬂictions
which, until he discovered the secret of her deeper trance, it had been difﬁcult to subdue.
"Cessez cette mauvaise plaisanterie," he said to the secondary self—and the latter obeyed.
The way in which the various personages share the stock of possible sensations between
them seems to be amusingly illustrated in this young woman. When awake, her skin is
insensible everywhere except on a zone about the arm where she habitually wears a gold
bracelet. This zone has feeling; but in the deepest trance, when all the rest of her body feels,
this particular zone becomes absolutely anæsthetic.
Sometimes the mutual ignorance of the selves leads to incidents which are strange enough. [Pg 208]
The acts and movements performed by the sub-conscious self are withdrawn from the
conscious one, and the subject will do all sorts of incongruous things of which he remains
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quite unaware. "I order Lucie [by the method of distraction] to make a pied de nez, and her
hands go forthwith to the end of her nose. Asked what she is doing, she replies that she is
doing nothing, and continues for a long time talking, with no apparent suspicion that her
ﬁngers are moving in front of her nose. I make her walk about the room; she continues to
speak and believes herself sitting down."
M. Janet observed similar acts in a man in alcoholic delirium. Whilst the doctor was
questioning him, M. J. made him by whispered suggestion walk, sit, kneel, and even lie
down on his face on the ﬂoor, he all the while believing himself to be standing beside his
bed. Such bizarreries sound incredible, until one has seen their like. Long ago, without
understanding it, I myself saw a small example of the way in which a person's knowledge
may be shared by the two selves. A young woman who had been writing automatically was
sitting with a pencil in her hand, trying to recall at my request the name of a gentleman
whom she had once seen. She could only recollect the ﬁrst syllable. Her hand meanwhile,
without her knowledge, wrote down the last two syllables. In a perfectly healthy young man
who can write with the planchette, I lately found the hand to be entirely anæsthetic during
the writing act; I could prick it severely without the Subject knowing the fact. The writing
on the planchette, however, accused me in strong terms of hurting the hand. Pricks on the
other (non-writing) hand, meanwhile, which awakened strong protest from the young man's
vocal organs, were denied to exist by the self which made the planchette go.[204]
We get exactly similar results in the so-called post-hypnotic suggestion. It is a familiar fact
that certain subjects, when told during a trance to perform an act or to experience an [Pg 209]
hallucination after waking, will when the time comes, obey the command. How is the
command registered? How is its performance so accurately timed? These problems were
long a mystery, for the primary personality remembers nothing of the trance or the
suggestion, and will often trump up an improvised pretext for yielding to the unaccountable
impulse which possesses the man so suddenly and which he cannot resist. Edmund Gurney
was the ﬁrst to discover, by means of automatic writing, that the secondary self is awake,
keeping its attention constantly ﬁxed on the command and watching for the signal of its
execution. Certain trance-subjects who were also automatic writers, when roused from
trance and put to the planchette,—not knowing then what they wrote, and having their upper
attention fully engrossed by reading aloud, talking, or solving problems in mental
arithmetic,—would inscribe the orders which they had received, together with notes relative
to the time elapsed and the time yet to run before the execution.[205] It is therefore to no
'automatism' in the mechanical sense that such acts are due: a self presides over them, a
split-off, limited and buried, but yet a fully conscious, self. More than this, the buried self
often comes to the surface and drives out the other self whilst the acts are performing. In
other words, the subject lapses into trance again when the moment arrives for execution, and
has no subsequent recollection of the act which he has done. Gurney and Beaunis
established this fact, which has since been veriﬁed on a large scale; and Gurney also showed
that the patient became suggestible again during the brief time of the performance. M.
Janet's observations, in their turn, well illustrate the phenomenon.
"I tell Lucie to keep her arms raised after she shall have awakened. Hardly is
she in the normal state, when up go her arms above her head, but she pays no
attention to them. She goes, comes, converses, holding her arms high in the air.
If asked what her arms are doing, she is surprised at such a question, and says
very sincerely: 'My hands are doing nothing; they are just like yours.'... I
command her to weep, and when awake she really sobs, but continues in the
midst of her tears to talk of very gay matters. The sobbing over, there remained
no trace of this grief, which seemed to have been quite sub-conscious."

[Pg 210]

The primary self often has to invent an hallucination by which to mask and hide from its
own view the deeds which the other self is enacting. Léonie 3[206] writes real letters whilst
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Léonie 1 believes that she is knitting; or Lucie 2 really comes to the doctor's ofﬁce, whilst
Lucie 1 believes herself to be at home. This is a sort of delirium. The alphabet, or the series
of numbers, when handed over to the attention of the secondary personage may for the time
be lost to the normal self. Whilst the hand writes the alphabet, obediently to command, the
'subject,' to her great stupefaction, ﬁnds herself unable to recall it, etc. Few things are more
curious than these relations of mutual exclusion, of which all gradations exist between the
several partial consciousnesses.

How far this splitting up of the mind into separate consciousnesses may exist in each one of
us is a problem. M. Janet holds that it is only possible where there is abnormal weakness,
and consequently a defect of unifying or co-ordinating power. An hysterical woman
abandons part of her consciousness because she is too weak nervously to hold it together.
The abandoned part meanwhile may solidify into a secondary or sub-conscious self. In a
perfectly sound subject, on the other hand, what is dropped out of mind at one moment
keeps coming back at the next. The whole fund of experiences and knowledges remains
integrated, and no split-off portions of it can get organized stably enough to form
subordinate selves. The stability, monotony, and stupidity of these latter is often very
striking. The post-hypnotic sub-consciousness seems to think of nothing but the order which
it last received; the cataleptic sub-consciousness, of nothing but the last position imprinted
on the limb. M. Janet could cause deﬁnitely circumscribed reddening and tumefaction of the
skin on two of his subjects, by suggesting to them in hypnotism the hallucination of a [Pg 211]
mustard-poultice of any special shape. "J'ai tout le temps pensé à votre sinapisme," says the
subject, when put back into trance after the suggestion has taken effect. A man N., whom M.
Janet operated on at long intervals, was betweenwhiles tampered with by another operator,
and when put to sleep again by M. Janet, said he was 'too far away to receive orders, being
in Algiers.' The other operator, having suggested that hallucination, had forgotten to remove
it before waking the subject from his trance, and the poor passive trance-personality had
stuck for weeks in the stagnant dream. Léonie's sub-conscious performances having been
illustrated to a caller, by a 'pied de nez' executed with her left hand in the course of
conversation, when, a year later, she meets him again, up goes the same hand to her nose
again, without Léonie's normal self suspecting the fact.

All these facts, taken together, form unquestionably the beginning of an inquiry which is
destined to throw a new light into the very abysses of our nature. It is for that reason that I
have cited them at such length in this early chapter of the book. They prove one thing
conclusively, namely, that we must never take a person's testimony, however sincere, that he
has felt nothing, as proof positive that no feeling has been there. It may have been there as
part of the consciousness of a 'secondary personage,' of whose experiences the primary one
whom we are consulting can naturally give no account. In hypnotic subjects (as we shall see
in a later chapter) just as it is the easiest thing in the world to paralyze a movement or
member by simple suggestion, so it is easy to produce what is called a systematized
anæsthesia by word of command. A systematized anæsthesia means an insensibility, not to
any one element of things, but to some one concrete thing or class of things. The subject is
made blind or deaf to a certain person in the room and to no one else, and thereupon denies
that that person is present, or has spoken, etc. M. P. Janet's Lucie, blind to some of the
numbered cards in her lap (p. 207 above), is a case in point. Now when the object is simple,
like a red wafer or a black cross, the subject, although he denies that he sees it when he [Pg 212]
looks straight at it, nevertheless gets a 'negative after-image' of it when he looks away again,
showing that the optical impression of it has been received. Moreover reﬂection shows that
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such a subject must distinguish the object from others like it in order to be blind to it. Make
him blind to one person in the room, set all the persons in a row, and tell him to count them.
He will count all but that one. But how can he tell which one not to count without
recognizing who he is? In like manner, make a stroke on paper or blackboard, and tell him it
is not there, and he will see nothing but the clean paper or board. Next (he not looking)
surround the original stroke with other strokes exactly like it, and ask him what he sees. He
will point out one by one all the new strokes, and omit the original one every time, no matter
how numerous the new strokes may be, or in what order they are arranged. Similarly, if the
original single stroke to which he is blind be doubled by a prism of some sixteen degrees
placed before one of his eyes (both being kept open), he will say that he now sees one
stroke, and point in the direction in which the image seen through the prism lies, ignoring
still the original stroke.
Obviously, then, he is not blind to the kind of stroke in the least. He is blind only to one
individual stroke of that kind in a particular position on the board or paper—that is to a
particular complex object; and, paradoxical as it may seem to say so, he must distinguish it
with great accuracy from others like it, in order to remain blind to it when the others are
brought near. He discriminates it, as a preliminary to not seeing it at all.
Again, when by a prism before one eye a previously invisible line has been made visible to
that eye, and the other eye is thereupon closed or screened, its closure makes no difference;
the line still remains visible. But if then the prism be removed, the line will disappear even
to the eye which a moment ago saw it, and both eyes will revert to their original blind state.
We have, then, to deal in these cases neither with a blindness of the eye itself, nor with a
mere failure to notice, but with something much more complex; namely, an active counting [Pg 213]
out and positive exclusion of certain objects. It is as when one 'cuts' an acquaintance,
'ignores' a claim, or 'refuses to be inﬂuenced' by a consideration. But the perceptive activity
which works to this result is disconnected from the consciousness which is personal, so to
speak, to the subject, and makes of the object concerning which the suggestion is made, its
own private possession and prey.[207]
The mother who is asleep to every sound but the stirrings of her babe, evidently has the
babe-portion of her auditory sensibility systematically awake. Relatively to that, the rest of
her mind is in a state of systematized anæsthesia. That department, split off and
disconnected from the sleeping part, can none the less wake the latter up in case of need. So
that on the whole the quarrel between Descartes and Locke as to whether the mind ever
sleeps is less near to solution than ever. On a priori speculative grounds Locke's view that
thought and feeling may at times wholly disappear seems the more plausible. As glands
cease to secrete and muscles to contract, so the brain should sometimes cease to carry
currents, and with this minimum of its activity might well coexist a minimum of
consciousness. On the other hand, we see how deceptive are appearances, and are forced to
admit that a part of consciousness may sever its connections with other parts and yet
continue to be. On the whole it is best to abstain from a conclusion. The science of the near
future will doubtless answer this question more wisely than we can now.
Let us turn now to consider the

[Pg 214]

RELATIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS TO SPACE.
This is the problem known in the history of philosophy as the question of the seat of the
soul. It has given rise to much literature, but we must ourselves treat it very brieﬂy.
Everything depends on what we conceive the soul to be, an extended or an inextended
entity. If the former, it may occupy a seat. If the latter, it may not; though it has been thought
that even then it might still have a position. Much hair-splitting has arisen about the
possibility of an inextended thing nevertheless being present throughout a certain amount of
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extension. We must distinguish the kinds of presence. In some manner our consciousness is
'present' to everything with which it is in relation. I am cognitively present to Orion
whenever I perceive that constellation, but I am not dynamically present there, I work no
effects. To my brain, however, I am dynamically present, inasmuch as my thoughts and
feelings seem to react upon the processes thereof. If, then, by the seat of the mind is meant
nothing more than the locality with which it stands in immediate dynamic relations, we are
certain to be right in saying that its seat is somewhere in the cortex of the brain. Descartes,
as is well known, thought that the inextended soul was immediately present to the pineal
gland. Others, as Lotze in his earlier days, and W. Volkmann, think its position must be at
some point of the structureless matrix of the anatomical brain-elements, at which point they
suppose that all nerve-currents may cross and combine. The scholastic doctrine is that the
soul is totally present, both in the whole and in each and every part of the body. This mode
of presence is said to be due to the soul's inextended nature and to its simplicity. Two
extended entities could only correspond in space with one another, part to part,—but not so
does the soul, which has no parts, correspond with the body. Sir Wm. Hamilton and
Professor Bowen defend something like this view. I. H. Fichte, Ulrici, and, among American
philosophers, Mr. J. E. Walter,[208] maintain the soul to be a space-ﬁlling principle. Fichte [Pg 215]
calls it the inner body, Ulrici likens it to a ﬂuid of non-molecular composition. These
theories remind us of the 'theosophic' doctrines of the present day, and carry us back to times
when the soul as vehicle of consciousness was not discriminated, as it now is, from the vital
principle presiding over the formation of the body. Plato gave head, breast, and abdomen to
the immortal reason, the courage, and the appetites, as their seats respectively. Aristotle
argues that the heart is the sole seat. Elsewhere we ﬁnd the blood, the brain, the lungs, the
liver the kidneys even, in turn assigned as seat of the whole or part of the soul.[209]
The truth is that if the thinking principle is extended we neither know its form nor its seat;
whilst if unextended, it is absurd to speak of its having any space-relations at all. Spacerelations we shall see hereafter to be sensible things. The only objects that can have mutual
relations of position are objects that are perceived coexisting in the same felt space. A thing
not perceived at all, such as the inextended soul must be, cannot coexist with any perceived
objects in this way. No lines can be felt stretching from it to the other objects. It can form no
terminus to any space-interval. It can therefore in no intelligible sense enjoy position. Its
relations cannot be spatial, but must be exclusively cognitive or dynamic, as we have seen.
So far as they are dynamic, to talk of the soul being 'present' is only a ﬁgure of speech.
Hamilton's doctrine that the soul is present to the whole body is at any rate false: for
cognitively its presence extends far beyond the body, and dynamically it does not extend
[Pg 216]
beyond the brain.[210]
THE RELATIONS OF MINDS TO OTHER OBJECTS
are either relations to other minds, or to material things. The material things are either the
mind's own brain, on the one hand, or anything else, on the other. The relations of a mind to
its own brain are of a unique and utterly mysterious sort; we discussed them in the last two
chapters, and can add nothing to that account.
The mind's relations to other objects than the brain are cognitive and emotional relations
exclusively, so far as we know. It knows them, and it inwardly welcomes or rejects them, but
it has no other dealings with them. When it seems to act upon them, it only does so through
the intermediary of its own body, so that not it but the body is what acts on them, and the
brain must ﬁrst act upon the body. The same is true when other things seem to act on it—
they only act on the body, and through that on its brain.[211] All that it can do directly is to
know other things, misknow or ignore them, and to ﬁnd that they interest it, in this fashion
or in that.
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Now the relation of knowing is the most mysterious thing in the world. If we ask how one
thing can know another we are led into the heart of Erkenntnisstheorie and metaphysics.
The psychologist, for his part, does not consider the matter so curiously as this. Finding a
world before him which he cannot but believe that he knows, and setting himself to study
his own past thoughts, or someone else's thoughts, of what he believes to be that same
world; he cannot but conclude that those other thoughts know it after their fashion even as
he knows it after his. Knowledge becomes for him an ultimate relation that must be
admitted, whether it be explained or not, just like difference or resemblance, which no one
seeks to explain.
Were our topic Absolute Mind instead of being the concrete minds of individuals dwelling
in the natural world, we could not tell whether that Mind had the function of knowing or
not, as knowing is commonly understood. We might learn the complexion of its thoughts; [Pg 217]
but, as we should have no realities outside of it to compare them with,—for if we had, the
Mind would not be Absolute,—we could not criticise them, and ﬁnd them either right or
wrong; and we should have to call them simply the thoughts, and not the knowledge, of the
Absolute Mind. Finite minds, however, can be judged in a different way, because the
psychologist himself can go bail for the independent reality of the objects of which they
think. He knows these to exist outside as well as inside the minds in question; he thus knows
whether the minds think and know, or only think; and though his knowledge is of course that
of a fallible mortal, there is nothing in the conditions that should make it more likely to be
wrong in this case than in any other.
Now by what tests does the psychologist decide whether the state of mind he is studying is a
bit of knowledge, or only a subjective fact not referring to anything outside itself?
He uses the tests we all practically use. If the state of mind resembles his own idea of a
certain reality; or if without resembling his idea of it, it seems to imply that reality and refer
to it by operating upon it through the bodily organs; or even if it resembles and operates on
some other reality that implies, and leads up to, and terminates in, the ﬁrst one,—in either or
all of these cases the psychologist admits that the state of mind takes cognizance, directly or
remotely, distinctly or vaguely, truly or falsely, of the reality's nature and position in the
world. If, on the other hand, the mental state under examination neither resembles nor
operates on any of the realities known to the psychologist, he calls it a subjective state pure
and simple, possessed of no cognitive worth. If, again, it resemble a reality or a set of
realities as he knows them, but altogether fail to operate on them or modify their course by
producing bodily motions which the psychologist sees, then the psychologist, like all of us,
may be in doubt. Let the mental state, for example, occur during the sleep of its subject. Let
the latter dream of the death of a certain man, and let the man simultaneously die. Is the
dream a mere coincidence, or a veritable cognition of the death? Such puzzling cases are [Pg 218]
what the Societies for 'Psychical Research' are collecting and trying to interpret in the most
reasonable way.
If the dream were the only one of the kind the subject ever had in his life, if the context of
the death in the dream differed in many particulars from the real death's context, and if the
dream led to no action about the death, unquestionably we should all call it a strange
coincidence, and naught besides. But if the death in the dream had a long context, agreeing
point for point with every feature that attended the real death; if the subject were constantly
having such dreams, all equally perfect, and if on awaking he had a habit of acting
immediately as if they were true and so getting 'the start' of his more tardily informed
neighbors,—we should probably all have to admit that he had some mysterious kind of
clairvoyant power, that his dreams in an inscrutable way knew just those realities which they
ﬁgured, and that the word 'coincidence' failed to touch the root of the matter. And whatever
doubts any one preserved would completely vanish if it should appear that from the midst of
his dream he had the power of interfering with the course of the reality, and making the
events in it turn this way or that, according as he dreamed they should. Then at least it
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would be certain that he and the psychologist were dealing with the same. It is by such tests
as these that we are convinced that the waking minds of our fellows and our own minds
know the same external world.

The psychologist's attitude towards cognition will be so important in the sequel that we must
not leave it until it is made perfectly clear. It is a thoroughgoing dualism. It supposes two
elements, mind knowing and thing known, and treats them as irreducible. Neither gets out of
itself or into the other, neither in any way is the other, neither makes the other. They just
stand face to face in a common world, and one simply knows, or is known unto, its
counterpart. This singular relation is not to be expressed in any lower terms, or translated
into any more intelligible name. Some sort of signal must be given by the thing to the
mind's brain, or the knowing will not occur—we ﬁnd as a matter of fact that the mere [Pg 219]
existence of a thing outside the brain is not a sufﬁcient cause for our knowing it: it must
strike the brain in some way, as well as be there, to be known. But the brain being struck,
the knowledge is constituted by a new construction that occurs altogether in the mind. The
thing remains the same whether known or not.[212] And when once there, the knowledge
may remain there, whatever becomes of the thing.
By the ancients, and by unreﬂecting people perhaps to-day, knowledge is explained as the
passage of something from without into the mind—the latter, so far, at least, as its sensible
affections go, being passive and receptive. But even in mere sense-impression the
duplication of the object by an inner construction must take place. Consider, with Professor
Bowne, what happens when two people converse together and know each other's mind.
"No thoughts leave the mind of one and cross into the mind of the other. When
we speak of an exchange of thought, even the crudest mind knows that this is a
mere ﬁgure of speech.... To perceive another's thought, we must construct his
thought within ourselves;... this thought is our own and is strictly original with
us. At the same time we owe it to the other; and if it had not originated with
him, it would probably not have originated with us. But what has the other
done?... This: by an entirely mysterious world-order, the speaker is enabled to
produce a series of signs which are totally unlike [the] thought, but which, by
virtue of the same mysterious order, act as a series of incitements upon the
hearer, so that he constructs within himself the corresponding mental state. The
act of the speaker consists in availing himself of the proper incitements. The act
of the hearer is immediately only the reaction of the soul against the
incitement.... All communion between ﬁnite minds is of this sort.... Probably no
reﬂecting person would deny this conclusion, but when we say that what is thus
true of perception of another's thought is equally true of the perception of the
outer world in general, many minds will be disposed to question, and not a few
will deny it outright. Yet there is no alternative but to afﬁrm that to perceive the
universe we must construct it in thought, and that our knowledge of the
universe is but the unfolding of the mind's inner nature.... By describing the
mind as a waxen tablet, and things as impressing themselves upon it, we seem
to get great insight until we think to ask where this extended tablet is, and how
things stamp themselves on it, and how the perceptive act would be explained
even if they did.... The immediate antecedents of sensation and perception are a
series of nervous changes in the brain. Whatever we know of the outer world is
revealed only in and through these nervous changes. But these are totally unlike
the objects assumed to exist as their causes. If we might conceive the mind as in
the light, and in direct contact with its objects, the imagination at least would be
comforted; but when we conceive the mind as coming in contact with the outer
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world only in the dark chamber of the skull, and then not in contact with the
objects perceived, but only with a series of nerve-changes of which, moreover,
it knows nothing, it is plain that the object is a long way off. All talk of pictures,
impressions, etc., ceases because of the lack of all the conditions to give such
ﬁgures any meaning. It is not even clear that we shall ever ﬁnd our way out of
the darkness into the world of light and reality again. We begin with complete
trust in physics and the senses, and are forthwith led away from the object into a
nervous labyrinth, where the object is entirely displaced by a set of nervous
changes which are totally unlike anything but themselves. Finally, we land in
the dark chamber of the skull. The object has gone completely, and knowledge
has not yet appeared. Nervous signs are the raw material of all knowledge of
the outer world according to the most decided realism. But in order to pass
beyond these signs into a knowledge of the outer world, we must posit an
interpreter who shall read back these signs into their objective meaning. But
that interpreter, again, must implicitly contain the meaning of the universe
within itself; and these signs are really but excitations which cause the soul to
unfold what is within itself. Inasmuch as by common consent the soul
communicates with the outer world only through these signs, and never comes
nearer to the object than such signs can bring it, it follows that the principles of
interpretation must be in the mind itself, and that the resulting construction is
primarily only an expression of the mind's own nature. All reaction is of this
sort; it expresses the nature of the reacting agent, and knowledge comes under
the same head, this fact makes it necessary for us either to admit a preestablished harmony between the laws and nature of thought and the laws and
nature of things, or else to allow that the objects of perception, the universe as it
appears, are purely phenomenal, being but the way in which the mind reacts
against the ground of its sensations."[213]
The dualism of Object and Subject and their pre-established harmony are what the
psychologist as such must assume, whatever ulterior monistic philosophy he may, as an
individual who has the right also to be a metaphysician, have in reserve. I hope that this
general point is now made clear, so that we may leave it, and descend to some distinctions [Pg 221]
of detail.

There are two kinds of knowledge broadly and practically distinguishable: we may call them
respectively knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge-about. Most languages express the
distinction; thus, γνῶναι, εὶδέναι; noscere, scire; kennen, wissen; connaître, savoir.[214] I
am acquainted with many people and things, which I know very little about, except their
presence in the places where I have met them. I know the color blue when I see it, and the
ﬂavor of a pear when I taste it; I know an inch when I move my ﬁnger through it; a second
of time, when I feel it pass; an effort of attention when I make it; a difference between two
things when I notice it; but about the inner nature of these facts or what makes them what
they are, I can say nothing at all. I cannot impart acquaintance with them to any one who has
not already made it himself. I cannot describe them, make a blind man guess what blue is
like, deﬁne to a child a syllogism, or tell a philosopher in just what respect distance is just
what it is, and differs from other forms of relation. At most, I can say to my friends, Go to
certain places and act in certain ways, and these objects will probably come. All the
elementary natures of the world, its highest genera, the simple qualities of matter and mind,
together with the kinds of relation that subsist between them, must either not be known at
all, or known in this dumb way of acquaintance without knowledge-about. In minds able to
speak at all there is, it is true, some knowledge about everything. Things can at least be
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classed, and the times of their appearance told. But in general, the less we analyze a thing,
and the fewer of its relations we perceive, the less we know about it and the more our
familiarity with it is of the acquaintance-type. The two kinds of knowledge are, therefore, as
the human mind practically exerts them, relative terms. That is, the same thought of a thing
may be called knowledge-about it in comparison with a simpler thought, or acquaintance
[Pg 222]
with it in comparison with a thought of it that is more articulate and explicit still.
The grammatical sentence expresses this. Its 'subject' stands for an object of acquaintance
which, by the addition of the predicate, is to get something known about it. We may already
know a good deal, when we hear the subject named—its name may have rich connotations.
But, know we much or little then, we know more still when the sentence is done. We can
relapse at will into a mere condition of acquaintance with an object by scattering our
attention and staring at it in a vacuous trance-like way. We can ascend to knowledge about it
by rallying our wits and proceeding to notice and analyze and think. What we are only
acquainted with is only present to our minds; we have it, or the idea of it. But when we
know about it, we do more than merely have it; we seem, as we think over its relations, to
subject it to a sort of treatment and to operate upon it with our thought. The words feeling
and thought give voice to the antithesis. Through feelings we become acquainted with
things, but only by our thoughts do we know about them. Feelings are the germ and starting
point of cognition, thoughts the developed tree. The minimum of grammatical subject, of
objective presence, of reality known about, the mere beginning of knowledge, must be
named by the word that says the least. Such a word is the interjection, as lo! there! ecco!
voilà! or the article or demonstrative pronoun introducing the sentence, as the, it, that. In
Chapter XII we shall see a little deeper into what this distinction, between the mere mental
having or feeling of an object and the thinking of it, portends.
The mental states usually distinguished as feelings are the emotions, and the sensations we
get from skin, muscle, viscus, eye, ear, nose, and palate. The 'thoughts,' as recognized in
popular parlance, are the conceptions and judgments. When we treat of these mental states
in particular we shall have to say a word about the cognitive function and value of each. It
may perhaps be well to notice now that our senses only give us acquaintance with facts of
body, and that of the mental states of other persons we only have conceptual knowledge. Of [Pg 223]
our own past states of mind we take cognizance in a peculiar way. They are 'objects of
memory,' and appear to us endowed with a sort of warmth and intimacy that makes the
perception of them seem more like a process of sensation than like a thought.

[198]

Messrs. Payton Spence (Journal of Spec. Phil., x, 338, xiv, 286) and M. M. Garver
(Amer. Jour. of Science, 3d series, xx, 189) argue, the one from speculative, the
other from experimental grounds, that, the physical condition of consciousness
being neural vibration, the consciousness must itself be incessantly interrupted by
unconsciousness—about ﬁfty times a second, according to Garver.

[199]

That the appearance of mental activity here is real can be proved by suggesting to
the 'hypnotized' somnambulist that he shall remember when he awakes. He will
then often do so.

[200]

For more details, cf. Malebranche, Rech. de la Verité, bk. iii, chap. i; J. Locke,
Essay conc. H. U., book iii, ch. i; C. Wolf, Psychol. rationalis, § 59; Sir W.
Hamilton, Lectures on Metaph., lecture xvii; J. Bascom, Science of Mind, § 12;
Th. Jouffroy, Mélanges Philos., 'du Sommeil'; H. Holland, Chapters on Mental
Physiol., p. 80; B. Brodie, Psychol. Researches, p. 147; E. M. Chesley, Journ. of
Spec. Phil., vol. xi, p. 72; Th. Ribot, Maladies de la Personnalité, pp. 8-10; H.
Lotze, Metaphysics, § 533.

[201]

L'Automatisme Psychologique, Paris, 1889, passim.
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[202]

See his articles in the Chicago Open Court, for July, August and November, 1889.
Also in the Revue Philosophique for 1889 and '90.

[203]

This whole phenomenon shows how an idea which remains itself below the
threshold of a certain conscious self may occasion associative effects therein. The
skin-sensations unfelt by the patient's primary consciousness awaken nevertheless
their usual visual associates therein.

[204]

See Proceedings of American Soc. for Psych. Research, vol. i, p. 548.

[205]

Proceedings of the (London) Soc. for Psych. Research, May, 1887, p. 268 ff.

[206]

M. Janet designates by numbers the different personalities which the subject may
display.

[207]

How to conceive of this state of mind is not easy. It would be much simpler to
understand the process, if adding new strokes made the ﬁrst one visible. There
would then be two different objects apperceived as totals,—paper with one stroke,
paper with many strokes; and, blind to the former, he would see all that was in the
latter, because he would have apperceived it as a different total in the ﬁrst
instance.
A process of this sort occurs sometimes (not always) when the new strokes,
instead of being mere repetitions of the original one, are lines which combine
with it into a total object, say a human face. The subject of the trance then may
regain his sight of the line to which he had previously been blind, by seeing it as
part of the face.

[208]

Perception of Space and Matter, 1879, part ii, chap. 3.

[209]

For a very good condensed history of the various opinions, see W. Volkmann von
Volkmar, Lehrbuch d. Psychologie, § 16, Anm. Complete references to Sir W.
Hamilton are given in J. E. Walter, Perception of Space and Matter, pp. 65-6.

[210]

Most contemporary writers ignore the question of the soul's seat. Lotze is the only
one who seems to have been much concerned about it, and his views have varied.
Cf. Medicinische Psychol., § 10. Microcosmus, bk. iii, ch. 2. Metaphysic, bk. iii,
ch. 5. Outlines of Psychol., part ii, ch. 3. See also G. T. Fechner, Psychophysik,
chap. xxxvii.

[211]

I purposely ignore 'clairvoyance' and action upon distant things by 'mediums,' as
not yet matters of common consent.

[212]

I disregard consequences which may later come to the thing from the fact that it is
known. The knowing per se in no wise affects the thing.

[213]

B. P. Bowne: Metaphysics, pp. 407-10. Cf. also Lotze: Logik, §§ 308, 326-7.

[214]

Cf. John Grote: Exploratio Philosophica, p. 60; H. Helmholtz, Popular Scientiﬁc
Lectures, London, p. 308-9.

CHAPTER IX.[215]

[Pg 224]

THE STREAM OF THOUGHT.
We now begin our study of the mind from within. Most books start with sensations, as the
simplest mental facts, and proceed synthetically, constructing each higher stage from those
below it. But this is abandoning the empirical method of investigation. No one ever had a
simple sensation by itself. Consciousness, from our natal day, is of a teeming multiplicity of
objects and relations, and what we call simple sensations are results of discriminative
attention, pushed often to a very high degree. It is astonishing what havoc is wrought in
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psychology by admitting at the outset apparently innocent suppositions, that nevertheless
contain a ﬂaw. The bad consequences develop themselves later on, and are irremediable,
being woven through the whole texture of the work. The notion that sensations, being the
simplest things, are the ﬁrst things to take up in psychology is one of these suppositions.
The only thing which psychology has a right to postulate at the outset is the fact of thinking
itself, and that must ﬁrst be taken up and analyzed. If sensations then prove to be amongst
the elements of the thinking, we shall be no worse off as respects them than if we had taken
them for granted at the start.
The ﬁrst fact for us, then, as psychologists, is that thinking of some sort goes on. I use the
word thinking, in accordance with what was said on p. 186, for every form of consciousness
indiscriminately. If we could say in English 'it thinks,' as we say 'it rains 'or 'it blows,' we
should be stating the fact most simply and with the minimum of assumption. As we cannot, [Pg 225]
we must simply say that thought goes on.
FIVE CHARACTERS IN THOUGHT.
How does it go on? We notice immediately ﬁve important characters in the process, of
which it shall be the duty of the present chapter to treat in a general way:
1) Every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness.
2) Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing.
3) Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous.
4) It always appears to deal with objects independent of itself.
5) It is interested in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others, and welcomes or
rejects—chooses from among them, in a word—all the while.
In considering these ﬁve points successively, we shall have to plunge in medias res as
regards our vocabulary, and use psychological terms which can only be adequately deﬁned
in later chapters of the book. But every one knows what the terms mean in a rough way; and
it is only in a rough way that we are now to take them. This chapter is like a painter's ﬁrst
charcoal sketch upon his canvas, in which no niceties appear.
1) Thought tends to Personal Form.
When I say every thought is part of a personal consciousness, 'personal consciousness' is
one of the terms in question. Its meaning we know so long as no one asks us to deﬁne it, but
to give an accurate account of it is the most difﬁcult of philosophic tasks. This task we must
confront in the next chapter; here a preliminary word will sufﬁce.
In this room—this lecture-room, say—there are a multitude of thoughts, yours and mine,
some of which cohere mutually, and some not. They are as little each-for-itself and
reciprocally independent as they are all-belonging-together. They are neither: no one of
them is separate, but each belongs with certain others and with none beside. My thought [Pg 226]
belongs with my other thoughts, and your thought with your other thoughts. Whether
anywhere in the room there be a mere thought, which is nobody's thought, we have no
means of ascertaining, for we have no experience of its like. The only states of
consciousness that we naturally deal with are found in personal consciousnesses, minds,
selves, concrete particular I's and you's.
Each of these minds keeps its own thoughts to itself. There is no giving or bartering between
them. No thought even comes into direct sight of a thought in another personal
consciousness than its own. Absolute insulation, irreducible pluralism, is the law. It seems
as if the elementary psychic fact were not thought or this thought or that thought, but my
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thought, every thought being owned. Neither contemporaneity, nor proximity in space, nor
similarity of quality and content are able to fuse thoughts together which are sundered by
this barrier of belonging to different personal minds. The breaches between such thoughts
are the most absolute breaches in nature. Everyone will recognize this to be true, so long as
the existence of something corresponding to the term 'personal mind' is all that is insisted
on, without any particular view of its nature being implied. On these terms the personal self
rather than the thought might be treated as the immediate datum in psychology. The
universal conscious fact is not 'feelings and thoughts exist,' but 'I think' and 'I feel.'[216] No
psychology, at any rate, can question the existence of personal selves. The worst a
psychology can do is so to interpret the nature of these selves as to rob them of their worth.
A French writer, speaking of our ideas, says somewhere in a ﬁt of anti-spiritualistic
excitement that, misled by certain peculiarities which they display, we 'end by personifying'
the procession which they make,—such personiﬁcation being regarded by him as a great
philosophic blunder on our part. It could only be a blunder if the notion of personality meant
something essentially different from anything to be found in the mental procession. But if [Pg 227]
that procession be itself the very 'original' of the notion of personality, to personify it cannot
possibly be wrong. It is already personiﬁed. There are no marks of personality to be
gathered aliunde, and then found lacking in the train of thought. It has them all already; so
that to whatever farther analysis we may subject that form of personal selfhood under which
thoughts appear, it is, and must remain, true that the thoughts which psychology studies do
continually tend to appear as parts of personal selves.
I say 'tend to appear' rather than 'appear,' on account of those facts of sub-conscious
personality, automatic writing, etc., of which we studied a few in the last chapter. The buried
feelings and thoughts proved now to exist in hysterical anæsthetics, in recipients of posthypnotic suggestion, etc., themselves are parts of secondary personal selves. These selves
are for the most part very stupid and contracted, and are cut off at ordinary times from
communication with the regular and normal self of the individual; but still they form
conscious unities, have continuous memories, speak, write, invent distinct names for
themselves, or adopt names that are suggested; and, in short, are entirely worthy of that title
of secondary personalities which is now commonly given them. According to M. Janet these
secondary personalities are always abnormal, and result from the splitting of what ought to
be a single complete self into two parts, of which one lurks in the background whilst the
other appears on the surface as the only self the man or woman has. For our present purpose
it is unimportant whether this account of the origin of secondary selves is applicable to all
possible cases of them or not, for it certainly is true of a large number of them. Now
although the size of a secondary self thus formed will depend on the number of thoughts that
are thus split-off from the main consciousness, the form of it tends to personality, and the
later thoughts pertaining to it remember the earlier ones and adopt them as their own. M.
Janet caught the actual moment of inspissation (so to speak) of one of these secondary
personalities in his anæsthetic somnambulist Lucie. He found that when this young woman's
attention was absorbed in conversation with a third party, her anæsthetic hand would write [Pg 228]
simple answers to questions whispered to her by himself. "Do you hear?" he asked. "No,"
was the unconsciously written reply. "But to answer you must hear." "Yes, quite so." "Then
how do you manage?" "I don't know." "There must be some one who hears me." "Yes."
"Who?" "Someone other than Lucie." "Ah! another person. Shall we give her a name?"
"No." "Yes, it will be more convenient." "Well, Adrienne, then." "Once baptized, the
subconscious personage," M. Janet continues, "grows more deﬁnitely outlined and displays
better her psychological characters. In particular she shows us that she is conscious of the
feelings excluded from the consciousness of the primary or normal personage. She it is who
tells us that I am pinching the arm or touching the little ﬁnger in which Lucie for so long has
had no tactile sensations."[217]
In other cases the adoption of the name by the secondary self is more spontaneous. I have
seen a number of incipient automatic writers and mediums as yet imperfectly 'developed,'
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who immediately and of their own accord write and speak in the name of departed spirits.
These may be public characters, as Mozart, Faraday, or real persons formerly known to the
subject, or altogether imaginary beings. Without prejudicing the question of real 'spiritcontrol' in the more developed sorts of trance-utterance, I incline to think that these (often
deplorably unintelligent) rudimentary utterances are the work of an inferior fraction of the
subject's own natural mind, set free from control by the rest, and working after a set pattern
ﬁxed by the prejudices of the social environment. In a spiritualistic community we get
optimistic messages, whilst in an ignorant Catholic village the secondary personage calls
itself by the name of a demon, and proffers blasphemies and obscenities, instead of telling
[Pg 229]
us how happy it is in the summer-land.[218]
Beneath these tracts of thought, which, however rudimentary, are still organized selves with
a memory, habits, and sense of their own identity, M. Janet thinks that the facts of catalepsy
in hysteric patients drive us to suppose that there are thoughts quite unorganized and
impersonal. A patient in cataleptic trance (which can be produced artiﬁcially in certain
hypnotized subjects) is without memory on waking, and seems insensible and unconscious
as long as the cataleptic condition lasts. If, however, one raises the arm of such a subject it
stays in that position, and the whole body can thus be moulded like wax under the hands of
the operator, retaining for a considerable time whatever attitude he communicates to it. In
hysterics whose arm, for example, is anæsthetic, the same thing may happen. The anæsthetic
arm may remain passively in positions which it is made to assume; or if the hand be taken
and made to hold a pencil and trace a certain letter, it will continue tracing that letter
indeﬁnitely on the paper. These acts, until recently, were supposed to be accompanied by no
consciousness at all: they were physiological reﬂexes. M. Janet considers with much more
plausibility that feeling escorts them. The feeling is probably merely that of the position or
movement of the limb, and it produces no more than its natural effects when it discharges
into the motor centres which keep the position maintained, or the movement incessantly
renewed.[219] Such thoughts as these, says M. Janet, "are known by no one, for
disaggregated sensations reduced to a state of mental dust are not synthetized in any
personality."[220] He admits, however, that these very same unutterably stupid thoughts tend
to develop memory,—the cataleptic ere long moves her arm at a bare hint; so that they form
no important exception to the law that all thought tends to assume the form of personal
consciousness.
2) Thought is in Constant Change.
I do not mean necessarily that no one state of mind has any duration—even if true, that
would be hard to establish. The change which I have more particularly in view is that which [Pg 230]
takes place in sensible intervals of time; and the result on which I wish to lay stress is this,
that no state once gone can recur and be identical with what it was before. Let us begin with
Mr. Shadworth Hodgson's description:
"I go straight to the facts, without saying I go to perception, or sensation, or
thought, or any special mode at all. What I ﬁnd when I look at my
consciousness at all is that what I cannot divest myself of, or not have in
consciousness, if I have any consciousness at all, is a sequence of different
feelings. I may shut my eyes and keep perfectly still, and try not to contribute
anything of my own will; but whether I think or do not think, whether I
perceive external things or not, I always have a succession of different feelings.
Anything else that I may have also, of a more special character, comes in as
parts of this succession, Not to have the succession of different feelings is not to
be conscious at all.... The chain of consciousness is a sequence of differents."
[221]
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Such a description as this can awaken no possible protest from any one. We all recognize as
different great classes of our conscious states. Now we are seeing, now hearing; now
reasoning, now willing; now recollecting, now expecting; now loving, now hating; and in a
hundred other ways we know our minds to be alternately engaged. But all these are complex
states. The aim of science is always to reduce complexity to simplicity; and in psychological
science we have the celebrated 'theory of ideas' which, admitting the great difference among
each other of what may be called concrete conditions of mind, seeks to show how this is all
the resultant effect of variations in the combination of certain simple elements of
consciousness that always remain the same. These mental atoms or molecules are what
Locke called 'simple ideas.' Some of Locke's successors made out that the only simple ideas
were the sensations strictly so called. Which ideas the simple ones may be does not,
however, now concern us. It is enough that certain philosophers have thought they could see
under the dissolving-view-appearance of the mind elementary facts of any sort that
remained unchanged amid the ﬂow.
And the view of these philosophers has been called little into question, for our common [Pg 231]
experience seems at ﬁrst sight to corroborate it entirely. Are not the sensations we get from
the same object, for example, always the same? Does not the same piano-key, struck with
the same force, make us hear in the same way? Does not the same grass give us the same
feeling of green, the same sky the same feeling of blue, and do we not get the same olfactory
sensation no matter how many times we put our nose to the same ﬂask of cologne? It seems
a piece of metaphysical sophistry to suggest that we do not; and yet a close attention to the
matter shows that there is no proof that the same bodily sensation is ever got by us twice.
What is got twice is the same OBJECT. We hear the same note over and over again; we see the
same quality of green, or smell the same objective perfume, or experience the same species
of pain. The realities, concrete and abstract, physical and ideal, whose permanent existence
we believe in, seem to be constantly coming up again before our thought, and lead us, in our
carelessness, to suppose that our 'ideas' of them are the same ideas. When we come, some
time later, to the chapter on Perception, we shall see how inveterate is our habit of not
attending to sensations as subjective facts, but of simply using them as stepping-stones to
pass over to the recognition of the realities whose presence they reveal. The grass out of the
window now looks to me of the same green in the sun as in the shade, and yet a painter
would have to paint one part of it dark brown, another part bright yellow, to give its real,
sensational effect. We take no heed, as a rule, of the different way in which the same things
look and sound and smell at different distances and under different circumstances. The
sameness of the things is what we are concerned to ascertain; and any sensations that assure
us of that will probably be considered in a rough way to be the same with each other. This is
what makes off-hand testimony about the subjective identity of different sensations wellnigh worthless as a proof of the fact. The entire history of Sensation is a commentary on our
inability to tell whether two sensations received apart are exactly alike. What appeals to our [Pg 232]
attention far more than the absolute quality or quantity of a given sensation is its ratio to
whatever other sensations we may have at the same time. When everything is dark a
somewhat less dark sensation makes us see an object white. Helmholtz calculates that the
white marble painted in a picture representing an architectural view by moonlight is, when
seen by daylight, from ten to twenty thousand times brighter than the real moonlit marble
would be.[222]
Such a difference as this could never have been sensibly learned; it had to be inferred from a
series of indirect considerations. There are facts which make us believe that our sensibility
is altering all the time, so that the same object cannot easily give us the same sensation over
again. The eye's sensibility to light is at its maximum when the eye is ﬁrst exposed, and
blunts itself with surprising rapidity. A long night's sleep will make it see things twice as
brightly on wakening, as simple rest by closure will make it see them later in the day.[223]
We feel things differently according as we are sleepy or awake, hungry or full, fresh or tired;
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differently at night and in the morning, differently in summer and in winter, and above all
things differently in childhood, manhood, and old age. Yet we never doubt that our feelings
reveal the same world, with the same sensible qualities and the same sensible things
occupying it. The difference of the sensibility is shown best by the difference of our emotion
about the things from one age to another, or when we are in different organic moods. What
was bright and exciting becomes weary, ﬂat, and unproﬁtable. The bird's song is tedious, the
breeze is mournful, the sky is sad.
To these indirect presumptions that our sensations, following the mutations of our capacity
for feeling, are always undergoing an essential change, must be added another presumption,
based on what must happen in the brain. Every sensation corresponds to some cerebral
action. For an identical sensation to recur it would have to occur the second time in an
unmodiﬁed brain. But as this, strictly speaking, is a physiological impossibility, so is an [Pg 233]
unmodiﬁed feeling an impossibility; for to every brain-modiﬁcation, however small, must
correspond a change of equal amount in the feeling which the brain subserves.
All this would be true if even sensations came to us pure and single and not combined into
'things.' Even then we should have to confess that, however we might in ordinary
conversation speak of getting the same sensation again, we never in strict theoretic accuracy
could do so; and that whatever was true of the river of life, of the river of elementary
feeling, it would certainly be true to say, like Heraclitus, that we never descend twice into
the same stream.
But if the assumption of 'simple ideas of sensation' recurring in immutable shape is so easily
shown to be baseless, how much more baseless is the assumption of immutability in the
larger masses of our thought!
For there it is obvious and palpable that our state of mind is never precisely the same. Every
thought we have of a given fact is, strictly speaking, unique, and only bears a resemblance
of kind with our other thoughts of the same fact. When the identical fact recurs, we must
think of it in a fresh manner, see it under a somewhat different angle, apprehend it in
different relations from those in which it last appeared. And the thought by which we
cognize it is the thought of it-in-those-relations, a thought suffused with the consciousness
of all that dim context. Often we are ourselves struck at the strange differences in our
successive views of the same thing. We wonder how we ever could have opined as we did
last month about a certain matter. We have outgrown the possibility of that state of mind, we
know not how. From one year to another we see things in new lights. What was unreal has
grown real, and what was exciting is insipid. The friends we used to care the world for are
shrunken to shadows; the women, once so divine, the stars, the woods, and the waters, how
now so dull and common! the young girls that brought an aura of inﬁnity, at present hardly
distinguishable existences; pictures so empty; and as for the books, what was there to ﬁnd so
mysteriously signiﬁcant in Goethe, or in John Mill so full of weight? Instead of all this,
more zestful than ever is the work, the work; and fuller and deeper the import of common [Pg 234]
duties and of common goods.
But what here strikes us so forcibly on the ﬂagrant scale exists on every scale, down to the
imperceptible transition from one hour's outlook to that of the next. Experience is
remoulding us every moment, and our mental reaction on every given thing is really a
resultant of our experience of the whole world up to that date. The analogies of brainphysiology must again be appealed to to corroborate our view.
Our earlier chapters have taught us to believe that, whilst we think, our brain changes, and
that, like the aurora borealis, its whole internal equilibrium shifts with every pulse of
change. The precise nature of the shifting at a given moment is a product of many factors.
The accidental state of local nutrition or blood-supply may be among them. But just as one
of them certainly is the inﬂuence of outward objects on the sense-organs during the moment,
so is another certainly the very special susceptibility in which the organ has been left at that
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moment by all it has gone through in the past. Every brain-state is partly determined by the
nature of this entire past succession. Alter the latter in any part, and the brain-state must be
somewhat different. Each present brain-state is a record in which the eye of Omniscience
might read all the foregone history of its owner. It is out of the question, then, that any total
brain-state should identically recur. Something like it may recur; but to suppose it to recur
would be equivalent to the absurd admission that all the states that had intervened between
its two appearances had been pure nonentities, and that the organ after their passage was
exactly as it was before. And (to consider shorter periods) just as, in the senses, an
impression feels very differently according to what has preceded it; as one color succeeding
another is modiﬁed by the contrast, silence sounds delicious after noise, and a note, when
the scale is sung up, sounds unlike itself when the scale is sung down; as the presence of
certain lines in a ﬁgure changes the apparent form of the other lines, and as in music the
whole æsthetic effect comes from the manner in which one set of sounds alters our feeling [Pg 235]
of another; so, in thought, we must admit that those portions of the brain that have just been
maximally excited retain a kind of soreness which is a condition of our present
consciousness, a codeterminant of how and what we now shall feel.[224]
Ever some tracts are waning in tension, some waxing, whilst others actively discharge. The
states of tension have as positive an inﬂuence as any in determining the total condition, and
in deciding what the psychosis shall be. All we know of submaximal nerve-irritations, and
of the summation of apparently ineffective stimuli, tends to show that no changes in the
brain are physiologically ineffective, and that presumably none are bare of psychological
result. But as the brain-tension shifts from one relative state of equilibrium to another, like
the gyrations of a kaleidoscope, now rapid and now slow, is it likely that its faithful psychic
concomitant is heavier-footed than itself, and that it cannot match each one of the organ's
irradiations by a shifting inward iridescence of its own? But if it can do this, its inward
iridescences must be inﬁnite, for the brain-redistributions are in inﬁnite variety. If so coarse
a thing as a telephone-plate can be made to thrill for years and never reduplicate its inward
condition, how much more must this be the case with the inﬁnitely delicate brain?
I am sure that this concrete and total manner of regarding the mind's changes is the only true
manner, difﬁcult as it may be to carry it out in detail. If anything seems obscure about it, it
will grow clearer as we advance. Meanwhile, if it be true, it is certainly also true that no two
'ideas' are ever exactly the same, which is the proposition we started to prove. The
proposition is more important theoretically than it at ﬁrst sight seems. For it makes it [Pg 236]
already impossible for us to follow obediently in the footprints of either the Lockian or the
Herbartian school, schools which have had almost unlimited inﬂuence in Germany and
among ourselves. No doubt it is often convenient to formulate the mental facts in an
atomistic sort of way, and to treat the higher states of consciousness as if they were all built
out of unchanging simple ideas. It is convenient often to treat curves as if they were
composed of small straight lines, and electricity and nerve-force as if they were ﬂuids. But
in the one case as in the other we must never forget that we are talking symbolically, and
that there is nothing in nature to answer to our words. A permanently existing 'idea' or
'Vorstellung' which makes its appearance before the footlights of consciousness at
periodical intervals, is as mythological an entity as the Jack of Spades.
What makes it convenient to use the mythological formulas is the whole organization of
speech, which, as was remarked a while ago, was not made by psychologists, but by men
who were as a rule only interested in the facts their mental states revealed. They only spoke
of their states as ideas of this or of that thing. What wonder, then, that the thought is most
easily conceived under the law of the thing whose name it bears! If the thing is composed of
parts, then we suppose that the thought of the thing must be composed of the thoughts of the
parts. If one part of the thing have appeared in the same thing or in other things on former
occasions, why then we must be having even now the very same 'idea' of that part which
was there on those occasions. If the thing is simple, its thought is simple. If it is
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multitudinous, it must require a multitude of thoughts to think it. If a succession, only a
succession of thoughts can know it. If permanent, its thought is permanent. And so on ad
libitum. What after all is so natural as to assume that one object, called by one name, should
be known by one affection of the mind? But, if language must thus inﬂuence us, the
agglutinative languages, and even Greek and Latin with their declensions, would be the
better guides. Names did not appear in them inalterable, but changed their shape to suit the
context in which they lay. It must have been easier then than now to conceive of the same [Pg 237]
object as being thought of at different times in non-identical conscious states.
This, too, will grow clearer as we proceed. Meanwhile a necessary consequence of the belief
in permanent self-identical psychic facts that absent themselves and recur periodically is the
Humian doctrine that our thought is composed of separate independent parts and is not a
sensibly continuous stream. That this doctrine entirely misrepresents the natural appearances
is what I next shall try to show.
3) Within each personal consciousness, thought is sensibly continuous.
I can only deﬁne 'continuous' as that which is without breach, crack, or division. I have
already said that the breach from one mind to another is perhaps the greatest breach in
nature. The only breaches that can well be conceived to occur within the limits of a single
mind would either be interruptions, time-gaps during which the consciousness went out
altogether to come into existence again at a later moment; or they would be breaks in the
quality, or content, of the thought, so abrupt that the segment that followed had no
connection whatever with the one that went before. The proposition that within each
personal consciousness thought feels continuous, means two things:
1. That even where there is a time-gap the consciousness after it feels as if it belonged
together with the consciousness before it, as another part of the same self;
2. That the changes from one moment to another in the quality of the consciousness are
never absolutely abrupt.
The case of the time-gaps, as the simplest, shall be taken ﬁrst. And ﬁrst of all a word about
time-gaps of which the consciousness may not be itself aware.
On page 200 we saw that such time-gaps existed, and that they might be more numerous
than is usually supposed. If the consciousness is not aware of them, it cannot feel them as
interruptions. In the unconsciousness produced by nitrous oxide and other anæsthetics, in
that of epilepsy and fainting, the broken edges of the sentient life may meet and merge over [Pg 238]
the gap, much as the feelings of space of the opposite margins of the 'blind spot' meet and
merge over that objective interruption to the sensitiveness of the eye. Such consciousness as
this, whatever it be for the onlooking psychologist, is for itself unbroken. It feels unbroken;
a waking day of it is sensibly a unit as long as that day lasts, in the sense in which the hours
themselves are units, as having all their parts next each other, with no intrusive alien
substance between. To expect the consciousness to feel the interruptions of its objective
continuity as gaps, would be like expecting the eye to feel a gap of silence because it does
not hear, or the ear to feel a gap of darkness because it does not see. So much for the gaps
that are unfelt.
With the felt gaps the case is different. On waking from sleep, we usually know that we
have been unconscious, and we often have an accurate judgment of how long. The judgment
here is certainly an inference from sensible signs, and its ease is due to long practice in the
particular ﬁeld.[225] The result of it, however, is that the consciousness is, for itself, not what
it was in the former case, but interrupted and discontinuous, in the mere sense of the words.
But in the other sense of continuity, the sense of the parts being inwardly connected and
belonging together because they are parts of a common whole, the consciousness remains
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sensibly continuous and one. What now is the common whole? The natural name for it is
myself, I, or me.
When Paul and Peter wake up in the same bed, and recognize that they have been asleep,
each one of them mentally reaches back and makes connection with but one of the two
streams of thought which were broken by the sleeping hours. As the current of an electrode
buried in the ground unerringly ﬁnds its way to its own similarly buried mate, across no
matter how much intervening earth; so Peter's present instantly ﬁnds out Peter's past, and
never by mistake knits itself on to that of Paul. Paul's thought in turn is as little liable to go
astray. The past thought of Peter is appropriated by the present Peter alone. He may have a [Pg 239]
knowledge, and a correct one too, of what Paul's last drowsy states of mind were as he sank
into sleep, but it is an entirely different sort of knowledge from that which he has of his own
last states. He remembers his own states, whilst he only conceives Paul's. Remembrance is
like direct feeling; its object is suffused with a warmth and intimacy to which no object of
mere conception ever attains. This quality of warmth and intimacy and immediacy is what
Peter's present thought also possesses for itself. So sure as this present is me, is mine, it
says, so sure is anything else that comes with the same warmth and intimacy and
immediacy, me and mine. What the qualities called warmth and intimacy may in themselves
be will have to be matter for future consideration. But whatever past feelings appear with
those qualities must be admitted to receive the greeting of the present mental state, to be
owned by it, and accepted as belonging together with it in a common self. This community
of self is what the time-gap cannot break in twain, and is why a present thought, although
not ignorant of the time-gap, can still regard itself as continuous with certain chosen
portions of the past.
Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or
'train' do not describe it ﬁtly as it presents itself in the ﬁrst instance. It is nothing jointed; it
ﬂows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In
talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective
life.

But now there appears, even within the limits of the same self, and between thoughts all of
which alike have this same sense of belonging together, a kind of jointing and separateness
among the parts, of which this statement seems to take no account. I refer to the breaks that
are produced by sudden contrasts in the quality of the successive segments of the stream of
thought If the words 'chain' and 'train' had no natural ﬁtness in them, how came such words
to be used at all? Does not a loud explosion rend the consciousness upon which it abruptly
breaks, in twain? Does not every sudden shock, appearance of a new object, or change in a [Pg 240]
sensation, create a real interruption, sensibly felt as such, which cuts the conscious stream
across at the moment at which it appears? Do not such interruptions smite us every hour of
our lives, and have we the right, in their presence, still to call our consciousness a
continuous stream?
This objection is based partly on a confusion and partly on a superﬁcial introspective view.
The confusion is between the thoughts themselves, taken as subjective facts, and the things
of which they are aware. It is natural to make this confusion, but easy to avoid it when once
put on one's guard. The things are discrete and discontinuous; they do pass before us in a
train or chain, making often explosive appearances and rending each other in twain. But
their comings and goings and contrasts no more break the ﬂow of the thought that thinks
them than they break the time and the space in which they lie. A silence may be broken by a
thunder-clap, and we may be so stunned and confused for a moment by the shock as to give
no instant account to ourselves of what has happened. But that very confusion is a mental
state, and a state that passes us straight over from the silence to the sound. The transition
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between the thought of one object and the thought of another is no more a break in the
thought than a joint in a bamboo is a break in the wood. It is a part of the consciousness as
much as the joint is a part of the bamboo.
The superﬁcial introspective view is the overlooking, even when the things are contrasted
with each other most violently, of the large amount of afﬁnity that may still remain between
the thoughts by whose means they are cognized. Into the awareness of the thunder itself the
awareness of the previous silence creeps and continues; for what we hear when the thunder
crashes is not thunder pure, but thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it.[226]
Our feeling of the same objective thunder, coming in this way, is quite different from what it
would be were the thunder a continuation of previous thunder. The thunder itself we believe [Pg 241]
to abolish and exclude the silence; but the feeling of the thunder is also a feeling of the
silence as just gone; and it would be difﬁcult to ﬁnd in the actual concrete consciousness of
man a feeling so limited to the present as not to have an inkling of anything that went
before. Here, again, language works against our perception of the truth. We name our
thoughts simply, each after its thing, as if each knew its own thing and nothing else. What
each really knows is clearly the thing it is named for, with dimly perhaps a thousand other
things. It ought to be named after all of them, but it never is. Some of them are always
things known a moment ago more clearly; others are things to be known more clearly a
moment hence.[227] Our own bodily position, attitude, condition, is one of the things of
which some awareness, however inattentive, invariably accompanies the knowledge of
whatever else we know. We think; and as we think we feel our bodily selves as the seat of [Pg 242]
the thinking. If the thinking be our thinking, it must be suffused through all its parts with
that peculiar warmth and intimacy that make it come as ours. Whether the warmth and
intimacy be anything more than the feeling of the same old body always there, is a matter
for the next chapter to decide. Whatever the content of the ego may be, it is habitually felt
with everything else by us humans, and must form a liaison between all the things of which
we become successively aware.[228]
On this gradualness in the changes of our mental content the principles of nerve-action can
throw some more light. When studying, in Chapter III, the summation of nervous activities,
we saw that no state of the brain can be supposed instantly to die away. If a new state
comes, the inertia of the old state will still be there and modify the result accordingly. Of
course we cannot tell, in our ignorance, what in each instance the modiﬁcations ought to be.
The commonest modiﬁcations in sense-perception are known as the phenomena of contrast.
In æsthetics they are the feelings of delight or displeasure which certain particular orders in
a series of impressions give. In thought, strictly and narrowly so called, they are
unquestionably that consciousness of the whence and the whither that always accompanies
its ﬂows. If recently the brain-tract a was vividly excited, and then b, and now vividly c, the
total present consciousness is not produced simply by c's excitement, but also by the dying
vibrations of a and b as well. If we want to represent the brain-process we must write it thus:
c
ab —three different processes coexisting, and correlated with them a thought which is no
one of the three thoughts which they would have produced had each of them occurred alone.
But whatever this fourth thought may exactly be, it seems impossible that it should not be
something like each of the three other thoughts whose tracts are concerned in its production,
though in a fast-waning phase.
It all goes back to what we said in another connection only a few pages ago (p. 233). As the [Pg 243]
total neurosis changes, so does the total psychosis change. But as the changes of neurosis
are never absolutely discontinuous, so must the successive psychoses shade gradually into
each other, although their rate of change may be much faster at one moment than at the
next.
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This difference in the rate of change lies at the basis of a difference of subjective states of
which we ought immediately to speak. When the rate is slow we are aware of the object of
our thought in a comparatively restful and stable way. When rapid, we are aware of a
passage, a relation, a transition from it, or between it and something else. As we take, in fact,
a general view of the wonderful stream of our consciousness, what strikes us ﬁrst is this
different pace of its parts. Like a bird's life, it seems to be made of an alternation of ﬂights
and perchings. The rhythm of language expresses this, where every thought is expressed in a
sentence, and every sentence closed by a period. The resting-places are usually occupied by
sensorial imaginations of some sort, whose peculiarity is that they can be held before the
mind for an indeﬁnite time, and contemplated without changing; the places of ﬂight are
ﬁlled with thoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that for the most part obtain between the
matters contemplated in the periods of comparative rest.
Let us call the resting-places the 'substantive parts,' and the places of ﬂight the 'transitive
parts,' of the stream of thought. It then appears that the main end of our thinking is at all
times the attainment of some other substantive part than the one from which we have just
been dislodged. And we may say that the main use of the transitive parts is to lead us from
one substantive conclusion to another.
Now it is very difﬁcult, introspectively, to see the transitive parts for what they really are. If
they are but ﬂights to a conclusion, stopping them to look at them before the conclusion is
reached is really annihilating them. Whilst if we wait till the conclusion be reached, it so
exceeds them in vigor and stability that it quite eclipses and swallows them up in its glare. [Pg 244]
Let anyone try to cut a thought across in the middle and get a look at its section, and he will
see how difﬁcult the introspective observation of the transitive tracts is. The rush of the
thought is so headlong that it almost always brings us up at the conclusion before we can
arrest it. Or if our purpose is nimble enough and we do arrest it, it ceases forthwith to be
itself. As a snow-ﬂake crystal caught in the warm hand is no longer a crystal but a drop, so,
instead of catching the feeling of relation moving to its term, we ﬁnd we have caught some
substantive thing, usually the last word we were pronouncing, statically taken, and with its
function, tendency, and particular meaning in the sentence quite evaporated. The attempt at
introspective analysis in these cases is in fact like seizing a spinning top to catch its motion,
or trying to turn up the gas quickly enough to see how the darkness looks. And the challenge
to produce these psychoses, which is sure to be thrown by doubting psychologists at anyone
who contends for their existence, is as unfair as Zeno's treatment of the advocates of motion,
when, asking them to point out in what place an arrow is when it moves, he argues the
falsity of their thesis from their inability to make to so preposterous a question an immediate
reply.
The results of this introspective difﬁculty are baleful. If to hold fast and observe the
transitive parts of thought's stream be so hard, then the great blunder to which all schools are
liable must be the failure to register them, and the undue emphasizing of the more
substantive parts of the stream. Were we not ourselves a moment since in danger of ignoring
any feeling transitive between the silence and the thunder, and of treating their boundary as
a sort of break in the mind? Now such ignoring as this has historically worked in two ways.
One set of thinkers have been led by it to Sensationalism. Unable to lay their hands on any
coarse feelings corresponding to the innumerable relations and forms of connection between
the facts of the world, ﬁnding no named subjective modiﬁcations mirroring such relations,
they have for the most part denied that feelings of relation exist, and many of them, like
Hume, have gone so far as to deny the reality of most relations out of the mind as well as in [Pg 245]
it. Substantive psychoses, sensations and their copies and derivatives, juxtaposed like
dominoes in a game, but really separate, everything else verbal illusion,—such is the upshot
of this view.[229] The Intellectualists, on the other hand, unable to give up the reality of
relations extra mentem, but equally unable to point to any distinct substantive feelings in
which they were known, have made the same admission that the feelings do not exist. But
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they have drawn an opposite conclusion. The relations must be known, they say, in
something that is no feeling, no mental modiﬁcation continuous and consubstantial with the
subjective tissue out of which sensations and other substantive states are made. They are
known, these relations, by something that lies on an entirely different plane, by an actus
purus of Thought, Intellect, or Reason, all written with capitals and considered to mean
something unutterably superior to any fact of sensibility whatever.
But from our point of view both Intellectualists and Sensationalists are wrong. If there be
such things as feelings at all, then so surely as relations between objects exist in rerum
naturâ, so surely, and more surely, do feelings exist to which these relations are known.
There is not a conjunction or a preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form,
or inﬂection of voice, in human speech, that does not express some shading or other of
relation which we at some moment actually feel to exist between the larger objects of our
thought. If we speak objectively, it is the real relations that appear revealed; if we speak
subjectively, it is the stream of consciousness that matches each of them by an inward
coloring of its own. In either case the relations are numberless, and no existing language is
capable of doing justice to all their shades.
We ought to say a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but, and a feeling of by, quite as
readily as we say a feeling of blue or a feeling of cold. Yet we do not: so inveterate has our [Pg 246]
habit become of recognizing the existence of the substantive parts alone, that language
almost refuses to lend itself to any other use. The Empiricists have always dwelt on its
inﬂuence in making us suppose that where we have a separate name, a separate thing must
needs be there to correspond with it; and they have rightly denied the existence of the mob
of abstract entities, principles, and forces, in whose favor no other evidence than this could
be brought up. But they have said nothing of that obverse error, of which we said a word in
Chapter VII, (see p. 195), of supposing that where there is no name no entity can exist. All
dumb or anonymous psychic states have, owing to this error, been coolly suppressed; or, if
recognized at all, have been named after the substantive perception they led to, as thoughts
'about' this object or 'about' that, the stolid word about engulﬁng all their delicate
idiosyncrasies in its monotonous sound. Thus the greater and greater accentuation and
isolation of the substantive parts have continually gone on.
Once more take a look at the brain. We believe the brain to be an organ whose internal
equilibrium is always in a state of change,—the change affecting every part. The pulses of
change are doubtless more violent in one place than in another, their rhythm more rapid at
this time than at that. As in a kaleidoscope revolving at a uniform rate, although the ﬁgures
are always rearranging themselves, there are instants during which the transformation seems
minute and interstitial and almost absent, followed by others when it shoots with magical
rapidity, relatively stable forms thus alternating with forms we should not distinguish if seen
again; so in the brain the perpetual rearrangement must result in some forms of tension
lingering relatively long, whilst others simply come and pass. But if consciousness
corresponds to the fact of rearrangement itself, why, if the rearrangement stop not, should
the consciousness ever cease? And if a lingering rearrangement brings with it one kind of
consciousness, why should not a swift rearrangement bring another kind of consciousness as
peculiar as the rearrangement itself? The lingering consciousnesses, if of simple objects, we [Pg 247]
call 'sensations' or 'images,' according as they are vivid or faint; if of complex objects, we
call them 'percepts' when vivid, 'concepts' or 'thoughts' when faint. For the swift
consciousnesses we have only those names of 'transitive states,' or 'feelings of relation,'
which we have used.[230] As the brain-changes are continuous, so do all these [Pg 248]
consciousnesses melt into each other like dissolving views. Properly they are but one
protracted consciousness, one unbroken stream.
Feelings of Tendency.
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So much for the transitive states. But there are other unnamed states or qualities of states
that are just as important and just as cognitive as they, and just as much unrecognized by the [Pg 250]
traditional sensationalist and intellectualist philosophies of mind. The ﬁrst fails to ﬁnd them
at all, the second ﬁnds their cognitive function, but denies that anything in the way of feeling
has a share in bringing it about. Examples will make clear what these inarticulate psychoses,
due to waxing and waning excitements of the brain, are like.[231]
Suppose three successive persons say to us: 'Wait!' 'Hark!' 'Look!' Our consciousness is
thrown into three quite different attitudes of expectancy, although no deﬁnite object is [Pg 251]
before it in any one of the three cases. Leaving out different actual bodily attitudes, and
leaving out the reverberating images of the three words, which are of course diverse,
probably no one will deny the existence of a residual conscious affection, a sense of the
direction from which an impression is about to come, although no positive impression is yet
there. Meanwhile we have no names for the psychoses in question but the names hark, look,
and wait.
Suppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of our consciousness is peculiar. There
is a gap therein; but no mere gap. It is a gap that is intensely active. A sort of wraith of the
name is in it, beckoning us in a given direction, making us at moments tingle with the sense
of our closeness, and then letting us sink back without the longed-for term. If wrong names
are proposed to us, this singularly deﬁnite gap acts immediately so as to negate them. They
do not ﬁt into its mould. And the gap of one word does not feel like the gap of another, all
empty of content as both might seem necessarily to be when described as gaps. When I
vainly try to recall the name of Spalding, my consciousness is far removed from what it is
when I vainly try to recall the name of Bowles. Here some ingenious persons will say: "How
can the two consciousnesses be different when the terms which might make them different
are not there? All that is there, so long as the effort to recall is vain, is the bare effort itself.
How should that differ in the two cases? You are making it seem to differ by prematurely
ﬁlling it out with the different names, although these, by the hypothesis, have not yet come.
Stick to the two efforts as they are, without naming them after facts not yet existent, and
you'll be quite unable to designate any point in which they differ." Designate, truly enough.
We can only designate the difference by borrowing the names of objects not yet in the mind.
Which is to say that our psychological vocabulary is wholly inadequate to name the
differences that exist, even such strong differences as these. But namelessness is compatible
with existence. There are innumerable consciousnesses of emptiness, no one of which taken [Pg 252]
in itself has a name, but all different from each other. The ordinary way is to assume that
they are all emptinesses of consciousness, and so the same state. But the feeling of an
absence is toto cœlo other than the absence of a feeling. It is an intense feeling. The rhythm
of a lost word may be there without a sound to clothe it; or the evanescent sense of
something which is the initial vowel or consonant may mock us ﬁtfully, without growing
more distinct. Every one must know the tantalizing effect of the blank rhythm of some
forgotten verse, restlessly dancing in one's mind, striving to be ﬁlled out with words.
Again, what is the strange difference between an experience tasted for the ﬁrst time and the
same experience recognized as familiar, as having been enjoyed before, though we cannot
name it or say where or when? A tune, an odor, a ﬂavor sometimes carry this inarticulate
feeling of their familiarity so deep into our consciousness that we are fairly shaken by its
mysterious emotional power. But strong and characteristic as this psychosis is—it probably
is due to the submaximal excitement of wide-spreading associational brain-tracts—the only
name we have for all its shadings is 'sense of familiarity.'
When we read such phrases as 'naught but,' 'either one or the other,' 'a is b, but,' 'although it
is, nevertheless,' 'it is an excluded middle, there is no tertium quid,' and a host of other
verbal skeletons of logical relation, is it true that there is nothing more in our minds than the
words themselves as they pass? What then is the meaning of the words which we think we
understand as we read? What makes that meaning different in one phrase from what it is in
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the other? 'Who?' 'When?' 'Where?' Is the difference of felt meaning in these interrogatives
nothing more than their difference of sound? And is it not (just like the difference of sound
itself) known and understood in an affection of consciousness correlative to it, though so
impalpable to direct examination? Is not the same true of such negatives as 'no,' 'never,' 'not
yet'?
The truth is that large tracts of human speech are nothing but signs of direction in thought, [Pg 253]
of which direction we nevertheless have an acutely discriminative sense, though no deﬁnite
sensorial image plays any part in it whatsoever. Sensorial images are stable psychic facts;
we can hold them still and look at them as long as we like. These bare images of logical
movement, on the contrary, are psychic transitions, always on the wing, so to speak, and not
to be glimpsed except in ﬂight. Their function is to lead from one set of images to another.
As they pass, we feel both the waxing and the waning images in a way altogether peculiar
and a way quite different from the way of their full presence. If we try to hold fast the
feeling of direction, the full presence comes and the feeling of direction is lost. The blank
verbal scheme of the logical movement gives us the ﬂeeting sense of the movement as we
read it, quite as well as does a rational sentence awakening deﬁnite imaginations by its
words.
What is that ﬁrst instantaneous glimpse of some one's meaning which we have, when in
vulgar phrase we say we 'twig' it? Surely an altogether speciﬁc affection of our mind. And
has the reader never asked himself what kind of a mental fact is his intention of saying a
thing before he has said it? It is an entirely deﬁnite intention, distinct from all other
intentions, an absolutely distinct state of consciousness, therefore; and yet how much of it
consists of deﬁnite sensorial images, either of words or of things? Hardly anything! Linger,
and the words and things come into the mind; the anticipatory intention, the divination is
there no more. But as the words that replace it arrive, it welcomes them successively and
calls them right if they agree with it, it rejects them and calls them wrong if they do not. It
has therefore a nature of its own of the most positive sort, and yet what can we say about it
without using words that belong to the later mental facts that replace it? The intention tosay-so-and-so is the only name it can receive. One may admit that a good third of our
psychic life consists in these rapid premonitory perspective views of schemes of thought not
yet articulate. How comes it about that a man reading something aloud for the ﬁrst time is
able immediately to emphasize all his words aright, unless from the very ﬁrst he have a [Pg 254]
sense of at least the form of the sentence yet to come, which sense is fused with his
consciousness of the present word, and modiﬁes its emphasis in his mind so as to make him
give it the proper accent as he utters it? Emphasis of this kind is almost altogether a matter
of grammatical construction. If we read 'no more' we expect presently to come upon a 'than';
if we read 'however' at the outset of a sentence it is a 'yet,' a 'still,' or a 'nevertheless,' that we
expect. A noun in a certain position demands a verb in a certain mood and number, in
another position it expects a relative pronoun. Adjectives call for nouns, verbs for adverbs,
etc., etc. And this foreboding of the coming grammatical scheme combined with each
successive uttered word is so practically accurate that a reader incapable of understanding
four ideas of the book he is reading aloud, can nevertheless read it with the most delicately
modulated expression of intelligence.
Some will interpret these facts by calling them all cases in which certain images, by laws of
association, awaken others so very rapidly that we think afterwards we felt the very
tendencies of the nascent images to arise, before they were actually there. For this school the
only possible materials of consciousness are images of a perfectly deﬁnite nature.
Tendencies exist, but they are facts for the outside psychologist rather than for the subject of
the observation. The tendency is thus a psychical zero; only its results are felt.
Now what I contend for, and accumulate examples to show, is that 'tendencies' are not only
descriptions from without, but that they are among the objects of the stream, which is thus
aware of them from within, and must be described as in very large measure constituted of
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feelings of tendency, often so vague that we are unable to name them at all. It is, in short, the
re-instatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental life which I am so anxious to
press on the attention. Mr. Galton and Prof. Huxley have, as we shall see in Chapter XVIII,
made one step in advance in exploding the ridiculous theory of Hume and Berkeley that we
can have no images but of perfectly deﬁnite things. Another is made in the overthrow of the
equally ridiculous notion that, whilst simple objective qualities are revealed to our [Pg 255]
knowledge in subjective feelings, relations are not. But these reforms are not half sweeping
and radical enough. What must be admitted is that the deﬁnite images of traditional
psychology form but the very smallest part of our minds as they actually live. The
traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river consists of nothing but pailsful,
spoonsful, quartpotsful, barrelsful, and other moulded forms of water. Even were the pails
and the pots all actually standing in the stream, still between them the free water would
continue to ﬂow. It is just this free water of consciousness that psychologists resolutely
overlook. Every deﬁnite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that ﬂows
round it. With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it
came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead. The signiﬁcance, the value, of the
image is all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it,—or rather that is fused
into one with it and has become bone of its bone and ﬂesh of its ﬂesh; leaving it, it is true,
an image of the same thing it was before, but making it an image of that thing newly taken
and freshly understood.
What is that shadowy scheme of the 'form' of an opera, play, or book, which remains in our
mind and on which we pass judgment when the actual thing is done? What is our notion of a
scientiﬁc or philosophical system? Great thinkers have vast premonitory glimpses of
schemes of relation between terms, which hardly even as verbal images enter the mind, so
rapid is the whole process.[232] We all of us have this permanent consciousness of whither
our thought is going. It is a feeling like any other, a feeling of what thoughts are next to [Pg 256]
arise, before they have arisen. This ﬁeld of view of consciousness varies very much in
extent, depending largely on the degree of mental freshness or fatigue. When very fresh, our
minds carry an immense horizon with them. The present image shoots its perspective far
before it, irradiating in advance the regions in which lie the thoughts as yet unborn. Under
ordinary conditions the halo of felt relations is much more circumscribed. And in states of
extreme brain-fag the horizon is narrowed almost to the passing word,—the associative
machinery, however, providing for the next word turning up in orderly sequence, until at last
the tired thinker is led to some kind of a conclusion. At certain moments he may ﬁnd
himself doubting whether his thoughts have not come to a full stop; but the vague sense of a
plus ultra makes him ever struggle on towards a more deﬁnite expression of what it may be;
whilst the slowness of his utterance shows how difﬁcult, under such conditions, the labor of
thinking must be.
The awareness that our deﬁnite thought has come to a stop is an entirely different thing from
the awareness that our thought is deﬁnitively completed. The expression of the latter state of
mind is the falling inﬂection which betokens that the sentence is ended, and silence. The
expression of the former state is 'hemming and hawing,' or else such phrases as 'et cetera,' or
'and so forth.' But notice that every part of the sentence to be left incomplete feels
differently as it passes, by reason of the premonition we have that we shall be unable to end
it. The 'and so forth' casts its shadow back, and is as integral a part of the object of the
thought as the distinctest of images would be.
Again, when we use a common noun, such as man, in a universal sense, as signifying all
possible men, we are fully aware of this intention on our part, and distinguish it carefully
from our intention when we mean a certain group of men, or a solitary individual before us.
In the chapter on Conception we shall see how important this difference of intention is. It
casts its inﬂuence over the whole of the sentence, both before and after the spot in which the
word man is used.
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Nothing is easier than to symbolize all these facts in terms of brain-action. Just as the echo [Pg 257]
of the whence, the sense of the starting point of our thought, is probably due to the dying
excitement of processes but a moment since vividly aroused; so the sense of the whither, the
foretaste of the terminus, must be due to the waxing excitement of tracts or processes which,
a moment hence, will be the cerebral correlatives of some thing which a moment hence will
be vividly present to the thought. Represented by a curve, the neurosis underlying
consciousness must at any moment be like this:

FIG. 27.

Each point of the horizontal line stands for some brain-tract or process. The height of the
curve above the line stands for the intensity of the process. All the processes are present, in
the intensities shown by the curve. But those before the latter's apex were more intense a
moment ago; those after it will be more intense a moment hence. If I recite a, b, c, d, e, f, g,
at the moment of uttering d, neither a, b, c, nor e, f, g, are out of my consciousness
altogether, but both, after their respective fashions, 'mix their dim lights' with the stronger
one of the d, because their neuroses are both awake in some degree.
There is a common class of mistakes which shows how brain-processes begin to be excited
before the thoughts attached to them are due—due, that is, in substantive and vivid form. I
mean those mistakes of speech or writing by which, in Dr. Carpenter's words, "we
mispronounce or misspell a word, by introducing into it a letter or syllable of some other,
whose turn is shortly to come; or, it may be, the whole of the anticipated word is substituted
for the one which ought to have been expressed."[233] In these cases one of two things must [Pg 258]
have happened: either some local accident of nutrition blocks the process that is due, so that
other processes discharge that ought as yet to be but nascently aroused; or some opposite
local accident furthers the latter processes and makes them explode before their time. In the
chapter on Association of Ideas, numerous instances will come before us of the actual effect
on consciousness of neuroses not yet maximally aroused.
It is just like the 'overtones' in music. Different instruments give the 'same note,' but each in
a different voice, because each gives more than that note, namely, various upper harmonics
of it which differ from one instrument to another. They are not separately heard by the ear;
they blend with the fundamental note, and suffuse it, and alter it; and even so do the waxing
and waning brain-processes at every moment blend with and suffuse and alter the psychic
effect of the processes which are at their culminating point.

Let us use the words psychic overtone, suffusion, or fringe, to designate the inﬂuence of a
faint brain-process upon our thought, as it makes it aware of relations and objects but dimly
perceived.[234]
If we then consider the cognitive function of different states of mind, we may feel assured [Pg 259]
that the difference between those that are mere 'acquaintance,' and those that are
'knowledges-about' (see p. 221) is reducible almost entirely to the absence or presence of
psychic fringes or overtones. Knowledge about a thing is knowledge of its relations.
Acquaintance with it is limitation to the bare impression which it makes. Of most of its
relations we are only aware in the penumbral nascent way of a 'fringe' of unarticulated
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afﬁnities about it. And, before passing to the next topic in order, I must say a little of this
sense of afﬁnity, as itself one of the most interesting features of the subjective stream.
In all our voluntary thinking there is some topic or subject about which all the members of
the thought revolve. Half the time this topic is a problem, a gap we cannot yet ﬁll with a
deﬁnite picture, word, or phrase, but which, in the manner described some time back,
inﬂuences us in an intensely active and determinate psychic way. Whatever may be the
images and phrases that pass before us, we feel their relation to this aching gap. To ﬁll it up
is our thoughts' destiny. Some bring us nearer to that consummation. Some the gap negates
as quite irrelevant. Each swims in a felt fringe of relations of which the aforesaid gap is the
term. Or instead of a deﬁnite gap we may merely carry a mood of interest about with us.
Then, however vague the mood, it will still act in the same way, throwing a mantle of felt
afﬁnity over such representations, entering the mind, as suit it, and tingeing with the feeling
of tediousness or discord all those with which it has no concern.
Relation, then, to our topic or interest is constantly felt in the fringe, and particularly the
relation of harmony and discord, of furtherance or hindrance of the topic. When the sense of
furtherance is there, we are 'all right;' with the sense of hindrance we are dissatisﬁed and
perplexed, and cast about us for other thoughts. Now any thought the quality of whose
fringe lets us feel ourselves 'all right,' is an acceptable member of our thinking, whatever
kind of thought it may otherwise be. Provided we only feel it to have a place in the scheme
of relations in which the interesting topic also lies, that is quite sufﬁcient to make of it a [Pg 260]
relevant and appropriate portion of our train of ideas.
For the important thing about a train of thought is its conclusion. That is the meaning, or, as
we say, the topic of the thought. That is what abides when all its other members have faded
from memory. Usually this conclusion is a word or phrase or particular image, or practical
attitude or resolve, whether rising to answer a problem or ﬁll a pre-existing gap that worried
us, or whether accidentally stumbled on in revery. In either case it stands out from the other
segments of the stream by reason of the peculiar interest attaching to it. This interest arrests
it, makes a sort of crisis of it when it comes, induces attention upon it and makes us treat it
in a substantive way.
The parts of the stream that precede these substantive conclusions are but the means of the
latter's attainment. And, provided the same conclusion be reached, the means may be as
mutable as we like, for the 'meaning' of the stream of thought will be the same. What
difference does it make what the means are? "Qu'importe le ﬂacon, pourvu qu'on ait
l'ivresse?" The relative unimportance of the means appears from the fact that when the
conclusion is there, we have always forgotten most of the steps preceding its attainment.
When we have uttered a proposition, we are rarely able a moment afterwards to recall our
exact words, though we can express it in different words easily enough. The practical upshot
of a book we read remains with us, though we may not recall one of its sentences.
The only paradox would seem to lie in supposing that the fringe of felt afﬁnity and discord
can be the same in two heterogeneous sets of images. Take a train of words passing through
the mind and leading to a certain conclusion on the one hand, and on the other hand an
almost wordless set of tactile, visual and other fancies leading to the same conclusion. Can
the halo, fringe, or scheme in which we feel the words to lie be the same as that in which we
feel the images to lie? Does not the discrepancy of terms involve a discrepancy of felt
relations among them?
If the terms be taken quâ mere sensations, it assuredly does. For instance, the words may
rhyme with each other,—the visual images can have no such afﬁnity as that. But quâ [Pg 261]
thoughts, quâ sensations understood, the words have contracted by long association fringes
of mutual repugnance or afﬁnity with each other and with the conclusion, which run exactly
parallel with like fringes in the visual, tactile and other ideas. The most important element of
these fringes is, I repeat, the mere feeling of harmony or discord, of a right or wrong
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direction in the thought. Dr. Campbell has, so far as I know, made the best analysis of this
fact, and his words, often quoted, deserve to be quoted again. The chapter is entitled "What
is the cause that nonsense so often escapes being detected, both by the writer and by the
reader?" The author, in answering this question, makes (inter alia) the following remarks:
[235]

"That connection [he says] or relation which comes gradually to subsist among
the different words of a language, in the minds of those who speak it,... is
merely consequent on this, that those words are employed as signs of connected
or related things. It is an axiom in geometry that things equal to the same thing
are equal to one another. It may, in like manner, be admitted as an axiom in
psychology that ideas associated by the same idea will associate one another.
Hence it will happen that if, from experiencing the connection of two things,
there results, as infallibly there will result, an association between the ideas or
notions annexed to them, as each idea will moreover be associated by its sign,
there will likewise be an association between the ideas of the signs. Hence the
sounds considered as signs will be conceived to have a connection analogous to
that which subsisteth among the things signiﬁed; I say, the sounds considered as
signs; for this way of considering them constantly attends us in speaking,
writing, hearing, and reading. When we purposely abstract from it, and regard
them merely as sounds, we are instantly sensible that they are quite
unconnected, and have no other relation than what ariseth from similitude of
tone or accent. But to consider them in this manner commonly results from
previous design, and requires a kind of effort which is not exerted in the
ordinary use of speech. In ordinary use they are regarded solely as signs, or,
rather, they are confounded with the things they signify; the consequence of
which is that, in the manner just now explained, we come insensibly to
conceive a connection among them of a very different sort from that of which
sounds are naturally susceptible.
"Now this conception, habit, or tendency of the mind, call it which you please,
is considerably strengthened by the frequent use of language and by the
structure of it. Language is the sole channel through which we communicate
our knowledge and discoveries to others, and through which the knowledge and
discoveries of others are communicated to us. By reiterated recourse to this
medium, it necessarily happens that when things are related to each other, the
words signifying those things are more commonly brought together in
discourse. Hence the words and names by themselves, by customary vicinity,
contract in the fancy a relation additional to that which they derive purely from
being the symbols of related things. Farther, this tendency is strengthened by
the structure of language. All languages whatever, even the most barbarous, as
far as hath yet appeared, are of a regular and analogical make. The consequence
is that similar relations in things will be expressed similarly; that is, by similar
inﬂections, derivations, compositions, arrangement of words, or juxtaposition
of particles, according to the genius or grammatical form of the particular
tongue. Now as, by the habitual use of a language (even though it were quite
irregular), the signs would insensibly become connected in the imagination
wherever the things signiﬁed are connected in nature, so, by the regular
structure of a language, this connection among the signs is conceived as
analogous to that which subsisteth among their archetypes."

[Pg 262]

If we know English and French and begin a sentence in French, all the later words that come
are French; we hardly ever drop into English. And this afﬁnity of the French words for each
other is not something merely operating mechanically as a brain-law, it is something we feel
at the time. Our understanding of a French sentence heard never falls to so low an ebb that
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we are not aware that the words linguistically belong together. Our attention can hardly so
wander that if an English word be suddenly introduced we shall not start at the change. Such
a vague sense as this of the words belonging together is the very minimum of fringe that can
accompany them, if 'thought' at all. Usually the vague perception that all the words we hear
belong to the same language and to the same special vocabulary in that language, and that
the grammatical sequence is familiar, is practically equivalent to an admission that what we
hear is sense. But if an unusual foreign word be introduced, if the grammar trip, or if a term
from an incongruous vocabulary suddenly appear, such as 'rat-trap' or 'plumber's bill' in a
philosophical discourse, the sentence detonates, as it were, we receive a shock from the
incongruity, and the drowsy assent is gone. The feeling of rationality in these cases seems
rather a negative than a positive thing, being the mere absence of shock, or sense of discord, [Pg 263]
between the terms of thought.
So delicate and incessant is this recognition by the mind of the mere ﬁtness of words to be
mentioned together that the slightest misreading, such as 'casualty' for 'causality,' or
'perpetual' for 'perceptual,' will be corrected by a listener whose attention is so relaxed that
he gets no idea of the meaning of the sentence at all.
Conversely, if words do belong to the same vocabulary, and if the grammatical structure is
correct, sentences with absolutely no meaning may be uttered in good faith and pass
unchallenged. Discourses at prayer-meetings, reshufﬂing the same collection of cant
phrases, and the whole genus of penny-a-line-isms and newspaper-reporter's ﬂourishes give
illustrations of this. "The birds ﬁlled the tree-tops with their morning song, making the air
moist, cool, and pleasant," is a sentence I remember reading once in a report of some
athletic exercises in Jerome Park. It was probably written unconsciously by the hurried
reporter, and read uncritically by many readers. An entire volume of 784 pages lately
published in Boston[236] is composed of stuff like this passage picked out at random:
"The ﬂow of the efferent ﬂuids of all these vessels from their outlets at the
terminal loop of each culminate link on the surface of the nuclear organism is
continuous as their respective atmospheric fruitage up to the altitudinal limit of
their expansibility, whence, when atmosphered by like but coalescing essences
from higher altitudes,—those sensibly expressed as the essential qualities of
external forms,—they descend, and become assimilated by the afferents of the
nuclear organism."[237]
There are every year works published whose contents show them to be by real lunatics. To [Pg 264]
the reader, the book quoted from seems pure nonsense from beginning to end. It is
impossible to divine, in such a case, just what sort of feeling of rational relation between the
words may have appeared to the author's mind. The border line between objective sense and
nonsense is hard to draw; that between subjective sense and nonsense, impossible.
Subjectively, any collocation of words may make sense—even the wildest words in a dream
—if one only does not doubt their belonging together. Take the obscurer passages in Hegel:
it is a fair question whether the rationality included in them be anything more than the fact
that the words all belong to a common vocabulary, and are strung together on a scheme of
predication and relation,—immediacy, self-relation, and what not,—which has habitually
recurred. Yet there seems no reason to doubt that the subjective feeling of the rationality of
these sentences was strong in the writer as he penned them, or even that some readers by
straining may have reproduced it in themselves.

To sum up, certain kinds of verbal associate, certain grammatical expectations fulﬁlled,
stand for a good part of our impression that a sentence has a meaning and is dominated by
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the Unity of one Thought. Nonsense in grammatical form sounds half rational; sense with
grammatical sequence upset sounds nonsensical; e.g., "Elba the Napoleon English faith had
banished broken to be Saint because Helena at." Finally, there is about each word the
psychic 'overtone' of feeling that it brings us nearer to a forefelt conclusion. Suffuse all the
words of a sentence, as they pass, with these three fringes or haloes of relation, let the
conclusion seem worth arriving at, and all will admit the sentence to be an expression of
[Pg 265]
thoroughly continuous, uniﬁed, and rational thought.[238]
Each word, in such a sentence, is felt, not only as a word, but as having a meaning. The
'meaning' of a word taken thus dynamically in a sentence may be quite different from its
meaning when taken statically or without context. The dynamic meaning is usually reduced
to the bare fringe we have described, of felt suitability or unﬁtness to the context and
conclusion. The static meaning, when the word is concrete, as 'table,' 'Boston,' consists of
sensory images awakened; when it is abstract, as 'criminal legislation,' 'fallacy,' the meaning
consists of other words aroused, forming the so-called 'deﬁnition.'
Hegel's celebrated dictum that pure being is identical with pure nothing results from his
taking the words statically, or without the fringe they wear in a context. Taken in isolation,
they agree in the single point of awakening no sensorial images. But taken dynamically, or
as signiﬁcant,—as thought,—their fringes of relation, their afﬁnities and repugnances, their
function and meaning, are felt and understood to be absolutely opposed.
Such considerations as these remove all appearance of paradox from those cases of
extremely deﬁcient visual imagery of whose existence Mr. Galton has made us aware (see
below). An exceptionally intelligent friend informs me that he can frame no image whatever
of the appearance of his breakfast-table. When asked how he then remembers it at all, he
says he simple 'knows' that it seated four people, and was covered with a white cloth on
which were a butter-dish, a coffee-pot, radishes, and so forth. The mind-stuff of which this
'knowing' is made seems to be verbal images exclusively. But if the words 'coffee,' 'bacon,'
'mufﬁns,' and 'eggs' lead a man to speak to his cook, to pay his bills, and to take measures
for the morrow's meal exactly as visual and gustatory memories would, why are they not, [Pg 266]
for all practical intents and purposes, as good a kind of material in which to think? In fact,
we may suspect them to be for most purposes better than terms with a richer imaginative
coloring. The scheme of relationship and the conclusion being the essential things in
thinking, that kind of mind-stuff which is handiest will be the best for the purpose. Now
words, uttered or unexpressed, are the handiest mental elements we have. Not only are they
very rapidly revivable, but they are revivable as actual sensations more easily than any other
items of our experience. Did they not possess some such advantage as this, it would hardly
be the case that the older men are and the more effective as thinkers, the more, as a rule,
they have lost their visualizing power and depend on words. This was ascertained by Mr.
Galton to be the case with members of the Royal Society. The present writer observes it in
his own person most distinctly.
On the other hand, a deaf and dumb man can weave his tactile and visual images into a
system of thought quite as effective and rational as that of a word-user. The question
whether thought is possible without language has been a favorite topic of discussion among
philosophers. Some interesting reminiscences of his childhood by Mr. Ballard, a deaf-mute
instructor in the National College at Washington, show it to be perfectly possible. A few
paragraphs may be quoted here.
"In consequence of the loss of my hearing in infancy, I was debarred from
enjoying the advantages which children in the full possession of their senses
derive from the exercises of the common primary school, from the every-day
talk of their school-fellows and playmates, and from the conversation of their
parents and other grown-up persons.
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"I could convey my thoughts and feelings to my parents and brothers by natural
signs or pantomime, and I could understand what they said to me by the same
medium; our intercourse being, however, conﬁned to the daily routine of home
affairs and hardly going beyond the circle of my own observation....
"My father adopted a course which he thought would, in some measure,
compensate me for the loss of my hearing. It was that of taking me with him
when business required him to ride abroad; and he took me more frequently
than he did my brothers; giving, as the reason for his apparent partiality, that
they could acquire information through the ear, while I depended solely upon
my eye for acquaintance with affairs of the outside world....

[Pg 267]

"I have a vivid recollection of the delight I felt in watching the different scenes
we passed through, observing the various phases of nature, both animate and
inanimate; though we did not, owing to my inﬁrmity, engage in conversation. It
was during those delightful rides, some two or three years before my initiation
into the rudiments of written language, that I began to ask myself the question:
How came the world into being? When this question occurred to my mind, I set
myself to thinking it over a long time. My curiosity was awakened as to what
was the origin of human life in its ﬁrst appearance upon the earth, and of
vegetable life as well, and also the cause of the existence of the earth, sun,
moon, and stars.
"I remember at one time when my eye fell upon a very large old stump which
we happened to pass in one of our rides, I asked myself, 'Is it possible that the
ﬁrst man that ever came into the world rose out of that stump? But that stump is
only a remnant of a once noble magniﬁcent tree, and how came that tree? Why,
it came only by beginning to grow out of the ground just like those little trees
now coming up.' And I dismissed from my mind, as an absurd idea, the
connection between the origin of man and a decaying old stump....
"I have no recollection of what it was that ﬁrst suggested to me the question as
to the origin of things. I had before this time gained ideas of the descent from
parent to child, of the propagation of animals, and of the production of plants
from seeds. The question that occurred to my mind was: whence came the ﬁrst
man, the ﬁrst animal, and the ﬁrst plant, at the remotest distance of time, before
which there was no man, no animal, no plant; since I knew they all had a
beginning and an end.
"It is impossible to state the exact order in which these different questions
arose, i.e., about men, animals, plants, the earth, sun, moon, etc. The lower
animals did not receive so much thought as was bestowed upon man and the
earth; perhaps because I put man and beast in the same class, since I believed
that man would be annihilated and there was no resurrection beyond the grave,
—though I am told by my mother that, in answer to my question, in the case of
a deceased uncle who looked to me like a person in sleep, she had tried to make
me understand that he would awake in the far future. It was my belief that man
and beast derived their being from the same source, and were to be laid down in
the dust in a state of annihilation. Considering the brute animal as of secondary
importance, and allied to man on a lower level, man and the earth were the two
things on which my mind dwelled most.
"I think I was ﬁve years old, when I began to understand the descent from
parent to child and the propagation of animals. I was nearly eleven years old,
when I entered the Institution where I was educated; and I remember distinctly
that it was at least two years before this time that I began to ask myself the
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question as to the origin of the universe. My age was then about eight, not over
nine years.
"Of the form of the earth, I had no idea in my childhood, except that, from a
look at a map of the hemispheres, I inferred there were two immense disks of
matter lying near each other. I also believed the sun and moon to be round, ﬂat
plates of illuminating matter; and for those luminaries I entertained a sort of
reverence on account of their power of lighting and heating the earth. I thought
from their coming up and going down, travelling across the sky in so regular a
manner that there must be a certain something having power to govern their
course. I believed the sun went into a hole at the west and came out of another
at the east, travelling through a great tube in the earth, describing the same
curve as it seemed to describe in the sky. The stars seemed to me to be tiny
lights studded in the sky.
"The source from which the universe came was the question about which my
mind revolved in a vain struggle to grasp it, or rather to ﬁght the way up to
attain to a satisfactory answer. When I had occupied myself with this subject a
considerable time, I perceived that it was a matter much greater than my mind
could comprehend; and I remember well that I became so appalled at its
mystery and so bewildered at my inability to grapple with it that I laid the
subject aside and out of my mind, glad to escape being, as it were, drawn into a
vortex of inextricable confusion. Though I felt relieved at this escape, yet I
could not resist the desire to know the truth; and I returned to the subject; but as
before, I left it, after thinking it over for some time. In this state of perplexity, I
hoped all the time to get at the truth, still believing that the more I gave thought
to the subject, the more my mind would penetrate the mystery. Thus I was
tossed like a shuttlecock, returning to the subject and recoiling from it, till I
came to school.
"I remember that my mother once told me about a being up above, pointing her
ﬁnger towards the sky and with a solemn look on her countenance. I do not
recall the circumstance which led to this communication. When she mentioned
the mysterious being up in the sky, I was eager to take hold of the subject, and
plied her with questions concerning the form and appearance of this unknown
being, asking if it was the sun, moon, or one of the stars. I knew she meant that
there was a living one somewhere up in the sky; but when I realized that she
could not answer my questions, I gave it up in despair, feeling sorrowful that I
could not obtain a deﬁnite idea of the mysterious living one up in the sky.
"One day, while we were haying in a ﬁeld, there was a series of heavy thunderclaps. I asked one of my brothers where they came from. He pointed to the sky
and made a zigzag motion with his ﬁnger, signifying lightning. I imagined there
was a great man somewhere in the blue vault, who made a loud noise with his
voice out of it; and each time I heard[239] a thunder-clap I was frightened, and
looked up at the sky, fearing he was speaking a threatening word."[240]
Here we may pause. The reader sees by this time that it makes
little or no difference in what sort of mind-stuff, in what quality of
imagery, his thinking goes on. The only images intrinsically
important are the halting-places, the substantive conclusions,
provisional or ﬁnal, of the thought. Throughout all the rest of the
stream, the feelings of relation are everything, and the terms
related almost naught. These feelings of relation, these psychic
overtones, halos, suffusions, or fringes about the terms, may be
the same in very different systems of imagery. A diagram may
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help to accentuate this indifference of the mental means where the end is the same. Let A be
some experience from which a number of thinkers start. Let Z be the practical conclusion
rationally inferrible from it. One gets to the conclusion by one line, another by another; one
follows a course of English, another of German, verbal imagery. With one, visual images
predominate; with another, tactile. Some trains are tinged with emotions, others not; some
are very abridged, synthetic and rapid, others, hesitating and broken into many steps. But
when the penultimate terms of all the trains, however differing inter se, ﬁnally shoot into the
same conclusion, we say and rightly say, that all the thinkers have had substantially the
same thought. It would probably astound each of them beyond measure to be let into his [Pg 270]
neighbor's mind and to ﬁnd how different the scenery there was from that in his own.
Thought is in fact a kind of Algebra, as Berkeley long ago said, "in which, though a
particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right, it is not requisite that in
every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to
stand for." Mr. Lewes has developed this algebra-analogy so well that I must quote his
words:
"The leading characteristic of algebra is that of operation on relations. This also
is the leading characteristic of Thought. Algebra cannot exist without values,
nor Thought without Feelings. The operations are so many blank forms till the
values are assigned. Words are vacant sounds, ideas are blank forms, unless
they symbolize images and sensations which are their values. Nevertheless it is
rigorously true, and of the greatest importance, that analysts carry on very
extensive operations with blank forms, never pausing to supply the symbols
with values until the calculation is completed; and ordinary men, no less than
philosophers, carry on long trains of thought without pausing to translate their
ideas (words) into images.... Suppose some one from a distance shouts 'a lion!'
At once the man starts in alarm.... To the man the word is not only an ...
expression of all that he has seen and heard of lions, capable of recalling
various experiences, but is also capable of taking its place in a connected series
of thoughts without recalling any of those experiences, without reviving an
image, however faint, of the lion—simply as a sign of a certain relation
included in the complex so named. Like an algebraic symbol it may be operated
on without conveying other signiﬁcance than an abstract relation: it is a sign of
Danger, related to fear with all its motor sequences. Its logical position
sufﬁces.... Ideas are substitutions which require a secondary process when what
is symbolized by them is translated into the images and experiences it replaces;
and this secondary process is frequently not performed at all, generally only
performed to a very small extent. Let anyone closely examine what has passed
in his mind when he has constructed a chain of reasoning, and he will be
surprised at the fewness and faintness of the images which have accompanied
the ideas. Suppose you inform me that 'the blood rushed violently from the
man's heart, quickening his pulse at the sight of his enemy.' Of the many latent
images in this phrase, how many were salient in your mind and in mine?
Probably two—the man and his enemy—and these images were faint. Images
of blood, heart, violent rushing, pulse, quickening, and sight, were either not
revived at all, or were passing shadows. Had any such images arisen, they
would have hampered thought, retarding the logical process of judgment by
irrelevant connections. The symbols had substituted relations for these values....
There are no images of two things and three things, when I say 'two and three
equal ﬁve;' there are simply familiar symbols having precise relations.... The
verbal symbol 'horse,' which stands for all our experiences of horses, serves all
the purposes of Thought, without recalling one of the images clustered in the
perception of horses, just as the sight of a horse's form serves all the purposes
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of recognition without recalling the sound of its neighing or its tramp, its
qualities as an animal of draught, and so forth."[241]
It need only be added that as the Algebrist, though the sequence of his terms is ﬁxed by their
relations rather than by their several values, must give a real value to the ﬁnal one he
reaches; so the thinker in words must let his concluding word or phrase be translated into its
full sensible-image-value, under penalty of the thought being left unrealized and pale.
This is all I have to say about the sensible continuity and unity of our thought as contrasted
with the apparent discreteness of the words, images, and other means by which it seems to
be carried on. Between all their substantive elements there is 'transitive' consciousness, and
the words and images are 'fringed,' and not as discrete as to a careless view they seem. Let
us advance now to the next head in our description of Thought's stream.
4. Human thought appears to deal with objects independent of itself; that is, it is
cognitive, or possesses the function of knowing.
For Absolute Idealism, the inﬁnite Thought and its objects are one. The Objects are, through
being thought; the eternal Mind is, through thinking them. Were a human thought alone in
the world there would be no reason for any other assumption regarding it. Whatever it might
have before it would be its vision, would be there, in its 'there,' or then, in its 'then'; and the
question would never arise whether an extra-mental duplicate of it existed or not. The
reason why we all believe that the objects of our thoughts have a duplicate existence
outside, is that there are many human thoughts, each with the same objects, as we cannot [Pg 272]
help supposing. The judgment that my thought has the same object as his thought is what
makes the psychologist call my thought cognitive of an outer reality. The judgment that my
own past thought and my own present thought are of the same object is what makes me take
the object out of either and project it by a sort of triangulation into an independent position,
from which it may appear to both. Sameness in a multiplicity of objective appearances is
thus the basis of our belief in realities outside of thought.[242] In Chapter XII we shall have
to take up the judgment of sameness again.
To show that the question of reality being extra-mental or not is not likely to arise in the
absence of repeated experiences of the same, take the example of an altogether
unprecedented experience, such as a new taste in the throat. Is it a subjective quality of
feeling, or an objective quality felt? You do not even ask the question at this point. It is
simply that taste. But if a doctor hears you describe it, and says: "Ha! Now you know what
heartburn is," then it becomes a quality already existent extra mentem tuam, which you in
turn have come upon and learned. The ﬁrst spaces, times, things, qualities, experienced by
the child probably appear, like the ﬁrst heartburn, in this absolute way, as simple beings,
neither in nor out of thought. But later, by having other thoughts than this present one, and
making repeated judgments of sameness among their objects, he corroborates in himself the
notion of realities, past and distant as well as present, which realities no one single thought
either possesses or engenders, but which all may contemplate and know. This, as was stated
in the last chapter, is the psychological point of view, the relatively uncritical non-idealistic
point of view of all natural science, beyond which this book cannot go. A mind which has
become conscious of its own cognitive function, plays what we have called 'the
psychologist' upon itself. It not only knows the things that appear before it; it knows that it [Pg 273]
knows them. This stage of reﬂective condition is, more or less explicitly, our habitual adult
state of mind.
It cannot, however, be regarded as primitive. The consciousness of objects must come ﬁrst.
We seem to lapse into this primordial condition when consciousness is reduced to a
minimum by the inhalation of anæsthetics or during a faint. Many persons testify that at a
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certain stage of the anæsthetic process objects are still cognized whilst the thought of self is
lost. Professor Herzen says:[243]
"During the syncope there is absolute psychic annihilation, the absence of all
consciousness; then at the beginning of coming to, one has at a certain moment
a vague, limitless, inﬁnite feeling—a sense of existence in general without the
least trace of distinction between the me and the not-me."
Dr. Shoemaker of Philadelphia describes during the deepest conscious stage of etherintoxication a vision of
"two endless parallel lines in swift longitudinal motion ... on a uniform misty
background ... together with a constant sound or whirr, not loud but distinct ...
which seemed to be connected with the parallel lines.... These phenomena
occupied the whole ﬁeld. There were present no dreams or visions in any way
connected with human affairs, no ideas or impressions akin to anything in past
experience, no emotions, of course no idea of personality. There was no
conception as to what being it was that was regarding the two lines, or that there
existed any such thing as such a being; the lines and waves were all."[244]
Similarly a friend of Mr. Herbert Spencer, quoted by him in 'Mind' (vol iii, p. 556), speaks
of "an undisturbed empty quiet everywhere except that a stupid presence lay like a heavy
intrusion somewhere—a blotch on the calm." This sense of objectivity and lapse of
subjectivity, even when the object is almost indeﬁnable, is, it seems to me, a somewhat
familiar phase in chloroformization, though in my own case it is too deep a phase for any
articulate after-memory to remain. I only know that as it vanishes I seem to wake to a sense
[Pg 274]
of my own existence as something additional to what had previously been there.[245]
Many philosophers, however, hold that the reﬂective consciousness of the self is essential to
the cognitive function of thought. They hold that a thought, in order to know a thing at all,
must expressly distinguish between the thing and its own self.[246] This is a perfectly
wanton assumption, and not the faintest shadow of reason exists for supposing it true. As
well might I contend that I cannot dream without dreaming that I dream, swear without
swearing that I swear, deny without denying that I deny, as maintain that I cannot know
without knowing that I know. I may have either acquaintance-with, or knowledge-about, an
object O without think about myself at all. It sufﬁces for this that I think O, and that it exist.
If, in addition to thinking O, I also think that I exist and that I know O, well and good; I then
know one more thing, a fact about O, of which I previously was unmindful. That, however,
does not prevent me from having already known O a good deal. O per se, or O plus P, are as
good objects of knowledge as O plus me is. The philosophers in question simply substitute
one particular object for all others, and call it the object par excellence. It is a case of the
'psychologist's fallacy' (see p. 197). They know the object to be one thing and the thought [Pg 275]
another; and they forthwith foist their own knowledge into that of the thought of which they
pretend to give a true account. To conclude, then, thought may, but need not, in knowing,
discriminate between its object and itself.
We have been using the word Object. Something must now be said about the proper use of
the term Object in Psychology.
In popular parlance the word object is commonly taken without reference to the act of
knowledge, and treated as synonymous with individual subject of existence. Thus if anyone
ask what is the mind's object when you say 'Columbus discovered America in 1492,' most
people will reply 'Columbus,' or 'America,' or, at most, 'the discovery of America.' They will
name a substantive kernel or nucleus of the consciousness, and say the thought is 'about'
that,—as indeed it is,—and they will call that your thought's 'object.' Really that is usually
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only the grammatical object, or more likely the grammatical subject, of your sentence. It is
at most your 'fractional object;' or you may call it the 'topic' of your thought, or the 'subject
of your discourse.' But the Object of your thought is really its entire content or deliverance,
neither more nor less. It is a vicious use of speech to take out a substantive kernel from its
content and call that its object; and it is an equally vicious use of speech to add a substantive
kernel not articulately included in its content, and to call that its object. Yet either one of
these two sins we commit, whenever we content ourselves with saying that a given thought
is simply 'about' a certain topic, or that that topic is its 'object.' The object of my thought in
the previous sentence, for example, is strictly speaking neither Columbus, nor America, nor
its discovery. It is nothing short of the entire sentence, 'Columbus-discovered-America-in1492.' And if we wish to speak of it substantively, we must make a substantive of it by
writing it out thus with hyphens between all its words. Nothing but this can possibly name
its delicate idiosyncrasy. And if we wish to feel that idiosyncrasy we must reproduce the
thought as it was uttered, with every word fringed and the whole sentence bathed in that [Pg 276]
original halo of obscure relations, which, like an horizon, then spread about its meaning.
Our psychological duty is to cling as closely as possible to the actual constitution of the
thought we are studying. We may err as much by excess as by defect. If the kernel or 'topic,'
Columbus, is in one way less than the thought's object, so in another way it may be more.
That is, when named by the psychologist, it may mean much more than actually is present to
the thought of which he is reporter. Thus, for example, suppose you should go on to think:
'He was a daring genius!' An ordinary psychologist would not hesitate to say that the object
of your thought was still 'Columbus.' True, your thought is about Columbus. It 'terminates'
in Columbus, leads from and to the direct idea of Columbus. But for the moment it is not
fully and immediately Columbus, it is only 'he,' or rather 'he-was-a-daring-genius;' which,
though it may be an unimportant difference for conversational purposes, is, for introspective
psychology, as great a difference as there can be.
The object of every thought, then, is neither more nor less than all that the thought thinks,
exactly as the thought thinks it, however complicated the matter, and however symbolic the
manner of the thinking may be. It is needless to say that memory can seldom accurately
reproduce such an object, when once it has passed from before the mind. It either makes too
little or too much of it. Its best plan is to repeat the verbal sentence, if there was one, in
which the object was expressed. But for inarticulate thoughts there is not even this resource,
and introspection must confess that the task exceeds her powers. The mass of our thinking
vanishes for ever, beyond hope of recovery, and psychology only gathers up a few of the
crumbs that fall from the feast.

The next point to make clear is that, however complex the object may be, the thought of it is
one undivided state of consciousness. As Thomas Brown says:[247]
"I have already spoken too often to require again to caution you against the
mistake into which, I confess, that the terms which the poverty of our language
obliges us to use might of themselves very naturally lead you; the mistake of
supposing that the most complex states of mind are not truly, in their very
essence, as much one and indivisible as those which we term simple—the
complexity and seeming coexistence which they involve being relative to our
feeling[248] only, not to their own absolute nature. I trust I need not repeat to
you that, in itself, every notion, however seemingly complex, is, and must be,
truly simple—being one state or affection, of one simple substance, mind. Our
conception of a whole army, for example, is as truly this one mind existing in
this one state, as our conception of any of the individuals that compose an army.
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Our notion of the abstract numbers, eight, four, two, is as truly one feeling of
the mind as our notion of simple unity."
The ordinary associationist-psychology supposes, in contrast with this, that whenever an
object of thought contains many elements, the thought itself must be made up of just as
many ideas, one idea for each element, and all fused together in appearance, but really
separate.[249] The enemies of this psychology ﬁnd (as we have already seen) little trouble in
showing that such a bundle of separate ideas would never form one thought at all, and they
contend that an Ego must be added to the bundle to give it unity, and bring the various ideas
into relation with each other.[250] We will not discuss the ego just yet, but it is obvious that if
things are to be thought in relation, they must be thought together, and in one something, be
that something ego, psychosis, state of consciousness, or whatever you please. If not thought
with each other, things are not thought in relation at all. Now most believers in the ego make
the same mistake as the associationists and sensationists whom they oppose. Both agree that
the elements of the subjective stream are discrete and separate and constitute what Kant
calls a 'manifold.' But while the associationists think that a 'manifold' can form a single [Pg 278]
knowledge, the egoists deny this, and say that the knowledge comes only when the manifold
is subjected to the synthetizing activity of an ego. Both make an identical initial hypothesis;
but the egoist, ﬁnding it won't express the facts, adds another hypothesis to correct it. Now I
do not wish just yet to 'commit myself' about the existence or non-existence of the ego, but I
do contend that we need not invoke it for this particular reason—namely, because the
manifold of ideas has to be reduced to unity. There is no manifold of coexisting ideas; the
notion of such a thing is a chimera. Whatever things are thought in relation are thought from
the outset in a unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity, a single psychosis, feeling, or state of
mind.
The reason why this fact is so strangely garbled in the books seems to be what on an earlier
page (see p. 196 ff.) I called the psychologist's fallacy. We have the inveterate habit,
whenever we try introspectively to describe one of our thoughts, of dropping the thought as
it is in itself and talking of something else. We describe the things that appear to the thought,
and we describe other thoughts about those things—as if these and the original thought were
the same. If, for example, the thought be 'the pack of cards is on the table,' we say, "Well,
isn't it a thought of the pack of cards? Isn't it of the cards as included in the pack? Isn't it of
the table? And of the legs of the table as well? The table has legs—how can you think the
table without virtually thinking its legs? Hasn't our thought then, all these parts—one part
for the pack and another for the table? And within the pack-part a part for each card, as
within the table-part a part for each leg? And isn't each of these parts an idea? And can our
thought, then, be anything but an assemblage or pack of ideas, each answering to some
element of what it knows?"
Now not one of these assumptions is true. The thought taken as an example is, in the ﬁrst
place, not of 'a pack of cards.' It is of 'the-pack-of-cards-is-on-the-table,' an entirely different
subjective phenomenon, whose Object implies the pack, and every one of the cards in it, but
whose conscious constitution bears very little resemblance to that of the thought of the pack [Pg 279]
per se. What a thought is, and what it may be developed into, or explained to stand for, and
be equivalent to, are two things, not one.[251]
An analysis of what passes through the mind as we utter the phrase the pack of cards is on
the table will, I hope, make this clear, and may at the same time condense into a concrete
example a good deal of what has gone before.
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FIG. 29.—The Stream of Consciousness.

It takes time to utter the phrase. Let the horizontal line in Fig. 29 represent time. Every part
of it will then stand for a fraction, every point for an instant, of the time. Of course the
thought has time-parts. The part 2-3 of it, though continuous with 1-2, is yet a different part
from 1-2. Now I say of these time-parts that we cannot take any one of them so short that it
will not after some fashion or other be a thought of the whole object 'the pack of cards is on
the table.' They melt into each other like dissolving views, and no two of them feel the
object just alike, but each feels the total object in a unitary undivided way. This is what I
mean by denying that in the thought any parts can be found corresponding to the object's
parts. Time-parts are not such parts.
Now let the vertical dimensions of the ﬁgure stand for the objects or contents of the [Pg 280]
thoughts. A line vertical to any point of the horizontal, as 1-1', will then symbolize the
object in the mind at the instant 1; a space above the horizontal, as 1-1'-2'-2, will symbolize
all that passes through the mind during the time 1-2 whose line it covers. The entire diagram
from 0 to 0' represents a ﬁnite length of thought's stream.
Can we now deﬁne the psychic constitution of each vertical section of this segment? We
can, though in a very rough way. Immediately after 0, even before we have opened our
mouths to speak, the entire thought is present to our mind in the form of an intention to utter
that sentence. This intention, though it has no simple name, and though it is a transitive state
immediately displaced by the ﬁrst word, is yet a perfectly determinate phase of thought,
unlike anything else (see p. 253). Again, immediately before 0', after the last word of the
sentence is spoken, all will admit that we again think its entire content as we inwardly
realize its completed deliverance. All vertical sections made through any other parts of the
diagram will be respectively ﬁlled with other ways of feeling the sentence's meaning.
Through 2, for example, the cards will be the part of the object most emphatically present to
the mind; through 4, the table. The stream is made higher in the drawing at its end than at its
beginning, because the ﬁnal way of feeling the content is fuller and richer than the initial
way. As Joubert says, "we only know just what we meant to say, after we have said it." And
as M. V. Egger remarks, "before speaking, one barely knows what one intends to say, but
afterwards one is ﬁlled with admiration and surprise at having said and thought it so well."
This latter author seems to me to have kept at much closer quarters with the facts than any
other analyst of consciousness.[252] But even he does not quite hit the mark, for, as I
understand him, he thinks that each word as it occupies the mind displaces the rest of the
thought's content. He distinguishes the 'idea' (what I have called the total object or meaning) [Pg 281]
from the consciousness of the words, calling the former a very feeble state, and contrasting
it with the liveliness of the words, even when these are only silently rehearsed. "The
feeling," he says, "of the words makes ten or twenty times more noise in our consciousness
than the sense of the phrase, which for consciousness is a very slight matter."[253] And
having distinguished these two things, he goes on to separate them in time, saying that the
idea may either precede or follow the words, but that it is a 'pure illusion' to suppose them
simultaneous.[254] Now I believe that in all cases where the words are understood, the total
idea may be and usually is present not only before and after the phrase has been spoken, but
also whilst each separate word is uttered.[255] It is the overtone, halo, or fringe of the word,
as spoken in that sentence. It is never absent; no word in an understood sentence comes to
consciousness as a mere noise. We feel its meaning as it passes; and although our object
differs from one moment to another as to its verbal kernel or nucleus, yet it is similar
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throughout the entire segment of the stream. The same object is known everywhere, now
from the point of view, if we may so call it, of this word, now from the point of view of that.
And in our feeling of each word there chimes an echo or foretaste of every other. The
consciousness of the 'Idea' and that of the words are thus consubstantial. They are made of [Pg 282]
the same 'mind-stuff,' and form an unbroken stream. Annihilate a mind at any instant, cut its
thought through whilst yet uncompleted, and examine the object present to the cross-section
thus suddenly made; you will ﬁnd, not the bald word in process of utterance, but that word
suffused with the whole idea. The word may be so loud, as M. Egger would say, that we
cannot tell just how its suffusion, as such, feels, or how it differs from the suffusion of the
next word. But it does differ; and we maybe sure that, could we see into the brain, we
should ﬁnd the same processes active through the entire sentence in different degrees, each
one in turn becoming maximally excited and then yielding the momentary verbal 'kernel,' to
the thought's content, at other times being only sub-excited, and then combining with the
other sub-excited processes to give the overtone or fringe.[256]

The pack of
cards is on the
table.
FIG. 30.

We may illustrate this by a farther development of the diagram on p.
279. Let the objective content of any vertical section through the stream
be represented no longer by a line, but by a plane ﬁgure, highest
opposite whatever part of the object is most prominent in consciousness
at the moment when the section is made. This part, in verbal thought,
will usually be some word. A series of sections 1-1', taken at the
moments 1, 2, 3, would then look like this: horizontal breadth stands for
the entire object in each of the ﬁgures; the height of the curve above
each part of that object marks the relative prominence of that part in
the thought. At the moment symbolized by the ﬁrst ﬁgure pack is the
prominent part; in the third ﬁgure it is table, etc.

We can easily add all these plane sections together to make a solid, one [Pg 283]
of whose solid dimensions will represent time, whilst a cut across this
The pack of cards at right angles will give the thought's content at the moment when the
is on the table.
cut is made. Let it be the thought, 'I am the same I that I was yesterday.'
FIG. 31.
If at the fourth moment of time we annihilate the thinker and examine
how the last pulsation of his consciousness was made, we ﬁnd that it
was an awareness of the whole content with same most prominent,
and the other parts of the thing known relatively less distinct. With
each prolongation of the scheme in the time-direction, the summit of
the curve of section would come further towards the end of the
The pack of cards sentence. If we make a solid wooden frame with the sentence written
is on the table.
on its front, and the time-scale on one of its sides, if we spread ﬂatly a
FIG. 32.
sheet of India rubber over its top, on which rectangular co-ordinates
are painted, and slide a smooth ball under the rubber in the direction
from 0 to 'yesterday,' the bulging of the membrane along this diagonal at successive
moments will symbolize the changing of the thought's content in a way plain enough, after
what has been said, to call for no more explanation. Or to express it in cerebral terms, it will
show the relative intensities, at successive moments, of the several nerve-processes to which
the various parts of the thought-object correspond.
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FIG. 33.

The last peculiarity of consciousness to which attention is to be drawn in this ﬁrst rough
description of its stream is that
5) It is always interested more in one part of its object than in another, and welcomes and
rejects, or chooses, all the while it thinks.

[Pg 284]

The phenomena of selective attention and of deliberative will are of course patent examples
of this choosing activity. But few of us are aware how incessantly it is at work in operations
not ordinarily called by these names. Accentuation and Emphasis are present in every
perception we have. We ﬁnd it quite impossible to disperse our attention impartially over a
number of impressions. A monotonous succession of sonorous strokes is broken up into
rhythms, now of one sort, now of another, by the different accent which we place on
different strokes. The simplest of these rhythms is the double one, tick-tóck, tick-tóck, ticktóck. Dots dispersed on a surface are perceived in rows and groups. Lines separate into
diverse ﬁgures. The ubiquity of the distinctions, this and that, here and there, now and then,
in our minds is the result of our laying the same selective emphasis on parts of place and
time.
But we do far more than emphasize things, and unite some, and keep others apart. We
actually ignore most of the things before us. Let me brieﬂy show how this goes on.
To begin at the bottom, what are our very senses themselves but organs of selection? Out of
the inﬁnite chaos of movements, of which physics teaches us that the outer world consists,
each sense-organ picks out those which fall within certain limits of velocity. To these it
responds, but ignores the rest as completely as if they did not exist. It thus accentuates
particular movements in a manner for which objectively there seems no valid ground; for, as
Lange says, there is no reason whatever to think that the gap in Nature between the highest
sound-waves and the lowest heat-waves is an abrupt break like that of our sensations; or that
the difference between violet and ultra-violet rays has anything like the objective
importance subjectively represented by that between light and darkness. Out of what is in
itself an undistinguishable, swarming continuum, devoid of distinction or emphasis, our
senses make for us, by attending to this motion and ignoring that, a world full of contrasts, [Pg 285]
of sharp accents, of abrupt changes, of picturesque light and shade.
If the sensations we receive from a given organ have their causes thus picked out for us by
the conformation of the organ's termination, Attention, on the other hand, out of all the
sensations yielded, picks out certain ones as worthy of its notice and suppresses all the rest.
Helmholtz's work on Optics is little more than a study of those visual sensations of which
common men never become aware—blind spots, muscæ volitantes, after-images, irradiation,
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chromatic fringes, marginal changes of color, double images, astigmatism, movements of
accommodation and convergence, retinal rivalry, and more besides. We do not even know
without special training on which of our eyes an image falls. So habitually ignorant are most
men of this that one may be blind for years of a single eye and never know the fact.
Helmholtz says that we notice only those sensations which are signs to us of things. But
what are things? Nothing, as we shall abundantly see, but special groups of sensible
qualities, which happen practically or æsthetically to interest us, to which we therefore give
substantive names, and which we exalt to this exclusive status of independence and dignity.
But in itself, apart from my interest, a particular dust-wreath on a windy day is just as much
of an individual thing, and just as much or as little deserves an individual name, as my own
body does.
And then, among the sensations we get from each separate thing, what happens? The mind
selects again. It chooses certain of the sensations to represent the thing most truly, and
considers the rest as its appearances, modiﬁed by the conditions of the moment. Thus my
table-top is named square, after but one of an inﬁnite number of retinal sensations which it
yields, the rest of them being sensations of two acute and two obtuse angles; but I call the
latter perspective views, and the four right angles the true form of the table, and erect the
attribute squareness; into the table's essence, for æsthetic reasons of my own. In like manner,
the real form of the circle is deemed to be the sensation it gives when the line of vision is
perpendicular to its centre—all its other sensations are signs of this sensation. The real [Pg 286]
sound of the cannon is the sensation it makes when the ear is close by. The real color of the
brick is the sensation it gives when the eye looks squarely at it from a near point, out of the
sunshine and yet not in the gloom; under other circumstances it gives us other colorsensations which are but signs of this—we then see it looks pinker or blacker than it really
is. The reader knows no object which he does not represent to himself by preference as in
some typical attitude, of some normal size, at some characteristic distance, of some standard
tint, etc., etc. But all these essential characteristics, which together form for us the genuine
objectivity of the thing and are contrasted with what we call the subjective sensations it may
yield us at a given moment, are mere sensations like the latter. The mind chooses to suit
itself, and decides what particular sensation shall be held more real and valid than all the
rest.
Thus perception involves a twofold choice. Out of all present sensations, we notice mainly
such as are signiﬁcant of absent ones; and out of all the absent associates which these
suggest, we again pick out a very few to stand for the objective reality par excellence. We
could have no more exquisite example of selective industry.
That industry goes on to deal with the things thus given in perception. A man's empirical
thought depends on the things he has experienced, but what these shall be is to a large extent
determined by his habits of attention. A thing may be present to him a thousand times, but if
he persistently fails to notice it, it cannot be said to enter into his experience. We are all
seeing ﬂies, moths, and beetles by the thousand, but to whom, save an entomologist, do they
say anything distinct? On the other hand, a thing met only once in a lifetime may leave an
indelible experience in the memory. Let four men make a tour in Europe. One will bring
home only picturesque impressions—costumes and colors, parks and views and works of
architecture, pictures and statues. To another all this will be non-existent; and distances and
prices, populations and drainage-arrangements, door- and window-fastenings, and other
useful statistics will take their place. A third will give a rich account of the theatres, [Pg 287]
restaurants, and public balls, and naught beside; whilst the fourth will perhaps have been so
wrapped in his own subjective broodings as to tell little more than a few names of places
through which he passed. Each has selected, out of the same mass of presented objects,
those which suited his private interest and has made his experience thereby.
If, now, leaving the empirical combination of objects, we ask how the mind proceeds
rationally to connect them, we ﬁnd selection again to be omnipotent. In a future chapter we
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shall see that all Reasoning depends on the ability of the mind to break up the totality of the
phenomenon reasoned about, into parts, and to pick out from among these the particular one
which, in our given emergency, may lead to the proper conclusion. Another predicament
will need another conclusion, and require another element to be picked out. The man of
genius is he who will always stick in his bill at the right point, and bring it out with the right
element—'reason' if the emergency be theoretical, 'means' if it be practical—transﬁxed upon
it. I here conﬁne myself to this brief statement, but it may sufﬁce to show that Reasoning is
but another form of the selective activity of the mind.
If now we pass to its æsthetic department, our law is still more obvious. The artist
notoriously selects his items, rejecting all tones, colors, shapes, which do not harmonize
with each other and with the main purpose of his work. That unity, harmony, 'convergence
of characters,' as M. Taine calls it, which gives to works of art their superiority over works
of nature, is wholly due to elimination. Any natural subject will do, if the artist has wit
enough to pounce upon some one feature of it as characteristic, and suppress all merely
accidental items which do not harmonize with this.
Ascending still higher, we reach the plane of Ethics, where choice reigns notoriously
supreme. An act has no ethical quality whatever unless it be chosen out of several all
equally possible. To sustain the arguments for the good course and keep them ever before
us, to stiﬂe our longing for more ﬂowery ways, to keep the foot unﬂinchingly on the arduous [Pg 288]
path, these are characteristic ethical energies. But more than these; for these but deal with
the means of compassing interests already felt by the man to be supreme. The ethical energy
par excellence has to go farther and choose which interest out of several, equally coercive,
shall become supreme. The issue here is of the utmost pregnancy, for it decides a man's
entire career. When he debates, Shall I commit this crime? choose that profession? accept
that ofﬁce, or marry this fortune?—his choice really lies between one of several equally
possible future Characters. What he shall become is ﬁxed by the conduct of this moment.
Schopenhauer, who enforces his determinism by the argument that with a given ﬁxed
character only one reaction is possible under given circumstances, forgets that, in these
critical ethical moments, what consciously seems to be in question is the complexion of the
character itself. The problem with the man is less what act he shall now choose to do, than
what being he shall now resolve to become.
Looking back, then, over this review, we see that the mind is at every stage a theatre of
simultaneous possibilities. Consciousness consists in the comparison of these with each
other, the selection of some, and the suppression of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting
agency of attention. The highest and most elaborated mental products are ﬁltered from the
data chosen by the faculty next beneath, out of the mass offered by the faculty below that,
which mass in turn was sifted from a still larger amount of yet simpler material, and so on.
The mind, in short, works on the data it receives very much as a sculptor works on his block
of stone. In a sense the statue stood there from eternity. But there were a thousand different
ones beside it, and the sculptor alone is to thank for having extricated this one from the rest.
Just so the world of each of us, howsoever different our several views of it may be, all lay
embedded in the primordial chaos of sensations, which gave the mere matter to the thought
of all of us indifferently. We may, if we like, by our reasonings unwind things back to that [Pg 289]
black and jointless continuity of space and moving clouds of swarming atoms which science
calls the only real world. But all the while the world we feel and live in will be that which
our ancestors and we, by slowly cumulative strokes of choice, have extricated out of this,
like sculptors, by simply rejecting certain portions of the given stuff. Other sculptors, other
statues from the same stone! Other minds, other worlds from the same monotonous and
inexpressive chaos! My world is but one in a million alike embedded, alike real to those
who may abstract them. How different must be the worlds in the consciousness of ant,
cuttle-ﬁsh, or crab!
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But in my mind and your mind the rejected portions and the selected portions of the original
world-stuff are to a great extent the same. The human race as a whole largely agrees as to
what it shall notice and name, and what not. And among the noticed parts we select in much
the same way for accentuation and preference or subordination and dislike. There is,
however, one entirely extraordinary case in which no two men ever are known to choose
alike. One great splitting of the whole universe into two halves is made by each of us; and
for each of us almost all of the interest attaches to one of the halves; but we all draw the line
of division between them in a different place. When I say that we all call the two halves by
the same; names, and that those names are 'me' and 'not-me' respectively, it will at once be
seen what I mean. The altogether unique kind of interest which each human mind feels in
those parts of creation which it can call me or mine may be a moral riddle, but it is a
fundamental psychological fact. No mind can take the same interest in his neighbor's me as
in his own. The neighbor's me falls together with all the rest of things in one foreign mass,
against which his own me stands out in startling relief. Even the trodden worm, as Lotze
somewhere says, contrasts his own suffering self with the whole remaining universe, though
he have no clear conception either of himself or of what the universe may be. He is for me a
mere part of the world; for him it is I who am the mere part. Each of us dichotomizes the [Pg 290]
Kosmos in a different place.
Descending now to ﬁner work than this ﬁrst general sketch, let us in the next chapter try to
trace the psychology of this fact of self-consciousness to which we have thus once more
been led.

[215]

A good deal of this chapter is reprinted from an article 'On some Omissions of
Introspective Psychology' which appeared in 'Mind' for January 1884.

[216]

B. P. Bowne: Metaphysics, p. 362.

[217]

L'Automatisme Psychologique, p. 318.

[218]

Cf. A. Constans: Relation sur une Épidémie d'hystéro-démonopathie en 1861.
2me ed. Paris, 1863.—Chiap e Franzolin: L'Epidemia d'istero-demonopatie in
Verzegnis. Reggio, 1879.—See also J. Kerner's little work: Nachricht von dem
Vorkommen des Besessenseins. 1836.

[219]

For the Physiology of this compare the chapter on the Will.

[220]

Loc. cit. p. 316.

[221]

The Philosophy of Reﬂection, i, 248, 290.

[222]

Populäre Wissenschaftliche Vorträge, Drittes Heft (1876). p. 72.

[223]

Fick, in L. Hermann's Handb. d. Physiol., Bd. iii, Th. i, p. 225.

[224]

It need of course not follow, because a total brain-state does not recur, that no
point of the brain can ever be twice in the same condition. That would be as
improbable a consequence as that in the sea a wave-crest should never come twice
at the same point of space. What can hardly come twice is an identical
combination of wave-forms all with their crests and hollows reoccupying
identical places. For such a total combination as this is the analogue of the brainstate to which our actual consciousness at any moment is due.

[225]

The accurate registration of the 'how long' is still a little mysterious.

[226]

Cf. Brentano; Psychologie, vol. i, pp. 219-20. Altogether this chapter of
Brentano's on the Unity of Consciousness is as good as anything with which I am
acquainted.
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[227]

Honor to whom honor is due! The most explicit acknowledgment I have
anywhere found of all this is in a buried and forgotten paper by the Rev. Jas.
Wills, on 'Accidental Association,' in the Transactions of the Royal Irish
Academy, vol xxi, part i (1846). Mr. Wills writes:
"At every instant of conscious thought there is a certain sum of perceptions, or
reﬂections, or both together, present, and together constituting one whole state of
apprehension. Of this some deﬁnite portion may be far more distinct than all the
rest; and the rest be in consequence proportionally vague, even to the limit of
obliteration. But still, within this limit, the most dim shade of perception enters
into, and in some inﬁnitesimal degree modiﬁes, the whole existing state. This
state will thus be in some way modiﬁed by any sensation or emotion, or act of
distinct attention, that may give prominence to any part of it; so that the actual
result is capable of the utmost variation, according to the person or the occasion....
To any portion of the entire scope here described there may be a special direction
of the attention, and this special direction is recognized as strictly what is
recognized as the idea present to the mind. This idea is evidently not
commensurate with the entire state of apprehension, and much perplexity has
arisen from not observing this fact. However deeply we may suppose the attention
to be engaged by any thought, any considerable alteration of the surrounding
phenomena would still be perceived; the most abstruse demonstration in this room
would not prevent a listener, however absorbed, from noticing the sudden
extinction of the lights. Our mental states have always an essential unity, such that
each state of apprehension, however variously compounded, is a single whole, of
which every component is, therefore, strictly apprehended (so far as it is
apprehended) as a part. Such is the elementary basis from which all our
intellectual operations commence."

[228]

Compare the charming passage in Taine on Intelligence (N. Y. ed.), i, 83-4.

[229]

E.g.: "The stream of thought is not a continuous current, but a series of distinct
ideas, more or less rapid in their succession; the rapidity being measurable by the
number that pass through the mind in a given time." (Bain: E. and W., p. 29.)

[230]

Few writers have admitted that we cognize relations through feeling. The
intellectualists have explicitly denied the possibility of such a thing—e.g., Prof. T.
H. Green ('Mind,' vol. vii, p. 28): "No feeling, as such or as felt, is [of?] a
relation.... Even a relation between feelings is not itself a feeling or felt." On the
other hand, the sensationists have either smuggled in the cognition without giving
any account of it, or have denied the relations to be cognized, or even to exist, at
all. A few honorable exceptions, however, deserve to be named among the
sensationists. Destutt de Tracy, Laromiguière, Cardaillac, Brown, and ﬁnally
Spencer, have explicitly contended for feelings of relation, consubstantial with
our feelings or thoughts of the terms 'between' which they obtain. Thus Destutt de
Tracy says (Éléments d'Idéologie, T. Ier, chap. iv): "The faculty of judgment is
itself a sort of sensibility, for it is the faculty of feeling the relations among our
ideas; and to feel relations is to feel." Laromiguière writes (Leçons de
Philosophie, IIme Partie, 3me Leçon):
"There is no one whose intelligence does not embrace simultaneously many ideas,
more or less distinct, more or less confused. Now, when we have many ideas at
once, a peculiar feeling arises in us: we feel, among these ideas, resemblances,
differences, relations. Let us call this mode of feeling, common to us all, the
feeling of relation, or relation-feeling (sentiment-rapport). One sees immediately
that these relation-feelings, resulting from the propinquity of ideas, must be
inﬁnitely more numerous than the sensation-feelings (sentiments-sensations) or
the feelings we have of the action of our faculties. The slightest knowledge of the
mathematical theory of combinations will prove this.... Ideas of relation originate
in feelings of relation. They are the effect of our comparing them and reasoning
about them."
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Similarly, de Cardaillac (Études Élémentaires de Philosophie, Section i, chap.
vii):
"By a natural consequence, we are led to suppose that at the same time that we
have several sensations or several ideas in the mind, we feel the relations which
exist between these sensations, and the relations which exist between these
ideas.... If the feeling of relations exists in us,... it is necessarily the most varied
and the most fertile of all human feelings: 1°, the most varied, because, relations
being more numerous than beings, the feelings of relation must be in the same
proportion more numerous than the sensations whose presence gives rise to their
formation; 2°, the most fertile, for the relative ideas of which the feeling-ofrelation is the source ... are more important than absolute ideas, if such exist.... If
we interrogate common speech, we ﬁnd the feeling of relation expressed there in
a thousand different ways. If it is easy to seize a relation, we say that it is sensible,
to distinguish it from one which, because its terms are too remote, cannot be as
quickly perceived. A sensible difference, or resemblance.... What is taste in the
arts, in intellectual productions? What but the feeling of those relations among the
parts which constitutes their merit?... Did we not feel relations we should never
attain to true knowledge,... for almost all our knowledge is of relations.... We
never have an isolated sensation;... we are therefore never without the feeling of
relation.... An object strikes our senses; we see in it only a sensation.... The
relative is so near the absolute, the relation-feeling so near the sensation-feeling,
the two are so intimately fused in the composition of the object, that the relation
appears to us as part of the sensation itself. It is doubtless to this sort of fusion
between sensations and feelings of relation that the silence of metaphysicians as
to the latter is due; and it is for the same reason that they have obstinately
persisted in asking from sensation alone those ideas of relation which it was
powerless to give."
Dr. Thomas Brown writes (Lectures, xlv, init.): "There is an extensive order of our
feelings which involve this notion of relation, and which consist indeed in the
mere perception of a relation of some sort.... Whether the relation be of two or of
many external objects, or of two or many affections of the mind, the feeling of
this relation ... is what I term a relative suggestion; that phrase being the simplest
which it is possible to employ, for expressing, without any theory, the mere fact of
the rise of certain feelings of relation, after certain other feelings which precede
them; and therefore, as involving no particular theory, and simply expressive of an
undoubted fact.... That the feelings of relation are states of the mind essentially
different from our simple perceptions, or conceptions of the objects,... that they
are not what Condillac terms transformed sensations, I proved in a former lecture,
when I combated the excessive simpliﬁcation of that ingenious but not very
accurate philosopher. There is an original tendency or susceptibility of the mind,
by which, on perceiving together different objects, we are instantly, without the
intervention of any other mental process, sensible of their relation in certain
respects, as truly as there is an original tendency or susceptibility by which, when
external objects are present and have produced a certain affection of our sensorial
organ, we are instantly affected with the primary elementary feelings of
perception; and, I may add, that as our sensations or perceptions are of various
species, so are there various species of relations;—the number of relations,
indeed, even of external things, being almost inﬁnite, while the number of
perceptions is, necessarily, limited by that of the objects which have the power of
producing some affection of our organs of sensation.... Without that susceptibility
of the mind by which it has the feeling of relation, our consciousness would be as
truly limited to a single point, as our body would become, were it possible to
fetter it to a single atom."
Mr. Spencer is even more explicit. His philosophy is crude in that he seems to
suppose that it is only in transitive states that outward relations are known;
whereas in truth space-relations, relations of contrast, etc., are felt along with their
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terms, in substantive states as well as in transitive states, as we shall abundantly
see. Nevertheless Mr. Spencer's passage is so clear that it also deserves to be
quoted in full (Principles of Psychology, § 65):
"The proximate components of Mind are of two broadly-contrasted kinds—
Feelings and the relations between feelings. Among the members of each group
there exist multitudinous unlikenesses, many of which are extremely strong; but
such unlikenesses are small compared with those which distinguish members of
the one group from members of the other. Let us, in the ﬁrst place, consider what
are the characters which all Feelings have in common, and what are the characters
which all Relations between feelings have in common.
"Each feeling, as we here deﬁne it, is any portion of consciousness which
occupies a place sufﬁciently large to give it a perceivable individuality; which has
its individuality marked off from adjacent portions of consciousness by qualitative
contrasts; and which, when introspectively contemplated, appears to be
homogeneous. These are the essentials. Obviously if, under introspection, a state
of consciousness is decomposable into unlike parts that exist either
simultaneously or successively, it is not one feeling but two or more. Obviously if
it is indistinguishable from an adjacent portion of consciousness, it forms one
with that portion—is not an individual feeling, but part of one. And obviously if it
does not occupy in consciousness an appreciable area, or an appreciable duration,
it cannot be known as a feeling.
"A Relation between feelings is, on the contrary, characterized by occupying no
appreciable part of consciousness. Take away the terms it unites, and it disappears
along with them; having no independent place, no individuality of its own. It is
true that, under an ultimate analysis, what we call a relation proves to be itself a
kind of feeling—the momentary feeling accompanying the transition from one
conspicuous feeling to an adjacent conspicuous feeling. And it is true that,
notwithstanding its extreme brevity, its qualitative character is appreciable; for
relations are (as we shall hereafter see) distinguishable from one another only by
the unlikenesses of the feelings which accompany the momentary transitions.
Each relational feeling may, in fact, be regarded as one of those nervous shocks
which we suspect to be the units of composition of feelings; and, though
instantaneous, it is known as of greater or less strength, and as taking place with
greater or less facility. But the contrast between these relational feelings and what
we ordinarily call feelings is so strong that we must class them apart. Their
extreme brevity, their small variety, and their dependence on the terms they unite,
differentiate them in an unmistakable way.
"Perhaps it will be well to recognize more fully the truth that this distinction
cannot be absolute. Besides admitting that, as an element of consciousness, a
relation is a momentary feeling, we must also admit that just as a relation can
have no existence apart from the feelings which form its terms, so a feeling can
exist only by relations to other feelings which limit it in space or time or both.
Strictly speaking, neither a feeling nor a relation is an independent element of
consciousness: there is throughout a dependence such that the appreciable areas of
consciousness occupied by feelings can no more possess individualities apart
from the relations which link them, than these relations can possess individualities
apart from the feelings they link. The essential distinction between the two, then,
appears to be that whereas a relational feeling is a portion of consciousness
inseparable into parts, a feeling, ordinarily so called, is a portion of consciousness
that admits imaginary division into like parts which are related to one another in
sequence or coexistence. A feeling proper is either made up of like parts that
occupy time, or it is made up of like parts that occupy space, or both. In any case,
a feeling proper is an aggregate of related like parts, while a relational feeling is
undecomposable. And this is exactly the contrast between the two which must
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result if, as we have inferred, feelings are composed of units of feelings, or
shocks."
[231]

M. Paulhan (Revue Philosophique, xx, 455-6), after speaking of the faint mental
images of objects and emotions, says: "We ﬁnd other vaguer states still, upon
which attention seldom rests, except in persons who by nature or profession are
addicted to internal observation. It is even difﬁcult to name them precisely, for
they are little known and not classed; but we may cite as an example of them that
peculiar impression which we feel when, strongly preoccupied by a certain
subject, we nevertheless are engaged with, and have our attention almost
completely absorbed by, matters quite disconnected therewithal. We do not then
exactly think of the object of our preoccupation; we do not represent it in a clear
manner; and yet our mind is not as it would be without this preoccupation. Its
object, absent from consciousness, is nevertheless represented there by a peculiar
unmistakable impression, which often persists long and is a strong feeling,
although so obscure for our intelligence." "A mental sign of the kind is the
unfavorable disposition left in our mind towards an individual by painful
incidents erewhile experienced and now perhaps forgotten. The sign remains, but
is not understood; its deﬁnite meaning is lost." (P. 458.)

[232]

Mozart describes thus his manner of composing: First bits and crumbs of the
piece come and gradually join together in his mind; then the soul getting warmed
to the work, the thing grows more and more, "and I spread it out broader and
clearer, and at last it gets almost ﬁnished in my head, even when it is a long piece,
so that I can see the whole of it at a single glance in my mind, as if it were a
beautiful painting or a handsome human being; in which way I do not hear it in
my imagination at all as a succession—the way it must come later—but all at
once, as it were. If is a rare feast! All the inventing and making goes on in me as
in a beautiful strong dream. But the best of all is the hearing of it all at once."

[233]

Mental Physiology, § 236. Dr. Carpenter's explanation differs materially from that
given in the text.

[234]

Cf. also S. Stricker: Vorlesungen über allg. u. exp. Pathologie (1879), pp. 462-3,
501, 547; Romanes: Origin of Human Faculty, p. 82. It is so hard to make one's
self clear that I may advert to a misunderstanding of my views by the late Prof.
Thos. Maguire of Dublin (Lectures on Philosophy, 1885). This author considers
that by the 'fringe' I mean some sort of psychic material by which sensations in
themselves separate are made to cohere together, and wittily says that I ought to
"see that uniting sensations by their 'fringes' is more vague than to construct the
universe out of oysters by platting their beards" (p. 211). But the fringe, as I use
the word, means nothing like this; it is part of the object cognized,—substantive
qualities and things appearing to the mind in a fringe of relations. Some parts—
the transitive parts—of our stream of thought cognize the relations rather than the
things; but both the transitive and the substantive parts form one continuous
stream, with no discrete 'sensations' in it such as Prof. Maguire supposes, and
supposes me to suppose, to be there.

[235]

George Campbell: Philosophy of Rhetoric, book ii, chap. vii.

[236]

Substantialism or Philosophy of Knowledge, by 'Jean Story' (1879).

[237]

M. G. Tarde, quoting (in Delbœuf, Le Sommeil et les Rêves (1885), p. 226) some
nonsense-verses from a dream, says they show "how prosodic forms may subsist
in a mind from which logical rules are effaced.... I was able, in dreaming, to
preserve the faculty of ﬁnding two words which rhymed, to appreciate the rhyme,
to ﬁll up the verse as it ﬁrst presented itself with other words which, added, gave
the right number of syllables, and yet I was ignorant of the sense of the words....
Thus we have the extraordinary fact that the words called each other up, without
calling up their sense.... Even when awake, it is more difﬁcult to ascend to the
meaning of a word than to pass from one word to another; or to put it otherwise, it
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is harder to be a thinker than to be a rhetorician, and on the whole nothing is
commoner than trains of words not understood."
[238]

We think it odd that young children should listen with such rapt attention to the
reading of stories expressed in words half of which they do not understand, and of
none of which they ask the meaning. But their thinking is in form just what ours is
when it is rapid. Both of us make ﬂying leaps over large portions of the sentences
uttered and we give attention only to substantive starting points, turning points,
and conclusions here and there. All the rest, 'substantive' and separately
intelligible as it may potentially be, actually serves only as so much transitive
material. It is internodal consciousness, giving us the sense of continuity, but
having no signiﬁcance apart from its mere gap-ﬁlling function. The children
probably feel no gap when through a lot of unintelligible words they are swiftly
carried to a familiar and intelligible terminus.

[239]

Not literally heard, of course. Deaf mutes are quick to perceive shocks and jars
that can be felt, even when so slight as to be unnoticed by those who can hear.

[240]

Quoted by Samuel Porter: 'Is Thought possible without Language?' in Princeton
Review, 57th year, pp. 108-12 (Jan. 1881?). Cf. also W. W. Ireland: The Blot upon
the Brain (1886), Paper x, part ii; G. J. Romanes: Mental Evolution in Man, pp.
81-83, and references therein made. Prof. Max Müller gives a very complete
history of this controversy in pp. 30-64 of his 'Science of Thought' (1887). His
own view is that Thought and Speech are inseparable; but under speech he
includes any conceivable sort of symbolism or even mental imagery, and he
makes no allowance for the wordless summary glimpses which we have of
systems of relation and direction.

[241]

Problems of Life and Mind, 3d Series, Problem iv, chapter 5. Compare also Victor
Egger: La Parole Intérieure (Paris, 1881), chap. vi.

[242]

If but one person sees an apparition we consider it his private hallucination. If
more than one, we begin to think it may be a real external presence.

[243]

Revue Philosophique, vol. xxi, p. 671.

[244]

Quoted from the Therapeutic Gazette, by the N. Y. Semi-weekly Evening Post for
Nov. 2, 1886.

[245]

In half-stunned states self-consciousness may lapse. A friend writes me: "We
were driving back from —— in a wagonette. The door ﬂew open and X., alias
'Baldy,' fell out on the road. We pulled up at once, and then he said, 'Did anybody
fall out?' or 'Who fell out?'—I don't exactly remember the words. When told that
Baldy fell out, he said, 'Did Baldy fall out? Poor Baldy!'"

[246]

Kant originated this view. I subjoin a few English statements of it. J. Ferrier,
Institutes of Metaphysic, Proposition i: "Along with whatever any intelligence
knows it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some knowledge
of itself." Sir Wm. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 47: "We know, and we know that we
know,—these propositions, logically distinct, are really identical; each implies the
other.... So true is the scholastic brocard: non sentimus nisi sentiamus nos sentire."
H. L. Mansel, Metaphysics, p. 58: "Whatever variety of materials may exist
within reach of my mind, I can become conscious of them only by recognizing
them as mine.... Relation to the conscious self is thus the permanent and universal
feature which every state of consciousness as such must exhibit." T. H. Green,
Introduction to Hume, p. 12: "A consciousness by the man ... of himself, in
negative relation to the thing that is his object, and this consciousness must be
taken to go along with the perceptive act itself. Not less than this indeed can be
involved in any act that is to be the beginning of knowledge at all. It is the
minimum of possible thought or intelligence."

[247]

Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Lecture 45.
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[248]

Instead of saying to our feeling only, he should have said, to the object only.

[249]

"There can be no difﬁculty in admitting that association does form the ideas of an
indeﬁnite number of individuals into one complex idea; because it is an
acknowledged fact. Have we not the idea of an army? And is not that precisely the
ideas of an indeﬁnite number of men formed into one idea?" (Jas. Mill's Analysis
of the Human Mind (J. S. Mill's Edition), vol. i, p. 264.)

[250]

For their arguments, see above.

[251]

I know there are readers whom nothing can convince that the thought of a
complex object has not as many parts as are discriminated in the object itself.
Well, then, let the word parts pass. Only observe that these parts are not the
separate 'ideas' of traditional psychology. No one of them can live out of that
particular thought, any more than my head can live off of my particular shoulders.
In a sense a soap-bubble has parts; it is a sum of juxtaposed spherical triangles.
But these triangles are not separate realities; neither are the 'parts' of the thought
separate realities. Touch the bubble and the triangles are no more. Dismiss the
thought and out go its parts. You can no more make a new thought out of 'ideas'
that have once served than you can make a new bubble out of old triangles Each
bubble, each thought, is a fresh organic unity, sui generis.

[252]

In his work, La Parole Intérieure (Paris, 1881), especially chapters vi and vii.

[253]

Page 301.

[254]

Page 218. To prove this point, M. Egger appeals to the fact that we often hear
some one speak whilst our mind is preoccupied, but do not understand him until
some moments afterwards, when we suddenly 'realize' what he meant. Also to our
digging out the meaning of a sentence in an unfamiliar tongue, where the words
are present to us long before the idea is taken in. In these special cases the word
does indeed precede the idea. The idea, on the contrary, precedes the word
whenever we try to express ourselves with effort, as in a foreign tongue, or in an
unusual ﬁeld of intellectual invention. Both sets of cases, however, are
exceptional, and M. Egger would probably himself admit, on reﬂection, that in the
former class there is some sort of a verbal suffusion, however evanescent, of the
idea, when it is grasped—we hear the echo of the words as we catch their
meaning. And he would probably admit that in the second class of cases the idea
persists after the words that came with so much effort are found. In normal cases
the simultaneity, as he admits, is obviously there.

[255]

A good way to get the words and the sense separately is to inwardly articulate
word for word the discourse of another. One then ﬁnds that the meaning will often
come to the mind in pulses, after clauses or sentences are ﬁnished.

[256]

The nearest approach (with which I am acquainted) to the doctrine set forth here
is in O. Liebmaun's Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit, pp. 427-438.

CHAPTER X.

[Pg 291]

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF.
Let us begin with the Self in its widest acceptation, and follow it up to its most delicate and
subtle form, advancing from the study of the empirical, as the Germans call it, to that of the
pure, Ego.
THE EMPIRICAL SELF OR ME.
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The Empirical Self of each of us is all that he is tempted to call by the name of me. But it is
clear that between what a man calls me and what he simply calls mine the line is difﬁcult to
draw. We feel and act about certain things that are ours very much as we feel and act about
ourselves. Our fame, our children, the work of our hands, may be as dear to us as our bodies
are, and arouse the same feelings and the same acts of reprisal if attacked. And our bodies
themselves, are they simply ours, or are they us? Certainly men have been ready to disown
their very bodies and to regard them as mere vestures, or even as prisons of clay from which
they should some day be glad to escape.
We see then that we are dealing with a ﬂuctuating material. The same object being
sometimes treated as a part of me, at other times as simply mine, and then again as if I had
nothing to do with it at all. In its widest possible sense, however, a man's Self is the sum
total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and
his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his
lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account. All these things give him the same emotions.
If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast
down,—not necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but in much the same way for all. [Pg 292]
Understanding the Self in this widest sense, we may begin by dividing the history of it into
three parts, relating respectively to—
1. Its constituents;
2. The feelings and emotions they arouse,—Self-feelings;
3. The actions to which they prompt,—Self-seeking and Self-preservation.

1. The constituents of the Self may be divided into two classes, those which make up
respectively—
(a) The material Self;
(b) The social Self;
(c) The spiritual Self; and
(d) The pure Ego.
(a) The body is the innermost part of the material Self in each of us; and certain parts of the
body seem more intimately ours than the rest. The clothes come next. The old saying that
the human person is composed of three parts—soul, body and clothes—is more than a joke.
We so appropriate our clothes and identify ourselves with them that there are few of us who,
if asked to choose between having a beautiful body clad in raiment perpetually shabby and
unclean, and having an ugly and blemished form always spotlessly attired, would not
hesitate a moment before making a decisive reply.[257] Next, our immediate family is a part
of ourselves. Our father and mother, our wife and babes, are bone of our bone and ﬂesh of
our ﬂesh. When they die, a part of our very selves is gone. If they do anything wrong, it is
our shame. If they are insulted, our anger ﬂashes forth as readily as if we stood in their
place. Our home comes next. Its scenes are part of our life; its aspects awaken the tenderest
feelings of affection; and we do not easily forgive the stranger who, in visiting it, ﬁnds fault
with its arrangements or treats it with contempt. All these different things are the objects of
instinctive preferences coupled with the most important practical interests of life. We all
have a blind impulse to watch over our body, to deck it with clothing of an ornamental sort, [Pg 293]
to cherish parents, wife and babes, and to ﬁnd for ourselves a home of our own which we
may live in and 'improve.'
An equally instinctive impulse drives us to collect property; and the collections thus made
become, with different degrees of intimacy, parts of our empirical selves. The parts of our
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wealth most intimately ours are those which are saturated with our labor. There are few men
who would not feel personally annihilated if a life-long construction of their hands or brains
—say an entomological collection or an extensive work in manuscript—were suddenly
swept away. The miser feels similarly towards his gold, and although it is true that a part of
our depression at the loss of possessions is due to our feeling that we must now go without
certain goods that we expected the possessions to bring in their train, yet in every case there
remains, over and above this, a sense of the shrinkage of our personality, a partial
conversion of ourselves to nothingness, which is a psychological phenomenon by itself. We
are all at once assimilated to the tramps and poor devils whom we so despise, and at the
same time removed farther than ever away from the happy sons of earth who lord it over
land and sea and men in the full-blown lustihood that wealth and power can give, and before
whom, stiffen ourselves as we will by appealing to anti-snobbish ﬁrst principles, we cannot
escape an emotion, open or sneaking, of respect and dread.

(b) A man's Social Self is the recognition which he gets from his mates. We are not only
gregarious animals, liking to be in sight of our fellows, but we have an innate propensity to
get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably, by our kind. No more ﬁendish punishment
could be devised, were such a thing physically possible, than that one should be turned loose
in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof. If no one turned
round when we entered, answered when we spoke, or minded what we did, but if every
person we met 'cut us dead,' and acted as if we were non-existing things, a kind of rage and
impotent despair would ere long well up in us, from which the cruellest bodily tortures [Pg 294]
would be a relief; for these would make us feel that, however bad might be our plight, we
had not sunk to such a depth as to be unworthy of attention at all.
Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize
him and carry an image of him in their mind. To wound any one of these his images is to
wound him.[258] But as the individuals who carry the images fall naturally into classes, we
may practically say that he has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of
persons about whose opinion he cares. He generally shows a different side of himself to
each of these different groups. Many a youth who is demure enough before his parents and
teachers, swears and swaggers like a pirate among his 'tough' young friends. We do not
show ourselves to our children as to our club-companions, to our customers as to the
laborers we employ, to our own masters and employers as to our intimate friends. From this
there results what practically is a division of the man into several selves; and this may be a
discordant splitting, as where one is afraid to let one set of his acquaintances know him as
he is elsewhere; or it may be a perfectly harmonious division of labor, as where one tender
to his children is stern to the soldiers or prisoners under his command.
The most peculiar social self which one is apt to have is in the mind of the person one is in
love with. The good or bad fortunes of this self cause the most intense elation and dejection
—unreasonable enough as measured by every other standard than that of the organic feeling
of the individual. To his own consciousness he is not, so long as this particular social self
fails to get recognition, and when it is recognized his contentment passes all bounds.
A man's fame, good or bad, and his honor or dishonor, are names for one of his social
selves. The particular social self of a man called his honor is usually the result of one of
those splittings of which we have spoken. It is his image in the eyes of his own 'set,' which
exalts or condemns him as he conforms or not to certain requirements that may not be made [Pg 295]
of one in another walk of life. Thus a layman may abandon a city infected with cholera; but
a priest or a doctor would think such an act incompatible with his honor. A soldier's honor
requires him to ﬁght or to die under circumstances where another man can apologize or run
away with no stain upon his social self. A judge, a statesman, are in like manner debarred by
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the honor of their cloth from entering into pecuniary relations perfectly honorable to persons
in private life. Nothing is commoner than to hear people discriminate between their different
selves of this sort: "As a man I pity you, but as an ofﬁcial I must show you no mercy; as a
politician I regard him as an ally, but as a moralist I loathe him;" etc., etc. What may be
called 'club-opinion' is one of the very strongest forces in life.[259] The thief must not steal
from other thieves; the gambler must pay his gambling-debts, though he pay no other debts
in the world. The code of honor of fashionable society has throughout history been full of
permissions as well as of vetoes, the only reason for following either of which is that so we
best serve one of our social selves. You must not lie in general, but you may lie as much as [Pg 296]
you please if asked about your relations with a lady; you must accept a challenge from an
equal, but if challenged by an inferior you may laugh him to scorn: these are examples of
what is meant.

(c) By the Spiritual Self, so far as it belongs to the Empirical Me, I mean a man's inner or
subjective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions, taken concretely; not the bare
principle of personal Unity, or 'pure' Ego, which remains still to be discussed. These psychic
dispositions are the most enduring and intimate part of the self, that which we most verily
seem to be. We take a purer self-satisfaction when we think of our ability to argue and
discriminate, of our moral sensibility and conscience, of our indomitable will, than when we
survey any of our other possessions. Only when these are altered is a man said to be
alienatus a se.
Now this spiritual self may be considered in various ways. We may divide it into faculties,
as just instanced, isolating them one from another, and identifying ourselves with either in
turn. This is an abstract way of dealing with consciousness, in which, as it actually presents
itself, a plurality of such faculties are always to be simultaneously found; or we may insist
on a concrete view, and then the spiritual self in us will be either the entire stream of our
personal consciousness, or the present 'segment' or 'section' of that stream, according as we
take a broader or a narrower view—both the stream and the section being concrete
existences in time, and each being a unity after its own peculiar kind. But whether we take it
abstractly or concretely, our considering the spiritual self at all is a reﬂective process, is the
result of our abandoning the outward-looking point of view, and of our having become able
to think of subjectivity as such, to think ourselves as thinkers.
This attention to thought as such, and the identiﬁcation of ourselves with it rather than with
any of the objects which it reveals, is a momentous and in some respects a rather mysterious
operation, of which we need here only say that as a matter of fact it exists; and that in
everyone, at an early age, the distinction between thought as such, and what it is 'of' or [Pg 297]
'about,' has become familiar to the mind. The deeper grounds for this discrimination may
possibly be hard to ﬁnd; but superﬁcial grounds are plenty and near at hand. Almost anyone
will tell us that thought is a different sort of existence from things, because many sorts of
thought are of no things—e.g., pleasures, pains, and emotions; others are of non-existent
things—errors and ﬁctions; others again of existent things, but in a form that is symbolic
and does not resemble them—abstract ideas and concepts; whilst in the thoughts that do
resemble the things they are 'of' (percepts, sensations), we can feel, alongside of the thing
known, the thought of it going on as an altogether separate act and operation in the mind.
Now this subjective life of ours, distinguished as such so clearly from the objects known by
its means, may, as aforesaid, be taken by us in a concrete or in an abstract way. Of the
concrete way I will say nothing just now, except that the actual 'section' of the stream will
ere long, in our discussion of the nature of the principle of unity in consciousness, play a
very important part. The abstract way claims our attention ﬁrst. If the stream as a whole is
identiﬁed with the Self far more than any outward thing, a certain portion of the stream
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abstracted from the rest is so identiﬁed in an altogether peculiar degree, and is felt by all
men as a sort of innermost centre within the circle, of sanctuary within the citadel,
constituted by the subjective life as a whole. Compared with this element of the stream, the
other parts, even of the subjective life, seem transient external possessions, of which each in
turn can be disowned, whilst that which disowns them remains. Now, what is this self of all
the other selves?
Probably all men would describe it in much the same way up to a certain point. They would
call it the active element in all consciousness; saying that whatever qualities a man's feelings
may possess, or whatever content his thought may include, there is a spiritual something in
him which seems to go out to meet these qualities and contents, whilst they seem to come in
to be received by it. It is what welcomes or rejects. It presides over the perception of
sensations, and by giving or withholding its assent it inﬂuences the movements they tend to [Pg 298]
arouse. It is the home of interest,—not the pleasant or the painful, not even pleasure or pain,
as such, but that within us to which pleasure and pain, the pleasant and the painful, speak. It
is the source of effort and attention, and the place from which appear to emanate the ﬁats of
the will. A physiologist who should reﬂect upon it in his own person could hardly help, I
should think, connecting it more or less vaguely with the process by which ideas or
incoming sensations are 'reﬂected' or pass over into outward acts. Not necessarily that it
should be this process or the mere feeling of this process, but that it should be in some close
way related to this process; for it plays a part analogous to it in the psychic life, being a sort
of junction at which sensory ideas terminate and from which motor ideas proceed, and
forming a kind of link between the two. Being more incessantly there than any other single
element of the mental life, the other elements end by seeming to accrete round it and to
belong to it. It become opposed to them as the permanent is opposed to the changing and
inconstant.
One may, I think, without fear of being upset by any future Galtonian circulars, believe that
all men must single out from the rest of what they call themselves some central principle of
which each would recognize the foregoing to be a fair general description,—accurate
enough, at any rate, to denote what is meant, and keep it unconfused with other things. The
moment, however, they came to closer quarters with it, trying to deﬁne more accurately its
precise nature, we should ﬁnd opinions beginning to diverge. Some would say that it is a
simple active substance, the soul, of which they are thus conscious; others, that it is nothing
but a ﬁction, the imaginary being denoted by the pronoun I; and between these extremes of
opinion all sorts of intermediaries would be found.
Later we must ourselves discuss them all, and sufﬁcient to that day will be the evil thereof.
Now, let us try to settle for ourselves as deﬁnitely as we can, just how this central nucleus of
the Self may feel, no matter whether it be a spiritual substance or only a delusive word.
For this central part of the Self is felt. It may be all that Transcendentalists say it is, and all [Pg 299]
that Empiricists say it is into the bargain, but it is at any rate no mere ens rationis, cognized
only in an intellectual way, and no mere summation of memories or mere sound of a word in
our ears. It is something with which we also have direct sensible acquaintance, and which is
as fully present at any moment of consciousness in which it is present, as in a whole lifetime
of such moments. When, just now, it was called an abstraction, that did not mean that, like
some general notion, it could not be presented in a particular experience. It only meant that
in the stream of consciousness it never was found all alone. But when it is found, it is felt;
just as the body is felt, the feeling of which is also an abstraction, because never is the body
felt all alone, but always together with other things. Now can we tell more precisely in what
the feeling of this central active self consists,—not necessarily as yet what the active self is,
as a being or principle, but what we feel when we become aware of its existence?
I think I can in my own case; and as what I say will be likely to meet with opposition if
generalized (as indeed it may be in part inapplicable to other individuals), I had better
continue in the ﬁrst person, leaving my description, to be accepted by those to whose
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introspection it may commend itself as true, and confessing my inability to meet the
demands of others, if others there be.
First of all, I am aware of a constant play of furtherances and hindrances in my thinking, of
checks and releases, tendencies which run with desire, and tendencies which run the other
way. Among the matters I think of, some range themselves on the side of the thought's
interests, whilst others play an unfriendly part thereto. The mutual inconsistencies and
agreements, reinforcements and obstructions, which obtain amongst these objective matters
reverberate backwards and produce what seem to be incessant reactions of my spontaneity
upon them, welcoming or opposing, appropriating or disowning, striving with or against,
saying yes or no. This palpitating inward life is, in me, that central nucleus which I just tried
to describe in terms that all men might use.
But when I forsake such general descriptions and grapple with particulars, coming to the [Pg 300]
closest possible quarters with the facts, it is difﬁcult for me to detect in the activity any
purely spiritual element at all. Whenever my introspective glance succeeds in turning round
quickly enough to catch one of these manifestations of spontaneity in the act, all it can ever
feel distinctly is some bodily process, for the most part taking place within the head.
Omitting for a moment what is obscure in these introspective results, let me try to state
those particulars which to my own consciousness seem indubitable and distinct.
In the ﬁrst place, the acts of attending, assenting, negating, making an effort, are felt as
movements of something in the head. In many cases it is possible to describe these
movements quite exactly. In attending to either an idea or a sensation belonging to a
particular sense-sphere, the movement is the adjustment of the sense-organ, felt as it occurs.
I cannot think in visual terms, for example, without feeling a ﬂuctuating play of pressures,
convergences, divergences, and accommodations in my eyeballs. The direction in which the
object is conceived to lie determines the character of these movements, the feeling of which
becomes, for my consciousness, identiﬁed with the manner in which I make myself ready to
receive the visible thing. My brain appears to me as if all shot across with lines of direction,
of which I have become conscious as my attention has shifted from one sense-organ to
another, in passing to successive outer things, or in following trains of varying sense-ideas.
When I try to remember or reﬂect, the movements in question, instead of being directed
towards the periphery, seem to come from the periphery inwards and feel like a sort of
withdrawal from the outer world. As far as I can detect, these feelings are due to an actual
rolling outwards and upwards of the eyeballs, such as I believe occurs in me in sleep, and is
the exact opposite of their action in ﬁxating a physical thing. In reasoning, I ﬁnd that I am
apt to have a kind of vaguely localized diagram in my mind, with the various fractional
objects of the thought disposed at particular points thereof; and the oscillations of my
attention from one of them to another are most distinctly felt as alternations of direction in [Pg 301]
movements occurring inside the head.[260]
In consenting and negating, and in making a mental effort, the movements seem more
complex, and I ﬁnd them harder to describe. The opening and closing of the glottis play a
great part in these operations, and, less distinctly, the movements of the soft palate, etc.,
shutting off the posterior nares from the mouth. My glottis is like a sensitive valve,
intercepting my breath instantaneously at every mental hesitation or felt aversion to the
objects of my thought, and as quickly opening, to let the air pass through my throat and
nose, the moment the repugnance is overcome. The feeling of the movement of this air is, in
me, one strong ingredient of the feeling of assent. The movements of the muscles of the
brow and eyelids also respond very sensitively to every ﬂuctuation in the agreeableness or
disagreeableness of what comes before my mind.
In effort of any sort, contractions of the jaw-muscles and of those of respiration are added to
those of the brow and glottis, and thus the feeling passes out of the head properly so called.
It passes out of the head whenever the welcoming or rejecting of the object is strongly felt.
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Then a set of feelings pour in from many bodily parts, all 'expressive' of my emotion, and
the head-feelings proper are swallowed up in this larger mass.
In a sense, then, it may be truly said that, in one person at least, the 'Self of selves,' when
carefully examined, is found to consist mainly of the collection of these peculiar motions in
the head or between the head and throat. I do not for a moment say that this is all it consists
of, for I fully realize how desperately hard is introspection in this ﬁeld. But I feel quite sure
that these cephalic motions are the portions of my innermost activity of which I am most
distinctly aware. If the dim portions which I cannot yet deﬁne should prove to be like unto
these distinct portions in me, and I like other men, it would follow that our entire feeling of
spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that name, is really a feeling of bodily [Pg 302]
activities whose exact nature is by most men overlooked.

Now, without pledging ourselves in any way to adopt this hypothesis, let us dally with it for
a while to see to what consequences it might lead if it were true.
In the ﬁrst place, the nuclear part of the Self, intermediary between ideas and overt acts,
would be a collection of activities physiologically in no essential way different from the
overt acts themselves. If we divide all possible physiological acts into adjustments and
executions, the nuclear self would be the adjustments collectively considered; and the less
intimate, more shifting self, so far as it was active, would be the executions. But both
adjustments and executions would obey the reﬂex type. Both would be the result of
sensorial and ideational processes discharging either into each other within the brain, or into
muscles and other parts outside. The peculiarity of the adjustments would be that they are
minimal reﬂexes, few in number, incessantly repeated, constant amid great ﬂuctuations in
the rest of the mind's content, and entirely unimportant and uninteresting except through
their uses in furthering or inhibiting the presence of various things, and actions before
consciousness. These characters would naturally keep us from introspectively paying much
attention to them in detail, whilst they would at the same time make us aware of them as a
coherent group of processes, strongly contrasted with all the other things consciousness
contained,—even with the other constituents of the 'Self,' material, social, or spiritual, as the
case might be. They are reactions, and they are primary reactions. Everything arouses them;
for objects which have no other effects will for a moment contract the brow and make the
glottis close. It is as if all that visited the mind had to stand an entrance-examination, and
just show its face so as to be either approved or sent back. These primary reactions are like
the opening or the closing of the door. In the midst of psychic change they are the permanent
core of turnings-towards and turnings-from, of yieldings and arrests, which naturally seem
central and interior in comparison with the foreign matters, a propos to which they occur, [Pg 303]
and hold a sort of arbitrating, decisive position, quite unlike that held by any of the other
constituents of the Me. It would not be surprising, then, if we were to feel them as the
birthplace of conclusions and the starting point of acts, or if they came to appear as what we
[Pg 304]
called a while back the 'sanctuary within the citadel' of our personal life.[261]
If they really were the innermost sanctuary, the ultimate one of all the selves whose being
we can ever directly experience, it would follow that all that is experienced is, strictly
considered, objective; that this Objective falls asunder into two contrasted parts, one realized
as 'Self,' the other as 'not-Self; 'and that over and above these parts there is nothing save the
fact that they are known, the fact of the stream of thought being there as the indispensable
subjective condition of their being experienced at all. But this condition of the experience is
not one of the things experienced at the moment; this knowing is not immediately known. It
is only known in subsequent reﬂection. Instead, then, of the stream of thought being one of
con-sciousness, "thinking its own existence along with whatever else it thinks," (as Ferrier
says) it might be better called a stream of Sciousness pure and simple, thinking objects of
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some of which it makes what it calls a 'Me,' and only aware of its 'pure' Self in an abstract,
hypothetic or conceptual way. Each 'section' of the stream would then be a bit of sciousness
or knowledge of this sort, including and contemplating its 'me' and its 'not-me' as objects
which work out their drama together, but not yet including or contemplating its own
subjective being. The sciousness in question would be the Thinker, and the existence of this
thinker would be given to us rather as a logical postulate than as that direct inner perception
of spiritual activity which we naturally believe ourselves to have. 'Matter,' as something
behind physical phenomena, is a postulate of this sort. Between the postulated Matter and
the postulated Thinker, the sheet of phenomena would then swing, some of them (the
'realities') pertaining more to the matter, others (the ﬁctions, opinions, and errors) pertaining
more to the Thinker. But who the Thinker would be, or how many distinct Thinkers we
ought to suppose in the universe, would all be subjects for an ulterior metaphysical inquiry.
Speculations like this traverse common-sense; and not only do they traverse common sense
(which in philosophy is no insuperable objection) but they contradict the fundamental
assumption of every philosophic school. Spiritualists, transcendentalists, and empiricists
alike admit in us a continual direct perception of the thinking activity in the concrete. [Pg 305]
However they may otherwise disagree, they vie with each other in the cordiality of their
recognition of our thoughts as the one sort of existent which skepticism cannot touch.[262] I
will therefore treat the last few pages as a parenthetical digression, and from now to the end
of the volume revert to the path of common-sense again. I mean by this that I will continue
to assume (as I have assumed all along, especially in the last chapter) a direct awareness of
the process of our thinking as such, simply insisting on the fact that it is an even more
inward and subtle phenomenon than most of us suppose. At the conclusion of the volume,
however, I may permit myself to revert again to the doubts here provisionally mooted, and
will indulge in some metaphysical reﬂections suggested by them.

At present, then, the only conclusion I come to is the following: That (in some persons at
least) the part of the innermost Self which is most vividly felt turns out to consist for the
most part of a collection of cephalic movements of 'adjustments' which, for want of attention
and reﬂection, usually fail to be perceived and classed as what they are; that over and above
these there is an obscurer feeling of something more; but whether it be of fainter
physiological processes, or of nothing objective at all, but rather of subjectivity as such, of
thought become 'its own object,' must at present remain an open question,—like the question
whether it be an indivisible active soul-substance, or the question whether it be a
personiﬁcation of the pronoun I, or any other of the guesses as to what its nature may be.
Farther than this we cannot as yet go clearly in our analysis of the Self's constituents. So let
us proceed to the emotions of Self which they arouse.
2. SELF-FEELING.
These are primarily self-complacency and self-dissatisfaction. Of what is called 'self-love,' I
will treat a little farther on. Language has synonyms enough for both primary feelings. Thus [Pg 306]
pride, conceit, vanity, self-esteem, arrogance, vainglory, on the one hand; and on the other
modesty, humility, confusion, difﬁdence, shame, mortiﬁcation, contrition, the sense of
obloquy and personal despair. These two opposite classes of affection seem to be direct and
elementary endowments of our nature. Associationists would have it that they are, on the
other hand, secondary phenomena arising from a rapid computation of the sensible pleasures
or pains to which our prosperous or debased personal predicament is likely to lead, the sum
of the represented pleasures forming the self-satisfaction, and the sum of the represented
pains forming the opposite feeling of shame. No doubt, when we are self-satisﬁed, we do
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fondly rehearse all possible rewards for our desert, and when in a ﬁt of self-despair we
forebode evil. But the mere expectation of reward is not the self-satisfaction, and the mere
apprehension of the evil is not the self-despair, for there is a certain average tone of selffeeling which each one of us carries about with him, and which is independent of the
objective reasons we may have for satisfaction or discontent. That is, a very meanlyconditioned man may abound in unfaltering conceit, and one whose success in life is secure
and who is esteemed by all may remain difﬁdent of his powers to the end.
One may say, however, that the normal provocative of self-feeling is one's actual success or
failure, and the good or bad actual position one holds in the world. "He put in his thumb and
pulled out a plum, and said what a good boy am I." A man with a broadly extended
empirical Ego, with powers that have uniformly brought him success, with place and wealth
and friends and fame, is not likely to be visited by the morbid difﬁdences and doubts about
himself which he had when he was a boy. "Is not this great Babylon, which I have planted?"
[263] Whereas he who has made one blunder after another, and still lies in middle life among
the failures at the foot of the hill, is liable to grow all sicklied o'er with self-distrust, and to [Pg 307]
shrink from trials with which his powers can really cope.
The emotions themselves of self-satisfaction and abasement are of a unique sort, each as
worthy to be classed as a primitive emotional species as are, for example, rage or pain. Each
has its own peculiar physiognomical expression. In self-satisfaction the extensor muscles are
innervated, the eye is strong and glorious, the gait rolling and elastic, the nostril dilated, and
a peculiar smile plays upon the lips. This whole complex of symptoms is seen in an
exquisite way in lunatic asylums, which always contain some patients who are literally mad
with conceit, and whose fatuous expression and absurdly strutting or swaggering gait is in
tragic contrast with their lack of any valuable personal quality. It is in these same castles of
despair that we ﬁnd the strongest examples of the opposite physiognomy, in good people
who think they have committed 'the unpardonable sin' and are lost forever, who crouch and
cringe and slink from notice, and are unable to speak aloud or look us in the eye. Like fear
and like anger, in similar morbid conditions, these opposite feelings of Self may be aroused
with no adequate exciting cause. And in fact we ourselves know how the barometer of our
self-esteem and conﬁdence rises and falls from one day to another through causes that seem
to be visceral and organic rather than rational, and which certainly answer to no
corresponding variations in the esteem in which we are held by our friends. Of the origin of
these emotions in the race, we can speak better when we have treated of—
3. SELF-SEEKING AND SELF-PRESERVATION.
These words cover a large number of our fundamental instinctive impulses. We have those
of bodily self-seeking, those of social self-seeking, and those of spiritual self-seeking.
All the ordinary useful reﬂex actions and movements of alimentation and defence are acts of
bodily self-preservation. Fear and anger prompt to acts that are useful in the same way.
Whilst if by self-seeking we mean the providing for the future as distinguished from
maintaining the present, we must class both anger and fear with the hunting, the acquisitive, [Pg 308]
the home-constructing and the tool-constructing instincts, as impulses to self-seeking of the
bodily kind. Really, however, these latter instincts, with amativeness, parental fondness,
curiosity and emulation, seek not only the development of the bodily Self, but that of the
material Self in the widest possible sense of the word.
Our social self-seeking, in turn, is carried on directly through our amativeness and
friendliness, our desire to please and attract notice and admiration, our emulation and
jealousy, our love of glory, inﬂuence, and power, and indirectly through whichever of the
material self-seeking impulses prove serviceable as means to social ends. That the direct
social self-seeking impulses are probably pure instincts is easily seen. The noteworthy thing
about the desire to be 'recognized' by others is that its strength has so little to do with the
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worth of the recognition computed in sensational or rational terms. We are crazy to get a
visiting-list which shall be large, to be able to say when any one is mentioned, "Oh! I know
him well," and to be bowed to in the street by half the people we meet. Of course
distinguished friends and admiring recognition are the most desirable—Thackeray
somewhere asks his readers to confess whether it would not give each of them an exquisite
pleasure to be met walking down Pall Mall with a duke on either arm. But in default of
dukes and envious salutations almost anything will do for some of us; and there is a whole
race of beings to-day whose passion is to keep their names in the newspapers, no matter
under what heading, 'arrivals and departures,' 'personal paragraphs,' 'interviews,'—gossip,
even scandal, will suit them if nothing better is to be had. Guiteau, Garﬁeld's assassin, is an
example of the extremity to which this sort of craving for the notoriety of print may go in a
pathological case. The newspapers bounded his mental horizon; and in the poor wretch's
prayer on the scaffold, one of the most heartfelt expressions was: "The newspaper press of
this land has a big bill to settle with thee, O Lord!"
Not only the people but the places and things I know enlarge my Self in a sort of metaphoric
social way. "Ça me connaît," as the French workman says of the implement he can use well. [Pg 309]
So that it comes about that persons for whose opinion we care nothing are nevertheless
persons whose notice we woo; and that many a man truly great, many a woman truly
fastidious in most respects, will take a deal of trouble to dazzle some insigniﬁcant cad
whose whole personality they heartily despise.
Under the head of spiritual self-seeking ought to be included every impulse towards psychic
progress, whether intellectual, moral, or spiritual in the narrow sense of the term. It must be
admitted, however, that much that commonly passes for spiritual self-seeking in this narrow
sense is only material and social self-seeking beyond the grave. In the Mohammedan desire
for paradise and the Christian aspiration not to be damned in hell, the materiality of the
goods sought is undisguised. In the more positive and reﬁned view of heaven many of its
goods, the fellowship of the saints and of our dead ones, and the presence of God, are but
social goods of the most exalted kind. It is only the search of the redeemed inward nature,
the spotlessness from sin, whether here or hereafter, that can count as spiritual self-seeking
pure and undeﬁned.
But this broad external review of the facts of the life of the Self will be incomplete without
some account of the
RIVALRY AND CONFLICT OF THE DIFFERENT SELVES.
With most objects of desire, physical nature restricts our choice to but one of many
represented goods, and even so it is here. I am often confronted by the necessity of standing
by one of my empirical selves and relinquishing the rest. Not that I would not, if I could, be
both handsome and fat and well dressed, and a great athlete, and make a million a year, be a
wit, a bon-vivant, and a lady-killer, as well as a philosopher; a philanthropist, statesman,
warrior, and African explorer, as well as a 'tone-poet' and saint. But the thing is simply
impossible. The millionaire's work would run counter to the saint's; the bon-vivant and the
philanthropist would trip each other up; the philosopher and the lady-killer could not well
keep house in the same tenement of clay. Such different characters may conceivably at the [Pg 310]
outset of life be alike possible to a man. But to make any one of them actual, the rest must
more or less be suppressed. So the seeker of his truest, strongest, deepest self must review
the list carefully, and pick out the one on which to stake his salvation. All other selves
thereupon become unreal, but the fortunes of this self are real. Its failures are real failures,
its triumphs real triumphs, carrying shame and gladness with them. This is as strong an
example as there is of that selective industry of the mind on which I insisted some pages
back (p. 284 ff.). Our thought, incessantly deciding, among many things of a kind, which
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ones for it shall be realities, here chooses one of many possible selves or characters, and
forthwith reckons it no shame to fail in any of those not adopted expressly as its own.
I, who for the time have staked my all on being a psychologist, am mortiﬁed if others know
much more psychology than I. But I am contented to wallow in the grossest ignorance of
Greek. My deﬁciencies there give me no sense of personal humiliation at all. Had I
'pretensions' to be a linguist, it would have been just the reverse. So we have the paradox of
a man shamed to death because he is only the second pugilist or the second oarsman in the
world. That he is able to beat the whole population of the globe minus one is nothing; he has
'pitted' himself to beat that one; and as long as he doesn't do that nothing else counts. He is
to his own regard as if he were not, indeed he is not.
Yonder puny fellow, however, whom every one can beat, suffers no chagrin about it, for he
has long ago abandoned the attempt to 'carry that line,' as the merchants say, of self at all.
With no attempt there can be no failure; with no failure no humiliation. So our self-feeling
in this world depends entirely on what we back ourselves to be and do. It is determined by
the ratio of our actualities to our supposed potentialities; a fraction of which our pretensions
are the denominator and the numerator our success: thus, Self-esteem = Success/
Pretensions. Such a fraction may be increased as well by diminishing the denominator as by [Pg 311]
increasing the numerator.[264] To give up pretensions is as blessed a relief as to get them
gratiﬁed; and where disappointment is incessant, and the struggle unending, this is what
men will always do. The history of evangelical theology, with its conviction of sin, its selfdespair, and its abandonment of salvation by works, is the deepest of possible examples, but
we meet others in every walk of life. There is the strangest lightness about the heart when
one's nothingness in a particular line is once accepted in good faith. All is not bitterness in
the lot of the lover sent away by the ﬁnal inexorable 'No.' Many Bostonians, crede experto
(and inhabitants of other cities, too, I fear), would be happier women and men to-day, if they
could once for all abandon the notion of keeping up a Musical Self, and without shame let
people hear them call a symphony a nuisance. How pleasant is the day when we give up
striving to be young,—or slender! Thank God! we say, those illusions are gone. Everything
added to the Self is a burden as well as a pride. A certain man who lost every penny during
our civil war went and actually rolled in the dust, saying he had not felt so free and happy
since he was born.
Once more, then, our self-feeling is in our power. As Carlyle says: "Make thy claim of
wages a zero, then hast thou the world under thy feet. Well did the wisest of our time write,
it is only with renunciation that life, properly speaking, can be said to begin."
Neither threats nor pleadings can move a man unless they touch some one of his potential or
actual selves. Only thus can we, as a rule, get a 'purchase' on another's will. The ﬁrst care of
diplomatists and monarchs and all who wish to rule or inﬂuence is, accordingly, to ﬁnd out
their victim's strongest principle of self-regard, so as to make that the fulcrum of all appeals. [Pg 312]
But if a man has given up those things which are subject to foreign fate, and ceased to
regard them as parts of himself at all, we are well-nigh powerless over him. The Stoic
receipt for contentment was to dispossess yourself in advance of all that was out of your
own power,—then fortune's shocks might rain down unfelt. Epictetus exhorts us, by thus
narrowing and at the same time solidifying our Self to make it invulnerable: "I must die;
well, but must I die groaning too? I will speak what appears to be right, and if the despot
says, then I will put you to death, I will reply, 'When did I ever tell you that I was immortal?
You will do your part and I mine; it is yours to kill and mine to die intrepid; yours to banish,
mine to depart untroubled.' How do we act in a voyage? We choose the pilot, the sailors, the
hour. Afterwards comes a storm. What have I to care for? My part is performed. This matter
belongs to the pilot. But the ship is sinking; what then have I to do? That which alone I can
do—submit to being drowned without fear, without clamor or accusing of God, but as one
who knows that what is born must likewise die."[265]
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This Stoic fashion, though efﬁcacious and heroic enough in its place and time, is, it must be
confessed, only possible as an habitual mood of the soul to narrow and unsympathetic
characters. It proceeds altogether by exclusion. If I am a Stoic, the goods I cannot
appropriate cease to be my goods, and the temptation lies very near to deny that they are
goods at all. We ﬁnd this mode of protecting the Self by exclusion and denial very common
among people who are in other respects not Stoics. All narrow people intrench their Me,
they retract it,—from the region of what they cannot securely possess. People who don't
resemble them, or who treat them with indifference, people over whom they gain no
inﬂuence, are people on whose existence, however meritorious it may intrinsically be, they
look with chill negation, if not with positive hate. Who will not be mine I will exclude from
existence altogether; that is, as far as I can make it so, such people shall be as if they were [Pg 313]
not.[266] Thus may a certain absoluteness and deﬁniteness in the outline of my Me console
me for the smallness of its content.
Sympathetic people, on the contrary, proceed by the entirely opposite way of expansion and
inclusion. The outline of their self often gets uncertain enough, but for this the spread of its
content more than atones. Nil humani a me alienum. Let them despise this little person of
mine, and treat me like a dog, I shall not negate them so long as I have a soul in my body.
They are realities as much as I am. What positive good is in them shall be mine too, etc., etc.
The magnanimity of these expansive natures is often touching indeed. Such persons can feel
a sort of delicate rapture in thinking that, however sick, ill-favored, mean-conditioned, and
generally forsaken they may be, they yet are integral parts of the whole of this brave world,
have a fellow's share in the strength of the dray-horses, the happiness of the young people,
the wisdom of the wise ones, and are not altogether without part or lot in the good fortunes
of the Vanderbilts and the Hohenzollerns themselves. Thus either by negating or by
embracing, the Ego may seek to establish itself in reality. He who, with Marcus Aurelius,
can truly say, "O Universe, I wish all that thou wishest," has a self from which every trace of
negativeness and obstructiveness has been removed—no wind can blow except to ﬁll its
sails.

A tolerably unanimous opinion ranges the different selves of which a man may be 'seized
and possessed,' and the consequent different orders of his self-regard, in an hierarchical
scale, with the bodily Self at the bottom, the spiritual Self at top, and the extracorporeal
material selves and the various social selves between. Our merely natural self-seeking
would lead us to aggrandize all these selves; we give up deliberately only those among them
which we ﬁnd we cannot keep. Our unselﬁshness is thus apt to be a 'virtue of necessity'; and [Pg 314]
it is not without all show of reason that cynics quote the fable of the fox and the grapes in
describing our progress therein. But this is the moral education of the race; and if we agree
in the result that on the whole the selves we can keep are the intrinsically best, we need not
complain of being led to the knowledge of their superior worth in such a tortuous way.
Of course this is not the only way in which we learn to subordinate our lower selves to our
higher. A direct ethical judgment unquestionably also plays its part, and last, not least, we
apply to our own persons judgments originally called forth by the acts of others. It is one of
the strangest laws of our nature that many things which we are well satisﬁed with in
ourselves disgust us when seen in others. With another man's bodily 'hoggishness' hardly
anyone has any sympathy;—almost as little with his cupidity, his social vanity and
eagerness, his jealousy, his despotism, and his pride. Left absolutely to myself I should
probably allow all these spontaneous tendencies to luxuriate in me unchecked, and it would
be long before I formed a distinct notion of the order of their subordination. But having
constantly to pass judgment on my associates, I come ere long to see, as Herr Horwicz says,
my own lusts in the mirror of the lusts of others, and to think about them in a very different
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way from that in which I simply feel. Of course, the moral generalities which from
childhood have been instilled into me accelerate enormously the advent of this reﬂective
judgment on myself.
So it comes to pass that, as aforesaid, men have arranged the various selves which they may
seek in an hierarchical scale according to their worth. A certain amount of bodily selﬁshness
is required as a basis for all the other selves. But too much sensuality is despised, or at best
condoned on account of the other qualities of the individual. The wider material selves are
regarded as higher than the immediate body. He is esteemed a poor creature who is unable
to forego a little meat and drink and warmth and sleep for the sake of getting on in the
world. The social self as a whole, again, ranks higher than the material self as a whole. We [Pg 315]
must care more for our honor, our friends, our human ties, than for a sound skin or wealth.
And the spiritual self is so supremely precious that, rather than lose it, a man ought to be
willing to give up friends and good fame, and property, and life itself.
In each kind of self, material, social, and spiritual, men distinguish between the immediate
and actual, and the remote and potential, between the narrower and the wider view, to the
detriment of the former and advantage of the latter. One must forego a present bodily
enjoyment for the sake of one's general health; one must abandon the dollar in the hand for
the sake of the hundred dollars to come; one must make an enemy of his present interlocutor
if thereby one makes friends of a more valued circle; one must go without learning and
grace, and wit, the better to compass one's soul's salvation.
Of all these wider, more potential selves, the potential social self is the most interesting, by
reason of certain apparent paradoxes to which it leads in conduct, and by reason of its
connection with our moral and religious life. When for motives of honor and conscience I
brave the condemnation of my own family, club, and 'set'; when, as a protestant, I turn
catholic; as a catholic, freethinker; as a 'regular practitioner,' homœopath, or what not, I am
always inwardly strengthened in my course and steeled against the loss of my actual social
self by the thought of other and better possible social judges than those whose verdict goes
against me now. The ideal social self which I thus seek in appealing to their decision may be
very remote: it may be represented as barely possible. I may not hope for its realization
during my lifetime; I may even expect the future generations, which would approve me if
they knew me, to know nothing about me when I am dead and gone. Yet still the emotion
that beckons me on is indubitably the pursuit of an ideal social self, of a self that is at least
worthy of approving recognition by the highest possible judging companion, if such
companion there be.[267] This self is the true, the intimate, the ultimate, the permanent Me [Pg 316]
which I seek. This judge is God, the Absolute Mind, the 'Great Companion.' We hear, in
these days of scientiﬁc enlightenment, a great deal of discussion about the efﬁcacy of
prayer; and many reasons are given us why we should not pray, whilst others are given us
why we should. But in all this very little is said of the reason why we do pray, which is
simply that we cannot help praying. It seems probable that, in spite of all that 'science' may
do to the contrary, men will continue to pray to the end of time, unless their mental nature
changes in a manner which nothing we know should lead us to expect. The impulse to pray
is a necessary consequence of the fact that whilst the innermost of the empirical selves of a
man is a Self of the social sort, it yet can ﬁnd its only adequate Socius in an ideal world.
All progress in the social Self is the substitution of higher tribunals for lower; this ideal
tribunal is the highest; and most men, either continually or occasionally, carry a reference to
it in their breast. The humblest outcast on this earth can feel himself to be real and valid by
means of this higher recognition. And, on the other hand, for most of us, a world with no
such inner refuge when the outer social self failed and dropped from us would be the abyss
of horror. I say 'for most of us,' because it is probable that individuals differ a good deal in
the degree in which they are haunted by this sense of an ideal spectator. It is a much more
essential part of the consciousness of some men than of others. Those who have the most of
it are possibly the most religious men. But I am sure that even those who say they are
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altogether without it deceive themselves, and really have it in some degree. Only a nongregarious animal could be completely without it. Probably no one can make sacriﬁces for
'right,' without to some degree personifying the principle of right for which the sacriﬁce is [Pg 317]
made, and expecting thanks from it. Complete social unselﬁshness, in other words, can
hardly exist; complete social suicide hardly occur to a man's mind. Even such texts as Job's,
"Though He slay me yet will I trust Him," or Marcus Aurelius's, "If gods hate me and my
children, there is a reason for it," can least of all be cited to prove the contrary. For beyond
all doubt Job revelled in the thought of Jehovah's recognition of the worship after the
slaying should have been done; and the Roman emperor felt sure the Absolute Reason
would not be all indifferent to his acquiescence in the gods' dislike. The old test of piety,
"Are you willing to be damned for the glory of God?" was probably never answered in the
afﬁrmative except by those who felt sure in their heart of hearts that God would 'credit' them
with their willingness, and set more store by them thus than if in His unfathomable scheme
He had not damned them at all.
All this about the impossibility of suicide is said on the supposition of positive motives.
When possessed by the emotion of fear, however, we are in a negative state of mind; that is,
our desire is limited to the mere banishing of something, without regard to what shall take
its place. In this state of mind there can unquestionably be genuine thoughts, and genuine
acts, of suicide, spiritual and social, as well as bodily. Anything, anything, at such times, so
as to escape and not to be! But such conditions of suicidal frenzy are pathological in their
nature and run dead against everything that is regular in the life of the Self in man.
WHAT SELF IS LOVED IN 'SELF-LOVE'?
We must now try to interpret the facts of self-love and self-seeking a little more delicately
from within.
A man in whom self-seeking of any sort is largely developed is said to be selﬁsh.[268] He is
on the other hand called unselﬁsh if he shows consideration for the interests of other selves [Pg 318]
than his own. Now what is the intimate nature of the selﬁsh emotion in him? and what is the
primary object of its regard? We have described him pursuing and fostering as his self ﬁrst
one set of things and then another; we have seen the same set of facts gain or lose interest in
his eyes, leave him indifferent, or ﬁll him either with triumph or despair according as he
made pretensions to appropriate them, treated them as if they were potentially or actually
parts of himself, or not. We know how little it matters to us whether some man, a man taken
at large and in the abstract, prove a failure or succeed in life,—he may be hanged for aught
we care,—but we know the utter momentousness and terribleness of the alternative when
the man is the one whose name we ourselves bear. I must not be a failure, is the very loudest
of the voices that clamor in each of our breasts: let fail who may, I at least must succeed.
Now the ﬁrst conclusion which these facts suggest is that each of us is animated by a direct
feeling of regard for his own pure principle of individual existence, whatever that may be,
taken merely as such. It appears as if all our concrete manifestations of selﬁshness might be
the conclusions of as many syllogisms, each with this principle as the subject of its major
premiss, thus: Whatever is me is precious; this is me; therefore this is precious; whatever is
mine must not fail; this is mine; therefore this must not fail, etc. It appears, I say, as if this
principle inoculated all it touched with its own intimate quality of worth; as if, previous to
the touching, everything might be matter of indifference, and nothing interesting in its own
right; as if my regard for my own body even were an interest not simply in this body, but in
this body only so far as it is mine.
But what is this abstract numerical principle of identity, this 'Number One' within me, for [Pg 319]
which, according to proverbial philosophy, I am supposed to keep so constant a 'lookout'? Is
it the inner nucleus of my spiritual self, that collection of obscurely felt 'adjustments,' plus
perhaps that still more obscurely perceived subjectivity as such, of which we recently
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spoke? Or is it perhaps the concrete stream of my thought in its entirety, or some one section
of the same? Or may it be the indivisible Soul-Substance, in which, according to the
orthodox tradition, my faculties inhere? Or, ﬁnally, can it be the mere pronoun I? Surely it is
none of these things, that self for which I feel such hot regard. Though all of them together
were put within me, I should still be cold, and fail to exhibit anything worthy of the name of
selﬁshness or of devotion to 'Number One.' To have a self that I can care for, nature must
ﬁrst present me with some object interesting enough to make me instinctively wish to
appropriate it for its own sake, and out of it to manufacture one of those material, social, or
spiritual selves, which we have already passed in review. We shall ﬁnd that all the facts of
rivalry and substitution that have so struck us, all the shiftings and expansions and
contractions of the sphere of what shall be considered me and mine, are but results of the
fact that certain things appeal to primitive and instinctive impulses of our nature, and that
we follow their destinies with an excitement that owes nothing to a reﬂective source. These
objects our consciousness treats as the primordial constituents of its Me. Whatever other
objects, whether by association with the fate of these, or in any other way, come to be
followed with the same sort of interest, form our remoter and more secondary self. The
words ME, then, and SELF, so far as they arouse feeling and connote emotional worth, are
OBJECTIVE designations, meaning ALL THE THINGS which have the power to produce in a stream
of consciousness excitement of a certain peculiar sort. Let us try to justify this proposition
in detail.
The most palpable selﬁshness of a man is his bodily selﬁshness; and his most palpable self
is the body to which that selﬁshness relates. Now I say that he identiﬁes himself with this
body because he loves it, and that he does not love it because he ﬁnds it to be identiﬁed with [Pg 320]
himself. Reverting to natural history-psychology will help us to see the truth of this. In the
chapter on Instincts we shall learn that every creature has a certain selective interest in
certain portions of the world, and that this interest is as often connate as acquired. Our
interest in things means the attention and emotion which the thought of them will excite,
and the actions which their presence will evoke. Thus every species is particularly interested
in its own prey or food, its own enemies, its own sexual mates, and its own young. These
things fascinate by their intrinsic power to do so; they are cared for for their own sakes.
Well, it stands not in the least otherwise with our bodies. They too are percepts in our
objective ﬁeld—they are simply the most interesting percepts there. What happens to them
excites in us emotions and tendencies to action more energetic and habitual than any which
are excited by other portions of the 'ﬁeld.' What my comrades call my bodily selﬁshness or
self-love, is nothing but the sum of all the outer acts which this interest in my body
spontaneously draws from me. My 'selﬁshness' is here but a descriptive name for grouping
together the outward symptoms which I show. When I am led by self-love to keep my seat
whilst ladies stand, or to grab something ﬁrst and cut out my neighbor, what I really love is
the comfortable seat, is the thing itself which I grab. I love them primarily, as the mother
loves her babe, or a generous man an heroic deed. Wherever, as here, self-seeking is the
outcome of simple instinctive propensity, it is but a name for certain reﬂex acts. Something
rivets my attention fatally, and fatally provokes the 'selﬁsh' response. Could an automaton be
so skilfully constructed as to ape these acts, it would be called selﬁsh as properly as I. It is
true that I am no automaton, but a thinker. But my thoughts, like my acts, are here
concerned only with the outward things. They need neither know nor care for any pure
principle within. In fact the more utterly 'selﬁsh' I am in this primitive way, the more blindly
absorbed my thought will be in the objects and impulses of my lusts, and the more devoid of
any inward looking glance. A baby, whose consciousness of the pure Ego, of himself as a [Pg 321]
thinker, is not usually supposed developed, is, in this way, as some German has said, 'der
vollendeteste Egoist.' His corporeal person, and what ministers to its needs, are the only self
he can possibly be said to love. His so-called self-love is but a name for his insensibility to
all but this one set of things. It may be that he needs a pure principle of subjectivity, a soul
or pure Ego (he certainly needs a stream of thought) to make him sensible at all to anything,
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to make him discriminate and love überhaupt,—how that may be, we shall see ere long; but
this pure Ego, which would then be the condition of his loving, need no more be the object
of his love than it need be the object of his thought. If his interests lay altogether in other
bodies than his own, if all his instincts were altruistic and all his acts suicidal, still he would
need a principle of consciousness just as he does now. Such a principle cannot then be the
principle of his bodily selﬁshness any more than it is the principle of any other tendency he
may show.
So much for the bodily self-love. But my social self-love, my interest in the images other
men have framed of me, is also an interest in a set of objects external to my thought. These
thoughts in other men's minds are out of my mind and 'ejective' to me. They come and go,
and grow and dwindle, and I am puffed up with pride, or blush with shame, at the result, just
as at my success or failure in the pursuit of a material thing. So that here again, just as in the
former case, the pure principle seems out of the game as an object of regard, and present
only as the general form or condition under which the regard and the thinking go on in me at
all.
But, it will immediately be objected, this is giving a mutilated account of the facts. Those
images of me in the minds of other men are, it is true, things outside of me, whose changes I
perceive just as I perceive any other outward change. But the pride and shame which I feel
are not concerned merely with those changes. I feel as if something else had changed too,
when I perceive my image in your mind to have changed for the worse, something in me to
which that image belongs, and which a moment ago I felt inside of me, big and strong and [Pg 322]
lusty, but now weak, contracted, and collapsed. Is not this latter change the change I feel the
shame about? Is not the condition of this thing inside of me the proper object of my egoistic
concern, of my self-regard? And is it not, after all, my pure Ego, my bare numerical
principle of distinction from other men, and no empirical part of me at all?
No, it is no such pure principle, it is simply my total empirical selfhood again, my historic
Me, a collection of objective facts, to which the depreciated image in your mind 'belongs.' In
what capacity is it that I claim and demand a respectful greeting from you instead of this
expression of disdain? It is not as being a bare I that I claim it; it is as being an I who has
always been treated with respect, who belongs to a certain family and 'set,' who has certain
powers, possessions, and public functions, sensibilities, duties, and purposes, and merits and
deserts. All this is what your disdain negates and contradicts; this is 'the thing inside of me'
whose changed treatment I feel the shame about; this is what was lusty, and now, in
consequence of your conduct, is collapsed; and this certainly is an empirical objective thing.
Indeed, the thing that is felt modiﬁed and changed for the worse during my feeling of shame
is often more concrete even than this,—it is simply my bodily person, in which your
conduct immediately and without any reﬂection at all on my part works those muscular,
glandular, and vascular changes which together make up the 'expression' of shame. In this
instinctive, reﬂex sort of shame, the body is just as much the entire vehicle of the selffeeling as, in the coarser cases which we ﬁrst took up, it was the vehicle of the self-seeking.
As, in simple 'hoggishness,' a succulent morsel gives rise, by the reﬂex mechanism, to
behavior which the bystanders ﬁnd 'greedy,' and consider to ﬂow from a certain sort of 'selfregard;' so here your disdain gives rise, by a mechanism quite as reﬂex and immediate, to
another sort of behavior, which the bystanders call 'shame-faced' and which they consider
due to another kind of self-regard. But in both cases there may be no particular self regarded
at all by the mind: and the name self-regard may be only a descriptive title imposed from [Pg 323]
without the reﬂex acts themselves, and the feelings that immediately result from their
discharge.
After the bodily and social selves come the spiritual. But which of my spiritual selves do I
really care for? My Soul-substance? my 'transcendental Ego, or Thinker'? my pronoun I? my
subjectivity as such? my nucleus of cephalic adjustments? or my more phenomenal and
perishable powers, my loves and hates, willingnesses and sensibilities, and the like? Surely
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the latter. But they, relatively to the central principle, whatever it may be, are external and
objective. They come and go, and it remains—"so shakes the magnet, and so stands the
pole." It may indeed have to be there for them to be loved, but being there is not identical
with being loved itself.
To sum up, then, we see no reason to suppose that 'self-love' is primarily, or secondarily, or
ever, love for one's mere principle of conscious identity. It is always love for something
which, as compared with that principle, is superﬁcial, transient, liable to be taken up or
dropped at will.
And zoological psychology again comes to the aid of our understanding and shows us that
this must needs be so. In fact, in answering the question what things it is that a man loves in
his self-love, we have implicitly answered the farther question, of why he loves them.
Unless his consciousness were something more than cognitive, unless it experienced a
partiality for certain of the objects, which, in succession, occupy its ken, it could not long
maintain itself in existence; for, by an inscrutable necessity, each human mind's appearance
on this earth is conditioned upon the integrity of the body with which it belongs, upon the
treatment which that body gets from others, and upon the spiritual dispositions which use it
as their tool, and lead it either towards longevity or to destruction. Its own body, then, ﬁrst of
all, its friends next, and ﬁnally its spiritual dispositions, MUST be the supremely interesting
OBJECTS for each human mind. Each mind, to begin with, must have a certain minimum of
selﬁshness in the shape of instincts of bodily self-seeking in order to exist. This minimum
must be there as a basis for all farther conscious acts, whether of self-negation or of a
selﬁshness more subtle still. All minds must have come, by the way of the survival of the [Pg 324]
ﬁttest, if by no directer path, to take an intense interest in the bodies to which they are
yoked, altogether apart from any interest in the pure Ego which they also possess.
And similarly with the images of their person in the minds of others. I should not be extant
now had I not become sensitive to looks of approval or disapproval on the faces among
which my life is cast. Looks of contempt cast on other persons need affect me in no such
peculiar way. Were my mental life dependent exclusively on some other person's welfare,
either directly or in an indirect way, then natural selection would unquestionably have
brought it about that I should be as sensitive to the social vicissitudes of that other person as
I now am to my own. Instead of being egoistic I should be spontaneously altruistic, then.
But in this case, only partially realized in actual human conditions, though the self I
empirically love would have changed, my pure Ego or Thinker would have to remain just
what it is now.
My spiritual powers, again, must interest me more than those of other people, and for the
same reason. I should not be here at all unless I had cultivated them and kept them from
decay. And the same law which made me once care for them makes me care for them still.
My own body and what ministers to its needs are thus the primitive object, instinctively
determined, of my egoistic interests. Other objects may become interesting derivatively
through association with any of these things, either as means or as habitual concomitants;
and so in a thousand ways the primitive sphere of the egoistic emotions may enlarge and
change its boundaries.
This sort of interest is really the meaning of the word 'my.' Whatever has it is eo ipso a part
of me. My child, my friend dies, and where he goes I feel that part of myself now is and
evermore shall be:
"For this losing is true dying;
This is lordly man's down-lying;
This his slow but sure reclining,
Star by star his world resigning."
[Pg 325]
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The fact remains, however, that certain special sorts of thing tend primordially to possess
this interest, and form the natural me. But all these things are objects, properly so called, to
the subject which does the thinking.[269] And this latter fact upsets at once the dictum of the
old-fashioned sensationalist psychology, that altruistic passions and interests are
contradictory to the nature of things, and that if they appear anywhere to exist, it must be as
secondary products, resolvable at bottom into cases of selﬁshness, taught by experience a
hypocritical disguise. If the zoological and evolutionary point of view is the true one, there
is no reason why any object whatever might not arouse passion and interest as primitively
and instinctively as any other, whether connected or not with the interests of the me. The
phenomenon of passion is in origin and essence the same, whatever be the target upon
which it is discharged; and what the target actually happens to be is solely a question of fact.
I might conceivably be as much fascinated, and as primitively so, by the care of my
neighbor's body as by the care of my own. The only check to such exuberant altruistic
interests is natural selection, which would weed out such as were very harmful to the
individual or to his tribe. Many such interests, however, remain unweeded out—the interest
in the opposite sex, for example, which seems in mankind stronger than is called for by its
utilitarian need; and alongside of them remain interests, like that in alcoholic intoxication, or
in musical sounds, which, for aught we can see, are without any utility whatever. The
sympathetic instincts and the egoistic ones are thus co-ordinate. They arise, so far as we can
tell, on the same psychologic level. The only difference between them is, that the instincts
called egoistic form much the larger mass.

The only author whom I know to have discussed the question whether the 'pure Ego,' per se,
can be an object of regard, is Herr Horwicz, in his extremely able and acute Psychologische
Analysen. He too says that all self-regard is regard for certain objective things. He disposes
[Pg 326]
so well of one kind of objection that I must conclude by quoting a part of his own words:
First, the objection:
"The fact is indubitable that one's own children always pass for the prettiest and
brightest, the wine from one's own cellar for the best—at least for its price,—
one's own house and horses for the ﬁnest. With what tender admiration do we
con over our own little deed of benevolence! our own frailties and
misdemeanors, how ready we are to acquit ourselves for them, when we notice
them at all, on the ground of 'extenuating circumstances'! How much more
really comic are our own jokes than those of others, which, unlike ours, will not
bear being repeated ten or twelve times over! How eloquent, striking, powerful,
our own speeches are! How appropriate our own address! In short, how much
more intelligent, soulful, better, is everything about us than in anyone else. The
sad chapter of artists' and authors' conceit and vanity belongs here.
"The prevalence of this obvious preference which we feel for everything of our
own is indeed striking. Does it not look as if our dear Ego must ﬁrst lend its
color and ﬂavor to anything in order to make it please us?... Is it not the
simplest explanation for all these phenomena, so consistent among themselves,
to suppose that the Ego, the self, which forms the origin and centre of our
thinking life, is at the same time the original and central object of our life of
feeling, and the ground both of whatever special ideas and of whatever special
feelings ensue?"
Herr Horwicz goes on to refer to what we have already noticed, that various things which
disgust us in others do not disgust us at all in ourselves.
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"To most of us even the bodily warmth of another, for example the chair warm
from another's sitting, is felt unpleasantly, whereas there is nothing disagreeable
in the warmth of the chair in which we have been sitting ourselves."
After some further remarks, he replies to these facts and reasonings as follows;
"We may with conﬁdence afﬁrm that our own possessions in most cases please
us better [not because they are ours], but simply because we know them better,
'realize' them more intimately, feel them more deeply. We learn to appreciate
what is ours in all its details and shadings, whilst the goods of others appear to
us in coarse outlines and rude averages. Here are some examples: A piece of
music which one plays one's self is heard and understood better than when it is
played by another. We get more exactly all the details, penetrate more deeply
into the musical thought. We may meanwhile perceive perfectly well that the
other person is the better performer, and yet nevertheless—at times—get more
enjoyment from our own playing because it brings the melody and harmony so
much nearer home to us. This case may almost be taken as typical for the other
cases of self-love. On close examination, we shall almost always ﬁnd that a
great part of our feeling about what is ours is due to the fact that we live closer
to our own things, and so feel them more thoroughly and deeply. As a friend of
mine was about to marry, he often bored me by the repeated and minute way in
which he would discuss the details of his new household arrangements. I
wondered that so intellectual a man should be so deeply interested in things of
so external a nature. But as I entered, a few years later, the same condition
myself, these matters acquired for me an entirely different interest, and it
became my turn to turn them over and talk of them unceasingly.... The reason
was simply this, that in the ﬁrst instance I understood nothing of these things
and their importance for domestic comfort, whilst in the latter ease they came
home to me with irresistible urgency, and vividly took possession of my fancy.
So it is with many a one who mocks at decorations and titles, until he gains one
himself. And this is also surely the reason why one's own portrait or reﬂection
in the mirror is so peculiarly interesting a thing to contemplate ... not on
account of any absolute 'c'est moi,' but just as with the music played by
ourselves. What greets our eyes is what we know best, most deeply understand;
because we ourselves have felt it and lived through it. We know what has
ploughed these furrows, deepened these shadows, blanched this hair; and other
faces may be handsomer, but none can speak to us or interest us like this."[270]

[Pg 327]

Moreover, this author goes on to show that our own things are fuller for us than those of
others because of the memories they awaken and the practical hopes and expectations they
arouse. This alone would emphasize them, apart from any value derived from their
belonging to ourselves. We may conclude with him, then, that an original central selffeeling can never explain the passionate warmth of our self-regarding emotions, which must,
on the contrary, be addressed directly to special things less abstract and empty of content.
To these things the name of 'self' may be given, or to our conduct towards them the name of
'selﬁshness,' but neither in the self nor the selﬁshness does the pure Thinker play the 'titlerole.'

Only one more point connected with our self-regard need be mentioned. We have spoken of
it so far as active instinct or emotion. It remains to speak of it as cold intellectual selfestimation. We may weigh our own Me in the balance of praise and blame as easily as we [Pg 328]
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weigh other people,—though with difﬁculty quite as fairly. The just man is the one who can
weigh himself impartially. Impartial weighing presupposes a rare faculty of abstraction from
the vividness with which, as Herr Horwicz has pointed out, things known as intimately as
our own possessions and performances appeal to our imagination; and an equally rare power
of vividly representing the affairs of others. But, granting these rare powers, there is no
reason why a man should not pass judgment on himself quite as objectively and well as on
anyone else. No matter how he feels about himself, unduly elated or unduly depressed, he
may still truly know his own worth by measuring it by the outward standard he applies to
other men, and counteract the injustice of the feeling he cannot wholly escape. This selfmeasuring process has nothing to do with the instinctive self-regard we have hitherto been
dealing with. Being merely one application of intellectual comparison, it need no longer
detain us here. Please note again, however, how the pure Ego appears merely as the vehicle
in which the estimation is carried on, the objects estimated being all of them facts of an
empirical sort,[271] one's body, one's credit, one' fame, one's intellectual ability, one's [Pg 329]
goodness, or whatever the case may be.
The empirical life of Self is divided, as below, into

SELFSEEKING.

MATERIAL.

SOCIAL.

Bodily Appetites and
Instincts

Desire to please, be
noticed, admired, etc.

Love of Adornment,
Foppery,
Acquisitiveness,
Constructiveness.
Love of Home, etc.

SPIRITUAL.
Intellectual, Moral and
Religious Aspiration,
Conscientiousness.

Sociability, Emulation,
Envy, Love, Pursuit of
Honor, Ambition, etc.

Social and Family Pride, Sense of Moral or
Vainglory, Snobbery,
Mental Superiority,
Humility, Shame, etc.
Purity, etc.
Pride of Wealth, Fear of
Sense of Inferiority or
Poverty
of Guilt

SELFPersonal Vanity,
ESTIMATION. Modesty, etc.

THE PURE EGO.
Having summed up in the above table the principal results of the chapter thus far, I have
said all that need be said of the constituents of the phenomenal self, and of the nature of [Pg 330]
self-regard. Our decks are consequently cleared for the struggle with that pure principle of
personal identity which has met us all along our preliminary exposition, but which we have
always shied from and treated as a difﬁculty to be postponed. Ever since Hume's time, it has
been justly regarded as the most puzzling puzzle with which psychology has to deal; and
whatever view one may espouse, one has to hold his position against heavy odds. If, with
the Spiritualists, one contend for a substantial soul, or transcendental principle of unity, one
can give no positive account of what that may be. And if, with the Humians, one deny such
a principle and say that the stream of passing thoughts is all, one runs against the entire
common-sense of mankind, of which the belief in a distinct principle of selfhood seems an
integral part. Whatever solution be adopted in the pages to come, we may as well make up
our minds in advance that it will fail to satisfy the majority of those to whom it is addressed.
The best way of approaching the matter will be to take up ﬁrst—
The Sense of Personal Identity.
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In the last chapter it was stated in as radical a way as possible that the thoughts which we
actually know to exist do not ﬂy about loose, but seem each to belong to some one thinker [Pg 331]
and not to another. Each thought, out of a multitude of other thoughts of which it may think,
is able to distinguish those which belong to its own Ego from those which do not. The
former have a warmth and intimacy about them of which the latter are completely devoid,
being merely conceived, in a cold and foreign fashion, and not appearing as blood-relatives,
bringing their greetings to us from out of the past.
Now this consciousness of personal sameness may be treated either as a subjective
phenomenon or as an objective deliverance, as a feeling, or as a truth. We may explain how
one bit of thought can come to judge other bits to belong to the same Ego with itself; or we
may criticise its judgment and decide how far it may tally with the nature of things.
As a mere subjective phenomenon the judgment presents no difﬁculty or mystery peculiar to
itself. It belongs to the great class of judgments of sameness; and there is nothing more
remarkable in making a judgment of sameness in the ﬁrst person than in the second or the
third. The intellectual operations seem essentially alike, whether I say 'I am the same,' or
whether I say 'the pen is the same, as yesterday.' It is as easy to think this as to think the
opposite and say 'neither I nor the pen is the same.'
This sort of bringing of things together into the object of a single judgment is of course
essential to all thinking. The things are conjoined in the thought, whatever may be the
relation in which they appear to the thought. The thinking them is thinking them together,
even if only with the result of judging that they do not belong together. This sort of
subjective synthesis, essential to knowledge as such (whenever it has a complex object),
must not be confounded with objective synthesis or union instead of difference or
disconnection, known among the things.[272] The subjective synthesis thesis is involved in [Pg 332]
thought's mere existence. Even a really disconnected world could only be known to be such
by having its parts temporarily united in the Object of some pulse of consciousness.[273]
The sense of personal identity is not, then, this mere synthetic form essential to all thought.
It is the sense of a sameness perceived by thought and predicated of things thought-about.
These things are a present self and a self of yesterday. The thought not only thinks them
both, but thinks that they are identical. The psychologist, looking on and playing the critic,
might prove the thought wrong, and show there was no real identity,—there might have
been no yesterday, or, at any rate, no self of yesterday; or, if there were, the sameness
predicated might not obtain, or might be predicated on insufﬁcient grounds. In either case
the personal identity would not exist as a fact; but it would exist as a feeling all the same;
the consciousness of it by the thought would be there, and the psychologist would still have
to analyze that, and show where its illusoriness lay. Let us now be the psychologist and see
whether it be right or wrong when it says, I am the same self that I was yesterday.

We may immediately call it right and intelligible so far as it posits a past time with past
thoughts or selves contained therein—these were data which we assumed at the outset of the
book. Right also and intelligible so far as it thinks of a present self—that present self we
have just studied in its various forms. The only question for us is as to what the
consciousness may mean when it calls the present self the same with one of the past selves [Pg 333]
which it has in mind.
We spoke a moment since of warmth and intimacy. This leads us to the answer sought. For,
whatever the thought we are criticising may think about its present self, that self comes to its
acquaintance, or is actually felt, with warmth and intimacy. Of course this is the case with
the bodily part of it; we feel the whole cubic mass of our body all the while, it gives us an
unceasing sense of personal existence. Equally do we feel the inner 'nucleus of the spiritual
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self,' either in the shape of yon faint physiological adjustments, or (adopting the universal
psychological belief), in that of the pure activity of our thought taking place as such. Our
remoter spiritual, material, and social selves, so far as they are realized, come also with a
glow and a warmth; for the thought of them infallibly brings some degree of organic
emotion in the shape of quickened heart-beats, oppressed breathing, or some other
alteration, even though it be a slight one, in the general bodily tone. The character of
'warmth,' then, in the present self, reduces itself to either of two things,—something in the
feeling which we have of the thought itself, as thinking, or else the feeling of the body's
actual existence at the moment,—or ﬁnally to both. We cannot realize our present self
without simultaneously feeling one or other of these two things. Any other fact which brings
these two things with it into consciousness will be thought with a warmth and an intimacy
like those which cling to the present self.
Any distant self which fulﬁls this condition will be thought with such warmth and intimacy.
But which distant selves do fulﬁl the condition, when represented?
Obviously those, and only those, which fulﬁlled it when they were alive. Them we shall
imagine with the animal warmth upon them, to them may possibly cling the aroma, the echo
of the thinking taken in the act. And by a natural consequence, we shall assimilate them to
each other and to the warm and intimate self we now feel within us as we think, and
separate them as a collection from whatever selves have not this mark, much as out of a herd
of cattle let loose for the winter on some wide western prairie the owner picks out and sorts [Pg 334]
together when the time for the round-up comes in the spring, all the beasts on which he ﬁnds
his own particular brand.
The various members of the collection thus set apart are felt to belong with each other
whenever they are thought at all. The animal warmth, etc., is their herd-mark, the brand
from which they can never more escape. It runs through them all like a thread through a
chaplet and makes them into a whole, which we treat as a unit, no matter how much in other
ways the parts may differ inter se. Add to this character the farther one that the distant
selves appear to our thought as having for hours of time been continuous with each other,
and the most recent ones of them continuous with the Self of the present moment, melting
into it by slow degrees; and we get a still stronger bond of union. As we think we see an
identical bodily thing when, in spite of changes of structure, it exists continuously before
our eyes, or when, however interrupted its presence, its quality returns unchanged; so here
we think we experience an identical Self when it appears to us in an analogous way.
Continuity makes us unite what dissimilarity might otherwise separate; similarity makes us
unite what discontinuity might hold apart. And thus it is, ﬁnally, that Peter, awakening in the
same bed with Paul, and recalling what both had in mind before they went to sleep,
reidentiﬁes and appropriates the 'warm' ideas as his, and is never tempted to confuse them
with those cold and pale-appearing ones which he ascribes to Paul. As well might he
confound Paul's body, which he only sees, with his own body, which he sees but also feels.
Each of us when he awakens says, Here's the same old self again, just as he says, Here's the
same old bed, the same old room, the came old world.
The sense of our own personal identity, then, is exactly like any one of our other perceptions
of sameness among phenomena. It is a conclusion grounded either on the resemblance in a
fundamental respect; or on the continuity before the mind, of the phenomena compared.
And it must not be taken to mean more than these grounds warrant, or treated as a sort of
metaphysical or absolute Unity in which all differences are overwhelmed. The past and [Pg 335]
present selves compared are the same just so far as they are the same, and no farther. A
uniform feeling of 'warmth,' of bodily existence (or an equally uniform feeling of pure
psychic energy?) pervades them all; and this is what gives them a generic unity, and makes
them the same in kind. But this generic unity coexists with generic differences just as real as
the unity. And if from the one point of view they are one self, from others they are as truly
not one but many selves. And similarly of the attribute of continuity; it gives its own kind of
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unity to the self—that of mere connectedness, or unbrokenness, a perfectly deﬁnite
phenomenal thing—but it gives not a jot or tittle more. And this unbrokenness in the stream
of selves, like the unbrokenness in an exhibition of 'dissolving views,' in no wise implies
any farther unity or contradicts any amount of plurality in other respects.
And accordingly we ﬁnd that, where the resemblance and the continuity are no longer felt,
the sense of personal identity goes too. We hear from our parents various anecdotes about
our infant years, but we do not appropriate them as we do our own memories. Those
breaches of decorum awaken no blush, those bright sayings no self-complacency. That child
is a foreign creature with which our present self is no more identiﬁed in feeling than it is
with some stranger's living child to-day. Why? Partly because great time-gaps break up all
these early years—we cannot ascend to them by continuous memories; and partly because
no representation of how the child felt comes up with the stories. We know what he said and
did; but no sentiment of his little body, of his emotions, of his psychic strivings as they felt
to him, comes up to contribute an element of warmth and intimacy to the narrative we hear,
and the main bond of union with our present self thus disappears. It is the same with certain
of our dimly-recollected experiences. We hardly know whether to appropriate them or to
disown them as fancies, or things read or heard and not lived through. Their animal heat has
evaporated; the feelings that accompanied them are so lacking in the recall, or so different [Pg 336]
from those we now enjoy, that no judgment of identity can be decisively cast.
Resemblance among the parts of a continuum of feelings (especially bodily feelings)
experienced along with things widely different in all other regards, thus constitutes the real
and veriﬁable 'personal identity' which we feel. There is no other identity than this in the
'stream' of subjective consciousness which we described in the last chapter. Its parts differ,
but under all their differences they are knit in these two ways; and if either way of knitting
disappears, the sense of unity departs. If a man wakes up some ﬁne day unable to recall any
of his past experiences, so that he has to learn his biography afresh, or if he only recalls the
facts of it in a cold abstract way as things that he is sure once happened; or if, without this
loss of memory, his bodily and spiritual habits all change during the night, each organ
giving a different tone, and the act of thought becoming aware of itself in a different way; he
feels, and he says, that he is a changed person. He disowns his former me, gives himself a
new name, identiﬁes his present life with nothing from out of the older time. Such cases are
not rare in mental pathology; but, as we still have some reasoning to do, we had better give
no concrete account of them until the end of the chapter.
This description of personal identity will be recognized by the instructed reader as the
ordinary doctrine professed by the empirical school. Associationists in England and France,
Herbartians in Germany, all describe the Self as an aggregate of which each part, as to its
being, is a separate fact. So far so good, then; thus much is true whatever farther things may
be true; and it is to the imperishable glory of Hume and Herbart and their successors to have
taken so much of the meaning of personal identity out of the clouds and made of the Self an
empirical and veriﬁable thing.

But in leaving the matter here, and saying that this sum of passing things is all, these writers
have neglected certain more subtle aspects of the Unity of Consciousness, to which we next
must turn.
Our recent simile of the herd of cattle will help us. It will be remembered that the beasts [Pg 337]
were brought together into one herd because their owner found on each of them his brand.
The 'owner' symbolizes here that 'section' of consciousness, or pulse of thought, which we
have all along represented as the vehicle of the judgment of identity; and the 'brand'
symbolizes the characters of warmth and continuity, by reason of which the judgment is
made. There is found a self-brand, just as there is found a herd-brand. Each brand, so far, is
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the mark, or cause of our knowing, that certain things belong-together. But if the brand is
the ratio cognoscendi of the belonging, the belonging, in the case of the herd, is in turn the
ratio existendi of the brand. No beast would be so branded unless he belonged to the owner
of the herd. They are not his because they are branded; they are branded because they are
his. So that it seems as if our description of the belonging-together of the various selves, as a
belonging-together which is merely represented, in a later pulse of thought, had knocked the
bottom out of the matter, and omitted the most characteristic one of all the features found in
the herd—a feature which common-sense ﬁnds in the phenomenon of personal identity as
well, and for our omission of which she will hold us to a strict account. For common-sense
insists that the unity of all the selves is not a mere appearance of similarity or continuity,
ascertained after the fact. She is sure that it involves a real belonging to a real Owner, to a
pure spiritual entity of some kind. Relation to this entity is what makes the self's
constituents stick together as they do for thought. The individual beasts do not stick
together, for all that they wear the same brand. Each wanders with whatever accidental
mates it ﬁnds. The herd's unity is only potential, its centre ideal, like the 'centre of gravity' in
physics, until the herdsman or owner comes. He furnishes a real centre of accretion to which
the beasts are driven and by which they are held. The beasts stick together by sticking
severally to him. Just so, common-sense insists, there must be a real proprietor in the case of
the selves, or else their actual accretion into a 'personal consciousness' would never have
taken place. To the usual empiricist explanation of personal consciousness this is a [Pg 338]
formidable reproof, because all the individual thoughts and feelings which have succeeded
each other 'up to date' are represented by ordinary Associationism as in some inscrutable
way 'integrating' or gumming themselves together on their own account, and thus fusing into
a stream. All the incomprehensibilities which in Chapter VI we saw to attach to the idea of
things fusing without a medium apply to the empiricist description of personal identity.
But in our own account the medium is fully assigned, the herdsman is there, in the shape of
something not among the things collected, but superior to them all, namely, the real, present
onlooking, remembering, 'judging thought' or identifying 'section' of the stream. This is
what collects,—'owns' some of the past facts which it surveys, and disowns the rest,—and
so makes a unity that is actualized and anchored and does not merely ﬂoat in the blue air of
possibility. And the reality of such pulses of thought, with their function of knowing, it will
be remembered that we did not seek to deduce or explain, but simply assumed them as the
ultimate kind of fact that the psychologist must admit to exist.
But this assumption, though it yields much, still does not yield all that common-sense
demands. The unity into which the Thought—as I shall for a time proceed to call, with a
capital T, the present mental state—binds the individual past facts with each other and with
itself, does not exist until the Thought is there. It is as if wild cattle were lassoed by a
newly-created settler and then owned for the ﬁrst time. But the essence of the matter to
common-sense is that the past thoughts never were wild cattle, they were always owned.
The Thought does not capture them, but as soon as it comes into existence it ﬁnds them
already its own. How is this possible unless the Thought have a substantial identity with a
former owner,—not a mere continuity or a resemblance, as in our account, but a real unity?
Common-sense in fact would drive us to admit what we may for the moment call an ArchEgo, dominating the entire stream of thought and all the selves that may be represented in it,
as the ever self-same and changeless principle implied in their union. The 'Soul' of [Pg 339]
Metaphysics and the 'Transcendental Ego' of the Kantian Philosophy, are, as we shall soon
see, but attempts to satisfy this urgent demand of common-sense. But, for a time at least, we
can still express without any such hypotheses that appearance of never-lapsing ownership
for which common-sense contends.
For how would it be if the Thought, the present judging Thought, instead of being in any
way substantially or transcendentally identical with the former owner of the past self,
merely inherited his 'title,' and thus stood as his legal representative now? It would then, if
its birth coincided exactly with the death of another owner, ﬁnd the past self already its own
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as soon as it found it at all, and the past self would thus never be wild, but always owned, by
a title that never lapsed. We can imagine a long succession of herdsmen coming rapidly into
possession of the same cattle by transmission of an original title by bequest. May not the
'title' of a collective self be passed from one Thought to another in some analogous way?
It is a patent fact of consciousness that a transmission like this actually occurs. Each pulse of
cognitive consciousness, each Thought, dies away and is replaced by another. The other,
among the things it knows, knows its own predecessor, and ﬁnding it 'warm,' in the way we
have described, greets it, saying: "Thou art mine, and part of the same self with me." Each
later Thought, knowing and including thus the Thoughts which went before, is the ﬁnal
receptacle—and appropriating them is the ﬁnal owner—of all that they contain and own.
Each Thought is thus born an owner, and dies owned, transmitting whatever it realized as its
Self to its own later proprietor. As Kant says, it is as if elastic balls were to have not only
motion but knowledge of it, and a ﬁrst ball were to transmit both its motion and its
consciousness to a second, which took both up into its consciousness and passed them to a
third, until the last ball held all that the other balls had held, and realized it as its own. It is
this trick which the nascent thought has of immediately taking up the expiring thought and
'adopting' it, which is the foundation of the appropriation of most of the remoter constituents [Pg 340]
of the self. Who owns the last self owns the self before the last, for what possesses the
possessor possesses the possessed.

It is impossible to discover any veriﬁable features in personal identity, which this sketch
does not contain, impossible to imagine how any transcendent non-phenomenal sort of an
Arch-Ego, were he there, could shape matters to any other result, or be known in time by
any other fruit, than just this production of a stream of consciousness each 'section' of which
should know, and knowing, hug to itself and adopt, all those that went before,—thus
standing as the representative of the entire past stream; and which should similarly adopt the
objects already adopted by any portion of this spiritual stream. Such standing-asrepresentative, and such adopting, are perfectly clear phenomenal relations. The Thought
which, whilst it knows another Thought and the Object of that Other, appropriates the Other
and the Object which the Other appropriated, is still a perfectly distinct phenomenon from
that Other; it may hardly resemble it; it may be far removed from it in space and time.
The only point that is obscure is the act of appropriation itself. Already in enumerating the
constituents of the self and their rivalry, I had to use the word appropriate. And the quickwitted reader probably noticed at the time, in hearing how one constituent was let drop and
disowned and another one held fast to and espoused, that the phrase was meaningless unless
the constituents were objects in the hands of something else. A thing cannot appropriate
itself; it is itself; and still less can it disown itself. There must be an agent of the
appropriating and disowning; but that agent we have already named. It is the Thought to
whom the various 'constituents' are known. That Thought is a vehicle of choice as well as of
cognition; and among the choices it makes are these appropriations, or repudiations, of its
'own.' But the Thought never is an object in its own hands, it never appropriates or disowns
itself. It appropriates to itself, it is the actual focus of accretion, the hook from which the
chain of past selves dangles, planted ﬁrmly in the Present, which alone passes for real, and [Pg 341]
thus keeping the chain from being a purely ideal thing. Anon the hook itself will drop into
the past with all it carries, and then be treated as an object and appropriated by a new
Thought in the new present which will serve as living hook in turn. The present moment of
consciousness is thus, as Mr. Hodgson says, the darkest in the whole series. It may feel its
own immediate existence—we have all along admitted the possibility of this, hard as it is by
direct introspection to ascertain the fact—but nothing can be known about it till it be dead
and gone. Its appropriations are therefore less to itself than to the most intimately felt part of
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its present Object, the body, and the central adjustments, which accompany the act of
thinking, in the head. These are the real nucleus of our personal identity, and it is their
actual existence, realized as a solid present fact, which makes us say 'as sure as I exist, those
past facts were part of myself.' They are the kernel to which the represented parts of the Self
are assimilated, accreted, and knit on; and even were Thought entirely unconscious of itself
in the act of thinking, these 'warm' parts of its present object would be a ﬁrm basis on which
the consciousness of personal identity would rest.[274] Such consciousness, then, as a [Pg 342]
psychologic fact, can be fully described without supposing any other agent than a succession
of perishing thoughts, endowed with the functions of appropriation and rejection, and of
which some can know and appropriate or reject objects already known, appropriated, or
rejected by the rest.

FIG. 34.
To illustrate by diagram, let A, B, and C stand for three successive thoughts, each with its
object inside of it. If B's object be A, and C's object be B; then A, B, and C would stand for
three pulses in a consciousness of personal identity. Each pulse would be something
different from the others; but B would know and adopt A, and C would know and adopt A
and B. Three successive states of the same brain, on which each experience in passing
leaves its mark, might very well engender thoughts differing from each other in just such a
way as this.

The passing Thought then seems to be the Thinker; and though there may be another nonphenomenal Thinker behind that, so far we do not seem to need him to express the facts. But
we cannot deﬁnitively make up our mind about him until we have heard the reasons that
have historically been used to prove his reality.
THE PURE SELF OR INNER PRINCIPLE OF PERSONAL UNITY.
To a brief survey of the theories of the Ego let us then next proceed. They are three in
number, as follows:
1) The Spiritualist theory;
2) The Associationist theory;
3) The Transcendentalist theory.
The Theory of the Soul.
In Chapter VI we were led ourselves to the spiritualist theory of the 'Soul,' as a means of
escape from the unintelligibilities of mind-stuff 'integrating' with itself, and from the [Pg 343]
physiological improbability of a material monad, with thought attached to it, in the brain.
But at the end of the chapter we said we should examine the 'Soul' critically in a later place,
to see whether it had any other advantages as a theory over the simple phenomenal notion of
a stream of thought accompanying a stream of cerebral activity, by a law yet unexplained.
The theory of the Soul is the theory of popular philosophy and of scholasticism, which is
only popular philosophy made systematic. It declares that the principle of individuality
within us must be substantial, for psychic phenomena are activities, and there can be no
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activity without a concrete agent. This substantial agent cannot be the brain but must be
something immaterial; for its activity, thought, is both immaterial, and takes cognizance of
immaterial things, and of material things in general and intelligible, as well as in particular
and sensible ways,—all which powers are incompatible with the nature of matter, of which
the brain is composed. Thought moreover is simple, whilst the activities of the brain are
compounded of the elementary activities of each of its parts. Furthermore, thought is
spontaneous or free, whilst all material activity is determined ab extra; and the will can turn
itself against all corporeal goods and appetites, which would be impossible were it a
corporeal function. For these objective reasons the principle of psychic life must be both
immaterial and simple as well as substantial, must be what is called a Soul. The same
consequence follows from subjective reasons. Our consciousness of personal identity
assures us of our essential simplicity: the owner of the various constituents of the self, as we
have seen them, the hypothetical Arch-Ego whom we provisionally conceived as possible, is
a real entity of whose existence self-consciousness makes us directly aware. No material
agent could thus turn round and grasp itself—material activities always grasp something else
than the agent. And if a brain could grasp itself and be self-conscious, it would be conscious
of itself as a brain and not as something of an altogether different kind. The Soul then exists
as a simple spiritual substance in which the various psychic faculties, operations, and
affections inhere.
If we ask what a Substance is, the only answer is that it is a self-existent being, or one which [Pg 344]
needs no other subject in which to inhere. At bottom its only positive determination is
Being, and this is something whose meaning we all realize even though we ﬁnd it hard to
explain. The Soul is moreover an individual being, and if we ask what that is, we are told to
look in upon our Self, and we shall learn by direct intuition better than through any abstract
reply. Our direct perception of our own inward being is in fact by many deemed to be the
original prototype out of which our notion of simple active substance in general is
fashioned. The consequences of the simplicity and substantiality of the Soul are its
incorruptibility and natural immortality—nothing but God's direct ﬁat can annihilate it—and
its responsibility at all times for whatever it may have ever done.
This substantialist view of the soul was essentially the view of Plato and of Aristotle. It
received its completely formal elaboration in the middle ages. It was believed in by Hobbes,
Descartes, Locke, Leibnitz, Wolf, Berkeley, and is now defended by the entire modern
dualistic or spiritualistic or common-sense school. Kant held to it while denying its
fruitfulness as a premise for deducing consequences veriﬁable here below. Kant's
successors, the absolute idealists, profess to have discarded it,—how that may be we shall
inquire ere long. Let us make up our minds what to think of it ourselves.
It is at all events needless for expressing the actual subjective phenomena of consciousness
as they appear. We have formulated them all without its aid, by the supposition of a stream
of thoughts, each substantially different from the rest, but cognitive of the rest and
'appropriative' of each other's content. At least, if I have not already succeeded in making
this plausible to the reader, I am hopeless of convincing him by anything I could add now.
The unity, the identity, the individuality, and the immateriality that appear in the psychic life
are thus accounted for as phenomenal and temporal facts exclusively, and with no need of
reference to any more simple or substantial agent than the present Thought or 'section' of the
stream. We have seen it to be single and unique in the sense of having no separable parts [Pg 345]
(above, p. 239 ff.)—perhaps that is the only kind of simplicity meant to be predicated of the
soul. The present Thought also has being,—at least all believers in the Soul believe so—and
if there be no other Being in which it 'inheres,' it ought itself to be a 'substance.' If this kind
of simplicity and substantiality were all that is predicated of the Soul, then it might appear
that we had been talking of the soul all along, without knowing it, when we treated the
present Thought as an agent, an owner, and the like. But the Thought is a perishing and not
an immortal or incorruptible thing. Its successors may continuously succeed to it, resemble
it, and appropriate it, but they are not it, whereas the Soul-Substance is supposed to be a
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ﬁxed unchanging thing. By the Soul is always meant something behind the present Thought,
another kind of substance, existing on a non-phenomenal plane.
When we brought in the Soul at the end of Chapter VI, as an entity which the various brainprocesses were supposed to affect simultaneously, and which responded to their combined
inﬂuence by single pulses of its thought, it was to escape integrated mind-stuff on the one
hand, and an improbable cerebral monad on the other. But when (as now, after all we have
been through since that earlier passage) we take the two formulations, ﬁrst of a brain to
whose processes pulses of thought simply correspond, and second, of one to whose
processes pulses of thought in a Soul correspond, and compare them together, we see that at
bottom the second formulation is only a more roundabout way than the ﬁrst, of expressing
the same bald fact. That bald fact is that when the brain acts, a thought occurs. The
spiritualistic formulation says that the brain-processes knock the thought, so to speak, out of
a Soul which stands there to receive their inﬂuence. The simpler formulation says that the
thought simply comes. But what positive meaning has the Soul, when scrutinized, but the
ground of possibility of the thought? And what is the 'knocking' but the determining of the
possibility to actuality? And what is this after all but giving a sort of concreted form to one's
belief that the coming of the thought, when the brain-processes occur, has some sort of [Pg 346]
ground in the nature of things? If the world Soul be understood merely to express that claim,
it is a good word to use. But if it be held to do more, to gratify the claim,—for instance, to
connect rationally the thought which comes, with the processes which occur, and to mediate
intelligibly between their two disparate natures,—then it is an illusory term. It is, in fact,
with the word Soul as with the word Substance in general. To say that phenomena inhere in
a Substance is at bottom only to record one's protest against the notion that the bare
existence of the phenomena is the total truth. A phenomenon would not itself be, we insist,
unless there were something more than the phenomenon. To the more we give the
provisional name of Substance. So, in the present instance, we ought certainly to admit that
there is more than the bare fact of coexistence of a passing thought with a passing brainstate. But we do not answer the question 'What is that more?' when we say that it is a 'Soul'
which the brain-state affects. This kind of more explains nothing; and when we are once
trying metaphysical explanations we are foolish not to go as far as we can. For my own part
I confess that the moment I become metaphysical and try to deﬁne the more, I ﬁnd the
notion of some sort of an anima mundi thinking in all of us to be a more promising
hypothesis, in spite of all its difﬁculties, than that of a lot of absolutely individual souls.
Meanwhile, as psychologists, we need not be metaphysical at all. The phenomena are
enough, the passing Thought itself is the only veriﬁable thinker, and its empirical connection
with the brain-process is the ultimate known law.
To the other arguments which would prove the need of a soul, we may also turn a deaf ear.
The argument from free-will can convince only those who believe in free-will; and even
they will have to admit that spontaneity is just as possible, to say the least, in a temporary
spiritual agent like our 'Thought' as in a permanent one like the supposed Soul. The same is
true of the argument from the kinds of things cognized. Even if the brain could not cognize
universal, immaterials, or its 'Self,' still the 'Thought' which we have relied upon in our
account is not the brain, closely as it seems connected with it; and after all, if the brain could [Pg 347]
cognize at all, one does not well see why it might not cognize one sort of thing as well as
another. The great difﬁculty is in seeing how a thing can cognize anything. This difﬁculty is
not in the least removed by giving to the thing that cognizes the name of Soul. The
Spiritualists do not deduce any of the properties of the mental life from otherwise known
properties of the soul. They simply ﬁnd various characters ready-made in the mental life,
and these they clap into the Soul, saying, "Lo! behold the source from whence they ﬂow!"
The merely verbal character of this 'explanation' is obvious. The Soul invoked, far from
making the phenomena more intelligible, can only be made intelligible itself by borrowing
their form,—it must be represented, if at all, as a transcendent stream of consciousness
duplicating the one we know.
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Altogether, the Soul is an outbirth of that sort of philosophizing whose great maxim,
according to Dr. Hodgson, is: "Whatever you are totally ignorant of, assert to be the
explanation of everything else."

Locke and Kant, whilst still believing in the soul, began the work of undermining the notion
that we know anything about it. Most modern writers of the mitigated spiritualistic, or
dualistic philosophy—the Scotch school, as it is often called among us—are forward to
proclaim this ignorance, and to attend exclusively to the veriﬁable phenomena of selfconsciousness, as we have laid them down. Dr. Wayland, for example, begins his Elements
of Intellectual Philosophy with the phrase "Of the essence of Mind we know nothing," and
goes on: "All that we are able to afﬁrm of it is that it is something which perceives, reﬂects,
remembers, imagines, and wills; but what that something is which exerts these energies we
know not. It is only as we are conscious of the action of these energies that we are conscious
of the existence of mind. It is only by the exertion of its own powers that the mind becomes
cognizant of their existence. The cognizance of its powers, however, gives us no knowledge
of that essence of which they are predicated. In these respects our knowledge of mind is [Pg 348]
precisely analogous to our knowledge of matter." This analogy of our two ignorances is a
favorite remark in the Scotch school. It is but a step to lump them together into a single
ignorance, that of the 'Unknowable' to which any one fond of superﬂuities in philosophy
may accord the hospitality of his belief, if it so please him, but which any one else may as
freely ignore and reject.
The Soul-theory is, then, a complete superﬂuity, so far as accounting for the actually veriﬁed
facts of conscious experience goes. So far, no one can be compelled to subscribe to it for
deﬁnite scientiﬁc reasons. The case would rest here, and the reader be left free to make his
choice, were it not for other demands of a more practical kind.
The ﬁrst of these is Immortality, for which the simplicity and substantiality of the Soul seem
to offer a solid guarantee. A 'stream' of thought, for aught that we see to be contained in its
essence, may come to a full stop at any moment; but a simple substance is incorruptible, and
will, by its own inertia, persist in Being so long as the Creator does not by a direct miracle
snuff it out. Unquestionably this is the stronghold of the spiritualistic belief,—as indeed the
popular touchstone for all philosophies is the question, "What is their bearing on a future
life?"
The Soul, however, when closely scrutinized, guarantees no immortality of a sort we care
for. The enjoyment of the atom-like simplicity of their substance in sæcula sæculorum
would not to most people seem a consummation devoutly to be wished. The substance must
give rise to a stream of consciousness continuous with the present stream, in order to arouse
our hope, but of this the mere persistence of the substance per se offers no guarantee.
Moreover, in the general advance of our moral ideas, there has come to be something
ridiculous in the way our forefathers had of grounding their hopes of immortality on the
simplicity of their substance. The demand for immortality is nowadays essentially
teleological. We believe ourselves immortal because we believe ourselves ﬁt for
immortality. A 'substance' ought surely to perish, we think, if not worthy to survive; and an
insubstantial 'stream' to prolong itself, provided it be worthy, if the nature of Things is
organized in the rational way in which we trust it is. Substance or no substance, soul or [Pg 349]
'stream,' what Lotze says of immortality is about all that human wisdom can say:
"We have no other principle for deciding it than this general idealistic belief:
that every created thing will continue whose continuance belongs to the
meaning of the world, and so long as it does so belong; whilst every one will
pass away whose reality is justiﬁed only in a transitory phase of the world's
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course. That this principle admits of no further application in human hands need
hardly be said. We surely know not the merits which may give to one being a
claim on eternity, nor the defects which would cut others off."[275]
A second alleged necessity for a soul-substance is our forensic responsibility before God.
Locke caused an uproar when he said that the unity of consciousness made a man the same
person, whether supported by the same substance or no, and that God would not, in the
great day, make a person answer for what he remembered nothing of. It was supposed
scandalous that our forgetfulness might thus deprive God of the chance of certain
retributions, which otherwise would have enhanced his 'glory.' This is certainly a good
speculative ground for retaining the Soul—at least for those who demand a plenitude of
retribution. The mere stream of consciousness, with its lapses of memory, cannot possibly
be as 'responsible' as a soul which is at the judgment day all that it ever was. To modern
readers, however, who are less insatiate for retribution than their grandfathers, this argument
will hardly be as convincing as it seems once to have been.

One great use of the Soul has always been to account for, and at the same time to guarantee,
the closed individuality of each personal consciousness. The thoughts of one soul must unite
into one self, it was supposed, and must be eternally insulated from those of every other
soul. But we have already begun to see that, although unity is the rule of each man's
consciousness, yet in some individuals, at least, thoughts may split away from the others and
form separate selves. As for insulation, it would be rash, in view of the phenomena of [Pg 350]
thought-transference, mesmeric inﬂuence and spirit-control, which are being alleged
nowadays on better authority than ever before, to be too sure about that point either. The
deﬁnitively closed nature of our personal consciousness is probably an average statistical
resultant of many conditions, but not an elementary force or fact; so that, if one wishes to
preserve the Soul, the less he draws his arguments from that quarter the better. So long as
our self, on the whole, makes itself good and practically maintains itself as a closed
individual, why, as Lotze says, is not that enough? And why is the being-an-individual in
some inaccessible metaphysical way so much prouder an achievement?[276]
My ﬁnal conclusion, then, about the substantial Soul is that it explains nothing and
guarantees nothing. Its successive thoughts are the only intelligible and veriﬁable things
about it, and deﬁnitely to ascertain the correlations of these with brain-processes is as much
as psychology can empirically do. From the metaphysical point of view, it is true that one
may claim that the correlations have a rational ground; and if the word Soul could be taken
to mean merely some such vague problematic ground, it would be unobjectionable. But the
trouble is that it professes to give the ground in positive terms of a very dubiously credible
sort. I therefore feel entirely free to discard the word Soul from the rest of this book. If I
ever use it, it will be in the vaguest and most popular way. The reader who ﬁnds any comfort
in the idea of the Soul, is, however, perfectly free to continue to believe in it; for our
reasonings have not established the non-existence of the Soul; they have only proved its
superﬂuity for scientiﬁc purposes.
The next theory of the pure Self to which we pass is
The Associationist Theory.
Locke paved the way for it by the hypothesis he suggested of the same substance having two
successive consciousnesses, or of the same consciousness being supported by more than one [Pg 351]
substance. He made his readers feel that the important unity of the Self was its veriﬁable
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and felt unity, and that a metaphysical or absolute unity would be insigniﬁcant, so long as a
consciousness of diversity might be there.
Hume showed how great the consciousness of diversity actually was. In the famous chapter
on Personal Identity, in his Treatise on Human Nature, he writes as follows:
"There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately
conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its
continuance in existence, and are certain, beyond the evidence of a
demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity.... Unluckily all these
positive assertions are contrary to that very experience which is pleaded for
them, nor have we any idea of Self, after the manner it is here explained.... It
must be some one impression that gives rise to every real idea.... If any
impression gives rise to the idea of Self, that impression must continue
invariably the same through the whole course of our lives, since self is
supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and
invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed
each other, and never all exist at the same time.... For my part, when I enter
most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular
perception or other of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or
pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never
can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for
any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself and may truly be
said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I
neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my
body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite
to make me a perfect non-entity. If anyone, upon serious and unprejudiced
reﬂection, thinks he has a different notion of himself I must confess I can reason
no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as
I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps,
perceive something simple and continued which he calls himself; though I am
certain there is no such principle in me.
"But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to afﬁrm of
the rest of mankind that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different
perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are
in a perpetual ﬂux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without
varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and
all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any
single power of the soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one
moment The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively
make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away and mingle in an inﬁnite
variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one
time, nor identity in different; whatever natural propension we may have to
imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not
mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind;
nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are
represented, nor of the material of which it is composed."

[Pg 352]

But Hume, after doing this good piece of introspective work, proceeds to pour out the child
with the bath, and to ﬂy to as great an extreme as the substantialist philosophers. As they say
the Self is nothing but Unity, unity abstract and absolute, so Hume says it is nothing but
Diversity, diversity abstract and absolute; whereas in truth it is that mixture of unity and
diversity which we ourselves have already found so easy to pick apart. We found among the
objects of the stream certain feelings that hardly changed, that stood out warm and vivid in
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the past just as the present feeling does now; and we found the present feeling to be the
centre of accretion to which, de proche en proche, these other feelings are, by the judging
Thought, felt to cling. Hume says nothing of the judging Thought; and he denies this thread
of resemblance, this core of sameness running through the ingredients of the Self, to exist
even as a phenomenal thing. To him there is no tertium quid between pure unity and pure
separateness. A succession of ideas "connected by a close relation affords to an accurate
view as perfect a notion of diversity as if there was no manner of relation" at all.
"All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and the mind never
perceives any real connection among distinct existences. Did our perceptions
either inhere in something simple or individual, or did the mind perceive some
real connection among them, there would be no difﬁculty in the case. For my
part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic and confess that this difﬁculty is too
hard for my understanding, I pretend not, however, to pronounce it insuperable.
Others, perhaps,... may discover some hypothesis that will reconcile these
contradictions."[277]
Hume is at bottom as much of a metaphysician as Thomas Aquinas. No wonder he can [Pg 353]
discover no 'hypothesis.' The unity of the parts of the stream is just as 'real' a connection as
their diversity is a real separation; both connection and separation are ways in which the
past thoughts appear to the present Thought;—unlike each other in respect of date and
certain qualities—this is the separation; alike in other qualities, and continuous in time—this
is the connection. In demanding a more 'real' connection than this obvious and veriﬁable
likeness and continuity, Hume seeks 'the world behind the looking glass,' and gives a
striking example of that Absolutism which is the great disease of philosophic Thought.

The chain of distinct existences into which Hume thus chopped up our 'stream' was adopted
by all of his successors as a complete inventory of the facts. The associationist Philosophy
was founded. Somehow, out of 'ideas,' each separate, each ignorant of its mates, but sticking
together and calling each other up according to certain laws, all the higher forms of
consciousness were to be explained, and among them the consciousness of our personal
identity. The task was a hard one, in which what we called the psychologist's fallacy (p. 196
ff.) bore the brunt of the work. Two ideas, one of 'A,' succeeded by another of 'B,' were
transmuted into a third idea of 'B after A.' An idea from last year returning now was taken to
be an idea of last year; two similar ideas stood for an idea of similarity, and the like;
palpable confusions, in which certain facts about the ideas, possible only to an outside
knower of them, were put into the place of the ideas' own proper and limited deliverance
and content. Out of such recurrences and resemblances in a series of discrete ideas and
feelings a knowledge was somehow supposed to be engendered in each feeling that it was
recurrent and resembling, and that it helped to form a series to whose unity the name I came
to be joined. In the same way, substantially, Herbart,[278] in Germany, tried to show how a [Pg 354]
conﬂict of ideas would fuse into a manner of representing itself for which I was the
consecrated name.[279]
The defect of all these attempts is that the conclusion pretended to follow from certain
premises is by no means rationally involved in the premises. A feeling of any kind, if it
simply returns, ought to be nothing else than what it was at ﬁrst. If memory of previous
existence and all sorts of other cognitive functions are attributed to it when it returns, it is no
longer the same, but a widely different feeling, and ought to be so described. We have so
described it with the greatest explicitness. We have said that feelings never do return. We
have not pretended to explain this; we have recorded it as an empirically ascertained law,
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analogous to certain laws of brain-physiology; and, seeking to deﬁne the way in which new
feelings do differ from the old, we have found them to be cognizant and appropriative of the
old, whereas the old were always cognizant and appropriative of something else. Once
more, this account pretended to be nothing more than a complete description of the facts. It
explained them no more than the associationist account explains them. But the latter both
assumes to explain them and in the same breath falsiﬁes them, and for each reason stands
condemned.
It is but just to say that the associationist writers as a rule seem to have a lurking bad
conscience about the Self; and that although they are explicit enough about what it is,
namely, a train of feelings or thoughts, they are very shy about openly tackling the problem
of how it comes to be aware of itself. Neither Bain nor Spencer, for example, directly touch
this problem. As a rule, associationist writers keep talking about 'the mind' and about what
'we' do; and so, smuggling in surreptitiously what they ought avowedly to have postulated in
the form of a present 'judging Thought,' they either trade upon their reader's lack of
discernment or are undiscerning themselves.
Mr. D. G. Thompson is the only associationist writer I know who perfectly escapes this
confusion, and postulates openly what he needs. "All states of consciousness," he says, [Pg 355]
"imply and postulate a subject Ego, whose substance is unknown and unknowable, to which
[why not say by which?] states of consciousness are referred as attributes, but which in the
process of reference becomes objectiﬁed and becomes itself an attribute of a subject Ego
which lies still beyond, and which ever eludes cognition though ever postulated for
cognition."[280] This is exactly our judging and remembering present 'Thought,' described in
less simple terms.
After Mr. Thompson, M. Taine and the two Mills deserve credit for seeking to be as clear as
they can. Taine tells us in the ﬁrst volume of his 'Intelligence' what the Ego is,—a
continuous web of conscious events no more really distinct from each other[281] than
rhomboids, triangles, and squares marked with chalk on a plank are really distinct, for the
plank itself is one. In the second volume he says all these parts have a common character
embedded in them, that of being internal [this is our character of 'warmness,' otherwise
named]. This character is abstracted and isolated by a mental ﬁction, and is what we are
conscious of as our self—'this stable within is what each of us calls I or me.' Obviously M.
Taine forgets to tell us what this 'each of us' is, which suddenly starts up and performs the
abstraction and 'calls' its product I or me. The character does not abstract itself. Taine means
by 'each of us' merely the present 'judging Thought' with its memory and tendency to
appropriate, but he does not name it distinctly enough, and lapses into the ﬁction that the
entire series of thoughts, the entire 'plank,' is the reﬂecting psychologist.
James Mill, after deﬁning Memory as a train of associated ideas beginning with that of my
past self and ending with that of my present self, deﬁnes my Self as a train of ideas of which
Memory declares the ﬁrst to be continuously connected with the last. The successive
associated ideas 'run, as it were, into a single point of consciousness.[282] John Mill, [Pg 356]
annotating this account, says:
"The phenomenon of Self and that of Memory are merely two sides of the same
fact, or two different modes of viewing the same fact. We may, as
psychologists, set out from either of them, and refer the other to it.... But it is
hardly allowable to do both. At least it must be said that by doing so we explain
neither. We only show that the two things are essentially the same; that my
memory of having ascended Skiddaw on a given day, and my consciousness of
being the same person who ascended Skiddaw on that day, are two modes of
stating the same fact: a fact which psychology has as yet failed to resolve into
anything more elementary. In analyzing the complex phenomena of
consciousness, we must come to something ultimate; and we seem to have
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reached two elements which have a good prima facie claim to that title. There
is, ﬁrst,... the difference between a fact and the Thought of that fact: a
distinction which we are able to cognize in the past, and which then constitutes
Memory, and in the future, when it constitutes Expectation; but in neither case
can we give any account of it except that it exists.... Secondly, in addition to
this, and setting out from the belief ... that the idea I now have was derived from
a previous sensation ... there is the further conviction that this sensation ... was
my own; that it happened to my self. In other words, I am aware of a long and
uninterrupted succession of past feelings, going back as far as memory reaches,
and terminating with the sensations I have at the present moment, all of which
are connected by an inexplicable tie, that distinguishes them not only from any
succession or combination in mere thought, but also from the parallel
successions of feelings which I believe, on satisfactory evidence, to have
happened to each of the other beings, shaped like myself, whom I perceive
around me. This succession of feelings, which I call my memory of the past, is
that by which I distinguish my Self. Myself is the person who had that series of
feelings, and I know nothing of myself, by direct knowledge, except that I had
them. But there is a bond of some sort among all the parts of the series, which
makes me say that they were feelings of a person who was the same person
throughout [according to us this is their 'warmth' and resemblance to the 'central
spiritual self' now actually felt] and a different person from those who had any
of the parallel successions of feelings; and this bond, to me, constitutes my Ego.
Here I think the question must rest, until some psychologist succeeds better
than anyone else has done, in showing a mode in which the analysis can be
carried further."[283]
The reader must judge of our own success in carrying the analysis farther. The various [Pg 357]
distinctions we have made are all parts of an endeavor so to do. John Mill himself, in a laterwritten passage, so far from advancing in the line of analysis, seems to fall back upon
something perilously near to the Soul. He says:
"The fact of recognizing a sensation,... remembering that it has been felt before,
is the simplest and most elementary fact of memory: and the inexplicable tie ...
which connects the present consciousness with the past one of which it reminds
me, is as near as I think we can get to a positive conception of Self. That there
is something real in this tie, real as the sensations themselves, and not a mere
product of the laws of thought without any fact corresponding to it, I hold to be
indubitable.... This original element,... to which we cannot give any name but
its own peculiar one, without implying some false or ungrounded theory, is the
Ego, or Self. As such I ascribe a reality to the Ego—to my own mind—different
from that real existence as a Permanent Possibility, which is the only reality I
acknowledge in Matter.... We are forced to apprehend every part of the series as
linked with the other parts by something in common which is not the feelings
themselves, any more than the succession of the feelings is the feelings
themselves; and as that which is the same in the ﬁrst as in the second, in the
second as in the third, in the third as in the fourth, and so on, must be the same
in the ﬁrst and in the ﬁftieth, this common element is a permanent element. But
beyond this we can afﬁrm nothing of it except the states of consciousness
themselves. The feelings or consciousnesses which belong or have belonged to
it, and its possibilities of having more, are the only facts there are to be asserted
of Self—the only positive attributes, except permanence, which we can ascribe
to it."[284]
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Mr. Mill's habitual method of philosophizing was to afﬁrm boldly some general doctrine
derived from his father, and then make so many concessions of detail to its enemies as
practically to abandon it altogether.[285] In this place the concessions amount, so far as they [Pg 358]
are intelligible, to the admission of something very like the Soul. This 'inexplicable tie'
which connects the feelings, this 'something in common' by which they are linked and which
is not the passing feelings themselves, but something 'permanent,' of which we can 'afﬁrm
nothing' save its attributes and its permanence, what is it but metaphysical Substance come
again to life? Much as one must respect the fairness of Mill's temper, quite as much must
one regret his failure of acumen at this point. At bottom he makes the same blunder as
Hume: the sensations per se, he thinks, have no 'tie.' The tie of resemblance and continuity
which the remembering Thought ﬁnds among them is not a 'real tie' but 'a mere product of
the laws of thought;' and the fact that the present Thought 'appropriates' them is also no real [Pg 359]
tie. But whereas Hume was contented to say that there might after all be no 'real tie,' Mill,
unwilling to admit this possibility, is driven, like any scholastic, to place it in a nonphenomenal world.
John Mill's concessions may be regarded as the deﬁnitive bankruptcy of the associationist
description of the consciousness of self, starting, as it does, with the best intentions, and
dimly conscious of the path, but 'perplexed in the extreme' at last with the inadequacy of
those 'simple feelings,' non-cognitive, non-transcendent of themselves, which were the only
baggage it was willing to take along. One must beg memory, knowledge on the part of the
feelings of something outside themselves. That granted, every other true thing follows
naturally, and it is hard to go astray. The knowledge the present feeling has of the past ones [Pg 360]
is a real tie between them, so is their resemblance; so is their continuity; so is the one's
'appropriation' of the other: all are real ties, realized in the judging Thought of every
moment, the only place where disconnections could be realized, did they exist. Hume and
Mill both imply that a disconnection can be realized there, whilst a tie cannot. But the ties
and the disconnections are exactly on a par, in this matter of self-consciousness. The way in
which the present Thought appropriates the past is a real way, so long as no other owner
appropriates it in a more real way, and so long as the Thought has no grounds for
repudiating it stronger than those which lead to its appropriation. But no other owner ever
does in point of fact present himself for my past; and the grounds which I perceive for
appropriating it—viz., continuity and resemblance with the present—outweigh those I
perceive for disowning it—viz., distance in time. My present Thought stands thus in the
plenitude of ownership of the train of my past selves, is owner not only de facto, but de jure,
the most real owner there can be, and all without the supposition of any 'inexplicable tie,'
but in a perfectly veriﬁable and phenomenal way.
Turn we now to what we may call
THE TRANSCENDENTALIST THEORY.
which owes its origin to Kant. Kant's own statements are too lengthy and obscure for
verbatim quotation here, so I must give their substance only. Kant starts, as I understand
him, from a view of the Object essentially like our own description of it on p. 275 ff., that is,
it is a system of things, qualities or facts in relation. "Object is that in the knowledge
(Begriff) of which the Manifold of a given Perception is connected."[286] But whereas we
simply begged the vehicle of this connected knowledge in the shape of what we call the
present Thought, or section of the Stream of Consciousness (which we declared to be the
ultimate fact for psychology), Kant denies this to be an ultimate fact and insists on analyzing
it into a large number of distinct, though equally essential, elements. The 'Manifoldness' of [Pg 361]
the Object is due to Sensibility, which per se is chaotic, and the unity is due to the synthetic
handling which this Manifold receives from the higher faculties of Intuition, Apprehension,
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Imagination, Understanding, and Apperception. It is the one essential spontaneity of the
Understanding which, under these different names, brings unity into the manifold of sense.
"The Understanding is, in fact, nothing more than the faculty of binding
together a priori, and of bringing the Manifold of given ideas under the unity of
Apperception, which consequently is the supreme principle in all human
knowledge" (§ 16).
The material connected must be given by lower faculties to the Understanding, for the latter
is not an intuitive faculty, but by nature 'empty.' And the bringing of this material 'under the
unity of Apperception' is explained by Kant to mean the thinking it always so that, whatever
its other determinations be, it may be known as thought by me.[287] Though this
consciousness, that I think it, need not be at every moment explicitly realized, it is always
capable of being realized. For if an object incapable of being combined with the idea of a
thinker were there, how could it be known, how related to other objects, how form part of
'experience' at all?
The awareness that I think is therefore implied in all experience. No connected
consciousness of anything without that of Self as its presupposition and 'transcendental'
condition! All things, then, so far as they are intelligible at all, are so through combination
with pure consciousness of Self, and apart from this, at least potential, combination nothing [Pg 362]
is knowable to us at all.
But this self, whose consciousness Kant thus established deductively as a conditio sine quâ
non of experience, is in the same breath denied by him to have any positive attributes.
Although Kant's name for it—the 'original transcendental synthetic Unity of
Apperception'—is so long, our consciousness about it is, according to him, short enough.
Self-consciousness of this 'transcendental' sort tells us, 'not how we appear, not how we
inwardly are, but only that we are' (§ 25). At the basis of our knowledge of our selves there
lies only "the simple and utterly empty idea: I; of which we cannot even say we have a
notion, but only a consciousness which accompanies all notions. In this I, or he or it (the
thing) which thinks, nothing more is represented than the bare transcendental Subject of the
knowledge = x, which is only recognized by the thoughts which are its predicates, and of
which, taken by itself, we cannot form the least conception" (ibid. 'Paralogisms'). The pure
Ego of all apperception is thus for Kant not the soul, but only that 'Subject' which is the
necessary correlate of the Object in all knowledge. There is a soul, Kant thinks, but this
mere ego-form of our consciousness tells us nothing about it, neither whether it be
substantial, nor whether it be immaterial, nor whether it be simple, nor whether it be
permanent. These declarations on Kant's part of the utter barrenness of the consciousness of
the pure Self, and of the consequent impossibility of any deductive or 'rational' psychology,
are what, more than anything else, earned for him the title of the 'all-destroyer.' The only self
we know anything positive about, he thinks, is the empirical me, not the pure I; the self
which is an object among other objects and the 'constituents' of which we ourselves have
seen, and recognized to be phenomenal things appearing in the form of space as well as
time.
This, for our purposes, is a sufﬁcient account of the 'transcendental' Ego.
Those purposes go no farther than to ascertain whether anything in Kant's conception ought
to make us give up our own, of a remembering and appropriating Thought incessantly [Pg 363]
renewed. In many respects Kant's meaning is obscure, but it will not be necessary for us to
squeeze the texts in order to make sure what it actually and historically was. If we can deﬁne
clearly two or three things which it may possibly have been, that will help us just as much to
clear our own ideas.
On the whole, a defensible interpretation of Kant's view would take somewhat the following
shape. Like ourselves he believes in a Reality outside the mind of which he writes, but the
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critic who vouches for that reality does so on grounds of faith, for it is not a veriﬁable
phenomenal thing. Neither is it manifold. The 'Manifold' which the intellectual functions
combine is a mental manifold altogether, which thus stands between the Ego of
Apperception and the outer Reality, but still stands inside the mind. In the function of
knowing there is a multiplicity to be connected, and Kant brings this multiplicity inside the
mind. The Reality becomes a mere empty locus, or unknowable, the so-called Noumenon;
the manifold phenomenon is in the mind. We, on the contrary, put the Multiplicity with the
Reality outside, and leave the mind simple. Both of us deal with the same elements—
thought and object—the only question is in which of them the multiplicity shall be lodged.
Wherever it is lodged it must be 'synthetized' when it comes to be thought. And that
particular way of lodging it will be the better, which, in addition to describing the facts
naturally, makes the 'mystery of synthesis' least hard to understand.
Well, Kant's way of describing the facts is mythological. The notion of our thought being
this sort of an elaborate internal machine-shop stands condemned by all we said in favor of
its simplicity on pages 276 ff. Our Thought is not composed of parts, however so composed
its objects may be. There is no originally chaotic manifold in it to be reduced to order. There
is something almost shocking in the notion of so chaste a function carrying this Kantian
hurly-burly in her womb. If we are to have a dualism of Thought and Reality at all, the
multiplicity should be lodged in the latter and not in the former member of the couple of
related terms. The parts and their relations surely belong less to the knower than to what is
known.
But even were all the mythology true, the process of synthesis would in no whit be [Pg 364]
explained by calling the inside of the mind its seat. No mystery would be made lighter by
such means. It is just as much a puzzle how the 'Ego' can employ the productive Imagination
to make the Understanding use the categories to combine the data which Recognition,
Association, and Apprehension receive from sensible Intuition, as how the Thought can
combine the objective facts. Phrase it as one may, the difﬁculty is always the same: the
Many known by the One. Or does one seriously think he understands better how the knower
'connects' its objects, when one calls the former a transcendental Ego and the latter a
'Manifold of Intuition' than when one calls them Thought and Things respectively?
Knowing must have a vehicle. Call the vehicle Ego, or call it Thought, Psychosis, Soul,
Intelligence, Consciousness, Mind, Reason, Feeling,—what you like—it must know. The
best grammatical subject for the verb know would, if possible, be one from whose other
properties the knowing could be deduced. And if there be no such subject, the best one
would be that with the fewest ambiguities and the least pretentious name. By Kant's
confession, the transcendental Ego has no properties, and from it nothing can be deduced.
Its name is pretentious, and, as we shall presently see, has its meaning ambiguously mixed
up with that of the substantial soul. So on every possible account we are excused from using
it instead of our own term of the present passing 'Thought,' as the principle by which the
Many is simultaneously known.

The ambiguity referred to in the meaning of the transcendental Ego is as to whether Kant
signiﬁed by it an Agent, and by the Experience it helps to constitute, an operation; or
whether the experience is an event produced in an unassigned way, and the Ego a mere
indwelling element therein contained. If an operation be meant, then Ego and Manifold must
both be existent prior to that collision which results in the experience of one by the other. If
a mere analysis is meant, there is no such prior existence, and the elements only are in so far
as they are in union. Now Kant's tone and language are everywhere the very words of one [Pg 365]
who is talking of operations and the agents by which they are performed.[288] And yet there
is reason to think that at bottom he may have had nothing of the sort in mind.[289] In this
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uncertainty we need again do no more than decide what to think of his transcendental Ego if
it be an agent.
Well, if it be so, Transcendentalism is only Substantialism grown shame-faced, and the Ego
only a 'cheap and nasty' edition of the soul. All our reasons for preferring the 'Thought' to
the 'Soul' apply with redoubled force when the Soul is shrunk to this estate. The Soul truly
explained nothing; the 'syntheses,' which she performed, were simply taken ready-made and
clapped on to her as expressions of her nature taken after the fact; but at least she had some
semblance of nobility and outlook. She was called active; might select; was responsible, and
permanent in her way. The Ego is simply nothing: as ineffectual and windy an abortion as
Philosophy can show. It would indeed be one of Reason's tragedies if the good Kant, with
all his honesty and strenuous pains, should have deemed this conception an important
outbirth of his thought.
But we have seen that Kant deemed it of next to no importance at all. It was reserved for his
Fichtean and Hegelian successors to call it the ﬁrst Principle of Philosophy, to spell its name
in capitals and pronounce it with adoration, to act, in short, as if they were going up in a
balloon, whenever the notion of it crossed their mind. Here again, however, I am uncertain
of the facts of history, and know that I may not read my authors aright. The whole lesson of
Kantian and post-Kantian speculation is, it seems to me, the lesson of simplicity. With Kant,
complication both of thought and statement was an inborn inﬁrmity, enhanced by the musty [Pg 366]
academicism of his Königsberg existence. With Hegel it was a raging fever. Terribly,
therefore, do the sour grapes which these fathers of philosophy have eaten set our teeth on
edge. We have in England and America, however, a contemporary continuation of Hegelism
from which, fortunately, somewhat simpler deliverances come; and, unable to ﬁnd any
deﬁnite psychology in what Hegel, Rosenkranz, or Erdmann tells us of the Ego, I turn to
Caird and Green.

The great difference, practically, between these authors and Kant is their complete
abstraction from the onlooking Psychologist and from the Reality he thinks he knows; or
rather it is the absorption of both of these outlying terms into the proper topic of
Psychology, viz., the mental experience of the mind under observation. The Reality
coalesces with the connected Manifold, the Psychologist with the Ego, knowing becomes
'connecting,' and there results no longer a ﬁnite or criticisable, but an 'absolute' Experience,
of which the Object and the Subject are always the same. Our ﬁnite 'Thought' is virtually
and potentially this eternal (or rather this 'timeless'), absolute Ego, and only provisionally
and speciously the limited thing which it seems prima facie to be. The later 'sections' of our
'Stream,' which come and appropriate the earlier ones, are those earlier ones, just as in
substantialism the Soul is throughout all time the same.[290] This 'solipsistic' character of an [Pg 367]
Experience conceived as absolute really annihilates psychology as a distinct body of
science.
Psychology is a natural science, an account of particular ﬁnite streams of thought, coexisting
and succeeding in time. It is of course conceivable (though far from clearly so) that in the
last metaphysical resort all these streams of thought may be thought by one universal Allthinker. But in this metaphysical notion there is no proﬁt for psychology; for grant that one
Thinker does think in all of us, still what He thinks in me and what in you can never be
deduced from the bare idea of Him. The idea of Him seems even to exert a positively
paralyzing effect on the mind. The existence of ﬁnite thoughts is suppressed altogether.
Thought's characteristics, as Professor Green says, are
"not to be sought in the incidents of individual lives which last but for a day....
No knowledge, nor any mental act involved in knowledge, can properly be
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called a 'phenomenon of consciousness.'... For a phenomenon is a sensible
event, related in the way of antecedence or consequence to other sensible
events, but the consciousness which constitutes a knowledge ... is not an event
so related nor made up of such events."
Again, if
"we examine the constituents of any perceived object,... we shall ﬁnd alike that
it is only for consciousness that they can exist, and that the consciousness for
which they thus exist cannot be merely a series of phenomena or a succession
of states.... It then becomes clear that there is a function of consciousness, as
exercised in the most rudimentary experience [namely, the function of
synthesis] which is incompatible with the deﬁnition of consciousness as any
sort of succession of any sort of phenomena."[291]
Were we to follow these remarks, we should have to abandon our notion of the 'Thought'
(perennially renewed in time, but always cognitive thereof), and to espouse instead of it an [Pg 368]
entity copied from thought in all essential respects, but differing from it in being 'out of
time.' What psychology can gain by this barter would be hard to divine. Moreover this
resemblance of the timeless Ego to the Soul is completed by other resemblances still. The
monism of the post-Kantian idealists seems always lapsing into a regular old-fashioned
spiritualistic dualism. They incessantly talk as if, like the Soul, their All-thinker were an
Agent, operating on detached materials of sense. This may come from the accidental fact
that the English writings of the school have been more polemic than constructive, and that a
reader may often take for a positive profession a statement ad hominem meant as part of a
reduction to the absurd, or mistake the analysis of a bit of knowledge into elements for a
dramatic myth about its creation. But I think the matter has profounder roots. Professor
Green constantly talks of the 'activity' of Self as a 'condition' of knowledge taking place.
Facts are said to become incorporated with other facts only through the 'action of a
combining self-consciousness upon data of sensation.'
"Every object we perceive ... requires, in order to its presentation, the action of
a principle of consciousness, not itself subject to conditions of time, upon
successive appearances, such action as may hold the appearances together,
without fusion, in an apprehended fact."[292]
It is needless to repeat that the connection of things in our knowledge is in no whit
explained by making it the deed of an agent whose essence is self-identity and who is out of
time. The agency of phenomenal thought coming and going in time is just as easy to
understand. And when it is furthermore said that the agent that combines is the same 'selfdistinguishing subject' which 'in another mode of its activity' presents the manifold object to
itself, the unintelligibilities become quite paroxysmal, and we are forced to confess that the
entire school of thought in question, in spite of occasional glimpses of something more
reﬁned, still dwells habitually in that mythological stage of thought where phenomena are
explained as results of dramas enacted by entities which but reduplicate the characters of the [Pg 369]
phenomena themselves. The self must not only know its object,—that is too bald and dead a
relation to be written down and left in its static state. The knowing must be painted as a
'famous victory' in which the object's distinctness is in some way 'overcome.'
"The self exists as one self only as it opposes itself, as object, to itself as
subject, and immediately denies and transcends that opposition. Only because it
is such a concrete unity, which has in itself a resolved contradiction, can the
intelligence cope with all the manifoldness and division of the mighty universe,
and hope to master its secrets. As the lightning sleeps in the dew-drop, so in the
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simple and transparent unity of self-consciousness there is held in equilibrium
that vital antagonism of opposites which ... seems to rend the world asunder.
The intelligence is able to understand the world, or, in other words, to break
down the barrier between itself and things and ﬁnd itself in them, just because
its own existence is implicitly the solution of all the division and conﬂict of
things."[293]
This dynamic (I had almost written dynamitic) way of representing knowledge has the merit
of not being tame. To turn from it to our own psychological formulation is like turning from
the ﬁreworks, trap-doors, and transformations of the pantomime into the insipidity of the
midnight, where
"ghastly through the drizzling rain,
On the bald street breaks the blank day!"[294]
And yet turn we must, with the confession that our 'Thought'—a cognitive phenomenal
event in time—is, if it exist at all, itself the only Thinker which the facts require. The only
service that transcendental egoism has done to psychology has been by its protests against
Hume's 'bundle'-theory of mind. But this service has been ill-performed; for the Egoists [Pg 370]
themselves, let them say what they will, believe in the bundle, and in their own system
merely tie it up, with their special transcendental string, invented for that use alone. Besides,
they talk as if, with this miraculous tying or 'relating,' the Ego's duties were done. Of its far
more important duty of choosing some of the things it ties and appropriating them, to the
exclusion of the rest, they tell us never a word. To sum up, then, my own opinion of the
transcendentalist school, it is (whatever ulterior metaphysical truth it may divine) a school in
which psychology at least has naught to learn, and whose deliverances about the Ego in
particular in no wise oblige us to revise our own formulation of the Stream of Thought.[295]

With this, all possible rival formulations have been discussed. The literature of the Self is
large, but all its authors may be classed as radical or mitigated representatives of the three [Pg 371]
schools we have named, substantialism, associationism, or transcendentalism. Our own
opinion must be classed apart, although it incorporates essential elements from all three
schools. There need never have been a quarrel between associationism and its rivals if the
former had admitted the indecomposable unity of every pulse of thought, and the latter been
willing to allow that 'perishing' pulses of thought might recollect and know.
We may sum up by saying that personality implies the incessant presence of two elements,
an objective person, known by a passing subjective Thought and recognized as continuing in
time. Hereafter let us use the words ME and I for the empirical person and the judging
Thought.

Certain vicissitudes in the me demand our notice.
In the ﬁrst place, although its changes are gradual, they become in time great. The central
part of the me is the feeling of the body and of the adjustments in the head; and in the
feeling of the body should be included that of the general emotional tones and tendencies,
for at bottom these are but the habits in which organic activities and sensibilities run. Well,
from infancy to old age, this assemblage of feelings, most constant of all, is yet a prey to
slow mutation. Our powers, bodily and mental, change at least as fast.[296] Our possessions
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notoriously are perishable facts. The identity which the I discovers, as it surveys this long [Pg 372]
procession, can only be a relative identity, that of a slow shifting in which there is always
some common ingredient retained.[297] The commonest element of all, the most uniform, is
the possession of the same memories. However different the man may be from the youth,
both look back on the same childhood, and call it their own.
Thus the identity found by the I in its me is only a loosely construed thing, an identity 'on
the whole,' just like that which any outside observer might ﬁnd in the same assemblage of [Pg 373]
facts. We often say of a man 'he is so changed one would not know him'; and so does a man,
less often, speak of himself. These changes in the me, recognized by the I, or by outside
observers, may be grave or slight. They deserve some notice here.
THE MUTATIONS OF THE SELF
may be divided into two main classes:
1. Alterations of memory; and
2. Alterations in the present bodily and spiritual selves.

1. Alterations of memory are either losses or false recollections. In either case the me is
changed. Should a man be punished for what he did in his childhood and no longer
remembers? Should he be punished for crimes enacted in post-epileptic unconsciousness,
somnambulism, or in any involuntarily induced state of which no recollection is retained?
Law, in accord with common-sense, says: "No; he is not the same person forensically now
which he was then." These losses of memory are a normal incident of extreme old age, and
the person's me shrinks in the ratio of the facts that have disappeared.
In dreams we forget our waking experiences; they are as if they were not. And the converse
is also true. As a rule, no memory is retained during the waking state of what has happened
during mesmeric trance, although when again entranced the person may remember it
distinctly, and may then forget facts belonging to the waking state. We thus have, within the
bounds of healthy mental life, an approach to an alternation of me's.
False memories are by no means rare occurrences in most of us, and, whenever they occur,
they distort the consciousness of the me. Most people, probably, are in doubt about certain
matters ascribed to their past. They may have seen them, may have said them, done them, or
they may only have dreamed or imagined they did so. The content of a dream will
oftentimes insert itself into the stream of real life in a most perplexing way. The most
frequent source of false memory is the accounts we give to others of our experiences. Such
accounts we almost always make both more simple and more interesting than the truth. We [Pg 374]
quote what we should have said or done, rather than what we really said or did; and in the
ﬁrst telling we may be fully aware of the distinction. But ere long the ﬁction expels the
reality from memory and reigns in its stead alone. This is one great source of the fallibility
of testimony meant to be quite honest. Especially where the marvellous is concerned, the
story takes a tilt that way, and the memory follows the story. Dr. Carpenter quotes from Miss
Cobbe the following, as an instance of a very common sort:
"It happened once to the Writer to hear a most scrupulously conscientious
friend narrate an incident of table-turning, to which she appended an assurance
that the table rapped when nobody was within a yard of it. The writer being
confounded by this latter fact, the lady, though fully satisﬁed of the accuracy of
her statement, promised to look at the note she had made ten years previously
of the transaction. The note was examined, and was found to contain the
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distinct statement that the table rapped when the hands of six persons rested on
it! The lady's memory as to all other points proved to be strictly correct; and in
this point she had erred in entire good faith."[298]
It is next to impossible to get a story of this sort accurate in all its details, although it is the
inessential details that suffer most change.[299] Dickens and Balzac were said to have
constantly mingled their ﬁctions with their real experiences. Every one must have known
some specimen of our mortal dust so intoxicated with the thought of his own person and the
sound of his own voice as never to be able even to think the truth when his autobiography
was in question. Amiable, harmless, radiant J. V.! mayst thou ne'er wake to the difference
[Pg 375]
between thy real and thy fondly-imagined self![300]
2. When we pass beyond alterations of memory to abnormal alterations in the present self
we have still graver disturbances. These alterations are of three main types, from the
descriptive point of view. But certain cases unite features of two or more types; and our
knowledge of the elements and causes of these changes of personality is so slight that the
division into types must not be regarded as having any profound signiﬁcance. The types are:
(1) Insane delusions;
(2) Alternating selves;
(3) Mediumships or possessions.

1) In insanity we often have delusions projected into the past, which are melancholic or
sanguine according to the character of the disease. But the worst alterations of the self come
from present perversions of sensibility and impulse which leave the past undisturbed, but
induce the patient to think that the present me is an altogether new personage. Something of
this sort happens normally in the rapid expansion of the whole character, intellectual as well
as volitional, which takes place after the time of puberty. The pathological cases are curious
enough to merit longer notice.
The basis of our personality, as M. Ribot says, is that feeling of our vitality which, because
it is so perpetually present, remains in the background of our consciousness.
"It is the basis because, always present, always acting, without peace or rest, it
knows neither sleep nor fainting, and lasts as long as life itself, of which it is
one form. It serves as a support to that self-conscious me which memory
constitutes, it is the medium of association among its other parts.... Suppose
now that it were possible at once to change our body and put another into its
place: skeleton, vessels, viscera, muscles, skin, everything made new, except
the nervous system with its stored-up memory of the past. There can be no
doubt that in such a case the afﬂux of unaccustomed vital sensations would
produce the gravest disorders. Between the old sense of existence engraved on
the nervous system, and the new one acting with all the intensity of its reality
and novelty, there would be irreconcilable contradiction."[301]
With the beginnings of cerebral disease there often happens something quite comparable to [Pg 376]
this:
"Masses of new sensation, hitherto foreign to the individual, impulses and ideas
of the same inexperienced kind, for example terrors, representations of enacted
crime, of enemies pursuing one, etc. At the outset, these stand in contrast with
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

214/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

the old familiar me, as a strange, often astonishing and abhorrent thou.[302]
Often their invasion into the former circle of feelings is felt as if the old self
were being taken possession of by a dark overpowering might, and the fact of
such 'possession' is described in fantastic images. Always this doubleness, this
struggle of the old self against the new discordant forms of experience, is
accompanied with painful mental conﬂict, with passion, with violent emotional
excitement. This is in great part the reason for the common experience, that the
ﬁrst stage in the immense majority of cases of mental disease is an emotional
alteration particularly of a melancholic sort. If now the brain-affection, which is
the immediate cause of the new abnormal train of ideas, be not relieved, the
latter becomes conﬁrmed. It may gradually contract associations with the trains
of ideas which characterized the old self, or portions of the latter may be
extinguished and lost in the progress of the cerebral malady, so that little by
little the opposition of the two conscious me's abates, and the emotional storms
are calmed. But by that time the old me itself has been falsiﬁed and turned into
another by those associations, by that reception into itself of the abnormal
elements of feeling and of will. The patient may again be quiet, and his thought
sometimes logically correct, but in it the morbid erroneous ideas are always
present, with the adhesions they have contracted, as uncontrollable premises,
and the man is no longer the same, but a really new person, his old self
transformed."[303]
But the patient himself rarely continues to describe the change in just these terms unless [Pg 377]
new bodily sensations in him or the loss of old ones play a predominant part. Mere
perversions of sight and hearing, or even of impulse, soon cease to be felt as contradictions
of the unity of the me.
What the particular perversions of the bodily sensibility may be, which give rise to these
contradictions, is for the most part impossible for a sound-minded person to conceive. One
patient has another self that repeats all his thoughts for him. Others, among whom are some
of the ﬁrst characters in history, have familiar dæmons who speak with them, and are replied
to. In another someone 'makes' his thoughts for him. Another has two bodies, lying in
different beds. Some patients feel as if they had lost parts of their bodies, teeth, brain,
stomach, etc. In some it is made of wood, glass, butter, etc. In some it does not exist any
longer, or is dead, or is a foreign object quite separate from the speaker's self. Occasionally,
parts of the body lose their connection for consciousness with the rest, and are treated as
belonging to another person and moved by a hostile will. Thus the right hand may ﬁght with
the left as with an enemy.[304] Or the cries of the patient himself are assigned to another
person with whom the patient expresses sympathy. The literature of insanity is ﬁlled with
narratives of such illusions as these. M. Taine quotes from a patient of Dr. Krishaber an
account of sufferings, from which it will be seen how completely aloof from what is normal
a man's experience may suddenly become:
"After the ﬁrst or second day it was for some weeks impossible to observe or
analyze myself. The suffering—angina pectoris—was too overwhelming. It was
not till the ﬁrst days of January that I could give an account to myself of what I
experienced.... Here is the ﬁrst thing of which I retain a clear remembrance. I
was alone, and already a prey to permanent visual trouble, when I was suddenly
seized with a visual trouble inﬁnitely more pronounced. Objects grew small and
receded to inﬁnite distances—men and things together. I was myself
immeasurably far away, I looked about me with terror and astonishment; the
world was escaping from me.... I remarked at the same time that my voice was
extremely far away from me, that it sounded no longer as if mine. I struck the
ground with my foot, and perceived its resistance; but this resistance seemed
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illusory—not that the soil was soft, but that the weight of my body was reduced
to almost nothing.... I had the feeling of being without weight...." In addition to
being so distant, "objects appeared to me ﬂat. When I spoke with anyone, I saw
him like an image cut out of paper with no relief.... This sensation lasted
intermittently for two years.... Constantly it seemed as if my legs did not belong
to me. It was almost as bad with my arms. As for my head, it seemed no longer
to exist.... I appeared to myself to act automatically, by an impulsion foreign to
myself.... There was inside of me a new being, and another part of myself, the
old being, which took no interest in the new-comer. I distinctly remember
saying to myself that the sufferings of this new being were to me indifferent. I
was never really dupe of these illusions, but my mind grew often tired of
incessantly correcting the new impressions, and I let myself go and lived the
unhappy life of this new entity. I had an ardent desire to see my old world
again, to get back to my old self. This desire kept me from killing myself.... I
was another, and I hated, I despised this other; he was perfectly odious to me; it
was certainly another who had taken my form and assumed my functions."[305]
In cases similar to this, it is as certain that the I is unaltered as that the me is changed. That
is to say, the present Thought of the patient is cognitive of both the old me and the new, so
long as its memory holds good. Only, within that objective sphere which formerly lent itself
so simply to the judgment of recognition and of egoistic appropriation, strange perplexities
have arisen. The present and the past both seen therein will not unite. Where is my old me?
What is this new one? Are they the same? Or have I two? Such questions, answered by
whatever theory the patient is able to conjure up as plausible, form the beginning of his
insane life.[306]
A case with which I am acquainted through Dr. C. J. Fisher of Tewksbury has possibly its [Pg 379]
origin in this way. The woman, Bridget F.,
"has been many years insane, and always speaks of her supposed self as 'the
rat,' asking me to 'bury the little rat,' etc. Her real self she speaks of in the third
person as 'the good woman,' saying, 'The good Woman knew Dr. F. and used to
work for him,' etc. Sometimes she sadly asks: 'Do you think the good woman
will ever come back?' She works at needlework, knitting, laundry, etc., and
shows her work, saying, 'Isn't that good for only a rat?' She has, during periods
of depression, hid herself under buildings, and crawled into holes and under
boxes. 'She was only a rat, and wants to die,' she would say when we found
her."
2. The phenomenon of alternating personality in its simplest phases seems based on lapses
of memory. Any man becomes, as we say, inconsistent with himself if he forgets his
engagements, pledges, knowledges, and habits; and it is merely a question of degree at what
point we shall say that his personality is changed. In the pathological cases known as those
of double or alternate personality the lapse of memory is abrupt, and is usually preceded by
a period of unconsciousness or syncope lasting a variable length of time. In the hypnotic
trance we can easily produce an alteration of the personality, either by telling the subject to
forget all that has happened to him since such or such a date, in which case he becomes (it
may be) a child again, or by telling him he is another altogether imaginary personage, in
which case all facts about himself seem for the time being to lapse from out his mind, and
he throws himself into the new character with a vivacity proportionate to the amount of
histrionic imagination which he possesses.[307] But in the pathological cases the
transformation is spontaneous. The most famous case, perhaps, on record is that of Félida
X., reported by Dr. Azam of Bordeaux.[308] At the age of fourteen this woman began to pass [Pg 380]
into a 'secondary' state characterized by a change in her general disposition and character, as
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if certain 'inhibitions,' previously existing, were suddenly removed. During the secondary
state she remembered the ﬁrst state, but on emerging from it into the ﬁrst state she
remembered nothing of the second. At the age of forty-four the duration of the secondary
state (which was on the whole superior in quality to the original state) had gained upon the
latter so much as to occupy most of her time. During it she remembers the events belonging
to the original state, but her complete oblivion of the secondary state when the original state
recurs is often very distressing to her, as, for example, when the transition takes place in a
carriage on her way to a funeral, and she hasn't the least idea which one of her friends may
be dead. She actually became pregnant during one of her early secondary states, and during
her ﬁrst state had no knowledge of how it had come to pass. Her distress at these blanks of
memory is sometimes intense and once drove her to attempt suicide.
To take another example, Dr. Rieger gives an account[309] of an epileptic man who for
seventeen years had passed his life alternately free, in prisons, or in asylums, his character
being orderly enough in the normal state, but alternating with periods, during which he
would leave his home for several weeks, leading the life of a thief and vagabond, being sent
to jail, having epileptic ﬁts and excitement, being accused of malingering, etc., etc., and
with never a memory of the abnormal conditions which were to blame for all his
wretchedness.
"I have never got from anyone," says Dr. Rieger, "so singular an impression as
from this man, of whom it could not be said that he had any properly conscious
past at all.... It is really impossible to think one's self into such a state of mind.
His last larceny had been performed in Nürnberg, he knew nothing of it, and
saw himself before the court and then in the hospital, but without in the least
understanding the reason why. That he had epileptic attacks, he knew. But it
was impossible to convince him that for hours together he raved and acted in an
abnormal way."

[Pg 381]

Another remarkable case is that of Mary Reynolds, lately republished again by Dr. Weir
Mitchell.[310] This dull and melancholy young woman, inhabiting the Pennsylvania
wilderness in 1811,
"was found one morning, long after her habitual time for rising, in a profound
sleep from which it was impossible to arouse her. After eighteen or twenty
hours of sleeping she awakened, but in a state of unnatural consciousness.
Memory had ﬂed. To all intents and purposes she was as a being for the ﬁrst
time ushered into the world. 'All of the past that remained to her was the faculty
of pronouncing a few words, and this seems to have been as purely instinctive
as the wailings of an infant; for at ﬁrst the words which she uttered were
connected with no ideas in her mind.' Until she was taught their signiﬁcance
they were unmeaning sounds.
"'Her eyes were virtually for the ﬁrst time opened upon the world. Old things
had passed away; all things had become new.' Her parents, brothers, sisters,
friends, were not recognized or acknowledged as such by her. She had never
seen them before,—never known them,—was not aware that such persons had
been. Now for the ﬁrst time she was introduced to their company and
acquaintance. To the scenes by which she was surrounded she was a perfect
stranger. The house, the ﬁelds, the forest, the hills, the vales, the streams,—all
were novelties. The beauties of the landscape were all unexplored.
"She had not the slightest consciousness that she had ever existed previous to
the moment in which she awoke from that mysterious slumber. 'In a word, she
was an infant, just born, yet born in a state of maturity, with a capacity for
relishing the rich, sublime, luxuriant wonders of created nature.'
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"The ﬁrst lesson in her education was to teach her by what ties she was bound
to those by whom she was surrounded, and the duties devolving upon her
accordingly. This she was very slow to learn, and, 'indeed, never did learn, or, at
least, never would acknowledge the ties of consanguinity, or scarcely those of
friendship. She considered those she had once known as for the most part
strangers and enemies, among whom she was, by some remarkable and
unaccountable means, transplanted, though from what region or state of
existence was a problem unsolved.'
"The next lesson was to re-teach her the arts of reading and writing. She was
apt enough, and made such rapid progress in both that in a few weeks she had
readily re-learned to read and write. In copying her name which her brother had
written for her as a ﬁrst lesson, she took her pen in a very awkward manner and
began to copy from right to left in the Hebrew mode, as though she had been
transplanted from an Eastern soil....

[Pg 382]

"The next thing that is noteworthy is the change which took place in her
disposition. Instead of being melancholy she was now cheerful to extremity.
Instead of being reserved she was buoyant and social. Formerly taciturn and
retiring, she was now merry and jocose. Her disposition was totally and
absolutely changed. While she was, in this second state, extravagantly fond of
company, she was much more enamoured of nature's works, as exhibited in the
forests, hills, vales, and water-courses. She used to start in the morning, either
on foot or horseback, and ramble until nightfall over the whole country; nor was
she at all particular whether she were on a path or in the trackless forest. Her
predilection for this manner of life may have been occasioned by the restraint
necessarily imposed upon her by her friends, which caused her to consider them
her enemies and not companions, and she was glad to keep out of their way.
"She knew no fear, and as bears and panthers were numerous in the woods, and
rattlesnakes and copperheads abounded everywhere, her friends told her of the
danger to which she exposed herself, but it produced no other effect than to
draw forth a contemptuous laugh, as she said, 'I know you only want to frighten
me and keep me at home, but you miss it, for I often see your bears and I am
perfectly convinced that they are nothing more than black hogs.'
"One evening, after her return from her daily excursion, she told the following
incident: 'As I was riding to-day along a narrow path a great black hog came out
of the woods and stopped before me. I never saw such an impudent black hog
before. It stood up on its hind feet and grinned and gnashed its teeth at me. I
could not make the horse go on. I told him he was a fool to be frightened at a
hog, and tried to whip him past, but he would not go and wanted to turn back. I
told the hog to get out of the way, but he did not mind me. "Well," said I, "if
you won't for words, I'll try blows;" so I got off and took a stick, and walked up
toward it. When I got pretty close by, it got down on all fours and walked away
slowly and sullenly, stopping every few steps and looking back and grinning
and growling. Then I got on my horse and rode on.'...
"Thus it continued for ﬁve weeks, when one morning, after a protracted sleep,
she awoke and was herself again. She recognized the parental, the brotherly,
and sisterly ties as though nothing had happened, and immediately went about
the performance of duties incumbent upon her, and which she had planned ﬁve
weeks previously. Great was her surprise at the change which one night (as she
supposed) had produced. Nature bore a different aspect. Not a trace was left in
her mind of the giddy scenes through which she had passed. Her ramblings
through the forest, her tricks and humor, all were faded from her memory, and
not a shadow left behind. Her parents saw their child; her brothers and sisters
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saw their sister. She now had all the knowledge that she had possessed in her
ﬁrst state previous to the change, still fresh and in as vigorous exercise as
though no change had been. But any new acquisitions she had made, and any
new ideas she had obtained, were lost to her now—yet not lost, but laid up out
of sight in safe-keeping for future use. Of course her natural disposition
returned; her melancholy was deepened by the information of what had
occurred. All went on in the old-fashioned way, and it was fondly hoped that
the mysterious occurrences of those ﬁve weeks would never be repeated, but
these anticipations were not to be realized. After the lapse of a few weeks she
fell into a profound sleep, and awoke in her second state, taking up her new life
again precisely where she had left it when she before passed from that state.
She was not now a daughter or a sister. All the knowledge she possessed was
that acquired during the few weeks of her former period of second
consciousness. She knew nothing of the intervening time. Two periods widely
separated were brought into contact. She thought it was but one night.
"In this state she came to understand perfectly the facts of her case, not from
memory, but from information. Yet her buoyancy of spirits was so great that no
depression was produced. On the contrary, it added to her cheerfulness, and was
made the foundation, as was everything else, of mirth.
"These alternations from one state to another continued at intervals of varying
length for ﬁfteen or sixteen years, but ﬁnally ceased when she attained the age
of thirty-ﬁve or thirty-six, leaving her permanently in her second state. In this
she remained without change for the last quarter of a century of her life."
The emotional opposition of the two states seems, however, to have become gradually
effaced in Mary Reynolds:
"The change from a gay, hysterical, mischievous woman, fond of jests and
subject to absurd beliefs or delusive convictions, to one retaining the
joyousness and love of society, but sobered down to levels of practical
usefulness, was gradual. The most of the twenty-ﬁve years which followed she
was as different from her melancholy, morbid self as from the hilarious
condition of the early years of her second state. Some of her family spoke of it
as her third state. She is described as becoming rational, industrious, and very
cheerful, yet reasonably serious; possessed of a well-balanced temperament,
and not having the slightest indication of an injured or disturbed mind. For
some years she taught school, and in that capacity was both useful and
acceptable, being a general favorite with old and young.
"During these last twenty-ﬁve years she lived in the same house with the Rev.
Dr. John V. Reynolds, her nephew, part of that time keeping house for him,
showing a sound judgment and a thorough acquaintance with the duties of her
position.

[Pg 384]

"Dr. Reynolds, who is still living in Meadville," says Dr. Mitchell, "and who
has most kindly placed the facts at my disposal, states in his letter to me of
January 4, 1888, that at a later period of her life she said she did sometimes
seem to have a dim, dreamy idea of a shadowy past, which she could not fully
grasp, and could not be certain whether it originated in a partially restored
memory or in the statements of the events by others during her abnormal state.
"Miss Reynolds died in January, 1854, at the age of sixty-one. On the morning
of the day of her death she rose in her usual health, ate her breakfast, and
superintended household duties. While thus employed she suddenly raised her
hands to her head and exclaimed: 'Oh! I wonder what is the matter with my
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head!' and immediately fell to the ﬂoor. When carried to a sofa she gasped once
or twice and died."
In such cases as the preceding, in which the secondary character is superior to the ﬁrst, there
seems reason to think that the ﬁrst one is the morbid one. The word inhibition describes its
dulness and melancholy. Félida X.'s original character was dull and melancholy in
comparison with that which she later acquired, and the change may be regarded as the
removal of inhibitions which had maintained themselves from earlier years. Such inhibitions
we all know temporarily, when we can not recollect or in some other way command our
mental resources. The systematized amnesias (losses of memory) of hypnotic subjects
ordered to forget all nouns, or all verbs, or a particular letter of the alphabet, or all that is
relative to a certain person, are inhibitions of the sort on a more extensive scale. They
sometimes occur spontaneously as symptoms of disease.[311] Now M. Pierre Janet has
shown that such inhibitions when they bear on a certain class of sensations (making the
subject anæsthetic thereto) and also on the memory of such sensations, are the basis of
changes of personality. The anæsthetic and 'amnesic' hysteric is one person; but when you
restore her inhibited sensibilities and memories by plunging her into the hypnotic trance—in
other words, when you rescue them from their 'dissociated' and split-off condition, and make [Pg 385]
them rejoin the other sensibilities and memories—she is a different person. As said above
(p. 203), the hypnotic trance is one method of restoring sensibility in hysterics. But one day
when the hysteric anæsthetic named Lucie was already in the hypnotic trance, M. Janet for a
certain reason continued to make passes over her for a full half-hour as if she were not
already asleep. The result was to throw her into a sort of syncope from which, after half an
hour, she revived in a second somnambulic condition entirely unlike that which had
characterized her thitherto—different sensibilities, a different memory, a different person, in
short. In the waking state the poor young woman was anæsthetic all over, nearly deaf, and
with a badly contracted ﬁeld of vision. Bad as it was, however, sight was her best sense, and
she used it as a guide in all her movements. With her eyes bandaged she became entirely
helpless, and like other persons of a similar sort whose cases have been recorded, she almost
immediately fell asleep in consequence of the withdrawal of her last sensorial stimulus. M.
Janet calls this waking or primary (one can hardly in such a connection say 'normal') state
by the name of Lucie 1. In Lucie 2, her ﬁrst sort of hypnotic trance, the anæsthesias were
diminished but not removed. In the deeper trance, 'Lucie 3,' brought about as just described,
no trace of them remained. Her sensibility became perfect, and instead of being an extreme
example of the 'visual' type, she was transformed into what in Prof. Charcot's terminology is
known as a motor. That is to say, that whereas when awake she had thought in visual terms
exclusively, and could imagine things only by remembering how they looked, now in this
deeper trance her thoughts and memories seemed to M. Janet to be largely composed of
images of movement and of touch.
Having discovered this deeper trance and change of personality in Lucie, M. Janet naturally
became eager to ﬁnd it in his other subjects. He found it in Rose, in Marie, and in Léonie;
and his brother, Dr. Jules Janet, who was interne at the Salpétrière Hospital, found it in the
celebrated subject Wit.... whose trances had been studied for years by the various doctors of [Pg 386]
that institution without any of them having happened to awaken this very peculiar
individuality.[312]
With the return of all the sensibilities in the deeper trance, these subjects turned, as it were,
into normal persons. Their memories in particular grew more extensive, and hereupon M.
Janet spins a theoretic generalization. When a certain kind of sensation, he says, is abolished
in an hysteric patient, there is also abolished along with it all recollection of past sensations
of that kind. If, for example, hearing be the anæsthetic sense, the patient becomes unable
even to imagine sounds and voices, and has to speak (when speech is still possible) by
means of motor or articulatory cues. If the motor sense be abolished, the patient must will
the movements of his limbs by ﬁrst deﬁning them to his mind in visual terms, and must
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

220/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

innervate his voice by premonitory ideas of the way in which the words are going to sound.
The practical consequences of this law would be great, for all experiences belonging to a
sphere of sensibility which afterwards became anæsthetic, as, for example, touch, would
have been stored away and remembered in tactile terms, and would be incontinently
forgotten as soon as the cutaneous and muscular sensibility should come to be cut out in the
course of disease. Memory of them would be restored again, on the other hand, so soon as
the sense of touch came back. Now, in the hysteric subjects on whom M. Janet
experimented, touch did come back in the state of trance. The result was that all sorts of
memories, absent in the ordinary condition, came back too, and they could then go back and
explain the origin of many otherwise inexplicable things in their life. One stage in the great
convulsive crisis of hystero-epilepsy, for example, is what French writers call the phase des
attitudes passionelles, in which the patient, without speaking or giving any account of
herself, will go through the outward movements of fear, anger, or some other emotional
state of mind. Usually this phase is, with each patient, a thing so stereotyped as to seem [Pg 387]
automatic, and doubts have even been expressed as to whether any consciousness exists
whilst it lasts. When, however, the patient Lucie's tactile sensibility came back in the deeper
trance, she explained the origin of her hysteric crisis in a great fright which she had had
when a child, on a day when certain men, hid behind the curtains, had jumped out upon her;
she told how she went through this scene again in all her crises; she told of her sleepwalking ﬁts through the house when a child, and how for several months she had been shut
in a dark room because of a disorder of the eyes. All these were things of which she
recollected nothing when awake, because they were records of experiences mainly of
motion and of touch.
But M. Janet's subject Léonie is interesting, and shows best how with the sensibilities and
motor impulses the memories and character will change.
"This woman, whose life sounds more like an improbable romance than a
genuine history, has had attacks of natural somnambulism since the age of three
years. She has been hypnotized constantly by all sorts of persons from the age
of sixteen upwards, and she is now forty-ﬁve. Whilst her normal life developed
in one way in the midst of her poor country surroundings, her second life was
passed in drawing-rooms and doctors' ofﬁces, and naturally took an entirely
different direction. To-day, when in her normal state, this poor peasant woman
is a serious and rather sad person, calm and slow, very mild with every one, and
extremely timid: to look at her one would never suspect the personage which
she contains. But hardly is she put to sleep hypnotically when a metamorphosis
occurs. Her face is no longer the same. She keeps her eyes closed, it is true, but
the acuteness of her other senses supplies their place. She is gay, noisy, restless,
sometimes insupportably so. She remains good-natured, but has acquired a
singular tendency to irony and sharp jesting. Nothing is more curious than to
hear her after a sitting when she has received a visit from strangers who wished
to see her asleep. She gives a word-portrait of them, apes their manners,
pretends to know their little ridiculous aspects and passions, and for each
invents a romance. To this character must be added the possession of an
enormous number of recollections, whose existence she does not even suspect
when awake, for her amnesia is then complete.... She refuses the name of
Léonie and takes that of Léontine (Léonie 2) to which her ﬁrst magnetizers had
accustomed her. 'That good woman is not myself,' she says, 'she is too stupid!'
To herself, Léontine or Léonie 2, she attributes all the sensations and all the
actions, in a word all the conscious experiences which she has undergone in
somnambulism, and knits them together to make the history of her already long
life. To Léonie 1 [as M. Janet calls the waking woman] on the other hand, she
exclusively ascribes the events lived through in waking hours. I was at ﬁrst
struck by an important exception to the rule, and was disposed to think that
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there might be something arbitrary in this partition of her recollections. In the
normal state Léonie has a husband and children; but Léonie 2, the
somnambulist, whilst acknowledging the children as her own, attributes the
husband to 'the other.' This choice, was perhaps explicable, but it followed no
rule. It was not till later that I learned that her magnetizers in early days, as
audacious as certain hypnotizers of recent date, had somnambulized her for her
ﬁrst accouchements, and that she had lapsed into that state spontaneously in the
later ones. Léonie 2 was thus quite right in ascribing to herself the children—it
was she who had had them, and the rule that her ﬁrst trance-state forms a
different personality was not broken. But it is the same with her second or
deepest state of trance. When after the renewed passes, syncope, etc., she
reaches the condition which I have called Léonie 3, she is another person still.
Serious and grave, instead of being a restless child, she speaks slowly and
moves but little. Again she separates herself from the waking Léonie 1. 'A good
but rather stupid woman,' she says, 'and not me.' And she also separates herself
from Léonie 2: 'How can you see anything of me in that crazy creature?' she
says. 'Fortunately I am nothing for her.'"
Léonie 1 knows only of herself; Léonie 2, of herself and of Léonie 1; Léonie 3 knows of
herself and of both the others. Léonie 1 has a visual consciousness; Léonie 2 has one both
visual and auditory; in Léonie 3 it is at once visual, auditory, and tactile. Prof. Janet thought
at ﬁrst that he was Léonie 3's discoverer. But she told him that she had been frequently in
that condition before. A former magnetizer had hit upon her just as M. Janet had, in seeking
by means of passes to deepen the sleep of Léonie 2.
"This resurrection of a somnambulic personage who had been extinct for twenty
years is curious enough; and in speaking to Léonie 3, I naturally now adopt the
name of Léonore which was given her by her ﬁrst master."
The most carefully studied case of multiple personality is that of the hysteric youth Louis V.
about whom MM. Bourru and Burot have written a book.[313] The symptoms are too
intricate to be reproduced here with detail. Sufﬁce it that Louis V. had led an irregular life,
in the army, in hospitals, and in houses of correction, and had had numerous hysteric [Pg 389]
anæsthesias, paralyses, and contractures attacking him differently at different times and
when he lived at different places. At eighteen, at an agricultural House of Correction he was
bitten by a viper, which brought on a convulsive crisis and left both of his legs paralyzed for
three years. During this condition he was gentle, moral, and industrious. But suddenly at
last, after a long convulsive seizure, his paralysis disappeared, and with it his memory for all
the time during which it had endured. His character also changed: he became quarrelsome,
gluttonous, impolite, stealing his comrades' wine, and money from an attendant, and ﬁnally
escaped from the establishment and fought furiously when he was overtaken and caught.
Later, when he ﬁrst fell under the observation of the authors, his right side was half
paralyzed and insensible, and his character intolerable; the application of metals transferred
the paralysis to the left side, abolished his recollections of the other condition, and carried
him psychically back to the hospital of Bicêtre where he had been treated for a similar
physical condition. His character, opinions, education, all underwent a concomitant
transformation. He was no longer the personage of the moment before. It appeared ere long
that any present nervous disorder in him could be temporarily removed by metals, magnets,
electric or other baths, etc.; and that any past disorder could be brought back by hypnotic
suggestion. He also went through a rapid spontaneous repetition of his series of past
disorders after each of the convulsive attacks which occurred in him at intervals. It was
observed that each physical state in which he found himself, excluded certain memories and
brought with it a deﬁnite modiﬁcation of character.
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"The law of these changes," say the authors, "is quite clear. There exist precise,
constant, and necessary relations between the bodily and the mental state, such
that it is impossible to modify the one without modifying the other in a parallel
fashion."[314]
The case of this proteiform individual would seem, then, nicely to corroborate M. P. Janet's [Pg 390]
law that anæsthesias and gaps in memory go together. Coupling Janet's law with Locke's
that changes of memory bring changes of personality, we should have an apparent
explanation of some cases at least of alternate personality. But mere anæsthesia does not
sufﬁciently explain the changes of disposition, which are probably due to modiﬁcations in
the perviousness of motor and associative paths, co-ordinate with those of the sensorial
paths rather than consecutive upon them. And indeed a glance at other cases than M. Janet's
own, sufﬁces to show us that sensibility and memory are not coupled in any invariable way.
[315] M. Janet's law, true of his own cases, does not seem to hold good in all.
Of course it is mere guesswork to speculate on what may be the cause of the amnesias
which lie at the bottom of changes in the Self. Changes of blood-supply have naturally been
invoked. Alternate action of the two hemispheres was long ago proposed by Dr. Wigan in
his book on the Duality of the Mind. I shall revert to this explanation after considering the
third class of alterations of the Self, those, namely, which I have called 'possessions.'
I have myself become quite recently acquainted with the subject of a case of alternate
personality of the 'ambulatory' sort, who has given me permission to name him in these [Pg 391]
pages.[316]
The Rev. Ansel Bourne, of Greene, R. I., was brought up to the trade of a
carpenter; but, in consequence of a sudden temporary loss, of sight and hearing
under very peculiar circumstances, he became converted from Atheism to
Christianity just before his thirtieth year, and has since that time for the most
part lived the life of an itinerant preacher. He has been subject to headaches and
temporary ﬁts of depression of spirits during most of his life, and has had a few
ﬁts of unconsciousness lasting an hour or less. He also has a region of
somewhat diminished cutaneous sensibility on the left thigh. Otherwise his
health is good, and his muscular strength and endurance excellent. He is of a
ﬁrm and self-reliant disposition, a man whose yea is yea and his nay, nay; and
his character for uprightness is such in the community that no person who
knows him will for a moment admit the possibility of his case not being
perfectly genuine.
On January 17, 1887, he drew 551 dollars from a bank in Providence with
which to pay for a certain lot of land in Greene, paid certain bills, and got into a
Pawtucket horse-car. This is the last incident which he remembers. He did not
return home that day, and nothing was heard of him for two months. He was
published in the papers as missing, and foul play being suspected, the police
sought in vain his whereabouts. On the morning of March 14th, however, at
Norristown, Pennsylvania, a man calling himself A. J. Brown, who had rented a
small shop six weeks previously, stocked it with stationery, confectionery, fruit
and small articles, and carried on his quiet trade without seeming to any one
unnatural or eccentric, woke up in a fright and called in the people of the house
to tell him where he was. He said that his name was Ansel Bourne, that he was
entirely ignorant of Norristown, that he knew nothing of shop-keeping, and that
the last thing he remembered—it seemed only yesterday—was drawing the
money from the bank, etc., in Providence. He would not believe that two
months had elapsed. The people of the house thought him insane; and so, at
ﬁrst, did Dr. Louis H. Read, whom they called in to see him. But on
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telegraphing to Providence, conﬁrmatory messages came, and presently his
nephew, Mr. Andrew Harris, arrived upon the scene, made everything straight,
and took him home. He was very weak, having lost apparently over twenty
pounds of ﬂesh during his escapade, and had such a horror of the idea of the
candy-store that he refused to set foot in it again.
The ﬁrst two weeks of the period remained unaccounted for, as he had no
memory, after he had once resumed his normal personality, of any part of the
time, and no one who knew him seems to have seen him after he left home. The
remarkable part of the change is, of course, the peculiar occupation which the
so-called Brown indulged in. Mr. Bourne has never in his life had the slightest
contact with trade. 'Brown' was described by the neighbors as taciturn, orderly
in his habits, and in no way queer. He went to Philadelphia several times;
replenished his stock; cooked for himself in the back shop, where he also slept;
went regularly to church; and once at a prayer-meeting made what was
considered by the hearers a good address, in the course of which he related an
incident which he had witnessed in his natural state of Bourne.

[Pg 392]

This was all that was known of the case up to June 1890, when I induced Mr.
Bourne to submit to hypnotism, so as to see whether, in the hypnotic trance, his
'Brown' memory would not come back. It did so with surprising readiness; so
much so indeed that it proved quite impossible to make him whilst in the
hypnosis remember any of the facts of his normal life. He had heard of Ansel
Bourne, but "didn't know as he had ever met the man." When confronted with
Mrs. Bourne he said that he had "never seen the woman before," etc. On the
other hand, he told of his peregrinations during the lost fortnight,[317] and gave
all sorts of details about the Norristown episode. The whole thing was prosaic
enough; and the Brown-personality seems to be nothing but a rather shrunken,
dejected, and amnesic extract of Mr. Bourne himself. He gives no motive for
the wandering except that there was 'trouble back there' and he 'wanted rest.'
During the trance he looks old, the corners of his mouth are drawn down, his
voice is slow and weak, and he sits screening his eyes and trying vainly to
remember what lay before and after the two months of the Brown experience.
"I'm all hedged in," he says: "I can't get out at either end. I don't know what set
me down in that Pawtucket horse-car, and I don't know how I ever left that
store, or what became of it." His eyes are practically normal, and all his
sensibilities (save for tardier response) about the same in hypnosis as in waking.
I had hoped by suggestion, etc., to run the two personalities into one, and make
the memories continuous, but no artiﬁce would avail to accomplish this, and
Mr. Bourne's skull to-day still covers two distinct personal selves.
The case (whether it contain an epileptic element or not) should apparently be
classed as one of spontaneous hypnotic trance, persisting for two months. The
peculiarity of it is that nothing else like it ever occurred in the man's life, and
that no eccentricity of character came out. In most similar cases, the attacks
recur, and the sensibilities and conduct markedly change.[318]

[Pg 393]

3. In 'mediumships' or 'possessions' the invasion and the passing away of the secondary state
are both relatively abrupt, and the duration of the state is usually short—i.e., from a few
minutes to a few hours. Whenever the secondary state is well developed no memory for
aught that happened during it remains after the primary consciousness comes back. The
subject during the secondary consciousness speaks, writes, or acts as if animated by a
foreign person, and often names this foreign person and gives his history. In old times the
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

224/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

foreign 'control' was usually a demon, and is so now in communities which favor that belief.
With us he gives himself out at the worst for an Indian or other grotesquely speaking but
harmless personage. Usually he purports to be the spirit of a dead person known or unknown
to those present, and the subject is then what we call a 'medium.' Mediumistic possession in
all its grades seems to form a perfectly natural special type of alternate personality, and the
susceptibility to it in some form is by no means an uncommon gift, in persons who have no
other obvious nervous anomaly. The phenomena are very intricate, and are only just
beginning to be studied in a proper scientiﬁc way. The lowest phase of mediumship is
automatic writing, and the lowest grade of that is where the Subject knows what words are
coming, but feels impelled to write them as if from without. Then comes writing
unconsciously, even whilst engaged in reading or talk. Inspirational speaking, playing on
musical instruments, etc., also belong to the relatively lower phases of possession, in which
the normal self is not excluded from conscious participation in the performance, though
their initiative seems to come from elsewhere. In the highest phase the trance is complete,
the voice, language, and everything are changed, and there is no after-memory whatever [Pg 394]
until the next trance comes. One curious thing about trance-utterances is their generic
similarity in different individuals. The 'control' here in America is either a grotesque, slangy,
and ﬂippant personage ('Indian' controls, calling the ladies 'squaws,' the men 'braves,' the
house a 'wigwam,' etc., etc., are excessively common); or, if he ventures on higher
intellectual ﬂights, he abounds in a curiously vague optimistic philosophy-and-water, in
which phrases about spirit, harmony, beauty, law, progression, development, etc., keep
recurring. It seems exactly as if one author composed more than half of the trance-messages,
no matter by whom they are uttered. Whether all sub-conscious selves are peculiarly
susceptible to a certain stratum of the Zeitgeist, and get their inspiration from it, I know not;
but this is obviously the case with the secondary selves which become 'developed' in
spiritualist circles. There the beginnings of the medium trance are indistinguishable from
effects of hypnotic suggestion. The subject assumes the rôle of a medium simply because
opinion expects it of him under the conditions which are present; and carries it out with a
feebleness or a vivacity proportionate to his histrionic gifts. But the odd thing is that persons
unexposed to spiritualist traditions will so often act in the same way when they become
entranced, speak in the name of the departed, go through the motions of their several deathagonies, send messages about their happy home in the summer-land, and describe the
ailments of those present. I have no theory to publish of these cases, several of which I have
personally seen.
As an example of the automatic writing performances I will quote from an account of his
own case kindly furnished me by Mr. Sidney Dean of Warren, R I., member of Congress
from Connecticut from 1855 to 1859, who has been all his life a robust and active journalist,
author, and man of affairs. He has for many years been a writing subject, and has a large
collection of manuscript automatically produced.
"Some of it," he writes us, "is in hieroglyph, or strange compounded arbitrary
characters, each series possessing a seeming unity in general design or
character, followed by what purports to be a translation or rendering into
mother English. I never attempted the seemingly impossible feat of copying the
characters. They were cut with the precision of a graver's tool, and generally
with a single rapid stroke of the pencil. Many languages, some obsolete and
passed from history, are professedly given. To see them would satisfy you that
no one could copy them except by tracing.

[Pg 395]

"These, however, are but a small part of the phenomena. The 'automatic' has
given place to the impressional, and when the work is in progress I am in the
normal condition, and seemingly two minds, intelligences, persons, are
practically engaged. The writing is in my own hand but the dictation not of my
own mind and will, but that of another, upon subjects of which I can have no
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

225/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

knowledge and hardly a theory; and I, myself, consciously criticise the thought,
fact, mode of expressing it, etc., while the hand is recording the subject-matter
and even the words impressed to be written. If I refuse to write the sentence, or
even the word, the impression instantly ceases, and my willingness must be
mentally expressed before the work is resumed, and it is resumed at the point of
cessation, even if it should be in the middle of a sentence. Sentences are
commenced without knowledge of mine as to their subject or ending. In fact, I
have never known in advance the subject of disquisition.
"There is in progress now, at uncertain times, not subject to my will, a series of
twenty-four chapters upon the scientiﬁc features of life, moral, spiritual, eternal.
Seven have already been written in the manner indicated. These were preceded
by twenty-four chapters relating generally to the life beyond material death, its
characteristics, etc. Each chapter is signed by the name of some person who has
lived on earth,—some with whom I have been personally acquainted, others
known in history.... I know nothing of the alleged authorship of any chapter
until it is completed and the name impressed and appended.... I am interested
not only in the reputed authorship,—of which I have nothing corroborative,—
but in the philosophy taught, of which I was in ignorance until these chapters
appeared. From my standpoint of life—which has been that of biblical
orthodoxy—the philosophy is new, seems to be reasonable, and is logically put.
I confess to an inability to successfully controvert it to my own satisfaction.
"It is an intelligent ego who writes, or else the inﬂuence assumes individuality,
which practically makes of the inﬂuence a personality. It is not myself; of that I
am conscious at every step of the process. I have also traversed the whole ﬁeld
of the claims of 'unconscious cerebration,' so called, so far as I am competent to
critically examine it, and it fails, as a theory, in numberless points, when
applied to this strange work through me. It would be far more reasonable and
satisfactory for me to accept the silly hypothesis of re-incarnation,—the old
doctrine of metempsychosis,—as taught by some spiritualists to-day, and to
believe that I lived a former life here, and that once in a while it dominates my
intellectual powers, and writes chapters upon the philosophy of life, or opens a
post-ofﬁce for spirits to drop their effusions, and have them put into English
script. No; the easiest and most natural solution to me is to admit the claim
made, i.e., that it is a decarnated intelligence who writes. But who? that is the
question. The names of scholars and thinkers who once lived are afﬁxed to the
most ungrammatical and weakest of bosh....

[Pg 396]

"It seems reasonable to me—upon the hypothesis that it is a person using
another's mind or brain—that there must be more or less of that other's style or
tone incorporated in the message, and that to the unseen personality, i.e., the
power which impresses, the thought, the fact, or the philosophy, and not the
style or tone, belongs. For instance, while the inﬂuence is impressing my brain
with the greatest force and rapidity, so that my pencil fairly ﬂies over the paper
to record the thoughts, I am conscious that, in many cases, the vehicle of the
thought, i.e., the language, is very natural and familiar to me, as if, somehow,
my personality as a writer was getting mixed up with the message. And, again,
the style, language, everything, is entirely foreign to my own style."
I am myself persuaded by abundant acquaintance with the trances of one medium that the
'control' may be altogether different from any possible waking self of the person. In the case
I have in mind, it professes to be a certain departed French doctor; and is, I am convinced,
acquainted with facts about the circumstances, and the living and dead relatives and
acquaintances, of numberless sitters whom the medium never met before, and of whom she
has never heard the names. I record my bare opinion here unsupported by the evidence, not,
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of course, in order to convert anyone to my view, but because I am persuaded that a serious
study of these trance-phenomena is one of the greatest needs of psychology, and think that
my personal confession may possibly draw a reader or two into a ﬁeld which the soi-disant
'scientist' usually refuses to explore.
Many persons have found evidence conclusive to their minds that in some cases the control
is really the departed spirit whom it pretends to be. The phenomena shade off so gradually
into cases where this is obviously absurd, that the presumption (quite apart from a priori
'scientiﬁc' prejudice) is great against its being true. The case of Lurancy Vennum is perhaps
as extreme a case of 'possession' of the modern sort as one can ﬁnd.[319] Lurancy was a [Pg 397]
young girl of fourteen, living with her parents at Watseka, Ill., who (after various distressing
hysterical disorders and spontaneous trances, during which she was possessed by departed
spirits of a more or less grotesque sort) ﬁnally declared herself to be animated by the spirit
of Mary Roff (a neighbor's daughter, who had died in an insane asylum twelve years before)
and insisted on being sent 'home' to Mr. Roff's house. After a week of 'homesickness' and
importunity on her part, her parents agreed, and the Roffs, who pitied her, and who were
spiritualists into the bargain, took her in. Once there, she seems to have convinced the
family that their dead Mary had exchanged habitations with Lurancy. Lurancy was said to
be temporarily in heaven, and Mary's spirit now controlled her organism, and lived again in
her former earthly home.
"The girl, now in her new home, seemed perfectly happy and content, knowing
every person and everything that Mary knew when in her original body, twelve
to twenty-ﬁve years ago, recognizing and calling by name those who were
friends and neighbors of the family from 1852 to 1865, when Mary died, calling
attention to scores, yes, hundreds of incidents that transpired during her natural
life. During all the period of her sojourn at Mr. Roff's she had no knowledge of,
and did not recognize, any of Mr. Vennum's family, their friends or neighbors,
yet Mr. and Mrs. Vennum and their children visited her and Mr. Roff's people,
she being introduced to them as to any strangers. After frequent visits, and
hearing them often and favorably spoken of, she learned to love them as
acquaintances, and visited them with Mrs. Roff three times. From day to day
she appeared natural, easy, affable, and industrious, attending diligently and
faithfully to her household duties, assisting in the general work of the family as
a faithful, prudent daughter might be supposed to do, singing, reading, or
conversing as opportunity offered, upon all matters of private or general interest
to the family."
The so-called Mary whilst at the Roffs' would sometimes 'go back to heaven,' and leave the
body in a 'quiet trance,' i.e., without the original personality of Lurancy returning. After
eight or nine weeks, however, the memory and manner of Lurancy would sometimes
partially, but not entirely, return for a few minutes. Once Lurancy seems to have taken full [Pg 398]
possession for a short time. At last, after some fourteen weeks, conformably to the prophecy
which 'Mary' had made when she ﬁrst assumed 'control,' she departed deﬁnitively and the
Lurancy-consciousness came back for good. Mr. Roff writes:
"She wanted me to take her home, which I did. She called me Mr. Roff, and
talked with me as a young girl would, not being acquainted. I asked her how
things appeared to her—if they seemed natural. She said it seemed like a dream
to her. She met her parents and brothers in a very affectionate manner, hugging
and kissing each one in tears of gladness. She clasped her arms around her
father's neck a long time, fairly smothering him with kisses. I saw her father
just now (eleven o'clock). He says she has been perfectly natural, and seems
entirely well."
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Lurancy's mother writes, a couple of months later, that she was
"perfectly and entirely well and natural. For two or three weeks after her return
home, she seemed a little strange to what she had been before she was taken
sick last summer, but only, perhaps, the natural change that had taken place
with the girl, and except it seemed to her as though she had been dreaming or
sleeping, etc. Lurancy has been smarter, more intelligent, more industrious,
more womanly, and more polite than before. We give the credit of her complete
cure and restoration to her family, to Dr. E. W. Stevens, and Mr. and Mrs. Roff,
by their obtaining her removal to Mr. Roff's, where her cure was perfected. We
ﬁrmly believe that, had she remained at home, she would have died, or we
would have been obliged to send her to the insane asylum; and if so, that she
would have died there; and further, that I could not have lived but a short time
with the care and trouble devolving on me. Several of the relatives of Lurancy,
including ourselves, now believe she was cured by spirit power, and that Mary
Roff controlled the girl."
Eight years later, Lurancy was reported to be married and a mother, and in good health. She
had apparently outgrown the mediumistic phase of her existence.[320]

On the condition of the sensibility during these invasions, few observations have been made.
I have found the hands of two automatic writers anæsthetic during the act. In two others I [Pg 399]
have found this not to be the case. Automatic writing is usually preceded by shooting pains
along the arm-nerves and irregular contractions of the arm-muscles. I have found one
medium's tongue and lips apparently insensible to pin-pricks during her (speaking) trance.

If we speculate on the brain-condition during all these different perversions of personality,
we see that it must be supposed capable of successively changing all its modes of action,
and abandoning the use for the time being of whole sets of well-organized association-paths.
In no other way can we explain the loss of memory in passing from one alternating
condition to another. And not only this, but we must admit that organized systems of paths
can be thrown out of gear with others, so that the processes in one system give rise to one
consciousness, and those of another system to another simultaneously existing
consciousness. Thus only can we understand the facts of automatic writing, etc., whilst the
patient is out of trance, and the false anæsthesias and amnesias of the hysteric type. But just
what sort of dissociation the phrase 'thrown out of gear' may stand for, we cannot even
conjecture; only I think we ought not to talk of the doubling of the self as if it consisted in
the failure to combine on the part of certain systems of ideas which usually do so. It is better
to talk of objects usually combined, and which are now divided between the two 'selves,' in
the hysteric and automatic cases in question. Each of the selves is due to a system of
cerebral paths acting by itself. If the brain acted normally, and the dissociated systems came
together again, we should get a new affection of consciousness in the form of a third 'Self'
different from the other two, but knowing their objects together, as the result.—After all I
have said in the last chapter, this hardly needs further remark.
Some peculiarities in the lower automatic performances suggest that the systems thrown out
of gear with each other are contained one in the right and the other in the left hemisphere.
The subjects, e.g., often write backwards, or they transpose letters, or they write mirrorscript. All these are symptoms of agraphic disease. The left hand, if left to its natural [Pg 400]
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impulse, will in most people write mirror-script more easily than natural script. Mr. F. W. H.
Myers has laid stress on these analogies.[321] He has also called attention to the usual
inferior moral tone of ordinary planchette writing. On Hughlings Jackson's principles, the
left hemisphere, being the more evolved organ, at ordinary times inhibits the activity of the
right one; but Mr. Myers suggests that during the automatic performances the usual
inhibition may be removed and the right hemisphere set free to act all by itself. This is very
likely to some extent to be the case. But the crude explanation of 'two' selves by 'two'
hemispheres is of course far from Mr. Myers's thought. The selves may be more than two,
and the brain-systems severally used for each must be conceived as interpenetrating each
other in very minute ways.
SUMMARY.
To sum up now this long chapter. The consciousness of Self involves a stream of thought,
each part of which as 'I' can 1) remember those which went before, and know the things they
knew; and 2) emphasize and care paramountly for certain ones among them as 'me,' and
appropriate to these the rest. The nucleus of the 'me' is always the bodily existence felt to be
present at the time. Whatever remembered-past-feelings resemble this present feeling are
deemed to belong to the same me with it. Whatever other things are perceived to be
associated with this feeling are deemed to form part of that me's experience; and of them
certain ones (which ﬂuctuate more or less) are reckoned to be themselves constituents of the
me in a larger sense,—such are the clothes, the material possessions, the friends, the honors
and esteem which the person receives or may receive. This me is an empirical aggregate of
things objectively known. The I which knows them cannot itself be an aggregate, neither for [Pg 401]
psychological purposes need it be considered to be an unchanging metaphysical entity like
the Soul, or a principle like the pure Ego, viewed as 'out of time.' It is a Thought, at each
moment different from that of the last moment, but appropriative of the latter, together with
all that the latter called its own. All the experiential facts ﬁnd their place in this description,
unencumbered with any hypothesis save that of the existence of passing thoughts or states of
mind. The same brain may subserve many conscious selves, either alternate or coexisting;
but by what modiﬁcations in its action, or whether ultra-cerebral conditions may intervene,
are questions which cannot now be answered.
If anyone urge that I assign no reason why the successive passing thoughts should inherit
each other's possessions, or why they and the brain-states should be functions (in the
mathematical sense) of each other, I reply that the reason, if there be any, must lie where all
real reasons lie, in the total sense or meaning of the world. If there be such a meaning, or
any approach to it (as we are bound to trust there is), it alone can make clear to us why such
ﬁnite human streams of thought are called into existence in such functional dependence
upon brains. This is as much as to say that the special natural science of psychology must
stop with the mere functional formula. If the passing thought be the directly veriﬁable
existent which no school has hitherto doubted it to be, then that thought is itself the thinker,
and psychology need not look beyond. The only pathway that I can discover for bringing in
a more transcendental thinker would be to deny that we have any direct knowledge of the
thought as such. The latter's existence would then be reduced to a postulate, an assertion that
there must be a knower correlative to all this known; and the problem who that knower is
would have become a metaphysical problem. With the question once stated in these terms,
the spiritualist and transcendentalist solutions must be considered as prima facie on a par
with our own psychological one, and discussed impartially. But that carries us beyond the
psychological or naturalistic point of view.
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[257]

See, for a charming passage on the Philosophy of Dress, H. Lotze's Microcosmus,
Eng. tr. vol. i, p. 592 ff.

[258]

"Who ﬁlches from me my good name," etc.

[259]

"He who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong motives on men
... seems little skilled in the nature and history of mankind; the greatest part
whereof he shall ﬁnd to govern themselves chieﬂy, if not solely, by this law of
fashion; and so they do that which keeps them in reputation with their company,
little regard the laws of God or the magistrate. The penalties that attend the breach
of God's laws some, nay, most, men seldom seriously reﬂect on; and amongst
those that do, many, whilst they break the laws, entertain thoughts of future
reconciliation, and making their peace for such breaches: and as to the
punishments due from the laws of the commonwealth, they frequently ﬂatter
themselves with the hope of impunity. But no man escapes the punishment of
their censure and dislike who offends against the fashion and opinion of the
company he keeps, and would recommend himself to. Nor is there one in ten
thousand who is stiff and insensible enough to bear up under the constant dislike
and condemnation of his own club. He must be of a strange and unusual
constitution who can content himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute
with his own particular society. Solitude many men have sought and been
reconciled to; but nobody that has the least thought or sense of a man about him
can live in society under the constant dislike and ill opinion of his familiars and
those he converses with. This is a burden too heavy for human sufferance: and he
must be made up of irreconcilable contradictions who can take pleasure in
company and yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his companions."
(Locke's Essay, book ii, ch. xxviii, § 12.)

[260]

For some farther remarks on these feelings of movement see the next chapter.

[261]

Wundt's account of Self-consciousness deserves to be compared with this. What I
have called 'adjustments' he calls processes of 'Apperception.' "In this
development (of consciousness) one particular group of percepts claims a
prominent signiﬁcance, namely, those of which the spring lies in ourselves. The
images of feelings we get from our own body, and the representations of our own
movements distinguish themselves from all others by forming a permanent group.
As there are always some muscles in a state either of tension or of activity it
follows that we never lack a sense, either dim or clear, of the positions or
movements of our body.... This permanent sense, moreover, has this peculiarity,
that we are aware of our power at any moment voluntarily to arouse any one of its
ingredients. We excite the sensations of movement immediately by such impulses
of the will as shall arouse the movements themselves; and we excite the visual
and tactile feelings of our body by the voluntary movement of our organs of
sense. So we come to conceive this permanent mass of feeling as immediately or
remotely subject to our will, and call it the consciousness of ourself. This selfconsciousness is, at the outset, thoroughly sensational,... only gradually the
second-named of its characters, its subjection to our will, attains predominance. In
proportion as the apperception of all our mental objects appears to us as an inward
exercise of will, does our self-consciousness begin both to widen itself and to
narrow itself at the same time. It widens itself in that every mental act whatever
comes to stand in relation to our will; and it narrows itself in that it concentrates
itself more and more upon the inner activity of apperception, over against which
our own body and all the representations connected with it appear as external
objects, different from our proper self. This consciousness, contracted down to the
process of apperception, we call our Ego; and the apperception of mental objects
in general, may thus, after Leibnitz, be designated as the raising of them into our
self-consciousness. Thus the natural development of self-consciousness implicitly
involves the most abstract forms in which this faculty has been described in
philosophy; only philosophy is fond of placing the abstract ego at the outset, and
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so reversing the process of development. Nor should we overlook the fact that the
completely abstract ego [as pure activity], although suggested by the natural
development of our consciousness, is never actually found therein. The most
speculative of philosophers is incapable of disjoining his ego from those bodily
feelings and images which form the incessant background of his awareness of
himself. The notion of his ego as such is, like every notion, derived from
sensibility, for the process of apperception itself comes to our knowledge chieﬂy
through those feelings of tension [what I have above called inward adjustments]
which accompany it." (Physiologische Psychologie, 2te Auﬂ. Bd. ii, pp. 217-19.)
[262]

The only exception I know of is M. J. Souriau, in his important article in the
Revue Philosophique, vol. xxi, p. 449. M. Souriau's conclusion is 'que la
conscience n'existe pas' (p. 472).

[263]

See the excellent remarks by Prof. Bain on the 'Emotion of Power' in his
'Emotions and the Will.'

[264]

Cf. Carlyle: Sartor Resartus, 'The Everlasting Yea.' "I tell thee, blockhead, it all
comes of thy vanity; of what thou fanciest those same deserts of thine to be.
Fancy that thou deservest to be hanged (as is most likely), thou wilt feel it
happiness to be only shot: fancy that thou deservest to be hanged in a hair halter,
it will be a luxury to die in hemp.... What act of legislature was there that thou
shouldst be happy? A little while ago thou hadst no right to be at all." etc., etc.

[265]

T. W. Higginson's translation (1866), p. 105.

[266]

"The usual mode of lessening the shock of disappointment or disesteem is to
contract, if possible, a low estimate of the persons that inﬂict it. This is our
remedy for the unjust censures of party spirit, as well as of personal malignity."
(Bain: Emotion and Will, p. 209.)

[267]

It must be observed that the qualities of the Self thus ideally constituted are all
qualities approved by my actual fellows in the ﬁrst instance; and that my reason
for now appealing from their verdict to that of the ideal judge lies in some
outward peculiarity of the immediate case. What once was admired in me as
courage has now become in the eyes of men 'impertinence'; what was fortitude is
obstinacy; what was ﬁdelity is now fanaticism. The ideal judge alone, I now
believe, can read my qualities, my willingnesses, my powers, for what they truly
are. My fellows, misled by interest and prejudice, have gone astray.

[268]

The kind of selﬁshness varies with the self that is sought. If it be the mere bodily
self; if a man grabs the best food, the warm corner, the vacant seat; if he makes
room for no one, spits about, and belches in our faces,—we call it hoggishness. If
it be the social self, in the form of popularity or inﬂuence, for which he is greedy,
he may in material ways subordinate himself to others as the best means to his
end; and in this case he is very apt to pass for a disinterested man. If it be the
'other-worldly' self which he seeks, and if he seeks it ascetically,—even though he
would rather see all mankind damned eternally than lose his individual soul,
—'saintliness' will probably be the name by which his selﬁshness will be called.

[269]

Lotze, Med. Psych. 498-501; Microcosmos, bk. ii, chap. v, §§ 3, 4.

[270]

Psychologische Analysen auf Physiologischer Grundlage. Theil ii, 2te Hälfte, §
11. The whole section ought to be read.

[271]

Professor Bain, in his chapter on 'Emotions of Self,' does scant justice to the
primitive nature of a large part of our self-feeling, and seems to reduce it to
reﬂective self-estimation of this sober intellectual sort, which certainly most of it
is not. He says that when the attention is turned inward upon self as a Personality,
"we are putting forth towards ourselves the kind of exercise that properly
accompanies our contemplation of other persons. We are accustomed to scrutinize
the actions and conduct of those about us, to set a higher value upon one man than
upon another, by comparing the two; to pity one in distress; to feel complacency
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towards a particular individual; to congratulate a man on some good fortune that
it pleases us to see him gain; to admire greatness or excellence as displayed by
any of our fellows. All these exercises are intrinsically social, like Love and
Resentment; an isolated individual could never attain to them, nor exercise them.
By what means, then, through what ﬁction [!] can we turn round and play them
off upon self? Or how comes it that we obtain any satisfaction by putting self in
the place of the other party? Perhaps the simplest form of the reﬂected act is that
expressed by Self-worth and Self-estimation, based and begun upon observation
of the ways and conduct of our fellow-beings. We soon make comparisons among
the individuals about us; we see that one is stronger and does more work than
another, and, in consequence perhaps, receives more pay. We see one putting forth
perhaps more kindness than another, and in consequence receiving more love. We
see some individuals surpassing the rest in astonishing feats, and drawing after
them the gaze and admiration of a crowd. We acquire a series of ﬁxed associations
towards persons so situated; favorable in the case of the superior, and unfavorable
to the inferior. To the strong and laborious man we attach an estimate of greater
reward, and feel that to be in his place would be a happier lot than falls to others.
Desiring, as we do, from the primary motives of our being, to possess good
things, and observing these to come by a man's superior exertions, we feel a
respect for such exertion and a wish that it might be ours. We know that we also
put forth exertions for our share of good things; and on witnessing others, we are
apt to be reminded of ourselves and to make comparisons with ourselves, which
comparisons derive their interest from the substantial consequences. Having thus
once learned to look at other persons as performing labors, greater or less, and as
realizing fruits to accord; being, moreover, in all respects like our fellows,—we
ﬁnd it an exercise neither difﬁcult nor unmeaning to contemplate self as doing
work and receiving the reward.... As we decide between one man and another,—
which is worthier,... so we decide between self and all other men; being, however,
in this decision under the bias of our own desires." A couple of pages farther on
we read: "By the terms Self-complacency. Self-gratulation, is indicated a positive
enjoyment in dwelling upon our own merits and belongings. As in other modes,
so here, the starting point is the contemplation of excellence or pleasing qualities
in another person, accompanied more or less with fondness or love." Self-pity is
also regarded by Professor Bain, in this place, as an emotion diverted to ourselves
from a more immediate object, "in a manner that we may term ﬁctitious and
unreal. Still, as we can view self in the light of another person, we can feel
towards it the emotion of pity called forth by others in our situation."
This account of Professor Bain's is, it will be observed, a good specimen of the
old-fashioned mode of explaining the several emotions as rapid calculations of
results, and the transfer of feeling from one object to another, associated by
contiguity or similarity with the ﬁrst. Zoological evolutionism, which came up
since Professor Bain ﬁrst wrote, has made us see, on the contrary, that many
emotions must be primitively aroused by special objects. None are more worthy of
being ranked primitive than the self-gratulation and humiliation attendant on our
own successes and failures in the main functions of life. We need no borrowed
reﬂection for these feelings. Professor Bain's account applies to but that small
fraction of our self-feeling which reﬂective criticism can add to, or subtract from,
the total mass.—Lotze has some pages on the modiﬁcations of our self-regard by
universal judgments, in Microcosmus, book v, chap. v, § 5.
[272]

"Also nur dadurch, dass ich ein Mannigfaltiges gegehener Vorstellungen in einem
Bewusstsein verbinden kann, ist es möglich dass ich die Identität des
Bewusstseins in diesen Vorstellungen selbst vorstelle, d. h. die analytische Einheit
der Apperception ist nur unter der Voraussetzung irgend einer synthetischen
möglich." In this passage (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2te Auﬂ. § 16) Kant calls by
the names of analytic and synthetic apperception what we here mean by objective
and subjective synthesis respectively. It were much to be desired that some one
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might invent a good pair of terms in which to record the distinction—those used
in the text are certainly very bad, but Kant's seem to me still worse. 'Categorical
unity' and 'transcendental synthesis' would also be good Kantian, but hardly good
human, speech.
[273]

So that we might say, by a sort of bad pun, "only a connected world can be known
as disconnected." I say bad pun, because the point of view shifts between the
connectedness and the disconnectedness. The disconnectedness is of the realities
known; the connectedness is of the knowledge of them; and reality and
knowledge of it are, from the psychological point of view held fast to in these
pages, two different facts.

[274]

Some subtle reader will object that the Thought cannot call any part of its Object
'I' and knit other parts on to it, without ﬁrst knitting that part on to Itself; and that
it cannot knit it on to Itself without knowing Itself;—so that our supposition
(above, p. 304) that the Thought may conceivably have no immediate knowledge
of Itself is thus overthrown. To which the reply is that we must take care not to be
duped by words. The words I and me signify nothing mysterious and unexampled
—they are at bottom only names of emphasis; and Thought is always
emphasizing something. Within a tract of space which it cognizes, it contrasts a
here with a there; within a tract of time a now with a then; of a pair of things it
calls one this, the other that. I and thou, I and it, are distinctions exactly on a par
with these,—distinctions possible in an exclusively objective ﬁeld of knowledge,
the 'I' meaning for the Thought nothing but the bodily life which it momentarily
feels. The sense of my bodily existence, however obscurely recognized as such,
may then be the absolute original of my conscious selfhood, the fundamental
perception that I am. All appropriations may be made to it, by a Thought not at the
moment immediately cognized by itself. Whether these are not only logical
possibilities but actual facts is something not yet dogmatically decided in the text.

[275]

Metaphysik, § 245 ﬁn. This writer, who in his early work, the Medizinische
Psychologie, was (to my reading) a strong defender of the Soul-Substance theory,
has written in §§ 243-5 of his Metaphysik the most beautiful criticism of this
theory which exists.

[276]

On the empirical and transcendental conceptions of the self's unity, see Lotze,
Metaphysic, § 244.

[277]

Appendix to book i of Hume's Treatise on Human Nature.

[278]

Herbart believed in the Soul, too; but for him the 'Self' of which we are
'conscious' is the empirical Self—not the soul.

[279]

Compare again the remarks on pp. 158-162 above.

[280]

System of Psychology (1884). vol. i, p. 114.

[281]

'Distinct only to observation,' he adds. To whose observation? the outside
psychologist's, the Ego's, their own, or the plank's? Darauf kommt es an!

[282]

Analysis, etc., J. S. Mill's Edition, vol. i, p. 331. The 'as it were' is delightfully
characteristic of the school.

[283]

J. Mill's Analysis, vol. ii, p. 175.

[284]

Examination of Hamilton. 4th ed. p. 263.

[285]

His chapter on the Psychological Theory of Mind is a beautiful case in point, and
his concessions there have become so celebrated that they must be quoted for the
reader's beneﬁt. He ends the chapter with these words (loc. cit. p. 247): "The
theory, therefore, which resolves Mind into a series of feelings, with a background
of possibilities of feeling, can effectually withstand the most invidious of the
arguments directed against it. But groundless as are the extrinsic objections, the
theory has intrinsic difﬁculties which we have not set forth, and which it seems to
me beyond the power of metaphysical analysis to remove....
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"The thread of consciousness which composes the mind's phenomenal life consist
not only of present sensations, but likewise, in part, of memories and
expectations. Now what are these? In themselves, they are present feelings, states
of present consciousness, and in that respect not distinguished from sensations.
They all, moreover, resemble some given sensations or feelings, of which we have
previously had experience. But they are attended with the peculiarity that each of
them involves a belief in more than its own present existence. A sensation
involves only this; but a remembrance of sensation, even if not referred to any
particular date, involves the suggestion and belief that a sensation, of which it is a
copy or representation, actually existed in the past; and an expectation involves
the belief, more or less positive, that a sensation or other feeling to which it
directly refers will exist in the future. Nor can the phenomena involved in these
two states of consciousness be adequately expressed, without saying that the
belief they include is, that I myself formerly had, or that I myself, and no other,
shall hereafter have, the sensations remembered or expected. The fact believed is,
that the sensations did actually form, or will hereafter form, part of the self-same
series of states, or thread of consciousness, of which the remembrance or
expectation of those sensations is the part now present. If, therefore, we speak of
the mind as a series of feelings we are obliged to complete the statement by
calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are
reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, is something
different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the
paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be
aware of itself as a series.
"The truth is, that we are here face to face with that ﬁnal inexplicability, at which,
as Sir W. Hamilton observes, we inevitably arrive when we reach ultimate facts;
and in general, one mode of stating it only appears more incomprehensible than
another, because the whole of human language is accommodated to the one, and is
so incongruous with the other that it cannot be expressed in any terms which do
not deny its truth. The real stumbling-block is perhaps not in any theory of the
fact, but in the fact itself. The true incomprehensibility perhaps is, that something
which has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be, in a manner, present; that
a series of feelings, the inﬁnitely greater part of which is past or future, can be
gathered up, as it were, into a simple present conception, accompanied by a belief
of reality. I think by far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable
fact, without any theory of how it takes place; and when we are obliged to speak
of it in terms which assume a theory, to use them with a reservation as to their
meaning."
In a later place in the same book (p. 561) Mill, speaking of what may rightly be
demanded of a theorist, says: "He is not entitled to frame a theory from one class
of phenomena, extend it to another class which it does not ﬁt, and excuse himself
by saying that if we cannot make it ﬁt, it is because ultimate facts are
inexplicable." The class of phenomena which the associationist school takes to
frame its theory of the Ego are feelings unaware of each other. The class of
phenomena the Ego presents are feelings of which the later ones are intensely
aware of those that went before. The two classes do not 'ﬁt,' and no exercise of
ingenuity can ever make them ﬁt. No shufﬂing of unaware feelings can make
them aware. To get the awareness we must openly beg it by postulating a new
feeling which has it. This new feeling is no 'Theory' of the phenomena, but a
simple statement of them; and as such I postulate in the text the present passing
Thought as a psychic integer, with its knowledge of so much that has gone before.
[286]

Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, 2te Auﬂ. § 17.

[287]

It must be noticed, in justice to what was said above on page 274 ff., that neither
Kant nor his successors anywhere discriminate between the presence of the
apperceiving Ego to the combined object, and the awareness by that Ego of its
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own presence and of its distinctness from what it apperceives. That the Object
must be known to something which thinks, and that it must be known to
something which thinks that it thinks, are treated by them as identical necessities,
—by what logic, does not appear. Kant tries to soften the jump in the reasoning by
saying the thought of itself on the part of the Ego need only be potential—"the 'I
think' must be capable of accompanying all other knowledge"—but a thought
which is only potential is actually no thought at all, which practically gives up the
case.
[288]

"As regards the soul, now, or the 'I,' the 'thinker,' the whole drift of Kant's advance
upon Hume and sensational psychology is towards the demonstration that the
subject of knowledge is an Agent." (G. S. Morris, Kant's Critique, etc. (Chicago,
1882), p. 224.)

[289]

"In Kant's Prolegomena," says H. Cohen,—I do not myself ﬁnd the passage,—"it
is expressly said that the problem is not to show how experience arises (ensteht),
but of what it consists (besteht)." (Kant's Theorie d. Erfahrung (1871), p. 138.)

[290]

The contrast between the Monism thus reached and our own psychological point
of view can be exhibited schematically thus, the terms in squares standing for
what, for us, are the ultimate irreducible data of psychological science, and the
vincula above it symbolizing the reductions which post-Kantian idealism
performs:

These reductions account for the ubiquitousness of the 'psychologist's fallacy (bk.
ii, ch. i, p. 32) in the modern monistic writings. For us it is an unpardonable
logical sin, when talking of a thought's knowledge (either of an object or of itself),
to change the terms without warning, and, substituting the psychologist's
knowledge therefor, still make as if we were continuing to talk of the same thing.
For monistic idealism, this is the very enfranchisement of philosophy, and of
course cannot be too much indulged in.
[291]

T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, §§ 57, 61, 64.

[292]

Loc. cit. § 64.

[293]

E. Caird: Hegel (1883), p. 149.

[294]

One is almost tempted to believe that the pantomime-state of mind and that of the
Hegelian dialectics are, emotionally considered, one and the same thing. In the
pantomime all common things are represented to happen in impossible ways,
people jump down each other's throats, houses turn inside out, old women become
young men, everything 'passes into its opposite' with inconceivable celerity and
skill; and this, so far from producing perplexity, brings rapture to the beholder's
mind. And so in the Hegelian logic, relations elsewhere recognized under the
insipid name of distinctions (such as that between knower and object, many and
one) must ﬁrst be translated into impossibilities and contradictions, then
'transcended' and identiﬁed by miracle, ere the proper temper is induced for
thoroughly enjoying the spectacle they show.

[295]

The reader will please understand that I am quite willing to leave the hypothesis
of the transcendental Ego as a substitute for the passing Thought open to
discussion on general speculative grounds. Only in this book I prefer to stick by
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the common sense assumption that we have successive conscious states, because
all psychologists make it, and because one does not see how there can be a
Psychology written which does not postulate such thoughts as its ultimate data.
The data of all natural sciences become in turn subjects of a critical treatment
more reﬁned than that which the sciences themselves accord; and so it may fare in
the end with our passing Thought. We have ourselves seen (pp. 299-305) that the
sensible certainty of its existence is less strong than is usually assumed. My
quarrel with the transcendental Egoists is mainly about their grounds for their
belief. Did they consistently propose it as a substitute for the passing Thought, did
they consistently deny the latter's existence, I should respect their position more.
But so far as I can understand them, they habitually believe in the passing
Thought also. They seem even to believe in the Lockian stream of separate ideas,
for the chief glory of the Ego in their pages is always its power to 'overcome' this
separateness and unite the naturally disunited, 'synthetizing,' 'connecting,' or
'relating' the ideas together being used as synonyms, by transcendentalist writers,
for knowing various objects at once. Not the being conscious at all, but the being
conscious of many things together is held to be the difﬁcult thing, in our psychic
life, which only the wonder-working Ego can perform. But on what slippery
ground does one get the moment one changes the deﬁnite notion of knowing an
object into the altogether vague one of uniting or synthetizing the ideas of its
various parts!—In the chapter on Sensation we shall come upon all this again.
[296]

"When we compare the listless inactivity of the infant, slumbering from the
moment at which he takes his milky food to the moment at which he wakes to
require it again, with the restless energies of that mighty being which he is to
become in his maturer years, pouring truth after truth, in rapid and dazzling
profusion, upon the world, or grasping in his single hand the destiny of empires,
how few are the circumstances of resemblance which we can trace, of all that
intelligence which is afterwards to be displayed; how little more is seen than what
serves to give feeble motion to the mere machinery of life!... Every age, if we
may speak of many ages in the few years of human life, seems to be marked with
a distinct character. Each has its peculiar objects which excite lively affections;
and in each, exertion is excited by affections, which in other periods terminate
without inducing active desire. The boy ﬁnds a world in less space than that
which bounds his visible horizon; he wanders over his range of ﬁeld and exhausts
his strength in the pursuit of objects which, in the years that follow, are seen only
to be neglected; while to him the objects that are afterwards to absorb his whole
soul are as indifferent as the objects of his present passions are destined then to
appear.... How many opportunities must every one have had of witnessing the
progress of intellectual decay, and the coldness that steals upon the once
benevolent heart! We quit our country, perhaps at an early period of life, and after
an absence of many years we return with all the remembrances of past pleasure
which grow more tender as they approach their objects. We eagerly seek him to
whose paternal voice we have been accustomed to listen with the same reverence
as if its predictions had possessed oracular certainty,—who ﬁrst led us into
knowledge, and whose image has been constantly joined in our mind with all that
veneration which does not forbid love. We ﬁnd him sunk, perhaps, in the
imbecility of idiotism, unable to recognize us,—ignorant alike of the past and of
the future, and living only in the sensibility of animal gratiﬁcation. We seek the
favorite companion of our childhood, whose tenderness of heart, etc.... We ﬁnd
him hardened into a man, meeting us scarcely with the cold hypocrisy of
dissembled friendship—in his general relations to the world careless of the misery
he is not to feel.... When we observe all this,... do we use only a metaphor of little
meaning when we say of him that he is become a different person, and that his
mind and character are changed? In what does the identity consist?... The
supposed test of identity, when applied to the mind in these cases, completely
fails. It neither affects, nor is affected, in the same manner in the same
circumstances. It therefore, if the test be a just one, is not the same identical
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mind." (T. Brown: Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 'on Mental
Identity.')
[297]

"Sir John Cutler had a pair of black worsted stockings, which his maid darned so
often with silk that they became at last a pair of silk stockings. Now, supposing
these stockings of Sir John's endued with some degree of consciousness at every
particular darning, they would have been sensible that they were the same
individual pair of stockings both before and after the darning; and this sensation
would have continued in them through all the succession of darnings; and yet
after the last of all, there was not perhaps one thread left of the ﬁrst pair of
stockings: but they were grown to be silk stockings, as was said before." (Pope's
Martinus Scriblerus, quoted by Brown, ibid.)

[298]

Hours of Work and Play, p. 100.

[299]

For a careful study of the errors in narratives, see E. Gurney: Phantasms of the
Living, vol. i, pp. 126-158. In the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical
Research for May 1887 Mr. Richard Hodgson shows by an extraordinary array of
instances how utterly inaccurate everyone's description from memory of a rapid
series of events is certain to be.

[300]

See Josiah Royce (Mind, vol. 13, p. 244, and Proceedings of Am. Soc. of Psych.
Research, vol. i, p. 366), for evidence that a certain sort of hallucination of
memory which he calls 'pseudo-presentiment' is no uncommon phenomenon.

[301]

Maladies de la Mémoire, p. 85. The little that would be left of personal
consciousness if all our senses stopped their work is ingenuously shown in the
remark of the extraordinary anæsthetic youth whose case Professor Strümpell
reports (in the Deutsches Archiv f. klin. Med., xxii, 847, 1878). This boy, whom
we shall later ﬁnd instructive in many connections, was totally anæsthetic without
and (so far as could be tested) within, save for the sight of one eye and the hearing
of one ear. When his eye was closed, he said: "Wenn ich nicht sehen kann, da BIN
ich gar nicht—I no longer am."

[302]

"One can compare the state of the patient to nothing so well as to that of a
caterpillar, which, keeping all its caterpillar's ideas and remembrances, should
suddenly become a butterﬂy with a butterﬂy's senses and sensations. Between the
old and the new state, between the ﬁrst self, that of the caterpillar, and the second
self, that of the butterﬂy, there is a deep scission, a complete rupture. The new
feelings ﬁnd no anterior series to which they can knit themselves on; the patient
can neither interpret nor use them; he does not recognize them; they are unknown.
Hence two conclusions, the ﬁrst which consists in his saying, I no longer am; the
second, somewhat later, which consists in his saying, I am another person." (H.
Taine: de l'Intelligence, 3me édition (1878), p. 462).

[303]

W. Griesinger: Mental Diseases, § 29.

[304]

See the interesting case of 'old Stump' in the Proceedings of the Am. Soc. for
Psych. Research, p. 552.

[305]

De l'Intelligence, 3me édition (1878), vol. ii, note, p. 461. Krishaber's book (La
Névropathie Cérébro-cardiaque, 1873) is full of similar observations.

[306]

Sudden alterations in outward fortune often produce such a change in the
empirical me as almost to amount to a pathological disturbance of selfconsciousness. When a poor man draws the big prize in a lottery, or unexpectedly
inherits an estate; when a man high in fame is publicly disgraced, a millionaire
becomes a pauper, or a loving husband and father sees his family perish at one fell
swoop, there is temporarily such a rupture between all past habits, whether of an
active or a passive kind, and the exigencies and possibilities of the new situation,
that the individual may ﬁnd no medium of continuity or association to carry him
over from the one phase to the other of his life. Under these conditions mental
derangement is no unfrequent result.
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[307]

The number of subjects who can do this with any fertility and exuberance is
relatively quite small.

[308]

First in the Revue Scientiﬁque for May 26, 1876, then in his book, Hypnotisme,
Double Conscience, et Altérations de la Personnalité (Paris, 1887).

[309]

Der Hypnotismus (1884), pp. 109-15.

[310]

Transactions of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia, April 4, 1888. Also,
less complete, in Harper's Magazine, May 1860.

[311]

Cf. Ribot's Diseases of Memory for cases. See also a large number of them in
Forbes Winslow's Obscure Diseases of the Brain and Mind, chapters xiii-xvii.

[312]

See the interesting account by M. J. Janet in the Revue Scientiﬁque, May 19,
1888.

[313]

Variations de la Personnalité (Paris, 1888).

[314]

Op. cit. p. 84. In this work and in Dr. Azam's (cited on a previous page), as well
as in Prof. Th. Ribot's Maladies de la Personnalité (1885), the reader will ﬁnd
information and references relative to the other known cases of the kind.

[315]

His own brother's subject Wit...., although in her anæsthetic waking state she
recollected nothing of either of her trances, yet remembered her deeper trance (in
which her sensibilities became perfect—see above, p. 207) when she was in her
lighter trance. Nevertheless in the latter she was as anæsthetic as when awake.
(Loc. cit. p. 619.)—It does not appear that there was any important difference in
the sensibility of Félida X. between her two states—as far as one can judge from
M. Azam's account she was to some degree anæsthetic in both (op. cit. pp. 71,
96).—In the case of double personality reported by M. Dufay (Revue
Scientiﬁque, vol. xviii, p. 69), the memory seems to have been best in the more
anæsthetic condition.—Hypnotic subjects made blind do not necessarily lose their
visual ideas. It appears, then, both that amnesias may occur without anæsthesias,
and anæsthesias without amnesias, though they may also occur in combination.
Hypnotic subjects made blind by suggestion will tell you that they clearly imagine
the things which they can no longer see.

[316]

A full account of the case, by Mr. R. Hodgson, will be found in the Proceedings
of the Society for Psychical Research for 1891.

[317]

He had spent an afternoon in Boston, a night in New York, an afternoon in
Newark, and ten days or more in Philadelphia, ﬁrst in a certain hotel and next in a
certain boarding-house, making no acquaintances, 'resting,' reading, and 'looking
round.' I have unfortunately been unable to get independent corroboration of these
details, as the hotel registers are destroyed, and the boarding-house named by him
has been pulled down. He forgets the name of the two ladies who kept it.

[318]

The details of the case, it will be seen, are all compatible with simulation. I can
only say of that, that no one who has examined Mr. Bourne (including Dr. Read,
Dr. Weir Mitchell, Dr. Guy Hinsdale, and Mr. R. Hodgson) practically doubts his
ingrained honesty, nor, so far as I can discover, do any of his personal
acquaintances indulge in a sceptical view.

[319]

The Watseka Wonder, by E. W. Stevens. Chicago, Religio-Philosophical
Publishing House, 1887.

[320]

My friend Mr. R. Hodgson informs me that he visited Watseka in April 1890, and
cross-examined the principal witnesses of this case. His conﬁdence in the original
narrative was strengthened by what he learned; and various unpublished facts
were ascertained, which increased the plausibility of the spiritualistic
interpretation of the phenomenon.

[321]

See his highly important series of articles on Automatic Writing, etc., in the
Proceedings of the Soc. for Psych. Research, especially Article ii (May 1885).
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Compare also Dr. Maudsley's instructive article in Mind, vol. xiv, p. 161, and
Luys's essay, 'Sur le Dédoublement,' etc., in l'Encéphale for 1889.

CHAPTER XI.

[Pg 402]

ATTENTION.
Strange to say, so patent a fact as the perpetual presence of selective attention has received
hardly any notice from psychologists of the English empiricist school. The Germans have
explicitly treated of it, either as a faculty or as a resultant, but in the pages of such writers as
Locke, Hume, Hartley, the Mills, and Spencer the word hardly occurs, or if it does so, it is
parenthetically and as if by inadvertence.[322] The motive of this ignoring of the
phenomenon of attention is obvious enough. These writers are bent on showing how the
higher faculties of the mind are pure products of 'experience;' and experience is supposed to
be of something simply given. Attention, implying a degree of reactive spontaneity, would
seem to break through the circle of pure receptivity which constitutes 'experience,' and
hence must not be spoken of under penalty of interfering with the smoothness of the tale.
But the moment one thinks of the matter, one sees how false a notion of experience that is
which would make it tantamount to the mere presence to the senses of an outward order.
Millions of items of the outward order are present to my senses which never properly enter
into my experience. Why? Because they have no interest for me. My experience is what I
agree to attend to. Only those items which I notice shape my mind—without selective
interest, experience is an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light and
shade, background and foreground—intelligible perspective, in a word. It varies in every [Pg 403]
creature, but without it the consciousness of every creature would be a gray chaotic
indiscriminateness, impossible for us even to conceive. Such an empiricist writer as Mr.
Spencer, for example, regards the creature as absolutely passive clay, upon which
'experience' rains down. The clay will be impressed most deeply where the drops fall
thickest, and so the ﬁnal shape of the mind is moulded. Give time enough, and all sentient
things ought, at this rate, to end by assuming an identical mental constitution—for
'experience,' the sole shaper, is a constant fact, and the order of its items must end by being
exactly reﬂected by the passive mirror which we call the sentient organism. If such an
account were true, a race of dogs bred for generations, say in the Vatican, with characters of
visual shape, sculptured in marble, presented to their eyes, in every variety of form and
combination, ought to discriminate before long the ﬁnest shades of these peculiar characters.
In a word, they ought to become, if time were given, accomplished connoisseurs of
sculpture. Anyone may judge of the probability of this consummation. Surely an eternity of
experience of the statues would leave the dog as inartistic as he was at ﬁrst, for the lack of
an original interest to knit his discriminations on to. Meanwhile the odors at the bases of the
pedestals would have organized themselves in the consciousness of this breed of dogs into a
system of 'correspondences' to which the most hereditary caste of custodi would never
approximate, merely because to them, as human beings, the dog's interest in those smells
would for ever be an inscrutable mystery. These writers have, then, utterly ignored the
glaring fact that subjective interest may, by laying its weighty index-ﬁnger on particular
items of experience, so accent them as to give to the least frequent associations far more
power to shape our thought than the most frequent ones possess. The interest itself, though
its genesis is doubtless perfectly natural, makes experience more than it is made by it.
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Every one knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid
form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. [Pg 404]
Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from
some things in order to deal effectively with others, and is a condition which has a real
opposite in the confused, dazed, scatter-brained state which in French is called distraction,
and Zerstreutheit in German.
We all know this latter state, even in its extreme degree. Most people probably fall several
times a day into a ﬁt of something like this: The eyes are ﬁxed on vacancy, the sounds of the
world melt into confused unity, the attention is dispersed so that the whole body is felt, as it
were, at once, and the foreground of consciousness is ﬁlled, if by anything, by a sort of
solemn sense of surrender to the empty passing of time. In the dim background of our mind
we know meanwhile what we ought to be doing: getting up, dressing ourselves, answering
the person who has spoken to us, trying to make the next step in our reasoning. But
somehow we cannot start; the pensée de derrière la tête fails to pierce the shell of lethargy
that wraps our state about. Every moment we expect the spell to break, for we know no
reason why it should continue. But it does continue, pulse after pulse, and we ﬂoat with it,
until—also without reason that we can discover—an energy is given, something—we know
not what—enables us to gather ourselves together, we wink our eyes, we shake our heads,
the background-ideas become effective, and the wheels of life go round again.
This curious state of inhibition can for a few moments be produced at will by ﬁxing the eyes
on vacancy. Some persons can voluntarily empty their minds and 'think of nothing.' With
many, as Professor Exner remarks of himself, this is the most efﬁcacious means of falling
asleep. It is difﬁcult not to suppose something like this scattered condition of mind to be the
usual state of brutes when not actively engaged in some pursuit. Fatigue, monotonous
mechanical occupations that end by being automatically carried on, tend to produce it in
men. It is not sleep; and yet when aroused from such a state, a person will often hardly be
able to say what he has been thinking about Subjects of the hypnotic trance seem to lapse
into it when left to themselves; asked what they are thinking of, they reply, 'of nothing [Pg 405]
particular'![323]
The abolition of this condition is what we call the awakening of the attention. One principal
object comes then into the focus of consciousness, others are temporarily suppressed. The
awakening may come about either by reason of a stimulus from without, or in consequence
of some unknown inner alteration; and the change it brings with it amounts to a
concentration upon one single object with exclusion of aught besides, or to a condition
anywhere between this and the completely dispersed state.
TO HOW MANY THINGS CAN WE ATTEND AT ONCE?
The question of the 'span' of consciousness has often been asked and answered—sometimes
a priori, sometimes by experiment. This seems the proper place for us to touch upon it; and
our answer, according to the principles laid down in Chapter IX, will not be difﬁcult. The
number of things we may attend to is altogether indeﬁnite, depending on the power of the
individual intellect, on the form of the apprehension, and on what the things are. When
apprehended conceptually as a connected system, their number may be very large. But
however numerous the things, they can only be known in a single pulse of consciousness for
which they form one complex 'object' (p. 276 ff.), so that properly speaking there is before
the mind at no time a plurality of ideas, properly so called.
The 'unity of the soul' has been supposed by many philosophers, who also believed in the [Pg 406]
distinct atomic nature of 'ideas,' to preclude the presence to it of more than one objective
fact, manifested in one idea, at a time. Even Dugald Stuart opines that every minimum
visibile of a pictured ﬁgure
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"constitutes just as distinct an object of attention to the mind as if it were
separated by an interval of empty space from the rest.... It is impossible for the
mind to attend to more than one of these points at once; and as the perception of
the ﬁgure implies a knowledge of the relative situation of the different points
with respect to each other, we must conclude that the perception of ﬁgure by the
eye is the result of a number of different acts of attention. These acts of
attention, however, are performed with such rapidity, that the effect, with
respect to us, is the same as if the perception were instantaneous."[324]
Such glaringly artiﬁcial views can only come from fantastic metaphysics or from the
ambiguity of the word 'idea,' which, standing sometimes for mental state and sometimes for
thing known, leads men to ascribe to the thing, not only the unity which belongs to the
mental state, but even the simplicity which is thought to reside in the Soul.
When the things are apprehended by the senses, the number of them that can be attended to
at once is small, "Pluribus intentus, minor est ad singula sensus."
"By Charles Bonnet the Mind is allowed to have a distinct notion of six objects
at once; by Abraham Tucker the number is limited to four; while Destutt Tracy
again ampliﬁes it to six. The opinion of the ﬁrst and last of these philosophers"
[continues Sir Wm. Hamilton] "seems to me correct. You can easily make the
experiments for yourselves, but you must beware of grouping the objects into
classes. If you throw a handful of marbles on the ﬂoor, you will ﬁnd it difﬁcult
to view at once more than six, or seven at most, without confusion; but if you
group them into twos, or threes, or ﬁves, you can comprehend as many groups
as you can units; because the mind considers these groups only as units—it
views them as wholes, and throws their parts out of consideration."[325]
Professor Jevons, repeating this observation, by counting instantaneously beans thrown into
a box, found that the number 6 was guessed correctly 120 times out of 147, 5 correctly 102
times out of 107, and 4 and 3 always right.[326] It is obvious that such observations decide [Pg 407]
nothing at all about our attention, properly so called. They rather measure in part the
distinctness of our vision—especially of the primary-memory-image[327]—in part the
amount of association in the individual between seen arrangements and the names of
numbers.[328]
Each number-name is a way of grasping the beans as one total object. In such a total object,
all the parts converge harmoniously to the one resultant concept; no single bean has special
discrepant associations of its own; and so, with practice, they may grow quite numerous ere
we fail to estimate them aright. But where the 'object' before us breaks into parts [Pg 408]
disconnected with each other, and forming each as it were a separate object or system, not
conceivable in union with the rest, it becomes harder to apprehend all these parts at once,
and the mind tends to let go of one whilst it attends to another. Still, within limits this can be
done. M. Paulhan has experimented carefully on the matter by declaiming one poem aloud
whilst he repeated a different one mentally, or by writing one sentence whilst speaking
another, or by performing calculations on paper whilst reciting poetry.[329] He found that
"the most favorable condition for the doubling of the mind was its simultaneous
application to two easy and heterogeneous operations. Two operations of the
same sort, two multiplications, two recitations, or the reciting one poem and
writing another, render the process more uncertain and difﬁcult."
The attention often, but not always, oscillates during these performances; and sometimes a
word from one part of the task slips into another. I myself ﬁnd when I try to simultaneously
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recite one thing and write another that the beginning of each word or segment of a phrase is
what requires the attention. Once started, my pen runs on for a word or two as if by its own
momentum. M. Paulhan compared the time occupied by the same two operations done
simultaneously or in succession, and found that there was often a considerable gain of time
from doing them simultaneously. For instance:
"I write the ﬁrst four verses of Athalie, whilst reciting eleven of Musset. The
whole performance occupies 40 seconds. But reciting alone takes 22 and
writing alone 31, or 53 altogether, so that there is a difference in favor of the
simultaneous operations."
Or again:
"I multiply 421 312 212 by 2; the operation takes 6 seconds; the recitation of 4
verses also takes 6 seconds. But the two operations done at once only take 6
seconds, so that there is no loss of time from combining them."
Of course these time-measurements lack precision. With three systems of object (writing
with each hand whilst reciting) the operation became much more difﬁcult.
If, then, by the original question, how many ideas or things can we attend to at once, be [Pg 409]
meant how many entirely disconnected systems or processes of conception can go on
simultaneously, the answer is, not easily more than one, unless the processes are very
habitual; but then two, or even three, without very much oscillation of the attention. Where,
however, the processes are less automatic, as in the story of Julius Cæsar dictating four
letters whilst he writes a ﬁfth,[330] there must be a rapid oscillation of the mind from one to
the next, and no consequent gain of time. Within any one of the systems the parts may be
numberless, but we attend to them collectively when we conceive the whole which they
form.

When the things to be attended to are small sensations, and when the effort is to be exact in
noting them, it is found that attention to one interferes a good deal with the perception of the
other. A good deal of ﬁne work has been done in this ﬁeld, of which I must give some
account.
It has long been noticed, when expectant attention is concentrated upon one of two
sensations, that the other one is apt to be displaced from consciousness for a moment and to
appear subsequent; although in reality the two may have been contemporaneous events.
Thus, to use the stock example of the books, the surgeon would sometimes see the blood
ﬂow from the arm of the patient whom he was bleeding, before he saw the instrument
penetrate the skin. Similarly the smith may see the sparks ﬂy before he sees the hammer
smite the iron, etc. There is thus a certain difﬁculty in perceiving the exact date of two
impressions when they do not interest our attention equally, and when they are of a disparate
sort.
Professor Exner, whose experiments on the minimal perceptible succession in time of two
sensations we shall have to quote in another chapter, makes some noteworthy remarks about
the way in which the attention must be set to catch the interval and the right order of the
sensations, when the time is exceeding small. The point was to tell whether two signals were [Pg 410]
simultaneous or successive; and, if successive, which one of them came ﬁrst.
The ﬁrst way of attending which he found himself to fall into, was when the signals did not
differ greatly—when, e.g., they were similar sounds heard each by a different ear. Here he
lay in wait for the ﬁrst signal, whichever it might be, and identiﬁed it the next moment in
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

242/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

memory. The second, which could then always be known by default, was often not clearly
distinguished in itself. When the time was too short, the ﬁrst could not be isolated from the
second at all.
The second way was to accommodate the attention for a certain sort of signal, and the next
moment to become aware in memory of whether it came before or after its mate.
"This way brings great uncertainty with it. The impression not prepared for
comes to us in the memory more weak than the other, obscure as it were, badly
ﬁxed in time. We tend to take the subjectively stronger stimulus, that which we
were intent upon, for the ﬁrst, just as we are apt to take an objectively stronger
stimulus to be the ﬁrst. Still, it may happen otherwise. In the experiments from
touch to sight it often seemed to me as if the impression for which the attention
was not prepared were there already when the other came."
Exner found himself employing this method oftenest when the impressions differed
strongly.[331]
In such observations (which must not be confounded with those where the two signals were
identical and their successiveness known as mere doubleness, without distinction of which
came ﬁrst), it is obvious that each signal must combine stably in our perception with a
different instant of time. It is the simplest possible case of two discrepant concepts
simultaneously occupying the mind. Now the case of the signals being simultaneous seems
of a different sort. We must turn to Wundt for observations ﬁt to cast a nearer light thereon.
The reader will remember the reaction-time experiments of which we treated in Chapter III.
It happened occasionally in Wundt's experiments that the reaction-time was reduced to zero
or even assumed a negative value, which, being translated into common speech, means that
the observer was sometimes so intent upon the signal that his reaction actually coincided in [Pg 411]
time with it, or even preceded it, instead of coming a fraction of a second after it, as in the
nature of things it should. More will be said of these results anon. Meanwhile Wundt, in
explaining them, says this:
"In general we have a very exact feeling of the simultaneity of two stimuli, if
they do not differ much in strength. And in a series of experiments in which a
warning precedes, at a ﬁxed interval, the stimulus, we involuntarily try to react,
not only as promptly as possible, but also in such wise that our movement may
coincide with the stimulus itself. We seek to make our own feelings of touch
and innervation [muscular contraction] objectively contemporaneous with the
signal which we hear; and experience shows that in many cases we
approximately succeed. In these cases we have a distinct consciousness of
hearing the signal, reacting upon it, and feeling our reaction take place,—all at
one and the same moment."[332]
In another place, Wundt adds:
"The difﬁculty of these observations and the comparative infrequency with
which the reaction-time can be made thus to disappear shows how hard it is,
when our attention is intense, to keep it ﬁxed even on two different ideas at
once. Note besides that when this happens, one always tries to bring the ideas
into a certain connection, to grasp them as components of a certain complex
representation. Thus in the experiments in question, it has often seemed to me
that I produced by my own recording movement the sound which the ball made
in dropping on the board."[333]
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The 'difﬁculty,' in the cases of which Wundt speaks, is that of forcing two non-simultaneous
events into apparent combination with the same instant of time. There is no difﬁculty, as he
admits, in so dividing our attention between two really simultaneous impressions as to feel
them to be such. The cases he describes are really cases of anachronistic perception, of
subjective time-displacement, to use his own term. Still more curious cases of it have been
most carefully studied by him. They carry us a step farther in our research, so I will quote
them, using as far as possible his exact words:
"The conditions become more complicated when we receive a series of
impressions separated by distinct intervals, into the midst of which a
heterogeneous impression is suddenly brought. Then comes the question, with
which member of the series do we perceive the additional impression to
coincide? with that member with whose presence it really coexists, or is there
some aberration?... If the additional stimulus belongs to a different sense very
considerable aberrations may occur.
"The best way to experiment is with a number of visual impressions (which one
can easily get from a moving object) for the series, and with a sound as the
disparate impression. Let, e.g., an index-hand move over a circular scale with
uniform and sufﬁciently slow velocity, so that the impressions it gives will not
fuse, but permit its position at any instant to be distinctly seen. Let the
clockwork which turns it have an arrangement which rings a bell once in every
revolution, but at a point which can be varied, so that the observer need never
know in advance just when the bell-stroke takes place. In such observations
three cases are possible. The bell-stroke can be perceived either exactly at the
moment to which the index points when it sounds—in this case there will be no
time-displacement; or we can combine it with a later position of the index—...
positive time-displacement, as we shall call it; or ﬁnally we can combine it with
a position of the index earlier than that at which the sound occurred—and this
we will call a negative displacement. The most natural displacement would
apparently be the positive, since for apperception a certain time is always
required.... But experience shows that the opposite is the case: it happens most
frequently that the sound appears earlier than its real date—far less often
coincident with it, or later. It should be observed that in all these experiments it
takes some time to get a distinctly perceived combination of the sound with a
particular position of the index, and that a single revolution of the latter is never
enough for the purpose. The motion must go on long enough for the sounds
themselves to form a regular series—the outcome being a simultaneous
perception of two distinct series of events, of which either may by changes in
its rapidity modify the result. The ﬁrst thing one remarks is that the sound
belongs in a certain region of the scale; only gradually is it perceived to
combine with a particular position of the index. But even a result gained by
observation of many revolutions may be deﬁcient in certainty, for accidental
combinations of attention have a great inﬂuence upon it. If we deliberately try
to combine the bell-stroke with an arbitrarily chosen position of the index, we
succeed without difﬁculty, provided this position be not too remote from the
true one. If, again, we cover the whole scale, except a single division over
which we may see the index pass, we have a strong tendency to combine the
bell-stroke with this actually seen position; and in so doing may easily overlook
more than 1/4 of a second of time. Results, therefore, to be of any value, must
be drawn from long-continued and very numerous observations, in which such
irregular oscillations of the attention neutralize each other according to the law
of great numbers, and allow the true laws to appear. Although my own
experiments extend over many years (with interruptions), they are not even yet
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numerous enough to exhaust the subject—still, they bring out the principal laws
which the attention follows under such conditions."[334]
Wundt accordingly distinguishes the direction from the amount of the apparent
displacement in time of the bell-stroke. The direction depends on the rapidity of the
movement of the index and (consequently) on that of the succession of the bell-strokes. The
moment at which the bell struck was estimated by him with the least tendency to error, when
the revolutions took place once in a second. Faster than this, positive errors began to prevail;
slower, negative ones almost always were present. On the other hand, if the rapidity went
quickening, errors became negative; if slowing, positive. The amount of error is, in general,
the greater the slower the speed and its alterations. Finally, individual differences prevail, as
well as differences in the same individual at different times.[335]
Wundt's pupil von Tschisch has carried out these experiments on a still more elaborate scale, [Pg 414]
[336] using, not only the single bell-stroke, but 2, 3, 4, or 5 simultaneous impressions, so that
the attention had to note the place of the index at the moment when a whole group of things
was happening. The single bell-stroke was always heard too early by von Tschisch—the
displacement was invariably 'negative.' As the other simultaneous impressions were added,
the displacement ﬁrst became zero and ﬁnally positive, i.e. the impressions were connected
with a position of the index that was too late. This retardation was greater when the
simultaneous impressions were disparate (electric tactile stimuli on different places, simple
touch-stimuli, different sounds) than when they were all of the same sort. The increment of
retardation became relatively less with each additional impression, so that it is probable that
six impressions would have given almost the same result as ﬁve, which was the maximum
number used by Herr von T.
Wundt explains all these results by his previous observation that a reaction sometimes
antedates the signal (see above, p. 411). The mind, he supposes, is so intent upon the bellstrokes that its 'apperception' keeps ripening periodically after each stroke in anticipation of
the next. Its most natural rate of ripening may be faster or slower than the rate at which the
strokes come. If faster, then it hears the stroke too early; if slower, it hears it too late. The
position of the index on the scale, meanwhile, is noted at the moment, early or late, at which
the bell-stroke is subjectively heard. Substituting several impressions for the single bell- [Pg 415]
stroke makes the ripening of the perception slower, and the index is seen too late. So, at
least, do I understand the explanations which Herren Wundt and v. Tschisch give.[337]
This is all I have to say about the difﬁculty of having two discrepant concepts together, and [Pg 416]
about the number of things to which we can simultaneously attend.
THE VARIETIES OF ATTENTION.
The things to which we attend are said to interest us. Our interest in them is supposed to be
the cause of our attending. What makes an object interesting we shall see presently; and
later inquire in what sense interest may cause attention. Meanwhile
Attention may be divided into kinds in various ways. It is either to
a) Objects of sense (sensorial attention); or to
b) Ideal or represented objects (intellectual attention). It is either
c) Immediate; or
d) Derived: immediate, when the topic or stimulus is interesting in itself, without relation to
anything else; derived, when it owes its interest to association with some other immediately
interesting thing. What I call derived attention has been named 'apperceptive' attention.
Furthermore, Attention may be either
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e) Passive, reﬂex, non-voluntary, effortless; or
f) Active and voluntary.
Voluntary attention is always derived; we never make an effort to attend to an object except
for the sake of some remote interest which the effort will serve. But both sensorial and
intellectual attention may be either passive or voluntary.
In passive immediate sensorial attention the stimulus is a sense-impression, either very
intense, voluminous, or sudden,—in which case it makes no difference what its nature may [Pg 417]
be, whether sight, sound, smell, blow, or inner pain,—or else it is an instinctive stimulus, a
perception which, by reason of its nature rather than its mere force, appeals to some one of
our normal congenital impulses and has a directly exciting quality. In the chapter on Instinct
we shall see how these stimuli differ from one animal to another, and what most of them are
in man: strange things, moving things, wild animals, bright things, pretty things, metallic
things, words, blows, blood, etc., etc., etc.
Sensitiveness to immediately exciting sensorial stimuli characterizes the attention of
childhood and youth. In mature age we have generally selected those stimuli which are
connected with one or more so-called permanent interests, and our attention has grown
irresponsive to the rest.[338] But childhood is characterized by great active energy, and has
few organized interests by which to meet new impressions and decide whether they are
worthy of notice or not, and the consequence is that extreme mobility of the attention with
which we are all familiar in children, and which makes their ﬁrst lessons such rough affairs.
Any strong sensation whatever produces accommodation of the organs which perceive it,
and absolute oblivion, for the time being, of the task in hand. This reﬂex and passive
character of the attention which, as a French writer says, makes the child seem to belong
less to himself than to every object which happens to catch his notice, is the ﬁrst thing
which the teacher must overcome. It never is overcome in some people, whose work, to the
end of life, gets done in the interstices of their mind-wandering.
The passive sensorial attention is derived when the impression, without being either strong
or of an instinctively exciting nature, is connected by previous experience and education
with things that are so. These things may be called the motives of the attention. The
impression draws an interest from them, or perhaps it even fuses into a single complex
object with them; the result is that it is brought into the focus of the mind. A faint tap per se
is not an interesting sound; it may well escape being discriminated from the general rumor [Pg 418]
of the world. But when it is a signal, as that of a lover on the window-pane, it will hardly go
unperceived. Herbart writes:
"How a bit of bad grammar wounds the ear of the purist! How a false note hurts
the musician! or an offence against good manners the man of the world! How
rapid is progress in a science when its ﬁrst principles have been so well
impressed upon us that we reproduce them mentally with perfect distinctness
and ease! How slow and uncertain, on the other hand, is our learning of the
principles themselves, when familiarity with the still more elementary percepts
connected with the subject has not given us an adequate predisposition!—
Apperceptive attention may be plainly observed in very small children when,
hearing the speech of their elders, as yet unintelligible to them, they suddenly
catch a single known word here and there, and repeat it to themselves; yes!
even in the dog who looks round at us when we speak of him and pronounce his
name. Not far removed is the talent which mind-wandering school-boys display
during the hours of instruction, of noticing every moment in which the teacher
tells a story. I remember classes in which, instruction being uninteresting, and
discipline relaxed, a buzzing murmur was always to be heard, which invariably
stopped for as long a time as an anecdote lasted. How could the boys, since they
seemed to hear nothing, notice when the anecdote began? Doubtless most of
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them always heard something of the teacher's talk; but most of it had no
connection with their previous knowledge and occupations, and therefore the
separate words no sooner entered their consciousness than they fell out of it
again; but, on the other hand, no sooner did the words awaken old thoughts,
forming strongly-connected series with which the new impression easily
combined, than out of new and old together a total interest resulted which drove
the vagrant ideas below the threshold of consciousness, and brought for a while
settled attention into their place."[339]
Passive intellectual attention is immediate when we follow in thought a train of images
exciting or interesting per se; derived, when the images are interesting only as means to a
remote end, or merely because they are associated with something which makes them dear.
Owing to the way in which immense numbers of real things become integrated into single
objects of thought for us, there is no clear line to be drawn between immediate and derived
attention of an intellectual sort. When absorbed in intellectual attention we may become so
inattentive to outer things as to be 'absent-minded,' 'abstracted,' or 'distraits.' All revery or [Pg 419]
concentrated meditation is apt to throw us into this state.
"Archimedes, it is well known, was so absorbed in geometrical meditation that
he was ﬁrst aware of the storming of Syracuse by his own death-wound, and his
exclamation on the entrance of the Roman soldiers was: Noli turbare circulos
meos! In like manner Joseph Scaliger, the most learned of men, when a
Protestant student in Paris, was so engrossed in the study of Homer that he
became aware of the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and of his own escape, only
on the day subsequent to the catastrophe. The philosopher Carneades was
habitually liable to ﬁts of meditation so profound that, to prevent him sinking
from inanition, his maid found it necessary to feed him like a child. And it is
reported of Newton that, while engaged in his mathematical researches, he
sometimes forgot to dine. Cardan, one of the most illustrious of philosophers
and mathematicians, was once, upon a journey, so lost in thought that he forgot
both his way and the object of his journey. To the questions of his driver
whether he should proceed, he made no answer; and when he came to himself
at nightfall, he was surprised to ﬁnd the carriage at a standstill, and directly
under a gallows. The mathematician Vieta was sometimes so buried in
meditation that for hours he bore more resemblance to a dead person than to a
living, and was then wholly unconscious of everything going on around him.
On the day of his marriage the great Budæus forgot everything in his
philological speculations, and he was only awakened to the affairs of the
external world by a tardy embassy from the marriage-party, who found him
absorbed in the composition of his Commentarii."[340]
The absorption may be so deep as not only to banish ordinary sensations, but even the
severest pain. Pascal, Wesley, Robert Hall, are said to have had this capacity. Dr. Carpenter
says of himself that
"he has frequently begun a lecture whilst suffering neuralgic pain so severe as
to make him apprehend that he would ﬁnd it impossible to proceed; yet no
sooner has he by a determined effort fairly launched himself into the stream of
thought, than he has found himself continuously borne along without the least
distraction, until the end has come, and the attention has been released; when
the pain has recurred with a force that has overmastered all resistance, making
him wonder how he could have ever ceased to feel it."[341]
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Dr. Carpenter speaks of launching himself by a determined effort. This effort characterizes
what we called active or voluntary attention. It is a feeling which every one knows, but [Pg 420]
which most people would call quite indescribable. We get it in the sensorial sphere
whenever we seek to catch an impression of extreme faintness, be it of sight, hearing, taste,
smell, or touch; we get it whenever we seek to discriminate a sensation merged in a mass of
others that are similar; we get it whenever we resist the attractions of more potent stimuli
and keep our mind occupied with some object that is naturally unimpressive. We get it in the
intellectual sphere under exactly similar conditions: as when we strive to sharpen and make
distinct an idea which we but vaguely seem to have; or painfully discriminate a shade of
meaning from its similars; or resolutely hold fast to a thought so discordant with our
impulses that, if left unaided, it would quickly yield place to images of an exciting and
impassioned kind. All forms of attentive effort would be exercised at once by one whom we
might suppose at a dinner-party resolutely to listen to a neighbor giving him insipid and
unwelcome advice in a low voice, whilst all around the guests were loudly laughing and
talking about exciting and interesting things.
There is no such thing as voluntary attention sustained for more than a few seconds at a
time. What is called sustained voluntary attention is a repetition of successive efforts which
bring back the topic to the mind.[342] The topic once brought back, if a congenial one,
develops; and if its development is interesting it engages the attention passively for a time.
Dr. Carpenter, a moment back, described the stream of thought, once entered, as 'bearing
him along.' This passive interest may be short or long. As soon as it ﬂags, the attention is
diverted by some irrelevant thing, and then a voluntary effort may bring it back to the topic
again; and so on, under favorable conditions, for hours together. During all this time,
however, note that it is not an identical object in the psychological sense (p. 275), but a [Pg 421]
succession of mutually related objects forming an identical topic only, upon which the
attention is ﬁxed. No one can possibly attend continuously to an object that does not
change.
Now there are always some objects that for the time being will not develop. They simply go
out; and to keep the mind upon anything related to them requires such incessantly renewed
effort that the most resolute Will ere long gives out and lets its thoughts follow the more
stimulating solicitations after it has withstood them for what length of time it can. There are
topics known to every man from which he shies like a frightened horse, and which to get a
glimpse of is to shun. Such are his ebbing assets to the spendthrift in full career. But why
single out the spendthrift when to every man actuated by passion the thought of interests
which negate the passion can hardly for more than a ﬂeeting instant stay before the mind? It
is like 'memento mori' in the heyday of the pride of life. Nature rises at such suggestions,
and excludes them from the view:—How long, O healthy reader, can you now continue
thinking of your tomb?—In milder instances the difﬁculty is as great, especially when the
brain is fagged. One snatches at any and every passing pretext, no matter how trivial or
external, to escape from the odiousness of the matter in hand. I know a person, for example,
who will poke the ﬁre, set chairs straight, pick dust-specks from the ﬂoor, arrange his table,
snatch up the newspaper, take down any book which catches his eye, trim his nails, waste
the morning anyhow, in short, and all without premeditation,—simply because the only
thing he ought to attend to Is the preparation of a noonday lesson in formal logic which he
detests. Anything but that!
Once more, the object must change. When it is one of sight, it will actually become
invisible; when of hearing, inaudible,—if we attend to it too unmovingly. Helmholtz, who
has put his sensorial attention to the severest tests, by using his eyes on objects which in
common life are expressly overlooked, makes some interesting remarks on this point in his
chapter on retinal rivalry.[343] The phenomenon called by that name is this, that if we look [Pg 422]
with each eye upon a different picture (as in the annexed stereoscopic slide), sometimes one
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picture, sometimes the other, or parts of both, will come to consciousness, but hardly ever
both combined. Helmholtz now says:
"I ﬁnd that I am able to attend voluntarily, now to one and now to the other
system of lines; and that then this system remains visible alone for a certain
time, whilst the other completely vanishes. This happens, for example,
whenever I try to count the lines ﬁrst of one and then of the other system.... But
it is extremely hard to chain the attention down to one of the systems for long,
unless we associate with our looking some distinct purpose which keeps the
activity of the attention perpetually renewed. Such a one is counting the lines,
comparing their intervals, or the like. An equilibrium of the attention, persistent
for any length of time, is under no circumstances attainable. The natural
tendency of attention when left to itself is to wander to ever new things; and so
soon as the interest of its object is over, so soon as nothing new is to be noticed
there, it passes, in spite of our will, to something else. If we wish to keep it
upon one and the same object, we must seek constantly to ﬁnd out something
new about the latter, especially if other powerful impressions are attracting us
away."

FIG. 36.

And again criticising an author who had treated of attention as an activity absolutely subject
to the conscious will, Helmholtz writes:
"This is only restrictedly true. We move our eyes by our will; but one without
training cannot so easily execute the intention of making them converge. At any
moment, however, he can execute that of looking at a near object, in which act
convergence is involved. Now just as little can we carry out our purpose to keep
our attention steadily ﬁxed upon a certain object, when our interest in the object
is exhausted, and the purpose is inwardly formulated in this abstract way. But
we can set ourselves new questions about the object, so that a new interest in it
arises, and then the attention will remain riveted. The relation of attention to
will is, then, less one of immediate than of mediate control."

[Pg 423]

These words of Helmholtz are of fundamental importance. And if true of sensorial attention,
how much more true are they of the intellectual variety! The conditio sine quâ non of
sustained attention to a given topic of thought is that we should roll it over and over
incessantly and consider different aspects and relations of it in turn. Only in pathological
states will a ﬁxed and ever monotonously recurring idea possess the mind.

And now we can see why it is that what is called sustained attention is the easier, the richer
in acquisitions and the fresher and more original the mind. In such minds, subjects bud and
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sprout and grow. At every moment, they please by a new consequence and rivet the
attention afresh. But an intellect unfurnished with materials, stagnant, unoriginal, will hardly
be likely to consider any subject long. A glance exhausts its possibilities of interest.
Geniuses are commonly believed to excel other men in their power of sustained attention.
[344] In most of them, it is to be feared, the so-called 'power' is of the passive sort. Their
ideas coruscate, every subject branches inﬁnitely before their fertile minds, and so for hours
they may be rapt. But it is their genius making them attentive, not their attention making
geniuses of them. And, when we come down to the root of the matter, we see that they differ
from ordinary men less in the character of their attention than in the nature of the objects
upon which it is successively bestowed. In the genius, these form a concatenated series,
suggesting each other mutually by some rational law. Therefore we call the attention [Pg 424]
'sustained' and the topic of meditation for hours 'the same.' In the common man the series is
for the most part incoherent, the objects have no rational bond, and we call the attention
wandering and unﬁxed.
It is probable that genius tends actually to prevent a man from acquiring habits of voluntary
attention, and that moderate intellectual endowments are the soil in which we may best
expect, here as elsewhere, the virtues of the will, strictly so called, to thrive. But, whether
the attention come by grace of genius or by dint of will, the longer one does attend to a topic
the more mastery of it one has. And the faculty of voluntarily bringing back a wandering
attention, over and over again, is the very root of judgment, character, and will. No one is
compos sui if he have it not. An education which should improve this faculty would be the
education par excellence. But it is easier to deﬁne this ideal than to give practical directions
for bringing it about. The only general pedagogic maxim bearing on attention is that the
more interest the child has in advance in the subject, the better he will attend. Induct him
therefore in such a way as to knit each new thing on to some acquisition already there; and if
possible awaken curiosity, so that the new thing shall seem to come as an answer, or part of
an answer, to a question pre-existing in his mind.

At present having described the varieties, let us turn to
THE EFFECTS OF ATTENTION.
Its remote effects are too incalculable to be recorded. The practical and theoretical life of
whole species, as well as of individual beings, results from the selection which the habitual
direction of their attention involves. In Chapters XIV and XV some of these consequences
will come to light. Sufﬁce it meanwhile that each of us literally chooses, by his ways of
attending to things, what sort of a universe he shall appear to himself to inhabit.
The immediate effects of attention are to make us:
a) perceive—
b) conceive—
c) distinguish—
d) remember—
better than otherwise we could—both more successive things and each thing more clearly. It [Pg 425]
also
(e) shortens 'reaction-time.'
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a and b. Most people would say that a sensation attended to becomes stronger than it
otherwise would be. This point is, however, not quite plain, and has occasioned some
discussion.[345] From the strength or intensity of a sensation must be distinguished its
clearness; and to increase this is, for some psychologists, the utmost that attention can do.
When the facts are surveyed, however, it must be admitted that to some extent the relative
intensity of two sensations may be changed when one of them is attended to and the other
not. Every artist knows how he can make a scene before his eyes appear warmer or colder in
color, according to the way he sets his attention. If for warm, he soon begins to see the red
color start out of everything; if for cold, the blue. Similarly in listening for certain notes in a
chord, or overtones in a musical sound, the one we attend to sounds probably a little more
loud as well as more emphatic than it did before. When we mentally break a series of
monotonous strokes into a rhythm, by accentuating every second or third one, etc., the
stroke on which the stress of attention is laid seems to become stronger as well as more
emphatic. The increased visibility of optical after-images and of double images, which close
attention brings about, can hardly be interpreted otherwise than as a real strengthening of the
retinal sensations themselves. And this view is rendered particularly probable by the fact
that an imagined visual object may, if attention be concentrated upon it long enough, acquire
before the mind's eye almost the brilliancy of reality, and (in the case of certain
exceptionally gifted observers) leave a negative after-image of itself when it passes away
(see Chapter XVIII). Conﬁdent expectation of a certain intensity or quality of impression
will often make us sensibly see or hear it in an object which really falls far short of it. In [Pg 426]
face of such facts it is rash to say that attention cannot make a sense-impression more
intense.
But, on the other hand, the intensiﬁcation which may be brought about seems never to lead
the judgment astray. As we rightly perceive and name the same color under various lights,
the same sound at various distances; so we seem to make an analogous sort of allowance for
the varying amounts of attention with which objects are viewed; and whatever changes of
feeling the attention may bring we charge, as it were, to the attention's account, and still
perceive and conceive the object as the same.
"A gray paper appears to us no lighter, the pendulum-beat of a clock no louder,
no matter how much we increase the strain of our attention upon them. No one,
by doing this, can make the gray paper look white, or the stroke of the
pendulum sound like the blow of a strong hammer,—everyone, on the contrary,
feels the increase as that of his own conscious activity turned upon the thing."
[346]

Were it otherwise, we should not be able to note intensities by attending to them. Weak
impressions would, as Stumpf says,[347] become stronger by the very fact of being observed.
"I should not be able to observe faint sounds at all, but only such as appeared to
me of maximal strength, or at least of a strength that increased with the amount
of my observation. In reality, however, I can, with steadily increasing attention,
follow a diminuendo perfectly well."
The subject is one which would well repay exact experiment, if methods could be devised.
Meanwhile there is no question whatever that attention augments the clearness of all that we
perceive or conceive by its aid. But what is meant by clearness here?

c. Clearness, so far as attention produces it, means distinction from other things and internal
analysis or subdivision. These are essentially products of intellectual discrimination,
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involving comparison, memory, and perception of various relations. The attention per se
does not distinguish and analyze and relate. The most we can say is that it is a condition of [Pg 427]
our doing so. And as these processes are to be described later, the clearness they produce
had better not be farther discussed here. The important point to notice here is that it is not
attention's immediate fruit.[348]

d. Whatever future conclusion we may reach as to this, we cannot deny that an object once
attended to will remain in the memory, whilst one inattentively allowed to pass will leave no
traces behind. Already in Chapter VI (see pp. 163 ff.) we discussed whether certain states of
mind were 'unconscious,' or whether they were not rather states to which no attention had
been paid, and of whose passage recollection could afterwards ﬁnd no vestiges. Dugald
Stewart says:[349] "The connection between attention and memory has been remarked by
many authors." He quotes Quintilian, Locke, and Helvetius; and goes on at great length to
explain the phenomena of 'secondary automatism' (see above, p. 114 ff.) by the presence of
a mental action grown so inattentive as to preserve no memory of itself. In our chapter on
Memory, later on, the point will come up again.

e) Under this head, the shortening of reaction-time, there is a good deal to be said of
Attention's effects. Since Wundt has probably worked over the subject more thoroughly than
any other investigator and made it peculiarly his own, what follows had better, as far as
possible, be in his words. The reader will remember the method and results of
experimentation on 'reaction-time,' as given in Chapter III.
The facts I proceed to quote may also be taken as a supplement to that chapter. Wundt
writes:
"When we wait with strained attention for a stimulus, it will often happen that
instead of registering the stimulus, we react upon some entirely different
impression,—and this not through confounding the one with the other. On the
contrary, we are perfectly well aware at the moment of making the movement
that we respond to the wrong stimulus. Sometimes even, though not so often,
the latter may be another kind of sensation altogether,—one may, for example,
in experimenting with sound, register a ﬂash of light, produced either by
accident or design. We cannot well explain these results otherwise than by
assuming that the strain of the attention towards the impression we expect
coexists with a preparatory innervation of the motor centre for the reaction,
which innervation the slightest shock then sufﬁces to turn into an actual
discharge. This shock may be given by any chance impression, even by one to
which we never intended to respond. When the preparatory innervation has
once reached this pitch of intensity, the time that intervenes between the
stimulus and the contraction of the muscles which react, may become
vanishingly small."[350]

[Pg 428]

"The perception of an impression is facilitated when the impression is preceded
by a warning which announces beforehand that it is about to occur. This case is
realized whenever several stimuli follow each other at equal intervals,—when,
e.g. we note pendulum movements by the eye, or pendulum-strokes by the ear.
Each single stroke forms here the signal for the next, which is thus met by a
fully prepared attention. The same thing happens when the stimulus to be
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perceived is preceded, at a certain interval, by a single warning: the time is
always notably shortened.... I have made comparative observations on reactiontime with and without a warning signal. The impression to be reacted on was
the sound made by the dropping of a ball on the board of the 'drop apparatus.'...
In a ﬁrst series no warning preceded the stroke of the ball; in the second, the
noise made by the apparatus in liberating the ball served as a signal.... Here are
the averages of two series of such experiments:
Height of Fall.
Average. Mean Error. No. of Expts.
25 cm.
No warning 0.253
0.051
13
Warning
0.076
0.060
17
5 cm.

No warning 0.266
Warning
0.175

0.036
0.035

14
17

"... In a long series of experiments, (the interval between warning and stimulus
remaining the same) the reaction-time grows less and less, and it is possible
occasionally to reduce it to a vanishing quantity (a few thousandths of a
second), to zero, or even to a negative value.[351]... The only ground that we can
assign for this phenomenon is the preparation (vorbereitende Spannung) of the
attention. It is easy to understand that the reaction-time should be shortened by
this means; but that it should sometimes sink to zero and even assume negative
values, may appear surprising. Nevertheless this latter case is also explained by
what happens in the simple reaction-time experiments" just referred to, in
which, "when the strain of the attention has reached its climax, the movement
we stand ready to execute escapes from the control of on will, and we register a
wrong signal. In these other experiments, in which a warning foretells the
moment of the stimulus, it is also plain that attention accommodates itself so
exactly to the latter's reception that no sooner is it objectively given than it is
fully apperceived, and with the apperception the motor discharge coincides."

[Pg 429]

[352]

Usually, when the impression is fully anticipated, attention prepares the motor centres so
completely for both stimulus and reaction that the only time lost is that of the physiological
conduction downwards. But even this interval may disappear, i.e. the stimulus and reaction
may become objectively contemporaneous; or more remarkable still, the reaction may be
discharged before the stimulus has actually occurred.[353] Wundt, as we saw some pages
back (p. 411), explains this by the effort of the mind so to react that we may feel our own
movement and the signal which prompts it, both at the same instant. As the execution of the
movement must precede our feeling of it, so it must also precede the stimulus, if that and
our movement are to be felt at once.
The peculiar theoretic interest of these experiments lies in their showing expectant attention
and sensation to be continuous or identical processes, since they may have identical motor
effects. Although other exceptional observations show them likewise to be continuous
subjectively, Wundt's experiments do not: he seems never, at the moment of reacting
prematurely, to have been misled into the belief that the real stimulus was there.
As concentrated attention accelerates perception, so, conversely, perception of a stimulus is
retarded by anything which either bafﬂes or distracts the attention with which we await it.
"If, e.g., we make reactions on a sound in such a way that weak and strong
stimuli irregularly alternate so that the observer can never expect a determinate
strength with any certainty, the reaction-time for all the various signals is
increased,—and so is the average error. I append two examples.... In Series I a
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strong and a weak sound alternated regularly, so that the intensity was each time
known in advance. In II they came irregularly.
I. Regular Alternation.
Strong sound
Weak sound

Average Time. Average Error. No. of Expts.
0.116"
0.010"
18
0.127"
0.012"
9

II. Irregular Alternation.
Strong sound
0.189"
Weak sound
0.298"

0.038"
0.076"

9
15

"Still greater is the increase of the time when, unexpectedly into a series of
strong impressions, a weak one is interpolated, or vice versâ. In this way I have
seen the time of reaction upon a sound so weak as to be barely perceived rise to
0.4" or 0.5", and for a strong sound to 0 25". It is also matter of general
experience that a stimulus expected in a general way, but for whose intensity
attention cannot be adapted in advance, demands a longer reaction-time. In such
cases ... the reason for the difference can only lie in the fact that wherever a
preparation of the attention is impossible, the time of both perception and
volition is prolonged. Perhaps also the conspicuously large reaction-times
which are got with stimuli so faint as to be just perceptible may be explained by
the attention tending always to adapt itself for something more than this
minimal amount of stimulus, so that a state ensues similar to that in the case of
unexpected stimuli.... Still more than by previously unknown stimuli is the
reaction-time prolonged by wholly unexpected impressions. This is sometimes
accidentally brought about, when the observer's attention, instead of being
concentrated on the coming signal, is dispersed. It can be realized purposely by
suddenly thrusting into a long series of equidistant stimuli a much shorter
interval which the observer does not expect. The mental effect here is like that
of being startled;—often the startling is outwardly visible. The time of reaction
may then easily be lengthened to one quarter of a second with strong signals, or
with weak ones to a half-second. Slighter, but still very noticeable, is the
retardation when the experiment is so arranged that the observer, ignorant
whether the stimulus is to be an impression of light, sound, or touch, cannot
keep his attention turned to any particular sense-organ in advance. One notices
then at the same time a peculiar unrest, as the feeling of strain which
accompanies the attention keeps vacillating between the several senses.
"Complications of another sort arise when what is registered is an impression
anticipated both in point of quality and strength, but accompanied by other
stimuli which make the concentration of the attention difﬁcult. The reactiontime is here always more or less prolonged. The simplest case of the sort is
where a momentary impression is registered in the midst of another, and
continuous, sensorial-stimulation of considerable strength. The continuous
stimulus may belong to the same sense as the stimulus to be reacted on, or to
another. When it is of the same sense, the retardation it causes may be partly
due to the distraction of the attention by it, but partly also to the fact that the
stimulus to be reacted on stands out less strongly than if alone, and practically
becomes a less intense sensation. But other factors in reality are present; for we
ﬁnd the reaction-time more prolonged by the concomitant stimulation when the
stimulus is weak than when it is strong I made experiments in which the
principal impression, or signal for reaction, was a bell-stroke whose strength
could be graduated by a spring against the hammer with a movable
counterpoise. Each set of observations comprised two series; in one of which
the bell-stroke was registered in the ordinary way, whilst in the other a toothed
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wheel belonging to the chronometric apparatus made during the entire
experiment a steady noise against a metal spring. In one half of the latter series
(A) the bell-stroke was only moderately strong, so that the accompanying noise
diminished it considerably, without, however, making it indistinguishable. In
the other half (B) the bell-sound was so loud as to be heard with perfect
distinctness above the noise.
Mean. Maximum. Minimum.

No. of
Experiments.

Without
noise

0.189 0.214

0.156

21

With noise

0.313 0.499

0.183

16

B
Without noise 0.158 0.206
(Bell-stroke With noise
0.203 0.295
loud)

0.133
0.140

20
19

A
(Bellstroke
moderate)

"Since, in these experiments, the sound B even with noise made a considerably
stronger impression than the sound A without, we must see in the ﬁgures a
direct inﬂuence of the disturbing noise on the process of reaction. This
inﬂuence is freed from mixture with other factors when the momentary stimulus
and the concomitant disturbance appeal to different senses. I chose, to test this,
sight and hearing. The momentary signal was an induction-spark leaping from
one platinum point to another against a dark background. The steady
stimulation was the noise above described.
Spark.
Mean. Maximum. Minimum. No. of Expts.
Without noise 0.222 0.284
0.158
20
With noise
0.300 0.390
0.250
18
"When one reﬂects that in the experiments with one and the same sense the
relative intensity of the signal is always depressed [which by itself is a retarding
condition] the amount of retardation in these last observations makes it
probable that the disturbing inﬂuence upon attention is greater when the stimuli
are disparate than when they belong to the same sense. One does not, in fact,
ﬁnd it particularly hard to register immediately, when the bell rings in the midst
of the noise; but when the spark is the signal one has a feeling of being coerced,
as one turns away from the noise towards it. This fact is immediately connected
with other properties of our attention. The effort of the latter is accompanied by
various corporeal sensations, according to the sense which is engaged. The
innervation which exists during the effort of attention is therefore probably a
different one for each sense-organ."[354]

[Pg 432]

Wundt then, after some theoretical remarks which we need not quote now, gives a table of
retardations, as follows:
Retardation.
1. Unexpected strength of impression:
a) Unexpectedly strong sound
b) Unexpectedly weak sound
2. Interference by like stimulus (sound by sound)
3. Interference by unlike stimulus (light by sound)

0.073
0.171
0.045[355]
0.078

It seems probable, from these results obtained with elementary processes of mind, that all
processes, even the higher ones of reminiscence, reasoning, etc., whenever attention is
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concentrated upon them instead of being diffused and languid, are thereby more rapidly
performed.[356]

Still more interesting reaction-time observations have been made by Münsterberg. The
reader will recollect the fact noted in Chapter III (p. 93) that reaction-time is shorter when
one concentrates his attention on the expected movement than when one concentrates it on
the expected signal. Herr Münsterberg found that this is equally the case when the reaction
is no simple reﬂex, but can take place only after an intellectual operation. In a series of
experiments the ﬁve ﬁngers were used to react with, and the reacter had to use a different [Pg 433]
ﬁnger according as the signal was of one sort or another. Thus when a word in the
nominative case was called out he used the thumb, for the dative he used another ﬁnger;
similarly adjectives, substantives, pronouns, numerals, etc., or, again, towns, rivers, beasts,
plants, elements; or poets, musicians, philosophers, etc., were co-ordinated each with its
ﬁnger, so that when a word belonging to either of these classes was mentioned, a particular
ﬁnger and no other had to perform the reaction. In a second series of experiments the
reaction consisted in the utterance of a word in answer to a question, such as "name an
edible ﬁsh," etc.; or "name the ﬁrst drama of Schiller," etc.; or "which is greater, Hume or
Kant?" etc.; or (ﬁrst naming apples and cherries, and several other fruits) "which do you
prefer, apples or cherries?" etc.; or "which is Goethe's ﬁnest drama?" etc.; or "which letter
comes the later in the alphabet, the letter L or the ﬁrst letter of the most beautiful tree?" etc.;
or "which is less, 15 or 20 minus 8?"[357] etc. etc. etc. Even in this series of reactions the
time was much quicker token the reacter turned his attention in advance towards the answer
than when he turned it towards the question. The shorter reaction-time was seldom more
than one ﬁfth of a second; the longer, from four to eight times as long.
To understand such results, one must bear in mind that in these experiments the reacter
always knew in advance in a general way the kind of question which he was to receive, and
consequently the sphere within which his possible answer lay.[358] In turning his attention,
therefore, from the outset towards the answer, those brain-processes in him which were
connected with this entire 'sphere' were kept sub-excited, and the question could then
discharge with a minimum amount of lost time that particular answer out of the 'sphere'
which belonged especially to it. When, on the contrary, the attention was kept looking
towards the question exclusively and averted from the possible reply, all this preliminary [Pg 434]
sub-excitement of motor tracts failed to occur, and the entire process of answering had to be
gone through with after the question was heard. No wonder that the time was prolonged. It
is a beautiful example of the summation of stimulations, and of the way in which expectant
attention, even when not very strongly focalized, will prepare the motor centres, and shorten
the work which a stimulus has to perform on them, in order to produce a given effect when
it comes.
THE INTIMATE NATURE OF THE ATTENTIVE PROCESS.
We have now a sufﬁcient number of facts to warrant our considering this more recondite
question. And two physiological processes, of which we have got a glimpse, immediately
suggest themselves as possibly forming in combination a complete reply. I mean
1. The accommodation or adjustment of the sensory organs; and
2. The anticipatory preparation from within of the ideational centres concerned with the
object to which the attention is paid.
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1. The sense-organs and the bodily muscles which favor their exercise are adjusted most
energetically in sensorial attention, whether immediate and reﬂex, or derived. But there are
good grounds for believing that even intellectual attention, attention to the idea of a sensible
object, is also accompanied with some degree of excitement of the sense-organs to which
the object appeals. The preparation of the ideational centres exists, on the other hand,
wherever our interest in the object—be it sensible or ideal—is derived from, or in any way
connected with, other interests, or the presence of other objects, in the mind. It exists as well
when the attention thus derived is classed as passive as when it is classed as voluntary. So
that on the whole we may conﬁdently conclude—since in mature life we never attend to
anything without our interest in it being in some degree derived from its connection with
other objects—that the two processes of sensorial adjustment and ideational preparation
probably coexist in all our concrete attentive acts.
The two points must now be proved in more detail. First, as respects the sensorial [Pg 435]
adjustment.
That it is present when we attend to sensible things is obvious. When we look or listen we
accommodate our eyes and ears involuntarily, and we turn our head and body as well; when
we taste or smell we adjust the tongue, lips, and respiration to the object; in feeling a surface
we move the palpatory organ in a suitable way; in all these acts, besides making involuntary
muscular contractions of a positive sort, we inhibit others which might interfere with the
result—we close the eyes in tasting, suspend the respiration in listening, etc. The result is a
more or less massive organic feeling that attention is going on. This organic feeling comes,
in the way described on page 302, to be contrasted with that of the objects which it
accompanies, and regarded as peculiarly ours, whilst the objects form the not-me. We treat it
as a sense of our own activity, although it comes in to us from our organs after they are
accommodated, just as the feeling of any object does. Any object, if immediately exciting,
causes a reﬂex accommodation of the sense-organ, and this has two results—ﬁrst, the
object's increase in clearness; and second, the feeling of activity in question. Both are
sensations of an 'afferent' sort.
But in intellectual attention, as we have already seen, (p. 300), similar feelings of activity
occur. Fechner was the ﬁrst, I believe, to analyze these feelings, and discriminate them from
the stronger ones just named. He writes:
"When we transfer the attention from objects of one sense to those of another,
we have an indescribable feeling (though at the same time one perfectly
determinate, and reproducible at pleasure), of altered direction or differently
localized tension (Spannung). We feel a strain forward in the eyes, one directed
sidewise in the ears, increasing with the degree of our attention, and changing
according as we look at an object carefully, or listen to something attentively;
and we speak accordingly of straining the attention. The difference is most
plainly felt when the attention oscillates rapidly between eye and ear; and the
feeling localizes itself with most decided difference in regard to the various
sense-organs, according as we wish to discriminate a thing delicately by touch,
taste, or smell.
"But now I have, when I try to vividly recall a picture of memory or fancy, a
feeling perfectly analogous to that which I experience when I seek to apprehend
a thing keenly by eye or ear; and this analogous feeling is very differently
localized. While in sharpest possible attention to real objects (as well as to
after-images) the strain is plainly forwards, and when the attention changes
from one sense to another only alters its direction between the several external
sense-organs, leaving the rest of the head free from strain, the case is different
in memory or fancy, for here the feeling withdraws entirely from the external
sense-organs, and seems rather to take refuge in that part of the head which the
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brain ﬁlls; if I wish, for example, to recall a place or person it will arise before
me with vividness, not according as I strain my attention forwards, but rather in
proportion as I, so to speak, retract it backwards."[359]
In myself the 'backward retraction' which is felt during attention to ideas of memory, etc.,
seems to be principally constituted by the feeling of an actual rolling outwards and upwards
of the eyeballs, such as occurs in sleep, and is the exact opposite of their behavior when we
look at a physical thing. I have already spoken of this feeling on page 300.[360] The reader [Pg 437]
who doubts the presence of these organic feelings is requested to read the whole of that
passage again.

It has been said, however, that we may attend to an object on the periphery of the visual
ﬁeld and yet not accommodate the eye for it. Teachers thus notice the acts of children in the
school-room at whom they appear not to be looking. Women in general train their peripheral
visual attention more than men. This would be an objection to the invariable and universal
presence of movements of adjustment as ingredients of the attentive process. Usually, as is
well known, no object lying in the marginal portions of the ﬁeld of vision can catch our
attention without at the same time 'catching our eye'—that is, fatally provoking such
movements of rotation and accommodation as will focus its image on the fovea, or point of
greatest sensibility. Practice, however, enables us, with effort, to attend to a marginal object
whilst keeping the eyes immovable. The object under these circumstances never becomes
perfectly distinct—the place of its image on the retina makes distinctness impossible—but
(as anyone can satisfy himself by trying) we become more vividly conscious of it than we
were before the effort was made. Helmholtz states the fact so strikingly that I will quote his
observation in full. He was trying to combine in a single solid percept pairs of stereoscopic
pictures illuminated instantaneously by the electric spark. The pictures were in a dark box
which the spark from time to time lighted up; and, to keep the eyes from wandering
betweenwhiles, a pin-hole was pricked through the middle of each picture, through which
the light of the room came, so that each eye had presented to it during the dark intervals a
single bright point. With parallel optical axes the points combined into a single image; and
the slightest movement of the eyeballs was betrayed by this image at once becoming double.
Helmholtz now found that simple linear ﬁgures could, when the eyes were thus kept
immovable, be perceived as solids at a single ﬂash of the spark. But when the ﬁgures were
complicated photographs, many successive ﬂashes were required to grasp their totality.
"Now it is interesting," he says, "to ﬁnd that, although we keep steadily ﬁxating
the pin-holes and never allow their combined image to break into two, we can,
nevertheless, before the spark comes, keep our attention voluntarily turned to
any particular portion we please of the dark ﬁeld, so as then, when the spark
comes, to receive an impression only from such parts of the picture as lie in this
region. In this respect, then, our attention is quite independent of the position
and accommodation of the eyes, and of any known alteration in these organs;
and free to direct itself by a conscious and voluntary effort upon any selected
portion of a dark and undifferenced ﬁeld of view. This is one of the most
important observations for a future theory of attention."[361]

[Pg 438]

Hering, however, adds the following detail:
"Whilst attending to the marginal object we must always," he says, "attend at
the same time to the object directly ﬁxated. If even for a single instant we let the
latter slip out of our mind, our eye moves towards the former, as may be easily
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recognized by the after-images produced, or by the muscular sounds heard. The
case is then less properly to be called one of translocation, than one of
unusually wide dispersion, of the attention, in which dispersion the largest
share still falls upon the thing directly looked at,"[362]
and consequently directly accommodated for. Accommodation exists here, then, as it does
elsewhere, and without it we should lose a part of our sense of attentive activity. In fact, the
strain of that activity (which is remarkably great in the experiment) is due in part to
unusually strong contractions of the muscles needed to keep the eyeballs still, which
produce unwonted feelings of pressure in those organs.

2. But if the peripheral part of the picture in this experiment be not physically
accommodated for, what is meant by its sharing our attention? What happens when we
'distribute' or 'disperse' the latter upon a thing for which we remain unwilling to 'adjust'?
This leads us to that second feature in the process, the 'ideational preparation' of which we
spoke. The effort to attend to the marginal region of the picture consists in nothing more nor
less than the effort to form as clear an idea as is possible of what is there portrayed. The
idea is to come to the help of the sensation and make it more distinct. It comes with effort,
and such a mode of coming is the remaining part of what we know as our attention's 'strain' [Pg 439]
under the circumstances. Let us show how universally present in our acts of attention this
reinforcing imagination, this inward reproduction, this anticipatory thinking of the thing we
attend to, is.
It must as a matter of course be present when the attention is of the intellectual variety, for
the thing attended to then is nothing but an idea, an inward reproduction or conception. If
then we prove ideal construction of the object to be present in sensorial attention, it will be
present everywhere. When, however, sensorial attention is at its height, it is impossible to
tell how much of the percept comes from without and how much from within; but if we ﬁnd
that the preparation we make for it always partly consists of the creation of an imaginary
duplicate of the object in the mind, which shall stand ready to receive the outward
impression as if in a matrix, that will be quite enough to establish the point in dispute.
In Wundt's and Exner's experiments quoted above, the lying in wait for the impressions, and
the preparation to react, consist of nothing but the anticipatory imagination of what the
impressions or the reactions are to be. Where the stimulus is unknown and the reaction
undetermined, time is lost, because no stable image can under such circumstances be formed
in advance. But where both nature and time of signal and reaction are foretold, so
completely does the expectant attention consist in premonitory imagination that, as we have
seen (Footnote 273; pp. 373, 377), it may mimic the intensity of reality, or at any rate
produce reality's motor effects. It is impossible to read Wundt's and Exner's pages of
description and not to interpret the 'Apperception' and 'Spannung' and other terms as
equivalents of imagination. With Wundt, in particular, the word Apperception (which he sets
great store by) is quite interchangeable with both imagination and attention. All three are
names for the excitement from within of ideational brain-centres, for which Mr. Lewes's
name of preperception seems the best possible designation.
Where the impression to be caught is very weak, the way not to miss it is to sharpen our
attention for it by preliminary contact with it in a stronger form.
"If we wish to begin to observe overtones, it is advisable, just before the sound
which is to be analyzed, to sound very softly the note of which we are in
search.... The piano and harmonium are well ﬁtted for this use, as both give
overtones that are strong. Strike upon the piano ﬁrst the g' [of a certain musical
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example previously given in the text]; then, when its vibrations have objectively
ceased, strike powerfully the note c, in whose sound g' is the third overtone, and
keep your attention steadily bent upon the pitch of the just heard g'; you will
now hear this tone sounding in the midst of the c.... If you place the resonator
which corresponds to a certain overtone, for example g' of the sound c, against
your ear, and then make the note c sound, you will hear g' much strengthened
by the resonator.... This strengthening by the resonator can be used to make the
naked ear attentive to the sound which it is to catch. For when the resonator is
gradually removed, the g' grows weaker; but the attention, once directed to it,
holds it now more easily fast, and the observer hears the tone g' now in the
natural unaltered sound of the note with his unaided ear."[363]
Wundt, commenting on experiences of this sort, says that
"on carefully observing, one will always ﬁnd that one tries ﬁrst to recall the
image in memory of the tone to be heard, and that then one hears it in the total
sound. The same thing is to be noticed in weak or fugitive visual impressions.
Illuminate a drawing by electric sparks separated by considerable intervals, and
after the ﬁrst, and often after the second and third spark, hardly anything will be
recognized. But the confused image is held fast in memory; each successive
illumination completes it; and so at last we attain to a clearer perception. The
primary motive to this inward activity proceeds usually from the outer
impression itself. We hear a sound in which, from certain associations, we
suspect a certain overtone; the next thing is to recall the overtone in memory;
and ﬁnally we catch it in the sound we hear. Or perhaps we see some mineral
substance we have met before; the impression awakens the memory-image,
which again more or less completely melts with the impression itself. In this
way every idea takes a certain time to penetrate to the focus of consciousness.
And during this time we always ﬁnd in ourselves the peculiar feeling of
attention.... The phenomena show that an adaptation of attention to the
impression takes place. The surprise which unexpected impressions give us is
due essentially to the fact that our attention, at the moment when the impression
occurs, is not accommodated for it. The accommodation itself is of the double
sort, relating as it does to the intensity as well as to the quality of the stimulus.
Different qualities of impression require disparate adaptations. And we remark
that our feeling of the strain of our inward attentiveness increases with every
increase in the strength of the impressions on whose perception we are intent."

[Pg 441]

[364]

The natural way of conceiving all this is under the symbolic form of a brain-cell played
upon from two directions. Whilst the object excites it from without, other brain-cells, or
perhaps spiritual forces, arouse it from within. The latter inﬂuence is the 'adaptation of the
attention.' The plenary energy of the brain-cell demands the co-operation of both factors:
not when merely present, but when both present and attended to, is the object fully
perceived.
A few additional experiences will now be perfectly clear. Helmholtz, for instance, adds this
observation to the passage we quoted a while ago concerning the stereoscopic pictures lit by
the electric spark.
"These experiments," he says, "are interesting as regards the part which
attention plays in the matter of double images.... For in pictures so simple that it
is relatively difﬁcult for me to see them double, I can succeed in seeing them
double, even when the illumination is only instantaneous, the moment I strive
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to imagine in a lively way how they ought then to look. The inﬂuence of
attention is here pure; for all eye movements are shut out."[365]
In another place[366] the same writer says:
"When I have before my eyes a pair of stereoscopic drawings which are hard to
combine, it is difﬁcult to bring the lines and points that correspond, to cover
each other, and with every little motion of the eyes they glide apart. But if I
chance to gain a lively mental image (Anschauungsbild) of the represented
solid form (a thing that often occurs by lucky chance), I then move my two eyes
with perfect certainty over the ﬁgure without the picture separating again."
Again, writing of retinal rivalry, Helmholtz says:
"It is not a trial of strength between two sensations, but depends on our ﬁxing or
failing to ﬁx the attention. Indeed, there is scarcely any phenomenon so well
ﬁtted for the study of the causes which are capable of determining the attention.
It is not enough to form the conscious intention of seeing ﬁrst with one eye and
then with the other; we must form as clear a notion as possible of what we
expect to see. Then it will actually appear."[367]
In ﬁgures 37 and 38, where the result is ambiguous, we can make the change from one [Pg 442]
apparent form to the other by imagining strongly in advance the form we wish to see.
Similarly in those puzzles where certain lines in a picture form by their combination an
object that has no connection with what the picture ostensibly represents; or indeed in every
case where an object is inconspicuous and hard to discern from the background; we may not
be able to see it for a long time; but, having once seen it, we can attend to it again whenever
we like, on account of the mental duplicate of it which our imagination now bears. In the
meaningless French words 'pas de lieu Rhône que nous,' who can recognize immediately the
English 'paddle your own canoe'?[368] But who that has once noticed the identity can fail to
have it arrest his attention again? When watching for the distant clock to strike, our mind is
so ﬁlled with its image that at every moment we think we hear the longed-for or dreaded
sound. So of an awaited footstep. Every stir in the wood is for the hunter his game; for the
fugitive his pursuers. Every bonnet in the street is momentarily taken by the lover to
enshroud the head of his idol. The image in the mind is the attention; the preperception, as
Mr. Lewes calls it, is half of the perception of the looked-for thing.[369]

FIGS. 37 & 38.
It is for this reason that men have no eyes but for those aspects of things which they have [Pg 443]
already been taught to discern. Any one of us can notice a phenomenon after it has once
been pointed out, which not one in ten thousand could ever have discovered for himself.
Even in poetry and the arts, some one has to come and tell us what aspects we may single
out, and what effects we may admire, before our æsthetic nature can 'dilate' to its full extent
and never 'with the wrong emotion.' In kindergarten instruction one of the exercises is to
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make the children see how many features they can point out in such an object as a ﬂower or [Pg 444]
a stuffed bird. They readily name the features they know already, such as leaves, tail, bill,
feet. But they may look for hours without distinguishing nostrils, claws, scales, etc., until
their attention is called to these details; thereafter, however, they see them every time. In
short, the only things which we commonly see are those which we preperceive. and the only
things which we preperceive are those which have been labelled for us, and the labels
stamped into our mind. If we lost our stock of labels we should be intellectually lost in the
midst of the world.

Organic adjustment, then, and ideational preparation or preperception are concerned in all
attentive acts. An interesting theory is defended by no less authorities than Professors
Bain[370] and Ribot,[371] and still more ably advocated by Mr. N. Lange,[372] who will have
it that the ideational preparation itself is a consequence of muscular adjustment, so that the
latter may be called the essence of the attentive process throughout. This at least is what the
theory of these authors practically amounts to, though the former two do not state it in just
these terms. The proof consists in the exhibition of cases of intellectual attention which
organic adjustment accompanies, or of objects in thinking which we have to execute a
movement. Thus Lange says that when he tries to imagine a certain colored circle, he ﬁnds
himself ﬁrst making with his eyes the movement to which the circle corresponds, and then
imagining the color, etc., as a consequence of the movement.
"Let my reader," he adds, "close his eyes and think of an extended object, for
instance a pencil. He will easily notice that he ﬁrst makes a slight movement [of
the eyes] corresponding to the straight line, and that he often gets a weak
feeling of innervation of the hand as if touching the pencil's surface. So, in
thinking of a certain sound, we turn towards its direction or repeat muscularly
its rhythm, or articulate an imitation of it."[373]
But it is one thing to point out the presence of muscular contractions as constant [Pg 445]
concomitants of our thoughts, and another thing to say, with Herr Lange, that thought is
made possible by muscular contraction alone. It may well be that where the object of
thought consists of two parts, one perceived by movement and another not, the part
perceived by movement is habitually called up ﬁrst and ﬁxed in the mind by the movement's
execution, whilst the other part comes secondarily as the movement's mere associate. But
even were this the rule with all men (which I doubt[374]), it would only be a practical habit,
not an ultimate necessity. In the chapter on the Will we shall learn that movements
themselves are results of images coming before the mind, images sometimes of feelings in
the moving part, sometimes of the movement's effects on eye and ear, and sometimes (if the
movement be originally reﬂex or instinctive), of its natural stimulus or exciting cause. It is,
in truth, contrary to all wider and deeper analogies to deny that any quality of feeling
whatever can directly rise up in the form of an idea, and to assert that only ideas of
movement can call other ideas to the mind.
So much for adjustment and preperception. The only third process I can think of as always
present is the inhibition of irrelevant movements and ideas. This seems, however, to be a
feature incidental to voluntary attention rather than the essential feature of attention at large,
[375] and need not concern us particularly now. Noting merely the intimate connection which [Pg 446]
our account so far establishes between attention, on the one hand, and imagination,
discrimination, and memory, on the other, let us draw a couple of practical inferences, and
then pass to the more speculative problem that remains.
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The practical inferences are pedagogic. First, to strengthen attention in children who care
nothing for the subject they are studying and let their wits go wool-gathering. The interest
here must be 'derived' from something that the teacher associates with the task, a reward or a
punishment if nothing less external comes to mind. Prof. Ribot says:
"A child refuses to read; he is incapable of keeping his mind ﬁxed on the letters,
which have no attraction for him; but he looks with avidity upon the pictures
contained in a book. 'What do they mean?' he asks. The father replies: 'When
you can read, the book will tell you.' After several colloquies like this, the child
resigns himself and falls to work, ﬁrst slackly, then the habit grows, and ﬁnally
he shows an ardor which has to be restrained. This is a case of the genesis of
voluntary attention. An artiﬁcial and indirect desire has to be grafted on a
natural and direct one. Reading has no immediate attractiveness, but it has a
borrowed one, and that is enough. The child is caught in the wheelwork, the
ﬁrst step is made."
I take another example, from M. B. Perez:[376]
"A child of six years, habitually prone to mind-wandering, sat down one day to
the piano of his own accord to repeat an air by which his mother had been
charmed. His exercises lasted an hour. The same child at the age of seven,
seeing his brother busy with tasks in vacation, went and sat at his father's desk.
'What are you doing there?' his nurse said, surprised at so ﬁnding him. 'I am,'
said the child, 'learning a page of German; it isn't very amusing, but it is for an
agreeable surprise to mamma.'"
Here, again, a birth of voluntary attention, grafted this time on a sympathetic instead of a
selﬁsh sentiment like that of the ﬁrst example. The piano, the German, awaken no [Pg 447]
spontaneous attention; but they arouse and maintain it by borrowing a force from elsewhere.
[377]

Second, take that mind-wandering which at a later age may trouble us whilst reading or
listening to a discourse. If attention be the reproduction of the sensation from within, the
habit of reading not merely with the eye, and of listening not merely with the ear, but of
articulating to one's self the words seen or heard, ought to deepen one's attention to the
latter. Experience shows that this is the case. I can keep my wandering mind a great deal
more closely upon a conversation or a lecture if I actively re-echo to myself the words than
if I simply hear them; and I ﬁnd a number of my students who report beneﬁt from
voluntarily adopting a similar course.[378]
Second, a teacher who wishes to engage the attention of his class must knit his novelties on
to things of which they already have preperceptions. The old and familiar is readily attended
to by the mind and helps to hold in turn the new, forming, in Herbartian phraseology, an
'Apperceptionsmasse' for it. Of course it is in every case a very delicate problem to know
what 'Apperceptionsmasse' to use. Psychology can only lay down the general rule.
IS VOLUNTARY ATTENTION A RESULTANT OR A FORCE?
When, a few pages back, I symbolized the 'ideational preparation' element in attention by a
brain-cell played upon from within, I added 'by other brain-cells, or by some spiritual force,'
without deciding which. The question 'which?' is one of those central psychologic mysteries
which part the schools. When we reﬂect that the turnings of our attention form the nucleus
of our inner self; when we see (as in the chapter on the Will we shall see) that volition is
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nothing but attention; when we believe that our autonomy in the midst of nature depends on
our not being pure effect, but a cause,—
Principium quoddam quod fati fœdera rumpat,
Ex inﬁnito ne causant causa sequatur—
we must admit that the question whether attention involve such a principle of spiritual [Pg 448]
activity or not is metaphysical as well as psychological, and is well worthy of all the pains
we can bestow on its solution. It is in fact the pivotal question of metaphysics, the very
hinge on which our picture of the world shall swing from materialism, fatalism, monism,
towards spiritualism, freedom, pluralism,—or else the other way.
It goes back to the automaton-theory. If feeling is an inert accompaniment, then of course
the brain-cell can be played upon only by other brain-cells, and the attention which we give
at any time to any subject, whether in the form of sensory adaptation or of 'preperception,' is
the fatally predetermined effect of exclusively material laws. If, on the other hand, the
feeling which coexists with the brain-cells' activity reacts dynamically upon that activity,
furthering or checking it, then the attention is in part, at least, a cause. It does not
necessarily follow, of course, that this reactive feeling should be 'free' in the sense of having
its amount and direction undetermined in advance, for it might very well be predetermined
in all these particulars. If it were so, our attention would not be materially determined, nor
yet would it be 'free' in the sense of being spontaneous or unpredictable in advance. The
question is of course a purely speculative one, for we have no means of objectively
ascertaining whether our feelings react on our nerve-processes or not; and those who answer
the question in either way do so in consequence of general analogies and presumptions
drawn from other ﬁelds. As mere conceptions, the effect-theory and the cause-theory of
attention are equally clear; and whoever afﬁrms either conception to be true must do so on
metaphysical or universal rather than on scientiﬁc or particular grounds.

As regards immediate sensorial attention hardly any one is tempted to regard it as anything
but an effect.[379] We are 'evolved' so as to respond to special stimuli by special [Pg 449]
accommodative acts which produce clear perceptions on the one hand in us, and on the other
hand such feelings of inner activity as were above described. The accommodation and the
resultant feeling are the attention. We don't bestow it, the object draws it from us. The object
has the initiative, not the mind.
Derived attention, where there is no voluntary effort, seems also most plausibly to be a mere
effect. The object again takes the initiative and draws our attention to itself, not by reason of
its own intrinsic interest, but because it is connected with some other interesting thing. Its
brain-process is connected with another that is either excited, or tending to be excited, and
the liability to share the excitement and become aroused is the liability to 'preperception' in
which the attention consists. If I have received an insult, I may not be actively thinking of it
all the time, yet the thought of it is in such a state of heightened irritability, that the place
where I received it or the man who inﬂicted it cannot be mentioned in my hearing without
my attention bounding, as it were, in that direction, as the imagination of the whole
transaction revives. Where such a stirring-up occurs, organic adjustment must exist as well,
and the ideas must innervate to some degree the muscles. Thus the whole process of
involuntary derived attention is accounted for if we grant that there is something interesting [Pg 450]
enough to arouse and ﬁx the thought of whatever may be connected with it. This ﬁxing is
the attention; and it carries with it a vague sense of activity going on, and of acquiescence,
furtherance, and adoption, which makes us feel the activity to be our own.
This reinforcement of ideas and impressions by the pre-existing contents of the mind was
what Herbart had in mind when he gave the name of apperceptive attention to the variety we
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describe. We easily see now why the lover's tap should be heard—it ﬁnds a nerve-centre half
ready in advance to explode. We see how we can attend to a companion's voice in the midst
of noises which pass unnoticed though objectively much louder than the words we hear.
Each word is doubly awakened; once from without by the lips of the talker, but already
before that from within by the premonitory processes irradiating from the previous words,
and by the dim arousal of all processes that are connected with the 'topic' of the talk. The
irrelevant noises, on the other hand, are awakened only once. They form an unconnected
train. The boys at school, inattentive to the teacher except when he begins an anecdote, and
then all pricking up their ears, are as easily explained. The words of the anecdote shoot into
association with exciting objects which react and ﬁx them; the other words do not. Similarly
with the grammar heard by the purist and Herbart's other examples quoted on page 418.
Even where the attention is voluntary, it is possible to conceive of it as an effect, and not a
cause, a product and not an agent. The things we attend to come to us by their own laws.
Attention creates no idea; an idea must already be there before we can attend to it. Attention
only ﬁxes and retains what the ordinary laws of association bring 'before the footlights' of
consciousness. But the moment we admit this we see that the attention per se, the feeling of
attending need no more ﬁx and retain the ideas than it need bring them. The associates
which bring them also ﬁx them by the interest which they lend. In short, voluntary and
involuntary attention may be essentially the same. It is true that where the ideas are
intrinsically very unwelcome and the effort to attend to them is great, it seems to us as if the [Pg 451]
frequent renewal of the effort were the very cause by which they are held fast, and we
naturally think of the effort as an original force. In fact it is only to the effort to attend, not
to the mere attending, that we are seriously tempted to ascribe spontaneous power. We think
we can make more of it if we will; and the amount which we make does not seem a ﬁxed
function of the ideas themselves, as it would necessarily have to be if our effort were an
effect and not a spiritual force. But even here it is possible to conceive the facts
mechanically and to regard the effort as a mere effect.
Effort is felt only where there is a conﬂict of interests in the mind. The idea A may be
intrinsically exciting to us. The idea Z may derive its interest from association with some
remoter good. A may be our sweetheart, Z may be some condition of our soul's salvation.
Under these circumstances, if we succeed in attending to Z at all it is always with
expenditure of effort. The 'ideational preparation,' the 'preperception' of A keeps going on of
its own accord, whilst that of Z needs incessant pulses of voluntary reinforcement—that is,
we have the feeling of voluntary reinforcement (or effort) at each successive moment in
which the thought of Z ﬂares brightly up in our mind. Dynamically, however, that may mean
only this: that the associative processes which make Z triumph are really the stronger, and in
A's absence would make us give a 'passive' and unimpeded attention to Z; but, so long as A
is present, some of of their force is used to inhibit the processes concerned with A. Such
inhibition is a partial neutralization of the brain-energy which would otherwise be available
for ﬂuent thought. But what is lost for thought is converted into feeling, in this case into the
peculiar feeling of effort, difﬁculty, or strain.
The stream of our thought is like a river. On the whole easy simple ﬂowing predominates in
it, the drift of things is with the pull of gravity, and effortless attention is the rule. But at
intervals an obstruction, a set-back, a log-jam occurs, stops the current, creates an eddy, and
makes things temporarily move the other way. If a real river could feel, it would feel these [Pg 452]
eddies and set-backs as places of effort. "I am here ﬂowing," it would say, "in the direction
of greatest resistance, instead of ﬂowing, as usual, in the direction of least. My effort is what
enables me to perform this feat." Really, the effort would only be a passive index that the
feat was being performed. The agent would all the while be the total downward drift of the
rest of the water, forcing some of it upwards in this spot; and although, on the average, the
direction of least resistance is downwards, that would be no reason for its not being upwards
now and then. Just so with our voluntary acts of attention. They are momentary arrests,
coupled with a peculiar feeling, of portions of the stream. But the arresting force, instead of
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being this peculiar feeling itself, may be nothing but the processes by which the collision is
produced. The feeling of effort may be 'an accompaniment,' as Mr. Bradley says, 'more or
less superﬂuous,' and no more contribute to the result than the pain in a man's ﬁnger, when a
hammer falls on it, contributes to the hammer's weight. Thus the notion that our effort in
attending is an original faculty, a force additional to the others of which brain and mind are
the seat, may be an abject superstition. Attention may have to go, like many a faculty once
deemed essential, like many a verbal phantom, like many an idol of the tribe. It may be an
excrescence on Psychology. No need of it to drag ideas before consciousness or ﬁx them,
when we see how perfectly they drag and ﬁx each other there.

I have stated the effect-theory as persuasively as I can.[380] It is a clear, strong, wellequipped conception, and like all such, is ﬁtted to carry conviction, where there is no
contrary proof. The feeling of effort certainly may be an inert accompaniment and not the
active element which it seems. No measurements are as yet performed (it is safe to say none
ever will be performed) which can show that it contributes energy to the result. We may then
regard attention as a superﬂuity, or a 'Luxus,' and dogmatize against its causal function with [Pg 453]
no feeling in our hearts but one of pride that we are applying Occam's razor to an entity that
has multiplied itself 'beyond necessity.'
But Occam's razor, though a very good rule of method, is certainly no law of nature. The
laws of stimulation and of association may well be indispensable actors in all attention's
performances, and may even be a good enough 'stock-company' to carry on many
performances without aid; and yet they may at times simply form the background for a 'starperformer,' who is no more their 'inert accompaniment' or their 'incidental product' than
Hamlet is Horatio's and Ophelia's. Such a star-performer would be the voluntary effort to
attend, if it were an original psychic force. Nature may, I say, indulge in these
complications; and the conception that she has done so in this case is, I think, just as clear (if
not as 'parsimonious' logically) as the conception that she has not. To justify this assertion,
let us ask just what the effort to attend would effect if it were an original force.
It would deepen and prolong the stay in consciousness of innumerable ideas which else
would fade more quickly away. The delay thus gained might not be more than a second in
duration—but that second might be critical; for in the constant rising and falling of
considerations in the mind, where two associated systems of them are nearly in equilibrium
it is often a matter of but a second more or less of attention at the outset, whether one system
shall gain force to occupy the ﬁeld and develop itself, and exclude the other, or be excluded
itself by the other. When developed, it may make us act; and that act may seal our doom.
When we come to the chapter on the Will, we shall see that the whole drama of the
voluntary life hinges on the amount of attention, slightly more or slightly less, which rival
motor ideas may receive. But the whole feeling of reality, the whole sting and excitement of
our voluntary life, depends on our sense that in it things are really being decided from one
moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged
innumerable ages ago. This appearance, which makes life and history tingle with such a
tragic zest, may not be an illusion. As we grant to the advocate of the mechanical theory that [Pg 454]
it may be one, so he must grant to us that it may not. And the result is two conceptions of
possibility face to face with no facts deﬁnitely enough known to stand as arbiter between
them.
Under these circumstances, one can leave the question open whilst waiting for light, or one
can do what most speculative minds do, that is, look to one's general philosophy to incline
the beam. The believers in mechanism do so without hesitation, and they ought not to refuse
a similar privilege to the believers in a spiritual force. I count myself among the latter, but as
my reasons are ethical they are hardly suited for introduction into a psychological work.[381]
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The last word of psychology here is ignorance, for the 'forces' engaged are certainly too
delicate and numerous to be followed in detail. Meanwhile, in view of the strange arrogance
with which the wildest materialistic speculations persist in calling themselves 'science,' it is
well to recall just what the reasoning is, by which the effect-theory of attention is conﬁrmed.
It is an argument from analogy, drawn from rivers, reﬂex actions and other material
phenomena where no consciousness appears to exist at all, and extended to cases where
consciousness seems the phenomenon's essential feature. The consciousness doesn't count,
these reasoners say; it doesn't exist for science, it is nil; you mustn't think about it at all. The
intensely reckless character of all this needs no comment. It is making the mechanical
theory true per fas aut nefas. For the sake of that theory we make inductions from
phenomena to others that are startlingly unlike them; and we assume that a complication
which Nature has introduced (the presence of feeling and of effort, namely) is not worthy of
scientiﬁc recognition at all. Such conduct may conceivably be wise, though I doubt it; but
scientiﬁc, as contrasted with metaphysical, it cannot seriously be called.[382]
INATTENTION.

[Pg 455]

Having spoken fully of attention, let me add a word about inattention.
We do not notice the ticking of the clock, the noise of the city streets, or the roaring of the
brook near the house; and even the din of a foundry or factory will not mingle with the
thoughts of its workers, if they have been there long enough. When we ﬁrst put on
spectacles, especially if they be of certain curvatures, the bright reﬂections they give of the
windows, etc., mixing with the ﬁeld of view, are very disturbing. In a few days we ignore
them altogether. Various entoptic images, muscæ volitantes, etc., although constantly
present, are hardly ever known. The pressure of our clothes and shoes, the beating of our
hearts and arteries, our breathing, certain steadfast bodily pains, habitual odors, tastes in the
mouth, etc., are examples from other senses, of the same lapse into unconsciousness of any
too unchanging content—a lapse which Hobbes has expressed in the well-known phrase,
"Semper idem sentire ac non sentire ad idem revertunt."
The cause of the unconsciousness is certainly not the mere blunting of the sense-organs.
Were the sensation important, we should notice it well enough; and we can at any moment
notice it by expressly throwing our attention upon it,[383] provided it have not become so
inveterate that inattention to it is ingrained in our very constitution, as in the case of the
muscæ volitantes the double retinal images, etc. But even in these cases artiﬁcial conditions
of observation and patience soon give us command of the impression which we seek. The
inattentiveness must then be a habit grounded on higher conditions than mere sensorial
fatigue.
Helmholtz has formulated a general law of inattention which we shall have to study in the [Pg 456]
next chapter but one. Helmholtz's law is that we leave all impressions unnoticed which are
valueless to us as signs by which to discriminate things. At most such impressions fuse with
their consorts into an aggregate effect. The upper partial tones which make human voices
differ make them differ as wholes only—we cannot dissociate the tones themselves. The
odors which form integral parts of the characteristic taste of certain substances, meat, ﬁsh,
cheese, butter, wine, do not come as odors to our attention. The various muscular and tactile
feelings that make up the perception of the attributes 'wet,' 'elastic,' 'doughy,' etc., are not
singled out separately for what they are. And all this is due to an inveterate habit we have
contracted, of passing from them immediately to their import and letting their substantive
nature alone. They have formed connections in the mind which it is now difﬁcult to break;
they are constituents of processes which it is hard to arrest, and which differ altogether from
what the processes of catching the attention would be. In the cases Helmholtz has in mind,
not only we but our ancestors have formed these habits. In the cases we started from,
however, of the mill-wheel, the spectacles, the factory din, the tight shoes, etc., the habits of
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inattention are more recent, and the manner of their genesis seems susceptible,
hypothetically at least, of being traced.
How can impressions that are not needed by the intellect be thus shunted off from all
relation to the rest of consciousness? Professor G. E. Müller has made a plausible reply to
this question, and most of what follows is borrowed from him.[384] He begins with the fact
that
"When we ﬁrst come out of a mill or factory, in which we have remained long
enough to get wonted to the noise, we feel as if something were lacking. Our
total feeling of existence is different from what it was when we were in the
mill.... A friend writes to me: 'I have in my room a little clock which does not
run quite twenty-four hours without winding. In consequence of this, it often
stops. So soon as this happens, I notice it, whereas I naturally fail to notice it
when going. When this ﬁrst began to happen, there was this modiﬁcation: I
suddenly felt an undeﬁned uneasiness or sort of void, without being able to say
what was the matter; and only after some consideration did I ﬁnd the cause in
the stopping of the clock.'"

[Pg 457]

That the stopping of an unfelt stimulus may itself be felt is a well-known fact: the sleeper in
church who wakes when the sermon ends; the miller who does the same when his wheel
stands still, are stock examples. Now (since every impression falling on the nervous system
must propagate itself somewhither), Müller suggests that impressions which come to us
when the thought-centres are preoccupied with other matters may thereby be blocked or
inhibited from invading these centres, and may then overﬂow into lower paths of discharge.
And he farther suggests that if this process recur often enough, the side-track thus created
will grow so permeable as to be used, no matter what may be going on in the centres above.
In the acquired inattention mentioned, the constant stimulus always caused disturbance at
ﬁrst; and consciousness of it was extruded successfully only when the brain was strongly
excited about other things. Gradually the extrusion became easier, and at last automatic.
The side-tracks which thus learn to draft off the stimulations that interfere with thought
cannot be assigned with any precision. They probably terminate in organic processes, or
insigniﬁcant muscular contractions which, when stopped by the cessation of their instigating
cause, immediately give us the feeling that something is gone from our existence (as Müller
says), or (as his friend puts it) the feeling of a void.[385]
Müller's suggestion awakens another. It is a well-known fact that persons striving to keep
their attention on a difﬁcult subject will resort to movements of various unmeaning kinds,
such as pacing the room, drumming with the ﬁngers, playing with keys or watch-chain,
scratching head, pulling mustache, vibrating foot, or what not, according to the individual. [Pg 458]
There is an anecdote of Sir W. Scott, when a boy, rising to the head of his class by cutting
off from the jacket of the usual head-boy a button which the latter was in the habit of
twirling in his ﬁngers during the lesson. The button gone, its owner's power of reciting also
departed.—Now much of this activity is unquestionably due to the overﬂow of emotional
excitement during anxious and concentrated thought. It drains away nerve-currents which if
pent up within the thought-centres would very likely make the confusion there worse
confounded. But may it not also be a means of drafting off all the irrelevant sensations of
the moment, and so keeping the attention more exclusively concentrated upon its inner task?
Each individual usually has his own peculiar habitual movement of this sort. A downward
nerve-path is thus kept constantly open during concentrated thought; and as it seems to be a
law of frequent (if not of universal) application, that incidental stimuli tend to discharge
through paths that are already discharging rather than through others, the whole arrangement
might protect the thought-centres from interference from without. Were this the true
rationale of these peculiar movements, we should have to suppose that the sensations
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produced by each phase of the movement itself are also drafted off immediately by the next
phase and help to keep the circular process agoing. I offer the suggestion for what it is
worth; the connection of the movements themselves with the continued effort of attention is
certainly a genuine and curious fact.

[322]

Bain mentions attention in the Senses and the Intellect, p. 558, and even gives a
theory of it on pp. 370-374 of the Emotions of the Will. I shall recur to this theory
later on.

[323]

"The ﬁrst and most important, but also the most difﬁcult, task at the outset of an
education is to overcome gradually the inattentive dispersion of mind which
shows itself wherever the organic life preponderates over the intellectual. The
training of animals ... must be in the ﬁrst instance based on the awakening of
attention (cf. Adrian Leonard, Essai sur l'Education des Animaux, Lille, 1842),
that is to say, we must seek to make them gradually perceive separately things
which, if left to themselves, would not be attended to, because they would fuse
with a great sum of other sensorial stimuli to a confused total impression of which
each separate item only darkens and interferes with the rest. Similarly at ﬁrst with
the human child. The enormous difﬁculties of deaf-mute- and especially of idiotinstruction is principally due to the slow and painful manner in which we succeed
in bringing out from the general confusion of perception single items with
sufﬁcient sharpness." (Waitz, Lehrb. d. Psychol., p. 632.)

[324]

Elements, part i, chap. ii, ﬁn.

[325]

Lectures on Metaphysics, lecture xiv.

[326]

Nature, vol. iii, p. 281 (1871).

[327]

If a lot of dots or strokes on a piece of paper be exhibited for a moment to a
person in normal condition, with the request that he say how many are there, he
will ﬁnd that they break into groups in his mind's eye, and that whilst he is
analyzing and counting one group in his memory the others dissolve. In short, the
impression made by the dots changes rapidly into something else. In the trancesubject, on the contrary, it seems to stick; I ﬁnd that persons in the hypnotic state
easily count the dots in the mind's eye so long as they do not much exceed twenty
in number.

[328]

Mr. Cattell made Jevons's experiment in a much more precise way
(Philosophische Studien, iii, 121 ff.). Cards were ruled with short lines, varying in
number from four to ﬁfteen, and exposed to the eye for a hundredth of a second.
When the number was but four or ﬁve, no mistakes as a rule were made. For
higher numbers the tendency was to under- rather than to over-estimate. Similar
experiments were tried with letters and ﬁgures, and gave the same result. When
the letters formed familiar words, three times as many of them could be named as
when their combination was meaningless. If the words formed a sentence, twice
as many of them could be caught as when they had no connection. "The sentence
was then apprehended as a whole. If not apprehended thus, almost nothing is
apprehended of the several words; but if the sentence as a whole is apprehended,
then the words appear very distinct."—Wundt and his pupil Dietze had tried
similar experiments on rapidly repeated strokes of sound. Wundt made them
follow each other in groups, and found that groups of twelve strokes at most could
be recognized and identiﬁed when they succeeded each other at the most
favorable rate, namely, from three to ﬁve tenths of a second (Phys. Psych., ii,
215). Dietze found that by mentally subdividing the groups into sub-groups as one
listened, as many as forty strokes could be identiﬁed as a whole. They were then
grasped as eight sub-groups of ﬁve, or as ﬁve of eight strokes each.
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(Philosophische Studien, ii, 362.)—Later in Wundt's Laboratory, Bechterew made
observations on two simultaneously elapsing series of metronome strokes, of
which one contained one stroke more than the other. The most favorable rate of
succession was 0.3 sec., and he then discriminated a group of 18 from one of 18 +
1, apparently. (Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1889, 272.)
[329]

Revue Scientiﬁque, vol. 39, p. 684 (May 28, 1887).

[330]

Cf. Chr. Wolff: Psychologia Empirica, § 245. Wolff's account of the phenomena
of attention is in general excellent.

[331]

Pﬂüger's Archiv, xi, 429-31.

[332]

Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, pp. 238-40.

[333]

Ib. p. 262.

[334]

Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 264-6.

[335]

This was the original 'personal equation' observation of Bessel. An Observer
looked through his equatorial telescope to note the moment at which a star
crossed the meridian, the latter being marked in the telescopic ﬁeld of view by a
visible thread, beside which other equidistant threads appear. "Before the star
reached the thread he looked at the clock, and then, with eye at telescope, counted
the seconds by the beat of the pendulum. Since the star seldom passed the
meridian at the exact moment of a beat, the observer, in order to estimate
fractions, had to note its position at the stroke before and at the stroke after the
passage, and to divide the time as the meridian-line seemed to divide the space. If,
e.g., one had counted 20 seconds, and at the 21st the star seemed removed by ac
from the meridian-thread c, whilst at the 22d it was at the distance bc; then, if ac:
bc:: 1: 2, the star would have passed at 21 1/8 seconds. The conditions resemble
those in our experiment: the star is the index-hand, the threads are the scale; and a
time-displacement is to be expected, which with high rapidities may be positive,
and negative with low. The astronomic observations do not permit us to measure
its absolute amount; but that it exists is made certain by the fact than after all
other possible errors are eliminated, there still remains between different
observers a personal difference which is often much larger than that between mere
reaction-times, amounting ... sometimes to more than a second." (Op. cit. p. 270.)

FIG. 35.
[336]

Philosophische Studien, ii, 601.

[337]

Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 273-4; 3d ed. ii, 339; Philosophische Studien, ii, 621 ff.
—I know that I am stupid, but I confess I ﬁnd these theoretical statements,
especially Wundt's, a little hazy. Herr v. Tschisch considers it impossible that the
perception of the index's position should come in too late, and says it demands no
particular attention (p. 622). It seems, however, that this can hardly be the case.
Both observers speak of the difﬁculty of seeing the index at the right moment.
The case is quite different from that of distributing the attention impartially over
simultaneous momentary sensations. The bell or other signal gives a momentary
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sensation, the index a continuous one, of motion. To note any one position of the
latter is to interrupt this sensation of motion and to substitute an entirely different
percept—one, namely, of position—for it, during a time however brief. This
involves a sudden change in the manner of attending to the revolutions of the
index; which change ought to take place neither sooner nor later than the
momentary impression, and ﬁx the index as it is then and there visible. Now this is
not a case of simply getting two sensations at once and so feeling them—which
would be an harmonious act; but of stopping one and changing it into another,
whilst we simultaneously get a third. Two of these acts are discrepant, and the
whole three rather interfere with each other. It becomes hard to 'ﬁx' the index at
the very instant that we catch the momentary impression; so we fall into a way of
ﬁxing it either at the last possible moment before, or at the ﬁrst possible moment
after, the impression comes.
This at least seems to me the more probable state of affairs. If we ﬁx the index
before the impression really comes, that means that we perceive it too late. But
why do we ﬁx it before when the impressions come slow and simple, and after
when they come rapid and complex? And why under certain conditions is there no
displacement at all? The answer which suggests itself is that when there is just
enough leisure between the impressions for the attention to adapt itself
comfortably both to them and to the index (one second in W.'s experiments), it
carries on the two processes at once; when the leisure is excessive, the attention,
following its own laws of ripening, and being ready to note the index before the
other impression comes, notes it then, since that is the moment of easiest action,
whilst the impression, which comes a moment later, interferes with noting it
again; and ﬁnally, that when the leisure is insufﬁcient, the momentary
impressions, being the more ﬁxed data, are attended to ﬁrst, and the index is ﬁxed
a little later on. The noting of the index at too early a moment would be the noting
of a real fact, with its analogue in many other rhythmical experiences. In reactiontime experiments, for example, when, in a regularly recurring series, the stimulus
is once in a while omitted, the observer sometimes reacts as if it came. Here, as
Wundt somewhere observes, we catch ourselves acting merely because our
inward preparation is complete. The 'ﬁxing' of the index is a sort of action; so that
my interpretation tallies with facts recognized elsewhere; but Wundt's explanation
(if I understand it) of the experiments requires us to believe that an observer like
v. Tschisch shall steadily and without exception get an hallucination of a bellstroke before the latter occurs, and not hear the real bell-stroke afterwards. I
doubt whether this is possible, and I can think of no analogue to it in the rest of
our experience. The whole subject deserves to be gone over again. To Wundt is
due the highest credit for his patience in working out the facts. His explanation of
them in his earlier work (Vorlesungen üb. Menschen und Thierseele, i, 37-42,
365-371) consisted merely in the appeal to the unity of consciousness, and may be
considered quite crude.
[338]

Note that the permanent interests are themselves grounded in certain objects and
relations in which our interest is immediate and instinctive.

[339]

Herbart: Psychologie als Wissenschaft, § 128.

[340]

Sir W. Hamilton. Metaphysics, lecture xiv.

[341]

Mental Physiol., § 124. The oft-cited case of soldiers not perceiving that they are
wounded is of an analogous sort.

[342]

Prof. J. M. Cattell made experiments to which we shall refer further on, on the
degree to which reaction-times might be shortened by distracting or voluntarily
concentrating the attention. He says of the latter series that "the averages show
that the attention can be kept strained, that is, the centres kept in a state of
unstable equilibrium, for one second" (Mind, xi, 240).

[343]

Physiologische Optik, § 32.
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[344]

"'Genius,' says Helvetius, 'is nothing but a continued attention (une attention
suivie).' 'Genius,' says Buffon, 'is only a protracted patience (une longue
patience).' 'In the exact sciences, at least,' says Cuvier, 'it is the patience of a
sound intellect, when invincible, which truly constitutes genius.' And Chesterﬁeld
has also observed that 'the power of applying an attention, steady and
undissipated, to a single object, is the sure mark of a superior genius.'" (Hamilton:
Lect. on Metaph., lecture xiv.)

[345]

See, e.g., Ulrici: Leib u. Seele, ii, 28; Lotze: Metaphysik, § 273; Fechner,
Revision d. Psychophysik, xix; G. E. Müller: Zur Theorie d. sinnl.
Aufmerksamkeit, $ 1; Stumpf: Tonpsychologie, i, 71.

[346]

Fechner, op. cit. p. 271.

[347]

Tonpsychologie, i, p. 71.

[348]

Compare, on clearness as the essential fruit of attention, Lotze's Metaphysic, §
273.

[349]

Elements, part i, chap. ii.

[350]

Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 226.

[351]

By a negative value of the reaction-time Wundt means the case of the reactive
movement occurring before the stimulus.

[352]

Op. cit. ii, 239.

[353]

The reader must not suppose this phenomenon to be of frequent occurrence.
Experienced observers, like Exner and Cattell, deny having met with it in their
personal experience.

[354]

Op. cit. pp. 241-5.

[355]

It should be added that Mr. J. M. Cattell (Mind, xi, 33) found, on repeating
Wundt's experiments with a disturbing noise upon two practised observers, that
the simple reaction-time either for light or sound was hardly perceptibly
increased. Making strong voluntary concentration of attention shortened it by
about 0.013 seconds on an average (p. 240). Performing mental additions whilst
waiting for the stimulus lengthened it more than anything, apparently. For other,
less careful, observations, compare Obersteiner, in Brain, i, 439. Cattell's negative
results show how far some persons can abstract their attention from stimuli by
which others would be disturbed.—A. Bartels (Versuche über die Ablenkung d.
Aufmerksamkeit, Dorpat, 1889) found that a stimulus to one eye sometimes
prevented, sometimes improved, the perception of a quickly ensuing very faint
stimulus to the other.

[356]

Cf. Wundt, Physiol. Psych., 1st ed. p. 794.

[357]

Beiträge zur Experimentellen Psychologie, Heft i, pp. 73-106 (1889).

[358]

To say the very least, he always brought his articulatory innervation close to the
discharging point. Herr M. describes a tightening of the head-muscles as
characteristic of the attitude of attention to the reply.

[359]

Psychophysik, Bd. ii, pp. 475-6.

[360]

I must say that I am wholly unconscious of the peculiar feelings in the scalp
which Fechner goes on to describe. "The feeling of strained attention in the
different sense-organs seems to be only a muscular one produced in using these
various organs by setting in motion, by a sort of reﬂex action, the muscles which
belong to them. One can ask, then, with what particular muscular contraction the
sense of strained attention in the effort to recall something is associated? On this
question my own feeling gives me a decided answer; it comes to me distinctly, not
as a sensation of tension in the inside of the head, but as a feeling of strain and
contraction in the scalp with a pressure from without inwards over the whole
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cranium, undoubtedly caused by a contraction of the muscles of the scalp. This
harmonizes very well with the German popular expression den Kopf
zusammennehmen, etc., etc. In a former illness, in which I could not endure the
slightest effort of continuous thought, and had no theoretical bias on this question,
the muscles of the scalp, especially those of the occiput, assumed a fairly morbid
degree of sensibility whenever I tried to think." (Ibid. pp. 490-491.) In an early
writing by Professor Mach, after speaking of the way in which by attention we
decompose complex musical sounds into their elements, this investigator
continues: "It is more than a ﬁgure of speech when one says that we 'search'
among the sounds. This hearkening search is very observably a bodily activity,
just like attentive looking in the case of the eye. If, obeying the drift of
physiology, we understand by attention nothing mystical, but a bodily disposition,
it is most natural to seek it in the variable tension of the muscles of the ear. Just
so, what common men call attentive looking reduces itself mainly to
accommodating and setting of the optic axes.... According to this, it seems to me a
very plausible view that quite generally Attention has its seat in the mechanism of
the body. If nervous work is being done through certain channels, that by itself is
a mechanical ground for other channels being closed." (Wien. Sitzungsberichte,
Math. Naturw., xlviii, 2, 297. 1863.)
[361]

Physiol. Optik, p. 741.

[362]

Hermann's Handbuch, iii, i, 548.

[363]

Helmholtz: Tonempﬁndungen, 3d ed. 85-9 (Engl. tr., 2d ed. 50, 51; see also pp.
60-1).

[364]

Physiol. Psych., ii, 209.

[365]

Physiol. Optik, 741.

[366]

P. 728.

[367]

Popular Scientiﬁc Lectures, Eng. Trans., p. 295.

[368]

Similarly in the verses which some one tried to puzzle me with the other day:
"Gui n'a beau dit, qui sabot dit, nid a beau dit elle?"

[369]

I cannot refrain from referring in a note to an additional set of facts instanced by
Lotze in his Medizinische Psychologie, § 431, although I am not satisﬁed with the
explanation, fatigue of the sense-organ, which he gives. "In quietly lying and
contemplating a wall-paper pattern, sometimes it is the ground, sometimes the
design, which is clearer and consequently comes nearer.... Arabesques of
monochromic many-convoluted lines now strike us as composed of one, now of
another connected linear system, and all without any intention on our part. [This
is beautifully seen in Moorish patterns; but a simple diagram like Fig. 39 also
shows it well.
We see it sometimes as two large triangles
superposed, sometimes as a hexagon with angles
spanning its sides, sometimes as six small triangles
stuck together at their corners.]... Often it happens in
revery that when we stare at a picture, suddenly
some one of its features will be lit up with especial
clearness, although neither its optical character nor
its meaning discloses any motive for such an arousal
of the attention.... To one in process of becoming
drowsy the surroundings alternately fade into
darkness and abruptly brighten up. The talk of the
bystanders seems now to come from indeﬁnite
distances; but at the next moment it startles us by its
threatening loudness at our very ear," etc. These
variations, which everyone will have noticed, are, it
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seems to me, easily explicable by the very unstable
equilibrium of our ideational centres, of which constant change is the law. We
conceive one set of lines as object, the other as background, and forthwith the ﬁrst
set becomes the set we see. There need be no logical motive for the conceptual
change, the irradiations of brain-tracts by each other, according to accidents of
nutrition, 'like sparks in burnt-up paper,' sufﬁce. The changes during drowsiness
are still more obviously due to this cause.
[370]

The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed. p. 370.

[371]

Psychologie de l'Attention (1889), p. 32 ff.

[372]

Philosophische Studien, iv, 413 ff.

[373]

See Lange, loc. cit. p. 417, for another proof of his view, drawn from the
phenomenon of retinal rivalry.

[374]

Many of my students have at my request experimented with imagined letters of
the alphabet and syllables, and they tell me that they can see them inwardly as
total colored pictures without following their outlines with the eye. I am myself a
bad visualizer, and make movements all the while.—M. L. Marillier, in an article
of eminent introspective power which appeared after my text was written
(Remarques sur le Mécanisme de l'Attention, in Revue Philosophique, vol. xxvii,
p. 566), has contended against Ribot and others for the non-dependence of
sensory upon motor images in their relations to attention. I am glad to cite him as
an ally.

[375]

Drs. Ferrier (Functions of the Brain, §§ 102-3) and Obersteiner (Brain, i, 439 ff.)
treat it as the essential feature. The author whose treatment of the subject is by far
the most thorough and satisfactory is Prof. G. E. Müller, whose little work Zur
Théorie der sinnlichen Aufmerksamkeit, Inauguraldissertation, Leipzig,
Edelmann (1874?), is for learning and acuteness a model of what a monograph
should be. I should like to have quoted from it, but the Germanism of its
composition makes quotation quite impossible. See also G. H. Lewes: Problems
of Life and Mind, 3d Series, Prob. 2, chap. 10; G. H. Schneider: Der menschliche
Wille, 294 ff., 309 ff.; C. Stumpf: Tonpsychologie, i, 67-75; W. B. Carpenter:
Mental Physiology, chap. 3; Cappie in 'Brain,' July 1886 (hyperæmia-theory); J.
Sully in 'Brain,' Oct. 1890.

[376]

L'Enfant de trois à sept Ans, p. 108.

[377]

Psychologie de l'Attention, p. 53.

[378]

Repetition of this sort does not confer intelligence of what is said, it only keeps
the mind from wandering into other channels. The intelligence sometimes comes
in beats, as it were, at the end of sentences, or in the midst of words which were
mere words until then. See above, p. 281.

[379]

The reader will please observe that I am saying all that can possibly be said in
favor of the effect-theory, since, inclining as I do myself to the cause-theory, I do
not want to undervalue the enemy. As a matter of fact, one might begin to take
one's stand against the effect theory at the outset, with the phenomenon of
immediate sensorial attention. One might say that attention causes the movements
of adjustment of the eyes, for example, and is not merely their effect. Hering
writes most emphatically to this effect: "The movements from one point of
ﬁxation to another are occasioned and regulated by the changes of place of the
attention. When an object, seen at ﬁrst indirectly, draws our attention to itself, the
corresponding movement of the eye follows without further ado, as a
consequence of the attention's migration and of our effort to make the object
distinct. The wandering of the attention entails that of the ﬁxation point. Before its
movement begins, its goal is already in consciousness and grasped by the
attention, and the location of this spot in the total space seen is what determines
the direction and amount of the movement of the eye." (Hermann's Handbuch, p.
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534.) I do not here insist on this, because it is hard to tell whether the attention or
the movement comes ﬁrst (Hering's reasons, pp. 535-6, also 544-6, seem to me
ambiguous), and because, even if the attention to the object does come ﬁrst, it
may be a mere effect of stimulus and association. Mach's theory that the will to
look is the space-feeling itself may be compared with Hering's in this place. See
Mach's Beiträge zur Analyse der Empﬁndungen (1886), pp. 55 ff.
[380]

F. H. Bradley, "Is there a Special Activity of Attention?" in 'Mind,' xi, 305, and
Lipps, Grundtatsachen, chaps. iv and xxx, have stated it similarly.

[381]

More will be said of the matter when we come to the chapter on the Will.

[382]

See, for a defence of the notion of inward activity, Mr. James Ward's searching
articles in 'Mind,' xii, 45 and 564.

[383]

It must be admitted that some little time will often elapse before this effort
succeeds. As a child, I slept in a nursery with a very loud-ticking clock, and
remember my astonishment more than once, on listening for its tick, to ﬁnd
myself unable to catch it for what seemed a long space of time; then suddenly it
would break into my consciousness with an almost startling loudness.—M.
Delbœuf somewhere narrates how, sleeping in the country near a mill-dam, he
woke in the night and thought the water had ceased to ﬂow, but on looking out of
the open window saw it ﬂowing in the moonlight, and then heard it too.

[384]

Zur Theorie d. sinnl. Aufmerksamkeit, p. 128 foll.

[385]

I have begun to inquire experimentally whether any of the measurable functions
of the workmen change after the din of machinery stops at a workshop. So far I
have found no constant results as regards either pulse, breathing, or strength of
squeeze by the hand. I hope to prosecute the inquiry farther (May, 1890).

CHAPTER XII.

[Pg 459]

CONCEPTION.
THE SENSE OF SAMENESS.
In Chapter VIII, p. 221, the distinction was drawn between two kinds of knowledge of
things, bare acquaintance with them and knowledge about them. The possibility of two such
knowledges depends on a fundamental psychical peculiarity which may be entitled "the
principle of constancy in the mind's meanings" and which may be thus expressed: "The
same matters can be thought of in successive portions of the mental stream, and some of
these portions can know that they mean the same matters which the other portions meant."
One might put it otherwise by saying that "the mind can always intend, and know when it
intends, to think of the Same."
This sense of sameness is the very keel and backbone of our thinking. We saw in Chapter X
how the consciousness of personal identity reposed on it, the present thought ﬁnding in its
memories a warmth and intimacy which it recognizes as the same warmth and intimacy it
now feels. This sense of identity of the knowing subject is held by some philosophers to be
the only vehicle by which the world hangs together. It seems hardly necessary to say that a
sense of identity of the known object would perform exactly the same unifying function,
even if the sense of subjective identity were lost. And without the intention to think of the
same outer things over and over again, and the sense that we were doing so, our sense of our
own personal sameness would carry us but a little way towards making a universe of our
experience.
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Note, however, that we are in the ﬁrst instance speaking of the sense of sameness from the
point of view of the mind's structure alone, and not from the point of view of the universe.
We are psychologizing, not philosophizing, That is, we do not care whether there be any [Pg 460]
real sameness in things or not, or whether the mind be true or false in its assumptions of it.
Our principle only lays it down that the mind makes continual use of the notion of
sameness, and if deprived of it, would have a different structure from what it has. In a word,
the principle that the mind can mean the Same is true of its meanings, but not necessarily of
aught besides.[386] The mind must conceive as possible that the Same should be before it,
for our experience to be the sort of thing it is. Without the psychological sense of identity,
sameness might rain down upon us from the outer world for ever and we be none the wiser.
With the psychological sense, on the other hand, the outer world might be an unbroken ﬂux,
and yet we should perceive a repeated experience. Even now, the world may be a place in
which the same thing never did and never will come twice. The thing we mean to point at
may change from top to bottom and we be ignorant of the fact. But in our meaning itself we
are not deceived; our intention is to think of the same. The name which I have given to the
principle, in calling it the law of constancy in our meanings, accentuates its subjective
character, and justiﬁes us in laying it down as the most important of all the features of our
mental structure.
Not all psychic life need be assumed to have the sense of sameness developed in this way. In
the consciousness of worms and polyps, though the same realities may frequently impress it,
the feeling of sameness may seldom emerge. We, however, running back and forth, like
spiders on the web they weave, feel ourselves to be working over identical materials and
thinking them in different ways. And the man who identiﬁes the materials most is held to
have the most philosophic human mind.
CONCEPTION DEFINED.

[Pg 461]

The function by which we thus identify a numerically distinct and permanent subject of
discourse is called CONCEPTION; and the thoughts which are its vehicles are called concepts.
But the word 'concept' is often used as if it stood for the object of discourse itself; and this
looseness feeds such evasiveness in discussion that I shall avoid the use of the expression
concept altogether, and speak of 'conceiving state of mind,' or something similar, instead.
The word 'conception' is unambiguous. It properly denotes neither the mental state nor what
the mental state signiﬁes, but the relation between the two, namely, the function of the
mental state in signifying just that particular thing. It is plain that one and the same mental
state can be the vehicle of many conceptions, can mean a particular thing, and a great deal
more besides. If it has such a multiple conceptual function, it may be called an act of
compound conception.
We may conceive realities supposed to be extra-mental, as steam-engine; ﬁctions, as
mermaid; or mere entia rationis, like difference or nonentity. But whatever we do conceive,
our conception is of that and nothing else—nothing else, that is, instead of that, though it
may be of much else in addition to that. Each act of conception results from our attention
singling out some one part of the mass of matter for thought which the world presents, and
holding fast to it, without confusion.[387] Confusion occurs when we do not know whether a [Pg 462]
certain object proposed to us is the same with one of our meanings or not; so that the
conceptual function requires, to be complete, that the thought should not only say 'I mean
this,' but also say 'I don't mean that.'[388]
Each conception thus eternally remains what it is, and never can become another. The mind
may change its states, and its meanings, at different times; may drop one conception and
take up another, but the dropped conception can in no intelligible sense be said to change
into its successor. The paper, a moment ago white, I may now see to have been scorched
black. But my conception 'white' does not change into my conception 'black.' On the
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contrary, it stays alongside of the objective blackness, as a different meaning in my mind,
and by so doing lets me judge the blackness as the paper's change. Unless it stayed, I should
simply say 'blackness' and know no more. Thus, amid the ﬂux of opinions and of physical
things, the world of conceptions, or things intended to be thought about, stands stiff and
immutable, like Plato's Realm of Ideas.[389]
Some conceptions are of things, some of events, some of qualities. Any fact, be it thing,
event, or quality, may be conceived sufﬁciently for purposes of identiﬁcation, if only it be
singled out and marked so as to separate it from other things. Simply calling it 'this' or 'that'
will sufﬁce. To speak in technical language, a subject may be conceived by its denotation, [Pg 463]
with no connotation, or a very minimum of connotation, attached. The essential point is that
it should be re-identiﬁed by us as that which the talk is about; and no full representation of it
is necessary for this, even when it is a fully representable thing.
In this sense, creatures extremely low in the intellectual scale may have conception. All that
is required is that they should recognize the same experience again. A polyp would be a
conceptual thinker if a feeling of 'Hollo! thingumbob again!' ever ﬂitted through its mind.
Most of the objects of our thought, however, are to some degree represented as well as
merely pointed out. Either they are things and events perceived or imagined, or they are
qualities apprehended in a positive way. Even where we have no intuitive acquaintance with
the nature of a thing, if we know any of the relations of it at all, anything about it, that is
enough to individualize and distinguish it from all the other things which we might mean.
Many of our topics of discourse are thus problematical, or deﬁned by their relations only.
We think of a thing about which certain facts must obtain, but we do not yet know how the
thing will look when it is realized. Thus we conceive of a perpetual-motion machine. It is a
quæsitum of a perfectly deﬁnite kind,—we can always tell whether the actual machines
offered us do or do not agree with what we mean by it. The natural possibility or
impossibility of the thing does not touch the question of its conceivability in this
problematic way. 'Round square,' 'black-white-thing,' are absolutely deﬁnite conceptions; it
is a mere accident, as far as conception goes, that they happen to stand for things which
nature never lets us sensibly perceive.[390]
CONCEPTIONS ARE UNCHANGEABLE.

[Pg 464]

The fact that the same real topic of discourse is at one time conceived as a mere 'that' or 'that
which, etc.,' and is at another time conceived with additional speciﬁcations, has been treated
by many authors as a proof that conceptions themselves are fertile and self-developing. A
conception, according to the Hegelizers in philosophy, 'develops its own signiﬁcance,'
'makes explicit what it implicitly contained,' passes, on occasion, 'over into its opposite,' and
in short loses altogether the blankly self-identical character we supposed it to maintain. The
ﬁgure we viewed as a polygon appears to us now as a sum of juxtaposed triangles; the
number hitherto conceived as thirteen is at last noticed to be six plus seven, or prime; the
man thought honest is believed a rogue. Such changes of our opinion are viewed by these
thinkers as evolutions of our conception, from within.
The facts are unquestionable; our knowledge does grow and change by rational and inward
processes, as well as by empirical discoveries. Where the discoveries are empirical, no one
pretends that the propulsive agency, the force that makes the knowledge develop, is mere
conception. All admit it to be our continued exposure to the thing, with its power to impress
our senses. Thus strychnin, which tastes bitter, we ﬁnd will also kill, etc. Now I say that
where the new knowledge merely comes from thinking, the facts are essentially the same,
and that to talk of self-development on the part of our conceptions is a very bad way of
stating the case. Not new sensations, as in the empirical instance, but new conceptions, are [Pg 465]
the indispensable conditions of advance.
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For if the alleged cases of self-development be examined it will be found, I believe, that the
new truth afﬁrms in every case a relation between the original subject of conception and
some new subject conceived later on. These new subjects of conception arise in various
ways. Every one of our conceptions is of something which our attention originally tore out
of the continuum of felt experience, and provisionally isolated so as to make of it an
individual topic of discourse. Every one of them has a way, if the mind is left alone with it,
of suggesting other parts of the continuum from which it was torn, for conception to work
upon in a similar way. This 'suggestion' is often no more than what we shall later know as
the association of ideas. Often, however, it is a sort of invitation to the mind to play, add
lines, break number-groups, etc. Whatever it is, it brings new conceptions into
consciousness, which latter thereupon may or may not expressly attend to the relation in
which the new stands to the old. Thus I have a conception of equidistant lines. Suddenly, I
know not whence, there pops into my head the conception of their meeting. Suddenly again
I think of the meeting and the equidistance both together, and perceive them incompatible.
"Those lines will never meet," I say. Suddenly again the word 'parallel' pops into my head.
'They are parallels,' I continue; and so on. Original conceptions to start with; adventitious
conceptions pushed forward by multifarious psychologic causes; comparisons and
combinations of the two; resultant conceptions to end with; which latter may be of either
rational or empirical relations.
As regards these relations, they are conceptions of the second degree, as one might say, and
their birthplace is the mind itself. In Chapter XXVIII I shall at considerable length defend
the mind's claim to originality and fertility in bringing them forth. But no single one of the
mind's conceptions is fertile of itself as the opinion which I criticise pretends. When the
several notes of a chord are sounded together, we get a new feeling from their combination.
This feeling is due to the mind reacting upon that group of sounds in that determinate way, [Pg 466]
and no one would think of saying of any single note of the chord that it 'developed' of itself
into the other notes or into the feeling of harmony. So of Conceptions. No one of them
develops into any other. But if two of them are thought at once, their relation may come to
consciousness, and form matter for a third conception.
Take 'thirteen' for example, which is said to develop into 'prime.' What really happens is that
we compare the utterly changeless conception of thirteen with various other conceptions,
those of the different multiples of two, three, four, ﬁve, and six, and ascertain that it differs
from them all. Such difference is a freshly ascertained relation. It is only for mere brevity's
sake that we call it a property of the original thirteen, the property of being prime. We shall
see in the next chapter that (if we count out æsthetic and moral relations between things) the
only important relations of which the mere inspection of conceptions makes us aware are
relations of comparison, that is, of difference and no-difference, between them. The
judgment 6 + 7 = 13 expresses the relation of equality between two ideal objects, 13 on the
one hand and 6 + 7 on the other, successively conceived and compared. The judgments 6 +
7 > 12, or 6 + 7 < 14, express in like manner relations of inequality between ideal objects.
But if it be unfair to say that the conception of 6 + 7 generates that of 12 or of 14, surely it is
as unfair to say that it generates that of 13.
The conceptions of 12, 13, and 14 are each and all generated by individual acts of the mind,
playing with its materials. When, comparing two ideal objects, we ﬁnd them equal, the
conception of one of them may be that of a whole and of the other that of all its parts. This
particular case is, it seems to me, the only case which makes the notion of one conception
evolving into another sound plausible. But even in this case the conception, as such, of the
whole does not evolve into the conception, as such, of the parts. Let the conception of some
object as a whole be given ﬁrst. To begin with, it points to and identiﬁes for future thought a
certain that. The 'whole' in question might be one of those mechanical puzzles of which the
difﬁculty is to unlock the parts. In this case, nobody would pretend that the richer and more [Pg 467]
elaborate conception which we gain of the puzzle after solving it came directly out of our
ﬁrst crude conception of it, for it is notoriously the outcome of experimenting with our
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hands. It is true that, as they both mean that same puzzle, our earlier thought and our later
thought have one conceptual function, are vehicles of one conception. But in addition to
being the vehicle of this bald unchanging conception, 'that same puzzle,' the later thought is
the vehicle of all those other conceptions which it took the manual experimentation to
acquire. Now, it is just the same where the whole is mathematical instead of being
mechanical. Let it be a polygonal space, which we cut into triangles, and of which we then
afﬁrm that it is those triangles. Here the experimentation (although usually done by a pencil
in the hands) may be done by the unaided imagination. We hold the space, ﬁrst conceived as
polygonal simply, in our mind's eye until our attention wandering to and fro within it has
carved it into the triangles. The triangles are a new conception, the result of this new
operation. Having once conceived them, however, and compared them with the old polygon
which we originally conceived and which we have never ceased conceiving, we judge them
to ﬁt exactly into its area. The earlier and later conceptions, we say, are of one and the same
space. But this relation between triangles and polygon which the mind cannot help ﬁnding if
it compares them at all, is very badly expressed by saying that the old conception has
developed into the new. New conceptions come from new sensations, new movements, new
emotions, new associations, new acts of attention, and new comparisons of old conceptions,
and not in other ways. Endogenous proliﬁcation is not a mode of growth to which
conceptions can lay claim.
I hope, therefore, that I shall not be accused of huddling mysteries out of sight, when I insist
that the psychology of conception is not the place in which to treat of those of continuity
and change. Conceptions form the one class of entities that cannot under any circumstances
change. They can cease to be, altogether; or they can stay, as what they severally are; but [Pg 468]
there is for them no middle way. They form an essentially discontinuous system, and
translate the process of our perceptual experience, which is naturally a ﬂux, into a set of
stagnant and petriﬁed terms. The very conception of ﬂux itself is an absolutely changeless
meaning in the mind: it signiﬁes just that one thing, ﬂux, immovably.—And, with this, the
doctrine of the ﬂux of the concept may be dismissed, and need not occupy our attention
again.[391]
'ABSTRACT' IDEAS.
We have now to pass to a less excusable mistake. There are philosophers who deny that
associated things can be broken asunder at all, even provisionally, by the conceiving mind.
The opinion known as Nominalism says that we really never frame any conception of the
partial elements of an experience, but are compelled, whenever we think it, to think it in its
totality, just as it came.
I will be silent of mediæval Nominalism, and begin with Berkeley, who is supposed to have
rediscovered the doctrine for himself. His asseverations against 'abstract ideas' are among [Pg 469]
the oftenest quoted passages in philosophic literature.
"It is agreed," he says, "on all hands that the qualities or modes of things do
never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated from all others, but
are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the same object. But, we
are told, the mind being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from
those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself
abstract ideas.... After this manner, it is said, we come by the abstract idea of
man, or, if you please, humanity, or human nature; wherein it is true there is
included color, because there is no man but has some color, but then it can be
neither white, nor black, nor any particular color, because there is no one
particular color wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included stature,
but then it is neither tall stature nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but
something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest.... Whether others have
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this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell: for myself, I
ﬁnd indeed I have a faculty of imagining or representing to myself the ideas of
those particular things I have perceived and of variously compounding and
dividing them.... I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself
abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then, whatever hand or
eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and color. Likewise the idea
of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a
straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any
effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. And it is equally
impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body
moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the
like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever.... And there is
ground to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The
generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend to abstract
notions. It is said they are difﬁcult, and not to be attained without pains and
study.
"Now I would fain know at what time it is men are employed in surmounting
that difﬁculty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary helps for
discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then it seems they are not
conscious of any such painstaking; it remains therefore to be the business of
their childhood. And surely the great and multiplied labor of framing abstract
notions will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to
imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of their sugar-plums and
rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till they have ﬁrst tacked together
numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in their minds abstract general ideas,
and annexed them to every common name they make use of?"[392]
The note, so bravely struck by Berkeley, could not, however, be well sustained in face of the [Pg 470]
fact patent to every human being that we can mean color without meaning any particular
color, and stature without meaning any particular height. James Mill, to be sure, chimes in
heroically in the chapter on Classiﬁcation of his 'Analysis'; but in his son John the
nominalistic voice has grown so weak that, although 'abstract ideas' are repudiated as a
matter of traditional form, the opinions uttered are really nothing but a conceptualism
ashamed to call itself by its own legitimate name.[393] Conceptualism says the mind can
conceive any quality or relation it pleases, and mean nothing but it, in isolation from
everything else in the world. This is, of course, the doctrine which we have professed. John
Mill says:
"The formation of a Concept does not consist in separating the attributes which
are said to compose it from all other attributes of the same object, and enabling
us to conceive those attributes, disjoined from any others. We neither conceive
them, nor think them, nor cognize them in any way, as a thing apart, but solely
as forming, in combination with numerous other attributes, the idea of an
individual object. But, though meaning them only as part of a larger
agglomeration, we have the power of ﬁxing our attention on them, to the
neglect of the other attributes with which we think them combined. While the
concentration of attention lasts, if it is sufﬁciently intense, we may be
temporarily unconscious of any of the other attributes, and may really, for a
brief interval, have nothing-present to our mind but the attributes constituent of
the concept.... General concepts, therefore, we have, properly speaking, none;
we have only complex ideas of objects in the concrete: but we are able to attend
exclusively to certain parts of the concrete idea: and by that exclusive attention
we enable those parts to determine exclusively the course of our thoughts as
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subsequently called up by association; and are in a condition to carry on a train
of meditation or reasoning relating to those parts only, exactly as if we were
able to conceive them separately from the rest."[394]
This is a lovely example of Mill's way of holding piously to his general statements, but
conceding in detail all that their adversaries ask. If there be a better description extant, of a
mind in possession of an 'abstract idea,' than is contained in the words I have italicized, I am [Pg 471]
unacquainted with it. The Berkeleyan nominalism thus breaks down.

It is easy to lay bare the false assumption which underlies the whole discussion of the
question as hitherto carried on. That assumption is that ideas, in order to know, must be cast
in the exact likeness of whatever things they know, and that the only things that can be
known are those which ideas can resemble. The error has not been conﬁned to nominalists.
Omnis cognitio ﬁt per assimilationem cognoscentis et cogniti has been the maxim, more or
less explicitly assumed, of writers of every school. Practically it amounts to saying that an
idea must be a duplicate edition of what it knows[395]—in other words, that it can only know
itself—or, more shortly still, that knowledge in any strict sense of the word, as a selftranscendent function, is impossible.
Now our own blunt statements about the ultimateness of the cognitive relation, and the
difference between the 'object' of the thought and its mere 'topic' or 'subject of discourse' (cf.
pp. 275 ff.), are all at variance with any such theory; and we shall ﬁnd more and more
occasion, as we advance in this book, to deny its general truth. All that a state of mind need
do, in order to take cognizance of a reality, intend it, or be 'about' it, is to lead to a remoter
state of mind which either acts upon the reality or resembles it. The only class of thoughts
which can with any show of plausibility be said to resemble their objects are sensations. The
stuff of which all our other thoughts are composed is symbolic, and a thought attests its
pertinency to a topic by simply terminating, sooner or later, in a sensation which resembles
the latter.
But Mill and the rest believe that a thought must be what it means, and mean what it is, and
that if it be a picture of an entire individual, it cannot mean any part of him to the exclusion
of the rest. I say nothing here of the preposterously false descriptive psychology involved in
the statement that the only things we can mentally picture are individuals completely [Pg 472]
determinate in all regards. Chapter XVIII will have something to say on that point, and we
can ignore it here. For even if it were true that our images were always of concrete
individuals, it would not in the least follow that our meanings were of the same.
The sense of our meaning is an entirely peculiar element of the thought. It is one of those
evanescent and 'transitive' facts of mind which introspection cannot turn round upon, and
isolate and hold up for examination, as an entomologist passes round an insect on a pin. In
the (somewhat clumsy) terminology I have used, it pertains to the 'fringe' of the subjective
state, and is a 'feeling of tendency,' whose neural counterpart is undoubtedly a lot of
dawning and dying processes too faint and complex to be traced. The geometer, with his one
deﬁnite ﬁgure before him, knows perfectly that his thoughts apply to countless other ﬁgures
as well, and that although he sees lines of a certain special bigness, direction, color, etc., he
means not one of these details. When I use the word man in two different sentences, I may
have both times exactly the same sound upon my lips and the same picture in my mental
eye, but I may mean, and at the very moment of uttering the word and imagining the picture,
know that I mean, two entirely different things. Thus when I say: "What a wonderful man
Jones is!" I am perfectly aware that I mean by man to exclude Napoleon Bonaparte or
Smith. But when I say: "What a wonderful thing Man is!" I am equally well aware that I
mean to include not only Jones, but Napoleon and Smith as well. This added consciousness
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is an absolutely positive sort of feeling, transforming what would otherwise be mere noise
or vision into something understood; and determining the sequel of my thinking, the later
words and images, in a perfectly deﬁnite way. We saw in Chapter IX that the image per se,
the nucleus, is functionally the least important part of the thought. Our doctrine, therefore,
of the 'fringe' leads to a perfectly satisfactory decision of the nominalistic and
conceptualistic controversy, so far as it touches psychology. We must decide in favor of the
conceptualists, and afﬁrm that the power to think things, qualities, relations, or whatever
other elements there may be, isolated and abstracted from the total experience in which they [Pg 473]
appear, is the most indisputable function of our thought.
UNIVERSALS.
After abstractions, universals! The 'fringe,' which lets us believe in the one, lets us believe in
the other too. An individual conception is of something restricted, in its application, to a
single case. A universal or general conception is of an entire class, or of something
belonging to an entire class, of things. The conception of an abstract quality is, taken by
itself, neither universal nor particular.[396] If I abstract white from the rest of the wintry
landscape this morning, it is a perfectly deﬁnite conception, a self-identical quality which I
may mean again; but, as I have not yet individualized it by expressly meaning to restrict it to
this particular snow, nor thought at all of the possibility of other things to which it may be
applicable, it is so far nothing but a 'that,' a 'ﬂoating adjective,' as Mr. Bradley calls it, or a
topic broken out from the rest of the world. Properly it is, in this state, a singular—I have
'singled it out;' and when, later, I universalize or individualize its application, and my
thought turns to mean either this white or all possible whites, I am in reality meaning two
new things and forming two new conceptions.[397] Such an alteration of my meaning has
nothing to do with any change in the image I may have in my mental eye, but solely with the
vague consciousness that surrounds the image, of the sphere to which it is intended to apply.
We can give no more deﬁnite account of this vague consciousness than has been given on [Pg 474]
pp. 249-266. But that is no reason for denying its presence.[398]
But the nominalists and traditional conceptualists ﬁnd matter for an inveterate quarrel in
these simple facts. Full of their notion that an idea, feeling, or state of consciousness can at
bottom only be aware of its own quality; and agreeing, as they both do, that such an idea or
state of consciousness is a perfectly determinate, singular, and transitory thing; they ﬁnd it
impossible to conceive how it should become the vehicle of a knowledge of anything
permanent or universal. "To know a universal, it must be universal; for like can only be
known by like," etc. Unable to reconcile these incompatibles, the knower and the known,
each side immolates one of them to save the other. The nominalists 'settle the hash' of the
thing known by denying it to be ever a genuine universal; the conceptualists despatch the
knower by denying it to be a state of mind, in the sense of being a perishing segment of
thoughts' stream, consubstantial with other facts of sensibility. They invent, instead of it, as
the vehicle of the knowledge of universals, an actus purus intellectus, or an Ego, whose
function is treated as quasi-miraculous and nothing if not awe-inspiring, and which it is a
sort of blasphemy to approach with the intent to explain and make common, or reduce to
lower terms. Invoked in the ﬁrst instance as a vehicle for the knowledge of universals, the
higher principle presently is made the indispensable vehicle of all thinking whatever, for, it
is contended, "a universal element is present in every thought." The nominalists meanwhile,
who dislike actus purus and awe-inspiring principles and despise the reverential mood, [Pg 475]
content themselves with saying that we are mistaken in supposing we ever get sight of the
face of an universal; and that what deludes us is nothing but the swarm of 'individual ideas'
which may at any time be awakened by the hearing of a name.
If we open the pages of either school, we ﬁnd it impossible to tell, in all the whirl about
universal and particular, when the author is talking about universals in the mind, and when
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about objective universals, so strangely are the two mixed together. James Ferrier, for
example, is the most brilliant of anti-nominalist writers. But who is nimble-witted enough to
count, in the following sentences from him, the number of times he steps from the known to
the knower, and attributes to both whatever properties he ﬁnds in either one?
"To think is to pass from the singular or particular to the idea [concept] or
universal.... Ideas are necessary because no thinking can take place without
them. They are universal, inasmuch as they are completely divested of the
particularity which characterizes all the phenomena of mere sensation. To grasp
the nature of this universality is not easy. Perhaps the best means by which this
end may be compassed is by contrasting it with the particular. It is not difﬁcult
to understand that a sensation, a phenomenon of sense, is never more than the
particular which it is. As such, that is, in its strict particularity, it is absolutely
unthinkable. In the very act of being thought, something more than it emerges,
and this something more cannot be again the particular.... Ten particulars per se
cannot be thought of any more than one particular can be thought of;... there
always emerges in thought an additional something, which is the possibility of
other particulars to an indeﬁnite extent.... The indeﬁnite additional something
which they are instances of is a universal.... The idea or universal cannot
possibly be pictured in the imagination, for this would at once reduce it to the
particular.... This inability to form any sort of picture or representation of an
idea does not proceed from any imperfection or limitation of our faculties, but
is a quality inherent in the very nature of intelligence. A contradiction is
involved in the supposition that an idea or a universal can become the object
either of sense or of the imagination. An idea is thus diametrically opposed to
an image."[399]
The nominalists, on their side, admit a quasi-universal, something which we think as if it
were universal, though it is not; and in all that they say about this something, which they [Pg 476]
explain to be 'an indeﬁnite number of particular ideas,' the same vacillation between the
subjective and the objective points of view appears. The reader never can tell whether an
'idea' spoken of is supposed to be a knower or a known. The authors themselves do not
distinguish. They want to get something in the mind which shall resemble what is out of the
mind, however vaguely, and they think that when that fact is accomplished, no farther
questions will be asked. James Mill writes:[400]
"The word, man, we shall say, is ﬁrst applied to an individual; it is ﬁrst
associated with the idea of that individual, and acquires the power of calling up
the idea of him; it is next applied to another individual and acquires the power
of calling up the idea of him; so of another and another, till it has become
associated with an indeﬁnite number, and has acquired the power of calling up
an indeﬁnite number of those ideas indifferently. What happens? It does call up
an indeﬁnite number of the ideas of individuals as often as it occurs; and calling
them in close connection, it forms a species of complex idea of them.... It is also
a fact, that when an idea becomes to a certain extent complex, from the
multiplicity of the ideas it comprehends, it is of necessity indistinct;... and this
indistinctness has, doubtless, been a main cause of the mystery which has
appeared to belong to it.... It thus appears that the word man is not a word
having a very simple idea, as was the opinion of the realists; nor a word having
no idea at all, as was that of the [earlier] nominalists; but a word calling up an
indeﬁnite number of ideas, by the irresistible laws of association, and forming
them into one very complex and indistinct, but not therefore unintelligible,
idea."
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Berkeley had already said:[401]
"A word becomes general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general
idea, but of many several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently
suggests to the mind. An idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes
general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the
same sort."
'Stand for,' not know; 'becomes general,' not becomes aware of something general; 'particular
ideas,' not particular things—everywhere the same timidity about begging the fact of
knowing, and the pitifully impotent attempt to foist it in the shape of a mode of being of
'ideas.' If the fact to be conceived be the indeﬁnitely numerous actual and possible members [Pg 477]
of a class, then it is assumed that if we can only get enough ideas to huddle together for a
moment in the mind, the being of each several one of them there will be an equivalent for
the knowing, or meaning, of one member of the class in question; and their number will be
so large as to confuse our tally and leave it doubtful whether all the possible members of the
class have thus been satisfactorily told off or not.
Of course this is nonsense. An idea neither is what it knows, nor knows what it is; nor will
swarms of copies of the same 'idea,' recurring in stereotyped form, or 'by the irresistible
laws of association formed into one idea,' ever be the same thing as a thought of 'all the
possible members' of a class. We must mean that by an altogether special bit of
consciousness ad hoc. But it is easy to translate Berkeley's, Hume's, and Mill's notion of a
swarm of ideas into cerebral terms, and so to make them stand for something real; and, in
this sense, I think the doctrine of these authors less hollow than the opposite one which
makes the vehicle of universal conceptions to be an actus purus of the soul. If each 'idea'
stand for some special nascent nerve-process, then the aggregate of these nascent processes
might have for its conscious correlate a psychic 'fringe,' which should be just that universal
meaning, or intention that the name or mental picture employed should mean all the possible
individuals of the class. Every peculiar complication of brain-processes must have some
peculiar correlate in the soul. To one set of processes will correspond the thought of an
indeﬁnite taking of the extent of a word like man; to another set that of a particular taking;
and to a third set that of a universal taking, of the extent of the same word. The thought
corresponding to either set of processes, is always itself a unique and singular event, whose
dependence on its peculiar nerve-process I of course am far from professing to explain.[402]
Truly in comparison with the fact that every conception, whatever it be of, is one of the [Pg 478]
mind's immutable possessions, the question whether a single thing, or a whole class of [Pg 479]
things, or only an unassigned quality, be meant by it, is an insigniﬁcant matter of detail. Our
meanings are of singulars, particulars, indeﬁnites, and universals, mixed together in every
way. A singular individual is as much conceived when he is isolated and identiﬁed away
from the rest of the world in my mind, as is the most rareﬁed and universally applicable
quality he may possess—being, for example, when treated in the same way.[403] From every
point of view, the overwhelming and portentous character ascribed to universal conceptions
is surprising. Why, from Plato and Aristotle downwards, philosophers should have vied with
each other in scorn of the knowledge of the particular, and in adoration of that of the
general, is hard to understand, seeing that the more adorable knowledge ought to be that of
the more adorable things, and that the things of worth are all concretes and singulars. The
only value of universal characters is that they help us, by reasoning, to know new truths [Pg 480]
about individual things. The restriction of one's meaning, moreover, to an individual thing,
probably requires even more complicated brain-processes than its extension to all the
instances of a kind; and the mere mystery, as such, of the knowledge, is equally great,
whether generals or singulars be the things known. In sum, therefore, the traditional
universal-worship can only be called a bit of perverse sentimentalism, a philosophic 'idol of
the cave.'
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It may seem hardly necessary to add (what follows as a matter of course from pp. 229-237,
and what has been implied in our assertions all along) that nothing can be conceived twice
over without being conceived in entirely different states of mind. Thus, my arm-chair is one
of the things of which I have a conception; I knew it yesterday and recognized it when I
looked at it. But if I think of it to-day as the same arm-chair which I looked at yesterday, it is
obvious that the very conception of it as the same is an additional complication to the
thought, whose inward constitution must alter in consequence. In short, it is logically
impossible that the same thing should be known as the same by two successive copies of the
same thought. As a matter of fact, the thoughts by which we know that we mean the same
thing are apt to be very different indeed from each other. We think the thing now in one
context, now in another; now in a deﬁnite image, now in a symbol. Sometimes our sense of
its identity pertains to the mere fringe, sometimes it involves the nucleus, of our thought. We
never can break the thought asunder and tell just which one of its bits is the part that lets us
know which subject is referred to; but nevertheless we always do know which of all possible
subjects we have in mind. Introspective psychology must here throw up the sponge; the
ﬂuctuations of subjective life are too exquisite to be arrested by its coarse means. It must
conﬁne itself to bearing witness to the fact that all sorts of different subjective states do form
the vehicle by which the same is known; and it must contradict the opposite view.
The ordinary Psychology of 'ideas' constantly talks as if the vehicle of the same thing- [Pg 481]
known must be the same recurrent state of mind, and as if the having over again of the same
'idea' were not only a necessary but a sufﬁcient condition for meaning the same thing twice.
But this recurrence of the same idea would utterly defeat the existence of a repeated
knowledge of anything. It would be a simple reversion into a pre-existent state, with nothing
gained in the interval, and with complete unconsciousness of the state having existed before.
Such is not the way in which we think. As a rule we are fully aware that we have thought
before of the thing we think of now. The continuity and permanency of the topic is of the
essence of our intellection. We recognize the old problem, and the old solutions; and we go
on to alter and improve and substitute one predicate for another without ever letting the
subject change.
This is what is meant when it is said that thinking consists in making judgments. A
succession of judgments may all be about the same thing. The general practical postulate
which encourages us to keep thinking at all is that by going on to do so we shall judge better
of the same things than if we do not.[404] In the successive judgments, all sorts of new
operations are performed on the things, and all sorts of new results brought out, without the
sense of the main topic ever getting lost. At the outset, we merely have the topic; then we
operate on it; and ﬁnally we have it again in a richer and truer way. A compound conception
has been substituted for the simple one, but with full consciousness that both are of the
Same.
The distinction between having and operating is as natural in the mental as in the material
world. As our hands may hold a bit of wood and a knife, and yet do naught with either; so
our mind may simply be aware of a thing's existence, and yet neither attend to it nor
discriminate it, neither locate nor count nor compare nor like nor dislike nor deduce it, nor
recognize it articulately as having been met with before. At the same time we know that,
instead of staring at it in this entranced and senseless way, we may rally our activity in a
moment, and locate, class, compare, count, and judge it. There is nothing involved in all this [Pg 482]
which we did not postulate at the very outset of our introspective work: realities, namely,
extra mentem, thoughts, and possible relations of cognition between the two. The result of
the thoughts' operating on the data given to sense is to transform the order in which
experience comes into an entirely different order, that of the conceived world. There is no
spot of light, for example, which I pick out and proceed to deﬁne as a pebble, which is not
thereby torn from its mere time- and space-neighbors, and thought in conjunction with
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things physically parted from it by the width of nature. Compare the form in which facts
appear in a text-book of physics, as logically subordinated laws, with that in which we
naturally make their acquaintance. The conceptual scheme is a sort of sieve in which we try
to gather up the world's contents. Most facts and relations fall through its meshes, being
either too subtle or insigniﬁcant to be ﬁxed in any conception. But whenever a physical
reality is caught and identiﬁed as the same with something already conceived, it remains on
the sieve, and all the predicates and relations of the conception with which it is identiﬁed
become its predicates and relations too; it is subjected to the sieve's network, in other words.
Thus comes to pass what Mr. Hodgson calls the translation of the perceptual into the
conceptual order of the world.[405] In Chapter XXII we shall see how this translation always
takes place for the sake of some subjective interest, and how the conception with which we
handle a bit of sensible experience is really nothing but a teleological instrument. This whole
function of conceiving, of ﬁxing, and holding fast to meanings, has no signiﬁcance apart
from the fact that the conceiver is a creature with partial purposes and private ends. There
remains, therefore, much more to be said about conception, but for the present this will
sufﬁce.

[386]

There are two other 'principles of identity' in philosophy. The ontological one
asserts that every real thing is what it is, that a is a, and b, b. The logical one says
that what is once true of the subject of a judgment is always true of that subject.
The ontological law is a tautological truism; the logical principle is already more,
for it implies subjects unalterable by time. The psychological law also implies
facts which might not be realized: there might be no succession of thoughts; or if
there were, the later ones might not think of the earlier; or if they did, they might
not recall the content thereof; or, recalling the content, they might not take it as
'the same' with anything else.

[387]

In later chapters we shall see that determinate relations exist between the various
data thus ﬁxed upon by the mind. These are called a priori or axiomatic relations.
Simple inspection of the data enables us to perceive them; and one inspection is
as effective as a million for engendering in us the conviction that between those
data that relation must always hold. To change the relation we should have to
make the data different. 'The guarantee for the uniformity and adequacy' of the
data can only be the mind's own power to ﬁx upon any objective content, and to
mean that content as often as it likes. This right of the mind to 'construct'
permanent ideal objects for itself out of the data of experience seems, singularly
enough, to be a stumbling-block to many. Professor Robertson in his clear and
instructive article 'Axioms' in the Encyclopædia Britannica (9th edition) suggests
that it may only be where movements enter into the constitution of the ideal object
(as they do in geometrical ﬁgures) that we can "make the ultimate relations to be
what for us they must be in all circumstances." He makes, it is true, a concession
in favor of conceptions of number abstracted from "subjective occurrences
succeeding each other in time" because these also are acts "of construction,
dependent on the power we have of voluntarily determining the ﬂow of subjective
consciousness." "The content of passive sensation," on the other hand, "may
indeﬁnitely vary beyond any control of ours." What if it do vary, so long as we
can continue to think of and mean the qualities it varied from? We can 'make'
ideal objects for ourselves out of irrecoverable bits of passive experience quite as
perfectly as out of easily repeatable active experiences. And when we have got
our objects together and compared them, we do not make, but ﬁnd, their relations.

[388]

Cf. Hodgson, Time and Space, § 46. Lotze, Logic, § 11.

[389]

"For though a man in a fever should from sugar have a bitter taste which at
another time would produce a sweet one, yet the idea of bitter in that man's mind
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would be as distinct as if he had tasted only gall." (Locke's Essay bk. ii, chap. xi,
§ 3. Read the whole section!)
[390]

Black round things, square white things, per contra, Nature gives us freely
enough. But the combinations which she refuses to realize may exist as distinctly,
in the shape of postulates, as those which she gives may exist in the shape of
positive images, in our mind. As a matter of fact, she may realize a warm cold
thing whenever two points of the skin, so near together as not to be locally
distinguished, are touched, the one with a warm, the other with a cold, piece of
metal. The warmth and the cold are then often felt as if in the same objective
place. Under similar conditions two objects, one sharp and the other blunt, may
feel like one sharp blunt thing. The same space may appear of two colors if, by
optical artiﬁce, one of the colors is made to appear as if seen through the other.—
Whether any two attributes whatever shall be compatible or not, in the sense of
appearing or not to occupy the same place and moment, depends simply on de
facto peculiarities of natural bodies and of our sense-organs. Logically, anyone
combination of qualities is to the full as conceivable as any other, and has as
distinct a meaning for thought. What necessitates this remark is the confusion
deliberately kept up by certain authors (e.g. Spencer, Psychology, §§ 420-7)
between the inconceivable and the not-distinctly-imaginable. How do we know
which things we cannot imagine unless by ﬁrst conceiving them, meaning them
and not other things?

[391]

Arguments seldom make converts in matters philosophical; and some readers, I
know, who ﬁnd that they conceive a certain matter differently from what they did,
will still prefer saying they have two different editions of the same conception,
one evolved from the other, to saying they have two different conceptions of the
same thing. It depends, after all, on how we deﬁne conception. We ourselves
deﬁned it as the function by which a state of mind means to think the same
whereof it thought on a former occasion. Two states of mind will accordingly be
two editions of the same conception just so far as either does mean to think what
the other thought; but no farther. If either mean to think what the other did not
think, it is a different conception from the other. And if either mean to think all
that the other thought, and more, it is a different conception, so far as the more
goes. In this last case one state of mind has two conceptual functions. Each
thought decides, by its own authority, which, out of all the conceptive functions
open to it, it shall now renew; with which other thought it shall identify itself as a
conceiver, and just how far. "The same A which I once meant," it says, "I shall
now mean again, and mean it with C as its predicate (or what not) instead of B, as
before." In all this, therefore, there is absolutely no changing, but only uncoupling
and recoupling of conceptions. Compound conceptions come, as functions of new
states of mind. Some of these functions are the same with previous ones, some
not. Any changed opinion, then, partly contains new editions (absolutely identical
with the old, however) of former conceptions, partly absolutely new conceptions.
The division is a perfectly easy one to make in each particular case.

[392]

Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, §§ 10, 14.

[393]

'Conceptualisme honteux,' Rabier, Psychologie, 310.

[394]

Exam. of Hamilton, p. 393. Cf. also Logic, bk. ii, chap. v, § 1, and bk iv, chap ii, §
1.

[395]

E.g.: "The knowledge of things must mean that the mind ﬁnds itself in them, or
that, in some way, the difference between them and the mind is dissolved." (E.
Caird, Philosophy of Kant, ﬁrst edition, p. 553.)

[396]

The traditional conceptualist doctrine is that an abstract must eo ipso be a
universal. Even modern and independent authors like Prof. Dewey (Psychology,
207) obey the tradition: "The mind seizes upon some one aspect,... abstracts or
prescinds it. This very seizure of some one element generalizes the one
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abstracted.... Attention, in drawing it forth, makes it a distinct content of
consciousness, and thus universalizes it; it is considered no longer in its particular
connection with the object, but on its own account; that is, as an idea, or what it
signiﬁes to the mind; and signiﬁcance is always universal."
[397]

C. F. Reid's Intellectual Powers, Essay v, chap. iii.—Whiteness is one thing, the
whiteness of this sheet of paper another thing.

[398]

Mr. F. H. Bradley says the conception or the 'meaning' "consists of a part of the
content, cut off, ﬁxed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the
sign. It would not be correct to add, and referred away to another real subject; for
where we think without judging, and where we deny, that description would not
be applicable." This seems to be the same doctrine as ours; the application to one
or to all subjects of the abstract fact conceived (i.e. its individuality or its
universality), constituting a new conception. I am, however, not quite sure that
Mr. Bradley steadily maintains this ground. Cf. the ﬁrst chapter of his Principles
of Logic. The doctrine I defend is stoutly upheld in Rosmini's Philosophical
System, Introduction by Thomas Davidson, p. 43 (London, 1882).

[399]

Lectures on Greek Philosophy, pp. 33-39.

[400]

Analysis, chap. viii.

[401]

Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, §§ 11, 12.

[402]

It may add to the effect of the text to quote a passage from the essay in 'Mind,'
referred to on p. 224.
"Why may we not side with the conceptualists in saying that the universal sense
of a word does correspond to a mental fact of some kind, but at the same time,
agreeing with the nominalists that all mental facts are modiﬁcations of subjective
sensibility, why may we not call that fact a 'feeling'? Man meant for mankind is in
short a different feeling from man as a mere noise, or from man meant for that
man, to wit, John Smith alone. Not that the difference consists simply in the fact
that, when taken universally, the word has one of Mr. Galton's 'blended' images of
man associated with it. Many persons have seemed to think that these blended or,
as Prof. Huxley calls them, 'generic' images are equivalent to concepts. But, in
itself, a blurred thing is just as particular as a sharp thing; and the generic
character of either sharp image or blurred image depends on its being felt with its
representative function. This function is the mysterious plus, the understood
meaning. But it is nothing applied to the image from above, no pure act of reason
inhabiting a supersensible and semi-supernatural plane. It can be diagrammatized
as continuous with all the other segments of the subjective stream. It is just that
staining, fringe, or halo of obscurely felt relation to masses of other imagery about
to come, but not yet distinctly in focus, which we have so abundantly set forth [in
Chapter IX].
"If the image come unfringed, it reveals but a simple quality, thing, or event; if it
come fringed, it may reveal something expressly taken universally or in a scheme
of relations. The difference between thought and feeling thus reduces itself, in the
last subjective analysis, to the presence or absence of 'fringe.' And this in turn
reduces itself, with much probability, in the last physiological analysis, to the
absence or presence of sub-excitements in other convolutions of the brain than
those whose discharges underlie the more deﬁnite nucleus, the substantive
ingredient, of the thought,—in this instance, the word or image it may happen to
arouse.
"The contrast is not, then, as the Platonists would have it, between certain
subjective facts called images and sensations, and others called acts of relating
intelligence; the former being blind perishing things, knowing not even their own
existence as such, whilst the latter combine the poles in the mysterious synthesis
of their cognitive sweep. The contrast is really between two aspects, in which all
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mental facts without exception may be taken; their structural aspect, as being
subjective, and their functional aspect, as being cognitions. In the former aspect,
the highest as well as the lowest is a feeling, a peculiarly tinged segment of the
stream. This tingeing is its sensitive body, the wie ihm zu Muthe ist, the way it
feels whilst passing. In the latter aspect, the lowest mental fact as well as the
highest may grasp some bit of truth as its content, even though that truth were as
relationless a matter as a bare unlocalized and undated quality of pain. From the
cognitive point of view, all mental facts are intellections. From the subjective
point of view all are feelings. Once admit that the passing and evanescent are as
real parts of the stream as the distinct and comparatively abiding; once allow that
fringes and halos, inarticulate perceptions, whereof the objects are as yet
unnamed, mere nascencies of cognition, premonitions, awarenesses of direction,
are thoughts sui generis, as much as articulate imaginings and propositions are;
once restore, I say, the vague to its psychological rights, and the matter presents
no further difﬁculty.
"And then we see that the current opposition of Feeling to Knowledge is quite a
false issue. If every feeling is at the same time a bit of knowledge, we ought no
longer to talk of mental states differing by having more or less of the cognitive
quality; they only differ in knowing more or less, in having much fact or little fact
for their object. The feeling of a broad scheme of relations is a feeling that knows
much; the feeling of a simple quality is a feeling that knows little. But the
knowing itself, whether of much or of little, has the same essence, and is as good
knowing in the one case as in the other. Concept and image, thus discriminated
through their objects, are consubstantial in their inward nature, as modes of
feeling. The one, as particular, will no longer be held to be a relatively base sort of
entity, to be taken as a matter of course, whilst the other, as universal, is
celebrated as a sort of standing miracle, to be adored but not explained. Both
concept and image, quâ subjective, are singular and particular. Both are moments
of the stream, which come and in an instant are no more. The word universality
has no meaning as applied to their psychic body or structure, which is always
ﬁnite. It only has a meaning when applied to their use, import, or reference to the
kind of object they may reveal. The representation, as such, of the universal
object is as particular as that of an object about which we know so little that the
interjection 'Ha!' is all it can evoke from us in the way of speech. Both should be
weighed in the same scales, and have the same measure meted out to them
whether of worship or of contempt." (Mind, ix, pp. 18-19.)
[403]

Hodgson, Time and Space, p. 404.

[404]

Compare the admirable passage in Hodgson's Time and Space, p. 310.

[405]

Philosophy of Reﬂection, i, 273-308.

CHAPTER XIII.

[Pg 483]

DISCRIMINATION AND COMPARISON.
It is matter of popular observation that some men have sharper senses than others, and that
some have acuter minds and are able to 'split hairs' and see two shades of meaning where the
majority see but one. Locke long ago set apart the faculty of discrimination as one in which
men differ individually. What he wrote is good enough to quote as an introduction to this
chapter:
"Another faculty we may take notice of in our minds is that of discerning and
distinguishing between the several ideas it has. It is not enough to have a
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confused perception of something in general: unless the mind had a distinct
perception of different objects and their qualities, it would be capable of very
little knowledge; though the bodies that affect us were as busy about us as they
are now, and the mind were continually employed in thinking. On this faculty
of distinguishing one thing from another depends the evidence and certainty of
several even very general propositions, which have passed for innate truths;
because men, overlooking the true cause why those propositions ﬁnd universal
assent, impute it wholly to native uniform impressions; whereas it in truth
depends upon this clear discerning faculty of the mind, whereby it perceives
two ideas to be the same or different. But of this more hereafter?
"How much the imperfection of accurately discriminating ideas one from
another lies either in the dulness or faults of the organs of sense, or want of
acuteness, exercise, or attention in the understanding, or hastiness and
precipitancy natural to some tempers, I will not here examine: it sufﬁces to take
notice that this is one of the operations that the mind may reﬂect on and observe
in itself. It is of that consequence to its other knowledge, that so far as this
faculty is in itself dull, or not rightly made use of for the distinguishing one
thing from another, so far our notions are confused, and our reason and
judgment disturbed or misled. If in having our ideas in the memory ready at
hand consists quickness of parts; in this of having them unconfused, and being
able nicely to distinguish one thing from another where there is but the least
difference, consists in a great measure the exactness of judgment and clearness
of reason which is to be observed in one man above another. And hence,
perhaps, may be given some reason of that common observation,—that men
who have a great deal of wit and prompt memories have not always the clearest
judgment or deepest reason. For, wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and
putting those together with quickness and variety wherein can be found any
resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable
visions in the fancy; judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in
separating carefully one from another ideas wherein can be found the least
difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude and by afﬁnity to take
one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor
and allusion, wherein for the most part lies that entertainment and pleasantry of
wit which strikes so lively on the fancy, and therefore, so acceptable to all
people because its beauty appears at ﬁrst sight, and there is required no labor of
thought to examine what truth or reason there is in it."[406]

[Pg 484]

But Locke's descendants have been slow to enter into the path whose fruitfulness was thus
pointed out by their master, and have so neglected the study of discrimination that one might
almost say that the classic English psychologists have, as a school, hardly recognized it to
exist. 'Association' has proved itself in their hands the one all-absorbing power of the mind.
Dr. Martineau, in his review of Bain, makes some very weighty remarks on this
onesidedness of the Lockian school. Our mental history, says he, is, in its view,
"a perpetual formation of new compounds: and the words 'association,'
'cohesion,' 'fusion,' 'indissoluble connection,' all express the change from
plurality of data to some unity of result. An explanation of the process therefore
requires two things: a true enumeration of the primary constituents, and a
correct statement of their laws of combination: just as, in chemistry, we are
furnished with a list of the simple elements, and the with then principles of their
synthesis. Now the latter of these two conditions we ﬁnd satisﬁed by the
association-psychologists: but not the former. They are not agreed upon their
catalogue of elements, or the marks by which they may know the simple from
the compound. The psychologic unit is not ﬁxed; that which is called one
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impression by Hartley is treated as half-a-dozen or more by Mill: and the
tendency of the modern teachers on this point is to recede more and more from
the better-chosen track of their master. Hartley, for example, regarded the whole
present effect upon us of any single object—say, an orange—as a single
sensation; and the whole vestige it left behind, as a single 'idea of sensation.'
His modern disciples, on the other hand, consider this same effect as an
aggregate from a plurality of sensations, and the ideal trace it leaves as highly
compound. 'The idea of an object,' instead of being an elementary starting-point
with them, is one of the elaborate results of repetition and experience; and is
continually adduced as remarkably illustrating the fusing power of habitual
association. Thus James Mill observes:

[Pg 485]

"'It is to this great law of association that we trace the formation of our ideas of
what we call external objects; that is, the ideas of a certain number of
sensations, received together so frequently that they coalesce as it were, and are
spoken of under the idea of unity. Hence, what we call the idea of a tree, the
idea of a stone, the idea of a horse, the idea of a man. In using the names, tree,
horse, man, the names of what I call objects, I am referring, and can be
referring, only to my own sensations; in fact, therefore, only naming a certain
number of sensations regarded as in a particular state of combination, that is,
concomitance. Particular sensations of sight, of touch, of the muscles, are the
sensations to the ideas of which, color, extension, roughness, hardness,
smoothness, taste, smell, so coalescing as to appear one idea, I give the name of
the idea of a tree.'[407]
"To precisely the same effect Mr. Bain remarks:
"'External objects usually affect us through a plurality of senses. The pebble on
the sea-shore is pictured on the eye as form and color. We take it up in the hand
and repeat the impression of form, with the additional feeling of touch. Knock
two together, and there is a characteristic sound. To preserve the impression of
an object of this kind, there must be an association of all these different effects.
Such association, when matured and ﬁrm, is our idea, our intellectual grasp of
the pebble. Passing to the organic world, and plucking a rose, we have the same
effects of form to the eye and hand, color and touch, with new effects of odor
and taste. A certain time is requisite for the coherence of all these qualities in
one aggregate, so as to give us for all purposes the enduring image of the rose.
When fully acquired, any one of the characteristic impressions will revive the
others; the odor, the sight, the feeling of the thorny stalk—each of these by
itself will hoist the entire impression into the view.'[408]
"Now, this order of derivation, making our objective knowledge begin with
plurality of impression and arrive at unity, we take to be a complete inversion of
our psychological history. Hartley, we think, was perfectly right in taking no
notice of the number of inlets through which an object delivers its effect upon
us, and, in spite of this circumstance, treating the effect as one.... Even now,
after life has read us so many analytic lessons, in proportion as we can ﬁx the
attitude of our scene and ourselves, the sense of plurality in our impressions
retreats, and we lapse into an undivided consciousness; losing, for instance, the
separate notice of any uniform hum in the ear, or light in the eye, or weight of
clothes on the body, though not one of them is inoperative on the complexion of
our feeling. This law, once granted, must be carried far beyond Hartley's point.
Not only must each object present itself to us integrally before it shells off into
its qualities, but the whole scene around us must disengage for us object after
object from its still background by emergence and change; and even our selfdetachment from the world over against us must wait for the start of collision
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between the force we issue and that which we receive. To conﬁne ourselves to
the simplest case: when a red ivory ball, seen for the ﬁrst time, has been
withdrawn, it will leave a mental representation of itself, in which all that it
simultaneously gave us will indistinguishably coexist. Let a white ball succeed
to it; now, and not before, will an attribute detach itself, and the color, by force
of contrast, be shaken out into the foreground. Let the white ball be replaced by
an egg: and this new difference will bring the form into notice from its previous
slumber. And thus, that which began by being simply an object, cut out from
the surrounding scene, becomes for us ﬁrst a red object, and then a red round
object; and so on. Instead, therefore, of the qualities, as separately given,
subscribing together and adding themselves up to present us with the object as
their aggregate, the object is beforehand with them, and from its integrity
delivers them out to our knowledge, one by one. In this disintegration, the
primary nucleus never loses its substantive character or name; whilst the
difference which it throws off appears as a mere attribute, expressed by an
adjective. Hence it is that we are compelled to think of the object as having, not
as being, its qualities; and can never heartily admit the belief of any loose lot of
attributes really fusing themselves into a thing. The unity of the original whole
is not felt to go to pieces and be resolved into the properties which it
successively gives off; it retains a residuary existence, which constitutes it a
substance, as against the emerging quality, which is only its phenomenal
predicate. Were it not for this perpetual process of differentiation of self from
the world, of object from its scene, of attribute from object, no step of
Abstraction could be taken; no qualities could fall under our notice; and had we
ten thousand senses, they would all converge and meet in but one
consciousness. But if this be so, it is an utter falsiﬁcation of the order of nature
to speak of sensations grouping themselves into aggregates, and so composing
for us the objects of which we think; and the whole language of the theory, in
regard to the ﬁeld of synchronous existences, is a direct inversion of the truth.
Experience proceeds and intellect is trained, not by Association, but by
Dissociation, not by reduction of pluralities of impression to one, but by the
opening out of one into many; and a true psychological history must expound
itself in analytic rather than synthetic terms. Precisely those ideas—of
Substance, of Mind, of Cause, of Space—which this system treats as inﬁnitely
complex, the last result of myriads of conﬂuent elements, are in truth the
residuary simplicities of consciousness, whose stability the eddies and currents
of phenomenal experience have left undisturbed."[409]

[Pg 487]

The truth is that Experience is trained by both association and dissociation, and that
psychology must be writ both in synthetic and in analytic terms. Our original sensible totals
are, on the one hand, subdivided by discriminative attention, and, on the other, united with
other totals,—either through the agency of our own movements, carrying our senses from
one part of space to another, or because new objects come successively and replace those by
which we were at ﬁrst impressed. The 'simple impression' of Hume, the 'simple idea' of
Locke are both abstractions, never realized in experience. Experience, from the very ﬁrst,
presents us with concreted objects, vaguely continuous with the rest of the world which
envelops them in space and time, and potentially divisible into inward elements and parts.
These objects we break asunder and reunite. We must treat them in both ways for our
knowledge of them to grow; and it is hard to say, on the whole, which way preponderates.
But since the elements with which the traditional associationism performs its constructions
—'simple sensations,' namely—are all products of discrimination carried to a high pitch, it
seems as if we ought to discuss the subject of analytic attention and discrimination ﬁrst.
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The noticing of any part whatever of our object is an act of discrimination. Already on p.
404 I have described the manner in which we often spontaneously lapse into the
undiscriminating state, even with regard to objects which we have already learned to
distinguish. Such anæsthetics as chloroform, nitrous oxide, etc., sometimes bring about
transient lapses even more total, in which numerical discrimination especially seems gone;
for one sees light and hears sound, but whether one or many lights and sounds is quite
impossible to tell. Where the parts of an object have already been discerned, and each made
the object of a special discriminative act, we can with difﬁculty feel the object again in its [Pg 488]
pristine unity; and so prominent may our consciousness of its composition be, that we may
hardly believe that it ever could have appeared undivided. But this is an erroneous view, the
undeniable fact being that any number of impressions, from any number of sensory sources,
falling simultaneously on a mind WHICH HAS NOT YET EXPERIENCED THEM SEPARATELY, will fuse
into a single undivided object for that mind. The law is that all things fuse that can fuse, and
nothing separates except what must. What makes impressions separate we have to study in
this chapter. Although they separate easier if they come in through distinct nerves, yet
distinct nerves are not an unconditional ground of their discrimination, as we shall presently
see. The baby, assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once, feels it all as one great
blooming, buzzing confusion; and to the very end of life, our location of all things in one
space is due to the fact that the original extents or bignesses of all the sensations which
came to our notice at once, coalesced together into one and the same space. There is no
other reason than this why "the hand I touch and see coincides spatially with the hand I
immediately feel."[410]
It is true that we may sometimes be tempted to exclaim, when once a lot of hitherto
unnoticed details of the object lie before us, "How could we ever have been ignorant of
these things and yet have felt the object, or drawn the conclusion, as if it were a continuum,
a plenum? There would have been gaps—but we felt no gaps; wherefore we must have seen
and heard these details, leaned upon these steps; they must have been operative upon our
minds, just as they are now, only unconsciously, or at least inattentively. Our ﬁrst
unanalyzed sensation was really composed of these elementary sensations, our ﬁrst rapid
conclusion was really based on these intermediate inferences, all the while, only we failed to
note the fact." But this is nothing but the fatal 'psychologist's fallacy' (p. 196) of treating an
inferior state of mind as if it must somehow know implicitly all that is explicitly known [Pg 489]
about the same topic by superior states of mind. The thing thought of is unquestionably the
same, but it is thought twice over in two absolutely different psychoses,—once as an
unbroken unit, and again as a sum of discriminated parts. It is not one thought in two
editions, but two entirely distinct thoughts of one thing. And each thought is within itself a
continuum, a plenum, needing no contributions from the other to ﬁll up its gaps. As I sit
here, I think objects, and I make inferences, which the future is sure to analyze and
articulate and riddle with discriminations, showing me many things wherever I now notice
one. Nevertheless, my thought feels quite sufﬁcient unto itself for the time being; and ranges
from pole to pole, as free, and as unconscious of having overlooked anything, as if it
possessed the greatest discriminative enlightenment. We all cease analyzing the world at
some point, and notice no more differences. The last units with which we stop are our
objective elements of being. Those of a dog are different from those of a Humboldt; those of
a practical man from those of a metaphysician. But the dog's and the practical man's
thoughts feel continuous, though to the Humboldt or the metaphysician they would appear
full of gaps and defects. And they are continuous, as thoughts. It is only as mirrors of things
that the superior minds ﬁnd them full of omissions. And when the omitted things are
discovered and the unnoticed differences laid bare, it is not that the old thoughts split up, but
that new thoughts supersede them, which make new judgments about the same objective
world.
THE PRINCIPLE OF MEDIATE COMPARISON.
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When we discriminate an element, we may contrast it with the case of its own absence, of
its simply not being there, without reference to what is there; or we may also take the latter
into account. Let the ﬁrst sort of discrimination be called existential, the latter differential
discrimination. A peculiarity of differential discriminations is that they result in a perception
of differences which are felt as greater or less one than the other. Entire groups of
differences may be ranged in series: the musical scale, the color scale, are examples. Every
department of our experience may have its data written down in an evenly gradated order, [Pg 490]
from a lowest to a highest member. And any one datum may be a term in several such
orders. A given note may have a high place in the pitch-series, a low place in the loudnessseries, and a medium place in the series of agreeablenesses. A given tint must, in order to be
fully determined, have its place assigned in the series of qualities, in the series of purities
(freedom from white), and in the series of intensities or brightnesses. It may be low in one
of these respects, but high in another. In passing from term to term in any such series we are
conscious not only of each step of difference being equal to (or greater or less than) the last,
but we are conscious of proceeding in a uniform direction, different from other possible
directions. This consciousness of serial increase of differences is one of the fundamental
facts of our intellectual life. More, more, MORE, of the same kind of difference, we say, as we
advance from term to term, and realize that the farther on we get the larger grows the breach
between the term we are at and the one from which we started. Between any two terms of
such a series the difference is greater than that between any intermediate terms, or than that
between an intermediate term and either of the extremes. The louder than the loud is louder
than the less loud; the farther than the far is farther than the less far; the earlier than the early
is earlier than the late; the higher than the high is higher than the low; the bigger than the big
is bigger than the small; or, to put it brieﬂy and universally, the more than the more is more
than the less; such is the great synthetic principle of mediate comparison which is involved
in the possession by the human mind of the sense of serial increase. In Chapter XXVIII we
shall see the altogether overwhelming importance of this principle in the conduct of all our
higher rational operations.
ARE ALL DIFFERENCES DIFFERENCES OF COMPOSITION?
Each of the differences in one of these uniform series feels like a deﬁnite sensible quantity,
and each term seems like the last term with this quantity added. In many concrete objects
which differ from one another we can plainly see that the difference does consist singly in [Pg 491]
the fact that one object is the same as the other plus something else, or that they both have
an identical part, to which each adds a distinct remainder. Thus two pictures may be struck
from the same block, but one of them may differ in having color added; or two carpets may
show an identical pattern which in each is woven in distinct hues. Similarly, two classes of
sensation may have the same emotional tone but negate each other in remaining respects—a
dark color and a deep sound, for example; or two faces may have the same shape of nose but
everything else unlike. The similarity of the same note sounded by instruments of different
timbre is explained by the coexistence of a fundamental tone common to both, with overtones in one which the other lacks. Dipping my hand into water and anon into a colder
water, I may then observe certain additional feelings, broader and deeper irradiations of the
cold, so to speak, which were not in the earlier experience, though for aught I can tell, the
feelings may be otherwise the same. 'Hefting' ﬁrst one weight, and then another, new
feelings may start out in my elbow-joint, wrist, and elsewhere, and make me call the second
weight the heavier of the twain. In all these cases each of the differing things may be
represented by two parts, one that is common to it and the others, and another that is
peculiar to itself. If they form a series, A, B, C, D, etc., and the common part be called X,
whilst the lowest difference be called d, then the composition of the series would be as
follows:
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A = X + d;
B = (X + d) + d, or X + 2d;
C = X + 3d;
D = X + 4d;
.......
If X itself were ultimately composed of d's we should have the entire series explained as due
to the varying combination and re-combination with itself of an unvarying element; and all
the apparent differences of quality would be translated into differences of quantity alone.
This is the sort of reduction which the atomic theory in physics and the mind-stuff theory in [Pg 492]
psychology regard as their ideal. So that, following the analogy of our instances, one might
easily be tempted to generalize and to say that all difference is but addition and subtraction,
and that what we called 'differential' discrimination is only 'existential' discrimination in
disguise; that is to say, that where A and B differ, we merely discern something in the one
which the other is without. Absolute identity in things up to a certain point, then absolute
non-identity, would on this theory take the place of those ultimate qualitative unlikenesses
between them, in which we naturally believe; and the mental function of discrimination,
ceasing to be regarded as an ultimate one, would resolve itself into mere logical afﬁrmation
and negation, or perception that a feature found in one thing, in another does not exist.

Theoretically, however, this theory is full of difﬁculty. If all the differences which we feel
were in one direction, so that all objects could be arranged in one series (however long), it
might still work. But when we consider the notorious fact that objects differ from each other
in divergent directions, it grows well nigh impossible to make it do so. For then, supposing
that an object differed from things in one direction by the increment d, it would have to
differ from things in another direction by a different sort of increment, call it d'; so that, after
getting rid of qualitative unlikeness between objects, we should have it back on our hands
again between their increments. We may of course re-apply our method, and say that the
difference between d and d' is not a qualitative unlikeness, but a fact of composition, one of
them being the same as the other plus an increment of still higher order, δ for example,
added. But when we recollect that everything in the world can be compared with everything
else, and that the number of directions of difference is indeﬁnitely great, then we see that the
complication of self-compoundings of the ultimate differential increment by which, on this
theory, all the innumerable unlikenesses of the world are explained, in order to avoid writing
any of them down as ultimate differences of kind, would beggar all conception. It is the
mind-dust theory; with all its difﬁculties in a particularly uncompromising form; and all for [Pg 493]
the sake of the fantastic pleasure of being able arbitrarily to say that there is between the
things in the world and between the 'ideas' in the mind nothing but absolute sameness and
absolute not-sameness of elements, the not-sameness admitting no degrees.
To me it seems much wiser to turn away from such transcendental extravagances of
speculation, and to abide by the natural appearances. These would leave unlikeness as an
indecomposable relation amongst things, and a relation moreover of which there were all
degrees. Absolute not-sameness would be the maximal degree, absolute sameness the
minimal degree of this unlikeness, the discernment of which would be one of our ultimate
cognitive powers.[411] Certainly the natural appearances are dead against the notion that no
qualitative differences exist. With the same clearness with which, in certain objects, we do
feel a difference to be a mere matter of plus and minus, in other objects we feel that this is
not the case. Contrast our feeling of the difference between the length of two lines with our
feeling of the difference between blue and yellow, or with that between right and left. Is
right equal to left with something added? Is blue yellow plus something? If so, plus what?
[412] So long as we stick to veriﬁable psychology, we are forced to admit that differences of
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simple KIND form an irreducible sort of relation between some of the elements of our
experience, and forced to deny that differential discrimination can everywhere be reduced to [Pg 494]
the mere ascertainment that elements present in one fact, in another fail to exist. The
perception that an element exists in one thing and does not exist in another and the
perception of qualitative difference are, in short, entirely disconnected mental functions.[413]
But at the same time that we insist on this, we must also admit that differences of quality,
however abundant, are not the only distinctions with which our mind has to deal.
Differences which seem of mere composition, of number, of plus and minus, also abound.
[414] But it will be best for the present to disregard all these quantitative cases and, taking
the others (which, by the least favorable calculation, will still be numerous enough), to
consider next the manner in which we come to cognize simple differences of kind. We cannot
explain the cognition; we can only ascertain the conditions by virtue of which it occurs.
THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRIMINATION.
What, then, are the conditions under which we discriminate things differing in a simple
way?
First, the things must BE different, either in time, or place, or quality. If the difference in any
of these regards is sufﬁciently great, then we cannot overlook it, except by not noticing the
things at all. No one can help singling out a black stripe on a white ground, or feeling the
contrast between a bass note and a high one sounded immediately after it. Discrimination is
here involuntary. But where the objective difference is less, discrimination need not so
inevitably occur, and may even require considerable effort of attention to be performed at
all.
Another condition which then favors it is that the sensations excited by the differing objects [Pg 495]
should not come to us simultaneously but fall in immediate SUCCESSION upon the same organ.
It is easier to compare successive than simultaneous sounds, easier to compare two weights
or two temperatures by testing one after the other with the same hand, than by using both
hands and comparing both at once. Similarly it is easier to discriminate shades of light or
color by moving the eye from one to the other, so that they successively stimulate the same
retinal tract. In testing the local discrimination of the skin, by applying compass-points, it is
found that they are felt to touch different spots much more readily when set down one after
the other than when both are applied at once. In the latter case they may be two or three
inches apart on the back, thighs, etc., and still feel as if they were set down in one spot.
Finally, in the case of smell and taste it is well-nigh impossible to compare simultaneous
impressions at all. The reason why successive impression so much favors the result seems to
be that there is a real sensation of difference, aroused by the shock of transition from one
perception to another which is unlike the ﬁrst. This sensation of difference has its own
peculiar quality, as difference, which remains sensible, no matter of what sort the terms may
be, between which it obtains. It is, in short, one of those transitive feelings, or feelings of
relation, of which I treated in a former place (pp. 245 ff.); and, when once aroused, its object
lingers in the memory along with the substantive terms which precede and follow, and
enables our judgments of comparison to be made. We shall soon see reason to believe that
no two terms can possibly be simultaneously perceived to differ, unless, in a preliminary
operation, we have successively attended to each, and, in so doing, had the transitional
sensation of difference between them aroused. A ﬁeld of consciousness, however complex,
is never analyzed unless some of its ingredients have changed. We now discern, 'tis true, a
multitude of coexisting things about us at every moment: but this is because we have had a
long education, and each thing we now see distinct has been already differentiated from its
neighbors by repeated appearances in successive order. To the infant, sounds, sights, [Pg 496]
touches, and pains, form probably one unanalyzed bloom of confusion.[415]
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Where the difference between the successive sensations is but slight, the transition between
them must be made as immediate as possible, and both must be compared in memory, in
order to get the best results. One cannot judge accurately of the difference between two
similar wines, whilst the second is still in one's mouth. So of sounds, warmths, etc.—we
must get the dying phases of both sensations of the pair we are comparing. Where, however,
the difference is strong, this condition is immaterial, and we can then compare a sensation
actually felt with another carried in memory only. The longer the interval of time between
the sensations, the more uncertain is their discrimination.
The difference, thus immediately felt between two terms, is independent of our ability to
identify either of the terms by itself. I can feel two distinct spots to be touched on my skin,
yet not know which is above and which below. I can observe two neighboring musical tones
to differ, and still not know which of the two is the higher in pitch. Similarly I may
discriminate two neighboring tints, whilst remaining uncertain which is the bluer or the
yellower, or how either differs from its mate.[416]

With such direct perceptions of difference as this, we must not confound those entirely
unlike cases in which we infer that two things must differ because we know enough about
each of them taken by itself to warrant our classing them under distinct heads. It often [Pg 497]
happens, when the interval is long between two experiences, that our judgments are guided,
not so much by a positive image or copy of the earlier one, as by our recollection of certain
facts about it. Thus I know that the sunshine to-day is less bright than on a certain day last
week, because I then said it was quite dazzling, a remark I should not now care to make. Or
I know myself to feel better now than I was last summer, because I can now psychologize,
and then I could not. We are constantly busy comparing feelings with whose quality our
imagination has no sort of acquaintance at the time—pleasures, or pains, for example. It is
notoriously hard to conjure up in imagination a lively image of either of these classes of
feeling. The associationists may prate of an idea of pleasure being a pleasant idea, of an idea
of pain being a painful one, but the unsophisticated sense of mankind is against them,
agreeing with Homer that the memory of griefs when past may be a joy, and with Dante that
there is no greater sorrow than, in misery, to recollect one's happier time.
Feelings remembered in this imperfect way must be compared with present or recent
feelings by the aid of what we know about them. We identify the remote experience in such
a case by conceiving it. The most perfect way of conceiving it is by deﬁning it in terms of
some standard scale. If I know the thermometer to stand at zero to-day and to have stood at
32° last Sunday, I know to-day to be colder, and I know just how much colder, than it was
last Sunday. If I know that a certain note was c, and that this note is d, I know that this note
must be the higher of the two.
The inference that two things differ because their concomitants, effects, names, kinds, or—
to put it generally—their signs, differ, is of course susceptible of unlimited complication.
The sciences furnish examples, in the way in which men are led, by noticing differences in
effects, to assume new hypothetical causes, differing from any known heretofore. But no
matter how many may be the steps by which such inferential discriminations are made, they
all end in a direct intuition of difference somewhere. The last ground for inferring that A and [Pg 498]
B differ must be that, whilst A is an m, B is an n, and that m and n are seen to differ. Let us
then neglect the complex cases, the A's and the B's, and go back to the study of the
unanalyzable perception of difference between their signs, the m's and the n's, when these
are seemingly simple terms.
I said that in their immediate succession the shock of their difference was felt. It is felt
repeatedly when we go back and forth from m to n; and we make a point of getting it thus
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repeatedly (by alternating our attention at least) whenever the shock is so slight as to be with
difﬁculty perceived. But in addition to being felt at the brief instant of transition, the
difference also feels as if incorporated and taken up into the second term, which feels
'different-from-the-ﬁrst' even while it lasts. It is obvious that the 'second term' of the mind in
this case is not bald n, but a very complex object; and that the sequence is not simply ﬁrst
'm,' then 'difference,' then 'n'; but ﬁrst 'm,' then 'difference,' then 'n-different-from-m.' The
several thoughts, however, to which these three several objects are revealed, are three
ordinary 'segments' of the mental 'stream.'
As our brains and minds are actually made, it is impossible to get certain m's and n's in
immediate sequence and to keep them pure. If kept pure, it would mean that they remained
uncompared. With us, inevitably, by a mechanism which we as yet fail to understand, the
shock of difference is felt between them, and the second object is not n pure, but n-asdifferent-from-m.[417] It is no more a paradox that under these conditions this cognition of m
and n in mutual relation should occur, than that under other conditions the cognition of m's
or n's simple quality should occur. But as it has been treated as a paradox, and as a spiritual
agent, not itself a portion of the stream, has been invoked to account for it, a word of further [Pg 499]
remark seems desirable.
My account, it will be noted, is merely a description of the facts as they occur: feelings (or
thoughts) each knowing something, but the later one knowing, if preceded by a certain
earlier one, a more complicated object than it would have known had the earlier one not
been there. I offer no explanation of such a sequence of cognitions. The explanation (I
devoutly expect) will be found some day to depend on cerebral conditions. Until it is
forthcoming, we can only treat the sequence as a special case of the general law that every
experience undergone by the brain leaves in it a modiﬁcation which is one factor in
determining what manner of experiences the following ones shall be (cf. pp. 232-236). To
anyone who denies the possibility of such a law I have nothing to say, until he brings his
proofs.
The sensationalists and the spiritualists meanwhile (ﬁlled both of them with their notion that
the mind must in some fashion contain what it knows) begin by giving a crooked account of
the facts. Both admit that for m and n to be known in any way whatever, little rounded and
ﬁnished off duplicates of each must be contained in the mind as separate entities. These pure
ideas, so called, of m and n respectively, succeed each other there. And since they are
distinct, say the sensationalists, they are eo ipso distinguished. "To have ideas different and
ideas distinguished, are synonymous expressions; different and distinguished meaning
exactly the same thing," says James Mill.[418] "Distinguished!" say the spiritualists,
"distinguished by what, forsooth? Truly the respective ideas of m and of n in the mind are
distinct. But for that very reason neither can distinguish itself from the other, for to do that it
would have to be aware of the other, and thus for the time being become the other, and that
would be to get mixed up with the other and to lose its own distinctness. Distinctness of
ideas and idea of distinctness, are not one thing, but two. This last is a relation. Only a
relating principle, opposed in nature to all facts of feeling, an Ego, Soul, or Subject, is [Pg 500]
competent, by being present to both of the ideas alike, to hold them together and at the same
time to keep them distinct."
But if the plain facts be admitted that the pure idea of 'n' is never in the mind at all, when 'm'
has once gone before; and that the feeling 'n-different-from-m' is itself an absolutely unique
pulse of thought, the bottom of this precious quarrel drops out and neither party is left with
anything to ﬁght about. Surely such a consummation ought to be welcomed, especially
when brought about, us here, by a formulation of the facts which offers itself so naturally
and unsophistically.[419]
We may, then, conclude our examination of the manner in which simple involuntary [Pg 501]
discrimination comes about, by saying, 1) that its vehicle is a thought possessed of a
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knowledge of both terms compared and of their difference; 2) that the necessary and
sufﬁcient condition (as the human mind goes) for arousing this thought is that a thought or
feeling of one of the terms discriminated should, as immediately as possible, precede that in
which the other term is known; and 3) and that the thought which knows the second term
will then also know the difference (or in more difﬁcult cases will be continuously succeeded
by one which does know the difference) and both of the terms between which it holds.
This last thought need, however, not be these terms with their difference, nor contain them.
A man's thought can know and mean all sorts of things without those things getting bodily
into it—the distant, for example, the future, and the past.[420] The vanishing term in the case
which occupies us vanishes; but because it is the speciﬁc term it is and nothing else, it
leaves a speciﬁc inﬂuence behind it when it vanishes, the effect of which is to determine the
succeeding pulse of thought in a perfectly characteristic way. Whatever consciousness
comes next must know the vanished term and call it different from the one now there.
Here we are at the end of our tether about involuntary discrimination of successively felt
simple things; and must drop the subject, hopeless of seeing any deeper into it for the [Pg 502]
present, and turn to discriminations of a less simple sort.
THE PROCESS OF ANALYSIS.
And ﬁrst, of the discrimination of simultaneously felt impressions! Our ﬁrst way of looking
at a reality is often to suppose it simple, but later we may learn to perceive it as compound.
This new way of knowing the same reality may conveniently be called by the name of
Analysis. It is manifestly one of the most incessantly performed of all our mental processes,
so let us examine the conditions under which it occurs.
I think we may safely lay down at the outset this fundamental principle, that any total
impression made on the mind must be unanalyzable, whose elements are never experienced
apart. The components of an absolutely changeless group of not-elsewhere-occurring
attributes could never be discriminated. If all cold things were wet and all wet things cold, if
all hard things pricked our skin, and no other things did so; is it likely that we should
discriminate between coldness and wetness, and hardness and pungency respectively? If all
liquids were transparent and no non-liquid were transparent, it would be long before we had
separate names for liquidity and transparency. If heat were a function of position above the
earth's surface, so that the higher a thing was the hotter it became, one word would serve for
hot and high. We have, in fact, a number of sensations whose concomitants are almost
invariably the same, and we ﬁnd it, accordingly, almost impossible to analyze them out from
the totals in which they are found. The contraction of the diaphragm and the expansion of
the lungs, the shortening of certain muscles and the rotation of certain joints, are examples.
The converging of the eyeballs and the accommodation for near objects are, for each
distance of the object (in the common use of the eyes) inseparably linked, and neither can
(without a sort of artiﬁcial training which shall presently be mentioned) be felt by itself. We
learn that the causes of such groups of feelings are multiple, and therefore we frame theories
about the composition of the feelings themselves, by 'fusion,' 'integration,' 'synthesis,' or [Pg 503]
what not. But by direct introspection no analysis of them is ever made. A conspicuous case
will come to view when we treat of the emotions. Every emotion has its 'expression,' of
quick breathing, palpitating heart, ﬂushed face, or the like. The expression gives rise to
bodily feelings; and the emotion is thus necessarily and invariably accompanied by these
bodily feelings. The consequence is that it is impossible to apprehend it as a spiritual state
by itself, or to analyze it away from the lower feelings in question. It is in fact impossible to
prove that it exists as a distinct psychic fact. The present writer strongly doubts that it does
so exist. But those who are most ﬁrmly persuaded of its existence must wait, to prove their
point, until they can quote some as yet unfound pathological case of an individual who shall
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have emotions in a body in which either complete paralysis will have prevented their
expression, or complete anæsthesia will have made the latter unfelt.
In general, then, if an object affects us simultaneously in a number of ways, abcd, we get a
peculiar integral impression, which thereafter characterizes to our mind the individuality of
that object, and becomes the sign of its presence; and which is only resolved into a, b, c, d,
respectively by the aid of farther experiences. These we now may turn to consider.
If any single quality or constituent, a, of such an object, have previously been known by us
isolatedly, or have in any other manner already become an object of separate acquaintance
on our part, so that we have an image of it, distinct or vague, in our mind, disconnected with
bcd, then that constituent a may be analyzed out from the total impression. Analysis of a
thing means separate attention to each of its parts. In Chapter XI we saw that one condition
of attending to a thing was the formation from within of a separate image of that thing,
which should, as it were, go out to meet the impression received. Attention being the
condition of analysis, and separate imagination being the condition of attention, it follows
also that separate imagination is the condition of analysis. Only such elements as we are
acquainted with, and can imagine, separately, can be discriminated within a total sense- [Pg 504]
impression. The image seems to welcome its own mate from out of the compound, and to
heighten the feeling thereof; whereas it dampens and opposes the feeling of the other
constituents; and thus the compound becomes broken for our consciousness into parts.
All the facts cited in Chapter XI, to prove that attention involves inward reproduction, go to
prove this point as well. In looking for any object in a room, for a book in a library, for
example, we detect it the more readily if, in addition to merely knowing its name, etc., we
carry in our mind a distinct image of its appearance. The assafœtida in 'Worcestershire
sauce' is not obvious to anyone who has not tasted assafœtida per se. In a 'cold' color an
artist would never be able to analyze out the pervasive presence of blue, unless he had
previously made acquaintance with the color blue by itself. All the colors we actually
experience are mixtures. Even the purest primaries always come to us with some white.
Absolutely pure red or green or violet is never experienced, and so can never be discerned in
the so-called primaries with which we have to deal: the latter consequently pass for pure.—
The reader will remember how an overtone can only be attended to in the midst of its
consorts in the voice of a musical instrument, by sounding it previously alone. The
imagination, being then full of it, hears the like of it in the compound tone. Helmholtz,
whose account of this observation we formerly quoted, goes on to explain the difﬁculty of
the case in a way which beautifully corroborates the point I now seek to prove. He says:
"The ultimate simple elements of the sensation of tone, simple tones
themselves, are rarely heard alone. Even those instruments by which they can
be produced (as tuning-forks before resonance-chambers), when strongly
excited, give rise to weak harmonic upper partials, partly within and partly
without the ear.... Hence the opportunities are very scanty for impressing on our
memory an exact and sure image of these simple elementary tones. But if the
constituents are only indeﬁnitely and vaguely known, the analysis of their sum
into them must be correspondingly uncertain. If we do not know with certainty
how much of the musical tone under consideration is to be attributed to its
prime, we cannot but be uncertain as to what belongs to the partials.
Consequently we must begin by making the individual elements which have to
be distinguished individually audible, so as to obtain an entirely fresh
recollection of the corresponding sensation, and the whole business requires
undisturbed and concentrated attention. We are even without the ease that can
be obtained by frequent repetitions of the experiment, such as we possess in the
analysis of musical chords into their individual notes. In that case we hear the
individual notes sufﬁciently often by themselves, whereas we rarely hear simple
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tones, and may almost be said never to hear the building up of a compound
from its simple tones."[421]
THE PROCESS OF ABSTRACTION.
Very few elements of reality are experienced by us in absolute isolation. The most that
usually happens to a constituent a, of a compound phenomenon abcd, is that its strength
relatively to bcd varies from a maximum to a minimum; or that it appears linked with other
qualities, in other compounds, as aefg, or ahik. Either of these vicissitudes in the mode of
our experiencing a may, under favorable circumstances, lead us to feel the difference
between it and its concomitants, and to single it out—not absolutely, it is true, but
approximately—and so to analyze the compound of which it is a part. The act of singling
out is then called abstraction, and the element disengaged is an abstract.
Consider the case of ﬂuctuations of relative strength or intensity ﬁrst. Let there be three
grades of the compound, as Abcd, abcd, and abcD. In passing between these compounds,
the mind will feel shocks of difference. The differences, moreover, will serially increase,
and their direction will be felt as of a distinct sort. The increase from abcd to Abcd is on the
a side; that to abcD is on the d side. And these two differences of direction are differently
felt. I do not say that this discernment of the a-direction from the d-direction will give us an
actual intuition either of a or of d in the abstract. But it leads us to conceive or postulate
each of these qualities, and to deﬁne it as the extreme of a certain direction. 'Dry' wines and
'sweet' wines, for example, differ, and form a series. It happens that we have an experience
of sweetness pure and simple in the taste of sugar, and this we can analyze out of the wine- [Pg 506]
taste. But no one knows what 'dryness' tastes like, all by itself. It must, however, be
something extreme in the dry direction; and we should probably not fail to recognize it as
the original of our abstract conception, in case we ever did come across it. In some such way
we get to form notions of the ﬂavor of meats, apart from their feeling to the tongue, or of
that of fruits apart from their acidity, etc., and we abstract the touch of bodies as distinct
from their temperature. We may even apprehend the quality of a muscle's contraction as
distinguished from its extent, or one muscle's contraction from another's, as when, by
practising with prismatic glasses, and varying our eyes' convergence whilst our
accommodation remains the same, we learn the direction in which our feeling of the
convergence differs from that of the accommodation.
But the ﬂuctuation in a quality's intensity is a less efﬁcient aid to our abstracting of it than
the diversity of the other qualities in whose company it may appear. What is associated now
with one thing and now with another tends to become dissociated from either, and to grow
into an object of abstract contemplation by the mind. One might call this the law of
dissociation by varying concomitants. The practical result of it will be to allow the mind
which has thus dissociated and abstracted a character to analyze it out of a total, whenever it
meets with it again. The law has been frequently recognized by psychologists, though I
know of none who has given it the emphatic prominence in our mental history which it
deserves. Mr. Spencer says:
"If the property A occurs here along with the properties B, C, D, there along
with C, F, H, and again with E, G, B,... it must happen that by multiplication of
experiences the impressions produced by these properties on the organism will
be disconnected and rendered so far independent in the organism as the
properties are in the environment, whence must eventually result a power to
recognize attributes in themselves, apart from particular bodies."[422]
And still more to the point Dr. Martineau, in the passage I have already quoted, writes:
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"When a red ivory ball, seen for the ﬁrst time, has been withdrawn, it will leave
a mental representation of itself, in which all that it simultaneously gave us will
indistinguishably coexist. Let a white ball succeed to it; now, and not before,
will an attribute detach itself, and the color, by force of contrast, be shaken out
into the foreground. Let the white ball be replaced by an egg, and this new
difference will bring the form into notice from its previous slumber, and thus
that which began by being simply an object cut out from the surrounding scene
becomes for us ﬁrst a red object, then a red round object, and so on."

[Pg 507]

Why the repetition of the character in combination with different wholes will cause it thus to
break up its adhesion with any one of them, and roll out, as it were, alone upon the table of
consciousness, is a little of a mystery. One might suppose the nerve-processes of the various
concomitants to neutralize or inhibit each other more or less and to leave the process of the
common term alone distinctly active. Mr. Spencer appears to think that the mere fact that the
common term is repeated more often than any one of its associates will, of itself, give it
such a degree of intensity that its abstraction must needs ensue.
This has a plausible sound, but breaks down when examined closely. For it is not always the
often-repeated character which is ﬁrst noticed when its concomitants have varied a certain
number of times; it is even more likely to be the most novel of all the concomitants, which
will arrest the attention. If a boy has seen nothing all his life but sloops and schooners, he
will probably never distinctly have singled out in his notion of 'sail' the character of being
hung lengthwise. When for the ﬁrst time he sees a square-rigged ship, the opportunity of
extracting the lengthwise mode of hanging as a special accident, and of dissociating it from
the general notion of sail, is offered. But there are twenty chances to one that that will not be
the form of the boy's consciousness. What he notices will be the new and exceptional
character of being hung crosswise. He will go home and speak of that, and perhaps never
consciously formulate what the more familiar peculiarity consists in.
This mode of abstraction is realized on a very wide scale, because the elements of the world
in which we ﬁnd ourselves appear, as a matter of fact, here, there, and everywhere, and are
changing their concomitants all the while. But on the other hand the abstraction is, so to [Pg 508]
speak, never complete, the analysis of a compound never perfect, because no element is ever
given to us absolutely alone, and we can never therefore approach a compound with the
image in our mind of any one of its components in a perfectly pure form. Colors, sounds,
smells, are just as much entangled with other matter as are more formal elements of
experience, such as extension, intensity, effort, pleasure, difference, likeness, harmony,
badness, strength, and even consciousness itself. All are embedded in one world. But by the
ﬂuctuations and permutations of which we have spoken, we come to form a pretty good
notion of the direction in which each element differs from the rest, and so we frame the
notion of it as a terminus, and continue to mean it as an individual thing. In the case of many
elements, the simple sensibles, like heat, cold, the colors, smells, etc., the extremes of the
directions are almost touched, and in these instances we have a comparatively exact
perception of what it is we mean to abstract. But even this is only an approximation; and in
literal mathematical strictness all our abstracts must be confessed to be but imperfectly
imaginable things. At bottom the process is one of conception, and is everywhere, even in
the sphere of simple sensible qualities, the same as that by which we are usually understood
to attain to the notions of abstract goodness, perfect felicity, absolute power, and the like:
the direct perception of a difference between compounds, and the imaginary prolongation of
the direction of the difference to an ideal terminus, the notion of which we ﬁx and keep as
one of our permanent subjects of discourse.
This is all that I can say usefully about abstraction, or about analysis, to which it leads.
THE IMPROVEMENT OF DISCRIMINATION BY PRACTICE.
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In all the cases considered hitherto I have supposed the differences involved to be so large
as to be ﬂagrant, and the discrimination, where successive, was treated as involuntary. But,
so far from being always involuntary, discriminations are often difﬁcult in the extreme, and
by most men never performed. Professor de Morgan, thinking, it is true, rather of conceptual [Pg 509]
than of perceptive discrimination, wrote, wittily enough:
"The great bulk of the illogical part of the educated community—whether
majority or minority I know not; perhaps six of one and half a dozen of the
other—have not power to make a distinction, and of course cannot be made to
take a distinction, and of course never attempt to shake a distinction. With them
all such things are evasions, subterfuges, come-offs, loop-holes, etc. They
would hang a man for horse-stealing under a statute against sheep-stealing; and
would laugh at you if you quibbled about the distinction between a horse and a
sheep."[423]
Any personal or practical interest, however, in the results to be obtained by distinguishing,
makes one's wits amazingly sharp to detect differences. The culprit himself is not likely to
overlook the difference between a horse and a sheep. And long training and practice in
distinguishing has the same effect as personal interest. Both of these agencies give to small
amounts of objective difference the same effectiveness upon the mind that, under other
circumstances, only large ones would have. Let us seek to penetrate the modus operandi of
their inﬂuence—beginning with that of practice and habit.
That 'practice makes perfect' is notorious in the ﬁeld of motor accomplishments. But motor
accomplishments depend in part on sensory discrimination. Billiard-playing, riﬂe-shooting,
tight-rope-dancing, demand the most delicate appreciation of minute disparities of sensation,
as well as the power to make accurately graduated muscular response thereto. In the purely
sensorial ﬁeld we have the well-known virtuosity displayed by the professional buyers and
testers of various kinds of goods. One man will distinguish by taste between the upper and
the lower half of a bottle of old Madeira. Another will recognize, by feeling the ﬂour in a
barrel, whether the wheat was grown in Iowa or Tennessee. The blind deaf-mute, Laura
Bridgman, had so improved her touch as to recognize, after a year's interval, the hand of a
person who once had shaken hers; and her sister in misfortune, Julia Brace, is said to have
been employed in the Hartford Asylum to sort the linen of its multitudinous inmates, after it [Pg 510]
came from the wash, by her wonderfully educated sense of smell.
The fact is so familiar that few, if any, psychologists have even recognized it as needing
explanation. They have seemed to think that practice must, in the nature of things, improve
the delicacy of discernment, and have let the matter rest. At most they have said: "Attention
accounts for it; we attend more to habitual things, and what we attend to we perceive more
minutely." This answer is true, but too general; it seems to me that we can be a little more
precise.

There are at least two distinct causes which we can see at work whenever experience
improves discrimination:
First, the terms whose difference comes to be felt contract disparate associates and these
help to drag them apart.
Second, the difference reminds us of larger differences of the same sort, and these help us to
notice it.
Let us study the ﬁrst cause ﬁrst, and begin by supposing two compounds, of ten elements
apiece. Suppose no one element of either compound to differ from the corresponding
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element of the other compound enough to be distinguished from it if the two are compared
alone, and let the amount of this imperceptible difference be called equal to 1. The
compounds will differ from each other, however, in ten different ways; and, although each
difference by itself might pass unperceived, the total difference, equal to 10, may very well
be sufﬁcient to strike the sense. In a word, increasing the number of 'points' involved in a
difference may excite our discrimination as effectually as increasing the amount of
difference at any one point. Two men whose mouth, nose, eyes, cheeks, chin, and hair, all
differ slightly, will be as little confounded by us, as two appearances of the same man one
with, and the other without, a false nose. The only contrast in the cases is that we can easily
name the point of difference in the one, whilst in the other we cannot.
Two things, then, B and C, indistinguishable when compared together alone, may each
contract adhesions with different associates, and the compounds thus formed may, as [Pg 511]
wholes, be judged very distinct. The effect of practice in increasing discrimination must
then, in part be due to the reinforcing effect, upon an original slight difference between the
terms, of additional differences between the diverse associates which they severally affect.
Let B and C be the terms: If A contract adhesions with B, and C with D, AB may appear
very distinct from CD, though B and C per se might have been almost identical.
To illustrate, how does one learn to distinguish claret from burgundy? Probably they have
been drunk on different occasions. When we ﬁrst drank claret we heard it called by that
name, we were eating such and such a dinner, etc. Next time we drink it, a dim reminder of
all those things chimes through us as we get the taste of the wine. When we try burgundy
our ﬁrst impression is that it is a kind of claret; but something falls short of full
identiﬁcation, and presently we hear it called burgundy. During the next few experiences,
the discrimination may still be uncertain—"which," we ask ourselves, "of the two wines is
this present specimen?" But at last the claret-ﬂavor recalls pretty distinctly its own name,
'claret,' "that wine I drank at So-and-so's table," etc.; and the burgundy-ﬂavor recalls the
name burgundy and some one else's table. And only when this different SETTING has come to
each is our discrimination between the two ﬂavors solid and stable. After a while the tables
and other parts of the setting, besides the name, grow so multifarious as not to come up
distinctly into consciousness; but pari passu with this, the adhesion of each wine with its
own name becomes more and more inveterate, and at last each ﬂavor suggests instantly and
certainly its own name and nothing else. The names differ far more than the ﬂavors, and
help to stretch these latter farther apart. Some such process as this must go on in all our
experience. Beef and mutton, strawberries and raspberries, odor of rose and odor of violet,
contract different adhesions which reinforce the differences already felt in the terms.
The reader may say that this has nothing to do with making us feel the difference between
the two terms. It is merely ﬁxing, identifying, and so to speak substantializing, the terms. [Pg 512]
But what we feel as their difference, we should feel, even though we were unable to name or
otherwise identify the terms.
To which I reply that I believe that the difference is always concreted and made to seem
more substantial by recognizing the terms. I went out for instance the other day and found
that the snow just fallen had a very odd look, different from the common appearance of
snow. I presently called it a 'micaceous' look; and it seemed to me as if, the moment I did so,
the difference grew more distinct and ﬁxed than it was before. The other connotations of the
word 'micaceous' dragged the snow farther away from ordinary snow and seemed even to
aggravate the peculiar look in question. I think some such effect as this on our way of
feeling a difference will be very generally admitted to follow from naming the terms
between which it obtains; although I admit myself that it is difﬁcult to show coercively that
naming or otherwise identifying any given pair of hardly distinguishable terms is essential
to their being felt as different at ﬁrst.[424]
I offer the explanation only as a partial one: it certainly is not complete. Take the way in [Pg 513]
which practice reﬁnes our local discrimination on the skin, for example. Two compasshttps://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm
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points touching the palm of the hand must be kept, say, half an inch asunder in order not to
be mistaken for one point. But at the end of an hour or so of practice with them we can
distinguish them as two, even when less than a quarter of an inch apart. If the same two
regions of the skin were constantly touched, in this experience, the explanation we have
been considering would perfectly apply. Suppose a line a b c d e f of points upon the skin.
Suppose the local difference of feeling between a and f to be so strong as to be instantly
recognized when the points are simultaneously touched, but suppose that between c and d to
be at ﬁrst too small for this purpose. If we began by putting the compasses on a and f and
gradually contracted their opening, the strong doubleness recognized at ﬁrst would still be
suggested, as the compass-points approached the positions c and d; for the point e would be
so near f, and so like it, as not to be aroused without f also coming to mind. Similarly d
would recall e and, more remotely, f. In such wise c—d would no longer be bare c—d, but
something more like abc—def,—palpably differing impressions. But in actual experience
the education can take place in a much less methodical way, and we learn at last to
discriminate c and d without any constant adhesion being contracted between one of these [Pg 514]
spots and ab, and the other and ef. Volkmann's experiments show this. He and Fechner,
prompted by Czermak's observation that the skin of the blind was twice as discriminative as
that of seeing folks, sought by experiment to show the effects of practice upon themselves.
They discovered that even within the limits of a single sitting the distances at which points
were felt double might fall at the end to considerably less than half of their magnitude at the
beginning; and that some, though not all, of this improved sensibility was retained next day.
But they also found that exercising one part of the skin in this way improved the
discrimination not only of the corresponding part of the opposite side of the body, but of the
neighboring parts as well. Thus, at the beginning of an experimental sitting, the compasspoints had to be a Paris line asunder, in order to be distinguished by the little-ﬁnger-tip. But
after exercising the other ﬁngers, it was found that the little-ﬁnger-tip could discriminate
points only half a line apart.[425] The same relation existed betwixt divers points of the arm
and hand.[426]
Here it is clear that the cause which I ﬁrst suggested fails to apply, and that we must invoke
another.
What are the exact experimental phenomena? The spots, as such, are not distinctly located,
and the difference, as such, between their feelings, is not distinctly felt, until the interval is
greater than the minimum required for the mere perception of their doubleness. What we
ﬁrst feel is a bluntness, then a suspicion of doubleness, which presently becomes a distinct
doubleness, and at last two different-feeling and differently placed spots with a deﬁnite tract
of space between them. Some of the places we try give us this latest stage of the perception
immediately; some only give us the earliest; and between them are intermediary places. But
as soon as the image of the doubleness as it is felt in the more discriminative places gets
lodged in our memory, it helps us to ﬁnd its like in places where otherwise we might have
missed it, much as the recent hearing of an 'overtone' helps us to detect the latter in a [Pg 515]
compound sound (supra, pp. 439-40). A dim doubleness grows clearer by being assimilated
to the image of a distincter doubleness felt a moment before. It is interpreted by means of
the latter. And so is any difference, like any other sort of impression, more easily perceived
when we carry in our mind to meet it a distinct image of what sort of a thing we are to look
for, of what its nature is likely to be.[427]
These two processes, the reinforcement of the terms by disparate associates, and the ﬁlling
of the memory with past differences, of similar direction with the present one, but of more
conspicuous amount, are the only explanations I can offer of the effects of education in this
line. What is accomplished by both processes is essentially the same thing: they make small
differences affect us as if they were large ones—that large differences should affect us as
they do remains an inexplicable fact. In principle these two processes ought to be sufﬁcient
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

305/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

to account for all possible cases. Whether in fact they are sufﬁcient, whether there be no
residual factor which we have failed to detect and analyze out, I will not presume to decide.
PRACTICAL INTERESTS LIMIT DISCRIMINATION.
It will be remembered that on page 509 personal interest was named as a sharpener of
discrimination alongside of practice. But personal interest probably acts through attention
and not in any immediate or speciﬁc way. A distinction in which we have a practical stake is
one which we concentrate our minds upon and which we are on the look-out for. We draw it
frequently, and we get all the beneﬁts of so doing, beneﬁts which have just been explained.
Where, on the other hand, a distinction has no practical interest, where we gain nothing by
analyzing a feature from out of the compound total of which it forms a part, we contract a [Pg 516]
habit of leaving it unnoticed, and at last grow callous to its presence. Helmholtz was the ﬁrst
psychologist who dwelt on these facts as emphatically as they deserve, and I can do no
better than quote his very words.
"We are accustomed," he says, "in a large number of cases where sensations of
different kinds, or in different parts of the body, exist simultaneously, to
recognize that they are distinct as soon as they are perceived, and to direct our
attention at will to any one of them separately. Thus at any moment we can be
separately conscious of what we see, of what we hear, of what we feel; and
distinguish what we feel in a ﬁnger or in the great toe, whether pressure, gentle
touch, or warmth. So also in the ﬁeld of vision. Indeed, as I shall endeavor to
show in what follows, we readily distinguish our sensations from one another
when we have a precise knowledge that they are composite, as, for example,
when we have become certain, by frequently repeated and invariable
experience, that our present sensation arises from the simultaneous action of
many independent stimuli, each of which usually excites an equally well-known
individual sensation."
This, it will be observed, is only another statement of our law, that the only individual
components which we can pick out of compounds are those of which we have independent
knowledge in a separate form.
"This induces us to think that nothing can be easier, when a number of different
sensations are simultaneously excited, than to distinguish them individually
from each other, and that this is an innate faculty of our minds.
"Thus we ﬁnd, among other things, that it is quite a matter of course to hear
separately the different musical tones which come to our senses collectively;
and we expect that in every case when two of them occur together, we shall be
able to do the like.
"The matter becomes very different when we set to work to investigate the
more unusual cases of perception, and seek more completely to understand the
conditions under which the above-mentioned distinction can or cannot be made,
as is the case in the physiology of the senses. We then become aware that two
different kinds or grades must be distinguished in our becoming conscious of a
sensation. The lower grade of this consciousness is that in which the inﬂuence
of the sensation in question makes itself felt only in the conceptions we form of
external things and processes, and assists in determining them. This can take
place without our needing, or indeed being able, to ascertain to what particular
part of our sensations we owe this or that circumstance in our perceptions. In
this case we will say that the impression of the sensation in question is
perceived synthetically. The second higher grade is when we immediately
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distinguish the sensation in question as an existing part of the sum of the
sensations excited in us. We will say, then, that the sensation is perceived
analytically. The two cases must be carefully distinguished from each other."

[Pg 517]

[428]

By the sensation being perceived synthetically, Helmholtz means that it is not discriminated
at all, but only felt in a mass with other simultaneous sensations. That it is felt there he
thinks is proved by the fact that our judgment of the total will change if anything occurs to
alter the outer cause of the sensation.[429] The following pages from an earlier edition show
what the concrete cases of synthetic perception and what those of analytic perception are
wont to be:
"In the use of our senses, practice and experience play a much larger part than
we ordinarily suppose. Our sensations are in the ﬁrst instance important only in
so far as they enable us to judge rightly of the world about us; and our practice
in discriminating between them usually goes only just far enough to meet this
end. We are, however, too much disposed to think that we must be immediately
conscious of every ingredient of our sensations. This natural prejudice is due to
the fact that we are indeed conscious, immediately and without effort, of
everything in our sensations which has a bearing upon those practical purposes,
for the sake of which we wish to know the outer world. Daily and hourly,
during our whole life, we keep our senses in training for this end exclusively,
and for its sake our experiences are accumulated. But even within the sphere of
these sensations, which do correspond to outer things, training and practice
make themselves felt. It is well known how much ﬁner and quicker the painter
is in discriminating colors and illuminations than one whose eye is not trained
in these matters; how the musician and the musical-instrument maker perceive
with ease and certainty differences of pitch and tone which for the ear of the
layman do not exist; and how even in the inferior realms of cookery and winejudging it takes a long habit of comparing to make a master. But more strikingly
still is seen the effect of practice when we pass to sensations which depend only
on inner conditions of our organs, and which, not corresponding at all to outer
things or to their effects upon us, are therefore of no value in giving us
information about the outer world. The physiology of the sense-organs has, in
recent times, made us acquainted with a number of such phenomena,
discovered partly in consequence of theoretic speculations and questionings,
partly by individuals, like Goethe and Purkinje, specially endowed by nature
with talent for this sort of observation. These so-called subjective phenomena
are extraordinarily hard to ﬁnd; and when they are once found, special aids for
the attention are almost always required to observe them. It is usually hard to
notice the phenomenon again even when one knows already the description of
the ﬁrst observer. The reason is that we are not only unpractised in singling out
these subjective sensations, but that we are, on the contrary, most thoroughly
trained in abstracting our attention from them, because they would only hinder
us in observing the outer world. Only when their intensity is so strong as
actually to hinder us in observing the outer world do we begin to notice them;
or they may sometimes, in dreaming and delirium, form the starting point of
hallucinations.

[Pg 518]

"Let me give a few well-known cases, taken from physiological optics, as
examples. Every eye probably contains muscæ volitantes, so called; these are
ﬁbres, granules, etc., ﬂoating in the vitreous humor, throwing their shadows on
the retina, and appearing in the ﬁeld of vision as little dark moving spots. They
are most easily detected by looking attentively at a broad, bright, blank surface
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like the sky. Most persons who have not had their attention expressly called to
the existence of these ﬁgures are apt to notice them for the ﬁrst time when some
ailment befalls their eyes and attracts their attention to the subjective state of
these organs. The usual complaint then is that the muscæ volitantes came in
with the malady; and this often makes the patients very anxious about these
harmless things, and attentive to all their peculiarities. It is then hard work to
make them believe that these ﬁgures have existed throughout all their previous
life, and that all healthy eyes contain them. I knew an old gentleman who once
had occasion to cover one of his eyes which had accidentally become diseased,
and who was then in no small degree shocked at ﬁnding that his other eye was
totally blind; with a sort of blindness, moreover, which must have lasted years,
and yet he never was aware of it.
"Who, besides, would believe without performing the appropriate experiments,
that when one of his eyes is closed there is a great gap, the so-called 'blind spot,'
not far from the middle of the ﬁeld of the open eye, in which he sees nothing at
all, but which he ﬁlls out with his imagination? Mariotte, who was led by
theoretic speculations to discover this phenomenon, awakened no small surprise
when he showed it at the court of Charles II. of England. The experiment was at
that time repeated with many variations, and became a fashionable amusement.
The gap is, in fact, so large that seven full moons alongside of each other would
not cover its diameter, and that a man's face 6 or 7 feet off disappears within it.
In our ordinary use of vision this great hole in the ﬁeld fails utterly to be
noticed; because our eyes are constantly wandering, and the moment an object
interests us we turn them full upon it. So it follows that the object which at any
actual moment excites our attention never happens to fall upon this gap, and
thus it is that we never grow conscious of the blind spot in the ﬁeld. In order to
notice it, we must ﬁrst purposely rivet our gaze upon one object and then move
about a second object in the neighborhood of the blind spot, striving meanwhile
to attend to this latter without moving the direction of our gaze from the ﬁrst
object. This runs counter to all our habits, and is therefore a difﬁcult thing to
accomplish. With some people it is even an impossibility. But only when it is
accomplished do we see the second object vanish and convince ourselves of the
existence of this gap.

[Pg 519]

"Finally, let me refer to the double images of ordinary binocular vision.
Whenever we look at a point with both eyes, all objects on this side of it or
beyond it appear double. It takes but a moderate effort of observation to
ascertain this fact; and from this we may conclude that we have been seeing the
far greater part of the external world double all our lives, although numbers of
persons are unaware of it, and are in the highest degree astonished when it is
brought to their attention. As a matter of fact, we never have seen in this double
fashion any particular object upon which our attention was directed at the time;
for upon such objects we always converge both eyes. In the habitual use of our
eyes, our attention is always withdrawn from such objects as give us double
images at the time; this is the reason why we so seldom learn that these images
exist. In order to ﬁnd them we must set our attention a new and unusual task;
we must make it explore the lateral parts of the ﬁeld of vision, not, as usual, to
ﬁnd what objects are there, but to analyze our sensations. Then only do we
notice this phenomenon.[430]
"The same difﬁculty which is found in the observation of subjective sensations
to which no external object corresponds is found also in the analysis of
compound sensations which correspond to a single object. Of this sort are many
of our sensations of sound. When the sound of a violin, no matter how often we
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hear it, excites over and over again in our ear the same sum of partial tones, the
result is that our feeling of this sum of tones ends by becoming for our mind a
mere sign for the voice of the violin. Another combination of partial tones
becomes the sensible sign of the voice of a clarionet, etc. And the oftener any
such combination is heard, the more accustomed we grow to perceiving it as an
integral total, and the harder it becomes to analyze it by immediate observation.
I believe that this is one of the principal reasons why the analysis of the notes of
the human voice in singing is relatively so difﬁcult. Such fusions of many
sensations into what, to conscious perception, seems a simple whole, abound in
all our senses.

[Pg 520]

"Physiological optics affords other interesting examples. The perception of the
bodily form of a near object comes about through the combination of two
diverse pictures which the eyes severally receive from it, and whose diversity is
due to the different position of each eye, altering the perspective view of what
is before it. Before the invention of the stereoscope this explanation could only
be assumed hypothetically; but it can now be proved at any moment by the use
of the instrument. Into the stereoscope we insert two ﬂat drawings, representing
the two perspective views of the two eyes, in such a manner that each eye sees
its own view in the proper place; and we obtain, in consequence, the perception
of a single extended solid, as complete and vivid as if we had the real object
before us.
"Now we can, it is true, by shutting one eye after the other and attending to the
point, recognize the difference in the pictures—at least when it is not too small.
But, for the stereoscopic perception of solidity, pictures sufﬁce whose
difference is so extraordinarily slight as hardly to be recognized by the most
careful comparison; and it is certain that, in our ordinary careless observing of
bodily objects, we never dream that the perception is due to two perspective
views fused into one, because it is an entirely different kind of perception from
that of either ﬂat perspective view by itself. It is certain, therefore, that two
different sensations of our two eyes fuse into a third perception entirely
different from either. Just as partial tones fuse into the perception of a certain
instrument's voice; and just as we learn to separate the partial tones of a
vibrating string by pinching a nodal point and letting them sound in isolation;
so we learn to separate the images on the two eyes by opening and closing them
alternately.
"There are other much more complex instances of the way in which many
sensations may combine to serve as the basis of a quite simple perception.
When, for example we perceive an object in a certain direction, we must
somehow be impressed by the fact that certain of our optic nerve-ﬁbres, and no
others, are impressed by its light. Furthermore, we must rightly judge the
position of our eyes in our head, and of our head upon our body, by means of
feelings in our eye-muscles and our neck-muscles respectively. If any of these
processes is disturbed we get a false perception of the object's position. The
nerve-ﬁbres can be changed by a prism before the eye; or the eyeball's position
changed by pressing the organ towards one side; and such experiments show
that, for the simple seeing of the position of an object, sensations of these two
sorts must concur. But it would be quite impossible to gather this directly from
the sensible impression which the object makes. Even when we have made
experiments and convinced ourselves in every possible manner that such must
be the fact, it still remains hidden from our immediate introspective
observation.
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"These examples" [of 'synthetic perception,' perception in which each
contributory sensation is felt in the whole, and is a co-determinant of what the
whole shall be, but does not attract the attention to its separate self] "may
sufﬁce to show the vital part which the direction of attention and practice in
observing play in sense-perception. To apply this now to the ear. The ordinary
task which our ear has to solve when many sounds assail it at once is to discern
the voices of the several sounding bodies or instruments engaged; beyond this it
has no objective interest in analyzing. We wish to know, when many men are
speaking together, what each one says, when many instruments and voices
combine, which melody is executed by each. Any deeper analysis, such as that
of each separate note into its partial tones (although it might be performed by
the same means and faculty of hearing as the ﬁrst analysis) would tell us
nothing new about the sources of sound actually present, but might lead us
astray as to their number. For this reason we conﬁne our attention in analyzing a
mass of sound to the several instruments' voices, and expressly abstain, as it
were, from discriminating the elementary components of the latter. In this last
sort of discrimination we are as unpractised as we are, on the contrary, well
trained in the former kind."[431]

[Pg 521]

After all we have said, no comment seems called for upon these interesting and important [Pg 522]
facts and reﬂections of Helmholtz.
REACTION-TIME AFTER DISCRIMINATION.

[Pg 523]

The time required for discrimination has been made a subject of experimental measurement.
Wundt calls it Unterscheidungszeit. His subjects (whose simple reaction-time—see p. 85 ff.
—had previously been determined) were required to make a movement, always the same,
the instant they discerned which of two or more signals they received. The exact time of the
signal and that of the movement were automatically registered by a galvanic chronoscope.
The particular signal to be received was unknown in advance, and the excess of time
occupied by those reactions in which its character had ﬁrst to be discerned, over the simple
reaction-time, measured, according to Wundt, the time required for the act of discrimination.
It was found longer when four different signals were irregularly used than when only two
were used. In the former case it averaged, for three observers respectively (the signals being
the sudden appearance of a black or of a white object),
0.050 sec;
0.047 sec.
0.079 sec.
In the latter case, a red and a green signal being added to the former ones, it became, for the [Pg 524]
same observers,
0.157;
0.073;
0.132.[432]
Later, in Wundt's Laboratory, Herr Tischer made many careful experiments after the same
method, where the facts to be discriminated were the different degrees of loudness in the
sound which served as a signal. I subjoin Herr Tischer's table of results, explaining that each
vertical column after the ﬁrst gives the average results obtained from a distinct individual,
and that the ﬁgure in the ﬁrst column stands for the number of possible loudnesses that
might be expected in the particular series of reactions made. The times are expressed in
thousandths of a second.
2 6
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3 10
14.4 19.9
4 16.7 20.8 29
5 25.6 31
...

22.7 58.5 57.8
29.1 75 84
40.1 95.5 138[433]

The interesting points here are the great individual variations, and the rapid way in which
the time for discrimination increases with the number of possible terms to discriminate. The
individual variations are largely due to want of practice in the particular task set, but partly
also to discrepancies in the psychic process. One gentleman said, for example, that in the
experiments with three sounds, he kept the image of the middle one ready in his mind, and
compared what he heard as either louder, lower, or the same. His discrimination among
three possibilities became thus very similar to a discrimination between two.[434]
Mr. J. M. Cattell found he could get no results by this method,[435] and reverted to one used
by observers previous to Wundt and which Wundt had rejected. This is the einfache [Pg 525]
Wahlmethode, as Wundt calls it. The reacter awaits the signal and reacts if it is of one sort,
but omits to act if it is of another sort. The reaction thus occurs after discrimination; the
motor impulse cannot be sent to the hand until the subject knows what the signal is. The
nervous impulse, as Mr. Cattell says, must probably travel to the cortex and excite changes
there, causing in consciousness the perception of the signal. These changes occupy the time
of discrimination (or perception-time, as it is called by Mr. C.) But then a nervous impulse
must descend from the cortex to the lower motor centre which stands primed and ready to
discharge; and this, as Mr. C. says, gives a will-time as well. The total reaction-time thus
includes both 'will-time' and 'discrimination-time.' But as the centrifugal and centripetal
processes occupying these two times respectively are probably about the same, and the time
used in the cortex is about equally divided between the perception of the signal and the
preparation of the motor discharge, if we divide it equally between perception
(discrimination) and volition, the error cannot be great.[436] We can moreover change the
nature of the perception without altering the will-time, and thus investigate with
considerable thoroughness the length of the perception-time.
Guided by these principles, Prof. Cattell found the time required for distinguishing a white
signal from no signal to be, in two observers:
0.030 sec. and 0.050 sec;
that for distinguishing one color from another was similarly:
0.100 and 0.110;
that for distinguishing a certain color from ten other colors:
0.105 and 0.117;
that for distinguishing the letter A in ordinary print from the letter Z:
0.142 and 0.137;
that for distinguishing a given letter from all the rest of the alphabet (not reacting until that [Pg 526]
letter appeared)
0.119 and 0.116;
that for distinguishing a word from any of twenty-ﬁve other words, from
0.118 sec. to 0.158 sec.
The difference depending on the length of the words and the familiarity of the language to
which they belonged.
Prof. Cattell calls attention to the fact that the time for distinguishing a word is often but
little more than that for distinguishing a letter:
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"We do not, therefore, distinguish separately the letters of which a word is
composed, but the word as a whole. The application of this in teaching children
to read is evident."
He also ﬁnds a great difference in the time with which various letters are distinguished, E
being particularly bad.[437]
I have, in describing these experiments, followed the example of previous writers and
spoken as if the process by which the nature of the signal determines the reaction were
identical with the ordinary conscious process of discriminative perception and volition. I am
convinced, however, that this is not the case; and that although the results are the same, the
form of consciousness is quite different. The reader will remember my contention (supra, p.
90 ff.) that the simple reaction-time (usually supposed to include a conscious process of
perceiving) really measures nothing but a reﬂex act. Anyone who will perform reactions
with discrimination will easily convince himself that the process here also is far more like a
reﬂex, than like a deliberate, operation. I have made, with myself and students, a large
number of measurements where the signal expected was in one series a touch somewhere on
the skin of the back and head, and in another series a spark somewhere in the ﬁeld of view.
The hand had to move as quickly as possible towards the place of the touch or the spark. It [Pg 527]
did so infallibly, and sensibly instantly; whilst both place and movement seemed to be
perceived only a moment later, in memory. These experiments were undertaken for the
express purpose of ascertaining whether the movement at the sight of the spark was
discharged immediately by the visual perception, or whether a 'motor-idea' had to intervene
between the perception of the spark and the reaction.[438] The ﬁrst thing that was manifest to
introspection was that no perception or idea of any sort preceded the reaction. It jumped of
itself, whenever the signal came; and perception was retrospective. We must suppose, then,
that the state of eager expectancy of a certain deﬁnite range of possible discharges,
innervates a whole set of paths in advance, so that when a particular sensation comes it is
drafted into its appropriate motor outlet too quickly for the perceptive process to be aroused.
In the experiments I describe, the conditions were most favorable for rapidity, for the
connection between the signals and their movements might almost be called innate. It is
instinctive to move the hand towards a thing seen or a skin-spot touched. But where the
movement is conventionally attached to the signal, there would be more chance for delay,
and the amount of practice would then determine the speed. This is well shown in Tischer's
results, quoted on p. 524, where the most practised observer, Tischer himself, reacted in one
eighth of the time needed by one of the others.[439] But what all investigators have aimed to
determine in these experiments is the minimum time. I trust I have said enough to convince
the student that this minimum time by no means measures what we consciously know as
discrimination. It only measures something which, under the experimental conditions, leads [Pg 528]
to a similar result. But it is the bane of psychology to suppose that where results are similar,
processes must be the same. Psychologists are too apt to reason as geometers would, if the
latter were to say that the diameter of a circle is the same thing as its semi-circumference,
because, forsooth, they terminate in the same two points.[440]
THE PERCEPTION OF LIKENESS.
The perception of likeness is practically very much bound up with that of difference. That is
to say, the only differences we note as differences, and estimate quantitatively, and arrange
along a scale, are those comparatively limited differences which we ﬁnd between members
of a common genus. The force of gravity and the color of this ink are things it never
occurred to me to compare until now that I am casting about for examples of the
incomparable. Similarly the elastic quality of this india-rubber band, the comfort of last
night's sleep, the good that can be done with a legacy, these are things too discrepant to have
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ever been compared ere now. Their relation to each other is less that of difference than of
mere logical negativity. To be found different, things must as a rule have some
commensurability, some aspect in common, which suggests the possibility of their being
treated in the same way. This is of course not a theoretic necessity—for any distinction may
be called a 'difference,' if one likes—but a practical and linguistic remark.
The same things, then, which arouse the perception of difference usually arouse that of
resemblance also. And the analysis of them, so as to deﬁne wherein the difference and
wherein the resemblance respectively consists, is called comparison. If we start to deal with
the things as simply the same or alike, we are liable to be surprised by the difference. If we
start to treat them as merely different, we are apt to discover how much they are alike. [Pg 529]
Difference, commonly so called, is thus between species of a genus. And the faculty by
which we perceive the resemblance upon which the genus is based, is just as ultimate and
inexplicable a mental endowment as that by which we perceive the differences upon which
the species depend. There is a shock of likeness when we pass from one thing to another
which in the ﬁrst instance we merely discriminate numerically, but, at the moment of
bringing our attention to bear, perceive to be similar to the ﬁrst; just as there is a shock of
difference when we pass between two dissimilars.[441] The objective extent of the likeness,
just like that of the difference, determines the magnitude of the shock. The likeness may be
so evanescent, or the basis of it so habitual and little liable to be attended to, that it will
escape observation altogether. Where, however, we ﬁnd it, there we make a genus of the
things compared; and their discrepancies and incommensurabilities in other respects can
then ﬁgure as the differential of so many species. As 'thinkables' or 'existents' even the
smoke of a cigarette and the worth of a dollar-bill are comparable—still more so as
'perishables,' or as 'enjoyables.'
Much, then, of what I have said of difference in the course of this chapter will apply, with a
simple change of language, to resemblance as well. We go through the world, carrying on
the two functions abreast, discovering differences in the like, and likenesses in the different.
To abstract the ground of either difference or likeness (where it is not ultimate) demands an
analysis of the given objects into their parts. So that all that was said of the dependence of
analysis upon a preliminary separate acquaintance with the character to be abstracted, and
upon its having varied concomitants, ﬁnds a place in the psychology of resemblance as well
as in that of difference.
But when all is said and done about the conditions which favor our perception of
resemblance and our abstraction of its ground, the crude fact remains, that some people are [Pg 530]
far more sensitive to resemblances, and far more ready to point out wherein they consist,
than others are. They are the wits, the poets, the inventors, the scientiﬁc men, the practical
geniuses. A native talent for perceiving analogies is reckoned by Prof. Bain, and by others
before and after him, as the leading fact in genius of every order. But as this chapter is
already long, and as the question of genius had better wait till Chapter XXII, where its
practical consequences can be discussed at the same time, I will say nothing more at present
either about it or about the faculty of noting resemblances. If the reader feels that this
faculty is having small justice done it at my hands, and that it ought to be wondered at and
made much more of than has been done in these last few pages, he will perhaps ﬁnd some
compensation when that later chapter is reached. I think I emphasize it enough when I call it
one of the ultimate foundation-pillars of the intellectual life, the others being
Discrimination, Retentiveness, and Association.
THE MAGNITUDE OF DIFFERENCES.
On page 489 I spoke of differences being greater or less, and of certain groups of them
being susceptible of a linear arrangement exhibiting serial increase. A series whose terms
grow more and more different from the starting point is one whose terms grow less and less
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like it. They grow more and more like it if you read them the other way. So that likeness and
unlikeness to the starting point are functions inverse to each other, of the position of any
term in such a series.
Professor Stumpf introduces the word distance to denote the position of a term in any such
series. The less like is the term, the more distant it is from the starting point. The ideally
regular series of this sort would be one in which the distances—the steps of resemblance or
difference—between all pairs of adjacent terms were equal. This would be an evenly
gradated series. And it is an interesting fact in psychology that we are able, in many
departments of our sensibility, to arrange the terms without difﬁculty in this evenly gradated
way. Differences, in other words, between diverse pairs of terms, a and b, for example, on [Pg 531]
the one hand, and c and d on the other,[442] can be judged equal or diverse in amount. The
distances from one term to another in the series are equal. Linear magnitudes and musical
notes are perhaps the impressions which we easiest arrange in this way. Next come shades
of light or color, which we have little difﬁculty in arranging by steps of difference of
sensibly equal value. Messrs. Plateau and Delbœuf have found it fairly easy to determine
what shade of gray will be judged by every one to hit the exact middle between a darker and
a lighter shade.[443]
How now do we so readily recognize the equality of two differences between different pairs
of terms? or, more brieﬂy, how do we recognize the magnitude of a difference at all? Prof.
Stumpf discusses this question in an interesting way;[444] and comes to the conclusion that
our feeling for the size of a difference, and our perception that the terms of two diverse pairs
are equally or unequally distant from each other, can be explained by no simpler mental
process, but, like the shock of difference itself, must be regarded as for the present an
unanalyzable endowment of the mind. This acute author rejects in particular the notion [Pg 532]
which would make our judgment of the distance between two sensations depend upon our
mentally traversing the intermediary steps. We may of course do so, and may often ﬁnd it
useful to do so, as in musical intervals, or ﬁgured lines, But we need not do so; and nothing
more is really required for a comparative judgment of the amount of a 'distance' than three
or four impressions belonging to a common kind.
The vanishing of all perceptible difference between two numerically distinct things makes
them qualitatively the same or equal. Equality, or qualitative (as distinguished from
numerical) identity, is thus nothing but the extreme degree of likeness.[445]
We saw above (p. 492) that some persons consider that the difference between two objects is
constituted of two things, viz., their absolute identity in certain respects, plus their absolute
non-identity in others. We saw that this theory would not apply to all cases (p. 493). So here
any theory which would base likeness on identity, and not rather identity on likeness, must
fail. It is supposed perhaps, by most people, that two resembling things owe their
resemblance to their absolute identity in respect of some attribute or attributes, combined
with the absolute non-identity of the rest of their being. This, which may be true of
compound things, breaks down when we come to simple impressions.
"When we compare a deep, a middle, and a high note, e.g. C, f sharp, a''', we
remark immediately that the ﬁrst is less like the third than the second is. The
same would be true of c d e in the same region of the scale. Our very calling
one of the notes a 'middle' note is the expression of a judgment of this sort. But
where here is the identical and where the non-identical part? We cannot think of
the overtones; for the ﬁrst-named three notes have none in common, at least not
on musical instruments. Moreover, we might take simple tones, and still our
judgment would be unhesitatingly the same, provided the tones were not chosen
too close together.... Neither can it be said that the identity consists in their all
being sounds, and not a sound, a smell, and a color, respectively. For this
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identical attribute comes to each of them in equal measure, whereas the ﬁrst,
being less like the third than the second is, ought, on the terms of the theory we
are criticising, to have less of the identical quality.... It thus appears
impracticable to deﬁne all possible cases of likeness as partial identity plus
partial disparity; and it is vain to seek in all cases for identical elements."[446]

[Pg 533]

And as all compound resemblances are based on simple ones like these, it follows that
likeness überhaupt must not be conceived as a special complication of identity, but rather
that identity must be conceived as a special degree of likeness, according to the proposition
expressed at the outset of the paragraph that precedes. Likeness and difference are ultimate
relations perceived. As a matter of fact, no two sensations, no two objects of all those we
know, are in scientiﬁc rigor identical. We call those of them identical whose difference is
unperceived. Over and above this we have a conception of absolute sameness, it is true, but
this, like so many of our conceptions (cf. p. 508), is an ideal construction got by following a
certain direction of serial increase to its maximum supposable extreme. It plays an important
part, among other permanent meanings possessed by us, in our ideal intellectual
constructions. But it plays no part whatever in explaining psychologically how we perceive
likenesses between simple things.
THE MEASURE OF DISCRIMINATIVE SENSIBILITY.
In 1860, Professor G. T. Fechner of Leipzig, a man of great learning and subtlety of mind,
published two volumes entitled 'Psychophysik,' devoted to establishing and explaining a law
called by him the psychophysic law, which he considered to express the deepest and most [Pg 534]
elementary relation between the mental and the physical worlds. It is a formula for the
connection between the amount of our sensations and the amount of their outward causes.
Its simplest expression is, that when we pass from one sensation to a stronger one of the
same kind, the sensations increase proportionally to the logarithms of their exciting causes.
Fechner's book was the starting point of a new department of literature, which it would be
perhaps impossible to match for the qualities of thoroughness and subtlety, but of which, in
the humble opinion of the present writer, the proper psychological outcome is just nothing.
The psychophysic law controversy has prompted a good many series of observations on
sense-discrimination, and has made discussion of them very rigorous. It has also cleared up
our ideas about the best methods for getting average results, when particular observations
vary; and beyond this it has done nothing; but as it is a chapter in the history of our science,
some account of it is here due to the reader.
Fechner's train of thought has been popularly expounded a great many times. As I have
nothing new to add, it is but just that I should quote an existing account. I choose the one
given by Wundt in his Vorlesungen über Menschen und Thierseele, 1863, omitting a good
deal:
"How much stronger or weaker one sensation is than another, we are never able
to say. Whether the sun be a hundred or a thousand times brighter than the
moon, a cannon a hundred or a thousand times louder than a pistol, is beyond
our power to estimate. The natural measure of sensation which we possess
enables us to judge of the equality, of the 'more' and of the 'less,' but not of 'how
many times more or less.' This natural measure is, therefore, as good as no
measure at all, whenever it becomes a question of accurately ascertaining
intensities in the sensational sphere. Even though it may teach us in a general
way that with the strength of the outward physical stimulus the strength of the
concomitant sensation waxes or wanes, still it leaves us without the slightest
knowledge of whether the sensation varies in exactly the same proportion as the
stimulus itself, or at a slower or a more rapid rate. In a word, we know by our
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natural sensibility nothing of the law that connects the sensation and its outward
cause together. To ﬁnd this law we must ﬁrst ﬁnd an exact measure for the
sensation itself; we must be able to say: A stimulus of strength one begets a
sensation of strength one; a stimulus of strength two begets a sensation of
strength two, or three, or four, etc. But to do this we must ﬁrst know what a
sensation two, three, or four times greater than another signiﬁes....

[Pg 535]

"Space magnitudes we soon learn to determine exactly because we only
measure one space against another. The measure of mental magnitudes is far
more difﬁcult.... But the problem of measuring the magnitude of sensations is
the ﬁrst step in the bold enterprise of making mental magnitudes altogether
subject to exact measurement.... Were our whole knowledge limited to the fact
that the sensation rises when the stimulus rises, and falls when the latter falls,
much would not be gained. But even immediate unaided observation teaches us
certain facts which, at least in a general way, suggest the law according to
which the sensations vary with their outward cause.
"Every one knows that in the stilly night we hear things unnoticed in the noise
of day. The gentle ticking of the clock, the air circulating through the chimney,
the cracking of the chairs in the room, and a thousand other slight noises,
impress themselves upon our ear. It is equally well known that in the confused
hubbub of the streets, or the clamor of a railway, we may lose not only what our
neighbor says to us, but even not hear the sound of our own voice. The stars
which are brightest at night are invisible by day; and although we see the moon
then, she is far paler than at night. Everyone who has had to deal with weights
knows that if to a pound in the hand a second pound be added, the difference is
immediately felt; whilst if it be added to a hundredweight, we are not aware of
the difference at all....
"The sound of the clock, the light of the stars, the pressure of the pound, these
are all stimuli to our senses, and stimuli whose outward amount remains the
same. What then do these experiences teach? Evidently nothing but this, that
one and the same stimulus, according to the circumstances under which it
operates, will be felt either more or less intensely, or not felt at all. Of what sort
now is the alteration in the circumstances, upon which this alteration in the
feeling may depend? On considering the matter closely we see that it is
everywhere of one and the same kind. The tick of the clock is a feeble stimulus
for our auditory nerve, which we hear plainly when it is alone, but not when it
is added to the strong stimulus of the carriage-wheels and other noises of the
day. The light of the stars is a stimulus to the eye. But if the stimulation which
this light exerts be added to the strong stimulus of daylight, we feel nothing of
it, although we feel it distinctly when it unites itself with the feebler stimulation
of the twilight. The pound-weight is a stimulus to our skin, which we feel when
it joins itself to a preceding stimulus of equal strength, but which vanishes
when it is combined with a stimulus a thousand times greater in amount.
"We may therefore lay it down as a general rule that a stimulus, in order to be
felt, may be so much the smaller if the already pre-existing stimulation of the
organ is small, but must be so much the larger, the greater the pre-existing
stimulation is. From this in a general way we can perceive the connection
between the stimulus and the feeling it excites. At least thus much appears, that
the law of dependence is not as simple a one as might have been expected
beforehand. The simplest relation would obviously be that the sensation should
increase in identically the same ratio as the stimulus, thus that if a stimulus of
strength one occasioned a sensation one, a stimulus of two should occasion
sensation two, stimulus three, sensation three, etc. But if this simplest of all
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relations prevailed, a stimulus added to a pre-existing strong stimulus ought to
provoke as great an increase of feeling as if it were added to a pre-existing
weak stimulus; the light of the stars e.g., ought to make as great an addition to
the daylight as it does to the darkness of the nocturnal sky. This we know not to
be the case: the stars are invisible by day, the addition they make to our
sensation then is unnoticeable, whereas the same addition to our feeling of the
twilight is very considerable indeed. So it is clear that the strength of the
sensations does not increase in proportion to the amount of the stimuli, but
more slowly. And now comes the question, in what proportion does the increase
of the sensation grow less as the increase of the stimulus grows greater. To
answer this question, every-day experiences do not sufﬁce. We need exact
measurements both of the amounts of the various stimuli, and of the intensity of
the sensations themselves.
"How to execute these measurements, however, is something which daily
experience suggests. To measure the strength of sensations is, as we saw,
impossible; we can only measure the difference of sensations. Experience
showed us what very unequal differences of sensation might come from equal
differences of outward stimulus. But all these experiences expressed themselves
in one kind of fact, that the same difference of stimulus could in one case be
felt, and in another case not felt at all—a pound felt if added to another pound,
but not if added to a hundred-weight.... We can quickest reach a result with our
observations if we start with an arbitrary strength of stimulus, notice what
sensation it gives us, and then see how much we can increase the stimulus
without making the sensation seem to change. If we carry out such observations
with stimuli of varying absolute amounts, we shall be forced to choose in an
equally varying way the amounts of addition to the stimulus which are capable
of giving us a just barely perceptible feeling of more. A light, to be just
perceptible in the twilight need not be near as bright as the starlight; it must be
far brighter to be just perceived during the day. If now we institute such
observations for all possible strengths of the various stimuli, and note for each
strength the amount of addition of the latter required to produce a barely
perceptible alteration of sensation, we shall have a series of ﬁgures in which is
immediately expressed the law according to which the sensation alters when the
stimulation is increased...."
Observations according to this method are particularly easy to make in the spheres of light-, [Pg 537]
sound-, and pressure-sensation.... Beginning with the latter case,
"We ﬁnd a surprisingly simple result. The barely sensible addition to the
original weight must stand exactly in the same proportion to it, be the same
fraction of it, no matter what the absolute value may be of the weights on which
the experiment is made.... As the average of a number of experiments, this
fraction is found to be about 1/3; that is, no matter what pressure there may
already be made upon the skin, an increase or a diminution of the pressure will
be felt, as soon as the added or subtracted weight amounts to one third of the
weight originally there."
Wundt then describes how differences may be observed in the muscular feelings, in the
feelings of heat, in those of light, and in those of sound; and he concludes his seventh
lecture (from which our extracts have been made) thus:
"So we have found that all the senses whose stimuli we are enabled to measure
accurately, obey a uniform law. However various may be their several
delicacies of discrimination, this holds true of all, that the increase of the
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stimulus necessary to produce an increase of the sensation bears a constant
ratio to the total stimulus. The ﬁgures which express this ratio in the several
senses may be shown thus in tabular form:
Sensation of light,
Muscular sensation,
Feeling of pressure,
Feeling of warmth,
Feeling of sound,

1/100
1/17
1/3
1/3
1/3

"These ﬁgures are far from giving as accurate a measure as might be desired.
But at least they are ﬁt to convey a general notion of the relative discriminative
susceptibility of the different senses.... The important law which gives in so
simple a form the relation of the sensation to the stimulus that calls it forth was
ﬁrst discovered by the physiologist Ernst Heinrich Weber to obtain in special
cases. Gustav Theodor Fechner ﬁrst proved it to be a law for all departments of
sensation. Psychology owes to him the ﬁrst comprehensive investigation of
sensations from a physical point of view, the ﬁrst basis of an exact Theory of
Sensibility."
So much for a general account of what Fechner calls Weber's law. The 'exactness' of the
theory of sensibility to which it leads consists in the supposed fact that it gives the means of
representing sensations by numbers. The unit of any kind of sensation will be that increment
which, when the stimulus is increased, we can just barely perceive to be added. The total [Pg 538]
number of units which any given sensation contains will consist of the total number of such
increments which may be perceived in passing from no sensation of the kind to a sensation
of the present amount. We cannot get at this number directly, but we can, now that we know
Weber's law, get at it by means of the physical stimulus of which it is a function. For if we
know how much of the stimulus it will take to give a barely perceptible sensation, and then
what percentage of addition to the stimulus will constantly give a barely perceptible
increment to the sensation, it is at bottom only a question of compound interest to compute,
out of the total amount of stimulus which we may be employing at any moment, the number
of such increments, or, in other words, of sensational units to which it may give rise. This
number bears the same relation to the total stimulus which the time elapsed bears to the
capital plus the compound interest accrued.
To take an example: If stimulus A just falls short of producing a sensation, and if r be the
percentage of itself which must be added to it to get a sensation which is barely perceptible
—call this sensation 1—then we should have the series of sensation-numbers corresponding
to their several stimuli as follows:
Sensation 0 = stimulus A;
Sensation 1 = stimulus A (1 + r);
Sensation 2 = stimulus A (1 + r)2;
Sensation 3 = stimulus A (1 + r)3;
.....
Sensation n = stimulus A (1 + r)n.
The sensations here form an arithmetical series, and the stimuli a geometrical series, and the
two series correspond term for term. Now, of two series corresponding in this way, the terms
of the arithmetical one are called the logarithms of the terms corresponding in rank to them
in the geometrical series. A conventional arithmetical series beginning with zero has been
formed in the ordinary logarithmic tables, so that we may truly say (assuming our facts to be [Pg 539]
correct so far) that the sensations vary in the same proportion as the logarithms of their
respective stimuli. And we can thereupon proceed to compute the number of units in any
given sensation (considering the unit of sensation to be equal to the just perceptible
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increment above zero, and the unit of stimulus to be equal to the increment of stimulus r,
which brings this about) by multiplying the logarithm of the stimulus by a constant factor
which must vary with the particular kind of sensation in question. If we call the stimulus R,
and the constant factor C, we get the formula
S = C log R,
which is what Fechner calls the psychophysischer Maasformel. This, in brief, is Fechner's
reasoning, as I understand it.
The Maasformel admits of mathematical development in various directions, and has given
rise to arduous discussions into which I am glad to be exempted from entering here, since
their interest is mathematical and metaphysical and not primarily psychological at all.[447] I
must say a word about them metaphysically a few pages later on. Meanwhile it should be
understood that no human being, in any investigation into which sensations entered, has
ever used the numbers computed in this or any other way in order to test a theory or to reach
a new result. The whole notion of measuring sensations numerically, remains in short a mere
mathematical speculation about possibilities, which has never been applied to practice.
Incidentally to the discussion of it, however, a great many particular facts have been
discovered about discrimination which merit a place in this chapter.
In the ﬁrst place it is found, when the difference of two sensations approaches the limit of
discernibility, that at one moment we discern it and at the next we do not. There are
accidental ﬂuctuations in our inner sensibility which make it impossible to tell just what the
least discernible increment of the sensation is without taking the average of a large number [Pg 540]
of appreciations. These accidental errors are as likely to increase as to diminish our
sensibility, and are eliminated in such an average, for those above and those below the line
then neutralize each other in the sum, and the normal sensibility, if there be one (that is, the
sensibility due to constant causes as distinguished from these accidental ones), stands
revealed. The best way of getting at the average sensibility has been very minutely worked
over. Fechner discussed three methods, as follows:
(1) The Method of just-discernible Differences. Take a standard sensation S, and add to it
until you distinctly feel the addition d; then subtract from S + d until you distinctly feel the
effect of the subtraction;[448] call the difference here d'. The least discernible difference
sought is d + d'/2; and the ratio of this quantity to the original S (or rather to S + d - d') is
what Fechner calls the difference-threshold. This difference-threshold should be a constant
fraction (no matter what is the size of S) if Weber's law holds universally true. The difﬁculty
in applying this method is that we are so often in doubt whether anything has been added to
S or not. Furthermore, if we simply take the smallest d about which we are never in doubt or
in error, we certainly get our least discernible difference larger than it ought theoretically to
be.[449]
Of course the sensibility is small when the least discernible difference is large, and vice
versâ; in other words, it and the difference-threshold are inversely related to each other.
(2) The Method of True and False Cases. A sensation which is barely greater than another
will, on account of accidental errors in a long series of experiments, sometimes be judged
equal, and sometimes smaller; i.e., we shall make a certain number of false and a certain
number of true judgments about the difference between the two sensations which we are [Pg 541]
comparing.
"But the larger this difference is, the more the number of the true judgments
will increase at the expense of the false ones; or, otherwise expressed, the
nearer to unity will be the fraction whose denominator represents the whole
number of judgments, and whose numerator represents those which are true. If
m is a ratio of this nature, obtained by comparison of two stimuli, A and B, we
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may seek another couple of stimuli, a and b, which when compared will give
the same ratio of true to false cases."[450]
If this were done, and the ratio of a to b then proved to be equal to that of A to B, that would
prove that pairs of small stimuli and pairs of large stimuli may affect our discriminative
sensibility similarly so long as the ratio of the components to each other within each pair is
the same. In other words, it would in so far forth prove the Weberian law. Fechner made use
of this method to ascertain his own power of discriminating differences of weight, recording
no less than 24,576 separate judgments, and computing as a result that his discrimination for
the same relative increase of weight was less good in the neighborhood of 500 than of 300
grams, but that after 500 grams it improved up to 3000, which was the highest weight he
experimented with.
(3) The Method of Average Errors consists in taking a standard stimulus and then trying to
make another one of the same sort exactly equal to it. There will in general be an error
whose amount is large when the discriminative sensibility called in play is small, and vice
versâ. The sum of the errors, no matter whether they be positive or negative, divided by
their number, gives the average error. This, when certain corrections are made, is assumed
by Fechner to be the 'reciprocal' of the discriminative sensibility in question. It should bear a
constant proportion to the stimulus, no matter what the absolute size of the latter may be, if
Weber's law hold true.

These methods deal with just perceptible differences. Delbœuf and Wundt have
experimented with larger differences by means of what Wundt calls the Méthode der [Pg 542]
mittleren Abstufungen, and what we may call
(4) The Method of Equal-appearing Intervals. This consists in so arranging three stimuli in a
series that the intervals between the ﬁrst and the second shall appear equal to that between
the second and the third. At ﬁrst sight there seems to be no direct logical connection
between this method and the preceding ones. By them we compare equally perceptible
increments of stimulus in different regions of the latter's scale; but by the fourth method we
compare increments which strike us as equally big. But what we can but just notice as an
increment need not appear always of the same bigness after it is noticed. On the contrary, it
will appear much bigger when we are dealing with stimuli that are already large.
(5) The method of doubling the stimulus has been employed by Wundt's collaborator,
Merkel, who tried to make one stimulus seem just double the other, and then measured the
objective relation of the two. The remarks just made apply also to this case.

So much for the methods. The results differ in the hands of different observers. I will add a
few of them, and will take ﬁrst the discriminative sensibility to light.
By the ﬁrst method, Volkmann, Aubert, Masson, Helmholtz, and Kräpelin ﬁnd ﬁgures
varying from 1/3 or 1/4 to 1/195 of the original stimulus. The smaller fractional increments
are discriminated when the light is already fairly strong, the larger ones when it is weak or
intense. That is, the discriminative sensibility is low when weak or overstrong lights are
compared, and at its best with a certain medium illumination. It is thus a function of the
light's intensity; but throughout a certain range of the latter it keeps constant, and in so far
forth Weber's law is veriﬁed for light. Absolute ﬁgures cannot be given, but Merkel, by
method 1, found that Weber's law held good for stimuli (measured by his arbitrary unit)
between 96 and 4096, beyond which intensity no experiments were made.[451] König and
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Brodhun have given measurements by method 1 which cover the most extensive series, and [Pg 543]
moreover apply to six different colors of light. These experiments (performed in
Helmholtz's laboratory, apparently,) ran from an intensity called 1 to one which was 100,000
times as great. From intensity 2000 to 20,000 Weber's law held good; below and above this
range discriminative sensibility declined. The increment discriminated here was the same
for all colors of light, and lay (according to the tables) between 1 and 2 per cent of the
stimulus.[452] Delbœuf had veriﬁed Weber's law for a certain range of luminous intensities
by method 4; that is, he had found that the objective intensity of a light which appeared
midway between two others was really the geometrical mean of the latter's intensities. But
A. Lehmann and afterwards Neiglick, in Wundt's laboratory, found that effects of contrast
played so large a part in experiments performed in this way that Delbœuf's results could not
be held conclusive. Merkel, repeating the experiments still later, found that the objective
intensity of the light which we judge to stand midway between two others neither stands
midway nor is a geometric mean. The discrepancy from both ﬁgures is enormous, but is
least large from the midway ﬁgure or arithmetical mean of the two extreme intensities.[453]
Finally, the stars have from time immemorial been arranged in 'magnitudes' supposed to
differ by equal-seeming intervals. Lately their intensities have been gauged photometrically,
and the comparison of the subjective with the objective series has been made. Prof. J.
Jastrow is the latest worker in this ﬁeld. He ﬁnds, taking Pickering's Harvard photometric
tables as a basis, that the ratio of the average intensity of each 'magnitude' to that below it
decreases as we pass from lower to higher magnitudes, showing a uniform departure from
Weber's law, if the method of equal-appearing intervals be held to have any direct relevance
to the latter.[454]
Sounds are less delicately discriminated in intensity than lights. A certain difﬁculty has [Pg 544]
come from disputes as to the measurement of the objective intensity of the stimulus. Earlier
inquiries made the perceptible increase of the stimulus to be about 1/3 of the latter. Merkel's
latest results of the method of just perceptible differences make it about 3/10 for that part of
the scale of intensities during which Weber's law holds good, which is from 20 to 5000 of
M.'s arbitrary unit.[455] Below this the fractional increment must be larger. Above it no
measurements were made.
For pressure and muscular sense we have rather divergent results. Weber found by the
method of just-perceptible differences that persons could distinguish an increase of weight
of 1/40 when the two weights were successively lifted by the same hand. It took a much
larger fraction to be discerned when the weights were laid on a hand which rested on the
table. He seems to have veriﬁed his results for only two pairs of differing weights,[456] and
on this founded his 'law.' Experiments in Hering's laboratory on lifting 11 weights, running
from 250 to 2750 grams showed that the least perceptible increment varied from 1/21 for
250 grams to 1/114 for 2500. For 2750 it rose to 1/98 again. Merkel's recent and very
careful experiments, in which the ﬁnger pressed down the beam of a balance
counterweighted by from 25 to 8020 grams, showed that between 200 and 2000 grams a
constant fractional increase of about 1/13 was felt when there was no movement of the
ﬁnger, and of about 1/19 when there was movement. Above and below these limits the
discriminative power grew less. It was greater when the pressure was upon one square
millimeter of surface than when it was upon seven.[457]
Warmth and taste have been made the subject of similar investigations with the result of
verifying something like Weber's law. The determination of the unit of stimulus is, however,
so hard here that I will give no ﬁgures. The results may be found in Wundt's Physiologische
Psychologie, 3d Ed. i, 370-2.
The discrimination of lengths by the eye has been found also to obey to a certain extent [Pg 545]
Weber's law. The ﬁgures will all be found in G. E. Müller, op. cit. part ii, chap. x, to which
the reader is referred. Professor Jastrow has published some experiments, made by what
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may be called a modiﬁcation of the method of equal-appearing differences, on our
estimation of the length of sticks, by which it would seem that the estimated intervals and
the real ones are directly and not logarithmically proportionate to each other. This resembles
Merkel's results by that method for weights, lights, and sounds, and differs from Jastrow's
own ﬁnding about star-magnitudes.[458]

If we look back over these facts as a whole, we see that it is not any ﬁxed amount added to
an impression that makes us notice an increase in the latter, but that the amount depends on
how large the impression already is. The amount is expressible as a certain fraction of the
entire impression to which it is added; and it is found that the fraction is a well-nigh
constant ﬁgure throughout an entire region of the scale of intensities of the impression in
question. Above and below this region the fraction increases in value. This is Weber's law,
which in so far forth expresses an empirical generalization of practical importance, without
involving any theory whatever or seeking any absolute measure of the sensations
themselves. It is in the
Theoretic Interpretation of Weber's Law
that Fechner's originality exclusively consists, in his assumptions, namely, 1) that the justperceptible increment is the sensation-unit, and is in all parts of the scale the same
(mathematically expressed, Δs= const.); 2) that all our sensations consist of sums of these
units; and ﬁnally, 3) that the reason why it takes a constant fractional increase of the
stimulus to awaken this unit lies in an ultimate law of the connection of mind with matter,
whereby the quantities of our feelings are related logarithmically to the quantities of their
objects. Fechner seems to ﬁnd something inscrutably sublime in the existence of an ultimate
'psychophysic' law of this form.
These assumptions are all peculiarly fragile. To begin with, the mental fact which in the [Pg 546]
experiments corresponds to the increase of the stimulus is not an enlarged sensation, but a
judgment that the sensation is enlarged. What Fechner calls the 'sensation' is what appears
to the mind as the objective phenomenon of light, warmth, weight, sound, impressed part of
body, etc. Fechner tacitly if not openly assumes that such a judgment of increase consists in
the simple fact that an increased number of sensation-units are present to the mind; and that
the judgment is thus itself a quantitatively bigger mental thing when it judges large
differences, or differences between large terms, than when it judges small ones. But these
ideas are really absurd. The hardest sort of judgment, the judgment which strains the
attention most (if that be any criterion of the judgment's 'size'), is that about the smallest
things and differences. But really it has no meaning to talk about one judgment being bigger
than another. And even if we leave out judgments and talk of sensations only, we have
already found ourselves (in Chapter VI) quite unable to read any clear meaning into the
notion that they are masses of units combined. To introspection, our feeling of pink is surely
not a portion of our feeling of scarlet; nor does the light of an electric arc seem to contain
that of a tallow-candle in itself. Compound things contain parts; and one such thing may
have twice or three times as many parts as another. But when we take a simple sensible
quality like light or sound, and say that there is now twice or thrice as much of it present as
there was a moment ago, although we seem to mean the same thing as if we were talking of
compound objects, we really mean something different. We mean that if we were to arrange
the various possible degrees of the quality in a scale of serial increase, the distance, interval,
or difference between the stronger and the weaker specimen before us would seem about as
great as that between the weaker one and the beginning of the scale. It is these RELATIONS,
these DISTANCES, which we are measuring and not the composition of the qualities
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themselves, as Fechner thinks. Whilst if we turn to objects which are divisible, surely a big
object may be known in a little thought. Introspection shows moreover that in most [Pg 547]
sensations a new kind of feeling invariably accompanies our judgment of an increased
impression; and this is a fact which Fechner's formula disregards.[459]
But apart from these a priori difﬁculties, and even supposing that sensations did consist of
added units, Fechner's assumption that all equally perceptible additions are equally great
additions is entirely arbitrary. Why might not a small addition to a small sensation be as
perceptible as a large addition to a large one? In this case Weber's law would apply not to
the additions themselves, but only to their perceptibility. Our noticing of a difference of
units in two sensations would depend on the latter being in a ﬁxed ratio. But the difference
itself would depend directly on that between their respective stimuli. So many units added to
the stimulus, so many added to the sensation, and if the stimulus grew in a certain ratio, in
exactly the same ratio would the sensation also grow, though its perceptibility grew
according to the logarithmic law.[460]
If A stand for the smallest difference which we perceive, then we should have, instead of the
formula Δs = const., which is Fechner's, the formula Δs/s = const., a formula which
interprets all the facts of Weber's law, in an entirely different theoretic way from that
adopted by Fechner.[461]
The entire superstructure which Fechner rears upon the facts is thus not only seen to be [Pg 548]
arbitrary and subjective, but in the highest degree improbable as well. The departures from
Weber's law in regions where it does not obtain, he explains by the compounding with it of
other unknown laws which mask its effects. As if any law could not be found in any set of
phenomena, provided one have the wit to invent enough other coexisting laws to overlap
and neutralize it! The whole outcome of the discussion, so far as Fechner's theories are
concerned, is indeed nil. Weber's law alone remains true, as an empirical generalization of
fair extent: What we add to a large stimulus we notice less than what we add to a small one,
unless it happen relatively to the stimulus to be as great.
Weber's law is probably purely physiological.
One can express this state of things otherwise by saying that the whole of the stimulus does
not seem to be effective in giving us the perception of 'more,' and the simplest interpretation
of such a state of things would be physical. The loss of effect would take place in the
nervous system. If our feelings resulted from a condition of the nerve-molecules which it
grew ever more difﬁcult for the stimulus to increase, our feelings would naturally grow at a
slower rate than the stimulus itself. An ever larger part of the latter's work would go to
overcoming the resistances, and an ever smaller part to the realization of the feelingbringing state. Weber's law would thus be a sort of law of friction in the neural machine.[462]
Just how these inner resistances and frictions are to be conceived is a speculative question.
Delbœuf has formulated them as fatigue; Bernstein and Ward, as irradiations. The latest, and
probably the most 'real,' hypothesis is that of Ebbinghaus, who supposes that the intensity of
sensation depends on the number of neural molecules which are disintegrated in the unit of
time. There are only a certain number at any time which are capable of disintegrating; and
whilst most of these are in an average condition of instability, some are almost stable and [Pg 549]
some already near to decomposition. The smallest stimuli affect these latter molecules only;
and as they are but few, the sensational effect from adding a given quantity of stimulus at
ﬁrst is relatively small. Medium stimuli affect the majority of the molecules, but affect
fewer and fewer in proportion as they have already diminished their number. The latest
additions to the stimuli ﬁnd all the medium molecules already disintegrated, and only affect
the small relatively indecomposable remainder, thus giving rise to increments of feeling
which are correspondingly small. (Pﬂüger's Archiv, 45, 113.)
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

323/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

It is surely in some such way as this that Weber's law is to be interpreted, if it ever is. The
Fechnerian Maasformel and the conception of it as an ultimate 'psychophysic law' will
remain an 'idol of the den,' if ever there was one. Fechner himself indeed was a German
Gelehrter of the ideal type, at once simple and shrewd, a mystic and an experimentalist,
homely and daring, and as loyal to facts as to his theories. But it would be terrible if even
such a dear old man as this could saddle our Science forever with his patient whimsies, and,
in a world so full of more nutritious objects of attention, compel all future students to
plough through the difﬁculties, not only of his own works, but of the still drier ones written
in his refutation. Those who desire this dreadful literature can ﬁnd it; it has a 'disciplinary
value;' but I will not even enumerate it in a foot-note. The only amusing part of it is that
Fechner's critics should always feel bound, after smiting his theories hip and thigh and
leaving not a stick of them standing, to wind up by saying that nevertheless to him belongs
the imperishable glory, of ﬁrst formulating them and thereby turning psychology into an
exact science,
"'And everybody praised the duke
Who this great ﬁght did win.'
'But what good came of it at last?'
Quoth little Peterkin.
'Why, that I cannot tell,' said he,
'But 'twas a famous victory!'"

[406]

Human Understanding, ii, xi, 1, 2.

[407]

Analysis, vol. i, p. 71.

[408]

The Senses and the Intellect, page 411.

[409]

Essays Philosophical and Theological: First Series, pp. 268-273.

[410]

Montgomery in 'Mind,' x, 527. Cf. also Lipps: Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens,
p. 579 ff.; and see below, Chapter XIX.

[411]

Stumpf (Tonpsychologie, i, 116 ff.) tries to prove that the theory that all
differences are differences of composition leads necessarily to an inﬁnite
regression when we try to determine the unit. It seems to me that in his particular
reasoning he forgets the ultimate units of the mind-stuff theory. I cannot ﬁnd the
completed inﬁnite to be one of the obstacles to belief in this theory, although I
fully accept Stumpf's general reasoning, and am only too happy to ﬁnd myself on
the same side with such an exceptionally clear thinker. The strictures by Wahle in
the Vierteljsch. f. wiss. Phil. seem to me to have no force, since the writer does
not discriminate between resemblance of things obviously compound and that of
things sensibly simple.

[412]

The belief that the causes of effects felt by us to differ qualitatively are facts
which differ only in quantity (e.g. that blue is caused by so many ether-waves, and
yellow by a smaller number) must not be confounded with the feeling that the
effects differ quantitatively themselves.

[413]

Herr G. H. Schneider, in his youthful pamphlet (Die Unterscheidung, 1877) has
tried to show that there are no positively existent elements of sensibility, no
substantive qualities between which differences obtain, but that the terms we call
such, the sensations, are but sums of differences, loci or starting points whence
many directions of difference proceed. 'Unterschiedsempﬁndungs-Complexe' are
what he calls them. This absurd carrying out of that 'principle of relativity' which
we shall have to mention in Chapter XVII may serve as a counterpoise to the
mind-stuff theory, which says that there are nothing but substantive sensations,
and denies the existence of relations of difference between them at all.
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[414]

Cf. Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, i, 121, and James Ward, Mind, i, 464.

[415]

The ordinary treatment of this is to call it the result of the fusion of a lot of
sensations, in themselves separate. This is pure mythology, as the sequel will
abundantly show.

[416]

"We often begin to be dimly aware of a difference in a sensation or group of
sensations, before we can assign any deﬁnite character to that which differs. Thus
we detect a strange or foreign ingredient or ﬂavor in a familiar dish, or of tone in
a familiar tune, and yet are wholly unable for a while to say what the intruder is
like. Hence perhaps discrimination may be regarded as the earliest and most
primordial mode of intellectual activity." (Sully: Outlines of Psychology, p. 142.
Cf. also G. H. Schneider: Die Unterscheidung, pp. 9-10.)

[417]

In cases where the difference is slight, we may need, as previously remarked, to
get the dying phase of n as well as of m before n-different-from-m is distinctly felt.
In that case the inevitably successive feelings (as far as we can sever what is so
continuous) would be four, m, difference, n, n-different-from-m. This slight
additional complication alters not a whit the essential features of the case.

[418]

Analysis. J. S. Mill's ed., ii, 17. Cf. also pp. 12, 14.

[419]

There is only one obstacle, and that is our inveterate tendency to believe that
where two things or qualities are compared, it must be that exact duplicates of
both have got into the mind and have matched themselves against each other
there. To which the ﬁrst reply is the empirical one of "Look into the mind and
see." When I recognize a weight which I now lift as inferior to the one I just
lifted; when, with my tooth now aching, I perceive the pain to be less intense than
it was a minute ago; the two things in the mind which are compared would, by the
authors I criticise, be admitted to be an actual sensation and an image in the
memory. An image in the memory, by general consent of these same authors, is
admitted to be a weaker thing than a sensation. Nevertheless it is in these
instances judged stronger; that is, an object supposed to be known only in so far
forth as this image represents it, is judged stronger. Ought not this to shake one's
belief in the notion of separate representative 'ideas' weighing themselves, or
being weighed by the Ego, against each other in the mind? And let it not be said
that what makes us judge the felt pain to be weaker than the imagined one of a
moment since is our recollection of the downward nature of the shock of
difference which we felt as we passed to the present moment from the one before
it. That shock does undoubtedly have a different character according as it comes
between terms of which the second diminishes or increases; and it may be
admitted that in cases Where the past term is doubtfully remembered, the memory
of the shock as plus or minus, might sometimes enable us to establish a relation
which otherwise we should not perceive. But one could hardly expect the memory
of this shock to overpower our actual comparison of terms, both of which are
present (as are the image and the sensation in the case supposed), and make us
judge the weaker one to be the stronger.—And hereupon comes the second reply:
Suppose the mind does compare two realities by comparing two ideas of its own
which represent them—what is gained? The same mystery is still there. The ideas
must still be known; and, as the attention in comparing oscillates from one to the
other, past must be known with present just as before. If you must end by simply
saying that your 'Ego,' whilst being neither the idea of m nor the idea of n, yet
knows and compares both, why not allow your pulse of thought, which is neither
the thing m nor the thing n, to know and compare both directly? 'Tis but a
question of how to name the facts least artiﬁcially. The egoist explains them, by
naming them as an Ego 'combining' or 'synthetizing' two ideas, no more than we
do by naming them a pulse of thought knowing two facts.

[420]

I fear that few will be converted by my words, so obstinately do thinkers of all
schools refuse to admit the unmediated function of knowing a thing, and so
incorrigibly do they substitute being the thing for it. E.g., in the latest utterance of
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the spiritualistic philosophy (Bowne's Introduction to Psychological Theory,
1887, published only three days before this writing) one of the ﬁrst sentences
which catch my eye is this: "What remembers? The spiritualist says, the soul
remembers; it abides across the years and the ﬂow of the body, and gathering up
its past, carries it with it" (p. 28). Why, for heaven's sake, O Bowne, cannot you
say 'knows it'? If there is anything our soul does not do to its past, it is to carry it
with it.
[421]

Sensations of Tone, 2d English Ed., p. 65.

[422]

Psychology, i, 345.

[423]

A Budget of Paradoxes, p. 380.

[424]

The explanation I offer presupposes that a difference too faint to have any direct
effect in the way of making the mind notice it per se will nevertheless be strong
enough to keep its 'terms' from calling up identical associates. It seems probable
from many observations that this is the case. All the facts of 'unconscious'
inference are proofs of it. We say a painting 'looks' like the work of a certain
artist, though we cannot name the characteristic differentiæ. We see by a man's
face that he is sincere, though we can give no deﬁnite reason for our faith. The
facts of sense-perception quoted from Helmholtz a few pages below will be
additional examples. Here is another good one, though it will perhaps be easier
understood after reading the chapter on Space-perception than now. Take two
stereoscopic slides and represent on each half-slide a pair of spots, a and b, but
make their distances such that the a's are equidistant on both slides, whilst the b's
are nearer together on slide 1 than on slide 2. Make moreover the distance ab =
ab''' and the distance ab' = ab''. Then look successively at the two slides
stereoscopically, so that the a's in both are directly ﬁxated (that is fall on the two
foveæ, or centres of distinctest vision). The a's will then appear single, and so
probably will the b's. But the now single-seeming b on slide 1 will look nearer,
whilst that on slide 2 will look farther than the a. But, if the diagrams are rightly
drawn, b and b''' must affect 'identical' spots, spots equally far to the right of the
fovea, b in the left eye and b''' in the right eye. The same is true of b' and b''.
Identical spots are spots whose sensations cannot possibly be discriminated as
such. Since in these two observations, however, they give rise to such opposite
perceptions of distance, and prompt such opposite tendencies to movement (since
in slide 1 we converge in looking from a to b, whilst in slide 2 we diverge), it
follows that two processes which occasion feelings quite indistinguishable to
direct consciousness may nevertheless be each allied with disparate associates
both of a sensorial and of a motor kind. Cf. Donders, Archiv f. Ophthalmologie,
Bd. 13 (1867). The basis of his essay is that we cannot feel on which eye any
particular element of a compound picture falls, but its effects on our total
perception differ in the two eyes.

[425]

A. W. Volkmann: Ueber den Einﬂuss der Uebung, etc., Leipzig Berichte, Math.phys. Classe. x, 1858, p. 67.

[426]

Ibid. Tabelle 1, p. 43.

[427]

Professor Lipps accounts for the tactile discrimination of the blind in a way which
(divested of its 'mythological' assumptions) seems to me essentially to agree with
this. Stronger ideas are supposed to raise weaker ones over the threshold of
consciousness by fusing with them, the tendency to fuse being proportional to the
similarity of the ideas Cf. Grundtatsachen, etc., pp. 232-3; also pp. 118, 492, 5267.
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[428]

Sensations of Tone, 2d. English Edition, p. 62.

[429]

Compare as to this, however, what I said above, Chapter V, pp. 172-176.

[430]

When a person squints, double images are formed in the centre of the ﬁeld. As a
matter of fact, most squinters are found blind of one eye, or almost so; and it has
long been supposed amongst ophthalmologists that the blindness is a secondary
affection superinduced by the voluntary suppression of one of the sets of double
images, in other words by the positive and persistent refusal to use one of the
eyes. This explanation of the blindness has, however, been called in question of
late years. See, for a brief account of the matter, O. F. Wadsworth in Boston Med.
and Surg. Journ., cxvi, 49 (Jan. 20, '87), and the replies by Derby and others a
little later.—W. J.

[431]

Tonempﬁndungen, Dritte Auﬂage, pp. 102-107.—The reader who has assimilated
the contents of our Chapter V, above, will doubtless have remarked that the
illustrious physiologist has fallen, in these paragraphs, into that sort of
interpretation of the facts which we there tried to prove erroneous. Helmholtz,
however, is no more careless than most psychologists in confounding together the
object perceived, the organic conditions of the perception, and the sensations
which would be excited by the several parts of the object, or by the several
organic conditions, provided they came into action separately or were separately
attended to, and in assuming that what is true of any one of these sorts of fact
must be true of the other sorts also. If each organic condition or part of the object
is there, its sensation, he thinks, must be there also, only in a 'synthetic'—which is
indistinguishable from what the authors whom we formerly reviewed called an
'unconscious'—state. I will not repeat arguments sufﬁciently detailed in the earlier
chapter (see especially pp. 170-176), but simply say that what he calls the 'fusion
of many sensations into one' is really the production of one sensation by the cooperation of many organic conditions; and that what perception fails to
discriminate (when it is 'synthetic') is not sensations already existent but not
singled out, but new objective facts, judged truer than the facts already
synthetically perceived—two views of the solid body, many harmonic tones,
instead of one view and one tone, states of the eyeball-muscles thitherto
unknown, and the like. These new facts, when ﬁrst discovered, are known in
states of consciousness never till that moment exactly realized before, states of
consciousness which at the same time judge them to be determinations of the
same matter of fact which was previously realized. All that Helmholtz says of the
conditions which hinder and further analysis applies just as naturally to the
analysis, through the advent of new feelings, of objects into their elements, as to
the analysis of aggregate feelings into elementary feelings supposed to have been
hidden in them all the while.
The reader can himself apply this criticism to the following passages from Lotze
and Stumpf respectively, which I quote because they are the ablest expressions of
the view opposed to my own. Both authors, it seems to me, commit the
psychologist's fallacy, and allow their later knowledge of the things felt to be
foisted into their account of the primitive way of feeling them.
Lotze says: "It is indubitable that the simultaneous assault of a variety of different
stimuli on different senses, or even on the same sense, puts us into a state of
confused general feeling in which we are certainly not conscious of clearly
distinguishing the different impressions. Still it does not follow that in such a case
we have a positive perception of an actual unity of the contents of our ideas,
arising from their mixture; our state of mind seems rather to consist in (1) the
consciousness of our inability to separate what really has remained diverse, and
(2) in the general feeling of the disturbance produced in the economy of our body
by the simultaneous assault of the stimuli.... Not that the sensations melt into one
another, but simply that the act of distinguishing them is absent; and this again
certainly not so far that the fact of the difference remains entirely unperceived, but
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only so far as to prevent us from determining the amount of the difference, and
from apprehending other relations between the different impressions. Anyone
who is annoyed at one and the same time by glowing heat, dazzling light,
deafening noise, and an offensive smell, will certainly not fuse these disparate
sensations into a single one with a single content which could be sensuously
perceived; they remain for him in separation, and he merely ﬁnds it impossible to
be conscious of one of them apart from the others. But, further, he will have a
feeling of discomfort—what I mentioned above as the second constituent of his
whole state. For every stimulus which produces in consciousness a deﬁnite
content of sensation is also a deﬁnite degree of disturbance, and therefore makes a
call upon the forces of the nerves; and the sum of these little changes, which in
their character as disturbances are not so diverse as the contents of consciousness
they give rise to, produce the general feeling which, added to the inability to
distinguish, deludes us into the belief in an actual absence of diversity in our
sensations. It is only in some such way as this, again, that I can imagine that state
which is sometimes described as the beginning of our whole education, a state
which in itself is supposed to be simple, and to be afterwards divided into
different sensations by an activity of separation. No activity of separation in the
world could establish differences where no real diversity existed; for it would
have nothing to guide it to the places where it was to establish them, or to indicate
the width it was to give them." (Metaphysic, § 260, English translation.)
Stumpf writes as follows: "Of coexistent sensations there are always a large
number undiscriminated in consciousness, or (if one prefer to call what is
undiscriminated unconscious) in the soul. They are, however, not fused into a
simple quality. When, on entering a room, we receive sensations of odor and
warmth together, without expressly attending to either, the two qualities of
sensation are not, as it were, an entirely new simple quality, which ﬁrst at the
moment in which attention analytically steps in changes into smell and warmth....
In such cases we ﬁnd ourselves in presence of an indeﬁnable, unnamable total of
feeling. And when, after successfully analyzing this total, we call it back to
memory, as it was in its unanalyzed state, and compare it with the elements we
have found, the latter (as it seems to me) may be recognized as real parts
contained in the former, and the former seen to be their sum. So, for example,
when we clearly perceive that the content of our sensation of oil of peppermint is
partly a sensation of taste and partly one of temperature." (Tonpsychologie, i,
107.)
I should prefer to say that we perceive that objective fact, known to us as the
peppermint taste, to contain those other objective facts known as aromatic or
sapid quality, and coldness, respectively. No ground to suppose that the vehicle of
this last very complex perception has any identity with the earlier psychosis—
least of all is contained in it.
[432]

Physiol. Psych., ii, 248.

[433]

Wundt's Philos. Studien, i, 527.

[434]

Ibid. p. 530.

[435]

Mind, xi, 377 ff. He says: "I apparently either distinguished the impression and
made the motion simultaneously, or if I tried to avoid this by waiting until I had
formed a distinct impression before I began to make the motion, I added to the
simple reaction, not only a perception, but a volition."—Which remark may well
conﬁrm our doubts as to the strict psychologic worth of any of these
measurements.

[436]

Mind, xi, 379.

[437]

For other determinations of discrimination-time by this method cf. v. Kries and
Auerbach, Archiv f. Physiologie, Bd. i, p. 297 ff. (these authors get much smaller
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ﬁgures); Friedrich, Psychologische Studien, i, 39. Chapter ix of Buccola's book,
Le Legge del tempo, etc., gives a full account of the subject.
[438]

If so, the reactions upon the spark would have to be slower than those upon the
touch. The investigation was abandoned because it was found impossible to
narrow down the difference between the conditions of the sight-series and those
of the touch-series, to nothing more than the possible presence in the latter of the
intervening motor-idea. Other disparities could not be excluded.

[439]

Tischer gives ﬁgures from quite unpractised individuals, which I have not quoted.
The discrimination-time of one of them is 22 times longer than Tischer's own!
(Psychol. Studien, i, 527.)

[440]

Compare Lipps's excellent passage to the same critical effect in his
Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens, pp. 390-393.—I leave my text just as it was
written before the publication of Lange's and Münsterberg's results cited on pp. 92
and 432. Their 'shortened' or 'muscular' times, got when the expectant attention
was addressed to the possible reactions rather than to the stimulus, constitute the
minimal reaction-time of which I speak, and all that I say in the text falls
beautifully into line with their results.

[441]

Cf. Sully: Mind, x, 494-5; Bradley: ibid. xi, 83; Bosanquet: ibid. xi, 405.

[442]

The judgment becomes easier if the two couples of terms have one member in
common, if a—b and b—c, for example, are compared. This, as Stumpf says
(Tonpsychologie, i, 131), is probably because the introduction of the fourth term
brings involuntary cross-comparisons with it, a and b with d, b with c, etc., which
confuses us by withdrawing our attention from the relations we ought alone to be
estimating.

[443]

J. Delbœuf: Éléments de Psychophysique (Paris, 1883), p. 64. Plateau in Stumpf,
Tonpsych., i, 125. I have noticed a curious enlargement of certain 'distances' of
difference under the inﬂuence of chloroform. The jingling of the bells on the
horses of a horse-car passing the door, for example, and the rumbling of the
vehicle itself, which to our ordinary hearing merge together very readily into a
quasi-continuous body of sound, have seemed so far apart as to require a sort of
mental facing in opposite directions to get from one to the other, as if they
belonged in different worlds. I am inclined to suspect, from certain data, that the
ultimate philosophy of difference and likeness will have to be built upon
experiences of intoxication, especially by nitrous oxide gas, which lets us into
intuitions the subtlety whereof is denied to the waking state. Cf. B. P. Blood: The
Anæsthetic Revelation, and the Gist of Philosophy (Amsterdam, N. Y., 1874). Cf.
also Mind, vii, 200.

[444]

Op. cit. p. 126 ff.

[445]

Stumpf, pp. 111-121.

[446]

Stumpf, pp. 116-7. I have omitted, so as not to make my text too intricate, an
extremely acute and conclusive paragraph, which I reproduce here: "We may
generalize: Wherever a number of sensible impressions are apprehended as a
series, there in the last instance must perceptions of simple likeness be found.
Proof: Assume that all the terms of a series, e.g. the qualities of tone, c d e f g,
have something in common,—no matter what it is, call it X; then I say that the
differing parts of each of these terms must not only be differently constituted in
each, but must themselves form a series, whose existence is the ground for our
apprehending the original terms in serial form. We thus get instead of the original
series a b c d e f ... the equivalent series Xα, Xβ, Xγ,... etc. What is gained? The
question immediately arises: How is α β γ known as a series? According to the
theory, these elements must themselves be made up of a part common to all, and
of parts differing in each, which latter parts form a new series, and so on ad
inﬁnitum, which is absurd."
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[447]

The most important ameliorations of Fechner's formula are Delbœuf's in his
Recherches sur la Mesure des Sensations (1873), p. 35, and Elsas's in his
pamphlet Über die Psychophysik (1886) p. 16.

[448]

Reversing the order is for the sake of letting the opposite accidental errors due to
'contrast' neutralize each other.

[449]

Theoretically it would seem that it ought to be equal to the sum of all the
additions which we judge to be increases divided by the total number of
judgments made.

[450]

J. Delbœuf, Éléments de Psychophysique (1883), p. 9.

[451]

Philos. Studien, iv, 588.

[452]

Berlin Acad. Sitzungsberichte, 1888, p. 917. Other observers (Dobrowolsky,
Lamausky) found great differences in different colors.

[453]

See Merkel's tables, loc. cit. p. 568.

[454]

American Journal of Psychology, i, 125. The rate of decrease is small but steady,
and I cannot well understand what Professor J. means by saying that his ﬁgures
verify Weber's law.

[455]

Philosophische Studien, v, 514-5.

[456]

Cf. G. E. Müller: Zur Grundlegung der Psychophysik, §§ 68-70.

[457]

Philosophische Studien, v, 287 ff.

[458]

American J. of Psychology, iii, 44-7.

[459]

Cf. Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, pp. 397-9. "One sensation cannot be a multiple of
another. If it could, we ought to be able to subtract the one from the other, and to
feel the remainder by itself. Every sensation presents itself as an indivisible unit."
Professor von Kries, in the Viertejahrschrift für wiss. Philosophie, vi, 257 ff.,
shows very clearly the absurdity of supposing that our stronger sensations contain
our weaker ones as parts. They differ as qualitative units. Compare also J.
Tannery in Delbœuf's Éléments de Psychophysique (1883), p. 134 ff.; J. Ward in
Mind, i, 464: Lotze, Metaphysik, § 258.

[460]

F Brentano, Psychologie, i, 9, 88 ff.—Merkel thinks that his results with the
method of equal-appearing intervals show that we compare considerable intervals
with each other by a different law from that by which we notice barely perceptible
intervals. The stimuli form an arithmetical series (a pretty wild one according to
his ﬁgures) in the former case, a geometrical one in the latter—at least so I
understand this valiant experimenter but somewhat obscure if acute writer.

[461]

This is the formula which Merkel thinks he has veriﬁed (if I understand him
aright) by his experiments by method 4.

[462]

Elsas: Ueber die Psychophysik (1856), p. 41. When the pans of a balance are
already loaded, but in equilibrium, it takes a proportionally larger weight added to
one of them to incline the beam.

CHAPTER XIV.[463]

[Pg 550]

ASSOCIATION.
After discrimination, association! Already in the last chapter I have had to invoke, in order
to explain the improvement of certain discriminations by practice, the 'association' of the
objects to be distinguished, with other more widely differing ones. It is obvious that the
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advance of our knowledge must consist of both operations; for objects at ﬁrst appearing as
wholes are analyzed into parts, and objects appearing separately are brought together and
appear as new compound wholes to the mind. Analysis and synthesis are thus the
incessantly alternating mental activities, a stroke of the one preparing the way for a stroke of
the other, much as, in walking, a man's two legs are alternately brought into use, both being
indispensable for any orderly advance.
The manner in which trains of imagery and consideration follow each other through our
thinking, the restless ﬂight of one idea before the next, the transitions our minds make
between things wide as the poles asunder, transitions which at ﬁrst sight startle us by their
abruptness, but which, when scrutinized closely, often reveal intermediating links of perfect
naturalness and propriety—all this magical, imponderable streaming has from time
immemorial excited the admiration of all whose attention happened to be caught by its
omnipresent mystery. And it has furthermore challenged the race of philosophers to banish
something of the mystery by formulating the process in simpler terms. The problem which
the philosophers have set themselves is that of ascertaining principles of connection between
the thoughts which thus appear to sprout one out of the other, whereby their peculiar [Pg 551]
succession or coexistence may be explained.
But immediately an ambiguity arises: which sort of connection is meant? connection
thought-of, or connection between thoughts? These are two entirely different things, and
only in the case of one of them is there any hope of ﬁnding 'principles.' The jungle of
connections thought of can never be formulated simply. Every conceivable connection may
be thought of—of coexistence, succession, resemblance, contrast, contradiction, cause and
effect, means and end, genus and species, part and whole, substance and property, early and
late, large and small, landlord and tenant, master and servant,—Heaven knows what, for the
list is literally inexhaustible. The only simpliﬁcation which could possibly be aimed at
would be the reduction of the relations to a smaller number of types, like those which such
authors as Kant and Renouvier call the 'categories' of the understanding.[464] According as
we followed one category or another we should sweep, with our thought, through the world
in this way or in that. And all the categories would be logical, would be relations of reason.
They would fuse the items into a continuum. Were this the sort of connection sought
between one moment of our thinking and another, our chapter might end here. For the only
summary description of these inﬁnite possibilities of transition, is that they are all acts of
reason, and that the mind proceeds from one object to another by some rational path of
connection. The trueness of this formula is only equalled by its sterility, for psychological
purposes. Practically it amounts to simply referring the inquirer to the relations between
facts or things, and to telling him that his thinking follows them.
But as a matter of fact, his thinking only sometimes follows them, and these so-called
'transitions of reason' are far from being all alike reasonable. If pure thought runs all our
trains, why should she run some so fast and some so slow, some through dull ﬂats and some
through gorgeous scenery, some to mountain-heights and jewelled mines, others through [Pg 552]
dismal swamps and darkness?—and run some off the track altogether, and into the
wilderness of lunacy? Why do we spend years straining after a certain scientiﬁc or practical
problem, but all in vain—thought refusing to evoke the solution we desire? And why, some
day, walking in the street with our attention miles away from that quest, does the answer
saunter into our minds as carelessly as if it had never been called for—suggested, possibly,
by the ﬂowers on the bonnet of the lady in front of us, or possibly by nothing that we can
discover? If reason can give us relief then, why did she not do so earlier?
The truth must be admitted that thought works under conditions imposed ab extra. The great
law of habit itself—that twenty experiences make us recall a thing better than one, that long
indulgence in error makes right thinking almost impossible—seems to have no essential
foundation in reason. The business of thought is with truth—the number of experiences
ought to have nothing to do with her hold of it; and she ought by right to be able to hug it all
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the closer, after years wasted out of its presence. The contrary arrangements seem quite
fantastic and arbitrary, but nevertheless are part of the very bone and marrow of our minds.
Reason is only one out of a thousand possibilities in the thinking of each of us. Who can
count all the silly fancies, the grotesque suppositions, the utterly irrelevant reﬂections he
makes in the course of a day? Who can swear that his prejudices and irrational beliefs
constitute a less bulky part of his mental furniture than his clariﬁed opinions? It is true that a
presiding arbiter seems to sit aloft in the mind, and emphasize the better suggestions into
permanence, while it ends by dropping out and leaving unrecorded the confusion. But this is
all the difference. The mode of genesis of the worthy and the worthless seems the same. The
laws of our actual thinking, of the cogitatum, must account alike for the bad and the good
materials on which the arbiter has to decide, for wisdom and for folly. The laws of the
arbiter, of the cogitandum, of what we ought to think, are to the former as the laws of ethics [Pg 553]
are to those of history. Who but an Hegelian historian ever pretended that reason in action
was per se a sufﬁcient explanation of the political changes in Europe?

There are, then, mechanical conditions on which thought depends, and which, to say the
least, determine the order in which is presented the content or material for her comparisons,
selections, and decisions. It is a suggestive fact that Locke, and many more recent
Continental psychologists, have found themselves obliged to invoke a mechanical process to
account for the aberrations of thought, the obstructive preprocessions, the frustrations of
reason. This they found in the law of habit, or what we now call Association by Contiguity.
But it never occurred to these writers that a process which could go the length of actually
producing some ideas and sequences in the mind might safely be trusted to produce others
too; and that those habitual associations which further thought may also come from the same
mechanical source as those which hinder it. Hartley accordingly suggested habit as a
sufﬁcient explanation of all connections of our thoughts, and in so doing planted himself
squarely upon the properly psychological aspect of the problem of connection, and sought to
treat both rational and irrational connections from a single point of view. The problem
which he essayed, however lamely, to answer, was that of the connection between our
psychic states considered purely as such, regardless of the objective connections of which
they might take cognizance. How does a man come, after thinking of A, to think of B the
next moment? or how does he come to think A and B always together? These were the
phenomena which Hartley undertook to explain by cerebral physiology. I believe that he
was, in many essential respects, on the right track, and I propose simply to revise his
conclusions by the aid of distinctions which he did not make.
But the whole historic doctrine of psychological association is tainted with one huge error—
that of the construction of our thoughts out of the confounding of themselves together of
immutable and incessantly recurring 'simple ideas.' It is the cohesion of these which the
'principles of association' are considered to account for. In Chapters VI and IX we saw [Pg 554]
abundant reasons for treating the doctrine of simple ideas or psychic atoms as mythological;
and, in all that follows, our problem will be to keep whatever truths the associationist
doctrine has caught sight of without weighing it down with the untenable incumbrance that
the association is between 'ideas.'

Association, so far as the word stands for an effect, is between THINGS THOUGHT OF—it is
THINGS, not ideas, which are associated in the mind. We ought to talk of the association of
objects, not of the association of ideas. And so far as association stands for a cause, it is
between processes in the brain—it is these which, by being associated in certain ways,
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determine what successive objects shall be thought. Let us proceed towards our ﬁnal
generalizations by surveying ﬁrst a few familiar facts.

The laws of motor habit in the lower centres of the nervous system are disputed by no one.
A series of movements repeated in a certain order tend to unroll themselves with peculiar
ease in that order for ever afterward. Number one awakens number two, and that awakens
number three, and so on, till the last is produced. A habit of this kind once become
inveterate may go on automatically. And so it is with the objects with which our thinking is
concerned. With some persons each note of a melody, heard but once, will accurately revive
in its proper sequence. Small boys at school learn the inﬂections of many a Greek noun,
adjective, or verb, from the reiterated recitations of the upper classes falling on their ear as
they sit at their desks. All this happens with no voluntary effort on their part and with no
thought of the spelling of the words. The doggerel rhymes which children use in their
games, such as the formula
"Ana mana mona mike
Barcelona bona strike,"
used for 'counting out,' form another familiar example of things heard in sequence cohering
in the same order in the memory.
In touch we have a smaller number of instances, though probably every one who bathes [Pg 555]
himself in a certain ﬁxed manner is familiar with the fact that each part of his body over
which the water is squeezed from the sponge awakens a premonitory tingling consciousness
in that portion of skin which is habitually the next to be deluged. Tastes and smells form no
very habitual series in our experience. But even if they did, it is doubtful whether habit
would ﬁx the order of their reproduction quite so well as it does that of other sensations. In
vision, however, we have a sense in which the order of reproduced things is very nearly as
much inﬂuenced by habit as is the order of remembered sounds. Rooms, landscapes,
buildings, pictures, or persons with whose look we are very familiar, surge up before the
mind's eye with all the details of their appearance complete, so soon as we think of any one
of their component parts. Some persons, in reciting printed matter by heart, will seem to see
each successive word, before they utter it, appear in its order on an imaginary page. A
certain chess-player, one of those heroes who train themselves to play several games at once
blindfold, is reported to say that in bed at night after a match the games are played all over
again before his mental eye, each board being pictured as passing in turn through each of its
successive stages. In this case, of course, the intense previous voluntary strain of the power
of visual representation is what facilitated the ﬁxed order of revival.
Association occurs as amply between impressions of different senses as between
homogeneous sensations. Seen things and heard things cohere with each other, and with
odors and tastes, in representation, in the same order in which they cohered as impressions
of the outer world. Feelings of contact reproduce similarly the sights, sounds, and tastes
with which experience has associated them. In fact, the 'objects' of our perception, as trees,
men, houses, microscopes, of which the real world seems composed, are nothing but
clusters of qualities which through simultaneous stimulation have so coalesced that the
moment one is excited actually it serves as a sign or cue for the idea of the others to arise.
Let a person enter his room in the dark and grope among the objects there. The touch of the [Pg 556]
matches will instantaneously recall their appearance. If his hand comes in contact with an
orange on the table, the golden yellow of the fruit, its savor and perfume will forthwith
shoot through his mind. In passing the hand over the sideboard or in jogging the coal-scuttle
with the foot, the large glossy dark shape of the one and the irregular blackness of the other
awaken like a ﬂash and constitute what we call the recognition of the objects. The voice of
the violin faintly echoes through the mind as the hand is laid upon it in the dark, and the
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feeling of the garments or draperies which may hang about the room is not understood till
the look correlative to the feeling has in each case been resuscitated. Smells notoriously
have the power of recalling the other experiences in whose company they were wont to be
felt, perhaps long years ago; and the voluminous emotional character assumed by the images
which suddenly pour into the mind at such a time forms one of the staple topics of popular
psychologic wonder—
"Lost and gone and lost and gone!
A breath, a whisper—some divine farewell—
Desolate sweetness—far and far away."
We cannot hear the din of a railroad tram or the yell of its whistle, without thinking of its
long, jointed appearance and its headlong speed, nor catch a familiar voice in a crowd
without recalling, with the name of the speaker, also his face. But the most notorious and
important case of the mental combination of auditory with optical impressions originally
experienced together is furnished by language. The child is offered a new and delicious fruit
and is at the same time told that it is called a 'ﬁg.' Or looking out of the window he exclaims,
"What a funny horse!" and is told that it is a 'piebald' horse. When learning his letters, the
sound of each is repeated to him whilst its shape is before his eye. Thenceforward, long as
he may live, he will never see a ﬁg, a piebald horse, or a letter of the alphabet without the
name which he ﬁrst heard in conjunction with each clinging to it in his mind; and inversely
[Pg 557]
he will never hear the name without the faint arousal of the image of the object.[465]
THE RAPIDITY OF ASSOCIATION.
Reading exempliﬁes this kind of cohesion even more beautifully. It is an uninterrupted and
protracted recall of sounds by sights which have always been coupled with them in the past.
I ﬁnd that I can name six hundred letters in two minutes on a printed page. Five distinct acts
of association between sight and sound (not to speak of all the other processes concerned)
must then have occurred in each second in my mind. In reading entire words the speed is
much more rapid. Valentin relates in his Physiology that the reading of a single page of the
proof, containing 2629 letters, took him 1 minute and 32 seconds. In this experiment each
letter was understood in 1/28 of a second, but owing to the integration of letters into entire
words, forming each a single aggregate impression directly associated with a single acoustic
image, we need not suppose as many as 28 separate associations in a sound. The ﬁgures,
however, sufﬁce to show with what extreme rapidity an actual sensation recalls its
customary associates. Both in fact seem to our ordinary attention to come into the mind at
once.
The time-measuring psychologists of recent days have tried their hand at this problem by
more elaborate methods. Galton, using a very simple apparatus, found that the sight of an
unforeseen word would awaken an associated 'idea' in about 5/6 of a second.[466] Wundt
next made determinations in which the 'cue' was given by single-syllabled words called out [Pg 558]
by an assistant. The person experimented on had to press a key as soon as the sound of the
word awakened an associated idea. Both word and reaction were chronographically
registered, and the total time-interval between the two amounted, in four observers, to 1.009,
0.896, 1.037, and 1.154 seconds respectively. From this the simple physiological reactiontime and the time of merely identifying the word's sound (the 'apperception-time,' as Wundt
calls it) must be subtracted, to get the exact time required for the associated idea to arise.
These times were separately determined and subtracted. The difference, called by Wundt the
association-time, amounted, in the same four persons, to 706, 723, 752, and 874 thousandths
of a second respectively.[467] The length of the last ﬁgure is due to the fact that the person
reacting (President G. S. Hall) was an American, whose associations with German words
would naturally be slower than those of natives. The shortest association-time noted was
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when the word 'Sturm' suggested to Prof. Wundt the word 'Wind' in 0.341 second.[468]—
Finally, Mr. Cattell made some interesting observations upon the association-time between
the look of letters and their names. "I pasted letters," he says, "on a revolving drum, and
determined at what rate they could be read aloud as they passed by a slit in a screen." He
found it to vary according as one, or more than one letter, was visible at a time through the
slit, and gives half a second as about the time which it takes to see and name a single letter
seen alone.
"When two or more letters are always in view, not only do the processes of
seeing and naming overlap, but while the subject is seeing one letter he begins
to see the ones next following, and so can read them more quickly. Of the nine
persons experimented on, four could read the letters faster when ﬁve were in
view at once, but were not helped by a sixth letter; three were not helped by a
ﬁfth, and two not by a fourth letter. This shows that while one idea is in the
centre, two, three, or four additional ideas may be in the background of
consciousness. The second letter in view shortens the time about 1/40, the third
1/60, the fourth 1/100, the ﬁfth 1/200 sec.

[Pg 559]

"I ﬁnd it takes about twice as long to read (aloud, as fast as possible) words
which have no connection as words which make sentences and letters which
have no connection as letters which make words. When the words make
sentences and the letters words, not only do the processes of seeing and naming
overlap, but by one mental effort the subject can recognize a whole group of
words or letters, and by one will-act choose the motions to be made in naming,
so that the rate at which the words and letters are read is really only limited by
the maximum rapidity at which the speech-organs can be moved. As the result
of a large number of experiments, the writer found that he had read words not
making sentences at the rate of 1/4 sec, words making sentences (a passage
from Swift) at the rate of 1/8 sec., per word.... The rate at which a person reads
a foreign language is proportional to his familiarity with the language. For
example, when reading as fast as possible the writer's rate was, English 138,
French 167, German 250, Italian 327, Latin 434, and Greek 484; the ﬁgures
giving the thousandths of a second taken to read each word. Experiments made
on others strikingly conﬁrm these results. The subject does not know that he is
reading the foreign language more slowly than his own; this explains why
foreigners seem to talk so fast. This simple method of determining a person's
familiarity with a language might be used in school examinations.
"The time required to see and name colors and pictures of objects was
determined in the same way. The time was found to be about the same (over 1/2
sec.) for colors as for pictures, and about twice as long as for words and letters.
Other experiments I have made show that we can recognize a single color or
picture in a slightly shorter time than a word or letter, but take longer to name
it. This is because, in the case of words and letters, the association between the
idea and name has taken place so often that the process has become automatic,
whereas in the case of colors and pictures we must by a voluntary effort choose
the name."[469]
In later experiments Mr. Cattell studied the time for various associations to be performed,
the termini (i.e., cue and answer) being words. A word in one language was to call up its
equivalent in another, the name of an author the tongue in which he wrote, that of a city the
country in which it lay, that of a writer one of his works, etc. The mean variation from the
average is very great in all these experiments; and the interesting feature which they show is [Pg 560]
the existence of certain constant differences between associations of different sorts. Thus:
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From country to city, Mr. C.'s time was 0.340 sec.
From season to month, Mr. C.'s time was 0.399
From language to author, Mr. C.'s time was 0.523
From author to work, Mr. C.'s time was 0.596
The average time of two observers, experimenting on eight different types of association,
was 0.420 and 0.436 sec. respectively.[470] The very wide range of variation is undoubtedly
a consequence of the fact that the words used as cues, and the different types of association [Pg 561]
studied, differ much in their degree of familiarity.
"For example, B is a teacher of mathematics; C has busied himself more with
literature. C knows quite as well as B that 7 + 5 = 12, yet he needs 1/10 a
second longer to call it to mind; B knows quite as well as C that Dante was a
poet, but needs 1/20 of a second longer to think of it. Such experiments lay bare
the mental life in a way that is startling and not always gratifying."[471]
THE LAW OF CONTIGUITY.
Time-determinations apart, the facts we have run over can all be summed up in the simple
statement that objects once experienced together tend to become associated in the
imagination, so that when any one of them is thought of, the others are likely to be thought
of also, in the same order of sequence or coexistence as before. This statement we may
name the law of mental association by contiguity.[472]
I preserve this name in order to depart as little as possible from tradition, although Mr.
Ward's designation of the process as that of association by continuity[473] or Wundt's as that
of external association (to distinguish it from the internal association which we shall
presently learn to know under the name of association by similarity)[474] are perhaps better
terms. Whatever we name the law, since it expresses merely a phenomenon of mental habit,
the most natural way of accounting for it is to conceive it as a result of the laws of habit in [Pg 562]
the nervous system; in other words, it is to ascribe it to a physiological cause. If it be truly a
law of those nerve-centres which co-ordinate sensory and motor processes together that
paths once used for coupling any pair of them are thereby made more permeable, there
appears no reason why the same law should not hold good of ideational centres and their
coupling-paths as well.[475] Parts of these centres which have once been in action together
will thus grow so linked that excitement at one point will irradiate through the system. The
chances of complete irradiation will be strong in proportion as the previous excitements
have been frequent, and as the present points excited afresh are numerous. If all points were
originally excited together, the irradiation may be sensibly simultaneous throughout the
system, when any single point or group of points is touched off. But where the original
impressions were successive—the conjugation of a Greek verb, for example—awakening [Pg 563]
nerve-tracts in a deﬁnite order, they will now, when one of them awakens, discharge into
each other in that deﬁnite order and in no other way.
The reader will recollect all that has been said of increased tension in nerve-tracts and of the
summation of stimuli (p. 82 ff.). We must therefore suppose that in these ideational tracts as
well as elsewhere, activity may be awakened, in any particular locality, by the summation
therein of a number of tensions, each incapable alone of provoking an actual discharge.
Suppose for example the locality M to be in functional continuity with four other localities,
K, L, N, and O. Suppose moreover that on four previous occasions it has been separately
combined with each of these localities in a common activity. M may then be indirectly
awakened by any cause which tends to awaken either K, L, N, or O. But if the cause which
awakens K, for instance, be so slight as only to increase its tension without arousing it to
full discharge, K will only succeed in slightly increasing the tension of M. But if at the same
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time the tensions of L, N, and O are similarly increased, the combined effects of all four
upon M may be so great as to awaken an actual discharge in this latter locality. In like
manner if the paths between M and the four other localities have been so slightly excavated
by previous experience as to require a very intense excitement in either of the localities
before M can be awakened, a less strong excitement than this in any one will fail to reach
M. But if all four at once are mildly excited, their compound effect on M may be adequate
to its full arousal.
The psychological law of association of objects thought of through their previous contiguity
in thought or experience would thus be an effect, within the mind, of the physical fact that
nerve-currents propagate themselves easiest through those tracts of conduction which have
been already most in use. Descartes and Locke hit upon this explanation, which modern
science has not yet succeeded in improving.
"Custom," says Locke, "settles habits of thinking in the understanding, as well
as of determining in the will, and of motions in the body; all which seem to be
but trains of motion in the animal spirits [by this Locke meant identically what
we understand by neural processes] which, once set agoing, continue in the
same steps they have been used to, which by often treading are worn into a
smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy and, as it were, natural."[476]

[Pg 564]

Hartley was more thorough in his grasp of the principle. The sensorial nerve-currents,
produced when objects are fully present, were for him 'vibrations,' and those which produce
ideas of objects in their absence were 'miniature vibrations.' And he sums up the cause of
mental association in a single formula by saying:
"Any vibrations, A, B, C, etc., by being associated together a sufﬁcient Number
of Times, get such a Power over a, b, c, etc., the corresponding Miniature
Vibrations, that any of the Vibrations A, when impressed alone, shall be able to
excite b, c, etc., the Miniatures of the rest."[477]
It is evident that if there be any law of neural habit similar to this, the contiguities,
coexistences, and successions, met with in outer experience, must inevitably be copied more
or less perfectly in our thought. If A B C D E be a sequence of outer impressions (they may
be events or they may be successively experienced properties of an object) which once gave [Pg 565]
rise to the successive 'ideas' a b c d e, then no sooner will A impress us again and awaken
the a, than b c d e will arise as ideas even before B C D E have come in as impressions. In
other words, the order of impressions will the next time be anticipated; and the mental order
will so far forth copy the order of the outer world. Any object when met again will make us
expect its former concomitants, through the overﬂowing of its brain-tract into the paths
which lead to theirs. And all these suggestions will be effects of a material law.
Where the associations are, as here, of successively appearing things, the distinction I made
at the outset of the chapter, between a connection thought of and a connection of thoughts, is
unimportant. For the connection thought of is concomitance or succession; and the
connection between the thoughts is just the same. The 'objects' and the 'ideas' ﬁt into parallel
schemes, and may be described in identical language, as contiguous things tending to be
thought again together, or contiguous ideas tending to recur together.
Now were these cases fair samples of all association, the distinction I drew might well be
termed a Spitzﬁndigkeit or piece of pedantic hair-splitting, and be dropped. But as a matter
of fact we cannot treat the subject so simply. The same outer object may suggest either of
many realities formerly associated with it—for in the vicissitudes of our outer experience we
are constantly liable to meet the same thing in the midst of differing companions—and a
philosophy of association that should merely say that it will suggest one of these, or even of
that one of them which it has oftenest accompanied, would go but a very short way into the
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rationale of the subject. This, however, is about as far as most associationists have gone
with their 'principle of contiguity.' Granted an object, A, they never tell us beforehand which
of its associates it will suggest; their wisdom is limited to showing, after it has suggested a
second object, that that object was once an associate. They have had to supplement their
principle of Contiguity by other principles, such as those of Similarity and Contrast, before [Pg 566]
they could begin to do justice to the richness of the facts.
THE ELEMENTARY LAW OF ASSOCIATION.
I shall try to show, in the pages which immediately follow, that there is no other elementary
causal law of association than the law of neural habit. All the materials of our thought are
due to the way in which one elementary process of the cerebral hemispheres tends to excite
whatever other elementary process it may have excited at some former time. The number of
elementary processes at work, however, and the nature of those which at any time are fully
effective in rousing the others, determine the character of the total brain-action, and, as a
consequence of this, they determine the object thought of at the time. According as this
resultant object is one thing or another, we call it a product of association by contiguity or of
association by similarity, or contrast, or whatever other sorts we may have recognized as
ultimate. Its production, however, is, in each one of these cases, to be explained by a merely
quantitative variation in the elementary brain-processes momentarily at work under the law
of habit, so that psychic contiguity, similarity, etc., are derivatives of a single profounder
kind of fact.
My thesis, stated thus brieﬂy, will soon become more clear; and at the same time certain
disturbing factors, which co-operate with the law of neural habit, will come to view.
Let us then assume as the basis of all our subsequent reasoning this law: When two
elementary brain-processes have been active together or in immediate succession, one of
them, on reoccurring, tends to propagate its excitement into the other.
But, as a matter of fact, every elementary process has found itself at different times excited
in conjunction with many other processes, and this by unavoidable outward causes. Which
of these others it shall awaken now becomes a problem. Shall b or c be aroused next by the
present a? We must make a further postulate, based, however, on the fact of tension in
nerve-tissue, and on the fact of summation of excitements, each incomplete or latent in [Pg 567]
itself, into an open resultant.[478] The process b, rather than c, will awake, if in addition to
the vibrating tract a some other tract d is in a state of sub-excitement, and formerly was
excited with b alone and not with a. In short, we may say:
The amount of activity at any given point in the brain-cortex is the sum of the tendencies of
all other points to discharge into it, such tendencies being proportionate (1) to the number
of times the excitement of each other point may have accompanied that of the point in
question; (2) to the intensity of such excitements; and (3) to the absence of any rival point
functionally disconnected with the ﬁrst point, into which the discharges might be diverted.
Expressing the fundamental law in this most complicated way leads to the greatest ultimate
simpliﬁcation. Let us, for the present, only treat of spontaneous trains of thought and
ideation, such as occur in revery or musing. The case of voluntary thinking toward a certain
end shall come up later.
Take, to ﬁx our ideas, the two verses from 'Locksley Hall':
"I, the heir of all the ages in the foremost ﬁles of time,"
and—
"For I doubt not through the ages one increasing purpose runs."
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Why is it that when we recite from memory one of these lines, and get as far as the ages,
that portion of the other line which follows, and, so to speak, sprouts out of the ages, does
not also sprout out of our memory, and confuse the sense of our words? Simply because the
word that follows the ages has its brain-process awakened not simply by the brain-process
of the ages alone, but by it plus the brain-processes of all the words preceding the ages. The
word ages at its moment of strongest activity would, per se, indifferently discharge into
either 'in' or 'one.' So would the previous words (whose tension is momentarily much less
strong than that of ages) each of them indifferently discharge into either of a large number [Pg 568]
of other words with which they have been at different times combined. But when the
processes of 'I, the heir of all the ages,' simultaneously vibrate in the brain, the last one of
them in a maximal, the others in a fading phase of excitement; then the strongest line of
discharge will be that which they all alike tend to take. 'In' and not 'one' or any other word
will be the next to awaken, for its brain-process has previously vibrated in unison not only
with that of ages, but with that of all those other words whose activity is dying away. It is a
good case of the effectiveness over thought of what we called on p. 258 a 'fringe.'
But if some one of these preceding words—'heir,' for example—had an intensely strong
association with some brain-tracts entirely disjoined in experience from the poem of
'Locksley Hall'—if the reciter, for instance, were tremulously awaiting the opening of a will
which might make him a millionaire—it is probable that the path of discharge through the
words of the poem would be suddenly interrupted at the word 'heir.' His emotional interest
in that word would be such that its own special associations would prevail over the
combined ones of the other words. He would, as we say, be abruptly reminded of his
personal situation, and the poem would lapse altogether from his thoughts.
The writer of these pages has every year to learn the names of a large number of students
who sit in alphabetical order in a lecture-room. He ﬁnally learns to call them by name, as
they sit in their accustomed places. On meeting one in the street, however, early in the year,
the face hardly ever recalls the name, but it may recall the place of its owner in the lectureroom, his neighbors' faces, and consequently his general alphabetical position; and then,
usually as the common associate of all these combined data, the student's name surges up in
his mind.
A father wishes to show to some guests the progress of his rather dull child in Kindergarten
instruction. Holding the knife upright on the table, he says, "What do you call that, my
boy?" "I calls it a knife, I does," is the sturdy reply, from which the child cannot be induced
to swerve by any alteration in the form of question, until the father recollecting that in the [Pg 569]
Kindergarten a pencil was used, and not a knife, draws a long one from his pocket, holds it
in the same way, and then gets the wished-for answer, "I calls it vertical." All the
concomitants of the Kindergarten experience had to recombine their effect before the word
'vertical' could be reawakened.
Professor Bain, in his chapters on 'Compound Association,' has treated in a minute and
exhaustive way of this type of mental sequence, and what he has done so well need not be
here repeated.[479]
Impartial Redintegration.
The ideal working of the law of compound association, were it unmodiﬁed by any
extraneous inﬂuence, would be such as to keep the mind in a perpetual treadmill of concrete
reminiscences from which no detail could be omitted. Suppose, for example, we begin by
thinking of a certain dinner-party. The only thing which all the components of the dinnerparty could combine to recall would be the ﬁrst concrete occurrence which ensued upon it.
All the details of this occurrence could in turn only combine to awaken the next following
occurrence, and so on. If a, b, c, d, e, for instance, be the elementary nerve-tracts excited by
the last act of the dinner-party, call this act A, and l, m, n, o, p, be those of walking home
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through the frosty night, which we may call B, then the thought of A must awaken that of B,
because a, b, c, d, e, will each and all discharge into l through the paths by which their
original discharge took place. Similarly they will discharge into m, n, o, and p; and these
latter tracts will also each reinforce the other's action because, in the experience B, they
have already vibrated in unison. The lines in Fig. 40 symbolize the summation of discharges
into each of the components of B, and the consequent strength of the combination of
inﬂuences by which B in its totality is awakened.
Hamilton ﬁrst used the word 'redintegration' to designate all association. Such processes as
we have just described might in an emphatic sense be termed redintegrations, for they would [Pg 570]
necessarily lead, if unobstructed, to the reinstatement in thought of the entire content of
large trains of past experience. From this complete redintegration there could be no escape
save through the irruption of some new and strong present impression of the senses, or
through the excessive tendency of some one of the elementary brain-tracts to discharge
independently into an aberrant quarter of the brain. Such was the tendency of the word 'heir'
in the verse from 'Locksley Hall,' which was our ﬁrst example. How such tendencies are
constituted we shall have soon to inquire with some care. Unless they are present, the
panorama of the past, once opened, must unroll itself with fatal literality to the end, unless
some outward sound, sight, or touch divert the current of thought.

FIG. 40.

Let us call this process impartial redintegration. Whether it ever occurs in an absolutely
complete form is doubtful. We all immediately recognize, however, that in some minds there
is a much greater tendency than in others for the ﬂow of thought to take this form. Those
insufferably garrulous old women, those dry and fanciless beings who spare you no detail,
however petty, of the facts they are recounting, and upon the thread of whose narrative all
the irrelevant items cluster as pertinaciously as the essential ones, the slaves of literal fact, [Pg 571]
the stumblers over the smallest abrupt step in thought, are ﬁgures known to all of us. Comic
literature has made her proﬁt out of them. Juliet's nurse is a classical example. George
Eliot's village characters and some of Dickens's minor personages supply excellent
instances.
Perhaps as successful a rendering as any of this mental type is the character of Miss Bates in
Miss Austen's 'Emma.' Hear how she redintegrates:
"'But where could you hear it?' cried Miss Bates. 'Where could you possibly
hear it, Mr. Knightley? For it is not ﬁve minutes since I received Mrs. Cole's
note—no, it cannot be more than ﬁve—or at least ten—for I had got my bonnet
and spencer on, just ready to come out—I was only gone down to speak to
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Patty again about the pork—Jane was standing in the passage—were not you,
Jane?—for my mother was so afraid that we had not any salting-pan large
enough. So I said I would go down and see, and Jane said: "Shall I go down
instead? for I think you have a little cold, and Patty has been washing the
kitchen." "Oh, my dear," said I—well, and just then came the note. A Miss
Hawkins—that's all I know—a Miss Hawkins, of Bath. But, Mr. Knightley,
how could you possibly have heard it? for the very moment Mr. Cole told Mrs.
Cole of it, she sat down and wrote to me. A Miss Hawkins—'"
But in every one of us there are moments when this complete reproduction of all the items
of a past experience occurs. What are those moments? They are moments of emotional
recall of the past as something which once was, but is gone for ever—moments, the interest
of which consists in the feeling that our self was once other than it now is. When this is the
case, any detail, however minute, which will make the past picture more complete, will also
have its effect in swelling that total contrast between now and then which forms the central
interest of our contemplation.
ORDINARY OR MIXED ASSOCIATION.
This case helps us to understand why it is that the ordinary spontaneous ﬂow of our ideas
does not follow the law of impartial redintegration. In no revival of a past experience are all
the items of our thought equally operative in determining what the next thought shall be.
Always some ingredient is prepotent over the rest. Its special suggestions or associations in [Pg 572]
this case will often be different from those which it has in common with the whole group of
items; and its tendency to awaken these outlying associates will deﬂect the path of our
revery. Just as in the original sensible experience our attention focalized itself upon a few of
the impressions of the scene before us, so here in the reproduction of those impressions an
equal partiality is shown, and some items are emphasized above the rest. What these items
shall be is, in most cases of spontaneous revery, hard to determine beforehand. In subjective
terms we say that the prepotent items are those which appeal most to our INTEREST.
Expressed in brain-terms, the law of interest will be: some one brain-process is always
prepotent above its concomitants in arousing action elsewhere.
"Two processes," says Mr. Hodgson,[480] "are constantly going on in
redintegration. The one a process of corrosion, melting, decay; the other a
process of renewing, arising, becoming.... No object of representation remains
long before consciousness in the same state, but fades, decays, and becomes
indistinct. Those parts of the object, however, which possess an interest resist
this tendency to gradual decay of the whole object.... This inequality in the
object—some parts, the uninteresting, submitting to decay; others, the
interesting parts, resisting it—when it has continued for a certain time, ends in
becoming a new object."
Only where the interest is diffused equally over all the parts (as in the emotional memory
just referred to, where, as all past, they all interest us alike) is this law departed from. It will
be least obeyed by those minds which have the smallest variety and intensity of interests—
those who, by the general ﬂatness and poverty of their æsthetic nature, are kept for ever
rotating among the literal sequences of their local and personal history.
Most of us, however, are better organized than this, and our musings pursue an erratic [Pg 573]
course, swerving continually into some new direction traced by the shifting play of interest
as it ever falls on some partial item in each complex representation that is evoked. Thus it so
often comes about that we ﬁnd ourselves thinking at two nearly adjacent moments of things
separated by the whole diameter of space and time. Not till we carefully recall each step of
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our cogitation do we see how naturally we came by Hodgson's law to pass from one to the
other. Thus, for instance, after looking at my clock just now (1879), I found myself thinking
of a recent resolution in the Senate about our legal-tender notes. The clock called up the
image of the man who had repaired its gong. He suggested the jeweller's shop where I had
last seen him; that shop, some shirt-studs which I had bought there; they, the value of gold
and its recent decline; the latter, the equal value of greenbacks, and this, naturally, the
question of how long they were to last, and of the Bayard proposition. Each of these images
offered various points of interest. Those which formed the turning-points of my thought are
easily assigned. The gong was momentarily the most interesting part of the clock, because,
from having begun with a beautiful tone, it had become discordant and aroused
disappointment. But for this the clock might have suggested the friend who gave it to me, or
any one of a thousand circumstances connected with clocks. The jeweller's shop suggested
the studs, because they alone of all its contents were tinged with the egoistic interest of
possession. This interest in the studs, their value, made me single out the material as its
chief source, etc., to the end. Every reader who will arrest himself at any moment and say,
"How came I to be thinking of just this?" will be sure to trace a train of representations
linked together by lines of contiguity and points of interest inextricably combined. This is
the ordinary process of the association of ideas as it spontaneously goes on in average
minds. We may call it ORDINARY, or MIXED, ASSOCIATION.
Another example of it is given by Hobbes in a passage which has been quoted so often as to
be classical:
"In a discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more impertinent than
to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman penny? Yet the coherence to
me was manifest enough. For the thought of the war introduced the thought of
the delivering up the King to his enemies; the thought of that brought in the
thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of the thirty
pence, which was the price of that treason: and thence easily followed that
malicious question; and all this in a moment of time; for thought is quick."[481]

[Pg 574]

Can we determine, now, when a certain portion of the going thought has, by dint of its
interest, become so prepotent as to make its own exclusive associates the dominant features
of the coming thought—can we, I say, determine which of its own associates shall be
evoked? For they are many. As Hodgson says:
"The interesting parts of the decaying object are free to combine again with any
objects or parts of objects with which at any time they have been combined
before. All the former combinations of these parts may come back into
consciousness; one must; but which will?"
Mr. Hodgson replies:
"There can be but one answer: that which has been most habitually combined
with them before. This new object begins at once to form itself in
consciousness, and to group its parts round the part still remaining from the
former object; part after part comes out and arranges itself in its old position;
but scarcely has the process begun, when the original law of interest begins to
operate on this new formation, seizes on the interesting parts and impresses
them on the attention to the exclusion of the rest, and the whole process is
repeated again with endless variety. I venture to propose this as a complete and
true account of the whole process of redintegration."
In restricting the discharge from the interesting item into that channel which is simply most
habitual in the sense of most frequent, Hodgson's account is assuredly imperfect. An image
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by no means always revives its most frequent associate, although frequency is certainly one
of the most potent determinants of revival. If I abruptly utter the word swallow, the reader, if
by habit an ornithologist, will think of a bird; if a physiologist or a medical specialist in
throat diseases, he will think of deglutition. If I say date, he will, if a fruit-merchant or an [Pg 575]
Arabian traveller, think of the produce of the palm; if an habitual student of history, ﬁgures
with A.D. or B.C. before them will rise in his mind. If I say bed, bath, morning, his own daily
toilet will be invincibly suggested by the combined names of three of its habitual associates.
But frequent lines of transition are often set at naught. The sight of C. Goring's 'System der
kritischen Philosophie' has most frequently awakened in me thoughts of the opinions therein
propounded. The idea of suicide has never been connected with the volumes. But a moment
since, as my eye fell upon them, suicide was the thought that ﬂashed into my mind. Why?
Because but yesterday I received a letter from Leipzig informing me that this philosopher's
recent death by drowning was an act of self-destruction. Thoughts tend, then, to awaken
their most recent as well as their most habitual associates. This is a matter of notorious
experience, too notorious, in fact, to need illustration. If we have seen our friend this
morning, the mention of his name now recalls the circumstances of that interview, rather
than any more remote details concerning him. If Shakespeare's plays are mentioned, and we
were last night reading 'Richard II.,' vestiges of that play rather than of 'Hamlet' or 'Othello'
ﬂoat through our mind. Excitement of peculiar tracts, or peculiar modes of general
excitement in the brain, leave a sort of tenderness or exalted sensibility behind them which
takes days to die away. As long as it lasts, those tracts or those modes are liable to have their
activities awakened by causes which at other times might leave them in repose. Hence,
recency in experience is a prime factor in determining revival in thought.[482]
Vividness in an original experience may also have the same effect as habit or recency in
bringing about likelihood of revival. If we have once witnessed an execution, any
subsequent conversation or reading about capital punishment will almost certainly suggest
images of that particular scene. Thus it is that events lived through only once, and in youth, [Pg 576]
may come in after-years, by reason of their exciting quality or emotional intensity, to serve
as types or instances used by our mind to illustrate any and every occurring topic whose
interest is most remotely pertinent to theirs. If a man in his boyhood once talked with
Napoleon, any mention of great men or historical events, battles or thrones, or the whirligig
of fortune, or islands in the ocean, will be apt to draw to his lips the incidents of that one
memorable interview. If the word tooth now suddenly appears on the page before the
reader's eye, there are ﬁfty chances out of a hundred that, if he gives it time to awaken any
image, it will be an image of some operation of dentistry in which he has been the sufferer.
Daily he has touched his teeth and masticated with them; this very morning he brushed
them, chewed his breakfast and picked them; but the rarer and remoter associations arise
more promptly because they were so much more intense.[483]
A fourth factor in tracing the course of reproduction is congruity in emotional tone between
the reproduced idea and our mood. The same objects do not recall the same associates when
we are cheerful as when we are melancholy. Nothing, in fact, is more striking than our utter
inability to keep up trains of joyous imagery when we are depressed in spirits. Storm,
darkness, war, images of disease, poverty, and perishing afﬂict unremittingly the
imaginations of melancholiacs. And those of sanguine temperament, when their spirits are
high, ﬁnd it impossible to give any permanence to evil forebodings or to gloomy thoughts.
In an instant the train of association dances off to ﬂowers and sunshine, and images of
spring and hope. The records of Arctic or African travel perused in one mood awaken no
thoughts but those of horror at the malignity of Nature; read at another time they suggest
only enthusiastic reﬂections on the indomitable power and pluck of man. Few novels so
overﬂow with joyous animal spirits as 'The Three Guardsmen' of Dumas. Yet it may awaken
in the mind of a reader depressed with sea-sickness (as the writer can personally testify) a [Pg 577]
most dismal and woeful consciousness of the cruelty and carnage of which heroes like
Athos, Porthos, and Aramis make themselves guilty.
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Habit, recency, vividness, and emotional congruity are, then, all reasons why one
representation rather than another should be awakened by the interesting portion of a
departing thought. We may say with truth that in the majority of cases the coming
representation will have been either habitual, recent, or vivid, and will be congruous. If all
these qualities unite in any one absent associate, we may predict almost infallibly that that
associate of the going thought will form an important ingredient in the coming thought. In
spite of the fact, however, that the succession of representations is thus redeemed from
perfect indeterminism and limited to a few classes whose characteristic quality is ﬁxed by
the nature of our past experience, it must still be confessed that an immense number of
terms in the linked chain of our representations fall outside of all assignable rule. To take the
instance of the clock given on page 586. Why did the jeweller's shop suggest the shirt-studs
rather than a chain which I had bought there more recently, which had cost more, and whose
sentimental associations were much more interesting? Both chain and studs had excited
brain-tracts simultaneously with the shop. The only reason why the nerve-stream from the
shop-tract switched off into the stud-tract rather than into the chain-tract must be that the
stud-tract happened at that moment to lie more open, either because of some accidental
alteration in its nutrition or because the incipient sub-conscious tensions of the brain as a
whole had so distributed their equilibrium, that it was more unstable here than in the chaintract. Any reader's introspection will easily furnish similar instances. It thus remains true
that to a certain extent, even in those forms of ordinary mixed association which lie nearest
to impartial redintegration, which associate of the interesting item shall emerge must be
called largely a matter of accident—accident, that is, for our intelligence. No doubt it is
determined by cerebral causes, but they are too subtile and shifting for our analysis.
ASSOCIATION BY SIMILARITY.

[Pg 578]

In partial or mixed association we have all along supposed the interesting portion of the
disappearing thought to be of considerable extent, and to be sufﬁciently complex to
constitute by itself a concrete object. Sir William Hamilton relates, for instance, that after
thinking of Ben Lomond he found himself thinking of the Prussian system of education, and
discovered that the links of association were a German gentleman whom he had met on Ben
Lomond, Germany, etc. The interesting part of Ben Lomond, as he had experienced it, the
part operative in determining the train of his ideas was the complex image of a particular
man. But now let us suppose that that selective agency of interested attention, which may
thus convert impartial redintegration into partial association—let us suppose that it reﬁnes
itself still further and accentuates a portion of the passing thought, so small as to be no
longer the image of a concrete thing, but only of an abstract quality or property. Let us
moreover suppose that the part thus accentuated persists in consciousness (or, in cerebral
terms, has its brain-process continue) after the other portions of the thought have faded. This
small surviving portion will then surround itself with its own associates after the fashion we
have already seen, and the relation between the new thought's object and the object of the
faded thought will be a relation of similarity. The pair of thoughts will form an instance of
what is called 'Association by Similarity.'[484]
The similars which are here associated, or of which the ﬁrst is followed by the second in the
mind, are seen to be compounds. Experience proves that this is always the case. There is no [Pg 579]
tendency on the part of SIMPLE 'ideas,' attributes, or qualities to remind us of their like. The
thought of one shade of blue does not remind us of that of another shade of blue, etc., unless
indeed we have in mind some general purpose like naming the tint, when we should
naturally think of other blues of the scale, through 'mixed association' of purpose, names,
and tints, together. But there is no elementary tendency of pure qualities to awaken their
similars in the mind.
We saw in the chapter on Discrimination that two compound things are similar when some
one quality or group of qualities is shared alike by both, although as regards their other
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qualities they may have nothing in common. The moon is similar to a gas-jet, it is also
similar to a foot-ball; but a gas-jet and a foot-ball are not similar to each other. When we
afﬁrm the similarity of two compound things, we should always say in what respect it
obtains. Moon and gas-jet are similar in respect of luminosity, and nothing else; moon and
foot-ball in respect of rotundity, and nothing else. Foot-ball and gas-jet are in no respect
similar—that is, they possess no common point, no identical attribute. Similarity, in
compounds, is partial identity. When the same attribute appears in two phenomena, though it
be their only common property, the two phenomena are similar in so far forth. To return now
to our associated representations. If the thought of the moon is succeeded by the thought of
a foot-ball, and that by the thought of one of Mr. X's railroads, it is because the attribute
rotundity in the moon broke away from all the rest and surrounded itself with an entirely
new set of companions—elasticity, leathery integument, swift mobility in obedience to
human caprice, etc.; and because the last-named attribute in the foot-ball in turn broke away
from its companions, and, itself persisting, surrounded itself with such new attributes as
make up the notions of a 'railroad king,' of a rising and falling stock-market, and the like.
The gradual passage from impartial redintegration to similar association through what we
have called ordinary mixed association may be symbolized by diagrams. Fig. 41 is impartial
redintegration, Fig. 42 is mixed, and Fig. 43 similar association. A in each is the passing, B [Pg 580]
the coming thought. In 'impartial,' all parts of A are equally operative in calling up B. In
'mixed,' most parts of A are inert. The part M alone breaks out and awakens B. In 'similar,'
the focalized part M is much smaller than in the previous case, and after awakening its new
set of associates, instead of fading out itself, it continues persistently active along with them,
forming an identical part in the two ideas, and making these, pro tanto, resemble each other.

FIG. 41.

FIG. 42.

FIG. 43.

Why a single portion of the passing thought should break out from its concert with the rest
and act, as we say, on its own hook, why the other parts should become inert, are mysteries
which we can ascertain but not explain. Possibly a minuter insight into the laws of neural
action will some day clear the matter up; possibly neural laws will not sufﬁce, and we shall [Pg 581]
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need to invoke a dynamic reaction of the form of consciousness upon its content. But into
this we cannot enter now.

To sum up, then, we see that the difference between the three kinds of association reduces
itself to a simple difference in the amount of that portion of the nerve-tract supporting the
going thought which is operative in calling up the thought which comes. But the modus
operandi of this active part is the same, be it large or be it small. The items constituting the
coming object waken in every instance because their nerve-tracts once were excited
continuously with those of the going object or its operative part. This ultimate physiological
law of habit among the neural elements is what runs the train. The direction of its course
and the form of its transitions, whether redintegrative, associative, or similar, are due to
unknown regulative or determinative conditions which accomplish their effect by opening
this switch and closing that, setting the engine sometimes at half-speed, and coupling or
uncoupling cars.
This last ﬁgure of speech, into which I have glided unwittingly, affords itself an excellent
instance of association by similarity. I was thinking of the deﬂections of the course of ideas.
Now, from Hobbes's time downward, English writers have been fond of speaking of the
train of our representations. This word happened to stand out in the midst of my complex
thought with peculiarly sharp accentuation, and to surround itself with numerous details of
railroad imagery. Only such details became clear, however, as had their nerve-tracts
besieged by a double set of inﬂuences—those from train on the one hand, and those from
the movement of thought on the other. It may possibly be that the prepotency of the
suggestions of the word train at this moment were due to the recent excitation of the railroad
brain-tract by the instance chosen a few pages back of ii railroad king playing foot-ball with
the stock-market.
It is apparent from such an example how inextricably complex are all the contributory
factors whose resultant is the line of our reverie. It would be folly in most cases to attempt [Pg 582]
to trace them out. From an instance like the above, where the pivot of the Similar
Association was formed by a deﬁnite concrete word, train, to those where it is so subtile as
utterly to elude our analysis, the passage is unbroken. We can form a series of examples.
When Mr. Bagehot says that the mind of the savage, so far from being in a state of nature, is
tattooed all over with monstrous superstitions, the case is very like the one we have just
been considering. When Sir James Stephen compares our belief in the uniformity of nature,
the congruity of the future with the past, to a man rowing one way and looking another, and
steering his boat by keeping her stern in a line with an object behind him, the operative link
becomes harder to dissect out. It is subtler still in Dr. Holmes's phrase, that stories in passing
from mouth to mouth make a great deal of lee-way in proportion to their headway; or in Mr.
Lowell's description of German sentences, that they have a way of yawing and going sternforemost and not minding the helm for several minutes after it has been put down. And
ﬁnally, it is a real puzzle when the color pale-blue is said to have feminine and blood-red
masculine afﬁnities. And if I hear a friend describe a certain family as having blotting-paper
voices, the image, though immediately felt to be apposite, bafﬂes the utmost powers of
analysis. The higher poets all use abrupt epithets, which are alike intimate and remote, and,
as Emerson says, sweetly torment us with invitations to their inaccessible homes.
In these latter instances we must suppose that there is an identical portion in the similar
objects, and that its brain-tract is energetically operative, without, however, being
sufﬁciently isolable in its activity as to stand out per se, and form the condition of a
distinctly discriminated 'abstract idea.' We cannot even by careful search see the bridge over
which we passed from the heart of one representation to that of the next. In some brains,
however, this mode of transition is extremely common. It would be one of the most
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important of physiological discoveries could we assign the mechanical or chemical
difference which makes the thoughts of one brain cling close to impartial redintegration,
while those of another shoot about in all the lawless revelry of similarity. Why, in these [Pg 583]
latter brains, action should tend to focalize itself in small spots, while in the others it ﬁlls
patiently its broad bed, it seems impossible to guess. Whatever the difference may be, it is
what separates the man of genius from the prosaic creature of habit and routine thinking. In
Chapter XXII we shall need to recur again to this point.
ASSOCIATION IN VOLUNTARY THOUGHT.
Hitherto we have assumed the process of suggestion of one object by another to be
spontaneous. The train of imagery wanders at its own sweet will, now trudging in sober
grooves of habit, now with a hop, skip, and jump darting across the whole ﬁeld of time and
space. This is revery, or musing; but great segments of the ﬂux of our ideas consist of
something very different from this. They are guided by a distinct purpose or conscious
interest. As the Germans say, we nachdenken, or think towards a certain end. It is now
necessary to examine what modiﬁcation is made in the trains of our imagery by the having
of an end in view. The course of our ideas is then called voluntary.
Physiologically considered, we must suppose that a purpose means the persistent activity of
certain rather deﬁnite brain-processes throughout the whole course of thought. Our most
usual cogitations are not pure reveries, absolute driftings, but revolve about some central
interest or topic to which most of the images are relevant, and towards which we return
promptly after occasional digressions. This interest is subserved by the persistently active
brain-tracts we have supposed. In the mixed associations which we have hitherto studied,
the parts of each object which form the pivots on which our thoughts successively turn have
their interest largely determined by their connection with some general interest which for
the time has seized upon the mind. If we call Z the brain-tract of general interest, then, if the
object abc turns up, and b has more associations with Z than have either a or c, b will
become the object's interesting, pivotal portion, and will call up its own associates
exclusively. For the energy of b's brain-tract will be augmented by Z's activity,—an activity
which, from lack of previous connection between Z and a or c, does not inﬂuence a or c. If, [Pg 584]
for instance, I think of Paris whilst I am hungry, I shall not improbably ﬁnd that its
restaurants have become the pivot of my thought, etc., etc.
But in the theoretic as well as in the practical life there are interests of a more acute sort,
taking the form of deﬁnite images of some achievement, be it action or acquisition, which
we desire to effect. The train of ideas arising under the inﬂuence of such an interest
constitutes usually the thought of the means by which the end shall be attained. If the end by
its simple presence does not instantaneously suggest the means, the search for the latter
becomes an intellectual problem. The solution of problems is the most characteristic and
peculiar sort of voluntary thinking. Where the end thought of is some outward deed or gain,
the solution is largely composed of the actual motor processes, walking, speaking, writing,
etc., which lead up to it. Where the end is in the ﬁrst instance only ideal, as in laying out a
place of operations, the steps are purely imaginary. In both of these cases the discovery of
the means may form a new sort of end, of an entirely peculiar nature, an end, namely, which
we intensely desire before we have attained it, but of the nature of which, even whilst most
strongly craving it, we have no distinct imagination whatever. Such an end is a problem.
The same state of things occurs whenever we seek to recall something forgotten, or to state
the reason for a judgment which we have made intuitively. The desire strains and presses in
a direction which it feels to be right but towards a point which it is unable to see. In short,
the absence of an item is a determinant of our representations quite as positive as its
presence can ever be. The gap becomes no mere void, but what is called an aching void. If
we try to explain in terms of brain-action how a thought which only potentially exists can
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yet be effective, we seem driven to believe that the brain-tract thereof must actually be
excited, but only in a minimal and sub-conscious way. Try, for instance, to symbolize what
goes on in a man who is racking his brains to remember a thought which occurred to him
last week. The associates of the thought are there, many of them at least, but they refuse to [Pg 585]
awaken the thought itself. We cannot suppose that they do not irradiate at all into its braintract, because his mind quivers on the very edge of its recovery. Its actual rhythm sounds in
his ears; the words seem on the imminent point of following, but fail. What it is that blocks
the discharge and keeps the brain-excitement here from passing beyond the nascent into the
vivid state cannot be guessed. But we see in the philosophy of desire and pleasure, that such
nascent excitements, spontaneously tending to a crescendo, but inhibited or checked by
other causes, may become potent mental stimuli and determinants of desire. All questioning,
wonder, emotion of curiosity, must be referred to cerebral causes of some such form as this.
The great difference between the effort to recall things forgotten and the search after the
means to a given end, is that the latter have not, whilst the former have, already formed a
part of our experience. If we ﬁrst study the mode of recalling a thing forgotten, we can take
up with better understanding the voluntary quest of the unknown.
The forgotten thing is felt by us as a gap in the midst of certain other things. If it is a
thought, we possess a dim idea of where we were and what we were about when it occurred
to us. We recollect the general subject to which it relates. But all these details refuse to shoot
together into a solid whole, for the lack of the vivid traits of this missing thought, the
relation whereof to each detail forms now the main interest of the latter. We keep running
over the details in our mind, dissatisﬁed, craving something more. From each detail there
radiate lines of association forming so many tentative guesses. Many of these are
immediately seen to be irrelevant, are therefore void of interest, and lapse immediately from
consciousness. Others are associated with the other details present, and with the missing
thought as well. When these surge up, we have a peculiar feeling that we are 'warm,' as the
children say when they play hide and seek; and such associates as these we clutch at and
keep before the attention. Thus we recollect successively that when we had the thought in
question we were at the dinner-table; then that our friend J. D. was there; then that the [Pg 586]
subject talked about was so and so; ﬁnally, that the thought came à propos of a certain
anecdote, and then that it had something to do with a French quotation. Now all these added
associations arise independently of the will, by the spontaneous process we know so well.
All that the will does is to emphasize and linger over those which seem pertinent, and ignore
the rest. Through this hovering of the attention in the neighborhood of the desired object, the
accumulation of associates becomes so great that the combined tensions of their neural
processes break through the bar, and the nervous wave pours into the tract which has so long
been awaiting its advent. And as the expectant, sub-conscious itching there, bursts into the
fulness of vivid feeling, the mind ﬁnds an inexpressible relief.
The whole process can be rudely symbolized in a diagram. Call the forgotten thing Z, the
ﬁrst facts with which we felt it was related, a, b, and c, and the details ﬁnally operative in
calling it up, l, m, and n. Each circle will then stand for the brain-process underlying the
thought of the object denoted by the letter contained within it. The activity in Z will at ﬁrst
be a mere tension; but as the activities in a, b, and c little by little irradiate into l, m, and n,
and as all these processes are somehow connected with Z, their combined irradiations upon
Z, represented by the centripetal arrows, succeed in helping the tension there to overcome
the resistance, and in rousing Z also to full activity.
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FIG. 44.

The tension present from the ﬁrst in Z, even though it keep below the threshold of discharge, [Pg 587]
is probably to some degree co-operative with a, b, c in determining that l, m, n shall awake.
Without Z's tension there might be a slower accumulation of objects connected with it. But,
as aforesaid, the objects come before us through the brain's own laws, and the Ego of the
thinker can only remain on hand, as it were, to recognize their relative values and brood
over some of them, whilst others are let drop. As when we have lost a material object we
cannot recover it by a direct effort, but only through moving about such neighborhoods
wherein it is likely to lie, and trusting that it will then strike our eye; so here, by not letting
our attention leave the neighborhood of what we seek, we trust that it will end by speaking
to us of its own accord.[485]

Turn now to the case of ﬁnding the unknown means to a distinctly conceived end. The end
here stands in the place of a, b, c, in the diagram. It is the starting-point of the irradiations of
suggestion; and here, as in that case, what the voluntary attention does is only to dismiss
some of the suggestions as irrelevant, and hold fast to others which are felt to be more
pertinent—let these be symbolized by l, m, n. These latter at last accumulate sufﬁciently to
discharge all together into Z, the excitement of which process is, in the mental sphere,
equivalent to the solution of our problem. The only difference between this case and the last,
is that in this one there need be no original sub-excitement in Z, co-operating from the very
ﬁrst. When we seek a forgotten name, we must suppose the name's centre to be in a state of [Pg 588]
active tension from the very outset, because of that peculiar feeling of recognition which we
get at the moment of recall. The plenitude of the thought seems here but a maximum degree
of something which our mind divined in advance. It instantaneously ﬁlls a socket
completely moulded to its shape; and it seems most natural to ascribe the identity of quality
in our feeling of the gaping socket and our feeling of what comes to ﬁll it, to the sameness
of a nerve-tract excited in different degrees. In the solving of a problem, on the contrary, the
recognition that we have found the means is much less immediate. Here, what we are aware
of in advance seems to be its relations with the items we already know. It must bear a causal
relation, or it must be an effect, or it must contain an attribute common to two items, or it
must be a uniform concomitant, or what not. We know, in short, a lot about it, whilst as yet
we have no knowledge of acquaintance with it (see p. 221), or in Mr. Hodgson's language,
"we know what we want to ﬁnd beforehand, in a certain sense, in its second intention, and
do not know it, in another sense, in its ﬁrst intention."[486] Our intuition that one of the ideas
which turn up is, at last, our quæsitum, is due to our recognition that its relations are
identical with those we had in mind, and this may be a rather slow act of judgment. In fact,
every one knows that an object may be for some time present to his mind before its relations
to other matters are perceived. To quote Hodgson again:
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

349/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

"The mode of operation is common to voluntary memory and reason.... But
reasoning adds to memory the function of comparing or judging the images
which arise.... Memory aims at ﬁlling the gap with an image which has at some
particular time ﬁlled it before, reasoning with one which bears certain time-and
space-relations to the images before and after"—
or, to use perhaps clearer language, one which stands in determinate logical relations to
those data round about the gap which ﬁlled our mind at the start. This feeling of the blank
form of relationship before we get the material quality of the thing related will surprise no [Pg 589]
one who has read Chapter IX.
From the guessing of newspaper enigmas to the plotting of the policy of an empire there is
no other process than this. We trust to the laws of cerebral nature to present us
spontaneously with the appropriate idea:
"Our only command over it is by the effort we make to keep the painful unﬁlled
gap in consciousness.[487]... Two circumstances are important to notice: the ﬁrst
is, that volition has no power of calling up images, but only of rejecting and
selecting from those offered by spontaneous redintegration.[488] But the rapidity
with which this selection is made, owing to the familiarity of the ways in which
spontaneous redintegration runs, gives the process of reasoning the appearance
of evoking images that are foreseen to be conformable to the purpose. There is
no seeing them before they are offered; there is no summoning them before
they are seen. The other circumstance is, that every kind of reasoning is
nothing, in its simplest form, but attention."[489]
It is foreign to our purpose here to enter into any detailed analysis of the different classes of
mental pursuit. In a scientiﬁc research we get perhaps as rich an example as can be found.
The inquirer starts with a fact of which he seeks the reason, or with an hypothesis of which
he seeks the proof. In either case he keeps turning the matter incessantly in his mind until,
by the arousal of associate upon associate, some habitual, some similar, one arises which he
recognizes to suit his need. This, however, may take years. No rules can be given by which
the investigator may proceed straight to his result; but both here and in the case of
reminiscence the accumulation of helps in the way of associations may advance more
rapidly by the use of certain routine methods. In striving to recall a thought, for example, we
may of set purpose run through the successive classes of circumstance with which it may [Pg 590]
possibly have been connected, trusting that when the right member of the class has turned
up it will help the thought's revival. Thus we may run through all the places in which we
may have had it. We may run through the persons whom we remember to have conversed
with, or we may call up successively all the books we have lately been reading. If we are
trying to remember a person we may run through a list of streets or of professions. Some
item out of the lists thus methodically gone over will very likely be associated with the fact
we are in need of, and may suggest it or help to do so. And yet the item might never have
arisen without such systematic procedure. In scientiﬁc research this accumulation of
associates has been methodized by Mill under the title of 'The Four Methods of
Experimental Inquiry.' By the 'method of agreement,' by that of 'difference,' by those of
'residues' and 'concomitant variations'(which cannot here be more nearly deﬁned), we make
certain lists of cases; and by ruminating these lists in our minds the cause we seek will be
more likely to emerge. But the ﬁnal stroke of discovery is only prepared, not effected, by
them. The brain-tracts must, of their own accord, shoot the right way at last, or we shall still
grope in darkness. That in some brains the tracts do shoot the right way much oftener than in
others, and that we cannot tell why,—these are ultimate facts to which we must never close
our eyes. Even in forming our lists of instances according to Mill's methods, we are at the
mercy of the spontaneous workings of Similarity in our brain. How are a number of facts,
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resembling the one whose cause we seek, to be brought together in a list unless the one will
rapidly suggest the other through association by similarity?
SIMILARITY NO ELEMENTARY LAW.
Such is the analysis I propose, ﬁrst of the three main types of spontaneous association, and
then of voluntary association. It will be observed that the object called up may bear any
logical relation whatever to the one which suggested it. The law requires only that one
condition should be fulﬁlled. The fading object must be due to a brain-process some of
whose elements awaken through habit some of the elements of the brain-process of the [Pg 591]
object which comes to view. This awakening is the operative machinery, the causal agency,
throughout, quite as much so in the kind of association I have called by the name of
Similarity, as in any other sort. The similarity between the objects, or between the thoughts
(if similarity there be between these latter), has no causal agency in carrying us from one to
the other. It is but a result—the effect of the usual causal agent when this happens to work in
a certain particular and assignable way. But ordinary writers talk as if the similarity of the
objects were itself an agent, co-ordinate with habit, and independent of it, and like it able to
push objects before the mind. This is quite unintelligible. The similarity of two things does
not exist till both things are there—it is meaningless to talk of it as an agent of production of
anything, whether in the physical or the psychical realms.[490] It is a relation which the mind
perceives after the fact, just as it may perceive the relations of superiority, of distance, of
causality, of container and content, of substance and accident, or of contrast, between an
object and some second object which the associative machinery calls up.[491]
There are, nevertheless, able writers who not only insist on preserving association by
similarity as a distinct elementary law, but who make it the most elementary law, and seek to
derive contiguous association from it. Their reasoning is as follows: When the present
impression A awakens the idea b of its past contiguous associate B, how can this occur [Pg 592]
except through ﬁrst reviving an image a of its own past occurrence. This is the term directly
connected with b; so that the process instead of being simply A—b is A—a—b. Now A and
a are similars; therefore no association by contiguity can occur except through a previous
association by similarity. The most important supposition here made is that every
impression on entering the mind must needs awaken an image of its past self, in the light of
which it is 'apperceived' or understood, and through the intermediation of which it enters
into relation with the mind's other objects. This assumption is almost universally made; and
yet it is hard to ﬁnd any good reason for it. It ﬁrst came before us when we were reviewing
the facts of aphasia and mental blindness (see p. 50 ff.). But we then saw no need of optical
and auditory images to interpret optical and auditory sensations by. On the contrary, we
agreed that auditory sensations were understood by us only so far as they awakened nonauditory images, and optical sensations only so far as they awakened non-optical images. In
the chapters on Memory, on Reasoning, and on Perception the same assumption will meet us
again, and again will have to be rejected as groundless. The sensational process A and the
ideational process a probably occupy essentially the same tracts. When the outer stimulus
comes and those tracts vibrate with the sensation A, they discharge as directly into the paths
which lead to B as when there is no outer stimulus and they only vibrate with the idea a. To
say that the process A can only reach these paths by the help of the weaker process a is like
saying that we need a candle to see the sun by. A replaces a, does all that a does and more;
and there is no intelligible meaning, to my mind, in saying that the weaker process coexists
with the stronger. I therefore consider that these writers are altogether wrong. The only
plausible proof they give of the coexistence of a with A is when A gives us a sense of
familiarity but fails to awaken any distinct thought of past contiguous associates. In a later
chapter I shall consider this case. Here I content myself with saying that it does not seem
conclusive as to the point at issue; and that I still believe association of coexistent or sequent [Pg 593]
impressions to be the one elementary law.
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CONTRAST has also been held to be an independent agent in association. But the
reproduction of an object contrasting with one already in the mind is easily explained on our
principles. Recent writers, in fact, all reduce it either to similarity or contiguity. Contrast
always presupposes generic similarity; it is only the extremes of a class which are
contrasted, black and white, not black and sour, or white and prickly. A machinery which
reproduces a similar at all, may reproduce the opposite similar, as well as any intermediate
term. Moreover, the greater number of contrasts are habitually coupled in speech, young and
old, life and death, rich and poor, etc., and are, as Dr. Bain says, in everybody's memory.
[492]

I trust that the student will now feel that the way to a deeper understanding of the order of
our ideas lies in the direction of cerebral physiology. The elementary process of revival can
be nothing but the law of habit. Truly the day is distant when physiologists shall actually
trace from cell-group to cell-group the irradiations which we have hypothetically invoked.
Probably it will never arrive. The schematism we have used is, moreover, taken immediately
from the analysis of objects into their elementary parts, and only extended by analogy to the
brain. And yet it is only as incorporated in the brain that such a schematism can represent
anything causal. This is, to my mind, the conclusive reason for saying that the order of
presentation of the mind's materials is due to cerebral physiology alone.
The law of accidental prepotency of certain processes over others falls also within the
sphere of cerebral probabilities. Granting such instability as the brain-tissue requires, certain
points must always discharge more quickly and strongly than others; and this prepotency
would shift its place from moment to moment by accidental causes, giving us a perfect [Pg 594]
mechanical diagram of the capricious play of similar association in the most gifted mind.
The study of dreams conﬁrms this view. The usual abundance of paths of irradiation seems,
in the dormant brain, reduced. A few only are pervious, and the most fantastic sequences
occur because the currents run—'like sparks in burnt-up paper'—wherever the nutrition of
the moment creates an opening, but nowhere else.

The effects of interested attention and volition remain. These activities seem to hold fast to
certain elements, and by emphasizing them and dwelling on them, to make their associates
the only ones which are evoked. This is the point at which an anti-mechanical psychology
must, if anywhere, make it stand in dealing with association. Everything else is pretty
certainly due to cerebral laws. My own opinion on the question of active attention and
spiritual spontaneity is expressed elsewhere. But even though there be a mental spontaneity,
it can certainly not create ideas or summon them ex abrupto. Its power is limited to selecting
amongst those which the associative machinery has already introduced or tends to introduce.
If it can emphasize, reinforce, or protract for a second either one of these, it can do all that
the most eager advocate of free will need demand; for it then decides the direction of the
next associations by making them hinge upon the emphasized term; and determining in this
wise the course of the man's thinking, it also determines his acts.
THE HISTORY OF OPINION CONCERNING ASSOCIATION
may be brieﬂy glanced at ere we end the chapter.[493] Aristotle seems to have caught both
the facts and the principle of explanation; but he did not expand his views, and it was not till
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the time of Hobbes that the matter was again touched on in a deﬁnite way. Hobbes ﬁrst
formulated the problem of the succession of our thoughts. He writes in Leviathan, chapter
iii, as follows:
"By consequence, or train of thoughts, I understand that succession of one
thought to another which is called, to distinguish it from discourse in words,
mental discourse. When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, his next
thought after is not altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to
every thought succeeds indifferently. But as we have no imagination, whereof
we have not formerly had sense, in whole or in parts; so we have no transition
from one imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our
senses. The reason whereof is this. All fancies are motions within us, relics of
those made in the sense: and those motions that immediately succeeded one
another in the sense continue also together after sense: insomuch as the former
coming again to take place, and be predominant, the latter followeth, by
coherence of the matter moved, in such manner, as water upon a plane table is
drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the ﬁnger. But because in
sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes
another succeedeth, it comes to pass in time that, in the imagining of anything,
there is no certainty what we shall imagine next; only this is certain, it shall be
something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another. This train of
thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The ﬁrst is unguided, without
design, and inconstant; wherein there is no passionate thought, to govern and
direct those that follow, to itself, as the end and scope of some desire, or other
passion.... The second is more constant; as being regulated by some desire and
design. For the impression made by such things as we desire, or fear, is strong
and permanent, or, if it cease for a time, of quick return: so strong is it,
sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From desire ariseth the thought of
some means we have seen produce the like of that which we aim at; and from
the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till
we come to some beginning within our own power. And because the end, by the
greatness of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to
wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way: which observed by one of
the seven wise men, made him give men this precept, which is now worn out,
Respite ﬁnem; that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would
have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.
"The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds; one, when of an effect
imagined we seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to
man and beast. The other is, when imagining anything whatsoever, we seek all
the possible effects that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what
we can do with it, when we have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any
sign, but in man only; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any
living creature that has no other passion but sensual, such as are hunger, thirst,
lust, and anger. In sum, the discourse of the mind, when it is governed by
design, is nothing but seeking or the faculty of invention, which the Latins
called sagacitas, and sollertia; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect,
present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause."

[Pg 595]

[Pg 596]

The most important passage after this of Hobbes is Hume's:
"As all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, and may be united
again in what form it pleases, nothing would be more unaccountable than the
operations of that faculty, were it not guided by some universal principles,
which render it, in some measure, uniform with itself in all times and places.
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

353/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone would join them; and
'tis impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as
they commonly do) without some bond of union among them, some associating
quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another. This uniting principle
among ideas is not to be considered as an inseparable connection; for that has
been already excluded from the imagination. Nor yet are we to conclude that
without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free than that
faculty: but we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails,
and is the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly correspond to
each other; nature in a manner pointing to every one those simple ideas which
are most proper to be united in a complex one. The qualities from which this
association arises, and by which the mind is after this manner conveyed from
one idea to another, are three, viz., RESEMBLANCE, CONTIGUITY in time or place,
and CAUSE and EFFECT.
"I believe it will not be very necessary to prove that these qualities produce an
association among ideas, and upon the appearance of one idea naturally
introduce another. 'Tis plain that in the course of our thinking, and in the
constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea to
any other that resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufﬁcient
bond and association. 'Tis likewise evident, that as the senses, in changing their
objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie
contiguous to each other, the imagination must by long custom acquire the same
method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its
objects. As to the connection that is made by the relation of cause and effect,
we shall have occasion afterwards to examine it to the bottom, and therefore
shall not at present insist upon it. 'Tis sufﬁcient to observe that there is no
relation which produces a stronger connection in the fancy, and makes one idea
more readily recall another, than the relation of cause and effect betwixt their
objects.... These are therefore the principles of union or cohesion among our
simple ideas, and in the imagination supply the place of that inseparable
connection by which they are united in our memory. Here is a kind of
ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary
effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as many and as various forms. Its
effects are everywhere conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly
unknown, and must be resolved into original qualities of human nature, which I
pretend not to explain."[494]

[Pg 597]

Hume did not, however, any more than Hobbes, follow out the effects of which he speaks,
and the task of popularizing the notion of association and making an effective school based
on association of ideas alone was reserved for Hartley[495] and James Mill.[496] These
authors traced minutely the presence of association in all the cardinal notions and operations
of the mind. The several 'faculties' of the Mind were dispossessed; the one principle of
association between ideas did all their work. As Priestley says:
"Nothing is requisite to make any man whatever he is, but a sentient principle
with this single law.... Not only all our intellectual pleasures and pains but all
the phenomena of memory, imagination, volition, reasoning and every other
mental affection and operation, are but different modes or cases of the
association of ideas."[497]
An eminent French psychologist, M. Ribot, repeats Hume's comparison of the law of
association with that of gravitation, and goes on to say:
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"It is remarkable that this discovery was made so late. Nothing is simpler,
apparently, than to notice that this law of association is the truly fundamental,
irreducible phenomenon of our mental life; that it is at the bottom of all our
acts; that it permits of no exception; that neither dream, revery, mystic ecstasy,
nor the most abstract reasoning can exist without it; that its suppression would
be equivalent to that of thought itself. Nevertheless no ancient author
understood it, for one cannot seriously maintain that a few scattered lines in
Aristotle and the Stoics constitute a theory and clear view of the subject. It is to
Hobbes, Hume, and Hartley that we must attribute the origin of these studies on
the connection of our ideas. The discovery of the ultimate law of our
psychologic acts has this, then, in common with many other discoveries: it
came late and seems so simple that it may justly astonish us.
"Perhaps it is not superﬂuous to ask in what this manner of explanation is
superior to the current theory of Faculties.[498] The most extended usage
consists, as we know, in dividing intellectual phenomena into classes, in
separating those which differ, in grouping together those of the same nature and
in giving to these a common name and in attributing them to the same cause; it
is thus that we have come to distinguish those diverse aspects of intelligence
which are called judgment, reasoning, abstraction, perception, etc. This method
is precisely the one followed in Physics, where the words caloric, electricity,
gravity, designate the unknown causes of certain groups of phenomena. If one
thus never forgets that the diverse faculties are only the unknown causes of
known phenomena, that they are simply a convenient means of classifying the
facts and speaking of them, if one does not fall into the common fault of
making out of them substantial entities, creations which now agree, now
disagree, so forming in the intelligence a little republic; then, we can see
nothing reprehensible in this distribution into faculties, conformable as it is to
the rules of a sound method and of a good natural classiﬁcation. In what then is
Mr. Bain's procedure superior to the method of the faculties? It is that the latter
is simply a classiﬁcation while his is an explanation. Between the psychology
which traces intellectual facts back to certain faculties, and that which reduces
them to the single law of association, there is, according to our way of thinking,
the same difference that we ﬁnd in Physics between those who attribute its
phenomena to ﬁve or six causes, and those who derive gravity caloric, light,
etc., from motion. The system of the faculties explains nothing because each
one of them is only a ﬂatus vocis which is of value merely through the
phenomena which it contains, and signiﬁes nothing more than these
phenomena. The new theory, on the contrary, shows that the different processes
of intelligence are only diverse cases of a single law; that imagination,
deduction, induction, perception, etc., are but so many determinate ways in
which ideas may combine with each other; and that the differences of faculties
are only differences of association. It explains all intellectual facts, certainly not
after the manner of Metaphysics which demands the ultimate and absolute
reason of things; but after the manner of Physics which seeks only their
secondary and immediate cause."[499]

[Pg 598]

The inexperienced reader may be glad of a brief indication of the manner in which all the
different mental operations may be conceived to consist of images of sensation associated
together.
Memory is the association of a present image with others known to belong to the past.
Expectation the same, with future substituted for past. Fancy, the association of images
without temporal order.
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Belief in anything not present to sense is the very lively, strong, and steadfast association of [Pg 599]
the image of that thing with some present sensation, so that as long as the sensation persists
the image cannot be excluded from the mind.
Judgment is 'transferring the idea of truth by association from one proposition to another
that resembles it.'[500]
Reasoning is the perception that "whatever has any mark has that which it is a mark of"; in
the concrete case the mark or middle term being always associated with each of the other
terms and so serving as a link by which they are themselves indirectly associated together.
This same kind of transfer of a sensible experience associated with another to a third also
associated with that other, serves to explain emotional facts. When we are pleased or hurt
we express it, and the expression associates itself with the feeling. Hearing the same
expression from another revives the associated feeling, and we sympathize, i.e. grieve or are
glad with him.
The other social affections, Benevolence, Conscientiousness, Ambition, etc., arise in like
manner by the transfer of the bodily pleasure experienced as a reward for social service, and
hence associated with it, to the act of service itself, the link of reward being dropped out.
Just so Avarice when the miser transfers the bodily pleasures associated with the spending of
money to the money itself, dropping the link of spending.
Fear is a transfer of the bodily hurt associated by experience with the thing feared, to the
thought of the thing, with the precise features of the hurt left out. Thus we fear a dog
without distinctly imagining his bite.
Love is the association of the agreeableness of certain sensible experiences with the idea of
the object capable of affording them. The experiences themselves may cease to be distinctly
imagined after the notion of their pleasure has been transferred to the object, constituting
our love therefor.
Volition is the association of ideas of muscular motion with the ideas of those pleasures
which the motion produces. The motion at ﬁrst occurs automatically and results in a [Pg 600]
pleasure unforeseen. The latter becomes so associated with the motion that whenever we
think of it the idea of the motion arises; and the idea of the motion when vivid causes the
motion to occur. This is an act of will.
Nothing is easier than for a philosopher of this school to explain from experience such a
notion as that of inﬁnitude.
"He sees in it an ordinary manifestation of one of the laws of the association of
ideas,—the law that the idea of a thing irresistibly suggests the idea of any other
thing which has been often experienced in close conjunction with it, and not
otherwise. As we have never had experience of any point of space without other
points beyond it, nor of any point of time without others following it, the law of
indissoluble association makes it impossible for us to think of any point of
space or time, however distant, without having the idea irresistibly realized, in
imagination, of other points still more remote. And thus the supposed original
and inherent property of these two ideas is completely explained and accounted
for by the law of association; and we are enabled to see that if Space or Time
were really susceptible of termination, we should be just as unable as we now
are to conceive the idea."[501]
These examples of the Associationist Psychology are with the exception of the last, very
crudely expressed, but they sufﬁce for our temporary need. Hartley and James Mill[502]
improved upon Hume so far as to employ but a single principle of association, that of
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contiguity or habit. Hartley ignores resemblance, James Mill expressly repudiates it in a
passage which is assuredly one of the curiosities of literature:
"I believe it will be found that we are accustomed to see like things together.
When we see a tree, we generally see more trees than one; a sheep, more sheep
than one; a man, more men than one. From this observation, I think, we may
refer resemblance to the law of frequency [i.e., contiguity], of which it seems to
form only a particular case."
Mr. Herbert Spencer has still more recently tried to construct a Psychology which ignores
Association by Similarity,[503] and in a chapter, which also is a curiosity, he tries to explain [Pg 601]
the association of two ideas by a conscious reference of the ﬁrst to the point of time when its
sensation was experienced, which point of time is no sooner thought of than its content,
namely, the second idea, arises. Messrs. Bain and Mill, however, and the immense majority
of contemporary psychologists retain both Resemblance and Contiguity as irreducible
principles of Association.
Professor Bain's exposition of association is by common consent looked upon as the best
expression of the English school. Perception of agreement and difference, retentiveness, and
the two sorts of association, contiguity and similarity, are by him regarded as constituting all
that is meant by intellect proper. His pages are painstaking and instructive from a descriptive
point of view; though, after my own attempt to deal with the subject causally, I can hardly
award to them any profound explanatory value. Association by Similarity, too much
neglected by the British school before Bain, receives from him the most generous
exempliﬁcation. As an instructive passage, the following, out of many equally good, may be
chosen to quote:
"We may have similarity in form with diversity of use, and similarity of use
with diversity of form. A rope suggests other ropes and cords, if we look to the
appearance; but looking to the use, it may suggest an iron cable, a wooden prop,
an iron girding, a leather band, or bevelled gear. In spite of diversity of
appearance, the suggestion turns on what answers a common end. If we are
very much attracted by sensible appearances, there will be the more difﬁculty in
recalling things that agree only in the use; if, on the other hand, we are
profoundly sensitive to the one point of practical efﬁciency as a tool, the
peculiarities not essential to this will be little noticed, and we shall be ever
ready to revive past objects corresponding in use to some one present, although
diverse in all other circumstances. We become oblivious to the difference
between a horse, a steam-engine, and a waterfall, when our minds are engrossed
with the one circumstance of moving power. The diversity in these had no
doubt for a long time the effect of keeping back their ﬁrst identiﬁcation; and to
obtuse intellects, this identiﬁcation might have been for ever impossible. A
strong concentration of mind upon the single peculiarity of mechanical force,
and a degree of indifference to the general aspect of the things themselves, must
conspire with the intellectual energy of resuscitation by similars, in order to
summon together in the view three structures so different. We can see, by an
instance like this, how new adaptations of existing machinery might arise in the
mind of a mechanical inventor. When it ﬁrst occurred to a reﬂecting mind that
moving water had a property identical with human or brute force, namely, the
property of setting other masses in motion, overcoming inertia and resistance,—
when the sight of the stream suggested through this point of likeness the power
of the animal,—a new addition was made to the class of prime movers, and
when circumstances permitted, this power could become a substitute for the
others. It may seem to the modern understanding, familiar with water-wheels
and drifting rafts, that the similarity here was an extremely obvious one. But if
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we put ourselves back into an early state of mind, when running water affected
the mind by its brilliancy, its roar, and irregular devastation, we may easily
suppose that to identify this with animal muscular energy was by no means an
obvious effect. Doubtless when a mind arose, insensible by natural constitution
to the superﬁcial aspects of things, and having withal a great stretch of
identifying intellect, such a comparison would then be possible. We may pursue
the same example one stage further, and come to the discovery of steam power,
or the identiﬁcation of expanding vapor with the previously known sources of
mechanical force. To the common eye, for ages, vapor presented itself as clouds
in the sky; or as a hissing noise at the spout of a kettle, with the formation of a
foggy curling cloud at a few inches' distance. The forcing up of the lid of a
kettle may also have been occasionally observed. But how long was it ere any
one was struck with the parallelism of this appearance with a blast of wind, a
rush of water, or an exertion of animal muscle? The discordance was too great
to be broken through by such a faint and limited amount of likeness. In one
mind, however, the identiﬁcation did take place, and was followed out into its
consequences. The likeness had occurred to other minds previously, but not
with the same results. Such minds must have been in some way or other
distinguished above the millions of mankind; and we are now endeavoring to
give the explanation of their superiority. The intellectual character of Watt
contained all the elements preparatory to a great stroke of similarity in such a
case;—a high susceptibility, both by nature and by education, to the mechanical
properties of bodies; ample previous knowledge or familiarity; and indifference
to the superﬁcial and sensational effects of things. It is not only possible,
however, but exceedingly probable, that many men possessed all these
accomplishments; they are of a kind not transcending common abilities. They
would in some degree attach to a mechanical education almost as a matter of
course. That the discovery was not sooner made supposes that something
farther, and not of common occurrence, was necessary; and this additional
endowment appears to be the identifying power of Similarity in general; the
tendency to detect likeness in the midst of disparity and disguise. This
supposition accounts for the fact, and is consistent with the known intellectual
character of the inventor of the steam-engine."[504]

[Pg 603]

Dr. Hodgson's account of association is by all odds the best yet propounded in English.[505]
All these writers hold more or less explicitly to the notion of atomistic 'ideas' which recur. In
Germany, the same mythological supposition has been more radically grasped, and carried
out to a still more logical, if more repulsive, extreme, by Herbart[506] and his followers, who
until recently may be said to have reigned almost supreme in their native country.[507] For
Herbart each idea is a permanently existing entity, the entrance whereof into consciousness
is but an accidental determination of its being. So far as it succeeds in occupying the theatre
of consciousness, it crowds out another idea previously there. This act of inhibition gives it,
however, a sort of hold on the other representation which on all later occasions facilitates its
following the other into the mind. The ingenuity with which most special cases of
association are formulated in this mechanical language of struggle and inhibition, is great,
and surpasses in analytic thoroughness anything that has been done by the British school.
This, however, is a doubtful merit, in a case where the elements dealt with are artiﬁcial; and
I must confess that to my mind there is something almost hideous in the glib Herbartian
jargon about Vorstellungsmassen and their Hemmungen and Hemmungssummen, and sinken
and erheben and schweben, and Verschmelzungen and Complexionen. Herr Lipps, the most
recent systematic German Psychologist, has, I regret to say, carried out the theory of ideas in
a way which the great originality, learning, and acuteness he shows make only the more [Pg 604]
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regrettable.[508] Such elaborately artiﬁcial constructions are, it seems to me, only a burden
and a hindrance, not a help, to our science.[509]
In French, M. Rabier in his chapter on Association,[510] handles the subject more vigorously
and acutely than any one. His treatment of it, though short, seems to me for general
soundness to rank second only to Hodgson's.
In the last chapter we already invoked association to account for the effects of use in
improving discrimination. In later chapters we shall see abundant proof of the immense part
which it plays in other processes, and shall then readily admit that few principles of
analysis, in any science, have proved more fertile than this one, however vaguely formulated
it often may have been. Our own attempt to formulate it more deﬁnitely, and to escape the
usual confusion between causal agencies and relations merely known, must not blind us to
the immense services of those by whom the confusion was unfelt. From this practical point
of view it would be a true ignoratio elenchi to ﬂatter one's self that one has dealt a heavy
blow at the psychology of association, when one has exploded the theory of atomistic ideas,
or shown that contiguity and similarity between ideas can only be there after association is
done.[511] The whole body of the associationist psychology remains standing after you have
translated 'ideas' into 'objects,' on the one hand, and 'brain-processes' on the other; and the
analysis of faculties and operations is as conclusive in these terms as in those traditionally
used.

[463]

The theory propounded in this chapter, and a good many pages of the text, were
originally published in the Popular Science Monthly for March, 1880.

[464]

Compare Renouvier's criticism of associationism in his Essais de Critique
générale, Logique, ii, p. 493 foll.

[465]

Unless the name belong to a rapidly uttered sentence, when no substantive image
may have time to arise.

[466]

In his observations he says that time was lost in mentally taking in the word
which was the cue, "owing to the quiet unobtrusive way in which I found it
necessary to bring it into view, so as not to distract the thoughts. Moreover, a
substantive standing by itself is usually the equivalent of too abstract an idea for
us to conceive properly without delay. Thus it is very difﬁcult to get a quick
conception of the word 'carriage,' because there are so many different kinds—
two-wheeled, four-wheeled, open and closed, and in so many different possible
positions, that the mind possibly hesitates amidst an obscure sense of many
alternations that cannot blend together. But limit the idea to say a landau, and the
mental association declares itself more quickly." (Inquiries, etc., p. 190.)

[467]

Physiol. Psych., ii, 280 fol.

[468]

For interesting remarks on the sorts of things associated, in these experiments,
with the prompting word, see Galton, op. cit. pp. 185-203, and Trautscholdt in
Wundt's Psychologische Studien, i, 213.

[469]

Mind, xi, 64-5.

[470]

This value is much smaller than that got by Wundt as above. No reason for the
difference is suggested by Mr. Cattell. Wundt calls attention to the fact that the
ﬁgures found by him give an average, 0.720'', exactly equal to the time interval
which in his experiments (vide infra, chapter on Time) was reproduced without
error either way, and to that required, according to the Webers, for the legs to
swing in rapid locomotion. "It is not improbable," he adds, "that this psychic
constant, of the mean association-time and of the most correct appreciation of a
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time-interval, may have been developed under the inﬂuence of the most usual
bodily movements, which also have determined the manner in which we tend to
subdivide rhythmically longer periods of time." (Physiol. Psych., ii, 286). The
rapprochement is of that tentative sort which it is no harm for psychologists to
make, provided they recollect how very ﬁctitious and incomparable mutually all
these averages derived from different observers, working under different
conditions, are. Mr. Cattell's ﬁgure throws Wundt's ingenious parallel entirely out
of line.—The only measurements of association-time which so far seem likely to
have much theoretic importance are a few made on insane patients by Von
Tschisch (Mendel's Neurologisches Centralblatt, 15 Mai, 1885, 3 Jhrg., p. 217).
The simple reaction time was found about normal in three patients, one with
progressive paralysis, one with inveterate mania of persecution, one recovering
from ordinary mania. In the convalescent maniac and the paralytic, however, the
association-time was hardly half as much as Wundt's normal ﬁgure (0.28'' and
0.23'' instead of 0.7'—smaller also than Cattell's), whilst in the sufferer from
delusions of persecution and hallucinations it was twice as great as normal (1.39''
instead of 0.7''). This latter patient's time was sixfold that of the paralytic. Herr
von Tschisch remarks on the connection of the short times with diminished power
for clear and consistent processes of thought, and on that of the long times with
the persistent ﬁxation of the attention upon monotonous objects (delusions). Miss
Marie Walitzky (Revue Philosophique, xxviii, 583) has carried Von Tschisch's
observations still farther, making 18,000 measurements in all. She found
association-time increased in paralytic dementia and diminished inmania. Choice
time, on the contrary, is increased in mania.
[471]

Mind, xii, 67-74.

[472]

Compare Bain's law of Association by Contiguity: "Actions, Sensations, and
States of Feeling, occurring together or in close succession, tend to grow together,
or cohere, in such a way that, when any one of them is afterwards presented to the
mind, the others are apt to be brought up in idea" (Senses and Intellect, p. 327).
Compare also Hartley's formulation: "Any sensations A, B, C, etc., by being
associated with one another a sufﬁcient Number of Times, get such a power over
the corresponding Ideas a, b, c, etc., that anyone of the sensations A, when
impressed alone, shall be able to excite in the Mind b, c, etc., the ideas of the
rest." (Observations on Man, part i, chap. i, § 2, Prop. x.) The statement in the text
differs from these in holding fast to the objective point of view. It is things, and
objective properties in things, which are associated in our thought.

[473]

Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th Ed., article Psychology, p. 60. col. 2.

[474]

Physiol. Psych., 2d ed. ii, 300.

[475]

The difﬁculty here as with habit überhaupt is in seeing how new paths come ﬁrst
to be formed (cf. above, p. 109). Experience shows that a new path is formed
between centres for sensible impressions whenever these vibrate together or in
rapid succession. A child sees a certain bottle and hears it called 'milk,' and
thenceforward thinks the name when he again sees the bottle. But why the
successive or simultaneous excitement of two centres independently stimulated
from without, one by sight and the other by hearing, should result in a path
between them, one does not immediately see. We can only make hypotheses. Any
hypothesis of the speciﬁc mode of their formation which tallies well with the
observed facts of association will be in so far forth credible, in spite of possible
obscurity. Herr Münsterberg thinks (Beiträge zur exp. Psychologie, Heft i, p. 132)
that between centres excited successively from without no path ought to be
formed, and that consequently all contiguous association is between simultaneous
experiences. Mr. Ward (loc. cit.) thinks, on the contrary, that it can only be
between successive experiences: "The association of objects simultaneously
presented can be resolved into an association of objects successively attended
to.... It seems hardly possible to mention a case in which attention to the
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associated objects could not have been successive. In fact, an aggregate of objects
on which attention could be focussed at once would be already associated."
Between these extreme possibilities, I have refrained from deciding in the text,
and have described contiguous association as holding between both successively
and coexistently presented objects. The physiological question as to how we may
conceive the paths to originate had better be postponed till it comes to us again in
the chapter on the Will, where we can treat it in a broader way. It is enough here
to have called attention to it as a serious problem.
[476]

Essay, bk. ii, chap. xxxiii, § 6. Compare Hume, who, like Locke, only uses the
principle to account for unreasonable and obstructive mental associations:
"'Twould have been easy to have made an imaginary dissection of the brain, and
have shown why, upon our conception of any idea, the animal spirits run into all
the contiguous traces, and rouse up the other ideas that are related to it. But
though I have neglected any advantage which I might have drawn from this topic
in explaining the relations of ideas, I am afraid I must here have recourse to it, in
order to account for the mistakes that arise from these relations. I shall therefore
observe, that as the mind is endowed with a power of exciting any idea it pleases;
whenever it dispatches the spirits into that region of the brain in which the idea is
placed, these spirits always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the
proper traces, and rummage that cell which belongs to the idea. But as their
motion is seldom direct, and naturally turns a little to the one side or the other: for
this reason the animal spirits, falling into the contiguous traces, present other
related ideas in lieu of that which the mind desired at ﬁrst to survey. This change
we are not always sensible of; but continuing still the same train of thought, make
use of the related idea which is presented to us, and employ it in our reasoning, as
if it were the same with what we demanded. This is the cause of many mistakes
and sophisms in philosophy; as will naturally be imagined, and as it would be
easy to show, if there was occasion."

[477]

Op. cit. prop. xi.

[478]

See Chapter III, pp. 82-5.

[479]

I strongly advise the student to read his Senses and Intellect, pp. 544-556.

[480]

Time and Space, p. 266. Compare Coleridge: "The true practical general law of
association is this: that whatever makes certain parts of a total impression more
vivid or distinct than the rest will determine the mind to recall these, in preference
to others equally linked together by the common condition of contemporaeity or
of contiguity. But the will itself, by conﬁning and intensifying the attention, may
arbitrarily give vividness or distinctness to any object whatsoever." (Biographia
Litteraria, Chap. v.)

[481]

Leviathan, pt. i, chap. iii, init.

[482]

I refer to a recency of a few hours. Mr. Galton found that experiences from
boyhood and youth were more likely to be suggested by words seen at random
than experiences of later years. See his highly interesting account of experiments
in his Inquiries into Human Faculty, pp. 191-203.

[483]

For other instances see Wahle, in Vierteljsch. f. Wiss. Phil., ix, 144-417 (1885).

[484]

I retain the title of association by similarity in order not to depart from common
usage. The reader will observe, however, that my nomenclature is not based on
the same principle throughout. Impartial redintegration connotes neural processes;
similarity is an objective relation perceived by the mind; ordinary or mixed
association is a merely denotative word. Total recall, partial recall, and focalized
recall, of associates, would be better terms. But as the denotation of the latter
word is almost identical with that of association by similarity, I think it better to
sacriﬁce propriety to popularity, and to keep the latter well-worn phrase.
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[485]

No one has described this process better than Hobbes: "Sometimes a man seeks
what he hath lost; and from that place and time wherein he misses it, his mind
runs back from place to place and time to time to and where and when he had it;
that is to say, to ﬁnd some certain and limited time and place, in which to begin a
method of seeking. Again, from thence his thoughts run over the same places and
times to ﬁnd what action or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call
Remembrance, or calling to mind. Sometimes a man knows a place determinate,
within the compass whereof he is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the
parts thereof, in the same manner as one would sweep a room to ﬁnd a jewel, or
as a spaniel ranges the ﬁeld till he ﬁnd a scent, or as a man should run over the
alphabet to start a rhyme." (Leviathan, 165, p. 10.)

[486]

Theory of Practice, vol. i, p. 394.

[487]

Ibid. p. 394.

[488]

All association is called redintegration by Hodgson.

[489]

Ibid. p. 400. Compare Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 377. "The outgoings of the
mind are necessarily random; the end alone is the thing that is clear to the view,
and with that there is a perception of the ﬁtness of every passing suggestion. The
volitional energy keeps up the attention on the active search; and the moment that
anything in point rises before the mind, it springs upon that like a wild beast upon
its prey."

[490]

Compare what is said of the principle of Similarity by F. H. Bradley, Principles of
Logic, pp. 294 ff.; E. Rabier, Psychologie, 187 ff.; Paulhan, Critique
Philosophique, 2me Série, i, 458; Rabier, ibid. 460; Pillon, ibid. ii, 55; B. P.
Bowne, Introduction to Psych. Theory, 92; Ward, Encyclop. Britt. art. Psychology,
p. 60; Wahle, Vierteljahrsch. f. wiss. Philos., ix, 426-431.

[491]

Dr. McCosh is accordingly only logical when he sinks similarity in what he calls
the Law of Correlation, according to which, when we have discovered a relation
between things, the idea of one tends to bring up the others, (Psychology, the
Cognitive Powers, p. 130). The relations mentioned by this author are Identity,
Whole and Parts, Resemblance, Space, Time, Quantity, Active Property, and
Cause and Effect. If perceived relations among objects are to be treated as
grounds for their appearance before the mind, similarity has of course no right to
an exclusive, or even to a predominant, place.

[492]

Cf. Bain, Senses and Intellect, 504 ff.; J. S. Mill, Note 39 to J. Mill's Analysis;
Lipps, Grundtatsachen, 97.

[493]

See, for farther details, Hamilton's Reid, Appendices D** and D***; and L. Ferri,
La Psychologie de l'Association (Paris, 1883). Also Robertson, art. Association in
Encyclop. Britannica.

[494]

Treatise of Human nature, part i,. § iv.

[495]

Observations on Man (London, 1749).

[496]

Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829).

[497]

Hartley's Theory, 2d ed. (1790) p. xxvii.

[498]

[Current, that is, in France.—W. J.]

[499]

La Psychologie Angloise, p. 242.

[500]

Priestley, op. cit. p. xxx.

[501]

Review of Bains's Psychology, by J.S. Mill, in Edinb. Review, Oct. 1, 1859, p.
293.

[502]

Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, J.S. Mill's edition, vol. i, p. 111.
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[503]

On the Associability of Relations between Feelings, in Principles of Psychology,
vol. i, p. 259. It is impossible to regard the "cohering of each feeling with
previously-experienced feelings of the same class, order, genus, species, and, so
far as may be, the same variety," which Spencer calls (p. 257) 'the sole process of
association of feelings,' as any equivalent for what is commonly known as
Association by similarity.

[504]

The Senses and the Intellect, pp. 491-3.

[505]

See his Time and Space, chapter v, and his Theory of Practice, §§ 53 to 57.

[506]

Psychologie als Wissenschaft (1824), 2.

[507]

Prof. Ribot, in chapter i of his 'Contemporary German Psychology,' has given a
good account of Herbart and his school, and of Beneke, his rival and partial
analogue. See also two articles on the Herbartian Psychology, by G. F. Stout, in
Mind for 1888. J. D. Morrell's Outlines of Mental Philosophy (2d ed., London,
1862) largely follows Herbart and Beneke. I know of no other English book
which does so.

[508]

See his Grundtatsachen des Bewusstseins (1883), chap. vi et passim, especially
pp. 106 ff., 364.

[509]

The most burdensome and utterly gratuitous of them are perhaps Steinthal's, in his
Einleitung in die Psychologie, 2te Auﬂ. (1881). Cf. also G. Glogau: Steinthal's
Psychologische Formeln (1886).

[510]

Leçons de Philosophie, i. Psychologie, chap. xvi (1884).

[511]

Mr. F. H. Bradley seems to me to have been guilty of something very like this
ignoratio elenchi in the, of course, subtle and witty but decidedly long-winded
critique of the association of ideas, contained in book ii, part ii, chap. i, of his
Principles of Logic.

CHAPTER XV.[512]

[Pg 605]

THE PERCEPTION OF TIME.
In the next two chapters I shall deal with what is sometimes called internal perception, or
the perception of time, and of events as occupying a date therein, especially when the date is
a past one, in which case the perception in question goes by the name of memory. To
remember a thing as past, it is necessary that the notion of 'past' should be one of our 'ideas.'
We shall see in the chapter on Memory that many things come to be thought by us as past,
not because of any intrinsic quality of their own, but rather because they are associated with
other things which for us signify pastness. But how do these things get their pastness? What
is the original of our experience of pastness, from whence we get the meaning of the term?
It is this question which the reader is invited to consider in the present chapter. We shall see
that we have a constant feeling sui generis of pastness, to which every one of our
experiences in turn falls a prey. To think a thing as past is to think it amongst the objects or
in the direction of the objects which at the present moment appear affected by this quality.
This is the original of our notion of past time, upon which memory and history build their
systems. And in this chapter we shall consider this immediate sense of time alone.
If the constitution of consciousness were that of a string of bead-like sensations and images,
all separate,
"we never could have any knowledge except that of the present instant. The
moment each of our sensations ceased it would be gone for ever; and we should
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be as if we had never been.... We should be wholly incapable of acquiring
experience.... Even if our ideas were associated in trains, but only as they are in
imagination, we should still be without the capacity of acquiring knowledge.
One idea, upon this supposition, would follow another. But that would be all.
Each of our successive states of consciousness, the moment it ceased, would be
gone forever. Each of those momentary states would be our whole being."[513]

[Pg 606]

We might, nevertheless, under these circumstances, act in a rational way, provided the
mechanism which produced our trains of images produced them in a rational order. We
should make appropriate speeches, though unaware of any word except the one just on our
lips; we should decide upon the right policy without ever a glimpse of the total grounds of
our choice. Our consciousness would be like a glow-worm spark, illuminating the point it
immediately covered, but leaving all beyond in total darkness. Whether a very highly
developed practical life be possible under such conditions as these is more than doubtful; it
is, however, conceivable.
I make the fanciful hypothesis merely to set off our real nature by the contrast. Our feelings
are not thus contracted, and our consciousness never shrinks to the dimensions of a glowworm spark. The knowledge of some other part of the stream, past or future, near or remote,
is always mixed in with our knowledge of the present thing.
A simple sensation, as we shall hereafter see, is an abstraction, and all our concrete states of
mind are representations of objects with some amount of complexity. Part of the complexity
is the echo of the objects just past, and, in a less degree, perhaps, the foretaste of those just
to arrive. Objects fade out of consciousness slowly. If the present thought is of ABCDEFG,
the next one will be of BCDEFGH, and the one after that of CDEFGHI—the lingerings of
the past dropping successively away, and the incomings of the future making up the loss.
These lingerings of old objects, these incomings of new, are the germs of memory and
expectation, the retrospective and the prospective sense of time. They give that continuity to [Pg 607]
consciousness without which it could not be called a stream.[514]
[Pg 608]

THE SENSIBLE PRESENT HAS DURATION.
Let any one try, I will not say to arrest, but to notice or attend to, the present moment of
time. One of the most bafﬂing experiences occurs. Where is it, this present? It has melted in
our grasp, ﬂed ere we could touch it, gone in the instant of becoming. As a poet, quoted by
Mr. Hodgson, says,
"Le moment où je parle est déjà loin de moi,"
and it is only as entering into the living and moving organization of a much wider tract of
time that the strict present is apprehended at all. It is, in fact, an altogether ideal abstraction,
not only never realized in sense, but probably never even conceived of by those
unaccustomed to philosophic meditation. Reﬂection leads us to the conclusion that it must [Pg 609]
exist, but that it does exist can never be a fact of our immediate experience. The only fact of
our immediate experience is what Mr. E. R. Clay has well called 'the specious present.' His
words deserve to be quoted in full:[515]
"The relation of experience to time has not been profoundly studied. Its objects
are given as being of the present, but the part of time referred to by the datum is
a very different thing from the conterminous of the past and future which
philosophy denotes by the name Present. The present to which the datum refers
is really a part of the past—a recent past—delusively given as being a time that
intervenes between the past and the future. Let it be named the specious
present, and let the past, that is given as being the past, be known as the obvious
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past. All the notes of a bar of a song seem to the listener to be contained in the
present. All the changes of place of a meteor seem to the beholder to be
contained in the present. At the instant of the termination of such series, no part
of the time measured by them seems to be a past. Time, then, considered
relatively to human apprehension, consists of four parts, viz., the obvious past,
the specious present, the real present, and the future. Omitting the specious
present, it consists of three ... nonentities—the past, which does not exist, the
future, which does not exist, and their conterminous, the present; the faculty
from which it proceeds lies to us in the ﬁction of the specious present."
In short, the practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain
breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into
time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow and a
stern, as it were—a rearward- and a forward-looking end.[516] It is only as parts of this [Pg 610]
duration-block that the relation of succession of one end to the other is perceived. We do not
ﬁrst feel one end and then feel the other after it, and from the perception of the succession
infer an interval of time between, but we seem to feel the interval of time as a whole, with
its two ends embedded in it. The experience is from the outset a synthetic datum, not a
simple one; and to sensible perception its elements are inseparable, although attention
looking back may easily decompose the experience, and distinguish its beginning from its
end.
When we come to study the perception of Space, we shall ﬁnd it quite analogous to time in
this regard. Date in time corresponds to position in space; and although we now mentally
construct large spaces by mentally imagining remoter and remoter positions, just as we now
construct great durations by mentally prolonging a series of successive dates, yet the
original experience of both space and time is always of something already given as a unit,
inside of which attention afterward discriminates parts in relation to each other. Without the
parts already given as in a time and in a space, subsequent discrimination of them could
hardly do more than perceive them as different from each other; it would have no motive for
calling the difference temporal order in this instance and spatial position in that.
And just as in certain experiences we may be conscious of an extensive space full of objects,
without locating each of them distinctly therein; so, when many impressions follow in
excessively rapid succession in time, although we may be distinctly aware that they occupy
some duration, and are not simultaneous, we may be quite at a loss to tell which comes ﬁrst
and which last; or we may even invert their real order in our judgment. In complicated
reaction-time experiments, where signals and motions, and clicks of the apparatus come in
exceedingly rapid order, one is at ﬁrst much perplexed in deciding what the order is, yet of
the fact of its occupancy of time we are never in doubt.
[Pg 611]

ACCURACY OF OUR ESTIMATE OF SHORT DURATIONS.
We must now proceed to an account of the facts of time-perception in detail as preliminary
to our speculative conclusion. Many of the facts are matters of patient experimentation,
others of common experience.
First of all, we note a marked difference between the elementary sensations of duration and
those of space. The former have a much narrower range; the time-sense may be called a
myopic organ, in comparison with the eye, for example. The eye sees rods, acres, even
miles, at a single glance, and these totals it can afterward subdivide into an almost inﬁnite
number of distinctly identiﬁed parts. The units of duration, on the other hand, which the
time-sense is able to take in at a single stroke, are groups of a few seconds, and within these
units very few subdivisions—perhaps forty at most, as we shall presently see—can be
clearly discerned. The durations we have practically most to deal with—minutes, hours, and
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days—have to be symbolically conceived, and constructed by mental addition, after the
fashion of those extents of hundreds of miles and upward, which in the ﬁeld of space are
beyond the range of most men's practical interests altogether. To 'realize' a quarter of a mile
we need only look out of the window and feel its length by an act which, though it may in
part result from organized associations, yet seems immediately performed. To realize an
hour, we must count 'now!—now!—now!—now!—' indeﬁnitely. Each 'now' is the feeling of
a separate bit of time, and the exact sum of the bits never makes a very clear impression on
our mind.
How many bits can we clearly apprehend at once? Very few if they are long bits, more if
they are extremely short, most if they come to us in compound groups, each including
smaller bits of its own.
Hearing is the sense by which the subdivision of durations is most sharply made. Almost all
the experimental work on the time-sense has been done by means of strokes of sound. How
long a series of sounds, then, can we group in the mind so as not to confound it with a
longer or a shorter series?
Our spontaneous tendency is to break up any monotonously given series of sounds into [Pg 612]
some sort of a rhythm. We involuntarily accentuate every second, or third, or fourth beat, or
we break the series in still more intricate ways. Whenever we thus grasp the impressions in
rhythmic form, we can identify a longer string of them without confusion.
Each variety of verse, for example, has its 'law'; and the recurrent stresses and sinkings
make us feel with peculiar readiness the lack of a syllable or the presence of one too much.
Divers verses may again be bound together in the form of a stanza, and we may then say of
another stanza, "Its second verse differs by so much from that of the ﬁrst stanza," when but
for the felt stanza-form the two differing verses would have come to us too separately to be
compared at all. But these superposed systems of rhythm soon reach their limit. In music, as
Wundt[517] says, "while the measure may easily contain 12 changes of intensity of sound (as
in 12/8 time), the rhythmical group may embrace 6 measures, and the period consist of 4,
exceptionally of 5 [8?] groups."
Wundt and his pupil Dietze have both tried to determine experimentally the maximal extent
of our immediate distinct consciousness for successive impressions.
Wundt found[518] that twelve impressions could be distinguished clearly as a united cluster,
provided they were caught in a certain rhythm by the mind, and succeeded each other at
intervals not smaller than 0.3 and not larger than 0.5 of a second. This makes the total time
distinctly apprehended to be equal to from 3.6 to 6 seconds.
Dietze[519] gives larger ﬁgures. The most favorable intervals for clearly catching the strokes
were when they came at from 0.3 second to 0.18 second apart. Forty strokes might then be
remembered as a whole, and identiﬁed without error when repeated, provided the mind
grasped them in ﬁve sub-groups of eight, or in eight sub-groups of ﬁve strokes each. When
no grouping of the strokes beyond making couples of them by the attention was allowed— [Pg 613]
and practically it was found impossible not to group them in at least this simplest of all ways
—16 was the largest number that could be clearly apprehended as a whole.[520] This would
make 40 times 0.8 second, or 12 seconds, to be the maximum ﬁlled duration of which we
can be both distinctly and immediately aware.
The maximum unﬁlled, or vacant duration, seems to lie within the same objective range.
Estel and Mehner, also working in Wundt's laboratory, found it to vary from 5 or 6 to 12
seconds, and perhaps more. The differences seemed due to practice rather than to
idiosyncrasy.[521]
These ﬁgures may be roughly taken to stand for the most important part of what, with Mr.
Clay, we called, a few pages back, the specious present. The specious present has, in
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addition, a vaguely vanishing backward and forward fringe; but its nucleus is probably the
dozen seconds or less that have just elapsed.
If these are the maximum, what, then, is the minimum amount of duration which we can
distinctly feel?
The smallest ﬁgure experimentally ascertained was by Exner, who distinctly heard the
doubleness of two successive clicks of a Savart's wheel, and of two successive snaps of an [Pg 614]
electric spark, when their interval was made as small as about 1/500 of a second.[522]
With the eye, perception is less delicate. Two sparks, made to fall beside each other in rapid
succession on the centre of the retina, ceased to be recognized as successive by Exner when
their interval fell below 0.044''.[523]
Where, as here, the succeeding impressions are only two in number, we can easiest perceive
the interval between them. President Hall, who experimented with a modiﬁed Savart's
wheel, which gave clicks in varying number and at varying intervals, says:[524]
"In order that their discontinuity may be clearly perceived, four or even three
clicks or beats must be farther apart than two need to be. When two are easily
distinguished, three or four separated by the same interval ... are often
conﬁdently pronounced to be two or three respectively. It would be well if
observations were so directed as to ascertain, at least up to ten or twenty, the
increase [of interval] required by each additional click in a series for the sense
of discontinuity to remain constant throughout."[525]
Where the ﬁrst impression falls on one sense, and the second on another, the perception of [Pg 615]
the intervening time tends to be less certain and delicate, and it makes a difference which
impression comes ﬁrst. Thus, Exner found[526] the smallest perceptible interval to be, in
seconds:
From sight to touch
From touch to sight
From sight to hearing
From hearing to sight
From one ear to another

0.071
0.053
0.16
0.06
0.064

To be conscious of a time interval at all is one thing; to tell whether it be shorter or longer
than another interval is a different thing. A number of experimental data are on hand which
give us a measure of the delicacy of this latter perception. The problem is that of the
smallest difference between two times which we can perceive.
The difference is at its minimum when the times themselves are very short. Exner,[527]
reacting as rapidly as possible with his foot, upon a signal seen by the eye (spark), noted all
the reactions which seemed to him either slow or fast in the making. He thought thus that
deviations of about 1/100 of a second either way from the average were correctly noticed by [Pg 616]
him at the time. The average was here 0.1840''. Hall and Jastrow listened to the intervals
between the clicks of their apparatus. Between two such equal intervals of 4.27'' each, a
middle interval was included, which might be made either shorter or longer than the
extremes. "After the series had been heard two or even three times, no impression of the
relative length of the middle interval would often exist, and only after hearing the fourth and
last [repetition of the series] would the judgment incline to the plus or minus side. Inserting
the variable between two invariable and like intervals greatly facilitated judgment, which
between two unlike terms is far less accurate."[528] Three observers in these experiments
made no error when the middle interval varied 1/60 from the extremes. When it varied
1/120, errors occurred, but were few. This would make the minimum absolute difference
perceived as large as 0.355''.
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This minimum absolute difference, of course, increases as the times compared grow long.
Attempts have been made to ascertain what ratio it bears to the times themselves. According
to Fechner's 'Psychophysic Law' it ought always to bear the same ratio. Various observers,
however, have found this not to be the case.[529] On the contrary, very interesting
oscillations in the accuracy of judgment and in the direction of the error—oscillations
dependent upon the absolute amount of the times compared—have been noticed by all who
have experimented with the question. Of these a brief account may be given.
In the ﬁrst place, in every list of intervals experimented with there will be found what
Vierordt calls an 'INDIFFERENCE-POINT;' that is to say, an interval which we judge with
maximum accuracy, a time which we tend to estimate as neither longer or shorter than it
really is, and away from which, in both directions, errors increase their size.[530] This time [Pg 617]
varies from one observer to another, but its average is remarkably constant, as the following
table shows.[531]
The times, noted by the ear, and the average indifference-points (given in seconds) were, for
—
Wundt[532]
Kollert[533]
Estel (probably)
Mehner
Stevens[534]
Mach[535]
Buccola (about)[536]

0.72
0.75
0.75
0.71
0.71
0.35
0.40

The odd thing about these ﬁgures is the recurrence they show in so many men of about three
fourths of a second, as the interval of time most easy to catch and reproduce, Odder still, [Pg 618]
both Estel and Mehner found that multiples of this time were more accurately reproduced
than the time-intervals of intermediary length;[537] and Glass found a certain periodicity,
with the constant increment of 1.25 sec., in his observations. There would seem thus to exist
something like a periodic or rhythmic sharpening of our time-sense, of which the period
differs somewhat from one observer to the next.
Our sense of time, like other senses, seems subject to the law of contrast. It appeared pretty
plainly in Estel's observations that an interval sounded shorter if a long one had immediately
preceded it, and longer when the opposite was the case.
Like other senses, too, our sense of time is sharpened by practice. Mehner ascribes almost
all the discrepancies between other observers and himself to this cause alone.[538]
Tracts of time ﬁlled (with clicks of sound) seem longer than vacant ones of the same
duration, when the latter does not exceed a second or two.[539] This, which reminds one of
what happens with spaces seen by the eye, becomes reversed when longer times are taken. It
is, perhaps, in accordance with this law that a loud sound, limiting a short interval of time,
makes it appear longer, a slight sound shorter. In comparing intervals marked out by sounds,
we must take care to keep the sounds uniform.[540]

There is a certain emotional feeling accompanying the intervals of time, as is well known in
music. The sense of haste goes with one measure of rapidity, that of delay with another; and
these two feelings harmonize with different mental moods. Vierordt listened to series of
strokes performed by a metronome at rates varying from 40 to 200 a minute, and found that [Pg 619]
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

368/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

they very naturally fell into seven categories, from 'very slow' to 'very fast.'[541] Each
category of feeling included the intervals following each other within a certain range of
speed, and no others. This is a qualitative, not a quantitative judgment—an æsthetic
judgment, in fact. The middle category, of speed that was neutral, or, as he calls it,
'adequate,' contained intervals that were grouped about 0.62 second, and Vierordt says that
this made what one might almost call an agreeable time.[542]
The feeling of time and accent in music, of rhythm, is quite independent of that of melody.
Tunes with marked rhythm can be readily recognized when simply drummed on the table
with the ﬁnger-tips.
WE HAVE NO SENSE FOR EMPTY TIME.
Although subdividing the time by beats of sensation aids our accurate knowledge of the
amount of it that elapses, such subdivision does not seem at the ﬁrst glance essential to our
perception of its ﬂow. Let one sit with closed eyes and, abstracting entirely from the outer
world, attend exclusively to the passage of time, like one who wakes, as the poet says, "to
hear time ﬂowing in the middle of the night, and all things moving to a day of doom." There
seems under such circumstances as these no variety in the material content of our thought,
and what we notice appears, if anything, to be the pure series of durations budding, as it
were, and growing beneath our indrawn gaze. Is this really so or not? The question is
important, for, if the experience be what it roughly seems, we have a sort of special sense
for pure time—a sense to which empty duration is an adequate stimulus; while if it be an
illusion, it must be that our perception of time's ﬂight, in the experiences quoted, is due to
the ﬁlling of the time, and to our memory of a content which it had a moment previous, and
which we feel to agree or disagree with its content now.
It takes but a small exertion of introspection to show that the latter alternative is the true [Pg 620]
one, and that we can no more intuit a duration than we can intuit an extension, devoid of all
sensible content. Just as with closed eyes we perceive a dark visual ﬁeld in which a curdling
play of obscurest luminosity is always going on; so, be we never so abstracted from distinct
outward impressions, we are always inwardly immersed in what Wundt has somewhere
called the twilight of our general consciousness. Our heart-beats, our breathing, the pulses of
our attention, fragments of words or sentences that pass through our imagination, are what
people this dim habitat. Now, all these processes are rhythmical, and are apprehended by us,
as they occur, in their totality; the breathing and pulses of attention, as coherent successions,
each with its rise and fall; the heart-beats similarly, only relatively far more brief; the words
not separately, but in connected groups. In short, empty our minds as we may, some form of
changing process remains for us to feel, and cannot be expelled. And along with the sense
of the process and its rhythm goes the sense of the length of time it lasts. Awareness of
change is thus the condition on which our perception of time's ﬂow depends; but there exists
no reason to suppose that empty time's own changes are sufﬁcient for the awareness of
change to be aroused. The change must be of some concrete sort—an outward or inward
sensible series, or a process of attention or volition.[543]
And here again we have an analogy with space. The earliest form of distinct space- [Pg 621]
perception is undoubtedly that of a movement over some one of our sensitive surfaces, and
this movement is originally given as a simple whole of feeling, and is only decomposed into
its elements—successive positions successively occupied by the moving body—when our
education in discrimination is much advanced. But a movement is a change, a process; so [Pg 622]
we see that in the time-world and the space-world alike the ﬁrst known things are not
elements, but combinations, not separate units, but wholes already formed. The condition of
being of the wholes may be the elements; but the condition of our knowing the elements is
our having already felt the wholes as wholes.
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In the experience of watching empty time ﬂow—'empty' to be taken hereafter in the relative
sense just set forth—we tell it off in pulses. We say 'now! now! now!' or we count 'more!
more! more!' as we feel it bud. This composition out of units of duration is called the law of
time's discrete ﬂow. The discreteness is, however, merely due to the fact that our successive
acts of recognition or apperception of what it is are discrete. The sensation is as continuous
as any sensation can be. All continuous sensations are named in beats. We notice that a
certain ﬁnite 'more' of them is passing or already past. To adopt Hodgson's image, the
sensation is the measuring-tape, the perception the dividing-engine which stamps its length.
As we listen to a steady sound, we take it in in discrete pulses of recognition, calling it
successively 'the same! the same! the same!' The case stands no otherwise with time.
After a small number of beats our impression of the amount we have told off becomes quite
vague. Our only way of knowing it accurately is by counting, or noticing the clock, or
through some other symbolic conception.[544] When the times exceed hours or days, the
conception is absolutely symbolic. We think of the amount we mean either solely as a name,
or by running over a few salient dates therein, with no pretence of imagining the full
durations that lie between them. No one has anything like a perception of the greater length
of the time between now and the ﬁrst century than of that between now and the tenth. To an
historian, it is true, the longer interval will suggest a host of additional dates and events, and [Pg 623]
so appear a more multitudinous thing. And for the same reason most people will think they
directly perceive the length of the past fortnight to exceed that of the past week. But there is
properly no comparative time intuition in these cases at all. It is but dates and events.
representing time; their abundance symbolizing its length. I am sure that this is so, even
where the times compared are no more than an hour or so in length. It is the same with
Spaces of many miles, which we always compare with each other by the numbers which
measure them.[545]
From this we pass naturally to speak of certain familial variations in our estimation of [Pg 624]
lengths of time. In general, a time ﬁlled with varied and interesting experiences seems short
in passing, but long as we look back. On the other hand, a tract of time empty of experiences
seems long in passing, but in retrospect short. A week of travel and sight-seeing may
subtend an angle more like three weeks in the memory; and a month of sickness hardly
yields more memories than a day. The length in retrospect depends obviously on the
multitudinousness of the memories which the time affords. Many objects, events, changes,
many subdivisions, immediately widen the view as we look back. Emptiness, monotony,
familiarity, make it shrivel up. In Von Holtei's 'Vagabonds' one Anton is described as
revisiting his native village.
"Seven years," he exclaims, "seven years since I ran away! More like seventy it
seems, so much has happened. I cannot think of it all without becoming dizzy—
at any rate not now. And yet again, when I look at the village, at the churchtower, it seems as if I could hardly have been seven days away."
Prof. Lazarus[546] (from whom I borrow this quotation), thus explains both of these
contrasted illusions by our principle of the awakened memories being multitudinous or few:
"The circle of experiences, widely extended, rich in variety, which he had in
view on the day of his leaving the village rises now in his mind as its image lies
before him. And with it—in rapid succession and violent motion, not in
chronologic order, or from chronologic motives, but suggesting each other by
all sorts of connections—arise massive images of all his rich vagabondage and
roving life. They roll and wave confusedly together, ﬁrst perhaps one from the
ﬁrst year, then from the sixth, soon from the second, again from the ﬁfth, the
ﬁrst, etc., until it seems as if seventy years must have been there, and he reels
with the fulness of his vision.... Then the inner eye turns away from all this
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past. The outer one turns to the village, especially to the church-tower. The
sight of it calls back the old sight of it, so that the consciousness is ﬁlled with
that alone, or almost alone. The one vision compares itself with the other, and
looks so near, so unchanged, that it seems as if only a week of time could have
come between."
The same space of time seems shorter as we grow older—that is, the days, the months, and
the years do so; whether the hours do so is doubtful, and the minutes and seconds to all
appearance remain about the same.
"Whoever counts many lustra in his memory need only question himself to ﬁnd
that the last of these, the past ﬁve years, have sped much more quickly than the
preceding periods of equal amount. Let any one remember his last eight or ten
school years: it is the space of a century. Compare with them the last eight or
ten years of life: it is the space of an hour."
So writes Prof. Paul Janet,[547] and gives a solution which can hardly be said to diminish the
mystery. There is a law, he says, by which the apparent length of an interval at a given
epoch of a man's life is proportional to the total length of the life itself. A child of 10 feels a
year as 1/10 of his whole life—a man of 50 as 1/50, the whole life meanwhile apparently
preserving a constant length. This formula roughly expresses the phenomena, it is true, but
cannot possibly be an elementary psychic law; and it is certain that, in great part at least, the
foreshortening of the years as we grow older is due to the monotony of memory's content,
and the consequent simpliﬁcation of the backward-glancing view. In youth we may have an
absolutely new experience, subjective or objective, every hour of the day. Apprehension is
vivid, retentiveness strong, and our recollections of that time, like those of a time spent in
rapid and interesting travel, are of something intricate, multitudinous, and long-drawn-out.
But as each passing year converts some of this experience into automatic routine which we
hardly note at all, the days and the weeks smooth themselves out in recollection to
contentless units, and the years grow hollow and collapse.
So much for the apparent shortening of tracts of time in retrospect. They shorten in passing [Pg 626]
whenever we are so fully occupied with their content as not to note the actual time itself. A
day full of excitement, with no pause, is said to pass 'ere we know it.' On the contrary, a day
full of waiting, of unsatisﬁed desire for change, will seem a small eternity. Tædium, ennui,
Langweile, boredom, are words for which, probably, every language known to man has its
equivalent. It comes about whenever, from the relative emptiness of content of a tract of
time, we grow attentive to the passage of the time itself. Expecting, and being ready for, a
new impression to succeed; when it fails to come, we get an empty time instead of it; and
such experiences, ceaselessly renewed, make us most formidably aware of the extent of the
mere time itself.[548] Close your eyes and simply wait to hear somebody tell you that a
minute has elapsed. The full length of your leisure with it seems incredible. You engulf
yourself into its bowels as into those of that interminable ﬁrst week of an ocean voyage, and
ﬁnd yourself wondering that history can have overcome many such periods in its course. All
because you attend so closely to the mere feeling of the time per se, and because your
attention to that is susceptible of such ﬁne-grained successive subdivision. The odiousness
of the whole experience comes from its insipidity; for stimulation is the indispensable
requisite for pleasure in an experience, and the feeling of bare time is the least stimulating
experience we can have.[549] The sensation of tæedium is a protest, says Volkmann, against
the entire present.
Exactly parallel variations occur in our consciousness of space. A road we walk back over, [Pg 627]
hoping to ﬁnd at each step an object we have dropped, seems to us longer than when we
walked over it the other way. A space we measure by pacing appears longer than one we
traverse with no thought of its length. And in general an amount of space attended to in
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itself leaves with us more impression of spaciousness than one of which we only note the
content.[550]
I do not say that everything in these ﬂuctuations of estimate can be accounted for by the
time's content being crowded and interesting, or simple and tame. Both in the shortening of
time by old age and in its lengthening by ennui some deeper cause may be at work. This
cause can only be ascertained, if it exist, by ﬁnding out why we perceive time at all. To this
inquiry let us, though without much hope, proceed.
THE FEELING OF PAST TIME IS A PRESENT FEELING.
If asked why we perceive the light of the sun, or the sound of an explosion, we reply,
"Because certain outer forces, ether-waves or air-waves, smite upon the brain, awakening
therein changes, to which the conscious perceptions, light and sound, respond." But we
hasten to add that neither light nor sound copy or mirror the ether- or air-waves; they
represent them only symbolically. The only case, says Helmholtz, in which such copying
occurs, and in which
"our perceptions can truly correspond with outer reality, is that of the tunesuccession of phenomena. Simultaneity, succession, and the regular return of
simultaneity or succession, can obtain as well in sensations as in outer events.
Events, like our perceptions of them, take place in time, so that the timerelations of the latter can furnish a true copy of those of the former. The
sensation of the thunder follows the sensation of the lightning just as the
sonorous convulsing of the air by the electric discharge reaches the observer's
place later than that of the luminiferous ether."[551]

[Pg 628]

One experiences an almost instinctive impulse, in pursuing such reﬂections as these, to
follow them to a sort of crude speculative conclusion, and to think that he has at last got the
mystery of cognition where, to use a vulgar phrase, 'the wool is short.' What more natural,
we say, than that the sequences and durations of things should become known? The
succession of the outer forces stamps itself as a like succession upon the brain. The brain's
successive changes are copied exactly by correspondingly successive pulses of the mental
stream. The mental stream, feeling itself, must feel the time-relations of its own states. But
as these are copies of the outward time-relations, so must it know them too. That is to say,
these latter time-relations arouse their own cognition; or, in other words, the mere existence
of time in those changes out of the mind which affect the mind is a sufﬁcient cause why
time is perceived by the mind.
This philosophy is unfortunately too crude. Even though we were to conceive the outer
successions as forces stamping their image on the brain, and the brain's successions as
forces stamping their image on the mind,[552] still, between the mind's own changes being
successive, and knowing their own succession, lies as broad a chasm as between the object
and subject of any case of cognition in the world. A succession of feelings, in and of itself, is
not a feeling of succession. And since, to our successive feelings, a feeling of their own
succession is added, that must be treated as an additional fact requiring its own special [Pg 629]
elucidation, which this talk about outer time-relations stamping copies of themselves within,
leaves all untouched.
I have shown, at the outset of the article, that what is past, to be known as past, must be
known with what is present, and during the 'present' spot of time. As the clear understanding
of this point has some importance, let me, at the risk of repetition, recur to it again.
Volkmann has expressed the matter admirably, as follows:
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"One might be tempted to answer the question of the origin of the time-idea by
simply pointing to the train of ideas, whose various members, starting from the
ﬁrst, successively attain to full clearness. But against this it must be objected
that the successive ideas are not yet the idea of succession, because succession
in thought is not the thought of succession. If idea A follows idea B,
consciousness simply exchanges one for another. That B comes after A is for
our consciousness a non-existent fact; for this after is given neither in B nor in
A; and no third idea has been supposed. The thinking of the sequence of B upon
A is another kind of thinking from that which brought forth A and then brought
forth B; and this ﬁrst kind of thinking is absent so long as merely the thinking
of A and the thinking of B are there. In short, when we look at the matter
sharply, we come to this antithesis, that if A and B are to be represented as
occurring in succession they must be simultaneously represented; if we are to
think of them as one after the other, we must think them both at once."[553]
If we represent the actual time-stream of our thinking by an horizontal line, the thought of
the stream or of any segment of its length, past, present, or to come, might be ﬁgured in a
perpendicular raised upon the horizontal at a certain point. The length of this perpendicular
stands for a certain object or content, which in this case is the time thought of, and all of
which is thought of together at the actual moment of the stream upon which the
perpendicular is raised. Mr. James Ward puts the matter very well in his masterly article
'Psychology' in the ninth edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, page 64. He says:
"We may, if we represent succession as a line, represent simultaneity as a
second line at right angles to the ﬁrst; empty time—or time-length without
time-breadth, we may say—is a mere abstraction. Now, it is with the former
line that we have to do in treating of time as it is, and with the latter in treating
of our intuition of time, where, just as in a perspective representation of
distance, we are conﬁned to lines in a plane at right angles to the actual line of
depth. In a succession of events, say of sense-impressions, A B C D E..., the
presence of B means the absence of A and C, but the presentation of this
succession involves the simultaneous presence in some mode or other of two or
more of the presentations A B C D. In reality, past, present, and future are
differences in time, but in presentation all that corresponds to these differences
is in consciousness simultaneously."

[Pg 630]

There is thus a sort of perspective projection of past objects upon present consciousness,
similar to that of wide landscapes upon a camera-screen.
And since we saw a while ago that our maximum distinct intuition of duration hardly covers
more than a dozen seconds (while our maximum vague intuition is probably not more than
that of a minute or so), we must suppose that this amount of duration is pictured fairly
steadily in each passing instant of consciousness by virtue of some fairly constant feature in
the brain-process to which the consciousness is tied. This feature of the brain-process,
whatever it be, must be the cause of our perceiving the fact of time at all.[554] The duration
thus steadily perceived is hardly more than the 'specious present,' as it was called a few
pages back. Its content is in a constant ﬂux, events dawning into its forward end as fast as
they fade out of its rearward one, and each of them changing its time-coefﬁcient from 'not
yet,' or 'not quite yet,' to 'just gone' or 'gone,' as it passes by. Meanwhile, the specious
present, the intuited duration, stands permanent, like the rainbow on the waterfall, with its
own quality unchanged by the events that stream through it. Each of these, as it slips out,
retains the power of being reproduced; and when reproduced, is reproduced with the
duration and neighbors which it originally had. Please observe, however, that the
reproduction of an event, after it has once completely dropped out of the rearward end of the
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specious present, is an entirely different psychic fact from its direct perception in the
specious present as a thing immediately past. A creature might be entirely devoid of
reproductive memory, and yet have the time-sense; but the latter would be limited, in his [Pg 631]
case, to the few seconds immediately passing by. Time older than that he would never recall.
I assume reproduction in the text, because I am speaking of human beings who notoriously
possess it. Thus memory gets strewn with dated things—dated in the sense of being before
or after each other.[555] The date of a thing is a mere relation of before or after the present
thing or some past or future thing. Some things we date simply by mentally tossing them
into the past or future direction. So in space we think of England as simply to the eastward,
of Charleston as lying south. But, again, we may date an event exactly, by ﬁtting it between
two terms of a past or future series explicitly conceived, just as we may accurately think of
England or Charleston being just so many miles away.[556]
The things and events thus vaguely or exactly dated become thenceforward those signs and
symbols of longer time-spaces, of which we previously spoke. According as we think of a
multitude of them, or of few, so we imagine the time they represent to be long or short. But
the original paragon and prototype of all conceived times is the specious present, the short
duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible.
TO WHAT CEREBRAL PROCESS IS THE SENSE OF TIME DUE?

[Pg 632]

Now, to what element in the brain-process may this sensibility be due? It cannot, as we have
seen, be due to the mere duration itself of the process; it must be due to an element present
at every moment of the process, and this element must bear the same inscrutable sort of
relation to its correlative feeling which all other elements of neural activity bear to their
psychic products, be the latter what they may. Several suggestions have been made as to
what the element is in the case of time. Treating of them in a note,[557] I will try to express
brieﬂy the only conclusion which seems to emerge from a study of them and of the facts— [Pg 633]
unripe though that conclusion be.
The phenomena of 'summation of stimuli' in the nervous system prove that each stimulus [Pg 634]
leaves some latent activity behind it which only gradually passes away. (See above, pp. 82- [Pg 635]
85.) Psychological proof of the same fact is afforded by those 'after-images' which we
perceive when a sensorial stimulus is gone. We may read off peculiarities in an after-image,
left by an object on the eye, which we failed to note in the original. We may 'hark back' and
take in the meaning of a sound several seconds after it has ceased. Delay for a minute,
however, and the echo itself of the clock or the question is mute; present sensations have
banished it beyond recall. With the feeling of the present thing there must at all times mingle
the fading echo of all those other things which the previous few seconds have supplied. Or,
to state it in neural terms, there is at every moment a cumulation of brain-processes
overlapping each other, of which the fainter ones are the dying phases of processes which
but shortly previous were active in a maximal degree. The AMOUNT OF THE OVERLAPPING
determines the feeling of the DURATION OCCUPIED. WHAT EVENTS shall appear to occupy the
duration depends on just WHAT PROCESSES the overlapping processes are. We know so little of
the intimate nature of the brain's activity that even where a sensation monotonously endures,
we cannot say that the earlier moments of it do not leave fading processes behind which [Pg 636]
coexist with those of the present moment. Duration and events together form our intuition
of the specious present with its content.[558] Why such an intuition should result from such a
combination of brain-processes I do not pretend to say. All I aim at is to state the most
elemental form of the psycho-physical conjunction.
I have assumed that the brain-processes are sensational ones. Processes of active attention
(see Mr. Ward's account in Footnote 556) will leave similar fading brain-processes behind.
If the mental processes are conceptual, a complication is introduced of which I will in a
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moment speak. Meanwhile, still speaking of sensational processes, a remark of Wundt's will
throw additional light on the account I give. As is known, Wundt and others have proved
that every act of perception of a sensorial stimulus takes an appreciable time. When two
different stimuli—e.g. a sight and a sound—are given at once or nearly at once, we have
difﬁculty in attending to both, and may wrongly judge their interval, or even invert their
order. Now, as the result of his experiments on such stimuli. Wundt lays down this law:[559]
that of the three possible determinations we may make of their order—
"namely, simultaneity, continuous transition, and discontinuous transition—
only the ﬁrst and last are realized, never the second. Invariably, when we fail to
perceive the impressions as simultaneous, we notice a shorter or longer empty
time between them, which seems to correspond to the sinking of one of the
ideas and to the rise of the other.... For our attention may share itself equally
between the two impressions, which will then compose one total percept [and
be simultaneously felt]; or it may be so adapted to one event as to cause it to be
perceived immediately, and then the second event can be perceived only after a
certain time of latency, during which the attention reaches its effective
maximum for it and diminishes for the ﬁrst event. In this case the events are
perceived as two, and in successive order—that is, as separated by a timeinterval in which attention is not sufﬁciently accommodated to either to bring a
distinct perception about.... While we are hurrying from one to the other,
everything between them vanishes in the twilight of general consciousness."

[Pg 637]

[560]

One might call this the law of discontinuous succession in time, of percepts to which we
cannot easily attend at once. Each percept then requires a separate brain-process; and when
one brain-process is at its maximum, the other would appear perforce to be in either a
waning or a waxing phase. If our theory of the time-feeling be true, empty time must then
subjectively appear to separate the two percepts, no matter how close together they may
objectively be; for, according to that theory, the feeling of a time-duration is the immediate
effect of such an overlapping of brain-processes of different phase—wherever and from [Pg 638]
whatever cause it may occur.
To pass, now, to conceptual processes: Suppose I think of the Creation, then of the Christian
era, then of the battle of Waterloo, all within a few seconds. These matters have their dates
far outside the specious present. The processes by which I think them, however, all overlap.
What events, then, does the specious present seem to contain? Simply my successive acts of
thinking these long-past things, not the long-past things themselves. As the instantly-present
thought may be of a long-past thing, so the just-past thought may be of another long-past
thing. When a long-past event is reproduced in memory and conceived with its date, the
reproduction and conceiving traverse the specious present. The immediate content of the
latter is thus all my direct experiences, whether subjective or objective. Some of these
meanwhile may be representative of other experiences indeﬁnitely remote.
The number of these direct experiences which the specious present and immediately-intuited
past may embrace measures the extent of our 'primary,' as Exner calls it, or, as Richet calls
it, of our 'elementary' memory.[561] The sensation resultant from the overlapping is that of
the duration which the experiences seem to ﬁll. As is the number of any larger set of events
to that of these experiences, so we suppose is the length of that duration to this duration. But
of the longer duration we have no direct 'realizing sense.' The variations in our appreciation
of the same amount of real time may possibly be explained by alterations in the rate of
fading in the images, producing changes in the complication of superposed processes, to
which changes changed states of consciousness may correspond. But however long we may
conceive a space of time to be, the objective amount of it which is directly perceived at any
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one moment by us can never exceed the scope of our 'primary memory' at the moment in
question.[562]
We have every reason to think that creatures may possibly differ enormously in the amounts [Pg 639]
of duration which they intuitively feel, and in the ﬁneness of the events that may ﬁll it. Von
Bær has indulged[563] in some interesting computations of the effect of such differences in
changing the aspect of Nature. Suppose we were able, within the length of a second, to note
10,000 events distinctly, instead of barely 10, as now; if our life were then destined to hold
the same number of impressions, it might be 1000 times as short. We should live less than a
month, and personally know nothing of the change of seasons. If born in winter, we should
believe in summer as we now believe in the heats of the Carboniferous era. The motions of
organic beings would be so slow to our senses as to be inferred, not seen. The sun would
stand still in the sky, the moon be almost free from change, and so on. But now reverse the
hypothesis and suppose a being to get only one 1000th part of the sensations that we get in a
given time, and consequently to live 1000 times as long. Winters and summers will be to
him like quarters of an hour. Mushrooms and the swifter-growing plants will shoot into
being so rapidly as to appear instantaneous creations; annual shrubs will rise and fall from
the earth like restlessly boiling-water springs; the motions of animals will be as invisible as
are to us the movements of bullets and cannon-balls; the sun will scour through the sky like
a meteor, leaving a ﬁery trail behind him, etc. That such imaginary cases (barring the
superhuman longevity) may be realized somewhere in the animal kingdom, it would be rash
to deny.
"A gnat's wings," says Mr Spencer,[564] "make ten or ﬁfteen thousand strokes a
second. Each stroke implies a separate nervous action. Each such nervous
action or change in a nervous centre is probably as appreciable by the gnat as is
a quick movement of his arm by a man. And if this, or anything like this, is the
fact, then the time occupied by a given external change, measured by many
movements in the one case, must seem much longer than in the other case,
when measured by one movement."
In hashish-intoxication there is a curious increase in the apparent time-perspective. We utter
a sentence, and ere the end is reached the beginning seems already to date from indeﬁnitely [Pg 640]
long ago. We enter a short street, and it is as if we should never get to the end of it. This
alteration might conceivably result from an approach to the condition of Von Bær's and
Spencer's short-lived beings. If our discrimination of successions became ﬁner-grained, so
that we noted ten stages in a process where previously we only noted one; and if at the same
time the processes faded ten times as fast as before; we might have a specious present of the
same subjective length as now, giving us the same time-feeling and containing as many
distinguishable successive events, but out from the earlier end of it would have dropped nine
tenths of the real events it now contains. They would have fallen into the general reservoir
of merely dated memories, reproducible at will. The beginning of our sentences would have
to be expressly recalled; each word would appear to pass through consciousness at a tenth of
its usual speed. The condition would, in short, be exactly analogous to the enlargement of
space by a microscope; fewer real things at once in the immediate ﬁeld of view, but each of
them taking up more than its normal room, and making the excluded ones seem unnaturally
far away.
Under other conditions, processes seem to fade rapidly without the compensating increase in
the subdivisibility of successions. Here the apparent length of the specious present contracts.
Consciousness dwindles to a point, and loses all intuitive sense of the whence and whither
of its path. Express acts of memory replace rapid bird's-eye views. In my own case,
something like this occurs in extreme fatigue. Long illnesses produce it. Occasionally, it
appears to accompany aphasia.[565] It would be vain to seek to imagine the exact brain- [Pg 641]
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change in any of these cases But we must admit the possibility that to some extent the
variations of time-estimate between youth and age, and excitement and ennui, are due to
such causes, more immediate than to the one we assigned some time ago.
But whether our feeling of the time which immediately-past[566] events have ﬁlled be of
something long or of something short, it is not what it is because those events are past, but
because they have left behind them processes which are present. To those processes,
however caused, the mind would still respond by feeling a specious present, with one part of
it just vanishing or vanished into the past. As the Creator is supposed to have made Adam
with a navel—sign of a birth which never occurred—so He might instantaneously make a
man with a brain in which were processes just like the 'fading' ones of an ordinary brain.
The ﬁrst real stimulus after creation would set up a process additional to these. The
processes would overlap; and the new-created man would unquestionably have the feeling,
at the very primal instant of his life, of having been in existence already some little space of
time.
Let me sum up, now, by saying that we are constantly conscious of a certain duration—the [Pg 642]
specious present—varying in length from a few seconds to probably not more than a minute,
and that this duration (with its content perceived as having one part earlier and the other part
later) is the original intuition of time. Longer times are conceived by adding, shorter ones by
dividing, portions of this vaguely bounded unit, and are habitually thought by us
symbolically. Kant's notion of an intuition of objective time as an inﬁnite necessary
continuum has nothing to support it. The cause of the intuition which we really have cannot
be the duration of our brain-processes or our mental changes. That duration is rather the
object of the intuition which, being realized at every moment of such duration, must be due
to a permanently present cause. This cause—probably the simultaneous presence of brainprocesses of different phase—ﬂuctuates; and hence a certain range of variation in the
amount of the intuition, and in its subdivisibility, accrues.

[512]

This chapter is reprinted almost verbatim from the Journal of Speculative
Philosophy, vol. xx, p. 374.

[513]

James Mill, Analysis, vol. x, p. 319 (J. S. Mill's edition).

[514]

"What I ﬁnd, when I look at consciousness at all, is, that what I cannot divest
myself of, or not have in consciousness, if I have consciousness at all, is a
sequence of different feelings.... The simultaneous perception of both subfeelings, whether as parts of a coexistence or of a sequence, is the total feeling—
the minimum of consciousness—and this minimum has duration.... Timeduration, however, is inseparable from the minimum, notwithstanding that, in an
isolated moment, we could not tell which part of it came ﬁrst, which last.... We do
not require to know that the sub-feelings come in sequence, ﬁrst one, then the
other; nor to know what coming in sequence means. But we have, in any
artiﬁcially isolated minimum of consciousness, the rudiments of the perception of
former and latter in time, in the sub-feeling that grows fainter, and the sub-feeling
that grows stronger, and the change between them....
"In the next place, I remark that the rudiments of memory are involved in the
minimum of consciousness. The ﬁrst beginnings of it appear in that minimum,
just as the ﬁrst beginnings of perception do. As each member of the change or
difference which goes to compose that minimum is the rudiment of a single
perception, so the priority of one member to the other, although both are given to
consciousness in one empirical present moment, is the rudiment of memory. The
fact that the minimum of consciousness is difference or change in feelings, is the
ultimate explanation of memory as well as of single perceptions. A former and a
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latter are included in the minimum of consciousness; and this is what is meant by
saying that all consciousness is in the form of time, or that time is the form of
feeling, the form of sensibility. Crudely and popularly we divide the course of
time into past, present, and future; but, strictly speaking, there is no present; it is
composed of past and future divided by an indivisible point or instant. That
instant, or time-point, is the strict present. What we call, loosely, the present, is an
empirical portion of the course of time, containing at least a minimum of
consciousness, in which the instant of change is the present time-point.... If we
take this as the present time-point, it is clear that the minimum of feeling contains
two portions—a sub-feeling that goes and a sub-feeling that comes. One is
remembered, the other imagined. The limits of both are indeﬁnite at beginning
and end of the minimum, and ready to melt into other minima, proceeding from
other stimuli.
"Time and consciousness do not come to us ready marked out into minima; we
have to do that by reﬂection, asking ourselves, What is the least empirical
moment of consciousness? That least empirical moment is what we usually call
the present moment; and even this is too minute for ordinary use; the present
moment is often extended practically to a few seconds, or even minutes, beyond
which we specify what length of time we mean, as the present hour, or day, or
year, or century.
"But this popular way of thinking imposes itself on great numbers even of
philosophically-minded people, and they talk about the present as if it was a
datum—as if time came to us marked into present periods like a measuring-tape."
(S. H. Hodgson: Philosophy of Reﬂection, vol. i, pp. 248-254.)
"The representation of time agrees with that of space in that a certain amount of it
must be presented together—included between its initial and terminal limit. A
continuous ideation, ﬂowing from one point to another, would indeed occupy
time, but not represent it, for it would exchange one element of succession for
another instead of grasping the whole succession at once. Both points—the
beginning and the end—are equally essential to the conception of time, and must
be present with equal clearness together." (Herbart: Psychol. als W., § 115.)
"Assume that ... similar pendulum-strokes follow each other at regular intervals in
a consciousness otherwise void. When the ﬁrst one is over, an image of it remains
in the fancy until the second succeeds. This, then, reproduces the ﬁrst by virtue of
the law of association by similarity, but at the same time meets with the aforesaid
persisting image.... Thus does the simple repetition of the sound provide all the
elements of time-perception. The ﬁrst sound [as it is recalled by association] gives
the beginning, the second the end, and the persistent image in the fancy represents
the length of the interval. At the moment of the second impression, the entire
time-perception exists at once, for then all its elements are presented together, the
second sound and the image in the fancy immediately, and the ﬁrst impression by
reproduction. But, in the same act, we are aware of a state in which only the ﬁrst
sound existed, and of another in which only its image existed in the fancy. Such a
consciousness as this is that of time.... In it no succession of ideas takes place."
(Wundt: Physiol. Psych., 1st ed. pp. 681-2.) Note here the assumption that the
persistence and the reproduction of an impression are two processes which may
go on simultaneously. Also that Wundt's description is merely an attempt to
analyze the 'deliverance' of a time-perception, and no explanation of the manner
in which it comes about.
[515]

The Alternative, p. 167.

[516]

Locke, in his dim way, derived the sense of duration from reﬂection on the
succession of our ideas (Essay, book ii, chap. xiv, § 3; chap. xv, § 12). Reid justly
remarks that if ten successive elements are to make duration, "then one must
make duration, otherwise duration must be made up of parts that have no
duration, which is impossible.... I conclude, therefore, that there must be duration
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in every single interval or element of which the whole duration is made up.
Nothing, indeed, is more certain than that every elementary part of extension must
have extension. Now, it must be observed that in these elements of duration, or
single intervals of successive ideas, there is no succession of ideas, yet we must
conceive them to have duration; whence we may conclude with certainty that
there is a conception of duration where there is no succession of ideas in the
mind." (Intellectual Powers, essay iii, chap. v.) "Qu'on ne cherche point," says
Royer-Collard in the Fragments added to Jouffroy's Translation of Reid, "la durée
dans la succession; on ne l'y trouvera jamais; la durée a précédé la succession; la
notion de la durée a précédé la notion de la succession. Elle en est donc tout-à-fait
indépendante, dira-t-on? Oui, elle en est tout-à-fait indépendante."
[517]

Physiol. Psych., ii, 54, 55.

[518]

Ibid. ii, 213.

[519]

Philosophische Studien, ii, 362.

[520]

Counting was of course not permitted. It would have given a symbolic concept
and no intuitive or immediate perception of the totality of the series. With
counting we may of course compare together series of any length—series whose
beginnings have faded from our mind, and of whose totality we retain no sensible
impression at all. To count a series of clicks is an altogether different thing from
merely perceiving them as discontinuous. In the latter case we need only be
conscious of the bits of empty duration between them; in the former we must
perform rapid acts of association between them and as many names of numbers.

[521]

Estel in Wundt's Philosophische Studien, ii, 50. Mehner, ibid. ii, 571. In Dietze's
experiments even numbers of strokes were better caught than odd ones, by the ear.
The rapidity of their sequence had a great inﬂuence on the result. At more than 4
seconds apart it was impossible to perceive series of them as units in all (cf.
Wundt, Physiol. Psych., ii, 214). They were simply counted as so many individual
strokes. Below 0.21 to 0.11 second, according to the observer, judgment again
became confused. It was found that the rate of succession most favorable for
grasping long series was when the strokes were sounded at intervals of from 0.3''
to 0.18' apart. Series of 4, 6, 8, 16 were more easily identiﬁed than series of 10,
12, 14, 18. The latter could hardly be clearly grasped at all. Among odd numbers
3, 5, 7 were the series easiest caught; next, 9, 15; hardest of all, 11 and 13; and 17
was impossible to apprehend.

[522]

The exact interval of the sparks was 0.00205''. The doubleness of their snap was
usually replaced by a single-seeming sound when it fell to 0.00198'', the sound
becoming louder when the sparks seemed simultaneous. The difference between
these two intervals is only 7/100000 of a second; and, as Exner remarks, our ear
and brain must be wonderfully efﬁcient organs to get distinct feelings from so
slight an objective difference as this. See Pﬂüger's Archiv, Bd. xi.

[523]

Ibid. p. 407. When the sparks fell so close together that their irradiation-circles
overlapped, they appeared like one spark moving from the position of the ﬁrst to
that of the second; and they might then follow each other as close as 0.015''
without the direction of the movement ceasing to be clear. When one spark fell on
the centre, the other on the margin, of the retina, the time-interval for successive
apprehension had to be raised to 0.076''.

[524]

Hall and Jastrow: Studies of Rhythm. Mind, xi, 58.

[525]

Nevertheless, multitudinous impressions may be felt as discontinuous, though
separated by excessively minute intervals of time. Grünhagen says (Pﬂüger's
Archiv, vi, 175) that 10,000 electric shocks a second are felt as interrupted, by the
tongue (!). Von Wittich (ibid. ii, 329), that between 1000 and 2000 strokes a
second are felt as discrete by the ﬁnger. W. Preyer, on the other hand (Die
Grenzen des Empﬁndungsvermögens, etc., 1868, p. 15), makes contacts appear
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continuous to the ﬁnger when 36.8 of them follow in a second. Similarly, Mach
(Wiener Sitzgsb., li, 2, 142) gives about 26. Lalanne (Comptes Rendus, i/xxxii, p.
1314) found summation of ﬁnger contacts after 22 repetitions in a second. Such
discrepant ﬁgures are of doubtful worth. On the retina 20 to 30 impressions a
second at the very utmost can be felt as discrete when they fail on the same spot.
The ear, which begins to fuse stimuli together into a musical tone when they
follow at the rate of a little over 30 a second, can still feel 132 of them a second as
discontinuous when they take the shape of 'beats' (Helmholtz, Tonempﬁndungen,
3d ed. p. 270).
[526]

Pﬂüger's Archiv, xi, 428. Also in Herrmann's Hdbh. d. Physiol., 2 Bd. i, Thl. pp.
260-2.

[527]

Pﬂüger's Archiv, vii, 639. Tigerstedt (Bihang till Kongl. Svenska Vetenskaps
Akad, Handl., Bd. 8, Häfte 2, Stockholm, 1884) revises Exner's ﬁgures, and
shows that his conclusions are exaggerated. According to Tigerstedt, two
observers almost always rightly appreciated 0.05 or 0.06'' of reaction-time
difference. Half the time they did it rightly when the difference sank to 0.03'',
though from 0.03'' and 0.06'' differences were often not noticed at all. Buccola
found (La Legge del Tempo nei Fenomeni dei Pensiero, Milano, 1883, p. 371)
that, after much practice in making rapid reactions upon a signal, he estimated
directly, in ﬁgures, his own reaction-time, in 10 experiments, with an error of
from 0.016'' to 0.018''; in 6, with one of 0.005'' to 0.069''; in one, with one of
0.002''; and in 3, with one of 0.003''.

[528]

Mind, xi, 61 (1886).

[529]

Mach, Wiener Sitzungsb., li, 2. 133 (1865); Estel, loc. cit. p. 65; Mehner, loc. cit.
p. 586; Buccola, op. cit. p. 378. Fechner labors to prove that his law is only
overlaid by other interfering laws in the ﬁgures recorded by these experimenters;
but his case seems to me to be one of desperate infatuation with a hobby. (See
Wundt's Philosphische Studien iii, 1.)

[530]

Curious discrepancies exist between the German and the American observers with
respect to the direction of the error below and above the point of indifference—
differences perhaps due the fatigue involved in the American method. The
Germans lengthened intervals below it and shortened those above. With seven
Americans experimented on by Stevens this was exactly reversed. The German
method was to passively listen to the intervals, then judge; the American was to
reproduce them actively by movements of the hand. In Mehner's experiments
there was found a second indifference point at about 5 seconds, beyond which
times were judged again too long. Glass, whose work on the subject is the latest
(Philos. Studien, iv, 423) found (when corrections were allowed for) that all times
except 0.8 sec. were estimated too short. He found a series of points of greatest
relative accuracy, viz. at 1.5, 2.5, 3.75, 5, 6.25, etc., seconds respectively, and
thought that his observations roughly corroborated Weber's law. As 'maximum'
and 'minimum' are printed interchangeably in Glass's article it is hard to follow.

[531]

With Vierordt and his pupils the indifference point lay as high as from 1.5 sec to
4.9 sec, according to the observer (cf. Der Zeitsinn, 1868, p. 112). In most of
these experiments the time heard was actively reproduced, after a short pause, by
movements of the hand, which were recorded. Wundt gives good reasons
(Physiol. Psych., ii, 289, 290) for rejecting Vierordt's ﬁgures as erroneous.
Vierordt's book, it should be said, is full of important matter, nevertheless.

[532]

Physiol. Psych., ii, 286, 290.

[533]

Philosophische Studien, i, 86.

[534]

Mind, xi, 400.

[535]

Loc cit. p. 144.
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[536]

Op. cit. p. 376. Mach's and Buccola's ﬁgures, it will be observed, are about one
half of the rest—sub-multiples, therefore. It ought to be observed, however, that
Buccola's ﬁgure has little value, his observations not being well ﬁtted to show this
particular point.

[537]

Estel's ﬁgures led him to think that all the multiples enjoyed this privilege; with
Mehner, on the other hand, only the odd multiples showed diminution of the
average error; thus, 0.71, 2.15, 3.55, 5, 6.4, 7.8, 9.3, and 10.65 second were
respectively registered with the least error. Cf. Phil. Studien, ii, pp. 57, 562-5.

[538]

Cf. especially pp. 558-561.

[539]

Wundt: Physiol. Psych., ii, 287. Hall and Jastrow: Mind, xi, 62.

[540]

Mehner: loc. cit. p. 553.

[541]

The number of distinguishable differences of speed between these limits is, as he
takes care to remark, very much larger that 7. (Der Zeitsinn, p. 137).

[542]

P. 19, § 18, p. 112.

[543]

I leave the text just as it was printed in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy (for
'Oct. 1886') in 1887. Since then Münsterberg in his masterly Beiträge zur
experimentellen Psychologie (Heft 2, 1889) seems to have made it clear what the
sensible changes are by which we measure the lapse of time. When the time
which separates two sensible impressions is less than one third of a second, he
thinks it is almost entirely the amount to which the memory-image of the ﬁrst
impression has faded when the second one overtakes it, which makes us feel how
wide they are apart (p. 29). When the time is longer than this, we rely, he thinks,
exclusively upon the feelings of muscular tension and relaxation, which we are
constantly receiving although we give to them so little of our direct attention.
These feelings are primarily in the muscles by which we adopt our sense-organs
in attending to the signals used, some of the muscles being in the eye and ear
themselves, some of them in the head, neck, etc. We here judge two time-intervals
to be equal when between the beginning and end of each we feel exactly similar
relaxations and subsequent expectant tensions of these muscles to have occurred.
In reproducing intervals ourselves we try to make our feelings of this sort just
what they were when we passively heard the interval. These feelings by
themselves, however, can only be used when the intervals are very short, for the
tension anticipatory of the terminal stimulus naturally reaches its maximum very
soon. With longer intervals we take the feeling of our inspirations and expirations
into account. With our expirations all the other muscular tensions in our body
undergo a rhythmical decrease; with our inspirations the reverse takes place.
When, therefore, we note a time-interval of several seconds with intent to
reproduce it, what we seek is to make the earlier and later interval agree in the
number and amount of these respiratory changes combined with sense-organ
adjustments with which they are ﬁlled. Münsterberg has studied carefully in his
own ease the variations of the respiratory factor. They are many; but he sums up
his experience by saying that whether he measured by inspirations that were
divided by momentary pauses into six parts, or by inspirations that were
continuous; whether with sensory tension during inspiration and relaxation during
expiration, or by tension during both inspiration and expiration, separated by a
sudden interpolated relaxation; whether with special notice taken of the cephalic
tensions, or of those in the trunk and shoulders, in all cases alike and without
exception he involuntarily endeavored, whenever he compared two times or tried
to make one the same as the other, to get exactly the same respiratory conditions
and conditions of tension, all the subjective conditions, in short, exactly the same
during the second interval as they were during the ﬁrst. Münsterberg corroborated
his subjective observations by experiments. The observer of the time had to
reproduce as exactly as possible an interval between two sharp sounds given him
by an assistant. The only condition imposed upon him was that he should not
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modify his breathing for the purposes of measurement. It was then found that
when the assistant broke in at random with his signals, the judgment of the
observer was vastly less accurate than when the assistant carefully watched the
observer's breathing and made both the beginning of the time given him and that
of the time which he was to give coincide with identical phases thereof.—Finally,
Münsterberg with great plausibility tries to explain the discrepancies between the
results of Vierordt, Estel, Mehner, Glass, etc., as due to the fact that they did not
all use the same measure. Some breathe a little faster, some a little slower. Some
break their inspirations into two parts, some do not, etc. The coincidence of the
objective times measured with deﬁnite natural phases of breathing would very
easily give periodical maxima of facility in measuring accurately.
[544]

"Any one wishing yet further examples of this mental substitution will ﬁnd one on
observing how habitually he thinks of the spaces on the clock-face instead of the
periods they stand for; how, on discovering it to be half an hour later than be
supposed, he does not represent the half hour in its duration, but scarcely passes
beyond the sign of it marked by the ﬁnger." (H. Spencer: Psychology, § 336.)

[545]

The only objections to this which I can think of are: (1) The accuracy with which
some men judge of the hour of day or night without looking at the clock; (2) the
faculty some have of waking at a preappointed hour; (3) the accuracy of timeperception reported to exist in certain trance-subjects. It might seem that in these
persons some sort of a sub-conscious record was kept of the lapse of time per se.
But this cannot be admitted until it is proved that there are no physiological
processes, the feeling of whose course may serve as a sign of how much time has
sped, and so lead us to infer the hour. That there are such processes it is hardly
possible to doubt. An ingenious friend of mine was long puzzled to know why
each day of the week had such a characteristic physiognomy to him. That of
Sunday was soon noticed to be due to the cessation of the city's rumbling, and the
sound of people's feet shufﬂing on the sidewalk; of Monday, to come from the
clothes drying in the yard and casting a white reﬂection on the ceiling; of
Tuesday, to a cause which I forget; and I think my friend did not get beyond
Wednesday. Probably each hour in the day has for most of us some outer or inner
sign associated with it as closely as these signs with the days of the week. It must
be admitted, after all, however, that the great improvement of the time-perception
during sleep and trance is a mystery not as yet cleared up. All my life I have been
struck by the accuracy with which I will wake at the same exact minute night after
night and morning after morning, if only the habit fortuitously begins. The
organic registration in me is independent of sleep. After lying in bed a long time
awake I suddenly rise without knowing the time, and for days and weeks together
will do so at an identical minute by the clock, as if some inward physiological
process caused the act by punctually running down.—Idiots are said sometimes to
possess the time-measuring faculty in a marked degree. I have an interesting
manuscript account of an idiot girl which says: "She was punctual almost to a
minute in her demand for food and other regular attentions. Her dinner was
generally furnished her at 12.30 p. m., and at that hour she would begin to scream
if it were not forthcoming. If on Fast-day or Thanksgiving it were delayed, in
accordance with the New England custom, she screamed from her usual dinnerhour until the food was carried to her. On the next day, however, she again made
known her wants promptly at 12.30. Any slight attention shown her on one day
was demanded on the next at the corresponding hour. If an orange were given her
at 4 p. m. on Wednesday, at the same hour on Thursday she made known her
expectation, and if the fruit were not given her she continued to call for it at
intervals for two or three hours. At four on Friday the process would be repeated
but would last less long; and so on for two or three days. If one of her sisters
visited her accidentally at a certain hour, the sharp piercing scream was sure to
summon her at the same hour the next day," etc., etc.—For these obscure matters
consult C. Du Prel: The Philosophy of Mysticism, chap. iii, § 1.
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[546]

Ideale Fragen (1878). p. 219 (Essay, 'Zeit und Weile').

[547]

Revue Philosophique, vol. iii, p. 496.

[548]

"Empty time is most strongly perceived when it comes as a pause in music or in
speech. Suppose a preacher in the pulpit, a professor at his desk, to stick still in
the midst of his discourse; or let a composer (as is sometimes purposely done)
make all his instruments stop at once; we await every instant the resumption of
the performance, and, in this awaiting, perceive, more than in any other possible
way, the empty time. To change the example, let, in a piece of polyphonic music
—a ﬁgure, for instance, in which a tangle of melodies are under way—suddenly a
single voice be heard, which sustains a long note, while all else is hushed.... This
one note will appear very protracted—why? Because we expect to hear
accompanying it the notes of the other instruments, but they fail to come."
(Herbart: Psychol. als W., § 115.)—Compare also Münsterberg, Beiträge, Heft 2,
p. 41.

[549]

A night of pain will seem terribly long: we keep looking forward to a moment
which never comes—the moment when it shall cease. But the odiousness of this
experience is not named ennui or Langweile, like the odiousness of time that
seems long from its emptiness. The more positive odiousness of the pain, rather,
is what tinges our memory of the night. What we feel, as Prof. Lazarus says (op.
cit. p. 202), is the long time of the suffering, not the suffering of the long time per
se.

[550]

On these variations of time-estimate, cf. Romanes, Consciousness of Time, in
Mind, vol. iii, p. 297; J. Sully, Illusions, pp. 245-261, 302-305; W. Wundt.
Physiol. Psych., ii, 287, 288; besides the essays quoted from Lazarus and Janet. In
German, the successors of Herbart have treated of this subject: compare
Volkmann's Lehrbuch d. Psych., § 89, and for references to other authors his note
3 to this section. Lindner (Lbh. d. empir. Psych.), as a parallel effect, instances
Alexander the Great's life (thirty-three years), which seems to us as if it must be
long, because it was so eventful. Similarly the English Commonwealth, etc.

[551]

Physiol. Optik, p. 445.

[552]

Succession, time per se, is no force. Our talk about its devouring tooth, etc., is all
elliptical. Its contents are what devour. The law of inertia is incompatible with
time's being assumed as an efﬁcient cause of anything.

[553]

Lehrbuch d. Psych., § 87. Compare also H. Lotze, Metaphysik, § 154.

[554]

The cause of the perceiving, not the object perceived!

[555]

"'No more' and 'not yet' are the proper time-feelings, and we are aware of time in
no other way than through these feelings," says Volkmann (Psychol., § 87). This,
which is not strictly true of our feeling of time per se, as an elementary bit of
duration, is true of our feeling of date in its events.

[556]

We construct the miles just as we construct the years. Travelling in the cars makes
a succession of different ﬁelds of view pass before our eyes. When those that have
passed from present sight revive in memory, they maintain their mutual order
because their contents overlap. We think them as having been before or behind
each other; and, from the multitude of the views we can recall behind the one now
presented, we compute the total space we have passed through.
It is often said that the perception of time develops later than that of space,
because children have so vague an idea of all dates before yesterday and after tomorrow. But no vaguer than they have of extensions that exceed as greatly their
unit of space-intuition. Recently I heard my child of four tell a visitor that he had
been 'as much as one week' in the country. As he had been there three months, the
visitor expressed surprise; whereupon the child corrected himself by saying he
had been there 'twelve years.' But the child made exactly the same kind of mistake
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when he asked if Boston was not one hundred miles from Cambridge, the distance
being three miles.
[557]

Most of these explanations simply give the signs which, adhering to impressions,
lead us to date them within a duration, or, in other words, to assign to them their
order. Why it should be a time-order, however, is not explained. Herbart's wouldbe explanation is a simple description of time-perception. He says it comes when,
with the last member of a series present to our consciousness, we also think of the
ﬁrst; and then the whole series revives in our thought at once, but with strength
diminishing in the backward direction (Psychol. als Wiss., § 115; Lehrb. zur
Psychol., §§ 171, 172, 175). Similarly Drobisch, who adds that the series must
appear as one already elapsed (durchlaufene), a word which shows even more
clearly the question-begging nature of this sort of account (Empirische Psychol., §
59). Th. Waitz is guilty of similar question-begging when he explains our timeconsciousness to be engendered by a set of unsuccessful attempts to make our
percepts agree with our expectations (Lehrb. d. Psychol., § 52). Volkmann's
mythological account of past representations striving to drive present ones out of
the seat of consciousness, being driven back by them, etc., suffers from the same
fallacy (Psychol., § 87). But all such accounts agree in implying one fact—viz.,
that the brain-processes of various events must be active simultaneously, and in
varying strength, for a time-perception to be possible. Later authors have made
this idea more precise. Thus, Lipps: "Sensations arise, occupy consciousness, fade
into images, and vanish. According as two of them, a and b, go through this
process simultaneously, or as one precedes or follows the other, the phases of
their fading will agree or differ; and the difference will be proportional to the
time-difference between their several moments of beginning. Thus there are
differences of quality in the images, which the mind may translate into
corresponding differences of their temporal order. There is no other possible
middle term between the objective time-relations and those in the mind than these
differences of phase." (Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens, p. 588.) Lipps
accordingly calls them 'temporal signs,' and hastens explicitly to add that the
soul's translation of their order of strength into a time-order is entirely
inexplicable (p. 591). M. Guyau's account (Revue Philosophique, xix, 353) hardly
differs from that of his predecessors, except in picturesqueness of style. Every
change leaves a series of trainées lumineuses in the mind like the passage of
shooting stars. Each image is in a more fading phase, according as its original was
more remote. This group of images gives duration, the mere time-form, the 'bed'
of time. The distinction of past, present, and future within the bed comes from our
active nature. The future (as with Waitz) is what I want, but have not yet got, and
must wait for. All this is doubtless true, but is no explanation.
Mr. Ward gives, in his Encyclopædia Britannica article (Psychology, p. 65, col. 1),
a still more reﬁned attempt to specify the 'temporal sign.' The problem being,
among a number of other things thought as successive, but simultaneously
thought, to determine which is ﬁrst and which last, he says: "After each distinct
representation, a b c d, there may intervene the representation of that movement of
attention of which we are aware in passing from one object to another. In our
present reminiscence we have, it must be allowed, little direct proof of this
intervention; though there is, I think, indirect evidence of it in the tendency of the
ﬂow of ideas to follow the order in which the presentations were at ﬁrst attended
to. With the movement itself when the direction of attention changes, we are
familiar enough, though the residua of such movements are not ordinarily
conspicuous. These residua, then, are our temporal signs.... But temporal signs
alone will not furnish all the pictorial exactness of the time-perspective. These
give us only a ﬁxed series; but the law of obliviscence, by insuring a progressive
variation in intensity as we pass from one member of the series to the other, yields
the effect which we call time-distance. By themselves such variations in intensity
would leave us liable to confound more vivid representations in the distance with
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fainter ones nearer the present, but from this mistake the temporal signs save us;
where the memory-continuum is imperfect such mistakes continually occur. On
the other hand, where these variations are slight and imperceptible, though the
memory-continuum preserves the order of events intact, we have still no such
distinct appreciation of comparative distance in time as we have nearer to the
present, where these perceptive effects are considerable.... Locke speaks of our
ideas succeeding each other 'at certain distances not much unlike the images in the
inside of a lantern turned round by the heat of a candle,' and 'guesses' that 'this
appearance of theirs in train varies not very much in a waking man.' Now what is
this 'distance' that separates a from b, b from c, and so on; and what means have
we of knowing that it is tolerably constant in waking life? It is, probably, that, the
residuum of which I have called a temporal sign; or, in other words, it is the
movement of attention from a to b." Nevertheless, Mr. Ward does not call our
feeling of this movement of attention the original of our feeling of time, or its
brain-process the brain-process which directly causes us to perceive time. He
says, a moment later, that "though the ﬁxation of attention does of course really
occupy time, it is probably not in the ﬁrst instance perceived as time—i.e. as
continuous 'protensity,' to use a term of Hamilton's—but as intensity. Thus, if this
supposition be true, there is an element in our concrete time perceptions which
has no place in our abstract conception of Time. In Time physically conceived
there is no trace of intensity; in time psychically experienced, duration is
primarily an intensive magnitude, and so far literally a perception." Its 'original'
is, then, if I understand Mr Ward, something like a feeling which accompanies, as
pleasure and pain may accompany, the movements of attention. Its brain-process
must, it would seem, be assimilated in general type to the brain-processes of
pleasure and pain. Such would seem more or less consciously to be Mr. Ward's
own view, for he says: "Everybody knows what it is to be distracted by a rapid
succession of varied impressions, and equally what it is to be wearied by the slow
and monotonous recurrence of the same impressions. Now these 'feelings' of
distraction and tedium owe their characteristic qualities to movements of
attention. In the ﬁrst, attention is kept incessantly on the move; before it is
accommodated to a, it is disturbed by the suddenness, intensity, and novelty of b;
in the second, it is kept all but stationary by the repeated presentation of the same
impression. Such excess and defect of surprises make one realize a fact which in
ordinary life is so obscure as to escape notice. But recent experiments have set
this fact in a more striking light, and made clear what Locke had dimly before his
mind in talking of a certain distance between the presentations of a waking man.
In estimating very short periods of time of a second or less, indicated, say, by the
beats of a metronome, it is found that there is a certain period for which the mean
of a number of estimates is correct, while shorter periods are on the whole over-,
and longer periods under-estimated. I take this to be evidence of the time
occupied in accommodating or ﬁxing attention." Alluding to the fact that a series
of experiences, a b c d e, may seem short in retrospect, which seemed everlasting
in passing, he says: "What tells in retrospect is the series a b c d e, etc.; what tells
in the present is the intervening t1 t2 t3, etc., or rather the original accommodation
of which these temporal signs are the residuum." And he concludes thus: "We
seem to have proof that our perception of duration rests ultimately upon quasimotor objects of varying intensity, the duration of which we do not directly
experience as duration at all."
Wundt also thinks that the interval of about three-fourths of a second, which is
estimated with the minimum of error, points to a connection between the timefeeling and the succession of distinctly 'apperceived' objects before the mind. The
'association-time' is also equal to about three fourths of a second. This
association-time he regards as a sort of internal standard of duration to which we
involuntarily assimilate all intervals which we try to reproduce, bringing shorter
ones up to it and longer ones down. [In the Stevens result we should have to say
contrast instead of assimilate, for the longer intervals there seem longer, and the
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shorter ones shorter still.] "Singularly enough," he adds (Physiol. Psych., ii, 286),
"this time is about that in which in rapid walking, according to the Webers, our
legs perform their swing. It seems thus not unlikely that both psychical constants,
that of the average speed of reproduction and that of the surest estimation of time,
have formed themselves under the inﬂuence of those most habitual movements of
the body which we also use when we try to subdivide rhythmically longer tracts
of time."
Finally, Prof. Mach makes a suggestion more speciﬁc still. After saying very
rightly that we have a real sensation of time—how otherwise should we identify
two entirely different airs as being played in the same 'time'? how distinguish in
memory the ﬁrst stroke of the clock from the second, unless to each there clove its
special time-sensation, which revived with it?—he says "it is probable that this
feeling is connected with that organic consumption which is necessarily linked
with the production of consciousness, and that the time which we feel is probably
due to the [mechanical?] work of [the process of?] attention. When attention is
strained, time seems long; during easy occupation, short, etc.... The fatigue of the
organ of consciousness, as long as we wake, continually increases, and the work
of attention augments as continually. Those impressions which are conjoined with
a greater amount of work of attention appear to us as the later." The apparent
relative displacement of certain simultaneous events and certain anachronisms of
dreams are held by Mach to be easily explicable as effects of a splitting of the
attention between two objects, one of which consumes most of it (Beiträge zur
Analyse der Empﬁndungen, p. 103 foll.). Mach's theory seems worthy of being
better worked out. It is hard to say now whether he, Ward, and Wundt mean at
bottom the same thing or not. The theory advanced in my own text, it will be
remarked, does not pretend to be an explanation, but only an elementary
statement of the 'law' which makes us aware of time. The Herbartian mythology
purports to explain.
[558]

It would be rash to say deﬁnitely just how many seconds long this specious
present must needs be, for processes fade 'asymptotically,' and the distinctly
intuited present merges into a penumbra of mere dim recency before it turns into
the past which is simply reproduced and conceived. Many a thing which we do
not distinctly date by intercalating it in a place between two other things will,
nevertheless, come to us with this feeling of belonging to a near past. This sense
of recency is a feeling sui generis, and may affect things that happened hours ago.
It would seem to show that their brain-processes are still in a state modiﬁed by the
foregoing excitement, still in a 'fading' phase, in spite of the long interval.

[559]

Physiol. Psych, ii, 263.

[560]

I leave my text as it was printed before Münsterberg's essay appeared (see
Footnote 542, above). He denies that we measure any but minimal durations by
the amount of fading in the ideational processes, and talks almost exclusively of
our feelings of muscular tension in his account, whereas I have made no mention
of such things in mine. I cannot, however, see that there is any conﬂict between
what he and I suggest. I am mainly concerned with the consciousness of duration
regarded as a speciﬁc sort of object, he is concerned with this object's
measurement exclusively. Feelings of tension might be the means of the
measurement, whilst overlapping processes of any and every kind gave the object
to be measured. The accommodative and respiratory movements from which the
feelings of tension come form regularly recurring sensations divided by their
'phases' into intervals as deﬁnite as those by which a yardstick is divided by the
marks upon its length.
Let a1, a2, a3, a4, be homologous phases in four successive movements of this
kind. If four outer stimuli 1, 2, 3, 4, coincide each with one of these successive
phases, then their 'distances apart' are felt as equal, otherwise not. But there is no
reason whatever to suppose that the mere overlapping of the brain-process of 2 by
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the fading process of 1, or that of 3 by that of 2, etc., does not give the
characteristic quality of content which we call 'distance apart' in this experience,
and which by aid of the muscular feelings gets judged to be equal. Doubtless the
muscular feelings can give us the object 'time' as well as its measure, because
their earlier phases leave fading sensations which constantly overlap the vivid
sensation of the present phase. But it would be contrary to analogy to suppose that
they should be the only experiences which give this object. I do not understand
Herr Münsterberg to claim this for them. He takes our sense of time for granted,
and only discusses its measurement.
[561]

Exner in Hermann's Hdbch. d. Physiol., Bd. ii, Thl. ii, p. 281. Richet in Revue
Philosophique, xxi, 568 (juin, 1886). See the next chapter, pp. 642-646.

[562]

I have spoken of fading brain-processes alone, but only for simplicity's sake.
Dawning processes probably play as important a part in giving the feeling of
duration to the specious present.

[563]

Reden (St. Petersburg, 1864), vol. i, pp. 255-268.

[564]

Psychology, § 91.

[565]

"The patient cannot retain the image of an object more than a moment. His
memory is as short for sounds, letters, ﬁgures, and printed words. If we cover a
written or printed word with a sheet of paper in which a little window has been
cut, so that only the ﬁrst letter is visible through the window, he pronounces this
letter. If, then, the sheet is moved so as to cover the ﬁrst letter and make the
second one visible, he pronounces the second, but forgets the ﬁrst, and cannot
pronounce the ﬁrst and second together." And so forth to the end. "If he closes his
eyes and draws his ﬁnger exploringly over a well-known object like a knife or
key, he cannot combine the separate impressions and recognize the object. But if
it is put into his hand so that he can simultaneously touch it with several ﬁngers,
he names it without difﬁculty. This patient has thus lost the capacity for grouping
successive ... impressions ... into a whole and perceiving them as a whole."
(Grashey, in Archiv für Psychiatrie, Bd. xvi, pp. 672-673.) It is hard to believe
that in such a patient the time intuited was not clipped off like the impressions it
held, though perhaps not so much of it.
I have myself often noted a curious exaggeration of time-perspective at the
moment of a falling asleep. A person will be moving or doing something in the
room, and a certain stage of his act (whatever it may be) will be my last waking
perception. Then a subsequent stage will wake me to a new perception. The two
stages of the act will not be more than a few seconds apart; and yet it always
seems to me as if, between the earlier and the later one, a long interval has passed
away. I conjecturally account for the phenomenon thus, calling the two stages of
the act a and b respectively: Were I awake, a would leave a fading process in my
sensorium which would overlap the process of b when the latter came, and both
would then appear in the same specious present, a belonging to its earlier end. But
the sudden advent of the brain-change called sleep extinguishes a's fading process
abruptly. When b then comes and wakes me, a comes back, it is true, but not as
belonging to the specious present. It has to be specially revoked in memory. This
mode of revocation usually characterizes long-past things—whence the illusion.

[566]

Again I omit the future, merely for simplicity's sake.

CHAPTER XVI.

[Pg 643]

MEMORY.
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In the last chapter what concerned us was the direct intuition of time. We found it limited to
intervals of considerably less than a minute. Beyond its borders extends the immense region
of conceived time, past and future, into one direction or another of which we mentally
project all the events which we think of as real, and form a systematic order of them by
giving to each a date. The relation of conceived to intuited time is just like that of the
ﬁctitious space pictured on the ﬂat back-scene of a theatre to the actual space of the stage.
The objects painted on the former (trees, columns, houses in a receding street, etc.) carry
back the series of similar objects solidly placed upon the latter, and we think we see things
in a continuous perspective, when we really see thus only a few of them and imagine that we
see the rest. The chapter which lies before us deals with the way in which we paint the
remote past, as it were, upon a canvas in our memory, and yet often imagine that we have
direct vision of its depths.
The stream of thought ﬂows on; but most of its segments fall into the bottomless abyss of
oblivion. Of some, no memory survives the instant of their passage. Of others, it is conﬁned
to a few moments, hours, or days. Others, again, leave vestiges which are indestructible, and
by means of which they may be recalled as long as life endures. Can we explain these
differences?
PRIMARY MEMORY.
The ﬁrst point to be noticed is that for a state of mind to survive in memory it must have
endured, for a certain length of time. In other words, it must be what I call a substantive
state. Prepositional and conjunctival states of mind are not remembered as independent facts
—we cannot recall just how we felt when we said 'how' or 'notwithstanding.' Our [Pg 644]
consciousness of these transitive states is shut up to their own moment—hence one
difﬁculty in introspective psychologizing.
Any state of mind which is shut up to its own moment and fails to become an object for
succeeding states of mind, is as if it belonged to another stream of thought. Or rather, it
belongs only physically, not intellectually, to its own stream, forming a bridge from one
segment of it to another, but not being appropriated inwardly by former segments or
appearing as part of the empirical self, in the manner explained in Chapter X. All the
intellectual value for us of a state of mind depends on our after-memory of it. Only then is it
combined in a system and knowingly made to contribute to a result. Only then does it count
for us. So that the EFFECTIVE consciousness we have of our states is the after-consciousness;
and the more of this there is, the more inﬂuence does the original state have, and the more
permanent a factor is it of our world. An indelibly-imprinted pain may color a life; but, as
Professor Richet says:
"To suffer for only a hundredth of a second is not to suffer at all; and for my
part I would readily agree to undergo a pain, however acute and intense it might
be, provided it should last only a hundredth of a second, and leave after it
neither reverberation nor recall."[567]
Not that a momentary state of consciousness need be practically resultless. Far from it: such
a state, though absolutely unremembered, might at its own moment determine the transition
of our thinking in a vital way, and decide our action irrevocably.[568] But the idea of it could
not afterwards determine transition and action, its content could not be conceived as one of [Pg 645]
the mind's permanent meanings: that is all I mean by saying that its intellectual value lies in
after-memory.
As a rule sensations outlast for some little time the objective stimulus which occasioned
them. This phenomenon is the ground of those 'after-images' which are familiar in the
physiology of the sense-organs. If we open our eyes instantaneously upon a scene, and then
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shroud them in complete darkness, it will be as if we saw the scene in ghostly light through
the dark screen. We can read off details in it which were unnoticed whilst the eyes were
open.[569]
In every sphere of sense, an intermittent stimulus, often enough repeated, produces a
continuous sensation. This is because the after-image of the impression just gone by blends
with the new impression coming in. The effects of stimuli may thus be superposed upon
each other many stages deep, the total result in consciousness being an increase in the
feeling's intensity, and in all probability, as we saw in the last chapter, an elementary sense
of the lapse of time (see p. 635).
Exner writes:

[Pg 646]

"Impressions to which we are inattentive leave so brief an image in the memory
that it is usually overlooked. When deeply absorbed, we do not hear the clock
strike. But our attention may awake after the striking has ceased, and we may
then count off the strokes. Such examples are often found in daily life. We can
also prove the existence of this primary memory-image, as it may be called, in
another person, even when his attention is completely absorbed elsewhere. Ask
someone, e.g., to count the lines of a printed page as fast as he can, and whilst
this is going on walk a few steps about the room. Then, when the person has
done counting, ask him where you stood. He will always reply quite deﬁnitely
that you have walked. Analogous experiments may be made with vision. This
primary memory-image is, whether attention have been turned to the
impression or not, an extremely lively one, but is subjectively quite distinct
from every sort of after-image or hallucination.... It vanishes, if not caught by
attention, in the course of a few seconds. Even when the original impression is
attended to, the liveliness of its image in memory fades fast."[570]
The physical condition in the nerve-tissue of this primary memory is called by Richet
'elementary memory.'[571] I much prefer to reserve the word memory for the conscious
phenomenon. What happens in the nerve-tissue is but an example of that plasticity or of
semi-inertness, yielding to change, but not yielding instantly or wholly, and never quite
recovering the original form, which, in Chapter V, we saw to be the groundwork of habit.
Elementary habit would be the better name for what Professor Richet means. Well, the ﬁrst
manifestation of elementary habit is the slow dying away of an impressed movement on the
neural matter, and its ﬁrst effect in consciousness is this so-called elementary memory. But
what elementary memory makes us aware of is the just past. The objects we feel in this
directly intuited past differ from properly recollected objects. An object which is recollected,
in the proper sense of that term, is one which has been absent from consciousness altogether,
and now revives anew. It is brought back, recalled, ﬁshed up, so to speak, from a reservoir in
which, with countless other objects, it lay buried and lost from view. But an object of
primary memory is not thus brought back; it never was lost; its date was never cut off in [Pg 647]
consciousness from that of the immediately present moment. In fact it comes to us as
belonging to the rearward portion of the present space of time, and not to the genuine past.
In the last chapter we saw that the portion of time which we directly intuit has a breadth of
several seconds, a rearward and a forward end, and may be called the specious present. All
stimuli whose ﬁrst nerve-vibrations have not yet ceased seem to be conditions of our getting
this feeling of the specious present. They give rise to objects which appear to the mind as
events just past.[572]
When we have been exposed to an unusual stimulus for many minutes or hours, a nervous
process is set up which results in the haunting of consciousness by the impression for a long
time afterwards. The tactile and muscular feelings of a day of skating or riding, after long
disuse of the exercise, will come back to us all through the night. Images of the ﬁeld of view
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of the microscope will annoy the observer for hours after an unusually long sitting at the
instrument. A thread tied around the ﬁnger, an unusual constriction in the clothing, will feel
as if still there, long after they have been removed. These revivals (called phenomena of
Sinnesgedächtniss by the Germans) have something periodical in their nature.[573] They
show that profound rearrangements and slow settlings into a new equilibrium are going on
in the neural substance, and they form the transition to that more peculiar and proper
phenomenon of memory, of which the rest of this chapter must treat. The ﬁrst condition [Pg 648]
which makes a thing susceptible of recall after it has been forgotten is that the original
impression of it should have been prolonged enough to give rise to a recurrent image of it,
as distinguished from one of those primary after-images which very ﬂeeting impressions
may leave behind, and which contain in themselves no guarantee that they will ever come
back after having once faded away.[574] A certain length of stimulation seems demanded by
the inertia of the nerve-substance. Exposed to a shorter inﬂuence, its modiﬁcation fails to
'set,' and it retains no effective tendency to fall again into the same form of vibration at
which the original feeling was due. This, as I said at the outset, may be the reason why only
'substantive' and not 'transitive' states of mind are as a rule recollected, at least as
independent things. The transitive states pass by too quickly.
ANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENON OF MEMORY.
Memory proper, or secondary memory as it might be styled, is the knowledge of a former
state of mind after it has already once dropped from consciousness; or rather it is the
knowledge of an event, or fact, of which meantime we have not been thinking, with the
additional consciousness that we have thought or experienced it before.
The ﬁrst element which such a knowledge involves would seem to be the revival in the mind [Pg 649]
of an image or copy of the original event.[575] And it is an assumption made by many
writers[576] that the revival of an image is all that is needed to constitute the memory of the
original occurrence. But such a revival is obviously not a memory, whatever else it may be;
it is simply a duplicate, a second event, having absolutely no connection with the ﬁrst event
except that it happens to resemble it. The clock strikes to-day; it struck yesterday; and may
strike a million times ere it wears out. The rain pours through the gutter this week; it did so
last week; and will do so in sæcula sæculorum. But does the present clock-stroke become
aware of the past ones, or the present stream recollect the past stream, because they repeat
and resemble them? Assuredly not. And let it not be said that this is because clock-strokes
and gutters are physical and not psychical objects; for psychical objects (sensations for
example) simply recurring in successive editions will remember each other on that account
no more than clock-strokes do. No memory is involved in the mere fact of recurrence. The
successive editions of a feeling are so many independent events, each snug in its own skin. [Pg 650]
Yesterday's feeling is dead and buried; and the presence of to-day's is no reason why it
should resuscitate. A farther condition is required before the present image can be held to
stand for a past original.
That condition is that the fact imaged be expressly referred to the past, thought as in the
past. But how can we think a thing as in the past, except by thinking of the past together
with the thing, and of the relation of the two? And how can we think of the past? In the
chapter on Time-perception we have seen that our intuitive or immediate consciousness of
pastness hardly carries us more than a few seconds backward of the present instant of time.
Remoter dates are conceived, not perceived; known symbolically by names, such as 'last
week,' '1850;' or thought of by events which happened in them, as the year in which we
attended such a school, or met with such a loss.—So that if we wish to think of a particular
past epoch, we must think of a name or other symbol, or else of certain concrete events,
associated therewithal. Both must be thought of, to think the past epoch adequately. And to
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'refer' any special fact to the past epoch is to think that fact with the names and events which
characterize its date, to think it, in short, with a lot of contiguous associates.
But even this would not be memory. Memory requires more than mere dating of a fact in the
past. It must be dated in my past. In other words, I must think that I directly experienced its
occurrence. It must have that 'warmth and intimacy' which were so often spoken of in the
chapter on the Self, as characterizing all experiences 'appropriated' by the thinker as his
own.
A general feeling of the past direction in time, then, a particular date conceived as lying
along that direction, and I deﬁned by its name or phenomenal contents, an event imagined as
located therein, and owned as part of my experience,—such are the elements of every act of
memory.
It follows that what we began by calling the 'image,' or 'copy,' of the fact in the mind, is
really not there at all in that simple shape, as a separate 'idea.' Or at least, if it be there as a
separate idea, no memory will go with it. What memory goes with is, on the contrary, a very [Pg 651]
complex representation, that of the fact to be recalled plus its associates, the whole forming
one 'object' (as explained on page 275, Chapter IX), known in one integral pulse of
consciousness (as set forth on pp. 276 ff.) and demanding probably a vastly more intricate
brain-process than that on which any simple sensorial image depends.
Most psychologists have given a perfectly clear analysis of the phenomenon we describe.
Christian Wolff, for example, writes:
"Suppose you have seen Mevius in the temple, but now afresh in Titus' house. I
say you recognize Mevius, that is, are conscious of having seen him before
because, although now you perceive him with your senses along with Titus'
house, your imagination produces an image of him along with one of the
temple, and of the acts of your own mind reﬂecting on Mevius in the temple.
Hence the idea of Mevius which is reproduced in sense is contained in another
series of perceptions than that which formerly contained it, and this difference
is the reason why we are conscious of having had it before.... For whilst now
you see Mevius in the house of Titus, your imagination places him in the
temple, and renders you conscious of the state of mind which you found in
yourself when you beheld him there. By this you know that you have seen him
before, that is, you recognize him. But you recognize him because his idea is
now contained in another series of perceptions from that in which you ﬁrst saw
him."[577]
Similarly James Mill writes:
"In my remembrance of George III., addressing the two houses of parliament,
there is, ﬁrst of all, the mere idea, or simple apprehension, the conception, as it
is sometimes called, of the objects. There is combined with this, to make it
memory, my idea of my having seen and heard those objects. And this
combination is so close that it is not in my power to separate them. I cannot
have the idea of George III.: his person and attitude, the paper he held in his
hand, the sound of his voice while reading from it; without having the other
idea along with it, that of my having been a witness of the scene.... If this
explanation of the case in which we remember sensations is understood, the
explanation of the case in which we remember ideas cannot occasion much of
difﬁculty. I have a lively recollection of Polyphemus's cave, and the actions of
Ulysses and the Cyclops, as described by Homer. In this recollection there is,
ﬁrst of all, the ideas, or simple conceptions of the objects and acts; and along
with these ideas, and so closely combined as not to be separable, the idea of my
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having formerly had those same ideas. And this idea of my having formerly had
those ideas is a very complicated idea; including the idea of myself of the
present moment remembering, and that of myself of the past moment
conceiving; and the whole series of the states of consciousness, which
intervened between myself remembering, and myself conceiving."[578]
Memory is then the feeling of belief in a peculiar complex object; but all the elements of
this object may be known to other states of belief; nor is there in the particular combination
of them as they appear in memory anything so peculiar as to lead us to oppose the latter to
other sorts of thought as something altogether sui generis, needing a special faculty to
account for it. When later we come to our chapter on Belief we shall see that any
represented object which is connected either mediately or immediately with our present
sensations or emotional activities tends to be believed in as a reality. The sense of a peculiar
active relation in it to ourselves is what gives to an object the characteristic quality of
reality, and a merely imagined past event differs from a recollected one only in the absence
of this peculiar-feeling relation. The electric current, so to speak, between it and our present
self does not close. But in their other determinations the re-recollected past and the
imaginary past may be much the same. In other words, there is nothing unique in the object
of memory, and no special faculty is needed to account for its formation. It is a synthesis of
parts thought of as related together, perception, imagination, comparison and reasoning
being analogous syntheses of parts into complex objects. The objects of any of these
faculties may awaken belief or fail to awaken it; the object of memory is only an object
imagined in the past (usually very completely imagined there) to which the emotion of belief
adheres.
MEMORY'S CAUSES.

[Pg 653]

Such being the phenomenon of memory, or the analysis of its object, can we see how it
comes to pass? can we lay bare its causes?
Its complete exercise presupposes two things:
1) The retention of the remembered fact;
2) Its reminiscence, recollection, reproduction, or recall.
Now the cause both of retention and of recollection is the law of habit in the nervous system,
working as it does in the 'association of ideas.'
Associationists have long explained recollection by association. James Mill gives an
account of it which I am unable to improve upon, unless it might be by translating his word
'idea' into 'thing thought of,' or 'object,' as explained so often before.
"There is," he says, "a state of mind familiar to all men, in which we are said to
remember. In this state it is certain we have not in the mind the idea which we
are trying to have in it.[579] How is it, then, that we proceed in the course of our
endeavor, to procure its introduction into the mind? If we have not the idea
itself, we have certain ideas connected with it. We run over those ideas, one
after another, in hopes that some one of them will suggest the idea we are in
quest of; and if any one of them does, it is always one so connected with it as to
call it up in the way of association. I meet an old acquaintance, whose name I
do not remember, and wish to recollect. I run over a number of names, in hopes
that some of them may be associated with the idea of the individual. I think of
all the circumstances in which I have seen him engaged; the time when I knew
him, the persons along with whom I knew him, the things he did, or the things
he suffered; and, if I chance upon any idea with which the name is associated,
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then immediately I have the recollection; if not, my pursuit of it is vain.[580]
There is another set of cases, very familiar, but affording very important
evidence on the subject. It frequently happens that there are matters which we
desire not to forget. What is the contrivance to which we have recourse for
preserving the memory—that is, for making sure that it will be called into
existence, when it is our wish that it should? All men invariably employ the
same expedient. They endeavor to form an association between the idea of the
thing to be remembered, and some sensation, or some idea, which they know
beforehand will occur at or near the time when they wish the remembrance to
be in their minds. If this association is formed, and the association or idea with
which it has been formed occurs; the sensation, or idea, calls up the
remembrance; and the object of him who formed the association is attained. To
use a vulgar instance: a man receives a commission from his friend, and, that he
may not forget it, ties a knot in his handkerchief. How is this fact to be
explained? First of all, the idea of the commission is associated with the making
of the knot. Next, the handkerchief is a thing which it is known beforehand will
be frequently seen, and of course at no great distance of time from the occasion
on which the memory is desired. The handkerchief being seen, the knot is seen,
and this sensation recalls the idea of the commission, between which and itself
the association had been purposely formed."[581]

[Pg 654]

In short, we make search in our memory for a forgotten idea, just as we rummage our house
for a lost object. In both cases we visit what seems to us the probable neighborhood of that
which we miss. We turn over the things under which, or within which, or alongside of
which, it may possibly be; and if it lies near them, it soon comes to view. But these matters,
in the case of a mental object sought, are nothing but its associates. The machinery of recall
is thus the same as the machinery of association, and the machinery of association, as we
know, is nothing but the elementary law of habit in the nerve-centres.
And this same law of habit is the machinery of retention also. Retention means liability to
recall, and it means nothing more than such liability. The only proof of there being retention
is that recall actually takes place. The retention of an experience is, in short, but another
name for the possibility of thinking it again, or the tendency to think it again, with its past
surroundings. Whatever accidental cue may turn this tendency into an actuality, the
permanent ground of the tendency itself lies in the organized neural paths by which the cue
calls up the experience on the proper occasion, together with its past associates, the sense
that the self was there, the belief that it really happened, etc., etc., just as previously
described. When the recollection is of the 'ready' sort, the resuscitation takes place the
instant the occasion arises; when it is slow, resuscitation comes after delay. But be the recall [Pg 655]
prompt or slow, the condition which makes it possible at all (or in other words, the
'retention' of the experience) is neither more nor less than the brain-paths which associate
the experience with the occasion and cue of the recall. When slumbering, these paths are the
condition of retention; when active, they are the condition of recall.

A simple scheme will now make the whole cause of memory plain. Let n be a past event; o
its 'setting' (concomitants, date, self present, warmth and intimacy, etc., etc., as already set
forth); and m some present thought or fact which may appropriately become the occasion of
its recall. Let the nerve-centres, active in the thought of m, n, and o, be represented by M, N,
and O, respectively; then the existence of the paths M—N and N—O will be the fact
indicated by the phrase 'retention of the event n in the memory,' and the excitement of the
brain along these paths will be the condition of the event n's actual recall. The retention of n,
it will be observed, is no mysterious storing up of an 'idea' in an unconscious state. It is not a
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fact of the mental order at all. It is a purely physical
phenomenon, a morphological feature, the presence of
these 'paths,' namely, in the ﬁnest recesses of the brain's
tissue. The recall or recollection, on the other hand, is a
psycho-physical phenomenon, with both a bodily and a
mental side. The bodily side is the functional excitement
of the tracts and paths in question; the mental side is the
conscious vision of the past occurrence, and the belief that
we experienced it before.
These habit-worn paths of association are a clear rendering
of what authors mean by 'predispositions,' 'vestiges,'
FIG. 45.
'traces,' etc., left in the brain by past experience. Most
[Pg 656]
writers leave the nature of these vestiges vague; few think
of explicitly assimilating them to channels of association. Dr. Maudsley, for example,
writes:
"When an idea which we have once had is excited again, there is a reproduction
of the same nervous current, with the conscious addition that it is a reproduction
—it is the same idea plus the consciousness that it is the same. The question
then suggests itself, What is the physical condition of this consciousness? What
is the modiﬁcation of the anatomical substrata of ﬁbres and cells, or of their
physiological activity, which is the occasion of this plus element in the
reproduced idea? It may be supposed that the ﬁrst activity did leave behind it,
when it subsided, some after-effect, some modiﬁcation of the nerve-element,
whereby the nerve-circuit was disposed to fall again readily into the same
action; such disposition appearing in consciousness as recognition or memory.
Memory is, in fact, the conscious phase of this physiological disposition when
it becomes active or discharges its functions on the recurrence of the particular
mental experience. To assist our conception of what may happen, let us suppose
the individual nerve-elements to be endowed with their own consciousness, and
let us assume them to be, as I have supposed, modiﬁed in a certain way by the
ﬁrst experience; it is hard to conceive that when they fall into the same action
on another occasion they should not recognize or remember it; for the second
action is a reproduction of the ﬁrst, with the addition of what it contains from
the after-effects of the ﬁrst. As we have assumed the process to be conscious,
this reproduction with its addition would be a memory or remembrance."[582]
In this passage Dr. Maudsley seems to mean by the 'nerve-element,' or 'anatomical
substratum of ﬁbres and cells,' something that corresponds to the N of our diagram. And the
'modiﬁcation' he speaks of seems intended to be understood as an internal modiﬁcation of
this same particular group of elements. Now the slightest reﬂection will convince anyone
that there is no conceivable ground for supposing that with the mere re-excitation of N there
should arise the 'conscious addition' that it is a re-excitation. The two excitations are simply
two excitations, their consciousnesses are two consciousnesses, they have nothing to do
with each other. And a vague 'modiﬁcation,' supposed to be left behind by the ﬁrst
excitation, helps us not a whit. For, according to all analogy, such a modiﬁcation can only
result in making the next excitation more smooth and rapid. This might make it less
conscious, perhaps, but could not endow it with any reference to the past. The gutter is worn [Pg 657]
deeper by each successive shower, but not for that reason brought into contact with previous
showers. Psychology (which Dr. Maudsley in his next sentence says "affords us not the least
help in this matter") puts us on the track of an at least possible brain-explanation. As it is the
setting o of the idea, when it recurs, which makes us conscious of it as past, so it can be no
intrinsic modiﬁcation of the 'nerve-element' N which is the organic condition of memory,
but something extrinsic to it altogether, namely, its connections with those other nervehttps://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm
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elements which we called O—that letter standing in the scheme for the cerebral substratum
of a great plexus of things other than the principal event remembered, dates, names,
concrete surroundings, realized intervals, and what not. The 'modiﬁcation' is the formation
in the plastic nerve-substance of the system of associative paths between N and O.
The only hypothesis, in short, to which the facts of inward experience give countenance is
that the brain-tracts excited by the event proper, and those excited in its recall, are in part
different from each other. If we could revive the past event without any associates we should
exclude the possibility of memory, and simply dream that we were undergoing the
experience as if for the ﬁrst time.[583] Wherever, in fact, the recalled event does appear [Pg 658]
without a deﬁnite setting, it is hard to distinguish it from a mere creation of fancy. But in
proportion as its image lingers and recalls associates which gradually become more deﬁnite,
it grows more and more distinctly into a remembered thing. For example, I enter a friend's
room and see on the wall a painting. At ﬁrst I have the strange, wondering consciousness,
'surely I have seen that before,' but when or how does not become clear. There only clings to
the picture a sort of penumbra of familiarity,—when suddenly I exclaim: "I have it, it is a
copy of part of one of the Fra Angelicos in the Florentine Academy—I recollect it there!"
But the motive to the recall does not lie in the fact that the brain-tract now excited by the
painting was once before excited in a similar way; it lies simply and solely in the fact that
with that brain-tract other tracts also are excited: those which sustain my friend's room with
all its peculiarities, on the one hand; those which sustain the mental image of the Florence
Academy, on the other hand, with the circumstances of my visit there; and ﬁnally those
which make me (more dimly) think of the years I have lived through between these two
times. The result of this total brain-disturbance is a thought with a peculiar object, namely,
that I who now stand here with this picture before me, stood so many years ago in the
Florentine Academy looking at its original.
M. Taine has described the gradual way in which a mental image develops into an object of
memory, in his usual vivid fashion. He says:
"I meet casually in the street a person whose appearance I am acquainted with,
and say to myself at once that I have seen him before. Instantly the ﬁgure
recedes into the past, and wavers about there vaguely, without at once ﬁxing
itself in any spot. It persists in me for some time, and surrounds itself with new
details. 'When I saw him he was bare-headed, with a working-jacket on,
painting in a studio; he is so-and-so, of such-and-such a street. But when was
it? It was not yesterday, nor this week, nor recently. I have it: he told me that he
was waiting for the ﬁrst leaves to come out to go into the country. It was before
the spring. But at what exact date? I saw, the same day, people carrying
branches in the streets and omnibuses: it was Palm Sunday!' Observe the travels
of the internal ﬁgure, its various shiftings to front and rear along the line of the
past; each of these mental sentences has been a swing of the balance. When
confronted with the present sensation and with the latent swarm of indistinct
images which repeat our recent life, the ﬁgure ﬁrst recoiled suddenly to an
indeterminate distance. Then, completed by precise details, and confronted with
all the shortened images by which we sum up the proceedings of a day or a
week, it again receded beyond the present day, beyond yesterday, the day
before, the week, still farther, beyond the ill-deﬁned mass constituted by our
recent recollections. Then something said by the painter was recalled, and it at
once receded again beyond an almost precise limit, which is marked by the
image of the green leaves and denoted by the word spring. A moment
afterwards, thanks to a new detail, the recollection of the branches, it has shifted
again, but forward this time, not backward; and, by a reference to the calendar,
is situated at a precise point, a week further back than Easter, and ﬁve weeks
nearer than the carnival, by the double effect of the contrary impulsions,
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pushing it, one forward and the other backward, and which are, at a particular
moment, annulled by one another."[584]
THE CONDITIONS OF GOODNESS IN MEMORY.
The remembered fact being n, then, the path N—O is what arouses for n its setting when it
is recalled, and makes it other than a mere imagination. The path M—N, on the other hand,
gives the cue or occasion of its being recalled at all. Memory being this altogether
conditioned on brain-paths, its excellence in a given individual will depend partly on the
number and partly on the persistence of these paths.
The persistence or permanence of the paths is a physiological property of the brain-tissue of
the individual, whilst their number is altogether due to the facts of his mental experience.
Let the quality of permanence in the paths be called the native tenacity, or physiological
retentiveness. This tenacity differs enormously from infancy to old age, and from one person
to another. Some minds are like wax under a seal—no impression, however disconnected [Pg 660]
with others, is wiped out. Others, like a jelly, vibrate to every touch, but under usual
conditions retain no permanent mark. These latter minds, before they can recollect a fact,
must weave it into their permanent stores of knowledge. They have no desultory memory.
Those persons, on the contrary, who retain names, dates and addresses, anecdotes, gossip,
poetry, quotations, and all sorts of miscellaneous facts, without an effort, have desultory
memory in a high degree, and certainly owe it to the unusual tenacity of their brainsubstance for any path once formed therein. No one probably was ever effective on a
voluminous scale without a high degree of this physiological retentiveness. In the practical
as in the theoretic life, the man whose acquisitions stick is the man who is always achieving
and advancing, whilst his neighbors, spending most of their time in relearning what they
once knew but have forgotten, simply hold their own. A Charlemagne, a Luther, a Leibnitz,
a Walter Scott, any example, in short, of your quarto or folio editions of mankind, must
needs have amazing retentiveness of the purely physiological sort. Men without this
retentiveness may excel in the quality of their work at this point or at that, but will never do
such mighty sums of it, or be inﬂuential contemporaneously on such a scale.[585]
But there comes a time of life for all of us when we can do no more than hold our own in the [Pg 661]
way of acquisitions, when the old paths fade as fast as the new ones form in our brain, and
when we forget in a week quite as much as we can learn in the same space of time. This
equilibrium may last many, many years. In extreme old age it is upset in the reverse
direction, and forgetting prevails over acquisition or rather there is no acquisition. Brainpaths are so transient that in the course of a few minutes of conversation the same question
is asked and its answer forgotten half a dozen times. Then the superior tenacity of the paths
formed in childhood becomes manifest: the dotard will retrace the facts of his earlier years
after he has lost all those of later date.
So much for the permanence of the paths. Now for their number.
It is obvious that the more there are of such paths as M—N in the brain, and the more of
such possible cues or occasions for the recall of n in the mind, the prompter and surer, on
the whole, the memory of n will be, the more frequently one will be reminded of it, the more [Pg 662]
avenues of approach to it one will possess. In mental terms, the more other facts a fact is
associated with in the mind, the better possession of it our memory retains. Each of its
associates becomes a hook to which it hangs, a means to ﬁsh it up by when sunk beneath the
surface. Together, they form a network of attachments by which it is woven into the entire
tissue of our thought. The 'secret of a good memory' is thus the secret of forming diverse
and multiple associations with every fact we care to retain. But this forming of associations
with a fact, what is it but thinking about the fact as much as possible? Brieﬂy, then, of two
men with the same outward experiences and the same amount of mere native tenacity, the
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one who THINKS over his experiences most, and weaves them into systematic relations with
each other, will be the one with the best memory. We see examples of this on every hand.
Most men have a good memory for facts connected with their own pursuits. The college
athlete who remains a dunce at his books will astonish you by his knowledge of men's
'records' in various feats and games, and will be a walking dictionary of sporting statistics.
The reason is that he is constantly going over these things in his mind, and comparing and
making series of them. They form for him not so many odd facts, but a concept-system—so
they stick. So the merchant remembers prices, the politician other politicians' speeches and
votes, with a copiousness which amazes outsiders, but which the amount of thinking they
bestow on these subjects easily explains. The great memory for facts which a Darwin and a
Spencer reveal in their books is not incompatible with the possession on their part of a brain
with only a middling degree of physiological retentiveness. Let a man early in life set
himself the task of verifying such a theory as that of evolution, and facts will soon cluster
and cling to him like grapes to their stem. Their relations to the theory will hold them fast;
and the more of these the mind is able to discern, the greater the erudition will become.
Meanwhile the theorist may have little, if any, desultory memory. Unutilizable facts may be
unnoted by him and forgotten as soon as heard. An ignorance almost as encyclopædic as his [Pg 663]
erudition may coexist with the latter, and hide, as it were, in the interstices of its web. Those
who have had much to do with scholars and savants will readily think of examples of the
class of mind I mean.
In a system, every fact is connected with every other by some thought-relation. The
consequence is that every fact is retained by the combined suggestive power of all the other
facts in the system, and forgetfulness is well-nigh impossible.
The reason why cramming is such a bad mode of study is now made clear. I mean by
cramming that way of preparing for examinations by committing 'points' to memory during
a few hours or days of intense application immediately preceding the ﬁnal ordeal, little or no
work having been performed during the previous course of the term. Things learned thus in
a few hours, on one occasion, for one purpose, cannot possibly have formed many
associations with other things in the mind. Their brain-processes are led into by few paths,
and are relatively little liable to be awakened again. Speedy oblivion is the almost inevitable
fate of all that is committed to memory in this simple way. Whereas, on the contrary, the
same materials taken in gradually, day after day, recurring in different contexts, considered
in various relations, associated with other external incidents, and repeatedly reﬂected on,
grow into such a system, form such connections with the rest of the mind's fabric, lie open
to so many paths of approach, that they remain permanent possessions. This is the
intellectual reason why habits of continuous application should be enforced in educational
establishments. Of course there is no moral turpitude in cramming. If it led to the desired
end of secure learning it would be inﬁnitely the best method of study. But it does not; and
students themselves should understand the reason why.
ONE'S NATIVE RETENTIVENESS IS UNCHANGEABLE.
It will now appear clear that all improvement of the memory lies in the line of ELABORATING
THE ASSOCIATES of each of the several things to be remembered. No amount of culture would
seem capable of modifying a man's GENERAL retentiveness. This is a physiological quality, [Pg 664]
given once for all with his organization, and which he can never hope to change. It differs
no doubt in disease and health; and it is a fact of observation that it is better in fresh and
vigorous hours than when we are fagged or ill. We may say, then, that a man's native
tenacity will ﬂuctuate somewhat with his hygiene, and that whatever is good for his tone of
health will also be good for his memory. We may even say that whatever amount of
intellectual exercise is bracing to the general tone and nutrition of the brain will also be
proﬁtable to the general retentiveness. But more than this we cannot say; and this, it is
obvious, is far less than most people believe.
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It is, in fact, commonly thought that certain exercises, systematically repeated, will
strengthen, not only a man's remembrance of the particular facts used in the exercises, but
his faculty for remembering facts at large. And a plausible case is always made out by
saying that practice in learning words by heart makes it easier to learn new words in the
same way.[586] If this be true, then what I have just said is false, and the whole doctrine of
memory as due to 'paths' must be revised. But I am disposed to think the alleged fact untrue.
I have carefully questioned several mature actors on the point, and all have denied that the
practice of learning parts has made any such difference as is alleged. What it has done for
them is to improve their power of studying a part systematically. Their mind is now full of
precedents in the way of intonation, emphasis, gesticulation; the new words awaken distinct
suggestions and decisions; are caught up, in fact, into a pre-existing net-work, like the
merchant's prices, or the athlete's store of 'records,' and are recollected easier, although the
mere native tenacity is not a whit improved, and is usually, in fact, impaired by age. It is a
case of better remembering by better thinking. Similarly when schoolboys improve by
practice in ease of learning by heart, the improvement will, I am sure, be always found to
reside in the mode of study of the particular piece (due to the greater interest, the greater [Pg 665]
suggestiveness, the generic similarity with other pieces, the more sustained attention, etc.,
etc.), and not at all to any enhancement of the brute retentive power.
The error I speak of pervades an otherwise useful and judicious book, 'How to Strengthen
the Memory,' by Dr. Holbrook of New York.[587] The author fails to distinguish between the
general physiological retentiveness and the retention of particular things, and talks as if both
must be beneﬁted by the same means.
"I am now treating," he says, "a case of loss of memory in a person advanced in
years, who did not know that his memory had failed most remarkably till I told
him of it. He is making vigorous efforts to bring it back again, and with partial
success. The method pursued is to spend two hours daily, one in the morning
and one in the evening, in exercising this faculty. The patient is instructed to
give the closest attention to all that he learns, so that it shall be impressed on his
mind clearly. He is asked to recall every evening all the facts and experiences of
the day, and again the next morning. Every name heard is written down and
impressed on his mind clearly, and an effort made to recall it at intervals. Ten
names from among public men are ordered to be committed to memory every
week. A verse of poetry is to be learned, also a verse from the Bible, daily. He
is asked to remember the number of the page in any book where any interesting
fact is recorded. These and other methods are slowly resuscitating a failing
memory."[588]
I ﬁnd it very hard to believe that the memory of the poor old gentleman is a bit the better for
all this torture except in respect of the particular facts thus wrought into it, the occurrences
attended to and repeated on those days, the names of those politicians, those Bible verses,
etc., etc. In another place Dr. Holbrook quotes the account given by the late Thurlow Weed,
journalist and politician, of his method of strengthening his memory.
"My memory was a sieve. I could remember nothing. Dates, names,
appointments, faces—everything escaped me. I said to my wife, 'Catherine, I
shall never make a successful politician, for I cannot remember, and that is a
prime necessity of politicians.' My wife told me I must train my memory. So
when I came home that night, I sat down alone and spent ﬁfteen minutes trying
silently to recall with accuracy the principal events of the day. I could
remember but little at ﬁrst; now I remember that I could not then recall what I
had for breakfast. After a few days' practice I found I could recall more. Events
came back to me more minutely, more accurately, and more vividly than at ﬁrst.
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

[Pg 666]

398/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

After a fortnight or so of this, Catherine said, 'Why don't you relate to me the
events of the day, instead of recalling them to yourself? It would be interesting,
and my interest in it would be a stimulus to you.' Having great respect for my
wife's opinion, I began a habit of oral confession, as it were, which was
continued for almost ﬁfty years. Every night, the last thing before retiring, I told
her everything I could remember that had happened to me or about me during
the day. I generally recalled the dishes I had had for breakfast, dinner, and tea;
the people I had seen and what they had said; the editorials I had written for my
paper, giving her a brief abstract of them. I mentioned all the letters I had sent
and received, and the very language used, as nearly as possible; when I had
walked or ridden—I told her everything that had come within my observation. I
found I could say my lessons better and better every year, and instead of the
practice growing irksome, it became a pleasure to go over again the events of
the day. I am indebted to this discipline for a memory of somewhat unusual
tenacity, and I recommend the practice to all who wish to store up facts, or
expect to have much to do with inﬂuencing men."[589]
I do not doubt that Mr. Weed's practical command of his past experiences was much greater
after ﬁfty years of this heroic drill than it would have been without it. Expecting to give his
account in the evening, he attended better to each incident of the day, named and conceived
it differently, set his mind upon it, and in the evening went over it again. He did more
thinking about it, and it stayed with him in consequence. But I venture to afﬁrm pretty
conﬁdently (although I know how foolish it often is to deny a fact on the strength of a
theory) that the same matter, casually attended to and not thought about, would have stuck
in his memory no better at the end than at the beginning of his years of heroic selfdiscipline. He had acquired a better method of noting and recording his experiences, but his
physiological retentiveness was probably not a bit improved.[590]
All improvement of memory consists, then, in the improvement of one's habitual methods of [Pg 667]
recording facts. In the traditional terminology methods are divided into the mechanical, the [Pg 668]
ingenious, and the judicious.
The mechanical methods consist in the intensiﬁcation, prolongation, and repetition of the
impression to be remembered. The modern method of teaching children to read by
blackboard work, in which each word is impressed by the four-fold channel of eye, ear,
voice, and hand, is an example of an improved mechanical method of memorizing.
Judicious methods of remembering things are nothing but logical ways of conceiving them
and working them into rational systems, classifying them, analyzing them into parts, etc.,
etc. All the sciences are such methods.
Of ingenious methods, many have been invented, under the name of technical memories. By
means of these systems it is often possible to retain entirely disconnected facts, lists of
names, numbers, and so forth, so multitudinous as to be entirely unrememberable in a
natural way. The method consists usually in a framework learned mechanically, of which the
mind is supposed to remain in secure and permanent possession. Then, whatever is to be
remembered is deliberately associated by some fanciful analogy or connection with some
part of this framework, and this connection thenceforward helps its recall. The best known
and most used of these devices is the ﬁgure-alphabet. To remember numbers, e.g., a ﬁgurealphabet is ﬁrst formed, in which each numerical digit is represented by one or more letters.
The number is then translated into such letters as will best make a word, if possible a word
suggestive of the object to which the number belongs. The word will then be remembered [Pg 669]
when the numbers alone might be forgotten.
"The most common ﬁgure-alphabet is this:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm
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t, n, m, r, l, sh,
d,
j,
ch,
g,

g, f, b, s,
k, v, p, c,
c,
z,
qu.

"To brieﬂy show its use, suppose it is desired to ﬁx 1142 feet in a second as the
velocity of sound: t, t, r, n, are the letters and order required. Fill up with vowels
forming a phrase, like 'tight run' and connect it by some such ﬂight of the
imagination as that if a man tried to keep up with the velocity of sound, he
would have a tight run. When you recall this a few days later great care must be
taken not to get confused with the velocity of light, nor to think he had a hard
run which would be 3000 feet too fast."[591]
Dr. Pick and others use a system which consists in linking together any two ideas to be
remembered by means of an intermediate idea which will be suggested by the ﬁrst and
suggest the second, and so on through the list. Thus,
"Let us suppose that we are to retain the following series of ideas: garden, hair,
watchman, philosophy, copper, etc.... We can combine the ideas in this manner:
garden, plant, hair of plant—hair; hair, bonnet, watchman;—watchman, wake,
study, philosophy; philosophy, chemistry, copper; etc. etc." (Pick.)[592]

It is matter of popular knowledge that an impression is remembered the better in proportion
as it is
1) More recent;
2) More attended to; and
3) More often repeated.
The effect of recency is all but absolutely constant. Of two events of equal signiﬁcance the
remoter one will be the one more likely to be forgotten. The memories of childhood which
persist in old age can hardly be compared with the events of the day or hour which are
forgotten, for these latter are trivial once-repeated things, whilst the childish reminiscences [Pg 670]
have been wrought into us during the retrospective hours of our entire intervening life.
Other things equal, at all times of life recency promotes memory. The only exception I can
think of is the unaccountable memory of certain moments of our childhood, apparently not
ﬁtted by their intrinsic interest to survive, but which are perhaps the only incidents we can
remember out of the year in which they occurred. Everybody probably has isolated glimpses
of certain hours of his nursery life, the position in which he stood or sat, the light of the
room, what his father or mother said, etc. These moments so oddly selected for immunity
from the tooth of time probably owe their good fortune to historical peculiarities which it is
now impossible to trace. Very likely we were reminded of them again soon after they
occurred; that became a reason why we should again recollect them, etc., so that at last they
became ingrained.
The attention which we lend to an experience is proportional to its vivid or interesting
character; and it is a notorious fact that what interests us most vividly at the time is, other
things equal, what we remember best. An impression may be so exciting emotionally as
almost to leave a scar upon the cerebral tissues; and thus originates a pathological delusion.
"A woman attacked by robbers takes all the men whom she sees, even her own son, for
brigands bent on killing her. Another woman sees her child run over by a horse; no amount
of reasoning, not even the sight of the living child, will persuade her that he is not killed. A
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

400/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

woman called 'thief' in a dispute remains convinced that every one accuses her of stealing
(Esquirol). Another, attacked with mania at the sight of the ﬁres in her street during the
Commune, still after six months sees in her delirium ﬂames on every side about her (Luys),
etc., etc."[593]
On the general effectiveness of both attention and repetition I cannot do better than copy
what M. Taine has written:
"If we compare different sensations, images, or ideas, we ﬁnd that their
aptitudes for revival are not equal. A large number of them are obliterated, and
never reappear through life; for instance, I drove through Paris a day or two
ago, and though I saw plainly some sixty or eighty new faces, I cannot now
recall any one of them; some extraordinary circumstance, a ﬁt of delirium, or
the excitement of haschish would be necessary to give them a chance of revival.
On the other hand, there are sensations with a force of revival which nothing
destroys or decreases. Though, as a rule, time weakens and impairs our
strongest sensations, these reappear entire and intense, without having lost a
particle of their detail, or any degree of their force. M. Brierre de Boismont,
having suffered when a child from a disease of the scalp, asserts that 'after ﬁftyﬁve years have elapsed he can still feel his hair pulled out under the treatment
of the skull-cap.'—For my own part, after thirty years, I remember feature for
feature the appearance of the theatre to which I was taken for the ﬁrst time.
From the third row of boxes, the body of the theatre appeared to me an
immense well, red and ﬂaming, swarming with heads; below, on the right, on a
narrow ﬂoor, two men and a woman entered, went out, and re-entered, made
gestures, and seemed to me like lively dwarfs: to my great surprise, one of these
dwarfs fell on his knees, kissed the lady's hand, then hid behind a screen; the
other, who was coming in, seemed angry, and raised his arm. I was then seven, I
could understand nothing of what was going on; but the well of crimson velvet
was so crowded, gilded, and bright, that after a quarter of an hour I was, as it
were, intoxicated, and fell asleep.

[Pg 671]

"Every one of us may ﬁnd similar recollections in his memory, and may
distinguish in them a common character. The primitive impression has been
accompanied by an extraordinary degree of attention, either as being horrible or
delightful, or as being new, surprising, and out of proportion to the ordinary run
of our life; this it is we express by saying that we have been strongly impressed;
that we were absorbed, that we could not think of anything else; that our other
sensations were effaced; that we were pursued all the next day by the resulting
image; that it beset us, that we could not drive it away; that all distractions were
feeble beside it. It is by force of this disproportion that impressions of
childhood are so persistent; the mind being quite fresh, ordinary objects and
events are surprising. At present, after seeing so many large halls and full
theatres, it is impossible for me, when I enter one, to feel swallowed up,
engulfed, and, as it were, lost in a huge dazzling well. The medical man of
sixty, who has experienced much suffering, both personally and in imagination,
would be less upset now by a surgical operation than when he was a child.
"Whatever may be the kind of attention, voluntary or involuntary, it always acts
alike; the image of an object or event is capable of revival, and of complete
revival, in proportion to the degree of attention with which we have considered
the object or event. We put this rule in practice at every moment in ordinary
life. If we are applying ourselves to a book or are in lively conversation, while
an air is being sung in the adjoining room, we do not retain it; we know vaguely
that there is singing going on, and that is all. We then stop our reading or
conversation, we lay aside all internal preoccupations and external sensations
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm
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which our mind or the outer world can throw in our way; we close our eyes, we
cause a silence within and about us, and, if the air is repeated, we listen. We say
then that we have listened with all our ears, that we have applied our whole
minds. If the air is a ﬁne one, and has touched us deeply, we add that we have
been transported, uplifted, ravished, that we have forgotten the world and
ourselves; that for some minutes our soul was dead to all but sounds....
"This exclusive momentary ascendency of one of our states of mind explains
the greater durability of its aptitude for revival and for more complete revival.
As the sensation revives in the image, the image reappears with a force
proportioned to that of the sensation. What we meet with in the ﬁrst state is also
to be met with in the second, since the second is but a revival of the ﬁrst. So, in
the struggle for life, in which all our images are constantly engaged, the one
furnished at the outset with most force retains in each conﬂict, by the very law
of repetition which gives it being, the capacity of treading down its adversaries;
this is why it revives, incessantly at ﬁrst, then frequently, until at last the laws of
progressive decay, and the continual accession of new impressions take away its
preponderance, and its competitors, ﬁnding a clear ﬁeld, are able to develop in
their turn.
"A second cause of prolonged revivals is repetition itself. Every one knows that
to learn a thing we must not only consider it attentively, but consider it
repeatedly. We say as to this in ordinary language, that an impression many
times renewed is imprinted more deeply and exactly on the memory. This is
how we contrive to retain a language, airs of music, passages of verse or prose,
the technical terms and propositions of a science, and still more so the ordinary
facts by which our conduct is regulated. When, from the form and color of a
currant-jelly, we think of its taste, or, when tasting it with our eyes shut, we
imagine its red tint and the brilliancy of a quivering slice, the images in our
mind are brightened by repetition. Whenever we eat, or drink, or walk, or avail
ourselves of any of our senses, or commence or continue any action whatever,
the same thing happens. Every man and every animal thus possesses at every
moment of life a certain stock of clear and easily reviving images, which had
their source in the past in a conﬂuence of numerous experiences, and are now
fed by a ﬂow of renewed experiences. When I want to go from the Tuileries to
the Panthéon, or from my study to the dining-room, I foresee at every turn the
colored forms which will present themselves to my sight; it is otherwise in the
case of a house where I have spent two hours, or of a town where I have stayed
three days; after ten years have elapsed the images will be vague, full of blanks,
sometimes they will not exist, and I shall have to seek my way or shall lose
myself.—This new property of images is also derived from the ﬁrst. As every
sensation tends to revive in its image, the sensation twice repeated will leave
after it a double tendency, that is, provided the attention be as great the second
time as the ﬁrst; usually this is not the case, for, the novelty diminishing, the
interest diminishes; but if other circumstances renew the interest, or if the will
renovates the attention, the incessantly increasing tendency will incessantly
increase the chances of the resurrection and integrity of the image."[594]

[Pg 673]

If a phenomenon is met with, however, too often, and with too great a variety of contexts,
although its image is retained and reproduced with correspondingly great facility, it fails to
come up with any one particular setting, and the projection of it backwards to a particular
past date consequently does not come about. We recognize but do not remember it—its
associates form too confused a cloud. No one is said to remember, says Mr. Spencer,

https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

402/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

"that the object at which he looks has an opposite side; or that a certain
modiﬁcation of the visual impression implies a certain distance; or that the
thing he sees moving about is a live animal. To ask a man whether he
remembers that the sun shines, that ﬁre burns, that iron is hard, would be a
misuse of language. Even the almost fortuitous connections among our
experiences cease to be classed as memories when they have become
thoroughly familiar. Though, on hearing the voice cf some unseen person
slightly known to us, we say we recollect to whom the voice belongs, we do not
use the same expression respecting the voices of those with whom we live. The
meanings of words which in childhood have to be consciously recalled seem in
adult life to be immediately present."[595]
These are cases where too many paths, leading to too diverse associates, block each other's
way, and all that the mind gets along with its object is a fringe of felt familiarity or sense
that there are associates. A similar result comes about when a deﬁnite setting is only
nascently aroused. We then feel that we have seen the object already, but when or where we
cannot say, though we may seem to ourselves to be on the brink of saying it. That nascent
cerebral excitations can effect consciousness with a sort of sense of the imminence of that
which stronger excitations would make us deﬁnitely feel, is obvious from what happens
when we seek to remember a name. It tingles, it trembles on the verge, but does not come. [Pg 674]
Just such a tingling and trembling of unrecovered associates is the penumbra of recognition
that may surround any experience and make it seem familiar, though we know not why.[596]
There is a curious experience which everyone seems to have had—the feeling that the [Pg 675]
present moment in its completeness has been experienced before—we were saying just this
thing, in just this place, to just these people, etc. This 'sense of pre-existence' has been
treated as a great mystery and occasioned much speculation. Dr. Wigan considered it due to
a dissociation of the action of the two hemispheres, one of them becoming conscious a little
later than the other, but both of the same fact.[597] I must confess that the quality of mystery [Pg 676]
seems to me a little strained. I have over and over again in my own case succeeded in
resolving the phenomenon into a case of memory, so indistinct that whilst some past
circumstances are presented again, the others are not. The dissimilar portions of the past do
not arise completely enough at ﬁrst for the date to be identiﬁed, All we get is the present
scene with a general suggestion of pastness about it. That faithful observer, Prof. Lazarus,
interprets the phenomenon in the same way;[598] and it is noteworthy that just as soon as the
past context grows complete and distinct the emotion of weirdness fades from the
experience.
EXACT MEASUREMENTS OF MEMORY
have recently been made in Germany. Professor Ebbinghaus, in a really heroic series of
daily observations of more than two years' duration, examined the powers of retention and
reproduction. He learned lists of meaningless syllables by heart, and tested his recollection
of them from day to day. He could not remember more than 7 after a single reading. It took,
however, 16 readings to remember 12, 44 readings to remember 24, and 55 readings to
remember 26 syllables, the moment of 'remembering' being here reckoned as the ﬁrst
moment when the list could be recited without a fault.[599] When a 16-syllable list was read
over a certain number of times on one day, and then studied on the day following until
remembered, it was found that the number of seconds saved in the study on the second day
was proportional to the number of readings on the ﬁrst—proportional, that is, within certain
rather narrow limits, for which see the text.[600] No amount of repetition spent on nonsenseverses over a certain length enabled Dr. Ebbinghaus to retain them without error for 24
hours. In forgetting such things as these lists of syllables, the loss goos on very much more
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rapidly at ﬁrst than later on. He measured the loss by the number of seconds required to [Pg 677]
relearn the list after it had been once learned. Roughly speaking, if it took a thousand
seconds to learn the list, and ﬁve hundred to relearn it, the loss between the two learnings
would have been one half. Measured in this way, full half of the forgetting seems to occur
within the ﬁrst half-hour, whilst only four ﬁfths is forgotten at the end of a month. The
nature of this result might have been anticipated, but hardly its numerical proportions. Dr.
Ebbinghaus says:
"The initial rapidity, as well as the ﬁnal slowness, as these were ascertained
under certain experimental conditions and for a particular individual,... may
well surprise us. An hour after the work of learning had ceased, forgetting was
so far advanced that more than half of the original work had to be applied again
before the series of syllables could once more be reproduced. Eight hours later
two thirds of the original labor had to be applied. Gradually, however, the
process of oblivion grew slower, so that even for considerable stretches of time
the losses were but barely ascertainable. After 24 hours a third, after 6 days a
fourth, and after a whole month a good ﬁfth of the original labor remain in the
shape of its after-effects, and made the relearning by so much the more speedy."
[601]

But the most interesting result of all those reached by this author relates to the question
whether ideas are recalled only by those that previously came immediately before them, or
whether an idea can possibly recall another idea with which it was never in immediate
contact, without passing through the intermediate mental links. The question is of theoretic
importance with regard to the way in which the process of 'association of ideas' must be
conceived; and Dr. Ebbinghaus's attempt is as successful as it is original, in bringing two
views, which seem at ﬁrst sight inaccessible to proof, to a direct practical test, and giving
the victory to one of them. His experiments conclusively show that an idea is not only
'associated' directly with the one that follows it, and with the rest through that, but that it is
directly associated with all that are near it, though in unequal degrees. He ﬁrst measured the
time needed to impress on the memory certain lists of syllables, and then the time needed to
impress lists of the same syllables with gaps between them. Thus, representing the syllables [Pg 678]
by numbers, if the ﬁrst list were 1, 2, 3, 4,... 13, 14, 15, 16, the second would be 1, 3, 5,...
15, 2, 4, 6,... 16, and so forth, with many variations.
Now, if 1 and 3 in the ﬁrst list were learned in that order merely by 1 calling up 2, and by 2
calling up 3, leaving out the 2 ought to leave 1 and 3 with no tie in the mind; and the second
list ought to take as much time in the learning as if the ﬁrst list had never been heard of. If,
on the other hand, 1 has a direct inﬂuence on 3 as well as on 2, that inﬂuence should be
exerted even when 2 is dropped out; and a person familiar with the ﬁrst list ought to learn
the second one more rapidly than otherwise he could. This latter case is what actually
occurs; and Dr. Ebbinghaus has found that syllables originally separated by as many as
seven intermediaries still reveal, by the increased rapidity with which they are learned in
order, the strength of the tie that the original learning established between them, over the
heads, so to speak, of all the rest. These last results ought to make us careful, when we speak
of nervous 'paths,' to use the word in no restricted sense. They add one more fact to the set
of facts which prove that association is subtler than consciousness, and that a nerve-process
may, without producing consciousness, be effective in the same way in which consciousness
would have seemed to be effective if it had been there.[602] Evidently the path from 1 to 3 [Pg 679]
(omitting 2 from consciousness) is facilitated, broadened perhaps, by the old path from 1 to
3 through 2—only the component which shoots round through this latter way is too feeble to
let 2 be thought as a distinct object.
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Mr. Wolfe, in his experiments on recognition, used vibrating metal tongues.
"These tongues gave tones differing by 2 vibrations only in the two lower
octaves, and by 4 vibrations in the three higher octaves. In the ﬁrst series of
experiments a tone was selected, and, after sounding it for one second, a second
tone was sounded, which was either the same as the ﬁrst, or different from it by
4, 8, or 12 vibrations in different series. The person experimented upon was to
answer whether the second tone was the same as the ﬁrst, thus showing that he
recognized it, or whether it was different, and, if so, whether it was higher or
lower. Of course, the interval of time between the two tones was an important
factor. The proportionate number of correct judgments, and the smallness of the
difference of the vibration-rates of the two tones, would measure the accuracy
of the tone-memory. It appeared that one could tell more readily when the two
tones were alike than when they were different, although in both cases the
accuracy of the memory was remarkably good.... The main point is the effect of
the time-interval between the tone and its reproduction. This was varied from 1
second to 30 seconds, or even to 60 seconds or 120 seconds in some
experiments. The general result is, that the longer the interval, the smaller are
the chances that the tone will be recognized; and this process of forgetting takes
place at ﬁrst very rapidly, and then more slowly.... This law is subject to
considerable variations, one of which seems to be constant and is peculiar;
namely, there seems to be a rhythm in the memory itself, which, after falling,
recovers slightly, and then fades out again."[603]
This periodical renewal of acoustic memory would seem to be an important element in the
production of the agreeableness of certain rates of recurrence in sound.
FORGETTING.
In the practical use of our intellect, forgetting is as important a function as recollecting.
Locke says, in a memorable page of his dear old book:
"The memory of some men, it is true, is very tenacious, even to a miracle; but
yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas, even of those which are
struck deepest, and in minds the most retentive: so that if they be not sometimes
renewed by repeated exercise of the senses, or reﬂection on those kinds of
objects which at ﬁrst occasioned them, the print wears out, and at last there
remains nothing to be seen. Thus the ideas, as well as children, of our youth,
often die before us; and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are
fast approaching; where, though the brass and marble remain, yet the
inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away. The pictures
drawn in our minds are laid in fading colors; and, if not sometimes refreshed,
vanish and disappear. How much the constitution of our bodies, and the make
of our animal spirits, are concerned in this; and whether the temper of the brain
makes this difference, that in some it retains the characters drawn on it like
marble, in others like freestone, and in others little better than sand, I shall not
here inquire, though it may seem probable that the constitution of the body does
sometimes inﬂuence the memory; since we oftentimes ﬁnd a disease quite strip
the mind of all its ideas, and the ﬂames of a fever in a few days calcine all those
images to dust and confusion, which seemed to be as lasting as if graven in
marble."[604]
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This peculiar mixture of forgetting with our remembering is but one instance of our mind's
selective activity. Selection is the very keel on which our mental ship is built. And in this
case of memory its utility is obvious. If we remembered everything, we should on most
occasions be as ill off as if we remembered nothing. It would take as long for us to recall a
space of time as it took the original time to elapse, and we should never get ahead with our
thinking. All recollected times undergo, accordingly, what M. Ribot calls foreshortening;
and this foreshortening is due to the omission of an enormous number of the facts which
ﬁlled them.
"As fast as the present enters into the past, our states of consciousness disappear
and are obliterated. Passed in review at a few days' distance, nothing or little of
them remains: most of them have made shipwreck in that great nonentity from
which they never more will emerge, and they have carried with them the
quantity of duration which was inherent in their being. This deﬁcit of surviving
conscious states is thus a deﬁcit in the amount of represented time. The process
of abridgment, of foreshortening, of which we have spoken, presupposes this
deﬁcit. If, in order to reach a distant reminiscence, we had to go through the
entire series of terms which separate it from our present selves, memory would
become impossible on account of the length of the operation. We thus reach the
paradoxical result that one condition of remembering is that we should forget.
Without totally forgetting a prodigious number of states of consciousness, and
momentarily forgetting a large number, we could not remember at all. Oblivion,
except in certain cases, is thus no malady of memory, but a condition of its
health and its life."[605]

[Pg 681]

There are many irregularities in the process of forgetting which are as yet unaccounted for.
A thing forgotten on one day will be remembered on the next. Something we have made the
most strenuous efforts to recall, but all in vain, will, soon after we have given up the
attempt, saunter into the mind, as Emerson somewhere says, as innocently as if it had never
been sent for. Experiences of bygone date will revive after years of absolute oblivion, often
as the result of some cerebral disease or accident which seems to develop latent paths of
association, as the photographer's ﬂuid develops the picture sleeping in the collodion ﬁlm.
The oftenest quoted of these cases is Coleridge's:
"In a Roman Catholic town in Germany, a young woman, who could neither
read nor write, was seized with a fever, and was said by the priests to be
possessed of a devil, because she was heard talking Latin, Greek, and Hebrew.
Whole sheets of her ravings were written out, and found to consist of sentences
intelligible in themselves, but having slight connection with each other. Of her
Hebrew sayings, only a few could be traced to the Bible, and most seemed to be
in the Rabbinical dialect. All trick was out of the question; the woman was a
simple creature; there was no doubt as to the fever. It was long before any
explanation, save that of demoniacal possession, could be obtained. At last the
mystery was unveiled by a physician, who determined to trace back the girl's
history, and who, after much trouble, discovered that at the age of nine she had
been charitably taken by an old Protestant pastor, a great Hebrew scholar, in
whose house she lived till his death. On further inquiry it appeared to have been
the old man's custom for years to walk up and down a passage of his house into
which the kitchen opened, and to read to himself with a loud voice out of his
books. The books were ransacked, and among them were found several of the
Greek and Latin Fathers, together with a collection of Rabbinical writings. In
these works so many of the passages taken down at the young woman's bedside
were identiﬁed that there could be no reasonable doubt as to their source."[606]
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Hypnotic subjects as a rule forget all that has happened in their trance. But in a succeeding [Pg 682]
trance they will often remember the events of a past one. This is like what happens in those
cases of 'double personality' in which no recollection of one of the lives is to be found in the
other. We have already seen in an earlier chapter that the sensibility often differs from one of
the alternate personalities to another, and we have heard M. Pierre Janet's theory that
anæsthesias carry amnesias with them (see above, pp. 385 ff.). In certain cases this is
evidently so; the throwing of certain functional brain-tracts out of gear with others, so as to
dissociate their consciousness from that of the remaining brain, throws them out for both
sensorial and ideational service. M. Janet proved in various ways that what his patients
forgot when anæsthetic they remembered when the sensibility returned. For instance, he
restored their tactile sense temporarily by means of electric currents, passes, etc., and then
made them handle various objects, such as keys and pencils, or make particular movements,
like the sign of the cross. The moment the anæsthesia returned they found it impossible to
recollect the objects or the acts. 'They had had nothing in their hands, they had done
nothing,' etc. The next day, however, sensibility being again restored by similar processes,
they remembered perfectly the circumstance, and told what they had handled or had done.
All these pathological facts are showing us that the sphere of possible recollection may be
wider than we think, and that in certain matters apparent oblivion is no proof against
possible recall under other conditions. They give no countenance, however, to the
extravagant opinion that nothing we experience can be absolutely forgotten. In real life, in [Pg 683]
spite of occasional surprises, most of what happens actually is forgotten. The only reasons
for supposing that if the conditions were forthcoming everything would revive are of a
transcendental sort. Sir Wm. Hamilton quotes and adopts them from the German writer
Schmid. Knowledge being a 'spontaneous self-energy' on the part of the mind,
"this energy being once determined, it is natural that it should persist, until
again annihilated by other causes. This [annihilation] would be the case, were
the mind merely passive.... But the mental activity, the act of knowledge, of
which I now speak, is more than this; it is an energy of the self-active power of
a subject one and indivisible: consequently a part of the ego must be detached
or annihilated, if a cognition once existent be again extinguished. Hence it is
that the problem most difﬁcult of solution is not, how a mental activity endures,
but how it ever vanishes."[607]
Those whom such an argument persuades may be left happy with their belief. Other positive
argument there is none, none certainly of a physiological sort.[608]

When memory begins to decay, proper names are what go ﬁrst, and at all times proper
names are harder to recollect than those of general properties and classes of things.
This seems due to the fact that common qualities and names have contracted an inﬁnitely
greater number of associations in our mind than the names of most of the persons whom we
know. Their memory is better organized. Proper names as well organized as those of our
family and friends are recollected as well as those of any other objects.[609] 'Organization'
means numerous associations; and the more numerous the associations, the greater the
number of paths of recall. For the same reason adjectives, conjunctions, prepositions, and
the cardinal verbs, those words, in short, which form the grammatical framework of all our
speech, are the very last to decay. Kussmaul[610] makes the following acute remark on this [Pg 684]
subject:
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"The concreter a conception is, the sooner is its name forgotten. This is because
our ideas of persons and things are less strongly bound up with their names than
with such abstractions as their business, their circumstances, their qualities. We
easily can imagine persons and things without their names, the sensorial image
of them being more important than that other symbolic image, their name.
Abstract conceptions, on the other hand, are only acquired by means of the
words which alone serve to confer stability upon them. This is why verbs,
adjectives, pronouns, and still more adverbs, prepositions, and conjunctions are
more intimately connected with our thinking than are substantives."
The disease called Aphasia, of which a little was said in Chapter II, has let in a ﬂood of light
on the phenomenon of Memory, by showing the number of ways in which the use of a given
object, like a word, may be lost by the mind. We may lose our acoustic idea or our
articulatory idea of it; neither without the other will give us proper command of the word.
And if we have both, but have lost the paths of association between the brain-centres which
support the two, we are in as bad a plight. 'Ataxic' and 'amnesic' aphasia, 'word-deafness,'
and 'associative aphasia' are all practical losses of word-memory. We have thus, as M. Ribot
says, not memory so much as memories.[611] The visual, the tactile, the muscular, the
auditory memory may all vary independently of each other in the same individual; and
different individuals may have them developed in different degrees. As a rule, a man's
memory is good in the departments in which his interest is strong; but those departments are
apt to be those in which his discriminative sensibility is high. A man with a bad ear is not
likely to have practically a good musical memory, or a purblind person to remember visual
appearances well. In a later chapter we shall see illustrations of the differences in men's
imagining power.[612] It is obvious that the machinery of memory must be largely
determined thereby.
Mr. Galton, in his work on English Men of Science,[613] has given a very interesting [Pg 685]
collation of cases showing individual variations in the type of memory, where it is strong.
Some have it verbal. Others have it good for facts and ﬁgures, others for form. Most say that
what is to be remembered must ﬁrst be rationally conceived and assimilated.[614]

There is an interesting fact connected with remembering, which, so far as I know, Mr. R.
Verdon was the ﬁrst writer expressly to call attention to. We can set our memory as it were
to retain things for a certain time, and then let them depart.
"Individuals often remember clearly and well up to the time when they have to
use their knowledge, and then, when it is no longer required, there follows a
rapid and extensive decay of the traces. Many schoolboys forget their lessons
after they have said them, many barristers forget details got up for a particular
case. Thus a boy learns thirty lines of Homer, says them perfectly, and then
forgets them so that he could not say ﬁve consecutive lines the next morning,
and a barrister may be one week learned in the mysteries of making cog-wheels,
but in the next he may be well acquainted with the anatomy of the ribs instead."
[615]

The rationale of this fact is obscure; and the existence of it ought to make us feel how truly
subtle are the nervous processes which memory involves. Mr. Verdon adds that
"When the use of a record is withdrawn, and attention withdrawn from it, and
we think no more about it, we know that we experience a feeling of relief, and
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we may thus conclude that energy is in some way liberated. If the ... attention is
not withdrawn, so that we keep the record in mind, we know that this feeling of
relief does not take place.... Also we are well aware, not only that after this
feeling of relief takes place, the record does not seem so well conserved as
before, but that we have real difﬁculty in attempting to remember it."
This shows that we are not as entirely unconscious of a topic as we think, during the time in
which we seem to be merely retaining it subject to recall.
"Practically," says Mr. Verdon, "we sometimes keep a matter in hand not
exactly by attending to it, but by keeping our attention referred to something
connected with it from time to time. Translating this into the language of
physiology, we mean that by referring attention to a part within, or closely
connected with, the system of traces [paths] required to be remembered, we
keep it well fed, so that the traces are preserved with the utmost delicacy."

[Pg 686]

This is perhaps as near as we can get to an explanation. Setting the mind to remember a
thing involves a continual minimal irradiation of excitement into paths which lead thereto,
involves the continued presence of the thing in the 'fringe' of our consciousness. Letting the
thing go involves withdrawal of the irradiation, unconsciousness of the thing, and, after a
time, obliteration of the paths.
A curious peculiarity of our memory is that things are impressed better by active than by
passive repetition. I mean that in learning by heart (for example), when we almost know the
piece, it pays better to wait and recollect by an effort from within, than to look at the book
again. If we recover the words in the former way, we shall probably know them the next
time; if in the latter way, we shall very likely need the hook once more.
The learning by heart means the formation of paths from a former
set to a later set of cerebral word-processes: call 1 and 2 in the
diagram the processes in question; then when we remember by
inward effort, the path is formed by discharge from 1 to 2, just as
it will afterwards be used. But when we excite 2 by the eye,
although the path 1—2 doubtless is then shot through also, the
phenomenon which we are discussing shows that the direct
discharge from 1 into 2, unaided by the eyes, ploughs the deeper
and more permanent groove. There is, moreover, a greater amount
of tension accumulated in the brain before the discharge from 1 to
2, when the latter takes place unaided by the eye. This is proved
FIG. 46.
by the general feeling of strain in the effort to remember 2; and
this also ought to make the discharge more violent and the path [Pg 687]
more deep. A similar reason doubtless accounts for the familiar fact that we remember our
own theories, our own discoveries, combinations, inventions, in short whatever 'ideas'
originate in our own brain, a thousand times better than exactly similar things which are
communicated to us from without.
A word, in closing, about the metaphysics involved in remembering. According to the
assumptions of this book, thoughts accompany the brain's workings, and those thoughts are
cognitive of realities. The whole relation is one which we can only write down empirically,
confessing that no glimmer of explanation of it is yet in sight. That brains should give rise to
a knowing consciousness at all, this is the one mystery which returns, no matter of what sort
the consciousness and of what sort the knowledge may be. Sensations, aware of mere
qualities, involve the mystery as much as thoughts, aware of complex systems, involve it. To
the platonizing tradition in philosophy, however, this is not so. Sensational consciousness is
something quasi-material, hardly cognitive, which one need not much wonder at. Relating
consciousness is quite the reverse, and the mystery of it is unspeakable. Professor Ladd, for
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example, in his usually excellent book,[616] after well showing the matter-of-fact
dependence of retention and reproduction on brain-paths, says:
"In the study of perception psycho-physics can do much towards a scientiﬁc
explanation. It can tell what qualities of stimuli produce certain qualities of
sensations, it can suggest a principle relating the quantity of the stimuli to the
intensity of the sensation; it can investigate the laws under which, by combined
action of various excitations, the sensations are combined [?] into presentations
of sense; it can show how the time-relations of the sensations and percepts in
consciousness correspond to the objective relations in time of the stimulations.
But for that spiritual activity which actually puts together in consciousness the
sensations, it cannot even suggest the beginning of a physical explanation.
Moreover, no cerebral process can be conceived of, which—in case it were
known to exist—could possibly be regarded as a ﬁtting basis for this unifying
actus of mind. Thus also, and even more emphatically, must we insist upon the
complete inability of physiology to suggest an explanation for conscious
memory, in so far as it is memory—that is, in so far as it most imperatively calls
for explanation.... The very essence of the act of memory consists in the ability
to say: This after-image is the image of a percept I had a moment since; or this
image of memory is the image of the percept I had at a certain time—I do not
remember precisely how long since. It would, then, be quite contrary to the
facts to hold that, when an image of memory appears in consciousness, it is
recognized as belonging to a particular original percept on account of its
perceived resemblance to this percept. The original percept does not exist and
will never be reproduced. Even more palpably false and absurd would it be to
hold that any similarity of the impressions or processes in end organs or central
organs explains the act of conscious memory. Consciousness knows nothing of
such similarity; knows nothing even of the existence of nervous impressions
and processes. Moreover, we could never know two impressions or processes
that are separated in time to be similar, without involving the same inexplicable
act of memory. It is a fact of consciousness on which all possibility of
connected experience and of recorded and cumulative human knowledge is
dependent that certain phases or products of consciousness appear with a claim
to stand for (to represent)[617] past experiences to which they are regarded as in
some respect similar. It is this peculiar claim in consciousness which constitutes
the essence of an act of memory; it is this which makes the memory wholly
inexplicable as a mere persistence or recurrence of similar impressions. It is this
which makes conscious memory a spiritual phenomenon, the explanation of
which, as arising out of nervous processes and conditions, is not simply
undiscovered in fact, but utterly incapable of approach by the imagination.
When, then, we speak of a physical basis of memory, recognition must be made
of the complete inability of science to suggest any physical process which can
be conceived of as correlated with that peculiar and mysterious actus of the
mind, connecting its present and its past, which constitutes the essence of
memory."

[Pg 688]

This passage seems to me characteristic of the reigning half-way modes of thought. It puts
the difﬁculties in the wrong places. At one moment it seems to admit with the cruder
sensationalists that the material of our thoughts is independent sensations reproduced, and
that the 'putting together' of these sensations would be knowledge, if it could only be
brought about, the only mystery being as to the what 'actus' can bring it about. At another
moment it seems to contend that even this sort of 'combining' would not be knowledge,
because certain of the elements connected must 'claim to represent or stand for' past [Pg 689]
originals, which is incompatible with their being mere images revived. The result is various
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confused and scattered mysteries and unsatisﬁed intellectual desires. But why not 'pool' our
mysteries into one great mystery, the mystery that brain-processes occasion knowledge at
all? It is surely no different mystery to feel myself by means of one brain-process writing at
this table now, and by means of a different brain-process a year hence to remember myself
writing. All that psychology can do is to seek to determine what the several brain-processes
are; and this, in a wretchedly imperfect way, is what such writings as the present chapter
have begun to do. But of 'images reproduced,' and 'claiming to represent,' and 'put together
by a unifying actus,' I have been silent, because such expressions either signify nothing, or
they are only roundabout ways of simply saying that the past is known when certain brainconditions are fulﬁlled, and it seems to me that the straightest and shortest way of saying
that is the best.
For a history of opinion about Memory, and other bibliographic references, I must refer to
the admirable little monograph on the subject by Mr. W. H. Burnham in the American
Journal of Psychology, vols. i and ii. Useful books are: D. Kay's Memory, What It Is, and
How to Improve It (1888); and F. Fauth's Das Gedächtniss, Studie zu einer Pädagogik, etc.,
1888.
END OF VOL. I.

[567]

L'Homme et l'Intelligence, p. 32.

[568]

Professor Richet has therefore no right to say, as he does in another place (Revue
Philosophique, xxi, 570): "Without memory no conscious sensation, without
memory no consciousness." All he is entitled to say is: "Without memory no
consciousness known outside of itself." Of the sort of consciousness that is an
object for later states, and becomes as it were permanent, he gives a good
example: "Who of us, alas! has not experienced a bitter and profound grief, the
immense laceration cause by the death of some cherished fellow-being? Well, in
these great griefs the present endures neither for a minute, for an hour, nor for a
day, but for weeks and months. The memory of the cruel moment will not efface
itself from consciousness. It disappears not, but remains living, present,
coexisting with the multitude of other sensations which are juxtaposed in
consciousness alongside of this one persistent emotion which is felt always in the
present tense. A long time is needed ere we can attain to forgetting it, ere we can
make it enter into the past. Hæret lateri letalis arundo." (Ibid. 583.)

[569]

This is the primary positive after-image. According to Helmholtz, one third of a
second is the most favorable length of exposure to the light for producing it.
Longer exposure, complicated by subsequent admission of light to the eye, results
in the ordinary negative and complementary after-images, with their changes,
which may (if the original impression was brilliant and the ﬁxation long) last for
many minutes. Fechner gives the name of memory-after-images (Psychophysik,
ii, 492) to the instantaneous positive effects, and distinguishes them from ordinary
after images by the following characters: 1) Their originals must have been
attended to, only such parts of a compound original as have been attended to
appearing. This is not the case in common visual after-images. 2) The strain of
attention towards them is inward, as in ordinary remembering, not outward, as in
observing a common after-image. 3) A short ﬁxation of the original is better for
the memory-after-image, a long one for the ordinary after-image. 4) The colors of
the memory-after-image are never complementary of those of the original.

[570]

Hermann's Hdbch. ii, 2. 282.

[571]

Rev. Philos., 562.
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[572]

Richet says: "The present has a certain duration, a variable duration, sometimes a
rather long one, which comprehends all the time occupied by the afterreverberation [retentissement, after-image] of a sensation. For example, if the
reverberation of an electric shock within our nerves lasts ten minutes, for that
electric shock there is a present of ten minutes. On the other hand, a feebler
sensation will have a shorter present. But in every case, for a conscious sensation
[I should say for a remembered sensation] to occur, there must be a present of a
certain duration, of a few seconds at least." We have seen in the last chapter that it
is hard to trace the backward limits of this immediately intuited duration, or
specious present. The ﬁgures which M. Richet supposes appear to be considerably
too large.

[573]

Cf. Fechner, Psychophysik, ii, 499.

[574]

The primary after-image itself cannot be utilized if the stimulus is too brief. Mr.
Cattell found (Psychologische Studien, iii, p. 93 ff.) that the color of a light must
fall upon the eye for a period varying from 0.00275 to 0.006 of a second, in order
to be recognized for what it is. Letters of the alphabet and familiar words require
from 0.00075 to 0.00175 sec.—truly an interval extremely short. Some letters, E
for example, are harder than others. In 1871 Helmholtz and Baxt had ascertained
that when an impression was immediately followed by another, the latter
quenched the former and prevented it from being known to later consciousness.
The ﬁrst stimulus was letters of the alphabet, the second a bright white disk.
"With an interval of 0.0048 sec. between the two excitations [I copy here the
abstract in Ladd's Physiological Psychology, p. 480], the disk appeared as
scarcely a trace of a weak shimmer; with an interval of 0.0096 sec., letters
appeared in the shimmer—one or two which could be partially recognized when
the interval increased to 0.0144 sec. When the interval was made 0.0192 sec. the
objects were a little more clearly discerned; at 0.00336 sec. four letters could be
well recognized; at 0.0432 sec., ﬁve letters; and at 0.0528 sec. all the letters could
be read." (Pﬂüger's Archiv, iv, 325 ff.)

[575]

When the past is recalled symbolically, or conceptually only, it is true that no such
copy need be there. In no sort of conceptual knowledge is it requisite that
deﬁnitely resembling images be there (cf. pp. 471 ff.). But as all conceptual
knowledge stands for intuitive knowledge, and terminates therein, I abstract from
this complication, and conﬁne myself to those memories in which the past is
directly imaged in the mind, or, as we say, intuitively known.

[576]

E.g. Spencer, Psychology, i, p. 448. How do the believers in the sufﬁciency of the
'image' formulate the cases where we remember that something did not happen—
that we did not wind our watch, did not lock the door, etc.? It is very hard to
account for these memories of omission. The image of winding the watch is just
as present to my mind now when I remember that I did not wind it as if I
remembered that I did. It must be a difference in the mode of feeling the image
which leads me to such different conclusions in the two cases. When I remember
that I did wind it, I feel it grown together with its associates of past date and
place. When I remember that I did not, it keeps aloof; the associates fuse with
each other, but not with it. This sense of fusion, of the belonging together of
things, is a most subtle relation; the sense of non-fusion is an equally subtle one.
Both relations demand most complex mental processes to know them, processes
quite different from that mere presence or absence of an image which does such
service in the cruder books.

[577]

Psychologia Empirica, § 174.

[578]

Analysis, i, 330-1. Mill believed that the various things remembered, the self
included, enter consciousness in the form of separate ideas, but so rapidly that
they are 'all clustered into one.' "Ideas called up in close conjunction ... assume,
even when there is the greatest complexity, the appearance, not of many ideas, but
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of one" (vol. i, p. 123). This mythology does not impair the accuracy of his
description of memory's object.
[579]

Compare, however, p. 251, Chapter IX.

[580]

Professor Bain adds, in a note to this passage of Mill's: "This process seems best
expressed by laying down a law of Compound or Composite Association, under
which a plurality of feeble links of connection may be a substitute for one
powerful and self-sufﬁcing link."

[581]

Analysis, chap. x.

[582]

H. Maudsley, The Physiology of Mind (London, 1876), p. 513.

[583]

The only fact which might plausibly be alleged against this view is the familiar
one that we may feel the lapse of time in an experience so monotonous that its
earlier portions can have no 'associates' different from its later ones. Sit with
closed eyes, for example, and steadily pronounce some vowel-sound, thus, a—a—
a—a—a— ... thinking only of the sound. Nothing changes during the time
occupied by the experiment, and yet at the end of it you know that its beginning
was far away. I think, however, that a close attention to what happens during this
experiment shows that it does not violate in the least the conditions of recall laid
down in the text; and that if the moment to which we mentally hark back lie many
seconds behind the present instant, it always has different associates by which we
deﬁne its date. Thus it was when I had just breathed out, or in; or it was the 'ﬁrst
moment' of the performance, the one 'preceded by silence;' or it was 'one very
close to that;' or it was 'one when we were looking forward instead of back, as
now;' or it is simply represented by a number and conceived symbolically with no
deﬁnite image of its date. It seems to me that I have no really intuitive
discrimination of the different past moments after the experience has gone on
some little time, but that back of the 'specious present' they all fuse into a single
conception of the kind of thing that has been going on, with a more or less clear
sense of the total time it has lasted, this latter being based on an automatic
counting of the successive pulses of thought by which the process is from moment
to moment recognized as being always the same. Within the few seconds which
constitute the specious present there is an intuitive perception of the successive
moments. But these moments, of which we have a primary memory-image, are
not properly recalled from the past, our knowledge of them is in no way
analogous to a memory properly so called. Cf. supra, p. 646.

[584]

On Intelligence, i, 258-9.

[585]

Not that mere native tenacity will make a man great. It must be coupled with great
passions and great intellect besides. Imbeciles sometimes have extraordinary
desultory memory. Drobisch describes (Empirische Psychol., p. 95) the case of a
young man whom he examined. He had with difﬁculty been taught to read and
speak. "But if two or three minutes were allowed him to peruse an octavo page, he
then could spell the single words out from his memory as well as if the book lay
open before him.... That there was no deception I could test by means of a new
Latin law-dissertation which had just come into my hands, which he never could
have seen, and of which both subject and language were unknown to him. He read
off [mentally] many lines, skipping about too, of the page which had been given
him to see, no worse than if the experiment had been made with a child's story."
Drobisch describes this case as if it were one of unusual persistence in the visual
image ['primary memory,' vide supra, p. 643]. But he adds that the youth
'remembered his pages a long time.' In the Journal of Speculative Philosophy for
Jan. 1871 (vi, 6) is an account by Mr. W. D. Henkle (together with the stock
classic examples of preternatural memory) of an almost blind Pennsylvania
farmer who could remember the day of the week on which any date had fallen for
forty-two years past, and also the kind of weather it was, and what he was doing
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on each of more than ﬁfteen thousand days. Pity that such a magniﬁcent faculty as
this could not have found more worthy application!
What these cases show is that the mere organic retentiveness of a man need bear
no deﬁnite relation to his other mental powers. Men of the highest general powers
will often forget nothing, however insigniﬁcant. One of the most generally
accomplished men I know has a memory of this sort. He never keeps written note
of anything, yet is never at a loss for a fact which he has once heard. He
remembers the old addresses of all his New York friends, living in numbered
streets, addresses which they themselves have long since moved away from and
forgotten. He says that he should probably recognize an individual ﬂy, if he had
seen him thirty years previous—he is, by the way, an entomologist. As an
instance of his desultory memory, he was introduced to a certain colonel at a club.
The conversation fell upon the signs of age in man. The colonel challenged him to
estimate his age. He looked at him, and gave the exact day of his birth, to the
wonder of all. But the secret of this accuracy was that, having picked up some
days previously an army-register, he had idly turned over its list of names, with
dates of birth, graduation, promotions, etc., attached, and when the colonel's name
was mentioned to him at the club, these ﬁgures, on which he had not bestowed a
moment's thought, involuntarily surged up in his mind. Such a memory is of
course a priceless boon.
[586]

Cf. Ebbinghaus: Ueber das Gedächtniss (1885), pp. 67, 45. One may hear a
person say: "I have a very poor memory, because I was never systematically made
to learn poetry at school."

[587]

How to Strengthen the Memory; or, The Natural and Scientiﬁc Methods of Never
Forgetting. By M. H. Holbrook, M.D. New York (no date).

[588]

Page 39.

[589]

Op. cit. p. 100.

[590]

In order to test the opinion so conﬁdently expressed in the text, I have tried to see
whether a certain amount of daily training in learning poetry by heart will shorten
the time it takes to learn an entirely different kind of poetry. During eight
successive days I learned 158 lines of Victor Hugo's 'Satyr.' The total number of
minutes required for this was 131 5/6—it should be said that I had learned
nothing by heart for many years. I then, working for twenty-odd minutes daily,
learned the entire ﬁrst book of Paradise Lost, occupying 38 days in the process.
After this training I went back to Victor Hugo's poem, and found that 158
additional lines (divided exactly as on the former occasion) took me 151 1/2
minutes. In other words, I committed my Victor Hugo to memory before the
training at the rate of a line in 50 seconds, after the training at the rate of a line in
57 seconds, just the opposite result from that which the popular view would lead
one to expect. But as I was perceptibly fagged with other work at the time of the
second batch of Victor Hugo, I thought that might explain the retardation; so I
persuaded several other persons to repeat the test.
Dr. W. H. Burnham learned 16 lines of In Memoriam for 8 days; time, 14-17
minutes—daily average 14 3/4. He then trained himself on Schiller's translation of
the second book of the Æneid into German, 16 lines daily for 26 consecutive
days. On returning to the same quantity of In Memoriam again, he found his
maximum time 20 minutes, minimum 10, average 14 27/48. As he feared the
outer conditions might not have been as favorable this time as the ﬁrst, he waited
a few days and got conditions as near as possible identical. The result was,
minimum time 8 minutes; maximum 19 1/2; average 14 3/48.
Mr. E. S. Drown tested himself on Virgil for 16 days, then again for 16 days, after
training himself on Scott. Average time before training, 13 minutes 26 seconds;
after training, 12 minutes 16 seconds. [Sixteen days is too long for the test, it
gives time for training on the test-verse.]
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Mr. C. H. Baldwin took 10 lines for 15 days as his test, trained himself on 450
lines 'of an entirely different verse,' and then took 15 days more of the former
verse 10 lines a day. Average result: 3 minutes 41 seconds before, 3 minutes 2
seconds after, training. [Same criticism as before.]
Mr. E. A. Pease tested himself on Idyls of the King, and trained himself on
Paradise Lost. Average result of 6 days each time: 14 minutes 34 seconds before,
14 minutes 55 seconds after, training. Mr. Burnham having suggested that to
eliminate facilitating effect entirely from the training verses one ought to test
one's self à la Ebbinghaus on series of nonsense-syllables, having no analogy
whatever with any system of expressive verses, I induced two of my students to
perform that experiment also. The record is unfortunately lost; but the result was a
very considerable shortening of the average time of the second series of nonsensesyllables, learned after training. This seems to me, however, more to show the
effects of rapid habituation to the nonsense-verses themselves than those of the
poetry used between them. But I mean to prosecute the experiments farther, and
will report in another place.
One of my students having quoted a clergyman of his acquaintance who had
marvellously improved by practice his power of learning his sermons by heart, I
wrote to the gentleman for corroboration. I append his reply, which shows that the
increased facility is due rather to a change in his methods of learning than to his
native retentiveness having grown by exercise: "As for memory, mine has
improved year by year, except when in ill-health, like a gymnast's muscle. Before
twenty it took three or four days to commit an hour-long sermon; after twenty,
two days, one day, half a day, and now one slow analytic, very attentive or
adhesive reading does it. But memory seems to me the most physical of
intellectual powers. Bodily ease and freshness have much to do with it. Then there
is a great difference of facility in method. I used to commit sentence by sentence.
Now I take the idea of the whole, then its leading divisions, then its subdivisions,
then its sentences."
[591]

E. Pick: Memory and its Doctors (1888), p. 7.

[592]

This system is carried out in great detail in a book called 'Memory Training,' by
Wm. L. Evans (1889).

[593]

Paulhan, L'Activité mental, et les Éléments de l'Esprit (1889). p. 70.

[594]

On Intelligence, i, 77-82.

[595]

Psychology, § 201.

[596]

Professor Höffding considers that the absence of contiguous associates distinctly
thought-of is a proof that associative processes are not concerned in these cases of
instantaneous recognition where we get a strong sense of familiarity with the
object, but no recall of previous time or place. His theory of what happens is that
the object before us, A, comes with a sense of familiarity whenever it awakens a
slumbering image, a, of its own past self, whilst without this image it seems
unfamiliar. The quality of familiarity is due to the coalescence of the two similar
processes A + a in the brain (Psychologie, p. 188; Vierteljsch. f. wiss. Phil., xiii,
432 [1889]). This explanation is a very tempting one where the phenomenon of
recognition is reduced to its simplest terms. Experiments have been performed in
Wundt's laboratory by Messrs. Wolfe, see below, p. 679, and Lehmann
(Philosophische Studien, v, 96), in which a person had to tell out of several
closely resembling sensible impressions (sounds, tints of color) presented, which
of them was the same with one presented a moment before. And it does seem here
as if the fading process in the just-excited tract must combine with the process of
the new impression to give to the latter a peculiar subjective tinge which should
separate it from the impressions which the other objects give. But recognition of
this immediate sort is beyond our power after a very short time has intervened. A
couple of minutes' interval is generally fatal to it; so that it is impossible to
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conceive that our frequent instantaneous recognition of a face, e.g., as having
been met before, takes place by any such simple process. Where we associate a
head of classiﬁcation with the object, the time-interval has much less effect. Dr.
Lehmann could identify shades of gray much more successfully and permanently
after mentally attaching names or numbers to them. Here it is the recall of the
contiguous associate, the number or name, which brings about the recognition.
Where an experience is complex, each element of the total object has had the
other elements for its past contiguous associates. Each element thus tends to
revive the other elements from within, at the same time that the outward object is
making them revive from without. We have thus, whenever we meet a familiar
object, that sense of expectation gratiﬁed which is so large a factor in our æsthetic
emotions; and even were there no 'fringe of tendency' toward the arousal of
extrinsic associates (which there certainly always is), still this intrinsic play of
mutual association among the parts would give a character of ease to familiar
percepts which would make of them a distinct subjective class. A process ﬁlls its
old bed in a different way from that in which it makes a new bed. One can appeal
to introspection for proof. When, for example, I go into a slaughter-house into
which I once went years ago, and the horrid din of the screaming hogs strikes me
with the overpowering sense of identiﬁcation, when the blood-stained face of the
'sticker,' whom I had long ceased to think of, is immediately recognized as the
face that struck me so before; when the dingy and reddened woodwork, the
purple-ﬂowing ﬂoor, the smell, the emotion of disgust, and all the details, in a
word, forthwith re-establish themeelves as familiar occupants of my mind; the
extraneous associates of the past time are anything but prominent. Again, in
trying to think of an engraving, say the portrait of Rajah Brooke preﬁxed to his
biography, I can do so only partially; but when I take down the book and, looking
at the actual face, am smitten with the intimate sense of its sameness with the one
I was striving to resuscitate,—where in the experience is the element of extrinsic
association? In both these cases it surely feels as if the moment when the sense of
recall is most vivid were also the moment when all extraneous associates were
most suppressed. The butcher's face recalls the former walls of the shambles; their
thought recalls the groaning beasts, and they the face again, just as I now
experience them, with no different past ingredient. In like manner the peculiar
deepening of my consciousness of the Rajah's physiognomy at the moment when
I open the book and say "Ah! that's the very face!" is so intense as to banish from
my mind all collateral circumstances, whether of the present or of former
experiences. But here it is the nose preparing tracts for the eye, the eye preparing
them for the mouth, the mouth preparing them for the nose again, all these
processes involving paths of contiguous association, as defended in the text. I
cannot agree, therefore, with Prof. Höffding, in spite of my respect for him as a
psychologist, that the phenomenon of instantaneous recognition is only explicable
through the recall and comparison of the thing with its own past image. Nor can I
see in the facts in question any additional ground for reinstating the general notion
which we have already rejected (supra, p. 592) that a 'sensation' is ever received
into the mind by an 'image' of its own past self. It is received by contiguous
associates; or if they form too faint a fringe, its neural currents run into a bed
which is still 'warm' from just-previous currents, and which consequently feel
different from currents whose bed is cold. I agree, however, with Höffding that
Dr. Lehmann's experiments (many of them) do not seem to prove the point which
he seeks to establish. Lehmann, indeed, seems himself to believe that we
recognize a sensation A by comparing it with its own past image α (loc. cit. p.
114), in which opinion I altogether fail to concur.
[597]

Duality of the Mind, p. 84. The same thesis is defended by the late Mr. R. H.
Proctor, who gives some cases rather hard to reconcile with my own proposed
explanation, in 'Knowledge' for Nov. 8, 1884. See also Ribot, Maladies de la
Mémoire, p. 149 ff.
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[598]

Zeitschr. f. Völkerpsychologie u. s. w., Bd. v, p. 146.

[599]

Ueber das Gedächtniss, experimentelle Untersuchungen (1885), p. 64.

[600]

Ibid. § 23.

[601]

Op. cit. p. 103.

[602]

All the inferences for which we can give no articulate reasons exemplify this law.
In the chapter on Perception we shall have innumerable examples of it. A good
pathological illustration of it is given in the curious observations of M. Binet on
certain hysterical subjects, with anæsthetic hands, who saw what was done with
their hands as an independent vision but did not feel it. The hand being hidden by
a screen, the patient was ordered to look at another screen and to tell of any visual
image which might project itself thereon. Numbers would then come,
corresponding to the number of times the insensible member was raised, touched,
etc. Colored lines and ﬁgures would come, corresponding to similar ones traced
on the palm; the hand itself, or its ﬁngers, would come when manipulated; and,
ﬁnally, objects placed in it would come; but on the hand itself nothing could ever
be felt. The whole phenomenon shows how an idea which remains itself below
the threshold of a certain conscious self may occasion associative effects therein.
The skin-sensations, unfelt by the patient's primary consciousness, awaken,
nevertheless, their usual visual associates therein.

[603]

I copy from the abstract of Wolfe's paper in 'Science' for Nov. 19, 1886. The
original is in Psychologische Studien, iii, 534 ff.

[604]

Essay conc. Human Understanding, ii, x, 5.

[605]

Th. Ribot, Les Maladies de la Mémoire, p. 46.

[606]

Biographia Literaria, ed. 1847, i, 117 (quoted in Carpenter's Mental Physiology,
chapter x, which see for a number of other cases, all unfortunately deﬁcient, like
this one, in the evidence of exact veriﬁcation which 'psychical research
'demands). Compare also Th. Ribot, Diseases of Memory, chap. iv. The
knowledge of foreign words, etc., reported in trance mediums, etc., may perhaps
often be explained by exaltation of memory. An hystero-epileptic girl, whose case
I quoted in Proc. of Am. Soc. for Psychical Research, automatically writes an
'Ingoldsby Legend' in several cantos, which her parents say she 'had never read.'
Of course she must have read or heard it, but perhaps never learned it. Of some
macaronic Latin-English verses about a sea-serpent which her hand also wrote
unconsciously, I have vainly sought the original (see Proc., etc., p. 553).

[607]

Lectures on Metaph., ii, 212.

[608]

Cf. on this point J. Delbœuf, Le Sommeil et les Rêves (1885), p. 119 ff.; R.
Verdon, Forgetfulness, in Mind, ii, 437.

[609]

Cf. A. Maury, Le Sommeil et les Rêves, p. 442.

[610]

Störungen der Sprache, quoted by Ribot, Les Maladies de la M., p. 133.

[611]

Op. cit. chap. iii.

[612]

"Those who have a good memory for ﬁgures are in general those who know best
how to handle them, that is, those who are most familiar with their relations to
each other and to things." (A. Maury, Le Sommeil et les Rêves, p. 443.)

[613]

Pp. 107-121.

[614]

For other examples see Hamilton's Lectures, ii, 219, and A. Huber: Das
Gedächtniss, p. 36 ff.

[615]

Mind, ii, 449.

[616]

Physiological Psychology, pt. ii, chap. x, § 23.

[617]

Why not say 'know'?—W. J.
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Cerebral process, see neural process
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their permanence, 464 ff.;
do not develop of themselves, 466 ff.;
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Concomitants, law of varying, I. 506
Confusion, II. 352
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its distribution, 142-3;
its function of selection, 139-41;
is personal in form, 225;
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of lack, 251;
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Difference, local, II. 167 ff.;
genesis of our perception of, 642
Diffusion of movements, the law of, II. 372
Dimension, third, II. 134 ff., 212 ff., 220
Dipsomania, II. 543
Disbelief, II. 284
Discrimination, Chapter XIII:
conditions which favor it, I. 494;
improves by practice, 508;
spatial, II. 167 ff.
See difference
Dissociation, I. 486-7;
law of, by varying concomitants, 506
Dissociation, ditto, II. 345, 359
Dissociation, of one part of the mind from another, see Janet, Pierre
Distance, between terms of a series, I. 530
Distance, in space, see third dimension
Distraction, I. 401. See inattention
Dizziness, see vertigo
Dog's cortical centres, after Ferrier, I. 33;
after Munk, I. 44-5;
after Luciani, I. 46, 53, 58, 60;
for special muscles, 64;
hemispheres ablated, 70
DONALDSON, II. 170
DONDERS, II. 235
Double images, II. 225-30, 252
Doubt, II. 284, 318 ff.;
the mania of, 545
DOUGAL, J. D., II. 222
Drainage of one brain-cell by another, II. 583 ff.
Dreams, II. 294
DROBISCH, I. 632, 660
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Drunkard, II. 565
Drunkenness, I. 144; II. 543, 565, 628
Dualism of object and knower, I. 218, 220
Duality, of Brain, I. 390, 399
DUDLEY, A. T., on mental qualities of an athlete, II. 539
DUFOUR, II. 211
DUNAN, CH., II. 176, 206, 208-9
Duration, the primitive object in time-perception, I. 609;
our estimate of short, 611 ff.
'Dynamogeny,' II. 379 ff., 491
EBBINGHAUS, H., I. 548, 676
Eccentric projection of sensations, II. 31 ff., 195 ff.
Education of hemispheres, I. 76
See pedagogic remarks
Effort, II. 534-7;
Muscular effort, 562;
Moral effort, 549, 561, 578-9
EGGER, V., I. 280-1-2; II. 256
Ego, Empirical, I. 291 ff.;
pure, 342 ff.;
'transcendental,' 362;
criticised, 364
Elementary factors of mind, see Units of consciousness
ELSAS, I. 548
EMERSON, R. W., I. 582, II. 307
Emotion, Chapter XXV:
continuous with instinct, II. 442;
description of typical emotions, 443-9;
results from reﬂex effects of stimulus upon organism, 449 ff.;
their classiﬁcation, 454;
in anæsthetic subjects, 455;
in the absence of normal stimulus, 458-60;
effects of expressing, 463 ff.;
of repressing, 466;
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the subtler, 469 ff.;
the neural process in, 472;
differences in individuals, 474;
evolution of special emotions, 477 ff.
Empirical ego, I. 290
Empirical propositions, II. 644
Emulation, II. 409
Ennui, I. 626
Entoptic sensations, I. 515 ff.
Equation, personal, I. 413
'Equilibration,' direct and indirect, II. 627
Essences, their meaning, II. 329 ff.;
sentimental and mechanical, 665
Essential qualities, see essences
ESTEL, I. 613, 618
Evolutionism demands a 'mind-dust,' I. 146
EXNER, on human cortical centres, I. 36;
on 'circumvallation' of centres, 65;
his psychodometer, 87;
on reaction-time, 91;
on perception of rapid succession, 409;
on attention, 439;
on time-perception, 615, 638, 646;
on feeling of motion, II. 172
Experience, I. 402, 487;
Relation of experience to necessary judgments, Chapter XXVIII;
Experience deﬁned, II. 619 ff., 628
Experimentation in psychology, I. 192
Extradition of sensations, II. 31 ff., 195 ff.
Fallacy, the Psychologist's, I. 196, 278, 153; II. 281
Familiarity, sense of, see recognition
Fatalism, II. 574
Fatigue, diminishes span of consciousness, I. 640
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Fear, instinct of, II. 396, 415;
the symptoms of, 446;
morbid, 460;
origin of, 478
FECHNER, I. 435-6, 533, 539 ff., 549, 616, 645; II. 50, 70, 137 ff., 178, 464
Feeling, synonym for consciousness in general in this book, I. 186;
feelings of relation, 243
FÉLIDA X., I. 380-4
FÉRÉ, CH., II. 68, 378 ff.
FERRIER, D., I. 31, 46-7-8, 53, 57-8-9, 445; II. 503
FERRIER, JAS., I. 274, 475
Fiat, of the will, II. 501, 526, 561, 564; 568.
See decision
FICHTE, I. 365
FICK, I. 150
FISKE, J., II. 577
Fixed ideas. See insistent ideas
FLECHSIG's Pyramidenbahn, I. 37
FLINT, R., II. 425
FLOURENS, P., I. 30
Force, supposed sense of, II. 518
Forgetting, I. 679 ff.; II. 870-1. See amnesia
FOUILLÉE, A., II. 500, 570
FRANÇOIS-FRANCK, I. 70
FRANKLIN, Mrs. C. L., II. 94
FRANZ, Dr., II. 63
Freedom, of the will, II. 569 ff.
'Fringe' of object, I. 258, 281-2, 471-2, 478
Frog's nerve-centres, I. 14
Fusion of feelings unintelligible, I. 157-62; II. 2. See Mind-stuff theory
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Fusion of impressions into one object, I. 484, 502; II. 103, 183
GALTON, F., I. 254, 265, 685;
on mental imagery, II. 51-7;
on gregariousness, 430
General propositions, what they involve, II. 337 ff. See universal conceptions
Genesis of brain-structure, its two modes, II. 624
Genius, I. 423, 530; II. 110, 352, 360
Gentleman, the mind of the, II. 370
Geometry, II. 658
Giddiness, see vertigo
GILMAN, B. I., I. 95
GLEY, E., II. 514-5, 525
GOLDSCHEIDER, II. 170, 192 ff., 200
GOLTZ, I. 9, 31, 33, 34, 45, 46, 58, 62, 67, 69, 70, 74, 77
Gorilla, II. 416
GRAEFE, A., II. 507, 510
GRASHEY, I. 640
GRASSMAN, R., II. 654
Gregariousness, II. 430
GREEN, T. H., I. 247, 274, 366-8; II. 4, 10, 11
Grief, II. 448, 480
GRIESINGER, W., II. 298
GRUBELSUCHT, II. 284
Guinea-pigs, epileptic, etc., II. 682-7
GUISLAIN, II. 546
GURNEY, E., I. 209; II. 117, 130, 469, 610
GUYAU, II. 414, 469
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Habit, Chapter IV:
due to plasticity of brain-matter, I. 105;
depends on paths in nerve-centres, 107;
origination of, 109-13;
mechanism of concatenated habits, 114-8;
they demand some sensation, 118;
ethical and pedagogic maxims, 121-7;
is the ground of association, 566;
of memory, 655
Habits may inhibit instincts, II. 394;
Habit accounts for one large part of our knowledge, 632
HALL, G. S., I. 96-7, 558, 614, 616; II. 155, 247, 281, 423
Hallucination, sensation a veridical, II. 33;
of lost limbs, 38, 105;
of emotional feeling, 459
Hallucinations, II. 114 ff.;
hypnagogic, 124;
the brain-process in, 122 ff.;
hypnotic, 604
HAMILTON, W., I. 214, 215, 274, 406, 419, 569, 578, 682; II. 113
HAMMOND, E., II. 673
Haploscopic method, II. 226
HARLESS, II. 497
HARTLEY, I. 553, 561, 564, 600
HARTMANN, R., II. 416
Hasheesh-delirium, II. 121
Hearing, its cortical centre, I. 52
Heat, of mental work, I. 100
HECKER, II. 480
HEGEL, I. 163, 265, 366, 369, 666
HEIDENHAIN, I. 82
HELMHOLTZ, H., I. 285;
on attention, 422, 487, 441;
on discrimination, 504, 516-21;
time as a category, 637-8;
after-images, 645, 648;
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on color-contrast, II. 17 ff.;
on sensation, 33;
on cochlea, 170;
on convergence of eyes, 200;
vision with inverted head, 213;
on what marks a sensation, 218 ff., 243-4;
on entoptic objects, 241-2;
on contrast in seen movement, 247;
on relief, 257;
on measurement of the ﬁeld of view, 266 ff.;
on theory of space-perception, 279;
on feeling of innervation, 493, 507, 510;
on conservation of energy, 667
Hemiamblyopia, I. 44
Hemianopsia, I. 41, 44; II. 73
Hemispheres, their distinction from lower centres, I. 20;
their education, 24, 67;
localization of function in, 30;
the exclusive seat of consciousness, 65;
effects of deprivation of, on frogs, 17, 72-3;
on ﬁshes, 73;
on birds, 74, 77;
on rodents, 74;
on dogs, 70, 74;
on primates, 75;
not devoid of connate paths, 76;
their evolution from lower centres, 79
HENLE, J., II. 445, 461, 481
HERBART, I. 353, 418, 603, 608, 626
Hereditary transmission of acquired characters, see inheritance
HERING, E., on attention, I. 438, 449;
on comparing weights, 544;
on pure sensation, II. 4;
on color-contrast, 20 ff.;
on roomy character of sensations, 136 ff.;
on after-images and convergence, 200;
on distance of double images, 230;
on stereoscopy, 252;
on reproduction in vision, 260 ff.;
on movements of closed eye, 510
HERZEN, I. 58;
on reaction-time from a corn, 96;
on cerebral thermometry, 100;
on swooning, 273
HITZIG, I. 31
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HOBBES, T., I. 573, 587, 594 ff.
HODGSON, R., I. 374, 398
HODGSON, S. H., on inertness of consciousness, I. 129-30, 133;
on self, 341, 347;
on conceptual order, 482;
on association, 572 ff., 603;
on voluntary redintegration, 588-9;
on the 'present' in time, 607
HÖFFDING, H., I. 674; II. 455
HOLBROOK, M. H., I. 665
HOLMES, O. W., I. 88, 405, 582
HOLTEI, VON, I. 624
Horopter, II. 226
HORSLEY, V., I. 35, 59, 63
HORWICZ, I. 314, 325-7
HOWE, S. G., II. 358
Human intellect, compared with that of brute, II. 348 ff.;
depends on association by similarity, 353 ff.;
various orders of, 360;
what brain-peculiarity it depends on, 366, 638
HUME, I. 254;
on personal identity, 351-3, 360;
association, 597;
due to brain-laws, 564;
on mental images, II. 45-6;
on belief, 295-6, 302;
on pleasure and will, 558
Hunting instinct, II. 411
HUXLEY, I. 130-1, 254; II. 46
HYATT, A., II. 102
Hylozoism, see Mind-stuff theory
Hyperæsthesia, in hypnotism, II. 609
Hypnotism, I. 407; II. 128, 351;
general account of, Chapter XXVII;
methods, II. 593;
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theories of, 596;
symptoms of trance, 602 ff.;
post-hypnotic suggestion, 618
Hysterics, their so-called anæsthesias, and unconsciousness, I. 202 ff.
Ideal objects, eternal and necessary relations between, II. 639, 661.
See conception
'Ideas,' the theory of, I. 230;
confounded with objects, 231, 276, 278, 399, 521;
they do not exist as parts of our thought, 279, 405, 553;
platonic, 462;
abstract, 468 ff.;
universal, 473 ff.;
never come twice the same, 480-1
Ideation, no distinct centres for, I. 564; II. 78
Identity, sense of, I. 459;
three principles of, 460;
not the foundation of likeness, 492
Identity, personal, I. 238, 330 ff.;
based on ordinary judgment of sameness, 334;
due to resemblance and continuity of our feelings, 336;
Lotze on, 350;
only relatively true, 372
Ideo-motor action the type of all volition, II. 522
Idiosyncrasy, II. 631
'Idomenians,' II. 214
Illusions, II. 85 ff., 129, 232 ff., 243-66.
See hallucination
Images, double, in vision, II. 225-30
Images, mental, not lost in mental blindness, etc., I. 50, 66; II. 73
Images, are usually vague, II. 45;
visual, 51 ff.;
auditory, 160;
motor, 61;
tactile, 165;
between sleep and waking, 124-6
Imagination, Chapter XVIII:
it differs in individuals, II. 51 ff.;
sometimes leaves an after-image, 67;
the cerebral process of, 68 ff.;
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not locally distinct from that of sensation, 73;
is ﬁgured, 82
Imitation, II. 408
Immortality, I. 348-9
Impulses, morbid, II. 542 ff. See instincts
Impulsiveness of all consciousness, II. 526 ff.
Inattention, I. 404, 455 ff.
Increase, serial, I. 490
Indeterminism, II. 569 ff.
INGERSOLL, R., II. 469
Inheritance of acquired characters, II. 367, 678 ff.
Inhibition, I. 43, 67, 404; II. 126, 373;
of instincts, 391, 394;
of one cortical process by another, 583
Innervation, feeling of, II. 236, 493;
it is unnecessary, 494 ff.;
no evidence for it, 499, 518
Innervation, collateral, see vicarious function
Insane delusions, I. 375; II. 113
Insistent ideas, II. 545
Instinct. Chapter XXIV;
deﬁned, II. 384;
is a reﬂex impulse, 385 ff.;
is neither blind nor invariable, 389;
contrary instincts in same animal, 392;
man has more than other mammals, 393, 441;
their transitoriness, 398;
special instincts, 404-441;
the origin of instincts, 678
'Integration' of feelings, Spencer's theory of, I. 151 ff.
Intelligence, the test of its presence, I. 8;
of lower brain-centres, 78 ff.
Intention to speak, I. 253
Interest, I. 140, 284 ff., 402-3, 482, 515 ff., 572, 594; II. 312 ff., 344-5, 634
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

436/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

Intermediaries, the axiom of skipped, II. 646
Introspection, I. 185
Inverted head, vision with, II. 213
JACKSON, HUGHLINGS, I. 29, 64, 400; II. 125-6
JANET, J., I. 385
JANET, PAUL, I. 625; II. 40-1
JANET, PIERRE, I. 203 ff., 227, 384 ff., 682; II. 456, 614
JASTROW, I. 88, 543, 545; II. 44, 135, 180
JEVONS, W. S., I. 406
Joints, their sensibility, II. 189 ff.
Judgments, existential, II. 290
Justice, II. 673
KANDINSKY, V., II. 70, 116
KANT, I. 274, 331, 344, 347;
his 'transcendental' deduction of the categories, 360;
his paralogisms, 362;
criticised, 363-6;
on time, 642;
on symmetrical ﬁgures, II. 150;
on space, 273 ff.;
on the real, 296;
on synthetic judgments a priori, 661,
and their relation to experience, 664
Kinæsthetic feelings, II. 488 ff., 493
'Kleptomania,' II. 425
Knee-jerk, II. 380
Knowing, I. 216 ff.;
psychology assumes it, 218;
not reducible to any other relation, 219, 471, 688
Knowledge, two kinds of, I. 221;
of Self not essential to, 274;
the relativity of, II. 9 ff.;
the genesis of, 630 ff.
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

437/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

Knowledge-about, I. 221
KÖNIG, I. 542
KRIES, VON, I. 96, 547; II. 253
KRISHABER, I. 377
KUSSMAUL, A., I. 684
LADD, G. T., I. 687; II. 3, 311
LAMARCK, II. 678
LANDRY, II. 490, 492
LANGE, A., I. 29, 284
LANGE, C., II. 443, 449, 455, 457, 460, 462
LANGE, K., II. 111
LANGE, L., on reaction-time, muscular and sensorial, I. 92
LANGE, N., on muscular element in imagination, I. 444
Language, as a human function, II. 356-8
LAROMIGUÈIRE, I. 247
Laughter, II. 480
LAZARUS, I. 624, 626; II. 84, 97, 369, 429
LE CONTE, JOSEPH, II. 228, 252, 265
LÉONIE, M. Janet's trance-subject, I. 201, 387 ff.
LEVY, W. H., II. 204
LEWES, on frog's sp. cord, I. 9, 78, 134;
on thought as a sort of algebra, 270;
on 'preperception,' 439, 442;
on muscular feeling, II. 199;
on begging in pup, 400;
on lapsed intelligence, 678
LEWINSKI, II. 192
LIBERATORE, II. 670
LIEBMAN, O., on brain as a machine, I. 10; II. 34
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LIÉGEOIS, J., II. 594, 606
Light, effects of, on movement, II. 379
Likeness, I. 528
LINDSAY, T. L., II. 421
LIPPS, on 'unconscious' sensations, I. 175;
on theory of ideas, 603;
time-perception, 632;
on muscular feeling, II. 200;
on distance, 221;
on visual illusions, 251, 264;
on space-perception, 280;
on reality, 297;
on effort, 575
LISSAUER, I. 50
Local signs, II. 155 ff., 167
Localization, in hemispheres, I. 30 ff.
Localization, II. 153 ff.;
of one sensible object in another, II. 31 ff., 183 ff., 195 ff.
LOCKE, J., I. 200, 230, 247, 349, 390, 462, 483, 553, 563, 679; II. 210, 306, 644, 662-4
'Locksley Hall,' I. 567
Locomotion, instinct of, II. 405
LOEB, I. 33, 44; II. 255, 516, 628
Logic, II. 647
LOMBARD, J. S., I. 99
LOMBARD, W., II. 380
LOTZE, I. 214;
on immortality, 349;
on personal identity, 350;
on attention, 442-3;
on fusion and discrimination of sensations, 522;
on local signs, II. 157, 495;
on volition, 523-4
LOUIS V., I. 388
Love, sexual, II. 437, 543;
parental, 439;
Bain's explanation of, 551
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LOWELL, J. R., I. 582
LUCIANI, I. 44-5-6-7, 53, 60
MCCOSH, I. 501
MACH, E., on attention, I. 436;
on space-feeling, 449;
on time feeling, 616, 635;
on motion-contrast, II. 247;
on optical inversion, 255;
on probability, 258;
on feeling of innervation, 509, 511
Magnitude of differences, I. 530 ff.
MALEBRANCHE, II. 9
MANOUVRIER, II. 496
Mania, transitory, II. 460
Man's intellectual distinction from brutes, II. 348 ff.
MANSEL, H. L., I. 274
MANTEGAZZA, P., II. 447, 479, 481
MARCUS AURELIUS, I. 313, 317; II. 675
MARILLIER, L., I. 445; II. 514
MARIQUE, I. 65
MARTIN, H. N., I. 99; II. 3
MARTINEAU, J., I. 484 ff., 506; II. 9
MAUDSLEY, H., I. 113, 656
MAURY, A., II. 83, 124, 127
Mechanical philosophy, the, II. 666 ff.
Mechanism vs. intelligence, I. 8-14
Mediate comparison, I. 489
Mediumship, I. 228, 393 ff.
MEHNER, I. 618
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Memory, Chapter XVI:
it depends on material conditions, I. 2;
the essential function of the hemispheres, 20;
lapses of, 373 ff.;
in hysterics, 384 ff.;
favored by attention, 427;
primary, 638, 643;
analysis of the phenomenon of Memory, 648;
the return of a mental image is not memory, 619;
memory's causes, 653 ff.;
the result of association, 654;
conditions of good memory, 659;
brute retentiveness, 660;
multiple associations, 662;
improvement of memory, 667 ff.;
its usefulness depends on forgetting much, 680;
its decay, 683;
metaphysical explanations of it, 687 ff.
Mentality, the mark of its presence, I. 8
Mental operations, simultaneous, I. 408
MERCIER, C., on inertness of consciousness, I. 135;
on inhibition, II. 583
MERKEL, I. 542-3-4
Metaphysical principles, II. 669 ff.
Metaphysics, I. 137, 401
Meyer's experiment on color-contrast, II. 21
MEYER, G. H., II. 66, 97-8
MEYNERT, T., his brain-scheme, I. 25, 64, 72
MILL, JAMES, I. 277, 355, 470, 476, 485, 499, 597, 651, 653; II. 77
MILL, J. S., I. 189;
on unity of self, 356-9;
on abstract ideas, 470;
methods of inquiry, 590;
on inﬁnitude and association, 600;
on space, II. 271;
on belief, 285, 822;
on reasoning, 331;
on the order of Nature, 634;
on arithmetical propositions, 654
MILLS, C. K., I. 60
Mimicry, its effects on emotion, II. 463-6
https://www.gutenberg.org/ﬁles/57628/57628-h/57628-h.htm

441/464

10/14/2020

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Principles of Psychology, by William James.

Mind, depends on brain-conditions, I. 4, 553;
the mark of its presence, 8;
difﬁculty of stating its connection with brain, 176;
what psychology means by it, 183, 216
Mind-Stuff theory, Chapter VI:
a postulate of evolution, I. 146, 176;
some proofs of it, 148;
author's interpretation of them, 154;
feelings cannot mix, 157 ff., II. 2, 103
Miser, associationist explanation of the, II. 423 ff.
MITCHELL, J. K., II. 616
MITCHELL, S. W., I. 381; II. 38-9, 380
Modesty, II. 435
MOLL, A., II. 616
MOLYNEUX, II. 210
Monadism, I. 179
Monism, I. 366-7
Monkey's cortical centres, I. 34-5, 46, 59
MONTGOMERY, E., I. 158
Moral principles, II. 639, 672
MORRIS, G. S., I. 365
MOSSO, on blood-supply to brain, I. 97-9
plethysmographic researches, II. 378;
on fear, 419, 483
Motor centres, I. 31 ff.
'Motor circle,' II. 583
Motor strands, I. 38;
for special muscles, I. 64
Motor type of imagination, II. 61
Movement, perception of, by sensory surfaces, II. 171 ff.;
part played by, in vision, 197, 203, 234-7
the, Production of, Chap. XXII
requires guiding sensations, 490
illusory perception of, during anæsthesia, 489;
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results from every kind of consciousness, 526
MOZART, I. 255
MÜLLER, G. E., I. 445, 456-8; II. 198, 280, 491, 502, 508, 517
MÜLLER, J., I. 68; II. 640
MÜLLER, J. J., II. 213
MÜLLER, MAX, I. 269
MUNK, H., I. 41-3-4-5-6, 57-8-9, 63
MÜNSTERBERG, on Meynert's scheme, I. 77;
on reaction times with intellectual operation, 432:
on association, 562;
on time-perception, 620, 637;
on imagination, II. 74;
on muscular sensibility, 189;
on volition, 505;
on feeling of innervation, 514;
on association, 590
Muscles, how represented in nerve-centres, I. 19
Muscle-reading, II. 525
Muscular sense, its cortical centre, I. 61;
its existence, II. 189 ff., 197 ff.;
its insigniﬁcance in space-perception, 197-203, 234-7
Music, its accidental genesis, II. 627; 687
MUSSEY, II. 543
Mutilations, inherited, II. 627
MYERS, F. W. H., I. 400; II. 133
Mysophobia, II. 435, 545
Nature, the order of, its incongruence with that of our thought, II. 634 ff.
NAUNYN, I. 55
Necessary truths are all truths of comparison, II. 641 ff., 651, 662.
See experience, a priori connections, etc.
NEIGLICK, I. 543
Neural process, in perception. I. 78 ff.;
in habit, 105 ff.;
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in association, 566;
in memory, 655;
in imagination, II. 68 ff.;
in perception, 82 ff., 103 ff.;
in hallucination, 122 ff.;
in space-perception, 143;
in emotion, 474;
in volition, 580 ff.;
in association, 587 ff.
Nitrous oxide intoxication, II. 284
Nonsense, how it escapes detection, I. 261
Normal position in vision, II. 238
NOTHNAGEL, I. 51, 60-1
Number, II. 653
OBERSTEINER, I. 87, 445
Object, use of the word, I. 275, 471;
confusion of, with thought that knows it, 278
Objective world, known before self, I. 273;
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PSYCHOLOGY.
CHAPTER XVII.

SENSATION.
After inner perception, outer perception! The next three chapters will treat
of the processes by which we cognize at all times the present world of space
and the material things which it contains. And first, of the process called
Sensation.
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION DISTINGUISHED.
The words Sensation and Perception do not carry very definitely
discriminated meanings in popular speech, and in Psychology also their
meanings run into each other. Both of them name processes in which we
cognize an objective world; both (under normal conditions) need the
stimulation of incoming nerves ere they can occur; Perception always
involves Sensation as a portion of itself; and Sensation in turn never takes
place in adult life without Perception also being there. They are therefore

names for different cognitive functions, not for different sorts of mental
fact. The nearer the object cognized comes to being a simple quality like
'hot,' 'cold,' 'red,' 'noise,' 'pain,' apprehended irrelatively to other things, the
more the state of mind approaches pure sensation. The fuller of relations the
object is, on the contrary; the more it is something classed, located,
measured, compared, assigned to a function, etc., etc.; the more
unreservedly do we call the state of mind a perception, and the relatively
smaller is the part in it which sensation plays.
Sensation, then, so long as we take the analytic point of view, differs from
Perception only in the extreme simplicity of its object or content.[1] Its
function is that of mere acquaintance with a fact. Perception's function, on
the other hand, is knowledge about[2] a fact; and this knowledge admits of
numberless degrees of complication. But in both sensation and perception
we perceive the fact as an immediately present outward reality, and this
makes them differ from 'thought' and 'conception,' whose objects do not
appear present in this immediate physical way. From the physiological point
of view both sensations and perceptions differ from 'thoughts' (in the
narrower sense of the word) in the fact that nerve-currents coming in from
the periphery are involved in their production. In perception these nervecurrents arouse voluminous associative or reproductive processes in the
cortex; but when sensation occurs alone, or with a minimum of perception,
the accompanying reproductive processes are at a minimum too.
I shall in this chapter discuss some general questions more especially
relative to Sensation. In a later chapter perception will take its turn. I shall
entirely pass by the classification and natural history of our special
'sensations,' such matters finding their proper place, and being sufficiently
well treated, in all the physiological books.[3]
THE COGNITIVE FUNCTION OF SENSATION.
A pure sensation is an abstraction; and when we adults talk of our
'sensations' we mean one of two things: either certain objects, namely
simple qualities or attributes like hard, hot, pain; or else those of our
thoughts in which acquaintance with these objects is least combined with
knowledge about the relations of them to other things. As we can only think
or talk about the relations of objects with which we have acquaintance

already, we are forced to postulate a function in our thought whereby we
first become aware of the bare immediate natures by which our several
objects are distinguished. This function is sensation. And just as logicians
always point out the distinction between substantive terms of discourse and
relations found to obtain between them, so psychologists, as a rule, are
ready to admit this function, of the vision of the terms or matters meant, as
something distinct from the knowledge about them and of their relations
inter se. Thought with the former function is sensational, with the latter,
intellectual. Our earliest thoughts are almost exclusively sensational. They
merely give us a set of thats, or its, of subjects of discourse, with their
relations not brought out. The first time we see light, in Condillac's phrase
we are it rather rather than see it. But all our later optical knowledge is
about what this experience gives. And though we were struck blind from
that first moment, our scholarship in the subject would lack no essential
feature so long as our memory remained. In training-institutions for the
blind they teach the pupils as much about light as in ordinary schools.
Reflection, refraction, the spectrum, the ether-theory, etc., are all studied.
But the best taught born-blind pupil of such an establishment yet lacks a
knowledge which the least instructed seeing baby has. They can never show
him what light is in its 'first intention'; and the loss of that sensible
knowledge no book-learning can replace. All this is so obvious that we
usually find sensation 'postulated' as an element of experience, even by
those philosophers who are least inclined to make much of its importance,
or to pay respect to the knowledge which it brings.[4]
But the trouble is that most, if not all, of those who admit it, admit it as a
fractional part of the thought, in the old-fashioned atomistic sense which
we have so often criticised.
Take the pain called toothache for example. Again and again we feel it and
greet it as the same real item in the universe. We must therefore, it is
supposed, have a distinct pocket for it in our mind into which it and nothing
else will fit. This pocket, when filled, is the sensation of toothache; and
must be either filled or half-filled whenever and under whatever form
toothache is present to our thought, and whether much or little of the rest of
the mind be filled at the same time. Thereupon of course comes up the
paradox and mystery: If the knowledge of toothache be pent up in this
separate mental pocket, how can it be known cum alio or brought into one

view with anything else? This pocket knows nothing else; no other part of
the mind knows toothache. The knowing of toothache cum alio must be a
miracle. And the miracle must have an Agent. And the Agent must be a
Subject or Ego 'out of time,'—and all the rest of it, as we saw in Chapter X.
And then begins the well-worn round of recrimination between the
sensationalists and the spiritualists, from which we are saved by our
determination from the outset to accept the psychological point of view, and
to admit knowledge whether of simple toothaches or of philosophic systems
as an ultimate fact. There are realities and there are 'states of mind,' and the
latter know the former; and it is just as wonderful for a state of mind to be a
'sensation' and know a simple pain as for it to be a thought and know a
system of related things.[5] But there is no reason to suppose that when
different states of mind know different things about the same toothache,
they do so by virtue of their all containing faintly or vividly the original
pain. Quite the reverse. The by-gone sensation of my gout was painful, as
Reid somewhere says; the thought of the same gout as by-gone is pleasant,
and in no respect resembles the earlier mental state.
Sensations, then, first make us acquainted with innumerable things, and
then are replaced by thoughts which know the same things in altogether
other ways. And Locke's main doctrine remains eternally true, however
hazy some of his language may have been, that
"though there be a great number of considerations wherein things may
be compared one with another, and so a multitude of relations; yet they
all terminate in, and are concerned about, those simple ideas[6] either
of sensation or reflection, which I think to be the whole materials of all
our knowledge.... The simple ideas we receive from sensation and
reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which, the mind
whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can
it make any discoveries when it would pry into the nature and hidden
causes of those ideas."[7]
The nature and hidden causes of ideas will never be unravelled till the nexus
between the brain and consciousness is cleared up. All we can say now is
that sensations are first things in the way of consciousness. Before
conceptions can come, sensations must have come; but before sensations
come, no psychic fact need have existed, a nerve-current is enough. If the

nerve-current be not given, nothing else will take its place. To quote the
good Locke again:
"It is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged
understanding, by any quickness or variety of thoughts, to invent or
frame one new simple idea [i.e. sensation] in the mind.... I would have
any one try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate, or
frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt; and when he can do this,
I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colors, and a deaf
man true distinct notions of sounds."[8]
The brain is so made that all currents in it run one way. Consciousness of
some sort goes with all the currents, but it is only when new currents are
entering that it has the sensational tang. And it is only then that
consciousness directly encounters (to use a word of Mr. Bradley's) a reality
outside itself.
The difference between such encounter and all conceptual knowledge is
very great. A blind man may know all about the sky's blueness, and I may
know all about your toothache, conceptually; tracing their causes from
primeval chaos, and their consequences to the crack of doom. But so long
as he has not felt the blueness, nor I the toothache, our knowledge, wide as
it is, of these realities, will be hollow and inadequate. Somebody must feel
blueness, somebody must have toothache, to make human knowledge of
these matters real. Conceptual systems which neither began nor left off in
sensations would be like bridges without piers. Systems about fact must
plunge themselves into sensation as bridges plunge their piers into the rock.
Sensations are the stable rock, the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem
of thought. To find such termini is our aim with all our theories—to
conceive first when and where a certain sensation may be had, and then to
have it. Finding it stops discussion. Failure to find it kills the false conceit
of knowledge. Only when you deduce a possible sensation for me from
your theory, and give it to me when and where the theory requires, do I
begin to be sure that your thought has anything to do with truth.
Pure sensations can only be realized in the earliest days of life. They are all
but impossible to adults with memories and stores of associations acquired.
Prior to all impressions on sense-organs the brain is plunged in deep sleep

and consciousness is practically non-existent. Even the first weeks after
birth are passed in almost unbroken sleep by human infants. It takes a
strong message from the sense-organs to break this slumber. In a new-born
brain this gives rise to an absolutely pure sensation. But the experience
leaves its 'unimaginable touch' on the matter of the convolutions, and the
next impression which a sense-organ transmits produces a cerebral reaction
in which the awakened vestige of the last impression plays its part. Another
sort of feeling and a higher grade of cognition are the consequence; and the
complication goes on increasing till the end of life, no two successive
impressions falling on an identical brain, and no two successive thoughts
being exactly the same. (See Vol. I, p. 230 ff.)
The first sensation which an infant gets is for him the Universe. And the
Universe which he later comes to know is nothing but an amplification and
an implication of that first simple germ which, by accretion on the one hand
and intussusception on the other, has grown so big and complex and
articulate that its first estate is unrememberable. In his dumb awakening to
the consciousness of something there, a mere this as yet (or something for
which even the term this would perhaps be too discriminative, and the
intellectual acknowledgment of which would be better expressed by the
bare interjection 'lo!'), the infant encounters an object in which (though it be
given in a pure sensation) all the 'categories of the understanding' are
contained. It has objectivity, unity, substantiality, causality, in the full sense
in which any later object or system of objects has these things. Here the
young knower meets and greets his world; and the miracle of knowledge
bursts forth, as Voltaire says, as much in the infant's lowest sensation as in
the highest achievement of a Newton's brain. The physiological condition of
this first sensible experience is probably nerve-currents coming in from
many peripheral organs at once. Later, the one confused Fact which these
currents cause to appear is perceived to be many facts, and to contain many
qualities.[9] For as the currents vary, and the brain-paths are moulded by
them, other thoughts with other 'objects' come, and the 'same thing' which
was apprehended as a present this soon figures as a past that, about which
many unsuspected things have come to light. The principles of this
development have been laid down already in Chapters XII and XIII, and
nothing more need here be added to that account.

"THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE."
To the reader who is tired of so much Erkenntnisstheorie I can only say that
I am so myself, but that it is indispensable, in the actual state of opinions
about Sensation, to try to clear up just what the word means. Locke's pupils
seek to do the impossible with sensations, and against them we must once
again insist that sensations 'clustered together' cannot build up our more
intellectual states of mind. Plato's earlier pupils used to admit Sensation's
existence, grudgingly, but they trampled it in the dust as something
corporeal, non-cognitive, and vile.[10] His latest followers seem to seek to
crowd it out of existence altogether. The only reals for the neo-Hegelian
writers appear to be relations, relations without terms, or whose terms are
only speciously such and really consist in knots, or gnarls of relations finer
still in infinitum.
"Exclude from what we have considered real all qualities constituted
by relation, we find that none are left." "Abstract the many relations
from the one thing and there is nothing.... Without the relations it
would not exist at all."[11] "The single feeling is nothing real." "On the
recognition of relations as constituting the nature of ideas, rests the
possibility of any tenable theory of their reality."
Such quotations as these from the late T. H. Green[12] would be matters of
curiosity rather than of importance, were it not that sensationalist writers
themselves believe in a so-called 'Relativity of Knowledge,' which, if they
only understood it, they would see to be identical with Professor Green's
doctrine. They tell us that the relation of sensations to each other is
something belonging to their essence, and that no one of them has an
absolute content:
"That, e.g., black can only be felt in contrast to white, or at least in
distinction from a paler or a deeper black; similarly a tone or a sound
only in alternation with others or with silence; and in like manner a
smell, a taste, a touch, only, so to speak, in statu nascendi, whilst,
when the stimulus continues, all sensation disappears. This all seems at
first sight to be splendidly consistent both with itself and with the
facts. But looked at more closely, it is seen that neither is the case."[13]

The two leading facts from which the doctrine of universal relativity derives
its wide-spread credit are these:
1) The psychological fact that so much of our actual knowledge is of the
relations of things—even our simplest sensations in adult life are habitually
referred to classes as we take them in; and
2) The physiological fact that our senses and brain must have periods of
change and repose, else we cease to feel and think.
Neither of these facts proves anything about the presence or non-presence
to our mind of absolute qualities with which we become sensibly
acquainted. Surely not the psychological fact; for our inveterate love of
relating and comparing things does not alter the intrinsic qualities or nature
of the things compared, or undo their absolute givenness. And surely not
the physiological fact; for the length of time during which we can feel or
attend to a quality is altogether irrelevant to the intrinsic constitution of the
quality felt. The time, moreover, is long enough in many instances, as
sufferers from neuralgia know.[14] And the doctrine of relativity, not proved
by these facts, is flatly disproved by other facts even more patent. So far are
we from not knowing (in the words of Professor Bain) "any one thing by
itself, but only the difference between it and another thing," that if this were
true the whole edifice of our knowledge would collapse. If all we felt were
the difference between the C and D, or c and d, on the musical scale, that
being the same in the two pairs of notes, the pairs themselves would be the
same, and language could get along without substantives. But Professor
Bain does not mean seriously what he says, and we need spend no more
time on this vague and popular form of the doctrine.[15] The facts which
seem to hover before the minds of its champions are those which are best
described under the head of a physiological law.
THE LAW OF CONTRAST.
I will first enumerate the main facts which fall under this law, and then
remark upon what seems to me their significance for psychology.[16]
[Nowhere are the phenomena of contrast better exhibited, and their laws
more open to accurate study, than in connection with the sense of sight.
Here both kinds—simultaneous and successive—can easily be observed, for

they are of constant occurrence. Ordinarily they remain unnoticed, in
accordance with the general law of economy which causes us to select for
conscious notice only such elements of our object as will serve us for
æsthetic or practical utility, and to neglect the rest; just as we ignore the
double images, the mouches volantes, etc., which exist for everyone, but
which are not discriminated without careful attention. But by attention we
may easily discover the general facts involved in contrast. We find that in
general the color and brightness of one object always apparently affect the
color and brightness of any other object seen simultaneously with it or
immediately after.
In the first place, if we look for a moment at any surface and then turn our
eyes elsewhere, the complementary color and opposite degree of brightness
to that of the first surface tend to mingle themselves with the color and the
brightness of the second. This is successive contrast. It finds its explanation
in the fatigue of the organ of sight, causing it to respond to any particular
stimulus less and less readily the longer such stimulus continues to act. This
is shown clearly in the very marked changes which occur in case of
continued fixation of one particular point of any field. The field darkens
slowly, becomes more and more indistinct, and finally, if one is practised
enough in holding the eye perfectly steady, slight differences in shade and
color may entirely disappear. If we now turn aside the eyes, a negative
after-image of the field just fixated at once forms, and mingles its
sensations with those which may happen to come from anything else looked
at. This influence is distinctly evident only when the first surface has been
'fixated' without movement of the eyes. It is, however, none the less present
at all times, even when the eye wanders from point to point, causing each
sensation to be modified more or less by that just previously experienced.
On this account successive contrast is almost sure to be present in cases of
simultaneous contrast, and to complicate the phenomena.
A visual image is modified not only by other sensations just previously
experienced, but also by all those experienced simultaneously with it, and
especially by such as proceed from contiguous portions of the retina. This is
the phenomenon of simultaneous contrast. In this, as in successive contrast,
both brightness and hue are involved. A bright object appears still brighter
when its surroundings are darker than itself, and darker when they are
brighter than itself. Two colors side by side are apparently changed by the

admixture, with each, of the complement of the other. And lastly, a gray
surface near a colored one is tinged with the complement of the latter.[17]
The phenomena of simultaneous contrast in sight are so complicated by
other attendant phenomena that it is difficult to isolate them and observe
them in their purity. Yet it is evidently of the greatest importance to do so, if
one would conduct his investigations accurately. Neglect of this principle
has led to many mistakes being made in accounting for the facts observed.
As we have seen, if the eye is allowed to wander here and there about the
field as it ordinarily does, successive contrast results and allowance must be
made for its presence. It can be avoided only by carefully fixating with the
well-rested eye a point of one field, and by then observing the changes
which occur in this field when the contrasting field is placed by its side.
Such a course will insure pure simultaneous contrast. But even thus it lasts
in its purity for a moment only. It reaches its maximum of effect
immediately after the introduction of the contrasting field, and then, if the
fixation is continued, it begins to weaken rapidly and soon disappears; thus
undergoing changes similar to those observed when any field whatever is
fixated steadily and the retina becomes fatigued by unchanging stimuli. If
one continues still further to fixate the same point, the color and brightness
of one field tend to spread themselves over and mingle with the color and
brightness of the neighboring fields, thus substituting 'simultaneous
induction' for simultaneous contrast.
Not only must we recognize and eliminate the effects of successive contrast,
of temporal changes due to fixation, and of simultaneous induction, in
analyzing the phenomena of simultaneous contrast, but we must also take
into account various other influences which modify its effects. Under
favorable circumstances the contrast-effects are very striking, and did they
always occur as strongly they could not fail to attract the attention. But they
are not always clearly apparent, owing to various disturbing causes which
form no exception to the laws of contrast, but which have a modifying
effect on its phenomena. When, for instance, the ground observed has many
distinguishable features—a coarse grain, rough surface, intricate pattern,
etc.—the contrast effect appears weaker. This does not imply that the effects
of contrast are absent, but merely that the resulting sensations are
overpowered by the many other stronger sensations which entirely occupy
the attention. On such a ground a faint negative after-image—undoubtedly

due to retinal modifications—may become invisible; and even weak
objective differences in color may become imperceptible. For example, a
faint spot or grease-stain on woollen cloth, easily seen at a distance, when
the fibres are not distinguishable, disappears when closer examination
reveals the intricate nature of the surface.
Another frequent cause of the apparent absence of contrast is the presence
of narrow dark intermediate fields, such as are formed by bordering a field
with black lines, or by the shaded contours of objects. When such fields
interfere with the contrast, it is because black and white can absorb much
color without themselves becoming clearly colored; and because such lines
separate other fields too far for them to distinctly influence one another.
Even weak objective differences in color may be made imperceptible by
such means.
A third case where contrast does not clearly appear is where the color of the
contrasting fields is too weak or too intense, or where there is much
difference in brightness between the two fields. In the latter case, as can
easily be shown, it is the contrast of brightness which interferes with the
color-contrast and makes it imperceptible. For this reason contrast shows
best between fields of about equal brightness. But the intensity of the color
must not be too great, for then its very darkness necessitates a dark
contrasting field which is too absorbent of induced color to allow the
contrast to appear strongly. The case is similar if the fields are too light.
To obtain the best contrast-effects, therefore, the contracting fields should
be near together, should not be separated by shadows or black lines, should
be of homogeneous texture, and should be of about equal brightness and
medium intensity of color. Such conditions do not often occur naturally, the
disturbing influences being present in case of almost all ordinary objects,
thus making the effects of contrast far less evident. To eliminate these
disturbances and to produce the conditions most favorable for the
appearance of good contrast-effects, various experiments have been
devised, which will be explained in comparing the rival theories of
explanation.

There are two theories—the psychological and the physiological—which
attempt to explain the phenomena of contrast.
Of these the psychological one was the first to gain prominence. Its most
able advocate has been Helmholtz. It explains contrast as a DECEPTION OF
JUDGMENT. In ordinary life our sensations have interest for us only so far as
they give us practical knowledge. Our chief concern is to recognize objects,
and we have no occasion to estimate exactly their absolute brightness and
color. Hence we gain no facility in so doing, but neglect the constant
changes in their shade, and are very uncertain as to the exact degree of their
brightness or tone of their color. When objects are near one another "we are
inclined to consider those differences which are clearly and surely
perceived as greater than those which appear uncertain in perception or
which must be judged by aid of memory,"[18] just as we see a medium-sized
man taller than he really is when he stands beside a short man. Such
deceptions are more easily possible in the judgment of small differences
than of large ones; also where there is but one element of difference instead
of many. In a large number of cases of contrast, in all of which a whitish
spot is surrounded on all sides by a colored surface—Meyer's experiment,
the mirror experiment, colored shadows, etc., soon to be described—the
contrast is produced, according to Helmholtz, by the fact that "a colored
illumination or a transparent colored covering appears to be spread out over
the field, and observation does not show directly that it fails on the white
spot."[19] We therefore believe that we see the latter through the former
color. Now
"Colors have their greatest importance for us in so far as they are
properties of bodies and can serve as signs for the recognition of
bodies.... We have become accustomed, in forming a judgment in
regard to the colors of bodies, to eliminate the varying brightness and
color of the illumination. We have sufficient opportunity to investigate
the same colors of objects in full sunshine, in the blue light of the clear
sky, in the weak white light of a cloudy day, in the reddish-yellow light
of the sinking sun or of the candle. Moreover the colored reflections of
surrounding objects are involved. Since we see the same colored
objects under these varying illuminations, we learn to form a correct
conception of the color of the object in spite of the difference in
illumination, i.e. to judge how such an object would appear in white

illumination; and since only the constant color of the object interests
us, we do not become conscious of the particular sensations on which
our judgment rests. So also we are at no loss, when we see an object
through a colored covering, to distinguish what belongs to the color of
the covering and what to the object. In the experiments mentioned we
do the same also where the covering over the object is not at all
colored, because of the deception into which we fall, and in
consequence of which we ascribe to the body a false color, the color
complementary to the colored portion of the covering."[20]
We think that we see the complementary color through the colored
covering,—for these two colors together would give the sensation of white
which is actually experienced. If, however, in any way the white spot is
recognized as an independent object, or if it is compared with another
object known to be white, our judgment is no longer deceived and the
contrast does not appear.
"As soon as the contrasting field is recognized as an independent body
which lies above the colored ground, or even through an adequate
tracing of its outlines is seen to be a separate field, the contrast
disappears. Since, then, the judgment of the spatial position, the
material independence, of the object in question is decisive for the
determination of its color, it follows that the contrast-color arises not
through an act of sensation but through an act of judgment."[21]
In short, the apparent change in color or brightness through contrast is due
to no change in excitation of the organ, to no change in sensation; but in
consequence of a false judgment the unchanged sensation is wrongly
interpreted, and thus leads to a changed perception of the brightness or
color.

In opposition to this theory has been developed one which attempts to
explain all cases of contrast as depending purely on physiological action of
the terminal apparatus of vision. Hering is the most prominent supporter of
this view. By great originality in devising experiments and by insisting on

rigid care in conducting them, he has been able to detect the faults in the
psychological theory and to practically establish the validity of his own.
Every visual sensation, he maintains, is correlated to a physical process in
the nervous apparatus. Contrast is occasioned, not by a false idea resulting
from unconscious conclusions, but by the fact that the excitation of any
portion of the retina—and the consequent sensation—depends not only on
its own illumination, but on that of the rest of the retina as well.
"If this psycho-physical process is aroused, as usually happens, by
light-rays impinging on the retina, its nature depends not only on the
nature of these rays, but also on the constitution of the entire nervous
apparatus which is connected with the organ of vision, and on the state
in which it finds itself."[22]
When a limited portion of the retina is aroused by external stimuli, the rest
of the retina, and especially the immediately contiguous parts, tends to react
also, and in such a way as to produce therefrom the sensation of the
opposite degree of brightness and the complementary color to that of the
directly-excited portion. When a gray spot is seen alone, and again when it
appears colored through contrast, the objective light from the spot is in both
cases the same. Helmholtz maintains that the neural process and the
corresponding sensation also remain unchanged, but are differently
interpreted; Hering, that the neural process and the sensation are themselves
changed, and that the 'interpretation' is the direct conscious correlate of the
altered retinal conditions. According to the one, the contrast is
psychological in its origin; according to the other, it is purely physiological.
In the cases cited above where the contrast-color is no longer apparent—on
a ground with many distinguishable features, on a field whose borders are
traced with black lines, etc.,—the psychological theory, as we have seen,
attributes this to the fact that under these circumstances we judge the
smaller patch of color to be an independent object on the surface, and are no
longer deceived in judging it to be something over which the color of the
ground is drawn. The physiological theory, on the other hand, maintains
that the contrast-effect is still produced, but that the conditions are such that
the slight changes in color and brightness which it occasions become
imperceptible.

The two theories, stated thus broadly, may seem equally plausible. Hering,
however, has conclusively proved, by experiments with after-images, that
the process on one part of the retina does modify that on neighboring
portions, under conditions where deception of judgment is impossible.[23] A
careful examination of the facts of contrast will show that its phenomena
must be due to this cause. In all the cases which one may investigate it will
be seen that the upholders of the psychological theory have failed to
conduct their experiments with sufficient care. They have not excluded
successive contrast, have overlooked the changes due to steady fixation,
and have failed to properly account for the various modifying influences
which have been mentioned above. We can easily establish this if we
examine the most striking experiments in simultaneous contrast.
Of these one of the best known and most easily arranged is that known as
Meyer's experiment. A scrap of gray paper is placed on a colored
background, and both are covered by a sheet of transparent white paper.
The gray spot then assumes a contrast-color, complementary to that of the
background, which shines with a whitish tinge through the paper which
covers it. Helmholtz explains the phenomenon thus:
"If the background is green, the covering-paper itself appears to be of a
greenish color. If now the substance of the paper extends without
apparent interruption over the gray which lies under it, we think that
we see an object glimmering through the greenish paper, and such an
object must in turn be rose-red, in order to give white light. If,
however, the gray spot has its limits so fixed that it appears to be an
independent object, the continuity with the greenish portion of the
surface fails, and we regard it as a gray object which lies on this
surface."[24]
The contrast-color may thus be made to disappear by tracing in black the
outlines of the gray scrap, or by placing above the tissue paper another gray
scrap of the same degree of brightness, and comparing together the two
grays. On neither of them does the contrast-color now appear.

Hering[25] shows clearly that this interpretation is incorrect, and that the
disturbing factors are to be otherwise explained. In the first place, the
experiment can be so arranged that we could not possibly be deceived into
believing that we see the gray through a colored medium. Out of a sheet of
gray paper cut strips 5 mm. wide in such a way that there will be alternately
an empty space and a bar of gray, both of the same width, the bars being
held together by the uncut edges of the gray sheet (thus presenting an
appearance like a gridiron). Lay this on a colored background—e.g. green
—cover both with transparent paper, and above all put a black frame which
covers all the edges, leaving visible only the bars, which are now alternately
green and gray. The gray bars appear strongly colored by contrast, although,
since they occupy as much space as the green bars, we are not deceived into
believing that we see the former through a green medium. The same is true
if we weave together into a basket pattern narrow strips of green and gray
and cover them with the transparent paper.
Why, then, if it is a true sensation due to physiological causes, and not an
error of judgment, which causes the contrast, does the color disappear when
the outlines of the gray scrap are traced, enabling us to recognize it as an
independent object? In the first place, it does not necessarily do so, as will
easily be seen if the experiment is tried. The contrast-color often remains
distinctly visible in spite of the black outlines. In the second place, there are
many adequate reasons why the effect should be modified. Simultaneous
contrast is always strongest at the border-line of the two fields; but a narrow
black field now separates the two, and itself by contrast strengthens the
whiteness of both original fields, which were already little saturated in
color; and on black and on white, contrast-colors show only under the most
favorable circumstances. Even weak objective differences in color may be
made to disappear by such tracing of outlines, as can be seen if we place on
a gray background a scrap of faintly-colored paper, cover it with transparent
paper and trace its outlines. Thus we see that it is not the recognition of the
contrasting field as an independent object which interferes with its color,
but rather a number of entirely explicable physiological disturbances.
The same may be proved in the case of holding above the tissue paper a
second gray scrap and comparing it with that underneath. To avoid the
disturbances caused by using papers of different brightness, the second
scrap should be made exactly like the first by covering the same gray with

the same tissue paper, and carefully cutting a piece about 10 mm. square out
of both together. To thoroughly guard against successive contrast, which so
easily complicates the phenomena, we must carefully prevent all previous
excitation of the retina by colored light. This may be done by arranging
thus: Place the sheet of tissue paper on a glass pane, which rests on four
supports; under the paper put the first gray scrap. By means of a wire,
fasten the second gray scrap 2 or 3 cm. above the glass plate. Both scraps
appear exactly alike, except at the edges. Gaze now at both scraps, with
eyes not exactly accommodated, so that they appear near one another, with
a very narrow space between. Shove now a colored field (green) underneath
the glass plate, and the contrast appears at once on both scraps. If it appears
less clearly on the upper scrap, it is because of its bright and dark edges, its
inequalities, its grain, etc. When the accommodation is exact, there is no
essential change, although then on the upper scrap the bright edge on the
side toward the light, and the dark edge on the shadow side, disturb
somewhat. By continued fixation the contrast becomes weaker and finally
yields to simultaneous induction, causing the scraps to become
indistinguishable from the ground. Remove the green field and both scraps
become green, by successive induction. If the eye moves about freely these
last-named phenomena do not appear, but the contrast continues indefinitely
and becomes stronger. When Helmholtz found that the contrast on the lower
scrap disappeared, it was evidently because he then really held the eye
fixed. This experiment may be disturbed by holding the upper scrap
wrongly and by the differences in brightness of its edges, or by other
inequalities, but not by that recognizing of it 'as an independent body lying
above the colored ground,' on which the psychological explanation rests.
In like manner the claims of the psychological explanation can be shown to
be inadequate in other cases of contrast. Of frequent use are revolving
disks, which are especially efficient in showing good contrast-phenomena,
because all inequalities of the ground disappear and leave a perfectly
homogeneous surface. On a white disk are arranged colored sectors, which
are interrupted midway by narrow black fields in such a way that when the
disk is revolved the white becomes mixed with the color and the black,
forming a colored disk of weak saturation on which appears a gray ring.
The latter is colored by contrast with the field which surrounds it.
Helmholtz explains the fact thus:

"The difference of the compared colors appears greater than it really is
either because this difference, when it is the only existing one and
draws the attention to itself alone, makes a stronger impression than
when it is one among many, or because the different colors of the
surface are conceived as alterations of the one ground-color of the
surface such as might arise through shadows falling on it, through
colored reflexes, or through mixture with colored paint or dust. In
truth, to produce an objectively gray spot on a green surface, a reddish
coloring would be necessary."[26]

This explanation is easily proved false by painting the disk with narrow
green and gray concentric rings, and giving each a different saturation. The
contrast appears though there is no ground-color, and no longer a single
difference, but many. The facts which Helmholtz brings forward in support
of his theory are also easily turned against him. He asserts that if the color
of the ground is too intense, or if the gray ring is bordered by black circles,
the contrast becomes weaker; that no contrast appears on a white scrap held
over the colored field; and that the gray ring when compared with such
scrap loses its contrast-color either wholly or in part. Hering points out the
inaccuracy of all these claims. Under favorable conditions it is impossible
to make the contrast disappear by means of black enclosing lines, although
they naturally form a disturbing element; increase in the saturation of the
field, if disturbance through increasing brightness-contrast is to be avoided,
demands a darker gray field, on which contrast-colors are less easily
perceived; and careful use of the white scrap leads to entirely different
results. The contrast-color does appear upon it when it is first placed above
the colored field; but if it is carefully fixated, the contrast-color diminishes
very rapidly both on it and on the ring, from causes already explained. To
secure accurate observation, all complication through successive contrast
should be avoided thus: first arrange the white scrap, then interpose a gray
screen between it and the disk, rest the eye, set the wheel in motion, fixate
the scrap, and then have the screen removed. The contrast at once appears
clearly, and its disappearance through continued fixation can be accurately
watched.
Brief mention of a few other cases of contrast must suffice. The so-called
mirror experiment consists of placing at an angle of 45º a green (or
otherwise colored) pane of glass, forming an angle with two white surfaces,
one horizontal and the other vertical. On each white surface is a black spot.
The one on the horizontal surface is seen through the glass and appears dark
green, the other is reflected from the surface of the glass to the eye, and
appears by contrast red. The experiment may be so arranged that we are not
aware of the presence of the green glass, but think that we are looking
directly at a surface with green and red spots upon it; in such a case there is
no deception of judgment caused by making allowance for the colored
medium through which we think that we see the spot, and therefore the

psychological explanation does not apply. On excluding successive contrast
by fixation the contrast soon disappears as in all similar experiments.[27]
Colored shadows have long been thought to afford a convincing proof of
the fact that simultaneous contrast is psychological in its origin. They are
formed whenever an opaque object is illuminated from two separate sides
by lights of different colors. When the light from one source is white, its
shadow is of the color of the other light, and the second shadow is of a color
complementary to that of the field illuminated by both lights. If now we
take a tube, blackened inside, and through it look at the colored shadow,
none of the surrounding field being visible, and then have the colored light
removed, the shadow still appears colored, although 'the circumstances
which caused it have disappeared.' This is regarded by the psychologists as
conclusive evidence that the color is due to deception of judgment. It can,
however, easily be shown that the persistence of the color seen through the
tube is due to fatigue of the retina through the prevailing light, and that
when the colored light is removed the color slowly disappears as the
equilibrium of the retina becomes gradually restored. When successive
contrast is carefully guarded against, the simultaneous contrast, whether
seen directly or through the tube, never lasts for an instant on removal of
the colored field. The physiological explanation applies throughout to all
the phenomena presented by colored shadows.[28]
If we have a small field whose illumination remains constant, surrounded
by a large field of changing brightness, an increase or decrease in brightness
of the latter results in a corresponding apparent decrease or increase
respectively in the brightness of the former, while the large field seems to
be unchanged. Exner says:
"This illusion of sense shows that we are inclined to regard as constant
the dominant brightness in our field of vision, and hence to refer the
changing difference between this and the brightness of a limited field
to a change in brightness of the latter."
The result, however, can be shown to depend not on illusion, but on actual
retinal changes, which alter the sensation experienced. The irritability of
those portions of the retina lighted by the large field becomes much reduced
in consequence of fatigue, so that the increase in brightness becomes much

less apparent than it would be without this diminution in irritability. The
small field, however, shows the change by a change in the contrast-effect
induced upon it by the surrounding parts of the retina.[29]
The above cases show clearly that physiological processes, and not
deception of judgment, are responsible for contrast of color. To say this,
however, is not to maintain that our perception of a color is never in any
degree modified by our judgment of what the particular colored thing
before us may be. We have unquestionable illusions of color due to wrong
inferences as to what object is before us. Thus Von Kries[30] speaks of
wandering through evergreen forests covered with snow, and thinking that
through the interstices of the boughs he saw the deep blue of pine-clad
mountains, covered with snow and lighted by brilliant sunshine; whereas
what he really saw was the white snow on trees near by, lying in shadow].
[31]

Such a mistake as this is undoubtedly of psychological origin. It is a wrong
classification of the appearances, due to the arousal of intricate processes of
association amongst which is the suggestion of a different hue from that
really before the eyes. In the ensuing chapters such illusions as this will be
treated of in considerable detail. But it is a mistake to interpret the simpler
cases of contrast in the light of such illusions as these. These illusions can
be rectified in an instant, and we then wonder how they could have been.
They come from insufficient attention, or from the fact that the impression
which we get is a sign of more than one possible object, and can be
interpreted in either way. In none of these points do they resemble simple
color-contrast, which unquestionably is a phenomenon of sensation
immediately aroused.

I have dwelt upon the facts of color-contrast at such great length because
they form so good a text to comment on in my struggle against the view that
sensations are immutable psychic things which coexist with higher mental
functions. Both sensationalists and intellectualists agree that such sensations
exist. They fuse, say the pure sensationalists, and make the higher mental
function; they are combined by activity of the Thinking Principle, say the

intellectualists. I myself have contended that they do not exist in or
alongside of the higher mental function when that exists. The things which
arouse them exist; and the higher mental function also knows these same
things. But just as its knowledge of the things supersedes and displaces their
knowledge, so it supersedes and displaces them, when it comes, being as
much as they are a direct resultant of whatever momentary brain-conditions
may obtain. The psychological theory of contrast, on the other hand, holds
the sensations still to exist in themselves unchanged before the mind, whilst
the 'relating activity' of the latter deals with them freely and settles to its
own satisfaction what each shall be, in view of what the others also are.
Wundt says expressly that the Law of Relativity is "not a law of sensation
but a law of Apperception;" and the word Apperception connotes with him
a higher intellectual spontaneity.[32] This way of taking things belongs with
the philosophy that looks at the data of sense as something earth-born and
servile, and the 'relating of them together' as something spiritual and free.
Lo! the spirit can even change the intrinsic quality of the sensible facts
themselves if by so doing it can relate them better to each other! But (apart
from the difficulty of seeing how changing the sensations should relate
them better) is it not manifest that the relations are part of the 'content' of
consciousness, part of the 'object,' just as much as the sensations are? Why
ascribe the former exclusively to the knower and the latter to the known?
The knower is in every case a unique pulse of thought corresponding to a
unique reaction of the brain upon its conditions. All that the facts of
contrast show us is that the same real thing may give us quite different
sensations when the conditions alter, and that we must therefore be careful
which one to select as the thing's truest representative.

There are many other facts beside the phenomena of contrast which prove
that when two objects act together on us the sensation which either would
give alone becomes a different sensation. A certain amount of skin dipped
in hot water gives the perception of a certain heat. More skin immersed
makes the heat much more intense, although of course the water's heat is
the same. A certain extent as well as intensity, in the quantity of the
stimulus is requisite for any quality to be felt. Fick and Wunderli could not

distinguish heat from touch when both were applied through a hole in a
card, and so confined to a small part of the skin. Similarly there is a
chromatic minimum of size in objects. The image they cast on the retina
must needs have a certain extent, or it will give no sensation of color at all.
Inversely, more intensity in the outward impression may make the
subjective object more extensive. This happens, as will be shown in Chapter
XIX, when the illumination is increased: The whole room expands and
dwindles according as we raise or lower the gas-jet. It is not easy to explain
any of these results as illusions of judgment due to the inference of a wrong
objective cause for the sensation which we get. No more is this easy in the
case of Weber's observation that a thaler laid on the skin of the forehead
feels heavier when cold than when warm; or of Szabadföldi's observation
that small wooden disks when heated to 122° Fahrenheit often feel heavier
than those which are larger but not thus warmed;[33] or of Hall's observation
that a heavy point moving over the skin seems to go faster than a lighter one
moving at the same rate of speed.[34]
Bleuler and Lehmann some years ago called attention to a strange
idiosyncrasy found in some persons, and consisting in the fact that
impressions on the eye, skin, etc., were accompanied by distinct sensations
of sound.[35] Colored hearing is the name sometimes given to the
phenomenon, which has now been repeatedly described. Quite lately the
Viennese aurist Urbantschitsch has proved that these cases are only extreme
examples of a very general law, and that all our sense-organs influence each
other's sensations.[36] The hue of patches of color so distant as not to be
recognized was immediately, in U.'s patients, perceived when a tuning-fork
was sounded close to the ear. Sometimes, on the contrary, the field was
darkened by the sound. The acuity of vision was increased, so that letters
too far off to be read could be read when the tuning-fork was heard.
Urbantschitsch, varying his experiments, found that their results were
mutual, and that sounds which were on the limits of audibility became
audible when lights of various colors were exhibited to the eye. Smell, taste,
touch, sense of temperature, etc., were all found to fluctuate when lights
were seen and sounds were heard. Individuals varied much in the degree
and kind of effect produced, but almost every one experimented on seems
to have been in some way affected. The phenomena remind one somewhat
of the 'dynamogenic' effects of sensations upon the strength of muscular

contraction observed by M. Féré, and later to be described. The most
familiar examples of them seem to be the increase of pain by noise or light,
and the increase of nausea by all concomitant sensations. Persons suffering
in any way instinctively seek stillness and darkness.

Probably every one will agree that the best way of formulating all such facts
is physiological: it must be that the cerebral process of the first sensation is
reinforced or otherwise altered by the other current which comes in. No
one, surely, will prefer a psychological explanation here. Well, it seems to
me that all cases of mental reaction to a plurality of stimuli must be like
these cases, and that the physiological formulation is everywhere the
simplest and the best. When simultaneous red and green light make us see
yellow, when three notes of the scale make us hear a chord, it is not because
the sensations of red and of green and of each of the three notes enter the
mind as such, and there 'combine' or 'are combined by its relating activity'
into the yellow and the chord, it is because the larger sum of light-waves
and of air-waves arouses new cortical processes, to which the yellow and
the chord directly correspond. Even when the sensible qualities of things
enter into the objects of our highest thinking, it is surely the same. Their
several sensations do not continue to exist there tucked away. They are
replaced by the higher thought which, although a different psychic unit
from them, knows the same sensible qualities which they know.
The principles laid down in Chapter VI seem then to be corroborated in this
new connection. You cannot build up one thought or one sensation out of
many; and only direct experiment can inform us of what we shall perceive
when we get many stimuli at once.
THE 'ECCENTRIC PROJECTION' OF SENSATIONS.
We often hear the opinion expressed that all our sensations at first appear to
us as subjective or internal, and are afterwards and by a special act on our
part 'extradited' or 'projected' so as to appear located in an outer world. Thus
we read in Professor Ladd's valuable work that

"Sensations... are psychical states whose place—so far as they can be
said to have one—is the mind. The transference of these sensations
from mere mental states to physical processes located in the periphery
of the body, or to qualities of things projected in space external to the
body, is a mental act. It may rather be said to be a mental achievement
[cf. Cudworth, note 10, as to knowledge being conquering], for it is an
act which in its perfection results from a long and intricate process of
development.... Two noteworthy stages, or 'epoch-making'
achievements in the process of elaborating the presentations of sense,
require a special consideration. These are 'localization,' or the
transference of the composite sensations from mere states of the mind
to processes or conditions recognized as taking place at more or less
definitely fixed points or areas of the body; and 'eccentric projection'
(sometimes called 'eccentric perception') or the giving to these
sensations an objective existence (in the fullest sense of the word
'objective') as qualities of objects situated within a field of space and in
contact with, or more or less remotely distant from, the body."[37]
It seems to me that there is not a vestige of evidence for this view. It hangs
together with the opinion that our sensations are originally devoid of all
spatial content,[38] an opinion which I confess that I am wholly at a loss to
understand. As I look at my bookshelf opposite I cannot frame to myself an
idea, however imaginary, of any feeling which I could ever possibly have
got from it except the feeling of the same big extended sort of outward fact
which I now perceive. So far is it from being true that our first way of
feeling things is the feeling of them as subjective or mental, that the exact
opposite seems rather to be the truth. Our earliest, most instinctive, least
developed kind of consciousness is the objective kind; and only as
reflection becomes developed do we become aware of an inner world at all.
Then indeed we enrich it more and more, even to the point of becoming
idealists, with the spoils of the outer world which at first was the only world
we knew. But subjective consciousness, aware of itself as subjective, does
not at first exist. Even an attack of pain is surely felt at first objectively as
something in space which prompts to motor reaction, and to the very end it
is located, not in the mind, but in some bodily part.

"A sensation which should not awaken an impulse to move, nor any
tendency to produce an outward effect, would manifestly be useless to
a living creature. On the principles of evolution such a sensation could
never be developed. Therefore every sensation originally refers to
something external and independent of the sentient creature.
Rhizopods (according to Engelmann's observations) retract their
pseudopodia whenever these touch foreign bodies, even if these
foreign bodies are the pseudopodia of other individuals of their own
species, whilst the mutual contact of their own pseudopodia is
followed by no such contraction. These low animals can therefore
already feel an outer world—even in the absence of innate ideas of
causality, and probably without any clear consciousness of space. In
truth the conviction that something exists outside of ourselves does not
come from thought. It comes from sensation; it rests on the same
ground as our conviction of our own existence.... If we consider the
behavior of new-born animals, we never find them betraying that they
are first of all conscious of their sensations as purely subjective
excitements. We far more readily incline to explain the astonishing
certainty with which they make use of their sensations (and which is
an effect of adaptation and inheritance) as the result of an inborn
intuition of the outer world.... Instead of starting from an original pure
subjectivity of sensation, and seeking how this could possibly have
acquired an objective signification, we must, on the contrary, begin by
the possession of objectivity by the sensation and then show how for
reflective consciousness the latter becomes interpreted as an effect of
the object, how in short the original immediate objectivity becomes
changed into a remote one."[39]
Another confusion, much more common than the denial of all objective
character to sensations, is the assumption that they are all originally located
inside the body and are projected outward by a secondary act. This
secondary judgment is always false, according to M. Taine, so far as the
place of the sensation itself goes. But it happens to hit a real object which is
at the point towards which the sensation is projected; so we may call its
result, according to this author, a veridical hallucination.[40] The word
Sensation, to begin with, is constantly, in psychological literature, used as if
it meant one and the same thing with the physical impression either in the

terminal organs or in the centres, which is its antecedent condition, and this
notwithstanding that by sensation we mean a mental, not a physical, fact.
But those who expressly mean by it a mental fact still leave to it a physical
place, still think of it as objectively inhabiting the very neural tracts which
occasion its appearance when they are excited; and then (going a step
farther) they think that it must place itself where they place it, or be
subjectively sensible of that place as its habitat in the first instance, and
afterwards have to be moved so as to appear elsewhere.
All this seems highly confused and unintelligible. Consciousness, as we
saw in an earlier chapter (vol. I p. 214) cannot properly be said to inhabit
any place. It has dynamic relations with the brain, and cognitive relations
with everything and anything. From the one point of view we may say that a
sensation is in the same place with the brain (if we like), just as from the
other point of view we may say that it is in the same place with whatever
quality it may be cognizing. But the supposition that a sensation primitively
feels either itself or its object to be in the same place with the brain is
absolutely groundless, and neither a priori probability nor facts from
experience can be adduced to show that such a deliverance forms any part
of the original cognitive function of our sensibility.
Where, then, do we feel the objects of our original sensations to be?
Certainly a child newly born in Boston, who gets a sensation from the
candle-flame which lights the bedroom, or from his diaper-pin, does not
feel either of these objects to be situated in longitude 72° W. and latitude
41° N. He does not feel them to be in the third story of the house. He does
not even feel them in any distinct manner to be to the right or the left of any
of the other sensations which he may be getting from other objects in the
room at the same time. He does not, in short, know anything about their
space-relations to anything else in the world. The flame fills its own place,
the pain fills its own place; but as yet these places are neither identified
with, nor discriminated from, any other places. That comes later. For the
places thus first sensibly known are elements of the child's space-world
which remain with him all his life; and by memory and later experience he
learns a vast number of things about those places which at first he did not
know. But to the end of time certain places of the world remain defined for
him as the places where those sensations were; and his only possible answer
to the question where anything is will be to say 'there,' and to name some

sensation or other like those first ones, which shall identify the spot. Space
means but the aggregate of all our possible sensations. There is no duplicate
space known aliunde, or created by an 'epoch-making achievement' into
which our sensations, originally spaceless, are dropped. They bring space
and all its places to our intellect, and do not derive it thence.
By his body, then, the child later means simply that place where the pain
from the pin, and a lot of other sensations like it, were or are felt. It is no
more true to say that he locates that pain in his body, than to say that he
locates his body in that pain. Both are true: that pain is part of what he
means by the word body. Just so by the outer world the child means nothing
more than that place where the candle-flame and a lot of other sensations
like it are felt. He no more locates the candle in the outer world than he
locates the outer world in the candle. Once again, he does both; for the
candle is part of what he means by 'outer world.'

This (it seems to me) will be admitted, and will (I trust) be made still more
plausible in the chapter on the Perception of Space. But the later
developments of this perception are so complicated that these simple
principles get easily overlooked. One of the complications comes from the
fact that things move, and that the original object which we feel them to be
splits into two parts, one of which remains as their whereabouts and the
other goes off as their quality or nature. We then contrast where they were
with where they are. If we do not move, the sensation of where they were
remains unchanged; but we ourselves presently move, so that that also
changes; and 'where they were' becomes no longer the actual sensation
which it was originally, but a sensation which we merely conceive as
possible. Gradually the system of these possible sensations, takes more and
more the place of the actual sensations. 'Up' and 'down' become 'subjective'
notions; east and west grow more 'correct' than 'right' and 'left' etc.; and
things get at last more 'truly' located by their relation to certain ideal fixed
co-ordinates than by their relation either to our bodies or to those objects by
which their place was originally defined. Now this revision of our original
localizations is a complex affair; and contains some facts which may very

naturally come to be described as translocations whereby sensations get
shoved farther off than they originally appeared.
Few things indeed are more striking than the changeable distance which the
objects of many of our sensations may be made to assume. A fly's humming
may be taken for a distant steam-whistle; or the fly itself, seen out of focus,
may for a moment give us the illusion of a distant bird. The same things
seem much nearer or much farther, according as we look at them through
one end or another of an opera-glass. Our whole optical education indeed is
largely taken up with assigning their proper distances to the objects of our
retinal sensations. An infant will grasp at the moon; later, it is said, he
projects that sensation to a distance which he knows to be beyond his reach.
In the much quoted case of the 'young gentleman who was born blind,' and
who was 'couched' for the cataract by Mr. Chesselden, it is reported of the
patient that "when he first saw, he was so far from making any judgment
about distances, that he thought all objects whatever touched his eyes (as he
expressed it) as what he felt did his skin." And other patients born blind, but
relieved by surgical operation, have been described as bringing their hand
close to their eyes to feel for the objects which they at first saw, and only
gradually stretching out their hand when they found that no contact
occurred. Many have concluded from these facts that our earliest visual
objects must seem in immediate contact with our eyes.
But tactile objects also may be affected with a like ambiguity of situation.
If one of the hairs of our head be pulled, we are pretty accurately sensible of
the direction of the pulling by the movements imparted to the head.[41] But
the feeling of the pull is localized, not in that part of the hair's length which
the fingers hold, but in the scalp itself. This seems connected with the fact
that our hair hardly serves at all as a tactile organ. In creatures with
vibrissæ, however, and in those quadrupeds whose whiskers are tactile
organs, it can hardly be doubted that the feeling is projected out of the root
into the shaft of the hair itself. We ourselves have an approach to this when
the beard as a whole, or the hair as a whole, is touched. We perceive the
contact at some distance from the skin.
When fixed and hard appendages of the body, like the teeth and nails, are
touched, we feel the contact where it objectively is, and not deeper in,

where the nerve-terminations lie. If, however, the tooth is loose, we feel two
contacts, spatially separated, one at its root, one at its top.
From this ease to that of a hard body not organically connected with the
surface, but only accidentally in contact with it, the transition is immediate.
With the point of a cane we can trace letters in the air or on a wall just as
with the finger-tip; and in so doing feel the size and shape of the path
described by the cane's tip just as immediately as, without a cane, we should
feel the path described by the tip of our finger. Similarly the draughtsman's
immediate perception seems to be of the point of his pencil, the surgeon's of
the end of his knife, the duellist's of the tip of his rapier as it plunges
through his enemy's skin. When on the middle of a vibrating ladder, we feel
not only our feet on the round, but the ladder's feet against the ground far
below. If we shake a locked iron gate we feel the middle, on which our
hands rest, move, but we equally feel the stability of the ends where the
hinges and the lock are, and we seem to feel all three at once.[42] And yet
the place where the contact is received is in all these cases the skin, whose
sensations accordingly are sometimes interpreted as objects on the surface,
and at other times as objects a long distance off.
We shall learn in the chapter on Space that our feelings of our own
movement are principally due to the sensibility of our rotating joints.
Sometimes by fixing the attention, say on our elbow-joint, we can feel the
movement in the joint itself; but we always are simultaneously conscious of
the path which during the movement our finger-tips describe through the
air, and yet these same finger-tips themselves are in no way physically
modified by the motion. A blow on our ulnar nerve behind the elbow is felt
both there and in the fingers. Refrigeration of the elbow produces pain in
the fingers. Electric currents passed through nerve-trunks, whether of
cutaneous or of more special sensibility (such as the optic nerve), give rise
to sensations which are vaguely localized beyond the nerve-tracts traversed.
Persons whose legs or arms have been amputated are, as is well known, apt
to preserve an illusory feeling of the lost hand or foot being there. Even
when they do not have this feeling constantly, it may be occasionally
brought back. This sometimes is the result of exciting electrically the nervetrunks buried in the stump.

"I recently faradized," says Dr. Mitchell, "a case of disarticulated
shoulder without warning my patient of the possible result. For two
years he had altogether ceased to feel the limb. As the current affected
the brachial plexus of nerves he suddenly cried aloud, 'Oh the hand,—
the hand!' and attempted to seize the missing member. The phantom I
had conjured up swiftly disappeared, but no spirit could have more
amazed the man, so real did it seem."[43]
Now the apparent position of the lost extremity varies. Often the foot seems
on the ground, or follows the position of the artificial foot, where one is
used. Sometimes where the arm is lost the elbow will seem bent, and the
hand in a fixed position on the breast. Sometimes, again, the position is
non-natural, and the hand will seem to bud straight out of the shoulder, or
the foot to be on the same level with the knee of the remaining leg.
Sometimes, again, the position is vague; and sometimes it is ambiguous, as
in another patient of Dr. Weir Mitchell's who
"lost his leg at the age of eleven, and remembers that the foot by
degrees approached, and at last reached the knee. When he began to
wear an artificial leg it reassumed in time its old position, and he is
never at present aware of the leg as shortened, unless for some time he
talks and thinks of the stump, and of the missing leg, when ... the
direction of attention to the part causes a feeling of discomfort, and the
subjective sensation of active and unpleasant movement of the toes.
With these feelings returns at once the delusion of the foot as being
placed at the knee."
All these facts, and others like them, can easily be described as if our
sensations might be induced by circumstances to migrate from their
original locality near the brain or near the surface of the body, and to appear
farther off; and (under different circumstances) to return again after having
migrated. But a little analysis of what happens shows us that this
description is inaccurate.
The objectivity with which each of our sensations originally comes to us,
the roomy and spatial character which is a primitive part of its content, is
not in the first instance relative to any other sensation. The first time we
open our eyes we get an optical object which is a place, but which is not yet

placed in relation to any other object, nor identified with any place
otherwise known. It is a place with which so far we are only acquainted.
When later we know that this same place is in 'front' of us, that only means
that we have learned something about it, namely, that it is congruent with
that other place, called 'front,' which is given us by certain sensations of the
arm and hand or of the head and body. But at the first moment of our optical
experience, even though we already had an acquaintance with our head,
hand, and body, we could not possibly know anything about their relations
to this new seen object. It could not be immediately located in respect of
them. How its place agrees with the places which their feelings yield is a
matter of which only later experience can inform us; and in the next chapter
we shall see with some detail how later experience does this by means of
discrimination, association, selection, and other constantly working
functions of the mind. When, therefore, the baby grasps at the moon, that
does not mean that what he sees fails to give him the sensation which he
afterwards knows as distance; it means only that he has not learned at what
tactile or manual distance things which appear at that visual distance are.
[44] And when a person just operated for cataract gropes close to his face for
far-off objects, that only means the same thing. All the ordinary optical
signs of differing distances are absent from the poor creature's sensation
anyhow. His vision is monocular (only one eye being operated at a time);
the lens is gone, and everything is out of focus; he feels photophobia,
lachrymation, and other painful resident sensations of the eyeball itself,
whose place he has long since learned to know in tactile terms; what
wonder, then, that the first tactile reaction which the new sensations
provoke should be one associated with the tactile situation of the organ
itself? And as for his assertions about the matter, what wonder, again, if, as
Prof. Paul Janet says, they are still expressed in the tactile language which
is the only one he knows. "To be touched means for him to receive an
impression without first making a movement." His eye gets such an
impression now; so he can only say that the objects are 'touching it.'
"All his language, borrowed from touch, but applied to the objects of
his sight, make us think that he perceives differently from ourselves,
whereas, at bottom, it is only his different way of talking about the
same experience."[45]

The other cases of translocation of our sensations are equally easily
interpreted without supposing any 'projection' from a centre at which they
are originally perceived. Unfortunately the details are intricate; and what I
say now can only be made fully clear when we come to the next chapter.
We shall then see that we are constantly selecting certain of our sensations
as realities and degrading others to the status of signs of these. When we
get one of the signs we think of the reality signified; and the strange thing is
that then the reality (which need not be itself a sensation at all at the time,
but only an idea) is so interesting that it acquires an hallucinatory strength,
which may even eclipse that of the relatively uninteresting sign and entirely
divert our attention from the latter. Thus the sensations to which our joints
give rise when they rotate are signs of what, through a large number of
other sensations, tactile and optical, we have come to know as the
movement of the whole limb. This movement of the whole limb is what we
think of when the joint's nerves are excited in that way; and its place is so
much more important than the joint's place that our sense of the latter is
taken up, so to speak, into our perception of the former, and the sensation of
the movement seems to diffuse itself into our very fingers and toes. But by
abstracting our attention from the suggestion of the entire extremity we can
perfectly well perceive the same sensation as if it were concentrated in one
spot. We can identify it with a differently located tactile and visual image of
'the joint' itself.
Just so when we feel the tip of our cane against the ground. The peculiar
sort of movement of the hand (impossible in one direction, but free in every
other) which we experience when the tip touches 'the ground,' is a sign to us
of the visual and tactile object which we already know under that name. We
think of 'the ground' as being there and giving us the sensation of this kind
of movement. The sensation, we say, comes from the ground. The ground's
place seems to be its place; although at the same time, and for very similar
practical reasons, we think of another optical and tactile object, 'the hand'
namely, and consider that its place also must be the place of our sensation.
In other words, we take an object or sensible content A, and confounding it
with another object otherwise known, B, or with two objects otherwise
known, B and C, we identify its place with their places. But in all this there
is no 'projecting' (such as the extradition-philosophers talk of) of A out of
an original place; no primitive location which it first occupied, away from
these other sensations, has to be contradicted; no natural 'centre,' from

which it is expelled, exists. That would imply that A aboriginally came to
us in definite local relations with other sensations, for to be out of B and C
is to be in local relation with them as much as to be in them is so. But it was
no more out of B and C than it was in them when it first came to us. It
simply had nothing to do with them. To say that we feel a sensation's seat to
be 'in the brain' or 'against the eye' or 'under the skin' is to say as much
about it and to deal with it in as non-primitive a way as to say that it is a
mile off. These are all secondary perceptions, ways of defining the
sensation's seat per aliud. They involve numberless associations,
identifications, and imaginations, and admit a great deal of vacillation and
uncertainty in the result.[46]

I conclude, then, that there is no truth in the 'eccentric projection' theory. It
is due to the confused assumption that the bodily processes which cause a
sensation must also be its seat.[47] But sensations have no seat in this sense.
They become seats for each other, as fast as experience associates them
together; but that violates no primitive seat possessed by any one of them.
And though our sensations cannot then so analyze and talk of themselves,
yet at their very first appearance quite as much as at any later date are they
cognizant of all those qualities which we end by extracting and conceiving
under the names of objectivity, exteriority, and extent. It is surely
subjectivity and interiority which are the notions latest acquired by the
human mind.[48]

[1] Some persons will say that we never have a really simple object or content. My definition of
sensation does not require the simplicity to be absolutely, but only relatively, extreme. It is worth
while in passing, however, to warn the reader against a couple of inferences that are often made. One
is that because we gradually learn to analyze so many qualities we ought to conclude that there are no
really indecomposable feelings in the mind. The other is that because the processes that produce our
sensations are multiple, the sensations regarded as subjective facts must also be compound. To take
an example, to a child the taste of lemonade comes at first as a simple quality. He later learns both
that many stimuli and many nerves are involved in the exhibition of this taste to his mind, and he also
learns to perceive separately the sourness, the coolness, the sweet, the lemon aroma, etc., and the
several degrees of strength of each and all of these things,—the experience falling into a large

number of aspects, each of which is abstracted, classed, named, etc., and all of which appear to be the
elementary sensations into which the original 'lemonade flavor' is decomposed. It is argued from this
that the latter never was the simple thing which it seemed. I have already criticised this sort of
reasoning in Chapter VI (see pp. 170 ff.). The mind of the child enjoying the simple lemonade flavor
and that of the same child grown up and analyzing it are in two entirely different conditions.
Subjectively considered, the two states of mind are two altogether distinct sorts of fact. The later
mental state says 'this is the same flavor (or fluid) which that earlier state perceived as simple,' but
that does not make the two states themselves identical. It is nothing but a case of learning more and
more about the same topics of discourse or things.—Many of these topics, however, must be
confessed to resist all analysis, the various colors for example. He who sees blue and yellow 'in' a
certain green means merely that when green is confronted with these other colors he sees relations of
similarity. He who sees abstract 'color' in it means merely that he sees a similarity between it and all
the other objects known as colors. (Similarity itself cannot ultimately be accounted for by an identical
abstract element buried in all the similars, as has been already shown, p. 492 ff.) He who sees
abstract paleness, intensity, purity, in the green means other similarities still. These are all outward
determinations of that special green, knowledges about it, zufällige Ansichten, as Herbart would say,
not elements of its composition. Compare the article by Meinong in the Vierteljahrschrift für wiss.
Phil., xii. 324.
[2] See Vol. I, p. 221.
[3] Those who wish a fuller treatment than Martin's Human Body affords may be recommended to
Bernstein's 'Five Senses of Man,' in the International Scientific Series, or to Ladd's or Wundt's
Physiological Psychology. The completest compendium is L. Hermann's Handbuch der Physiologie,
vol. iii.
[4] "The sensations which we postulate as the signs or occasions of our perceptions" (A. Seth:
Scottish Philosophy, p. 89). "Their existence is supposed only because, without them, it would be
impossible to account for the complex phenomena which are directly present in consciousness" (J.
Dewey: Psychology, p. 34). Even as great an enemy of Sensation as T. H. Green has to allow it a sort
of hypothetical existence under protest. "Perception presupposes feeling" (Contemp. Review, vol.
xxxi. p. 747). Cf. also such passages as those in his Prolegomena to Ethics, §§ 48, 49.—
Physiologically, the sensory and the reproductive or associative processes may wax and wane
independently of each other. Where the part directly due to stimulation of the sense-organ
preponderates, the thought has a sensational character, and differs from other thoughts in the
sensational direction. Those thoughts which lie farthest in that direction we call sensations, for
practical convenience, just as we call conceptions those which lie nearer the opposite extreme. But
we no more have conceptions pure than we have pure sensations. Our most rarefied intellectual states
involve some bodily sensibility, just as our dullest feelings have some intellectual scope. Commonsense and common psychology express this by saying that the mental state is composed of distinct
fractional parts, one of which is sensation, the other conception. We, however, who believe every
mental state to be an integral thing (Vol. I. p. 276) cannot talk thus, but must speak of the degree of
sensational or intellectual character, or function, of the mental state. Professor Hering puts, as usual,
his finger better upon the truth than any one else. Writing of visual perception, he says: "It is
inadmissible in the present state of our knowledge to assert that first and last the same retinal picture
arouses exactly the same pure sensation, but that this sensation, in consequence of practice and
experience, is differently interpreted the last time, and elaborated into a different perception from the
first. For the only real data are, on the one hand, the physical picture on the retina,—and that is both
times the same; and, on the other hand, the resultant state of consciousness (ausgeloste
Empfindungscomplex)—and that is both times distinct. Of any third thing, namely, a pure sensation
thrust between the retinal and the mental pictures, we know nothing. We can then, if we wish to avoid
all hypothesis, only say that the nervous apparatus reacts upon the same stimulus differently the last

time from the first, and that in consequence the consciousness is different too." (Hermann's Hdbch.,
iii. i. 567-8.)

[5] Yet even writers like Prof. Bain will deny, in the most gratuitous way, that sensations know
anything. "It is evident that the lowest or most restricted form of sensation does not contain an
element of knowledge. The mere state of mind called the sensation of scarlet is not knowledge,
although a necessary preparation for it." 'Is not knowledge about scarlet' is all that Professor Bain can
rightfully say.
[6] By simple ideas of sensation Locke merely means sensations.
[7] Essay c. H. U., bk. ii. ch. xxiii. § 29; ch. xxv. § 9.
[8] Op. cit. bk. ii. ch. ii. § 2.
[9] "So far is it from being true that we necessarily have as many feelings in consciousness at one
time as there are inlets to the sense then played upon, that it is a fundamental law of pure sensation
that each momentary state of the organism yields but one feeling, however numerous may be its parts
and its exposures.... To this original Unity of consciousness it makes no difference that the tributaries
to the single feeling are beyond the organism instead of within it, in an outside object with several
sensible properties, instead of in the living body with its several sensitive functions.... The unity
therefore is not made by 'association' of several components; but the plurality is formed by
dissociation of unsuspected varieties within the unity; the substantive thing being no product of
synthesis, but the residuum of differentiation." (J. Martineau: A Study of Religion (1888), p. 193-4.)
Compare also F. H. Bradley, Logic, book i. chap. ii.
[10] Such passages as the following abound in anti-sensationalist literature: "Sense is a kind of dull,
confused, and stupid perception obtruded upon the soul from without, whereby it perceives the
alterations and motions within its own body, and takes cognizance of individual bodies existing
round about it, but does not clearly comprehend what they are nor penetrate into the nature of them, it
being intended by nature, as Plotinus speaks, not so properly for knowledge as for the use of the body.
For the soul suffering under that which it perceives by way of passion cannot master or Conquer it,
that is to say, know or understand it. For so Anaxagoras in Aristotle very fitly expresses the nature of
knowledge and intellection under the notion of Conquering. Wherefore it is necessary, since the mind
understands all things, that it should be free from mixture and passion, for this end, as Anaxagoras
speaks, that it may be able to master and conquer its objects, that is to say, to know and understand
them. In like manner Plotinus, in his book of Sense and Memory, makes to suffer and to be
conquered all one, as also to know and to conquer; for which reason he concludes that that which
suffers doth not know.... Sense that suffers from external objects lies as it were prostrate under them,
and is overcome by them.... Sense therefore is a certain kind of drowsy and somnolent perception of
that passive part of the soul which is as it were asleep in the body, and acts concretely with it.... It is
an energy arising from the body and a certain kind of drowsy or sleeping life of the soul blended
together with it. The perceptions of which compound, or of the soul as it were half asleep and half
awake, are confused, indistinct, turbid, and encumbered cogitations very different from the energies
of the noetical part,... which are free, clear, serene, satisfactory, and awakened cogitations. That is to
say, knowledges." Etc., etc., etc. (R. Cudworth: Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality,
bk. iii. chap. ii.) Similarly Malebranche: "THÉODORE.—Oh, oh, Ariste! God knows pain, pleasure,
warmth, and the rest. But he does not feel these things. He knows pain, since he knows what that
modification of the soul is in which pain consists. He knows it because he alone causes it in us (as I
shall presently prove), and he knows what he does. In a word, he knows it because his knowledge has
no bounds. But he does not feel it, for if so he would be unhappy. To know pain, then, is not to feel it.
ARISTE.—That is true. But to feel it is to know it, is it not? THÉODORE.—No indeed, since God does
not feel it in the least, and yet he knows it perfectly. But in order not to quibble about terms, if you
will have it that to feel pain is to know it, agree at least that it is not to know it clearly, that it is not to
know it by light and by evidence—in a word, that it is not to know its nature; in other words and to
speak exactly, it is not to know it at all. To feel pain, for example, is to feel ourselves unhappy

without well knowing either what we are or what is this modality of our being which makes us
unhappy.... Impose silence on your senses, your imagination, and your passions, and you will hear the
pure voice of inner truth, the clear and evident replies of our common master. Never confound the
evidence which results from the comparison of ideas with the liveliness of the sensations which touch
and thrill you. The livelier our sensations and feelings (sentiments) are, the more darkness do they
shed. The more terrible or agreeable are our phantoms, and the more body and reality they appear to
have, the more dangerous are they and fit to lead us astray." (Entretiens sur la Métaphysique, 3me
Entretien, ad init.) Malebranche's Théodore prudently does not try to explain how God's 'infinite
felicity' is compatible with his not feeling joy.
[11] Green: Prolegomena, §§ 20, 28.
[12] Introd. to Hume, §§ 146, 188. It is hard to tell just what this apostolic human being but
strenuously feeble writer means by relation. Sometimes it seems to stand for system of related fact.
The ubiquity of the 'psychologist's fallacy' (see Vol. I p. 196) in his pages, his incessant leaning on
the confusion between the thing known, the thought that knows it, and the farther things known about
that thing and about that thought by later and additional thoughts, make it impossible to clear up his
meaning. Compare, however, with the utterances in the text such others as these: "The waking of
Self-consciousness from the sleep of sense is an absolute new beginning, and nothing can come
within the 'crystal sphere' of intelligence except as it is determined by intelligence. What sense is to
sense is nothing for thought. What sense is to thought, it is as determined by thought. There can,
therefore, be no 'reality' in sensation to which the world of thought can be referred." (Edward Caird's
Philosophy of Kant, 1st ed. pp. 393-4.) "When," says Green again, "feeling a pain or pleasure of heat,
I perceive it to be connected with the action of approaching the fire, am I not perceiving a relation of
which one constituent, at any rate, is a simple sensation? The true answer is, No." "Perception, in its
simplest form...—perception as the first sight or touch of an object in which nothing but what is seen
or touched is recognized—neither is nor contains sensation" (Contemp. Rev., xxxi. pp. 746, 750.)
"Mere sensation is in truth a phrase that represents no reality." "Mere feeling, then, as a matter
unformed by thought, has no place in the world of facts, in the cosmos of possible experience."
(Prolegomena to Ethics, §§ 46, 50.)—I have expressed myself a little more fully on this subject in
Mind, x. 27 ff.
[13] Stumpf: Tonpsychologie, i. pp. 7, 8. Hobbes's phrase, sentire semper idem et non sentire ad idem
recidunt, is generally treated as the original statement of the relativity doctrine. J. S. Mill (Examn. of
Hamilton, p. 6) and Bain (Senses and Intellect, p. 321; Emotions and Will, pp. 550, 570-2; Logic, i.
p. 2; Body and Mind, p. 81) are subscribers to this doctrine. Cf. also J. Mill's Analysis, J. S. Mill's
edition, II. 11, 12.
[14] We can steadily hear a note for half an hour. The differences between the senses are marked.
Smell and taste seem soon to get fatigued.
[15] In the popular mind it is mixed up with that entirely different doctrine of the 'Relativity of
Knowledge' preached by Hamilton and Spencer. This doctrine says that our knowledge is relative to
us, and is not of the object as the latter is in itself. It has nothing to do with the question which we
have been discussing, of whether our objects of knowledge contain absolute terms or consist
altogether of relations.
[16] What follows in brackets, as far as p. 27, is from the pen of my friend and pupil Mr. E. B.
Delabarre.
[17] These phenomena have close analogues in the phenomena of contrast presented by the
temperature-sense (see W. Preyer in Archiv f. d. ges. Phys., Bd. xxv. p. 79 ff.). Successive contrast
here is shown in the fact that a warm sensation appears warmer if a cold one has just previously been
experienced; and a cold one colder, if the preceding one was warm. If a finger which has been

plunged in hot water, and another which has been in cold water, be both immersed in lukewarm
water, the same water appears cold to the former finger and warm to the latter. In simultaneous
contrast, a sensation of warmth on any part of the skin tends to induce the sensation of cold in its
immediate neighborhood; and vice versâ. This may be seen if we press with the palm on two metal
surfaces of about an inch and a half square and three-fourths inch apart; the skin between them
appears distinctly warmer. So also a small object of exactly the temperature of the palm appears
warm if a cold object, and cold if a warm object, touch the skin near it.
[18] Helmholtz, Physiolog. Optik, p. 392.
[19] Loc. cit. p. 407.
[20] Loc. cit. p. 408.
[21] Loc. cit. p. 406.
[22] E. Hering, in Hermann's Handbuch d. Physiologie, iii. 1, p. 565.
[23] Hering: 'Zur Lehre vom Lichtsinne.'—Of these experiments the following (found on p. 24 ff.)
may be cited as a typical one: "From dark gray paper cut two strips 3-4 cm. long and 1/2 cm. wide,
and lay them on a background of which one half is white and the other half deep black, in such a way
that one strip lies on each side of the border-line and parallel to it, and at least 1 cm. distant from it.
Fixate 1/2 to 1 minute a point on the border-line between the strips. One strip appears much brighter
than the other. Close and cover the eyes, and the negative after-image appears.... The difference in
brightness of the strips in the after-image is in general much greater than it appeared in direct
vision.... This difference in brightness of the strips by no means always increases and decreases with
the difference in brightness of the two halves of the background.... A phase occurs in which the
difference in brightness of the two halves of the background entirely disappears, and yet both afterimages of the strips are still very clear, one of them brighter and one darker than the background,
which is equally bright on both halves. Here can no longer be any question of contrast-effect, because
the conditio sine quâ non of contrast, namely, the differing brightness of the ground, is no longer
present. This proves that the different brightness of the after-images of the strips must have its ground
in a different state of excitation of the corresponding portions of the retina, and from this follows
further that both these portions of the retina were differently stimulated during the original
observation; for the different after-effect demands here a different fore-effect.... In the original
arrangement, the objectively similar strips appeared of different brightness, because both
corresponding portions of the retina were truly differently excited."
[24] Helmholtz, Physiolog. Optik, p. 407.
[25] In Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. xli. §. 1 ff.
[26] Helmholtz, loc. cit. p. 412.
[27] See Hering: Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. xli. S. 358 ff.
[28] Hering: Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. xl. S. 172 ff.; Delabarre: American Journal of Psychology,
ii. 636.
[29] Hering: Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. xli. S. 91 ff.
[30] Die Gesichtsempfindungen u. ihre Analyse, p. 128.
[31] Mr. Delabarre's contribution ends here.
[32] Physiol. Psych., i. 351, 458-60. The full inanity of the law of relativity is best to be seen in
Wundt's treatment, where the great 'allgemeiner Gesetz der Beziehung,' invoked to account for
Weber's law as well as for the phenomena of contrast and many other matters, can only be defined as

a tendency to feel all things in relation to each other! Bless its little soul! But why does it change the
things so, when it thus feels them in relation?
[33] Ladd: Physiol. Psych., p. 348.
[34] Mind, x. 567.
[35] Zwangemässige Lichtempfindung durch Schall (Leipzig, 1881).
[36] Pflüger's Archiv, xlii. 154.
[37] Physiological Psychology, 385, 387. See also such passages as that in Bain; The Senses and the
Intellect, pp. 364-6.
[38] "Especially must we avoid all attempts, whether avowed or concealed, to account for the spatial
qualities of the presentations of sense by merely describing the qualities of the simple sensations and
the modes of their combination. It is position and extension in space which constitutes the very
peculiarity of the objects as no longer mere sensations or affections of the mind. As sensations, they
are neither out of ourselves nor possessed of the qualities indicated by the word spread-out." (Ladd,
op. cit. p. 391.)
[39] A. Riehl: Der Philosophischer Kriticismus, Bd. ii. Theil ii. p. 64.
[40] On Intelligence, part ii. bk. ii. chap. ii. §§ vii, viii. Compare such statements as these: "The
consequence is that when a sensation has for its usual condition the presence of an object more or
less distant from our bodies, and experience has once made us acquainted with this distance, we shall
situate our sensation at this distance.—This, in fact, is the case with sensations of hearing and sight.
The peripheral extremity of the acoustic nerve is in the deep-seated chamber of the ear. That of the
optic nerve is in the most inner recess of the eye. But still, in our present state, we never situate our
sensations of sound or color in these places, but without us, and often at a considerable distance from
us.... All our sensations of color are thus projected out of our body, and clothe more or less distant
objects, furniture, walls, houses, trees, the sky, and the rest. This is why, when we afterwards reflect
on them, we cease to attribute them to ourselves; they are alienated and detached from us, so far as to
appear different from us. Projected from the nervous surface in which we localize the majority of the
others, the tie which connected them to the others and to ourselves is undone.... Thus, all our
sensations are wrongly situated, and the red color is no more extended on the arm-chair than the
sensation of tingling is situated at my fingers' ends. They are all situated in the sensory centres of the
encephalon; all appear situated elsewhere, and a common law allots to each of them its apparent
situation." (vol. ii. pp. 47-53.)—Similarly Schopenhauer: "I will now show the same by the sense of
sight. The immediate datum is here limited to the sensation of the retina which, it is true, admits of
considerable diversity, but at bottom reverts to the impression of light and dark with their shades, and
that of colors. This sensation is through and through subjective, that is, inside of the organism and
under the skin." (Schopenhauer: Satz vom Grunde, p. 58.) This philosopher then enumerates seriatim
what the Intellect does to make the originally subjective sensation objective: 1) it turns it bottom side
up; 2) it reduces its doubleness to singleness; 3) it changes its flatness to solidity; and 4) it projects it
to a distance from the eye. Again: "Sensations are what we call the impressions on our senses, in so
far as they come to our consciousness as states of our own body, especially of our nervous apparatus;
we call them perceptions when we form out of them the representation of outer objects." (Helmholtz:
Tonempfindungen, 1870, p. 101.)—Once more: "Sensation is always accomplished in the psychic
centres, but it manifests itself at the excited part of the periphery. In other words, one is conscious of
the phenomenon in the nervous centres,... but one perceives it in the peripheric organs. This
phenomenon depends on the experience of the sensations themselves, in which there is a reflection of
the subjective phenomenon and a tendency on the part of perception to return as it were to the
external cause which has roused the mental state because the latter is connected with the former."

(Sergi: Psychologie Physiologique (Paris, 1888), p. 189.)—The clearest and best passage I know is in
Liebmann: Der Objective Anblick (1869), pp. 67-72, but it is unfortunately too long to quote.
[41] This is proved by Weber's device of causing the head to be firmly pressed against a support by
another person, whereupon the direction of traction ceases to be perceived.
[42] Lotze: Med. Psych., 428-433; Lipps: Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens, 582.
[43] Injuries to Nerves (Philadelphia, 1872), p. 350 ff.
[44] In reality it probably means only a restless movement of desire, which he might make even after
he had become aware of his impotence to touch the object.
[45] Revue Philosophique, vii. p. 1 ff., an admirable critical article, in the course of which M. Janet
gives a bibliography of the cases in question. See also Dunan: ibid. xxv. 165-7. They are also
discussed and similarly interpreted by T. K. Abbot: Sight and Touch (1864), chapter x.
[46] The intermediary and shortened locations of the lost hand and foot in the amputation cases also
show this. It is easy to see why the phantom foot might continue to follow the position of the
artificial one. But I confess that I cannot explain its half way-positions.
[47] It is from this confused assumption that the time-honored riddle comes, of how, with an upsidedown picture on the retina, we can see things right-side up. Our consciousness is naïvely supposed to
inhabit the picture and to feel the picture's position as related to other objects of space. But the truth
is that the picture is non-existent either as a habitat or as anything else, for immediate consciousness.
Our notion of it is an enormously late conception. The outer object is given immediately with all
those qualities which later are named and determined in relation to other sensations. The 'bottom' of
this object is where we see what by touch we afterwards know as our feet, the 'top' is the place in
which we see what we know as other people's heads, etc., etc. Berkeley long ago made this matter
perfectly clear (see his Essay towards a new Theory of Vision, §§ 93-98, 113-118).
[48] For full justification the reader must see the next chapter. He may object, against the summary
account given now, that in a babe's immediate field of vision the various things which appear are
located relatively to each other from the outset. I admit that if discriminated, they would appear so
located. But they are parts of the content of one sensation, not sensations separately experienced,
such as the text is concerned with. The fully developed 'world,' in which all our sensations ultimately
find location, is nothing but an imaginary object framed after the pattern of the field of vision, by the
addition and continuation of one sensation upon another in an orderly and systematic way. In
corroboration of my text I must refer to pp. 57-60 of Riehl's book quoted above on page 32, and to
Uphues: Wahrnehmung und Empfindung (1888), especially the Einleitung and pp. 51-61.

CHAPTER XVIII.

IMAGINATION.
Sensations, once experienced, modify the nervous organism, so that copies
of them arise again in the mind after the original outward stimulus is gone.

No mental copy, however, can arise in the mind, of any kind of sensation
which has never been directly excited from without.
The blind may dream of sights, the deaf of sounds, for years after they have
lost their vision or hearing;[49] but the man born deaf can never be made to
imagine what sound is like, nor can the man born blind ever have a mental
vision. In Locke's words, already quoted, "the mind can frame unto itself no
one new simple idea." The originals of them all must have been given from
without. Fantasy, or Imagination, are the names given to the faculty of
reproducing copies of originals once felt. The imagination is called
'reproductive' when the copies are literal; 'productive' when elements from
different originals are recombined so as to make new wholes.
After-images belong to sensation rather than to imagination; so that the
most immediate phenomena of imagination would seem to be those tardier
images (due to what the Germans call Sinnesgedächtniss) which were
spoken of in Vol. I, p. 617,—coercive hauntings of the mind by echoes of
unusual experiences for hours after the latter have taken place. The
phenomena ordinarily ascribed to imagination, however, are those mental
pictures of possible sensible experiences, to which the ordinary processes of
associative thought give rise.
When represented with surroundings concrete enough to constitute a date,
these pictures, when they revive, form recollections. We have already
studied the machinery of recollection in Chapter XVI. When the mental
pictures are of data freely combined, and reproducing no past combination
exactly, we have acts of imagination properly so called.
OUR IMAGES ARE USUALLY VAGUE.
For the ordinary 'analytic' psychology, each sensibly discernible element of
the object imagined is represented by its own separate idea, and the total
object is imagined by a 'cluster' or 'gang' of ideas. We have seen abundant
reason to reject this view (see Vol. I, p. 276 ff.). An imagined object,
however complex, is at any one moment thought in one idea, which is
aware of all its qualities together. If I slip into the ordinary way of talking,
and speak of various ideas 'combining,' the reader will understand that this

is only for popularity and convenience, and he will not construe it into a
concession to the atomistic theory in psychology.
Hume was the hero of the atomistic theory. Not only were ideas copies of
original impressions made on the sense-organs, but they were, according to
him, completely adequate copies, and were all so separate from each other
as to possess no manner of connection. Hume proves ideas in the
imagination to be completely adequate copies, not by appeal to observation,
but by a priori reasoning, as follows:
"The mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality, without
forming a precise notion of the degrees of each," for "'tis confessed
that no object can appear to the senses; or in other words, that no
impression[50] can become present to the mind, without being
determined in its degrees both of quantity and quality. The confusion
in which impressions are sometimes involved proceeds only from their
faintness and unsteadiness, not from any capacity in the mind to
receive any impression, which in its real existence has no particular
degree nor proportion. That is a contradiction in terms; and even
implies the flattest of all contradictions, viz., that 'tis possible for the
same thing both to be and not to be. Now since all ideas are derived
from impressions, and are nothing but copies and representations of
them, whatever is true of the one must be acknowledged concerning
the other. Impressions and ideas differ only in their strength and
vivacity. The foregoing conclusion is not founded on any particular
degree of vivacity. It cannot therefore be affected by any variation in
that particular. An idea is a weaker impression; and as a strong
impression must necessarily have a determinate quantity and quality,
the case must be the same with its copy or representative."[51]
The slightest introspective glance will show to anyone the falsity of this
opinion. Hume surely had images of his own works without seeing
distinctly every word and letter upon the pages which floated before his
mind's eye. His dictum is therefore an exquisite example of the way in
which a man will be blinded by a priori theories to the most flagrant facts.
It is a rather remarkable thing, too, that the psychologists of Hume's own
empiricist school have, as a rule, been more guilty of this blindness than
their opponents. The fundamental facts of consciousness have been, on the

whole, more accurately reported by the spiritualistic writers. None of
Hume's pupils, so far as I know, until Taine and Huxley, ever took the pains
to contradict the opinion of their master. Prof. Huxley in his brilliant little
work on Hume set the matter straight in the following words:
"When complex impressions or complex ideas are reproduced as
memories, it is probable that the copies never give all the details of the
originals with perfect accuracy, and it is certain that they rarely do so.
No one possesses a memory so good, that if he has only once observed
a natural object, a second inspection does not show him something that
he has forgotten. Almost all, if not all, our memories are therefore
sketches, rather than portraits, of the originals—the salient features are
obvious, while the subordinate characters are obscure or
unrepresented.
"Now, when several complex impressions which are more or less
different from one another—let us say that out of ten impressions in
each, six are the same in all, and four are different from all the rest—
are successively presented to the mind, it is easy to see what must be
the nature of the result. The repetition of the six similar impressions
will strengthen the six corresponding elements of the complex idea,
which will therefore acquire greater vividness; while the four differing
impressions of each will not only acquire no greater strength than they
had at first, but, in accordance with the law of association, they will all
tend to appear at once, and will thus neutralize one another.
"This mental operation may be rendered comprehensible by
considering what takes place in the formation of compound
photographs—when the images of the faces of six sitters, for example,
are each received on the same photographic plate, for a sixth of the
time requisite to take one portrait. The final result is that all those
points in which the six faces agree are brought out strongly, while all
those in which they differ are left vague; and thus what may be termed
a generic portrait of the six, in contradistinction to a specific portrait of
any one, is produced.
"Thus our ideas of single complex impressions are incomplete in one
way, and those of numerous, more or less similar, complex impressions
are incomplete in another way; that is to say, they are generic, not

specific. And hence it follows that our ideas of the impressions in
question are not, in the strict sense of the word, copies of those
impressions; while, at the same time, they may exist in the mind
independently of language.
"The generic ideas which are formed from several similar, but not
identical, complex experiences are what are called abstract or general
ideas; and Berkeley endeavored to prove that all general ideas are
nothing but particular ideas annexed to a certain term, which gives
them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall, upon
occasion, other individuals which are similar to them. Hume says that
he regards this as 'one of the greatest and the most valuable discoveries
that has been made of late years in the republic of letters,' and
endeavors to confirm it in such a manner that it shall be 'put beyond all
doubt and controversy.'
"I may venture to express a doubt whether he has succeeded in his
object; but the subject is an abstruse one; and I must content myself
with the remark, that though Berkeley's view appears to be largely
applicable to such general ideas as are formed after language has been
acquired, and to all the more abstract sort of conceptions, yet that
general ideas of sensible objects may nevertheless be produced in the
way indicated, and may exist independently of language. In dreams,
one sees houses, trees, and other objects, which are perfectly
recognizable as such, but which remind one of the actual objects as
seen 'out of the corner of the eye,' or of the pictures thrown by a badlyfocussed magic lantern. A man addresses us who is like a figure seen
in twilight; or we travel through countries where every feature of the
scenery is vague; the outlines of the hills are ill-marked, and the rivers
have no defined banks. They are, in short, generic ideas of many past
impressions of men, hills, and rivers. An anatomist who occupies
himself intently with the examination of several specimens of some
new kind of animal, in course of time acquires so vivid a conception of
its form and structure that the idea may take visible shape and become
a sort of waking dream. But the figure which thus presents itself is
generic, not specific. It is no copy of any one specimen, but, more or
less, a mean of the series; and there seems no reason to doubt that the

minds of children before they learn to speak, and of deaf-mutes, are
peopled with similarly generated generic ideas of sensible objects."[52]
Are Vague Images 'Abstract Ideas'?
The only point which I am tempted to criticise in this account is Prof.
Huxley's identification of these generic images with 'abstract or general
ideas' in the sense of universal conceptions. Taine gives the truer view. He
writes:
"Some years ago I saw in England, in Kew Gardens, for the first time,
araucarias, and I walked along the beds looking at these strange plants,
with their rigid bark and compact, short, scaly leaves, of a sombre
green, whose abrupt, rough, bristling form cut in upon the fine softlylighted turf of the fresh grass-plat. If I now inquire what this
experience has left in me, I find, first, the sensible representation of an
araucaria; in fact, I have been able to describe almost exactly the form
and color of the plant. But there is a difference between this
representation and the former sensations, of which it is the present
echo. The internal semblance, from which I have just made my
description, is vague, and my past sensations were precise. For,
assuredly, each of the araucarias I saw then excited in me a distinct
visual sensation; there are no two absolutely similar plants in nature; I
observed perhaps twenty or thirty araucarias; without a doubt each one
of them differed from the others in size, in girth, by the more or less
obtuse angles of its branches, by the more or less abrupt jutting out of
its scales, by the style of its texture; consequently, my twenty or thirty
visual sensations were different. But no one of these sensations has
completely survived in its echo; the twenty or thirty revivals have
blunted one another; thus upset and agglutinated by their resemblance
they are confounded together, and my present representation is their
residue only. This is the product, or rather the fragment, which is
deposited in us, when we have gone through a series of similar facts or
individuals. Of our numerous experiences there remain on the
following day four or five more or less distinct recollections, which,
obliterated themselves, leave behind in us a simple colorless, vague
representation, into which enter as components various reviving

sensations, in an utterly feeble, incomplete, and abortive state.—But
this representation is not the general and abstract idea. It is but its
accompaniment, and, if I may say so, the ore from which it is
extracted. For the representation, though badly sketched, is a sketch,
the sensible sketch of a distinct individual.... But my abstract idea
corresponds to the whole class; it differs, then, from the representation
of an individual.—Moreover, my abstract idea is perfectly clear and
determinate; now that I possess it, I never fail to recognize an araucaria
among the various plants which may be shown me; it differs then from
the confused and floating representation I have of some particular
araucaria."[53]
In other words, a blurred picture is just as much a single mental fact as a
sharp picture is; and the use of either picture by the mind to symbolize a
whole class of individuals is a new mental function, requiring some other
modification of consciousness than the mere perception that the picture is
distinct or not. I may bewail the indistinctness of my mental image of my
absent friend. That does not prevent my thought from meaning him alone,
however. And I may mean all mankind, with perhaps a very sharp image of
one man in my mind's eye. The meaning is a function of the more
'transitive' parts of consciousness, the 'fringe' of relations which we feel
surrounding the image, be the latter sharp or dim. This was explained in a
previous place (see Vol. I, p. 473 ff., especially the note to page 477), and I
would not touch upon the matter at all here but for its historical interest.
Our ideas or images of past sensible experiences may then be either distinct
and adequate or dim, blurred, and incomplete. It is likely that the different
degrees in which different men are able to make them sharp and complete
has had something to do with keeping up such philosophic disputes as that
of Berkeley with Locke over abstract ideas. Locke had spoken of our
possessing 'the general idea of a triangle' which "must be neither oblique
nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none
of these at once." Berkeley says:
"If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a
triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out
of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is that the reader would fully
and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no."[54]

Until very recent years it was supposed by all philosophers that there was a
typical human mind which all individual minds were like, and that
propositions of universal validity could be laid down about such faculties as
'the Imagination.' Lately, however, a mass of revelations have poured in,
which make us see how false a view this is. There are imaginations, not 'the
Imagination,' and they must be studied in detail.
INDIVIDUALS DIFFER IN IMAGINATION.
The first breaker of ground in this direction was Fechner, in 1860. Fechner
was gifted with unusual talent for subjective observation, and in chapter
xliv of his 'Psychophysik' he gave the results of a most careful comparison
of his own optical after-images, with his optical memory-pictures, together
with accounts by several other individuals of their optical memory-pictures.
[55] The result was to show a great personal diversity. "It would be
interesting," he writes, "to work up the subject statistically; and I regret that
other occupations have kept me from fulfilling my earlier intention to
proceed in this way."
Flechner's intention was independently executed by Mr. Galton, the
publication of whose results in 1880 may be said to have made an era in
descriptive Psychology.
"It is not necessary," says Galton, "to trouble the reader with my early
tentative steps. After the inquiry had been fairly started it took the
form of submitting a certain number of printed questions to a large
number of persons. There is hardly any more difficult task than that of
framing questions which are not likely to be misunderstood, which
admit of easy reply, and which cover the ground of inquiry. I did my
best in these respects, without forgetting the most important part of all
—namely, to tempt my correspondents to write freely in fuller
explanation of their replies, and on cognate topics as well. These
separate letters have proved more instructive and interesting by far
than the replies to the set questions.
"The first group of the rather long series of queries related to the
illumination, definition, and coloring of the mental image, and were
framed thus:

"'Before addressing yourself to any of the Questions on the opposite
page, think of some definite object—suppose it is your breakfast-table
as you sat down to it this morning—and consider carefully the picture
that rises before your mind's eye.
"'1. Illumination.—Is the image dim or fairly clear? Is its brightness
comparable to that of the actual scene?
"'2. Definition.—Are all the objects pretty well defined at the same
time, or is the place of sharpest definition at any one moment more
contracted than it is in a real scene?
"'3. Coloring.—Are the colors of the china, of the toast, bread-crust,
mustard, meat, parsley, or whatever may have been on the table, quite
distinct and natural?'
"The earliest results of my inquiry amazed me. I had begun by
questioning friends in the scientific world, as they were the most likely
class of men to give accurate answers concerning this faculty of
visualizing, to which novelists and poets continually allude, which has
left an abiding mark on the vocabularies of every language, and which
supplies the material out of which dreams and the well-known
hallucinations of sick people are built.
"To my astonishment, I found that the great majority of the men of
science to whom I first applied protested that mental imagery was
unknown to them, and they looked on me as fanciful and fantastic in
supposing that the words 'mental imagery' really expressed what I
believed everybody supposed them to mean. They had no more notion
of its true nature than a color-blind man, who has not discerned his
defect, has of the nature of color. They had a mental deficiency of
which they were unaware, and naturally enough supposed that those
who affirmed they possessed it were romancing. To illustrate their
mental attitude it will be sufficient to quote a few lines from the letter
of one of my correspondents, who writes:
"'These questions presuppose assent to some sort of a proposition
regarding the "mind's eye," and the "images" which it sees.... This
points to some initial fallacy.... It is only by a figure of speech that I
can describe my recollection of a scene as a "mental image" which I

can "see" with my "mind's eye."... I do not see it... any more than a
man sees the thousand lines of Sophocles which under due pressure he
is ready to repeat. The memory possesses it,' etc.
"Much the same result followed inquiries made for me by a friend
among members of the French Institute.
"On the other hand, when I spoke to persons whom I met in general
society, I found an entirely different disposition to prevail. Many men
and a yet larger number of women, and many boys and girls, declared
that they habitually saw mental imagery, and that it was perfectly
distinct to them and full of color. The more I pressed and crossedquestioned them, professing myself to be incredulous, the more
obvious was the truth of their first assertions. They described their
imagery in minute detail, and they spoke in a tone of surprise at my
apparent hesitation in accepting what they said. I felt that I myself
should have spoken exactly as they did if I had been describing a scene
that lay before my eyes, in broad daylight, to a blind man who
persisted in doubting the reality of vision. Reassured by this happier
experience, I recommenced to inquire among scientific men, and soon
found scattered instances of what I sought, though in by no means the
same abundance as elsewhere. I then circulated my questions more
generally among my friends and through their hands, and obtained
replies... from persons of both sexes, and of various ages, and in the
end from occasional correspondents in nearly every civilized country.
"I have also received batches of answers from various educational
establishments both in England and America, which were made after
the masters had fully explained the meaning of the questions, and
interested the boys in them. These have the merit of returns derived
from a general census, which my other data lack, because I cannot for
a moment suppose that the writers of the latter are a haphazard
proportion of those to whom they were sent. Indeed I know of some
who, disavowing all possession of the power, and of many others who,
possessing it in too faint a degree to enable them to express what their
experiences really were, in a manner satisfactory to themselves, sent
no returns at all. Considerable statistical similarity was, however,
observed between the sets of returns furnished by the schoolboys and
those sent by my separate correspondents, and I may add that they

accord in this respect with the oral information I have elsewhere
obtained. The conformity of replies from so many different sources
which was clear from the first, the fact of their apparent
trustworthiness being on the whole much increased by crossexamination (though I could give one or two amusing instances of
break-down), and the evident effort made to give accurate answers,
have convinced me that it is a much easier matter than I had
anticipated to obtain trustworthy replies to psychological questions.
Many persons, especially women and intelligent children, take
pleasure in introspection, and strive their very best to explain their
mental processes. I think that a delight in self-dissection must be a
strong ingredient in the pleasure that many are said to take in
confessing themselves to priests.
"Here, then, are two rather notable results: the one is the proved
facility of obtaining statistical insight into the processes of other
persons' minds, whatever a priori objection may have been made as to
its possibility; and the other is that scientific men, as a class, have
feeble powers of visual representation. There is no doubt whatever on
the latter point, however it may be accounted for. My own conclusion
is that an over-ready perception of sharp mental pictures is antagonistic
to the acquirement of habits of highly-generalized and abstract
thought, especially when the steps of reasoning are carried on by
words as symbols, and that if the faculty of seeing the pictures was
ever possessed by men who think hard, it is very apt to be lost by
disuse. The highest minds are probably those in which it is not lost, but
subordinated, and is ready for use on suitable occasions. I am,
however, bound to say that the missing faculty seems to be replaced so
serviceably by other modes of conception, chiefly, I believe, connected
with the incipient motor sense, not of the eyeballs only but of the
muscles generally, that men who declare themselves entirely deficient
in the power of seeing mental pictures can nevertheless give lifelike
descriptions of what they have seen, and can otherwise express
themselves as if they were gifted with a vivid visual imagination. They
can also become painters of the rank of Royal Academicians....[56]
"It is a mistake to suppose that sharp sight is accompanied by clear
visual memory. I have not a few instances in which the independence

of the two faculties is emphatically commented on; and I have at least
one clear case where great interest in outlines and accurate
appreciation of straightness, squareness, and the like, is
unaccompanied by the power of visualizing. Neither does the faculty
go with dreaming. I have cases where it is powerful, and at the same
time where dreams are rare and faint or altogether absent. One friend
tells me that his dreams have not the hundredth part of the vigor of his
waking fancies.
"The visualizing and the identifying powers are by no means
necessarily combined. A distinguished writer on metaphysical topics
assures me that he is exceptionally quick at recognizing a face that he
has seen before, but that he cannot call up a mental image of any face
with clearness.
"Some persons have the power of combining in a single perception
more than can be seen at any one moment by the two eyes....
"I find that a few persons can, by what they often describe as a kind of
touch-sight, visualize at the same moment all round the image of a
solid body. Many can do so nearly, but not altogether round that of a
terrestrial globe. An eminent mineralogist assures me that he is able to
imagine simultaneously all the sides of a crystal with which he is
familiar. I may be allowed to quote a curious faculty of my own in
respect to this. It is exercised only occasionally and in dreams, or
rather in nightmares, but under those circumstances I am perfectly
conscious of embracing an entire sphere in a single perception. It
appears to lie within my mental eyeball, and to be viewed centripetally.
"This power of comprehension is practically attained in many cases by
indirect methods. It is a common feat to take in the whole surroundings
of an imagined room with such a rapid mental sweep as to leave some
doubt whether it has not been viewed simultaneously. Some persons
have the habit of viewing objects as though they were partly
transparent; thus, if they so dispose a globe in their imagination as to
see both its north and south poles at the same time, they will not be
able to see its equatorial parts. They can also perceive all the rooms of
an imaginary house by a single mental glance, the walls and floors
being as if made of glass. A fourth class of persons have the habit of

recalling scenes, not from the point of view whence they were
observed, but from a distance, and they visualize their own selves as
actors on the mental stage. By one or other of these ways, the power of
seeing the whole of an object, and not merely one aspect of it, is
possessed by many persons.
"The place where the image appears to lie differs much. Most persons
see it in an indefinable sort of way, others see it in front of the eye,
others at a distance corresponding to reality. There exists a power
which is rare naturally, but can, I believe, be acquired without much
difficulty, of projecting a mental picture upon a piece of paper, and of
holding it fast there, so that it can be outlined with a pencil. To this I
shall recur.
"Images usually do not become stronger by dwelling on them; the first
idea is commonly the most vigorous, but this is not always the case.
Sometimes the mental view of a locality is inseparably connected with
the sense of its position as regards the points of the compass, real or
imaginary. I have received full and curious descriptions from very
different sources of this strong geographical tendency, and in one or
two cases I have reason to think it allied to a considerable faculty of
geographical comprehension.
"The power of visualizing is higher in the female sex than in the male,
and is somewhat, but not much, higher in public-school boys than in
men. After maturity is reached, the further advance of age does not
seem to dim the faculty, but rather the reverse, judging from numerous
statements to that effect; but advancing years are sometimes
accompanied by a growing habit of hard abstract thinking, and in these
cases—not uncommon among those whom I have questioned—the
faculty undoubtedly becomes impaired. There is reason to believe that
it is very high in some young children, who seem to spend years of
difficulty in distinguishing between the subjective and objective world.
Language and book-learning certainly tend to dull it.
"The visualizing faculty is a natural gift, and, like all natural gifts, has
a tendency to be inherited. In this faculty the tendency to inheritance is
exceptionally strong, as I have abundant evidence to prove, especially
in respect to certain rather rare peculiarities,... which, when they exist

at all, are usually found among two, three, or more brothers and sisters,
parents, children, uncles and aunts, and cousins.
"Since families differ so much in respect to this gift, we may suppose
that races would also differ, and there can be no doubt that such is the
case. I hardly like to refer to civilized nations, because their natural
faculties are too much modified by education to allow of their being
appraised in an off-hand fashion. I may, however, speak of the French,
who appear to possess the visualizing faculty in a high degree. The
peculiar ability they show in prearranging ceremonials and fêtes of all
kinds, and their undoubted genius for tactics and strategy, show that
they are able to foresee effects with unusual clearness. Their ingenuity
in all technical contrivances is an additional testimony in the same
direction, and so is their singular clearness of expression. Their phrase
'figurez-vous,' or 'picture to yourself,' seems to express their dominant
mode of perception. Our equivalent of 'imagine' is ambiguous.

"I have many cases of persons mentally reading off scores when
playing the pianoforte, or manuscript when they are making speeches.
One statesman has assured me that a certain hesitation in utterance
which he has at times is due to his being plagued by the image of his
manuscript speech with its original erasures and corrections. He cannot
lay the ghost, and he puzzles in trying to decipher it.
"Some few persons see mentally in print every word that is uttered;
they attend to the visual equivalent and not to the sound of the words,
and they read them off usually as from a long imaginary strip of paper,
such as is unwound from telegraphic instruments."
The reader will find further details in Mr. Galton's 'Inquiries into Human
Faculty,' pp. 83-114.[57] I have myself for many years collected from each
and all of my psychology-students descriptions of their own visual
imagination; and found (together with some curious idiosyncrasies)
corroboration of all the variations which Mr. Galton reports. As examples, I
subjoin extracts from two cases near the ends of the scale. The writers are

first cousins, grandsons of a distinguished man of science. The one who is a
good visualizer says:
"This morning's breakfast-table is both dim and bright; it is dim if I try
to think of it when my eyes are open upon any object; it is perfectly
clear and bright if I think of it with my eyes closed.—All the objects
are clear at once, yet when I confine my attention to any one object it
becomes far more distinct.—I have more power to recall color than
any other one thing: if, for example, I were to recall a plate decorated
with flowers I could reproduce in a drawing the exact tone, etc. The
color of anything that was on the table is perfectly vivid.—There is
very little limitation to the extent of my images: I can see all four sides
of a room, I can see all four sides of two, three, four, even more rooms
with such distinctness that if you should ask me what was in any
particular place in any one, or ask me to count the chairs, etc., I could
do it without the least hesitation.—The more I learn by heart the more
clearly do I see images of my pages. Even before I can recite the lines
I see them so that I could give them very slowly word for word, but
my mind is so occupied in looking at my printed image that I have no
idea of what I am saying, of the sense of it, etc. When I first found
myself doing this I used to think it was merely because I knew the
lines imperfectly; but I have quite convinced myself that I really do see
an image. The strongest proof that such is really the fact is, I think, the
following:
"I can look down the mentally seen page and see the words that
commence all the lines, and from any one of these words I can
continue the line. I find this much easier to do if the words begin in a
straight line than if there are breaks. Example:
Étant fait....
Tous....
A des....
Que fit....
Céres....
Avec....
Un fleur....

Comme....
(La Fontaine 8. iv.)"
The poor visualizer says:
"My ability to form mental images seems, from what I have studied of
other people's images, to be defective, and somewhat peculiar. The
process by which I seem to remember any particular event is not by a
series of distinct images, but a sort of panorama, the faintest
impressions of which are perceptible through a thick fog.—I cannot
shut my eyes and get a distinct image of anyone, although I used to be
able to a few years ago, and the faculty seems to have gradually
slipped away.—In my most vivid dreams, where the events appear like
the most real facts, I am often troubled with a dimness of sight which
causes the images to appear indistinct.—To come to the question of the
breakfast-table, there is nothing definite about it. Everything is vague.
I cannot say what I see. I could not possibly count the chairs, but I
happen to know that there are ten. I see nothing in detail.—The chief
thing is a general impression that I cannot tell exactly what I do see.
The coloring is about the same, as far as I can recall it, only very much
washed out. Perhaps the only color I can see at all distinctly is that of
the table-cloth, and I could probably see the color of the wall-paper if I
could remember what color it was."
A person whose visual imagination is strong finds it hard to understand how
those who are without the faculty can think at all. Some people undoubtedly
have no visual images at all worthy of the name,[58] and instead of seeing
their breakfast-table, they tell you that they remember it or know what was
on it. This knowing and remembering takes place undoubtedly by means of
verbal images, as was explained already in Chapter IX, pp. 265-6.

The study of Aphasia (see Vol. I, p. 54) has of late years shown how
unexpectedly great are the differences between individuals in respect of
imagination. And at the same time the discrepancies between lesion and
symptom in different cases of the disease have been largely cleared up. In

some individuals the habitual 'thought-stuff,' if one may so call it, is visual;
in others it is auditory, articulatory, or motor; in most, perhaps, it is evenly
mixed. The same local cerebral injury must needs work different practical
results in persons who differ in this way. In one it will throw a much-used
brain-tract out of gear; in the other it may affect an unimportant region. A
particularly instructive case was published by Charcot in 1883.[59] The
patient was
Mr. X., a merchant, born in Vienna, highly educated, master of
German, Spanish, French, Greek, and Latin. Up to the beginning of the
malady which took him to Professor Charcot, he read Homer at sight.
He could, starting from any verse out of the first book of the Iliad,
repeat the following verses without hesitating, by heart. Virgil and
Horace were familiar. He also knew enough of modern Greek for
business purposes. Up to within a year (from the time Charcot saw
him) he enjoyed an exceptional visual memory. He no sooner thought
of persons or things, but features, forms, and colors arose with the
same clearness, sharpness, and accuracy as if the objects stood before
him. When he tried to recall a fact or a figure in his voluminous
polyglot correspondence, the letters themselves appeared before him
with their entire content, irregularities, erasures and all. At school he
recited from a mentally seen page which he read off line by line and
letter by letter. In making computations, he ran his mental eye down
imaginary columns of figures, and performed in this way the most
varied operations of arithmetic. He could never think of a passage in a
play without the entire scene, stage, actors, and audience appearing to
him. He had been a great traveller. Being a good draughtsman, he used
to sketch views which pleased him; and his memory always brought
back the entire landscape exactly. If he thought of a conversation, a
saying, an engagement, the place, the people, the entire scene rose
before his mind.
His auditory memory was always deficient, or at least secondary. He
had no taste for music.
A year and a half previous to examination, after business-anxieties,
loss of sleep, appetite, etc., he noticed suddenly one day an
extraordinary change in himself. After complete confusion, there came

a violent contrast between his old and his new state. Everything about
him seemed so new and foreign that at first he thought he must be
going mad. He was nervous and irritable. Although he saw all things
distinct, he had entirely lost his memory for forms and colors. On
ascertaining this, he became reassured as to his sanity. He soon
discovered that he could carry on his affairs by using his memory in an
altogether new way. He can now describe clearly the difference
between his two conditions.
Every time he returns to A., from which place business often calls him,
he seems to himself as if entering a strange city. He views the
monuments, houses, and streets with the same surprise as if he saw
them for the first time. Gradually, however, his memory returns, and he
finds himself at home again. When asked to describe the principal
public place of the town, he answered, "I know that it is there, but it is
impossible to imagine it, and I can tell you nothing about it." He has
often drawn the port of A. To-day he vainly tries to trace its principal
outlines. Asked to draw a minaret, he reflects, says it is a square tower,
and draws, rudely, four lines, one for ground, one for top, and two for
sides. Asked to draw an arcade, he says, "I remember that it contains
semi-circular arches, and that two of them meeting at an angle make a
vault, but how it looks I am absolutely unable to imagine." The profile
of a man which he drew by request was as if drawn by a little child;
and yet he confessed that he had been helped to draw it by looking at
the bystanders. Similarly he drew a shapeless scribble for a tree.
He can no more remember his wife's and children's faces than he can
remember the port of A. Even after being with them some time they
seem unusual to him. He forgets his own face, and once spoke to his
image in a mirror, taking it for a stranger. He complains of his loss of
feeling for colors. "My wife has black hair, this I know; but I can no
more recall its color than I can her person and features." This visual
amnesia extends to dating objects from his childhood's years—paternal
mansion, etc., forgotten.
No other disturbances but this loss of visual images. Now when he
seeks something in his correspondence, he must rummage among the
letters like other men, until he meets the passage. He can recall only
the first few verses of the Iliad, and must grope to read Homer, Virgil,

and Horace. Figures which he adds he must now whisper to himself.
He realises clearly that he must help his memory out with auditory
images, which he does with effort. The words and expressions which
he recalls seem now to echo in his ear, an altogether novel sensation
for him. If he wishes to learn by heart anything, a series of phrases for
example, he must read them several times aloud, so as to impress his
ear. When later he repeats the thing in question, the sensation of
inward hearing which precedes articulation rises up in his mind. This
feeling was formerly unknown to him. He speaks French fluently; but
affirms that he can no longer think in French; but must get his French
words by translating them from Spanish or German, the languages of
his childhood. He dreams no more in visual terms, but only in words,
usually Spanish words. A certain degree of verbal blindness affects
him—he is troubled by the Greek alphabet, etc.[60]
If this patient had possessed the auditory type of imagination from the start,
it is evident that the injury, whatever it was, to his centres for optical
imagination, would have affected his practical life much less profoundly.
"The auditory type," says M. A. Binet,[61] "appears to be rarer than
the visual. Persons of this type imagine what they think of in the
language of sound. In order to remember a lesson they impress upon
their mind, not the look of the page, but the sound of the words. They
reason, as well as remember, by ear. In performing a mental addition
they repeat verbally the names of the figures, and add, as it were, the
sounds, without any thought of the graphic signs. Imagination also
takes the auditory form. 'When I write a scene,' said Legouvé to
Scribe, 'I hear; but you see. In each phrase which I write, the voice of
the personage who speaks strikes my ear. Vous, qui êtes le théâtre
même, your actors walk, gesticulate before your eyes; I am a listener,
you a spectator.'—'Nothing more true,' said Scribe; 'do you know
where I am when I write a piece? In the middle of the parterre.' It is
clear that the pure audile, seeking to develop only a single one of his
faculties, may, like the pure visualizer, perform astounding feats of
memory—Mozart, for example, noting from memory the Miserere of
the Sistine Chapel after two hearings; the deaf Beethoven, composing
and inwardly repeating his enormous symphonies. On the other hand,

the man of auditory type, like the visual, is exposed to serious dangers;
for if he lose his auditory images, he is without resource and breaks
down completely.
"It is possible that persons with hallucinations of hearing, and
individuals afflicted with the mania that they are victims of
persecution, may all belong to the auditory type; and that the
predominance of a certain kind of imagination may predispose to a
certain order of hallucinations, and perhaps of delirium.

"The motor type remains—perhaps the most interesting of all, and
certainly the one of which least is known. Persons who belong to this
type [les moteurs, in French, motiles, as Mr. Galton proposes to call
them in English] make use, in memory, reasoning, and all their
intellectual operations, of images derived from movement. In order to
understand this important point, it is enough to remember that 'all our
perceptions, and in particular the important ones, those of sight and
touch, contain as integral elements the movements of our eyes and
limbs; and that, if movement is ever an essential factor in our really
seeing an object, it must be an equally essential factor when we see the
same object in imagination' (Ribot).[62] For example, the complex
impression of a ball, which is there, in our hand, is the resultant of
optical impressions of touch, of muscular adjustments of the eye, of
the movements of our fingers, and of the muscular sensations which
these yield. When we imagine the ball, its idea must include the
images of these muscular sensations, just as it includes those of the
retinal and epidermal sensations. They form so many motor images. If
they were not earlier recognized to exist, that is because our
knowledge of the muscular sense is relatively so recent. In older
psychologies it never was mentioned, the number of senses being
restricted to five.
"There are persons who remember a drawing better when they have
followed its outlines with their finger. Lecoq de Boisbaudran used this
means in his artistic teaching, in order to accustom his pupils to draw

from memory. He made them follow the outlines of figures with a
pencil held in the air, forcing them thus to associate muscular with
visual memory. Galton quotes a curious corroborative fact. Colonel
Moncrieff often observed in North America young Indians who,
visiting occasionally his quarters, interested themselves greatly in the
engravings which were shown them. One of them followed with care
with the point of his knife the outline of a drawing in the Illustrated
London News, saying that this was to enable him to carve it out the
better on his return home. In this ease the motor images were to
reinforce the visual ones. The young savage was a motor....[63] When
one's motor images are destroyed, one loses one's remembrance of
movements, and sometimes, more curiously still, one loses the power
of executing them. Pathology gives us examples in motor aphasia,
agraphia, etc. Take the case of agraphia. An educated man, knowing
how to write, suddenly loses this power, as a result of cerebral injury.
His hand and arm are in no way paralytic, yet he cannot write. Whence
this loss of power? He tells us himself: he no longer knows how. He
has forgotten how to set about it to trace the letters, he has lost the
memory of the movements to be executed, he has no longer the motor
images which, when formerly he wrote, directed his hand.... Other
patients, affected with word-blindness, resort to these motor images
precisely to make amends for their other deficiency.... An individual
affected in this way cannot read letters which are placed before his
eyes, even although his sight be good enough for the purpose. This
loss of the power of reading by sight may, at a certain time, be the only
trouble the patient has. Individuals thus mutilated succeed in reading
by an ingenious roundabout way which they often discover
themselves: it is enough that they should trace the letters with their
finger to understand their sense. What happens in such a case? How
can the hand supply the place of the eye? The motor image gives the
key to the problem. If the patient can read, so to speak, with his
fingers, it is because in tracing the letters he gives himself a certain
number of muscular impressions which are those of writing. In one
word, the patient reads by writing (Charcot): the feeling of the graphic
movements suggests the sense of what is being written as well as sight
would."[64]

The imagination of a blind-deaf mute like Laura Bridgman must be
confined entirely to tactile and motor material. All blind persons must
belong to the 'tactile' and 'motile' types of the French authors. When the
young man whose cataracts were removed by Dr. Franz was shown
different geometric figures, he said he "had not been able to form from
them the idea of a square and a disk until he perceived a sensation of what
he saw in the points of his fingers, as if he really touched the objects."[65]
Professor Stricker of Vienna, who seems to have the motile form of
imagination developed in unusual strength, has given a very careful analysis
of his own case in a couple of monographs with which all students should
become familiar.[66] His recollections both of his own movements and of
those of other things are accompanied invariably by distinct muscular
feelings in those parts of his body which would naturally be used in
effecting or in following the movement. In thinking of a soldier marching,
for example, it is as if he were helping the image to march by marching
himself in his rear. And if he suppresses this sympathetic feeling in his own
legs, and concentrates all his attention on the imagined soldier, the latter
becomes, as it were, paralyzed. In general his imagined movements, of
whatsoever objects, seem paralyzed the moment no feelings of movement
either in his own eyes or in his own limbs accompany them.[67] The
movements of articulate speech play a predominant part in his mental life.
"When after my experimental work I proceed to its description, as a
rule I reproduce in the first instance only words, which I had already
associated with the perception of the various details of the observation
whilst the latter was going on. For speech plays in all my observing so
important a part that I ordinarily clothe phenomena in words as fast as
I observe them."[68]
Most persons, on being asked in what sort of terms they imagine words, will
say 'in terms of hearing.' It is not until their attention is expressly drawn to
the point that they find it difficult to say whether auditory images or motor
images connected with the organs of articulation predominate. A good way
of bringing the difficulty to consciousness is that proposed by Stricker:
Partly open your mouth and then imagine any word with labials or dentals
in it, such as 'bubble, 'toddle.' Is your image under these conditions distinct?

To most people the image is at first 'thick,' as the sound of the word would
be if they tried to pronounce it with the lips parted. Many can never imagine
the words clearly with the mouth open; others succeed after a few
preliminary trials. The experiment proves how dependent our verbal
imagination is on actual feelings in lips, tongue, throat, larynx, etc.
"When we recall the impression of a word or sentence, if we do not
speak it out, we feel the twitter of the organs just about to come to that
point. The articulating parts—the larynx, the tongue, the lips—are all
sensibly excited; a suppressed articulation is in fact the material of our
recollection, the intellectual manifestation, the idea of speech."[69]
The open mouth in Stricker's experiment not only prevents actual
articulation of the labials, but our feeling of its openness keeps us from
imagining their articulation, just as a sensation of glaring light will keep us
from strongly imagining darkness. In persons whose auditory imagination is
weak, the articulatory image seems to constitute the whole material for
verbal thought. Professor Stricker says that in his own case no auditory
image enters into the words of which he thinks.[70] Like most psychologists,
however, he makes of his personal peculiarities a rule, and says that verbal
thinking is normally and universally an exclusively motor representation. I
certainly get auditory images, both of vowels and of consonants, in addition
to the articulatory images or feelings on which this author lays such stress.
And I find that numbers of my students, after repeating his experiments,
come to this conclusion. There is at first a difficulty due to the open mouth.
That, however, soon vanishes, as does also the difficulty of thinking of one
vowel whilst continuously sounding another. What probably remains true,
however, is that most men have a less auditory and a more articulatory
verbal imagination than they are apt to be aware of. Professor Stricker
himself has acoustic images, and can imagine the sounds of musical
instruments, and the peculiar voice of a friend. A statistical inquiry on a
large scale, into the variations of acoustic, tactile, and motor imagination,
would probably bear less fruit than Galton's inquiry into visual images. A
few monographs by competent observers, like Stricker, about their own
peculiarities, would give much more valuable information about the
diversities which prevail.[71]

Touch-images are very strong in some people. The most vivid touch-images
come when we ourselves barely escape local injury, or when we see another
injured. The place may then actually tingle with the imaginary sensation—
perhaps not altogether imaginary, since goose-flesh, paling or reddening,
and other evidences of actual muscular contraction in the spot may result.
"An educated man," says a writer who must always be quoted when it
is question of the powers of imagination,[72] "told me once that on
entering his house one day he received a shock from crushing the
finger of one of his little children in the door. At the moment of his
fright he felt a violent pain in the corresponding finger of his own
body, and this pain abode with him three days."
The same author makes the following discrimination, which probably most
men could verify:
"On the skin I easily succeed in bringing out suggested sensations
wherever I will. But because it is necessary to protract the mental
effort I can only awaken such sensations as are in their nature
prolonged, as warmth, cold, pressure. Fleeting sensations, as those of a
prick, a cut, a blow, etc., I am unable to call up, because I cannot
imagine them ex abrupto with the requisite intensity. The sensations of
the former order I can excite upon any part of the skin; and they may
become so lively that, whether I will or not, I have to pass my hand
over the place just as if it were a real impression on the skin."[73]
Meyer's account of his own visual images is very interesting; and with it we
may close our survey of differences between the normal powers of
imagining in different individuals.
"With much practice," he says, "I have succeeded in making it possible
for me to call up subjective visual sensations at will. I tried all my
experiments by day or at night with closed eyes. At first it was very
difficult. In the first experiments which succeeded the whole picture
was luminous, the shadows being given in a somewhat less strong
bluish light. In later experiments I saw the objects dark, with bright
outlines, or rather I saw outline drawings of them, bright on a dark
ground. I can compare these drawings less to chalk drawings on a

blackboard than to drawings made with phosphorus on a dark wall at
night, though the phosphorus would show luminous vapors which
were absent from my lines. If I wished, for example, to see a face,
without intending that of a particular person, I saw the outline of a
profile against the dark background. When I tried to repeat an
experiment of the elder Darwin I saw only the edges of the die as
bright lines on a dark ground. Sometimes, however, I saw the die
really white and its edges black; it was then on a paler ground. I could
soon at will change between a white die with black borders on a light
field, and a black die with white borders on a dark field; and I can do
this at any moment now. After long practice ... these experiments
succeeded better still. I can now call before my eyes almost any object
which I please, as a subjective appearance, and this in its own natural
color and illumination. I see them almost always on a more or less
light or dark, mostly dimly changeable ground. Even known faces I
can see quite sharp, with the true color of hair and cheeks. It is odd that
I see these faces mostly in profile, whereas those described [in the
previous extract] were all full-face. Here are some of the final results
of these experiments:
"1) Some time after the pictures have arisen they vanish or change into
others, without my being able to prevent it.
"2) When the color does not integrally belong to the object, I cannot
always control it. A face, e.g., never seems to me blue, but always in
its natural color; a red cloth, on the other hand, I can sometimes
change to a blue one.
"3) I have sometimes succeeded in seeing pure colors without objects;
they then fill the entire field of view.
"4) I often fail to see objects which are not known to me, mere fictions
of my fancy, and instead of them there will appear familiar objects of a
similar sort; for instance, I once tried to see a brass sword-hilt with a
brass guard, instead of which the more familiar picture of a rapierguard appeared.
"5) Most of these subjective appearances, especially when they were
bright, left after-images behind them when the eyes were quickly
opened during their presence. For example, I thought of a silver

stirrup, and after I had looked at it a while I opened my eyes and for a
long while afterwards saw its after-image.
"These experiments succeeded best when I lay quietly on my back and
closed my eyes. I could bear no noise about me, as this kept the vision
from attaining the requisite intensity. The experiments succeed with
me now so easily that I am surprised they did not do so at first, and I
feel as though they ought to succeed with everyone. The important
point in them is to get the image sufficiently intense by the exclusive
direction of the attention upon it, and by the removal of all disturbing
impressions."[74]
The negative after-images which succeeded upon Meyer's imagination when
he opened his eyes are a highly interesting, though rare, phenomenon. So
far as I know there is only one other published report of a similar
experience.[75] It would seem that in such a case the neural process
corresponding to the imagination must be the entire tract concerned in the
actual sensation, even down as far as the retina. This leads to a new
question to which we may now turn—of what is
THE NEURAL PROCESS WHICH UNDERLIES IMAGINATION?
The commonly-received idea is that it is only a milder degree of the same
process which took place when the thing now imagined was sensibly
perceived. Professor Bain writes:
"Since a sensation in the first instance diffuses nerve-currents through
the interior of the brain outwards to the organs of expression and
movement,—the persistence of that sensation, after the outward
exciting cause is withdrawn, can be but a continuance of the same
diffusive currents, perhaps less intense, but not otherwise different.
The shock remaining in the ear and brain, after the sound of thunder,
must pass through the same circles, and operate in the same way as
during the actual sound. We can have no reason for believing that, in
this self-sustaining condition, the impression changes its seat, or passes
into some new circles that have the special property of retaining it.
Every part actuated after the shock must have been actuated by the

shock, only more powerfully. With this single difference of intensity,
the mode of existence of a sensation existing after the fact is
essentially the same as its mode of existence during the fact.... Now if
this be the case with impressions persisting when the cause has ceased,
what view are we to adopt concerning impressions reproduced by
mental causes alone, or without the aid of the original, as in ordinary
recollection? What is the manner of occupation of the brain with a
resuscitated feeling of resistance, a smell or a sound? There is only one
answer that seems admissable. The renewed feeling occupies the very
same parts, and in the same manner, as the original feeling, and no
other parts, nor in any other assignable manner. I imagine that if our
present knowledge of the brain had been present to the earliest
speculators, this is the only hypothesis that would have occurred to
them. For where should a past feeling be embodied, if not in the same
organs as the feeling when present? It is only in this way that its
identity can be preserved; a feeling differently embodied would be a
different feeling."[76]
It is not plain from Professor Bain's text whether by the 'same parts' he
means only the same parts inside the brain, or the same peripheral parts
also, as those occupied by the original feeling. The examples which he
himself proceeds to give are almost all cases of imagination of movement,
in which the peripheral organs are indeed affected, for actual movements of
a weak sort are found to accompany the idea. This is what we should
expect. All currents tend to run forward in the brain and discharge into the
muscular system; and the idea of a movement tends to do this with peculiar
facility. But the question remains: Do currents run backward, so that if the
optical centres (for example) are excited by 'association' and a visual object
is imagined, a current runs down to the retina also, and excites that
sympathetically with the higher tracts? In other words, can peripheral
sense-organs be excited from above, or only from without? Are they excited
in imagination? Professor Bain's instances are almost silent as to this point.
All he says is this:
"We might think of a blow on the hand until the skin were actually
irritated and inflamed. The attention very much directed to any part of
the body, as the great toe, for instance, is apt to produce a distinct

feeling in the part, which we account for only by supposing a revived
nerve-current to flow there, making a sort of false sensation, an
influence from within mimicking the influences from without in
sensation proper.—(See the writings of Mr. Braid, of Manchester, on
Hypnotism, etc.)"
If I may judge from my own experience, all feelings of this sort are
consecutive upon motor currents invading the skin and producing
contraction of the muscles there, the muscles whose contraction gives
'goose-flesh' when it takes place on an extensive scale. I never get a feeling
in the skin, however strongly I imagine it, until some actual change in the
condition of the skin itself has occurred. The truth seems to be that the cases
where peripheral sense-organs are directly excited in consequence of
imagination are exceptional rarities, if they exist at all. In common cases of
imagination it would seem more natural to suppose that the seat of the
process is purely cerebral, and that the sense-organ is left out. Reasons for
such a conclusion would be briefly these:
1) In imagination the starting-point of the process must be in the brain.
Now we know that currents usually flow one way in the nervous system;
and for the peripheral sense-organs to be excited in these cases, the current
would have to flow backward.
2) There is between imagined objects and felt objects a difference of
conscious quality which may be called almost absolute. It is hardly possible
to confound the liveliest image of fancy with the weakest real sensation.
The felt object has a plastic reality and outwardness which the imagined
object wholly lacks. Moreover, as Fechner says, in imagination the attention
feels as if drawn backwards to the brain; in sensation (even of after-images)
it is directed forward towards the sense-organ.[77] The difference between
the two processes feels like one of kind, and not like a mere 'more' or 'less'
of the same.[78] If a sensation of sound were only a strong imagination, and
an imagination a weak sensation, there ought to be a border-line of
experience where we never could tell whether we were hearing a weak
sound or imagining a strong one. In comparing a present sensation felt with
a past one imagined, it will be remembered that we often judge the
imagined one to have been the stronger (see above, Vol. I p. 500, note).

This is inexplicable if the imagination be simply a weaker excitement of the
sensational process.
To these reasons the following objections may be made:
To 1): The current demonstrably does flow backward down the optic nerve
in Meyer's and Féré's negative after-image. Therefore it can flow backward;
therefore it may flow backward in some, however slight, degree, in all
imagination.[79]
To 2): The difference alleged is not absolute, and sensation and imagination
are hard to discriminate where the sensation is so weak as to be just
perceptible. At night hearing a very faint striking of the hour by a far-off
clock, our imagination reproduces both rhythm and sound, and it is often
difficult to tell which was the last real stroke. So of a baby crying in a
distant part of the house, we are uncertain whether we still hear it, or only
imagine the sound. Certain violin-players take advantage of this in
diminuendo terminations. After the pianissimo has been reached they
continue to bow as if still playing, but are careful not to touch the strings.
The listener hears in imagination a degree of sound fainter still than the
preceding pianissimo. This phenomenon is not confined to hearing:
"If we slowly approach our finger to a surface of water, we often
deceive ourselves about the moment in which the wetting occurs. The
apprehensive patient believes himself to feel the knife of the surgeon
whilst it is still at some distance."[80]
Visual perception supplies numberless instances in which the same
sensation of vision is perceived as one object or another according to the
interpretation of the mind. Many of these instances will come before us in
the course of the next two chapters; and in Chapter XIX similar illusions
will be described in the other senses. Taken together, all these facts would
force us to admit that the subjective difference between imagined and felt
objects is less absolute than has been claimed, and that the cortical
processes which underlie imagination and sensation are not quite as
discrete as one at first is tempted to suppose. That peripheral sensory
processes are ordinarily involved in imagination seems improbable; that
they may sometimes be aroused from the cortex downwards cannot,
however, be dogmatically denied.

The imagination-process CAN then pass over into the sensation-process. In
other words, genuine sensations can be centrally originated. When we come
to study hallucinations in the chapter on Outer Perception, we shall see that
this is by no means a thing of rare occurrence. At present, however, we
must admit that normally the two processes do NOT pass over into each
other; and we must inquire why. One of two things must be the reason.
Either
1. Sensation-processes occupy a different locality from imaginationprocesses; or
2. Occupying the same locality, they have an intensity which under normal
circumstances currents from other cortical regions are incapable of
arousing, and to produce which currents from the periphery are required.
It seems almost certain (after what was said in Chapter II. pp. 49-51) that
the imagination-process differs from the sensation-process by its intensity
rather than by its locality. However it may be with lower animals, the
assumption that ideational and sensorial centres are locally distinct appears
to be supported by no facts drawn from the observation of human beings.
After occipital destruction, the hemianopsia which results in man is
sensorial blindness, not mere loss of optical ideas. Were there centres for
crude optical sensation below the cortex, the patients in these cases would
still feel light and darkness. Since they do not preserve even this impression
on the lost half of the field, we must suppose that there are no centres for
vision of any sort whatever below the cortex, and that the corpora
quadrigemina and other lower optical ganglia are organs for reflex
movement of eye-muscles and not for conscious sight. Moreover there are
no facts which oblige us to think that, within the occipital cortex, one part is
connected with sensation and another with mere ideation or imagination.
The pathological cases assumed to prove this are all better explained by
disturbances of conduction between the optical and other centres (see p.
50). In bad cases of hemianopsia the patient's images depart from him
together with his sensibility to light. They depart so completely that he does
not even know what is the matter with him. To perceive that one is blind to
the right half of the field of view one must have an idea of that part of the
field's possible existence. But the defect in these patients has to be revealed

to them by the doctor, they themselves only knowing that there is
'something wrong' with their eyes. What you have no idea of you cannot
miss; and their not definitely missing this great region out of their sight
seems due to the fact that their very idea and memory of it is lost along with
the sensation. A man blind of his eyes merely, sees darkness. A man blind
of his visual brain-centres can no more see darkness out of the parts of his
retina which are connected with the brain-lesion than he can see it out of the
skin of his back. He cannot see at all in that part of the field; and he cannot
think of the light which he ought to be feeling there, for the very notion of
the existence of that particular 'there' is cut out of his mind.[81]
Now if we admit that sensation and imagination are due to the activity of
the same centres in the cortex, we can see a very good teleological reason
why they should correspond to discrete kinds of process in these centres,
and why the process which gives the sense that the object is really there
ought normally to be arousable only by currents entering from the periphery
and not by currents from the neighboring cortical parts. We can see, in
short, why the sensational process OUGHT TO be discontinuous with all
normal ideational processes, however intense. For, as Dr. Münsterberg
justly observes:
"Were there not this peculiar arrangement we should not distinguish
reality and fantasy, our conduct would not be accommodated to the
facts about us, but would be inappropriate and senseless, and we could
not keep ourselves alive.... That our thoughts and memories should be
copies of sensations with their intensity greatly reduced is thus a
consequence deducible logically from the natural adaptation of the
cerebral mechanism to its environment."[82]
Mechanically the discontinuity between the ideational and the sensational
kinds of process must mean that when the greatest ideational intensity has
been reached, an order of resistance presents itself which only a new order
of force can break through. The current from the periphery is the new order
of force required; and what happens after the resistance is overcome is the
sensational process. We may suppose that the latter consists in some new
and more violent sort of disintegration of the neural matter, which now
explodes at a deeper level than at other times.

Now how shall we conceive of the 'resistance' which prevents this sort of
disintegration from taking place, this sort of intensity in the process from
being attained, so much of the time? It must be either an intrinsic resistance,
some force of cohesion in the neural molecules themselves; or an extrinsic
influence, due to other cortical cells. When we come to study the process of
hallucination we shall see that both factors must be taken into account.
There is a degree of inward molecular cohesion in our brain-cells which it
probably takes a sudden inrush of destructive energy to spring apart.
Incoming peripheral currents possess this energy from the outset. Currents
from neighboring cortical regions might attain to it if they could accumulate
within the centre which we are supposed to be considering. But since during
waking hours every centre communicates with others by association-paths,
no such accumulation can take place. The cortical currents which run in run
right out again, awakening the next ideas; the level of tension in the cells
does not rise to the higher explosion-point; and the latter must be gained by
a sudden current from the periphery or not at all.

[49] Prof. Jastrow has ascertained by statistical inquiry among the blind that if their blindness have
occurred before a period embraced between the fifth and seventh years the visual centres seem to
decay, and visual dreams and images are gradually outgrown. If sight is lost after the seventh year,
visual imagination seems to survive through life. See Prof. J.'s interesting article on the Dreams of
the Blind, in the New Princeton Review for January 1888.
[50] Impression means sensation for Hume.
[51] Treatise on Human Nature, part i. § vii.
[52] Huxley's Hume, pp. 92-94.
[53] On Intelligence (N. Y.), vol. ii. p. 139.
[54] Principles, Introd. § 13. Compare also the passage quoted above, vol. I, p. 469.
[55] The differences noted by Fechner between after-images and images of imagination proper are as
follows:

After Images.
Feel coercive;

Imagination-images.
Feel subject to our spontaneity;

Seem unsubstantial, vaporous;

Have, as it were, more body;

Are sharp in outline;

Are blurred;

Are bright;

Are darker than even the darkest
black of the after-images;

Are almost colorless;

Have lively coloration;

Are continuously enduring;

Incessantly disappear, and have to
be renewed by an effort of will.
At last even this fails to revive
them.

Cannot be voluntarily changed.

Are exact copies of originals.

Are more easily got with shut than
with open eyes;
Seem to move when the head or eyes
move;

Can be exchanged at will for
others.
Cannot violate the necessary laws
of
appearance of their originals—e.g.,
a man cannot be imagined from
in front and behind at once. The
imagination must walk round him,
so to speak;
Are more easily had with open than
with shut eyes;
Need not follow movements of
head
or eyes.

The field within which they appear
The field is extensive in three
(with closed eyes) is dark, contracted, dimensions, and objects can be

flat, close to the eyes, in
front, and the images have no
perspective;
The attention seems directed
forwards
towards the sense-organ, in
observing after-images.

imagined in it above or behind
almost as easily as in front.

In imagining, the attention feels as
if drawn backwards towards the
brain.

Finally, Fechner speaks of the impossibility of attending to both after-images and imagination-images
at once, even when they are of the same object and might be expected to combine. All these
differences are true of Fechner; but many of them would be untrue of other persons. I quote them as a
type of observation which any reader with sufficient patience may repeat. To them may be added, as
a universal proposition, that after-images seem larger if we project them on a distant screen, and
smaller if we project them on a near one, whilst no such change takes place in mental pictures.
[56] [I am myself a good draughtsman, and have a very lively interest in pictures, statues,
architecture and decoration, and a keen sensibility to artistic effects. But I am an extremely poor
visualizer, and find myself often unable to reproduce in my mind's eye pictures which I have most
carefully examined.—W. J.]
[57] See also McCosh and Osborne, Princeton Review, Jan. 1884. There are some good examples of
high development of the Faculty in the London Spectator, Dec. 28, 1878, pp. 1631, 1634, Jan. 4, 11,
25, and March 18, 1879.
[58] Take the following report from one of my students: "I am unable to form in my mind's eye any
visual likeness of the table whatever. After many trials, I can only get a hazy surface, with nothing on
it or about it. I can see no variety in color, and no positive limitations in extent, while I cannot see
what I see well enough to determine its position in respect to my eye, or to endow it with any quality
of size. I am in the same position as to the word dog. I cannot see it in my mind's eye at all; and so
cannot tell whether I should have to run my eye along it, if I did see it."
[59] Progrès Médical, 21 juillet. I abridge from the German report of the case in Wilbrand: Die
Seelenblindheit (188).
[60] In a letter to Charcot this interesting patient adds that his character also is changed: "I was
formerly receptive, easily made enthusiastic, and possessed a rich fancy. Now I am quiet and cold,
and fancy never carries my thoughts away.... I am much less susceptible than formerly to anger or
sorrow. I lately lost my dearly-beloved mother; but felt far less grief at the bereavement than if I had
been able to see in my mind's eye her physiognomy and the phases of her suffering, and especially
less than if I had been able to witness in imagination the outward effects of her untimely loss upon
the members of the family."
[61] Psychologie du Raisonnement (1886), p. 25.
[62] [I am myself a very poor visualizer, and find that I can seldom call to mind even a single letter
of the alphabet in purely retinal terms. I must trace the letter by running my mental eye over its
contour in order that the image of it shall have any distinctness at all. On questioning a large number
of other people, mostly students, I find that perhaps half of them say they have no such difficulty in
seeing letters mentally. Many affirm that they can see an entire word at once, especially a short one

like 'dog,' with no such feeling of creating the letters successively by tracing them with the eye.—W.
J.]
[63] It is hardly needful to say that in modern primary education, in which the blackboard is so much
used, the children are taught their letters, etc., by all possible channels at once, sight, hearing, and
movement.
[64] See an interesting case of a similar sort, reported by Farges, in l'Encéphale, 7me Année, p. 545.
[65] Philosophical Transactions, 1841, p. 65.
[66] Studien über die Sprachvorstellungen (1880), and Studien über die Bewegungsvorstellungen
(1882).
[67] Prof. Stricker admits that by practice he has succeeded in making his eye-movements 'act
vicariously' for his leg-movements in imagining men walking.
[68] Bewegungsvorstellungen, p. 6.
[69] Bain: Senses and Intellect, p. 339.
[70] Studien über Sprachvorstellungen, 28, 31, etc. Cf. pp. 49-50, etc. Against Stricker, see Stumpf,
Tonpsychol., 155-162, and Revue Philosophique, xx. 617. See also Paulhan, Rev. Philosophique, xvi.
405. Stricker replies to Paulhan in vol. xviii. p. 685. P. retorts in vol. xix p. 118. Stricker reports that
out of 100 persons questioned he found only one who had no feeling in his lips when silently
thinking the letters M, B, P; and out of 60 only two who were conscious of no internal articulation
whilst reading (pp. 59-60).
[71] I think it must be admitted that some people have no vivid substantive images in any department
of their sensibility. One of my students, an intelligent youth, denied so pertinaciously that there was
anything in his mind at all when he thought, that I was much perplexed by his case. I myself
certainly have no such vivid play of nascent movements or motor images as Professor Stricker
describes. When I seek to represent a row of soldiers marching, all I catch is a view of stationary legs
first in one phase of movement and then in another, and these views are extremely imperfect and
momentary. Occasionally (especially when I try to stimulate my imagination, as by repeating Victor
Hugo's lines about the regiment,
"Leur pas est si correct, sans tarder ni courir,
Qu'on croit voir des ciseaux se fermer et s'ouvrir,")
I seem to get an instantaneous glimpse of an actual movement, but it is to the last degree dim and
uncertain. All these images seem at first as if purely retinal. I think, however, that rapid eyemovements accompany them, though these latter give rise to such slight feelings that they are almost
impossible of detection. Absolutely no leg-movements of my own are there; in fact, to call such up
arrests my imagination of the soldiers. My optical images are in general very dim, dark, fugitive, and
contracted. It would be utterly impossible to draw from them, and yet I perfectly well distinguish one
from the other. My auditory images are excessively inadequate reproductions of their originals. I
have no images of taste or smell. Touch-imagination is fairly distinct, but comes very little into play
with most objects thought of. Neither is all my thought verbalized; for I have shadowy schemes of
relation, as apt to terminate in a nod of the head or an expulsion of the breath as in a definite word.
On the whole, vague images or sensations of movement inside of my head towards the various parts
of space in which the terms I am thinking of either lie or are momentarily symbolized to lie together
with movements of the breath through my pharynx and nostrils, form a by no means inconsiderable
part of my thought-stuff. I doubt whether my difficulty in giving a clearer account is wholly a matter
of inferior power of introspective attention, though that doubtless plays its part. Attention, ceteris

paribus, must always be inferior in proportion to the feebleness of the internal images which are
offered it to hold on to.
[72] Geo. Herm. Meyer, Untersuchungen üb. d. Physiol. d. Nervenfaser (1843), p. 233. For other
cases see Tuke's Influence of Mind upon Body, chaps. ii. and vii.
[73] Meyer, op. cit. p. 238.
[74] Meyer, op. cit. pp. 238-41.
[75] That of Dr. Ch. Féré in the Revue Philosophique, xx. 364. Johannes Müller's account of
hypnagogic hallucinations floating before the eyes for a few moments after these had been opened,
seems to belong more to the category of spontaneous hallucinations (see his Physiology, London,
1843, p. 1394). It is impossible to tell whether the words in Wundt's Vorlesungen, i. 387, refer to a
personal experience of his own or not; probably not. Il va sans dire that an inferior visualizer like
myself can get no such after-images. Nor have I as yet succeeded in getting report of any from my
students.
[76] Senses and Intellect, p. 338.
[77] See above, note 55.
[78] V. Kandinsky (Kritische u. klinische Betrachtungen im Gebiete der Sinnestäuschungen (Berlin,
1885), p. 135 ff.) insists that in even the liveliest pseudo-hallucinations (see below, Chapter XX),
which may be regarded as the intensest possible results of the imaginative process, there is no
outward objectivity perceived in the thing represented, and that a ganzer Abgrund separates these
'ideas' from true hallucination and objective perception.

[79] It seems to also flow backwards in certain hypnotic hallucinations. Suggest to a 'Subject' in the
hypnotic trance that a sheet of paper has a red cross upon it, then pretend to remove the imaginary
cross, whilst you tell the Subject to look fixedly at a dot upon the paper, and he will presently tell you
that he sees a 'bluish-green' cross. The genuineness of the result has been doubted, but there seems no
good reason for rejecting M. Binet's account (Le Magnetisme Animal, 1887, p. 188). M. Binet,
following M. Parinaud, and on the faith of a certain experiment, at one time believed, the optical
brain-centres and not the retina to be the seat of ordinary negative after-images. The experiment is
this: Look fixedly, with one eye open, at a colored spot on a white background. Then close that eye
and look fixedly with the other eye at a plain surface. A negative after-image of the colored spot will
presently appear. (Psychologie du Raisonnement, 1886, p. 45.) But Mr. Delabarre has proved
(American Journal of Psychology, ii. 326) that this after-image is due, not to a higher cerebral
process, but to the fact that the retinal process in the closed eye affects consciousness at certain
moments, and that its object is then projected into the field seen by the eye which is open. M. Binet
informs me that he is converted by the proofs given by Mr. Delabarre.
The fact remains, however, that the negative after-images of Herr Meyer, M. Féré, and the hypnotic
subjects, form an exception to all that we know of nerve-currents, if they are due to a refluent
centrifugal current to the retina. It may be that they will hereafter be explained in some other way.
Meanwhile we can only write them down as a paradox. Sig. Sergi's theory that there is always a
refluent wave in perception hardly merits serious consideration (Psychologie Physiologique, pp. 99,
189). Sergi's theory has recently been reaffirmed with almost incredible crudity by Lombroso and
Ottolenghi in the Revue Philosophique, xxix. 70 (Jan. 1890).
[80] Lotze, Med. Psych. p. 509.
[81] See an important article by Binet in the Revue Philosophique, xxvi. 481 (1888); also Dufour, in
Revue Méd. de la Suisse Romande, 1889. No. 8, cited in the Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1890. p.
48.
[82] Die Willenshandlung (1888), pp. 129-40.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.'
PERCEPTION AND SENSATION COMPARED.
A pure sensation we saw above, p. 7, to be an abstraction never realized in
adult life. Any quality of a thing which affects our sense-organs does also
more than that: it arouses processes in the hemispheres which are due to the
organization of that organ by past experiences, and the result of which in
consciousness are commonly described as ideas which the sensation
suggests. The first of these ideas is that of the thing to which the sensible

quality belongs. The consciousness of particular material things present to
sense is nowadays called perception.[83] The consciousness of such things
may be more or less complete; it may be of the mere name of the thing and
its other essential attributes, or it may be of the thing's various remoter
relations. It is impossible to draw any sharp line of distinction between the
barer and the richer consciousness, because the moment we get beyond the
first crude sensation all our consciousness is a matter of suggestion, and the
various suggestions shade gradually into each other, being one and all
products of the same psychological machinery of association. In the directer
consciousness fewer, in the remoter more, associative processes are brought
into play.
Perception thus differs from sensation by the consciousness of farther facts
associated with the object of the sensation:
"When I lift my eyes from the paper on which I am writing I see the
chairs and tables and walls of my room, each of its proper shape and at
its proper distance. I see, from my window, trees and meadows, and
horses and oxen, and distant hills. I see each of its proper size, of its
proper form, and at its proper distance; and these particulars appear as
immediate informations of the eye, as the colors which I see by means
of it. Yet philosophy has ascertained that we derive nothing from the
eye whatever but sensations of color.... How, then, is it that we receive
accurate information, by the eye, of size and shape and distance? By
association merely. The colors upon a body are different, according to
its figure, its shape, and its size. But the sensations of color and what
we may here, for brevity, call the sensations of extension, of figure, of
distance, have been so often united, felt in conjunction, that the
sensation of the color is never experienced without raising the ideas of
the extension, the figure, the distance, in such intimate union with it,
that they not only cannot be separated, but are actually supposed to be
seen. The sight, as it is called, of figure, or distance, appearing as it
does a simple sensation, is in reality a complex state of consciousness
—a sequence in which the antecedent, a sensation of color, and the
consequent, a number of ideas, are so closely combined by association
that they appear not one idea, but one sensation."

This passage from James Mill[84] gives a clear statement of the doctrine
which Berkeley in his Theory of Vision made for the first time an integral
part of Psychology. Berkeley compared our visual sensations to the words
of a language, which are but signs or occasions for our intellects to pass to
what the speaker means. As the sounds called words have no inward
affinity with the ideas they signify, so neither have our visual sensations,
according to Berkeley, any inward affinity with the things of whose
presence they make us aware. Those things are tangibles; their real
properties, such as shape, size, mass, consistency, position, reveal
themselves only to touch. But the visible signs and the tangible significates
are by long custom so "closely twisted, blended, and incorporated together,
and the prejudice is so confirmed and riveted in our thoughts by a long tract
of time, by the use of language, and want of reflection,"[85] that we think we
see the whole object, tangible and visible alike, in one simple indivisible
act.
Sensational and reproductive brain-processes combined, then, are what
give us the content of our perceptions. Every concrete particular material
thing is a conflux of sensible qualities, with which we have become
acquainted at various times. Some of these qualities, since they are more
constant, interesting, or practically important, we regard as essential
constituents of the thing. In a general way, such are the tangible shape, size,
mass, etc. Other properties, being more fluctuating, we regard as more or
less accidental or inessential. We call the former qualities the reality, the
latter its appearances. Thus, I hear a sound, and say 'a horse-car'; but the
sound is not the horse-car, it is one of the horse-car's least important
manifestations. The real horse-car is a feelable, or at most a feelable and
visible, thing which in my imagination the sound calls up. So when I get, as
now, a brown eye-picture with lines not parallel, and with angles unlike,
and call it my big solid rectangular walnut library-table, that picture is not
the table. It is not even like the table as the table is for vision, when rightly
seen. It is a distorted perspective view of three of the sides of what I
mentally perceive (more or less) in its totality and undistorted shape. The
back of the table, its square corners, its size, its heaviness, are features of
which I am conscious when I look, almost as I am conscious of its name.
The suggestion of the name is of course due to mere custom. But no less is
that of the back, the size, weight, squareness, etc.

Nature, as Reid says, is frugal in her operations, and will not be at the
expense of a particular instinct to give us that knowledge which experience
and habit will soon produce. Reproduced sights and contacts tied together
with the present sensation in the unity of a thing with a name, these are the
complex objective stuff out of which my actually perceived table is made.
Infants must go through a long education of the eye and ear before they can
perceive the realities which adults perceive. Every perception is an acquired
perception.[86]
Perception may then be defined, in Mr. Sully's words, as that process by
which the mind
"supplements a sense-impression by an accompaniment or escort of
revived sensations, the whole aggregate of actual and revived
sensations being solidified or 'integrated' into the form of a percept,
that is, an apparently immediate apprehension or cognition of an object
now present in a particular locality or region of space."[87]
Every reader's mind will supply abundant examples of the process here
described; and to write them down would be therefore both unnecessary and
tedious. In the chapter on Space we have already discussed some of the
more interesting ones; for in our perceptions of shape and position it is
really difficult to decide how much of our sense of the object is due to
reproductions of past experience, and how much to the immediate
sensations of the eye. I shall accordingly confine myself in the rest of this
chapter to certain additional generalities connected with the perceptive
process.

The first point is relative to that 'solidification' or 'integration,' whereof Mr.
Sully speaks, of the present with the absent and merely represented
sensations. Cerebrally taken, these words mean no more than this, that the
process aroused in the sense-organ has shot into various paths which habit
has already organized in the hemispheres, and that instead of our having the
sort of consciousness which would be correlated with the simple sensorial
process, we have that which is correlated with this more complex process.

This, as it turns out, is the consciousness of that more complex 'object,' the
whole 'thing,' instead of being the consciousness of that more simple object,
the few qualities or attributes which actually impress our peripheral nerves.
This consciousness must have the unity which every 'section' of our stream
of thought retains so long as its objective content does not sensibly change.
More than this we cannot say; we certainly ought not to say what usually is
said by psychologists, and treat the perception as a sum of distinct psychic
entities, the present sensation namely, plus a lot of images from the past, all
'integrated' together in a way impossible to describe. The perception is one
state of mind or nothing—as I have already so often said.
In many cases it is easy to compare the psychic results of the sensational
with those of the perceptive process. We then see a marked difference in the
way in which the impressed portions of the object are felt, in consequence
of being cognized along with the reproduced portion, in the higher state of
mind. Their sensible quality changes under our very eye. Take the alreadyquoted catch, Pas de lieu Rhône que nous: one may read this over and over
again without recognizing the sounds to be identical with those of the words
paddle your own canoe. As we seize the English meaning the sound itself
appears to change. Verbal sounds are usually perceived with their meaning
at the moment of being heard. Sometimes, however, the associative
irradiations are inhibited for a few moments (the mind being preoccupied
with other thoughts) whilst the words linger on the ear as mere echoes of
acoustic sensation. Then, usually, their interpretation suddenly occurs. But
at that moment one may often surprise a change in the very feel of the word.
Our own language would sound very different to us if we heard it without
understanding, as we hear a foreign tongue. Rises and falls of voice, odd
sibilants and other consonants, would fall on our ear in a way of which we
can now form no notion. Frenchmen say that English sounds to them like
the gazouillement des oiseaux—an impression which it certainly makes on
no native ear. Many of us English would describe the sound of Russian in
similar terms. All of us are conscious of the strong inflections of voice and
explosives and gutturals of German speech in a way in which no German
can be conscious of them.
This is probably the reason why, if we look at an isolated printed word and
repeat it long enough, it ends by assuming an entirely unnatural aspect. Let
the reader try this with any word on this page. He will soon begin to wonder

if it can possibly be the word he has been using all his life with that
meaning. It stares at him from the paper like a glass eye, with no
speculation in it. Its body is indeed there, but its soul is fled. It is reduced,
by this new way of attending to it, to its sensational nudity. We never before
attended to it in this way, but habitually got it clad with its meaning the
moment we caught sight of it, and rapidly passed from it to the other words
of the phrase. We apprehended it, in short, with a cloud of associates, and
thus perceiving it, we felt it quite otherwise than as we feel it now divested
and alone.
Another well-known change is when we look at a landscape with our head
upside down. Perception is to a certain extent baffled by this manœuvre;
gradations of distance and other space-determinations are made uncertain;
the reproductive or associative processes, in short, decline; and,
simultaneously with their diminution, the colors grow richer and more
varied, and the contrasts of light and shade more marked. The same thing
occurs when we turn a painting bottom upward. We lose much of its
meaning, but, to compensate for the loss, we feel more freshly the value of
the mere tints and shadings, and become aware of any lack of purely
sensible harmony or balance which they may show.[88] Just so, if we lie on
the floor and look up at the mouth of a person talking behind us. His lower
lip here takes the habitual place of the upper one upon our retina, and seems
animated by the most extraordinary and unnatural mobility, a mobility
which now strikes us because (the associative processes being disturbed by
the unaccustomed point of view) we get it as a naked sensation and not as
part of a familiar object perceived.
On a later page other instances will meet us. For the present these are
enough to prove our point. Once more we find ourselves driven to admit
that when qualities of an object impress our sense and we thereupon
perceive the object, the sensation as such of those qualities does not still
exist inside of the perception and form a constituent thereof. The sensation
is one thing and the perception another, and neither can take place at the
same time with the other, because their cerebral conditions are not the same.
They may resemble each other, but in no respect are they identical states of
mind.
PERCEPTION IS OF DEFINITE AND PROBABLE THINGS.

The chief cerebral conditions of perception are the paths of association
irradiating from the sense-impression, which may have been already
formed. If a certain sensation be strongly associated with the attributes of a
certain thing, that thing is almost sure to be perceived when we get the
sensation. Examples of such things would be familiar people, places, etc.,
which we recognize and name at a glance. But where the sensation is
associated with more than one reality, so that either of two discrepant sets
of residual properties may arise, the perception is doubtful and vacillating,
and the most that can then be said of it is that it will be of a PROBABLE thing,
of the thing which would most usually have given us that sensation.
In these ambiguous cases it is interesting to note that perception is rarely
abortive; some perception takes place. The two discrepant sets of associates
do not neutralize each other or mix and make a blur. What we more
commonly get is first one object in its completeness, and then the other in
its completeness. In other words, all brain-processes are such as give rise to
what we may call FIGURED consciousness. If paths are irradiated at all, they
are irradiated in consistent systems, and occasion thoughts of definite
objects, not mere hodge-podges of elements. Even where the brain's
functions are half thrown out of gear, as in aphasia or dropping asleep, this
law of figured consciousness holds good. A person who suddenly gets
sleepy whilst reading aloud will read wrong; but instead of emitting a mere
broth of syllables, he will make such mistakes as to read 'supper-time'
instead of 'sovereign,' 'overthrow' instead of 'opposite,' or indeed utter
entirely imaginary phrases, composed of several definite words, instead of
phrases of the book. So in aphasia: where the disease is mild the patient's
mistakes consist in using entire wrong words instead of right ones. Only in
the gravest lesions does he become quite inarticulate. These facts show how
subtle is the associative link; how delicate yet how strong that connection
among brain-paths which makes any number of them, once excited
together, thereafter tend to vibrate as a systematic whole. A small group of
elements, 'this,' common to two systems, A and B, may touch off A or B
according as accident decides the next step (see Fig. 47). If it happen that a
single point leading from 'this' to B is momentarily a little more pervious
than any leading from 'this' to A, then that little advantage will upset the
equilibrium in favor of the entire system B. The currents will sweep first
through that point and thence into all the paths of B, each increment of
advance making A more and more impossible. The thoughts correlated with

A and B, in such a case, will have objects different, though similar. The
similarity will, however, consist in some very limited feature if the 'this' be
small.

FIG. 47.

Thus the faintest sensations will give rise to the perception of definite things
if only they resemble those which the things are wont to arouse. In fact, a
sensation must be strong and distinct in order not to suggest an object and,
if it is a nondescript feeling, really to seem one. The auræ of epilepsy,
globes of light, fiery vision, roarings in the ears, the sensations which
electric currents give rise to when passed through the head, these are
unfigured because they are strong. Weaker feelings of the same sort would
probably suggest objects. Many years ago, after reading Maury's book, Le
Sommeil et les Rêves, I began for the first time to observe those ideas which
faintly flit through the mind at all times, words, visions, etc., disconnected
with the main stream of thought, but discernible to an attention on the
watch for them. A horse's head, a coil of rope, an anchor, are, for example,
ideas which have come to me unsolicited whilst I have been writing these
latter lines. They can often be explained by subtle links of association, often
not at all. But I have not a few times been surprised, after noting some such
idea, to find, on shutting my eyes, an after-image left on the retina by some
bright or dark object recently looked at, and which had evidently suggested
the idea. 'Evidently,' I say, because the general shape, size, and position of
object thought-of and of after-image were the same, although the idea had
details which the retinal image lacked. We shall probably never know just
what part retinal after-images play in determining the train of our thoughts.
Judging by my own experiences I should suspect it of being not
insignificant.[89]
ILLUSIONS.

Let us now, for brevity's sake, treat A and B in Fig. 47 as if they stood for
objects instead of brain-processes. And let us furthermore suppose that A
and B are, both of them, objects which might probably excite the sensation
which I have called 'this,' but that on the present occasion A and not B is the
one which actually does so. If, then, on this occasion 'this' suggests A and
not B, the result is a correct perception. But if, on the contrary, 'this'
suggests B and not A, the result is a false perception, or, as it is technically
called, an illusion. But the process is the same, whether the perception be
true or false.
Note that in every illusion what is false is what is inferred, not what is
immediately given. The 'this,' if it were felt by itself alone, would be all
right, it only becomes misleading by what it suggests. If it is a sensation of
sight, it may suggest a tactile object, for example, which later tactile
experiences prove to be not there. The so-called 'fallacy of the senses,' of
which the ancient sceptics made so much account, is not fallacy of the
senses proper, but rather of the intellect, which interprets wrongly what the
senses give.[90]

So much premised, let us look a little closer at these illusions. They are due
to two main causes. The wrong object is perceived either because
1) Although not on this occasion the real cause, it is yet the habitual,
inveterate, or most probable cause of 'this;' or because
2) The mind is temporarily full of the thought of that object, and therefore
'this' is peculiarly prone to suggest it at this moment.
I will give briefly a number of examples under each head. The first head is
the more important, because it includes a number of constant illusions to
which all men are subject, and which can only be dispelled by much
experience.
Illusions of the First Type.

FIG. 48.

One of the oldest instances dates from Aristotle. Cross two fingers and roll
a pea, pen-holder, or other small object between them. It will seem double.
Professor Croom Robertson has given the clearest analysis of this illusion.
He observes that if the object be brought into contact first with the
forefinger and next with the second finger, the two contacts seem to come
in at different points of space. The forefinger-touch seems higher, though
the finger is really lower; the second-finger-touch seems lower, though the
finger is really higher. "We perceive the contacts as double because we refer
them to two distinct parts of space." The touched sides of the two fingers
are normally not together in space, and customarily never do touch one
thing; the one thing which now touches them, therefore, seems in two
places, i.e. seems two things.[91]
There is a whole batch of illusions which come from optical sensations
interpreted by us in accordance with our usual rule, although they are now
produced by an unusual object. The stereoscope is an example. The eyes
see a picture apiece, and the two pictures are a little disparate, the one seen
by the right eye being a view of the object taken from a point slightly to the
right of that from which the left eye's picture is taken. Pictures thrown on
the two eyes by solid objects present this identical disparity. Whence we
react on the sensation in our usual way, and perceive a solid. If the pictures
be exchanged we perceive a hollow mould of the object, for a hollow mould
would cast just such disparate pictures as these. Wheatstone's instrument,
the pseudoscope, allows us to look at solid objects and see with each eye
the other eye's picture. We then perceive the solid object hollow, if it be an
object which might probably be hollow, but not otherwise. A human face,
e.g., never appears hollow to the pseudoscope. In this irregularity of
reaction on different objects, some seem hollow, others not; the perceptive
process is true to its law, which is always to react on the sensation in a

determinate and figured fashion if possible, and in as probable a fashion as
the case admits. To couple faces and hollowness violates all our habits of
association. For the same reason it is very easy to make an intaglio cast of a
face, or the painted inside of a pasteboard mask, look convex, instead of
concave as they are.
Our sense of the position of things with respect to our eye consists in
suggestions of how we must move our hand to touch them. Certain places
of the image on the retina, certain actively-produced positions of the
eyeballs, are normally linked with the sense of every determinate position
which an outer thing may come to occupy. Hence we perceive the usual
position, even if the optical sensation be artificially brought from a different
part of space. Prisms warp the light-rays in this way, and throw upon the
retina the image of an object situated, say, at spot a of space in the same
manner in which (without the prisms) an object situated at spot b would cast
its image. Accordingly we feel for the object at b instead of a. If the prism
be before one eye only we see the object at b with that eye, and in its right
position a with the other—in other words, we see it double. If both eyes be
armed with prisms with their angle towards the right, we pass our hand to
the right of all objects when we try rapidly to touch them. And this illusory
sense of their position lasts until a new association is fixed, when on
removing the prisms a contrary illusion at first occurs. Passive or
unintentional changes in the position of the eyeballs seem to be no more
kept account of by the mind than prisms are; so we spontaneously make no
allowance for them in our perception of distance and movements. Press one
of the eyeballs into a strained position with the finger, and objects move and
are translocated accordingly, just as when prisms are used.
Curious illusions of movement in objects occur whenever the eyeballs move
without our intending it. We shall learn in the following chapter that the
original visual feeling of movement is produced by any image passing over
the retina. Originally, however, this sensation is definitely referred neither
to the object nor to the eyes. Such definite reference grows up later, and
obeys certain simple laws. We believe objects to move: 1) whenever we get
the retinal movement-feeling, but think our eyes are still; and 2) whenever
we think that our eyes move, but fail to get the retinal movement-feeling.
We believe objects to be still, on the contrary, 1) whenever we get the
retinal movement-feeling, but think our eyes are moving; and 2) whenever

we neither think our eyes are moving, nor get the retinal movement-feeling.
Thus the perception of the object's state of motion or rest depends on the
notion we frame of our own eye's movement. Now many sorts of
stimulation make our eyes move without our knowing it. If we look at a
waterfall, river, railroad train, or any body which continuously passes in
front of us in the same direction, it carries our eyes with it. This movement
can be noticed in our eyes by a bystander. If the object keep passing
towards our left, our eyes keep following whatever moving bit of it may
have caught their attention at first, until that bit disappears from view. Then
they jerk back to the right again, and catch a new bit, which again they
follow to the left, and so on indefinitely. This gives them an oscillating
demeanor, slow involuntary rotations leftward alternating with rapid
voluntary jerks rightward. But the oscillations continue for a while after the
object has come to a standstill, or the eyes are carried to a new object, and
this produces the illusion that things now move in the opposite direction.
For we are unaware of the slow leftward automatic movements of our
eyeballs, and think that the retinal movement-sensations thereby aroused
must be due to a rightward motion of the object seen; whilst the rapid
voluntary rightward movements of our eyeballs we interpret as attempts to
pursue and catch again those parts of the object which have been slipping
away to the left.
Exactly similar oscillations of the eyeballs are produced in giddiness, with
exactly similar results. Giddiness is easiest produced by whirling on our
heels. It is a feeling of the movement of our own head and body through
space, and is now pretty well understood to be due to the irritation of the
semi-circular canals of the inner ear.[92] When, after whirling, we stop, we
seem to be spinning in the reverse direction for a few seconds, and then
objects appear to continue whirling in the same direction in which, a
moment previous, our body actually whirled. The reason is that our eyes
normally tend to maintain their field of view. If we suddenly turn our head
leftwards it is hard to make the eyes follow. They roll in their orbits
rightwards, by a sort of compensating inertia. Even though we falsely think
our head to be moving leftwards, this consequence occurs, and our eyes
move rightwards—as may be observed in any one with vertigo after
whirling. As these movements are unconscious, the retinal movementfeelings which they occasion are naturally referred to the objects seen. And
the intermittent voluntary twitches of the eyes towards the left, by which we

ever and anon recover them from the extreme rightward positions to which
the reflex movement brings them, simply confirm and intensify our
impression of a leftward-whirling field of view: we seem to ourselves to be
periodically pursuing and overtaking the objects in their leftward flight. The
whole phenomenon fades out after a few seconds. And it often ceases if we
voluntarily fix our eyes upon a given point.[93]
Optical vertigo, as these illusions of objective movement are called, results
sometimes from brain-trouble, intoxications, paralysis, etc. A man will
awaken with a weakness of one of his eye-muscles. An intended orbital
rotation will then not produce its expected result in the way of retinal
movement-feeling—whence false perceptions, of which one of the most
interesting cases will fall to be discussed in later chapters.

There is an illusion of movement of the opposite sort, with which every one
is familiar at railway stations. Habitually, when we ourselves move
forward, our entire field of view glides backward over our retina. When our
movement is due to that of the windowed carriage, car, or boat in which we
sit, all stationary objects visible through the window give us a sensation of
gliding in the opposite direction. Hence, whenever we get this sensation, of
a window with all objects visible through it moving in one direction, we
react upon it in our customary way, and perceive a stationary field of view,
over which the window, and we ourselves inside of it, are passing by a
motion of our own. Consequently when another train comes alongside of
ours in a station, and fills the entire window, and, after standing still awhile,
begins to glide away, we judge that it is our train which is moving, and that
the other train is still. If, however, we catch a glimpse of any part of the
station through the windows, or between the cars, of the other train, the
illusion of our own movement instantly disappears, and we perceive the
other train to be the one in motion. This, again, is but making the usual and
probable inference from our sensation.[94]
Another illusion due to movement is explained by Helmholtz. Most wayside
objects, houses, trees, etc., look small when seen out of the windows of a
swift train. This is because we perceive them in the first instance unduly

near. And we perceive them unduly near because of their extraordinarily
rapid parallactic flight backwards. When we ourselves move forward all
objects glide backwards, as aforesaid; but the nearer they are, the more
rapid is this apparent translocation. Relative rapidity of passage backwards
is thus so familiarly associated with nearness that when we feel it we
perceive nearness. But with a given size of retinal image the nearer an
object is, the smaller do we judge its actual size to be. Hence in the train,
the faster we go, the nearer do the trees and houses seem, and the nearer
they seem, the smaller do they look.[95]

Other illusions are due to the feeling of convergence being wrongly
interpreted. When we converge our eyeballs we perceive an approximation
of whatever thing we may be looking at. Whatever things do approach
whilst we look at them oblige us, so long as they are not very distant, to
converge our eyes. Hence approach of the thing is the probable objective
fact when we feel our eyes converging. Now in most persons the internal
recti muscles, to which convergence is due, are weaker than the others; and
the entirely passive position of the eyeballs, the position which they assume
when covered and looking at nothing in particular, is either that of
parallelism or of slight divergence. Make a person look with both eyes at
some near object, and then screen the object from one of his eyes by a card
or book. The chances are that you will see the eye thus screened turn just a
little outwards. Remove the screen, and you will now see it turn in as it
catches sight of the object again. The other eye meanwhile keeps as it was
at first. To most persons, accordingly, all objects seem to come nearer
when, after looking at them with one eye, both eyes are used; and they seem
to recede during the opposite change. With persons whose external recti
muscles are insufficient, the illusions may be of the contrary kind.

The size of the retinal image is a fruitful source of illusions. Normally, the
retinal image grows larger as the object draws near. But the sensation
yielded by this enlargement is also given by any object which really grows

in size without changing its distance. Enlargement of retinal image is
therefore an ambiguous sign. An opera-glass enlarges the moon. But most
persons will tell you that she looks smaller through it, only a great deal
nearer and brighter. They read the enlargement as a sign of approach; and
the perception of approach makes them actually reverse the sensation which
suggests it—by an exaggeration of our habitual custom of making
allowance of the apparent enlargement of whatever object approaches us,
and reducing it in imagination to its natural size. Similarly, in the theatre the
glass brings the stage near, but hardly seems to magnify the people on it.
The well-known increased apparent size of the moon on the horizon is a
result of association and probability. It is seen through vaporous air, and
looks dimmer and duskier than when it rides on high; and it is seen over
fields, trees, hedges, streams, and the like, which break up the intervening
space and make us the better realize the latter's extent. Both these causes
make the moon seem more distant from us when it is low; and as its visual
angle grows no less, we deem that it must be a larger body, and we so
perceive it. It looks particularly enormous when it comes up directly behind
some well-known large object, as a house or tree, distant enough to subtend
an angle no larger than that of the moon itself.[96]

The feeling of accommodation also gives rise to false perceptions of size.
Usually we accommodate our eyes for an object as it approaches us.
Usually under these circumstances the object throws a larger retinal image.
But believing the object to remain the same, we make allowance for this
and treat the entire eye-feeling which we receive as significant of nothing
but approach. When we relax our accommodation and at the same time the
retinal image grows smaller, the probable cause is always a receding object.
The moment we put on convex glasses, however, the accommodation
relaxes, but the retinal image grows larger instead of less. This is what
would happen if our object, whilst receding, grew. Such a probable object
we accordingly perceive, though with a certain vacillation as to the
recession, for the growth in apparent size is also a probable sign of
approach, and is at moments interpreted accordingly.—Atropin paralyzes
the muscles of accommodation. It is possible to get a dose which will

weaken these muscles without laming them altogether. When a known near
object is then looked at we have to make the same voluntary strain to
accommodate, as if it were a great deal nearer; but as its retinal image is not
enlarged in proportion to this suggested approach, we deem that it must
have grown smaller than usual. In consequence of this so-called micropsy,
Aubert relates that he saw a man apparently no larger than a photograph.
But the small size again made the man seem farther off. The real distance
was two or three feet, and he seemed against the wall of the room.[97] Of
these vacillations we shall have to speak again in the ensuing chapter.[98]

FIG. 49.

Mrs. C. L. Franklin has recently described and explained with rare
acuteness an illusion of which the most curious thing is that it was never
noticed before. Take a single pair of crossed lines (Fig. 49), hold them in a
horizontal plane before the eyes, and look along them, at such a distance
that with the right eye shut, 1, and with the left eye shut, 2, looks like the
projection of a vertical line. Look steadily now at the point of intersection
of the lines with both eyes open, and you will see a third line sticking up
like a pin through the paper at right angles to the plane of the two first lines.
The explanation of this illusion is very simple, but so circumstantial that I
must refer for it to Mrs. Franklin's own account.[99] Suffice it that images of
the two lines fall on 'corresponding' rows of retinal points, and that the
illusory vertical line is the only object capable of throwing such images. A
variation of the experiment is this:

"In Fig. 50 the lines are all drawn so as to pass through a common
point. With a little trouble one eye can be put into the position of this
point—it is only necessary that the paper be held so that, with one eye
shut, the other eye sees all the lines leaning neither to the right nor to
the left. After a moment one can fancy the lines to be vertical staffs
standing out of the plane of the paper.'... This illusion [says Mrs.
Franklin] I take to be of purely mental origin. When a line lies
anywhere in a plane passing through the apparent vertical meridian of
one eye, and is looked at with that eye only... we have no very good
means of knowing how it is directed in that plane.... Now of the lines
in nature which lie anywhere within such a plane, by far the greater
number are vertical lines. Hence we are peculiarly inclined to think
that a line which we perceive to be in such a plane is a vertical line.
But to see a whole lot of lines at once, all ready to throw their images
upon the vertical meridian, is a thing that has hardly ever happened to
us, except when they all have been vertical lines. Hence when that
happens we have a still stronger tendency to think that what we see
before us is a group of vertical lines."

FIG. 50.

In other words, we see, as always, the most probable object.

The foregoing may serve as examples of the first type of illusions
mentioned on page 86. I could cite of course many others, but it would be
tedious to enumerate all the thaumatropes and zoetropes, dioramas, and
juggler's tricks in which they are embodied. In the chapter on Sensation we
saw that many illusions commonly ranged under this type are,
physiologically considered, of another sort altogether, and that associative
processes, strictly so called, have nothing to do with their production.
Illusions of the Second Type.
We may now turn to illusions of the second of the two types discriminated
on page 86. In this type we perceive a wrong object because our mind is full
of the thought of it at the time, and any sensation which is in the least
degree connected with it touches off, as it were, a train already laid, and
gives us a sense that the object is really before us. Here is a familiar
example:
"If a sportsman, while shooting woodcock in cover, sees a bird about
the size and color of a woodcock get up and fly through the foliage,
not having time to see more than that it is a bird of such a size and
color, he immediately supplies by inference the other qualities of a
woodcock, and is afterwards disgusted to find that he has shot a thrush.
I have done so myself, and could hardly believe that the thrush was the
bird I had fired at, so complete was my mental supplement to my
visual perception."[100]
As with game, so with enemies, ghosts, and the like. Anyone waiting in a
dark place and expecting or fearing strongly a certain object will interpret
any abrupt sensation to mean that object's presence. The boy playing 'I spy,'
the criminal skulking from his pursuers, the superstitious person hurrying
through the woods or past the churchyard at midnight, the man lost in the
woods, the girl who tremulously has made an evening appointment with her
swain, all are subject to illusions of sight and sound which make their hearts
beat till they are dispelled. Twenty times a day the lover, perambulating the

streets with his preoccupied fancy, will think he perceives his idol's bonnet
before him.
The Proof-reader's Illusion. I remember one night in Boston, whilst waiting
for a 'Mount Auburn' car to bring me to Cambridge, reading most distinctly
that name upon the signboard of a car on which (as I afterwards learned)
'North Avenue' was painted. The illusion was so vivid that I could hardly
believe my eyes had deceived me. All reading is more or less performed in
this way.
"Practised novel- or newspaper-readers could not possibly get on so
fast if they had to see accurately every single letter of every word in
order to perceive the words. More than half of the words come out of
their mind, and hardly half from the printed page. Were this not so, did
we perceive each letter by itself, typographic errors in well-known
words would never be overlooked. Children, whose ideas are not yet
ready enough to perceive words at a glance, read them wrong if they
are printed wrong, that is, right according to the way of printing. In a
foreign language, although it may be printed with the same letters, we
read by so much the more slowly as we do not understand, or are
unable promptly to perceive the words. But we notice misprints all the
more readily. For this reason Latin and Greek and, still better, Hebrew
works are more correctly printed, because the proofs are better
corrected, than in German works. Of two friends of mine, one knew
much Hebrew, the other little; the latter, however, gave instruction in
Hebrew in a gymnasium; and when he called the other to help correct
his pupils' exercises, it turned out that he could find out all sorts of
little errors better than his friend, because the latter's perception of the
words as totals was too swift."[101]
Testimony to personal identity is proverbially fallacious for similar reasons.
A man has witnessed a rapid crime or accident, and carries away his mental
image. Later he is confronted by a prisoner whom he forthwith perceives in
the light of that image, and recognizes or 'identifies' as a participant,
although he may never have been near the spot. Similarly at the so-called
'materializing séances' which fraudulent mediums give: in a dark room a
man sees a gauze-robed figure who in a whisper tells him she is the spirit of
his sister, mother, wife, or child, and falls upon his neck. The darkness, the

previous forms, and the expectancy have so filled his mind with
premonitory images that it is no wonder he perceives what is suggested.
These fraudulent 'séances' would furnish most precious documents to the
psychology of perception, if they could only be satisfactorily inquired into.
In the hypnotic trance any suggested object is sensibly perceived. In certain
subjects this happens more or less completely after waking from the trance.
It would seem that under favorable conditions a somewhat similar
susceptibility to suggestion may exist in certain persons who are not
otherwise entranced at all.
This suggestibility is greater in the lower senses than in the higher. A
German observer writes:
"We know that a weak smell or taste may be very diversely interpreted
by us, and that the same sensation will now be named as one thing and
the next moment as another. Suppose an agreeable smell of flowers in
a room: A visitor will notice it, seek to recognize what it is, and at last
perceive more and more distinctly that it is the perfume of roses—until
after all he discovers a bouquet of violets. Then suddenly he
recognizes the violet-smell, and wonders how he could possibly have
hit upon the roses.—Just so it is with taste. Try some meat whose
visible characteristics are disguised by the mode of cooking, and you
will perhaps begin by taking it for venison, and end by being quite
certain that it is venison, until you are told that it is mutton; whereupon
you get distinctly the mutton flavor.—In this wise one may make a
person taste or smell what one will, if one only makes sure that he
shall conceive it beforehand as we wish, by saying to him: 'Doesn't
that taste just like, etc.?' or 'Doesn't it smell just like, etc.?' One can
cheat whole companies in this way; announce, for instance, at a meal,
that the meat tastes 'high,' and almost every one who is not animated
by a spirit of opposition will discover a flavor of putrescence which in
reality is not there at all.
"In the sense of feeling this phenomenon is less prominent, because we
get so close to the object that our sensation of it is never incomplete.
Still, examples may be adduced from this sense. On superficially
feeling of a cloth, one may confidently declare it for velvet, whilst it is
perhaps a long-haired cloth; or a person may perhaps not be able to

decide whether he has put on woolen or cotton stockings, and, trying
to ascertain this by the feeling on the skin of the feet, he may become
aware that he gets the feeling of cotton or wool according as he thinks
of the one or the other. When the feeling in our fingers is somewhat
blunted by cold, we notice many such phenomena, being then more
exposed to confound objects of touch with one another."[102]
High authorities have doubted this power of imagination to falsify present
impressions of sense.[103] Yet it unquestionably exists. Within the past
fortnight I have been annoyed by a smell, faint but unpleasant, in my
library. My annoyance began by an escape of gas from the furnace below
stairs. This seemed to get lodged in my imagination as a sort of standard of
perception; for, several days after the furnace had been rectified, I perceived
the 'same smell' again. It was traced this time to a new pair of India rubber
shoes which had been brought in from the shop and laid on a table. It
persisted in coming to me for several days, however, in spite of the fact that
no other member of the family or visitor noticed anything unpleasant. My
impression during part of this time was one of uncertainty whether the
smell was imaginary or real; and at last it faded out. Everyone must be able
to give instances like this from the smell-sense. When we have paid the
faithless plumber for pretending to mend our drains, the intellect inhibits
the nose from perceiving the same unaltered odor, until perhaps several
days go by. As regards the ventilation or heating of rooms, we are apt to
feel for some time as we think we ought to feel. If we believe the ventilator
is shut, we feel the room close. On discovering it open, the oppression
disappears.
An extreme instance is given in the following extract:
"A patient called at my office one day in a state of great excitement
from the effects of an offensive odor in the horse-car she had come in,
and which she declared had probably emanated from some very sick
person who must have been just carried in it. There could be no doubt
that something had affected her seriously, for she was very pale, with
nausea, difficulty in breathing, and other evidences of bodily and
mental distress. I succeeded, after some difficulty and time, in quieting
her, and she left, protesting that the smell was unlike anything she had
ever before experienced and was something dreadful. Leaving my

office soon after, it so happened that I found her at the street-corner,
waiting for a car: we thus entered the car together. She immediately
called my attention to the same sickening odor which she had
experienced in the other car, and began to be affected the same as
before, when I pointed out to her that the smell was simply that which
always emanates from the straw which has been in stables. She quickly
recognized it as the same, when the unpleasant effects which arose
while she was possessed with another perception of its character at
once passed away."[104]
It is the same with touch. Everyone must have felt the sensible quality
change under his hand, as sudden contact with something moist or hairy, in
the dark, awoke a shock of disgust or fear which faded into calm
recognition of some familiar object? Even so small a thing as a crumb of
potato on the table-cloth, which we pick up, thinking it a crumb of bread,
feels horrible for a few moments to our fancy, and different from what it is.
Weight or muscular feeling is a sensation; yet who has not heard the
anecdote of some one to whom Sir Humphry Davy showed the metal
sodium which he had just discovered? "Bless me, how heavy it is!" said the
man; showing that his idea of what metals as a class ought to be had
falsified the sensation he derived from a very light substance.
In the sense of hearing, similar mistakes abound. I have already mentioned
the hallucinatory effect of mental images of very faint sounds, such as
distant clock-strokes (above, p. 71). But even when stronger sensations of
sound have been present, everyone must recall some experience in which
they have altered their acoustic character as soon as the intellect referred
them to a different source. The other day a friend was sitting in my room,
when the clock, which has a rich low chime, began to strike. "Hollo!" said
he, "hear that hand-organ in the garden," and was surprised at finding the
real source of the sound. I had myself some years ago a very striking
illusion of the sort. Sitting reading late one night, I suddenly heard a most
formidable noise proceeding from the upper part of the house, which it
seemed to fill. It ceased, and in a moment renewed itself. I went into the
hall to listen, but it came no more. Resuming my seat in the room, however,
there it was again, low, mighty, alarming, like a rising flood or the avantcourier of an awful gale. It came from all space. Quite startled, I again went

into the hall, but it had already ceased once more. On returning a second
time to the room, I discovered that it was nothing but the breathing of a
little Scotch terrier which lay asleep on the floor. The noteworthy thing is
that as soon as I recognized what it was, I was compelled to think it a
different sound, and could not then hear it as I had heard it a moment
before.
In the anecdotes given by Delbœuf and Reid, this was probably also the
case, though it is not so stated. Reid says:
"I remember that once lying abed, and having been put into a fright, I
heard my own heart beat; but I took it to be one knocking at the door,
and arose and opened the door oftener than once, before I discovered
that the sound was in my own breast." (Inquiry, chap. iv. § 1.)
Delbœuf's story is as follows:
"The illustrious P. J. van Beneden, senior, was walking one evening
with a friend along a woody hill near Chaudfontaine. 'Don't you hear,'
said the friend, 'the noise of a hunt on the mountain?' M. van Beneden
listens and distinguishes in fact the giving-tongue of the dogs. They
listen some time, expecting from one moment to another to see a deer
bound by; but the voice of the dogs seems neither to recede nor
approach. At last a countryman comes by, and they ask him who it is
that can be hunting at this late hour. But he, pointing to some puddles
of water near their feet, replies: 'Yonder little animals are what you
hear.' And there there were in fact a number of toads of the species
Bombinator igneus.... This batrachian emits at the pairing season a
silvery or rather crystalline note.... Sad and pure, it is a voice in nowise
resembling that of hounds giving chase."[105]
The sense of sight, as we have seen in studying Space, is pregnant with
illusions of both the types considered. No sense gives such fluctuating
impressions of the same object as sight does. With no sense are we so apt to
treat the sensations immediately given as mere signs; with none is the
invocation from memory of a thing, and the consequent perception of the
latter, so immediate. The 'thing' which we perceive always resembles, as we
have seen, the object of some absent sensation, usually another optical

figure which in our mind has come to be the standard of reality; and it is
this incessant reduction of our optical objects to more 'real' forms which has
led some authors into the mistake of thinking that the sensations which first
apprehend them are originally and natively of no form at all.[106]
Of accidental and occasional illusions of sight many amusing examples
might be given. Two will suffice. One is a reminiscence of my own. I was
lying in my berth in a steamer listening to the sailors holystone the deck
outside; when, on turning my eyes to the window, I perceived with perfect
distinctness that the chief-engineer of the vessel had entered my state-room,
and was standing looking through the window at the men at work upon the
guards. Surprised at his intrusion, and also at his intentness and immobility,
I remained watching him and wondering how long he would stand thus. At
last I spoke; but getting no reply, sat up in my berth, and then saw that what
I had taken for the engineer was my own cap and coat hanging on a peg
beside the window. The illusion was complete; the engineer was a peculiarlooking man; and I saw him unmistakably; but after the illusion had
vanished I found it hard voluntarily to make the cap and coat look like him
at all.
The following story, which I owe to my friend Prof. Hyatt, is of a probably
not uncommon class:
"During the winter of 1858, while in Venice, I had the somewhat
peculiar illusion which you request me to relate. I remember the
circumstances very accurately because I have often repeated the story,
and have made an effort to keep all the attendant circumstances clear
of exaggeration. I was travelling with my mother, and we had taken
rooms at a hotel which had been located in an old palace. The room in
which I went to bed was large and lofty. The moon was shining
brightly, and I remember standing before a draped window, thinking of
the romantic nature of the surroundings, remnants of old stories of
knights and ladies, and the possibility that even in that room itself
love-scenes and sanguinary tragedies might have taken place. The
night was so lovely that many of the people were strolling through the
narrow lanes or so-called streets, singing as they went, and I laid
awake for some time listening to these patrols of serenaders, and of
course finally fell asleep. I became aware that some one was leaning

over me closely, and that my own breathing was being interfered with;
a decided feeling of an unwelcome presence of some sort awakened
me. As I opened my eyes I saw, as distinctly as I ever saw any living
person, a draped head about a foot or eighteen inches to the right, and
just above my bed. The horror which took possession of my young
fancy was beyond anything I have ever experienced. The head was
covered by a long black veil which floated out into the moonlight, the
face itself was pale and beautiful, and the lower part swathed in the
white band commonly worn by the nuns of Catholic orders. My hair
seemed to rise up, and a profuse perspiration attested the genuineness
of the terror which I felt. For a time I lay in this way, and then
gradually gaining more command over my superstitious terrors,
concluded to try to grapple with the apparition. It remained perfectly
distinct until I reached at it sharply with my hand, and then
disappeared, to return again, however, as soon as I sank back into the
pillow. The second or third grasp which I made at the head was not
followed by a reappearance, and I then saw that the ghost was not a
real presence, but depended upon the position of my head. If I moved
my eyes either to the left or right of the original position occupied by
my head when I awakened, the ghost disappeared, and by returning to
about the same position, I could make it reappear with nearly the same
intensity as at first. I presently satisfied myself by these experiments
that the illusion arose from the effect of the imagination, aided by the
actual figure made by a visual section of the moonbeams shining
through the lace curtains of the window. If I had given way to the first
terror of the situation and covered up my head, I should probably have
believed in the reality of the apparition, since I have not by the
slightest word, so far as I know, exaggerated the vividness of my
feelings."
THE PHYSIOLOGICAL PROCESS IN PERCEPTION.
Enough, has now been said to prove the general law of perception, which is
this, that whilst part of what we perceive comes through our senses from the
object before us, another part (and it may be the larger part) always comes
(in Lazarus's phrase) out of our own head.

At bottom this is only one case (and that the simplest case) of the general
fact that our nerve-centres are an organ for reacting on sense-impressions,
and that our hemispheres, in particular, are given us in order that records of
our private past experience may co-operate in the reaction. Of course such a
general way of stating the fact is vague; and all those who follow the
current theory of ideas will be prompt to throw this vagueness at it as a
reproach. Their way of describing the process goes much more into detail.
The sensation, they say, awakens 'images' of other sensations associated
with it in the past. These images 'fuse,' or are 'combined' by the Ego with
the present sensation into a new product, the percept, etc., etc. Something so
indistinguishable from this in practical outcome is what really occurs, that
one may seem fastidious in objecting to such a statement, specially if have
no rival theory of the elementary processes to propose. And yet, if this
notion of images rising and flocking and fusing be mythological (and we
have all along so considered it), why should we entertain it unless
confessedly as a mere figure of speech? As such, of course, it is convenient
and welcome to pass. But if we try to put an exact meaning into it, all we
find is that the brain reacts by paths which previous experiences have worn,
and makes us usually perceive the probable thing, i.e., the thing by which
on previous occasions the reaction was most frequently aroused.
But we can, I think, without danger of being too speculative, be a little more
exact than this, and conceive of a physiological reason why the felt quality
of an object changes when, instead of being apprehended in a mere
sensation, the object is perceived as a thing. All consciousness seems to
depend on a certain slowness of the process in the cortical cells. The rapider
currents are, the less feeling they seem to awaken. If a region A, then, be so
connected with another region B that every current which enters A
immediately drains off into B, we shall not be very strongly conscious of
the sort of object that A can make us feel. If B, on the contrary, has no such
copious channel of discharge, the excitement will linger there longer ere it
diffuses itself elsewhere, and our consciousness of the sort of object that B
makes us feel will be strong. Carrying this to an ideal maximum, we may
say that if A offer no resistance to the transmission forward of the current,
and if the current terminate in B, then, no matter what causes may initiate
the current, we shall get no consciousness of the object peculiar to A, but on
the contrary a vivid sensation of the object peculiar to B. And this will be
true though at other times the connection between A and B might lie less

open, and every current then entering A might give us a strong
consciousness of A's peculiar object. In other words, just in proportion as
associations are habitual, will the qualities of the suggested thing tend to
substitute themselves in consciousness for those of the thing immediately
there; or, more briefly, just in proportion as an experience is probable will it
tend to be directly felt. In all such experiences the paths lie wide open from
the cells first affected to those concerned with the suggested ideas. A
circular after-image on the receding wall or ceiling is actually seen as an
ellipse, a square after-image of a cross there is seen as slant-legged, etc.,
because only in the process correlated with the vision of the latter figures do
the inward currents find a pause (see the next chapter).
We must remember this when, in dealing with the eye, we come to point out
the erroneousness of the principle laid down by Reid and Helmholtz that
true sensations can never be changed by the suggestions of experience.

A certain illusion of which I have not yet spoken affords an additional
illustration of this. When we will to execute a movement and the movement
for some reason does not occur, unless the sensation of the part's NOT
moving is a strong one, we are apt to feel as if the movement had actually
taken place. This seems habitually to be the case in anæsthesia of the
moving parts. Close the patient's eyes, hold his anæsthetic arm still, and tell
him to raise his hand to his head; and when he opens his eyes he will be
astonished to find that the movement has not taken place. All reports of
anæsthetic cases seem to mention this illusion. Sternberg who wrote on the
subject in 1885,[107] lays it down as a law that the intention to move is the
same thing as the feeling of the motion. We shall later see that this is false
(Chapter XXV); but it certainly may suggest the feeling of the motion with
hallucinatory intensity. Sternberg gives the following experiment, which I
find succeeds with at least half of those who try it: Rest your palm on the
edge of the table with your forefinger hanging over in a position of extreme
flexion, and then exert your will to flex it still more. The position of the
other fingers makes this impossible, and yet if we do not look to see the
finger, we think we feel it move. He quotes from Exner a similar
experiment with the jaws: Put some hard rubber or other unindentable

obstacle between your back teeth and bite hard: you think you feel the jaw
move and the front teeth approach each other, though in the nature of things
no movement can occur.[108]—The visual suggestion of the path traversed
by the finger-tip as the locus of the movement-feeling in the joint, which we
discussed on page 41, is another example of this semi-hallucinatory power
of the suggested thing. Amputated people, as we have learned, still feel
their lost feet, etc. This is a necessary consequence of the law of specific
energies, for if the central region correlated with the foot give rise to any
feeling at all it must give rise to the feeling of a foot.[109] But the curious
thing is that many of these patients can will the foot to move, and when they
have done so, distinctly feel the movement to occur. They can, to use their
own language, 'work' or 'wiggle' their lost toes.[110]
Now in all these various cases we are dealing with data which in normal life
are inseparably joined. Of all possible experiences, it is hard to imagine any
pair more uniformly and incessantly coupled than the volition to move, on
the one hand, and the feeling of the changed position of the parts, on the
other. From the earliest ancestors of ours which had feet, down to the
present day, the movement of the feet must always have accompanied the
will to move them; and here, if anywhere, habit's consequences ought to be
found. The process of the willing ought, then, to pour into the process of
feeling the command effected, and ought to awaken that feeling in a
maximal degree provided no other positively contradictory sensation come
in at the same time. In most of us, when the will fails of its effect there is a
contradictory sensation. We discern a resistance or the unchanged position
of the limb. But neither in anæsthesia nor in amputation can there be any
contradictory sensation in the foot to correct us; so imagination has all the
force of fact.
'APPERCEPTION.'
In Germany since Herbart's time Psychology has always had a great deal to
say about a process called Apperception.[111] The incoming ideas or
sensations are said to be 'apperceived' by 'masses' of ideas already in the
mind. It is plain that the process we have been describing as perception is,
at this rate, an apperceptive process. So are all recognition, classing, and
naming; and passing beyond these simplest suggestions, all farther thoughts

about our percepts are apperceptive processes as well. I have myself not
used the word apperception because it has carried very different meanings
in the history of philosophy,[112] and 'psychic reaction,' 'interpretation,'
'conception,' 'assimilation,' 'elaboration,' or simply 'thought,' are perfect
synonyms for its Herbartian meaning, widely taken. It is, moreover, hardly
worth while to pretend to analyze the so-called apperceptive performances
beyond the first or perceptive stage, because their variations and degrees are
literally innumerable. 'Apperception' is a name for the sum-total of the
effects of what we have studied as association; and it is obvious that the
things which a given experience will suggest to a man depend on what Mr.
Lewes calls his entire psychostatical conditions, his nature and stock of
ideas, or, in other words, his character, habits, memory, education, previous
experience, and momentary mood. We gain no insight into what really
occurs either in the mind or in the brain by calling all these things the
'apperceiving mass,' though of course this may upon occasion be
convenient. On the whole I am inclined to think Mr. Lewes's term of
'assimilation' the most fruitful one yet used.[113]
Professor H. Steinthal has analyzed apperceptive processes with a sort of
detail which is simply burdensome.[114] His introduction of the matter may,
however, be quoted. He begins with an anecdote from a comic paper.
"In the compartment of a railway-carriage six persons unknown to
each other sit in lively conversation. It becomes a matter of regret that
one of the company must alight at the next station. One of the others
says that he of all things prefers such a meeting with entirely unknown
persons, and that on such occasions he is accustomed neither to ask
who or what his companions may be nor to tell who or what he is.
Another thereupon says that he will undertake to decide this question,
if they each and all will answer him an entirely disconnected question.
They began. He drew five leaves from his note-book, wrote a question
on each, and gave one to each of his companions with the request that
he write the answer below. When the leaves were returned to him, he
turned, after reading them, without hesitation to the others, and said to
the first, 'You are a man of science'; to the second, 'You are a soldier';
to the third, 'You are a philologer'; to the fourth, 'You are a journalist';
to the fifth, 'You are a farmer.' All admitted that he was right,

whereupon he got out and left the five behind. Each wished to know
what question the others had received; and behold, he had given the
same question to each. It ran thus:
"'What being destroys what it has itself brought forth?'
"To this the naturalist had answered, 'vital force'; the soldier, 'war'; the
philologist, 'Kronos'; the publicist, 'revolution'; the farmer, 'a boar'.
This anecdote, methinks, if not true, is at least splendidly well
invented. Its narrator makes the journalist go on to say: 'Therein
consists the joke. Each one answers the first thing that occurs to him,
[115] and that is whatever is most newly related to his pursuit in life.
Every question is a hole-drilling experiment, and the answer is an
opening through which one sees into our interiors.'... So do we all. We
are all able to recognize the clergyman, the soldier, the scholar, the
business man, not only by the cut of their garments and the attitude of
their body, but by what they say and how they express it. We guess the
place in life of men by the interest which they show and the way in
which they show it, by the objects of which they speak, by the point of
view from which they regard things, judge them, conceive them, in
short by their mode of apperceiving....
"Every man has one group of ideas which relate to his own person and
interests, and another which is connected with society. Each has his
group of ideas about plants, religion, law, art, etc., and more especially
about the rose, epic poetry, sermons, free trade, and the like. Thus the
mental content of every individual, even of the uneducated and of
children, consists of masses or circles of knowledge of which each lies
within some larger circle, alongside of others similarly included, and
of which each includes smaller circles within itself.... The perception
of a thing like a horse... is a process between the present horse's picture
before our eyes, on the one hand, and those fused or interwoven
pictures and ideas of all the horses we have ever seen, on the other;... a
process between two factors or momenta, of which one existed before
the process and was an old possession of the mind (the group of ideas,
or concept, namely), whilst the other is but just presented to the mind,
and is the immediately supervening factor (the sense-impression). The
former apperceives the latter; the latter is apperceived by the former.
Out of their combination an apperception-product arises: the

knowledge of the perceived being as a horse. The earlier factor is
relatively to the later one active and a priori; the supervening factor is
given, a posteriori, passive.... We may then define Apperception as the
movement of two masses of consciousness (Vorstellungsmassen)
against each other so as to produce a cognition.
"The a priori factor we called active, the a posteriori factor passive,
but this is only relatively true.... Although the a priori moment
commonly shows itself to be the more powerful, apperceptionprocesses can perfectly well occur in which the new observation
transforms or enriches the apperceiving group of ideas. A child who
hitherto has seen none but four-cornered tables apperceives a round
one as a table; but by this the apperceiving mass ('table') is enriched.
To his previous knowledge of tables comes this new feature that they
need not be four-cornered, but may be round. In the history of science
it has happened often enough that some discovery, at the same time
that it was apperceived, i.e. brought into connection with the system of
our knowledge, transformed the whole system. In principle, however,
we must maintain that, although either factor is both active and
passive, the a priori factor is almost always the more active of the
two."[116]

This account of Steinthal's brings out very clearly the difference between
our psychological conceptions and what are called concepts in logic. In
logic a concept is unalterable; but what are popularly called our
'conceptions of things' alter by being used. The aim of 'Science' is to attain
conceptions so adequate and exact that we shall never need to change them.
There is an everlasting struggle in every mind between the tendency to keep
unchanged, and the tendency to renovate, its ideas. Our education is a
ceaseless compromise between the conservative and the progressive factors.
Every new experience must be disposed of under some old head. The great
point is to find the head which has to be least altered to take it in. Certain
Polynesian natives, seeing horses for the first time, called them pigs, that
being the nearest head. My child of two played for a week with the first
orange that was given him, calling it a 'ball.' He called the first whole eggs
he saw 'potatoes,' having been accustomed to see his 'eggs' broken into a
glass, and his potatoes without the skin. A folding pocket-corkscrew he
unhesitatingly called 'bad-scissors.' Hardly any one of us can make new
heads easily when fresh experiences come. Most of us grow more and more
enslaved to the stock conceptions with which we have once become
familiar, and less and less capable of assimilating impressions in any but the
old ways. Old-fogyism, in short, is the inevitable terminus to which life
sweeps us on. Objects which violate our established habits of 'apperception'
are simply not taken account of at all; or, if on some occasion we are forced
by dint of argument to admit their existence, twenty-four hours later the
admission is as if it were not, and every trace of the unassimilable truth has
vanished from our thought. Genius, in truth, means little more than the
faculty of perceiving in an unhabitual way.
On the other hand, nothing is more congenial, from babyhood to the end of
life, than to be able to assimilate the new to the old, to meet each
threatening violator or burster of our well-known series of concepts, as it
comes in, see through its unwontedness, and ticket it off as an old friend in
disguise. This victorious assimilation of the new is in fact the type of all
intellectual pleasure. The lust for it is curiosity. The relation of the new to
the old, before the assimilation is performed, is wonder. We feel neither
curiosity nor wonder concerning things so far beyond us that we have no
concepts to refer them to or standards by which to measure them.[117] The
Fuegians, in Darwin's voyage, wondered at the small boats, but took the big

ship as a 'matter of course.' Only what we partly know already inspires us
with a desire to know more. The more elaborate textile fabrics, the vaster
works in metal, to most of us are like the air, the water, and the ground,
absolute existences which awaken no ideas. It is a matter of course that an
engraving or a copper-plate inscription should possess that degree of
beauty. But if we are shown a pen-drawing of equal perfection, our personal
sympathy with the difficulty of the task makes us immediately wonder at
the skill. The old lady admiring the Academician's picture, says to him:
"And is it really all done by hand?"
IS PERCEPTION UNCONSCIOUS INFERENCE?
A widely-spread opinion (which has been held by such men as
Schopenhauer, Spencer, Hartmann, Wundt, Helmholtz, and lately
interestingly pleaded for by M. Binet)[118] will have it that perception
should be called a sort of reasoning operation, more or less unconsciously
and automatically performed. The question seems at first a verbal one,
depending on how broadly the term reasoning is to be taken. If, every time
a present sign suggests an absent reality to our mind, we make an inference;
and if every time we make an inference we reason; then perception is
indubitably reasoning. Only one sees no room in it for any unconscious
part. Both associates, the present sign and the contiguous things which it
suggests, are above-board, and no intermediary ideas are required. Most of
those who have upheld the thesis in question have, however, made a more
complex supposition. What they have meant is that perception is a mediate
inference, and that the middle term is unconscious. When the sensation
which I have called 'this' (p. 83, supra) is felt, they think that some process
like the following runs through the mind:
'This' is M;
but M is A;
therefore 'this' is A.[119]
Now there seem no good grounds for supposing this additional wheelwork
in the mind. The classification of 'this' as M is itself an act of perception,
and should, if all perception were inference, require a still earlier syllogism
for its performance, and so backwards in infinitum. The only extrication
from this coil would be to represent the process in altered guise, thus:

'This' is like those;
Those are A;
Therefore 'this' is A.
The major premise here involves no association by contiguity, no naming of
those as M, but only a suggestion of unnamed similar images, a recall of
analogous past sensations with which the characters that make up A were
habitually conjoined. But here again, what grounds of fact are there for
admitting this recall? We are quite unconscious of any such images of the
past. And the conception of all the forms of association as resultants of the
elementary fact of habit-worn paths in the brain makes such images entirely
superfluous for explaining the phenomena in point. Since the brain-process
of 'this,' the sign of A, has repeatedly been aroused in company with the
process of the full object A, direct paths of irradiation from the one to the
other must be already established. And although roundabout paths may also
be possible, as from 'this' to 'those,' and then from 'those' to 'A' (paths which
would lead to practically the same conclusion as the straighter ones), yet
there is no ground whatever for assuming them to be traversed now,
especially since appearances point the other way. In explicit reasoning, such
paths are doubtless traversed; in perception they are in all probability
closed. So far, then, from perception being a species of reasoning properly
so called, both it and reasoning are co-ordinate varieties of that deeper sort
of process known psychologically as the association of ideas, and
physiologically as the law of habit in the brain. To call perception
unconscious reasoning is thus either a useless metaphor, or a positively
misleading confusion between two different things.

One more point and we may leave the subject of Perception. Sir Wm.
Hamilton thought that he had discovered a 'great law' which had been
wholly overlooked by psychologists, and which, 'simple and universal,' is
this: "Knowledge and Feeling,—Perception and Sensation, though always
coexistent, are always in the inverse ratio of each other." Hamilton wrote as
if perception and sensation were two coexistent elements entering into a
single state of consciousness. Spencer refines upon him by contending that
they are two mutually exclusive states of consciousness, not two elements

of a single state. If sensation be taken, as both Hamilton and Spencer
mainly take it in this discussion, to mean the feeling of pleasure or pain,
there is no doubt that the law, however expressed, is true; and that the mind
which is strongly conscious of the pleasantness or painfulness of an
experience is ipso facto less fitted to observe and analyze its outward cause.
[120] Apart from pleasure and pain, however, the law seems but a corollary
of the fact that the more concentrated a state of consciousness is, the more
vivid it is. When feeling a color, or listening to a tone per se, we get it more
intensely, notice it better, than when we are aware of it merely as one
among many other properties of a total object. The more diffused cerebral
excitement of the perceptive state is probably incompatible with quite as
strong an excitement of separate parts as the sensational state comports. So
we come back here to our own earlier discrimination between the
perceptive and the sensational processes, and to the examples which we
gave on pp. 80, 81.[121]
HALLUCINATIONS.
Between normal perception and illusion we have seen that there is no break,
the process being identically the same in both. The last illusions we
considered might fairly be called hallucinations. We must now consider the
false perceptions more commonly called by that name.[122] In ordinary
parlance hallucination is held to differ from illusion in that, whilst there is
an object really there in illusion, in hallucination there is no objective
stimulus at all. We shall presently see that this supposed absence of
objective stimulus in hallucination is a mistake, and that hallucinations are
often only extremes of the perception process, in which the secondary
cerebral reaction is out of all normal proportion to the peripheral stimulus
which occasions the activity. Hallucinations usually appear abruptly and
have the character of being forced upon the subject. But they possess
various degrees of apparent objectivity. One mistake in limine must be
guarded against. They are often talked of as mental images projected
outwards by mistake. But where an hallucination is complete, it is much
more than a mental image. An hallucination is a strictly sensational form of
consciousness, as good and true a sensation as if there were a real object
there. The object happens not to be there, that is all.

The milder degrees of hallucination have been designated as pseudohallucinations. Pseudo-hallucinations and hallucinations have been sharply
distinguished from each other only within a few years. Dr. Kandinsky
writes of their difference as follows:
"In carelessly questioning a patient we may confound his pseudohallucinatory perceptions with hallucinations. But to the unconfused
consciousness of the patient himself, even though he be imbecile, the
identification of the two phenomena is impossible, at least in the
sphere of vision. At the moment of having a pseudo-hallucination of
sight, the patient feels himself in an entirely different relation to this
subjective sensible appearance, from that in which he finds himself
whilst subject to a true visual hallucination. The latter is reality itself;
the former, on the contrary, remains always a subjective phenomenon
which the individual commonly regards either as sent to him as a sign
of God's grace, or as artificially induced by his secret persecutors.... If
he knows by his own experience what a genuine hallucination is, it is
quite impossible for him to mistake the pseudo-hallucination for it.... A
concrete example will make the difference clear:
"Dr. N. L.... heard one day suddenly amongst the voices of his
persecutors ('coming from a hollow space in the midst of the wall') a
rather loud voice impressively saying to him: 'Change your national
allegiance.' Understanding this to mean that his only hope consisted in
ceasing to be subject to the Czar of Russia, he reflected a moment
what allegiance would be better, and resolved to become an English
subject. At the same moment he saw a pseudo-hallucinatory lion of
natural size, which appeared and quickly laid its fore-paws on his
shoulders. He had a lively feeling of these paws as a tolerably painful
local pressure (complete hallucination of touch). Then the same voice
from the wall said: 'Now you have a lion—now you will rule,'
whereupon the patient recollected that the lion was the national
emblem of England. The lion appeared to L. very distinct and vivid,
but he nevertheless remained conscious, as he afterwards expressed it,
that he saw the animal, not with his bodily but with his mental eyes.
(After his recovery he called analogous apparitions by the name of
'expressive-plastic ideas.') Accordingly he felt no terror, even though
he felt the contact of the claws.... Had the lion been a complete

hallucination, the patient, as he himself remarked after recovery, would
have felt great fear, and very likely screamed or taken to flight. Had it
been a simple image of the fancy he would not have connected it with
the voices, of whose objective reality he was at the time quite
convinced."[123]
From ordinary images of memory and fancy, pseudo-hallucinations differ in
being much more vivid, minute, detailed, steady, abrupt, and spontaneous,
in the sense that all feeling of our own activity in producing them is lacking.
Dr. Kandinsky had a patient who, after taking opium or haschisch, had
abundant pseudo-hallucinations and hallucinations. As he also had strong
visualizing power and was an educated physician, the three sorts of
phenomena could be easily compared. Although projected outwards
(usually not farther than the limit of distinctest vision, a foot or so) the
pseudo-hallucinations lacked the character of objective reality which the
hallucinations possessed, but, unlike the pictures of imagination, it was
almost impossible to produce them at will. Most of the 'voices' which
people hear (whether they give rise to delusions or not) are pseudohallucinations. They are described as 'inner' voices, although their character
is entirely unlike the inner speech of the subject with himself. I know two
persons who hear such inner voices making unforeseen remarks whenever
they grow quiet and listen for them. They are a very common incident of
delusional insanity, and at last grow into vivid hallucinations. The latter are
comparatively frequent occurrences in sporadic form; and certain
individuals are liable to have them often. From the results of the 'Census of
Hallucinations,' which was begun by Edmund Gurney, it would appear that,
roughly speaking, one person at least in every ten is likely to have had a
vivid hallucination at some time in his life.[124] The following cases from
healthy people will give an idea of what these hallucinations are:
"When a girl of eighteen, I was one evening engaged in a very painful
discussion with an elderly person. My distress was so great that I took
up a thick ivory knitting-needle that was lying on the mantelpiece of
the parlor and broke it into small pieces as I talked. In the midst of the
discussion I was very wishful to know the opinion of a brother with
whom I had an unusually close relationship. I turned round and saw
him sitting at the further side of a centre-table, with his arms folded

(an unusual position with him), but, to my dismay, I perceived from
the sarcastic expression of his mouth that he was not in sympathy with
me, was not 'taking my side,' as I should then have expressed it. The
surprise cooled me, and the discussion was dropped.
"Some minutes after, having occasion to speak to my brother, I turned
towards him, but he was gone. I inquired when he left the room, and
was told that he had not been in it, which I did not believe, thinking
that he had come in for a minute and had gone out without being
noticed. About an hour and a half afterwards he appeared, and
convinced me, with some trouble, that he had never been near the
house that evening. He is still alive and well."
Here is another case:
"One night in March 1873 or '74, I cannot recollect which year, I was
attending on the sick-bed of my mother. About eight o'clock in the
evening I went into the dining-room to fix a cup of tea, and on turning
from the sideboard to the table, on the other side of the table before the
fire, which was burning brightly, as was also the gas, I saw standing
with his hand clasped to his side in true military fashion a soldier of
about thirty years of age, with dark, piercing eyes looking directly into
mine. He wore a small cap with standing feather; his costume was also
of a soldierly style. He did not strike me as being a spirit, ghost, or
anything uncanny, only a living man; but after gazing for fully a
minute I realized that it was nothing of earth, for he neither moved his
eyes nor his body, and in looking closely I could see the fire beyond. I
was of course startled, and yet did not run out of the room. I felt
stunned. I walked out rapidly, however, and turning to the servant in
the hall asked her if she saw anything. She said not. I went into my
mother's room and remained talking for about an hour, but never
mentioned the above subject for fear of exciting her, and finally forgot
it altogether, returning to the dining-room, still in forgetfulness of what
had occurred, but repeating, as above, the turning from sideboard to
table in act of preparing more tea. I looked casually towards the fire,
and there I saw the soldier again. This time I was entirely alarmed, and
fled from the room in haste. I called to my father, but when he came he
saw nothing."

Sometimes more than one sense is affected. The following is a case:
"In response to your request to write out my experience of Oct. 30,
1886, I will inflict on you a letter.
"On the day above mentioned, Oct. 30, 1886, I was in ——, where I
was teaching. I had performed my regular routine work for the day,
and was sitting in my room working out trigonometrical formulæ. I
was expecting every day to hear of the confinement of my wife, and
naturally my thoughts for some time had been more or less with her.
She was, by the way, in B——, some fifty miles from me.
"At the time, however, neither she nor the expected event was in my
mind; as I said, I was working out trigonometrical formulæ, and I had
been working on trigonometry the entire evening. About eleven
o'clock, as I sat there buried in sines, cosines, tangents, cotangents,
secants, and cosecants, I felt very distinctly upon my left shoulder a
touch, and a slight shake, as if somebody had tried to attract my
attention by other means and had failed. Without rising I turned my
head, and there between me and the door stood my wife, dressed
exactly as I last saw her, some five weeks before. As I turned she said:
'It is a little Herman; he has come.' Something more was said, but this
is the only sentence I can recall. To make sure that I was not asleep and
dreaming, I rose from the chair, pinched myself and walked toward the
figure, which disappeared immediately as I rose. I can give no
information as to the length of time occupied by this episode, but I
know I was awake, in my usual good health. The touch was very
distinct, the figure was absolutely perfect, stood about three feet from
the door, which was closed, and had not been opened during the
evening. The sound of the voice was unmistakable, and I should have
recognized it as my wife's voice even if I had not turned and had not
seen the figure at all. The tone was conversational, just as if she would
have said the same words had she been actually standing there.
"In regard to myself, I would say, as I have already intimated, I was in
my usual good health; I had not been sick before, nor was I after the
occurrence, not so much as a headache having afflicted me.

"Shortly after the experience above described, I retired for the night
and, as I usually do, slept quietly until morning. I did not speculate
particularly about the strange appearance of the night before, and
though I thought of it some, I did not tell anybody. The following
morning I rose, not conscious of having dreamed anything, but I was
very firmly impressed with the idea that there was something for me at
the telegraph-office. I tried to throw off the impression, for so far as I
knew there was no reason for it. Having nothing to do, I went out for a
walk; and to help throw off the impression above noted, I walked away
from the telegraph-office. As I proceeded, however, the impression
became a conviction, and I actually turned about and went to the very
place I had resolved not to visit, the telegraph-office. The first person I
saw on arriving at said office was the telegraph-operator, who being on
terms of intimacy with me, remarked: 'Hello, papa, I've got a telegram
for you.' The telegram announced the birth of a boy, weighing nine
pounds, and that all were doing well. Now, then, I have no theory at all
about the events narrated above; I never had any such experience
before nor since; I am no believer in spiritualism, am not in the least
superstitious, know very little about 'thought-transference,'
'unconscious cerebration,' etc., etc., but I am absolutely certain about
what I have tried to relate.
"In regard to the remark which I heard, 'It is a little Herman,' etc.; I
would add that we had previously decided to call the child, if a boy,
Herman—my own name, by the way."[125]
The hallucination sometimes carries a change of the general consciousness
with it, so as to appear more like a sudden lapse into a dream. The
following case was given me by a man of 43, who had never anything
resembling it before:
"While sitting at my desk this A. M. reading a circular of the Loyal
Legion a very curious thing happened to me, such as I have never
experienced. It was perfectly real, so real that it took some minutes to
recover from. It seems to me like a direct intromission into some other
world. I never had anything approaching it before save when dreaming
at night. I was wide awake, of course. But this was the feeling. I had
only just sat down and become interested in the circular, when I

seemed to lose myself for a minute and then found myself in the top
story of a high building very white and shining and clean, with a noble
window immediately at the right of where I sat. Through this window I
looked out upon a marvellous reach of landscape entirely new. I never
had before such a sense of infinity in nature, such superb stretches of
light and color and cleanness. I know that for the space of three
minutes I was entirely lost, for when I began to come to, so to speak,—
sitting in that other world, I debated for three or four minutes more as
to which was dream and which was reality. Sitting there I got a faint
sense of C.... [the town in which the writer was], away off and dim at
first. Then I remember thinking 'Why, I used to live in C....; perhaps I
am going back.' Slowly C.... did come back, and I found myself at my
desk again. For a few minutes the process of determining where I was
was very funny. But the whole experience was perfectly delightful,
there was such a sense of brilliancy and clearness and lightness about
it. I suppose it lasted in all about seven minutes or ten minutes."
The hallucinations of fever-delirium are a mixture of pseudo-hallucination,
true hallucination, and illusion. Those of opium, hasheesh, and belladonna
resemble them in this respect. The following vivid account of a fit of
hasheesh-delirium has been given me by a friend:
"I was reading a newspaper, and the indication of the approaching
delirium was an inability to keep my mind fixed on the narrative.
Directly I lay down upon a sofa there appeared before my eyes several
rows of human hands, which oscillated for a moment, revolved and
then changed to spoons. The same motions were repeated, the objects
changing to wheels, tin soldiers, lamp-posts, brooms, and countless
other absurdities. This stage lasted about ten minutes, and during that
time it is safe to say that I saw at least a thousand different objects.
These whirling images did not appear like the realities of life, but had
the character of the secondary images seen in the eye after looking at
some brightly-illuminated object. A mere suggestion from the person
who was with me in the room was sufficient to call up an image of the
thing suggested, while without suggestion there appeared all the
common objects of life and many unreal monstrosities, which it is

absolutely impossible to describe, and which seemed to be creations of
the brain.
"The character of the symptoms changed rapidly. A sort of wave
seemed to pass over me, and I became aware of the fact that my pulse
was beating rapidly. I took out my watch, and by exercising
considerable will-power managed to time the heart-beats, 135 to the
minute.
"I could feel each pulsation through my whole system, and a curious
twitching commenced, which no effort of the mind could stop.
"There were moments of apparent lucidity, when it seemed as if I
could see within myself, and watch the pumping of my heart. A
strange fear came over me, a certainty that I should never recover from
the effects of the opiate, which was as quickly followed by a feeling of
great interest in the experiment, a certainty that the experience was the
most novel and exciting that I had ever been through.
"My mind was in an exceedingly impressionable state. Any place
thought of or suggested appeared with all the distinctness of the reality.
I thought of the Giant's Causeway in Staffa, and instantly I stood
within the portals of Fingal's Cave. Great basaltic columns rose on all
sides, while huge waves rolled through the chasm and broke in silence
upon the rocky shore. Suddenly there was a roar and blast of sound,
and the word 'Ishmaral' was echoing up the cave. At the enunciation of
this remarkable word the great columns of basalt changed into
whirling clothes pins and I laughed aloud at the absurdity.
"(I may here state that the word 'Ishmaral' seemed to haunt my other
hallucinations, for I remember that I heard it frequently thereafter.) I
next enjoyed a sort of metempsychosis. Any animal or thing that I
thought of could be made the being which held my mind. I thought of
a fox, and instantly I was transformed into that animal. I could
distinctly feel myself a fox, could see my long ears and bushy tail, and
by a sort of introvision felt that my complete anatomy was that of a
fox. Suddenly the point of vision changed. My eyes seemed to be
located at the back of my mouth; I looked out between the parted lips,
saw the two rows of pointed teeth, and, closing my mouth with a snap,
saw—nothing.

"I was next transformed into a bombshell, felt my size, weight, and
thickness, and experienced the sensation of being shot up out of a giant
mortar, looking down upon the earth, bursting and falling back in a
shower of iron fragments.
"Into countless other objects was I transformed, many of them so
absurd that I am unable to conceive what suggested them. For
example, I was a little china doll, deep down in a bottle of olive oil,
next moment a stick of twisted candy, then a skeleton inclosed in a
whirling coffin, and so on ad infinitum.
"Towards the end of the delirium the whirling images appeared again,
and I was haunted by a singular creation of the brain, which
reappeared every few moments. It was an image of a double-faced
doll, with a cylindrical body running down to a point like a peg-top.
"It was always the same, having a sort of crown on its head, and
painted in two colors, green and brown, on a background of blue. The
expression of the Janus-like profiles was always the same, as were the
adornments of the body. After recovering from the effects of the drug I
could not picture to myself exactly how this singular monstrosity
appeared, but in subsequent experiences I was always visited by this
phantom, and always recognized every detail of its composition. It was
like visiting some long-forgotten spot and seeing some sight that had
faded from the memory, but which appeared perfectly familiar as soon
as looked upon.
"The effects of the drug lasted about an hour and a half, leaving me a
trifle tipsy and dizzy; but after a ten-hour sleep I was myself again,
save for a slight inability to keep my mind fixed on any piece of work
for any length of time, which remained with me during most of the
next day."
THE NEURAL PROCESS IN HALLUCINATION.
Examples of these singular perversions of perception might be multiplied
indefinitely, but I have no more space. Let us turn to the question of what
the physiological process may be to which they are due. It must, of course,
consist of an excitement from within of those centres which are active in

normal perception, identical in kind and degree with that which real
external objects are usually needed to induce. The particular process which
currents from the sense-organs arouse would seem under normal
circumstances to be arousable in no other way. On p. 72 ff. above, we saw
that the centres aroused by incoming peripheral currents are probably
identical with the centres used in mere imagination; and that the vividness
of the sensational kind of consciousness is probably correlated with a
discrete degree of intensity in the process therein aroused. Referring the
reader back to that passage and to what was more lately said on p. 103 ff., I
now proceed to complete my theory of the perceptive process by an
analysis of what may most probably be believed to take place in
hallucination strictly so called.
We have seen (p. 75) that the free discharge of cells into each other through
associative paths is a likely reason why the maximum intensity of function
is not reached when the cells are excited by their neighbors in the cortex. At
the end of Chapter XXV we shall return to this conception, and whilst
making it still more precise, use it for explaining certain phenomena
connected with the will. The idea is that the leakage forward along these
paths is too rapid for the inner tension in any centre to accumulate to the
maximal explosion-point, unless the exciting currents are greater than those
which the various portions of the cortex supply to each other. Currents from
the periphery are (as it seems) the only currents whose energy can vanquish
the supra-ideational resistance (so to call it) of the cells, and cause the
peculiarly intense sort of disintegration with which the sensational quality is
linked. If, however, the leakage forward were to stop, the tension inside
certain cells might reach the explosion-point, even though the influence
which excited them came only from neighboring cortical parts. Let an
empty pail with a leak in its bottom, tipped up against a support so that if it
ever became full of water it would upset, represent the resting condition of
the centre for a certain sort of feeling. Let water poured into it stand for the
currents which are its natural stimulus; then the hole in its bottom will, of
course, represent the 'paths' by which it transmits its excitement to other
associated cells. Now let two other vessels have the function of supplying it
with water. One of these vessels stands for the neighboring cortical cells,
and can pour in hardly any more water than goes out by the leak. The pail
consequently never upsets in consequence of the supply from this source. A
current of water passes through it and does work elsewhere, but in the pail

itself nothing but what stands for ideational activity is aroused. The other
vessel, however, stands for the peripheral sense-organs, and supplies a
stream of water so copious that the pail promptly fills up in spite of the
leak, and presently upsets; in other words, sensational activity is aroused.
But it is obvious that if the leak were plugged, the slower stream of supply
would also end by upsetting the pail.
To apply this to the brain and to thought, if we take a series of processes A
B C D E, associated together in that order, and suppose that the current
through them is very fluent, there will be little intensity anywhere until,
perhaps, a pause occurs at E. But the moment the current is blocked
anywhere, say between C and D, the process in C must grow more intense,
and might even be conceived to explode so as to produce a sensation in the
mind instead of an idea.
It would seem that some hallucinations are best to be explained in this way.
We have in fact a regular series of facts which can all be formulated under
the single law that the substantive strength of a state of consciousness bears
an inverse proportion to its suggestiveness. It is the halting-places of our
thought which are occupied with distinct imagery. Most of the words we
utter have no time to awaken images at all; they simply awaken the
following words. But when the sentence stops, an image dwells for awhile
before the mental eye (see Vol. I. p. 243). Again, whenever the associative
processes are reduced and impeded by the approach of unconsciousness, as
in falling asleep, or growing faint, or becoming narcotized, we find a
concomitant increase in the intensity of whatever partial consciousness may
survive. In some people what M. Maury has called 'hypnagogic'
hallucinations[126] are the regular concomitant of the process of falling
asleep. Trains of faces, landscapes, etc., pass before the mental eye, first as
fancies, then as pseudo-hallucinations, finally as full-fledged hallucinations
forming dreams. If we regard association-paths as paths of drainage, then
the shutting off of one after another of them as the encroaching cerebral
paralysis advances ought to act like the plugging of the hole in the bottom
of the pail, and make the activity more intense in those systems of cells that
retain any activity at all. The level rises because the currents are not drained
away, until at last the full sensational explosion may occur.
The usual explanation of hypnagogic hallucinations is that they are ideas
deprived of their ordinary reductives. In somnolescence, sensations being

extinct, the mind, it is said, then having no stronger things to compare its
ideas with, ascribes to these the fulness of reality. At ordinary times the
objects of our imagination are reduced to the status of subjective facts by
the ever-present contrast of our sensations with them. Eliminate the
sensations, however, this view supposes, and the 'images' are forthwith
'projected' into the outer world and appear as realities. Thus is the illusion
of dreams also explained. This, indeed, after a fashion gives an account of
the facts.[127] And yet it certainly fails to explain the extraordinary vivacity
and completeness of so many of our dream-fantasms. The process of
'imagining' must (in these cases at least[128]) be not merely relatively, but
absolutely and in itself more intense than at other times. The fact is, it is not
a process of imagining, but a genuine sensational process; and the theory in
question is therefore false as far as that point is concerned.
Dr. Hughlings Jackson's explanation of the epileptic seizure is
acknowledged to be masterly. It involves principles exactly like those which
I am bringing forward here. The 'loss of consciousness' in epilepsy is due to
the most highly organized brain-processes being exhausted and thrown out
of gear. The less organized (more instinctive) processes, ordinarily inhibited
by the others, are then exalted, so that we get as a mere consequence of
relief from the inhibition, the meaningless or maniacal action which so
often follows the attack.[129]
Similarly the subsultus tendinorum or jerking of the muscles which so often
startles us when we are on the point of falling asleep, may be interpreted as
due to the rise (in certain lower motor centres) of the ordinary 'tonic' tension
to the explosion-point, when the inhibition commonly exerted by the higher
centres falls too suddenly away.

One possible condition of hallucination then stands revealed, whatever
other conditions there may be. When the normal paths of association
between a centre and other centres are thrown out of gear, any activity
which may exist in the first centre tends to increase in intensity until finally
the point may be reached at which the last inward resistance is overcome,
and the full sensational process explodes.[130] Thus it will happen that

causes of an amount of activity in brain-cells which would ordinarily result
in a weak consciousness may produce a very strong consciousness when the
overflow of these cells is stopped by the torpor of the rest of the brain. A
slight peripheral irritation, then, if it reaches the centres of consciousness at
all during sleep, will give rise to the dream of a violent sensation. All the
books about dreaming are full of anecdotes which illustrate this. For
example, M. Maury's nose and lips are tickled with a feather while he
sleeps. He dreams he is being tortured by having a pitch-plaster applied to
his face, torn off, lacerating the skin of nose and lips. Descartes, on being
bitten by a flea, dreams of being run through by a sword. A friend tells me,
as I write this, of his hair changing its position in his forehead just as he
'dozed off' in his chair a few days since. Instantly he dreamed that some one
had struck him a blow. Examples can be quoted ad libitum, but these are
enough.[131]
We seem herewith to have an explanation for a certain number of
hallucinations. Whenever the normal forward irradiation of intra-cortical
excitement through association-paths is checked, any accidental
spontaneous activity or any peripheral stimulation (however inadequate at
other times) by which a brain-centre may be visited, sets up a process of full
sensational intensity therein.

In the hallucinations artificially produced in hypnotic subjects, some degree
of peripheral excitement seems usually to be required. The brain is asleep as
far as its own spontaneous thinking goes, and the words of the 'magnetizer'
then awaken a cortical process which drafts off into itself any currents of a
related sort which may come in from the periphery, resulting in a vivid
objective perception of the suggested thing. Thus, point to a dot on a sheet
of paper, and call it 'General Grant's photograph,' and your subject will see a
photograph of the General there instead of the dot. The dot gives objectivity
to the appearance, and the suggested notion of the General gives it form.
Then magnify the dot by a lens; double it by a prism or by nudging the
eyeball; reflect it in a mirror; turn it upside down; or wipe it out; and the
subject will tell you that the 'photograph' has been enlarged, doubled,
reflected, turned about, or made to disappear. In M. Binet's language,[132]

the dot is the outward point de repère which is needed to give objectivity to
your suggestion, and without which the latter will only produce a
conception in the subject's mind.[133] M. Binet has shown that such a
peripheral point de repère is used in an enormous number, not only of
hypnotic hallucinations, but of hallucinations of the insane. These latter are
often unilateral; that is, the patient hears the voices always on one side of
him, or sees the figure only when a certain one of his eyes is open. In many
of these cases it has been distinctly proved that a morbid irritation in the
internal ear, or an opacity in the humors of the eye, was the starting point of
the current which the patient's diseased acoustic or optical centres clothed
with their peculiar products in the way of ideas. Hallucinations produced in
this way are 'ILLUSIONS' and M. Binet's theory, that all hallucinations must
start in the periphery, may be called an attempt to reduce hallucination and
illusion to one physiological type, the type, namely, to which normal
perception belongs. In every case, according to M. Binet, whether of
perception, of hallucination, or of illusion, we get the sensational vividness
by means of a current from the peripheral nerves. It may be a mere trace of
a current. But that trace is enough to kindle the maximal or supra-ideational
process so that the object perceived will have the character of externality.
What the nature of the object shall be will depend wholly on the particular
system of paths in which the process is kindled. Part of the thing in all cases
comes from the sense-organ, the rest is furnished by the mind. But we
cannot by introspection distinguish between these parts; and our only
formula for the result is that the brain has reacted on the impression in the
normal way. Just so in the dreams which we have considered, and in the
hallucinations of which M. Binet tells, we can only say that the brain has
reacted in an abnormal way.
M. Binet's theory accounts indeed for a multitude of cases, but certainly not
for all. The prism does not always double the false appearance,[134] nor
does the latter always disappear when the eyes are closed. Dr. Hack
Tuke[135] gives several examples in sane people of well-exteriorized
hallucinations which did not respond to Binet's tests; and Mr. Edmund
Gurney[136] gives a number of reasons why intensity in a cortical process
may be expected to result from local pathological activity just as much as
its peculiar nature does. For Binet, an abnormally or exclusively active part
of the cortex gives the nature of what shall appear, whilst a peripheral

sense-organ alone can give the intensity sufficient to make it appear
projected into real space. But since this intensity is after all but a matter of
degree, one does not see why, under rare conditions, the degree in question
might not be attained by inner causes exclusively. In that case we should
have certain hallucinations centrally initiated alongside of the peripherally
initiated hallucinations, which are the only sort that M. Binet's theory
allows. It seems probable on the whole, therefore, that centrally initiated
hallucinations can exist. How often they do exist is another question. The
existence of hallucinations which affect more than one sense is an argument
for central initiation. For grant that the thing seen may have its starting
point in the outer world, the voice which it is heard to utter must be due to
an influence from the visual region, i.e. must be of central origin.
Sporadic cases of hallucination, visiting people only once in a lifetime
(which seem to be by far the most frequent type), are on any theory hard to
understand in detail. They are often extraordinarily complete; and the fact
that many of them are reported as veridical, that is, as coinciding with real
events, such as accidents, deaths, etc., of the persons seen, is an additional
complication of the phenomenon. The first really scientific study of
hallucination in all its possible bearings, on the basis of a large mass of
empirical material, was begun by Mr. Edmund Gurney and is continued by
other members of the Society for Psychical Research; and the 'Census' is
now being applied to several countries under the auspices of the
International Congress of Experimental Psychology. It is to be hoped that
out of these combined labors something solid will eventually grow. The
facts shade off into the phenomena of motor automatism, trance, etc.; and
nothing but a wide comparative study can give really instructive results.[137]
The part played by the peripheral sense-organ in hallucination is just as
obscure as we found it in the case of imagination. The things seen often
seem opaque and hide the background upon which they are projected. It
does not follow from this, however, that the retina is actually involved in
the vision. A contrary process going on in the visual centres would prevent
the retinal impression made by the outer realities from being felt, and this
would in mental terms be equivalent to the hiding of them by the imaginary
figure. The negative after-images of mental pictures reported by Meyer and
Féré, and the negative after-images of hypnotic hallucinations reported by
Binet and others so far constitute the only evidence there is for the retina

being involved. But until these after-images are explained in some other
way we must admit the possibility of a centrifugal current from the optical
centres downwards into the peripheral organ of sight, paradoxical as the
course of such a current may appear.
'PERCEPTION-TIME.'
The time which the perceptive process occupies has been inquired into by
various experimenters. Some call it perception-time, some choice-time,
some discrimination-time. The results have been already given in Chapter
XIII (vol. I, p. 523 ff.), to which the reader is consequently referred.
Dr. Romanes gives an interesting variation of these time-measurements. He
found[138]
"an astonishing difference between different individuals with respect to
the rate at which they are able to read. Of course reading implies
enormously intricate processes of perception both of the sensuous and
of the intellectual order; but if we choose for these observations
persons who have been accustomed to read much, we may consider
that they are all very much on a par with respect to the amount of
practice which they have had, so that the differences in their rates of
reading may fairly be attributed to real differences in their rates of
forming complex perceptions in rapid succession, and not to any
merely accidental differences arising from greater or less facility
acquired by special practice.
"My experiments consisted in marking a brief printed paragraph in a
book which had never been read by any of the persons to whom it was
to be presented. The paragraph, which contained simple statements of
simple facts, was marked on the margin with pencil. The book was
then placed before the reader open, the page, however, being covered
with a sheet of paper. Having pointed out to the reader upon this sheet
of paper what part of the underlying page the marked paragraph
occupied, I suddenly removed the sheet of paper with one hand, while
I started a chronograph with the other. Twenty seconds being allowed
for reading the paragraph (ten lines octavo), as soon as the time was up
I again suddenly placed the sheet of paper over the printed page,

passed the book on to the next reader, and repeated the experiment as
before. Meanwhile, the first reader, the moment after the book had
been removed, wrote down all that he or she could remember having
read. And so on with all the other readers.
"Now the results of a number of experiments conducted on this
method were to show, as I have said, astonishing differences in the
maximum rate of reading which is possible to different individuals, all
of whom have been accustomed to extensive reading. That is to say,
the difference may amount to 4 to 1; or, otherwise stated, in a given
time one individual may be able to read four times as much as another.
Moreover, it appeared that there was no relationship between slowness
of reading and power of assimilation; on the contrary, when all the
efforts are directed to assimilating as much as possible in a given time,
the rapid readers (as shown by their written notes) usually give a better
account of the portions of the paragraph which have been compassed
by the slow readers than the latter are able to give; and the most rapid
reader I have found is also the best at assimilating. I should further say
that there is no relationship between rapidity of perception as thus
tested and intellectual activity as tested by the general results of
intellectual work; for I have tried the experiment with several highly
distinguished men in science and literature, most of whom I found to
be slow readers."[139]

[83] The word Perception, however, has been variously used. For historical notices, see Hamilton's
Lectures on Metaphysics, ii. 96. For Hamilton perception is 'the consciousness of external objects'
(ib. 28). Spencer defines it oddly enough as "a discerning of the relation or relations between states of
consciousness partly presentative and partly representative; which states of consciousness must be
themselves known to the extent involved in the knowledge of their relations" (Psychol., § 355).
[84] Analysis, i. 97.
[85] Theory of Vision, 51.
[86] The educative process is particularly obvious in the case of the ear, for all sudden sounds seem
alarming to babies. The familiar noises of house and street keep them in constant trepidation until
such time as they have either learned the objects which emit them, or have become blunted to them
by frequent experience of their innocuity.
[87] Outlines, p. 153.
[88] Cf. Helmholtz, Optik, pp. 433, 723, 728, 772; and Spencer, Psychology, vol. ii. p. 249, note.
[89] The more or less geometrically regular phantasms which are produced by pressure on the
eyeballs, congestion of the head, inhalation of anæsthetics, etc., might again be cited to prove that
faint and vague excitements of sense-organs are transformed into figured objects by the brain, only
the facts are not quite clearly interpretable; and the figuring may possibly be due to some retinal
peculiarity, as yet unexplored. Beautiful patterns, which would do for wall-papers, succeed each
other when the eyeballs are long pressed. Goethe's account of his own phantasm of a flower is well
known. It came in the middle of his visual field whenever he closed his eyes and depressed his head,
"unfolding itself and developing from its interior new flowers, formed of colored or sometimes green
leaves, not natural but of fantastic forms, and symmetrical as the rosettes of sculptors," etc. (quoted
in Müller's Physiology, Baly's tr., p. 1397). The fortification- and zigzag-patterns, which are wellknown appearances in the field of view in certain functional disorders, have characteristics
(steadiness, coerciveness, blotting out of other objects) suggestive of a retinal origin—this is why the
entire class of phenomena treated of in this note seem to me still doubtfully connected with the
cerebral factor in perception of which the text treats.—I copy from Taine's book on Intelligence (vol.
i. p. 61) the translation of an interesting observation by Prof. M. Lazarus, in which the same effect of
an after-image is seen. Lazarus himself proposes the name of 'visionary illusions' for such
modifications of ideal pictures by peripheral stimulations (Lehre von den Sinnestäuschungen, 1867,
p. 19). "I was on the Kaltbad terrace at Rigi, on a very clear afternoon, and attempting to make out
the Waldbruder, a rock which stands out from the midst of the gigantic wall of mountains
surrounding it, on whose summits we see like a crown the glaciers of Titlis, Uri-Rothsdock, etc. I was
looking alternately with the naked eye and with a spy-glass; but could not distinguish it with the
naked eye. For the space of six to ten minutes I had gazed steadfastly upon the mountains, whose
color varied according to their several altitudes or declivities between violet, brown, and dark green,
and I had fatigued myself to no purpose, when I ceased looking and turned away. At that moment I
saw before me (I cannot recollect whether my eyes were shut or open) the figure of an absent friend,
like a corpse.... I asked myself at once how I had come to think of my absent friend.—In a few
seconds I regained the thread of my thoughts, which my looking for the Waldbruder had interrupted,
and readily found that the idea of my friend had by a very simple necessity introduced itself among
them. My recollecting him was thus naturally accounted for.—But in addition to this, he had
appeared as a corpse. How was this?—At this moment, whether through fatigue or in order to think, I
closed my eyes, and found at once the whole field of sight, over a considerable extent, covered with
the same corpse-like hue, a greenish-yellow gray. I thought at once that I had here the principle of the
desired explanation, and attempted to recall to memory the forms of other persons. And, in fact, these
forms too appeared like corpses; standing or sitting, as I wished, all had a corpse-like tint. The

persons whom I wished to see did not all appear to me as sensible phantoms; and again, when my
eyes were open. I did not see phantoms, or at all events only saw them faintly, of no determined
color.—I then inquired how it was that phantoms of persons were affected by and colored like the
visual field surrounding them, how their outlines were traced, and if their faces and clothes were of
the same color. But it was then too late, or perhaps the influence of reflection and examination had
been too powerful. All grew suddenly pale, and the subjective phenomenon, which might have lasted
some minutes longer, had disappeared.—It is plain that here an inward reminiscence, arising in
accordance with the laws of association, had combined with an optical after-image. The excessive
excitation of the periphery of the optic nerve, I mean the long-continued preceding sensation of my
eyes when contemplating the color of the mountain, had indirectly provoked a subjective and durable
sensation, that of the complementary color; and my reminiscence, incorporating itself with this
subjective sensation, became the corpse-like phantom I have described."
[90] Cf. Th. Reid's Intellectual Powers, essay ii. chap. xxii, and A. Binet, in Mind, ix. 206. M. Binet
points out the fact that what is fallaciously inferred is always an object of some other sense than the
'this.' 'Optical illusions' are generally errors of touch and muscular sensibility, and the fallaciously
perceived object and the experiences which correct it are both tactile in these cases.
[91] The converse illusion is hard to bring about. The points a and b, being normally in contact, mean
to us the same space, and hence it might be supposed that when simultaneously touched, as by a pair
of callipers, we should feel but one object, whilst us a matter of fact we feel two. It should be
remarked in explanation of this that an object placed between the two fingers in their normal
uncrossed position always awakens the sense of two contacts. When the fingers are pressed together
we feel one object to be between them. And when the fingers are crossed, and their corresponding
points a and b simultaneously pressed, we do get something like the illusion of singleness—that is,
we get a very doubtful doubleness.
[92] Purkinje, Mach, and Breuer are the authors to whom we mainly owe the explanation of the
feeling of vertigo. I have found (American Journal of Otology, Oct. 1882) that in deaf-mutes (whose
semi-circular canals or entire auditory nerves must often be disorganized) there very frequently exists
no susceptibility to giddiness or whirling.
[93] The involuntary continuance of the eye's motions is not the only cause of the false perception in
these cases. There is also a true negative after-image of the original retinal movement-sensations, as
we shall see in Chapter XX.
[94] We never, so far as I know, get the converse illusion at a railroad station and believe the other
train to move when it is still.
[95] Helmholtz: Physiol. Optik, 365.
[96] Cf. Berkeley's Theory of Vision, §§ 67-79; Helmholtz: Physiologische Optik, pp. 630-1;
Lechalas in Revue Philosophique, xxvi. 49.
[97] Physiol. Optik, p. 602.
[98] It seems likely that the strains in the recti muscles have something to do with the vacillating
judgment in these atropin cases. The internal recti contract whenever we accommodate. They squint
and produce double vision when the innervation for accommodation is excessive. To see singly, when
straining the atropinized accommodation, the contraction of our internal recti must be neutralized by
a correspondingly excessive contraction of the external recti. But this is a sign of the object's
recession, etc.
[99] American Journal of Psychology, i. 101 ff.
[100] Romanes, Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 324.

[101] M. Lazarus: Das Leben d. Seele, ii (1857), p. 32. In the ordinary hearing of speech half the
words we seem to hear are supplied out of our own head. A language with which we are perfectly
familiar is understood, even when spoken in low tones and far off. An unfamiliar language is
unintelligible under these conditions. If we do not get a very good seat at a foreign theatre, we fail to
follow the dialogue; and what gives trouble to most of us when abroad is not only that the natives
speak so fast, but that they speak so indistinctly and so low. The verbal objects for interpreting the
sounds by are not alert and ready made in our minds, as they are in our familiar mother-tongue, and
do not start up at so faint a cue.
[102] G. H. Meyer, Untersuchungen, etc., pp. 242-8.
[103] Helmholtz, P. O. 438. The question will soon come before us again in the chapter on the
Perception of Space.
[104] C. F. Taylor, Sensation and Pain, p. 37 (N. Y., 1882).
[105] Examen Critique de la Loi Psychophysique (1883), p. 61.
[106] Compare A. W Volkmann's essay 'Ueber Ursprüngliches und Erworbenes in den
Raumanschauungen,' on p. 139 of his Untersuchungen im Gebiete der Optik; and Chapter xiii of
Hering's contribution to Hermann's Handbuch der Physiologie, vol. iii.
[107] In the Proceedings of the American Society for Psychical Research, pp. 253-4, I have tried to
account for some of the variations in this consciousness. Out of 140 persons whom I found to feel
their lost foot, some did so dubiously. "Either they only feel it occasionally, or only when it pains
them, or only when they try to move it; or they only feel it when they 'think a good deal about it' and
make an effort to conjure it up. When they 'grow inattentive,' the feeling 'flies back' or 'jumps back,'
to the stump. Every degree of consciousness, from complete and permanent hallucination down to
something hardly distinguishable from ordinary fancy, seems represented in the sense of the missing
extremity which these patients say they have. Indeed I have seldom seen a more plausible lot of
evidence for the view that imagination and sensation are but differences of vividness in an identical
process than these confessions, taking them altogether, contain. Many patients say they can hardly
tell whether they feel or fancy the limb."
[108] Pflüger's Archiv, xxxvii. 1.
[109] Not all patients have this additional illusion.
[110] I ought to say that in almost all cases the volition is followed by actual contraction of muscles
in the stump.
[111] Cf. Herbart, Psychol. als. Wissenschaft, § 125.
[112] Compare the historical reviews by K. Lange: Ueber Apperception (Plauen, 1879), pp. 12-14;
by Staude in Wundt's Philosophische Studien, i. 149; and by Marty in Vierteljsch. f. wiss. Phil., x.
347 ff.
[113] Problems, vol. i. p. 118 ff.
[114] See his Einleitung in die Psychologie u. Sprachwissenschaft (1881) p. 166 ff.
[115] One of my colleagues, asking himself the question after reading the anecdote, tells me that he
replied 'Harvard College,' the faculty of that body having voted, a few days previously, to keep back
the degrees of members of the graduating class who might be disorderly on class-day night. W. J.
[116] Op. cit. pp. 166-171.
[117] The great maxim in pedagogy is to knit every new piece of knowledge on to a pre-existing
curiosity—i.e., to assimilate its matter in some way to what is already known. Hence the advantage

of "comparing all that is far off and foreign to something that is near home, of making the unknown
plain by the example of the known, and of connecting all the instruction with the personal experience
of the pupil.... If the teacher is to explain the distance of the sun from the earth, let him ask.... 'If
anyone there in the sun fired off a cannon straight at you, what should you do?' 'Get out of the way'
would be the answer. 'No need of that,' the teacher might reply. 'You may quietly go to sleep in your
room, and get up again, you may wait till your confirmation-day, you may learn a trade, and grow as
old as I am,—then only will the cannon-ball be getting near, then you may jump to one side! See, so
great as that is the sun's distance!'" (K. Lange, Ueber Apperception, 1879, p. 76—a charming though
prolix little work.)
[118] A. Schopenhauer, Satz vom Grunde, chap. iv. H. Spencer, Psychol., part vi. chaps. ix, x. E. v.
Hartmann, Phil. of the Unconscious (B), chaps. vii, viii. W. Wundt, Beiträge, pp. 422 ff.;
Vorlesungen, iv, xiii. H. Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, pp. 430, 447. A. Binet, Psychol. du
Raisonnement, chaps. iii, v. Wundt and Helmholtz have more recently 'recanted.' See above, vol i. p.
169 note.
[119] When not all M, but only some M, is A, when, in other words, M is 'undistributed' the
conclusion is liable to error. Illusions would thus be logical fallacies, if true perceptions were valid
syllogisms. They would draw false conclusions from undistributed middle terms.
[120] See Spencer, Psychol., ii. p. 250, note, for a physiological hypothesis to account for this fact.
[121] Here is another good example, taken from Helmholtz's Optics, p. 435: "The sight of a man
walking is a familiar spectacle to us. We perceive it as a connected whole, and at most notice the
most striking of its peculiarities. Strong attention is required, and a special choice of the point of
view, in order to feel the perpendicular and lateral oscillations of such a walking figure. We must
choose fitting points or lines in the background with which to compare the positions of its head, but if
a distant walking man be looked at through an astronomical telescope (which inverts the object),
what a singular hopping and rocking appearance he presents! No difficulty now in seeing the body's
oscillations, and many other details of the gait.... But, on the other hand, its total character, whether
light or clumsy, dignified or graceful, is harder to perceive than in the upright position."
[122] Illusions and hallucinations must both be distinguished from delusions. A delusion is a false
opinion about a matter of fact, which need not necessarily involve, though it often does involve, false
perceptions of sensible things. We may, for example, have religious delusions, medical delusions,
delusions about our own importance, about other peoples' characters, etc., ad libitum. The delusions
of the insane are apt to affect certain typical forms, often very hard to explain. But in many cases
they are certainly theories which the patients invent to account for their abnormal bodily sensations.
In other cases they are due to hallucinations of hearing and of sight. Dr. Clouston (Clinical Lectures
on Mental Disease, lecture iii ad fin.) gives the following special delusions as having been found in
about a hundred melancholy female patients who were afflicted in this way. There were delusions of

general persecution;
being destitute;
general suspicion;
being followed by the police;
being poisoned;
being very wicked;
being killed;
impending death;
being conspired against;
impending calamity;
being defrauded;
the soul being lost;
being preached against in church; having no stomach;

being pregnant;
having a bone in the throat;
having lost much money;
being unfit to live;
that she will not recover;
that she is to be murdered;
that she is to be boiled alive;
that she is to be starved;
that the flesh is boiling;
that the head is severed
from the body;
that children are burning;
that murders take place around;
that it is wrong to take food;
being in hell;
being tempted of the devil;
being possessed of the devil;
having committed an
unpardonable sin;
unseen agencies working;
her own identity;
being on fire;

having no inside;
having neither stomach nor brains;
being covered with vermin;
letters being written about her;
property being stolen;
her children being killed;
having committed theft;
the legs being made of glass;
having horns on the head;
being chloroformed;
having committed murder;
fear of being hanged;
being called names by person;
being acted on by spirits;
being a man;
the body being transformed;
insects coming from the body;
rape being practised on her;
having a venereal disease;
being a fish;
being dead;
having committed suicide of the soul.

[123] V. Kandinsky: Kritische u. Klinische Betrachtungen im Gebiete d. Sinnestäuschungen (1886),
p. 42.
[124] See Proceedings of Soc. for Psych. Research, Dec. 1889, pp. 7, 183. The International
Congress for Experimental Psychology has now charge of the Census, and the present writer is its
agent for America.
[125] This case is of the class which Mr. Myers terms 'veridical.' In a subsequent letter the writer
informs me that his vision occurred some five hours before the child was born.
[126] Le Sommeil et les Rêves (1865), chaps. iii, iv.
[127] This theory of incomplete rectification of the inner images by their usual reductives is most
brilliantly stated by M. Taine in his work on Intelligence, book ii. chap. i.
[128] Not, of course, in all cases, because the cells remaining active are themselves on the way to be
overpowered by the general (unknown) condition to which sleep is due.

[129] For a full account of Jackson's theories, see his 'Croonian Lectures' published in the Brit. Med.
Journ. for 1884. Cf. also his remarks in the Discussion of Dr. Mercier's paper on Inhibition in 'Brain,'
xi. 361.
The loss of vivacity in the images in the process of waking, as well as the gain of it in falling asleep,
are both well described by M. Taine, who writes (on Intelligence, i. 50, 58) that often in the daytime,
when fatigued and seated in a chair, it is sufficient for him to close one eye with a handkerchief,
when, "by degrees, the sight of the other eye becomes vague, and it closes. All external sensations are
gradually effaced, or cease, at all events, to be remarked; the internal images, on the other hand,
feeble and rapid during the state of complete wakefulness, become intense, distinct, colored, steady,
and lasting: there is a sort of ecstasy, accompanied by a feeling of expansion and of comfort. Warned
by frequent experience, I know that sleep is coming on, and that I must not disturb the rising vision; I
remain passive, and in a few minutes it is complete. Architecture, landscapes, moving figures, pass
slowly by, and sometimes remain, with incomparable clearness of form and fulness of being; sleep
comes on, and I know no more of the real world I am in. Many times, like M. Maury, I have caused
myself to be gently roused at different moments of this state, and have thus been able to mark its
characters.—The intense image which seems an external object is but a more forcible continuation of
the feeble image which an instant before I recognized as internal; some scrap of a forest, some house,
some person which I vaguely imagined on closing my eyes, has in a minute become present to me
with full bodily details, so as to change into a complete hallucination. Then, waking up on a hand
touching me, I feel the figure decay, lose color, and evaporate: what had appeared a substance is
reduced to a shadow.... In such a case, I have often seen, for a passing moment, the image grow pale,
waste away, and evaporate; sometimes, on opening the eyes, a fragment of landscape or the skirt of a
dress appears still to float over the fire-irons or on the black hearth." This persistence of dreamobjects for a few moments after the eyes are opened seems to be no extremely rare experience. Many
cases of it have been reported to me directly. Compare Müller's Physiology, Baly's tr., p. 945.
[130] I say the 'normal' paths, because hallucinations are not incompatible with some paths of
association being left. Some hypnotic patients will not only have hallucinations of objects suggested
to them, but will amplify them and act out the situation. But the paths here seem excessively narrow,
and the reflections which ought to make the hallucination incredible do not occur to the subject's
mind. In general, the narrower a train of 'ideas' is, the vivider the consciousness is of each. Under
ordinary circumstances, the entire brain probably plays a part in draining any centre which may be
ideationally active. When the drainage is reduced in any way it probably makes the active process
more intense.
[131] M. A. Maury gives a number: op. cit. pp. 126-8.
[132] M. Binet's highly important experiments, which were first published in vol. XVII of the Revue
Philosophique (1884), are also given in full in chapter ix of his and Féré's work on 'Animal
Magnetism' in the International Scientific Series. Where there is no dot on the paper, nor any other
visible mark, the subject's judgment about the 'portrait' would seem to be guided by what he sees
happening to the entire sheet.
[133] It is a difficult thing to distinguish in a hypnotic patient between a genuine sensorial
hallucination of something suggested and a conception of it merely, coupled with belief that it is
there. I have been surprised at the vagueness with which such subjects will often trace upon blank
paper the outlines of the pictures which they say they 'see' thereupon. On the other hand, you will
hear them say that they find no difference between a real flower which you show them and an
imaginary flower which you tell them is beside it. When told that one is imaginary and that they must
pick out the real one, they sometimes say the choice is impossible, and sometimes they point to the
imaginary flower.

[134] Only the other day, to three hypnotized girls, I failed to double a hallucination with a prism. Of
course it may not have been a fully-developed hallucination.
[135] Brain, xi. 441.
[136] Mind, x. 161, 316; and Phantasms of the Living (1886), i. 470-488.
[137] In Mr. Gurney's work, just cited, a very large number of veridical cases are critically discussed.
[138] Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 186.
[139] Literature. The best treatment of perception with which I am acquainted is that in Mr. James
Sully's book on 'Illusions' in the International Scientific Series. On hallucinations the literature is
large. Gurney, Kandinsky (as already cited), and some articles by Kraepelin in the Vierteljahrschrift
für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie, vol. v (1881), are the most systematic studies recently made. All
works on Insanity treat of them. Dr. W. W. Ireland's works, 'The Blot upon the Brain' (1886) and
'Through the Ivory Gate' (1890) have much information on the subject. Gurney gives pretty complete
references to older literature. The most important thing on the subject from the point of view of
theory is the article by Mr. Myers on the Demon of Socrates in the Proceedings of the Society for
Psychical Research for 1889, p. 522.

CHAPTER XX.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.[140]
THE FEELING OF CRUDE EXTENSITY.
In the sensations of hearing, touch, sight, and pain we are accustomed to
distinguish from among the other elements the element of voluminousness.
We call the reverberations of a thunderstorm more voluminous than the
squeaking of a slate-pencil; the entrance into a warm bath gives our skin a
more massive feeling than the prick of a pin; a little neuralgic pain, fine as a
cobweb, in the face, seems less extensive than the heavy soreness of a boil
or the vast discomfort of a colic or a lumbago; and a solitary star looks
smaller than the noonday sky. In the sensation of dizziness or subjective
motion, which recent investigation has proved to be connected with
stimulation of the semi-circular canals of the ear, the spatial character is
very prominent. Whether the 'muscular sense' directly yields us knowledge
of space is still a matter of litigation among psychologists. Whilst some go
so far as to ascribe our entire cognition of extension to its exclusive aid,
others deny to it all extensive quality whatever. Under these circumstances

we shall do better to adjourn its consideration; admitting, however, that it
seems at first sight as if we felt something decidedly more voluminous
when we contract our thigh-muscles than when we twitch an eyelid or some
small muscle in the face. It seems, moreover, as if this difference lay in the
feeling of the thigh-muscles themselves.
In the sensations of smell and taste this element of varying vastness seems
less prominent but not altogether absent. Some tastes and smells appear less
extensive than complex flavors, like that of roast meat or plum pudding, on
the one hand, or heavy odors like musk or tuberose, on the other. The
epithet sharp given to the acid class would seem to show that to the popular
mind there is something narrow and, as it were, streaky, in the impression
they make, other flavors and odors being bigger and rounder.
The sensations derived from the inward organs are also distinctly more or
less voluminous. Repletion and emptiness, suffocation, palpitation,
headache, are examples of this, and certainly not less spatial is the
consciousness we have of our general bodily condition in nausea, fever,
heavy drowsiness, and fatigue. Our entire cubic content seems then sensibly
manifest to us as such, and feels much larger than any local pulsation,
pressure, or discomfort. Skin and retina are, however, the organs in which
the space-element plays the most active part. Not only does the maximal
vastness yielded by the retina surpass that yielded by any other organ, but
the intricacy with which our attention can subdivide this vastness and
perceive it to be composed of lesser portions simultaneously coexisting
alongside of each other is without a parallel elsewhere.[141] The ear gives a
greater vastness than the skin, but is considerably less able to subdivide it.
[142]

Now my first thesis is that this element, discernible in each and every
sensation, though more developed in some than in others, is the original
sensation of space, out of which all the exact knowledge about space that
we afterwards come to have is woven by processes of discrimination,
association, and selection. 'Extensity,' as Mr. James Ward calls it,[143] on
this view, becomes an element in each sensation just as intensity is. The

latter every one will admit to be a distinguishable though not separable
ingredient of the sensible quality. In like manner extensity, being an entirely
peculiar kind of feeling indescribable except in terms of itself, and
inseparable in actual experience from some sensational quality which it
must accompany, can itself receive no other name than that of sensational
element.
It must now be noted that the vastness hitherto spoken of is as great in one
direction as in another. Its dimensions are so vague that in it there is no
question as yet of surface as opposed to depth; 'volume' being the best short
name for the sensation in question. Sensations of different orders are
roughly comparable, inter se, with respect to their volumes. This shows that
the spatial quality in each is identical wherever found, for different
qualitative elements, e.g. warmth and odor, are incommensurate. Persons
born blind are reported surprised at the largeness with which objects appear
to them when their sight is restored. Franz says of his patient cured of
cataract: "He saw everything much larger than he had supposed from the
idea obtained by his sense of touch. Moving, and especially living, objects
appeared very large."[144] Loud sounds have a certain enormousness of
feeling. It is impossible to conceive of the explosion of a cannon as filling a
small space. In general, sounds seem to occupy all the room between us and
their source; and in the case of certain ones, the cricket's song, the whistling
of the wind, the roaring of the surf, or a distant railway train, to have no
definite starting point.
In the sphere of vision we have facts of the same order. 'Glowing' bodies, as
Hering says, give us a perception "which seems roomy (raumhaft) in
comparison with that of strictly surface color. A glowing iron looks
luminous through and through, and so does a flame."[145] A luminous fog, a
band of sunshine, affect us in the same way. As Hering urges:
"We must distinguish roomy from superficial, as well as distinctly
from indistinctly bounded, sensations. The dark which with closed
eyes one sees before one is, for example, a roomy sensation. We do not
see a black surface like a wall in front of us, but a space filled with
darkness, and even when we succeed in seeing this darkness as
terminated by a black wall there still remains in front of this wall the
dark space. The same thing happens when we find ourselves with open

eyes in an absolutely dark room. This sensation of darkness is also
vaguely bounded. An example of a distinctly bounded roomy sensation
is that of a clear and colored fluid seen in a glass; the yellow of the
wine is seen not only on the bounding surface of the glass; the yellow
sensation fills the whole interior of the glass. By day the so-called
empty space between us and objects seen appears very different from
what it is by night. The increasing darkness settles not only upon the
things but also between us and the things, so as at last to cover them
completely and fill the space alone. If I look into a dark box I find it
filled with darkness, and this is seen not merely as the dark-colored
sides or walls of the box. A shady corner in an otherwise well-lighted
room is full of a darkness which is not only on the walls and floor but
between them in the space they include. Every sensation is there where
I experience it, and if I have it at once at every point of a certain roomy
space, it is then a voluminous sensation. A cube of transparent green
glass gives us a spatial sensation; an opaque cube painted green, on the
contrary, only sensations of surface."[146]
There are certain quasi-motor sensations in the head when we change the
direction of the attention, which equally seem to involve three dimensions.
If with closed eyes we think of the top of the house and then of the cellar, of
the distance in front of us and then of that behind us, of space far to the
right and then far to the left, we have something far stronger than an idea,—
an actual feeling, namely, as if something in the head moved into another
direction. Fechner was, I believe, the first to publish any remarks on these
feelings. He writes as follows:
"When we transfer the attention from objects of one sense to those of
another we have an indescribable feeling (though at the same time one
perfectly determinate and reproducible at pleasure) of altered direction,
or differently localized tension (Spannung). We feel a strain forward in
the eyes, one directed sideways in the ears, increasing with the degree
of our attention, and changing according as we look at an object
carefully, or listen to something attentively; wherefore we speak of
straining the attention. The difference is most plainly felt when the
attention vibrates rapidly between eye and ear. This feeling localizes
itself with most decided difference in regard to the various sense-

organs according as we wish to discriminate a thing delicately by
touch, taste, or smell.
"But now I have, when I try to vividly recall a picture of memory or
fancy, a feeling perfectly analogous to that which I experience when I
seek to grasp a thing keenly by eye or ear; and this analogous feeling is
very differently localized. While in sharpest possible attention to real
objects (as well as to after-images) the strain is plainly forwards, and,
when the attention changes from one sense to another, only alters its
direction between the sense-organs, leaving the rest of the head free
from strain, the case is different in memory or fancy; for here the
feeling withdraws entirely from the external sense-organs, and seems
rather to take refuge in that part of the head which the brain fills. If I
wish, for example, to recall a place or person, it will arise before me
with vividness, not according as I strain my attention forwards, but
rather in proportion as I, so to speak, retract it backwards."[147]
It appears probable that the feelings which Fechner describes are in part
constituted by imaginary semi-circular canal sensations.[148] These
undoubtedly convey the most delicate perception of change in direction;
and when, as here, the changes are not perceived as taking place in the
external world, they occupy a vague internal space located within the head.
[149]

In the skin itself there is a vague form of projection into the third dimension
to which Hering has called attention.
"Heat is not felt only against the cutaneous surface, but when
communicated through the air may appear extending more or less out
from the surface into the third dimension of surrounding space.... We
can determine in the dark the place of a radiant body by moving the
hand to and fro, and attending to the fluctuation of our feeling of
warmth. The feeling itself, however, is not projected fully into the spot
at which we localize the hot body, but always remains in the
neighborhood of the hand."
The interior of one's mouth-cavity feels larger when explored by the tongue
than when looked at. The crater of a newly-extracted tooth, and the
movements of a loose tooth in its socket, feel quite monstrous. A midge

buzzing against the drum of the ear will often seem as big as a butterfly.
The spatial sensibility of the tympanic membrane has hitherto been very
little studied, though the subject will well repay much trouble. If we
approach it by introducing into the outer ear some small object like the tip
of a rolled-up tissue-paper lamplighter, we are surprised at the large
radiating sensation which its presence gives us, and at the sense of clearness
and openness which comes when it is removed. It is immaterial to inquire
whether the far-reaching sensation here be due to actual irradiation upon
distant nerves or not. We are considering now, not the objective causes of
the spatial feeling, but its subjective varieties, and the experiment shows
that the same object gives more of it to the inner than to the outer cuticle of
the ear. The pressure of the air in the tympanic cavity upon the membrane
gives an astonishingly large sensation. We can increase the pressure by
holding our nostrils and closing our mouth and forcing air through our
Eustachian tubes by an expiratory effort; and we can diminish it by either
inspiring or swallowing under the same conditions of closed mouth and
nose. In either case we get a large round tridimensional sensation inside of
the head, which seems as if it must come from the affection of an organ
much larger than the tympanic membrane, whose surface hardly exceeds
that of one's little-finger-nail.
The tympanic membrane is furthermore able to render sensible differences
in the pressure of the external atmosphere, too slight to be felt either as
noise or in this more violent way. If the reader will sit with closed eyes and
let a friend approximate some solid object, like a large book, noiselessly to
his face, he will immediately become aware of the object's presence and
position—likewise of its departure. A friend of the writer, making the
experiment for the first time, discriminated unhesitatingly between the three
degrees of solidity of a board, a lattice-frame, and a sieve, held close to his
ear. Now as this sensation is never used by ordinary persons as a means of
perception, we may fairly assume that its felt quality, in those whose
attention is called to it for the first time, belongs to it quâ sensation, and
owes nothing to educational suggestions. But this felt quality is most
distinctly and unmistakably one of vague spatial vastness in three
dimensions—quite as much so as is the felt quality of the retinal sensation
when we lie on our back and fill the entire field of vision with the empty
blue sky. When an object is brought near the ear we immediately feel shut
in, contracted; when the object is removed, we suddenly feel as if a

transparency, clearness, openness, had been made outside of us. And the
feeling will, by any one who will take the pains to observe it, be
acknowledged to involve the third dimension in a vague, unmeasured state.
[150]

The reader will have noticed, in this enumeration of facts, that
voluminousness of the feeling seems to bear very little relation to the size of
the organ that yields it. The ear and eye are comparatively minute organs,
yet they give us feelings of great volume. The same lack of exact proportion
between size of feeling and size of organ affected obtains within the limits
of particular sensory organs. An object appears smaller on the lateral
portions of the retina than it does on the fovea, as may be easily verified by
holding the two forefingers parallel and a couple of inches apart, and
transferring the gaze of one eye from one to the other. Then the finger not
directly looked at will appear to shrink, and this whatever be the direction
of the fingers. On the tongue a crumb, or the calibre of a small tube, appears
larger than between the fingers. If two points kept equidistant (blunted
compass- or scissors-points, for example) be drawn across the skin so as
really to describe a pair of parallel lines, the lines will appear farther apart
in some spots than in others. If, for example, we draw them horizontally
across the face, so that the mouth falls between them, the person
experimented upon will feel as if they began to diverge near the mouth and
to include it in a well-marked ellipse. In like manner, if we keep the
compass-points one or two centimetres apart, and draw them down the
forearm over the wrist and palm, finally drawing one along one finger, the
other along its neighbor, the appearance will be that of a single line, soon
breaking into two, which become more widely separated below the wrist, to
contract again in the palm, and finally diverge rapidly again towards the
finger-tips. The dotted lines in Figs. 51 and 52 represent the true path of the
compass-points; the full lines their apparent path.

FIG. 51 (after Weber).

The same length of skin, moreover, will convey a more extensive sensation
according to the manner of stimulation. If the edge of a card be pressed
against the skin, the distance between its extremities will seem shorter than
that between two compass-tips touching the same terminal points.[151]

FIG. 52 (after Weber).

In the eye, intensity of nerve-stimulation seems to increase the volume of
the feeling as well as its brilliancy. If we raise and lower the gas alternately,
the whole room and all the objects in it seem alternately to enlarge and
contract. If we cover half a page of small print with a gray glass, the print
seen through the glass appears decidedly smaller than that seen outside of it,
and the darker the glass the greater the difference. When a circumscribed

opacity in front of the retina keeps off part of the light from the portion
which it covers, objects projected on that portion may seem but half as large
as when their image falls outside of it.[152] The inverse effect seems
produced by certain drugs and anæsthetics. Morphine, atropine, daturine,
and cold blunt the sensibility of the skin, so that distances upon it seem less.
Haschish produces strange perversions of the general sensibility. Under its
influence one's body may seem either enormously enlarged or strangely
contracted. Sometimes a single member will alter its proportion to the rest;
or one's back, for instance, will appear entirely absent, as if one were
hollow behind. Objects comparatively near will recede to a vast distance, a
short street assume to the eye an immeasurable perspective. Ether and
chloroform occasionally produce not wholly dissimilar results. Panum, the
German physiologist, relates that when, as a boy, he was etherized for
neuralgia, the objects in the room grew extremely small and distant, before
his field of vision darkened over and the roaring in his ears began. He also
mentions that a friend of his in church, struggling in vain to keep awake,
saw the preacher grow smaller and smaller and more and more distant. I
myself on one occasion observed the same recession of objects during the
beginning of chloroformization. In various cerebral diseases we find
analogous disturbances.
Can we assign the physiological conditions which make the elementary
sensible largeness of one sensation vary so much from that of another?
Only imperfectly. One factor in the result undoubtedly is the number of
nerve-terminations simultaneously excited by the outward agent that
awakens the sensation. When many skin-nerves are warmed, or much
retinal surface illuminated, our feeling is larger than when a lesser nervous
surface is excited. The single sensation yielded by two compass-points,
although it seems simple, is yet felt to be much bigger and blunter than that
yielded by one. The touch of a single point may always be recognized by its
quality of sharpness. This page looks much smaller to the reader if he closes
one eye than if both eyes are open. So does the moon, which latter fact
shows that the phenomenon has nothing to do with parallax. The celebrated
boy couched for the cataract by Chesselden thought, after his first eye was
operated, "all things he saw extremely large," but being couched of his
second eye, said "that objects at first appeared large to this eye, but not so
large as they did at first to the other; and looking upon the same object with

both eyes, he thought it looked about twice as large as with the first
couched eye only, but not double, that we can anyways discover."
The greater extensiveness that the feeling of certain parts of the same
surface has over other parts, and that one order of surface has over another
(retina over skin, for example), may also to a certain extent be explained by
the operation of the same factor. It is an anatomical fact that the most
spatially sensitive surfaces (retina, tongue, finger-tips, etc.) are supplied by
nerve-trunks of unusual thickness, which must supply to every unit of
surface-area an unusually large number of terminal fibres. But the
variations of felt extension obey probably only a very rough law of
numerical proportion to the number of fibres. A sound is not twice as
voluminous to two ears as to one; and the above-cited variations of feeling,
when the same surface is excited under different conditions, show that the
feeling is a resultant of several factors of which the anatomical one is only
the principal. Many ingenious hypotheses have been brought forward to
assign the co-operating factors where different conditions give conflicting
amounts of felt space. Later we shall analyze some of these cases in detail,
but it must be confessed here in advance that many of them resist analysis
altogether.[153]
THE PERCEPTION OF SPATIAL ORDER.
So far, all we have established or sought to establish is the existence of the
vague form or quale of spatiality as an inseparable element bound up with
the other peculiarities of each and every one of our sensations. The
numerous examples we have adduced of the variations of this extensive
element have only been meant to make clear its strictly sensational
character. In very few of them will the reader have been able to explain the
variation by an added intellectual element, such as the suggestion of a
recollected experience. In almost all it has seemed to be the immediate
psychic effect of a peculiar sort of nerve-process excited; and all the nerveprocesses in question agree in yielding what space they do yield, to the
mind, in the shape of a simple total vastness, in which, primitively at least,
no order of parts or of subdivisions reigns.
Let no one be surprised at this notion of a space without order. There may
be a space without order just as there may be an order without space.[154]

And the primitive perceptions of space are certainly of an unordered kind.
The order which the spaces first perceived potentially include must, before
being distinctly apprehended by the mind, be woven into those spaces by a
rather complicated set of intellectual acts. The primordial largenesses which
the sensations yield must be measured and subdivided by consciousness,
and added together, before they can form by their synthesis what we know
as the real Space of the objective world. In these operations, imagination,
association, attention, and selection play a decisive part; and although they
nowhere add any new material to the space-data of sense, they so shuffle
and manipulate these data and hide present ones behind imagined ones that
it is no wonder if some authors have gone so far as to think that the sensedata have no spatial worth at all, and that the intellect, since it makes the
subdivisions, also gives the spatial quality to them out of resources of its
own.

As for ourselves, having found that all our sensations (however as yet
unconnected and undiscriminated) are of extensive objects, our next
problem, is: How do we ARRANGE these at first chaotically given spaces into
the one regular and orderly 'world of space' which we now know?
To begin with, there is no reason to suppose that the several sense-spaces of
which a sentient creature may become conscious, each filled with its own
peculiar content, should tend, simply because they are many, to enter into
any definite spatial intercourse with each other, or lie in any particular order
of positions. Even in ourselves we can recognize this. Different feelings
may coexist in us without assuming any particular spatial order. The sound
of the brook near which I write, the odor of the cedars, the comfort with
which my breakfast has filled me, and my interest in this paragraph, all lie
distinct in my consciousness, but in no sense outside or alongside of each
other. Their spaces are interfused and at most fill the same vaguely
objective world. Even where the qualities are far less disparate, we may
have something similar. If we take our subjective and corporeal sensations
alone, there are moments when, as we lie or sit motionless, we find it very
difficult to feel distinctly the length of our back or the direction of our feet
from our shoulders. By a strong effort we can succeed in dispersing our

attention impartially over our whole person, and then we feel the real shape
of our body in a sort of unitary way. But in general a few parts are strongly
emphasized to consciousness and the rest sink out of notice; and it is then
remarkable how vague and ambiguous our perception of their relative order
of location is. Obviously, for the orderly arrangement of a multitude of
sense-spaces in consciousness, something more than their mere separate
existence is required. What is this further condition?
If a number of sensible extents are to be perceived alongside of each other
and in definite order they must appear as parts in a vaster sensible extent
which can enter the mind simply and all at once. I think it will be seen that
the difficulty of estimating correctly the form of one's body by pure feeling
arises from the fact that it is very hard to feel its totality as a unit at all. The
trouble is similar to that of thinking forwards and backwards
simultaneously. When conscious of our head we tend to grow unconscious
of our feet, and there enters thus an element of time-succession into our
perception of ourselves which transforms the latter from an act of intuition
to one of construction. This element of constructiveness is present in a still
higher degree, and carries with it the same consequences, when we deal
with objective spaces too great to be grasped by a single look. The relative
positions of the shops in a town, separated by many tortuous streets, have to
be thus constructed from data apprehended in succession, and the result is a
greater or less degree of vagueness.
That a sensation be discriminated as a part from out of a larger enveloping
space is then the conditio sine quâ non of its being apprehended in a
definite spatial order. The problem of ordering our feelings in space is then,
in the first instance, a problem of discrimination, but not of discrimination
pure and simple; for then not only coexistent sights but coexistent sounds
would necessarily assume such order, which they notoriously do not.
Whatever is discriminated will appear as a small space within a larger
space, it is true, but this is but the very rudiment of order. For the location
of it within that space to become precise, other conditions still must
supervene; and the best way to study what they are will be to pause for a
little and analyze what the expression 'spatial order' means.

Spatial order is an abstract term. The concrete perceptions which it covers
are figures, directions, positions, magnitudes, and distances. To single out
any one of these things from a total vastness is partially to introduce order
into the vastness. To subdivide the vastness into a multitude of these things
is to apprehend it in a completely orderly way. Now what are these things
severally? To begin with, no one can for an instant hesitate to say that some
of them are qualities of sensation, just as the total vastness is in which they
lie. Take figure: a square, a circle, and a triangle appear in the first instance
to the eye simply as three different kinds of impressions, each so peculiar
that we should recognize it if it were to return. When Nunnely's patient had
his cataracts removed, and a cube and a sphere were presented to his notice,
he could at once perceive a difference in their shapes; and though he could
not say which was the cube and which the sphere, he saw they were not of
the same figure. So of lines: if we can notice lines at all in our field of
vision, it is inconceivable that a vertical one should not affect us differently
from an horizontal one, and should not be recognized as affecting us
similarly when presented again, although we might not yet know the name
'vertical,' or any of its connotations, beyond this peculiar affection of our
sensibility. So of angles: an obtuse one affects our feeling immediately in a
different way from an acute one. Distance-apart, too, is a simple sensation
—the sensation of a line joining the two distant points: lengthen the line,
you alter the feeling and with it the distance felt.
Space-relations.
But with distance and direction we pass to the category of space-relations,
and are immediately confronted by an opinion which makes of all relations
something toto cœlo different from all facts of feeling or imagination
whatsoever. A relation, for the Platonizing school in psychology, is an
energy of pure thought, and, as such, is quite incommensurable with the
data of sensibility between which it may be perceived to obtain.
We may consequently imagine a disciple of this school to say to us at this
point: "Suppose you have made a separate specific sensation of each line
and each angle, what boots it? You have still the order of directions and of
distances to account for; you have still the relative magnitudes of all these
felt figures to state; you have their respective positions to define before you

can be said to have brought order into your space. And not one of these
determinations can be effected except through an act of relating thought, so
that your attempt to give an account of space in terms of pure sensibility
breaks down almost at the very outset. Position, for example, can never be a
sensation, for it has nothing intrinsic about it; it can only obtain between a
spot, line, or other figure and extraneous co-ordinates, and can never be an
element of the sensible datum, the line or the spot, in itself. Let us then
confess that Thought alone can unlock the riddle of space, and that Thought
is an adorable but unfathomable mystery."
Such a method of dealing with the problem has the merit of shortness. Let
us, however, be in no such hurry, but see whether we cannot get a little
deeper by patiently considering what these space-relations are.
'Relation' is a very slippery word. It has so many different concrete
meanings that the use of it as an abstract universal may easily introduce
bewilderment into our thought. We must therefore be careful to avoid
ambiguity by making sure, wherever we have to employ it, what its precise
meaning is in that particular sphere of application. At present we have to do
with space-relations, and no others. Most 'relations' are feelings of an
entirely different order from the terms they relate. The relation of similarity,
e.g., may equally obtain between jasmine and tuberose, or between Mr.
Browning's verses and Mr. Story's; it is itself neither odorous nor poetical,
and those may well be pardoned who have denied to it all sensational
content whatever. But just as, in the field of quantity, the relation between
two numbers is another number, so in the field of space the relations are
facts of the same order with the facts they relate. If these latter be patches in
the circle of vision, the former are certain other patches between them.
When we speak of the relation of direction of two points toward each other,
we mean simply the sensation of the line that joins the two points together.
The line is the relation; feel it and you feel the relation, see it and you see
the relation; nor can you in any conceivable way think the latter except by
imagining the former (however vaguely), or describe or indicate the one
except by pointing to the other. And the moment you have imagined the
line, the relation stands before you in all its completeness, with nothing
further to be done. Just so the relation of direction between two lines is
identical with the peculiar sensation of shape of the space enclosed between
them. This is commonly called an angular relation.

If these relations are sensations, no less so are the relations of position. The
relation of position between the top and bottom points of a vertical line is
that line, and nothing else. The relations of position between a point and a
horizontal line below it are potentially numerous. There is one more
important than the rest, called its distance. This is the sensation, ideal or
actual, of a perpendicular drawn from the point to the line.[155] Two lines,
one from each extremity of the horizontal to the point, give us a peculiar
sensation of triangularity. This feeling may be said to constitute the locus of
all the relations of position of the elements in question. Rightness and
leftness, upness and downness, are again pure sensations differing
specifically from each other, and generically from everything else. Like all
sensations, they can only be indicated, not described. If we take a cube and
label one side top, another bottom, a third front, and a fourth back, there
remains no form of words by which we can describe to another person
which of the remaining sides is right and which left. We can only point and
say here is right and there is left, just as we should say this is red and that
blue. Of two points seen beside each other at all, one is always affected by
one of these feelings, and the other by the opposite; the same is true of the
extremities of any line.[156]
Thus it appears indubitable that all space-relations except those of
magnitude are nothing more or less than pure sensational objects. But
magnitude appears to outstep this narrow sphere. We have relations of
muchness and littleness between times, numbers, intensities, and qualities,
as well as spaces. It is impossible, then, that such relations should form a
particular kind of simply spatial feeling. This we must admit: the relation of
quantity is generic and occurs in many categories of consciousness, whilst
the other relations we have considered are specific and occur in space alone.
When our attention passes from a shorter line to a longer, from a smaller
spot to a larger, from a feebler light to a stronger, from a paler blue to a
richer, from a march tune to a galop, the transition is accompanied in the
synthetic field of consciousness by a peculiar feeling of difference which is
what we call the sensation of more,—more length, more expanse, more
light, more blue, more motion. This transitional sensation of more must be
identical with itself under all these different accompaniments, or we should
not give it the same name in every case. We get it when we pass from a
short vertical line to a long horizontal one, from a small square to a large

circle, as well as when we pass between those figures whose shapes are
congruous. But when the shapes are congruous our consciousness of the
relation is a good deal more distinct, and it is most distinct of all when, in
the exercise of our analytic attention, we notice, first, a part, and then the
whole, of a single line or shape. Then the more of the whole actually sticks
out, as a separate piece of space, and is so envisaged. The same exact
sensation of it is given when we are able to superpose one line or figure on
another. This indispensable condition of exact measurement of the more has
led some to think that the feeling itself arose in every case from original
experiences of superposition. This is probably not an absolutely true
opinion, but for our present purpose that is immaterial. So far as the
subdivisions of a sense-space are to be measured exactly against each other,
objective forms occupying one subdivision must directly or indirectly be
superposed upon the other, and the mind must get the immediate feeling of
an outstanding plus. And even where we only feel one subdivision to be
vaguely larger or less, the mind must pass rapidly between it and the other
subdivision, and receive the immediate sensible shock of the more.

We seem thus to have accounted for all space-relations, and made them
clear to our understanding. They are nothing but sensations of particular
lines, particular angles, particular forms of transition, or (in the case of a
distinct more) of particular outstanding portions of space after two figures
have been superposed. These relation-sensations may actually be produced
as such, as when a geometer draws new lines across a figure with his pencil
to demonstrate the relations of its parts, or they may be ideal representations
of lines, not really drawn. But in either case their entrance into the mind is
equivalent to a more detailed subdivision, cognizance, and measurement of
the space considered. The bringing of subdivisions to consciousness
constitutes, then, the entire process by which we pass from our first vague
feeling of a total vastness to a cognition of the vastness in detail. The more
numerous the subdivisions are, the more elaborate and perfect the cognition
becomes. But inasmuch as all the subdivisions are themselves sensations,
and even the feeling of 'more' or 'less' is, where not itself a figure, at least a
sensation of transition between two sensations of figure, it follows, for

aught we can as yet see to the contrary, that all spatial knowledge is
sensational at bottom, and that, as the sensations lie together in the unity of
consciousness, no new material element whatever comes to them from a
supra-sensible source.[157]
The bringing of subdivisions to consciousness! This, then, is our next topic.
They may be brought to consciousness under three aspects in respect of
their locality, in respect of their size, in respect of their shape.
The Meaning of Localization.
Confining ourselves to the problem of locality for the present, let us begin
with the simple case of a sensitive surface, only two points of which receive
stimulation from without. How, first, are these two points felt as alongside
of each other with an interval of space between them? We must be
conscious of two things for this: of the duality of the excited points, and of
the extensiveness of the unexcited interval. The duality alone, although a
necessary, is not a sufficient condition of the spatial separation. We may, for
instance, discern two sounds in the same place, sweet and sour in the same
lemonade, warm and cold, round and pointed contact in the same place on
the skin, etc.[158] In all discrimination the recognition of the duality of two
feelings by the mind is the easier the more strongly the feelings are
contrasted in quality. If our two excited points awaken identical qualities of
sensation, they must, perforce, appear to the mind as one; and, not
distinguished at all, they are, a fortiori, not localized apart. Spots four
centimetres distant on the back have no qualitative contrast at all, and fuse
into a single sensation. Points less than three thousandths of a millimetre
apart awaken on the retina sensations so contrasted that we apprehend them
immediately as two. Now these unlikenesses which arise so slowly when
we pass from one point to another in the back, so much faster on the tongue
and finger-tips, but with such inconceivable rapidity on the retina, what are
they? Can we discover anything about their intrinsic nature?
The most natural and immediate answer to make is that they are unlikeness
of place pure and simple. In the words of a German physiologist,[159] to
whom psychophysics owes much:

"The sensations are from the outset (von vornherein) localized....
Every sensation as such is from the very beginning affected with the
spatial quality, so that this quality is nothing like an external attribute
coming to the sensation from a higher faculty, but must be regarded as
something immanently residing in the sensation itself."
And yet the moment we reflect on this answer an insuperable logical
difficulty seems to present itself. No single quale of sensation can, by itself,
amount to a consciousness of position. Suppose no feeling but that of a
single point ever to be awakened. Could that possibly be the feeling of any
special whereness or thereness? Certainly not. Only when a second point is
felt to arise can the first one acquire a determination of up, down, right or
left, and these determinations are all relative to that second point. Each
point, so far as it is placed, is then only by virtue of what it is not, namely,
by virtue of another point. This is as much as to say that position has
nothing intrinsic about it; and that, although a feeling of absolute bigness
may, a feeling of place cannot, possibly form an immanent element in any
single isolated sensation. The very writer we have quoted has given heed to
this objection, for he continues (p. 335) by saying that the sensations thus
originally localized "are only so in themselves, but not in the representation
of consciousness, which is not yet present.... They are, in the first instance,
devoid of all mutual relations with each other." But such a localization of
the sensation 'in itself' would seem to mean nothing more than the
susceptibility or potentiality of being distinctly localized when the time
came and other conditions became fulfilled. Can we now discover anything
about such susceptibility in itself before it has borne its ulterior fruits in the
developed consciousness?
'Local Signs.'
To begin with, every sensation of the skin and every visceral sensation
seems to derive from its topographic seat a peculiar shade of feeling, which
it would not have in another place. And this feeling per se seems quite
another thing from the perception of the place. Says Wundt[160]:
"If with the finger we touch first the cheek and then the palm, exerting
each time precisely the same pressure, the sensation shows

notwithstanding a distinctly marked difference in the two cases.
Similarly, when we compare the palm with the back of the hand, the
nape of the neck with its anterior surface, the breast with the back; in
short, any two distant parts of the skin with each other. And moreover,
we easily remark, by attentively observing, that spots even tolerably
close together differ in respect of the quality of their feeling. If we pass
from one point of our cutaneous surface to another, we find a perfectly
gradual and continuous alteration in our feeling, notwithstanding the
objective nature of the contact has remained the same. Even the
sensations of corresponding points on opposite sides of the body,
though similar, are not identical. If, for instance, we touch first the
back of one hand and then of the other, we remark a qualitative
unlikeness of sensation. It must not be thought that such differences
are mere matters of imagination, and that we take the sensations to be
different because we represent each of them to ourselves as occupying
a different place. With sufficient sharpening of the attention, we may,
confining ourselves to the quality of the feelings alone, entirely
abstract from their locality, and yet notice the differences quite as
markedly."
Whether these local contrasts shade into each other with absolutely
continuous gradations, we cannot say. But we know (continues Wundt) that
"they change, when we pass from one point of the skin to its neighbor,
with very different degrees of rapidity. On delicately-feeling parts,
used principally for touching, such as the finger-tips, the difference of
sensation between two closely approximate points is already strongly
pronounced; whilst in parts of lesser delicacy, as the arm, the back, the
legs, the disparities of sensation are observable only between distant
spots."
The internal organs, too, have their specific qualia of sensation. An
inflammation of the kidney is different from one of the liver; pains in joints
and muscular insertions are distinguished. Pain in the dental nerves is
wholly unlike the pain of a burn. But very important and curious similarities
prevail throughout these differences. Internal pains, whose seat we cannot
see, and have no means of knowing unless the character of the pain itself

reveal it, are felt where they belong. Diseases of the stomach, kidney, liver,
rectum, prostate, etc., of the bones, of the brain and its membranes, are
referred to their proper position. Nerve-pains describe the length of the
nerve. Such localizations as those of vertical, frontal, or occipital headache
of intracranial origin force us to conclude that parts which are neighbors,
whether inner or outer, may possess by mere virtue of that fact a common
peculiarity of feeling, a respect in which their sensations agree, and which
serves as a token of their proximity. These local colorings are, moreover, so
strong that we cognize them as the same, throughout all contrasts of
sensible quality in the accompanying perception. Cold and heat are wide as
the poles asunder; yet if both fall on the cheek, there mixes with them
something that makes them in that respect identical; just as, contrariwise,
despite the identity of cold with itself wherever found, when we get it first
on the palm and then on the cheek, some difference comes, which keeps the
two experiences for ever asunder.[161]
And now let us revert to the query propounded a moment since: Can these
differences of mere quality in feeling, varying according to locality yet
having each sensibly and intrinsically and by itself nothing to do with
position, constitute the 'susceptibilities' we mentioned, the conditions of
being perceived in position, of the localities to which they belong? The
numbers on a row of houses, the initial letters of a set of words, have no
intrinsic kinship with points of space, and yet they are the conditions of our
knowledge of where any house is in the row, or any word in the dictionary.
Can the modifications of feeling in question be tags or labels of this kind
which in no wise originally reveal the position of the spot to which they are
attached, but guide us to it by what Berkeley would call a 'customary tie'?
Many authors have unhesitatingly replied in the affirmative; Lotze, who in
his Medizinische Psychologie[162] first described the sensations in this way,
designating them, thus conceived, as local-signs. This term has obtained
wide currency in Germany, and in speaking of the 'LOCAL-SIGN THEORY'
hereafter, I shall always mean the theory which denies that there can be in a
sensation any element of actual locality, of inherent spatial order, any tone
as it were which cries to us immediately and without further ado, 'I am
here,' or 'I am there.'
If, as may well be the case, we by this time find ourselves tempted to accept
the Local-sign theory in a general way, we have to clear up several farther

matters. If a sign is to lead us to the thing it means, we must have some
other source of knowledge of that thing. Either the thing has been given in a
previous experience of which the sign also formed part—they are
associated; or it is what Reid calls a 'natural' sign, that is, a feeling which,
the first time it enters the mind, evokes from the native powers thereof a
cognition of the thing that hitherto had lain dormant. In both cases,
however, the sign is one thing, and the thing another. In the instance that
now concerns us, the sign is a quality of feeling and the thing is a position.
Now we have seen that the position of a point is not only revealed, but
created, by the existence of other points to which it stands in determinate
relations. If the sign can by any machinery which it sets in motion evoke a
consciousness either of the other points, or of the relations, or of both, it
would seem to fulfil its function, and reveal to us the position we seek.
But such a machinery is already familiar to us. It is neither more nor less
than the law of habit in the nervous system. When any point of the sensitive
surface has been frequently excited simultaneously with, or immediately
before or after, other points, and afterwards comes to be excited alone, there
will be a tendency for its perceptive nerve-centre to irradiate into the nervecentres of the other points. Subjectively considered, this is the same as if we
said that the peculiar feeling of the first point SUGGESTS the feeling of the
entire region with whose stimulation its own excitement has been habitually
ASSOCIATED.
Take the case of the stomach. When the epigastrium is heavily pressed,
when certain muscles contract, etc., the stomach is squeezed, and its
peculiar local sign awakes in consciousness simultaneously with the local
signs of the other squeezed parts. There is also a sensation of total vastness
aroused by the combined irritation, and somewhere in this the stomachfeeling seems to lie. Suppose that later a pain arises in the stomach from
some non-mechanical cause. It will be tinged by the gastric local sign, and
the nerve-centre supporting this latter feeling will excite the centre
supporting the dermal and muscular feelings habitually associated with it
when the excitement was mechanical. From the combination the same
peculiar vastness will again arise. In a word, 'something' in the stomachsensation 'reminds' us of a total space, of which the diaphragmatic and
epigastric sensations also form a part, or, to express it more briefly still,
suggests the neighborhood of these latter organs.[163]

Revert to the case of two excited points on a surface with an unexcited
space between them. The general result of previous experience has been
that when either point was impressed by an outward object, the same object
also touched the immediately neighboring parts. Each point, together with
its local sign, is thus associated with a circle of surrounding points, the
association fading in strength as the circle grows larger. Each will revive its
own circle; but when both are excited together, the strongest revival will be
that due to the combined irradiation. Now the tract joining the two excited
points is the only part common to the two circles. And the feelings of this
whole tract will therefore awaken with considerable vividness in the
imagination when its extremities are touched by an outward irritant. The
mind receives with the impression of the two distinct points the vague idea
of a line. The twoness of the points comes from the contrast of their local
signs: the line comes from the associations into which experience has
wrought these latter. If no ideal line arises we have duality without sense of
interval; if the line be excited actually rather than ideally, we have the
interval given with its ends, in the form of a single extended object felt. E.
H. Weber, in the famous article in which he laid the foundations of all our
accurate knowledge of these subjects, laid it down as the logical requisite
for the perception of two separated points, that the mind should, along with
its consciousness of them, become aware of an unexcited interval as such. I
have only tried to show how the known laws of experience may cause this
requisite to be fulfilled. Of course, if the local signs of the entire region
offer but little qualitative contrast inter se, the line suggested will be but
dimly defined or discriminated in length or direction from other possible
lines in its neighborhood. This is what happens in the back, where
consciousness can sunder two spots, whilst only vaguely apprehending their
distance and direction apart.
The relation of position of the two points is the suggested interval or line.
Turn now to the simplest case, that of a single excited spot. How can it
suggest its position? Not by recalling any particular line unless experience
have constantly been in the habit of marking or tracing some one line from
it towards some one neighboring point. Now on the back, belly, viscera,
etc., no such tracing habitually occurs. The consequence is that the only
suggestion is that of the whole neighboring circle; i.e., the spot simply
recalls the general region in which it happens to lie. By a process of
successive construction, it is quite true that we can also get the feeling of

distance between the spot and some other particular spot. Attention, by
reinforcing the local sign of one part of the circle, can awaken a new circle
round this part, and so de proche en proche we may slide our feeling down
from our cheek, say, to our foot. But when we first touched our cheek we
had no consciousness of the foot at all.[164] In the extremities, the lips, the
tongue and other mobile parts, the case is different. We there have an
instinctive tendency, when a part of lesser discriminative sensibility is
touched, to move the member so that the touching object glides along it to
the place where sensibility is greatest. If a body touches our hand we move
the hand over it till the finger-tips are able to explore it. If the sole of our
foot touches anything we bring it towards the toes, and so forth. There thus
arise lines of habitual passage from all points of a member to its sensitive
tip. These are the lines most readily recalled when any point is touched, and
their recall is identical with the consciousness of the distance of the touched
point from the 'tip.' I think anyone must be aware when he touches a point
of his hand or wrist that it is the relation to the finger-tips of which he is
usually most conscious. Points on the forearm suggest either the finger-tips
or the elbow (the latter being a spot of greater sensibility[165]). In the foot it
is the toes, and so on. A point can only be cognized in its relations to the
entire body at once by awakening a visual image of the whole body. Such
awakening is even more obviously than the previously considered cases a
matter of pure association.

This leads us to the eye. On the retina the fovea and the yellow spot about it
form a focus of exquisite sensibility, towards which every impression
falling on an outlying portion of the field is moved by an instinctive action
of the muscles of the eyeball. Few persons, until their attention is called to
the fact, are aware how almost impossible it is to keep a conspicuous visible
object in the margin of the field of view. The moment volition is relaxed we
find that without our knowing it our eyes have turned so as to bring it to the
centre. This is why most persons are unable to keep the eyes steadily
converged upon a point in space with nothing in it. The objects against the
walls of the room invincibly attract the foveæ to themselves. If we
contemplate a blank wall or sheet of paper, we always observe in a moment

that we are directly looking at some speck upon it which, unnoticed at first,
ended by 'catching our eye.' Thus whenever an image falling on the point P
of the retina excites attention, it more habitually moves from that point
towards the fovea than in any one other direction. The line traced thus by
the image is not always a straight line. When the direction of the point from
the fovea is neither vertical nor horizontal but oblique, the line traced is
often a curve, with its concavity directed upwards if the direction is
upwards, downwards if the direction is downwards. This may be verified by
anyone who will take the trouble to make a simple experiment with a
luminous body like a candle-flame in a dark enclosure, or a star. Gazing
first at some point remote from the source of light, let the eye be suddenly
turned full upon the latter. The luminous image will necessarily fall in
succession upon a continuous series of points, reaching from the one first
affected to the fovea. But by virtue of the slowness with which retinal
excitements die away, the entire series of points will for an instant be
visible as an after-image, displaying the above peculiarity of form
according to its situation.[166] These radiating lines are neither regular nor
invariable in the same person, nor, probably, equally curved in different
individuals. We are incessantly drawing them between the fovea and every
point of the field of view. Objects remain in their peripheral indistinctness
only so long as they are unnoticed. The moment we attend to them they
grow distinct through one of these motions—which leads to the idea
prevalent among uninstructed persons that we see distinctly all parts of the
field of view at once. The result of this incessant tracing of radii is that
whenever a local sign P is awakened by a spot of light falling upon it, it
recalls forthwith, even though the eyeball be unmoved, the local signs of all
the other points which lie between P and the fovea. It recalls them in
imaginary form, just as the normal reflex movement would recall them in
vivid form; and with their recall is given a consciousness more or less faint
of the whole line on which they lie. In other words, no ray of light can fall
on any retinal spot without the local sign of that spot revealing to us, by
recalling the line of its most habitual associates, its direction and distance
from the centre of the field. The fovea acts thus as the origin of a system of
polar co-ordinates, in relation to which each and every retinal point has
through an incessantly-repeated process of association its distance and
direction determined. Were P alone illumined and all the rest of the field
dark we should still, even with motionless eyes, know whether P lay high or

low, right or left, through the ideal streak, different from all other streaks,
which P alone has the power of awakening.[167]
And with this we can close the first great division of our subject. We have
shown that, within the range of every sense, experience takes ab initio the
spatial form. We have also shown that in the cases of the retina and skin
every sensible total may be subdivided by discriminative attention into
sensible parts, which are also spaces, and into relations between the parts,
these being sensible spaces too. Furthermore, we have seen (in note 167)
that different parts, once discriminated, necessarily fall into a determinate
order, both by reason of definite gradations in their quality, and by reason of
the fixed order of time-succession in which movements arouse them. But in
all this nothing has been said of the comparative measurement of one
sensible space-total against another, or of the way in which, by summing
our divers simple sensible space-experiences together, we end by
constructing what we regard as the unitary, continuous, and infinite
objective Space of the real world. To this more difficult inquiry we next
pass.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF 'REAL' SPACE.
The problem breaks into two subordinate problems.
(1) How is the subdivision and measurement of the several sensorial spaces
completely effected? and
(2) How do their mutual addition and fusion and reduction to the same
scale, in a word, how does their synthesis, occur?
I think that, as in the investigation just finished, we found ourselves able to
get along without invoking any data but those that pure sensibility on the
one hand, and the ordinary intellectual powers of discrimination and
recollection on the other, were able to yield; so here we shall emerge from
our more complicated quest with the conviction that all the facts can be
accounted for on the supposition that no other mental forces have been at
work save those we find everywhere else in psychology: sensibility, namely,
for the data; and discrimination, association, memory, and choice for the
rearrangements and combinations which they undergo.

1. The Subdivision of the Original Sense-spaces.
How are spatial subdivisions brought to consciousness? in other words,
How does spatial discrimination occur? The general subject of
discrimination has been treated in a previous chapter. Here we need only
inquire what are the conditions that make spatial discrimination so much
finer in sight than in touch, and in touch than in hearing, smell, or taste.
The first great condition is, that different points of the surface shall differ in
the quality of their immanent sensibility, that is, that each shall carry its
special local-sign. If the skin felt everywhere exactly alike, a foot-bath
could be distinguished from a total immersion, as being smaller, but never
distinguished from a wet face. The local-signs are indispensable; two points
which have the same local-sign will always be felt as the same point. We do
not judge them two unless we have discerned their sensations to be
different.[168] Granted none but homogeneous irritants, that organ would
then distinguish the greatest multiplicity of irritants—would count most
stars or compass-points, or best compare the size of two wet surfaces—
whose local sensibility was the least even. A skin whose sensibility shaded
rapidly off from a focus, like the apex of a boil, would be better than a
homogeneous integument for spatial perception. The retina, with its
exquisitely sensitive fovea, has this peculiarity, and undoubtedly owes to it
a great part of the minuteness with which we are able to subdivide the total
bigness of the sensation it yields. On its periphery the local differences do
not shade off very rapidly, and we can count there fewer subdivisions.
But these local differences of feeling, so long as the surface is unexcited
from without, are almost null. I cannot feel them by a pure mental act of
attention unless they belong to quite distinct parts of the body, as the nose
and the lip, the finger-tip and the ear; their contrast needs the reinforcement
of outward excitement to be felt. In the spatial muchness of a colic—or, to
call it by the more spacious-sounding vernacular, of a 'bellyache'—one can
with difficulty distinguish the north-east from the south-west corner, but can
do so much more easily if, by pressing one's finger against the former
region, one is able to make the pain there more intense.
The local differences require then an adventitious sensation, superinduced
upon them, to awaken the attention. After the attention has once been

awakened in this way, it may continue to be conscious of the unaided
difference; just as a sail on the horizon may be too faint for us to notice
until someone's finger, placed against the spot, has pointed it out to us, but
may then remain visible after the finger has been withdrawn. But all this is
true only on condition that separate points of the surface may be exclusively
stimulated. If the whole surface at once be excited from without, and
homogeneously, as, for example, by immersing the body in salt water, local
discrimination is not furthered. The local-signs, it is true, all awaken at
once; but in such multitude that no one of them, with its specific quality,
stands out in contrast with the rest. If, however, a single extremity be
immersed, the contrast between the wet and dry parts is strong, and, at the
surface of the water especially, the local-signs attract the attention, giving
the feeling of a ring surrounding the member. Similarly, two or three wet
spots separated by dry spots, or two or three hard points against the skin,
will help to break up our consciousness of the latter's bigness. In cases of
this sort, where points receiving an identical kind of excitement are,
nevertheless, felt to be locally distinct, and the objective irritants are also
judged multiple,—e.g., compass-points on skin or stars on retina,—the
ordinary explanation is no doubt just, and we judge the outward causes to
be multiple because we have discerned the local feelings of their sensations
to be different.
Capacity for partial stimulation is thus the second condition favoring
discrimination. A sensitive surface which has to be excited in all its parts at
once can yield nothing but a sense of undivided largeness. This appears to
be the case with the olfactory, and to all intents and purposes with the
gustatory, surfaces. Of many tastes and flavors, even simultaneously
presented, each affects the totality of its respective organ, each appears with
the whole vastness given by that organ, and appears interpenetrated by the
rest.[169]
I should have been willing some years ago to name without hesitation a
third condition of discrimination—saying it would be most developed in
that organ which is susceptible of the most various qualities of feeling. The
retina is unquestionably such an organ. The colors and shades it perceives
are infinitely more numerous than the diversities of skin-sensation. And it
can feel at once white and black, whilst the ear can in nowise so feel sound
and silence. But the late researches of Donaldson, Blix, and Goldscheider,
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on specific points for heat, cold, pressure, and pain in the skin; the
older ones of Czermak (repeated later by Klug in Ludwig's laboratory),
showing that a hot and a cold compass-point are no more easily
discriminated as two than two of equal temperature; and some unpublished
experiments of my own—all disincline me to make much of this condition
now.[171] There is, however, one quality of sensation which is particularly
exciting, and that is the feeling of motion over any of our surfaces. The
erection of this into a separate elementary quality of sensibility is one of the
most recent of psychological achievements, and is worthy of detaining us a
while at this point.
The Sensation of Motion over Surfaces.
The feeling of motion has generally been assumed by physiologists to be
impossible until the positions of terminus a quo and terminus ad quem are
severally cognized, and the successive occupancies of these positions by the
moving body are perceived to be separated by a distinct interval of time.
[172] As a matter of fact, however, we cognize only the very slowest motions
in this way. Seeing the hand of a clock at XII and afterwards at VI, we
judge that it has moved through the interval. Seeing the sun now in the east
and again in the west, I infer it to have passed over my head. But we can
only infer that which we already generically know in some more direct
fashion, and it is experimentally certain that we have the feeling of motion
given us as a direct and simple sensation. Czermak long ago pointed out the
difference between seeing the motion of the second-hand of a watch, when
we look directly at it, and noticing the fact of its having altered its position
when we fix our gaze upon some other point of the dial-plate. In the first
case we have a specific quality of sensation which is absent in the second. If
the reader will find a portion of his skin—the arm, for example—where a
pair of compass-points an inch apart are felt as one impression, and if he
will then trace lines a tenth of an inch long on that spot with a pencil-point,
he will be distinctly aware of the point's motion and vaguely aware of the
direction of the motion. The perception of the motion here is certainly not
derived from a pre-existing knowledge that its starting and ending points
are separate positions in space, because positions in space ten times wider
apart fail to be discriminated as such when excited by the dividers. It is the

same with the retina. One's fingers when cast upon its peripheral portions
cannot be counted—that is to say, the five retinal tracts which they occupy
are not distinctly apprehended by the mind as five separate positions in
space—and yet the slightest movement of the fingers is most vividly
perceived as movement and nothing else. It is thus certain that our sense of
movement, being so much more delicate than our sense of position, cannot
possibly be derived from it. A curious observation by Exner[173] completes
the proof that movement is a primitive form of sensibility, by showing it to
be much more delicate than our sense of succession in time. This very able
physiologist caused two electric sparks to appear in rapid succession, one
beside the other. The observer had to state whether the right-hand one or the
left-hand one appeared first. When the interval was reduced to as short a
time as 0.044'' the discrimination of temporal order in the sparks became
impossible. But Exner found that if the sparks were brought so close
together in space that their irradiation-circles overlapped, the eye then felt
their flashing as if it were the motion of a single spark from the point
occupied by the first to the point occupied by the second, and the timeinterval might then be made as small as 0.015'' before the mind began to be
in doubt as to whether the apparent motion started from the right or from
the left. On the skin similar experiments gave similar results.
Vierordt, at almost the same time,[174] called attention to certain persistent
illusions, amongst which are these: If another person gently trace a line
across our wrist or finger, the latter being stationary, it will feel to us as if
the member were moving in the opposite direction to the tracing point. If,
on the contrary, we move our limb across a fixed point, it will be seen as if
the point were moving as well. If the reader will touch his forehead with his
forefinger kept motionless, and then rotate the head so that the skin of the
forehead passes beneath the finger's tip, he will have an irresistible
sensation of the latter being itself in motion in the opposite direction to the
head. So in abducting the fingers from each other; some may move and the
rest be still still, but the still ones will feel as if they were actively
separating from the rest. These illusions, according to Vierordt, are
survivals of a primitive form of perception, when motion was felt as such,
but ascribed to the whole content of consciousness, and not yet
distinguished as belonging exclusively to one of its parts. When our
perception is fully developed we go beyond the mere relative motion of

thing and ground, and can ascribe absolute motion to one of these
components of our total object, and absolute rest to another. When, in vision
for example, the whole background moves together, we think that it is
ourselves or our eyes which are moving; and any object in the foreground
which may move relatively to the background is judged by us to be still.
But primitively this discrimination cannot be perfectly made. The sensation
of the motion spreads over all that we see and infects it. Any relative
motion of object and retina both makes the object seem to move, and makes
us feel ourselves in motion. Even now when our whole object moves we
still get giddy; and we still see an apparent motion of the entire field of
view, whenever we suddenly jerk our head and eyes or shake them quickly
to and fro. Pushing our eyeballs gives the same illusion. We know in all
these cases what really happens, but the conditions are unusual, so our
primitive sensation persists unchecked. So it does when clouds float by the
moon. We know the moon is still; but we see it move even faster than the
clouds. Even when we slowly move our eyes the primitive sensation
persists under the victorious conception. If we notice closely the
experience, we find that any object towards which we look appears moving
to meet our eye.
But the most valuable contribution to the subject is the paper of G. H.
Schneider,[175] who takes up the matter zoologically, and shows by
examples from every branch of the animal kingdom that movement is the
quality by which animals most easily attract each other's attention. The
instinct of 'shamming death' is no shamming of death at all, but rather a
paralysis through fear, which saves the insect, crustacean, or other creature
from being noticed at all by his enemy. It is parallelled in the human race
by the breath-holding stillness of the boy playing 'I spy,' to whom the seeker
is near; and its obverse side is shown in our involuntary waving of arms,
jumping up and down, and so forth, when we wish to attract someone's
attention at a distance. Creatures 'stalking' their prey and creatures hiding
from their pursuers alike show how immobility diminishes conspicuity. In
the woods, if we are quiet, the squirrels and birds will actually touch us.
Flies will light on stuffed birds and stationary frogs.[176] On the other hand,
the tremendous shock of feeling the thing we are sitting on begin to move,
the exaggerated start it gives us to have an insect unexpectedly pass over
our skin, or a cat noiselessly come and snuffle about our hand, the excessive

reflex effects of tickling, etc., show how exciting the sensation of motion is
per se. A kitten cannot help pursuing a moving ball. Impressions too faint to
be cognized at all are immediately felt if they move. A fly sitting is
unnoticed,—we feel it the moment it crawls. A shadow may be too faint to
be perceived. As soon as it moves, however, we see it. Schneider found that
a shadow, with distinct outline, and directly fixated, could still be perceived
when moving, although its objective strength might be but half as great as
that of a stationary shadow so faint as just to disappear. With a blurred
shadow in indirect vision the difference in favor of motion was much
greater—namely, 13.3:40.7. If we hold a finger between our closed eyelid
and the sunshine we shall not notice its presence. The moment we move it
to and fro, however, we discern it. Such visual perception as this reproduces
the conditions of sight among the radiates.[177]
Enough has now been said to show that in the education of spatial
discrimination the motions of impressions across sensory surfaces must
have been the principal agent in breaking up our consciousness of the
surfaces into a consciousness of their parts. Even to-day the main function
of the peripheral regions of our retina is that of sentinels, which, when
beams of light move over them, cry 'Who goes there?' and call the fovea to
the spot. Most parts of the skin do but perform the same office for the
finger-tips. Of course finger-tips and fovea leave some power of direct
perception to marginal retina and skin respectively. But it is worthy of note
that such perception is best developed on the skin of the most movable parts
(the labors of Vierordt and his pupils have well shown this); and that in the
blind, whose skin is exceptionally discriminative, it seems to have become
so through the inveterate habit which most of them possess of twitching and
moving it under whatever object may touch them, so as to become better
acquainted with the conformation of the same. Czermak was the first to
notice this. It may be easily verified. Of course movement of surface under
object is (for purposes of stimulation) equivalent to movement of object
over surface. In exploring the shapes and sizes of things by either eye or
skin the movements of these organs are incessant and unrestrainable. Every
such movement draws the points and lines of the object across the surface,
imprints them a hundred times more sharply, and drives them home to the
attention. The immense part thus played by movements in our perceptive
activity is held by many psychologists[178] to prove that the muscles are

themselves the space-perceiving organ. Not surface-sensibility, but 'the
muscular sense,' is for these writers the original and only revealer of
objective extension. But they have all failed to notice with what peculiar
intensity muscular contractions call surface-sensibilities into play, and that
the mere discrimination of impressions (quite apart from any question of
measuring the space between them) largely depends on the mobility of the
surface upon which they fall.[179]
2. The Measurement of the sense-spaces against each other.
What precedes is all we can say in answer to the problem of discrimination.
Turn now to that of measurement of the several spaces against each other,
that being the first step in our constructing out of our diverse spaceexperiences the one space we believe in as that of the real world.
The first thing that seems evident is that we have no immediate power of
comparing together with any accuracy the extents revealed by different
sensations. Our mouth-cavity feels indeed to itself smaller, and to the
tongue larger, than it feels to the finger or eye, our tympanic membrane
feels larger than our finger-tip, our lips feel larger than a surface equal to
them on our thigh. So much comparison is immediate; but it is vague; and
for anything exact we must resort to other help.
The great agent in comparing the extent felt by one sensory surface with
that felt by another, is superposition—superposition of one surface upon
another, and superposition of one outer thing upon many surfaces. Thus are
exact equivalencies and common measures introduced, and the way
prepared for numerical results.
Could we not superpose one part of our skin upon another, or one object on
both parts, we should hardly succeed in coming to that knowledge of our
own form which we possess. The original differences of bigness of our
different parts would remain vaguely operative, and we should have no
certainty as to how much lip was equivalent to so much forehead, how
much finger to so much back.
But with the power of exploring one part of the surface by another we get a
direct perception of cutaneous equivalencies. The primitive differences of
bigness are overpowered when we feel by an immediate sensation that a

certain length of thigh-surface is in contact with the entire palm and fingers.
And when a motion of the opposite finger-tips draws a line first along this
same length of thigh and then along the whole of the hand in question, we
get a new manner of measurement, less direct but confirming the
equivalencies established by the first. In these ways, by superpositions of
parts and by tracing lines on different parts by identical movements, a
person deprived of sight can soon learn to reduce all the dimensions of his
body to a homogeneous scale. By applying the same methods to objects of
his own size or smaller, he can with equal ease make himself acquainted
with their extension stated in terms derived from his own bulk, palms, feet,
cubits, spans, paces, fathoms (armspreads), etc. In these reductions it is to
be noticed that when the resident sensations of largeness of two opposed
surfaces conflict, one of the sensations is chosen as the true standard and
the other treated as illusory. Thus an empty tooth-socket is believed to be
really smaller than the finger-tip which it will not admit, although it may
feel larger; and in general it may be said that the hand, as the almost
exclusive organ of palpation, gives its own magnitude to the other parts,
instead of having its size determined by them. In general, it is, as Fechner
says, the extent felt by the more sensitive part to which the other extents are
reduced.[180]
But even though exploration of one surface by another were impossible, we
could always measure our various surfaces against each other by applying
the same extended object first to one and then to another. We should of
course have the alternative of supposing that the object itself waxed and
waned as it glided from one place to another (cf. above, p. 141); but the
principle of simplifying as much as possible our world would soon drive us
out of that assumption into the easier one that objects as a rule keep their
sizes, and that most of our sensations are affected by errors for which a
constant allowance must be made.
In the retina there is no reason to suppose that the bignesses of two
impressions (lines or blotches) falling on different regions are primitively
felt to stand in any exact mutual ratio. It is only when the impressions come
from the same object that we judge their sizes to be the same. And this, too,
only when the relation of the object to the eye is believed to be on the
whole unchanged. When the object by moving changes its relations to the
eye the sensation excited by its image even on the same retinal region

becomes so fluctuating that we end by ascribing no absolute import
whatever to the retinal space-feeling which at any moment we may receive.
So complete does this overlooking of retinal magnitude become that it is
next to impossible to compare the visual magnitudes of objects at different
distances without making the experiment of superposition. We cannot say
beforehand how much of a distant house or tree our finger will cover. The
various answers to the familiar question, How large is the moon?—answers
which vary from a cartwheel to a wafer—illustrate this most strikingly. The
hardest part of the training of a young draughtsman is his learning to feel
directly the retinal (i.e. primitively sensible) magnitudes which the different
objects in the field of view subtend. To do this he must recover what Ruskin
calls the 'innocence of the eye'—that is, a sort of childish perception of
stains of color merely as such, without consciousness of what they mean.
With the rest of us this innocence is lost. Out of all the visual magnitudes of
each known object we have selected one as the REAL one to think of, and
degraded all the others to serve as its signs. This 'real' magnitude is
determined by æsthetic and practical interests. It is that which we get when
the object is at the distance most propitious for exact visual discrimination
of its details. This is the distance at which we hold anything we are
examining. Farther than this we see it too small, nearer too large. And the
larger and the smaller feeling vanish in the act of suggesting this one, their
more important meaning. As I look along the dining-table I overlook the
fact that the farther plates and glasses feel so much smaller than my own,
for I know that they are all equal in size; and the feeling of them, which is a
present sensation, is eclipsed in the glare of the knowledge, which is a
merely imagined one.
If the inconsistencies of sight-spaces inter se can thus be reduced, of course
there can be no difficulty in equating sight-spaces with spaces given to
touch. In this equation it is probably the touch-feeling which prevails as real
and the sight which serves as sign—a reduction made necessary not only by
the far greater constancy of felt over seen magnitudes, but by the greater
practical interest which the sense of touch possesses for our lives. As a rule,
things only benefit or harm us by coming into direct contact with our skin:
sight is only a sort of anticipatory touch; the latter is, in Mr. Spencer's
phrase, the 'mother-tongue of thought,' and the handmaid's idiom must be

translated into the language of the mistress before it can speak clearly to the
mind.[181]
Later on we shall see that the feelings excited in the joints when a limb
moves are used as signs of the path traversed by the extremity. But of this
more anon. As for the equating of sound-, smell-, and taste-volumes with
those yielded by the more discriminative senses, they are too vague to need
any remark. It may be observed of pain, however, that its size has to be
reduced to that of the normal tactile size of the organ which is its seat. A
finger with a felon on it, and the pulses of the arteries therein, both 'feel'
larger than we believe they really 'are.'
It will have been noticed in the account given that when two sensorial
space-impressions, believed to come from the same object, differ, then THE
ONE MOST INTERESTING, practically or æsthetically, IS JUDGED TO BE THE TRUE
ONE. This law of interest holds throughout—though a permanent interest,
like that of touch, may resist a strong but fleeting one like that of pain, as in
the case just given of the felon.
3. The Summation of the Sense-spaces.
Now for the next step in our construction of real space: How are the various
sense-spaces added together into a consolidated and unitary continuum?
For they are, in man at all events, incoherent at the start.

Here again the first fact that appears is that primitively our spaceexperiences form a chaos, out of which we have no immediate faculty for
extricating them. Objects of different sense-organs, experienced together, do
not in the first instance appear either inside or alongside or far outside of
each other, neither spatially continuous nor discontinuous, in any definite
sense of these words. The same thing is almost as true of objects felt by
different parts of the same organ before discrimination has done its finished
work. The most we can say is that all our space-experiences together form
an objective total and that this objective total is vast.

Even now the space inside our mouth, which is so intimately known and
accurately measured by its inhabitant the tongue, can hardly be said to have
its internal directions and dimensions known in any exact relation to those
of the larger world outside. It forms almost a little world by itself. Again,
when the dentist excavates a small cavity in one of our teeth, we feel the
hard point of his instrument scraping, in distinctly differing directions, a
surface which seems to our sensibility vaguely larger than the subsequent
use of the mirror tells us it 'really' is. And though the directions of the
scraping differ so completely inter se, not one of them can be identified
with the particular direction in the outer world to which it corresponds. The
space of the tooth-sensibility is thus really a little world by itself, which can
only become congruent with the outer space-world by farther experiences
which shall alter its bulk, identify its directions, fuse its margins, and finally
imbed it as a definite part within a definite whole. And even though every
joint's rotations should be felt to vary inter se as so many differences of
direction in a common room; even though the same were true of diverse
tracings on the skin, and of diverse tracings on the retina respectively, it
would still not follow that feelings of direction, on these different surfaces,
are intuitively comparable among each other, or with the other directions
yielded by the feelings of the semi-circular canals. It would not follow that
we should immediately judge the relations of them all to each other in one
space-world.
If with the arms in an unnatural attitude we 'feel' things, we are perplexed
about their shape, size, and position. Let the reader lie on his back with his
arms stretched above his head, and it will astonish him to find how ill able
he is to recognize the geometrical relations of objects placed within reach of
his hands. But the geometrical relations here spoken of are nothing but
identities recognized between the directions and sizes perceived in this way
and those perceived in the more usual ways. The two ways do not fit each
other intuitively.
How lax the connection between the system of visual and the system of
tactile directions is in man, appears from the facility with which
microscopists learn to reverse the movements of their hand in manipulating
things on the stage of the instrument. To move the slide to the seen left they
must draw it to the felt right. But in a very few days the habit becomes a
second nature. So in tying our cravat, shaving before a mirror, etc., the right

and left sides are inverted, and the directions of our hand movements are
the opposite of what they seem. Yet this never annoys us. Only when by
accident we try to tie the cravat of another person do we learn that there are
two ways of combining sight and touch perceptions. Let any one try for the
first time to write or draw while looking at the image of his hand and paper
in a mirror, and he will be utterly bewildered. But a very short training will
teach him to undo in this respect the associations of his previous lifetime.
Prisms show this in an even more striking way. If the eyes be armed with
spectacles containing slightly prismatic glasses with their bases turned, for
example, towards the right, every object looked at will be apparently
translocated to the left; and the hand put forth to grasp any such object will
make the mistake of passing beyond it on the left side. But less than an hour
of practice in wearing such spectacles rectifies the judgment so that no
more mistakes are made. In fact the new-formed associations are already so
strong, that when the prisms are first laid aside again the opposite error is
committed, the habits of a lifetime violated, and the hand now passed to the
right of every object which it seeks to touch.
The primitive chaos thus subsists to a great degree through life so far as our
immediate sensibility goes. We feel our various objects and their bignesses,
together or in succession; but so soon as it is a question of the order and
relations of many of them at once our intuitive apprehension remains to the
very end most vague and incomplete. Whilst we are attending to one, or at
most to two or three objects, all the others lapse, and the most we feel of
them is that they still linger on the outskirts and can be caught again by
turning in a certain way. Nevertheless throughout all this confusion we
conceive of a world spread out in a perfectly fixed and orderly fashion, and
we believe in its existence. The question is: How do this conception and this
belief arise? How is the chaos smoothed and straightened out?

Mainly by two operations: Some of the experiences are apprehended to
exist out- and alongside of each other, and others are apprehended to
interpenetrate each other, and to occupy the same room. In this way what
was incoherent and irrelative ends by being coherent and definitely related;

nor is it hard to trace the principles, by which the mind is guided in this
arrangement of its perceptions, in detail.
In the first place, following the great intellectual law of economy, we
simplify, unify, and identify as much as we possibly can. Whatever sensible
data can be attended to together we locate together. Their several extents
seem one extent. The place at which each appears is held to be the same
with the place at which the others appear. They become, in short, so many
properties of ONE AND THE SAME REAL THING. This is the first and great
commandment, the fundamental 'act' by which our world gets spatially
arranged.
In this coalescence in a 'thing,' one of the coalescing sensations is held to be
the thing, the other sensations are taken for its more or less accidental
properties, or modes of appearance.[182] The sensation chosen to be the
thing essentially is the most constant and practically important of the lot;
most often it is hardness or weight. But the hardness or weight is never
without tactile bulk; and as we can always see something in our hand when
we feel something there, we equate the bulk felt with the bulk seen, and
thenceforward this common bulk is also apt to figure as of the essence of
the 'thing.' Frequently a shape so figures, sometimes a temperature, a taste,
etc.; but for the most part temperature, smell, sound, color, or whatever
other phenomena may vividly impress us simultaneously with the bulk felt
or seen, figure among the accidents. Smell and sound impress us, it is true,
when we neither see nor touch the thing; but they are strongest when we see
or touch, so we locate the source of these properties within the touched or
seen space, whilst the properties themselves we regard as overflowing in a
weakened form into the spaces filled by other things. In all this, it will be
observed, the sense-data whose spaces coalesce into one are yielded by
different sense-organs. Such data have no tendency to displace each other
from consciousness, but can be attended to together all at once. Often
indeed they vary concomitantly and reach a maximum together. We may be
sure, therefore, that the general rule of our mind is to locate IN each other
all sensations which are associated in simultaneous experience, and do not
interfere with each other's perception.[183]
Different impressions on the same sense-organ do interfere with each
other's perception, and cannot well be attended to at once. Hence we do not
locate them in each other's spaces, but arrange them in a serial order of

exteriority, each alongside of the rest, in a space larger than that which any
one sensation brings. This larger space, however, is an object of conception
rather than of direct intuition, and bears all the marks of being constructed
piecemeal by the mind. The blind man forms it out of tactile, locomotor,
and auditory experiences, the seeing man out of visual ones almost
exclusively. As the visual construction is the easiest to understand, let us
consider that first.

Every single visual sensation or 'field of view' is limited. To get a new field
of view for our object the old one must disappear. But the disappearance
may be only partial. Let the first field of view be A B C. If we carry our
attention to the limit C, it ceases to be the limit, and becomes the centre of
the field, and beyond it appear fresh parts where there were none before:
[184] A B C changes, in short, to C D E. But although the parts A B are lost
to sight, yet their image abides in the memory; and if we think of our first
object A B C as having existed or as still existing at all, we must think of it
as it was originally presented, namely, as spread out from C in one direction
just as C D E is spread out in another. A B and D E can never coalesce in
one place (as they could were they objects of different senses) because they
can never be perceived at once: we must lose one to see the other. So (the
letters standing now for 'things') we get to conceive of the successive fields
of things after the analogy of the several things which we perceive in a
single field. They must be out- and alongside of each other, and we
conceive that their juxtaposed spaces must make a larger space. A B C + C
D E must, in short, be imagined to exist in the form of A B C D E or not
imagined at all.
We can usually recover anything lost from sight by moving our attention
and our eyes back in its direction; and through these constant changes every
field of seen things comes at last to be thought of as always having a fringe
of other things possible to be seen spreading in all directions round about it.
Meanwhile the movements concomitantly with which the various fields
alternate are also felt and remembered; and gradually (through association)
this and that movement come in our thought to suggest this or that extent of
fresh objects introduced. Gradually, too, since the objects vary indefinitely

in kind, we abstract from their several natures and think separately of their
mere extents, of which extents the various movements remain as the only
constant introducers and associates. More and more, therefore, do we think
of movement and seen extent as mutually involving each other, until at last
(with Bain and J. S. Mill) we may get to regard them as synonymous, and
say, "What is the meaning of the word extent, unless it be possible
movement?"[185] We forget in this conclusion that (whatever intrinsic
extensiveness the movements may appear endowed with), that seen
spreadoutness which is the pattern of the abstract extensiveness which we
imagine came to us originally from the retinal sensation.
The muscular sensations of the eyeball signify this sort of visible
spreadoutness, just as this visible spreadoutness may come in later
experience to signify the 'real' bulks, distances, lengths and breadths known
to touch and locomotion.[186] To the very end, however, in us seeing men,
the quality, the nature, the sort of thing we mean by extensiveness, would
seem to be the sort of feeling which our retinal stimulations bring.

In one deprived of sight the principles by which the notion of real space is
constructed are the same. Skin-feelings take in him the place of retinal
feelings in giving the quality of lateral spreadoutness, as our attention
passes from one extent of them to another, awakened by an object sliding
along. Usually the moving object is our hand; and feelings of movement in
our joints invariably accompany the feelings in the skin. But the feeling of
the skin is what the blind man means by his skin; so the size of the skinfeelings stands as the absolute or real size, and the size of the joint-feelings
becomes a sign of these. Suppose, for example, a blind baby with (to make
the description shorter) a blister on his toe, exploring his leg with his fingertip and feeling a pain shoot up sharply the instant the blister is touched. The
experiment gives him four different kinds of sensation—two of them
protracted, two sudden. The first pair are the movement-feeling in the joints
of the upper limb, and the movement-feeling on the skin of the leg and foot.
These, attended to together, have their extents identified as one objective
space—the hand moves through the same space in which the leg lies. The
second pair of objects are the pain in the blister, and the peculiar feeling the

blister gives to the finger. Their spaces also fuse; and as each marks the end
of a peculiar movement-series (arm moved, leg stroked), the movementspaces are emphatically identified with each other at that end. Were there
other small blisters distributed down the leg, there would be a number of
these emphatic points; the movement-spaces would be identified, not only
as totals, but point for point.[187]
Just so with spaces beyond the body's limits. Continuing the joint-feeling
beyond the toe, the baby hits another object, which he can still think of
when he brings his hand back to its blister again. That object at the end of
that joint-feeling means a new place for him, and the more such objects
multiply in his experience the wider does the space of his conception grow.
If, wandering through the woods to-day by a new path, I find myself
suddenly in a glade which affects my senses exactly as did another I
reached last week at the end of a different walk, I believe the two identical
affections to present the same persisting glade, and infer that I have attained
it by two differing roads. The spaces walked over grow congruent by their
extremities; though apart from the common sensation which those
extremities give me, I should be under no necessity of connecting one walk
with another at all. The case in no whit differs when shorter movements are
concerned. If, moving first one arm and then another, the blind child gets
the same kind of sensation upon the hand, and gets it again as often as he
repeats either process, he judges that he has touched the same object by
both motions, and concludes that the motions terminate in a common place.
From place to place marked in this way he moves, and adding the places
moved through, one to another, he builds up his notion of the extent of the
outer world. The seeing man's process is identical; only his units, which
may be successive bird's-eye views, are much larger than in the case of the
blind.
FEELINGS IN JOINTS AND FEELINGS IN MUSCLES.
1. Feelings of Movement in Joints.
I have been led to speak of feelings which arise in joints. As these feelings
have been too much neglected in Psychology hitherto, in entering now
somewhat minutely into their study I shall probably at the same time

freshen the interest of the reader, which under the rather dry abstractions of
the previous pages may presumably have flagged.
When, by simply flexing my right forefinger on its metacarpal joint, I trace
with its tip an inch on the palm of my left hand, is my feeling of the size of
the inch purely and simply a feeling in the skin of the palm, or have the
muscular contractions of the right hand and forearm anything to do with it?
In the preceding pages I have constantly assumed spatial sensibility to be an
affair of surfaces. At first starting, the consideration of the 'muscular sense'
as a space-measurer was postponed to a later stage. Many writers, of whom
the foremost was Thomas Brown, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of the
Human Mind, and of whom the latest is no less a Psychologist than Prof.
Delbœuf,[188] hold that the consciousness of active muscular motion, aware
of its own amount, is the fons et origo of all spatial measurement. It would
seem to follow, if this theory were true, that two skin-feelings, one of a
large patch, one of a small one, possess their difference of spatiality, not as
an immediate element, but solely by virtue of the fact that the large one, to
get its points successively excited, demands more muscular contraction than
the small one does. Fixed associations with the several amounts of muscular
contraction required in this particular experience would thus explain the
apparent sizes of the skin-patches, which sizes would consequently not be
primitive data but derivative results.
It seems to me that no evidence of the muscular measurements in question
exists; but that all the facts may be explained by surface-sensibility,
provided we take that of the joint-surfaces also into account.
The most striking argument, and the most obvious one, which an upholder
of the muscular theory is likely to produce is undoubtedly this fact: if, with
closed eyes, we trace figures in the air with the extended forefinger (the
motions may occur from the metacarpal-, the wrist-, the elbow-, or the
shoulder-joint indifferently), what we are conscious of in each case, and
indeed most acutely conscious of, is the geometric path described by the
finger-tip. Its angles, its subdivisions, are all as distinctly felt as if seen by
the eye; and yet the surface of the finger-tip receives no impression at all.
[189] But with each variation of the figure, the muscular contractions vary,
and so do the feelings which these yield. Are not these latter the sensible
data that make us aware of the lengths and directions we discern in the
traced line?

Should we be tempted to object to this supposition of the advocate of
perception by muscular feelings, that we have learned the spatial
significance of these feelings by reiterated experiences of seeing what
figure is drawn when each special muscular grouping is felt, so that in the
last resort the muscular space feelings would be derived from retinalsurface feelings, our opponent might immediately hush us by pointing to
the fact that in persons born blind the phenomenon in question is even more
perfect than in ourselves.
If we suggest that the blind may have originally traced the figures on the
cutaneous surface of cheek, thigh, or palm, and may now remember the
specific figure which each present movement formerly caused the skinsurface to perceive, he may reply that the delicacy of the motor perception
far exceeds that of most of the cutaneous surfaces; that, in fact, we can feel
a figure traced only in its differentials, so to speak,—a figure which we
merely start to trace by our finger-tip, a figure which, traced in the same
way on our finger-tip by the hand of another, is almost if not wholly
unrecognizable.

The champion of the muscular sense seems likely to be triumphant until we
invoke the articular cartilages, as internal surfaces whose sensibility is
called in play by every movement we make, however delicate the latter may
be.
To establish the part they play in our geometrizing, it is necessary to review
a few facts. It has long been known by medical practitioners that, in patients
with cutaneous anæsthesia of a limb, whose muscles also are insensible to
the thrill of the faradic current, a very accurate sense of the way in which
the limb may be flexed or extended by the hand of another may be
preserved.[190] On the other hand, we may have this sense of movement
impaired when the tactile sensibility is well preserved. That the pretended
feeling of outgoing innervation can play in these cases no part, is obvious
from the fact that the movements by which the limb changes its position are
passive ones, imprinted on it by the experimenting physician. The writers
who have sought a rationale of the matter have consequently been driven

by way of exclusion to assume the articular surfaces to be the seat of the
perception in question.[191]
That the joint-surfaces are sensitive appears evident from the fact that in
inflammation they become the seat of excruciating pains, and from the
perception by everyone who lifts weights or presses against resistance, that
every increase of the force opposing him betrays itself to his consciousness
principally by the starting-out of new feelings or the increase of old ones, in
or about the joints. If the structure and mode of mutual application of two
articular surfaces be taken into account, it will appear that, granting the
surfaces to be sensitive, no more favorable mechanical conditions could be
possible for the delicate calling of the sensibility into play than are realized
in the minutely graduated rotations and firmly resisted variations of
pressure involved in every act of extension or flexion. Nevertheless it is a
great pity that we have as yet no direct testimony, no expressions from
patients with healthy joints accidentally laid open, of the impressions they
experience when the cartilage is pressed or rubbed.
The first approach to direct evidence, so far as I know, is contained in the
paper of Lewinski,[192] published in 1879. This observer had a patient the
inner half of whose leg was anæsthetic. When this patient stood up, he had
a curious illusion about the position of his limb, which disappeared the
moment he lay down again: he thought himself knock-kneed. If, as
Lewinski says, we assume the inner half of the joint to share the
insensibility of the corresponding part of the skin, then he ought to feel,
when the joint-surfaces pressed against each other in the act of standing, the
outer half of the joint most strongly. But this is the feeling he would also get
whenever it was by any chance sought to force his leg into a knock-kneed
attitude. Lewinski was led by this case to examine the feet of certain ataxic
patients with imperfect sense of position. He found in every instance that
when the toes were flexed and drawn upon at the same time (the jointsurfaces drawn asunder) all sense of the amount of flexion disappeared. On
the contrary, when he pressed a toe in, whilst flexing it, the patient's
appreciation of the amount of flexion was much improved, evidently
because the artificial increase of articular pressure made up for the
pathological insensibility of the parts.

Since Lewinski's paper an important experimental research by A.
Goldscheider[193] has appeared, which completely establishes our point.
This patient observer caused his fingers, arms, and legs to be passively
rotated upon their various joints in a mechanical apparatus which registered
both the velocity of movement impressed and the amount of angular
rotation. No active muscular contraction took place. The minimal felt
amounts of rotation were in all cases surprisingly small, being much less
than a single angular degree in all the joints except those of the fingers.
Such displacements as these, the author says (p. 490), can hardly be
detected by the eye. The point of application of the force which rotated the
limb made no difference in the result. Rotations round the hip-joint, for
example, were as delicately felt when the leg was hung by the heel as when
it was hung by the thigh whilst the movements were performed. Anæsthesia
of the skin produced by induction-currents also had no disturbing effect on
the perception, nor did the various degrees of pressure of the moving force
upon the skin affect it. It became, in fact, all the more distinct in proportion
as the concomitant pressure-feelings were eliminated by artificial
anæsthesia. When the joints themselves, however, were made artificially
anæsthetic the perception of the movement grew obtuse and the angular
rotations had to be much increased before they were perceptible. All these
facts prove according to Herr Goldscheider, that the joint surfaces and these
alone are the starting point of the impressions by which the movements of
our members are immediately perceived.
Applying this result, which seems invulnerable, to the case of the tracing
finger-tip, we see that our perception of the latter gives no countenance to
the theory of the muscular sense. We indubitably localize the finger-tip at
the successive points of its path by means of the sensations which we
receive from our joints. But if this is so, it may be asked, why do we feel the
figure to be traced, not within the joint itself, but in such an altogether
different place? And why do we feel it so much larger than it really is?
I will answer these questions by asking another: Why do we move our
joints at all? Surely to gain something more valuable than the insipid jointfeelings themselves. And these more interesting feelings are in the main
produced upon the skin of the moving part, or of some other part over
which it passes, or upon the eye. With movements of the fingers we explore
the configuration of all real objects with which we have to deal, our own

body as well as foreign things. Nothing that interests us is located in the
joint; everything that interests us either is some part of our skin, or is
something that we see as we handle it. The cutaneously felt and the seen
extents come thus to figure as the important things for us to concern
ourselves with. Every time the joint moves, even though we neither see, nor
feel cutaneously, the reminiscence of skin-events and sights which formerly
coincided with that extent of movement, ideally awaken as the movement's
import, and the mind drops the present sign to attend to the import alone.
The joint-sensation itself, as such, does not disappear in the process. A little
attention easily detects it, with all its fine peculiarities, hidden beneath its
vaster suggestions; so that really the mind has two space-perceptions before
it, congruent in form but different in scale and place, either of which
exclusively it may notice, or both at once,—the joint-space which it feels
and the real space which it means.
The joint-spaces serve so admirably as signs because of their capacity for
parallel variation to all the peculiarities of external motion. There is not a
direction in the real world nor a ratio of distance which cannot be matched
by some direction or extent of joint-rotation. Joint-feelings, like all feelings,
are roomy. Specific ones are contrasted inter se as different directions are
contrasted within the same extent. If I extend my arm straight out at the
shoulder, the rotation of the shoulder-joint will give me one feeling of
movement; if then I sweep the arm forward, the same joint will give me
another feeling of movement. Both these movements are felt to happen in
space, and differ in specific quality. Why shall not the specificness of the
quality just consist in the feeling of a peculiar direction?[194] Why may not
the several joint-feelings be so many perceptions of movement in so many
different directions? That we cannot explain why they should is no
presumption that they do not, for we never can explain why any senseorgan should awaken the sensation it does.
But if the joint-feelings are directions and extents, standing in relation to
each other, the task of association in interpreting their import in eye- or
skin-terms is a good deal simplified. Let the movement bc, of a certain
joint, derive its absolute space-value from the cutaneous feeling it is always
capable of engendering; then the longer movement abcd of the same joint
will be judged to have a greater space-value, even though it may never have
wholly merged with a skin-experience. So of differences of direction: so

much joint-difference = so much skin-difference; therefore, more jointdifference = more skin-difference. In fact, the joint-feeling can excellently
serve as a map on a reduced scale, of a reality which the imagination can
identify at its pleasure with this or that sensible extension simultaneously
known in some other way.
When the joint-feeling in itself acquires an emotional interest,—which
happens whenever the joint is inflamed and painful,—the secondary
suggestions fail to arise, and the movement is felt where it is, and in its
intrinsic scale of magnitude.[195]
The localization of the joint-feeling in a space simultaneously known
otherwise (i.e. to eye or skin), is what is commonly called the extradition or
eccentric projection of the feeling. In the preceding chapter I said a good
deal on this subject; but we must now see a little more closely just what
happens in this instance of it. The content of the joint-feeling, to begin with,
is an object, and is in itself a place. For it to be placed, say in the elbow, the
elbow as seen or handled must already have become another object for the
mind, and with its place as thus known, the place which the joint-feeling
fills must coalesce. That the latter should be felt 'in the elbow' is therefore a
'projection' of it into the place of another object as much as its being felt in
the finger-tip or at the end of a cane can be. But when we say 'projection'
we generally have in our mind the notion of a there as contrasted with a
here. What is the here when we say that the joint-feeling is there? The 'here'
seems to be the spot which the mind has chosen for its own post of
observation, usually some place within the head, but sometimes within the
throat or breast—not a rigorously fixed spot, but a region from any portion
of which it may send forth its various acts of attention. Extradition from
either of these regions is the common law under which we perceive the
whereabouts of the north star, of our own voice, of the contact of our teeth
with each other, of the tip of our finger, of the point of our cane on the
ground, or of a movement in our elbow-joint.
But for the distance between the 'here' and the 'there' to be felt, the entire
intervening space must be itself an object of perception. The consciousness
of this intervening space is the sine quâ non of the joint-feeling's projection
to the farther end of it. When it is filled by our own bodily tissues (as where
the projection only goes as far as the elbow or finger-tip) we are sensible of
its extent alike by our eye, by our exploring movements, and by the resident

sensations which fill its length. When it reaches beyond the limits of our
body, the resident sensations are lacking, but limbs and hand and eye suffice
to make it known. Let me, for example, locate a feeling of motion coming
from my elbow-joint in the point of my cane a yard beyond my hand. Either
I see this yard as I flourish the cane, and the seen end of it then absorbs my
sensation just as my seen elbow might absorb it, or I am blind and imagine
the cane as an object continuing my arm, either because I have explored
both arm and cane with the other hand, or because I have pressed them both
along my body and leg. If I project my joint-feeling farther still, it is by a
conception rather than a distinct imagination of the space. I think: 'farther,'
'thrice as far,' etc.; and thus get a symbolic image of a distant path at which I
point.[196] But the 'absorption' of the joint-feeling by the distant spot, in
whatever terms the latter may be apprehended, is never anything but that
coalescence into one 'thing' already spoken of on page 184, of whatever
different sensible objects interest our attention at once.
2. Feelings of Muscular Contraction.
Readers versed in psychological literature will have missed, in our account
thus far, the usual invocation of 'the muscular sense.' This word is used with
extreme vagueness to cover all resident sensations, whether of motion or
position, in our members, and even to designate the supposed feeling of
efferent discharge from the brain. We shall later see good reason to deny the
existence of the latter feeling. We have accounted for the better part at least
of the resident feelings of motion in limbs by the sensibility of the articular
surfaces. The skin and ligaments also must have feelings awakened as they
are stretched or squeezed in flexion or extension. And I am inclined to think
that the sensations of our contracting muscles themselves probably play as
small a part in building up our exact knowledge of space as any class of
sensations which we possess. The muscles, indeed, play an all-important
part, but it is through the remote effect of their contractions on other
sensitive parts, not through their own resident sensations being aroused. In
other words, muscular contraction is only indirectly instrumental, in giving
us space-perceptions, by its effects on surfaces. In skin and retina it
produces a motion of the stimulus upon the surface; in joints it produces a
motion of the surfaces upon each other—such motion being by far the most
delicate manner of exciting the surfaces in question. One is tempted to

doubt whether the muscular sensibility as such plays even a subordinate
part as sign of these more immediately geometrical perceptions which are
so uniformly associated with it as effects of the contraction objectively
viewed.
For this opinion many reasons can be assigned. First, it seems a priori
improbable that such organs as muscles should give us feelings whose
variations bear any exact proportion to the spaces traversed when they
contract. As G. E. Müller says,[197] their sensory nerves must be excited
either chemically or by mechanical compression whilst the contractions
last, and in neither case can the excitement be proportionate to the position
into which the limb is thrown. The chemical state of the muscle depends on
the previous work more than on the actually present contraction; and the
internal pressure of it depends on the resistance offered more than on the
shortening attained. The intrinsic muscular sensations are likely therefore to
be merely those of massive strain or fatigue, and to carry no accurate
discrimination with them of lengths of path moved through.
Empirically we find this probability confirmed by many facts. The judicious
A. W. Volkmann observes[198] that:
"Muscular feeling gives tolerably fine evidence as to the existence of
movement, but hardly any direct information about its extent or
direction. We are not aware that the contractions of a supinator longus
have a wider range than those of a supinator brevis; and that the fibres
of a bipenniform muscle contract in opposite directions is a fact of
which the muscular feeling itself gives not the slightest intimation.
Muscle-feeling belongs to that class of general sensations which tell us
of our inner states, but not of outer relations; it does not belong among
the space-perceiving senses."
E. H. Weber in his article Tastsinn called attention to the fact that muscular
movements as large and strong as those of the diaphragm go on continually
without our perceiving them as motion.
G. H. Lewes makes the same remark. When we think of our muscular
sensations as movements in space, it is because we have ingrained with
them in our imagination a movement on a surface simultaneously felt.

"Thus whenever we breathe there is a contraction of the muscles of the
ribs and the diaphragm. Since we see the chest expanding, we know it
as a movement and can only think of it as such. But the diaphragm
itself is not seen, and consequently by no one who is not
physiologically enlightened on the point is this diaphragm thought of
in movement. Nay, even when told by a physiologist that the
diaphragm moves at each breathing, every one who has not seen it
moving downward pictures it as an upward movement, because the
chest moves upward."[199]
A personal experience of my own seems strongly to corroborate this view.
For years I have been familiar, during the act of gaping, with a large, round,
smooth sensation in the region of the throat, a sensation characteristic of
gaping and nothing else, but which, although I had often wondered about it,
never suggested to my mind the motion of anything. The reader probably
knows from his own experience exactly what feeling I mean. It was not till
one of my students told me, that I learned its objective cause. If we look
into the mirror while gaping, we see that at the moment we have this feeling
the hanging palate rises by the contraction of its intrinsic muscles. The
contraction of these muscles and the compression of the palatine mucous
membrane are what occasion the feeling; and I was at first astonished that,
coming from so small an organ, it could appear so voluminous. Now the
curious point is this—that no sooner had I learned by the eye its objective
space-significance, than I found myself enabled mentally to feel it as a
movement upwards of a body in the situation of the uvula. When I now
have it, my fancy injects it, so to speak, with the image of the rising uvula;
and it absorbs the image easily and naturally. In a word, a muscular
contraction gave me a sensation whereof I was unable during forty years to
interpret a motor meaning, of which two glances of the eye made me
permanently the master. To my mind no further proof is needed of the fact
that muscular contraction, merely as such, need not be perceived directly as
so much motion through space.
Take again the contractions of the muscles which make the eyeball rotate.
The feeling of these is supposed by many writers to play the chief part in
our perceptions of extent. The space seen between two things means,
according to these authors, nothing but the amount of contraction which is
needed to carry the fovea from the first thing to the second. But close the

eyes and note the contractions in themselves (even when coupled as they
still are with the delicate surface sensations of the eyeball rolling under the
lids), and we are surprised at finding how vague their space-import appears.
Shut the eyes and roll them, and you can with no approach to accuracy tell
the outer object which shall first be seen when you open them again.[200]
Moreover, if our eye-muscle-contractions had much to do with giving us
our sense of seen extent, we ought to have a natural illusion of which we
find no trace. Since the feeling in the muscles grows disproportionately
intense as the eyeball is rolled into an extreme eccentric position, all places
on the extreme margin of the field of view ought to appear farther from the
centre than they really are, for the fovea cannot get to them without an
amount of this feeling altogether in excess of the amount of actual rotation.
[201] When we turn to the muscles of the body at large we find the same
vagueness. Goldscheider found that the minimal perceived rotation of a
limb about a joint was no less when the movement was 'active' or produced
by muscular contraction than when it was 'passively' impressed.[202] The
consciousness of active movement became so blunt when the joint (alone!)
was made anæsthetic by faradization, that it became evident that the feeling
of contraction could never be used for fine discrimination of extents. And
that it was not used for coarse discriminations appeared clear to
Goldscheider from certain other results which are too circumstantial for me
to quote in detail.[203] His general conclusion is that we feel our movements
exclusively in our articular surfaces, and that our muscular contractions in
all probability hardly occasion this sort of perception at all.[204]
My conclusion is that the 'muscular sense' must fall back to the humble
position from which Charles Bell raised it, and no longer figure in
Psychology as the leading organ in space-perception which it has been so
long 'cracked up' to be.

Before making a minuter study of Space as apprehended by the eye, we
must turn to see what we can discover of space as known to the blind. But
as we do so, let us cast a glance upon the results of the last pages, and ask
ourselves once more whether the building up of orderly space-perceptions
out of primitive incoherency requires any mental powers beyond those

displayed in ordinary intellectual operations. I think it is obvious—granting
the spacial quale to exist in the primitive sensations—that discrimination,
association, addition, multiplication, and division, blending into generic
images, substitution of similars, selective emphasis, and abstraction from
uninteresting details, are quite capable of giving us all the space-perceptions
we have so far studied, without the aid of any mysterious 'mental chemistry'
or power of 'synthesis' to create elements absent from the original data of
feeling. It cannot be too strongly urged in the face of mystical attempts,
however learned, that there is not a landmark, not a length, not a point of
the compass in real space which is not some one of our feelings, either
experienced directly as a presentation or ideally suggested by another
feeling which has come to serve as its sign. In degrading some sensations to
the rank of signs and exalting others to that of realities signified, we smooth
out the wrinkles of our first chaotic impressions and make a continuous
order of what was a rather incoherent multiplicity. But the content of the
order remains identical with that of the multiplicity—sensational both,
through and through.
HOW THE BLIND PERCEIVE SPACE.
The blind man's construction of real space differs from that of the seeing
man most obviously in the larger part which synthesis plays in it, and the
relative subordination of analysis. The seeing baby's eyes take in the whole
room at once, and discriminative attention must arise in him before single
objects are visually discerned. The blind child, on the contrary, must form
his mental image of the room by the addition, piece to piece, of parts which
he learns to know successively. With our eyes we may apprehend instantly,
in an enormous bird's-eye view, a landscape which the blind man is
condemned to build up bit by bit after weeks perhaps of exploration. We are
exactly in his predicament, however, for spaces which exceed our visual
range. We think the ocean as a whole by multiplying mentally the
impression we get at any moment when at sea. The distance between New
York and San Francisco is computed in days' journeys; that from earth to
sun is so many times the earth's diameter, etc.; and of longer distances still
we may be said to have no adequate mental image whatever, but only
numerical verbal symbols.

But the symbol will often give us the emotional effect of the perception.
Such expressions as the abysmal vault of heaven, the endless expanse of
ocean, etc., summarize many computations to the imagination, and give the
sense of an enormous horizon. So it seems with the blind. They multiply
mentally the amount of a distinctly felt freedom to move, and gain the
immediate sense of a vaster freedom still. Thus it is that blind men are
never without the consciousness of their horizon. They all enjoy travelling,
especially with a companion who can describe to them the objects they
pass. On the prairies they feel the great openness; in valleys they feel closed
in; and one has told me that he thought few seeing people could enjoy the
view from a mountain-top more than he. A blind person on entering a house
or room immediately receives, from the reverberations of his voice and
steps, an impression of its dimensions, and to a certain extent of its
arrangement. The tympanic sense noticed on p. 140, supra, comes in to help
here, and possibly other forms of tactile sensibility not yet understood. Mr.
W. Hanks Levy, the blind author of 'Blindness and the Blind' (London),
gives the following account of his powers of perception:
"Whether within a house or in the open air, whether walking or
standing still, I can tell, although quite blind, when I am opposite an
object, and can perceive whether it be tall or short, slender or bulky. I
can also detect whether it be a solitary object or a continuous fence;
whether it be a close fence or composed of open rails; and often
whether it be a wooden fence, a brick or stone wall, or a quick-set
hedge. I cannot usually perceive objects if much lower than my
shoulder, but sometimes very low objects can be detected. This may
depend on the nature of the objects, or on some abnormal state of the
atmosphere. The currents of air can have nothing to do with this
power, as the state of the wind does not directly affect it; the sense of
hearing has nothing to do with it, as when snow lies thickly on the
ground objects are more distinct, although the footfall cannot be heard.
I seem to perceive objects through the skin of my face, and to have the
impressions immediately transmitted to the brain. The only part of my
body possessing this power is my face; this I have ascertained by
suitable experiments. Stopping my ears does not interfere with it, but
covering my face with a thick veil destroys it altogether. None of the
five senses have anything to do with the existence of this power, and

the circumstances above named induce me to call this unrecognized
sense by the name of 'facial perception.'... When passing along a street
I can distinguish shops from private houses, and even point out the
doors and windows, etc., and this whether the doors be shut or open.
When a window consists of one entire sheet of glass, it is more
difficult to discover than one composed of a number of small panes.
From this it would appear that glass is a bad conductor of sensation, or
at any rate of the sensation specially connected with this sense. When
objects below the face are perceived, the sensation seems to come in
an oblique line from the object to the upper part of the face. While
walking with a friend in Forest Lane, Stratford, I said, pointing to a
fence which separated the road from a field, 'Those rails are not quite
as high as my shoulder.' He looked at them, and said they were higher.
We, however, measured, and found them about three inches lower than
my shoulder. At the time of making this observation I was about four
feet from the rails. Certainly in this instance facial perception was
more accurate than sight. When the lower part of a fence is brickwork,
and the upper part rails, the fact can be detected, and the line where the
two meet easily perceived. Irregularities in height, and projections and
indentations in walls, can also be discovered."
According to Mr. Levy, this power of seeing with the face is diminished by
a fog, but not by ordinary darkness. At one time he could tell when a cloud
obscured the horizon, but he has now lost that power, which he has known
several persons to possess who are totally blind. These effects of aqueous
vapor suggest immediately that fluctuations in the heat radiated by the
objects may be the source of the perception. One blind gentleman, Mr.
Kilburne, an instructor in the Perkins Institution in South Boston, who has
the power spoken of in an unusual degree, proved, however, to have no
more delicate a sense of temperature in his face than ordinary persons. He
himself supposed that his ears had nothing to do with the faculty until a
complete stoppage of them, not only with cotton but with putty on top of it,
by abolishing the perception entirely, proved his first impression to be
erroneous. Many blind men say immediately that their ears are concerned in
the matter.
Sounds certainly play a far more prominent part in the mental life of the
blind than in our own. In taking a walk through the country, the mutations

of sound, far and near, constitute their chief delight. And to a great extent
their imagination of distance and of objects moving from one distant spot to
another seems to consist in thinking how a certain sonority would be
modified by the change of place. It is unquestionable that the semi-circularcanal feelings play a great part in defining the points of the compass and the
direction of distant spots, in the blind as in us. We start towards them by
feelings of this sort; and so many directions, so many different-feeling
starts.[205]
The only point that offers any theoretic difficulty is the prolongation into
space of the direction, after the start. We saw, ten pages back, that for
extradition to occur beyond the skin, the portion of skin in question and the
space beyond must form a common object for some other sensory surface.
The eyes are for most of us this sensory surface; for the blind it can only be
other parts of the skin, coupled or not with motion. But the mere gropings
of the hands in every direction must end by surrounding the whole body
with a sphere of felt space. And this sphere must become enlarged with
every movement of locomotion, these movements gaining their spacevalues from the semi-circular-canal feelings which accompany them, and
from the farther and farther parts of large fixed objects (such as the bed, the
wainscoting, or a fence) which they bring within the grasp. It might be
supposed that a knowledge of space acquired by so many successive
discrete acts would always retain a somewhat jointed and so to speak,
granulated character. When we who are gifted with sight think of a space
too large to come into a single field of view, we are apt to imagine it as
composite, and filled with more or less jerky stoppings and startings (think,
for instance, of the space from here to San Francisco), or else we reduce the
scale symbolically and imagine how much larger on a map the distance
would look than others with whose totality we are familiar.
I am disposed to believe, after interrogating many blind persons, that the
use of imaginary maps on a reduced scale is less frequent with them than
with the rest of us. Possibly the extraordinary changeableness of the visual
magnitudes of things makes this habit natural to us, while the fixity of
tactile magnitudes keeps them from falling into it. (When the blind young
man operated on by Dr. Franz was shown a portrait in a locket, he was
vastly surprised that the face could be put into so small a compass: it would
have seemed to him, he said, as impossible as to put a bushel into a pint.)

Be this as it may, however, the space which each blind man feels to extend
beyond his body is felt by him as one smooth continuum—all trace of those
muscular startings and stoppings and reversals which presided over its
formation having been eliminated from the memory. It seems, in other
words, a generic image of the space-element common to all these
experiences, with the unessential particularities of each left out. In truth,
where in this space a start or a stop may have occurred was quite accidental.
It may never occur just there again, and so the attention lets it drops
altogether. Even as long a space as that traversed in a several-mile walk will
not necessarily appear to a blind man's thought in the guise of a series of
locomotor acts. Only where there is some distinct locomotor difficulty, such
as a step to ascend, a difficult crossing, or a disappearance of the path, will
distinct locomotor images constitute the idea. Elsewhere the space seems
continuous, and its parts may even all seem coexistent; though, as a very
intelligent blind friend once remarked to me, 'To think of such distances
involves probably more mental wear and tear and brain-waste in the blind
than in the seeing.' This seems to point to a greater element of successive
addition and construction in the blind man's idea.
Our own visual explorations go on by means of innumerable stoppings and
startings of the eyeballs. Yet these are all effaced from the final spacesphere of our visual imagination. They have neutralized each other. We can
even distribute our attention to the right and left sides simultaneously, and
think of those two quarters of space as coexistent. Does the smoothing out
of the locomotor interruptions from the blind man's tactile space-sphere
offer any greater paradox? Surely not. And it is curious to note that both in
him and in us there is one particular locomotor feeling that is apt to assert
itself obstinately to the last. We and he alike spontaneously imagine space
as lying in front of us, for reasons too obvious to enumerate. If we think of
the space behind us, we, as a rule, have to turn round mentally, and in doing
so the front space vanishes. But in this, as in the other things of which we
have been talking, individuals differ widely. Some, in imagining a room,
can think of all its six surfaces at once. Others mentally turn round, or, at
least, imagine the room in several successive and mutually exclusive acts
(cf. p. 54, above).

Sir William Hamilton, and J. S. Mill after him, have quoted approvingly an
opinion of Platner (an eighteenth-century philosopher) regarding the spaceperceptions of the blind. Platner says:
"The attentive observation of a person born blind... has convinced me
that the sense of touch by itself is altogether incompetent to afford us
the representation of extension and space.... In fact, to those born
blind, time serves instead of space. Vicinity and distance mean in their
mouths nothing more than the shorter or longer time ... necessary to
attain from some one feeling to some other."
After my own observation of blind people, I should hardly have considered
this as anything but an eccentric opinion, worthy to pair off with that other
belief that color is primitively seen without extent, had it not been for the
remarkable Essay on Tactile and Visual Space by M. Ch. Dunan, which
appeared in the Revue Philosophique for 1888. This author quotes[206] three
very competent witnesses, all officials in institutions for the blind [it does
not appear from the text that more than one of them was blind himself],
who say that blind people only live in time. M. Dunan himself does not
share exactly this belief, but he insists that the blind man's and the seeing
man's representation of space have absolutely naught in common, and that
we are deceived into believing that what they mean by space is analogous to
what we mean, by the fact that so many of them are but semi-blind and still
think in visual terms, and from the farther fact that they all talk in visual
terms just like ourselves. But on examining M. Dunan's reasons one finds
that they all rest on the groundless logical assumption that the perception of
a geometrical form which we get with our eyes, and that which a blind man
gets with his fingers, must either be absolutely identical or absolutely
unlike. They cannot be similar in diversity, "for they are simple notions, and
it is of the essence of such to enter the mind or leave it all at once, so that
one who has a simple notion at all, possesses it in all its completeness....
Therefore, since it is impossible that the blind should have of the forms in
question ideas completely identical with our seeing ones, it follows that
their ideas must be radically different from and wholly irreducible to our
own."[207] Hereupon M. Dunan has no difficulty in finding a blind man who
still preserves a crude sensation of diffused light, and who says when
questioned that this light has no extent. Having 'no extent' appears,

however, on farther questioning, to signify merely not enveloping any
particular tactile objects, nor being located within their outline; so that
(allowing for latitude of expression) the result tallies perfectly with our own
view. A relatively stagnant retinal sensation of diffused light, not varying
when different objects are handled, would naturally remain an object quite
apart. If the word 'extent' were habitually used to denote tactile extent, this
sensation, having no tactile associates whatever, would naturally have
'extent' denied of it. And yet all the while it would be analogous to the
tactile sensations in having the quality of bigness. Of course it would have
no other tactile qualities, just as the tactile objects have no other optical
qualities than bigness. All sorts of analogies obtain between the spheres of
sensibility. Why are 'sweet' and 'soft' used so synonymously in most
languages? and why are both these adjectives applied to objects of so many
sensible kinds? Rough sounds, heavy smells, hard lights, cold colors, are
other examples. Nor does it follow from such analogies as these that the
sensations compared need be composite and have some of their parts
identical. We saw in Chapter XIII that likeness and difference are an
elementary relation, not to be resolved in every case into a mixture of
absolute identity and absolute heterogeneity of content (cf. Vol. I, pp. 4923).
I conclude, then, that although in its more superficial determinations the
blind man's space is very different from our space, yet a deep analogy
remains between the two. 'Big' and 'little,' 'far' and 'near,' are similar
contents of consciousness in both of us. But the measure of the bigness and
the farness is very different in him and in ourselves. He, for example, can
have no notion of what we mean by objects appearing smaller as they move
away, because he must always conceive of them as of their constant tactile
size. Nor, whatever analogy the two extensions involve, should we expect
that a blind man receiving sight for the first time should recognize his newgiven optical objects by their familiar tactile names. Molyneux wrote to
Locke:
"Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to
distinguish between a cube and a sphere,... so as to tell, when he felt
one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then
the cube and sphere placed on a table and the blind man to be made to

see; query, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now
distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube?"
This has remained in literature as 'Molyneux's query.' Molyneux answered
'No.' And Locke says:[208]
"I agree with this thinking gentleman whom I am proud to call my
friend, and am of opinion that the blind man at first sight would not be
able to say which was the globe, which the cube, whilst he only saw
them; though he could unerringly name them by his touch and
certainly distinguish them by the difference of their figures felt."
This opinion has not lacked experimental confirmation. From Chesselden's
case downwards, patients operated for congenital cataract have been unable
to name at first the things they saw. "So, Puss, I shall know you another
time," said Chesselden's patient, after catching the cat, looking at her
steadfastly, and setting her down. Some of this incapacity is unquestionably
due to general mental confusion at the new experience, and to the
excessively unfavorable conditions for perception which an eye with its
lens just extirpated affords. That the analogy of inner nature between the
retinal and tactile sensations goes beyond mere extensity is proved by the
cases where the patients were the most intelligent, as in the young man
operated on by Dr. Franz, who named circular, triangular, and quadrangular
figures at first sight.[209]
VISUAL SPACE.
It is when we come to analyze minutely the conditions of visual perception
that difficulties arise which have made psychologists appeal to new and
quasi-mythical mental powers. But I firmly believe that even here exact
investigation will yield the same verdict as in the cases studied hitherto.
This subject will close our survey of the facts; and if it give the result I
foretell, we shall be in the best of positions for a few final pages of
critically historical review.
If a common person is asked how he is enabled to see things as they are, he
will simply reply, by opening his eyes and looking. This innocent answer
has, however, long since been impossible for science. There are various

paradoxes and irregularities about what we appear to perceive under
seemingly identical optical conditions, which immediately raise questions.
To say nothing now of the time-honored conundrums of why we see upright
with an inverted retinal picture, and why we do not see double; and to leave
aside the whole field of color-contrasts and ambiguities, as not directly
relevant to the space-problem,—it is certain that the same retinal image
makes us see quite differently-sized and differently-shaped objects at
different times, and it is equally certain that the same ocular movement
varies in its perceptive import. It ought to be possible, were the act of
perception completely and simply intelligible, to assign for every distinct
judgment of size, shape, and position a distinct optical modification of some
kind as its occasion. And the connection between the two ought to be so
constant that, given the same modification, we should always have the same
judgment. But if we study the facts closely we soon find no such constant
connection between either judgment and retinal modification, or judgment
and muscular modification, to exist. The judgment seems to result from the
combination of retinal, muscular and intellectual factors with each other;
and any one of them may occasionally overpower the rest in a way which
seems to leave the matter subject to no simple law.
The scientific study of the subject, if we omit Descartes, began with
Berkeley, and the particular perception he analyzed in his New Theory of
Vision was that of distance or depth. Starting with the physical assumption
that a difference in the distance of a point can make no difference in the
nature of its retinal image, since "distance being a line directed endwise to
the eye, it projects only one point in the fund of the eye—which point
remains invariably the same, whether the distance be longer or shorter," he
concluded that distance could not possibly be a visual sensation, but must
be an intellectual 'suggestion' from 'custom' of some non-visual experience.
According to Berkeley this experience was tactile. His whole treatment of
the subject was excessively vague,—no shame to him, as a breaker of fresh
ground,—but as it has been adopted and enthusiastically hugged in all its
vagueness by nearly the whole line of British psychologists who have
succeeded him, it will be well for us to begin our study of vision by refuting
his notion that depth cannot possibly be perceived in terms of purely visual
feeling.

The Third Dimension.
Berkeleyans unanimously assume that no retinal sensation can primitively
be of volume; if it be of extension at all (which they are barely disposed to
admit), it can be only of two-, not of three-, dimensional extension. At the
beginning of the present chapter we denied this, and adduced facts to show
that all objects of sensation are voluminous in three dimensions (cf. p. 136
ff.). It is impossible to lie on one's back on a hill, to let the empty abyss of
blue fill one's whole visual field, and to sink deeper and deeper into the
merely sensational mode of consciousness regarding it, without feeling that
an indeterminate, palpitating, circling depth is as indefeasibly one of its
attributes as its breadth. We may artificially exaggerate this sensation of
depth. Rise and look from the hill-top at the distant view; represent to
yourself as vividly as possible the distance of the uttermost horizon; and
then with inverted head look at the same. There will be a startling increase
in the perspective, a most sensible recession of the maximum distance; and
as you raise the head you can actually see the horizon-line again draw near.
[210]

Mind, I say nothing as yet about our estimate of the 'real' amount of this
depth or distance. I only want to confirm its existence as a natural and
inevitable optical consort of the two other optical dimensions. The field of
view is always a volume-unit. Whatever be supposed to be its absolute and
'real' size, the relative sizes of its dimensions are functions of each other.
Indeed, it happens perhaps most often that the breadth- and height-feeling
take their absolute measure from the depth-feeling. If we plunge our head
into a wash-basin, the felt nearness of the bottom makes us feel the lateral
expanse to be small. If, on the contrary, we are on a mountain-top, the
distance of the horizon carries with it in our judgment a proportionate
height and length in the mountain-chains that bound it to our view. But as
aforesaid, let us not consider the question of absolute size now,—it must
later be taken up in a thorough way. Let us confine ourselves to the way in
which the three dimensions which are seen, get their values fixed relatively
to each other.
Reid, in his Inquiry into the Human Mind, has a section 'Of the Geometry
of Visibles,' in which he assumes to trace what the perceptions would be of
a race of 'Idomenians' reduced to the sole sense of sight. Agreeing with

Berkeley that sight alone can give no knowledge of the third dimension, he
humorously deduces various ingenious absurdities in their interpretations of
the material appearances before their eyes.
Now I firmly believe, on the contrary, that one of Reid's Idomenians would
frame precisely the same conception of the external world that we do, if he
had our intellectual powers.[211] Even were his very eyeballs fixed and not
movable like ours, that would only retard, not frustrate, his education. For
the same object, by alternately covering in its lateral movements different
parts of his retina, would determine the mutual equivalencies of the first
two dimensions of the field of view; and by exciting the physiological cause
of his perception of depth in various degrees, it would establish a scale of
equivalency between the first two and the third.
First of all, one of the sensations given by the object is chosen to represent
its 'real' size and shape, in accordance with the principles laid down on pp.
178 and 179. One sensation measures the 'thing' present, and the 'thing'
then measures the other sensations. The peripheral parts of the retina are
equated with the central by receiving the image of the same object. This
needs no elucidation in case the object does not change its distance or its
front. But suppose, to take a more complicated case, that the object is a
stick, seen first in its whole length, and then rotated round one of its ends;
let this fixed end be the one near the eye. In this movement the stick's image
will grow progressively shorter; its farther end will appear less and less
separated laterally from its fixed near end; soon it will be screened by the
latter, and then reappear on the opposite side, and finally on that side
resume its original length. Suppose this movement to become a familiar
experience; the mind will presumably react upon it after its usual fashion
(which is that of unifying all data which it is in any way possible to unify),
and consider it the movement of a constant object rather than the
transformation of a fluctuating one. Now, the sensation of depth which it
receives during the experience is awakened more by the far than by the near
end of the object. But how much depth? What shall measure its amount?
Why, at the moment the far end is ready to be eclipsed, the difference of its
distance from the near end's distance must be judged equal to the stick's
whole length; but that length has already been judged equal to a certain
optical sensation of breadth. Thus we find that given amounts of the visual
depth-feeling become signs of fixed amounts of the visual breadth-feeling.

The measurement of distance is, as Berkeley truly said, a result of
suggestion and experience. But visual experience alone is adequate to
produce it, and this he erroneously denied.
Suppose a colonel in front of his regiment at dress-parade, and suppose he
walks at right angles towards the midmost man of the line. As he advances,
and surveys the line in either direction, he looks more and more down it and
less and less at it, until, when abreast of the midmost man, he feels the end
men to be most distant; then when the line casts hardly any lateral image on
his retina at all, what distance shall he judge to be that of the end men?
Why, half the length of the regiment as it was originally seen, of course; but
this length was a moment ago a retinal object spread out laterally before his
sight. He has now merely equated a retinal depth-feeling with a retinal
breadth-feeling. If the regiment moved, and the colonel stood still, the result
would be the same. In such ways as these a creature endowed with eyes
alone could hardly fail of measuring out all three dimensions of the space
he inhabited. And we ourselves, I think, although we may often 'realize'
distance in locomotor terms (as Berkeley says we must always do), yet do
so no less often in terms of our retinal map, and always in this way the more
spontaneously. Were this not so, the three visual dimensions could not
possibly feel to us as homogeneous as they do, nor as commensurable inter
se.
Let us then admit distance to be at least as genuinely optical a content of
consciousness as either height or breadth. The question immediately
returns, Can any of them be said in any strictness to be optical sensations?
We have contended all along for the affirmative reply to this question, but
must now cope with difficulties greater than any that have assailed us
hitherto.
Helmholtz and Reid on Sensations.

A sensation is, as we have seen in Chapter XVII, the mental affection that
follows most immediately upon the stimulation of the sense-tract. Its
antecedent is directly physical, no psychic links, no acts of memory,
inference, or association intervening. Accordingly, if we suppose the nexus
between neural process in the sense-organ, on the one hand, and conscious
affection, on the other, to be by nature uniform, the same process ought
always to give the same sensation; and conversely, if what seems to be a
sensation varies whilst the process in the sense-organ remains unchanged,
the reason is presumably that it is really not a sensation but a higher mental
product, whereof the variations depend on events occurring in the system of
higher cerebral centres.
Now the size of the field of view varies enormously in all three dimensions,
without our being able to assign with any definiteness the process in the
visual tract on which the variation depends. We just saw how impossible
such assignment was in the case where turning down the head produces the
enlargement. In general, the maximum feeling of depth or distance seems to
take the lead in determining the apparent magnitude of the whole field, and
the two other dimensions seem to follow. If, to use the former instance, I
look close into a wash-basin, the lateral extent of the field shrinks
proportionately to its nearness. If I look from a mountain, the things seen
are vast in height and breadth, in proportion to the farness of the horizon.
But when we ask what changes in the eye determine how great this
maximum feeling of depth or distance (which is undoubtedly felt as a
unitary vastness) shall be, we find ourselves unable to point to any one of
them as being its absolutely regular concomitant. Convergence,
accommodation, double and disparate images, differences in the parallactic
displacement when we move our head, faintness of tint, dimness of outline,
and smallness of the retinal image of objects named and known, are all
processes that have something to do with the perception of 'far' and of 'near';
but the effect of each and any one of them in determining such a perception
at one moment may at another moment be reversed by the presence of some
other sensible quality in the object, that makes us, evidently by reminding
us of past experience, judge it to be at a different distance and of another
shape. If we paint the inside of a pasteboard-mask like the outside, and look
at it with one eye, the accommodation- and parallax-feelings are there, but
fail to make us see it hollow, as it is. Our mental knowledge of the fact that

human faces are always convex overpowers them, and we directly perceive
the nose to be nearer to us than the cheek instead of farther of.
The other organic tokens of farness and nearness are proved by similar
experiments (of which we shall ere long speak more in detail) to have an
equally fluctuating import. They lose all their value whenever the collateral
circumstances favor a strong intellectual conviction that the object
presented to the gaze is improbable—cannot be either what or where they
would make us perceive it to be.
Now the query immediately arises: Can the feelings of these processes in
the eye, since they are so easily neutralized and reversed by intellectual
suggestions, ever have been direct sensations of distance at all? Ought we
not rather to assume, since the distances which we see in spite of them are
conclusions from past experience, that the distances which we see by means
of them are equally such conclusions? Ought we not, in short, to say
unhesitatingly that distance must be an intellectual and not a sensible
content of consciousness? and that each of these eye-feelings serves as a
mere signal to awaken this content, our intellect being so framed that
sometimes it notices one signal more readily and sometimes another?
Reid long ago (Inquiry, c. vi. sec. 17) said:
"It may be taken for a general rule that things which are produced by
custom may be undone or changed by disuse or by contrary custom.
On the other hand, it is a strong argument that an effect is not owing to
custom, but to the constitution of nature, when a contrary custom is
found neither to change nor to weaken it."
More briefly, a way of seeing things that can be unlearned was presumably
learned, and only what we cannot unlearn is instinctive.
This seems to be Helmholtz's view, for he confirms Reid's maxim by saying
in emphatic print:
"No elements in our perception can be sensational which may be
overcome or reversed by factors of demonstrably experimental origin.
Whatever can be overcome by suggestions of experience must be
regarded as itself a product of experience and custom. If we follow this

rule it will appear that only qualities are sensational, whilst almost all
spatial attributes are results of habit and experience."[212]
This passage of Helmholtz's has obtained, it seems to me, an almost
deplorable celebrity. The reader will please observe its very radical import.
Not only would he, and does he, for the reasons we have just been ourselves
considering, deny distance to be an optical sensation; but, extending the
same method of criticism to judgments of size, shape, and direction, and
finding no single retinal or muscular process in the eyes to be indissolubly
linked with any one of these, he goes so far as to say that all optical spaceperceptions whatsoever must have an intellectual origin, and a content that
no items of visual sensibility can account for.[213]
As Wundt and others agree with Helmholtz here, and as their conclusions, if
true, are irreconcilable with all the sensationalism which I have been
teaching hitherto, it clearly devolves upon me to defend my position against
this new attack. But as this chapter on Space is already so overgrown with
episodes and details, I think it best to reserve the refutation of their general
principle for the next chapter, and simply to assume at this point its
untenability. This has of course an arrogant look; but if the reader will bear
with me for not very many pages more, I shall hope to appease his mind.
Meanwhile I affirm confidently that the same outer objects actually FEEL
different to us according as our brain reacts on them in one way or another
by making us perceive them as this or as that sort of thing. So true is this
that one may well, with Stumpf,[214] reverse Helmholtz's query, and ask:
"What would become of our sense-perceptions in case experience were not
able so to transform them?" Stumpf adds: "All wrong perceptions that
depend on peculiarities in the organs are more or less perfectly corrected by
the influence of imagination following the guidance of experience."
If, therefore, among the facts of optical space-perception (which we must
now proceed to consider in more detail) we find instances of an identical
organic eye-process, giving us different perceptions at different times, in
consequence of different collateral circumstances suggesting different
objective facts to our imagination, we must not hastily conclude, with the
school of Helmholtz and Wundt, that the organic eye-process pure and
simple, without the collateral circumstances, is incapable of giving us any
sensation of a spatial kind at all. We must rather seek to discover by what

means the circumstances can so have transformed a space-sensation, which,
but for their presence, would probably have been felt in its natural purity.
And I may as well say now in advance that we shall find the means to be
nothing more or less than association—the suggestion to the mind of optical
objects not actually present, but more habitually associated with the
'collateral circumstances' than the sensation which they now displace and
being imagined now with a quasi-hallucinatory strength. But before this
conclusion emerges, it will be necessary to have reviewed the most
important facts of optical space-perception, in relation to the organic
conditions on which they depend. Readers acquainted with German optics
will excuse what is already familiar to them in the following section.[215]
Let us begin the long and rather tedious inquiry by the most important case.
Physiologists have long sought for a simple law by which to connect the
seen direction and distance of objects with the retinal impressions they
produce. Two principal theories have been held of this matter, the 'theory of
identical points,' and the 'theory of projection,'—each incompatible with the
other, and each beyond certain limits becoming inconsistent with the facts.
The Theory of Identical Points.

FIG. 54.

This theory starts from the truth that on both retinæ an impression on the
upper half makes us perceive an object as below, on the lower half as above,
the horizon; and on the right half an object to the left, on the left half one to
the right, of the median line. Thus each quadrant of one retina corresponds
as a whole to the similar quadrant of the other; and within two similar
quadrants, al and ar for example, there should, if the correspondence were
consistently carried out, be geometrically similar points which, if impressed
at the same time by light emitted from the same object, should cause that

object to appear in the same direction to either eye. Experiment verifies this
surmise. If we look at the starry vault with parallel eyes, the stars all seem
single; and the laws of perspective show that under the circumstances the
parallel light-rays coming from each star must impinge on points within
either retina which are geometrically similar to each other. The same result
may be more artificially obtained. If we take two exactly similar pictures,
smaller, or at least no larger, than those on an ordinary stereoscopic slide,
and if we look at them as stereoscopic slides are looked at, that is, at one
with each eye (a median partition confining the view of either eye to the
picture opposite it), we shall see but one flat picture, all of whose parts
appear sharp and single.[216] Identical points being impressed, both eyes see
their object in the same direction, and the two objects consequently
coalesce into one.
The same thing may be shown in still another way. With fixed head
converge the eyes upon some conspicuous objective point behind a pane of
glass; then close either eye alternately and make a little ink-mark on the
glass, 'covering' the object as seen by the eye which is momentarily open.
On looking now with both eyes the ink-marks will seem single, and in the
same direction as the objective point. Conversely, let the eyes converge on a
single ink-spot on the glass, and then by alternate shutting of them let it be
noted what objects behind the glass the spot covers to the right and left eye
respectively. Now with both eyes open, both these objects and the spot will
appear in the same place, one or other of the three becoming more distinct
according to the fluctuations of retinal attention.[217]
Now what is the direction of this common place? The only way of defining
the direction of an object is by pointing to it. Most people, if asked to look
at an object over the horizontal edge of a sheet of paper which conceals
their hand and arm, and then to point their finger at it (raising the hand
gradually so that at last a finger-tip will appear above the sheet of paper),
are found to place the finger not between either eye and the object, but
between the latter and the root of the nose, and this whether both eyes or
either alone be used. Hering and Helmholtz express this by saying that we
judge of the direction of objects as they would appear to an imaginary
cyclopean eye, situated between our two real eyes, and with its optical axis
bisecting the angle of convergence of the latter. Our two retinæ act,
according to Hering, as if they were superposed in the place of this

imaginary double-eye; we see by the corresponding points of each, situated
far asunder as they really are, just as we should see if they were superposed
and could both be excited together.
The judgment of objective singleness and that of identical direction seem to
hang necessarily together. And that of identical direction seems to carry
with it the necessity of a common origin, between the eyes or elsewhere,
from which all the directions felt may seem to be estimated. This is why the
cyclopean eye is really a fundamental part of the formulation of the theory
of identical retinal points, and why Hering, the greatest champion of this
theory, lays so much stress upon it.
It is an immediate consequence of the law of identical projection of images
on geometrically similar points that images which fall upon geometrically
DISPARATE points of the two retinæ should be projected in DISPARATE
directions, and that their objects should consequently appear in TWO places,
or LOOK DOUBLE. Take the parallel rays from a star falling upon two eyes
which converge upon a near object, O, instead of being parallel, as in the
previously instanced case. If SL and SR in Fig. 55 be the parallel rays, each
of them will fall upon the nasal half of the retina which it strikes.

FIG. 55.

But the two nasal halves are disparate, geometrically symmetrical, not
geometrically similar. The image on the left one will therefore appear as if
lying in a direction leftward of the cyclopean eye's line of sight; the image
of the right one will appear far to the right of the same direction. The star
will, in short, be seen double,—'homonymously' double.
Conversely, if the star be looked at directly with parallel axes, O will be
seen double, because its images will affect the outer or cheek halves of the
two retinæ, instead of one outer and one nasal half. The position of the
images will here be reversed from that of the previous case. The right eye's
image will now appear to the left, the left eye's to the right—the double
images will be 'heteronymous.'
The same reasoning and the same result ought to apply where the object's
place with respect to the direction of the two optic axes is such as to make
its images fall not on non-similar retinal halves, but on non-similar parts of
similar halves. Here, of course, the directions of projection will be less
widely disparate than in the other case, and the double images will appear
to lie less widely apart.

Careful experiments made by many observers according to the so-called
haploscopic method confirm this law, and show that corresponding points,
of single visual direction, exist upon the two retinæ. For the detail of these
one must consult the special treatises.
Note now an important consequence. If we take a stationary object and
allow the eyes to vary their direction and convergence, a purely geometrical
study will show that there will be some positions in which its two images
impress corresponding retinal points, but more in which they impress
disparate points. The former constitute the so-called horopter, and their
discovery has been attended with great mathematical difficulty. Objects or
parts of objects which lie in the eyes' horopter at any given time cannot
appear double. Objects lying out of the horopter would seem, if the theory of
identical points were strictly true, necessarily and always to appear double.
Here comes the first great conflict of the identity-theory with experience.
Were the theory true, we ought all to have an intuitive knowledge of the
horopter as the line of distinctest vision. Objects placed elsewhere ought to
seem, if not actually double, at least blurred. And yet no living man makes
any such distinction between the parts of his field of vision. To most of us
the whole field appears single, and it is only by rare accident or by special
education that we ever catch a glimpse of a double image. In 1838,
Wheatstone, in his truly classical memoir on binocular vision and the
stereoscope,[218] showed that the disparateness of the points on which the
two images of an object fall does not within certain limits affect its seen
singleness at all, but rather the distance at which it shall appear. Wheatstone
made an observation, moreover, which subsequently became the bone of
much hot contention, in which he strove to show that not only might
disparate images fuse, but images on corresponding or identical points
might be seen double.[219]
I am unfortunately prevented by the weakness of my own eyes from
experimenting enough to form a decided personal opinion on the matter. It
seems to me, however, that the balance of evidence is against the
Wheatstonian interpretation, and that disparate points may fuse, without
identical points for that reason ever giving double images. The two
questions, "Can we see single with disparate points?" and "Can we see
double with identical points?" although at the first blush they may appear,
as to Helmholtz they appear, to be but two modes of expressing the same

inquiry, are in reality distinct. The first may quite well be answered
affirmatively and the second negatively.
Add to this that the experiment quoted from Helmholtz above by no means
always succeeds, but that many individuals place their finger between the
object and one of their eyes, oftenest the right;[220] finally, observe that the
identity-theory, with its Cyclopean starting point for all lines of direction,
gives by itself no ground for the distance on any line at which an object
shall appear, and has to be helped out in this respect by subsidiary
hypotheses, which, in the hands of Hering and others, have become so
complex as easily to fall a prey to critical attacks; and it will soon seem as if
the law of identical seen directions by corresponding points, although a
simple formula for expressing concisely many fundamental phenomena, is
by no means an adequate account of the whole matter of retinal perception.
[221]

The Projection-Theory.
Does the theory of projection fare any better? This theory admits that each
eye sees the object in a different direction from the other, along the line,
namely, passing from the object through the middle of the pupil to the
retina. A point directly fixated is thus seen on the optical axes of both eyes.
There is only one point, however, which these two optical axes have in
common, and that is the point to which they converge. Everything directly
looked at is seen at this point, and is thus seen both single and at its proper
distance. It is easy to show the incompatibility of this theory with the theory
of identity. Take an objective point (like O in Fig. 50, when the star is
looked at) casting its images R' and L' on geometrically dissimilar parts of
the two retinæ and affecting the outer half of each eye. On the identitytheory it ought necessarily to appear double, whilst on the projection-theory
there is no reason whatever why it should not appear single, provided only
it be located by the judgment on each line of visible direction, neither
nearer nor farther than its point of intersection with the other line.
Every point in the field of view ought, in truth, if the projection-theory were
uniformly valid, to appear single, entirely irrespective of the varying
positions of the eyes, for from every point of space two lines of visible
direction pass to the two retinæ; and at the intersection of these lines, or just

where the point is, there, according to the theory, it should appear. The
objection to this theory is thus precisely the reverse of the objection to the
identity-theory. If the latter ruled, we ought to see most things double all the
time. If the projection-theory ruled, we ought never to see anything double.
As a matter of fact we get too few double images for the identity-theory, and
too many for the projection-theory.
The partisans of the projection-theory, beginning with Aguilonius, have
always explained double images as the result of an erroneous judgment of
the distance of the object, the images of the latter being projected by the
imagination along the two lines of visible direction either nearer or farther
than the point of intersection of the latter. A diagram will make this clear.

FIG. 56.

Let O be the point looked at, M an object farther, and N an object nearer,
than it. Then M and N will send the lines of visible direction MM and NN
to the two retinæ. If N be judged as far as O, it must necessarily lie where
the two lines of visible direction NN intersect the plane of the arrow, or in

two places, at N' and at N''. If M be judged as near as O, it must for the
same reason form two images at M' and M''.
It is, as a matter of fact, true that we often misjudge the distance in the way
alleged. If the reader will hold his forefingers, one beyond the other, in the
median line, and fixate them alternately, he will see the one not looked at,
double; and he will also notice that it appears nearer to the plane of the one
looked at, whichever the latter may be, than it really is. Its changes of
apparent size, as the convergence of the eyes alter, also prove the change of
apparent distance. The distance at which the axes converge seems, in fact,
to exert a sort of attraction upon objects situated elsewhere. Being the
distance of which we are most acutely sensible, it invades, so to speak, the
whole field of our perception. If two half-dollars be laid on the table an inch
or two apart, and the eyes fixate steadily the point of a pen held in the
median line at varying distances between the coins and the face, there will
come a distance at which the pen stands between the left half-dollar and the
right eye, and the right half-dollar and the left eye. The two half-dollars will
then coalesce into one; and this one will show its apparent approach to the
pen-point by seeming suddenly much reduced in size.[222]
Yet, in spite of this tendency to inaccuracy, we are never actually mistaken
about the half-dollar being behind the pen-point. It may not seem far
enough off, but still it is farther than the point. In general it may be said that
where the objects are known to us, no such illusion of distance occurs in
any one as the theory would require. And in some observers, Hering for
example, it seems hardly to occur at all. If I look into infinite distance and
get my finger in double images, they do not seem infinitely far off. To make
objects at different distances seem equidistant, careful precautions must be
taken to have them alike in appearance, and to exclude all outward reasons
for ascribing to the one a different location from that ascribed to the other.
Thus Donders tries to prove the law of projection by taking two similar
electric sparks, one behind the other on a dark ground, one seen double; or
an iron rod placed so near to the eyes that its double images seem as broad
as that of a fixated stove-pipe, the top and bottom of the objects being cut
off by screens, so as to prevent all suggestions of perspective, etc. The three
objects in each experiment seem in the same plane.[223]
Add to this the impossibility, recognized by all observers, of ever seeing
double with the fovea, and the fact that authorities as able as those quoted in

the note on Wheatstone's observation deny that they can see double then
with identical points, and we are forced to conclude that the projectiontheory, like its predecessor, breaks down. Neither formulates exactly or
exhaustively a law for all our perceptions.
Ambiguity of Retinal Impressions.

FIG. 57.

What does each theory try to do? To make of seen location a fixed function
of retinal impression. Other facts may be brought forward to show how far
from fixed are the perceptive functions of retinal impressions. We alluded a
while ago to the extraordinary ambiguity of the retinal image as a revealer
of magnitude. Produce an after-image of the sun and look at your finger-tip:
it will be smaller than your nail. Project it on the table, and it will be as big
as a strawberry; on the wall, as large as a plate; on yonder mountain, bigger
than a house. And yet it is an unchanged retinal impression. Prepare a sheet
with the figures shown in Fig. 57 strongly marked upon it, and get by direct
fixation a distinct after-image of each.

FIGS. 58 & 59.

Project the after-image of the cross upon the upper left-hand part of the
wall, it will appear as in Fig. 58; on the upper right-hand it will appear as in
Fig. 59. The circle similarly projected will be distorted into two different
ellipses. If the two parallel lines be projected upon the ceiling or floor far in

front, the farther ends will diverge; and if the three parallel lines be thrown
on the same surfaces, the upper pair will seem farther apart than the lower.

FIG. 60.

FIG. 61.

Adding certain lines to others has the same distorting effect. In what is
known as Zöllner's pattern (Fig. 60), the long parallels tip towards each
other the moment we draw the short slanting lines over them yet their
retinal images are the same they always were. A similar distortion of
parallels appears in Fig 61.

FIG. 62.

FIG. 63.

Drawing a square inside the circle (Fig. 62) gives to the outline of the latter
an indented appearance where the square's corners touch it. Drawing the
radii inside of one[Pg 233]
[Pg 234] of the right angles in the same figure makes it seem larger than the
other. In Fig. 63, the retinal image of the space between the extreme dots is
in all three lines the same, yet it seems much larger the moment it is filled
up with other dots.
In the stereoscope certain pairs of lines which look single under ordinary
circumstances immediately seem double when we add certain other lines to
them.[224]
Ambiguous Import of Eye-movements.

These facts show the indeterminateness of the space-import of various
retinal impressions. Take now the eye's movements, and we find a similar
vacillation. When we follow a moving object with our gaze, the motion is
'voluntary'; when our eyes oscillate to and fro after we have made ourselves
dizzy by spinning around, it is 'reflex'; and when the eyeball is pushed with
the finger, it is 'passive.' Now, in all three of these cases we get a feeling
from the movement as it effects itself. But the objective perceptions to
which the feeling assists us are by no means the same. In the first case we
may see a stationary field of view with one moving object in it; in the
second, the total field swimming more or less steadily in one direction; in
the third, a sudden jump or twist of the same total field.
The feelings of convergence of the eyeballs permit of the same ambiguous
interpretation. When objects are near we converge strongly upon them in
order to see them; when far, we set our optic axes parallel. But the exact
degree of convergence fails to be felt; or rather, being felt, fails to tell us the
absolute distance of the object we are regarding. Wheatstone arranged his
stereoscope in such a way that the size of the retinal images might change
without the convergence altering; or conversely, the convergence might
change without the retinal image altering. Under these circumstances, he
says,[225] the object seemed to approach or recede in the first case, without
altering its size, in the second, to change its size without altering its distance
—just the reverse of what might have been expected. Wheatstone adds,
however, that 'fixing the attention' converted each of these perceptions into
its opposite. The same perplexity occurs in looking through prismatic
glasses, which alter the eyes' convergence. We cannot decide whether the
object has come nearer, or grown larger, or both, or neither; and our
judgment vacillates in the most surprising way. We may even make our
eyes diverge, and the object will none the less appear at a finite distance.
When we look through the stereoscope, the picture seems at no determinate
distance. These and other facts have led Helmholtz to deny that the feeling
of convergence has any very exact value as a distance-measurer.[226]
With the feelings of accommodation it is very much the same. Donders has
shown[227] that the apparent magnifying power of spectacles of moderate
convexity hardly depends at all upon their enlargement of the retinal image,
but rather on the relaxation they permit of the muscle of accommodation.
This suggests an object farther off, and consequently a much larger one,

since its retinal size rather increases than diminishes. But in this case the
same vacillation of judgment as in the previously mentioned case of
convergence takes place. The recession made the object seem larger, but the
apparent growth in size of the object now makes it look as if it came nearer
instead of receding. The effect thus contradicts its own cause. Everyone is
conscious, on first putting on a pair of spectacles, of a doubt whether the
field of view draws near or retreats.[228]
There is still another deception, occurring in persons who have had one
eye-muscle suddenly paralyzed. This deception has led Wundt to affirm that
the eyeball-feeling proper, the incoming sensation of effected rotation, tells
us only of the direction of our eye-movements, but not of their whole
extent.[229] For this reason, and because not only Wundt, but many other
authors, think the phenomena in these partial paralyses demonstrate the
existence of a feeling of innervation, a feeling of the outgoing nervous
current, opposed to every afferent sensation whatever, it seems proper to
note the facts with a certain degree of detail.
Suppose a man wakes up some morning with the external rectus muscle of
his right eye half paralyzed, what will be the result? He will be enabled only
with great effort to rotate the eye so as to look at objects lying far off to the
right. Something in the effort he makes will make him feel as if the object
lay much farther to the right than it really is. If the left and sound eye be
closed, and he be asked to touch rapidly with his finger an object situated
towards his right, he will point the finger to the right of it. The current
explanation of the 'something' in the effort which causes this deception is
that it is the sensation of the outgoing discharge from the nervous centres,
the 'feeling of innervation,' to use Wundt's expression, requisite for bringing
the open eye with its weakened muscle to bear upon the object to be
touched. If that object be situated 20 degrees to the right, the patient has
now to innervate as powerfully to turn the eye those 20 degrees as formerly
he did to turn the eye 30 degrees. He consequently believes as before that
he has turned it 30 degrees; until, by a newly-acquired custom, he learns the
altered spatial import of all the discharges his brain makes into his right
abducens nerve. The 'feeling of innervation,' maintained to exist by this and
other observations, plays an immense part in the space-theories of certain
philosophers, especially Wundt. I shall elsewhere try to show that the
observations by no means warrant the conclusions drawn from them, and

that the feeling in question is probably a wholly fictitious entity.[230]
Meanwhile it suffices to point out that even those who set most store by it
are compelled, by the readiness with which the translocation of the field of
view becomes corrected and further errors avoided, to admit that the precise
space-import of the supposed sensation of outgoing energy is as ambiguous
and indeterminate as that of any other of the eye-feelings we have
considered hitherto.

I have now given what no one will call an understatement of the facts and
arguments by which it is sought to banish the credit of directly revealing
space from each and every kind of eye-sensation taken by itself. The reader
will confess that they make a very plausible show, and most likely wonder
whether my own theory of the matter can rally from their damaging
evidence. But the case is far from being hopeless; and the introduction of a
discrimination hitherto unmade will, if I mistake not, easily vindicate the
view adopted in these pages, whilst at the same time it makes ungrudging
allowance for all the ambiguity and illusion on which so much stress is laid
by the advocates of the intellectualist-theory.
The Choice of the Visual Reality.
We have native and fixed optical space-sensations; but experience leads us
to select certain ones from among them to be the exclusive bearers of
reality: the rest become mere signs and suggesters of these. The factor of
selection, on which we have already laid so much stress, here as elsewhere
is the solving word of the enigma. If Helmholtz, Wundt, and the rest, with
an ambiguous retinal sensation before them, meaning now one size and
distance, and now another, had not contented themselves with merely
saying:—The size and distance are not this sensation, they are something
beyond it which it merely calls up, and whose own birthplace is afar—in
'synthesis' (Wundt) or in 'experience' (Helmholtz) as the case may be; if
they had gone on definitely to ask and definitely to answer the question,
What are the size and distance in their proper selves? they would not only
have escaped the present deplorable vagueness of their space-theories, but

they would have seen that the objective spatial attributes 'signified' are
simply and solely certain other optical sensations now absent, but which
the present sensations suggest.
What, for example, is the slant-legged cross which we think we see on the
wall when we project the rectangular after-image high up towards our right
or left (Figs. 58 and 59)? Is it not in very sooth a retinal sensation itself? An
imagined sensation, not a felt one, it is true, but none the less essentially
and originally sensational or retinal for that,—the sensation, namely, which
we should receive if a 'real' slant-legged cross stood on the wall in front of
us and threw its image on our eye. That image is not the one our retina now
holds. Our retina now holds the image which a cross of square shape throws
when in front, but which a cross of the slant-legged pattern would throw,
provided it were actually on the wall in the distant place at which we look.
Call this actual retinal image the 'square' image. The square image is then
one of the innumerable images the slant-legged cross can throw. Why
should another one, and that an absent one, of those innumerable images be
picked out to represent exclusively the slant-legged cross's 'true' shape?
Why should that absent and imagined slant-legged image displace the
present and felt square image from our mind? Why, when the objective
cross gives us so many shapes, as it varies its position, should we think we
feel the true shape only when the cross is directly in front? And when that
question is answered, how can the absent and represented feeling of a slantlegged figure so successfully intrude itself into the place of a presented
square one?
Before answering either question, let us be doubly sure about our facts, and
see how true it is that in our dealings with objects we always do pick out
one of the visual images they yield, to constitute the real form or size.
The matter of size has been already touched upon, so that no more need be
said of it here. As regards shape, almost all the retinal shapes that objects
throw are perspective 'distortions.' Square table-tops constantly present two
acute and two obtuse angles; circles drawn on our wall-papers, our carpets,
or on sheets of paper, usually show like ellipses; parallels approach as they
recede; human bodies are foreshortened; and the transitions from one to
another of these altering forms are infinite and continual. Out of the flux,
however, one phase always stands prominent. It is the form the object has
when we see it easiest and best: and that is when our eyes and the object

both are in what may be called the normal position. In this position our
head is upright and our optic axes either parallel or symmetrically
convergent; the plane of the object is perpendicular to the visual plane; and
if the object is one containing many lines it is turned so as to make them, as
far as possible, either parallel or perpendicular to the visual plane. In this
situation it is that we compare all shapes with each other; here every exact
measurement and decision is made.[231]
It is very easy to see why the normal situation should have this
extraordinary pre-eminence. First, it is the position in which we easiest hold
anything we are examining in our hands; second, it is a turning-point
between all right- and all left-hand perspective views of a given object;
third, it is the only position in which symmetrical figures seem symmetrical
and equal angles seem equal; fourth, it is often that starting-point of
movements from which the eye is least troubled by axial rotations, by
which superposition[232] of the retinal images of different lines and different
parts of the same line is easiest produced, and consequently by which the
eye can make the best comparative measurements in its sweeps. All these
merits single the normal position out to be chosen. No other point of view
offers so many æsthetic and practical advantages. Here we believe we see
the object as it is; elsewhere, only as it seems. Experience and custom soon
teach us, however, that the seeming appearance passes into the real one by
continuous gradations. They teach us, moreover, that seeming and being
may be strangely interchanged. Now a real circle may slide into a seeming
ellipse; now an ellipse may, by sliding in the same direction, become a
seeming circle; now a rectangular cross grows slant-legged; now a slantlegged one grows rectangular.
Almost any form in oblique vision may be thus a derivative of almost any
other in 'primary' vision; and we must learn, when we get one of the former
appearances, to translate it into the appropriate one of the latter class; we
must learn of what optical 'reality' it is one of the optical signs. Having
learned this, we do but obey that law of economy or simplification which
dominates our whole psychic life, when we attend exclusively to the 'reality'
and ignore as much as our consciousness will let us the 'sign' by which we
came to apprehend it. The signs of each probable real thing being multiple
and the thing itself one and fixed, we gain the same mental relief by
abandoning the former for the latter that we do when we abandon mental

images, with all their fluctuating characters, for the definite and
unchangeable names which they suggest. The selection of the several
'normal' appearances from out of the jungle of our optical experiences, to
serve as the real sights of which we shall think, is psychologically a parallel
phenomenon to the habit of thinking in words, and has a like use. Both are
substitutions of terms few and fixed for terms manifold and vague.
Sensations which we Ignore.
This service of sensations as mere signs, to be ignored when they have
evoked the other sensations which are their significates, was noticed first by
Berkeley and remarked in many passages, as the following:
"Signs, being little considered in themselves, or for their own sake, but
only in their relative capacity and for the sake of those things whereof
they are signs, it comes to pass that the mind overlooks them, so as to
carry its attention immediately on to the things signified ... which in
truth and strictness are not seen, but only suggested and apprehended
by means of the proper objects of sight which alone are seen." (Divine
Visual Language, § 12.)
Berkeley of course erred in supposing that the thing suggested was not even
originally an object of sight, as the sign now is which calls it up. Reid
expressed Berkeley's principle in yet clearer language:
"The visible appearances of objects are intended by nature only as
signs or indications, and the mind passes instantly to the things
signified, without making the least reflection upon the sign, or even
perceiving that there is any such thing.... The mind has acquired a
confirmed and inveterate habit of inattention to them (the signs). For
they no sooner appear than, quick as lightning, the thing signified
succeeds and engrosses all our regard. They have no name in
language; and although we are conscious of them when they pass
through the mind, yet their passage is so quick and so familiar that it is
absolutely unheeded; nor do they leave any footsteps of themselves,
either in the memory or imagination." (Inquiry, chap. v. §§ 2, 3.)

If we review the facts we shall find every grade of non-attention between
the extreme form of overlooking mentioned by Reid (or forms even more
extreme still) and complete conscious perception of the sensation present.
Sometimes it is literally impossible to become aware of the latter.
Sometimes a little artifice or effort easily leads us to discern it together, or
in alternation, with the 'object' it reveals. Sometimes the present sensation is
held to be the object or to reproduce its features in undistorted shape, and
then, of course, it receives the mind's full glare.
The deepest inattention is to subjective optical sensations, strictly so called,
or those which are not signs of outer objects at all. Helmholtz's treatment of
these phenomena, muscæ volitantes, negative after-images, double images,
etc., is very satisfactory. He says:
"We only attend with any ease and exactness to our sensations in so far
forth as they can be utilized for the knowledge of outward things; and
we are accustomed to neglect all those portions of them which have no
significance as regards the external world. So much is this the case that
for the most part special artifices and practice are required for the
observation of these latter more subjective feelings. Although it might
seem that nothing should be easier than to be conscious of one's own
sensations, experience nevertheless shows that often enough either a
special talent like that showed in eminent degree by Purkinje, or
accident or theoretic speculation, are necessary conditions for the
discovery of subjective phenomena. Thus, for example, the blind spot
on the retina was discovered by Mariotte by the theoretic way;
similarly by me the existence of 'summation'-tones in acoustics. In the
majority of cases accident is what first led observers whose attention
was especially exercised on subjective phenomena to discover this one
or that; only where the subjective appearances are so intense that they
interfere with the perception of objects are they noticed by all men
alike. But if they have once been discovered it is for the most part easy
for subsequent observers who place themselves in proper conditions
and bend their attention in the right direction to perceive them. But in
many cases—for example, in the phenomena of the blind spot, in the
discrimination of over-tones and combination-tones from the groundtone of musical sounds, etc.—such a strain of the attention is required,
even with appropriate instrumental aids, that most persons fail. The

very after-images of bright objects are by most men perceived only
under exceptionally favorable conditions, and it takes steady practice
to see the fainter images of this kind. It is a commonly recurring
experience that persons smitten with some eye-disease which impairs
vision suddenly remark for the first time the muscæ volitantes which
all through life their vitreous humor has contained, but which they now
firmly believe to have arisen since their malady; the truth being that
the latter has only made them more observant of all their visual
sensations. There are also cases where one eye has gradually grown
blind, and the patient lived for an indefinite time without knowing it,
until, through the accidental closure of the healthy eye alone, the
blindness of the other was brought to attention.
"Most people, when first made aware of binocular double images, are
uncommonly astonished that they should never have noticed them
before, although all through their life they had been in the habit of
seeing singly only those few objects which were about equally distant
with the point of fixation, and the rest, those nearer and farther, which
constitute the great majority, had always been double.
"We must then learn to turn our attention to our particular sensations,
and we learn this commonly only for such sensations as are means of
cognition of the outer world. Only so far as they serve this end have
our sensations any importance for us in ordinary life. Subjective
feelings are mostly interesting only to scientific investigators; were
they remarked in the ordinary use of the senses, they could only cause
disturbance. Whilst, therefore, we reach an extraordinary degree of
firmness and security in objective observation, we not only do not
reach this where subjective phenomena are concerned, but we actually
attain in a high degree the faculty of overlooking these altogether, and
keeping ourselves independent of their influence in judging of objects,
even in cases where their strength might lead them easily to attract our
attention." (Physiol. Optik, pp. 431-2.)
Even where the sensation is not merely subjective, as in the cases of which
Helmholtz speaks, but is a sign of something outward, we are also liable, as
Reid says, to overlook its intrinsic quality and attend exclusively to the
image of the 'thing' it suggests. But here everyone can easily notice the

sensation itself if he will. Usually we see a sheet of paper as uniformly
white, although a part of it may be in shadow. But we can in an instant, if
we please, notice the shadow as local color. A man walking towards us does
not usually seem to alter his size; but we can, by setting our attention in a
peculiar way make him appear to do so. The whole education of the artist
consists in his learning to see the presented signs as well as the represented
things. No matter what the field of view means, he sees it also as it feels—
that is, as a collection of patches of color bounded by lines—the whole
forming an optical diagram of whose intrinsic proportions one who is not an
artist has hardly a conscious inkling. The ordinary man's attention passes
over them to their import; the artist's turns back and dwells upon them for
their own sake. 'Don't draw the thing as it is, but as it looks!' is the endless
advice of every teacher to his pupil; forgetting that what it 'is' is what it
would also 'look,' provided it were placed in what we have called the
'normal' situation for vision. In this situation the sensation as 'sign' and the
sensation as 'object' coalesce into one, and there is no contrast between
them.
Sensations which seem Suppressed.
But a great difficulty has been made of certain peculiar cases which we
must now turn to consider. They are cases in which a present sensation,
whose existence is supposed to be proved by its outward conditions being
there, seems absolutely suppressed or changed by the image of the 'thing' it
suggests.
This matter carries us back to what was said on p. 218. The passage there
quoted from Helmholtz refers to these cases. He thinks they conclusively
disprove the original and intrinsic spatiality of any of our retinal sensations;
for if such a one, actually present, had an immanent and essential spacedetermination of its own, that might well be added to and overlaid or even
momentarily eclipsed by suggestions of its signification, but how could it
possibly be altered or completely suppressed thereby? Of actually present
sensations, he says, being suppressed by suggestions of experience—
"We have not a single well-attested example. In all those illusions
which are provoked by sensations in the absence of their usually

exciting objects, the mistake never vanishes by the better
understanding of the object really present, and by insight into the cause
of deception. Phosphenes provoked by pressure on the eyeball, by
traction on the entrance of the optic nerve, after-images, etc., remain
projected into their apparent place in the field of vision, just as the
image projected from a mirror's surface continues to be seen behind
the mirror, although we know that to all these appearances no outward
reality corresponds. True enough, we can remove our attention, and
keep it removed, from sensations that have no reference to the outer
world, those, e.g., of the weaker after-images, and of entoptic objects,
etc.... But what would become of our perceptions at all if we had the
power not only of ignoring, but of transforming into their opposites,
any part of them that differed from that outward experience, the image
of which, as that of a present reality, accompanies them in the mind?"
[233]

And again:
"On the analogy of all other experience, we should expect that the
conquered feelings would persist to our perception, even if only in the
shape of recognized illusions. But this is not the case. One does not see
how the assumption of originally spatial sensations can explain our
optical cognitions, when in the last resort those who believe in these
very sensations find themselves obliged to assume that they are
overcome by our better judgment, based on experience."
These words, coming from such a quarter, necessarily carry great weight.
But the authority even of a Helmholtz ought not to shake one's critical
composure. And the moment one abandons abstract generalities and comes
to close quarters with the particulars, I think one easily sees that no such
conclusions as those we have quoted follow from the latter. But profitably
to conduct the discussion we must divide the alleged instances into groups.

(a) With Helmholtz, color-perception is equally with space-perception an
intellectual affair. The so-called simultaneous color-contrast, by which one

color modifies another alongside of which it is said, is explained by him as
an unconscious inference. In Chapter XVII we discussed the color-contrast
problem; the principles which applied to its solution will prove also
applicable to part of the present problem. In my opinion, Hering has
definitively proved that, when one color is laid beside another, it modifies
the sensation of the latter, not by virtue of any mere mental suggestion, as
Helmholtz would have it, but by actually exciting a new nerve-process, to
which the modified feeling of color immediately corresponds. The
explanation is physiological, not psychological. The transformation of the
original color by the inducing color is due to the disappearance of the
physiological conditions under which the first color was produced, and to
the induction, under the new conditions, of a genuine new sensation, with
which the 'suggestions of experience' have naught to do.

FIG. 64.

That processes in the visual apparatus propagate themselves laterally, if one
may so express it, is also shown by the phenomena of contrast which occur
after looking upon motions of various kinds. Here are a few examples. If,
over the rail of a moving vessel, we look at the water rushing along the side,
and then transfer our gaze to the deck, a band of planks will appear to us,
moving in the opposite direction to that in which, a moment previously, we
had been seeing the water move, whilst on either side of this band another
band of planks will move as the water did. Looking at a waterfall, or at the
road from out of a car-window in a moving tram, produces the same

illusion, which may be easily verified in the laboratory by a simple piece of
apparatus. A board with a window five or six inches wide and of any
convenient length is supported upright on two feet. On the back side of the
board, above and below the window, are two rollers, one of which is
provided with a crank. An endless band of any figured stuff is passed over
these rollers (one of which can be so adjusted on its bearings as to keep the
stuff always taut and not liable to slip), and the surface of the front board is
also covered with stuff or paper of a nature to catch the eye. Turning the
crank now sets the central band in continuous motion, whilst the margins of
the field remain really at rest, but after a while appear moving in the
contrary way. Stopping the crank results in an illusory appearance of
motion in reverse directions all over the field.
A disk with an Archimedean spiral drawn upon it, whirled round on an
ordinary rotating machine, produces still more startling effects.

FIG. 65.

"If the revolution is in the direction in which the spiral line approaches
the centre of the disk the entire surface of the latter seems to expand
during revolution and to contract after it has ceased; and vice versâ if
the movement of revolution is in the opposite direction. If in the
former case the eyes of the observers are turned from the rotating disk
towards any familiar object—e.g. the face of a friend—the latter seems
to contract or recede in a somewhat striking manner, and to expand or
approach after the opposite motion of the spiral."[234]

FIG. 66.

An elementary form of these motor illusions seems to be the one described
by Helmholtz on pp. 568-571 of his Optik. The motion of anything in the
field of vision along an acute angle towards a straight line sensibly distorts
that line. Thus in Fig. 66: Let AB be a line drawn on paper, CDE the tracing
made over this line by the point of a compass steadily followed by the eye,
as it moves. As the compass-point passes from C to D, the line appears to
move downwards; as it passes from D to E, the line appears to move
upwards; at the same time the whole line seems to incline itself in the
direction FG during the first half of the compass's movement; and in the
direction HI during its last half; the change from one inclination to another
being quite distinct as the compass-point passes over D.
Any line across which we draw a pencil-point appears to be animated by a
rapid movement of its own towards the pencil-point. This apparent
movement of both of two things in relative motion to each other, even when
one of them is absolutely still, reminds us of the instances quoted from
Vierordt on page 188, and seems to take us back to a primitive stage of
perception, in which the discriminations we now make when we feel a
movement have not yet been made. If we draw the point of a pencil through
'Zöllner's pattern' (Fig. 60, p. 232), and follow it with the eye, the whole
figure becomes the scene of the most singular apparent unrest, of which
Helmholtz has very carefully noted the conditions. The illusion of Zöllner's
figure vanishes entirely, or almost so, with most people, if they steadily

look at one point of it with an unmoving eye; and the same is the case with
many other illusions.
Now all these facts taken together seem to show—vaguely it is true, but
certainly—that present excitements and after-effects of former excitements
may alter the result of processes occurring simultaneously at a distance
from them in the retina or other portions of the apparatus for optical
sensation. In the cases last considered, the moving eye, as it sweeps the
fovea over certain parts of the figure, seems thereby to determine a
modification in the feeling which the other parts confer, which modification
is the figure's 'distortion.' It is true that this statement explains nothing. It
only keeps the cases to which it applies from being explained spuriously.
The spurious account of these illusions is that they are intellectual, not
sensational, that they are secondary, not primary, mental facts. The
distorted figure is said to be one which the mind is led to imagine, by
falsely drawing an unconscious inference from certain premises of which it
is not distinctly aware. And the imagined figure is supposed to be strong
enough to suppress the perception of whatever real sensations there may be.
But Helmholtz, Wundt, Delbœuf, Zöllner, and all the advocates of
unconscious inference are at variance with each other when it comes to the
question what these unconscious premises and inferences may be.

FIG. 67.

FIG. 68.

That small angles look proportionally larger than larger ones is, in brief, the
fundamental illusion to which almost all authors would reduce the
peculiarity of Fig. 67, as of Figs. 60, 61, 62 (p. 232). This peculiarity of
small angles is by Wundt treated as the case of a filled space seeming larger
than an empty one, as in Fig. 68; and this, according to both Delbœuf and
Wundt, is owing to the fact that more muscular innervation is needed for the
eye to traverse a filled space than an empty one, because the points and
lines in the filled space inevitably arrest and constrain the eye, and this
makes us feel as if it were doing more work, i.e. traversing a longer
distance.[235] When, however, we recollect that muscular movements are
positively proved to have no share in the waterfall and revolving-spiral
illusions, and that it is hard to see how Wundt's and Delbœuf's particular
form of muscle-explanation can possibly apply to the compass-point
illusion considered a moment ago, we must conclude that these writers have

probably exaggerated, to say the least, the reach of their muscle-explanation
in the case of the subdivided angles and lines. Never do we get such strong
muscular feelings as when, against the course of nature, we oblige our eyes
to be still; but fixing the eyes on one point of the figure, so far from making
that part of the latter seem larger, dispels, in most persons, the illusion of
these diagrams altogether.
As for Helmholtz, he invokes, to explain the enlargement of small angles,
[236] what he calls a 'law of contrast' between directions and distances of
lines, analogous to that between colors and intensities of light. Lines cutting
another line make the latter seem more inclined away from them than it
really is. Moreover, clearly recognizable magnitudes appear greater than
equal magnitudes which we but vaguely apprehend. But this is surely a
sensationalistic law, a native function of our seeing-apparatus. Quite as little
as the negative after-image of the revolving spiral could such contrast be
deduced from any association of ideas or recall of past objects. The
principle of contrast is criticised by Wundt,[237] who says that by it small
spaces ought to appear to us smaller, and not larger, than they really are.
Helmholtz might have retorted (had not the retort been as fatal to the
uniformity of his own principle as to Wundt's) that if the muscleexplanation were true, it ought not to give rise to just the opposite illusions
in the skin. We saw on p. 141 that subdivided spaces appear shorter than
empty ones upon the skin. To the instances there given add this: Divide a
line on paper into equal halves, puncture the extremities, and make
punctures all along one of the halves; then, with the finger-tip on the
opposite side of the paper, follow the line of punctures; the empty half will
seem much longer than the punctured half. This seems to bring things back
to unanalyzable laws, by reason of which our feeling of size is determined
differently in the skin and in the retina, even when the objective conditions
are the same. Hering's explanation of Zöllner's figure is to be found in
Hermann's Handb. d. Physiologie, iii. 1. p. 579. Lipps[238] gives another
reason why lines cutting another line make the latter seem to bend away
from them more than is really the case. If, he says, we draw (Fig. 69) the
line pm upon the line ab, and follow the latter with our eye, we shall, on
reaching the point m, tend for a moment to slip off ab and to follow mp,
without distinctly realizing that we are not still on the main line. This makes
us feel as if the remainder mb of the main line were bent a little away from

its original direction. The illusion is apparent in the shape of a seeming
approach of the ends b, b, of the two main lines. This to my mind would be
a more satisfactory explanation of this class of illusions than any of those
given by previous authors, were it not again for what happens in the skin.

FIG. 69.

Considering all the circumstances, I feel justified in discarding his entire
batch of illusions as irrelevant to our present inquiry. Whatever they may
prove, they do not prove that our visual percepts of form and movement
may not be sensations strictly so called. They much more probably fall into
line with the phenomena of irradiation and of color-contrast, and with
Vierordt's primitive illusions of movement. They show us, if anything, a
realm of sensations in which our habitual experience has not yet made
traces, and which persist in spite of our better knowledge, unsuggestive of
those other space-sensations which we all the time know from extrinsic
evidence to constitute the real space-determinations of the diagram. Very
likely, if these sensations were as frequent and as practically important as
they now are insignificant and rare, we should end by substituting their
significates—the real space-values of the diagrams—for them. These latter
we should then seem to see directly, and the illusions would disappear like
that of the size of a tooth-socket when the tooth has been out a week.

(b) Another batch of cases which we may discard is that of double images.
A thoroughgoing anti-sensationalist ought to deny all native tendency to see
double images when disparate retinal points are stimulated, because, he
should say, most people never get them, but see all things single which

experience has led them to believe to be single. "Can a doubleness, so
easily neutralized by our knowledge, ever be a datum of sensation at all?"
such an anti-sensationalist might ask.

FIG. 70.

To which the answer is that it is a datum of sensation, but a datum which,
like many other data, must first be discriminated. As a rule, no sensible
qualities are discriminated without a motive.[239] And those that later we
learn to discriminate were originally felt confused. As well pretend that a
voice, or an odor, which we have learned to pick out, is no sensation now.
One may easily acquire skill in discriminating double images, though, as
Hering somewhere says, it is an art of which one cannot become master in
one year or in two. For masters like Hering himself, or Le Conte, the
ordinary stereoscopic diagrams are of little use. Instead of combining into
one solid appearance, they simply cross each other with their doubled lines.
Volkmann has shown a great variety of ways in which the addition of
secondary lines, differing in the two fields, helps us to see the primary lines
double. The effect is analogous to that shown in the cases which we
despatched a moment ago, where given lines have their space-value
changed by the addition of new lines, without our being able to say why,
except that a certain mutual adhesion of the lines and modification of the
resultant feeling takes place by psychophysiological laws. Thus, if in Fig.
70, l and r be crossed by an horizontal line at the same level, and viewed
stereoscopically, they appear as a single pair of lines, s, in space. But if the
horizontal be at different levels, as in l', r', three lines appear, as in s''.[240]
Let us then say no more about double images. All that the facts prove is
what Volkmann says,[241] that, although there may be sets of retinal fibres
so organized as to give an impression of two separate spots, yet the

excitement of other retinal fibres may inhibit the effect of the first
excitement, and prevent us from actually making the discrimination. Still
farther retinal processes may, however, bring the doubleness to the eye of
attention; and, once there, it is as genuine a sensation as any that our life
affords.[242]

(c) These groups of illusions being eliminated, either as cases of defective
discrimination, or as changes of one space-sensation into another when the
total retinal process changes, there remain but two other groups to puzzle
us. The first is that of the after-images distorted by projection on to oblique
planes; the second relates to the instability of our judgments of relative
distance and size by the eye, and includes especially what are known as
pseudoscopic illusions.
The phenomena of the first group were described on page 232. A. W.
Volkmann has studied them with his accustomed clearness and care.[243]
Even an imaginarily inclined wall, in a picture, will, if an after-image be
thrown upon it, distort the shape thereof, and make us see a form of which
our after-image would be the natural projection on the retina, were that
form laid upon the wall. Thus a signboard is painted in perspective on a
screen, and the eye, after steadily looking at a rectangular cross, is turned to
the painted signboard. The after-image appears as an oblique-legged cross
upon the signboard. It is the converse phenomenon of a perspective drawing
like Fig. 71, in which really oblique-legged figures are seen as rectangular
crosses.

FIG. 71.

FIG. 72.

FIG. 73.

The unstable judgments of relative distance and size were also mentioned
on pp. 231-2. Whatever the size may be of the retinal image which an
object makes, the object is seen as of its own normal size. A man moving
towards us is not sensibly perceived to grow, for example; and my finger, of
which a single joint may more than conceal him from my view, is
nevertheless seen as a much smaller object than the man. As for distances, it
is often possible to make the farther part of an object seem near and the
nearer part far. A human profile in intaglio, looked at steadily with one eye,
or even both, soon appears irresistibly as a bas-relief. The inside of a
common pasteboard mask, painted like the outside, and viewed with one
eye in a direct light, also looks convex instead of hollow. So strong is the
illusion, after long fixation, that a friend who painted such a mask for me
told me it soon became difficult to see how to apply the brush. Bend a
visiting-card across the middle, so that its halves form an angle of 90º more
or less; set it upright on the table, as in Fig. 72, and view it with one eye.
You can make it appear either as if it opened towards you or away from
you. In the former case, the angle ab lies upon the table, b being nearer to
you than a; in the latter case ab seems vertical to the table—as indeed it
really is—with a nearer to you than b.[244] Again, look, with either one or
two eyes, at the opening of a wine-glass or tumbler (Fig. 73), held either
above or below the eye's level. The retinal image of the opening is an oval,

but we can see the oval in either of two ways,—as if it were the perspective
view of a circle whose edge b were farther from us than its edge a (in which
case we should seem to be looking down on the circle), or as if its edge a
were the more distant edge (in which case we should be looking up at it
through the b side of the glass). As the manner of seeing the edge changes,
the glass itself alters its form in space and looks straight or seems bent
towards or from the eye,[245] according as the latter is placed beneath or
above it.

FIG. 74.

FIG. 75.

FIG. 76.

Plane diagrams also can be conceived as solids, and that in more than one
way. Figs. 74, 75, 76, for example, are ambiguous perspective projections,
and may each of them remind us of two different natural objects.

Whichever of these objects we conceive clearly at the moment of looking at
the figure, we seem to see in all its solidity before us. A little practice will
enable us to flap the figures, so to speak, backwards and forwards from one
object to the other at will. We need only attend to one of the angles
represented, and imagine it either solid or hollow—pulled towards us out of
the plane of the paper, or pushed back behind the same—and the whole
figure obeys the cue and is instantaneously transformed beneath our gaze.
[246]

The peculiarity of all these cases is the ambiguity of the perception to which
the fixed retinal impression gives rise. With our retina excited in exactly the
same way, whether by after-image, mask or diagram, we see now this object
and now that, as if the retinal image per se had no essential space-import.
Surely if form and length were originally retinal sensations, retinal
rectangles ought not to become acute or obtuse, and lines ought not to alter
their relative lengths as they do. If relief were an optical feeling, it ought not
to flap to and fro, with every optical condition unchanged. Here, if
anywhere, the deniers of space-sensation ought to be able to make their
final stand.[247]
It must be confessed that their plea is plausible at first sight. But it is one
thing to throw out retinal sensibility altogether as a space-yielding function
the moment we find an ambiguity in its deliverances, and another thing to
examine candidly the conditions which may have brought the ambiguity
about. The former way is cheap, wholesale, shallow; the latter difficult and
complicated, but full of instruction in the end. Let us try it for ourselves.

In the case of the diagrams 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, the real object, lines meeting
or crossing each other on a plane, is replaced by an imagined solid which
we describe as seen. Really it is not seen but only so vividly conceived as to
approach a vision of reality. We feel all the while, however, that the solid
suggested is not solidly there. The reason why one solid may seem more
easily suggested than another, and why it is easier in general to perceive the
diagram solid than flat, seems due to probability.[248] Those lines have
countless times in our past experience been drawn on our retina by solids

for once that we have seen them flat on paper. And hundreds of times we
have looked down upon the upper surface of parallelopipeds, stairs and
glasses, for once that we have looked upwards at their bottom—hence we
see the solids easiest as if from above.
Habit or probability seems also to govern the illusion of the intaglio profile,
and of the hollow mask. We have never seen a human face except in relief
—hence the case with which the present sensation is overpowered. Hence,
too, the obstinacy with which human faces and forms, and other extremely
familiar convex objects, refuse to appear hollow when viewed through
Wheatstone's pseudoscope. Our perception seems wedded to certain total
ways of seeing certain objects. The moment the object is suggested at all, it
takes possession of the mind in the fulness of its stereotyped habitual form.
This explains the suddenness of the transformations when the perceptions
change. The object shoots back and forth completely from this to that
familiar thing, and doubtful, indeterminate, and composite things are
excluded, apparently because we are unused to their existence.
When we turn from the diagrams to the actual folded visiting-card and to
the real glass, the imagined form seems fully as real as the correct one. The
card flaps over; the glass rim tilts this way or that, as if some inward spring
suddenly became released in our eye. In these changes the actual retinal
image receives different complements from the mind. But the remarkable
thing is that the complement and the image combine so completely that the
twain are one flesh, as it were, and cannot be discriminated in the result. If
the complement be, as we have called it (on pp. 237-8), a set of imaginary
absent eye-sensations, they seem no whit less vividly there than the
sensation which the eye now receives from without.
The case of the after-images distorted by projection upon an oblique plane
is even more strange, for the imagined perspective figure, lying in the plane,
seems less to combine with the one a moment previously seen by the eye
than to suppress it and take its place.[249] The point needing explanation,
then, in all this, is how it comes to pass that, when imagined sensations are
usually so inferior in vivacity to real ones, they should in these few
experiences prove to be almost or quite their match.
The mystery is solved when we note the class to which all these experiences
belong. They are 'perceptions' of definite 'things,' definitely situated in

tridimensional space. The mind uniformly uses its sensations to identify
things by. The sensation is invariably apperceived by the idea, name, or
'normal' aspect (p. 238) of the thing. The peculiarity of the optical signs of
things is their extraordinary mutability. A 'thing' which we follow with the
eye, never doubting of its physical identity, will change its retinal image
incessantly. A cross, a ring, waved about in the air, will pass through every
conceivable angular and elliptical form. All the while, however, as we look
at them, we hold fast to the perception of their 'real' shape, by mentally
combining the pictures momentarily received with the notion of peculiar
positions in space. It is not the cross and ring pure and simple which we
perceive, but the cross so held, the ring so held. From the day of our birth
we have sought every hour of our lives to correct the apparent form of
things, and translate it into the real form by keeping note of the way they
are placed or held. In no other class of sensations does this incessant
correction occur. What wonder, then, that the notion 'so placed' should
invincibly exert its habitual corrective effect, even when the object with
which it combines is only an after-image, and make us perceive the latter
under a changed but more 'real' form? The 'real' form is also a sensation
conjured up by memory; but it is one so probable, so habitually conjured up
when we have just this combination of optical experiences, that it partakes
of the invincible freshness of reality, and seems to break through that law
which elsewhere condemns reproductive processes to being so much fainter
than sensations.
Once more, these cases form an extreme. Somewhere, in the list of our
imaginations of absent feelings, there must be found the vividest of all.
These optical reproductions of real form are the vividest of all. It is foolish
to reason from cases lower in the scale, to prove that the scale can contain
no such extreme cases as these; and particularly foolish since we can
definitely see why these imaginations ought to be more vivid than any
others, whenever they recall the forms of habitual and probable things.
These latter, by incessantly repeated presence and reproduction, will plough
deep grooves in the nervous system. There will be developed, to correspond
to them, paths of least resistance, of unstable equilibrium, liable to become
active in their totality when any point is touched off. Even when the
objective stimulus is imperfect, we shall still see the full convexity of a
human face, the correct inclination of an angle or sweep of a curve, or the
distance of two lines. Our mind will be like a polyhedron, whose facets are

the attitudes of perception in which it can most easily rest. These are worn
upon it by habitual objects, and from one of these it can pass only by
tumbling over into another.[250]
Hering has well accounted for the sensationally vivid character of these
habitually reproduced forms. He says, after reminding us that every visual
sensation is correlated to a physical process in the nervous apparatus:
"If this psycho-physical process is aroused, as usually happens, by
light-rays impinging on the retina, its form depends not only on the
nature of these rays, but on the constitution of the entire nervous
apparatus which is connected with the organ of vision, and on the state
in which it finds itself. The same stimulus may excite widely different
sensations according to this state.
"The constitution of the nervous apparatus depends naturally in part
upon innate predisposition; but the ensemble of effects wrought by
stimuli upon it in the course of life, whether these come through the
eyes or from elsewhere, is a co-factor of its development. To express it
otherwise, involuntary and voluntary experience and exercise assist in
determining the material structure of the nervous organ of vision, and
hence the ways in which it may react on a retinal image as an outward
stimulus. That experience and exercise should be possible at all in
vision is a consequence of the reproductive power, or memory, of its
nerve-substance. Every particular activity of the organ makes it more
suited to a repetition of the same; ever slighter touches are required to
make the repetition occur. The organ habituates itself to the repeated
activity....
"Suppose now that, in the first experience of a complex sensation
produced by a particular retinal image, certain portions were made the
special objects of attention. In a repetition of the sensible experience it
will happen that notwithstanding the identity of the outward stimulus
these portions will be more easily and strongly reproduced; and when
this happens a hundred times the inequality with which the various
constituents of the complex sensation appeal to consciousness grows
ever greater.

"Now in the present state of our knowledge we cannot assert that in
both the first and the last occurrence of the retinal image in question
the same pure sensation is provoked, but that the mind interprets it
differently the last time in consequence of experience; for the only
given things we know are on the one hand the retinal image which is
both times the same, and on the other the mental percept which is both
times different; of a third thing, such as a pure sensation, interpolated
between image and percept, we know nothing. We ought, therefore, if
we wish to avoid hypotheses, simply to say that the nervous apparatus
reacts the last time differently from the first, and gives us in
consequence a different group of sensations.
"But not only by repetition of the same retinal image, but by that of
similar ones, will the law obtain. Portions of the image common to the
successive experiences will awaken, as it were, a stronger echo in the
nervous apparatus than other portions. Hence it results that
reproduction is usually elective: the more strongly reverberating parts
of the picture yield stronger feelings than the rest. This may result in
the latter being quite overlooked and, as it were, eliminated from
perception. It may even come to pass that instead of these parts
eliminated by election a feeling of entirely different elements comes to
consciousness-elements not objectively contained in the stimulus. A
group of sensations, namely, for which a strong tendency to
reproduction has become, by frequent repetition, ingrained in the
nervous system will easily revive as a whole when, not its whole
retinal image, but only an essential part thereof, returns. In this case we
get some sensations to which no adequate stimulus exists in the retinal
image, and which owe their being solely to the reproductive power of
the nervous apparatus. This is complementary (ergänzende)
reproduction.
"Thus a few points and disconnected strokes are sufficient to make us
see a human face, and without specially directed attention we fail to
note that we see much that really is not drawn on the paper. Attention
will show that the outlines were deficient in spots where we thought
them complete.... The portions of the percept supplied by
complementary reproduction depend, however, just as much as its
other portions, on the reaction of the nervous apparatus upon the

retinal image, indirect though this reaction may, in the case of the
supplied portions, be. And so long as they are present, we have a
perfect right to call them sensations, for they differ in no wise from
such sensations as correspond to an actual stimulus in the retina. Often,
however, they are not persistent; many of them may be expelled by
more close observation, but this is not proved to be the case with all....
In vision with one eye ... the distribution of parts within the third
dimension is essentially the work of this complementary reproduction,
i.e. of former experience.... When a certain way of localizing a
particular group of sensations has become with us a second nature, our
better knowledge, our judgment, our logic, are of no avail.... Things
actually diverse may give similar or almost identical retinal images;
e.g., an object extended in three dimensions, and its flat perspective
picture. In such cases it often depends on small accidents, and
especially on our will, whether the one or the other group of sensations
shall be excited.... We can see a relief hollow, as a mould, or vice
versâ; for a relief illuminated from the left can look just like its mould
illuminated from the right. Reflecting upon this, one may infer from
the direction of the shadows that one has a relief before one, and the
idea of the relief will guide the nerve-processes into the right path, so
that the feeling of the relief is suddenly aroused.... Whenever the
retinal image is of such a nature that two diverse modes of reaction on
the part of the nervous apparatus are, so to speak, equally, or nearly
equally, imminent, it must depend on small accidents whether the one
or the other reaction is realized. In these cases our previous knowledge
often has a decisive effect, and helps the correct perception to victory.
The bare idea of the right object is itself a feeble reproduction which
with the help of the proper retinal picture develops into clear and lively
sensation. But if there be not already in the nervous apparatus a
disposition to the production of that percept which our judgment tells
us is right, our knowledge strives in vain to conjure up the feeling of it;
we then know that we see something to which no reality corresponds,
but we see it all the same."[251]

FIG. 77.

Note that no object not probable, no object which we are not incessantly
practised in reproducing, can acquire this vividness in imagination.
Objective corners are ever changing their angles to the eyes, spaces their
apparent size, lines their distance. But by no transmutation of position in
space does an objective straight line appear bent, and only in one position
out of an infinity does a broken line look straight. Accordingly, it is
impossible by projecting the after-image of a straight line upon two surfaces
which make a solid angle with each other to give the line itself a sensible
'kink.' Look with it at the corner of your room: the after-image, which may
overlap all three surfaces of the corner, still continues straight. Volkmann
constructed a complicated surface of projection like that drawn in Fig. 77,
but he found it impossible so to throw a straight after-image upon it as to
alter its visible form.
One of the situations in which we oftenest see things is spread out on the
ground before us. We are incessantly drilled in making allowance for this
perspective, and reducing things to their real form in spite of optical
foreshortening. Hence if the preceding explanations are true, we ought to

find this habit inveterate. The lower half of the retina, which habitually sees
the farther half of things spread out on the ground, ought to have acquired a
habit of enlarging its pictures by imagination, so as to make them more than
equal to those which fall on the upper retinal surface; and this habit ought to
be hard to escape from, even when both halves of the object are equidistant
from the eye, as in a vertical line on paper. Delbœuf has found, accordingly,
that if we try to bisect such a line we place the point of division about of its
length too high.[252]

FIG. 78.

Similarly, a square cross, or a square, drawn on paper, should look higher
than it is broad. And that this is actually the case, the reader may verify by a
glance at Fig. 78. For analogous reasons the upper and lower halves of the
letter S, or of the figure 8, hardly seem to differ. But when turned upside
down, the upper half looks much the larger.[253]

FIG. 79.

Hering has tried to explain our exaggeration of small angles in the same
way. We have more to do with right angles than with any others: right
angles, in fact, have an altogether unique sort of interest for the human
mind. Nature almost never begets them, but we think space by means of

them and put them everywhere. Consequently obtuse and acute ones, liable
always to be the images of right ones foreshortened, particularly easily
revive right ones in memory. It is hard to look at such figures as a, b, c, in
Fig. 79, without seeing them in perspective, as approximations, at least, to
foreshortened rectangular forms.[254]
At the same time the genuine sensational form of the lines before us can, in
all the cases of distortion by suggested perspective, be felt correctly by a
mind able to abstract from the notion of perspective altogether. Individuals
differ in this abstracting power. Artistic training improves it, so that after a
little while errors in vertical bisection, in estimating height relatively to
breadth, etc., become impossible. In other words, we learn to take the
optical sensation before us pure.[255]
We may then sum up our study of illusions by saying that they in no wise
undermine our view that every spatial determination of things is originally
given in the shape of a sensation of the eyes. They only show how very
potent certain imagined sensations of the eyes may become.
These sensations, so far as they bring definite forms to the mind, appear to
be retinal exclusively. The movements of the eyeballs play a great part in
educating our perception, it is true; but they have nothing to do with
constituting any one feeling of form. Their function is limited to exciting
the various feelings of form, by tracing retinal streaks; and to comparing
them, and measuring them off against each other, by applying different
parts of the retinal surface to the same objective thing. Helmholtz's analysis
of the facts of our 'measurement of the field of view' is, bating a lapse or
two, masterly, and seems to prove that the movements of the eye have had
some part in bringing our sense of retinal equivalencies about—
equivalencies, mind, of different retinal forms and sizes, not forms and sizes
themselves. Superposition is the way in which the eye-movements
accomplish this result. An object traces the line AB on a peripheral tract of
the retina. Quickly we move the eye so that the same object traces the line
ab on a central tract. Forthwith, to our mind, AB and ab are judged
equivalent. But, as Helmholtz admits, the equivalence-judgment is
independent of the way in which we may feel the form and length of the
several retinal pictures themselves:

"The retina is like a pair of compasses, whose points we apply in
succession to the ends of several lines to see whether they agree or not
in length. All we need know meanwhile about the compasses is that
the distance of their points remains unchanged. What that distance is,
and what is the shape of the compasses, is a matter of no account."[256]
Measurement implies a stuff to measure. Retinal sensations give the stuff;
objective things form the yardstick; motion does the measuring operation;
which can, of course, be well performed only where it is possible to make
the same object fall on many retinal tracts. This is practically impossible
where the tracts make a wide angle with each other. But there are certain
directions in the field of view, certain retinal lines, along which it is
particularly easy to make the image of an object slide. The object then
becomes a 'ruler' for these lines, as Helmholtz puts it,[257] making them
seem straight throughout if the object looked straight to us in that part of
them at which it was most distinctly seen.
But all this need of superposition shows how devoid of exact space-import
the feelings of movement are per se. As we compare the space-value of two
retinal tracts by superposing them successively upon the same objective
line, so we also have to compare the space-value of objective angles and
lines by superposing them on the same retinal tract. Neither procedure
would be required if our eye-movements were apprehended immediately, by
pure muscular feeling or innervation, for example, as distinct lengths and
directions in space. To compare retinal tracts, it would then suffice simply
to notice how it feels to move any image over them. And two objective
lines could be compared as well by moving different retinal tracts along
them as by laying them along the same. It would be as easy to compare
non-parallel figures as it now is to judge of those which are parallel.[258]
Those which it took the same amount of movement to traverse would be
equal, in whatever direction the movement occurred.
GENERAL SUMMARY.
With this we may end our long and, I fear to many readers, tediously minute
survey. The facts of vision form a jungle of intricacy; and those who
penetrate deeply into physiological optics will be more struck by our

omissions than by our abundance of detail. But for students who may have
lost sight of the forest for the trees, I will recapitulate briefly the points of
our whole argument from the beginning, and then proceed to a short
historical survey, which will set them in relief.
All our sensations are positively and inexplicably extensive wholes.
The sensations contributing to space-perception seem exclusively to be the
surface of skin, retina, and joints. 'Muscular' feelings play no appreciable
part in the generation of our feelings of form, direction, etc.
The total bigness of a cutaneous or retinal feeling soon becomes subdivided
by discriminative attention.
Movements assist this discrimination by reason of the peculiarly exciting
quality of the sensations which stimuli moving over surfaces arouse.
Subdivisions, once discriminated, acquire definite relations of position
towards each other within the total space. These 'relations' are themselves
feelings of the subdivisions that intervene. When these subdivisions are not
the seat of stimuli, the relations are only reproduced in imaginary form.
The various sense-spaces are, in the first instance, incoherent with each
other; and primitively both they and their subdivisions are but vaguely
comparable in point of bulk and form.
The education of our space-perception consists largely of two processes—
reducing the various sense-feelings to a common measure, and adding them
together into the single all-including space of the real world.
Both the measuring and the adding are performed by the aid of things.
The imagined aggregate of positions occupied by all the actual or possible,
moving or stationary, things which we know, is our notion of 'real' space—a
very incomplete and vague conception in all minds.
The measuring of our space-feelings against each other mainly comes about
through the successive arousal of different ones by the same thing, by our
selection of certain ones as feelings of its real size and shape, and by the
degradation of others to the status of being merely signs of these.
For the successive application of the same thing to different space-giving
surfaces motion is indispensable, and hence plays a great part in our space-

education, especially in that of the eye. Abstractly considered, the motion of
the object over the sensitive surface would educate us quite as well as that
of the surface over the object. But the self-mobility of the organ carrying
the surface accelerates immensely the result.
In completely educated space-perception, the present sensation is usually
just what Helmholtz (Physiol. Optik, p. 797) calls it, 'a sign, the
interpretation of whose meaning is left to the understanding.' But the
understanding is exclusively reproductive and never productive in the
process; and its function is limited to the recall of previous space-sensations
with which the present one has been associated and which may be judged
more real than it.
Finally, this reproduction may in the case of certain visual forms be as
vivid, or almost so, as actual sensation is.
The third dimension forms an original element of all our space-sensations.
In the eye it is subdivided by various discriminations. The more distant
subdivisions are often shut out altogether, and, in being suppressed, have
the effect of diminishing the absolute space-value of the total field of view.
[259]

HISTORICAL.
Let us now close with a brief historical survey. The first achievement of
note in the study of space-perception was Berkeley's theory of vision. This
undertook to establish two points, first that distance was not a visual but a
tactile form of consciousness, suggested by visual signs; secondly, that
there is no one quality or 'idea' common to the sensations of touch and
sight, such that prior to experience one might possibly anticipate from the
look of an object anything about its felt size, shape, or position, or from the
touch of it anything about its look.
In other words, that primitively chaotic or semi-chaotic condition of our
various sense-spaces which we have demonstrated, was established for
good by Berkeley; and he bequeathed to psychology the problem of
describing the manner in which the deliverances are harmonized so as all to
refer to one and the same extended world.

His disciples in Great Britain have solved this problem after Berkeley's own
fashion, and to a great extent as we have done ourselves, by the ideas of the
various senses suggesting each other in consequence of Association. But,
either because they were intoxicated with the principle of association, or
because in the number of details they lost their general bearings, they have
forgotten, as a rule, to state under what sensible form the primitive spatial
experiences are found which later became associated with so many other
sensible signs. Heedless of their master Locke's precept, that the mind can
frame unto itself no one new simple idea, they seem for the most part to be
trying to explain the extensive quality itself, account for it, and evolve it, by
the mere association together of feelings which originally possessed it not.
They first evaporate the nature of extension by making it tantamount to
mere 'coexistence,' and then they explain coexistence as being the same
thing as succession, provided it be an extremely rapid or a reversible
succession. Space-perception thus emerges without being anywhere
postulated. The only things postulated are unextended feelings and time.
Says Thomas Brown (lecture xxiii.): "I am inclined to reverse exactly the
process commonly supposed; and instead of deriving the measure of time
from extension, to derive the knowledge and original measure of extension
from time." Brown and both the Mills think that retinal sensations, colors,
in their primitive condition, are felt with no extension and that the latter
merely becomes inseparably associated with them. John Mill says:
"Whatever may be the retinal impression conveyed by a line which bounds
two colors, I see no ground for thinking that by the eye alone we could
acquire the conception of what we now mean when we say that one of the
colors is outside [beside] the other."[260]
Whence does the extension come which gets so inseparably associated with
these non-extended colored sensations? From the 'sweep and movements' of
the eye—from muscular feelings. But, as Prof. Bain says, if movementfeelings give us any property of things, "it would seem to be not space, but
time."[261] And John Mill says that "the idea of space is, at bottom, one of
time."[262] Space, then, is not to be found in any elementary sensation, but,
in Bain's words, "as a quality, it has no other origin and no other meaning
than the association of these different [non-spatial] motor and sensitive
effects."[263]

This phrase is mystical-sounding enough to one who understands
association as producing nothing, but only as knitting together things
already produced in separate ways. The truth is that the English
Associationist school, in trying to show how much their principle can
accomplish, have altogether overshot the mark and espoused a kind of
theory in respect to space-perception which the general tenor of their
philosophy should lead them to abhor. Really there are but three possible
kinds of theory concerning space. Either (1) there is no spatial quality of
sensation at all, and space is a mere symbol of succession; or (2) there is an
extensive quality given immediately in certain particular sensations; or,
finally, (3) there is a quality produced out of the inward resources of the
mind, to envelop sensations which, as given originally, are not spatial, but
which, on being cast into the spatial form, become united and orderly. This
last is the Kantian view. Stumpf admirably designates it as the 'psychic
stimulus' theory, the crude sensations being considered as goads to the mind
to put forth its slumbering power.
Brown, the Mills, and Bain, amid these possibilities, seem to have gone
astray like lost sheep. With the 'mental chemistry' of which the Mills speak
—precisely the same thing as the 'psychical synthesis' of Wundt, which, as
we shall soon see, is a principle expressly intended to do what Association
can never perform—they hold the third view, but again in other places
imply the first. And, between the impossibility of getting from mere
association anything not contained in the sensations associated and the
dislike to allow spontaneous mental productivity, they flounder in a dismal
dilemma. Mr. Sully joins them there in what I must call a vague and
vacillating way. Mr. Spencer of course is bound to pretend to 'evolve' all
mental qualities out of antecedents different from themselves, so that we
need perhaps not wonder at his refusal to accord the spatial quality to any of
the several elementary sensations out of which our space-perception grows.
Thus (Psychology, ii. 168, 172, 218):
"No idea of extension can arise from a simultaneous excitation" of a
multitude of nerve-terminations like those of the skin or the retina,
since this would imply a "knowledge of their relative positions"—that
is, "a pre-existent idea of a special extension, which is absurd." "No
relation between successive states of consciousness gives in itself any
idea of extension." "The muscular sensations accompanying motion

are quite distinct from the notions of space and time associated with
them."
Mr. Spencer none the less inveighs vociferously against the Kantian
position that space is produced by the mind's own resources. And yet he
nowhere denies space to be a specific affection of consciousness different
from time!
Such incoherency is pitiful. The fact is that, at bottom, all these authors are
really 'psychical stimulists,' or Kantists. The space they speak of is a supersensational mental product. This position appears to me thoroughly
mythological. But let us see how it is held by those who know more
definitely what they mean. Schopenhauer expresses the Kantian view with
more vigor and clearness than anyone else. He says:
"A man must be forsaken by all the gods to dream that the world we
see outside of us, filling space in its three dimensions, moving down
the inexorable stream of time, governed at each step by Causality's
invariable law,—but in all this only following rules which we may
prescribe for it in advance of all experience,—to dream, I say, that
such a world should stand there outside of us, quite objectively real
with no complicity of ours, and thereupon by a subsequent act, through
the instrumentality of mere sensation, that it should enter our head and
reconstruct a duplicate of itself as it was outside. For what a povertystricken thing is this mere sensation! Even in the noblest organs of
sense it is nothing more than a local and specific feeling, susceptible
within its kind of a few variations, but always strictly subjective and
containing in itself nothing objective, nothing resembling a perception.
For sensation of every sort is and remains a process in the organism
itself. As such it is limited to the territory inside the skin and can
never, accordingly, per se contain anything that lies outside the skin or
outside ourselves.... Only when the Understanding ... is roused to
activity and brings its sole and only form, the law of Causality, into
play, only then does the mighty transformation take place which makes
out of subjective sensation objective intuition. The Understanding,
namely, grasps by means of its innate, a priori, ante-experiential form,
the given sensation of the body as an effect which as such must
necessarily have a cause. At the same time the Understanding

summons to its aid the form of the outer sense which similarly lies
already preformed in the intellect (or brain), and which is Space, in
order to locate that cause outside of the organism.... In this process the
Understanding, as I shall soon show, takes note of the most minute
peculiarities of the given sensation in order to construct in the outer
space a cause which shall completely account for them. This operation
of the Understanding is, however, not one that takes place discursively,
reflectively, in abstracto, by means of words and concepts; but is
intuitive and immediate.... Thus the Understanding must first create the
objective world; never can the latter, already complete in se, simply
promenade into our heads through the senses and organic apertures.
For the senses yield us nothing further than the raw material which
must be first elaborated into the objective conception of an orderly
physical world-system by means of the aforesaid simple forms of
Space, Time, and Causality.... Let me show the great chasm between
sensation and perception by showing how raw the material is out of
which the fair structure is upreared. Only two senses serve objective
perception: touch and sight. They alone furnish the data on the basis
whereof the Understanding, by the process indicated, erects the
objective world.... These data in themselves are still no perception; that
is the Understanding's work. If I press with my hand against the table,
the sensation I receive has no analogy with the idea of the firm
cohesion of the parts of this mass: only when my Understanding passes
from the sensation to its cause does it create for itself a body with the
properties of solidity, impenetrability, and hardness. When in the dark I
lay my hand on a surface, or grasp a ball of three inches diameter, in
either case the same parts of the hand receive the impression: but out
of the different contraction of the hand in the two cases my
Understanding constructs the form of the body whose contact caused
the feeling, and confirms its construction by leading me to move my
hand over the body. If one born blind handles a cubical body, the
sensations of his hand are quite uniform on all sides and in all
directions,—only the corners press upon a smaller part of his skin. In
these sensations, as such, there is nothing whatever analogous to a
cube. But from the felt resistance his Understanding infers
immediately and intuitively a cause thereof, which now presents itself
as a solid body; and from the movements of exploration which the

arms made whilst the feelings of the hands remained constant he
constructs, in the space known to him a priori, the body's cubical
shape. Did he not bring with him ready-made the idea of a cause and
of a space, with the laws thereof, there never could arise, out of those
successive feelings in his hand, the image of a cube. If we let a string
run through our closed hand, we immediately construct as the cause of
the friction and its duration in such an attitude of the hand, a long
cylindrical body moving uniformly in one direction. But never out of
the pure sensation in the hand could the idea of movement, that is, of
change of position in space by means of time, arise: such a content can
never lie in sensation, nor come out of it. Our Intellect, antecedently to
all experience, must bear in itself the intuitions of Space and Time, and
therewithal of the possibility of motion, and no less the idea of
Causality, to pass from the empirically given feeling to its cause, and
to construct the latter as a so moving body of the designated shape. For
how great is the abyss between the mere sensation in the hand and the
ideas of causality, materiality, and movement through Space, occurring
in Time! The feeling in the hand, even with different contacts and
positions, is something far too uniform and poor in content for it to be
possible to construct out of it the idea of Space with its three
dimensions, of the action of bodies on each other, with the properties
of extension, impenetrability, cohesion, shape, hardness, softness, rest,
and motion—in short, the foundations of the objective world. This is
only possible through Space, Time, and Causality ... being preformed
in the Intellect itself,... from whence it again follows that the
perception of the external world is essentially an intellectual process, a
work of the Understanding, to which sensation furnishes merely the
occasion, and the data to be interpreted in each particular case."[264]
I call this view mythological, because I am conscious of no such Kantian
machine-shop in my mind, and feel no call to disparage the powers of poor
sensation in this merciless way. I have no introspective experience of
mentally producing or creating space. My space-intuitions occur not in two
times but in one. There is not one moment of passive inextensive sensation,
succeeded by another of active extensive perception, but the form I see is as
immediately felt as the color which fills it out. That the higher parts of the
mind come in, who can deny? They add and subtract, they compare and

measure, they reproduce and abstract. They inweave the space-sensations
with intellectual relations; but these relations are the same when they obtain
between the elements of the space-system as when they obtain between any
of the other elements of which the world is made.
The essence of the Kantian contention is that there are not spaces, but
Space—one infinite continuous Unit—and that our knowledge of this
cannot be a piecemeal sensational affair, produced by summation and
abstraction. To which the obvious reply is that, if any known thing bears on
its front the appearance of piecemeal construction and abstraction, it is this
very notion of the infinite unitary space of the world. It is a notion, if ever
there was one; and no intuition. Most of us apprehend it in the barest
symbolic abridgment: and if perchance we ever do try to make it more
adequate, we just add one image of sensible extension to another until we
are tired. Most of us are obliged to turn round and drop the thought of the
space in front of us when we think of that behind. And the space
represented as near to us seems more minutely subdivisible than that we
think of as lying far away.

The other prominent German writers on space are also 'psychical stimulists.'
Herbart, whose influence has been widest, says 'the resting eye sees no
space,'[265] and ascribes visual extension to the influence of movements
combining with the non-spatial retinal feelings so as to form gradated series
of the latter. A given sensation of such a series reproduces the idea of its
associates in regular order, and its idea is similarly reproduced by any one
of them with the order reversed. Out of the fusion of these two contrasted
reproductions comes the form of space[266]—Heaven knows how.
The obvious objection is that mere serial order is a genus, and space-order a
very peculiar species of that genus; and that, if the terms of reversible series
became by that fact coexistent terms in space, the musical scale, the degrees
of warmth and cold, and all other ideally graded series ought to appear to us
in the shape of extended corporeal aggregates,—which they notoriously do
not, though we may of course symbolize their order by a spatial scheme. W.
Volkmann von Volkmar, the Herbartian, takes the bull here by the horns,

and says the musical scale is spatially extended, though he admits that its
space does not belong to the real world.[267] I am unacquainted with any
other Herbartian so bold.

To Lotze we owe the much-used term 'local sign.' He insisted that space
could not emigrate directly into the mind from without, but must be
reconstructed by the soul; and he seemed to think that the first
reconstructions of it by the soul must be super-sensational. But why
sensations themselves might not be the soul's original spatial reconstructive
acts Lotze fails to explain.

Wundt has all his life devoted himself to the elaboration of a space-theory,
of which the neatest and most final expression is to be found in his Logik
(ii. 457-60). He says:
"In the eye, space-perception has certain constant peculiarities which
prove that no single optical sensation by itself possesses the extensive
form, but that everywhere in our perception of space heterogeneous
feelings combine. If we simply suppose that luminous sensations per
se feel extensive, our supposition is shattered by that influence of
movement in vision which is so clearly to be traced in many normal
errors in the measurement of the field of view. If we assume, on the
other hand, that the movements and their feelings are alone possessed
of the extensive quality, we make an unjustified hypothesis, for the
phenomena compel us, it is true, to accord an influence to movement,
but give us no right to call the retinal sensations indifferent, for there
are no visual ideas without retinal sensations. If then we wish
rigorously to express the given facts, we can ascribe a spatial
constitution only to combinations of retinal sensations with those of
movement."

Thus Wundt, dividing theories into 'nativistic' and 'genetic,' calls his own a
genetic theory. To distinguish it from other theories of the same class, he
names it a 'theory of complex local signs.'
"It supposes two systems of local signs, whose relations—taking the
eye as an example—we may think as ... the measuring of the manifold
local-sign system of the retina by the simple local-sign system of the
movements. In its psychological nature this is a process of associative
synthesis: it consists in the fusion of both groups of sensations into a
product, whose elementary components are no longer separable from
each other in idea. In melting wholly away into the product which they
create they become consciously undistinguishable, and the mind
apprehends only their resultant, the intuition of space. Thus there
obtains a certain analogy between this psychic synthesis and that
chemical synthesis which out of simple bodies generates a compound
that appears to our immediate perception as a homogeneous whole
with new properties."
Now let no modest reader think that if this sounds obscure to him it is
because he does not know the full context; and that if a wise professor like
Wundt can talk so fluently and plausibly about 'combination' and 'psychic
synthesis,' it must surely be because those words convey a so much greater
fulness of positive meaning to the scholarly than to the unlearned mind.
Really it is quite the reverse; all the virtue of the phrase lies in its mere
sound and skin. Learning does but make one the more sensible of its inward
unintelligibility. Wundt's 'theory' is the flimsiest thing in the world. It starts
by an untrue assumption, and then corrects it by an unmeaning phrase.
Retinal sensations are spatial; and were they not, no amount of 'synthesis'
with equally spaceless motor sensations could intelligibly make them so.
Wundt's theory is, in short, but an avowal of impotence, and an appeal to
the inscrutable powers of the soul.[268] It confesses that we cannot analyze
the constitution or give the genesis of the spatial quality in consciousness.
But at the same time it says the antecedents thereof are psychical and not
cerebral facts. In calling the quality in question a sensational quality, our
own account equally disclaimed ability to analyze it, but said its
antecedents were cerebral, not psychical—in other words, that it was a first

psychical thing. This is merely a question of probable fact, which the reader
may decide.

And now what shall be said of Helmholtz? Can I find fault with a book
which, on the whole, I imagine to be one of the four or five greatest
monuments of human genius in the scientific line? If truth impels I must
fain try, and take the risks. It seems to me that Helmholtz's genius moves
most securely when it keeps close to particular facts. At any rate, it shows
least strong in purely speculative passages, which in the Optics, in spite of
many beauties, seem to me fundamentally vacillating and obscure. The
'empiristic' view which Helmholtz defends is that the space-determinations
we perceive are in every case products of a process of unconscious
inference.[269] The inference is similar to one from induction or analogy.
[270] We always see that form before us which habitually would have caused
the sensation we now have.[271] But the latter sensation can never be
intrinsically spatial, or its intrinsic space-determinations would never be
overcome as they are so often by the 'illusory' space-determinations it so
often suggests.[272] Since the illusory determination can be traced to a
suggestion of Experience, the 'real' one must also be such a suggestion: so
that all space intuitions are due solely to Experience.[273] The only psychic
activity required for this is the association of ideas.[274]
But how, it may be asked, can association produce a space-quality not in the
things associated? How can we by induction or analogy infer what we do
not already generically know? Can 'suggestions of experience' reproduce
elements which no particular experience originally contained? This is the
point by which Helmholtz's 'empiristic' theory, as a theory, must be judged.
No theory is worthy of the name which leaves such a point obscure.

Well, Helmholtz does so leave it. At one time he seems to fall back on
inscrutable powers of the soul, and to range himself with the 'psychical
stimulists.' He speaks of Kant as having made the essential step in the
matter in distinguishing the content of experience from that form—space,
course—which is given it by the peculiar faculties of the mind.[275] But
elsewhere, again,[276] speaking of sensationalistic theories which would
connect spatially determinate feelings directly with certain neural events, he
says it is better to assume only such simple psychic activities as we know to
exist, and gives the association of ideas as an instance of what he means.
Later,[277] he reinforces this remark by confessing that he does not see how
any neural process can give rise without antecedent experience to a readymade (fertige) perception of space. And, finally, in a single momentous
sentence, he speaks of sensations of touch as if they might be the original
material of our space-percepts—which thus, from the optical point of view,
'may be assumed as given.'[278]
Of course the eye-man has a right to fall back on the skin-man for help at a
pinch. But doesn't this mean that he is a mere eye-man and not a complete
psychologist? In other words, Helmholtz's Optics and the 'empiristic theory'
therein professed must not be understood as attempts at answering the
general question of how space-consciousness enters the mind. They simply
deny that it enters with the first optical sensations.[279] Our own account has
affirmed stoutly that it enters then; but no more than Helmholtz have we
pretended to show why. Who calls a thing a first sensation admits he has no
theory of its production. Helmholtz, though all the while without an
articulate theory, makes the world think he has one. He beautifully traces
the immense part which reproductive processes play in our vision of space,
and never—except in that one pitiful little sentence about touch—does he
tell us just what it is they reproduce. He limits himself to denying that they
reproduce originals of a visual sort. And so difficult is the subject, and so
magically do catch-words work on the popular-scientist ear, that most
likely, had he written 'physiological' instead of 'nativistic,' and 'spiritualistic'
instead of 'empiristic' (which synonyms Hering suggests), numbers of his
present empirical evolutionary followers would fail to find in his teaching
anything worthy of praise. But since he wrote otherwise, they hurrah for
him as a sort of second Locke, dealing another death-blow at the old

bugaboo of 'innate ideas.' His 'nativistic' adversary Hering they probably
imagine—Heaven save the mark!—to be a scholastic in modern disguise.

After Wundt and Helmholtz, the most important anti-sensationalist spacephilosopher in Germany is Professor Lipps, whose deduction of space from
an order of non-spatial differences, continuous yet separate, is a wonderful
piece of subtlety and logic. And yet he has to confess that continuous
differences form in the first instance only a logical series, which need not
appear spatial, and that wherever it does so appear, this must be accounted a
'fact,' due merely 'to the nature of the soul.'[280]
Lipps, and almost all the anti-sensationalist theorists except Helmholtz,
seem guilty of that confusion which Mr. Shadworth Hodgson has done so
much to clear away, viz., the confounding the analysis of an idea with the
means of its production. Lipps, for example, finds that every space we think
of can be broken up into positions, and concludes that in some undefined
way the several positions must have pre-existed in thought before the
aggregate space could have appeared to perception. Similarly Mr. Spencer,
defining extension as an 'aggregate of relations of coexistent position,' says
"every cognition of magnitude is a cognition of relations of position,"[281]
and "no idea of extension can arise from the simultaneous excitation" of
many nerves "unless there is a knowledge of their relative positions."[282]
Just so Prof. Bain insists that the very meaning of space is scope for
movement,[283] and that therefore distance and magnitude can be no
original attributes of the eye's sensibility. Similarly because movement is
analyzable into positions occupied at successive moments by the mover,
philosophers (e.g. Schopenhauer, as quoted above) have repeatedly denied
the possibility of its being an immediate sensation. We have, however, seen
that it is the most immediate of all our space-sensations. Because it can only
occur in a definite direction the impossibility of perceiving it without
perceiving its direction has been decreed—a decree which the simplest
experiment overthrows.[284] It is a case of what I have called the
'psychologist's fallacy': mere acquaintance with space is treated as
tantamount to every sort of knowledge about it, the conditions of the latter
are demanded of the former state of mind, and all sorts of mythological

processes are brought in to help.[285] As well might one say that because the
world consists of all its parts, therefore we can only apprehend it at all by
having unconsciously summed these up in our head. It is the old idea of our
actual knowledge being drawn out from a pre-existent potentiality, an idea
which, whatever worth it may metaphysically possess, does no good in
psychology.
My own sensationalistic account has derived most aid and comfort from the
writings of Hering, A. W. Volkmann, Stumpf, Le Conte, and Schön. All
these authors allow ample scope to that Experience which Berkeley's genius
saw to be a present factor in all our visual acts. But they give Experience
some grist to grind, which the soi-distant 'empiristic' school forgets to do.
Stumpf seems to me the most philosophical and profound of all these
writers; and I owe him much. I should doubtless have owed almost as much
to Mr. James Ward, had his article on Psychology in the Encyclopædia
Britannica appeared before my own thoughts were written down. The
literature of the question is in all languages very voluminous. I content
myself with referring to the bibliography in Helmholtz's and Aubert's works
on Physiological Optics for the visual part of the subject, and with naming
in a note the ablest works in the English tongue which have treated of the
subject in a general way.[286]

[140] Reprinted, with considerable revision, from 'Mind' for 1887.
[141] Prof. Jastrow has found that invariably we tend to underestimate the amount of our skin which
may be stimulated by contact with an object when we express it in terms of visual space; that is,
when asked to mark on paper the extent of skin affected, we always draw it much too small. This
shows that the eye gets as much space feeling from the smaller line as the skin gets from the larger
one. Cf. Jastrow: Mind, xi. 546-7; American Journal of Psychology, iii. 53.
[142] Amongst sounds the graver ones seem the most extensive. Stumpf gives three reasons for this:
1) association with bigger causes; 2) wider reverberation of the hand and body when grave notes are
sung; 3) audibility at a greater distance. He thinks that these three reasons dispense us from
supposing an immanent extensity in the sensation of sound as such. See his remarks in the
Tonpsychologie, i. 207-211.
[143] Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th Edition, article Psychology, pp. 46, 58.
[144] Philosophical Transactions (1841).
[145] Hermann's Handb. d. Physiol., Bd. iii. 1, §. 575.
[146] Loc. cit. §. 572.

[147] Elemente der Psychophysik, ii. 475-6.
[148] See Foster's Text-book of Physiology, bk. iii. c. vi. § 2.
[149] Fechner, who was ignorant of the but lately discovered function of the semi-circular canals,
gives a different explanation of the organic seat of these feelings. They are probably highly
composite. With me, actual movements in the eyes play a considerable part in them, though I am
hardly conscious of the peculiar feelings in the scalp which Fechner goes on to describe thus: "The
feeling of strained attention in the different sense-organs seems to be only a muscular one produced
in using these various organs by setting in motion, by a sort of reflex action, the set of muscles which
belong to them. One can ask, then, with what particular muscular contraction the sense of strained
attention in the effort to recall something is associated? On this question my own feeling gives me a
decided answer; it comes to me distinctly not as a sensation of tension in the inside of the head, but
as a feeling of strain and contraction in the scalp, with a pressure from outwards in over the whole
cranium, undoubtedly caused by a contraction of the muscles of the scalp. This harmonizes very well
with the expressions, sich den Kopf zerbrechen, den Kopf zusammennehmen. In a former illness,
when I could not endure the slightest effort after continuous thought, and had no theoretical bias on
this question, the muscles of the scalp, especially those of the back-head, assumed a fairly morbid
degree of sensibility whenever I tried to think." (Elem. der Psychophysik, ii, 490-91.)
[150] That the sensation in question is one of tactile rather than of acoustic sensibility would seem
proved by the fact that a medical friend of the writer, both of whose membranæ tympani are quite
normal, but one of whose ears is almost totally deaf, feels the presence and withdrawal of objects as
well at one ear as at the other.
[151] The skin seems to obey a different law from the eye here. If a given retinal tract be excited,
first by a series of points, and next by the two extreme points, with the interval between them
unexcited, this interval will seem considerably less in the second case than it seemed in the first. In
the skin the unexcited interval feels the larger. The reader may easily verify the facts in this case by
taking a visiting-card, cutting one edge of it into a saw-tooth pattern, and from the opposite edge
cutting out all but the two corners, and then comparing the feelings aroused by the two edges when
held against the skin.
[152] Classen, Physiologie des Gesichtssinnes, p. 114; see also A. Riehl, Der Philosophische
Kriticismus, ii. p. 149.
[153] It is worth while at this point to call attention with some emphasis to the fact that, though the
anatomical condition of the feeling resembles the feeling itself, such resemblance cannot be taken by
our understanding to explain why the feeling should be just what it is. We hear it untiringly reiterated
by materialists and spiritualists alike that we can see no possible inward reason why a certain brainprocess should produce the feeling of redness and another of anger: the one process is no more red
than the other is angry, and the coupling of process and feeling is, as far as our understanding goes, a
juxtaposition pure and simple. But in the matter of spatial feeling, where the retinal patch that
produces a triangle in the mind is itself a triangle, etc., it looks at first sight as if the sensation might
be a direct cognition of its own neural condition. Were this true, however, our sensation should be
one of multitude rather than of continuous extent; for the condition is number of optical nervetermini, and even this is only a remote condition and not an immediate condition. The immediate
condition of the feeling is not the process in the retina, but the process in the brain; and the process in
the brain may, for aught we know, be as unlike a triangle,—nay, it probably is so,—as it is unlike
redness or rage. It is simply a coincidence that in the case of space one of the organic conditions, viz.,
the triangle impressed on the skin or the retina, should lead to a representation in the mind of the
subject observed similar to that which it produces in the psychological observer. In no other kind of
case is the coincidence found. Even should we admit that we cognize triangles in space because of
our immediate cognition of the triangular shape of our excited group of nerve-tips, the matter would

hardly be more transparent, for the mystery would still remain, why are we so much better cognizant
of triangles on our finger-tips than on the nerve-tips of our back, on our eye than on our ear, and on
any of these parts than in our brain? Thos. Brown very rightly rejects the notion of explaining the
shape of the space perceived by the shape of the 'nervous expansion affected.' "If this alone were
necessary, we should have square inches and half inches, and various other forms, rectilinear and
curvilinear, of fragrance and sound." (Lectures, XXII.)
[154] Musical tones, e.g., have an order of quality independent either of their space- or time-order.
Music comes from the time-order of the notes upsetting their quality-order. In general, if a b c d e f g
h i j k, etc., stand for an arrangement of feelings in the order of their quality, they may assume any
space-order or time-order, as d e f a h g, etc., and still the order of quality will remain fixed and
unchanged.
[155] The whole science of geometry may be said to owe its being to the exorbitant interest which
the human mind takes in lines. We cut space up in every direction in order to manufacture them.
[156] Kant was, I believe, the first to call attention to this last order of facts. After pointing out that
two opposite spherical triangles, two gloves of a pair, two spirals wound in contrary directions, have
identical inward determinations, that is, have their parts defined with relation to each other by the
same law, and so must be conceived as identical, he showed that the impossibility of their mutual
superposition obliges us to assign to each figure of a symmetrical pair a peculiar difference of its own
which can only consist in an outward determination or relation of its parts, no longer to each other,
but to the whole of an objectively outlying space with its points of the compass given absolutely. This
inconceivable difference is perceived only "through the relation to right and left, which is a matter of
immediate intuition." In these last words (welches unmittelbar auf Anschauung geht—Prolegomena,
§ 12) Kant expresses all that we have meant by speaking of up and down, right and left, as
sensations. He is wrong, however, in invoking relation to extrinsic total space as essential to the
existence of these contrasts in figures. Relation to our own body is enough.
[157] In the eyes of many it will have seemed strange to call a relation a mere line, and a line a mere
sensation. We may easily learn a great deal about any relation, say that between two points: we may
divide the line which joins these, and distinguish it, and classify it, and find out its relations by
drawing or representing new lines, and so on. But all this further industry has naught to do with our
acquaintance with the relation itself, in its first intention. So cognized, the relation is the line and
nothing more. It would indeed be fair to call it something less; and in fact it is easy to understand
how most of us come to feel as if the line were a much grosser thing than the relation. The line is
broad or narrow, blue or red, made by this object or by that alternately, in the course of our
experience; it is therefore independent of any one of these accidents; and so, from viewing it as no
one of such sensible qualities, we may end by thinking of it as something which cannot be defined
except as the negation of all sensible quality whatever, and which needs to be put into the sensations
by a mysterious act of 'relating thought.'
Another reason why we get to feel as if a space-relation must be something other than the mere
feeling of a line or angle is that between two positions we can potentially make any number of lines
and angles, or find, to suit our purposes, endlessly numerous relations. The sense of this indefinite
potentiality cleaves to our words when we speak in a general way of 'relations of place,' and misleads
us into supposing that not even any single one of them can be exhaustively equated by a single angle
or a single line.
[158] This often happens when the warm and cold points, or the round and pointed ones, are applied
to the skin within the limits of a single 'Empfindungskreis.'
[159] Vierordt, Grundriss der Physiologie, 5te Auflage (1877), pp. 326, 436.

[160] Vorlesungen üb. Menschen- u. Thierseele (Leipzig, 1863), i. 214. See also Ladd's Physiological
Psychology, pp. 396-8, and compare the account by G. Stanley Hall (Mind, x. 571) of the sensations
produced by moving a blunt point lightly over the skin. Points of cutting pain, quivering, thrilling,
whirling, tickling, scratching, and acceleration, alternated with each other along the surface.
[161] Of the anatomical and physiological conditions of these facts we know as yet but little, and that
little need not here be discussed. Two principal hypotheses have been invoked in the case of the
retina. Wundt (Menschen- u. Thierseele, i. 214) called attention to the changes of color-sensibility
which the retina displays as the image of the colored object passes from the fovea to the periphery.
The color alters and becomes darker, and the change is more rapid in certain directions than in others.
This alteration in general, however, is one of which, as such, we are wholly unconscious. We see the
sky as bright blue all over, the modifications of the blue sensation being interpreted by us, not as
differences in the objective color, but as distinctions in its locality. Lotze (Medizinische Psychologie,
333, 355), on the other hand, has pointed out the peculiar tendency which each particular point of the
retina has to call forth that movement of the eyeball which will carry the image of the exciting object
from the point in question to the fovea. With each separate tendency to movement (as with each
actual movement) we may suppose a peculiar modification of sensibility to be conjoined. This
modification would constitute the peculiar local tingeing of the image by each point. See also Sully's
Psychology, pp. 118-121. Prof. B. Erdman has quite lately (Vierteljahrsschrift f. wiss. Phil., x. 324-9)
denied the existence of all evidence for such immanent qualia of feeling characterizing each locality.
Acute as his remarks are, they quite fail to convince me. On the skin the qualia are evident, I should
say. Where, as on the retina, they are less so (Kries and Auerbach), this may well be a mere difficulty
of discrimination not yet educated to the analysis.
[162] 1852, p. 331.
[163] Maybe the localization of intracranial pain is itself due to such association as this of local signs
with each other, rather than to their qualitative similarity in neighboring parts (supra, p. 19); though it
is conceivable that association and similarity itself should here have one and the same neural basis. If
we suppose the sensory nerves from those parts of the body beneath any patch of skin to terminate in
the same sensorial brain-tract as those from the skin itself, and if the excitement of any one fibre
tends to irradiate through the whole of that tract, the feelings of all fibres going to that tract would
presumably both have a similar intrinsic quality, and at the same time tend each to arouse the other.
Since the same nerve-trunk in most cases supplies the skin and the parts beneath, the anatomical
hypothesis presents nothing improbable.
[164] Unless, indeed, the foot happen to be spontaneously tingling or something of the sort at the
moment. The whole surface of the body is always in a state of semi-conscious irritation which needs
only the emphasis of attention, or of some accidental inward irritation, to become strong at any point.
[165] It is true that the inside of the forearm, though its discriminative sensibility is often less than
that of the outside, usually rises very prominently into consciousness when the latter is touched. Its
æsthetic sensibility to contact is a good deal finer. We enjoy stroking it from the extensor to the
flexor surface around the ulnar side more than in the reverse direction. Pronating movements give
rise to contacts in this order, and are frequently indulged in when the back of the forearm feels an
object against it.
[166] These facts were first noticed by Wundt: see his Beiträge, p. 140, 202. See also Lamansky,
Pflüger's Archiv, xi. 418.
[167] So far all has been plain sailing, but our course begins to be so tortuous when we descend into
minuter detail that I will treat of the more precise determination of locality in a long note. When P
recalls an ideal line leading to the fovea the line is felt in its entirety and but vaguely; whilst P, which
we supposed to be a single star of actual light, stands out in strong distinction from it. The ground of

the distinction between P and the ideal line which it terminates is manifest—P being vivid while the
line is faint; but why should P hold the particular position it does, at the end of the line, rather than
anywhere else—for example, in its middle? That seems something not at all manifest.
To clear up our thoughts about this latter mystery, let us take the case of an actual line of light, none
of whose parts is ideal. The feeling of the line is produced, as we know, when a multitude of retinal
points are excited together, each of which when excited separately would give rise to one of the
feelings called local signs. Each of these signs is the feeling of a small space. From their
simultaneous arousal we might well suppose a feeling of larger space to result. But why is it
necessary that in this larger spaciousness the sign a should appear always at one end of the line, z at
the other, and m in the middle? For though the line be a unitary streak of light, its several constituent
points can nevertheless break out from it, and become alive, each for itself, under the selective eye of
attention.
The uncritical reader, giving his first careless glance at the subject, will say that there is no mystery
in this, and that 'of course' local signs must appear alongside of each other, each in its own place;—
there is no other way possible. But the more philosophic student, whose business it is to discover
difficulties quite as much as to get rid of them, will reflect that it is conceivable that the partial
factors might fuse into a larger space, and yet not each be located within it any more than a voice is
located in a chorus. He will wonder how, after combining into the line, the points can become
severally alive again: the separate puffs of a 'sirene' no longer strike the ear after they have fused into
a certain pitch of sound. He will recall the fact that when, after looking at things with one eye closed,
we double, by opening the other eye, the number of retinal points affected, the new retinal sensations
do not as a rule appear alongside of the old ones and additional to them, but merely make the old
ones seem larger and nearer. Why should the affection of new points on the same retina have so
different a result? In fact, he will see no sort of logical connection between (1) the original separate
local signs, (2) the line as a unit, (3) the line with the points discriminated in it, and (4) the various
nerve-processes which subserve all these different things. He will suspect our local sign of being a
very slippery and ambiguous sort of creature. Positionless at first, it no sooner appears in the midst of
a gang of companions than it is found maintaining the strictest position of its own, and assigning
place to each of its associates. How is this possible? Must we accept what we rejected a while ago as
absurd, and admit the points each to have position in se? Or must we suspect that our whole
construction has been fallacious, and that we have tried to conjure up, out of association, qualities
which the associates never contained?
There is no doubt a real difficulty here; and the shortest way of dealing with it would be to confess it
insoluble and ultimate. Even if position be not an intrinsic character of any one of those sensations
we have called local signs, we must still admit that there is something about every one of them that
stands for the potentiality of position, and is the ground why the local sign, when it gets placed at all,
gets placed here rather than there. If this 'something' be interpreted as a physiological something, as a
mere nerve-process, it is easy to say in a blank way that when it is excited alone, it is an 'ultimate
fact' (1) that a positionless spot will appear; that when it is excited together with other similar
processes, but without the process of discriminative attention, it is another 'ultimate fact' (2) that a
unitary line will come; and that the final 'ultimate fact' (3) is that, when the nerve-process is excited
in combination with that other process which subserves the feeling of attention, what results will be
the line with the local sign inside of it determined to a particular place. Thus we should escape the
responsibility of explaining, by falling back on the everlasting inscrutability of the psycho-neural
nexus. The moment we call the ground of localization physiological, we need only point out how, in
those cases in which localization occurs, the physiological process differs from those in which it does
not, to have done all we can possibly do in the matter. This would be unexceptionable logic, and with
it we might let the matter drop, satisfied that there was no self-contradiction in it, but only the

universal psychological puzzle of how a new mode of consciousness emerges whenever a
fundamentally new mode of nervous action occurs.
But, blameless as such tactics would logically be on our part, let us see whether we cannot push our
theoretic insight a little farther. It seems to me we can. We cannot, it is true, give a reason why the
line we feel when process (2) awakens should have its own peculiar shape; nor can we explain the
essence of the process of discriminative attention. But we can see why, if the brute facts be admitted
that a line may have one of its parts singled out by attention at all, and that that part may appear in
relation to other parts at all, the relation must be in the line itself,—for the line and the parts are the
only things supposed to be in consciousness. And we can furthermore suggest a reason why parts
appearing thus in relation to each other in a line should fall into an immutable order, and each within
that order keep its characteristic place.
If a lot of such local signs all have any quality which evenly augments as we pass from one to the
other, we can arrange them in an ideal serial order, in which any one local sign must lie below those
with more, above those with less, of the quality in question. It must divide the series into two parts,—
unless indeed it have a maximum or minimum of the quality, when it either begins or ends it.
Such an ideal series of local signs in the mind is, however, not yet identical with the feeling of a line
in space. Touch a dozen points on the skin successively, and there seems no necessary reason why the
notion of a definite line should emerge, even though we be strongly aware of a gradation of quality
among the touches. We may of course symbolically arrange them in a line in our thought, but we can
always distinguish between a line symbolically thought and a line directly felt.
But note now the peculiarity of the nerve-processes of all these local signs: though they may give no
line when excited successively, when excited together they do give the actual sensation of a line in
space. The sum of them is the neural process of that line; the sum of their feelings is the feeling of
that line; and if we begin to single out particular points from the line, and notice them by their rank, it
is impossible to see how this rank can appear except as an actual fixed space-position sensibly felt as
a bit of the total line. The scale itself appearing as a line, rank in it must appear as a definite part of
the line. If the seven notes of an octave, when heard together, appeared to the sense of hearing as an
outspread line of sound—which it is needless to say they do not—why then no one note could be
discriminated without being localized, according to its pitch, in the line, either as one of its
extremities or as some part between.
But not alone the gradation of their quality arranges the local-sign feelings in a scale. Our movements
arrange them also in a time-scale. Whenever a stimulus passes from point a of the skin or retina to
point f, it awakens the local-sign feelings in the perfectly definite time-order abcdef. It cannot excite f
until cde have been successively aroused. The feeling c sometimes is preceded by ab, sometimes
followed by ba, according to the movement's direction; the result of it all being that we never feel
either a, c, or f, without there clinging to it faint reverberations of the various time-orders of
transition in which, throughout past experience, it has been aroused. To the local sign a there clings
the tinge or tone, the penumbra or fringe, of the transition bcd. To f, to c, there cling quite different
tones. Once admit the principle that a feeling may be tinged by the reproductive consciousness of an
habitual transition, even when the transition is not made, and it seems entirely natural to admit that, if
the transition be habitually in the order abcdef, and if a, c, and f be felt separately at all, a will be felt
with an essential earliness, f with an essential lateness, and that c will fall between. Thus those
psychologists who set little store by local signs and great store by movements in explaining spaceperception, would have a perfectly definite time-order, due to motion, by which to account for the
definite order of positions that appears when sensitive spots are excited all at once. Without,
however, the preliminary admission of the 'ultimate fact' that this collective excitement shall feel like
a line and nothing else, it can never be explained why the new order should needs be an order of
positions, and not of merely ideal serial rank. We shall hereafter have any amount of opportunity to

observe how thoroughgoing is the participation of motion in all our spatial measurements. Whether
the local signs have their respective qualities evenly graduated or not, the feelings of transition must
be set down as among the veræ causæ in localization. But the gradation of the local signs is hardly to
be doubted; so we may believe ourselves really to possess two sets of reasons for localizing any point
we may happen to distinguish from out the midst of any line or any larger space.
[168] M. Binet (Revue Philosophique, Sept. 1880, page 291) says we judge them locally different as
soon as their sensations differ enough for us to distinguish them as qualitatively different when
successively excited. This is not strictly true. Skin-sensations, different enough to be discriminated
when successive, may still fuse locally if excited both at once.
[169] It may, however, be said that even in the tongue there is a determination of bitter flavors to the
back and of acids to the front edge of the organ. Spices likewise affect its sides and front, and a taste
like that of alum localizes itself, by its styptic effect on the portion of mucous membrane, which it
immediately touches, more sharply than roast pork, for example, which stimulates all parts alike. The
pork, therefore, tastes more spacious than the alum or the pepper. In the nose, too, certain smells, of
which vinegar may be taken as the type, seem less spatially extended than heavy, suffocating odors,
like musk. The reason of this appears to be that the former inhibit inspiration by their sharpness,
whilst the latter are drawn into the lungs, and thus excite an objectively larger surface. The ascription
of height and depth to certain notes seems due, not to any localization of the sounds, but to the fact
that a feeling of vibration in the chest and tension in the gullet accompanies the singing of a bass
note, whilst, when we sing high, the palatine mucous membrane is drawn upon by the muscles which
move the larynx, and awakens a feeling in the roof of the mouth.
The only real objection to the law of partial stimulation laid down in the text is one that might be
drawn from the organ of hearing; for, according to modern theories, the cochlea may have its separate
nerve-termini exclusively excited by sounds of differing pitch, and yet the sounds seem all to fill a
common space, and not necessarily to be arranged alongside of each other. At most the high note is
felt as a thinner, brighter streak against a darker background. In an article on Space, published in the
Journal of Speculative Philosophy for January, 1879, I ventured to suggest that possibly the auditory
nerve termini might be "excited all at once by sounds of any pitch, as the whole retina would be by
every luminous point if there were no dioptric apparatus affixed." And I added: "Notwithstanding the
brilliant conjectures of the last few years which assign different acoustic end-organs to different rates
of air-wave, we are still greatly in the dark about the subject; and I, for my part, would much more
confidently reject a theory of hearing which violated the principles advanced in this article than give
up those principles for the sake of any hypothesis hitherto published about either organs of Corti or
basilar membrane." Professor Rutherford's theory of hearing, advanced at the meeting of the British
Association for 1886, already furnishes an alternative view which would make hearing present no
exception to the space-theory I defend and which, whether destined to be proved true or false, ought,
at any rate to make us feel that the Helmholtzian theory is probably not the last word in the
physiology of hearing. Stepano, ff. (Hermann und Schwalbe's Jahresbericht, xv. 404, Literature 1886)
reports a case in which more than the upper half of one cochlea was lost without any such deafness to
deep notes on that side as Helmholtz's theory would require.
[170] Donaldson, in Mind, x. 399, 577; Goldscheider, in Archiv f. (Anat. u.) Physiologie; Blix, in
Zeitschrift für Biologie. A good résumé may be found in Ladd's Physiol. Psychology, part ii. chap. iv.
§§ 21-23.
[171] I tried on nine or ten people, making numerous observations on each, what difference it made
in the discrimination of two points to have them alike or unlike. The points chosen were (1) two large
needle-heads, (2) two screw-heads, and (3) a needle-head and a screw-head. The distance of the
screw-heads was measured from their centres. I found that when the points gave diverse qualities of
feeling (as in 3), this facilitated the discrimination, but much less strongly than I expected. The

difference, in fact, would often not be perceptible twenty times running. When, however, one of the
points was endowed with a rotary movement, the other remaining still, the doubleness of the points
became much more evident than before. To observe this I took an ordinary pair of compasses with
one point blunt, and the movable leg replaced by a metallic rod which could, at any moment, be
made to rotate in situ by a dentist's drilling-machine, to which it was attached. The compass had then
its points applied to the skin at such a distance apart as to be felt as one impression. Suddenly rotating
the drill-apparatus then almost always made them seem as two.
[172] This is only another example of what I call 'the psychologist's fallacy'—thinking that the mind
he is studying must necessarily be conscious of the object after the fashion in which the psychologist
himself is conscious of it.
[173] Sitzb. der. k. Akad. Wien, Bd. lxxii., Abth. 8 (1875).
[174] Zeitschrift für Biologie, xii. 226 (1876).
[175] Vierteljahrsch. für wiss. Philos., ii. 377.
[176] Exner tries to show that the structure of the faceted eye of articulates adapts it for perceiving
motions almost exclusively.
[177] Schneider tries to explain why a sensory surface is so much more excited when its impression
moves. It has long since been noticed how much more acute is discrimination of successive than of
simultaneous differences. But in the case of a moving impression, say on the retina, we have a
summation of both sorts of difference; whereof the natural effect must be to produce the most perfect
discrimination of all.

FIG. 53.
In the left-hand figure let the dark spot B move, for example, from right to left. At the outset there is
the simultaneous contrast of black and white in B and A. When the motion has occurred so that the
right-hand figure is produced, the same contrast remains, the black and the white having changed
places. But in addition to it there is a double successive contrast, first in A, which, a moment ago
white, has now become black; and second in B, which, a moment ago black, has now become white.
If we make each single feeling of contrast = 1 (a supposition far too favorable to the state of rest), the
sum of contrasts in the case of motion will be 3, as against 1 in the state of rest. That is, our attention
will be called by a treble force to the difference of color, provided the color begin to move.—(Cf.
also Fleischl, Physiologische Optische Notizen, 2te Mittheilung, Wiener Sitzungsberichte, 1882.)
[178] Brown, Bain, J. S. Mill, and in a modified manner Wundt, Helmholtz, Sully, etc.

[179] M. Ch. Dunan, in his forcibly written essay 'l'Espace Visuel et l'Espace Tactile' in the Revue
Philosophique for 1888, endeavors to prove that surfaces alone give no perception of extent, by citing
the way in which the blind go to work to gain an idea of an object's shape. If surfaces were the
percipient organ, he says, "both the seeing and the blind ought to gain an exact idea of the size (and
shape) of an object by merely laying their hand flat upon it (provided of course that it were smaller
than the hand), and this because of their direct appreciation of the amount of tactile surface affected,
and with no recourse to the muscular sense.... But the fact is that a person born blind never proceeds
in this way to measure objective surfaces. The only means which he has of getting at the size of a
body is that of running his finger along the lines by which it is bounded. For instance, if you put into
the hands of one born blind a book whose dimensions are unknown to him, he will begin by resting it
against his chest so as to hold it horizontal; then, bringing his two hands together at the middle of the
edge opposite to the one against his body, he will draw them asunder till they reach the ends of the
edge in question; and then, and not till then, will he be able to say what the length of the object is"
(vol. xxv. p. 148). I think that anyone who will try to appreciate the size and shape of an object by
simply 'laying his hand flat upon it' will find that the great obstacle is that he feels the contours so
imperfectly. The moment, however, the hands move, the contours are emphatically and distinctly felt.
All perception of shape and size is perception of contours, and first of all these must be made sharp.
Motion does this; and the impulse to move our organs in perception is primarily due to the craving
which we feel to get our surface-sensations sharp. When it comes to the naming and measuring of
objects in terms of some common standard we shall see presently how movements help also; but no
more in this case than the other do they help, because the quality of extension itself is contributed by
the 'muscular sense.'
[180] Fechner describes (Psychophysik, i. 132) a 'method of equivalents' for measuring the sensibility
of the skin. Two compasses are used, one on the part A, another on the part B, of the surface. The
points on B must be adjusted so that their distance apart appears equal to that between the points on
A. With the place A constant, the second pair of points must be varied a great deal for every change
in the place B, though for the same A and B the relation of the two compasses is remarkably
constant, and continues unaltered for months, provided but few experiments are made on each day. If,
however, we practise daily their difference grows less, in accordance with the law given in the text.
[181] Prof. Jastrow gives as the result of his experiments this general conclusion (Am. Journal of
Psychology, iii. 53): "The space-perceptions of disparate senses are themselves disparate, and
whatever harmony there is amongst them we are warranted in regarding as the result of experience.
The spacial notions of one deprived of the sense of sight and reduced to the use of the other spacesenses must indeed be different from our own." But he continues: "The existence of the striking
disparities between our visual and our other space-perceptions without confusing us, and, indeed,
without usually being noticed, can only be explained by the tendency to interpret all dimensions into
their visual equivalents." But this author gives no reasons for saying 'visual' rather than 'tactile;' and I
must continue to think that probabilities point the other way so far as what we call real magnitudes
are concerned.
[182] Cf. Lipps on 'Complication,' Grundtatsachen, etc., p. 579.
[183] Ventriloquism shows this very prettily. The ventriloquist talks without moving his lips, and at
the same time draws our attention to a doll, a box, or some other object. We forthwith locate the
voice within this object. On the stage an actor ignorant of music sometimes has to sing, or play on the
guitar or violin. He goes through the motions before our eyes, whilst in the orchestra or elsewhere the
music is performed. But because as we listen we see the actor, it is almost impossible not to hear the
music as if coming from where he sits or stands.
[184] Cf. Shand, in Mind, xiii. 340.

[185] See, e.g., Bain's Senses and Intellect, pp. 366-7, 371.
[186] When, for example, a baby looks at its own moving hand, it sees one object at the same time
that it feels another. Both interest its attention, and it locates them together. But the felt object's size is
the more constant size, just as the felt object is, on the whole, the more interesting and important
object; and so the retinal sensations become regarded as its signs and have their 'real space-values'
interpreted in tangible terms.
[187] The incoherence of the different primordial sense-spaces inter se is often made a pretext for
denying to the primitive bodily feelings any spatial quality at all. Nothing is commoner than to hear it
said: "Babies have originally no spatial perception; for when a baby's toe aches he does not place the
pain in the toe. He makes no definite movements of defence, and may be vaccinated without being
held." The facts are true enough; but the interpretation is all wrong. What really happens is that the
baby does not place his 'toe' in the pain; for he knows nothing of his 'toe' as yet. He has not attended
to it as a visual object; he has not handled it with his fingers; nor have its normal organic sensations
or contacts yet become interesting enough to be discriminated from the whole massive feeling of the
foot, or even of the leg to which it belongs. In short, the toe is neither a member of the babe's optical
space, of his hand-movement space, nor an independent member of his leg-and-foot space. It has
actually no mental existence yet save as this little pain-space. What wonder, then, if the pain seem a
little space-world all by itself? But let the pain once associate itself with these other space-worlds,
and its space will become part of their space. Let the baby feel the nurse stroking the limb and
awakening the pain every time her finger passes towards the toe; let him look on and see her finger
on the toe every time the pain shoots up; let him handle his foot himself and get the pain whenever
the toe comes into his fingers or his mouth; let moving the leg exacerbate the pain,—and all is
changed. The space of the pain becomes identified with that part of each of the other spaces which
gets felt when it awakens; and by their identity with it these parts are identified with each other, and
grow systematically connected as members of a larger extensive whole.
[188] 'Pourquoi les Sensations visuelles sont elles étendues?' in Revue Philosophique, iv. 167.—As
the proofs of this chapter are being corrected, I receive the third 'Heft' of Münsterberg's Beiträge zur
Experimentellen Psychologie, in which that vigorous young psychologist reaffirms (if I understand
him after so hasty a glance) more radically than ever the doctrine that muscular sensation proper is
our one means of measuring extension. Unable to reopen the discussion here, I am in duty bound to
call the attention of the reader to Herr M.'s work.
[189] Even if the figure be drawn on a board instead of in the air, the variations of contact on the
finger's surface will be much simpler than the peculiarities of the traced figure itself.
[190] See for example Duchenne, Electrisation localisée, pp. 727, 770, Leyden; Virchow's Archiv,
Bd. xlvii. (1869).
[191] E.g., Eulenburg, Lehrb. d. Nervenkrankheiten (Berlin), 1878, i. 3.
[192] 'Ueber den Kraftsinn,' Virchow's Archiv, Bd. lxxvii. 134.
[193] Archiv f. (Anat. u) Physiologie (1889), pp. 369, 540.
[194] Direction in its 'first intention,' of course; direction with which so far we merely become
acquainted, and about which we know nothing save perhaps its difference from another direction a
moment ago experienced in the same way!
[195] I have said hardly anything about associations with visual space in the foregoing account,
because I wished to represent a process which the blind and the seeing man might equally share. It is
to be noticed that the space suggested to the imagination when the joint moves, and projected to the
distance of the finger-tip, is not represented as any specific skin-tract. What the seeing man imagines
is a visible path; what the blind man imagines is rather a generic image, an abstraction from many

skin-spaces whose local signs have neutralized each other, and left nothing but their common
vastness behind. We shall see as we go on that this generic abstraction of space-magnitude from the
various local peculiarities of feeling which accompanied it when it was for the first time felt, occurs
on a considerable scale in the acquired perceptions of blind as well as of seeing men.
[196] The ideal enlargement of a system of sensations by the mind is nothing exceptional. Vision is
full of it; and in the manual arts, where a workman gets a tool larger than the one he is accustomed to
and has suddenly to adapt all his movements to its scale, or where he has to execute a familiar set of
movements in an unnatural position of body; where a piano-player meets an instrument with
unusually broad or narrow keys; where a man has to alter the size of his handwriting—we see how
promptly the mind multiplies once for all, as it were, the whole series of its operations by a constant
factor, and has not to trouble itself after that with further adjustment of the details.
[197] Pflüger's Archiv, xlv. 65.
[198] Untersuchungen im Gebiete der Optik, Leipzig (1863), p. 188.
[199] Problems of Life and Mind, prob. vi. chap. iv. § 45.
[200] Volkmann, op. cit. p. 189. Compare also what Hering says of the inability in his own case to
make after-images seem to move when he rolls his closed eyes in their sockets; and of the
insignificance of his feelings of convergence for the sense of distance (Beiträge zur Physiologie,
1881-2, pp. 31, 141). Helmholtz also allows to the muscles of convergence a very feeble share in
producing our sense of the third dimension (Physiologische Optik, 649-59).
[201] Compare Lipps, Psychologische Studien (1885), p. 18, and the other arguments given on pp. 12
to 27. The most plausible reasons for contractions of the eyeball-muscles being admitted as original
contributors to the perception of extent, are those of Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, ii. 96-100.
They are drawn from certain constant errors in our estimate of lines and angles; which, however, are
susceptible, all of them, of different interpretations (see some of them further on).—Just as my MS.
goes to the printer, Herr Münsterberg's Beiträge zur experimentellen Psychologie, Heft 2, comes into
my hands with experiments on the measurement of space recorded in it, which, in the author's view,
prove the feeling of muscular strain to be a principal factor in our vision of extent. As Münsterberg
worked three hours a day for a year and a half at comparing the length of lines, seen with his eyes in
different positions; and as he carefully averaged and 'percented' 20,000 observations, his conclusion
must be listened to with great respect. Briefly it is this, that "our judgments of size depend on a
comparison of the intensity of the feelings of movement which arise in our eyeball-muscles as we
glance over the distance, and which fuse with the sensations of light" (p. 142). The facts upon which
the conclusion is based are certain constant errors which Münsterberg found according as the
standard or given interval was to the right or the left of the interval to be marked off as equal to it, or
as it was above or below it, or stood in some more complicated relation still. He admits that he
cannot explain all the errors in detail, and that we "stand before results which seem surprising and not
to be unravelled, because we cannot analyze the elements which enter into the complex sensation
which we receive." But he has no doubt whatever of the general fact "that the movements of the eyes
and the sense of their position when fixed exert so decisive an influence on our estimate of the spaces
seen, that the errors cannot possibly be explained by anything else than the movement-feelings and
their reproductions in the memory" (pp. 166, 167). It is presumptuous to doubt a man's opinion when
you haven't had his experience; and yet there are a number of points which make me feel like
suspending judgment in regard to Herr M.'s dictum. He found, for example, a constant tendency to
underestimate intervals lying to the right, and to overestimate intervals lying to the left. He
ingeniously explains this as a result of the habit of reading, which trains us to move our eyes easily
along straight lines from left to right, whereas in looking from right to left we move them in curved
lines across the page. As we measure intervals as straight lines, it costs more muscular effort to
measure from right to left than the other way, and an interval lying to the left seems to us

consequently longer than it really is. Now I have been a reader for more years than Herr
Münsterberg; and yet with me there is a strongly pronounced error the other way. It is the rightwardlying interval which to me seems longer than it really is. Moreover, Herr M. wears concave
spectacles, and looked through them with his head fixed. May it not be that some of the errors were
due to distortion of the retinal image, as the eye looked no longer through the centre but through the
margin of the glass? In short, with all the presumptions which we have seen against muscular
contraction being definitely felt as length, I think that there may be explanations of Herr M.'s results
which have escaped even his sagacity; and I call for a suspension of judgment until they shall have
been confirmed by other observers. I do not myself doubt that our feeling of seen extent may be
altered by concomitant muscular feelings. In Chapter XVII (pp. 28-30) we saw many examples of
similar alterations, interferences with, or exaltations of, the sensory effect of one nerve-process by
another. I do not see why currents from the muscles or eyelids, coming in at the same time with a
retinal impression, might not make the latter seem bigger, in the same way that a greater intensity in
the retinal stimulation makes it seem bigger; or in the way that a greater extent of surface excited
makes the color of the surface seem stronger, or if it be a skin-surface, makes its heat seem greater; or
in the way that the coldness of the dollar on the forehead (in Weber's old experiments) made the
dollar seem heavier. But this is a physiological way; and the bigness gained is that of the retinal
image after all. If I understand Münsterberg's meaning, it is quite different from this: the bigness
belongs to the muscular feelings, as such, and is merely associated with those of the retina. This is
what I deny.
[202] Archiv f. (Anat. u.) Physiol. (1889), p. 543.
[203] Ibid. p. 496.
[204] Ibid. p. 497. Goldscheider thinks that our muscles do not even give us the feeling of resistance,
that being also due to the articular surfaces; whilst weight is due to the tendons. Ibid. p. 541.
[205] "Whilst the memories which we seeing folks preserve of a man all centre round a certain
exterior form composed of his image, his height, his gait, in the blind all these memories are referred
to something quite different, namely, the sound of his voice." (Dunan, Rev. Phil., xxv. 357.)
[206] Vol. xxv. pp. 357-8.
[207] P. 135.
[208] Essay conc. Hum. Und., bk. ii. chap. ix. § 8.
[209] Philosophical Transactions, 1841. In T. K. Abbot's Sight and Touch there is a good discussion
of these cases. Obviously, positive cases are of more importance than negative. An under-witted
peasant, Noé M., whose case is described by Dr. Dufour of Lausanne (Guerison d'un Aveugle né;
1876) is much made of by MM. Naville and Dunan; but it seems to me only to show how little some
people can deal with new experiences in which others find themselves quickly at home. This man
could not even tell whether one of his first objects of sight moved or stood still (p. 9).
[210] What may be the physiological process connected with this increased sensation of depth is hard
to discover. It seems to have nothing to do with the parts of the retina affected, since the mere
inversion of the picture (by mirrors, reflecting prisms, etc.), without inverting the head, does not
seem to bring it about; nothing with sympathetic axial rotation of the eyes, which might enhance the
perspective through exaggerated disparity of the two retinal images (see J. J. Müller, 'Raddrehung u.
Tiefendimension,' Leipzig Acad. Berichte, 1875, page 124), for one-eyed persons get it as strongly as
those with two eyes. I cannot find it to be connected with any alteration in the pupil or with any
ascertainable strain in the muscles of the eye, sympathizing with those of the body. The exaggeration
of distance is even greater when we throw the head over backwards and contract our superior recti in
getting the view, than when we bend forward and contract the inferior recti. Making the eyes diverge

slightly by weak prismatic glasses has no such effect. To me, and to all whom I have asked to repeat
the observation, the result is so marked that I do not well understand how such an observer as
Helmholtz, who has carefully examined vision with inverted head, can have overlooked it. (See his
Phys. Optik, pp. 488, 723, 728, 772.) I cannot help thinking that anyone who can explain the
exaggeration of the depth-sensation in this case will at the same time throw much light on its normal
constitution.
[211] "In Froriep's Notizen (1838, July), No. 133, is to be found a detailed account, with a picture, of
an Esthonian girl, Eva Lauk, then fourteen years old, born with neither arms nor legs, which
concludes with the following words: 'According to the mother, her intellect developed quite as fast as
that of her brother and sisters; in particular, she came as quickly to a right judgment of the size and
distance of visible objects, although, of course, she had no use of hands.'" (Schopenhauer, Welt als
Wille, ii. 44.)
[212] Physiol. Optik, p. 438. Helmholtz's reservation of 'qualities' is inconsistent. Our judgments of
light and color vary as much as our judgments of size, shape, and place, and ought by parity of
reasoning to be called intellectual products and not sensations. In other places he does treat color as if
it were an intellectual product.
[213] It is needless at this point to consider what Helmholtz's views of the nature of the intellectual
space-yielding process may be. He vacillates—we shall later see how.
[214] Op. cit. p. 214.
[215] Before embarking on this new topic it will be well to shelve, once for all, the problem of what
is the physiological process that underlies the distance-feeling. Since one-eyed people have it, and are
inferior to the two-eyed only in measuring its gradations, it can have no exclusive connection with
the double and disparate images produced by binocular parallax. Since people with closed eyes,
looking at an after-image, do not usually see it draw near or recede with varying convergence, it
cannot be simply constituted by the convergence-feeling. For the same reason it would appear nonidentical with the feeling of accommodation. The differences of apparent parallactic movement
between far and near objects as we move our head cannot constitute the distance-sensation, for such
differences may be easily reproduced experimentally (in the movements of visible spots against a
background) without engendering any illusion of perspective. Finally, it is obvious that visible
faintness, dimness, and smallness are not per se the feeling of visible distance, however much in the
case of well-known objects they may serve as signs to suggest it.
A certain maximum distance-value, however, being given to the field of view of the moment,
whatever it be, the feelings that accompany the processes just enumerated become so many local
signs of the gradation of distances within this maximum depth. They help us to subdivide and
measure it. Itself, however, is felt as a unit, a total distance-value, determining the vastness of the
whole field of view, which accordingly appears as an abyss of a certain volume. And the question
still persists, what neural process is it that underlies the sense of this distance-value?
Hering, who has tried to explain the gradations within it by the interaction of certain native distancevalues belonging to each point of the two retinæ, seems willing to admit that the absolute scale of the
space-volume within which the natively fixed relative distances shall appear is not fixed, but
determined each time by 'experience in the widest sense of the word' (Beiträge, p. 344). What he
calls the Kernpunkt of this space-volume is the point we are momentarily fixating. The absolute scale
of the whole volume depends on the absolute distance at which this Kernpunkt is judged to lie from
the person of the looker. "By an alteration of the localization of the Kernpunkt, the inner relations of
the seen space are nowise altered; this space in its totality is as a fixed unit, so to speak, displaced
with respect to the self of the looker" (p. 345). But what constitutes the localization of the Kernpunkt

itself at any given time, except 'Experience,' i.e., higher cerebral and intellectual processes, involving
memory, Hering does not seek to define.
Stumpf, the other sensationalist writer who has best realized the difficulties of the problem, thinks
that the primitive sensation of distance must have an immediate physical antecedent, either in the
shape of "an organic alteration accompanying the process of accommodation, or else given directly in
the specific energy of the optic nerve." In contrast with Hering, however, he thinks that it is the
absolute distance of the spot fixated which is thus primitively, immediately, and physiologically
given, and not the relative distances of other things about this spot. These, he thinks, are originally
seen in what, broadly speaking, may be termed one plane with it. Whether the distance of this plane,
considered as a phenomenon of our primitive sensibility, be an invariable datum, or susceptible of
fluctuation, he does not, if I understand him rightly, undertake dogmatically to decide, but inclines to
the former view. For him then, as for Hering, higher cerebral processes of association, under the
name of 'Experience,' are the authors of fully one-half part of the distance-perceptions which we at
any given time may have.
Hering's and Stumpf's theories are reported for the English reader by Mr. Sully (in Mind, iii. pp. 1726). Mr. Abbott, in his Sight and Touch (pp. 96-8), gives a theory which is to me so obscure that I only
refer the reader to its place, adding that it seems to make of distance a fixed function of retinal
sensation as modified by focal adjustment. Besides these three authors I am ignorant of any, except
Panum, who may have attempted to define distance as in any degree an immediate sensation. And
with them the direct sensational share is reduced to a very small proportional part, in our completed
distance-judgments.
Professor Lipps, in his singularly acute Psychologische Studien (p. 69 ff.), argues, as Ferrier, in his
review of Berkeley (Philosophical Remains, ii. 330 ff.), had argued before him, that it is logically
impossible we should perceive the distance of anything from the eye by sight; for a seen distance can
only be between seen termini; and one of the termini, in the case of distance from the eye, is the eye
itself, which is not seen. Similarly of the distance of two points behind each other: the near one hides
the far one, no space is seen between them. For the space between two objects to be seen, both must
appear beside each other, then the space in question will be visible. On no other condition is its
visibility possible. The conclusion is that things can properly be seen only in what Lipps calls a
surface, and that our knowledge of the third dimension must needs be conceptual, not sensational or
visually intuitive.
But no arguments in the world can prove a feeling which actually exists to be impossible. The feeling
of depth or distance, of farness or awayness, does actually exist as a fact of our visual sensibility. All
that Professor Lipps's reasonings prove concerning it is that it is not linear in its character, or in its
immediacy fully homogeneous and consubstantial with the feeling of literal distance between two
seen termini; in short, that there are two sorts of optical sensation, each inexplicably due to a peculiar
neural process. The neural process is easily discovered, in the case of lateral extension or
spreadoutness, to be the number of retinal nerve-ends affected by the light; in the case of protension
or mere farness it is more complicated and, as we have concluded, is still to seek. The two sensible
qualities unite in the primitive visual bigness. The measurement of their various amounts against
each other obeys the general laws of all such measurements. We discover their equivalencies by
means of objects, apply the same units to both, and translate them into each other so habitually that at
last they get to seem to us even quite similar in kind. This final appearance of homogeneity may
perhaps be facilitated by the fact that in binocular vision two points situated on the prolongation of
the optical axis of one of the eyes, so that the near one hides the far one, are by the other eye seen
laterally apart. Each eye has in fact a foreshortened lateral view of the other's line of sight. In The
London Times for Feb. 8, 1884, is an interesting letter by J. D. Dougal, who tries to explain by this
reason why two-eyed rifle-shooting has such advantages over shooting with one eye closed.

[216] Just so, a pair of spectacles held an inch or so from the eyes seem like one large median glass.
The faculty of seeing stereoscopic slides single without an instrument is of the utmost utility to the
student of physiological optics, and persons with strong eyes can easily acquire it. The only difficulty
lies in dissociating the degree of accommodation from the degree of convergence which it usually
accompanies. If the right picture is focussed by the right eye, the left by the left eye, the optic axes
must either be parallel or converge upon an imaginary point some distance behind the plane of the
pictures, according to the size and distance apart of the pictures. The accommodation, however, has
to be made for the plane of the pictures itself, and a near accommodation with a far-off convergence
is something which the ordinary use of our eyes never teaches us to effect.
[217] These two observations prove the law of identical direction only for objects which excite the
foveæ or lie in the line of direct looking. Observers skilled in indirect vision can, however, more or
less easily verify the law for outlying retinal points.
[218] This essay, published in the Philosophical Transactions, contains the germ of almost all the
methods applied since to the study of optical perception. It seems a pity that England, leading off so
brilliantly the modern epoch of this study, should so quickly have dropped out of the field. Almost all
subsequent progress has been made in Germany, Holland, and, longo intervallo, America.
[219] This is no place to report this controversy, but a few bibliographic references may not be
inappropriate. Wheatstone's own experiment is in section 12 of his memoir. In favor of his
interpretation see Helmholtz, Phys. Opt., pp. 737-9; Wundt, Physiol. Psychol., 2te Aufl. p. 144;
Nagel, Sehen mit zwei Augen, pp. 78-82. Against Wheatstone see Volkmann, Arch. f. Ophth., v. 274, and Untersuchungen, p. 266; Hering, Beiträge zur Physiologie, 29-45, also in Hermann's Hdbch.
d. Physiol., Bd. iii. 1 Th. p. 435; Aubert, Physiologie d. Netzhaut, p. 322; Schön, Archiv f. Ophthal.,
xxiv. 1. pp. 56-65; and Donders, ibid. xiii. 1. p. 15 and note.
[220] When we see the finger the whole time, we usually put it in the line joining object and left eye
if it be the left finger, joining object and right eye if it be the right finger. Microscopists, marksmen,
or persons one of whose eyes is much better than the other, almost always refer directions to a single
eye, as may be seen by the position of the shadow on their face when they point at a candle-flame.
[221] Professor Joseph Le Conte, who believes strongly in the identity-theory, has embodied the
latter in a pair of laws of the relation between positions seen single and double, near or far, on the one
hand, and convergences and retinal impressions, on the other, which, though complicated, seems to
me by far the best descriptive formulation yet made of the normal facts of vision. His account is
easily accessible to the reader in his volume 'Sight' in the International Scientific Series, bk. ii. c. 8,
so I say no more about it now, except that it does not solve any of the difficulties we are noting in the
identity-theory, nor account for the other fluctuating perceptions of which we go on to treat.
[222] Naturally it takes a smaller object at a less distance to cover by its image a constant amount of
retinal surface.
[223] Archiv f. Ophthal., Bd. xvii. Abth. 2, pp. 44-6 (1871).
[224] A. W. Volkmann, Untersuchungen, p. 253.
[225] Philosophical Transactions, 1852, p. 4.
[226] Physiol. Optik, 649-664. Later this author is led to value convergence more highly. Arch. f.
(Anat. u.) Physiol. (1878), p. 322.
[227] Anomalies of Accommodation and Refraction (New Sydenham Soc. Transl., London, 1864), p.
155.
[228] These strange contradictions have been called by Aubert 'secondary' deceptions of judgment.
See Grundzüge d. Physiologischen Optik (Leipzig, 1876), pp. 601, 615, 627. One of the best

examples of them is the small size of the moon as first seen through a telescope. It is larger and
brighter, so we see its details more distinctly and judge it nearer. But because we judge it so much
nearer we think it must have grown smaller. Cf. Charpentier in Jahresbericht, x. 430.
[229] Revue Philosophique, iii. 9, p. 220.
[230] See Chapter XXIV.
[231] The only exception seems to be when we expressly wish to abstract from particulars, and to
judge of the general 'effect.' Witness ladies trying on new dresses with their heads inclined and their
eyes askance; or painters in the same attitude judging of the 'values' in their pictures.
[232] The importance of Superposition will appear later on.
[233] Physiol. Optik, p. 817.
[234] Bowditch and Hall, in Journal of Physiology, vol. iii. p. 299. Helmholtz tries to explain this
phenomenon by unconscious rotations of the eyeball. But movements of the eyeball can only explain
such appearances of movements as are the same over the whole field. In the windowed board one
part of the field seems to move in one way, another part in another. The same is true when we turn
from the spiral to look at the wall—the centre of the field alone swells out or contracts, the margin
does the reverse or remains at rest. Mach and Dvorak have beautifully proved the impossibility of
eye-rotations in this case (Sitzungsber. d. Wiener Akad., Bd. lxi.). See also Bowditch and Hall's paper
as above, p. 300.
[235] Bulletins de l'Acad. de Belgique, xxi. 2; Revue Philosophique, vi. pp. 223-5; Physiologische
Psychologie, 2te Aufl. p. 103. Compare Münsterberg's views, Beiträge, Heft 2, p. 174.
[236] Physiol. Optik, pp. 562-71.
[237] Physiol. Psych., pp. 107-8.
[238] Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens, pp. 526-30.
[239] Cf. supra, vol. I. p. 515 ff.
[240] See Archiv f. Ophthalm., v. 2, 1 (1859), where many more examples are given.
[241] Untersuchungen, p. 250; see also p. 242.
[242] I pass over certain difficulties about double images, drawn from the perceptions of a few
squinters (e.g. by Schweigger, Klin. Untersuch über das Schielen, Berlin, 1881; by Javal, Annales
d'Oculistique, lxxxv. p. 217), because the facts are exceptional at best and very difficult of
interpretation. In favor of the sensationalistic or nativistic view of one such case, see the important
paper by Von Kries, Archiv f. Ophthalm., xxiv. 4, p. 117.
[243] Physiologische Untersuchungen im Gebiete der Optik, v.
[244] Cf. E. Mach, Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen, p. 87.
[245] Cf. V. Egger, Revue Philos., xx. 488.
[246] Loeb (Pflüger's Archiv, xl. 274) has proved that muscular changes of adaptation in the eye for
near and far distance are what determine the form of the relief.
[247] The strongest passage in Helmholtz's argument against sensations of space is relative to these
fluctuations of seen relief: "Ought one not to conclude that if sensations of relief exist at all, they
must be so faint and vague as to have no influence compared with that of past experience? Ought we
not to believe that the perception of the third dimension may have arisen without them, since we now
see it taking place as well against them as with them?" (Physiol. Optik, p. 817.)

[248] Cf. E. Mach, Beiträge, etc., p. 90, and the preceding chapter of the present work, p. 86 ff.
[249] I ought to say that I seem always able to see the cross rectangular at will. But this appears to
come from an imperfect absorption of the rectangular after-image by the inclined plane at which the
eyes look. The cross, with me, is apt to detach itself from this and then look square. I get the illusion
better from the circle, whose after-image becomes in various ways elliptical on being projected upon
the different surfaces of the room, and cannot then be easily made to look circular again.
[250] In Chapter XVIII, p. 74, I gave a reason why imaginations ought not to be as vivid as
sensations. It should be borne in mind that that reason does not apply to these complemental
imaginings of the real shape of things actually before our eyes.
[251] Hermann's Handb. der Physiologie, iii. 1. p. 565-71.
[252] Bulletin de l'Académie de Belgique, 2me Série, xix. 2.
[253] Wundt seeks to explain all these illusions by the relatively stronger 'feeling of innervation'
needed to move the eyeballs upwards,—a careful study of the muscles concerned is taken to prove
this,—and a consequently greater estimate of the distance traversed. It suffices to remark, however,
with Lipps, that were the innervation all, a column of S's placed on top of each other should look
each larger than the one below it, and a weathercock on a steeple gigantic, neither of which is the
case. Only the halves of the same object look different in size, because the customary correction for
foreshortening bears only on the relations of the parts of special things spread out before us. Cf.
Wundt, Physiol. Psych., 2te Aufl. ii. 96-8; Th. Lipps, Grundtatsachen, etc., p. 535.
[254] Hering would partly solve in this way the mystery of Figs. 60, 61, and 67. No doubt the
explanation partly applies; but the strange cessation of the illusion when we fix the gaze fails to be
accounted for thereby.
[255] Helmholtz has sought (Physiol. Optik, p. 715) to explain the divergence of the apparent vertical
meridians of the two retinæ, by the manner in which an identical line drawn on the ground before us
in the median plane will throw its images on the two eyes respectively. The matter is too technical for
description here; the unlearned reader may be referred for it to J. Le Conte's Sight in the Internat.
Scient. Series, p. 198 ff. But, for the benefit of those to whom verbum sat, I cannot help saying that it
seems to me that the exactness of the relation of the two meridians—whether divergent or not, for
their divergence differs in individuals and often in one individual at diverse times—precludes its
being due to the mere habitual falling-off of the image of one objective line on both. Le Conte, e.g.,
measures their position down to a sixth of a degree, others to tenths. This indicates an organic
identity in the sensations of the two retinæ, which the experience of median perspective horizontals
may roughly have agreed with, but hardly can have engendered. Wundt explains the divergence as
usual, by the Innervationsgefühl (op. cit.. ii. 99 ff.).
[256] Physiol. Optik, p. 547.
[257] "We can with a short ruler draw a line as long as we please on a plane surface by first drawing
one as long as the ruler permits, and then sliding the ruler somewhat along the drawn line and
drawing again, etc. If the ruler is exactly straight, we get in this way a straight line. If it is somewhat
curved we get a circle. Now, instead of the sliding ruler we use in the field of sight the central spot of
distinctest vision impressed with a linear sensation of sight, which at times may be intensified till it
becomes an after-image. We follow, in looking, the direction of this line, and in so doing we slide the
line along itself and get a prolongation of its length. On a plane surface we can carry on this
procedure on any sort of a straight or curved ruler, but in the field of vision there is for each direction
and movement of the eye only one sort of line which it is possible for us to slide along in its own
direction continually." These are what Helmholtz calls the 'circles of direction' of the visual field—
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CHAPTER XXI.[287]

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY.
BELIEF.
Everyone knows the difference between imagining a thing and believing in
its existence, between supposing a proposition and acquiescing in its truth.
In the case of acquiescence or belief, the object is not only apprehended by
the mind, but is held to have reality. Belief is thus the mental state or
function of cognizing reality. As used in the following pages, 'Belief' will
mean every degree of assurance, including the highest possible certainty
and conviction.
There are, as we know, two ways of studying every psychic state. First, the
way of analysis: What does it consist in? What is its inner nature? Of what
sort of mind-stuff is it composed? Second, the way of history: What are its
conditions of production, and its connection with other facts?
Into the first way we cannot go very far. In its inner nature, belief, or the
sense of reality, is a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions than to

anything else. Mr. Bagehot distinctly calls it the 'emotion' of conviction. I
just now spoke of it as acquiescence. It resembles more than anything what
in the psychology of volition we know as consent. Consent is recognized by
all to be a manifestation of our active nature. It would naturally be
described by such terms as 'willingness' or the 'turning of our disposition.'
What characterizes both consent and belief is the cessation of theoretic
agitation, through the advent of an idea which is inwardly stable, and fills
the mind solidly to the exclusion of contradictory ideas. When this is the
case, motor effects are apt to follow. Hence the states of consent and belief,
characterized by repose on the purely intellectual side, are both intimately
connected with subsequent practical activity. This inward stability of the
mind's content is as characteristic of disbelief as of belief. But we shall
presently see that we never disbelieve anything except for the reason that
we believe something else which contradicts the first thing.[288] Disbelief is
thus an incidental complication to belief, and need not be considered by
itself.

The true opposites of belief, psychologically considered, are doubt and
inquiry, not disbelief. In both these states the content of our mind is in
unrest, and the emotion engendered thereby is, like the emotion of belief
itself, perfectly distinct, but perfectly indescribable in words. Both sorts of
emotion may be pathologically exalted. One of the charms of drunkenness
unquestionably lies in the deepening of the sense of reality and truth which
is gained therein. In whatever light things may then appear to us, they seem
more utterly what they are, more 'utterly utter' than when we are sober. This
goes to a fully unutterable extreme in the nitrous oxide intoxication, in
which a man's very soul will sweat with conviction, and he be all the while
unable to tell what he is convinced of at all.[289] The pathological state
opposed to this solidity and deepening has been called the questioning
mania (Grübelsucht by the Germans). It is sometimes found as a
substantive affection, paroxysmal or chronic, and consists in the inability to
rest in any conception, and the need of having it confirmed and explained.
'Why do I stand here where I stand?' 'Why is a glass a glass, a chair a chair?'
'How is it that men are only of the size they are? Why not as big as houses,'

etc., etc.[290] There is, it is true, another pathological state which is as far
removed from doubt as from belief, and which some may prefer to consider
the proper contrary of the latter state of mind. I refer to the feeling that
everything is hollow, unreal, dead. I shall speak of this state again upon a
later page. The point I wish to notice here is simply that belief and disbelief
are but two aspects of one psychic state.

John Mill, reviewing various opinions about belief, comes to the conclusion
that no account of it can be given:
"What," he says, "is the difference to our minds between thinking of a
reality and representing to ourselves an imaginary picture? I confess I
can see no escape from the opinion that the distinction is ultimate and
primordial. There is no more difficulty in holding it to be so than in
holding the difference between a sensation and an idea to be
primordial. It seems almost another aspect of the same difference.... I
cannot help thinking, therefore, that there is in the remembrance of a
real fact, as distinguished from that of a thought, an element which
does not consist... in a difference between the mere ideas which are
present to the mind in the two cases. This element, howsoever we
define it, constitutes belief, and is the difference between Memory and
Imagination. From whatever direction we approach, this difference
seems to close our path. When we arrive at it, we seem to have
reached, as it were, the central point of our intellectual nature,
presupposed and built upon in every attempt we make to explain the
more recondite phenomena of our mental being."[291]
If the words of Mill be taken to apply to the mere subjective analysis of
belief—to the question, What does it feel like when we have it?—they must
be held, on the whole, to be correct. Belief, the sense of reality, feels like
itself—that is about as much as we can say.
Prof. Brentano, in an admirable chapter of his Psychologie, expresses this
by saying that conception and belief (which he names judgment) are two
different fundamental psychic phenomena. What I myself have called (Vol.

I, p. 275) the 'object' of thought may be comparatively simple, like "Ha!
what a pain," or "It-thunders"; or it may be complex, like "Columbusdiscovered-America-in-1492," or "There-exists-an-all-wise-Creator-of-theworld." In either case, however, the mere thought of the object may exist as
something quite distinct from the belief in its reality. The belief, as
Brentano says, presupposes the mere thought:
"Every object comes into consciousness in a twofold way, as simply
thought of [vorgestellt] and as admitted [anerkannt] or denied. The
relation is analogous to that which is assumed by most philosophers
(by Kant no less than by Aristotle) to obtain between mere thought and
desire. Nothing is ever desired without being thought of; but the
desiring is nevertheless a second quite new and peculiar form of
relation to the object, a second quite new way of receiving it into
consciousness. No more is anything judged [i.e., believed or
disbelieved] which is not thought of too. But we must insist that, so
soon as the object of a thought becomes the object of an assenting or
rejecting judgment, our consciousness steps into an entirely new
relation towards it. It is then twice present in consciousness, as thought
of, and as held for real or denied; just as when desire awakens for it, it
is both thought and simultaneously desired." (P. 266.)
The commonplace doctrine of 'judgment' is that it consists in the
combination of 'ideas' by a 'copula' into a 'proposition,' which may be of
various sorts, as affirmative, negative, hypothetical, etc. But who does not
see that in a disbelieved or doubted or interrogative or conditional
proposition, the ideas are combined in the same identical way in which they
are in a proposition which is solidly believed? The way in which the ideas
are combined is a part of the inner constitution of the thought's object or
content. That object is sometimes an articulated whole with relations
between its parts, amongst which relations, that of predicate to subject may
be one. But when we have got our object with its inner constitution thus
defined in a proposition, then the question comes up regarding the object as
a whole: 'Is it a real object? is this proposition a true proposition or not?'
And in the answer Yes to this question lies that new psychic act which
Brentano calls 'judgment,' but which I prefer to call 'belief.'

In every proposition, then, so far as it is believed, questioned, or
disbelieved, four elements are to be distinguished, the subject, the predicate,
and their relation (of whatever sort it be)—these form the object of belief—
and finally the psychic attitude in which our mind stands towards the
proposition taken as a whole—and this is the belief itself.[292]
Admitting, then, that this attitude is a state of consciousness sui generis,
about which nothing more can be said in the way of internal analysis, let us
proceed to the second way of studying the subject of belief: Under what
circumstances do we think things real? We shall soon see how much matter
this gives us to discuss.
THE VARIOUS ORDERS OF REALITY.
Suppose a new-born mind, entirely blank and waiting for experience to
begin. Suppose that it begins in the form of a visual impression (whether
faint or vivid is immaterial) of a lighted candle against a dark background,
and nothing else, so that whilst this image lasts it constitutes the entire
universe known to the mind in question. Suppose, moreover (to simplify the
hypothesis), that the candle is only imaginary, and that no 'original' of it is
recognized by us psychologists outside. Will this hallucinatory candle be
believed in, will it have a real existence for the mind?
What possible sense (for that mind) would a suspicion have that the candle
was not real? What would doubt or disbelief of it imply? When we, the
onlooking psychologists, say the candle is unreal, we mean something quite
definite, viz., that there is a world known to us which is real, and to which
we perceive that the candle does not belong; it belongs exclusively to that
individual mind, has no status anywhere else, etc. It exists, to be sure, in a
fashion, for it forms the content of that mind's hallucination; but the
hallucination itself, though unquestionably it is a sort of existing fact, has
no knowledge of other facts; and since those other facts are the realities par
excellence for us, and the only things we believe in, the candle is simply
outside of our reality and belief altogether.
By the hypothesis, however, the mind which sees the candle can spin no
such considerations as these about it, for of other facts, actual or possible, it
has no inkling whatever. That candle is its all, its absolute. Its entire faculty

of attention is absorbed by it. It is, it is that; it is there; no other possible
candle, or quality of this candle, no other possible place, or possible object
in the place, no alternative, in short, suggests itself as even conceivable; so
how can the mind help believing the candle real? The supposition that it
might possibly not do so is, under the supposed conditions, unintelligible.
[293]

This is what Spinoza long ago announced:
"Let us conceive a boy," he said, "imagining to himself a horse, and
taking note of nothing else. As this imagination involves the existence
of the horse, and the boy has no perception which annuls its existence,
he will necessarily contemplate the horse as present, nor will he be
able to doubt of its existence, however little certain of it he may be. I
deny that a man in so far as he imagines [percipit] affirms nothing. For
what is it to imagine a winged horse but to affirm that, the horse [that
horse, namely] has wings? For if the mind had nothing before it but the
winged horse it would contemplate the same as present, would have no
cause to doubt of its existence, nor any power of dissenting from its
existence, unless the imagination of the winged horse were joined to
an idea which contradicted [tollit] its existence." (Ethics, ii. 49,
Scholium.)
The sense that anything we think of is unreal can only come, then, when
that thing is contradicted by some other thing of which we think. Any object
which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute
reality.
Now, how comes it that one thing thought of can be contradicted by
another? It cannot unless it begins the quarrel by saying something
inadmissible about that other. Take the mind with the candle, or the boy
with the horse. If either of them say, 'That candle or that horse, even when I
don't see it, exists in the outer world,' he pushes into 'the outer world' an
object which may be incompatible with everything which he otherwise
knows of that world. If so, he must take his choice of which to hold by, the
present perceptions or the other knowledge of the world. If he holds to the
other knowledge, the present perceptions are contradicted, so far as their
relation to that world goes. Candle and horse, whatever they may be, are
not existents in outward space. They are existents, of course; they are

mental objects; mental objects have existence as mental objects. But they
are situated in their own spaces, the space in which they severally appear,
and neither of those spaces is the space in which the realities called 'the
outer world' exist.
Take again the horse with wings. If I merely dream of a horse with wings,
my horse interferes with nothing else and has not to be contradicted. That
horse, its wings, and its place, are all equally real. That horse exists no
otherwise than as winged, and is moreover really there, for that place exists
no otherwise than as the place of that horse, and claims as yet no connection
with the other places of the world. But if with this horse I make an inroad
into the world otherwise known, and say, for example, 'That is my old mare
Maggie, having grown a pair of wings where she stands in her stall,' the
whole case is altered; for now the horse and place are identified with a
horse and place otherwise known, and what is known of the latter objects is
incompatible with what is perceived with the former. 'Maggie in her stall
with wings! Never!' The wings are unreal, then, visionary. I have dreamed a
lie about Maggie in her stall.
The reader will recognize in these two cases the two sorts of judgment
called in the logic-books existential and attributive respectively. The candle
exists as an outer reality' is an existential, 'My Maggie has got a pair of
wings' is an attributive, proposition;[294] and it follows from what was first
said that all propositions, whether attributive or existential, are believed
through the very fact of being conceived, unless they clash with other
propositions believed, at the same time, by affirming that their terms are the
same with the terms of these other propositions. A dream-candle has
existence, true enough; but not the same existence (existence for itself,
namely, or extra mentem meam) which the candles of waking perception
have. A dream-horse has wings; but then neither horse nor wings are the
same with any horses or wings known to memory. That we can at any
moment think of the same thing which at any former moment we thought of
is the ultimate law of our intellectual constitution. But when we now think
of it incompatibly with our other ways of thinking it, then we must choose
which way to stand by, for we cannot continue to think in two contradictory
ways at once. The whole distinction of real and unreal, the whole
psychology of belief, disbelief, and doubt, is thus grounded on two mental
facts—first, that we are liable to think differently of the same; and second,

that when we have done so, we can choose which way of thinking to adhere
to and which to disregard.
The subjects adhered to become real subjects, the attributes adhered to real
attributes, the existence adhered to real existence; whilst the subjects
disregarded become imaginary subjects, the attributes disregarded
erroneous attributes, and the existence disregarded an existence in no man's
land, in the limbo 'where footless fancies dwell.' The real things are, in M.
Taine's terminology, the reductives of the things judged unreal.
THE MANY WORLDS.
Habitually and practically we do not count these disregarded things as
existents at all. For them Væ victis is the law in the popular philosophy;
they are not even treated as appearances; they are treated as if they were
mere waste, equivalent to nothing at all. To the genuinely philosophic mind,
however, they still have existence, though not the same existence, as the
real things. As objects of fancy, as errors, as occupants of dreamland, etc.,
they are in their way as indefeasible parts of life, as undeniable features of
the Universe, as the realities are in their way. The total world of which the
philosophers must take account is thus composed of the realities plus the
fancies and illusions.
Two sub-universes, at least, connected by relations which philosophy tries
to ascertain! Really there are more than two sub-universes of which we take
account, some of us of this one, and others of that. For there are various
categories both of illusion and of reality, and alongside of the world of
absolute error (i.e., error confined to single individuals) but still within the
world of absolute reality (i.e., reality believed by the complete philosopher)
there is the world of collective error, there are the worlds of abstract reality,
of relative or practical reality, of ideal relations, and there is the
supernatural world. The popular mind conceives of all these sub-worlds
more or less disconnectedly; and when dealing with one of them, forgets for
the time being its relations to the rest. The complete philosopher is he who
seeks not only to assign to every given object of his thought its right place
in one or other of these sub-worlds, but he also seeks to determine the
relation of each sub-world to the others in the total world which is.

The most important sub-universes commonly discriminated from each other
and recognized by most of us as existing, each with its own special and
separate style of existence, are the following:
(1) The world of sense, or of physical 'things' as we instinctively apprehend
them, with such qualities as heat, color, and sound, and such 'forces' as life,
chemical affinity, gravity, electricity, all existing as such within or on the
surface of the things.
(2) The world of science, or of physical things as the learned conceive
them, with secondary qualities and 'forces' (in the popular sense) excluded,
and nothing real but solids and fluids and their 'laws' (i.e., customs) of
motion.[295]
(3) The world of ideal relations, or abstract truths believed or believable by
all, and expressed in logical, mathematical, metaphysical, ethical, or
æsthetic propositions.
(4) The world of 'idols of the tribe,' illusions or prejudices common to the
race. All educated people recognize these as forming one sub-universe. The
motion of the sky round the earth, for example, belongs to this world. That
motion is not a recognized item of any of the other worlds; but as an 'idol of
the tribe' it really exists. For certain philosophers 'matter' exists only as an
idol of the tribe. For science, the 'secondary qualities' of matter are but
'idols of the tribe.'
(5) The various supernatural worlds, the Christian heaven and hell, the
world of the Hindoo mythology, the world of Swedenborg's visa et audita,
etc. Each of these is a consistent system, with definite relations among its
own parts. Neptune's trident, e.g., has no status of reality whatever in the
Christian heaven; but within the classic Olympus certain definite things are
true of it, whether one believe in the reality of the classic mythology as a
whole or not. The various worlds of deliberate fable may be ranked with
these worlds of faith—the world of the Iliad, that of King Lear, of the
Pickwick Papers, etc.[296]
(6) The various worlds of individual opinion, as numerous as men are.
(7) The worlds of sheer madness and vagary, also indefinitely numerous.

Every object we think of gets at last referred to one world or another of this
or of some similar list. It settles into our belief as a common-sense object, a
scientific object, an abstract object, a mythological object, an object of
some one's mistaken conception, or a madman's object; and it reaches this
state sometimes immediately, but often only after being hustled and bandied
about amongst other objects until it finds some which will tolerate its
presence and stand in relations to it which nothing contradicts. The
molecules and ether-waves of the scientific world, for example, simply kick
the object's warmth and color out, they refuse to have any relations with
them. But the world of 'idols of the tribe' stands ready to take them in. Just
so the world of classic myth takes up the winged horse; the world of
individual hallucination, the vision of the candle; the world of abstract truth,
the proposition that justice is kingly, though no actual king be just. The
various worlds themselves, however, appear (as aforesaid) to most men's
minds in no very definitely conceived relation to each other, and our
attention, when it turns to one, is apt to drop the others for the time being
out of its account. Propositions concerning the different worlds are made
from 'different points of view'; and in this more or less chaotic state the
consciousness of most thinkers remains to the end. Each world whilst it is
attended to is real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses with the
attention.
THE WORLD OF 'PRACTICAL REALITIES.'
Each thinker, however, has dominant habits of attention; and these
practically elect from among the various worlds some one to be for him the
world of ultimate realities. From this world's objects he does not appeal.
Whatever positively contradicts them must get into another world or die.
The horse, e.g., may have wings to its heart's content, so long as it does not
pretend to be the real world's horse—that horse is absolutely wingless. For
most men, as we shall immediately see, the 'things of sense' hold this
prerogative position, and are the absolutely real world's nucleus. Other
things, to be sure, may be real for this man or for that—things of science,
abstract moral relations, things of the Christian theology, or what not. But
even for the special man, these things are usually real with a less real reality
than that of the things of sense. They are taken less seriously; and the very

utmost that can be said for anyone's belief in them is that it is as strong as
his 'belief in his own senses.'[297]
In all this the everlasting partiality of our nature shows itself, our inveterate
propensity to choice. For, in the strict and ultimate sense of the word
existence, everything which can be thought of at all exists as some sort of
object, whether mythical object, individual thinker's object, or object in
outer space and for intelligence at large. Errors, fictions, tribal beliefs, are
parts of the whole great Universe which God has made, and He must have
meant all these things to be in it, each in its respective place. But for us
finite creatures, "'tis to consider too curiously to consider so." The mere fact
of appearing as an object at all is not enough to constitute reality. That may
be metaphysical reality, reality for God; but what we need is practical
reality, reality for ourselves; and, to have that, an object must not only
appear, but it must appear both interesting and important. The worlds
whose objects are neither interesting nor important we treat simply
negatively, we brand them as unreal.
In the relative sense, then, the sense in which we contrast reality with
simple unreality, and in which one thing is said to have more reality than
another, and to be more believed, reality means simply relation to our
emotional and active life. This is the only sense which the word ever has in
the mouths of practical men. In this sense, whatever excites and stimulates
our interest is real; whenever an object so appeals to us that we turn to it,
accept it, fill our mind with it, or practically take account of it, so far it is
real for us, and we believe it. Whenever, on the contrary, we ignore it, fail
to consider it or act upon it, despise it, reject it, forget it, so far it is unreal
for us and disbelieved. Hume's account of the matter was then essentially
correct, when he said that belief in anything was simply the having the idea
of it in a lively and active manner:
"I say, then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible,
firm, steady conception of an object than the imagination alone is ever
able to attain.... It consists not in the peculiar nature or order of the
ideas, but in the manner of their conception and in their feeling to the
mind. I confess that it is impossible perfectly to explain this feeling or
manner of conception.... Its true and proper name... is belief, which is a
term that everyone sufficiently understands in common life. And in

philosophy we can go no farther than assert that belief is something
felt by the mind, which distinguishes the idea of the judgment from the
fictions of the imagination.[298] It gives them more weight and
influence; makes them appear of greater importance; enforces them in
the mind; gives them a superior influence on the passions, and renders
them the governing principle in our actions."[299]
Or as Prof. Bain puts it: "In its essential character, belief is a phase of our
active nature—otherwise called the Will."[300]

The object of belief, then, reality or real existence, is something quite
different from all the other predicates which a subject may possess. Those
are properties intellectually or sensibly intuited. When we add any one of
them to the subject, we increase the intrinsic content of the latter, we enrich
its picture in our mind. But adding reality does not enrich the picture in any
such inward way; it leaves it inwardly as it finds it, and only fixes it and
stamps it in to us.
"The real," as Kant says, "contains no more than the possible. A
hundred real dollars do not contain a penny more than a hundred
possible dollars.... By whatever, and by however many, predicates I
may think a thing, nothing is added to it if I add that the thing exists....
Whatever, therefore, our concept of an object may contain, we must
always step outside of it in order to attribute to it existence."[301]
The 'stepping outside' of it is the establishment either of immediate practical
relations between it and ourselves, or of relations between it and other
objects with which we have immediate practical relations. Relations of this
sort, which are as yet not transcended or superseded by others, are ipso
facto real relations, and confer reality upon their objective term. The fons et
origo of all reality, whether from the absolute or the practical point of view,
is thus subjective, is ourselves. As bare logical thinkers, without emotional
reaction, we give reality to whatever objects we think of, for they are really
phenomena, or objects of our passing thought, if nothing more. But, as

thinkers with emotional reaction, we give what seems to us a still higher
degree of reality to whatever things we select and emphasize and turn to
WITH A WILL. These are our living realities; and not only these, but all the
other things which are intimately connected with these. Reality, starting
from our Ego, thus sheds itself from point to point—first, upon all objects
which have an immediate sting of interest for our Ego in them, and next,
upon the objects most continuously related with these. It only fails when the
connecting thread is lost. A whole system may be real, if it only hang to our
Ego by one immediately stinging term. But what contradicts any such
stinging term, even though it be another stinging term itself, is either not
believed, or only believed after settlement of the dispute.

We reach thus the important conclusion that our own reality, that sense of
our own life which we at every moment possess, is the ultimate of ultimates
for our belief. 'As sure as I exist!'—this is our uttermost warrant for the
being of all other things. As Descartes made the indubitable reality of the
cogito go bail for the reality of all that the cogito involved, so we all of us,
feeling our own present reality with absolutely coercive force, ascribe an all
but equal degree of reality, first to whatever things we lay hold on with a
sense of personal need, and second, to whatever farther things continuously
belong with these. "Mein Jetzt und Hier," as Prof. Lipps says, "ist der letzte
Angelpunkt für alle Wirklichkeit, also alle Erkenntniss."
The world of living realities as contrasted with unrealities is thus anchored
in the Ego, considered as an active and emotional term.[302] That is the hook
from which the rest dangles, the absolute support. And as from a painted
hook it has been said that one can only hang a painted chain, so conversely,
from a real hook only a real chain can properly be hung. Whatever things
have intimate and continuous connection with my life are things of whose
reality I cannot doubt. Whatever things fail to establish this connection are
things which are practically no better for me than if they existed not at all.
In certain forms of melancholic perversion of the sensibilities and reactive
powers, nothing touches us intimately, rouses us, or wakens natural feeling.
The consequence is the complaint so often heard from melancholic patients,

that nothing is believed in by them as it used to be, and that all sense of
reality is fled from life. They are sheathed in india-rubber; nothing
penetrates to the quick or draws blood, as it were. According to Griesinger,
"I see, I hear!" such patients say, "but the objects do not reach me, it is as if
there were a wall between me and the outer world!"
"In such patients there often is an alteration of the cutaneous
sensibility, such that things feel indistinct or sometimes rough and
woolly. But even were this change always present, it would not
completely explain the psychic phenomenon... which reminds us more
of the alteration in our psychic relations to the outer world which
advancing age on the one hand, and on the other emotions and
passions, may bring about. In childhood we feel ourselves to be closer
to the world of sensible phenomena, we live immediately with them
and in them; an intimately vital tie binds us and them together. But
with the ripening of reflection this tie is loosened, the warmth of our
interest cools, things look differently to us, and we act more as
foreigners to the outer world, even though we know it a great deal
better. Joy and expansive emotions in general draw it nearer to us
again. Everything makes a more lively impression, and with the quick
immediate return of this warm receptivity for sense impressions, joy
makes us feel young again. In depressing emotions it is the other way.
Outer things, whether living or inorganic, suddenly grow cold and
foreign to us, and even our favorite objects of interest feel as if they
belonged to us no more. Under these circumstances, receiving no
longer from anything a lively impression, we cease to turn towards
outer things, and the sense of inward loneliness grows upon us....
Where there is no strong intelligence to control this blasé condition,
this psychic coldness and lack of interest, the issue of these states in
which all seems so cold and hollow, the heart dried up, the world
grown dead and empty, is often suicide or the deeper forms of
insanity."[303]
THE PARAMOUNT REALITY OF SENSATIONS.
But now we are met by questions of detail. What does this stirring, this
exciting power, this interest, consist in, which some objects have? which

are those 'intimate relations' with our life which give reality? And what
things stand in these relations immediately, and what others are so closely
connected with the former that (in Hume's language) we 'carry our
disposition' also on to them?
In a simple and direct way these questions cannot be answered at all. The
whole history of human thought is but an unfinished attempt to answer
them. For what have men been trying to find out, since men were men, but
just those things: "Where do our true interests lie—which relations shall we
call the intimate and real ones—which things shall we call living realities
and which not?" A few psychological points can, however, be made clear.
Any relation to our mind at all, in the absence of a stronger relation,
suffices to make an object real. The barest appeal to our attention is enough
for that. Revert to the beginning of the chapter, and take the candle entering
the vacant mind. The mind was waiting for just some such object to make
its spring upon. It makes its spring and the candle is believed. But when the
candle appears at the same time with other objects, it must run the gauntlet
of their rivalry, and then it becomes a question which of the various
candidates for attention shall compel belief. As a rule we believe as much
as we can. We would believe everything if we only could. When objects are
represented by us quite unsystematically they conflict but little with each
other, and the number of them which in this chaotic manner we can believe
is limitless. The primitive savage's mind is a jungle in which hallucinations,
dreams, superstitions, conceptions, and sensible objects all flourish
alongside of each other, unregulated except by the attention turning in this
way or in that. The child's mind is the same. It is only as objects become
permanent and their relations fixed that discrepancies and contradictions are
felt and must be settled in some stable way. As a rule, the success with
which a contradicted object maintains itself in our belief is proportional to
several qualities which it must possess. Of these the one which would be
put first by most people, because it characterizes objects of sensation, is its
—
(1) Coerciveness over attention, or the mere power to possess
consciousness: then follow—
(2) Liveliness, or sensible pungency, especially in the way of exciting
pleasure or pain;

(3) Stimulating effect upon the will, i.e., capacity to arouse active impulses,
the more instinctive the better;
(4) Emotional interest, as object of love, dread, admiration, desire, etc.;
(5) Congruity with certain favorite forms of contemplation—unity,
simplicity, permanence, and the like;
(6) Independence of other causes, and its own causal importance.
These characters run into each other. Coerciveness is the result of liveliness
or emotional interest. What is lively and interesting stimulates eo ipso the
will; congruity holds of active impulses as well as of contemplative forms;
causal independence and importance suit a certain contemplative demand,
etc. I will therefore abandon all attempt at a formal treatment, and simply
proceed to make remarks in the most convenient order of exposition.

As a whole, sensations are more lively and are judged more real than
conceptions; things met with every hour more real than things seen once;
attributes perceived when awake, more real than attributes perceived in a
dream. But, owing to the diverse relations contracted by the various objects
with each other, the simple rule that the lively and permanent is the real is
often enough disguised. A conceived thing may be deemed more real than a
certain sensible thing, if it only be intimately related to other sensible things
more vivid, permanent, or interesting than the first one. Conceived
molecular vibrations, e.g., are by the physicist judged more real than felt
warmth, because so intimately related to all those other facts of motion in
the world which he has made his special study. Similarly, a rare thing may
be deemed more real than a permanent thing if it be more widely related to
other permanent things. All the occasional crucial observations of science
are examples of this. A rare experience, too, is likely to be judged more real
than a permanent one, if it be more interesting and exciting. Such is the
sight of Saturn through a telescope; such are the occasional insights and
illuminations which upset our habitual ways of thought.
But no mere floating conception, no mere disconnected rarity, ever
displaces vivid things or permanent things from our belief. A conception, to

prevail, must terminate in the world of orderly sensible experience. A rare
phenomenon, to displace frequent ones, must belong with others more
frequent still. The history of science is strewn with wrecks and ruins of
theory—essences and principles, fluids and forces—once fondly clung to,
but found to hang together with no facts of sense. And exceptional
phenomena solicit our belief in vain until such time as we chance to
conceive them as of kinds already admitted to exist. What science means by
'verification' is no more than this, that no object of conception shall be
believed which sooner or later has not some permanent and vivid object of
sensation for its term. Compare what was said on pages 3-7, above.
Sensible objects are thus either our realities or the tests of our realities.
Conceived objects must show sensible effects or else be disbelieved. And
the effects, even though reduced to relative unreality when their causes
come to view (as heat, which molecular vibrations make unreal), are yet the
things on which our knowledge of the causes rests. Strange mutual
dependence this, in which the appearance needs the reality in order to exist,
but the reality needs the appearance in order to be known!
Sensible vividness or pungency is then the vital factor in reality when once
the conflict between objects, and the connecting of them together in the
mind, has begun. No object which neither possesses this vividness in its
own right nor is able to borrow it from anything else has a chance of
making headway against vivid rivals, or of rousing in us that reaction in
which belief consists. On the vivid objects we pin, as the saying is, our faith
in all the rest; and out belief returns instinctively even to those of them from
which reflection has led it away. Witness the obduracy with which the
popular world of colors, sounds, and smells holds its own against that of
molecules and vibrations. Let the physicist himself but nod, like Homer,
and the world of sense becomes his absolute reality again.[304]
That things originally devoid of this stimulating power should be enabled,
by association with other things which have it, to compel our belief as if
they had it themselves, is a remarkable psychological fact, which since
Hume's time it has been impossible to overlook.
"The vividness of the first conception," he writes, "diffuses itself along
the relations and is conveyed, as by so many pipes or channels, to
every idea that has any communication with the primary one....

Superstitious people are fond of the relics of saints and holy men, for
the same reason that they seek after types and images, in order to
enliven their devotion and give them a more intimate and strong
conception of those exemplary lives.... Now, 'tis evident one of the best
relics a devotee could procure would be the handiwork of a saint, and
if his clothes and furniture are ever to be considered in this light, 'tis
because they were once at his disposal, and were moved and affected
by him; in which respect they are... connected with him by a shorter
train of consequences than any of those from which we learn the
reality of his existence. This phenomenon clearly proves that a present
impression, with a relation of causation, may enliven any idea, and
consequently produce belief or assent, according to the precedent
definition of it.... It has been remarked among the Mahometans as well
as Christians that those pilgrims who have seen Mecca or the Holy
Land are ever after more faithful and zealous believers than those who
have not had that advantage. A man whose memory presents him with
a lively image of the Red Sea and the Desert and Jerusalem and
Galilee can never doubt of any miraculous events which are related
either by Moses or the Evangelists. The lively idea of the places passes
by an easy transition to the facts which are supposed to have been
related to them by contiguity, and increases the belief by increasing the
vivacity of the conception. The remembrance of those fields and rivers
has the same influence as a new argument.... The ceremonies of the
Catholic religion may be considered as instances of the same nature.
The devotees of that strange superstition usually plead in excuse for
the mummeries with which they are upbraided that they feel the good
effect of external motions and postures and actions in enlivening their
devotion and quickening their fervor, which otherwise would decay, if
directed entirely to distant and immaterial objects. We shadow out the
objects of our faith, say they, in sensible types and images, and render
them more present to us by the immediate presence of these types than
it is possible for us to do merely by an intellectual view and
contemplation."[305]
Hume's cases are rather trivial; and the things which associated sensible
objects make us believe in are supposed by him to be unreal. But all the
more manifest for that is the fact of their psychological influence. Who does

not 'realize' more the fact of a dead or distant friend's existence, at the
moment when a portrait, letter, garment or other material reminder of him is
found? The whole notion of him then grows pungent and speaks to us and
shakes us, in a manner unknown at other times. In children's minds, fancies
and realities live side by side. But however lively their fancies may be, they
still gain help from association with reality. The imaginative child identifies
its dramatis personæ with some doll or other material object, and this
evidently solidifies belief, little as it may resemble what it is held to stand
for. A thing not too interesting by its own real qualities generally does the
best service here. The most useful doll I ever saw was a large cucumber in
the hands of a little Amazonian-Indian girl; she nursed it and washed it and
rocked it to sleep in a hammock, and talked to it all day long—there was no
part in life which the cucumber did not play. Says Mr. Tylor:
"An imaginative child will make a dog do duty for a horse, or a soldier
for a shepherd, till at last the objective resemblance almost disappears,
and a bit of wood may be dragged about, resembling a ship on the sea
or a coach on the road. Here the likeness of the bit of wood to a ship or
coach is very slight indeed; but it is a thing, and can be moved about,...
and is an evident assistance to the child in enabling it to arrange and
develop its ideas.... Of how much use... may be seen by taking it away,
and leaving the child nothing to play with.... In later years and among
highly educated people the mental process which goes on in a child's
playing with wooden soldiers and horses, though it never disappears,
must be sought for in more complex phenomena. Perhaps nothing in
after-life more closely resembles the effect of a doll upon a child than
the effect of the illustrations of a tale upon a grown reader. Here the
objective resemblance is very indefinite... yet what reality is given to
the scene by a good picture.... Mr. Backhouse one day noticed in Van
Diemen's Land a woman arranging several stones that were flat, oval,
and about two inches wide, and marked in various directions with
black and red lines. These, he learned, represented absent friends, and
one larger than the rest stood for a fat native woman on Flinder's
Island, known by the name of Mother Brown. Similar practices are
found among far higher races than the ill-fated Tasmanians. Among
some North American tribes a mother who has lost a child keeps its
memory ever present to her by filling its cradle with black feathers and

quills, and carrying it about with her for a year or more. When she
stops anywhere, she sets up the cradle and talks to it as she goes about
her work, just as she would have done if the dead body had been still
alive within it. Here we have an image; but in Africa we find a rude
doll representing the child, kept as a memorial.... Bastian saw Indian
women in Peru who had lost an infant carrying about on their backs a
wooden doll to represent it."[306]
To many persons among us, photographs of lost ones seem to be fetishes.
They, it is true, resemble; but the fact that the mere materiality of the
reminder is almost as important as its resemblance is shown by the
popularity a hundred years ago of the black taffeta 'silhouettes' which are
still found among family relics, and of one of which Fichte could write to
his affianced: 'Die Farbe fehlt, das Auge fehlt, es fehlt der himmlische
Ausdruck deiner lieblichen Züge'—and yet go on worshipping it all the
same. The opinion so stoutly professed by many, that language is essential
to thought, seems to have this much of truth in it, that all our inward images
tend invincibly to attach themselves to something sensible, so as to gain in
corporeity and life. Words serve this purpose, gestures serve it, stones,
straws, chalk-marks, anything will do. As soon as anyone of these things
stands for the idea, the latter seems to be more real. Some persons, the
present writer among the number, can hardly lecture without a blackboard:
the abstract conceptions must be symbolized by letters, squares or circles,
and the relations between them by lines. All this symbolism, linguistic,
graphic, and dramatic, has other uses too, for it abridges thought and fixes
terms. But one of its uses is surely to rouse the believing reaction and give
to the ideas a more living reality. As, when we are told a story, and shown
the very knife that did the murder, the very ring whose hiding-place the
clairvoyant revealed, the whole thing passes from fairy-land to motherearth, so here we believe all the more, if only we see that 'the bricks are
alive to tell the tale.'

So much for the prerogative position of sensations in regard to our belief.
But among the sensations themselves all are not deemed equally real. The

more practically important ones, the more permanent ones, and the more
æsthetically apprehensible ones are selected from the mass, to be believed
in most of all; the others are degraded to the position of mere signs and
suggestions of these. This fact has already been adverted to in former
chapters.[307] The real color of a thing is that one color-sensation which it
gives us when most favorably lighted for vision. So of its real size, its real
shape, etc.—these are but optical sensations selected out of thousands of
others, because they have æsthetic characteristics which appeal to our
convenience or delight. But I will not repeat what I have already written
about this matter, but pass on to our treatment of tactile and muscular
sensations, as 'primary qualities,' more real than those 'secondary' qualities
which eye and ear and nose reveal. Why do we thus so markedly select the
tangible to be the real? Our motives are not far to seek. The tangible
qualities are the least fluctuating. When we get them at all we get them the
same. The other qualities fluctuate enormously as our relative position to
the object changes. Then, more decisive still, the tactile properties are those
most intimately connected with our weal or woe. A dagger hurts us only
when in contact with our skin, a poison only when we take it into our
mouths, and we can only use an object for our advantage when we have it
in our muscular control. It is as tangibles, then, that things concern us most;
and the other senses, so far as their practical use goes, do but warn us of
what tangible things to expect. They are but organs of anticipatory touch, as
Berkeley has with perfect clearness explained.[308]
Among all sensations, the most belief-compelling are those productive of
pleasure or of pain. Locke expressly makes the pleasure- or pain-giving
quality to be the ultimate human criterion of anything's reality. Discussing
(with a supposed Berkeleyan before Berkeley) the notion that all our
perceptions may be but a dream, he says:
"He may please to dream that I make him this answer... that I believe
he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in
the fire and being actually in it. But yet if he be resolved to appear so
sceptical as to maintain that what I call being actually in the fire is
nothing but a dream, and that we cannot thereby certainly know that
any such thing as fire actually exists without us, I answer that we,
certainly finding that pleasure or pain [or emotion of any sort] follows
upon the application of certain objects to us, whose existence we

perceive, or dream that we perceive by our senses, this certainly is as
great as our happiness or misery, beyond which we have no
concernment to know or to be."[309]
THE INFLUENCE OF EMOTION AND ACTIVE IMPULSE ON
BELIEF.
The quality of arousing emotion, of shaking, moving us or inciting us to
action, has as much to do with our belief in an object's reality as the quality
of giving pleasure or pain. In Chapter XXIV I shall seek to show that our
emotions probably owe their pungent quality to the bodily sensations which
they involve. Our tendency to believe in emotionally exciting objects
(objects of fear, desire, etc.) is thus explained without resorting to any
fundamentally new principle of choice. Speaking generally, the more a
conceived object excites us, the more reality it has. The same object excites
us differently at different times. Moral and religious truths come 'home' to
us far more on some occasions than on others. As Emerson says, "There is a
difference between one and another hour of life in their authority and
subsequent effect. Our faith comes in moments,... yet there is a depth in
those brief moments which constrains us to ascribe more reality to them
than to all other experiences." The 'depth' is partly, no doubt, the insight into
wider systems of unified relation, but far more often than that it is the
emotional thrill. Thus, to descend to more trivial examples, a man who has
no belief in ghosts by daylight will temporarily believe in them when, alone
at midnight, he feels his blood curdle at a mysterious sound or vision, his
heart thumping, and his legs impelled to flee. The thought of falling when
we walk along a curbstone awakens no emotion of dread; so no sense of
reality attaches to it, and we are sure we shall not fall. On a precipice's
edge, however, the sickening emotion which the notion of a possible fall
engenders makes us believe in the latter's imminent reality, and quite unfits
us to proceed.
The greatest proof that a man is sui compos is his ability to suspend belief
in presence of an emotionally exciting idea. To give this power is the
highest result of education. In untutored minds the power does not exist.
Every exciting thought in the natural man carries credence with it. To
conceive with passion is eo ipso to affirm. As Bagehot says:

"The Caliph Omar burnt the Alexandrian Library, saying: 'All books
which contain what is not in the Koran are dangerous. All which
contain what is in it are useless!' Probably no one ever had an intenser
belief in anything than Omar had in this. Yet it is impossible to
imagine it preceded by an argument. His belief in Mahomet, in the
Koran, and in the sufficiency of the Koran, probably came to him in
spontaneous rushes of emotion; there may have been little vestiges of
argument floating here and there, but they did not justify the strength
of the emotion, still less did they create it, and they hardly even
excused it.... Probably, when the subject is thoroughly examined,
conviction will be found to be one of the intensest of human emotions,
and one most closely connected with the bodily state,... accompanied
or preceded by the sensation that Scott makes his seer describe as the
prelude of a prophecy:
'At length the fatal answer came,
In characters of living flame—
Not spoke in words, nor blazed in scroll,
But borne and branded on my soul.'
A hot flash seems to burn across the brain. Men in these intense states
of mind have altered all history, changed for better or worse the creed
of myriads, and desolated or redeemed provinces or ages. Nor is this
intensity a sign of truth, for it is precisely strongest in those points in
which men differ most from each other. John Knox felt it in his antiCatholicism; Ignatius Loyola in his anti-Protestantism; and both, I
suppose, felt it as much as it is possible to feel it."[310]

The reason of the belief is undoubtedly the bodily commotion which the
exciting idea sets up. 'Nothing which I can feel like that can be false.' All
our religious and supernatural beliefs are of this order. The surest warrant
for immortality is the yearning of our bowels for our dear ones; for God, the
sinking sense it gives us to imagine no such Providence or help. So of our
political or pecuniary hopes and fears, and things and persons dreaded and
desired. "A grocer has a full creed as to foreign policy, a young lady a
complete theory of the sacraments, as to which neither has any doubt.... A
girl in a country parsonage will be sure that Paris never can be taken, or that
Bismarck is a wretch"—all because they have either conceived these things
at some moment with passion, or associated them with other things which
they have conceived with passion.
M. Renouvier calls this belief of a thing for no other reason than that we
conceive it with passion, by the name of mental vertigo.[311] Other objects
whisper doubt or disbelief; but the object of passion makes us deaf to all but
itself, and we affirm it unhesitatingly. Such objects are the delusions of
insanity, which the insane person can at odd moments steady himself
against, but which again return to sweep him off his feet. Such are the
revelations of mysticism. Such, particularly, are the sudden beliefs which
animate mobs of men when frenzied impulse to action is involved.
Whatever be the action in point—whether the stoning of a prophet, the
hailing of a conqueror, the burning of a witch, the baiting of a heretic or
Jew, the starting of a forlorn hope, or the flying from a foe—the fact that to
believe a certain object will cause that action to explode is a sufficient
reason for that belief to come. The motor impulse sweeps it unresisting in
its train.
The whole history of witchcraft and early medicine is a commentary on the
facility with which anything which chances to be conceived is believed the
moment the belief chimes in with an emotional mood. 'The cause of
sickness?' When a savage asks the cause of anything he means to ask
exclusively 'What is to blame?' The theoretic curiosity starts from the
practical life's demands. Let some one then accuse a necromancer, suggest a
charm or spell which has been cast, and no more 'evidence' is asked for.
What evidence is required beyond this intimate sense of the culprit's
responsibility, to which our very viscera and limbs reply?[312]

Human credulity in the way of therapeutics has similar psychological roots.
If there is anything intolerable (especially to the heart of a woman), it is to
do nothing when a loved one is sick or in pain. To do anything is a relief.
Accordingly, whatever remedy may be suggested is a spark on inflammable
soil. The mind makes its spring towards action on that cue, sends for that
remedy, and for a day at least believes the danger past. Blame, dread, and
hope are thus the great belief-inspiring passions, and cover among them the
future, the present, and the past.
These remarks illustrate the earlier heads of the list on page 292. Whichever
represented objects give us sensations, especially interesting ones, or incite
our motor impulses, or arouse our hate, desire, or fear, are real enough for
us. Our requirements in the way of reality terminate in our own acts and
emotions, our own pleasures and pains. These are the ultimate fixities from
which, as we formerly observed, the whole chain of our beliefs depends,
object hanging to object, as the bees, in swarming, hang to each other until,
de proche en proche, the supporting branch, the Self, is reached and held.
BELIEF IN OBJECTS OF THEORY.
Now the merely conceived or imagined objects which our mind represents
as hanging to the sensations (causing them, etc.), filling the gaps between
them, and weaving their interrupted chaos into order are innumerable.
Whole systems of them conflict with other systems, and our choice of
which system shall carry our belief is governed by principles which are
simple enough, however subtle and difficult may be their application to
details. The conceived system, to pass for true, must at least include the
reality of the sensible objects in it, by explaining them as effects on us, if
nothing more. The system which includes the most of them, and definitely
explains or pretends to explain the most of them, will, ceteris paribus,
prevail. It is needless to say how far mankind still is from having
excogitated such a system. But the various materialisms, idealisms, and
hylozoisms show with what industry the attempt is forever made. It is
conceivable that several rival theories should equally well include the actual
order of our sensations in their scheme, much as the one-fluid and two-fluid
theories of electricity formulated all the common electrical phenomena
equally well. The sciences are full of these alternatives. Which theory is

then to be believed? That theory will be most generally believed which,
besides offering us objects able to account satisfactorily for our sensible
experience, also offers those which are most interesting, those which appeal
most urgently to our æsthetic, emotional, and active needs. So here, in the
higher intellectual life, the same selection among general conceptions goes
on which went on among the sensations themselves. First, a word of their
relation to our emotional and active needs—and here I can do no better than
quote from an article published some years ago:[313]
"A philosophy may be unimpeachable in other respects, but either of
two defects will be fatal to its universal acceptance. First, its ultimate
principle must not be one that essentially baffles and disappoints our
dearest desires and most cherished powers. A pessimistic principle like
Schopenhauer's incurably vicious Will-substance, or Hartmann's
wicked jack-at-all-trades, the Unconscious, will perpetually call forth
essays at other philosophies. Incompatibility of the future with their
desires and active tendencies is, in fact, to most men a source of more
fixed disquietude than uncertainty itself. Witness the attempts to
overcome the 'problem of evil,' the 'mystery of pain.' There is no
problem of 'good.'
"But a second and worse defect in a philosophy than that of
contradicting our active propensities is to give them no Object
whatever to press against. A philosophy whose principle is so
incommensurate with our most intimate powers as to deny them all
relevancy in universal affairs, as to annihilate their motives at one
blow, will be even more unpopular than pessimism. Better face the
enemy than the eternal Void! This is why materialism will always fail
of universal adoption, however well it may fuse things into an
atomistic unity, however clearly it may prophesy the future eternity.
For materialism denies reality to the objects of almost all the impulses
which we most cherish. The real meaning of the impulses, it says, is
something which has no emotional interest for us whatever. But what
is called extradition is quite as characteristic of our emotions as of our
sense. Both point to an Object as the cause of the present feeling. What
an intensely objective reference lies in fear! In like manner an
enraptured man, a dreary-feeling man, are not simply aware of their
subjective states; if they were, the force of their feelings would

evaporate. Both believe there is outward cause why they should feel as
they do: either 'It is a glad world! how good is life!' or 'What a
loathsome tedium is existence!' Any philosophy which annihilates the
validity of the reference by explaining away its objects or translating
them into terms of no emotional pertinency leaves the mind with little
to care or act for. This is the opposite condition from that of nightmare,
but when acutely brought home to consciousness it produces a kindred
horror. In nightmare we have motives to act, but no power; here we
have powers, but no motives. A nameless Unheimlichkeit comes over
us at the thought of there being nothing eternal in our final purposes, in
the objects of those loves and aspirations which are our deepest
energies. The monstrously lopsided equation of the universe and its
knower, which we postulate as the ideal of cognition, is perfectly
paralleled by the no less lopsided equation of the universe and the
doer. We demand in it a character for which our emotions and active
propensities shall be a match. Small as we are, minute as is the point
by which the Cosmos impinges upon each one of us, each one desires
to feel that his reaction at that point is congruous with the demands of
the vast whole, that he balances the latter, so to speak, and is able to do
what it expects of him. But as his abilities to 'do' lie wholly in the line
of his natural propensities; as he enjoys reaction with such emotions as
fortitude, hope, rapture, admiration, earnestness, and the like; and as he
very unwillingly reacts with fear, disgust, despair, or doubt,—a
philosophy which should legitimate only emotions of the latter sort
would be sure to leave the mind a prey to discontent and craving.
"It is far too little recognized how entirely the intellect is built up of
practical interests. The theory of Evolution is beginning to do very
good service by its reduction of all mentality to the type of reflex
action. Cognition, in this view, is but a fleeting moment, a crosssection at a certain point of what in its totality is a motor phenomenon.
In the lower forms of life no one will pretend that cognition is anything
more than a guide to appropriate action. The germinal question
concerning things brought for the first time before consciousness is not
the theoretic 'What is that?' but the practical 'Who goes there?' or
rather, as Horwicz has admirably put it, 'What is to be done?'—'Was
fang' ich an?' In all our discussions about the intelligence of lower
animals the only test we use is that of their acting as if for a purpose.

Cognition, in short, is incomplete until discharged in act. And although
it is true that the later mental development, which attains its maximum
through the hypertrophied cerebrum of man, gives birth to a vast
amount of theoretic activity over and above that which is immediately
ministerial to practice, yet the earlier claim is only postponed, not
effaced, and the active nature asserts its rights to the end.
"If there be any truth at all in this view, it follows that however
vaguely a philosopher may define the ultimate universal datum, he
cannot be said to leave it unknown to us so long as he in the slightest
degree pretends that our emotional or active attitude towards it should
be of one sort rather than another. He who says, 'Life is real, life is
earnest,' however much he may speak of the fundamental
mysteriousness of things, gives a distinct definition to that
mysteriousness by ascribing to it the right to claim from us the
particular mood called seriousness, which means the willingness to
live with energy, though energy bring pain. The same is true of him
who says that all is vanity. Indefinable as the predicate vanity may be
in se, it is clearly enough something which permits anæsthesia, mere
escape from suffering, to be our rule of life. There is no more ludicrous
incongruity than for agnostics to proclaim with one breath that the
substance of things is unknowable, and with the next that the thought
of it should inspire us with admiration of its glory, reverence, and a
willingness to add our co-operative push in the direction towards
which its manifestations seem to be drifting. The unknowable may be
unfathomed, but if it make such distinct demands upon our activity, we
surely are not ignorant of its essential quality.
"If we survey the field of history and ask what feature all great periods
of revival, of expansion of the human mind, display in common, we
shall find, I think, simply this: that each and all of them have said to
the human being, 'The inmost nature of the reality is congenial to
powers which you possess.' In what did the emancipating message of
primitive Christianity consist, but in the announcement that God
recognizes those weak and tender impulses which paganism had so
rudely overlooked? Take repentance: the man who can do nothing
rightly can at least repent of his failures. But for paganism this faculty
of repentance was a pure supernumerary, a straggler too late for the

fair. Christianity took it and made it the one power within us which
appealed straight to the heart of God. And after the night of the Middle
Ages had so long branded with obloquy even the generous impulses of
the flesh, and defined the Reality to be such that only slavish natures
could commune with it, in what did the Sursum corda! of the
Renaissance lie but in the proclamation that the archetype of verity in
things laid claim on the widest activity of our whole æsthetic being?
What were Luther's mission and Wesley's but appeals to powers which
even the meanest of men might carry with them, faith and self-despair,
but which were personal, requiring no priestly intermediation, and
which brought their owner face to face with God? What caused the
wild-fire influence of Rousseau but the assurance he gave that man's
nature was in harmony with the nature of things, if only the paralyzing
corruptions of custom would stand from between? How did Kant and
Fichte, Goethe and Schiller, inspire their time with cheer, except by
saying, 'Use all your powers; that is the only obedience which the
universe exacts'? And Carlyle with his gospel of Work, of Fact, of
Veracity, how does he move us except by saying that the universe
imposes no tasks upon us but such as the most humble can perform?
Emerson's creed that everything that ever was or will be is here in the
enveloping Now; that man has but to obey himself—'He who will rest
in what he is, is a part of Destiny'—is in like manner nothing but an
exorcism of all scepticism as to the pertinency of one's natural
faculties.
"In a word, 'Son of Man, stand upon thy feet and I will speak unto
thee!' is the only revelation of truth to which the solving epochs have
helped the disciple. But that has been enough to satisfy the greater part
of his rational need. In se and per se the universal essence has hardly
been more defined by any of these formulæ than by the agnostic x; but
the mere assurance that my powers, such as they are, are not irrelevant
to it, but pertinent, that it speaks to them and will in some way
recognize their reply, that I can be a match for it if I will, and not a
footless waif, suffices to make it rational to my feeling in the sense
given above. Nothing could be more absurd than to hope for the
definitive triumph of any philosophy which should refuse to
legitimate, and to legitimate in an emphatic manner, the more powerful
of our emotional and practical tendencies. Fatalism, whose solving

word in all crises of behavior is 'All striving is vain,' will never reign
supreme, for the impulse to take life strivingly is indestructible in the
race. Moral creeds which speak to that impulse will be widely
successful in spite of inconsistency, vagueness, and shadowy
determination of expectancy. Man needs a rule for his will, and will
invent one if one be not given him."
After the emotional and active needs come the intellectual and æsthetic
ones. The two great æsthetic principles, of richness and of ease, dominate
our intellectual as well as our sensuous life. And, ceteris paribus, no system
which should not be rich, simple, and harmonious would have a chance of
being chosen for belief, if rich, simple, and harmonious systems were also
there. Into the latter we should unhesitatingly settle, with that welcoming
attitude of the will in which belief consists. To quote from a remarkable
book:
"This law that our consciousness constantly tends to the minimum of
complexity and to the maximum of definiteness, is of great importance
for all our knowledge.... Our own activity of attention will thus
determine what we are to know and what we are to believe. If things
have more than a certain complexity, not only will our limited powers
of attention forbid us to unravel this complexity, but we shall strongly
desire to believe the things much simpler than they are. For our
thoughts about them will have a constant tendency to become as
simple and definite as possible. Put a man into a perfect chaos of
phenomena—sounds, sights, feelings—and if the man continued to
exist, and to be rational at all, his attention would doubtless soon find
for him away to make up some kind of rhythmic regularity, which he
would impute to the things about him, so as to imagine that he had
discovered some laws of sequence in this mad new world. And thus, in
every case where we fancy ourselves sure of a simple law of Nature,
we must remember that a great deal of the fancied simplicity may be
due, in the given case, not to Nature, but to the ineradicable prejudice
of our own minds in favor of regularity and simplicity. All our
thoughts are determined, in great measure, by this law of least effort,
as it is found exemplified in our activity of attention.... The aim of the
whole process seems to be to reach as complete and united a

conception of reality as possible, a conception wherein the greatest
fulness of data shall be combined with the greatest simplicity of
conception. The effort of consciousness seems to be to combine the
greatest richness of content with the greatest definiteness of
organization."[314]
The richness is got by including all the facts of sense in the scheme; the
simplicity, by deducing them out of the smallest possible number of
permanent and independent primordial entities: the definite organization, by
assimilating these latter to ideal objects between which relations of an
inwardly rational sort obtain. What these ideal objects and rational relations
are will require a separate chapter to show.[315] Meanwhile, enough has
surely been said to justify the assertion made above that no general off-hand
answer can be given as to which objects mankind shall choose as its
realities. The fight is still under way. Our minds are yet chaotic; and at best
we make a mixture and a compromise, as we yield to the claim of this
interest or that, and follow first one and then another principle in turn. It is
undeniably true that materialistic, or so-called 'scientific,' conceptions of the
universe have so far gratified the purely intellectual interests more than the
mere sentimental conceptions have. But, on the other hand, as already
remarked, they leave the emotional and active interests cold. The perfect
object of belief would be a God or 'Soul of the World,' represented both
optimistically and moralistically (if such a combination could be), and
withal so definitely conceived as to show us why our phenomenal
experiences should be sent to us by Him in just the very way in which they
come. All Science and all History would thus be accounted for in the
deepest and simplest fashion. The very room in which I sit, its sensible
walls and floor, and the feeling the air and fire within it give me, no less
than the 'scientific' conceptions which I am urged to frame concerning the
mode of existence of all these phenomena when my back is turned, would
then all be corroborated, not de-realized, by the ultimate principle of my
belief. The World-soul sends me just those phenomena in order that I may
react upon them; and among the reactions is the intellectual one of spinning
these conceptions. What is beyond the crude experiences is not an
alternative to them, but something that means them for me here and now. It
is safe to say that, if ever such a system is satisfactorily excogitated,
mankind will drop all other systems and cling to that one alone as real.

Meanwhile the other systems coexist with the attempts at that one, and, all
being alike fragmentary, each has its little audience and day.

I have now, I trust, shown sufficiently what the psychologic sources of the
sense of reality are. Certain postulates are given in our nature; and whatever
satisfies those postulates is treated as if real.[316] I might therefore finish the
chapter here, were it not that a few additional words will set the truth in a
still clearer light.
DOUBT.
There is hardly a common man who (if consulted) would not say that things
come to us in the first instance as ideas; and that if we take them for
realities, it is because we add something to them, namely, the predicate of
having also 'real existence outside of our thought.' This notion that a higher
faculty than the mere having of a conscious content is needed to make us
know anything real by its means has pervaded psychology from the earliest
times, and is the tradition of Scholasticism, Kantism, and Common-sense.
Just as sensations must come as inward affections and then be 'extradited;'
as objects of memory must appear at first as presently unrealities, and
subsequently be 'projected' backwards as past realities; so conceptions must
be entia rationis till a higher faculty uses them as windows to look beyond
the ego, into the real extra-mental world;—so runs the orthodox and
popular account.
And there is no question that this is a true account of the way in which
many of our later beliefs come to pass. The logical distinction between the
bare thought of an object and belief in the object's reality is often a
chronological distinction as well. The having and the crediting of an idea do
not always coalesce; for often we first suppose and then believe; first play
with the notion, frame the hypothesis, and then affirm the existence, of an
object of thought. And we are quite conscious of the succession of the two
mental acts. But these cases are none of them primitive cases. They only
occur in minds long schooled to doubt by the contradictions of experience.
The primitive impulse is to affirm immediately the reality of all that is

conceived.[317] When we do doubt, however, in what does the subsequent
resolution of the doubt consist? It either consists in a purely verbal
performance, the coupling of the adjectives 'real' or 'outwardly existing' (as
predicates) to the thing originally conceived (as subject); or it consists in
the perception in the given case of that for which these adjectives,
abstracted from other similar concrete cases, stand. But what these
adjectives stand for, we now know well. They stand for certain relations
(immediate, or through intermediaries) to ourselves. Whatever concrete
objects have hitherto stood in those relations have been for us 'real,'
'outwardly existing.' So that when we now abstractly admit a thing to be
'real' (without perhaps going through any definite perception of its
relations), it is as if we said "it belongs in the same world with those other
objects." Naturally enough, we have hourly opportunities for this summary
process of belief. All remote objects in space or time are believed in this
way. When I believe that some prehistoric savage chipped this flint, for
example, the reality of the savage and of his act makes no direct appeal
either to my sensation, emotion, or volition. What I mean by my belief in it
is simply my dim sense of a continuity between the long dead savage and
his doings and the present world of which the flint forms part. It is preeminently a case for applying our doctrine of the 'fringe' (see Vol I. p. 258).
When I think the savage with one fringe of relationship, I believe in him;
when I think him without that fringe, or with another one (as, e.g., if I
should class him with 'scientific vagaries' in general), I disbelieve him. The
word 'real' itself is, in short, a fringe.
RELATIONS OF BELIEF AND WILL.
We shall see in Chapter XXV that will consists in nothing but a manner of
attending to certain objects, or consenting to their stable presence before the
mind. The objects, in the case of will, are those whose existence depends on
our thought, movements of our own body for example, or facts which such
movements executed in future may make real. Objects of belief, on the
contrary, are those which do not change according as we think regarding
them. I will to get up early to-morrow morning; I believe that I got up late
yesterday morning; I will that my foreign bookseller in Boston shall procure
me a German book and write to him to that effect. I believe that he will
make me pay three dollars for it when it comes, etc. Now the important

thing to notice is that this difference between the objects of will and belief
is entirely immaterial, as far as the relation of the mind to them goes. All
that the mind does is in both cases the same; it looks at the object and
consents to its existence, espouses it, says 'it shall be my reality.' It turns to
it, in short, in the interested active emotional way. The rest is done by
nature, which in some cases makes the objects real which we think of in this
manner, and in other cases does not. Nature cannot change the past to suit
our thinking. She cannot change the stars or the winds; but she does change
our bodies to suit our thinking, and through their instrumentality changes
much besides; so the great practical distinction between objects which we
may will or unwill, and objects which we can merely believe or disbelieve,
grows up, and is of course one of the most important distinctions in the
world. Its roots, however, do not lie in psychology, but in physiology; as the
chapter on Volition will abundantly make plain. Will and Belief, in short,
meaning a certain relation between objects and the Self, are two names for
one and the same PSYCHOLOGICAL phenomenon. All the questions which arise
concerning one are questions which arise concerning the other. The causes
and conditions of the peculiar relation must be the same in both. The freewill question arises as regards belief. If our wills are indeterminate, so must
our beliefs be, etc. The first act of free-will, in short, would naturally be to
believe in free-will, etc. In Chapter XXVI, I shall mention this again.

A practical observation may end this chapter. If belief consists in an
emotional reaction of the entire man on an object, how can we believe at
will? We cannot control our emotions. Truly enough, a man cannot believe
at will abruptly. Nature sometimes, and indeed not very infrequently,
produces instantaneous conversions for us. She suddenly puts us in an
active connection with objects of which she had till then left us cold. "I
realize for the first time," we then say, "what that means!" This happens
often with moral propositions. We have often heard them; but now they
shoot into our lives; they move us; we feel their living force. Such
instantaneous beliefs are truly enough not to be achieved by will. But
gradually our will can lead us to the same results by a very simple method:
we need only in cold blood ACT as if the thing in question were real, and

keep acting as if it were real, and it will infallibly end by growing into such
a connection with our life that it will become real. It will become so knit
with habit and emotion that our interests in it will be those which
characterize belief. Those to whom 'God' and 'Duty' are now mere names
can make them much more than that, if they make a little sacrifice to them
every day. But all this is so well known in moral and religious education
that I need say no more.[318]

[287] Reprinted, with additions, from 'Mind' for July 1889.
[288] Compare this psychological fact with the corresponding logical truth that all negation rests on
covert assertion of something else than the thing denied. (See Bradley's Principles of Logic, bk. i. ch.
3.)
[289] See that very remarkable little work, 'The Anæsthetic Revelation and the Gist of Philosophy,'
by Benj. P. Blood (Amsterdam, N. Y., 1874). Compare also Mind, vii. 206.
[290] "To one whose mind is healthy thoughts come and go unnoticed; with me they have to be
faced, thought about in a peculiar fashion, and then disposed of as finished, and this often when I am
utterly wearied and would be at peace; but the call is imperative. This goes on to the hindrance of all
natural action. If I were told that the staircase was on fire and I had only a minute to escape, and the
thought arose—'Have they sent for fire-engines? Is it probable that the man who has the key is on
hand? Is the man a careful sort of person? Will the key be hanging on a peg? Am I thinking rightly?
Perhaps they don't lock the depot'—my foot would be lifted to go down; I should be conscious to
excitement that I was losing my chance; but I should be unable to stir until all these absurdities were
entertained and disposed of. In the most critical moments of my life, when I ought to have been so
engrossed as to leave no room for any secondary thoughts, I have been oppressed by the inability to
be at peace. And in the most ordinary circumstances it is all the same. Let me instance the other
morning I went to walk. The day was biting cold, but I was unable to proceed except by jerks. Once I
got arrested, my feet in a muddy pool. One foot was lifted to go, knowing that it was not good to be
standing in water, but there I was fast, the cause of detention being the discussing with myself the
reasons why I should not stand in that pool." (T. S. Clouston, Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases,
1883, p. 43. See also Berger, in Archiv f. Psychiatrie, vi. 217.)
[291] Note to Jas. Mill's Analysis, i. 412-428.
[292] For an excellent account of the history of opinion on this subject see A. Marty, in
Vierteljahrsch. f. wiss. Phil., viii. 181 ff. (1884).
[293] We saw near the end of Chapter XIX that a candle-image taking exclusive possession of the
mind in this way would probably acquire the sensational vividness. But this physiological accident is
logically immaterial to the argument in the text, which ought to apply as well to the dimmest sort of
mental image as to the brightest sensation.
[294] In both existential and attributive judgments a synthesis is represented. The syllable ex in the
word Existence, da in the word Dasein, express it. 'The candle exists' is equivalent to 'The candle is
over there.' And the 'over there' means real space, space related to other reals. The proposition
amounts to saying: 'The candle is in the same space with other reals.' It affirms of the candle a very

concrete predicate—namely, this relation to other particular concrete things. Their real existence, as
we shall later see, resolves itself into their peculiar relation to ourselves. Existence is thus no
substantive quality when we predicate it of any object; it is a relation, ultimately terminating in
ourselves, and at the moment when it terminates, becoming a practical relation. But of this more
anon. I only wish now to indicate the superficial nature of the distinction between the existential and
the attributive proposition.
[295] I define the scientific universe here in the radical mechanical way. Practically, it is oftener
thought of in a mongrel way and resembles in more points the popular physical world.
[296] It thus comes about that we can say such things as that Ivanhoe did not really marry Rebecca,
as Thackeray falsely makes him do. The real Ivanhoe-world is the one which Scott wrote down for
us. In that world Ivanhoe does not marry Rebecca. The objects within that world are knit together by
perfectly definite relations, which can be affirmed or denied. Whilst absorbed in the novel, we turn
our backs on all other worlds, and, for the time, the Ivanhoe-world remains our absolute reality.
When we wake from the spell, however, we find a still more real world, which reduces Ivanhoe, and
all things connected with him, to the Active status, and relegates them to one of the sub-universes
grouped under No. 5.
[297] The world of dreams is our real world whilst we are sleeping, because our attention then lapses
from the sensible world. Conversely, when we wake the attention usually lapses from the dreamworld and that becomes unreal. But if a dream haunts us and compels our attention during the day it
is very apt to remain figuring in our consciousness as a sort of sub-universe alongside of the waking
world. Most people have probably had dreams which it is hard to imagine not to have been glimpses
into an actually existing region of being, perhaps a corner of the 'spiritual world.' And dreams have
accordingly in all ages been regarded as revelations, and have played a large part in furnishing forth
mythologies and creating themes for faith to lay hold upon. The 'larger universe,' here, which helps
us to believe both in the dream and in the waking reality which is its immediate reductive, is the total
universe, of Nature plus the Supernatural. The dream holds true, namely, in one half of that universe;
the waking perceptions in the other half. Even to-day dream-objects figure among the realities in
which some 'psychic-researchers' are seeking to rouse our belief. All our theories, not only those
about the supernatural, but our philosophic and scientific theories as well, are like our dreams in
rousing such different degrees of belief in different minds.
[298] Distinguishes realities from unrealities, the essential from the rubbishy and neglectable.
[299] Inquiry concerning Hum. Understanding, sec. v. pt. 2 (slightly transposed in my quotation).
[300] Note to Jas. Mill's Analysis, i. 394.
[301] Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Müller, ii. 515-17. Hume also: "When, after the simple
conception of anything, we would conceive it as existent, we in reality make no addition to, or
alteration of, our first idea. Thus, when we affirm that God is existent, we simply form the idea of
such a being as He is represented to us; nor is the existence which we attribute to Him conceived by a
particular idea, which we join to His other qualities, and can again separate and distinguish from
them.... The belief of the existence joins no new idea to those which compose the ideas of the object.
When I think of God, when I think of Him as existent, and when I believe Him to be existent, my
idea of Him neither increases nor diminishes. But as 'tis certain there is a great difference betwixt the
simple conception of the existence of an object and the belief of it, and as this difference lies not in
the facts or compositions of the idea which we conceive, it follows that it must lie in the manner in
which we conceive it." (Treatise of Human Nature, pt. iii. sec. 7.)
[302] I use the notion of the Ego here, as common-sense uses it. Nothing is prejudged as to the
results (or absence of results) of ulterior attempts to analyze the notion.

[303] Griesinger, Mental Diseases, §§ 50, 98. The neologism we so often hear, that an experience
'gives us a realising sense' of the truth of some proposition or other, illustrates the dependence of the
sense of reality upon excitement. Only what stirs us is 'realized.'
[304] The way in which sensations are pitted against systematized conceptions, and in which the one
or the other then prevails according as the sensations are felt by ourselves or merely known by report,
is interestingly illustrated at the present day by the state of public belief about 'spiritualistic'
phenomena. There exist numerous narratives of movement without contact on the part of articles of
furniture and other material objects, in the presence of certain privileged individuals called mediums.
Such movement violates our memories, and the whole system of accepted physical 'science.'
Consequently those who have not seen it either brand the narratives immediately as lies or call the
phenomena 'illusions' of sense, produced by fraud or due to hallucination. But one who has actually
seen such a phenomenon, under what seems to him sufficiently 'test-conditions,' will hold to his
sensible experience through thick and thin, even though the whole fabric of 'science' should be rent in
twain. That man would be a weak-spirited creature indeed who should allow any fly-blown
generalities about 'the liability of the senses to be deceived' to bully him out of his adhesion to what
for him was an indubitable experience of sight. A man may err in this obstinacy, sure enough, in any
particular case. But the spirit that animates him is that on which ultimately the very life and health of
Science rest.
[305] Treatise of Human Nature, bk. i. pt. iii. sec. 7.
[306] Early Hist. of Mankind, p. 108.
[307] See Vol. I. pp. 285-6; Vol. II. pp. 237 ff.
[308] See Theory of Vision, § 59.
[309] Essay, bk. iv. chap. 2, § 14. In another place: "He that sees a candle burning and hath
experimented the force of its flame by putting his finger into it, will little doubt that this is something
existing without him, which does him harm and puts him to great pain.... And if our dreamer pleases
to try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy
man's fancy by putting his hand into it, he may, perhaps, be awakened into a certainty greater than he
could wish, that it is something more than bare imagination. So that the evidence is as great as we
can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, i.e. happiness or misery; beyond which we
have no concernment, either of knowledge or being. Such an assurance of the existence of things
without us is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good and avoiding the evil which is caused by
them, which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them," (Ibid. bk.
iv. chap. 11, § 8.)
[310] W. Bagehot, 'The Emotion of Conviction,' Literary Studies, i. 412-17.
[311] Psychologie Rationnelle, ch. 12.
[312] Two examples out of a thousand:
Reid, Inquiry, ch. ii. § 9: "I remember, many years ago, a white ox was brought into the country, of so
enormous size that people came many miles to see him. There happened, some months after, an
uncommon fatality among women in child-hearing. Two such uncommon events, following one
another, gave a suspicion of their connection, and occasioned a common opinion among the country
people that the white ox was the cause of this fatality."
H. M. Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, ii. 388: "On the third day of our stay at Mowa, feeling
quite comfortable amongst the people, on account of their friendly bearing, I began to write in my
note-book the terms for articles, in order to improve my already copious vocabulary of native words.
I had proceeded only a few minutes when I observed a strange commotion amongst the people who

had been flocking about me, and presently they ran away. In a short time we heard war-cries ringing
loudly and shrilly over the table-land. Two hours afterwards a long line of warriors were seen
descending the table-land and advancing towards our camp. There may have been between five and
six hundred of them. We, on the other hand, had made but few preparations except such as would
justify us replying to them in the event of the actual commencement of hostilities. But I had made
many firm friends among them, and I firmly believed that I should be able to avert an open rupture.
When they had assembled at about a hundred yards in front of our camp, Safeni and I walked up
towards them and sat down midway. Some half-dozen of the Mowa people came near, and the shauri
began.
"'What is the matter, my friends?' I asked. 'Why do you come with guns in your hands, in such
numbers, as though you were coming to fight? Fight? fight us, your friends! Tut! this is some great
mistake, surely.'
"'Mundele,' replied one of them,... 'our people saw you yesterday make marks on some tara-tara
[paper]. This is very bad. Our country will waste, our goats will die, our bananas will rot, and our
women will dry up. What have we done to you that you should wish to kill us? We have sold you
food and we have brought you wine each day. Your people are allowed to wander where they please
without trouble. Why is the Mundele so wicked? We have gathered together to fight you if you do
not burn that tara-tara now before our eyes. If you burn it we go away, and shall be your friends as
heretofore.'
"'I told them to rest there, and left Safeni in their hands as a pledge that I should return. My tent was
not fifty yards from the spot, but while going towards it my brain was busy in devising some plan to
foil this superstitious madness. My note-book contained a vast number of valuable notes.... I could
not sacrifice it to the childish caprice of savages. As I was rummaging my book-box, I came across a
volume of Shakespeare [Chandos edition] much worn, and well thumbed, and which was of the same
size as my field-book; its cover was similar also, and it might be passed for the field-book, provided
that no one remembered its appearance too well. I took it to them. 'Is this the tara-tara, friends, that
you wish burned?'
"'Yes, yes, that is it.'
"'Well, take it, and burn it, or keep it.'
"'M—m. No, no, no. We will not touch it. It is fetish. You must burn it.'
"'I! Well, let it be so. I will do anything to please my good friends of Mowa.'
"'We walked to the nearest fire. I breathed a regretful farewell to my genial companion, which, during
my many weary hours of night, had assisted to relieve my mind when oppressed by almost
intolerable woes, and then gravely consigned the innocent Shakespeare to the flames, heaping the
brush fuel over it with ceremonious care.
"'A-h-h,' breathed the poor deluded natives sighing their relief.... 'There is no trouble now.'... And
something approaching to a cheer was shouted among them, which terminated the episode of the
burning of Shakespeare."

[313] 'Rationality, Activity, and Faith' (Princeton Review, July 1882, pp. 64-9).
[314] J. Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (Boston, 1885). pp. 317-57.
[315] Chapter XXVII.
[316] Prof. Royce puts this well in discussing idealism and the reality of an 'external' world. "If the
history of popular speculation on these topics could be written, how much of cowardice and shuffling
would be found in the behavior of the natural mind before the question, 'How dost thou know of an
external reality?' Instead of simply and plainly answering: 'I mean by the external world in the first
place something that I accept or demand, that I posit, postulate, actively construct on the basis of
sense-data,' the natural man gives us all kinds of vague compromise answers.... Where shall these
endless turnings and twistings have an end?... All these lesser motives are appealed to, and the one
ultimate motive is neglected. The ultimate motive with the man of every-day life is the will to have
an external world. Whatever consciousness contains, reason will persist in spontaneously adding the
thought: 'But there shall be something beyond this.'... The popular assurance of an external world is
the fixed determination to make one, now and henceforth." (Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 304—
the italics are my own.) This immixture of the will appears most flagrantly in the fact that although
external matter is doubted commonly enough, minds external to our own are never doubted. We need
them too much, are too essentially social to dispense with them. Semblances of matter may suffice to
react upon, but not semblances of communing souls. A psychic solipsism is too hideous a mockery of
our wants, and, so far as I know, has never been seriously entertained.—Chapters ix and x of Prof.
Royce's work are on the whole the clearest account of the psychology of belief with which I am
acquainted.
[317] "The leading fact in Belief, according to my view of it, is our Primitive Credulity. We begin by
believing everything; whatever is, is true.... The animal born in the morning of a summer day
proceeds upon the fact of daylight; assumes the perpetuity of that fact. Whatever it is disposed to do,
it does without misgivings. If in the morning it began a round of operations continuing for hours,
under the full benefit of daylight, it would unhesitatingly begin the same round in the evening. Its
state of mind is practically one of unbounded confidence; but, as yet, it does not understand what
confidence means.
"The pristine assurance is soon met by checks; a disagreeable experience leading to new insight. To
be thwarted and opposed is one of our earliest and most frequent pains. It develops the sense of a
distinction between free and obstructed impulses; the unconsciousness of an open way is exchanged
for consciousness; we are now said properly to believe in what has never been contradicted, as we
disbelieve in what has been contradicted. We believe that, after the dawn of day, there is before us a
continuance of light; we do not believe that this light is to continue forever.
"Thus, the vital circumstance in belief is never to be contradicted—never to lose prestige. The
number of repetitions counts for little in the process: we are as much convinced after ten as after
fifty; we are more convinced by ten unbroken than by fifty for and one against." (Bain: The Emotions
and the Will, pp. 511, 512.)
[318] Literature. D. Hume: Treatise on Human Nature, part iii. §§ vii-x. A. Bain: Emotions and Will,
chapter on Belief (also pp. 20 ff.). J. Sully: Sensation and Intuition, essay iv. J. Mill: Analysis of
Human Mind, chapter xi. Ch. Renouvier: Psychologie Rationnelle, vol. ii. pt. ii. and Esquisse d'une
Classification systématique des Doctrines Philosophiques, part vi. J. H. Newman: The Grammar of
Assent. J. Venn: Some Characteristics of Belief. V. Brochard: De l'Erreur, part ii. chap. vi, ix; and
Revue Philosophique, xxviii. 1. E. Rabier: Psychologie, chap xxi. Appendix. Ollé Laprune: La
Certitude Morale (1881). G. F. Stout: On Genesis of Cognition of Physical Reality, in 'Mind,' Jan.
1890. J. Pikler: The Psychology of the Belief in Objective Existence (London, 1890).—Mill says that
we believe present sensations; and makes our belief in all other things a matter of association with

these. So far so good; but as he makes no mention of emotional or volitional reaction, Bain rightly
charges him with treating belief as a purely intellectual state. For Bain belief is rather an incident of
our active life. When a thing is such as to make us act on it, then we believe it, according to Bain.
"But how about past things, or remote things, upon which no reaction of ours is possible? And how
about belief in things which check action?" says Sully; who considers that we believe a thing only
when "the idea of it has an inherent tendency to approximate in character and intensity to a
sensation." It is obvious that each of these authors emphasizes a true aspect of the question. My own
account has sought to be more complete, sensation, association, and active reaction all being
acknowledged to be concerned. The most compendious possible formula perhaps would be that our
belief and attention are the same fact. For the moment, what we attend to is reality; Attention is a
motor reaction; and we are so made that sensations force attention from us. On Belief and Conduct
see an article by Leslie Stephen, Fortnightly Review, July 1888.
A set of facts have been recently brought to my attention which I hardly know how to treat, so I say a
word about them in this foot-note. I refer to a type of experience which has frequently found a place
amongst the 'Yes' answers to the 'Census of Hallucinations,' and which is generally described by
those who report it as an 'impression of the presence' of someone near them, although no sensation
either of sight, hearing, or touch is involved. From the way in which this experience is spoken of by
those who have had it, it would appear to be an extremely definite and positive state of mind, coupled
with a belief in the reality of its object quite as strong as any direct sensation ever gives. And yet no
sensation seems to be connected with it at all. Sometimes the person whose nearness is thus
impressed is a known person, dead or living, sometimes an unknown one. His attitude and situation
are often very definitely impressed, and so, sometimes (though not by way of hearing), are words
which he wishes to say.
The phenomenon would seem to be due to a pure conception becoming saturated with the sort of
stinging urgency which ordinarily only sensations bring. But I cannot yet persuade myself that the
urgency in question consists in concomitant emotional and motor impulses. The 'impression' may
come quite suddenly and depart quickly; it may carry no emotional suggestions, and wake no motor
consequences beyond those involved in attending to it. Altogether, the matter is somewhat
paradoxical, and no conclusion can be come to until more definite data are obtained.
Perhaps the most curious case of the sort which I have received is the following. The subject of the
observation, Mr. P., is an exceptionally intelligent witness, though the words of the narrative are his
wife's.
"Mr. P. has all his life been the occasional subject of rather singular delusions or impressions of
various kinds. If I had belief in the existence of latent or embryo faculties, other than the five senses,
I should explain them on that ground. Being totally blind, his other perceptions are abnormally keen
and developed, and given the existence of a rudimentary sixth sense, it would be only natural that this
also should be more acute in him than in others. One of the most interesting of his experiences in this
line was the frequent apparition of a corpse some years ago, which may be worth the attention of
your Committee on that subject. At the time Mr. P. had a music-room in Boston on Beacon Street,
where he used to do severe and protracted practice with little interruption. Now, all one season it was
a very familiar occurrence with him while in the midst of work to feel a cold draft of air suddenly
upon his face, with a prickling sensation at the roots of his hair, when he would turn from the piano,
and a figure which he knew to be dead would come sliding under the crack of the door from without,
flattening itself to squeeze through and rounding out again to the human form. It was of a middleaged man, and drew itself along the carpet on hands and knees, but with head thrown back till it
reached the sofa, upon which it stretched itself. It remained some moments, but vanished always if
Mr. P. spoke or made a decided movement. The most singular point in the occurrence was its frequent
repetition. He might expect it on any day between two and four o'clock, and it came always heralded
by the same sudden cold shiver, and was invariably the same figure which went through the same

movements. He afterwards traced the whole experience to strong tea. He was in the habit of taking
cold tea, which always stimulates him, for lunch, and on giving up this practice he never saw this or
any other apparition again. However, even allowing, as is doubtless true, that the event was a
delusion of nerves first fatigued by overwork and then excited by this stimulant, there is one point
which is still wholly inexplicable and highly interesting to me. Mr. P. has no memory whatever of
sight, nor conception of it. It is impossible for him to form any idea of what we mean by light or
color, consequently he has no cognizance of any object which does not reach his sense of hearing or
of touch, though these are so acute as to give a contrary impression sometimes to other people. When
he becomes aware of the presence of a person or an object, by means which seem mysterious to
outsiders, he can always trace it naturally and legitimately to slight echoes, perceptible only to his
keen ears, or to differences in atmospheric pressure, perceptible only to his acute nerves of touch; but
with the apparition described, for the only time in his experience, he was aware of presence, size, and
appearance, without the use of either of these mediums. The figure never produced the least sound
nor came within a number of feet of his person, yet he knew that it was a man, that it moved, and in
what direction, even that it wore a full beard, which, like the thick curly hair, was partially gray; also
that it was dressed in the style of suit known as 'pepper and salt.' These points were all perfectly
distinct and invariable each time. If asked how he perceived them, he will answer he cannot tell, he
simply knew it, and so strongly and so distinctly that it is impossible to shake his opinion as to the
exact details of the man's appearance. It would seem that in this delusion of the senses he really saw,
as he has never done in the actual experiences of life, except in the first two years of childhood."
On cross-examining Mr. P., I could not make out that there was anything like visual imagination
involved, although he was quite unable to describe in just what terms the false perception was carried
on. It seemed to be more like an intensely definite conception than anything else, a conception to
which the feeling of present reality was attached, but in no such shape as easily to fall under the
heads laid down in my text.

CHAPTER XXII.[319]

REASONING.
We talk of man being the rational animal; and the traditional intellectualist
philosophy has always made a great point of treating the brutes as wholly
irrational creatures. Nevertheless, it is by no means easy to decide just what
is meant by reason, or how the peculiar thinking process called reasoning
differs from other thought-sequences which may lead to similar results.
Much of our thinking consists of trains of images suggested one by another,
of a sort of spontaneous revery of which it seems likely enough that the
higher brutes should be capable. This sort of thinking leads nevertheless to
rational conclusions, both practical and theoretical. The links between the
terms are either 'contiguity' or 'similarity,' and with a mixture of both these

things we can hardly be very incoherent. As a rule, in this sort of
irresponsible thinking, the terms which fall to be coupled together are
empirical concretes, not abstractions. A sunset may call up the vessel's deck
from which I saw one last summer, the companions of my voyage, my
arrival into port, etc.; or it may make me think of solar myths, of Hercules'
and Hector's funeral pyres, of Homer and whether he could write, of the
Greek alphabet, etc. If habitual contiguities predominate, we have a prosaic
mind; if rare contiguities, or similarities, have free play, we call the person
fanciful, poetic, or witty. But the thought as a rule is of matters taken in
their entirety. Having been thinking of one, we find later that we are
thinking of another, to which we have been lifted along, we hardly know
how. If an abstract quality figures in the procession, it arrests our attention
but for a moment, and fades into something else; and is never very abstract.
Thus, in thinking of the sun-myths, we may have a gleam of admiration at
the gracefulness of the primitive human mind, or a moment of disgust at the
narrowness of modern interpreters. But, in the main, we think less of
qualities than of whole things, real or possible, just as we may experience
them.
The upshot of it may be that we are reminded of some practical duty: we
write a letter to a friend abroad, or we take down the lexicon and study our
Greek lesson. Our thought is rational, and leads to a rational act, but it can
hardly be called reasoning in a strict sense of the term.
There are other shorter flights of thought, single couplings of terms which
suggest one another by association, which approach more to what would
commonly be classed as acts of reasoning proper. Those are where a present
sign suggests an unseen, distant, or future reality. Where the sign and what
it suggests are both concretes which have been coupled together on
previous occasions, the inference is common to both brutes and men, being
really nothing more than association by contiguity. A and B, dinner-bell and
dinner, have been experienced in immediate succession. Hence A no sooner
falls upon the sense than B is anticipated, and steps are taken to meet it. The
whole education of our domestic beasts, all the cunning added by age and
experience to wild ones, and the greater part of our human knowingness
consists in the ability to make a mass of inferences of this simplest sort. Our
'perceptions,' or recognitions of what objects are before us, are inferences of
this kind. We feel a patch of color, and we say 'a distant house,' a whiff of

odor crosses us, and we say 'a skunk,' a faint sound is heard, and we call it 'a
railroad train.' Examples are needless; for such inferences of sensations not
presented form the staple and tissue of our perceptive life, and our Chapter
XIX was full of them, illusory or veracious. They have been called
unconscious inferences. Certainly we are commonly unconscious that we
are inferring at all. The sign and the signified melt into what seems to us the
object of a single pulse of thought. Immediate inferences would be a good
name for these simple acts of reasoning requiring but two terms,[320] were it
not that formal logic has already appropriated the expression for a more
technical use.
'RECEPTS.'
In these first and simplest inferences the conclusion may follow so
continuously upon the 'sign' that the latter is not discriminated or attended
to as a separate object by the mind. Even now we can seldom define the
optical signs which lead us to infer the shapes and distances of the objects
which by their aid we so unhesitatingly perceive. The objects, too, when
thus inferred, are general objects. The dog crossing a scent thinks of a deer
in general, or of another dog in general, not of a particular deer or dog. To
these most primitive abstract objects Dr. G. J. Romanes gives the name of
recepts or generic ideas, to distinguish them from concepts and general
ideas properly so called.[321] They are not analyzed or defined, but only
imagined.
"It requires but a slight analysis of our ordinary mental processes to
prove that all our simpler ideas are group-arrangements which have
been formed spontaneously or without any of that intentionally
comparing, sifting, and combining process which is required in the
higher departments of ideational activity. The comparing, sifting, and
combining is here done, as it were, for the conscious agent, not by him.
Recepts are received; it is only concepts that require to be conceived....
If I am crossing a street and hear behind me a sudden shout, I do not
require to wait in order to predicate to myself that there is probably a
hansom-cab just about to run me down: a cry of this kind, and in those
circumstances, is so intimately associated in my mind with its purpose,
that the idea which it arouses need not rise above the level of a recept;

and the adaptive movements on my part which that idea immediately
prompts are performed without any intelligent reflection. Yet, on the
other hand, they are neither reflex actions nor instinctive actions; they
are what may be termed receptual actions, or actions depending on
recepts."[322]
"How far can this kind of unnamed or non-conceptional ideation extend?"
Dr. Romanes asks; and answers by a variety of examples taken from the life
of brutes, for which I must refer to his book. One or two of them, however,
I will quote:
"Houzeau writes that while crossing a wide and arid plain in Texas, his
two dogs suffered greatly from thirst, and that between thirty and forty
times they rushed down the hollows to search for water. The hollows
were not valleys, and there were no trees in them, or any other
difference in the vegetation; and as they were absolutely dry, there
could have been no smell of damp earth. The dogs behaved as if they
knew that a dip in the ground offered them the best chance of finding
water, and Houzeau has often witnessed the same behavior in other
animals....
"Mr. Darwin writes: 'When I say to my terrier in an eager voice (and I
have made the trial many times), "Hi! hi! where is it?" she at once
takes it as a sign that something is to be hunted, and generally first
looks quickly all round, and then rushes into the nearest thicket, to
scout for any game, but finding nothing she looks up into any
neighboring tree for a squirrel. Now do not these actions clearly show
that she had in her mind a general idea, or concept, that some animal is
to be discovered and hunted?'"[323]
They certainly show this. But the idea in question is of an object about
which nothing farther may be articulately known. The thought of it prompts
to activity, but to no theoretic consequence. Similarly in the following
example:
"Water-fowl adopt a somewhat different mode of alighting upon land,
or even upon ice, from that which they adopt when alighting upon
water; and those kinds which dive from a height (such as terns and

gannets) never do so upon land or upon ice. These facts prove that the
animals have one recept answering to a solid surface, and another
answering to a fluid. Similarly a man will not dive from a height over
hard ground or over ice, nor will he jump into water in the same way
as he jumps upon dry land. In other words, like the water-fowl he has
two distinct recepts, one of which answers to solid ground, and the
other to an unresisting fluid. But unlike the water-fowl he is able to
bestow upon each of these recepts a name, and thus to raise them both
to the level of concepts. So far as the practical purposes of locomotion
are concerned, it is of course immaterial whether or not he thus raises
his recepts into concepts; but ... for many other purposes it is of the
highest importance that he is able to do this."[324]
IN REASONING, WE PICK OUT ESSENTIAL QUALITIES.
The chief of these purposes is predication, a theoretic function which,
though it always leads eventually to some kind of action, yet tends as often
as not to inhibit the immediate motor response to which the simple
inferences of which we have been speaking give rise. In reasoning, A may
suggest B; but B, instead of being an idea which is simply obeyed by us, is
an idea which suggests the distinct additional idea C. And where the train of
suggestion is one of reasoning distinctively so called as contrasted with
mere revery or 'associative' sequence, the ideas bear certain inward relations
to each other which we must proceed to examine with some care.
The result C yielded by a true act of reasoning is apt to be a thing
voluntarily sought, such as the means to a proposed end, the ground for an
observed effect, or the effect of an assumed cause. All these results may be
thought of as concrete things, but they are not suggested immediately by
other concrete things, as in the trains of simply associative thought. They
are linked to the concretes which precede them by intermediate steps, and
these steps are formed by general characters articulately denoted and
expressly analyzed out. A thing inferred by reasoning need neither have
been an habitual associate of the datum from which we infer it, nor need it
be similar to it. It may be a thing entirely unknown to our previous
experience, something which no simple association of concretes could ever
have evoked. The great difference, in fact, between that simpler kind of

rational thinking which consists in the concrete objects of past experience
merely suggesting each other, and reasoning distinctively so called, is this,
that whilst the empirical thinking is only reproductive, reasoning is
productive. An empirical, or 'rule-of-thumb,' thinker can deduce nothing
from data with whose behavior and associates in the concrete he is
unfamiliar. But put a reasoner amongst a set of concrete objects which he
has neither seen nor heard of before, and with a little time, if he is a good
reasoner, he will make such inferences from them as will quite atone for his
ignorance. Reasoning helps us out of unprecedented situations—situations
for which all our common associative wisdom, all the 'education' which we
share in common with the beasts, leaves us without resource.

Let us make this ability to deal with NOVEL data the technical differentia of
reasoning. This will sufficiently mark it out from common associative
thinking, and will immediately enable us to say just what peculiarity it
contains.
It contains analysis and abstraction. Whereas the merely empirical thinker
stares at a fact in its entirety, and remains helpless, or gets 'stuck,' if it
suggests no concomitant or similar, the reasoner breaks it up and notices
some one of its separate attributes. This attribute he takes to be the essential
part of the whole fact before him. This attribute has properties or
consequences which the fact until then was not known to have, but which,
now that it is noticed to contain the attribute, it must have.
Call the fact or concrete datum S;
the essential attribute M;
the attribute's property P.
Then the reasoned inference of P from S cannot be made without M's
intermediation. The 'essence' M is thus that third or middle term in the
reasoning which a moment ago was pronounced essential. For his original
concrete S the reasoner substitutes its abstract property, M. What is true of
M, what is coupled with M, then holds true of S, is coupled with S. As M is
properly one of the parts of the entire S, reasoning may then be very well

defined as the substitution of parts and their implications or consequences
for wholes. And the art of the reasoner will consist of two stages:
First, sagacity,[325] or the ability to discover what part, M, lies embedded in
the whole S which is before him;
Second, learning, or the ability to recall promptly M's consequences,
concomitants, or implications.[326]
If we glance at the ordinary syllogism—
M is P;
S is M;
Therefore S is P
—we see that the second or minor premise, the 'subsumption' as it is
sometimes called, is the one requiring the sagacity; the first or major the
one requiring the fertility, or fulness of learning. Usually the learning is
more apt to be ready than the sagacity, the ability to seize fresh aspects in
concrete things, being rarer than the ability to learn old rules; so that, in
most actual cases of reasoning, the minor premise, or the way of conceiving
the subject, is the one that makes the novel step in thought. This is, to be
sure, not always the case; for the fact that M carries P with it may also be
unfamiliar and now formulated for the first time.
The perception that S is M is a mode of conceiving S. The statement that M
is P is an abstract or general proposition. A word about both is necessary.
WHAT IS MEANT BY A MODE OF CONCEIVING.
When we conceive of S merely as M (of vermilion merely as a mercurycompound, for example), we neglect all the other attributes which it may
have, and attend exclusively to this one. We mutilate the fulness of S's
reality. Every reality has an infinity of aspects or properties. Even so simple
a fact as a line which you trace in the air may be considered in respect to its
form, its length, its direction, and its location. When we reach more
complex facts, the number of ways in which we may regard them is literally
endless. Vermilion is not only a mercury-compound, it is vividly red, heavy,
and expensive, it comes from China, and so on, in infinitum. All objects are
well-springs of properties, which are only little by little developed to our

knowledge, and it is truly said that to know one thing thoroughly would be
to know the whole universe. Mediately or immediately, that one thing is
related to everything else; and to know all about it, all its relations need be
known. But each relation forms one of its attributes, one angle by which
some one may conceive it, and while so conceiving it may ignore the rest of
it. A man is such a complex fact. But out of the complexity all that an army
commissary picks out as important for his purposes is his property of eating
so many pounds a day; the general, of marching so many miles; the chairmaker, of having such a shape; the orator, of responding to such and such
feelings; the theatre-manager, of being willing to pay just such a price, and
no more, for an evening's amusement. Each of these persons singles out the
particular side of the entire man which has a bearing on his concerns, and
not till this side is distinctly and separately conceived can the proper
practical conclusions for that reasoner be drawn; and when they are drawn
the man's other attributes may be ignored.
All ways of conceiving a concrete fact, if they are true ways at all, are
equally true ways. There is no property ABSOLUTELY essential to any one
thing. The same property which figures as the essence of a thing on one
occasion becomes a very inessential feature upon another. Now that I am
writing, it is essential that I conceive my paper as a surface for inscription.
If I failed to do that, I should have to stop my work. But if I wished to light
a fire, and no other materials were by, the essential way of conceiving the
paper would be as combustible material; and I need then have no thought of
any of its other destinations. It is really all that it is: a combustible, a
writing surface, a thin thing, a hydrocarbonaceous thing, a thing eight
inches one way and ten another, a thing just one furlong east of a certain
stone in my neighbor's field, an American thing, etc., etc., ad infinitum.
Whichever one of these aspects of its being I temporarily class it under,
makes me unjust to the other aspects. But as I always am classing it under
one aspect or another, I am always unjust, always partial, always exclusive.
My excuse is necessity—the necessity which my finite and practical nature
lays upon me. My thinking is first and last and always for the sake of my
doing, and I can only do one thing at a time. A God, who is supposed to
drive the whole universe abreast, may also be supposed, without detriment
to his activity, to see all parts of it at once and without emphasis. But were
our human attention so to disperse itself we should simply stare vacantly at
things at large and forfeit our opportunity of doing any particular act. Mr.

Warner, in his Adirondack story, shot a bear by aiming, not at his eye or
heart, but 'at him generally.' But we cannot aim 'generally' at the universe;
or if we do, we miss our game. Our scope is narrow, and we must attack
things piecemeal, ignoring the solid fulness in which the elements of Nature
exist, and stringing one after another of them together in a serial way, to suit
our little interests as they change from hour to hour. In this, the partiality of
one moment is partly atoned for by the different sort of partiality of the
next. To me now, writing these words, emphasis and selection seem to be
the essence of the human mind. In other chapters other qualities have
seemed, and will again seem, more important parts of psychology.
Men are so ingrainedly partial that, for common-sense and scholasticism
(which is only common-sense grown articulate), the notion that there is no
one quality genuinely, absolutely, and exclusively essential to anything is
almost unthinkable. "A thing's essence makes it what it is. Without an
exclusive essence it would be nothing in particular, would be quite
nameless, we could not say it was this rather than that. What you write on,
for example,—why talk of its being combustible, rectangular, and the like,
when you know that these are mere accidents, and that what it really is, and
was made to be, is just paper and nothing else?" The reader is pretty sure to
make some such comment as this. But he is himself merely insisting on an
aspect of the thing which suits his own petty purpose, that of naming the
thing; or else on an aspect which suits the manufacturer's purpose, that of
producing an article for which there is a vulgar demand. Meanwhile the
reality overflows these purposes at every pore. Our usual purpose with it,
our commonest title for it, and the properties which this title suggests, have
in reality nothing sacramental. They characterize us more than they
characterize the thing. But we are so stuck in our prejudices, so petrified
intellectually, that to our vulgarest names, with their suggestions, we ascribe
an eternal and exclusive worth. The thing must be, essentially, what the
vulgarest name connotes; what less usual names connote, it can be only in
an 'accidental' and relatively unreal sense.[327]
Locke undermined the fallacy. But none of his successors, so far as I know,
have radically escaped it, or seen that the only meaning of essence is
teleological, and that classification and conception are purely teleological
weapons of the mind. The essence of a thing is that one of its properties
which is so important for my interests that in comparison with it I may

neglect the rest. Amongst those other things which have this important
property I class it, after this property I name it, as a thing endowed with this
property I conceive it; and whilst so classing, naming, and conceiving it, all
other truths about it become to me as naught.[328] The properties which are
important vary from man to man and from hour to hour.[329] Hence divers
appellations and conceptions for the same thing. But many objects of daily
use—as paper, ink, butter, horse-car—have properties of such constant
unwavering importance, and have such stereotyped names, that we end by
believing that to conceive them in those ways is to conceive them in the
only true way. Those are no truer ways of conceiving them than any others;
they are only more important ways, more frequently serviceable ways.[330]
So much for what is implied, when the reasoner conceives of the fact S
before him as a case of which the essence is to be M. One word now as to
what is involved in M's having properties, consequences, or implications,
and we can go back to the study of the reasoning process again.
WHAT IS INVOLVED IN GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.
M is not a concrete, or 'self-sufficient,' as Mr. Clay would say. It is an
abstract character which may exist, embedded with other characters, in
many concretes. Whether it be the character of being a writing surface, of
being made in America or China, of being eight inches square, or of being
in a certain part of space, this is always true of it. Now we might conceive
of this being a world in which all such general characters were independent
of each other, so that if any one of them were found in a subject S, we never
could be sure what others would be found alongside of it. On one occasion
there might be P with M, on another Q, and so on. In such a world there
would be no general sequences or coexistences, and no universal laws.
Each grouping would be sui generis; from the experience of the past no
future could be predicted; and reasoning, as we shall presently see, would
be an impossibility.
But the world we live in is not one of this sort. Though many general
characters seem indifferent to each other, there remain a number of them
which affect constant habits of mutual concomitance or repugnance. They
involve or imply each other. One of them is a sign to us that the other will
be found. They hunt in couples, as it were; and such a proposition as that M

is P, or includes P, or precedes or accompanies P, if it prove to be true in one
instance, may very likely be true in every other instance which we meet.
This is, in fact, a world in which general laws obtain, in which universal
propositions are true, and in which reasoning is therefore possible.
Fortunately for us: for since we cannot handle things as wholes, but only by
conceiving them through some general character which for the time we call
their essence, it would be a great pity if the matter ended there, and if the
general character, once picked out and in our possession, helped us to no
farther advance. In Chapter XXVIII we shall have again to consider this
harmony between our reasoning faculty and the world in which its lot is
cast.[331]
To revert now to our symbolic representation of the reasoning process:
M is P
S is M
———
S is P
M is discerned and picked out for the time being to be the essence of the
concrete fact, phenomenon, or reality, S. But M in this world of ours is
inevitably conjoined with P; so that P is the next thing that we may expect
to find conjoined with the fact S. We may conclude or infer P, through the
intermediation of the M which our sagacity began by discerning, when S
came before it, to be the essence of the case.
Now note that if P have any value or importance for us, M was a very good
character for our sagacity to pounce upon and abstract. If, on the contrary, P
were of no importance, some other character than M would have been a
better essence for us to conceive of S by. Psychologically, as a rule, P
overshadows the process from the start. We are seeking P, or something like
P. But the bare totality of S does not yield it to our gaze; and casting about
for some point in S to take hold of, which will lead us to P, we hit, if we are
sagacious, upon M, because M happens to be just the character which is
knit up with P. Had we wished Q instead of P, and were N a property of S
conjoined with Q, we ought to have ignored M, noticed N, and conceived of
S as a sort of N exclusively.
Reasoning is always for a subjective interest, to attain some particular
conclusion, or to gratify some special curiosity. It not only breaks up the

datum placed before it and conceives it abstractly; it must conceive it
rightly too; and conceiving it rightly means conceiving it by that one
particular abstract character which leads to the one sort of conclusion which
it is the reasoner's temporary interest to attain.[332]
The results of reasoning may be hit upon by accident, The stereoscope was
actually a result of reasoning; it is conceivable, however, that a man playing
with pictures and mirrors might accidentally have hit upon it. Cats have
been known to open doors by pulling latches, etc. But no cat, if the latch got
out of order, could open the door again, unless some new accident of
random fumbling taught her to associate some new total movement with the
total phenomenon of the closed door. A reasoning man, however, would
open the door by first analyzing the hindrance. He would ascertain what
particular feature of the door was wrong. The lever, e.g., does not raise the
latch sufficiently from its slot—case of insufficient elevation—raise door
bodily on hinges! Or door sticks at top by friction against lintel—press it
bodily down! Now it is obvious that a child or an idiot might without this
reasoning learn the rule for opening that particular door. I remember a clock
which the maid-servant had discovered would not go unless it were
supported so as to tilt slightly forwards. She had stumbled on this method
after many weeks of groping. The reason of the stoppage was the friction of
the pendulum-bob against the back of the clock-case, a reason which an
educated man would have analyzed out in five minutes. I have a student's
lamp of which the flame vibrates most unpleasantly unless the collar which
bears the chimney be raised about a sixteenth of an inch. I learned the
remedy after much torment by accident, and now always keep the collar up
with a small wedge. But my procedure is a mere association of two totals,
diseased object and remedy. One learned in pneumatics could have named
the cause of the disease, and thence inferred the remedy immediately. By
many measurements of triangles one might find their area always equal to
their height multiplied by half their base, and one might formulate an
empirical law to that effect. But a reasoner saves himself all this trouble by
seeing that it is the essence (pro hac vice) of a triangle to be the half of a
parallelogram whose area is the height into the entire base. To see this he
must invent additional lines; and the geometer must often draw such to get
at the essential property he may require in a figure. The essence consists in
some relation of the figure to the new lines, a relation not obvious at all

until they are put in. The geometer's sagacity lies in the invention of the
new lines.
THUS, THERE ARE TWO GREAT POINTS IN REASONING:
First, an extracted character is taken as equivalent to the entire datum from
which it comes; and,
Second, the character thus taken suggests a certain consequence more
obviously than it was suggested by the total datum as it originally came.
Take them again, successively.

1. Suppose I say, when offered a piece of cloth, "I won't buy that; it looks as
if it would fade," meaning merely that something about it suggests the idea
of fading to my mind,—my judgment, though possibly correct, is not
reasoned, but purely empirical; but, if I can say that into the color there
enters a certain dye which I know to be chemically unstable, and that
therefore the color will fade, my judgment is reasoned. The notion of the
dye which is one of the parts of the cloth, is the connecting link between the
latter and the notion of fading. So, again, an uneducated man will expect
from past experience to see a piece of ice melt if placed near the fire, and
the tip of his finger look coarse if he views it through a convex glass. In
neither of these cases could the result be anticipated without full previous
acquaintance with the entire phenomenon. It is not a result of reasoning.
But a man who should conceive heat as a mode of motion, and liquefaction
as identical with increased motion of molecules; who should know that
curved surfaces bend light-rays in special ways, and that the apparent size
of anything is connected with the amount of the 'bend' of its light-rays as
they enter the eye,—such a man would make the right inferences for all
these objects, even though he had never in his life had any concrete
experience of them; and he would do this because the ideas which we have
above supposed him to possess would mediate in his mind between the
phenomena he starts with and the conclusions he draws. But these ideas or
reasons for his conclusions are all mere extracted portions or circumstances

singled out from the mass of characters which make up the entire
phenomena. The motions which form heat, the bending of the light-waves,
are, it is true, excessively recondite ingredients; the hidden pendulum I
spoke of above is less so; and the sticking of a door on its sill in the earlier
example would hardly be so at all. But each and all agree in this, that they
bear a more evident relation to the conclusion than did the immediate data
in their full totality.
The difficulty is, in each case, to extract from the immediate data that
particular ingredient which shall have this very evident relation to the
conclusion. Every phenomenon or so-called 'fact' has an infinity of aspects
or properties, as we have seen, amongst which the fool, or man with little
sagacity, will inevitably go astray. But no matter for this point now. The
first thing is to have seen that every possible case of reasoning involves the
extraction of a particular partial aspect of the phenomena thought about,
and that whilst Empirical Thought simply associates phenomena in their
entirety, Reasoned Thought couples them by the conscious use of this
extract.

2. And, now, to prove the second point: Why are the couplings,
consequences, and implications of extracts more evident and obvious than
those of entire phenomena? For two reasons.
First, the extracted characters are more general than the concretes, and the
connections they may have are, therefore, more familiar to us, having been
more often met in our experience. Think of heat as motion, and whatever is
true of motion will be true of heat; but we have had a hundred experiences
of motion for every one of heat. Think of the rays passing through this lens
as bending towards the perpendicular, and you substitute for the
comparatively unfamiliar lens the very familiar notion of a particular
change in direction of a line, of which notion every day brings us countless
examples.
The other reason why the relations of the extracted characters are so evident
is that their properties are so few, compared with the properties of the
whole, from which we derived them. In every concrete total the characters

and their consequences are so inexhaustibly numerous that we may lose our
way among them before noticing the particular consequence it behooves us
to draw. But, if we are lucky enough to single out the proper character, we
take in, as it were, by a single glance all its possible consequences. Thus the
character of scraping the sill has very few suggestions, prominent among
which is the suggestion that the scraping will cease if we raise the door;
whilst the entire refractory door suggests an enormous number of notions to
the mind.
Take another example. I am sitting in a railroad-car, waiting for the train to
start. It is winter, and the stove fills the car with pungent smoke. The
brakeman enters, and my neighbor asks him to "stop that stove smoking."
He replies that it will stop entirely as soon as the car begins to move. "Why
so?" asks the passenger. "It always does," replies the brakeman. It is evident
from this 'always' that the connection between car moving and smoke
stopping was a purely empirical one in the brakeman's mind, bred of habit.
But, if the passenger had been an acute reasoner, he, with no experience of
what that stove always did, might have anticipated the brakeman's reply,
and spared his own question. Had he singled out of all the numerous points
involved in a stove's not smoking the one special point of smoke pouring
freely out of the stove-pipe's mouth, he would, probably, owing to the few
associations of that idea, have been immediately reminded of the law that a
fluid passes more rapidly out of a pipe's mouth if another fluid be at the
same time streaming over that mouth; and then the rapid draught of air over
the stove-pipe's mouth, which is one of the points involved in the car's
motion, would immediately have occurred to him.
Thus a couple of extracted characters, with a couple of their few and
obvious connections, would have formed the reasoned link in the
passenger's mind between the phenomena, smoke stopping and car moving,
which were only linked as wholes in the brakeman's mind. Such examples
may seem trivial, but they contain the essence of the most refined and
transcendental theorizing. The reason why physics grows more deductive
the more the fundamental properties it assumes are of a mathematical sort,
such as molecular mass or wave-length, is that the immediate consequences
of these notions are so few that we can survey them all at once, and
promptly pick out those which concern us.

Sagacity; or the Perception of the Essence.
To reason, then, we must be able to extract characters,—not any characters,
but the right characters for our conclusion. If we extract the wrong
character, it will not lead to that conclusion. Here, then, is the difficulty:
How are characters extracted, and why does it require the advent of a
genius in many cases before the fitting character is brought to light? Why
cannot anybody reason as well as anybody else? Why does it need a
Newton to notice the law of the squares, a Darwin to notice the survival of
the fittest? To answer these questions we must begin a new research, and
see how our insight into facts naturally grows.
All our knowledge at first is vague. When we say that a thing is vague, we
mean that it has no subdivisions ab intra, nor precise limitations ab extra;
but still all the forms of thought may apply to it. It may have unity, reality,
externality, extent, and what not—thinghood, in a word, but thinghood only
as a whole.[333] In this vague way, probably, does the room appear to the
babe who first begins to be conscious of it as something other than his
moving nurse. It has no subdivisions in his mind, unless, perhaps, the
window is able to attract his separate notice. In this vague way, certainly,
does every entirely new experience appear to the adult. A library, a
museum, a machine-shop, are mere confused wholes to the uninstructed,
but the machinist, the antiquary, and the bookworm perhaps hardly notice
the whole at all, so eager are they to pounce upon the details. Familiarity
has in them bred discrimination. Such vague terms as 'grass,' 'mould,' and
'meat' do not exist for the botanist or the anatomist. They know too much
about grasses, moulds, and muscles. A certain person said to Charles
Kingsley, who was showing him the dissection of a caterpillar, with its
exquisite viscera, "Why, I thought it was nothing but skin and squash!" A
layman present at a shipwreck, a battle, or a fire is helpless. Discrimination
has been so little awakened in him by experience that his consciousness
leaves no single point of the complex situation accented and standing out
for him to begin to act upon. But the sailor, the fireman, and the general
know directly at what corner to take up the business. They 'see into the
situation'—that is, they analyze it—with their first glance. It is full of
delicately differenced ingredients which their education has little by little
brought to their consciousness, but of which the novice gains no clear idea.

How this power of analysis was brought about we saw in our chapters on
Discrimination and Attention. We dissociate the elements of originally
vague totals by attending to them or noticing them alternately, of course.
But what determines which element we shall attend to first? There are two
immediate and obvious answers: first, our practical or instinctive interests;
and, second, our æsthetic interests. The dog singles out of any situation its
smells, and the horse its sounds, because they may reveal facts of practical
moment, and are instinctively exciting to these several creatures. The infant
notices the candle-flame or the window, and ignores the rest of the room,
because those objects give him a vivid pleasure. So, the country boy
dissociates the blackberry, the chestnut, and the wintergreen, from the
vague mass of other shrubs and trees, for their practical uses, and the savage
is delighted with the beads, the bits of looking-glass, brought by an
exploring vessel, and gives no heed to the features of the vessel itself,
which is too much beyond his sphere. These æsthetic and practical interests,
then, are the weightiest factors in making particular ingredients stand out in
high relief. What they lay their accent on, that we notice; but what they are
in themselves, we cannot say. We must content ourselves here with simply
accepting them as irreducible ultimate factors in determining the way our
knowledge grows.
Now, a creature which has few instinctive impulses, or interests, practical or
æsthetic, will dissociate few characters, and will, at best, have limited
reasoning powers; whilst one whose interests are very varied will reason
much better. Man, by his immensely varied instincts, practical wants, and
æsthetic feelings, to which every sense contributes, would, by dint of these
alone, be sure to dissociate vastly more characters than any other animal;
and accordingly we find that the lowest savages reason incomparably better
than the highest brutes. The diverse interests lead, too, to a diversification
of experiences, whose accumulation becomes a condition for the play of
that law of dissociation by varying concomitants of which I treated in a
former chapter (see Vol I. p. 506).
The Help given by Association by Similarity.
It is probable, also, that man's superior association by similarity has much
to do with those discriminations of character on which his higher flights of

reasoning are based. As this latter is an important matter, and as little or
nothing was said of it in the chapter on Discrimination, it behooves me to
dwell a little upon it here.
What does the reader do when he wishes to see in what the precise likeness
or difference of two objects lies? He transfers his attention as rapidly as
possible, backwards and forwards, from one to the other. The rapid
alteration in consciousness shakes out, as it were, the points of difference or
agreement, which would have slumbered forever unnoticed if the
consciousness of the objects compared had occurred at widely distant
periods of time. What does the scientific man do who searches for the
reason or law embedded in a phenomenon? He deliberately accumulates all
the instances he can find which have any analogy to that phenomenon; and,
by simultaneously filling his mind with them all, he frequently succeeds in
detaching from the collection the peculiarity which he was unable to
formulate in one alone; even though that one had been preceded in his
former experience by all of those with which he now at once confronts it.
These examples show that the mere general fact of having occurred at some
time in one's experience, with varying concomitants, is not by itself a
sufficient reason for a character to be dissociated now. We need something
more; we need that the varying concomitants should in all their variety be
brought into consciousness at once. Not till then will the character in
question escape from its adhesion to each and all of them and stand alone.
This will immediately be recognized by those who have read Mill's Logic
as the ground of Utility in his famous 'four methods of experimental
inquiry,' the methods of agreement, of difference, of residues, and of
concomitant variations. Each of these gives a list of analogous instances out
of the midst of which a sought-for character may roll and strike the mind.
Now it is obvious that any mind in which association by similarity is highly
developed is a mind which will spontaneously form lists of instances like
this. Take a present case A, with a character m in it. The mind may fail at
first to notice this character m at all. But if A calls up C, D, E, and F,—these
being phenomena which resemble A in possessing m, but which may not
have entered for months into the experience of the animal who now
experiences A, why, plainly, such association performs the part of the
reader's deliberately rapid comparison referred to above, and of the
systematic consideration of like cases by the scientific investigator, and may

lead to the noticing of m in an abstract way. Certainly this is obvious; and
no conclusion is left to us but to assert that, after the few most powerful
practical and æsthetic interests, our chief help towards noticing those
special characters of phenomena, which, when once possessed and named,
are used as reasons, class names, essences, or middle terms, is this
association by similarity. Without it, indeed, the deliberate procedure of the
scientific man would be impossible: he could never collect his analogous
instances. But it operates of itself in highly-gifted minds without any
deliberation, spontaneously collecting analogous instances, uniting in a
moment what in nature the whole breadth of space and time keeps separate,
and so permitting a perception of identical points in the midst of different
circumstances, which minds governed wholly by the law of contiguity
could never begin to attain.

FIG. 80.

Figure 80 shows this. If m, in the present representation A, calls up B, C, D,
and E, which are similar to A in possessing it, and calls them up in rapid
succession, then m, being associated almost simultaneously with such
varying concomitants, will 'roll out' and attract our separate notice.
If so much is clear to the reader, he will be willing to admit that the mind in
which this mode of association most prevails will, from its better
opportunity of extricating characters, be the one most prone to reasoned
thinking; whilst, on the other hand, a mind in which we do not detect
reasoned thinking will probably be one in which association by contiguity
holds almost exclusive sway.
Geniuses are, by common consent, considered to differ from ordinary minds
by an unusual development of association by similarity. One of Professor
Bain's best strokes of work is the exhibition of this truth.[334] It applies to
geniuses in the line of reasoning as well as in other lines. And as the genius
is to the vulgarian, so the vulgar human mind is to the intelligence of a
brute. Compared with men, it is probable that brutes neither attend to
abstract characters, nor have associations by similarity. Their thoughts
probably pass from one concrete object to its habitual concrete successor far
more uniformly than is the case with us. In other words, their associations

of ideas are almost exclusively by contiguity. It will clear up still farther our
understanding of the reasoning process, if we devote a few pages to
THE INTELLECTUAL CONTRAST BETWEEN BRUTE AND MAN.
I will first try to show, by taking the best stories I can find of animal
sagacity, that the mental process involved may as a rule be perfectly
accounted for by mere contiguous association, based on experience. Mr.
Darwin, in his 'Descent of Man,' instances the Arctic dogs, described by Dr.
Hayes, who scatter, when drawing a sledge, as soon as the ice begins to
crack. This might be called by some an exercise of reason. The test would
be, Would the most intelligent Eskimo dogs that ever lived act so when
placed upon ice for the first time together? A band of men from the tropics
might do so easily. Recognizing cracking to be a sign of breaking, and
seizing immediately the partial character that the point of rupture is the
point of greatest strain, and that the massing of weight at a given point
concentrates there the strain, a Hindoo might quickly infer that scattering
would stop the cracking, and, by crying out to his comrades to disperse,
save the party from immersion. But in the dog's case we need only suppose
that they have individually experienced wet skins after cracking, that they
have often noticed cracking to begin when they were huddled together, and
that they have observed it to cease when they scattered. Naturally, therefore,
the sound would redintegrate all these former experiences, including that of
scattering, which latter they would promptly renew. It would be a case of
immediate suggestion or of that 'Logic of Recepts' as Mr. Romanes calls it,
of which we spoke above on p. 327.
A friend of the writer gave as a proof of the almost human intelligence of
his dog that he took him one day down to his boat on the shore, but found
the boat full of dirt and water. He remembered that the sponge was up at the
house, a third of a mile distant; but, disliking to go back himself, he made
various gestures of wiping out the boat and so forth, saying to his terrier,
"Sponge, sponge; go fetch the sponge." But he had little expectation of a
result, since the dog had never received the slightest training with the boat
or the sponge. Nevertheless, off he trotted to the house, and, to his owner's
great surprise and admiration, brought the sponge in his jaws. Sagacious as
this was, it required nothing but ordinary contiguous association of ideas.

The terrier was only exceptional in the minuteness of his spontaneous
observation. Most terriers would have taken no interest in the boat-cleaning
operation, nor noticed what the sponge was for. This terrier, in having
picked those details out of the crude mass of his boat-experience distinctly
enough to be reminded of them, was truly enough ahead of his peers on the
line which leads to human reason. But his act was not yet an act of
reasoning proper. It might fairly have been called so if, unable to find the
sponge at the house, he had brought back a dipper or a mop instead. Such a
substitution would have shown that, embedded in the very different
appearances of these articles, he had been able to discriminate the identical
partial attribute of capacity to take up water, and had reflected, "For the
present purpose they are identical." This, which the dog did not do, any man
but the very stupidest could not fail to do.
If the reader will take the trouble to analyze the best dog and elephant
stories he knows, he will find that, in most cases, this simple contiguous
calling up of one whole by another is quite sufficient to explain the
phenomena. Sometimes, it is true, we have to suppose the recognition of a
property or character as such, but it is then always a character which the
peculiar practical interests of the animal may have singled out. A dog,
noticing his master's hat on its peg, may possibly infer that he has not gone
out. Intelligent dogs recognize by the tone of the master's voice whether the
latter is angry or not. A dog will perceive whether you have kicked him by
accident or by design, and behave accordingly. The character inferred by
him, the particular mental state in you, however it be represented in his
mind—it is represented probably by a 'recept' (p. 327) or set of practical
tendencies, rather than by a definite concept or idea—is still a partial
character extracted from the totality of your phenomenal being, and is his
reason for crouching and skulking, or playing with you. Dogs, moreover,
seem to have the feeling of the value of their master's personal property, or
at least a particular interest in objects which their master uses. A dog left
with his master's coat will defend it, though never taught to do so. I know of
a dog accustomed to swim after sticks in the water, but who always refused
to dive for stones. Nevertheless, when a fish-basket, which he had never
been trained to carry, but merely knew as his master's, fell over, he
immediately dived after it and brought it up. Dogs thus discern, at any rate
so far as to be able to act, this partial character of being valuable, which lies
hidden in certain things.[335] Stories are told of dogs carrying coppers to

pastry-cooks to get buns, and it is said that a certain dog, if he gave two
coppers, would never leave without two buns. This was probably mere
contiguous association, but it is possible that the animal noticed the
character of duality, and identified it as the same in the coin and the cake. If
so, it is the maximum of canine abstract thinking. Another story told to the
writer is this: a dog was sent to a lumber-camp to fetch a wedge, with which
he was known to be acquainted. After half an hour, not returning, he was
sought and found biting and tugging at the handle of an axe which was
driven deeply into a stump. The wedge could not be found. The teller of the
story thought that the dog must have had a clear perception of the common
character of serving to split which was involved in both the instruments,
and, from their identity in this respect, inferred their identity for the
purposes required.
It cannot be denied that this interpretation is a possible one, but it seems to
me far to transcend the limits of ordinary canine abstraction. The property
in question was not one which had direct personal interest for the dog, such
as that of belonging to his master is in the case of the coat or the basket. If
the dog in the sponge story had returned to the boat with a dipper it would
have been no more remarkable. It seems more probable, therefore, that this
wood-cutter's dog had also been accustomed to carry the axe, and now,
excited by the vain hunt for the wedge, had discharged his carrying powers
upon the former instrument in a sort of confusion—just as a man may pick
up a sieve to carry water in, in the excitement of putting out a fire.[336]
Thus, then, the characters extracted by animals are very few, and always
related to their immediate interests or emotions. That dissociation by
varying concomitants, which in man is based so largely on association by
similarity, hardly seems to take place at all in the mind of brutes. One total
thought suggests to them another total thought, and they find themselves
acting with propriety, they know not why. The great, the fundamental,
defect of their minds seems to be the inability of their groups of ideas to
break across in unaccustomed places. They are enslaved to routine, to cutand-dried thinking; and if the most prosaic of human beings could be
transported into his dog's mind, he would be appalled at the utter absence of
fancy which reigns there.[337] Thoughts will not be found to call up their
similars, but only their habitual successors. Sunsets will not suggest heroes'
deaths, but supper-time. This is why man is the only metaphysical animal.

To wonder why the universe should be as it is presupposes the notion of its
being different, and a brute, which never reduces the actual to fluidity by
breaking up its literal sequences in his imagination, can never form such a
notion. He takes the world simply for granted, and never wonders at it at all.
Professor Strümpell quotes a dog-story which is probably a type of many
others. The feat performed looks like abstract reasoning; but an
acquaintance with all the circumstances shows it to have been a random
trick learned by habit. The story is as follows:
"I have two dogs, a small, long-legged pet dog and a rather large
watch-dog. Immediately beyond the house-court is the garden, into
which one enters through a low lattice-gate which is closed by a latch
on the yard-side. This latch is opened by lifting it. Besides this,
moreover, the gate is fastened on the garden-side by a string nailed to
the gate-post. Here, as often as one wished, could the following sight
be observed. If the little dog was shut in the garden and he wished to
get out, he placed himself before the gate and barked. Immediately the
large dog in the court would hasten to him and raise the latch with his
nose while the little dog on the garden-side leaped up and, catching the
string in his teeth, bit it through; whereupon the big one wedged his
snout between the gate and the post, pushed the gate open, and the
little dog slipped through. Certainly reasoning seems here to prevail. In
face of it, however, and although the dogs arrived of themselves, and
without human aid, at their solution of the gate question, I am able to
point out that the complete action was pieced together out of accidental
experiences which the dogs followed, I might say, unconsciously.
While the large dog was young, he was allowed, like the little one, to
go into the garden, and therefore the gate was usually not latched, but
simply closed. Now if he saw anyone go in, he would follow by
thrusting his snout between gate and post, and so pushing the gate
open. When he was grown I forbade his being taken in, and had the
gate kept latched. But he naturally still tried to follow when anyone
entered and tried in the old fashion to open it, which he could no
longer do. Now it fell out that once, while making the attempt, he
raised his nose higher than usual and hit the latch from below so as to
lift it off its hook, and the gate unclosed. From thenceforth he made the
same movement of the head when trying to open it, and, of course,

with the same result. He now knew how to open the gate when it was
latched.
"The little dog had been the large one's teacher in many things,
especially in the chasing of cats and the catching of mice and moles; so
when the little one was heard barking eagerly, the other always
hastened to him. If the barking came from the garden, he opened the
gate to get inside. But meanwhile the little dog, who wanted to get out
the moment the gate opened, slipped out between the big one's legs,
and so the appearance of his having come with the intention of letting
him out arose. And that it was simply an appearance transpired from
the fact that when the little dog did not succeed at once in getting out,
the large one ran in and nosed about the garden, plainly showing that
he had expected to find something there. In order to stop this opening
of the gate I fastened a string on the garden-side which, tightly drawn,
held the gate firm against the post, so that if the yard dog raised the
latch and let go, it would every time fall back on to the hook. And this
device was successful for quite a time, until it happened one day that
on my return from a walk upon which the little dog had accompanied
me I crossed the garden, and in passing through the gate the dog
remained behind, and refused to come to my whistle. As it was
beginning to rain, and I knew how he disliked to get wet, I closed the
gate in order to punish him in this manner. But I had hardly readied the
house ere he was before the gate, whining and crying most piteously,
for the rain was falling faster and faster. The big dog, to whom the rain
was a matter of perfect indifference, was instantly on hand and tried
his utmost to open the gate, but naturally without success. Almost in
despair the little dog bit at the gate, at the same time springing into the
air in the attempt to jump over it, when he chanced to catch the string
in his teeth; it broke, and the gate flew open. Now he knew the secret
and thenceforth bit the string whenever he wished to get out, so that I
was obliged to change it.
"That the big dog in raising the latch did not in the least know that the
latch closed the gate, that the raising of the same opened it, but that he
merely repeated the automatic blow with his snout which had once had
such happy consequences, transpires from the following: the gate
leading to the barn is fastened with a latch precisely like the one on the

garden-gate, only placed a little higher, still easily within the dog's
reach. Here, too, occasionally the little dog is confined, and when he
barks the big one makes every possible effort to open the gate, but it
has never occurred to him to push the latch up. The brute cannot draw
conclusions, that is, he cannot think."[338]
Other classical differentiæ of man besides that of being the only reasoning
animal, also seem consequences of his unrivalled powers of similar
association. He has, e.g., been called 'the laughing animal.' But humor has
often been defined as the recognition of identities in things different. When
the man in Coriolanus says of that hero that "there is no more mercy in him
than there is milk in a male tiger," both the invention of the phrase and its
enjoyment by the hearer depend on a peculiarly perplexing power to
associate ideas by similarity.
Man is known again as 'the talking animal'; and language is assuredly a
capital distinction between man and brute. But it may readily be shown how
this distinction merely flows from those we have pointed out, easy
dissociation of a representation into its ingredients, and association by
similarity.
Language is a system of signs, different from the things signified, but able
to suggest them.
No doubt brutes have a number of such signs. When a dog yelps in front of
a door, and his master, understanding his desire, opens it, the dog may, after
a certain number of repetitions, get to repeat in cold blood a yelp which was
at first the involuntary interjectional expression of strong emotion. The
same dog may be taught to 'beg' for food, and afterwards come to do so
deliberately when hungry. The dog also learns to understand the signs of
men, and the word 'rat' uttered to a terrier suggests exciting thoughts of the
rat-hunt. If the dog had the varied impulse to vocal utterance which some
other animals have, he would probably repeat the word 'rat' whenever he
spontaneously happened to think of a rat-hunt—he no doubt does have it as
an auditory image, just as a parrot calls out different words spontaneously
from its repertory, and having learned the name of a given dog will utter it
on the sight of a different dog. In each of these separate cases the particular
sign may be consciously noticed by the animal, as distinct from the
particular thing signified, and will thus, so far as it goes, be a true

manifestation of language. But when we come to man we find a great
difference. He has a deliberate intention to apply a sign to everything. The
linguistic impulse is with him generalized and systematic. For things
hitherto unnoticed or unfelt, he desires a sign before he has one. Even
though the dog should possess his 'yelp' for this thing, his 'beg' for that, and
his auditory image 'rat' for a third thing, the matter with him rests there. If a
fourth thing interests him for which no sign happens already to have been
learned, he remains tranquilly without it and goes no further. But the man
postulates it, its absence irritates him, and he ends by inventing it. This
GENERAL PURPOSE constitutes, I take it, the peculiarity of human speech, and
explains its prodigious development.
How, then, does the general purpose arise? It arises as soon as the notion of
a sign as such, apart from any particular import, is born; and this notion is
born by dissociation from the outstanding portions of a number of concrete
cases of signification. The 'yelp,' the 'beg,' the 'rat,' differ as to their several
imports and natures. They agree only in so far as they have the same use—
to be signs, to stand for something more important than themselves. The
dog whom this similarity could strike would have grasped the sign per se as
such, and would probably thereupon become a general sign-maker, or
speaker in the human sense. But how can the similarity strike him? Not
without the juxtaposition of the similars (in virtue of the law we have laid
down (Vol. I. p. 506), that in order to be segregated an experience must be
repeated with varying concomitants)—not unless the 'yelp' of the dog at the
moment it occurs recalls to him his 'beg,' by the delicate bond of their
subtle similarity of use—not till then can this thought flash through his
mind: "Why, yelp and beg, in spite of all their unlikeness, are yet alike in
this: that they are actions, signs, which lead to important boons. Other
boons, any boons, may then be got by other signs!" This reflection made,
the gulf is passed. Animals probably never make it, because the bond of
similarity is not delicate enough. Each sign is drowned in its import, and
never awakens other signs and other imports in juxtaposition. The rat-hunt
idea is too absorbingly interesting in itself to be interrupted by anything so
uncontiguous to it as the idea of the 'beg for food,' or of 'the door-open
yelp,' nor in their turn do these awaken the rat-hunt idea.
In the human child, however, these ruptures of contiguous association are
very soon made; far off cases of sign-using arise when we make a sign now;

and soon language is launched. The child in each case makes the discovery
for himself. No one can help him except by furnishing him with the
conditions. But as he is constituted, the conditions will sooner or later shoot
together into the result.[339]
The exceedingly interesting account which Dr. Howe gives of the education
of his various blind-deaf mutes illustrates this point admirably. He began to
teach Laura Bridgman by gumming raised letters on various familiar
articles. The child was taught by mere contiguity to pick out a certain
number of particular articles when made to feel the letters. But this was
merely a collection of particular signs, out of the mass of which the general
purpose of signification had not yet been extracted by the child's mind. Dr.
Howe compares his situation at this moment to that of one lowering a line
to the bottom of the deep sea in which Laura's soul lay, and waiting until
she should spontaneously take hold of it and be raised into the light. The
moment came, 'accompanied by a radiant flash of intelligence and glow of
joy'; she seemed suddenly to become aware of the general purpose
imbedded in the different details of all these signs, and from that moment
her education went on with extreme rapidity.
Another of the great capacities in which man has been said to differ
fundamentally from the animal is that of possessing self-consciousness or
reflective knowledge of himself as a thinker. But this capacity also flows
from our criterion, for (without going into the matter very deeply) we may
say that the brute never reflects on himself as a thinker, because he has
never clearly dissociated, in the full concrete act of thought, the element of
the thing thought of and the operation by which he thinks it. They remain
always fused, conglomerated—just as the interjectional vocal sign of the
brute almost invariably merges in his mind with the thing signified, and is
not independently attended to in se.[340]
Now, the dissociation of these two elements probably occurs first in the
child's mind on the occasion of some error or false expectation which would
make him experience the shock of difference between merely imagining a
thing and getting it. The thought experienced once with the concomitant
reality, and then without it or with opposite concomitants, reminds the child
of other cases in which the same provoking phenomenon occurred. Thus the
general ingredient of error may be dissociated and noticed per se, and from
the notion of his error or wrong thought to that of his thought in general the

transition is easy. The brute, no doubt, has plenty of instances of error and
disappointment in his life, but the similar shock is in him most likely
always swallowed up in the accidents of the actual case. An expectation
disappointed may breed dubiety as to the realization of that particular thing
when the dog next expects it. But that disappointment, that dubiety, while
they are present in the mind, will not call up other cases, in which the
material details were different, but this feature of possible error was the
same. The brute will, therefore, stop short of dissociating the general notion
of error per se, and a fortiori will never attain the conception of Thought
itself as such.

We may then, we think, consider it proven that the most elementary single
difference between the human mind and that of brutes lies in this deficiency
on the brute's part to associate ideas by similarity—characters, the
abstraction of which depends on this sort of association, must in the brute
always remain drowned, swamped in the total phenomenon which they help
constitute, and never used to reason from. If a character stands out alone, it
is always some obvious sensible quality like a sound or a smell which is
instinctively exciting and lies in the line of the animal's propensities; or it is
some obvious sign which experience has habitually coupled with a
consequence, such as, for the dog, the sight of his master's hat on and the
master's going out.
DIFFERENT ORDERS OF HUMAN GENIUS.
But, now, since nature never makes a jump, it is evident that we should find
the lowest men occupying in this respect an intermediate position between
the brutes and the highest men. And so we do. Beyond the analogies which
their own minds suggest by breaking up the literal sequence of their
experience, there is a whole world of analogies which they can appreciate
when imparted to them by their betters, but which they could never
excogitate alone. This answers the question why Darwin and Newton had to
be waited for so long. The flash of similarity between an apple and the
moon, between the rivalry for food in nature and the rivalry for man's

selection, was too recondite to have occurred to any but exceptional minds.
Genius, then, as has been already said, is identical with the possession of
similar association to an extreme degree. Professor Bain says: "This I count
the leading fact of genius. I consider it quite impossible to afford any
explanation of intellectual originality except on the supposition of unusual
energy on this point." Alike in the arts, in literature, in practical affairs, and
in science, association by similarity is the prime condition of success.
But as, according to our view, there are two stages in reasoned thought, one
where similarity merely operates to call up cognate thoughts, and another
farther stage, where the bond of identity between the cognate thoughts is
noticed; so minds of genius may be divided into two main sorts, those who
notice the bond and those who merely obey it. The first are the abstract
reasoners, properly so called, the men of science, and philosophers—the
analysts, in a word; the latter are the poets, the critics—the artists, in a
word, the men of intuitions. These judge rightly, classify cases, characterize
them by the most striking analogic epithets, but go no further. At first sight
it might seem that the analytic mind represented simply a higher intellectual
stage, and that the intuitive mind represented an arrested stage of
intellectual development; but the difference is not so simple as this.
Professor Bain has said that a man's advance to the scientific stage (the
stage of noticing and abstracting the bond of similarity) may often be due to
an absence of certain emotional sensibilities. The sense of color, he says,
may no less determine a mind away from science than it determines it
toward painting. There must be a penury in one's interest in the details of
particular forms in order to permit the forces of the intellect to be
concentrated on what is common to many forms.[341] In other words,
supposing a mind fertile in the suggestion of analogies, but, at the same
time, keenly interested in the particulars of each suggested image, that mind
would be far less apt to single out the particular character which called up
the analogy than one whose interests were less generally lively. A certain
richness of the æsthetic nature may, therefore, easily keep one in the
intuitive stage. All the poets are examples of this. Take Homer:
"Ulysses, too, spied round the house to see if any man were still alive
and hiding, trying to get away from gloomy death. He found them all
fallen in the blood and dirt, and in such number as the fish which the
fishermen to the low shore, out of the foaming sea, drag with their

meshy nets. These all, sick for the ocean water, are strewn around the
sands, while the blazing sun takes their life from them. So there the
suitors lay strewn round on one another." Or again:
"And as when a Mæonian or a Carian woman stains ivory with purple
to be a cheek-piece for horses, and it is kept in the chamber, and many
horsemen have prayed to bear it off; but it is kept a treasure for a king,
both a trapping for his horse and a glory to the driver—in such wise
were thy stout thighs, Menelaos, and legs and fair ankles stained with
blood."[342]
A man in whom all the accidents of an analogy rise up as vividly as this,
may be excused for not attending to the ground of the analogy. But he need
not on that account be deemed intellectually the inferior of a man of drier
mind, in whom the ground is not as liable to be eclipsed by the general
splendor. Barely are both sorts of intellect, the splendid and the analytic,
found in conjunction. Plato among philosophers, and M. Taine, who cannot
quote a child's saying without describing the 'voix chantante, étonnée,
heureuse' in which it is uttered, are only exceptions whose strangeness
proves the rule.
An often-quoted writer has said that Shakespeare possessed more
intellectual power than any one else that ever lived. If by this he meant the
power to pass from given premises to right or congruous conclusions, it is
no doubt true. The abrupt transitions in Shakespeare's thought astonish the
reader by their unexpectedness no less than they delight him by their
fitness. Why, for instance, does the death of Othello so stir the spectator's
blood and leave him with a sense of reconcilement? Shakespeare himself
could very likely not say why; for his invention, though rational, was not
ratiocinative. Wishing the curtain to fall upon a reinstated Othello, that
speech about the turbaned Turk suddenly simply flashed across him as the
right end of all that went before. The dry critic who comes after can,
however, point out the subtle bonds of identity that guided Shakespeare's
pen through that speech to the death of the Moor. Othello is sunk in
ignominy, lapsed from his height at the beginning of the play. What better
way to rescue him at last from this abasement than to make him for an
instant identify himself in memory with the old Othello of better days, and
then execute justice on his present disowned body, as he used then to smite

all enemies of the State? But Shakespeare, whose mind supplied these
means, could probably not have told why they were so effective.
But though this is true, and though it would be absurd in an absolute way to
say that a given analytic mind was superior to any intuitional one, yet it is
none the less true that the former represents the higher stage. Men, taken
historically, reason by analogy long before they have learned to reason by
abstract characters. Association by similarity and true reasoning may have
identical results. If a philosopher wishes to prove to you why you should do
a certain thing, he may do so by using abstract considerations exclusively; a
savage will prove the same by reminding you of a similar case in which you
notoriously do as he now proposes, and this with no ability to state the point
in which the cases are similar. In all primitive literature, in all savage
oratory, we find persuasion carried on exclusively by parables and similes,
and travellers in savage countries readily adopt the native custom. Take, for
example, Dr. Livingstone's argument with the negro conjuror. The
missionary was trying to dissuade the savage from his fetichistic ways of
invoking rain. "You see," said he, "that, after all your operations, sometimes
it rains and sometimes it does not, exactly as when you have not operated at
all." "But," replied the sorcerer, "it is just the same with you doctors; you
give your remedies, and sometimes the patient gets well and sometimes he
dies, just as when you do nothing at all." To that the pious missionary
replied: "The doctor does his duty, after which God performs the cure if it
pleases Him." "Well," rejoined the savage, "it is just so with me. I do what
is necessary to procure rain, after which God sends it or withholds it
according to His pleasure."[343]
This is the stage in which proverbial philosophy reigns supreme. "An empty
sack can't stand straight" will stand for the reason why a man with debts
may lose his honesty; and "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush" will
serve to back up one's exhortations to prudence. Or we answer the question:
"Why is snow white?" by saying, "For the same reason that soap-suds or
whipped eggs are white"—in other words, instead of giving the reason for a
fact, we give another example of the same fact. This offering a similar
instance, instead of a reason, has often been criticised as one of the forms of
logical depravity in men. But manifestly it is not a perverse act of thought,
but only an incomplete one. Furnishing parallel cases is the necessary first
step towards abstracting the reason imbedded in them all.

As it is with reasons, so it is with words. The first words are probably
always names of entire things and entire actions, of extensive coherent
groups. A new experience in the primitive man can only be talked about by
him in terms of the old experiences which have received names. It reminds
him of certain ones from among them, but the points in which it agrees with
them are neither named nor dissociated. Pure similarity must work before
the abstraction can work which is based upon it. The first adjectives will
therefore probably be total nouns embodying the striking character. The
primeval man will say, not 'the bread is hard,' but 'the bread is stone'; not
'the face is round,' but 'the face is moon'; not 'the fruit is sweet,' but 'the fruit
is sugar-cane.' The first words are thus neither particular nor general, but
vaguely concrete; just as we speak of an 'oval' face, a 'velvet' skin, or an
'iron' will, without meaning to connote any other attributes of the adjectivenoun than those in which it does resemble the noun it is used to qualify.
After a while certain of these adjectively-used nouns come only to signify
the particular quality for whose sake they are oftenest used; the entire thing
which they originally meant receives another name, and they become true
abstract and general terms. Oval, for example, with us suggests only shape.
The first abstract qualities thus formed are, no doubt, qualities of one and
the same sense found in different objects—as big, sweet; next analogies
between different senses, as 'sharp' of taste, 'high' of sound, etc.; then
analogies of motor combinations, or form of relation, as simple, confused,
difficult, reciprocal, relative, spontaneous, etc. The extreme degree of
subtlety in analogy is reached in such cases as when we say certain English
art critics' writing reminds us of a close room in which pastilles have been
burning, or that the mind of certain Frenchmen is like old Roquefort cheese.
Here language utterly fails to hit upon the basis of resemblance.
Over immense departments of our thought we are still, all of us, in the
savage state. Similarity operates in us, but abstraction has not taken place.
We know what the present case is like, we know what it reminds us of, we
have an intuition of the right course to take, if it be a practical matter. But
analytic thought has made no tracks, and we cannot justify ourselves to
others. In ethical, psychological, and æsthetic matters, to give a clear reason
for one's judgment is universally recognized as a mark of rare genius. The
helplessness of uneducated people to account for their likes and dislikes is
often ludicrous. Ask the first Irish girl why she likes this country better or
worse than her home, and see how much she can tell you. But if you ask

your most educated friend why he prefers Titian to Paul Veronese, you will
hardly get more of a reply; and you will probably get absolutely none if you
inquire why Beethoven reminds him of Michael Angelo, or how it comes
that a bare figure with unduly flexed joints, by the latter, can so suggest the
moral tragedy of life. His thought obeys a nexus, but cannot name it. And so
it is with all those judgments of experts, which even though unmotived are
so valuable. Saturated with experience of a particular class of materials, an
expert intuitively feels whether a newly-reported fact is probable or not,
whether a proposed hypothesis is worthless or the reverse. He instinctively
knows that, in a novel case, this and not that will be the promising course of
action. The well-known story of the old judge advising the new one never
to give reasons for his decisions, "the decisions will probably be right, the
reasons will surely be wrong," illustrates this. The doctor will feel that the
patient is doomed, the dentist will have a premonition that the tooth will
break, though neither can articulate a reason for his foreboding. The reason
lies imbedded, but not yet laid bare, in all the countless previous cases
dimly suggested by the actual one, all calling up the same conclusion,
which the adept thus finds himself swept on to, he knows not how or why.

A physiological conclusion remains to be drawn. If the principles laid down
in Chapter XIV are true, then it follows that the great cerebral difference
between habitual and reasoned thinking must be this: that in the former an
entire system of cells vibrating at any one moment discharges in its totality
into another entire system, and that the order of the discharges tends to be a
constant one in time; whilst in the latter a part of the prior system still keeps
vibrating in the midst of the subsequent system, and the order—which part
this shall be, and what shall be its concomitants in the subsequent system—
has little tendency to fixedness in time. This physical selection, so to call it,
of one part to vibrate persistently whilst the others rise and subside, we
found, in the chapter in question, to be the basis of similar association. (See
especially Vol. I. pp. 578-81.) It would seem to be but a minor degree of
that still more urgent and importunate localized vibration which we can
easiest conceive to underlie the mental fact of interest, attention, or
dissociation. In terms of the brain-process, then, all these mental facts

resolve themselves into a single peculiarity: that of indeterminateness of
connection between the different tracts, and tendency of action to focalize
itself, so to speak, in small localities which vary infinitely at different times,
and from which irradiation may proceed in countless shifting ways.
(Compare figure 80, p. 347.) To discover, or (what more befits the present
stage of nerve-physiology) to adumbrate by some possible guess, on what
chemical or molecular-mechanical fact this instable equilibrium of the
human brain may depend, should be the next task of the physiologist who
ponders over the passage from brute to man. Whatever the physical
peculiarity in question may be, it is the cause why a man, whose brain has
it, reasons so much, whilst his horse, whose brain lacks it, reasons so little.
We can but bequeath the problem to abler hands than our own.
But, meanwhile, this mode of stating the matter suggests a couple of other
inferences. The first is brief. If focalization of brain-activity be the
fundamental fact of reasonable thought, we see why intense interest or
concentrated passion makes us think so much more truly and profoundly.
The persistent focalization of motion in certain tracts is the cerebral fact
corresponding to the persistent domination in consciousness of the
important feature of the subject. When not 'focalized,' we are scatterbrained; but when thoroughly impassioned, we never wander from the
point. None but congruous and relevant images arise. When roused by
indignation or moral enthusiasm, how trenchant are our reflections, how
smiting are our words! The whole network of petty scruples and byconsiderations which, at ordinary languid times, surrounded the matter like
a cobweb, holding back our thought, as Gulliver was pinned to the earth by
the myriad Lilliputian threads, are dashed through at a blow, and the subject
stands with its essential and vital lines revealed.

The last point is relative to the theory that what was acquired habit in the
ancestor may become congenital tendency in the offspring. So vast a
superstructure is raised upon this principle that the paucity of empirical
evidence for it has alike been matter of regret to its adherents, and of
triumph to its opponents. In Chapter XXVIII we shall see what we may call
the whole beggarly array of proof. In the human race, where our

opportunities for observation are the most complete, we seem to have no
evidence whatever which would support the hypothesis, unless it possibly
be the law that city-bred children are more apt to be near-sighted than
country children. In the mental world we certainly do not observe that the
children of great travellers get their geography lessons with unusual ease, or
that a baby whose ancestors have spoken German for thirty generations
will, on that account, learn Italian any the less easily from its Italian nurse.
But if the considerations we have been led to are true, they explain perfectly
well why this law should not be verified in the human race, and why,
therefore, in looking for evidence on the subject, we should confine
ourselves exclusively to lower animals. In them fixed habit is the essential
and characteristic law of nervous action. The brain grows to the exact
modes in which it has been exercised, and the inheritance of these modes—
then called instincts—would have in it nothing surprising. But in man the
negation of all fixed modes is the essential characteristic. He owes his
whole pre-eminence as a reasoner, his whole human quality of intellect, we
may say, to the facility with which a given mode of thought in him may
suddenly be broken up into elements, which recombine anew. Only at the
price of inheriting no settled instinctive tendencies is he able to settle every
novel case by the fresh discovery by his reason of novel principles. He is,
par excellence, the educable animal. If, then, the law that habits are
inherited were found exemplified in him, he would, in so far forth, fall short
of his human perfections; and, when we survey the human races, we
actually do find that those which are most instinctive at the outset are those
which, on the whole, are least educated in the end. An untutored Italian is,
to a great extent, a man of the world; he has instinctive perceptions,
tendencies to behavior, reactions, in a word, upon his environment, which
the untutored German wholly lacks. If the latter be not drilled, he is apt to
be a thoroughly loutish personage; but, on the other hand, the mere absence
in his brain of definite innate tendencies enables him to advance by the
development, through education, of his purely reasoned thinking, into
complex regions of consciousness that the Italian may probably never
approach.
We observe an identical difference between men as a whole and women as a
whole. A young woman of twenty reacts with intuitive promptitude and
security in all the usual circumstances in which she may be placed.[344] Her
likes and dislikes are formed; her opinions, to a great extent, the same that

they will be through life. Her character is, in fact, finished in its essentials.
How inferior to her is a boy of twenty in all these respects! His character is
still gelatinous, uncertain what shape to assume, 'trying it on' in every
direction. Feeling his power, yet ignorant of the manner in which he shall
express it, he is, when compared with his sister, a being of no definite
contour. But this absence of prompt tendency in his brain to set into
particular modes is the very condition which insures that it shall ultimately
become so much more efficient than the woman's. The very lack of
preappointed trains of thought is the ground on which general principles
and heads of classification grow up; and the masculine brain deals with new
and complex matter indirectly by means of these, in a manner which the
feminine method of direct intuition, admirably and rapidly as it performs
within its limits, can vainly hope to cope with.

In looking back over the subject of reasoning, one feels how intimately
connected it is with conception; and one realizes more than ever the deep
reach of that principle of selection on which so much stress was laid
towards the close of Chapter IX. As the art of reading (after a certain stage
in one's education) is the art of skipping, so the art of being wise is the art
of knowing what to overlook. The first effect on the mind of growing
cultivated is that processes once multiple get to be performed by a single
act. Lazarus has called this the progressive 'condensation' of thought. But in
the psychological sense it is less a condensation than a loss, a genuine
dropping out and throwing overboard of conscious content. Steps really
sink from sight. An advanced thinker sees the relations of his topics in such
masses and so instantaneously that when he comes to explain to younger
minds it is often hard to say which grows the more perplexed, he or the
pupil. In every university there are admirable investigators who are
notoriously bad lecturers. The reason is that they never spontaneously see
the subject in the minute articulate way in which the student needs to have
it offered to his slow reception. They grope for the links, but the links do
not come. Bowditch, who translated and annotated Laplace's Mécanique
Céleste, said that whenever his author prefaced a proposition by the words
'it is evident,' he knew that many hours of hard study lay before him.

When two minds of a high order, interested in kindred subjects, come
together, their conversation is chiefly remarkable for the summariness of its
allusions and the rapidity of its transitions. Before one of them is half
through a sentence the other knows his meaning and replies. Such genial
play with such massive materials, such an easy flashing of light over far
perspectives, such careless indifference to the dust and apparatus that
ordinarily surround the subject and seem to pertain to its essence, make
these conversations seem true feasts for gods to a listener who is educated
enough to follow them at all. His mental lungs breathe more deeply, in an
atmosphere more broad and vast than is their wont. On the other hand, the
excessive explicitness and short-windedness of an ordinary man are as
wonderful as they are tedious to the man of genius. But we need not go as
far as the ways of genius. Ordinary social intercourse will do. There the
charm of conversation is in direct proportion to the possibility of
abridgment and elision, and in inverse ratio to the need of explicit
statement. With old friends a word stands for a whole story or set of
opinions. With new-comers everything must be gone over in detail. Some
persons have a real mania for completeness, they must express every step.
They are the most intolerable of companions, and although their mental
energy may in its way be great, they always strike us as weak and secondrate. In short, the essence of plebeianism, that which separates vulgarity
from aristocracy, is perhaps less a defect than an excess, the constant need
to animadvert upon matters which for the aristocratic temperament do not
exist. To ignore, to disdain to consider, to overlook, are the essence of the
'gentleman.' Often most provokingly so; for the things ignored may be of
the deepest moral consequence. But in the very midst of our indignation
with the gentleman, we have a consciousness that his preposterous inertia
and negativeness in the actual emergency is, somehow or other, allied with
his general superiority to ourselves. It is not only that the gentleman ignores
considerations relative to conduct, sordid suspicions, fears, calculations,
etc., which the vulgarian is fated to entertain; it is that he is silent where the
vulgarian talks; that he gives nothing but results where the vulgarian is
profuse of reasons; that he does not explain or apologize; that he uses one
sentence instead of twenty; and that, in a word, there is an amount of
interstitial thinking, so to call it, which it is quite impossible to get him to
perform, but which is nearly all that the vulgarian mind performs at all. All
this suppression of the secondary leaves the field clear,—for higher flights,

should they choose to come. But even if they never came, what thoughts
there were would still manifest the aristocratic type and wear the well-bred
form. So great is our sense of harmony and ease in passing from the
company of a philistine to that of an aristocratic temperament, that we are
almost tempted to deem the falsest views and tastes as held by a man of the
world, truer than the truest as held by a common person. In the latter the
best ideas are choked, obstructed, and contaminated by the redundancy of
their paltry associates. The negative conditions, at least, of an atmosphere
and a free outlook are present in the former.
I may appear to have strayed from psychological analysis into æsthetic
criticism. But the principle of selection is so important that no illustrations
seem redundant which may help to show how great is its scope. The upshot
of what I say simply is that selection implies rejection as well as choice;
and that the function of ignoring, of inattention, is as vital a factor in mental
progress as the function of attention itself.

[319] The substance of this chapter, and a good many pages of the text, originally appeared in an
article entitled 'Brute and Human Intellect,' in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy for July 1878
(vol. xii. p. 236).
[320] I see no need of assuming more than two terms in this sort of reasoning—first, the sign, and
second, the thing inferred from it. Either may be complex, but essentially it is but A calling up B, and
no middle term is involved. M. Binet, in his most intelligent little book, La Psychologie du
Raisonnement, maintains that there are three terms. The present sensation or sign must, according to
him, first evoke from the past an image which resembles it and fuses with it, and the things suggested
or inferred are always the contiguous associates of this intermediate image, and not of the immediate
sensation. The reader of Chapter XIX will see why I do not believe in the 'image' in question as a
distinct psychic fact.
[321] Mental Evolution in Man (1889), chapters iii and iv. See especially pp. 68-80, and later 353,
396.
[322] Loc. cit. p. 50.
[323] P. 52.
[324] Loc. cit. p. 74.
[325] J. Locke, Essay conc. Hum. Understanding, bk. iv. chap. ii. § 3.
[326] To be sagacious is to be a good observer. J. S. Mill has a passage which is so much in the spirit
of the text that I cannot forbear to quote it. "The observer is not he who merely sees the thing which is
before his eyes, but he who sees what parts that thing is composed of. To do this well is a rare talent.
One person, from inattention, or attending only in the wrong place, overlooks half of what he sees;
another sets down much more than he sees, confounding it with what he imagines, or with what he
infers; another takes note of the kind of all the circumstances, but being inexpert in estimating their
degree, leaves the quantity of each vague and uncertain; another sees indeed the whole, but makes
such an awkward division of it into parts, throwing things into one mass which require to be separated,
and separating others which might more conveniently be considered as one, that the result is much the
same, sometimes even worse, than if no analysis had been attempted at all. It would be possible to
point out what qualities of mind, and modes of mental culture, fit a person for being a good observer:
that, however, is a question not of Logic, but of the Theory of Education, in the most enlarged sense of
the term. There is not properly an Art of Observing. There may be rules for observing. But these, like
rules for inventing, are properly instructions for the preparation of one's own mind; for putting it into
the state in which it will be most fitted to observe, or most likely to invent. They are, therefore,
essentially rules of self-education, which is a different thing from Logic. They do not teach how to do
the thing, but how to make ourselves capable of doing it. They are an art of strengthening the limbs,
not an art of using them. The extent and minuteness of observation which may be requisite, and the
degree of decomposition to which it may be necessary to carry the mental analysis, depend on the
particular purpose in view. To ascertain the state of the whole universe at any particular moment is
impossible, but would also be useless. In making chemical experiments, we do not think it necessary
to note the position of the planets; because experience has shown, as a very superficial experience is
sufficient to show, that in such cases that circumstance is not material to the result: and accordingly, in
the ages when man believed in the occult influences of the heavenly bodies, it might have been
unphilosophical to omit ascertaining the precise condition of those bodies at the moment of the
experiment." (Logic, bk. iii. chap. vii. § 1. Cf. also bk. iv. chap. ii.)
[327] Readers brought up on Popular Science may think that the molecular structure of things is their
real essence in an absolute sense, and that water is H-O-H more deeply and truly than it is a solvent of
sugar or a slaker of thirst. Not a whit! It is all of these things with equal reality, and the only reason
why for the chemist it is H-O-H primarily, and only secondarily the other things, is that for his purpose

of deduction and compendious definition, the H-O-H aspect of it is the more useful one to bear in
mind.
[328] "We find that we take for granted irresistibly that each kind [of thing] has some character which
distinguishes it from other classes.... What is the foundation of this postulate? What is the ground of
this assumption that there must exist a definition which we have never seen, and which perhaps no one
has seen in a satisfactory form?... I reply that our conviction that there must needs be characteristic
marks by which things can be defined in words is founded upon the assumption of the necessary
possibility of reasoning." (W. Whewell: Hist. of Scientific Ideas, bk. viii. chap. i, § 9.)
[329] I may quote a passage from an article entitled 'The Sentiment of Rationality,' published in vol. iv
of Mind, 1879: "What is a conception? It is a teleological instrument. It is a partial aspect of a thing
which for our purpose we regard as its essential aspect, as the representative of the entire thing. In
comparison with this aspect, whatever other properties and qualities the thing may have are
unimportant accidents which we may without blame ignore. But the essence, the ground of
conception, varies with the end we have in view. A substance like oil has as many different essences
as it has uses to different individuals. One man conceives it as a combustible, another as a lubricator,
another as a food; the chemist thinks of it as a hydrocarbon; the furniture-maker as a darkener of
wood; the speculator as a commodity whose market-price to-day is this and to-morrow that. The soapboiler, the physicist, the clothes-scourer severally ascribe to it other essences in relation to their needs.
Ueberweg's doctrine that the essential quality of a thing is the quality of most worth is strictly true; but
Ueberweg has failed to note that the worth is wholly relative to the temporary interests of the
conceiver. And, even, when his interest is distinctly defined in his own mind, the discrimination of the
quality in the object which has the closest connection with it is a thing which no rules can teach. The
only a priori advice that can be given to a man embarking on life with a certain purpose is the
somewhat barren counsel: Be sure that in the circumstances that meet you, you attend to the right ones
for your purpose. To pick out the right ones is the measure of the man. 'Millions,' says Hartmann,
'stare at the phenomenon before a genialer Kopf pounces on the concept.' The genius is simply he to
whom, when he opens his eyes upon the world, the 'right' characters are the prominent ones. The fool
is he who, with the same purposes as the genius, infallibly gets his attention tangled amid the
accidents."
[330] Only if one of our purposes were itself truer than another, could one of our conceptions become
the truer conception. To be a truer purpose, however, our purpose must conform more to some
absolute standard of purpose in things to which our purposes ought to conform. This shows that the
whole doctrine of essential characters is intimately bound up with a teleological view of the world.
Materialism becomes self-contradictory when it denies teleology, and yet in the same breath calls
atoms, etc., the essential facts. The world contains consciousness as well as atoms—and the one must
be written down as just as essential as the other, in the absence of any declared purpose regarding
them on the creator's part, or in the absence of any creator. As far as we ourselves go, the atoms are
worth more for purposes of deduction, the consciousness for purposes of inspiration. We may fairly
write the Universe in either way, thus: ATOMS-producing-consciousness; or CONSCIOUSNESS-producedby-atoms. Atoms alone, or consciousness alone, are precisely equal mutilations of the truth. If, without
believing in a God, I still continue to talk of what the world 'essentially is,' I am just as much entitled
to define it as a place in which my nose itches, or as a place where at a certain corner I can get a mess
of oysters for twenty cents, as to call it an evolving nebula differentiating and integrating itself. It is
hard to say which of the three abstractions is the more rotten or miserable substitute for the world's
concrete fulness. To conceive it merely as 'God's work' would be a similar mutilation of it, so long as
we said not what God, or what kind of work. The only real truth about the world, apart from particular
purposes, is the total truth.
[331] Compare Lotze, Metaphysik, §§ 58, 67, for some instructive remarks on ways in which the
world's constitution might differ from what it actually is. Compare also Chapter XXVIII.

[332] Sometimes, it must be confessed, the conceiver's purpose falls short of reasoning and the only
conclusion he cares to reach is the bare naming of the datum. "What is that?" is our first question
relative to any unknown thing. And the ease with which our curiosity is quenched as soon as we are
supplied with any sort of a name to call the object by, is ridiculous enough. To quote from an
unpublished essay by a former student of mine, Mr. R. W. Black: "The simplest end which a thing's
predicate can serve is the satisfaction of the desire for unity itself, the mere desire that the thing shall
be the same with something else. Why, the other day, when I mistook a portrait of Shakespeare for one
of Hawthorne, was I not, on psychological principles, as right as if I had correctly named it?—the two
pictures had a common essence, bald forehead, mustache, flowing hair. Simply because the only end
that could possibly be served by naming it Hawthorne was my desire to have it so. With reference to
any other end that classification of it would not serve. And every unity, every identity, every
classification is rightly called fanciful unless it serves some other end than the mere satisfaction,
emotion, or inspiration caught by momentarily believing in it."
[333] See above, p. 8.
[334] See his Study of Character, chap. xv; also Senses and Intellect, 'Intellect,' chap. ii, the latter half.
[335] Whether the dog has the notion of your being angry or of your property being valuable in any
such abstract way as we have these notions is more than doubtful. The conduct is more likely an
impulsive result of a conspiracy of outward stimuli; the beast feels like acting so when these stimuli
are present, though conscious of no definite reason why. The distinction of recept and concept is
useful here. Some breeds of dogs, e.g. collies, seem instinctively to defend their master's property. The
case is similar to that of a dog's barking at people after dark, at whom he would not bark in daylight. I
have heard this quoted as evidence of the dog's reasoning power. It is only, as Chapter III has shown
us, the impulsive result of a summation of stimuli, and has no connection with reasoning.
In certain stages of the hypnotic trance the subject seems to lapse into the non-analytic state. If a sheet
of ruled foolscap paper, or a paper with a fine monotonous ornamental pattern printed on it, be shown
to the subject, and one of the ruled lines or elements of the pattern be pointed to for an instant, and the
paper immediately removed, he will then almost always, when after a short interval the paper is
presented to him again, pick out the indicated line or element with infallible correctness. The operator,
meanwhile, has either to keep his eye fixed upon it, or to make sure of its position by counting, in
order not to lose its place. Just so we may remember a friend's house in a street by the single character
of its number rather than by its general look. The trance-subject would seem, in these instances, to
surrender himself to the general look. He disperses his attention impartially over the sheet. The place
of the particular line touched is part of a 'total effect' which he gets in its entirety, and which would be
distorted if another line were touched instead. This total effect is lost upon the normal looker-on, bent
as he is on concentration, analysis, and emphasis. What wonder, then, that, under these experimental
conditions, the trance-subject excels him in touching the right line again? If he has time given him to
count the line, he will excel the trance-subject; but if the time be too short to count, he will best
succeed by following the trance-method, abstaining from analysis, and being guided by the 'general
look' of the line's place on the sheet. One is surprised at one's success in this the moment one gives up
one's habitually analytic state of mind.
Is it too much to say that we have in this dispersion of the attention and subjection to the 'general
effect' something like a relapse into the state of mind of brutes? The trance-subject never gives any
other reason for his optical discriminations, save that 'it looks so.' So a man, on a road once traversed
inattentively before, takes a certain turn for no reason except that he feels as if it must be right. He is
guided by a sum of impressions, not one of which is emphatic or distinguished from the rest, not one
of which is essential, not one of which is conceived, but all of which together drive him to a
conclusion to which nothing but that sum-total leads. Are not some of the wonderful discriminations
of animals explicable in the same way? The cow finds her own stanchions in the long stable, the horse
stops at the house he has once stopped at in the monotonous street, because no other stanchions, no

other house, yield impartially all the impressions of the previous experience. The man, however, by
seeking to make some one impression characteristic and essential, prevents the rest from having their
effect. So that, if the (for him) essential feature be forgotten or changed, he is too apt to be thrown off
altogether, and then the brute or the trance-subject may seem to outstrip him in sagacity.
Dr. Romanes's already quoted distinction between 'receptual' and 'conceptual' thought (published since
the body of my text and my note were written) connotes conveniently the difference which I seek to
point out. See also his Mental Evolution in Man, p. 197 ff., for proofs of the fact that in a receptual
way brutes cognize the mental states of other brutes and men.
[336] This matter of confusion is important and interesting. Since confusion is mistaking the wrong
part of the phenomenon for the whole, whilst reasoning is, according to our definition, based on the
substitution of the right part for the whole, it might be said that confusion and reasoning are
generically the same process. I believe that they are so, and that the only difference between a muddlehead and a genius is that between extracting wrong characters and right ones. In other words, a
muddle-headed person is a genius spoiled in the making. I think it will be admitted that all eminently
muddle-headed persons have the temperament of genius. They are constantly breaking away from the
usual consecutions of concretes. A common associator by contiguity is too closely tied to routine to
get muddle-headed.
[337] The horse is a densely stupid animal, as far as everything goes except contiguous association.
We reckon him intelligent, partly because he looks so handsome, partly because he has such a
wonderful faculty of contiguous association and can be so quickly moulded into a mass of set habits.
Had he anything of reasoning intelligence, he would be a less faithful slave than he is.
[338] Th. Schumann: Journal Daheim, No. 19, 1878. Quoted by Strümpell: Die Geisteskräfte der
Menschen verglicken mit denen der Thiere (Leipzig, 1878), p. 39. Cats are notorious for the skill with
which they will open latches, locks, etc. Their feats are usually ascribed to their reasoning powers. But
Dr. Romanes well remarks (Mental Evolution, etc., p. 351, note) that we ought first to be sure that the
actions are not due to mere association. A cat is constantly playing with things with her paws; a trick
accidentally hit upon may be retained. Romanes notes the fact that the animals most skilled in this way
need not be the most generally intelligent, but those which have the best corporeal members for
handling things, cat's paws, horse's lips, elephant's trunk, cow's horns. The monkey has both the
corporeal and the intellectual superiority. And my deprecatory remarks on animal reasoning in the text
apply far less to the quadrumana than to quadrupeds.—On the possible fallacies in interpreting
animals' minds, compare C. L. Morgan in Mind, xi. 174 (1886).
[339] There are two other conditions of language in the human being, additional to association by
similarity, that assist its action, or rather pave the way for it. These are: first, the great natural
loquacity; and, second, the great imitativeness of man. The first produces the original reflex
interjectional sign; the second (as Bleek has well shown) fixes it, stamps it, and ends by multiplying
the number of determinate specific signs which are a requisite preliminary to the general conscious
purpose of sign-making, which I have called the characteristic human element in language. The way in
which imitativeness fixes the meaning of signs is this: When a primeval man has a given emotion, he
utters his natural interjection; or when (to avoid supposing that the reflex sounds are exceedingly
determinate by nature) a group of such men experience a common emotion, and one takes the lead in
the cry, the others cry like him from sympathy or imitativeness. Now, let one of the group hear
another, who is in presence of the experience, utter the cry; he, even without the experience, will
repeat the cry from pure imitativeness. But, as he repeats the sign, he will be reminded by it of his own
former experience. Thus, first, he has the sign with the emotion; then, without it; then, with it again. It
is "dissociated by change of concomitants"; he feels it as a separate entity and yet as having a
connection with the emotion. Immediately it becomes possible for him to couple it deliberately with
the emotion, in cases where the latter would either have provoked no interjectional cry or not the same
one. In a word, his mental procedure tends to fix this cry on that emotion; and when this occurs, in

many instances, he is provided with a stock of signs, like the yelp, beg, rat of the dog, each of which
suggests a determinate image. On this stock, then, similarity works in the way above explained.
[340] See the 'Evolution of Self-consciousness' in 'Philosophical Discussions,' by Chauncey Wright
(New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1877). Dr. Romanes, in the book from which I have already quoted,
seeks to show that the 'consciousness of truth as truth' and the deliberate intention to predicate (which
are the characteristics of higher human reasoning) presuppose a consciousness of ideas as such, as
things distinct from their objects; and that this consciousness depends on our having made signs for
them by language. My text seems to me to include Dr. Romanes's facts, and formulates them in what
to me is a more elementary way, though the reader who wishes to understand the matter better should
go to his clear and patient exposition also.
[341] Study of Character, p. 317.
[342] Translated by my colleague, Professor G. H. Palmer.
[343] Quoted by Renouvier, Critique Philosophique, October 19, 1879.
[344] Social and domestic circumstances, that is, not material ones. Perceptions of social relations
seem very keen in persons whose dealings with the material world are confined to knowing a few
useful objects, principally animals, plants, and weapons. Savages and boors are often as tactful and
astute socially as trained diplomatists. In general, it is probable that the consciousness of how one
stands with other people occupies a relatively larger and larger part of the mind, the lower one goes in
the scale of culture. Woman's intuitions, so fine in the sphere of personal relations, are seldom firstrate in the way of mechanics. All boys teach themselves how a clock goes: few girls. Hence Dr.
Whately's jest, "Woman is the unreasoning animal, and pokes the fire from on top."

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT.
The reader will not have forgotten, in the jungle of purely inward processes
and products through which the last chapters have borne him, that the final
result of them all must be some form of bodily activity due to the escape of
the central excitement through outgoing nerves. The whole neural organism,
it will be remembered, is, physiologically considered, but a machine for
converting stimuli into reactions; and the intellectual part of our life is knit
up with but the middle or 'central' portion of the machine's operations. Let us
now turn to consider the final or emergent operations, the bodily activities,
and the forms of consciousness connected therewithal.
Every impression which impinges on the incoming nerves produces some
discharge down the outgoing ones, whether we be aware of it or not. Using
sweeping terms and ignoring exceptions, we might say that every possible

feeling produces a movement, and that the movement is a movement of the
entire organism, and of each and all its parts. What happens patently when
an explosion or a flash of lightning startles us, or when we are tickled,
happens latently with every sensation which we receive. The only reason
why we do not feel the startle or tickle in the case of insignificant sensations
is partly its very small amount, partly our obtuseness. Professor Bain many
years ago gave the name of the Law of Diffusion to this phenomenon of
general discharge, and expressed it thus: "According as an impression is
accompanied with Feeling, the aroused currents diffuse themselves over the
brain, leading to a general agitation of the moving organs, as well as
affecting the viscera."
In cases where the feeling is strong the law is too familiar to require proof.
As Prof. Bain says:
"Each of us knows in our own experience that a sudden shock of feeling
is accompanied with movements of the body generally, and with other
effects. When no emotion is present, we are quiescent; a slight feeling
is accompanied with slight manifestations; a more intense shock has a
more intense outburst. Every pleasure and every pain, and every mode
of emotion, has a definite wave of effects, which our observation makes
known to us; and we apply the knowledge to infer other men's feelings
from their outward display.... The organs first and prominently affected,
in the diffused wave of nervous influence, are the moving members,
and of these, by preference, the features of the face (with the ears in
animals), whose movements constitute the expression of the
countenance. But the influence extends to all the parts of the moving
system, voluntary and involuntary; while an important series of effects
are produced on the glands and viscera—the stomach, lungs, heart,
kidneys, skin, together with the sexual and mammary organs.... The
circumstance is seemingly universal, the proof of it does not require a
citation of instances in detail; on the objectors is thrown the burden of
adducing unequivocal exceptions to the law."[345]
There are probably no exceptions to the diffusion of every impression
through the nerve-centres. The effect of the wave through the centres may,
however, often be to interfere with processes, and to diminish tensions
already existing there; and the outward consequences of such inhibitions

may be the arrest of discharges from the inhibited regions and the checking
of bodily activities already in process of occurrence. When this happens it
probably is like the draining or siphoning of certain channels by currents
flowing through others. When, in walking, we suddenly stand still because a
sound, sight, smell, or thought catches our attention, something like this
occurs. But there are cases of arrest of peripheral activity which depend, not
on central inhibition, but on stimulation of centres which discharge outgoing
currents of an inhibitory sort. Whenever we are startled, for example, our
heart momentarily stops or slows its beating, and then palpitates with
accelerated speed. The brief arrest is due to an outgoing current down the
pneumogastric nerve. This nerve, when stimulated, stops or slows the heartbeats, and this particular effect of startling fails to occur if the nerve be cut.
In general, however, the stimulating effects of a sense-impression
preponderate over the inhibiting effects, so that we may roughly say, as we
began by saying, that the wave of discharge produces an activity in all parts
of the body. The task of tracing out all the effects of any one incoming
sensation has not yet been performed by physiologists. Recent years have,
however, begun to enlarge our information; and although I must refer to
special treatises for the full details, I can briefly string together here a
number of separate observations which prove the truth of the law of
diffusion.

FIG. 81.

First take effects upon the circulation. Those upon the heart we have just
seen. Haller long ago recorded that the blood from an open vein flowed out
faster at the beat of a drum.[346] In Chapter III. (Vol. I. p. 98) we learned how

instantaneously, according to Mosso, the circulation in the brain is altered by
changes of sensation and of the course of thought. The effect of objects of
fear, shame, and anger upon the blood-supply of the skin, especially the skin
of the face, are too well known to need remark. Sensations of the higher
senses produce, according to Couty and Charpentier, the most varied effects
upon the pulse-rate and blood-pressure in dogs. Fig. 81, a pulse-tracing from
these authors, shows the tumultuous effect on a dog's heart of hearing the
screams of another dog. The changes of blood-pressure still occurred when
the pneumogastric nerves were cut, showing the vaso-motor effect to be
direct and not dependent on the heart. When Mosso invented that simple
instrument, the plethysmograph, for recording the fluctuations in volume of
the members of the body, what most astonished him, he says, "in the first
experiments which he made in Italy, was the extreme unrest of the bloodvessels of the hand, which at every smallest emotion, whether during waking
or during sleep, changed their volume in surprising fashion."[347] Figure 82
(from Féré[348])[Pg 375]
[Pg 376] shows the way in which the pulse of one subject was modified by the
exhibition of a red light lasting from the moment marked a to that marked b.

FIG. 82.

FIG. 83.—Respiratory curve of B: a, with eyes open; b, with eyes closed.

The effects upon respiration of sudden sensory stimuli are also too well
known to need elaborate comment. We 'catch our breath' at every sudden
sound. We 'hold our breath' whenever our attention and expectation are
strongly engaged, and we sigh when the tension of the situation is relieved.
When a fearful object is before us we pant and cannot deeply inspire; when
the object makes us angry it is, on the contrary, the act of expiration which is
hard. I subjoin a couple of figures from Féré which explain themselves. They
show the effects of light upon the breathing of two of his hysteric patients.
[349]

FIG. 84. Respiratory curve of L: a, with yellow light; b with green light; c, with red light. The
red has the strongest effect.

On the sweat-glands, similar consequences of sensorial stimuli are observed.
Tarchanoff, testing the condition of the sweat-glands by the power of the
skin to start a galvanic current through electrodes applied to its surface,
found that "nearly every kind of nervous activity, from the simplest
sensations and impressions, to voluntary motions and the highest forms of
mental exertion, is accompanied by an increased activity in the glands of the
skin."[350] On the pupil observations are recorded by Sanders which show
that a transitory dilatation follows every sensorial stimulus applied during
sleep, even if the stimulus be not strong enough to wake the subject up. At

the moment of awaking there is a dilatation, even if strong light falls on the
eye.[351] The pupil of children can easily be observed to dilate enormously
under the influence of fear. It is said to dilate in pain and fatigue; and to
contract, on the contrary, in rage.
As regards effects on the abdominal viscera, they unquestionably exist, but
very few accurate observations have been made.[352]
The bladder, bowels, and uterus respond to sensations, even indifferent ones.
Mosso and Pellicani, in their plethysmographic investigations on the bladder
of dogs, found all sorts of sensorial stimuli to produce reflex contractions of
this organ, independent of those of the abdominal walls. They call the
bladder 'as good an æsthesiometer as the iris,' and refer to the not uncommon
reflex effects of psychic stimuli in the human female upon this organ.[353] M.
Féré has registered the contractions of the sphincter ani which even
indifferent sensations will produce. In some pregnant women the fœtus is
felt to move after almost every sensorial excitement received by the mother.
The only natural explanation is that it is stimulated at such moments by
reflex contractions of the womb.[354] That the glands are affected in emotion
is patent enough in the case of the tears of grief, the dry mouth, moist skin,
or diarrhœa of fear, the biliary disturbances which sometimes follow upon
rage, etc. The watering of the mouth at the sight of succulent food is well
known. It is difficult to follow the smaller degrees of all these reflex
changes, but it can hardly be doubted that they exist in some degree, even
where they cease to be traceable, and that all our sensations have some
visceral effects. The sneezing produced by sunshine, the roughening of the
skin (goose-flesh) which certain strokings, contacts, and sounds, musical or
non-musical, provoke, are facts of the same order as the shuddering and
standing up of the hair in fear, only of less degree.
Effects on Voluntary Muscles. Every sensorial stimulus not only sends a
special discharge into certain particular muscles dependent on the special
nature of the stimulus in question—some of these special discharges we
have studied in Chapter XI, others we shall examine under the heads of
Instinct and Emotion—but it innervates the muscles generally. M. Féré has
given very curious experimental proofs of this. The strength of contraction
of the subject's hand was measured by a self-registering dynamometer.
Ordinarily the maximum strength, under simple experimental conditions,
remains the same from day to day. But if simultaneously with the contraction

the subject received a sensorial impression, the contraction was sometimes
weakened, but more often increased. This reinforcing effect has received the
name of dynamogeny. The dynamogenic value of simple musical notes
seems to be proportional to their loudness and height. Where the notes are
compounded into sad strains, the muscular strength diminishes. If the strains
are gay, it is increased.—The dynamogenic value of colored lights varies
with the color. In a subject[355] whose normal strength was expressed by 23,
it became 24 when a blue light was thrown on the eyes, 28 for green, 30 for
yellow, 35 for orange, and 42 for red. Red is thus the most exciting color.
Among tastes, sweet has the lowest value, next comes salt, then bitter, and
finally sour, though, as M. Féré remarks, such a sour as acetic acid excites
the nerves of pain and smell as well as of taste. The stimulating effects of
tobacco-smoke, alcohol, beef-extract (which is innutritious), etc., etc., may
be partly due to a dynamogenic action of this sort.—Of odors, that of musk
seems to have a peculiar dynamogenic power. Fig. 85 is a copy of one of M.
Féré's dynamographic tracings, which explains itself. The smaller
contractions are those without stimulus; the stronger ones are due to the
influence of red rays of light.

FIG. 85.

Everyone is familiar with the patellar reflex, or jerk upwards of the foot,
which is produced by smartly tapping the tendon below the knee-pan when
the leg hangs over the other knee. Drs. Weir Mitchell and Lombard have
found that when other sensations come in simultaneously with the tap, the
jerk is increased.[356] Heat, cold, pricking, itching, or faradic stimulation of
the skin, sometimes strong optical impressions, music, all have this
dynamogenic effect, which also results whenever voluntary movements are
set up in other parts of the body, simultaneously with the tap.[357]
These 'dynamogenic' effects, in which one stimulation simply reinforces
another already under way, must not be confounded with reflex acts properly
so called, in which new activities are originated by the stimulus. All
instinctive performances and manifestations of emotion are reflex acts. But
underneath those of which we are conscious there seem to go on continually

others smaller in amount, which probably in most persons might be called
fluctuations of muscular tone, but which in certain neurotic subjects can be
demonstrated ocularly. M. Féré figures some of them in the article to which I
have already referred.[358]

Looking back over all these facts, it is hard to doubt the truth of the law of
diffusion, even where verification is beyond reach. A process set up
anywhere in the centres reverberates everywhere, and in some way or other
affects the organism throughout, making its activities either greater or less.
We are brought again to the assimilation which was expressed on a previous
page of the nerve-central mass to a good conductor charged with electricity,
of which the tension cannot be changed anywhere without changing it
everywhere.

Herr Schneider has tried to show, by an ingenious and suggestive zoological
review,[359] that all the special movements which highly evolved animals
make are differentiated from the two originally simple movements, of
contraction and expansion, in which the entire body of simple organisms
takes part. The tendency to contract is the source of all the self-protective
impulses and reactions which are later developed, including that of flight.
The tendency to expand splits up, on the contrary, into the impulses and
instincts of an aggressive kind, feeding, fighting, sexual intercourse, etc.
Schneider's articles are well worth reading, if only for the careful
observations on animals which they embody. I cite them here as a sort of
evolutionary reason to add to the mechanical a priori reason why there ought
to be the diffusive wave which our a posteriori instances have shown to
exist.
I will now proceed to a detailed study of the more important classes of
movement consequent upon cerebro-mental change. They may be
enumerated as—
1) Instinctive or Impulsive Performances;

2) Expressions of Emotion; and
3) Voluntary Deeds;
and each shall have a chapter to itself.

[345] Emotions and Will, pp. 4, 5.
[346] Cf. Féré. Sensation et Mouvement (1887), p. 56.
[347] La Paura (1884), p. 117. Compare Féré: Sensation et Mouvement, chap. xvii.
[348] Revue Philosophique, xxiv. 570.
[349] Revue Phil., xxiv. pp. 566-7.—For further information about the relations between the brain and
respiration, see Danilewsky's Essay in the Biologisches Centralblatt, ii. 690.
[350] Quoted from the report of Tarchanoff's paper (in Pflüger's Archiv, xlvi. 46) in the American
Journal of Psych., ii. 652.
[351] Archiv f. Psychiatrie, vii. 652; ix. 129.
[352] Sensation et Mouvement, 57-8.

[353] R. Accad. dei Lincei (1881-2). I follow the report in Hofmann Schwalbe's Jahresbericht, x. ii.
93.
[354] Cf. Féré, Sensation et Mouvement, chap. xiv.
[355] The figures given are from an hysterical subject, and the differences are greater than normal.
M. Féré considers that the unstable nervous system of the hysteric ('ces grenouilles de la
psychologie') shows the law on a quantitatively exaggerated scale, without altering the qualitative
relations. The effects remind us a little of the influence of sensations upon minimal sensations of
other orders discovered by Urbantschitsch, and reported on page 29 of this volume.
[356] Mitchell in (Philadelphia) Medical News (Feb. 13 and 20, 1886); Lombard in American
Journal of Psychology (Oct. 1887).
[357] Prof. H. P. Bowditch has made the interesting discovery that if the reinforcing movement be as
much as 0.4 of a second late, the reinforcement fails to occur, and is transformed into a positive
inhibition of the knee-jerk for retardations of between 0.4' and 1.7'. The knee-jerk fails to be modified
at all by voluntary movements made later than 1.7' after the patellar ligament is tapped (see Boston
Med. and Surg. Journ., May 31, 1888).
[358] Revue Phil., xxiv. 572 ff.
[359] In the Vierteljahrschrift für wiss. Philos., iii. 294.

CHAPTER XXIV.[360]

INSTINCT.
Instinct is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such a way as to
produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous
education in the performance. That instincts, as thus defined, exist on an
enormous scale in the animal kingdom needs no proof. They are the
functional correlatives of structure. With the presence of a certain organ
goes, one may say, almost always a native aptitude for its use.
"Has the bird a gland for the secretion of oil? She knows instinctively
how to press the oil from the gland, and apply it to the feather. Has the
rattlesnake the grooved tooth and gland of poison? He knows without
instruction how to make both structure and function most effective
against his enemies. Has the silk-worm the function of secreting the
fluid silk? At the proper time she winds the cocoon such as she has
never seen, as thousands before have done; and thus without

instruction, pattern, or experience, forms a safe abode for herself in the
period of transformation. Has the hawk talons? She knows by instinct
how to wield them effectively against the helpless quarry."[361]
A very common way of talking about these admirably definite tendencies to
act is by naming abstractly the purpose they subserve, such as selfpreservation, or defence, or care for eggs and young—and saying the
animal has an instinctive fear of death or love of life, or that she has an
instinct of self-preservation, or an instinct of maternity and the like. But this
represents the animal as obeying abstractions which not once in a million
cases is it possible it can have framed. The strict physiological way of
interpreting the facts leads to far clearer results. The actions we call
instinctive all conform to the general reflex type; they are called forth by
determinate sensory stimuli in contact with the animal's body, or at a
distance in his environment. The cat runs after the mouse, runs or shows
fight before the dog, avoids falling from walls and trees, shuns fire and
water, etc., not because he has any notion either of life or of death, or of
self, or of preservation. He has probably attained to no one of these
conceptions in such a way as to react definitely upon it. He acts in each case
separately, and simply because he cannot help it; being so framed that when
that particular running thing called a mouse appears in his field of vision he
must pursue; that when that particular barking and obstreperous thing called
a dog appears there he must retire, if at a distance, and scratch if close by;
that he must withdraw his feet from water and his face from flame, etc. His
nervous system is to a great extent a preorganized bundle of such reactions
—they are as fatal as sneezing, and as exactly correlated to their special
excitants as it is to its own. Although the naturalist may, for his own
convenience, class these reactions under general heads, he must not forget
that in the animal it is a particular sensation or perception, or image which
calls them forth.
At first this view astounds us by the enormous number of special
adjustments it supposes animals to possess ready-made in anticipation of
the outer things among which they are to dwell. Can mutual dependence be
so intricate and go so far? Is each thing born fitted to particular other things,
and to them exclusively, as locks are fitted to their keys? Undoubtedly this
must be believed to be so. Each nook and cranny of creation, down to our
very skin and entrails, has its living inhabitants, with organs suited to the

place, to devour and digest the food it harbors and to meet the dangers it
conceals; and the minuteness of adaptation thus shown in the way of
structure knows no bounds. Even so are there no bounds to the minuteness
of adaptation in the way of conduct which the several inhabitants display.
The older writings on instinct are ineffectual wastes of words, because their
authors never came down to this definite and simple point of view, but
smothered everything in vague wonder at the clairvoyant and prophetic
power of the animals—so superior to anything in man—and at the
beneficence of God in endowing them with such a gift. But God's
beneficence endows them, first of all, with a nervous system; and, turning
our attention to this, makes instinct immediately appear neither more nor
less wonderful than all the other facts of life.

Every instinct is an impulse. Whether we shall call such impulses as
blushing, sneezing, coughing, smiling, or dodging, or keeping time to
music, instincts or not, is a mere matter of terminology. The process is the
same throughout. In his delightfully fresh and interesting work, Der
Thierische Wille, Herr G. H. Schneider subdivides impulses (Triebe) into
sensation-impulses, perception-impulses, and idea-impulses. To crouch
from cold is a sensation-impulse; to turn and follow, if we see people
running one way, is a perception-impulse; to cast about for cover, if it
begins to blow and rain, is an imagination-impulse. A single complex
instinctive action may involve successively the awakening of impulses of
all three classes. Thus a hungry lion starts to seek prey by the awakening in
him of imagination coupled with desire; he begins to stalk it when, on eye,
ear, or nostril, he gets an impression of its presence at a certain distance; he
springs upon it, either when the booty takes alarm and flees, or when the
distance is sufficiently reduced; he proceeds to tear and devour it the
moment he gets a sensation of its contact with his claws and fangs. Seeking,
stalking, springing, and devouring are just so many different kinds of
muscular contraction, and neither kind is called forth by the stimulus
appropriate to the other.
Schneider says of the hamster, which stores corn in its hole:

"If we analyze the propensity of storing, we find that it consists of
three impulses: First, an impulse to pick up the nutritious object, due to
perception; second, an impulse to carry it off into the dwelling-place,
due to the idea of this latter; and third, an impulse to lay it down there,
due to the sight of the place. It lies in the nature of the hamster that it
should never see a full ear of corn without feeling a desire to strip it; it
lies in its nature to feel, as soon as its cheek-pouches are filled, an
irresistible desire to hurry to its home; and finally, it lies in its nature
that the sight of the storehouse should awaken the impulse to empty
the cheeks" (p. 208).
In certain animals of a low order the feeling of having executed one
impulsive step is such an indispensable part of the stimulus of the next one,
that the animal cannot make any variation in the order of its performance.

Now, why do the various animals do what seem to us such strange things, in
the presence of such outlandish stimuli? Why does the hen, for example,
submit herself to the tedium of incubating such a fearfully uninteresting set
of objects as a nestful of eggs, unless she have some sort of a prophetic
inkling of the result? The only answer is ad hominem. We can only interpret
the instincts of brutes by what we know of instincts in ourselves. Why do
men always lie down, when they can, on soft beds rather than on hard
floors? Why do they sit round the stove on a cold day? Why, in a room, do
they place themselves, ninety-nine times out of a hundred, with their faces
towards its middle rather than to the wall? Why do they prefer saddle of
mutton and champagne to hard-tack and ditch-water? Why does the maiden
interest the youth so that everything about her seems more important and
significant than anything else in the world? Nothing more can be said than
that these are human ways, and that every creature likes its own ways, and
takes to the following them as a matter of course. Science may come and
consider these ways, and find that most of them are useful. But it is not for
the sake of their utility that they are followed, but because at the moment of
following them we feel that that is the only appropriate and natural thing to
do. Not one man in a billion, when taking his dinner, ever thinks of utility.
He eats because the food tastes good and makes him want more. If you ask

him why he should want to eat more of what tastes like that, instead of
revering you as a philosopher he will probably laugh at you for a fool. The
connection between the savory sensation and the act it awakens is for him
absolute and selbstverständlich, an 'a priori synthesis' of the most perfect
sort, needing no proof but its own evidence. It takes, in short, what
Berkeley calls a mind debauched by learning to carry the process of making
the natural seem strange, so far as to ask for the why of any instinctive
human act. To the metaphysician alone can such questions occur as: Why
do we smile, when pleased, and not scowl? Why are we unable to talk to a
crowd as we talk to a single friend? Why does a particular maiden turn our
wits so upside-down? The common man can only say, "Of course we smile,
of course our heart palpitates at the sight of the crowd, of course we love
the maiden, that beautiful soul clad in that perfect form, so palpably and
flagrantly made from all eternity to be loved!"
And so, probably, does each animal feel about the particular things it tends
to do in presence of particular objects. They, too, are a priori syntheses. To
the lion it is the lioness which is made to be loved; to the bear, the she-bear.
To the broody hen the notion would probably seem monstrous that there
should be a creature in the world to whom a nestful of eggs was not the
utterly fascinating and precious and never-to-be-too-much-sat-upon object
which it is to her.[362]
Thus we may be sure that, however mysterious some animals' instincts may
appear to us, our instincts will appear no less mysterious to them. And we
may conclude that, to the animal which obeys it, every impulse and every
step of every instinct shines with its own sufficient light, and seems at the
moment the only eternally right and proper thing to do. It is done for its
own sake exclusively. What voluptuous thrill may not shake a fly, when she
at last discovers the one particular leaf, or carrion, or bit of dung, that out of
all the world can stimulate her ovipositor to its discharge? Does not the
discharge then seem to her the only fitting thing? And need she care or
know anything about the future maggot and its food?

Since the egg-laying instincts are simple examples to consider, a few
quotations about them from Schneider may be serviceable:
"The phenomenon so often talked about, so variously interpreted, so
surrounded with mystification, that an insect should always lay her
eggs in a spot appropriate to the nourishment of her young, is no more
marvellous than the phenomenon that every animal pairs with a mate
capable of bearing posterity, or feeds on materials capable of affording
him nourishment.... Not only the choice of a place for laying the eggs,
but all the various acts for depositing and protecting them, are
occasioned by the perception of the proper object, and the relation of
this perception to the various stages of maternal impulse. When the
burying beetle perceives a carrion, she is not only impelled to
approach it and lodge her eggs in it, but also to go through the
movements requisite for burying it; just us a bird who sees his hen-bird
is impelled to caress her, to strut around her, dance before her, or in
some other way to woo her; just as a tiger, when he sees an antelope, is
impelled to stalk it, to pounce upon it, and to strangle it. When the
tailor-bee cuts out pieces of rose-leaf, bends them, carries them into a
caterpillar- or mouse-hole in trees or in the earth, covers their seams
again with other pieces, and so makes a thimble-shaped case—when
she fills this with honey and lays an egg in it, all these various
appropriate expressions of her will are to be explained by supposing
that at the time when the eggs are ripe within her, the appearance of a
suitable caterpillar- or mouse-hole and the perception of rose-leaves
are so correlated in the insect with the several impulses in question,
that the performances follow as a matter of course when the
perceptions take place....
"The perception of the empty nest, or of a single egg, seems in birds to
stand in such a close relation to the physiological functions of
oviparation, that it serves as a direct stimulus to these functions, while
the perception of a sufficient number of eggs has just the opposite
effect. It is well known that hens and ducks lay more eggs if we keep
removing them than if we leave them in the nest. The impulse to sit
arises, as a rule, when a bird sees a certain number of eggs in her nest.
If this number is not yet to be seen there, the ducks continue to lay,
although they perhaps have laid twice as many eggs as they are

accustomed to sit upon.... That sitting, also, is independent of any idea
of purpose and is a pure perception-impulse is evident, among other
things, from the fact that many birds, e.g. wild ducks, steal eggs from
each other.... The bodily disposition to sit is, it is true, one condition
[since broody hens will sit where there are no eggs], but the perception
of the eggs is the other condition of the activity of the incubating
impulse. The propensity of the cuckoo and of the cow-bird to lay their
eggs in the nests of other species must also be interpreted as a pure
perception-impulse. These birds have no bodily disposition to become
broody, and there is therefore in them no connection between the
perception of an egg and the impulse to sit upon it. Eggs ripen,
however, in their oviducts, and the body tends to get rid of them. And
since the two birds just named do not drop their eggs anywhere on the
ground, but in nests, which are the only places where they may
preserve the species, it might easily appear that such preservation of
the species was what they had in view, and that they acted with full
consciousness of the purpose. But this is not so.... The cuckoo is
simply excited by the perception of quite determinate sorts of nest,
which already contain eggs, to drop her own into them, and throw the
others out, because this perception is a direct stimulus to these acts. It
is impossible that she should have any notion of the other bird coming
and sitting on her egg."[363]
INSTINCTS NOT ALWAYS BLIND OR INVARIABLE.
Remember that nothing is said yet of the origin of instincts, but only of the
constitution of those that exist fully formed. How stands it with the instincts
of mankind?
Nothing is commoner than the remark that Man differs from lower creatures
by the almost total absence of instincts, and the assumption of their work in
him by 'reason.' A fruitless discussion might be waged on this point by two
theorizers who were careful not to define their terms. 'Reason' might be
used, as it often has been, since Kant, not as the mere power of 'inferring,'
but also as a name for the tendency to obey impulses of a certain lofty sort,
such as duty, or universal ends. And 'instinct' might have its significance so
broadened as to cover all impulses whatever, even the impulse to act from

the idea of a distant fact, as well as the impulse to act from a present
sensation. Were the word instinct used in this broad way, it would of course
be impossible to restrict it, as we began by doing, to actions done with no
prevision of an end. We must of course avoid a quarrel about words, and the
facts of the case are really tolerably plain. Man has a far greater variety of
impulses than any lower animal; and any one of these impulses, taken in
itself, is as 'blind' as the lowest instinct can be; but, owing to man's memory,
power of reflection, and power of inference, they come each one to be felt
by him, after he has once yielded to them and experienced their results, in
connection with a foresight of those results. In this condition an impulse
acted out may be said to be acted out, in part at least, for the sake of its
results. It is obvious that every instinctive act, in an animal with memory,
must cease to be 'blind' after being once repeated, and must be
accompanied with foresight of its 'end' just so far as that end may have
fallen under the animal's cognizance. An insect that lays her eggs in a place
where she never sees them hatched must always do so 'blindly;' but a hen
who has already hatched a brood can hardly be assumed to sit with perfect
'blindness' on her second nest. Some expectation of consequences must in
every case like this be aroused; and this expectation, according as it is that
of something desired or of something disliked, must necessarily either reenforce or inhibit the mere impulse. The hen's idea of the chickens would
probably encourage her to sit; a rat's memory, on the other hand, of a former
escape from a trap would neutralize his impulse to take bait from anything
that reminded him of that trap. If a boy sees a fat hopping-toad, he probably
has incontinently an impulse (especially if with other boys) to smash the
creature with a stone, which impulse we may suppose him blindly to obey.
But something in the expression of the dying toad's clasped hands suggests
the meanness of the act, or reminds him of sayings he has heard about the
sufferings of animals being like his own; so that, when next he is tempted
by a toad, an idea arises which, far from spurring him again to the torment,
prompts kindly actions, and may even make him the toad's champion
against less reflecting boys.
It is plain, then, that, no matter how well endowed an animal may originally
be in the way of instincts, his resultant actions will be much modified if the
instincts combine with experience, if in addition to impulses he have
memories, associations, inferences, and expectations, on any considerable
scale. An object O, on which he has an instinctive impulse to react in the

manner A, would directly provoke him to that reaction. But O has meantime
become for him a sign of the nearness of P, on which he has an equally
strong impulse to react in the manner B, quite unlike A. So that when he
meets O the immediate impulse A and the remote impulse B struggle in his
breast for the mastery. The fatality and uniformity said to be characteristic
of instinctive actions will be so little manifest that one might be tempted to
deny to him altogether the possession of any instinct about the object O. Yet
how false this judgment would be! The instinct about O is there; only by the
complication of the associative machinery it has come into conflict with
another instinct about P.
Here we immediately reap the good fruits of our simple physiological
conception of what an instinct is. If it be a mere excito-motor impulse, due
to the pre-existence of a certain 'reflex arc' in the nerve-centres of the
creature, of course it must follow the law of all such reflex arcs. One
liability of such arcs is to have their activity 'inhibited,' by other processes
going on at the same time. It makes no difference whether the arc be
organized at birth, or ripen spontaneously later, or be due to acquired habit,
it must take its chances with all the other arcs, and sometimes succeed, and
sometimes fail, in drafting off the currents through itself. The mystical view
of an instinct would make it invariable. The physiological view would
require it to show occasional irregularities in any animal in whom the
number of separate instincts, and the possible entrance of the same stimulus
into several of them, were great. And such irregularities are what every
superior animal's instincts do show in abundance.[364]
Wherever the mind is elevated enough to discriminate; wherever several
distinct sensory elements must combine to discharge the reflex-arc;
wherever, instead of plumping into action instantly at the first rough
intimation of what sort of a thing is there, the agent waits to see which one
of its kind it is and what the circumstances are of its appearance; wherever
different individuals and different circumstances can impel him in different
ways; wherever these are the conditions—we have a masking of the
elementary constitution of the instinctive life. The whole story of our
dealings with the lower wild animals is the history of our taking advantage
of the way in which they judge of everything by its mere label, as it were,
so as to ensnare or kill them. Nature, in them, has left matters in this rough
way, and made them act always in the manner which would be oftenest

right. There are more worms unattached to hooks than impaled upon them;
therefore, on the whole, says Nature to her fishy children, bite at every
worm and take your chances. But as her children get higher, and their lives
more precious, she reduces the risks. Since what seems to be the same
object may be now a genuine food and now a bait; since in gregarious
species each individual may prove to be either the friend or the rival,
according to the circumstances, of another; since any entirely unknown
object may be fraught with weal or woe, Nature implants contrary impulses
to act on many classes of things, and leaves it to slight alterations in the
conditions of the individual case to decide which impulse shall carry the
day. Thus, greediness and suspicion, curiosity and timidity, coyness and
desire, bashfulness and vanity, sociability and pugnacity, seem to shoot over
into each other as quickly, and to remain in as unstable equilibrium, in the
higher birds and mammals as in man. They are all impulses, congenital,
blind at first, and productive of motor reactions of a rigorously determinate
sort. Each one of them, then, is an instinct, as instincts are commonly
defined. But they contradict each other—'experience' in each particular
opportunity of application usually deciding the issue. The animal that
exhibits them, loses the 'instinctive' demeanor and appears to lead a life of
hesitation and choice, an intellectual life; not, however, because he has no
instincts—rather because he has so many that they block each other's path.
Thus, then, without troubling ourselves about the words instinct and reason,
we may confidently say that however uncertain man's reactions upon his
environment may sometimes seem in comparison with those of lower
creatures, the uncertainty is probably not due to their possession of any
principles of action which he lacks. On the contrary, man possesses all the
impulses that they have, and a great many more besides. In other words,
there is no material antagonism between instinct and reason. Reason, per se,
can inhibit no impulses; the only thing that can neutralize an impulse is an
impulse the other way. Reason may, however, make an inference which will
excite the imagination so as to set loose the impulse the other way; and
thus, though the animal richest in reason might be also the animal richest in
instinctive impulses too, he would never seem the fatal automaton which a
merely instinctive animal would be.

Let us now turn to human impulses with a little more detail. All we have
ascertained so far is that impulses of an originally instinctive character may
exist, and yet not betray themselves by automatic fatality of conduct. But in
man what impulses do exist? In the light of what has been said, it is obvious
that an existing impulse may not always be superficially apparent even
when its object is there. And we shall see that some impulses may be
masked by causes of which we have not yet spoken.
TWO PRINCIPLES OF NON-UNIFORMITY IN INSTINCTS.
Were one devising an abstract scheme, nothing would be easier than to
discover from an animal's actions just how many instincts he possessed. He
would react in one way only upon each class of objects with which his life
had to deal; he would react in identically the same way upon every
specimen of a class; and he would react invariably during his whole life.
There would be no gaps among his instincts; all would come to light
without perversion or disguise. But there are no such abstract animals, and
nowhere does the instinctive life display itself in such a way. Not only, as
we have seen, may objects of the same class arouse reactions of opposite
sorts in consequence of slight changes in the circumstances, in the
individual object, or in the agent's inward condition; but two other
principles of which we have not yet spoken, may come into play and
produce results so striking that observers as eminent as Messrs. D. A.
Spalding and Romanes do not hesitate to call them 'derangements of the
mental constitution,' and to conclude that the instinctive machinery has got
out of gear.
These principles are those
1. Of the inhibition of instincts by habits; and
2. Of the transitoriness of instincts.
Taken in conjunction with the two former principles—that the same object
may excite ambiguous impulses, or suggest an impulse different from that
which it excites, by suggesting a remote object—they explain any amount
of departure from uniformity of conduct, without implying any getting out
of gear of the elementary impulses from which the conduct flows.

1. The law of inhibition of instincts by habits is this: When objects of a
certain class elicit from an animal a certain sort of reaction, it often
happens that the animal becomes partial to the first specimen of the class
on which it has reacted, and will not afterward react on any other specimen.
The selection of a particular hole to live in, of a particular mate, of a
particular feeding-ground, a particular variety of diet, a particular anything,
in short, out of a possible multitude, is a very wide-spread tendency among
animals, even those low down in the scale. The limpet will return to the
same sticking-place in its rock, and the lobster to its favorite nook on the
sea-bottom. The rabbit will deposit its dung in the same corner; the bird
makes its nest on the same bough. But each of these preferences carries
with it an insensibility to other opportunities and occasions—an
insensibility which can only be described physiologically as an inhibition of
new impulses by the habit of old ones already formed. The possession of
homes and wives of our own makes us strangely insensible to the charms of
those of other people. Few of us are adventurous in the matter of food; in
fact, most of us think there is something disgusting in a bill of fare to which
we are unused. Strangers, we are apt to think, cannot be worth knowing,
especially if they come from distant cities, etc. The original impulse which
got us homes, wives, dietaries, and friends at all, seems to exhaust itself in
its first achievements and to leave no surplus energy for reacting on new
cases. And so it comes about that, witnessing this torpor, an observer of
mankind might say that no instinctive propensity toward certain objects
existed at all. It existed, but it existed miscellaneously, or as an instinct pure
and simple, only before habit was formed. A habit, once grafted on an
instinctive tendency, restricts the range of the tendency itself, and keeps us
from reacting on any but the habitual object, although other objects might
just as well have been chosen had they been the first-comers.
Another sort of arrest of instinct by habit is where the same class of objects
awakens contrary instinctive impulses. Here the impulse first followed
toward a given individual of the class is apt to keep him from ever
awakening the opposite impulse in us. In fact, the whole class may be
protected by this individual specimen from the application to it of the other
impulse. Animals, for example, awaken in a child the opposite impulses of

fearing and fondling. But if a child, in his first attempts to pat a dog, gets
snapped at or bitten, so that the impulse of fear is strongly aroused, it may
be that for years to come no dog will excite in him the impulse to fondle
again. On the other hand, the greatest natural enemies, if carefully
introduced to each other when young and guided at the outset by superior
authority, settle down into those 'happy families' of friends which we see in
our menageries. Young animals, immediately after birth, have no instinct of
fear, but show their dependence by allowing themselves to be freely
handled. Later, however, they grow 'wild,' and, if left to themselves, will not
let man approach them. I am told by farmers in the Adirondack wilderness
that it is a very serious matter if a cow wanders off and calves in the woods
and is not found for a week or more. The calf, by that time, is as wild and
almost as fleet as a deer, and hard to capture without violence. But calves
rarely show any particular wildness to the men who have been in contact
with them during the first days of their life, when the instinct to attach
themselves is uppermost, nor do they dread strangers as they would if
brought up wild.
Chickens give a curious illustration of the same law. Mr. Spalding's
wonderful article on instinct shall supply us with the facts. These little
creatures show opposite instincts of attachment and fear, either of which
may be aroused by the same object, man. If a chick is born in the absence of
the hen, it
"will follow any moving object. And, when guided by sight alone, they
seem to have no more disposition to follow a hen than to follow a duck
or a human being. Unreflecting lookers-on, when they saw chickens a
day old running after me," says Mr. Spalding, "and older ones
following me for miles, and answering to my whistle, imagined that I
must have some occult power over the creatures: whereas I had simply
allowed them to follow me from the first. There is the instinct to
follow; and the ear, prior to experience, attaches them to the right
object."[365]
But if a man presents himself for the first time when the instinct of fear is
strong, the phenomena are altogether reversed. Mr. Spalding kept three
chickens hooded until they were nearly four days old, and thus describes
their behavior:

"Each of them, on being unhooded, evinced the greatest terror to me,
dashing off in the opposite direction whenever I sought to approach it.
The table on which they were unhooded stood before a window, and
each in its turn beat against the window like a wild bird. One of them
darted behind some books, and, squeezing itself into a corner,
remained cowering for a length of time. We might guess at the
meaning of this strange and exceptional wildness; but the odd fact is
enough for my present purpose. Whatever might have been the
meaning of this marked change in their mental constitution—had they
been unhooded on the previous day they would have run to me instead
of from me—it could not have been the effect of experience; it must
have resulted wholly from changes in their own organizations."[366]
Their case was precisely analogous to that of the Adirondack calves. The
two opposite instincts relative to the same object ripen in succession. If the
first one engenders a habit, that habit will inhibit the application of the
second instinct to that object. All animals are tame during the earliest phase
of their infancy. Habits formed then limit the effects of whatever instincts of
wildness may later be evolved.
Mr. Romanes gives some very curious examples of the way in which
instinctive tendencies may be altered by the habits to which their first
'objects' have given rise. The cases are a little more complicated than those
mentioned in the text, inasmuch as the object reacted on not only starts a
habit which inhibits other kinds of impulse toward it (although such other
kinds might be natural), but even modifies by its own peculiar conduct the
constitution of the impulse which it actually awakens.
Two of the instances in question are those of hens who hatched out broods
of chicks after having (in three previous years) hatched ducks. They strove
to coax or to compel their new progeny to enter the water, and seemed
much perplexed at their unwillingness. Another hen adopted a brood of
young ferrets which, having lost their mother, were put under her. During
all the time they were left with her she had to sit on the nest, for they could
not wander like young chicks. She obeyed their hoarse growling as she
would have obeyed her chickens' peep. She combed out their hair with her
bill, and "used frequently to stop and look with one eye at the wriggling
nestful, with an inquiring gaze, expressive of astonishment." At other times

she would fly up with a loud scream, doubtless because the orphans had
nipped her in their search for teats. Finally, a Brahma hen nursed a young
peacock during the enormous period of eighteen months, and never laid any
eggs during all this time. The abnormal degree of pride which she showed
in her wonderful chicken is described by Dr. Romanes as ludicrous.[367]
2. This leads us to the law of transitoriness, which is this: Many instincts
ripen at a certain age and then fade away. A consequence of this law is that
if, during the time of such an instinct's vivacity, objects adequate to arouse
it are met with, a habit of acting on them is formed, which remains when
the original instinct has passed away; but that if no such objects are met
with, then no habit will be formed; and, later on in life, when the animal
meets the objects, he will altogether fail to react, as at the earlier epoch he
would instinctively have done.
No doubt such a law is restricted. Some instincts are far less transient than
others—those connected with feeding and 'self-preservation' may hardly be
transient at all, and some, after fading out for a time, recur as strong as ever,
e.g., the instincts of pairing and rearing young. The law, however, though
not absolute, is certainly very widespread, and a few examples will
illustrate just what it means.
In the chickens and calves above mentioned, it is obvious that the instinct to
follow and become attached fades out after a few days, and that the instinct
of flight then takes its place, the conduct of the creature toward man being
decided by the formation or non-formation of a certain habit during those
days. The transiency of the chicken's instinct to follow is also proved by its
conduct toward the hen. Mr. Spalding kept some chickens shut up till they
were comparatively old, and, speaking of these, he says:
"A chicken that has not heard the call of the mother till until eight or
ten days old then hears it as if it heard it not. I regret to find that on this
point my notes are not so full as I could wish, or as they might have
been. There is, however, an account of one chicken that could not be
returned to the mother when ten days old. The hen followed it, and
tried to entice it in every way; still, it continually left her and ran to the
house or to any person of whom it caught sight. This it persisted in
doing, though beaten back with a small branch dozens of times, and,

indeed, cruelly maltreated. It was also placed under the mother at
night, but it again left her in the morning."
The instinct of sucking is ripe in all mammals at birth, and leads to that
habit of taking the breast which, in the human infant, may be prolonged by
daily exercise long beyond its usual term of a year or a year and a half. But
the instinct itself is transient, in the sense that if, for any reason, the child be
fed by spoon during the first few days of its life and not put to the breast, it
may be no easy matter after that to make it suck at all. So of calves. If their
mother die, or be dry, or refuse to let them suck for a day or two, so that
they are fed by hand, it becomes hard to get them to suck at all when a new
nurse is provided. The ease with which sucking creatures are weaned, by
simply breaking the habit and giving them food in a new way, shows that
the instinct, purely as such, must be entirely extinct.
Assuredly the simple fact that instincts are transient, and that the effect of
later ones may be altered by the habits which earlier ones have left behind,
is a far more philosophical explanation than the notion of an instinctive
constitution vaguely 'deranged' or 'thrown out of gear.'
I have observed a Scotch terrier, born on the floor of a stable in December,
and transferred six weeks later to a carpeted house, make, when he was less
than four months old, a very elaborate pretence of burying things, such as
gloves, etc., with which he had played till he was tired. He scratched the
carpet with his forefeet, dropped the object from his mouth upon the spot,
and then scratched all about it (with both fore-and hind-feet, if I remember
rightly), and finally went away and let it lie. Of course, the act was entirely
useless. I saw him perform it at that age, some four or five times, and never
again in his life. The conditions were not present to fix a habit which should
last when the prompting instinct died away. But suppose meat instead of a
glove, earth instead of a carpet, hunger-pangs instead of a fresh supper a
few hours later, and it is easy to see how this dog might have got into a
habit of burying superfluous food, which might have lasted all his life. Who
can swear that the strictly instructive part of the food-burying propensity in
the wild Canidæ may not be as short-lived as it was in this terrier?
A similar instance is given by Dr. H. D. Schmidt[368] of New Orleans:

"I may cite the example of a young squirrel which I had tamed, a
number of years ago, when serving in the army, and when I had
sufficient leisure and opportunity to study the habits of animals. In the
autumn, before the winter sets in, adult squirrels bury as many nuts as
they can collect, separately, in the ground. Holding the nut firmly
between their teeth, they first scratch a hole in the ground, and, after
pointing their ears in all directions to convince themselves that no
enemy is near, they ram—the head, with the nut still between the front
teeth, serving as a sledge-hammer—the nut into the ground, and then
fill up the hole by means of their paws. The whole process is executed
with great rapidity, and, as it appeared to me, always with exactly the
same movements; in fact, it is done so well that I could never discover
the traces of the burial-ground. Now, as regards the young squirrel,
which, of course, never had been present at the burial of a nut, I
observed that, after having eaten a number of hickory-nuts to appease
its appetite, it would take one between its teeth, then sit upright and
listen in all directions. Finding all right, it would scratch upon the
smooth blanket on which I was playing with it as if to make a hole,
then hammer with the nut between its teeth upon the blanket, and
finally perform all the motions required to fill up a hole—in the air;
after which it would jump away, leaving the nut, of course,
uncovered."
The anecdote, of course, illustrates beautifully the close relation of instinct
to reflex action—a particular perception calls forth particular movements,
and that is all. Dr. Schmidt writes me that the squirrel in question soon
passed away from his observation. It may fairly be presumed that, if he had
been long retained prisoner in a cage, he would soon have forgotten his
gesticulations over the hickory-nuts.
One might, indeed, go still further with safety, and expect that, if such a
captive squirrel were then set free, he would never afterwards acquire this
peculiar instinct of his tribe.[369]

Leaving lower animals aside, and turning to human instincts, we see the law
of transiency corroborated on the widest scale by the alternation of different
interests and passions as human life goes on. With the child, life is all play
and fairy-tales and learning the external properties of 'things;' with the
youth, it is bodily exercises of a more systematic sort, novels of the real
world, boon-fellowship and song, friendship and love, nature, travel and
adventure, science and philosophy; with the man, ambition and policy,
acquisitiveness, responsibility to others, and the selfish zest of the battle of
life. If a boy grows up alone at the age of games and sports, and learns
neither to play ball, nor row, nor sail, nor ride, nor skate, nor fish, nor shoot,
probably he will be sedentary to the end of his days; and, though the best of
opportunities be afforded him for learning these things later, it is a hundred
to one but he will pass them by and shrink back from the effort of taking
those necessary first steps the prospect of which, at an earlier age, would
have filled him with eager delight. The sexual passion expires after a
protracted reign; but it is well known that its peculiar manifestations in a
given individual depend almost entirely on the habits he may form during
the early period of its activity. Exposure to bad company then makes him a
loose liver all his days; chastity kept at first makes the same easy later on.
In all pedagogy the great thing is to strike the iron while hot, and to seize
the wave of the pupil's interest in each successive subject before its ebb has
come, so that knowledge may be got and a habit of skill acquired—a
headway of interest, in short, secured, on which afterward the individual
may float. There is a happy moment for fixing skill in drawing, for making
boys collectors in natural history, and presently dissectors and botanists;
then for initiating them into the harmonies of mechanics and the wonders of
physical and chemical law. Later, introspective psychology and the
metaphysical and religious mysteries take their turn; and, last of all, the
drama of human affairs and worldly wisdom in the widest sense of the term.
In each of us a saturation-point is soon reached in all these things; the
impetus of our purely intellectual zeal expires, and unless the topic be one
associated with some urgent personal need that keens our wits constantly
whetted about it, we settle into an equilibrium, and live on what we learned
when our interest was fresh and instinctive, without adding to the store.
Outside of their own business, the ideas gained by men before they are
twenty-five are practically the only ideas they shall have in their lives. They
cannot get anything new. Disinterested curiosity is past, the mental grooves

and channels set, the power of assimilation gone. If by chance we ever do
learn anything about some entirely new topic we are afflicted with a strange
sense of insecurity, and we fear to advance a resolute opinion. But, with
things learned in the plastic days of instinctive curiosity we never lose
entirely our sense of being at home. There remains a kinship, a sentiment of
intimate acquaintance, which, even when we know we have failed to keep
abreast of the subject, flatters us with a sense of power over it, and makes
us feel not altogether out of the pale.
Whatever individual exceptions might be cited to this are of the sort that
'prove the rule.'
To detect the moment of the instinctive readiness for the subject is, then, the
first duty of every educator. As for the pupils, it would probably lead to a
more earnest temper on the part of college students if they had less belief in
their unlimited future intellectual potentialities, and could be brought to
realize that whatever physics and political economy and philosophy they
are now acquiring are, for better or worse, the physics and political
economy and philosophy that will have to serve them to the end.
The natural conclusion to draw from this transiency of instincts is that most
instincts are implanted for the sake of giving rise to habits, and that, this
purpose once accomplished, the instincts themselves, as such, have no
raison d'être in the psychical economy, and consequently fade away. That
occasionally an instinct should fade before circumstances permit of a habit
being formed, or that, if the habit be formed, other factors than the pure
instinct should modify its course, need not surprise us. Life is full of the
imperfect adjustment to individual cases, of arrangements which, taking the
species as a whole, are quite orderly and regular. Instinct cannot be
expected to escape this general risk.
SPECIAL HUMAN INSTINCTS.
Let us now test our principles by turning to human instincts in more detail.
We cannot pretend in these pages to be minute or exhaustive. But we can
say enough to set all the above generalities in a more favorable light. But
first, what kind of motor reactions upon objects shall we count as instincts?
This, as aforesaid, is a somewhat arbitrary matter. Some of the actions

aroused in us by objects go no further than our own bodies. Such is the
bristling up of the attention when a novel object is perceived, or the
'expression' on the face or the breathing apparatus of an emotion it may
excite. These movements merge into ordinary reflex actions like laughing
when tickled, or making a wry face at a bad taste. Other actions take effect
upon the outer world. Such are flight from a wild beast, imitation of what
we see a comrade do, etc. On the whole it is best to be catholic, since it is
very hard to draw an exact line; and call both of these kinds of activity
instinctive, so far as either may be naturally provoked by the presence of
specific sorts of outward fact.
Professor Preyer, in his careful little work, 'Die Seele des Kindes,' says
"instinctive acts are in man few in number, and, apart from those connected
with the sexual passion, difficult to recognize after early youth is past." And
he adds, "so much the more attention should we pay to the instinctive
movements of new-born babies, sucklings, and small children." That
instinctive acts should be easiest recognized in childhood would be a very
natural effect of our principles of transitoriness, and of the restrictive
influence of habits once acquired; but we shall see how far they are from
being 'few in number' in man. Professor Preyer divides the movements of
infants into impulsive, reflex, and instinctive. By impulsive movements he
means random movements of limbs, body, and voice, with no aim, and
before perception is aroused. Among the first reflex movements are crying
on contact with the air, sneezing, snuffling, snoring, coughing, sighing,
sobbing, gagging, vomiting, hiccuping, starting, moving the limbs when
tickled, touched, or blown upon, etc., etc.
Of the movements called by him instinctive in the child, Professor Preyer
gives a full account. Herr Schneider does the same; and as their descriptions
agree with each other and with what other writers about infancy say, I will
base my own very brief statement on theirs.
Sucking: almost perfect at birth; not coupled with any congenital tendency
to seek the breast, this being a later acquisition. As we have seen, sucking is
a transitory instinct.
Biting an object placed in the mouth, chewing and grinding the teeth;
licking sugar; making characteristic grimaces over bitter and sweet tastes;
spitting out.

Clasping an object which touches the fingers or toes. Later, attempts to
grasp at an object seen at a distance. Pointing at such objects, and making a
peculiar sound expressive of desire, which, in my own three children, was
the first manifestation of speech, occurring many weeks before other
significant sounds.
Carrying to the mouth of the object, when grasped. This instinct, guided
and inhibited by the sense of taste, and combined with the instincts of
biting, chewing, sucking, spitting-out, etc., and with the reflex act of
swallowing, leads in the individual to a set of habits which constitute his
function of alimentation, and which may or may not be gradually modified
as life goes on.
Crying at bodily discomfort, hunger, or pain, and at solitude. Smiling at
being noticed, fondled, or smiled at by others. It seems very doubtful
whether young infants have any instinctive fear of a terrible or scowling
face. I have been unable to make my own children, under a year old, change
their expression when I changed mine; at most they manifested attention or
curiosity. Preyer instances a protrusion of the lips, which, he says, may be
so great as to remind one of that in the chimpanzee, as an instinctive
expression of concentrated attention in the human infant.
Turning the head aside as a gesture of rejection, a gesture usually
accompanied with a frown and a bending back of the body, and with
holding the breath.
Holding head erect.
Sitting up.
Standing.
Locomotion. The early movements of children's limbs are more or less
symmetrical. Later a baby will move his legs in alternation if suspended in
the air. But until the impulse to walk awakens by the natural ripening of the
nerve-centres, it seems to make no difference how often the child's feet may
be placed in contact with the ground; the legs remain limp, and do not
respond to the sensation of contact in the soles by muscular contractions
pressing downwards. No sooner, however, is the standing impulse born,
than the child stiffens his legs and presses downward as soon as he feels the
floor. In some babies this is the first locomotory reaction. In others it is

preceded by the instinct to creep, which arises, as I can testify, often in a
very sudden way. Yesterday the baby sat quite contentedly wherever he was
put; to-day it has become impossible to keep him sitting at all, so irresistible
is the impulse, aroused by the sight of the floor, to throw himself forward
upon his hands. Usually the arms are too weak, and the ambitious little
experimenter falls on his nose. But his perseverance is dauntless, and he
ends in a few days by learning to travel rapidly around the room in the
quadrupedal way. The position of the legs in 'creeping' varies much from
one child to another. My own child, when creeping, was often observed to
pick up objects from the floor with his mouth, a phenomenon which, as Dr.
O. W. Holmes has remarked, like the early tendency to grasp with the toes,
easily lends itself to interpretation as a reminiscence of prehuman ancestral
habits.
The walking instinct may awaken with no less suddenness, and its entire
education be completed within a week's compass, barring, of course, a little
'grogginess' in the gait. Individual infants vary enormously; but on the
whole it is safe to say that the mode of development of these locomotor
instincts is inconsistent with the account given by the older English
associationist school, of their being results of the individual's education, due
altogether to the gradual association of certain perceptions with certain
haphazard movements and certain resultant pleasures. Mr. Bain has tried,
[370] by describing the demeanor of new-born lambs, to show that
locomotion is learned by a very rapid experience. But the observation
recorded proves the faculty to be almost perfect from the first; and all others
who have observed new-born calves, lambs, and pigs agree that in these
animals the powers of standing and walking, and of interpreting the
topographical significance of sights and sounds, are all but fully developed
at birth. Often in animals who seem to be 'learning' to walk or fly the
semblance is illusive. The awkwardness shown is not due to the fact that
'experience' has not yet been there to associate the successful movements
and exclude the failures, but to the fact that the animal is beginning his
attempts before the co-ordinating centres have quite ripened for their work.
Mr. Spalding's observations on this point are conclusive as to birds.
"Birds," he says, "do not learn to fly. Two years ago I shut up five
unfledged swallows in a small box, not much larger than the nest from
which they were taken. The little box, which had a wire front, was

hung on the wall near the nest, and the young swallows were fed by
their parents through the wires. In this confinement, where they could
not even extend their wings, they were kept until after they were fully
fledged.... On going to set the prisoners free, one was found dead....
The remaining four were allowed to escape one at a time. Two of these
were perceptibly wavering and unsteady in their flight. One of them,
after a flight of some ninety yards, disappeared among some trees."
No. 3 and No. 4 "never flew against anything, nor was there, in their
avoiding objects, any appreciable difference between them and the old
birds. No. 3 swept round the Wellingtonia, and No. 4 rose over the
hedge, just as we see the old swallows doing every hour of the day. I
have this summer verified these observations. Of two swallows I had
similarly confined, one, on being set free, flew a yard or two close to
the ground, rose in the direction of a beech-tree, which it gracefully
avoided; it was seen for a considerable time sweeping round the
beeches and performing magnificent evolutions in the air high above
them. The other, which was observed to beat the air with its wings
more than usual, was soon lost to sight, behind some trees. Titmice,
tomtits, and wrens I have made the subjects of similar observations,
and with similar results."[371]
In the light of this report, one may well be tempted to make a prediction
about the human child, and say that if a baby were kept from getting on his
feet for two or three weeks after the first impulse to walk had shown itself
in him,—a small blister on each sole would do the business,—he might then
be expected to walk about as well, through the mere ripening of his nervecentres, as if the ordinary process of 'learning' had been allowed to occur
during all the blistered time. It is to be hoped that some scientific widower,
left alone with his offspring at the critical moment, may ere long test this
suggestion on the living subject. Climbing on trees, fences, furniture,
banisters, etc., is a well-marked instinctive propensity which ripens after the
fourth year.
Vocalization. This may be either musical or significant. Very few weeks
after birth the baby begins to express its spirits by emitting vowel sounds,
as much during inspiration as during expiration, and will lie on its back
cooing and gurgling to itself for nearly an hour. But this singing has nothing
to do with speech. Speech is sound significant. During the second year a

certain number of significant sounds are gradually acquired; but talking
proper does not set in till the instinct to imitate sounds ripens in the nervous
system; and this ripening seems in some children to be quite abrupt. Then
speech grows rapidly in extent and perfection. The child imitates every
word he hears uttered, and repeats it again and again with the most evident
pleasure at his new power. At this time it is quite impossible to talk with
him, for his condition is that of 'Echolalia,'—instead of answering the
question, he simply reiterates it. The result is, however, that his vocabulary
increases very fast; and little by little, with teaching from above, the young
prattler understands, puts words together to express his own wants and
perceptions, and even makes intelligent replies. From a speechless, he has
become a speaking, animal. The interesting point with regard to this instinct
is the oftentimes very sudden birth of the impulse to imitate sounds. Up to
the date of its awakening the child may have been as devoid of it as a dog.
Four days later his whole energy may be poured into this new channel. The
habits of articulation formed during the plastic age of childhood are in most
persons sufficient to inhibit the formation of new ones of a fundamentally
different sort—witness the inevitable 'foreign accent' which distinguishes
the speech of those who learn a language after early youth.
Imitation. The child's first words are in part vocables of his own invention,
which his parents adopt, and which, as far as they go, form a new human
tongue upon the earth; and in part they are his more or less successful
imitations of words he hears the parents use. But the instinct of imitating
gestures develops earlier than that of imitating sounds,—unless the
sympathetic crying of a baby when it hears another cry may be reckoned as
imitation of a sound. Professor Preyer speaks of his child imitating the
protrusion of the father's lips in its fifteenth week. The various
accomplishments of infancy, making 'pat-a-cake,' saying 'bye-bye,' 'blowing
out the candle,' etc., usually fall well inside the limits of the first year. Later
come all the various imitative games in which childhood revels, playing
'horse,' 'soldiers,' etc., etc. And from this time onward man is essentially the
imitative animal. His whole educability and in fact the whole history of
civilization depend on this trait, which his strong tendencies to rivalry,
jealousy, and acquisitiveness reinforce. 'Humani nihil a me alienum puto,' is
the motto of each individual of the species; and makes him, whenever
another individual shows a power or superiority of any kind, restless until
he can exhibit it himself. But apart from this kind of imitation, of which the

psychological roots are complex, there is the more direct propensity to
speak and walk and behave like others, usually without any conscious
intention of so doing. And there is the imitative tendency which shows itself
in large masses of men, and produces panics, and orgies, and frenzies of
violence, and which only the rarest individuals can actively withstand. This
sort of imitativeness is possessed by man in common with other gregarious
animals, and is an instinct in the fullest sense of the term, being a blind
impulse to act as soon as a certain perception occurs. It is particularly hard
not to imitate gaping, laughing, or looking and running in a certain
direction, if we see others doing so. Certain mesmerized subjects must
automatically imitate whatever motion their operator makes before their
eyes.[372] A successful piece of mimicry gives to both bystanders and mimic
a peculiar kind of æsthetic pleasure. The dramatic impulse, the tendency to
pretend one is someone else, contains this pleasure of mimicry as one of its
elements. Another element seems to be a peculiar sense of power in
stretching one's own personality so as to include that of a strange person. In
young children this instinct often knows no bounds. For a few months in
one of my children's third year, he literally hardly ever appeared in his own
person. It was always, "Play I am So-and-so, and you are So-and-so, and
the chair is such a thing, and then we'll do this or that." If you called him by
his name, H., you invariably got the reply, "I'm not H., I'm a hyena, or a
horse-car," or whatever the feigned object might be. He outwore this
impulse after a time; but while it lasted, it had every appearance of being
the automatic result of ideas, often suggested by perceptions, working out
irresistible motor effects. Imitation shades into
Emulation or Rivalry, a very intense instinct, especially rife with young
children, or at least especially undisguised. Everyone knows it. Nine-tenths
of the work of the world is done by it. We know that if we do not do the
task someone else will do it and get the credit, so we do it. It has very little
connection with sympathy, but rather more with pugnacity, which we
proceed in turn to consider.
Pugnacity; anger; resentment. In many respects man is the most ruthlessly
ferocious of beasts. As with all gregarious animals, 'two souls,' as Faust
says, 'dwell within his breast,' the one of sociability and helpfulness, the
other of jealousy and antagonism to his mates. Though in a general way he
cannot live without them, yet, as regards certain individuals, it often falls

out that he cannot live with them either. Constrained to be a member of a
tribe, he still has a right to decide, as far as in him lies, of which other
members the tribe shall consist. Killing off a few obnoxious ones may often
better the chances of those that remain. And killing off a neighboring tribe
from whom no good thing comes, but only competition, may materially
better the lot of the whole tribe. Hence the gory cradle, the bellum omnium
contra omnes, in which our race was reared; hence the fickleness of human
ties, the ease with which the foe of yesterday becomes the ally of to-day, the
friend of to-day the enemy of to-morrow; hence the fact that we, the lineal
representatives of the successful enactors of one scene of slaughter after
another, must, whatever more pacific virtues we may also possess, still
carry about with us, ready at any moment to burst into flame, the
smouldering and sinister traits of character by means of which they lived
through so many massacres, harming others, but themselves unharmed.
Sympathy is an emotion as to whose instinctiveness psychologists have held
hot debate, some of them contending that it is no primitive endowment, but,
originally at least, the result of a rapid calculation of the good consequences
to ourselves of the sympathetic act. Such a calculation, at first conscious,
would grow more unconscious as it became more habitual, and at last,
tradition and association aiding, might prompt to actions which could not be
distinguished from immediate impulses. It is hardly needful to argue against
the falsity of this view. Some forms of sympathy, that of mother with child,
for example, are surely primitive, and not intelligent forecasts of board and
lodging and other support to be reaped in old age. Danger to the child
blindly and instantaneously stimulates the mother to actions of alarm or
defence. Menace or harm to the adult beloved or friend excites us in a
corresponding way, often against all the dictates of prudence. It is true that
sympathy does not necessarily follow from the mere fact of gregariousness.
Cattle do not help a wounded comrade; on the contrary, they are more likely
to dispatch him. But a dog will lick another sick dog, and even bring him
food; and the sympathy of monkeys is proved by many observations to be
strong. In man, then, we may lay it down that the sight of suffering or
danger to others is a direct exciter of interest, and an immediate stimulus, if
no complication hinders, to acts of relief. There is nothing unaccountable or
pathological about this—nothing to justify Professor Bain's assimilation of
it to the 'fixed ideas' of insanity, as 'clashing with the regular outgoings of
the will.' It may be as primitive as any other 'outgoing,' and may be due to a

random variation selected, quite as probably as gregariousness and maternal
love are, even in Spencer's opinion, due to such variations.
It is true that sympathy is peculiarly liable to inhibition from other instincts
which its stimulus may call forth. The traveller whom the good Samaritan
rescued may well have prompted such instinctive fear or disgust in the
priest and Levite who passed him by, that their sympathy could not come to
the front. Then, of course, habits, reasoned reflections, and calculations may
either check or reinforce one's sympathy; as may also the instincts of love
or hate, if these exist, for the suffering individual. The hunting and
pugnacious instincts, when aroused, also inhibit our sympathy absolutely.
This accounts for the cruelty of collections of men hounding each other on
to bait or torture a victim. The blood mounts to the eyes, and sympathy's
chance is gone.[373]
The hunting instinct has an equally remote origin in the evolution of the
race.[374] The hunting and the fighting instinct combine in many
manifestations. They both support the emotion of anger; they combine in
the fascination which stories of atrocity have for most minds; and the
utterly blind excitement of giving the rein to our fury when our blood is up
(an excitement whose intensity is greater than that of any other human
passion save one) is only explicable as an impulse aboriginal in character,
and having more to do with immediate and overwhelming tendencies to
muscular discharge than to any possible reminiscences of effects of
experience, or association of ideas. I say this here, because the pleasure of
disinterested cruelty has been thought a paradox, and writers have sought to
show that it is no primitive attribute of our nature, but rather a resultant of
the subtile combination of other less malignant elements of mind. This is a
hopeless task. If evolution and the survival of the fittest be true at all, the
destruction of prey and of human rivals must have been among the most
important of man's primitive functions, the fighting and the chasing
instincts must have become ingrained. Certain perceptions must
immediately, and without the intervention of inferences and ideas, have
prompted emotions and motor discharges; and both the latter must, from the
nature of the case, have been very violent, and therefore, when unchecked,
of an intensely pleasurable kind. It is just because human bloodthirstiness is
such a primitive part of us that it is so hard to eradicate, especially where a
fight or a hunt is promised as part of the fun.[375]

As Rochefoucauld says, there is something in the misfortunes of our very
friends that does not altogether displease us; and an apostle of peace will
feel a certain vicious thrill run through him, and enjoy a vicarious brutality,
as he turns to the column in his newspaper at the top of which 'Shocking
Atrocity' stands printed in large capitals. See how the crowd flocks round a
street-brawl! Consider the enormous annual sale of revolvers to persons, not
one in a thousand of whom has any serious intention of using them, but of
whom each one has his carnivorous self-consciousness agreeably tickled by
the notion, as he clutches the handle of his weapon, that he will be rather a
dangerous customer to meet. See the ignoble crew that escorts every great
pugilist—parasites who feel as if the glory of his brutality rubbed off upon
them, and whose darling hope, from day to day, is to arrange some set-to of
which they may share the rapture without enduring the pains! The first
blows at a prize-fight are apt to make a refined spectator sick; but his blood
is soon up in favor of one party, and it will then seem as if the other fellow
could not be banged and pounded and mangled enough—the refined
spectator would like to reinforce the blows himself. Over the sinister orgies
of blood of certain depraved and insane persons let a curtain be drawn, as
well as over the ferocity with which otherwise fairly decent men may be
animated, when (at the sacking of a town, for instance), the excitement of
victory long delayed, the sudden freedom of rapine and of lust, the
contagion of a crowd, and the impulse to imitate and outdo, all combine to
swell the blind drunkenness of the killing-instinct, and carry it to its
extreme. No! those who try to account for this from above downwards, as if
it resulted from the consequences of the victory being rapidly inferred, and
from the agreeable sentiments associated with them in the imagination,
have missed the root of the matter. Our ferocity is blind, and can only be
explained from below. Could we trace it back through our line of descent,
we should see it taking more and more the form of a fatal reflex response,
and at the same time becoming more and more the pure and direct emotion
that it is.[376]
In childhood it takes this form. The boys who pull out grasshoppers' legs
and butterflies' wings, and disembowel every frog they catch, have no
thought at all about the matter. The creatures tempt their hands to a
fascinating occupation, to which they have to yield. It is with them as with
the 'boy-fiend' Jesse Pomeroy, who cut a little girl's throat, 'just to see how
she'd act.' The normal provocatives of the impulse are all living beasts,

great and small, toward which a contrary habit has not been formed—all
human beings in whom we perceive a certain intent towards us, and a large
number of human beings who offend us peremptorily, either by their look,
or gait, or by some circumstance in their lives which we dislike. Inhibited
by sympathy, and by reflection calling up impulses of an opposite kind,
civilized men lose the habit of acting out their pugnacious instincts in a
perfectly natural way, and a passing feeling of anger, with its comparatively
faint bodily expressions, may be the limit of their physical combativeness.
Such a feeling as this may, however, be aroused by a wide range of objects.
Inanimate things, combinations of color and sound, bad bills of fare, may in
persons who combine fastidious taste with an irascible temperament
produce real ebullitions of rage. Though the female sex is often said to have
less pugnacity than the male, the difference seems connected more with the
extent of the motor consequences of the impulse than with its frequency.
Women take offence and get angry, if anything, more easily than men, but
their anger is inhibited by fear and other principles of their nature from
expressing itself in blows. The hunting-instinct proper seems to be
decidedly weaker in them than in men. The latter instinct is easily restricted
by habit to certain objects, which become legitimate 'game,' while other
things are spared. If the hunting-instinct be not exercised at all, it may even
entirely die out, and a man may enjoy letting a wild creature live, even
though he might easily kill it. Such a type is now becoming frequent; but
there is no doubt that in the eyes of a child of nature such a personage
would seem a sort of moral monster.

Fear is a reaction aroused by the same objects that arouse ferocity. The
antagonism of the two is an interesting study in instinctive dynamics. We
both fear, and wish to kill, anything that may kill us; and the question which
of the two impulses we shall follow is usually decided by some one of those
collateral circumstances of the particular case, to be moved by which is the
mark of superior mental natures. Of course this introduces uncertainty into
the reaction; but it is an uncertainty found in the higher brutes as well as in
men, and ought not to be taken as proof that we are less instinctive than
they. Fear has bodily expressions of an extremely energetic kind, and
stands, beside lust and anger, as one of the three most exciting emotions of
which our nature is susceptible. The progress from brute to man is
characterized by nothing so much as by the decrease in frequency of proper
occasions for fear. In civilized life, in particular, it has at last become
possible for large numbers of people to pass from the cradle to the grave
without ever having had a pang of genuine fear. Many of us need an attack
of mental disease to teach us the meaning of the word. Hence the possibility
of so much blindly optimistic philosophy and religion. The atrocities of life
become 'like a tale of little meaning though the words are strong;' we doubt
if anything like us ever really was within the tiger's jaws, and conclude that
the horrors we hear of are but a sort of painted tapestry for the chambers in
which we lie so comfortably at peace with ourselves and with the world.
Be this as it may, fear is a genuine instinct, and one of the earliest shown by
the human child. Noises seem especially to call it forth. Most noises from
the outer world, to a child bred in the house, have no exact significance.
They are simply startling. To quote a good observer, M. Perez:
"Children between three and ten months are less often alarmed by
visual than by auditory impressions. In cats, from the fifteenth day, the
contrary is the case. A child, three and a half months old, in the midst
of the turmoil of a conflagration, in presence of the devouring flames
and ruined walls, showed neither astonishment nor fear, but smiled at
the woman who was taking care of him, while his parents were busy.
The noise, however, of the trumpet of the firemen, who were
approaching, and that of the wheels of the engine, made him start and
cry. At this age I have never yet seen an infant startled at a flash of
lightning, even when intense; but I have seen many of them alarmed at

the voice of the thunder.... Thus fear comes rather by the ears than by
the eyes, to the child without experience. It is natural that this should
be reversed, or reduced, in animals organized to perceive danger afar.
Accordingly, although I have never seen a child frightened at his first
sight of fire, I have many a time seen young dogs, young cats, young
chickens, and young birds frightened thereby.... I picked up some years
ago a lost cat about a year old. Some months afterward at the onset of
cold weather I lit the fire in the grate of my study, which was her
reception-room. She first looked at the flame in a very frightened way.
I brought her near to it. She leaped away and ran to hide under the bed.
Although the fire was lighted every day, it was not until the end of the
winter that I could prevail upon her to stay upon a chair near it. The
next winter, however, all apprehension had disappeared.... Let us, then,
conclude that there are hereditary dispositions to fear, which are
independent of experience, but which experiences may end by
attenuating very considerably. In the human infant I believe them to be
particularly connected with the ear."[377]
The effect of noise in heightening any terror we may feel in adult years is
very marked. The howling of the storm, whether on sea or land, is a
principal cause of our anxiety when exposed to it. The writer has been
interested in noticing in his own person, while lying in bed, and kept awake
by the wind outside, how invariably each loud gust of it arrested
momentarily his heart. A dog, attacking us, is much more dreadful by
reason of the noises he makes.
Strange men, and strange animals, either large or small, excite fear, but
especially men or animals advancing toward us in a threatening way. This is
entirely instinctive and antecedent to experience. Some children will cry
with terror at their very first sight of a cat or dog, and it will often be
impossible for weeks to make them touch it. Others will wish to fondle it
almost immediately. Certain kinds of 'vermin,' especially spiders and
snakes, seem to excite a fear unusually difficult to overcome. It is
impossible to say how much of this difference is instinctive and how much
the result of stories heard about these creatures. That the fear of 'vermin'
ripens gradually, seemed to me to be proved in a child of my own to whom
I gave a live frog once, at the age of six to eight months, and again when he
was a year and a half old. The first time he seized it promptly, and holding

it, in spite of its struggling, at last got its head into his mouth. He then let it
crawl up his breast, and get upon his face, without showing alarm. But the
second time, although he had seen no frog and heard no story about a frog
between whiles, it was almost impossible to induce him to touch it. Another
child, a year old, eagerly took some very large spiders into his hand. At
present he is afraid, but has been exposed meanwhile to the teachings of the
nursery. One of my children from her birth upwards saw daily the pet pugdog of the house, and never betrayed the slightest fear until she was (if I
recollect rightly) about eight months old. Then the instinct suddenly seemed
to develop, and with such intensity that familiarity had no mitigating effect.
She screamed whenever the dog entered the room, and for many months
remained afraid to touch him. It is needless to say that no change in the
pug's unfailingly friendly conduct had anything to do with this change of
feeling in the child.
Preyer tells of a young child screaming with fear on being carried near to
the sea. The great source of terror to infancy is solitude. The teleology of
this is obvious, as is also that of the infant's expression of dismay—the
never-failing cry—on waking up and finding himself alone.
Black things, and especially dark places, holes, caverns, etc., arouse a
peculiarly gruesome fear. This fear, as well as that of solitude, of being
'lost,' are explained after a fashion by ancestral experience. Says Schneider:
"It is a fact that men, especially in childhood, fear to go into a dark
cavern or a gloomy wood. This feeling of fear arises, to be sure, partly
from the fact that we easily suspect that dangerous beasts may lurk in
these localities—a suspicion due to stories we have heard and read.
But, on the other hand, it is quite sure that this fear at a certain
perception is also directly inherited. Children who have been carefully
guarded from all ghost-stories are nevertheless terrified and cry if led
into a dark place, especially if sounds are made there. Even an adult
can easily observe that an uncomfortable timidity steals over him in a
lonely wood at night, although he may have the fixed conviction that
not the slightest danger is near.
"This feeling of fear occurs in many men even in their own house after
dark, although it is much stronger in a dark cavern or forest. The fact
of such instinctive fear is easily explicable when we consider that our

savage ancestors through innumerable generations were accustomed to
meet with dangerous beasts in caverns, especially bears, and were for
the most part attacked by such beasts during the night and in the
woods, and that thus an inseparable association between the
perceptions of darkness of caverns and woods, and fear took place, and
was inherited."[378]
High places cause fear of a peculiarly sickening sort, though here, again,
individuals differ enormously. The utterly blind instinctive character of the
motor impulses here is shown by the fact that they are almost always
entirely unreasonable, but that reason is powerless to suppress them. That
they are a mere incidental peculiarity of the nervous system, like liability to
sea-sickness, or love of music, with no teleological significance, seems
more than probable. The fear in question varies so much from one person to
another, and its detrimental effects are so much more obvious than its uses,
that it is hard to see how it could be a selected instinct. Man is anatomically
one of the best fitted of animals for climbing about high places. The best
psychical complement to this equipment would seem to be a 'level head'
when there, not a dread of going there at all. In fact, the teleology of fear,
beyond a certain point, is very dubious. Professor Mosso, in his interesting
monograph, 'La Paura' (which has been translated into French), concludes
that many of its manifestations must be considered pathological rather than
useful; Bain, in several places, expresses the same opinion; and this, I think,
is surely the view which any observer without a priori prejudices must take.
A certain amount of timidity obviously adapts us to the world we live in,
but the fear-paroxysm is surely altogether harmful to him who is its prey.
Fear of the supernatural is one variety of fear. It is difficult to assign any
normal object for this fear, unless it were a genuine ghost. But, in spite of
psychical research-societies, science has not yet adopted ghosts; so we can
only say that certain ideas of supernatural agency, associated with real
circumstances, produce a peculiar kind of horror. This horror is probably
explicable as the result of a combination of simpler horrors. To bring the
ghostly terror to its maximum, many usual elements of the dreadful must
combine, such as loneliness, darkness, inexplicable sounds, especially of a
dismal character, moving figures half discerned (or, if discerned, of dreadful
aspect), and a vertiginous baffling of the expectation. This last element,
which is intellectual, is very important. It produces a strange emotional

'curdle' in our blood to see a process with which we are familiar deliberately
taking an unwonted course. Any one's heart would stop beating if he
perceived his chair sliding unassisted across the floor. The lower animals
appear to be sensitive to the mysteriously exceptional as well as ourselves.
My friend Professor W. K. Brooks, of the Johns Hopkins University, told
me of his large and noble dog being frightened into a sort of epileptic fit by
a bone being drawn across the floor by a thread which the dog did not see.
Darwin and Romanes have given similar experiences.[379] The idea of the
supernatural involves that the usual should be set at naught. In the witch
and hobgoblin supernatural, other elements still of fear are brought in—
caverns, slime and ooze, vermin, corpses, and the like.[380] A human corpse
seems normally to produce an instinctive dread, which is no doubt
somewhat due to its mysteriousness, and which familiarity rapidly dispels.
But, in view of the fact that cadaveric, reptilian, and underground horrors
play so specific and constant a part in many nightmares and forms of
delirium, it seems not altogether unwise to ask whether these forms of
dreadful circumstance may not at a former period have been more normal
objects of the environment than now. The ordinary cock-sure evolutionist
ought to have no difficulty in explaining these terrors, and the scenery that
provokes them, as relapses into the consciousness of the cave-men, a
consciousness usually overlaid in us by experiences of more recent date.
There are certain other pathological fears, and certain peculiarities in the
expression of ordinary fear, which might receive an explanatory light from
ancestral conditions, even infra-human ones. In ordinary fear, one may
either run, or remain semi-paralyzed. The latter condition reminds us of the
so-called death-shamming instinct shown by many animals. Dr. Lindsay, in
his work 'Mind in Animals,' says this must require great self-command in
those that practise it. But it is really no feigning of death at all, and requires
no self-command. It is simply a terror-paralysis which has been so useful as
to become hereditary. The beast of prey does not think the motionless bird,
insect, or crustacean dead. He simply fails to notice them at all; because his
senses, like ours, are much more strongly excited by a moving object than
by a still one. It is the same instinct which leads a boy playing 'I spy' to hold
his very breath when the seeker is near, and which makes the beast of prey
himself in many cases motionlessly lie in wait for his victim or silently
'stalk' it, by rapid approaches alternated with periods of immobility. It is the

opposite of the instinct which makes us jump up and down and move our
arms when we wish to attract the notice of some one passing far away, and
makes the shipwrecked sailor frantically wave a cloth upon the raft where
he is floating when a distant sail appears. Now, may not the statue-like,
crouching immobility of some melancholiacs, insane with general anxiety
and fear of everything, be in some way connected with this old instinct?
They can give no reason for their fear to move; but immobility makes them
feel safer and more comfortable. Is not this the mental state of the 'feigning'
animal?
Again, take the strange symptom which has been described of late years by
the rather absurd name of agoraphobia. The patient is seized with
palpitation and terror at the sight of any open place or broad street which he
has to cross alone. He trembles, his knees bend, he may even faint at the
idea. Where he has sufficient self-command he sometimes accomplishes the
object by keeping safe under the lee of a vehicle going across, or joining
himself to a knot of other people. But usually he slinks round the sides of
the square, hugging the houses as closely as he can. This emotion has no
utility in a civilized man, but when we notice the chronic agoraphobia of
our domestic cats, and see the tenacious way in which many wild animals,
especially rodents, cling to cover, and only venture on a dash across the
open as a desperate measure—even then making for every stone or bunch
of weeds which may give a momentary shelter—when we see this we are
strongly tempted to ask whether such an odd kind of fear in us be not due to
the accidental resurrection, through disease, of a sort of instinct which may
in some of our ancestors have had a permanent and on the whole a useful
part to play?
Appropriation or Acquisitiveness. The beginnings of acquisitiveness are
seen in the impulse which very young children display, to snatch at, or beg
for, any object which pleases their attention. Later, when they begin to
speak, among the first words they emphasize are 'me' and 'mine.'[381] Their
earliest quarrels with each other are about questions of ownership; and
parents of twins soon learn that it conduces to a quiet house to buy all
presents in impartial duplicate. Of the later evolution of the proprietary
instinct I need not speak. Everyone knows how difficult a thing it is not to
covet whatever pleasing thing we see, and how the sweetness of the thing
often is as gall to us so long as it is another's. When another is in

possession, the impulse to appropriate the thing often turns into the impulse
to harm him—what is called envy, or jealousy, ensues. In civilized life the
impulse to own is usually checked by a variety of considerations, and only
passes over into action under circumstances legitimated by habit and
common consent, an additional example of the way in which one instinctive
tendency may be inhibited by others. A variety of the proprietary instinct is
the impulse to form collections of the same sort of thing. It differs much in
individuals, and shows in a striking way how instinct and habit interact.
For, although a collection of any given thing—like postage-stamps—need
not be begun by any given person, yet the chances are that if accidentally it
be begun by a person with the collecting instinct, it will probably be
continued. The chief interest of the objects, in the collector's eyes, is that
they are a collection, and that they are his. Rivalry, to be sure, inflames this,
as it does every other passion, yet the objects of a collector's mania need not
be necessarily such as are generally in demand. Boys will collect anything
that they see another boy collect, from pieces of chalk and peach-pits up to
books and photographs. Out of a hundred students whom I questioned, only
four or five had never collected anything.[382]
The associationist psychology denies that there is any blind primitive
instinct to appropriate, and would explain all acquisitiveness, in the first
instance, as a desire to secure the 'pleasures' which the objects possessed
may yield; and, secondly, as the association of the idea of pleasantness with
the holding of the thing, even though the pleasure originally got by it was
only gained through its expense or destruction. Thus the miser is shown to
us as one who has transferred to the gold by which he may buy the goods of
this life all the emotions which the goods themselves would yield; and who
thereafter loves the gold for its own sake, preferring the means of pleasure
to the pleasure itself. There can be little doubt that much of this analysis a
broader view of the facts would have dispelled. 'The miser' is an
abstraction. There are all kinds of misers. The common sort, the excessively
niggardly man, simply exhibits the psychological law that the potential has
often a far greater influence over our mind than the actual. A man will not
marry now, because to do so puts an end to his indefinite potentialities of
choice of a partner. He prefers the latter. He will not use open fires or wear
his good clothes, because the day may come when he will have to use the
furnace or dress in a worn-out coat, 'and then where will he be?' For him,
better the actual evil than the fear of it; and so it is with the common lot of

misers. Better to live poor now, with the power of living rich, than to live
rich at the risk of losing the power. These men value their gold, not for its
own sake, but for its powers. Demonetize it, and see how quickly they will
get rid of it! The associationist theory is, as regards them, entirely at fault:
they care nothing for the gold in se.
With other misers there combines itself with this preference of the power
over the act the far more instinctive element of the simple collecting
propensity. Every one collects money, and when a man of petty ways is
smitten with the collecting mania for this object he necessarily becomes a
miser. Here again the associationist psychology is wholly at fault. The
hoarding instinct prevails widely among animals as well as among men.
Professor Silliman has thus described one of the hoards of the California
wood-rat, made in an empty stove of an unoccupied house:
"I found the outside to be composed entirely of spikes, all laid with
symmetry, so as to present the points of the nails outward. In the centre
of this mass was the nest, composed of finely-divided fibres of hemppacking. Interlaced with the spikes were the following: about two
dozen knives, forks, and spoons; all the butcher's knives, three in
number; a large carving-knife, fork, and steel; several large plugs of
tobacco,... an old purse containing some silver, matches, and tobacco;
nearly all the small tools from the tool-closets, with several large
augers,... all of which must have been transported some distance, as
they were originally stored in different parts of the house.... The
outside casing of a silver watch was disposed of in one part of the pile,
the glass of the same watch in another, and the works in still another."
[383]

In every lunatic asylum we find the collecting instinct developing itself in
an equally absurd way. Certain patients will spend all their time picking
pins from the floor and hoarding them. Others collect bits of thread,
buttons, or rags, and prize them exceedingly. Now, 'the Miser' par
excellence of the popular imagination and of melodrama, the monster of
squalor and misanthropy, is simply one of these mentally deranged persons.
His intellect may in many matters be clear, but his instincts, especially that
of ownership, are insane, and their insanity has no more to do with the
association of ideas than with the precession of the equinoxes. As a matter

of fact his hoarding usually is directed to money; but it also includes almost
anything besides. Lately in a Massachusetts town there died a miser who
principally hoarded newspapers. These had ended by so filling all the rooms
of his good-sized house from floor to ceiling that his living-space was
restricted to a few narrow channels between them. Even as I write, the
morning paper gives an account of the emptying of a miser's den in Boston
by the City Board of Health. What the owner hoarded is thus described:
"He gathered old newspapers, wrapping-paper, incapacitated
umbrellas, canes, pieces of common wire, cast-off clothing, empty
barrels, pieces of iron, old bones, battered tin-ware, fractured pots, and
bushels of such miscellany as is to be found only at the city 'dump.'
The empty barrels were filled, shelves were filled, every hole and
corner was filled, and in order to make more storage-room, 'the hermit'
covered his store-room with a network of ropes, and hung the ropes as
full as they could hold of his curious collections. There was nothing
one could think of that wasn't in that room. As a wood-sawyer, the old
man had never thrown away a saw-blade or a wood-buck. The bucks
were rheumatic and couldn't stand up, and the saw-blades were worn
down to almost nothing in the middle. Some had been actually worn in
two, but the ends were carefully saved and stored away. As a coalheaver, the old man had never cast off a worn-out basket, and there
were dozens of the remains of the old things, patched up with canvas
and rope-yarns, in the store-room. There were at least two dozen old
hats, fur, cloth, silk, and straw," etc.
Of course there may be a great many 'associations of ideas' in the miser's
mind about the things he hoards. He is a thinking being, and must associate
things; but, without an entirely blind impulse in this direction behind all his
ideas, such practical results could never be reached.[384]
Kleptomania, as it is called, is an uncontrollable impulse to appropriate,
occurring in persons whose 'associations of ideas' would naturally all be of
a counteracting sort. Kleptomaniacs often promptly restore, or permit to be
restored, what they have taken; so the impulse need not be to keep, but only
to take. But elsewhere hoarding complicates the result. A gentleman, with
whose case I am acquainted, was discovered, after his death, to have a
hoard in his barn of all sorts of articles, mainly of a trumpery sort, but

including pieces of silver which he had stolen from his own dining-room,
and utensils which he had stolen from his own kitchen, and for which he
had afterward bought substitutes with his own money.
Constructiveness is as genuine and irresistible an instinct in man as in the
bee or the beaver. Whatever things are plastic to his hands, those things he
must remodel into shapes of his own, and the result of the remodelling,
however useless it may be, gives him more pleasure than the original thing.
The mania of young children for breaking and pulling apart whatever is
given them is more often the expression of a rudimentary constructive
impulse than of a destructive one. 'Blocks' are the playthings of which they
are least apt to tire. Clothes, weapons, tools, habitations, and works of art
are the result of the discoveries to which the plastic instinct leads, each
individual starting where his forerunners left off, and tradition preserving
all that once is gained. Clothing, where not necessitated by cold, is nothing
but a sort of attempt to remodel the human body itself—an attempt still
better shown in the various tattooings, tooth-filings, scarrings, and other
mutilations that are practised by savage tribes. As for habitation, there can
be no doubt that the instinct to seek a sheltered nook, open only on one side,
into which he may retire and be safe, is in man quite as specific as the
instinct of birds to build a nest. It is not necessarily in the shape of a shelter
from wet and cold that the need comes before him, but he feels less exposed
and more at home when not altogether uninclosed than when lying all
abroad. Of course the utilitarian origin of this instinct is obvious. But to
stick to bare facts at present and not to trace origins, we must admit that this
instinct now exists, and probably always has existed, since man was man.
Habits of the most complicated kind are reared upon it. But even in the
midst of these habits we see the blind instinct cropping out; as, for example,
in the fact that we feign a shelter within a shelter, by backing up beds in
rooms with their heads against the wall, and never lying in them the other
way—just as dogs prefer to get under or upon some piece of furniture to
sleep, instead of lying in the middle of the room. The first habitations were
caves and leafy grottoes, bettered by the hands; and we see children to-day,
when playing in wild places, take the greatest delight in discovering and
appropriating such retreats and 'playing house' there.

Play. The impulse to play in special ways is certainly instinctive. A boy can
no more help running after another boy who runs provokingly near him,
than a kitten can help running after a rolling ball. A child trying to get into
its own hand some object which it sees another child pick up, and the latter
trying to get away with the prize, are just as much slaves of an automatic
prompting as are two chickens or fishes, of which one has taken a big
morsel into its mouth and decamps with it, while the other darts after in
pursuit. All simple active games are attempts to gain the excitement yielded
by certain primitive instincts, through feigning that the occasions for their
exercise are there. They involve imitation, hunting, fighting, rivalry,
acquisitiveness, and construction, combined in various ways; their special
rules are habits, discovered by accident, selected by intelligence, and
propagated by tradition; but unless they were founded in automatic
impulses, games would lose most of their zest. The sexes differ somewhat
in their play-impulses. As Schneider says:
"The little boy imitates soldiers, models clay into an oven, builds
houses, makes a wagon out of chairs, rides on horseback upon a stick,
drives nails with the hammer, harnesses his brethren and comrades
together and plays the stage-driver, or lets himself be captured as a
wild horse by some one else. The girl, on the contrary, plays with her
doll, washes and dresses it, strokes it, clasps and kisses it, puts it to bed
and tucks it in, sings it a cradle-song, or speaks with it as if it were a
living being.... This fact that a sexual difference exists in the playimpulse, that a boy gets more pleasure from a horse and rider and a
soldier than from a doll, while with the girl the opposite is the case, is
proof that an hereditary connection exists between the perception of
certain things (horse, doll, etc.), and the feeling of pleasure, as well as
between this latter and the impulse to play."[385]
There is another sort of human play, into which higher æsthetic feelings
enter. I refer to that love of festivities, ceremonies, ordeals, etc., which
seems to be universal in our species. The lowest savages have their dances,
more or less formally conducted. The various religions have their solemn
rites and exercises, and civic and military power symbolize their grandeur
by processions and celebrations of divers sorts. We have our operas and
parties and masquerades. An element common to all these ceremonial

games, as they may be called, is the excitement of concerted action as one
of an organized crowd. The same acts, performed with a crowd, seem to
mean vastly more than when performed alone. A walk with the people on a
holiday afternoon, an excursion to drink beer or coffee at a popular 'resort,'
or an ordinary ball-room, are examples of this. Not only are we amused at
seeing so many strangers, but there is a distinct stimulation at feeling our
share in their collective life. The perception of them is the stimulus; and our
reaction upon it is our tendency to join them and do what they are doing,
and our unwillingness to be the first to leave off and go home alone. This
seems a primitive element in our nature, as it is difficult to trace any
association of ideas that could lead up to it; although, once granting it to
exist, it is very easy to see what its uses to a tribe might be in facilitating
prompt and vigorous collective action. The formation of armies and the
undertaking of military expeditions would be among its fruits. In the
ceremonial games it is but the impulsive starting-point. What particular
things the crowd then shall do, depends for the most part on the initiative of
individuals, fixed by imitation and habit, and continued by tradition. The
co-operation of other æsthetic pleasures with games, ceremonial or other,
has a great deal to do with the selection of such as shall become stereotyped
and habitual. The peculiar form of excitement called by Professor Bain the
emotion of pursuit, the pleasure of a crescendo, is the soul of many
common games. The immense extent of the play-activities in human life is
too obvious to be more than mentioned.[386]

Curiosity. Already pretty low down among vertebrates we find that any
object may excite attention, provided it be only novel, and that attention
may be followed by approach and exploration by nostril, lips, or touch.
Curiosity and fear form a couple of antagonistic emotions liable to be
awakened by the same outward thing, and manifestly both useful to their
possessor. The spectacle of their alternation is often amusing enough, as in
the timid approaches and scared wheelings which sheep or cattle will make
in the presence of some new object they are investigating. I have seen
alligators in the water act in precisely the same way towards a man seated
on the beach in front of them—gradually drawing near as long as he kept

still, frantically careering back as soon as he made a movement. Inasmuch
as new objects may always be advantageous, it is better that an animal
should not absolutely fear them. But, inasmuch as they may also possibly
be harmful, it is better that he should not be quite indifferent to them either,
but on the whole remaining on the qui vive, ascertain as much about them,
and what they may be likely to bring forth, as he can, before settling down
to rest in their presence. Some such susceptibility for being excited and
irritated by the mere novelty, as such, of any movable feature of the
environment must form the instinctive basis of all human curiosity; though,
of course, the superstructure absorbs contributions from so many other
factors of the emotional life that the original root may be hard to find. With
what is called scientific curiosity, and with metaphysical wonder, the
practical instinctive root has probably nothing to do. The stimuli here are
not objects, but ways of conceiving objects; and the emotions and actions
they give rise to are to be classed, with many other æsthetic manifestations,
sensitive and motor, as incidental features of our mental life. The
philosophic brain responds to an inconsistency or a gap in its knowledge,
just as the musical brain responds to a discord in what it hears. At certain
ages the sensitiveness to particular gaps and the pleasure of resolving
particular puzzles reach their maximum, and then it is that stores of
scientific knowledge are easiest and most naturally laid in. But these effects
may have had nothing to do with the uses for which the brain was originally
given; and it is probably only within a few centuries, since religious beliefs
and economic applications of science have played a prominent part in the
conflicts of one race with another, that they may have helped to 'select' for
survival a particular type of brain. I shall have to consider this matter of
incidental and supernumerary faculties in Chapter XXVIII.
Sociability and Shyness. As a gregarious animal, man is excited both by the
absence and by the presence of his kind. To be alone is one of the greatest
of evils for him. Solitary confinement is by many regarded as a mode of
torture too cruel and unnatural for civilized countries to adopt. To one long
pent up on a desert island, the sight of a human footprint or a human form
in the distance would be the most tumultuously exciting of experiences. In
morbid states of mind, one of the commonest symptoms is the fear of being
alone. This fear may be assuaged by the presence of a little child, or even of
a baby. In a case of hydrophobia known to the writer, the patient insisted on
keeping his room crowded with neighbors all the while, so intense was his

fear of solitude. In a gregarious animal, the perception that he is alone
excites him to vigorous activity. Mr. Galton thus describes the behavior of
the South African cattle whom he had such good opportunities for
observing:
"Although the ox has little affection for, or interest in, his fellows, he
cannot endure even a momentary separation from his herd. If he be
separated from it by stratagem or force, he exhibits every sign of
mental agony; he strives with all his might to get back again, and when
he succeeds he plunges into its middle to bathe his whole body with
the comfort of closest companionship."[387]
Man is also excited by the presence of his kind. The bizarre actions of dogs
meeting strange dogs are not altogether without a parallel in our own
constitution. We cannot meet strangers without a certain tension, or talk to
them exactly as to our familiars. This is particularly the case if the stranger
be an important personage. It may then happen that we not only shrink from
meeting his eye, but actually cannot collect our wits or do ourselves any
sort of justice in his presence.
"This odd state of mind," says Darwin,[388] "is chiefly recognized by
the face reddening, by the eyes being averted or cast down, and by
awkward, nervous movements of the body.... Shyness seems to depend
on sensitiveness to the opinion, whether good or bad, of others, more
especially with respect to external appearance. Strangers neither know
nor care anything about our conduct or character, but they may, and
often do, criticise our appearance.... The consciousness of anything
peculiar, or even new, in the dress, or any slight blemish on the person,
and more especially on the face—points which are likely to attract the
attention of strangers—makes the shy intolerably shy.[389] On the other
hand, in those cases in which conduct, and not personal appearance, is
concerned, we are much more apt to be shy in the presence of
acquaintances whose judgment we in some degree value than in that of
strangers.... Some persons, however, are so sensitive that the mere act
of speaking to almost any one is sufficient to rouse their selfconsciousness, and a slight blush is the result. Disapprobation ...
causes shyness and blushing much more readily than does

approbation.... Persons who are exceedingly shy are rarely shy in the
presence of those with whom they are quite familiar, and of whose
good opinion and sympathy they are quite assured; for instance, a girl
in presence of her mother.... Shyness ... is closely related to fear; yet it
is distinct from fear in the ordinary sense. A shy man dreads the notice
of strangers, but can hardly be said to be afraid of them; he may be as
bold as a hero in battle, and yet have no self-confidence about trifles in
the presence of strangers. Almost every one is extremely nervous when
first addressing a public assembly, and most men remain so through
their lives."
As Mr. Darwin observes, a real dread of definite consequences may enter
into this 'stage-fright' and complicate the shyness. Even so our shyness
before an important personage may be complicated by what Professor Bain
calls 'servile terror,' based on representation of definite dangers if we fail to
please. But both stage-fright and servile terror may exist with the most
indefinite apprehensions of danger, and, in fact, when our reason tells us
there is no occasion for alarm. We must, therefore, admit a certain amount
of purely instinctive perturbation and constraint, due to the consciousness
that we have become objects for other people's eyes. Mr. Darwin goes on to
say: "Shyness comes on at a very early age. In one of my own children, two
years and three months old, I saw a trace of what certainly appeared to be
shyness directed toward myself, after an absence from home of only a
week." Every parent has noticed the same sort of thing. Considering the
despotic powers of rulers in savage tribes, respect and awe must, from time
immemorial, have been emotions excited by certain individuals; and stagefright, servile terror, and shyness, must have had as copious opportunities
for exercise as at the present time. Whether these impulses could ever have
been useful, and selected for usefulness, is a question which, it would seem,
can only be answered in the negative. Apparently they are pure hindrances,
like fainting at sight of blood or disease, sea-sickness, a dizzy head on high
places, and certain squeamishnesses of æsthetic taste. They are incidental
emotions, in spite of which we get along. But they seem to play an
important part in the production of two other propensities, about the
instinctive character of which a good deal of controversy has prevailed. I
refer to cleanliness and modesty, to which we must proceed, but not before

we have said a word about another impulse closely allied to shyness. I mean
—

Secretiveness, which, although often due to intelligent calculation and the
dread of betraying our interests in some more or less definitely foreseen
way, is quite as often a blind propensity, serving no useful purpose, and is
so stubborn and ineradicable a part of the character as fully to deserve a
place among the instincts. Its natural stimuli are unfamiliar human beings,
especially those whom we respect. Its reactions are the arrest of whatever
we are saying or doing when such strangers draw nigh, coupled often with
the pretense that we were not saying or doing that thing, but possibly
something different. Often there is added to this a disposition to mendacity
when asked to give an account of ourselves. With many persons the first
impulse, when the door-bell rings, or a visitor is suddenly announced, is to
scuttle out of the room, so as not to be 'caught.' When a person at whom we
have been looking becomes aware of us, our immediate impulse may be to
look the other way, and pretend we have not seen him. Many friends have
confessed to me that this is a frequent phenomenon with them in meeting
acquaintances in the street, especially unfamiliar ones. The bow is a
secondary correction of the primary feint that we do not see the other
person. Probably most readers will recognize in themselves, at least, the
start, the nascent disposition, on many occasions, to act in each and all of
these several ways. That the 'start' is neutralized by second thought proves it
to come from a deeper region than thought. There is unquestionably a
native impulse in every one to conceal love-affairs, and the acquired
impulse to conceal pecuniary affairs seems in many to be almost equally
strong. It is to be noted that even where a given habit of concealment is
reflective and deliberate, its motive is far less often definite prudence than a
vague aversion to have one's sanctity invaded and one's personal concerns
fingered and turned over by other people. Thus, some persons will never
leave anything with their name written on it, where others may pick it up—
even in the woods, an old envelope must not be thrown on the ground.
Many cut all the leaves of a book of which they may be reading a single
chapter, so that no one shall know which one they have singled out, and all

this with no definite notion of harm. The impulse to conceal is more apt to
be provoked by superiors than by equals or inferiors. How differently do
boys talk together when their parents are not by! Servants see more of their
masters' characters than masters of servants'.[390] Where we conceal from
our equals and familiars, there is probably always a definite element of
prudential prevision involved. Collective secrecy, mystery, enters into the
emotional interest of many games, and is one of the elements of the
importance men attach to freemasonries of various sorts, being delightful
apart from any end.

Cleanliness. Seeing how very filthy savages and exceptional individuals
among civilized people may be, philosophers have doubted whether any
genuine instinct of cleanliness exists, and whether education and habit be
not responsible for whatever amount of it is found. Were it an instinct, its
stimulus would be dirt, and its characteristic reaction the shrinking from
contact therewith, and the cleaning of it away after contact had occurred.
Now, if some animals are cleanly, men may be so, and there can be no doubt
that some kinds of matter are natively repugnant, both to sight, touch, and
smell—excrementitious and putrid things, blood, pus, entrails, and diseased
tissues, for example. It is true that the shrinking from contact with these
things may be inhibited very easily, as by a medical education; and it is
equally true that the impulse to clean them away may be inhibited by so
slight an obstacle as the thought of the coldness of the ablution, or the
necessity of getting up to perform it. It is also true than an impulse to
cleanliness, habitually checked, will become obsolete fast enough. But none
of these facts prove the impulse never to have been there.[391] It seems to be
there in all cases; and then to be particularly amenable to outside influences,
the child having his own degree of squeamishness about what he shall touch
or eat, and later being either hardened or made more fastidious still by the
habits he is forced to acquire and the examples among which he lives.
Examples get their hold on him in this way, that a particularly evil-smelling
or catarrhal or lousy comrade is rather offensive to him, and that he sees the
odiousness in another of an amount of dirt to which he would have no
spontaneous objection if it were on his own skin. That we dislike in others

things which we tolerate in ourselves is a law of our æsthetic nature about
which there can be no doubt. But as soon as generalization and reflection
step in, this judging of others leads to a new way of regarding ourselves.
"Who taught you politeness? The impolite," is, I believe, a Chinese proverb.
The concept, 'dirty fellow,' which we have formed, becomes one under
which we personally shrink from being classed; and so we 'wash up,' and
set ourselves right, at moments when our social self-consciousness is
awakened, in a manner toward which no strictly instinctive native
prompting exists. But the standard of cleanliness attained in this way is not
likely to go beyond the mutual tolerance for one another of the members of
the tribe, and hence may comport a good deal of actual filth.

Modesty, Shame. Whether there be an instinctive impulse to hide certain
parts of the body and certain acts is perhaps even more open to doubt than
whether there be an instinct of cleanliness. Anthropologists have denied it,
and in the utter shamelessness of infancy and of many savage tribes have
seemed to find a good basis for their views. It must, however, be
remembered that infancy proves nothing, and that, as far as sexual modesty
goes, the sexual impulse itself works directly against it at times of
excitement, and with reference to certain people; and that habits of
immodesty contracted with those people may forever afterwards inhibit it
any impulse to be modest towards them. This would account for a great deal
of actual immodesty, even if an original modest impulse were there. On the
other hand, the modest impulse, if it do exist, must be admitted to have a
singularly ill-defined sphere of influence, both as regards the presences that
call it forth, and as regards the acts to which it leads. Ethnology shows it to
have very little backbone of its own, and to follow easily fashion and
example. Still, it is hard to see the ubiquity of some sort of tribute to shame,
however perverted—as where female modesty consists in covering the face
alone, or immodesty in appearing before strangers unpainted—and to
believe it to have no impulsive root whatever. Now, what may the impulsive
root be? I believe that, for one thing, it is shyness, the feeling of dread that
unfamiliar persons, as explained above, may inspire us withal. Such persons
are the original stimuli to our modesty.[392] But the actions of modesty are

quite different from the actions of shyness. They consist of the restraint of
certain bodily functions, and of the covering of certain parts; and why do
such particular actions necessarily ensue? That there may be in the human
animal, as such, a 'blind' and immediate automatic impulse to such
restraints and coverings in respect-inspiring presences is a possibility
difficult of actual disproof. But it seems more likely, from the facts, that the
actions of modesty are suggested to us in a roundabout way; and that, even
more than those of cleanliness, they arise from the application in the second
instance to ourselves of judgments primarily passed upon our mates. It is
not easy to believe that, even among the nakedest savages, an unusual
degree of cynicism and indecency in an individual should not beget a
certain degree of contempt, and cheapen him in his neighbor's eyes. Human
nature is sufficiently homogeneous for us to be sure that everywhere reserve
must inspire some respect, and that persons who suffer every liberty are
persons whom others disregard. Not to be like such people, then, would be
one of the first resolutions suggested by social self-consciousness to a child
of nature just emerging from the unreflective state. And the resolution
would probably acquire effective pungency for the first time when the
social self-consciousness was sharpened into a real fit of shyness by some
person being present whom it was important not to disgust or displease.
Public opinion would of course go on to build its positive precepts upon this
germ; and, through a variety of examples and experiences, the ritual of
modesty would grow, until it reached the New England pitch of
sensitiveness and range, making us say stomach instead of belly, limb
instead of leg, retire instead of go to bed, and forbidding us to call a female
dog by name.
At bottom this amounts to the admission that, though in some shape or
other a natural and inevitable feature of human life, modesty need not
necessarily be an instinct in the pure and simple excito-motor sense of the
term.

Love. Of all propensities, the sexual impulses bear on their face the most
obvious signs of being instinctive, in the sense of blind, automatic, and
untaught. The teleology they contain is often at variance with the wishes of

the individuals concerned; and the actions are performed for no assignable
reason but because Nature urges just that way. Here, if ever, then, we ought
to find those characters of fatality, infallibility, and uniformity, which, we
are told, make of actions done from instinct a class so utterly apart. But is
this so? The facts are just the reverse: the sexual instinct is particularly
liable to be checked and modified by slight differences in the individual
stimulus, by the inward condition of the agent himself, by habits once
acquired, and by the antagonism of contrary impulses operating on the
mind. One of these is the ordinary shyness recently described; another is
what might be called the anti-sexual instinct, the instinct of personal
isolation, the actual repulsiveness to us of the idea of intimate contact with
most of the persons we meet, especially those of our own sex.[393] Thus it
comes about that this strongest passion of all, so far from being the most
'irresistible,' may, on the contrary, be the hardest one to give rein to, and that
individuals in whom the inhibiting influences are potent may pass through
life and never find an occasion to have it gratified. There could be no better
proof of the truth of that proposition with which we began our study of the
instinctive life in man, that irregularity of behavior may come as well from
the possession of too many instincts as from the lack of any at all.
The instinct of personal isolation, of which we have spoken, exists more
strongly in men with respect to one another, and more strongly in women
with respect to men. In women it is called coyness, and has to be positively
overcome by a process of wooing before the sexual instinct inhibits it and
takes its place. As Darwin has shown in his book on the 'Descent of Man
and Sexual Selection,' it has played a vital part in the amelioration of all
higher animal types, and is to a great degree responsible for whatever
degree of chastity the human race may show. It illustrates strikingly,
however, the law of the inhibition of instincts by habits—for, once broken
through with a given person, it is not apt to assert itself again; and
habitually broken through, as by prostitutes, with various persons, it may
altogether decay. Habit also fixes it in us toward certain individuals:
nothing is so particularly displeasing as the notion of close personal contact
with those whom we have long known in a respectful and distant way. The
fondness of the ancients and of modern Orientals for forms of unnatural
vice, of which the notion affects us with horror, is probably a mere case of
the way in which this instinct may be inhibited by habit. We can hardly
suppose that the ancients had by gift of Nature a propensity of which we are

devoid, and were all victims of what is now a pathological aberration
limited to individuals. It is more probable that with them the instinct of
physical aversion toward a certain class of objects was inhibited early in life
by habits, formed under the influence of example; and that then a kind of
sexual appetite, of which very likely most men possess the germinal
possibility, developed itself in an unrestricted way. That the development of
it in an abnormal way may check its development in the normal way, seems
to be a well-ascertained medical fact. And that the direction of the sexual
instinct towards one individual tends to inhibit its application to other
individuals, is a law, upon which, though it suffers many exceptions, the
whole régime of monogamy is based. These details are a little unpleasant to
discuss, but they show so beautifully the correctness of the general
principles in the light of which our review has been made, that it was
impossible to pass them over unremarked.

Jealousy is unquestionably instinctive.

Parental Love is an instinct stronger in woman than in man, at least in the
early childhood of its object. I need do little more than quote Schneider's
lively description of it as it exists in her:
"As soon as a wife becomes a mother her whole thought and feeling,
her whole being, is altered. Until then she had only thought of her own
well-being, of the satisfaction of her vanity; the whole world appeared
made only for her; everything that went on about her was only noticed
so far as it had personal reference to herself; she asked of every one
that he should appear interested in her, pay her the requisite attention,
and as far as possible fulfil her wishes. Now, however, the centre of the
world is no longer herself, but her child. She does not think of her own
hunger, she must first be sure that the child is fed. It is nothing to her
that she herself is tired and needs rest, so long as she sees that the
child's sleep is disturbed; the moment it stirs she awakes, though far

stronger noises fail to arouse her now. She, who formerly could not
bear the slightest carelessness of dress, and touched everything with
gloves, allows herself to be soiled by the infant, and does not shrink
from seizing its clouts with her naked hands. Now, she has the greatest
patience with the ugly, piping cry-baby (Schreihals), whereas until
now every discordant sound, every slightly unpleasant noise, made her
nervous. Every limb of the still hideous little being appears to her
beautiful, every movement fills her with delight. She has, in one word,
transferred her entire egoism to the child, and lives only in it. Thus, at
least, it is in all unspoiled, naturally-bred mothers, who, alas! seem to
be growing rarer; and thus it is with all the higher animal-mothers. The
maternal joys of a cat, for example, are not to be disguised. With an
expression of infinite comfort she stretches out her fore-legs to offer
her teats to her children, and moves her tail with delight when the little
hungry mouths tug and suck.... But not only the contact, the bare look
of the offspring affords endless delight, not only because the mother
thinks that the child will some day grow great and handsome and bring
her many joys, but because she has received from Nature an instinctive
love for her children. She does not herself know why she is so happy,
and why the look of the child and the care of it are so agreeable, any
more than the young man can give an account of why he loves a
maiden, and is so happy when she is near. Few mothers, in caring for
their child, think of the proper purpose of maternal love for the
preservation of the species. Such a thought may arise in the father's
mind; seldom in that of the mother. The latter feels only... that it is an
everlasting delight to hold the being which she has brought forth
protectingly in her arms, to dress it, to wash it, to rock it to sleep, or to
still its hunger."
So far the worthy Schneider, to whose words may be added this remark, that
the passionate devotion of a mother—ill herself, perhaps—to a sick or
dying child is perhaps the most simply beautiful moral spectacle that human
life affords. Contemning every danger, triumphing over every difficulty,
outlasting all fatigue, woman's love is here invincibly superior to anything
that man can show.

These are the most prominent of the tendencies which are worthy of being
called instinctive in the human species.[394] It will be observed that no other
mammal, not even the monkey, shows so large an array. In a perfectlyrounded development, every one of these instincts would start a habit
toward certain objects and inhibit a habit toward certain others. Usually this
is the case; but, in the one-sided development of civilized life, it happens
that the timely age goes by in a sort of starvation of objects, and the
individual then grows up with gaps in his psychic constitution which future
experiences can never fill. Compare the accomplished gentleman with the
poor artisan or tradesman of a city: during the adolescence of the former,
objects appropriate to his growing interests, bodily and mental, were offered
as fast as the interests awoke, and, as a consequence, he is armed and
equipped at every angle to meet the world. Sport came to the rescue and
completed his education where real things were lacking. He has tasted of
the essence of every side of human life, being sailor, hunter, athlete, scholar,
fighter, talker, dandy, man of affairs, etc., all in one. Over the city poor
boy's youth no such golden opportunities were hung, and in his manhood no
desires for most of them exist. Fortunate it is for him if gaps are the only
anomalies his instinctive life presents; perversions are too often the fruit of
his unnatural bringing up.
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to play, and says the root of the matter is the aversion to remain unoccupied, which substitutes a
sham occupation when no real one is ready. No doubt this is true; but why the particular forms of
sham occupation? The elements of all bodily games and of ceremonial games are given by direct
excito-motor stimulations—just as when puppies chase one another and swallows have a parliament.
[387] Inquiries into Human Faculty, p. 72.
[388] Expression of the Emotions (New York, 1873), p. 330.
[389] "The certainty that we are well dressed," a charming woman has said, "gives us a peace of heart
compared to which that yielded by the consolations of religion is as nothing."
[390] Thackeray, in his exquisite Roundabout Paper, 'On a Chalk-Mark on the Door,' says: "You get
truth habitually from equals only; so, my good Mr. Holyshade, don't talk to me about the habitual
candor of the young Etonian of high birth, or I have my own opinion of your candor or discernment
when you do. No. Tom Bowling is the soul of honor, and has been true to Black-eyed Syousan since
the last time they parted at Wapping Old Stairs; but do you suppose Tom is perfectly frank, familiar,
and above-board in his conversation with Admiral Nelson, K. C. B.? There are secrets,
prevarications, fibs, if you will, between Tom and the admiral—between your crew (of servants) and
their captain. I know I hire a worthy, clean, agreeable, and conscientious male or female hypocrite at
so many guineas a year to do so and so for me. Were he other than hypocrite, I would send him about
his business."
[391] The insane symptom called "mysophobia," or dread of foulness, which leads a patient to wash
his hands perhaps a hundred times a day, hardly seems explicable without supposing a primitive
impulse to clean one's self of which it is, as it were, the convulsive exaggeration.

[392] "We often find modesty coming in only in the presence of foreigners, especially of clothed
Europeans. Only before these do the Indian women in Brazil cover themselves with their girdle, only
before these do the women on Timor conceal their bosom. In Australia we find the same thing
happening." (Th. Waitz, Anthropologie der Naturvölker, vol. i. p 358.) The author gives
bibliographical references, which I omit.
[393] To most of us it is even unpleasant to sit down in a chair still warm from occupancy by another
person's body. To many, hand-shaking is disagreeable.
[394] Some will, of course, find the list too large, others too small. With the boundaries of instinct
fading into reflex action below, and into acquired habit or suggested activity above, it is likely that
there will always be controversy about just what to include under the class-name. Shall we add the
propensity to walk along a curbstone, or any other narrow path, to the list of instincts? Shall we
subtract secretiveness, as due to shyness or to fear? Who knows? Meanwhile our physiological
method has this inestimable advantage, that such questions of limit have neither theoretical nor
practical importance. The facts once noted, it matters little how they are named. Most authors give a
shorter list than that in the text. The phrenologists add adhesiveness, inhabitiveness, love of
approbation, etc., etc., to their list of 'sentiments,' which in the main agree with our list of instincts.
Fortlage, in his System der Psychologie, classes among the Triebe all the vegetative physiological
functions. Santlus (Zur Psychologie der Menschlichen Triebe, Leipsic, 1864) says there are at bottom
but three instincts, that of 'Being,' that of 'Function,' and that of 'Life.' The 'Instinct of Being' he
subdivides into animal, embracing the activities of all the senses; and psychical, embracing the acts
of the intellect and of the 'transempiric consciousness.' The 'Instinct of Function' he divides into
sexual, inclinational (friendship, attachment, honor); and moral (religion, philanthropy, faith, truth,
moral freedom, etc.). The 'Instinct of Life' embraces conservation (nutrition, motion); sociability
(imitation, juridical and ethical arrangements); and personal interest (love of independence and
freedom, acquisitiveness, self-defence). Such a muddled list as this shows how great are the
advantages of the physiological analysis we have used.

CHAPTER XXV.[395]

THE EMOTIONS.
In speaking of the instincts it has been impossible to keep them separate
from the emotional excitements which go with them. Objects of rage, love,
fear, etc., not only prompt a man to outward deeds, but provoke
characteristic alterations in his attitude and visage, and affect his breathing,
circulation, and other organic functions in specific ways. When the outward
deeds are inhibited, these latter emotional expressions still remain, and we
read the anger in the face, though the blow may not be struck, and the fear
betrays itself in voice and color, though one may suppress all other sign.
Instinctive reactions and emotional expressions thus shade imperceptibly

into each other. Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as
well. Emotions, however, fall short of instincts, in that the emotional
reaction usually terminates in the subject's own body, whilst the instinctive
reaction is apt to go farther and enter into practical relations with the
exciting object.
Emotional reactions are often excited by objects with which we have no
practical dealings. A ludicrous object, for example, or a beautiful object are
not necessarily objects to which we do anything; we simply laugh, or stand
in admiration, as the case may be. The class of emotional, is thus rather
larger than that of instinctive, impulses, commonly so called. Its stimuli are
more numerous, and its expressions are more internal and delicate, and
often less practical. The physiological plan and essence of the two classes
of impulse, however, is the same.
As with instincts, so with emotions, the mere memory or imagination of the
object may suffice to liberate the excitement. One may get angrier in
thinking over one's insult than at the moment of receiving it; and we melt
more over a mother who is dead than we ever did when she was living. In
the rest of the chapter I shall use the word object of emotion indifferently to
mean one which is physically present or one which is merely thought of.
It would be tedious to go through a complete list of the reactions which
characterize the various emotions. For that the special treatises must be
referred to. A few examples of their variety, however, ought to find a place
here. Let me begin with the manifestations of Grief as a Danish
physiologist, C. Lange, describes them:[396]
"The chief feature in the physiognomy of grief is perhaps its
paralyzing effect on the voluntary movements. This effect is by no
means as extreme as that which fright produces, being seldom more
than that degree of weakening which makes it cost an effort to perform
actions usually done with ease. It is, in other words, a feeling of
weariness; and (as in all weariness) movements are made slowly,
heavily, without strength, unwillingly, and with exertion, and are
limited to the fewest possible. By this the grieving person gets his
outward stamp: he walks slowly, unsteadily, dragging his feet and
hanging his arms. His voice is weak and without resonance, in
consequence of the feeble activity of the muscles of expiration and of

the larynx. He prefers to sit still, sunk in himself and silent. The
tonicity or 'latent innervation' of the muscles is strikingly diminished.
The neck is bent, the head hangs ('bowed down' with grief), the
relaxation of the cheek- and jaw-muscles makes the face look long and
narrow, the jaw may even hang open. The eyes appear large, as is
always the case where the orbicularis muscle is paralyzed, but they
may often be partly covered by the upper lid which droops in
consequence of the laming of its own levator. With this condition of
weakness of the voluntary nerve- and muscle-apparatus of the whole
body, there coexists, as aforesaid, just as in all states of similar motor
weakness, a subjective feeling of weariness and heaviness, of
something which weighs upon one; one feels 'downcast,' 'oppressed,'
'laden,' one speaks of his 'weight of sorrow,' one must 'bear up' under
it, just as one must 'keep down' his anger. Many there are who
'succumb' to sorrow to such a degree that they literally cannot stand
upright, but sink or lean against surrounding objects, fall on their
knees, or, like Romeo in the monk's cell, throw themselves upon the
earth in their despair.
"But this weakness of the entire voluntary motor apparatus (the socalled apparatus of 'animal' life) is only one side of the physiology of
grief. Another side, hardly less important, and in its consequences
perhaps even more so, belongs to another subdivision of the motor
apparatus, namely, the involuntary or 'organic' muscles, especially
those which are found in the walls of the blood-vessels, and the use of
which is, by contracting, to diminish the latter's calibre. These muscles
and their nerves, forming together the 'vaso-motor apparatus,' act in
grief contrarily to the voluntary motor apparatus. Instead of being
paralyzed, like the latter, the vascular muscles are more strongly
contracted than usual, so that the tissues and organs of the body
become anæmic. The immediate consequence of this bloodlessness is
pallor and shrunkenness, and the pale color and collapsed features are
the peculiarities which, in connection with the relaxation of the visage,
give to the victim of grief his characteristic physiognomy, and often
give an impression of emaciation which ensues too rapidly to be
possibly due to real disturbance of nutrition, or waste uncompensated
by repair. Another regular consequence of the bloodlessness of the skin
is a feeling of cold, and shivering. A constant symptom of grief is

sensitiveness to cold, and difficulty in keeping warm. In grief, the
inner organs are unquestionably anæmic as well as the skin. This is of
course not obvious to the eye, but many phenomena prove it. Such is
the diminution of the various secretions, at least of such as are
accessible to observation. The mouth grows dry, the tongue sticky, and
a bitter taste ensues which, it would appear, is only a consequence of
the tongue's dryness. [The expression 'bitter sorrow' may possibly arise
from this.] In nursing women the milk diminishes or altogether dries
up. There is one of the most regular manifestations of grief, which
apparently contradicts these other physiological phenomena, and that
is the weeping, with its profuse secretion of tears, its swollen reddened
face, red eyes, and augmented secretion from the nasal mucous
membrane."
Lange goes on to suggest that this may be a reaction from a previously
contracted vaso-motor state. The explanation seems a forced one. The fact
is that there are changeable expressions of grief. The weeping is as apt as
not to be immediate, especially in women and children. Some men can
never weep. The tearful and the dry phases alternate in all who can weep,
sobbing storms being followed by periods of calm; and the shrunken, cold,
and pale condition which Lange describes so well is more characteristic of a
severe settled sorrow than of an acute mental pain. Properly we have two
distinct emotions here, both prompted by the same object, it is true, but
affecting different persons, or the same person at different times, and feeling
quite differently whilst they last, as anyone's consciousness will testify.
There is an excitement during the crying fit which is not without a certain
pungent pleasure of its own; but it would take a genius for felicity to
discover any dash of redeeming quality in the feeling of dry and shrunken
sorrow.—Our author continues:
"If the smaller vessels of the lungs contract so that these organs
become anæmic, we have (as is usual under such conditions) the
feeling of insufficient breath, and of oppression of the chest, and these
tormenting sensations increase the sufferings of the griever, who seeks
relief by long-drawn sighs, instinctively, like every one who lacks
breath from whatever cause.[397]

"The anæmia of the brain in grief is shown by intellectual inertia,
dullness, a feeling of mental weariness, effort, and indisposition to
work, often by sleeplessness. Indeed it is the anæmia of the motor
centres of the brain which lies at the bottom of all that weakening of
the voluntary powers of motion which we described in the first
instance."
My impression is that Dr. Lange simplifies and universalizes the
phenomena a little too much in this description, and in particular that he
very likely overdoes the anæmia-business. But such as it is, his account
may stand as a favorable specimen of the sort of descriptive work to which
the emotions have given rise.
Take next another emotion, Fear, and read what Mr. Darwin says of its
effects:
"Fear is often preceded by astonishment, and is so far akin to it that
both lead to the senses of sight and hearing being instantly aroused. In
both cases the eyes and mouth are widely opened and the eyebrows
raised. The frightened man at first stands like a statue, motionless and
breathless, or crouches down as if instinctively to escape observation.
The heart beats quickly and violently, so that it palpitates or knocks
against the ribs; but it is very doubtful if it then works more efficiently
than usual, so as to send a greater supply of blood to all parts of the
body; for the skin instantly becomes pale as during incipient faintness.
This paleness of the surface, however, is probably in large part, or is
exclusively, due to the vaso-motor centre being affected in such a
manner as to cause the contraction of the small arteries of the skin.
That the skin is much affected under the sense of great fear, we see in
the marvellous manner in which perspiration immediately exudes from
it. This exudation is all the more remarkable, as the surface is then
cold, and hence the term, a cold sweat; whereas the sudorific glands
are properly excited into action when the surface is heated. The hairs
also on the skin stand erect, and the superficial muscles shiver. In
connection with the disturbed action of the heart the breathing is
hurried. The salivary glands act imperfectly; the mouth becomes dry
and is often opened and shut. I have also noticed that under slight fear
there is strong tendency to yawn. One of the best marked symptoms is

the trembling of all the muscles of the body; and this is often first seen
in the lips. From this cause, and from the dryness of the mouth, the
voice becomes husky or indistinct or may altogether fail. 'Obstupui
steteruntque comæ, et vox faucibus hæsit.'... As fear increases into an
agony of terror, we behold, as under all violent emotions, diversified
results. The heart beats wildly or must fail to act and faintness ensue;
there is a death-like pallor; the breathing is labored; the wings of the
nostrils are widely dilated; there is a gasping and convulsive motion of
the lips, a tremor on the hollow cheek, a gulping and catching of the
throat; the uncovered and protruding eyeballs are fixed on the object of
terror; or they may roll restlessly from side to side, huc illuc volens
oculos totumque pererrat. The pupils are said to be enormously
dilated. All the muscles of the body may become rigid or may be
thrown into convulsive movements. The hands are alternately clenched
and opened, often with a twitching movement. The arms may be
protruded as if to avert some dreadful danger, or may be thrown wildly
over the head. The Rev. Mr. Hagenauer has seen this latter action in a
terrified Australian. In other cases there is a sudden and uncontrollable
tendency to headlong flight; and so strong is this that the boldest
soldiers may be seized with a sudden panic."[398]
Finally take Hatred, and read the synopsis of its possible effects as given by
Sig. Mantegazza:[399]
"Withdrawal of the head backwards, withdrawal of the trunk;
projection forwards of the hands, as if to defend one's self against the
hated object; contraction or closure of the eyes; elevation of the upper
lip and closure of the nose,—these are all elementary movements of
turning away. Next threatening movements, as: intense frowning; eyes
wide open; display of teeth; grinding teeth and contracting jaws;
opened mouth with tongue advanced: clenched fists; threatening action
of arms; stamping with the feet; deep inspirations—panting; growling
and various cries; automatic repetition of one word or syllable; sudden
weakness and trembling of voice; spitting. Finally, various
miscellaneous reactions and vaso-motor symptoms: general trembling;
convulsions of lips and facial muscles, of limbs and of trunk; acts of
violence to one's self, as biting fist or nails; sardonic laughter; bright

redness of face; sudden pallor of face; extreme dilatation of nostrils;
standing up of hair on head."
Were we to go through the whole list of emotions which have been named
by men, and study their organic manifestations, we should but ring the
changes on the elements which these three typical cases involve. Rigidity of
this muscle, relaxation of that, constriction of arteries here, dilatation there,
breathing of this sort or that, pulse slowing or quickening, this gland
secreting and that one dry, etc., etc. We should, moreover, find that our
descriptions had no absolute truth; that they only applied to the average
man; that every one of us, almost, has some personal idiosyncrasy of
expression, laughing or sobbing differently from his neighbor, or reddening
or growing pale where others do not. We should find a like variation in the
objects which excite emotion in different persons. Jokes at which one
explodes with laughter nauseate another, and seem blasphemous to a third;
and occasions which overwhelm me with fear or bashfulness are just what
give you the full sense of ease and power. The internal shadings of
emotional feeling, moreover, merge endlessly into each other. Language has
discriminated some of them, as hatred, antipathy, animosity, dislike,
aversion, malice, spite, vengefulness, abhorrence, etc., etc.; but in the
dictionaries of synonyms we find these feelings distinguished more by their
severally appropriate objective stimuli than by their conscious or subjective
tone.
The result of all this flux is that the merely descriptive literature of the
emotions is one of the most tedious parts of psychology. And not only is it
tedious, but you feel that its subdivisions are to a great extent either
fictitious or unimportant, and that its pretences to accuracy are a sham. But
unfortunately there is little psychological writing about the emotions which
is not merely descriptive. As emotions are described in novels, they interest
us, for we are made to share them. We have grown acquainted with the
concrete objects and emergencies which call them forth, and any knowing
touch of introspection which may grace the page meets with a quick and
feeling response. Confessedly literary works of aphoristic philosophy also
flash lights into our emotional life, and give us a fitful delight. But as far as
"scientific psychology" of the emotions goes, I may have been surfeited by
too much reading of classic works on the subject, but I should as lief read
verbal descriptions of the shapes of the rocks on a New Hampshire farm as

toil through them again. They give one nowhere a central point of view, or a
deductive or generative principle. They distinguish and refine and specify in
infinitum, without ever getting on to another logical level. Whereas the
beauty of all truly scientific work is to get to ever deeper levels. Is there no
way out from this level of individual description in the case of the
emotions? I believe there is a way out, but I fear that few will take it.
The trouble with the emotions in psychology is that they are regarded too
much as absolutely individual things. So long as they are set down as so
many eternal and sacred psychic entities, like the old immutable species in
natural history, so long all that can be done with them is reverently to
catalogue their separate characters, points, and effects. But if we regard
them as products of more general causes (as 'species' are now regarded as
products of heredity and variation), the mere distinguishing and cataloguing
becomes of subsidiary importance. Having the goose which lays the golden
eggs, the description of each egg already laid is a minor matter. Now the
general causes of the emotions are indubitably physiological. Prof. O.
Lange, of Copenhagen, in the pamphlet from which I have already quoted,
published in 1885 a physiological theory of their constitution and
conditioning, which I had already broached the previous year in an article in
Mind. None of the criticisms which I have heard of it have made me doubt
its essential truth. I will therefore devote the next few pages to explaining
what it is. I shall limit myself in the first instance to what may be called the
coarser emotions, grief, fear, rage, love, in which every one recognizes a
strong organic reverberation, and afterwards speak of the subtler emotions,
or of those whose organic reverberation is less obvious and strong.
EMOTION FOLLOWS UPON THE BODILY EXPRESSION IN THE
COARSER EMOTIONS AT LEAST.
Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions is that the mental
perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and
that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory,
on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of
the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS
the emotion. Common-sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep;
we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry

and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of
sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced
by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed
between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because
we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we
cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case
may be. Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter
would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional
warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the
insult and deem it right to strike, but we should not actually feel afraid or
angry.
Stated in this crude way, the hypothesis is pretty sure to meet with
immediate disbelief. And yet neither many nor far-fetched considerations
are required to mitigate its paradoxical character, and possibly to produce
conviction of its truth.
To begin with, no reader of the last two chapters will be inclined to doubt
the fact that objects do excite bodily changes by a preorganized mechanism,
or the farther fact that the changes are so indefinitely numerous and subtle
that the entire organism may be called a sounding-board, which every
change of consciousness, however slight, may make reverberate. The
various permutations and combinations of which these organic activities are
susceptible make it abstractly possible that no shade of emotion, however
slight, should be without a bodily reverberation as unique, when taken in its
totality, as is the mental mood itself. The immense number of parts
modified in each emotion is what makes it so difficult for us to reproduce in
cold blood the total and integral expression of any one of them. We may
catch the trick with the voluntary muscles, but fail with the skin, glands,
heart, and other viscera. Just as an artificially imitated sneeze lacks
something of the reality, so the attempt to imitate an emotion in the absence
of its normal instigating cause is apt to be rather 'hollow.'
The next thing to be noticed is this, that every one of the bodily changes,
whatsoever it be, is FELT, acutely or obscurely, the moment it occurs. If the
reader has never paid attention to this matter, he will be both interested and
astonished to learn how many different local bodily feelings he can detect in
himself as characteristic of his various emotional moods. It would be
perhaps too much to expect him to arrest the tide of any strong gust of

passion for the sake of any such curious analysis as this; but he can observe
more tranquil states, and that may be assumed here to be true of the greater
which is shown to be true of the less. Our whole cubic capacity is sensibly
alive; and each morsel of it contributes its pulsations of feeling, dim or
sharp, pleasant, painful, or dubious, to that sense of personality that every
one of us unfailingly carries with him. It is surprising what little items give
accent to these complexes of sensibility. When worried by any slight
trouble, one may find that the focus of one's bodily consciousness is the
contraction, often quite inconsiderable, of the eyes and brows. When
momentarily embarrassed, it is something in the pharynx that compels
either a swallow, a clearing of the throat, or a slight cough; and so on for as
many more instances as might be named. Our concern here being with the
general view rather than with the details, I will not linger to discuss these,
but, assuming the point admitted that every change that occurs must be felt,
I will pass on.
I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is this: If
we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our
consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have
nothing left behind, no 'mind-stuff' out of which the emotion can be
constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all
that remains. It is true that, although most people when asked say that their
introspection verifies this statement, some persist in saying theirs does not.
Many cannot be made to understand the question. When you beg them to
imagine away every feeling of laughter and of tendency to laugh from their
consciousness of the ludicrousness of an object, and then to tell you what
the feeling of its ludicrousness would be like, whether it be anything more
than the perception that the object belongs to the class 'funny,' they persist
in replying that the thing proposed is a physical impossibility, and that they
always must laugh if they see a funny object. Of course the task proposed is
not the practical one of seeing a ludicrous object and annihilating one's
tendency to laugh. It is the purely speculative one of subtracting certain
elements of feeling from an emotional state supposed to exist in its fulness,
and saying what the residual elements are. I cannot help thinking that all
who rightly apprehend this problem will agree with the proposition above
laid down. What kind of an emotion of fear would be left if the feeling
neither of quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of
trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral

stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible for me to think. Can one fancy
the state of rage and picture no ebullition in the chest, no flushing of the
face, no dilatation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to
vigorous action, but in their stead limp muscles, calm breathing, and a
placid face? The present writer, for one, certainly cannot. The rage is as
completely evaporated as the sensation of its so-called manifestations, and
the only thing that can possibly be supposed to take its place is some coldblooded and dispassionate judicial sentence, confined entirely to the
intellectual realm, to the effect that a certain person or persons merit
chastisement for their sins. In like manner of grief: what would it be
without its tears, its sobs, its suffocation of the heart, its pang in the breastbone? A feelingless cognition that certain circumstances are deplorable, and
nothing more. Every passion in turn tells the same story. A purely
disembodied human emotion is a nonentity. I do not say that it is a
contradiction in the nature of things, or that pure spirits are necessarily
condemned to cold intellectual lives; but I say that for us, emotion
dissociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable. The more closely I
scrutinize my states, the more persuaded I become that whatever moods,
affections, and passions I have are in very truth constituted by, and made up
of, those bodily changes which we ordinarily call their expression or
consequence; and the more it seems to me that if I were to become
corporeally anæsthetic, I should be excluded from the life of the affections,
harsh and tender alike, and drag out an existence of merely cognitive or
intellectual form. Such an existence, although it seems to have been the
ideal of ancient sages, is too apathetic to be keenly sought after by those
born after the revival of the worship of sensibility, a few generations ago.
Let not this view be called materialistic. It is neither more nor less
materialistic than any other view which says that our emotions are
conditioned by nervous processes. No reader of this book is likely to rebel
against such a saying so long as it is expressed in general terms; and if any
one still finds materialism in the thesis now defended, that must be because
of the special processes invoked. They are sensational processes, processes
due to inward currents set up by physical happenings. Such processes have,
it is true, always been regarded by the platonizers in psychology as having
something peculiarly base about them. But our emotions must always be
inwardly what they are, whatever be the physiological ground of their
apparition. If they are deep, pure, worthy, spiritual facts on any conceivable

theory of their physiological source, they remain no less deep, pure,
spiritual, and worthy of regard on this present sensational theory. They
carry their own inner measure of worth with them; and it is just as logical to
use the present theory of the emotions for proving that sensational processes
need not be vile and material, as to use their vileness and materiality as a
proof that such a theory cannot be true.
If such a theory is true, then each emotion is the resultant of a sum of
elements, and each element is caused by a physiological process of a sort
already well known. The elements are all organic changes, and each of them
is the reflex effect of the exciting object. Definite questions now
immediately arise—questions very different from those which were the
only possible ones without this view. Those were questions of
classification: "Which are the proper genera of emotion, and which the
species under each?" or of description: "By what expression is each
emotion characterized?" The questions now are causal: "Just what changes
does this object and what changes does that object excite?" and "How come
they to excite these particular changes and not others?" We step from a
superficial to a deep order of inquiry. Classification and description are the
lowest stage of science. They sink into the background the moment
questions of genesis are formulated, and remain important only so far as
they facilitate our answering these. Now the moment the genesis of an
emotion is accounted for, as the arousal by an object of a lot of reflex acts
which are forthwith felt, we immediately see why there is no limit to the
number of possible different emotions which may exist, and why the
emotions of different individuals may vary indefinitely, both as to their
constitution and as to objects which call them forth. For there is nothing
sacramental or eternally fixed in reflex action. Any sort of reflex effect is
possible, and reflexes actually vary indefinitely, as we know.
"We have all seen men dumb, instead of talkative, with joy; we have
seen fright drive the blood into the head of its victim, instead of
making him pale; we have seen grief run restlessly about lamenting,
instead of sitting bowed down and mute; etc., etc., and this naturally
enough, for one and the same cause can work differently on different
men's blood-vessels (since these do not always react alike), whilst
moreover the impulse on its way through the brain to the vaso-motor

centre is differently influenced by different earlier impressions in the
form of recollections or associations of ideas."[400]
In short, any classification of the emotions is seen to be as true and as
'natural' as any other, if it only serves some purpose; and such a question as
"What is the 'real' or 'typical' expression of anger, or fear?" is seen to have
no objective meaning at all. Instead of it we now have the question as to
how any given 'expression' of anger or fear may have come to exist; and
that is a real question of physiological mechanics on the one hand, and of
history on the other, which (like all real questions) is in essence answerable,
although the answer may be hard to find. On a later page I shall mention the
attempts to answer it which have been made.
DIFFICULTY OF TESTING THE THEORY EXPERIMENTALLY.
I have thus fairly propounded what seems to me the most fruitful way of
conceiving of the emotions. It must be admitted that it is so far only a
hypothesis, only possibly a true conception, and that much is lacking to its
definite proof. The only way coercively to disprove it, however, would be to
take some emotion, and then exhibit qualities of feeling in it which should
be demonstrably additional to all those which could possibly be derived
from the organs affected at the time. But to detect with certainty such purely
spiritual qualities of feeling would obviously be a task beyond human
power. We have, as Professor Lange says, absolutely no immediate criterion
by which to distinguish between spiritual and corporeal feelings; and, I may
add, the more we sharpen our introspection, the more localized all our
qualities of feeling become (see above, Vol. I. p. 300) and the more difficult
the discrimination consequently grows.[401]
A positive proof of the theory would, on the other hand, be given if we
could find a subject absolutely anæsthetic inside and out, but not paralytic,
so that emotion-inspiring objects might evoke the usual bodily expressions
from him, but who, on being consulted, should say that no subjective
emotional affection was felt. Such a man would be like one who, because
he eats, appears to bystanders to be hungry, but who afterwards confesses
that he had no appetite at all. Cases like this are extremely hard to find.
Medical literature contains reports, so far as I know, of but three. In the

famous one of Remigius Leins no mention is made by the reporters of his
emotional condition. In Dr. G. Winter's case[402] the patient is said to be
inert and phlegmatic, but no particular attention, as I learn from Dr. W., was
paid to his psychic condition. In the extraordinary case reported by
Professor Strümpell (to which I must refer later in another connection)[403]
we read that the patient, a shoemaker's apprentice of fifteen, entirely
anæsthetic, inside and out, with the exception of one eye and one ear, had
shown shame on the occasion of soiling his bed, and grief, when a formerly
favorite dish was set before him, at the thought that he could no longer taste
its flavor. Dr. Strümpell is also kind enough to inform me that he manifested
surprise, fear, and anger on certain occasions. In observing him, however,
no such theory as the present one seems to have been thought of; and it
always remains possible that, just as he satisfied his natural appetites and
necessities in cold blood, with no inward feeling, so his emotional
expressions may have been accompanied by a quite cold heart.[404] Any
new case which turns up of generalized anæsthesia ought to be carefully
examined as to the inward emotional sensibility as distinct from the
'expressions' of emotion which circumstances may bring forth.
Objections Considered.
Let me now notice a few objections. The replies will make the theory still
more plausible.
First Objection. There is no real evidence, it may be said, for the
assumption that particular perceptions do produce wide-spread bodily
effects by a sort of immediate physical influence, antecedent to the arousal
of an emotion or emotional idea.
Reply. There is most assuredly such evidence. In listening to poetry, drama,
or heroic narrative we are often surprised at the cutaneous shiver which like
a sudden wave flows over us, and at the heart-swelling and the lachrymal
effusion that unexpectedly catch us at intervals. In listening to music the
same is even more strikingly true. If we abruptly see a dark moving form in
the woods, our heart stops beating, and we catch our breath instantly and
before any articulate idea of danger can arise. If our friend goes near to the
edge of a precipice, we get the well-known feeling of 'all-overishness,' and
we shrink back, although we positively know him to be safe, and have no

distinct imagination of his fall. The writer well remembers his
astonishment, when a boy of seven or eight, at fainting when he saw a horse
bled. The blood was in a bucket, with a stick in it, and, if memory does not
deceive him, he stirred it round and saw it drip from the stick with no
feeling save that of childish curiosity. Suddenly the world grew black
before his eyes, his ears began to buzz, and he knew no more. He had never
heard of the sight of blood producing faintness or sickness, and he had so
little repugnance to it, and so little apprehension of any other sort of danger
from it, that even at that tender age, as he well remembers, he could not
help wondering how the mere physical presence of a pailful of crimson
fluid could occasion in him such formidable bodily effects.
Professor Lange writes:
"No one has ever thought of separating the emotion produced by an
unusually loud sound from the true inward affections. No one hesitates
to call it a sort of fright, and it shows the ordinary signs of fright. And
yet it is by no means combined with the idea of danger, or in any way
occasioned by associations, memories, or other mental processes. The
phenomena of flight follow the noise immediately without a trace of
'spiritual' fear. Many men can never grow used to standing beside a
cannon when it is fired off, although they perfectly know that there is
danger neither for themselves nor for others—the bare sound is too
much for them."[405]
Imagine two steel knife-blades with their keen edges crossing each other at
right angles, and moving to and fro. Our whole nervous organization is 'onedge' at the thought; and yet what emotion can be there except the
unpleasant nervous feeling itself, or the dread that more of it may come?
The entire fund and capital of the emotion here is the senseless bodily effect
which the blades immediately arouse. This case is typical of a class: where
an ideal emotion seems to precede the bodily symptoms, it is often nothing
but an anticipation of the symptoms themselves. One who has already
fainted at the sight of blood may witness the preparations for a surgical
operation with uncontrollable heart-sinking and anxiety. He anticipates
certain feelings, and the anticipation precipitates their arrival. In cases of
morbid terror the subjects often confess that what possesses them seems,
more than anything, to be fear of the fear itself. In the various forms of what

Professor Bain calls 'tender emotion,' although the appropriate object must
usually be directly contemplated before the emotion can be aroused, yet
sometimes thinking of the symptoms of the emotion itself may have the
same effect. In sentimental natures the thought of 'yearning' will produce
real 'yearning.' And, not to speak of coarser examples, a mother's
imagination of the caresses she bestows on her child may arouse a spasm of
parental longing.
In such cases as these we see plainly how the emotion both begins and ends
with what we call its effects or manifestations. It has no mental status
except as either the vivid feeling of the manifestations, or the idea of them;
and the latter thus constitute its entire material, and sum and substance. And
these cases ought to make us see how in all cases the feeling of the
manifestations may play a much deeper part in the constitution of the
emotion than we are wont to suppose.

The best proof that the immediate cause of emotion is a physical effect on
the nerves is furnished by those pathological cases in which the emotion is
objectless. One of the chief merits, in fact, of the view which I propose
seems to be that we can so easily formulate by its means pathological cases
and normal cases under a common scheme. In every asylum we find
examples of absolutely unmotived fear, anger, melancholy, or conceit; and
others of an equally unmotived apathy which persists in spite of the best of
outward reasons why it should give way. In the former cases we must
suppose the nervous machinery to be so 'labile' in some one emotional
direction that almost every stimulus (however inappropriate) causes it to
upset in that way, and to engender the particular complex of feelings of
which the psychic body of the emotion consists. Thus, to take one special
instance, if inability to draw deep breath, fluttering of the heart, and that
peculiar epigastric change felt as 'precordial anxiety,' with an irresistible
tendency to take a somewhat crouching attitude and to sit still, and with
perhaps other visceral processes not now known, all spontaneously occur
together in a certain person; his feeling of their combination is the emotion
of dread, and he is the victim of what is known as morbid fear. A friend
who has had occasional attacks of this most distressing of all maladies tells

me that in his case the whole drama seems to centre about the region of the
heart and respiratory apparatus, that his main effort during the attacks is to
get control of his inspirations and to slow his heart, and that the moment he
attains to breathing deeply and to holding himself erect, the dread, ipso
facto, seems to depart.[406]
The emotion here is nothing but the feeling of a bodily state, and it has a
purely bodily cause.
"All physicians who have been much engaged in general practice have
seen cases of dyspepsia in which constant low spirits and occasional
attacks of terror rendered the patient's condition pitiable in the
extreme. I have observed these cases often, and have watched them
closely, and I have never seen greater suffering of any kind than I have
witnessed during these attacks.... Thus, a man is suffering from what
we call nervous dyspepsia. Some day, we will suppose in the middle of
the afternoon, without any warning or visible cause, one of these
attacks of terror comes on. The first thing the man feels is great but
vague discomfort. Then he notices that his heart is beating much too
violently. At the same time shocks or flashes as of electrical
discharges, so violent as to be almost painful, pass one after another
through his body and limbs. Then in a few minutes he falls into a
condition of the most intense fear. He is not afraid of anything; he is
simply afraid. His mind is perfectly clear. He looks for a cause of his
wretched condition, but sees none. Presently his terror is such that he
trembles violently and utters low moans; his body is damp with
perspiration; his mouth is perfectly dry; and at this stage there are no
tears in his eyes, though his suffering is intense. When the climax of
the attack is reached and passed, there is a copious flow of tears, or
else a mental condition in which the person weeps upon the least
provocation. At this stage a large quantity of pale urine is passed. Then
the heart's action becomes again normal, and the attack passes off."[407]
Again:
"There are outbreaks of rage so groundless and unbridled that all must
admit them to be expressions of disease. For the medical layman
hardly anything can be more instructive than the observation of such a

pathological attack of rage, especially when it presents itself pure and
unmixed with other psychical disturbances. This happens in that rather
rare disease named transitory mania. The patient predisposed to this—
otherwise an entirely reasonable person—will be attacked suddenly
without the slightest outward provocation, and thrown (to use the
words of the latest writer on the subject, O. Schwartzer, Die
transitorische Tobsucht, Wien, 1880), 'into a paroxysm of the wildest
rage, with a fearful and blindly furious impulse to do violence and
destroy.' He flies at those about him; strikes, kicks, and throttles
whomever he can catch; dashes every object about which he can lay
his hands on; breaks and crushes what is near him; tears his clothes;
shouts, howls, and roars, with eyes that flash and roll, and shows
meanwhile all those symptoms of vaso-motor congestion which we
have learned to know as the concomitants of anger. His face is red,
swollen, his cheeks hot, his eyes protuberant and their whites
bloodshot, the heart beats violently, the pulse marks 100-120 strokes a
minutes. The arteries of the neck are full and pulsating, the veins are
swollen, the saliva flows. The fit lasts only a few hours, and ends
suddenly with a sleep of from 8 to 12 hours, on waking from which the
patient has entirely forgotten what has happened."[408]
In these (outwardly) causeless emotional conditions the particular paths
which are explosive are discharged by any and every incoming sensation.
Just as, when we are seasick, every smell, every taste, every sound, every
sight, every movement, every sensible experience whatever, augments our
nausea, so the morbid terror or anger is increased by each and every
sensation which stirs up the nerve-centres. Absolute quiet is the only
treatment for the time. It seems impossible not to admit that in all this the
bodily condition takes the lead, and that the mental emotion follows. The
intellect may, in fact, be so little affected as to play the cold-blooded
spectator all the while, and note the absence of a real object for the emotion.
[409]

A few words from Henle may close my reply to this first objection:
"Does it not seem as if the excitations of the bodily nerves met the
ideas half way, in order to raise the latter to the height of emotions?
[Note how justly this expresses our theory!] That they do so is proved

by the cases in which particular nerves, when specially irritable, share
in the emotion and determine its quality. When one is suffering from
an open wound, any grievous or horrid spectacle will cause pain in the
wound. In sufferers from heart-disease there is developed a psychic
excitability, which is often incomprehensible to the patients
themselves, but which comes from the heart's liability to palpitate. I
said that the very quality of the emotion is determined by the organs
disposed to participate in it. Just as surely as a dark foreboding, rightly
grounded on inference from the constellations, will be accompanied by
a feeling of oppression in the chest, so surely will a similar feeling of
oppression, when due to disease of the thoracic organs, be
accompanied by groundless forebodings. So small a thing as a bubble
of air rising from the stomach through the œsophagus, and loitering on
its way a few minutes and exerting pressure on the heart, is able during
sleep to occasion a nightmare, and during waking to produce a vague
anxiety. On the other hand, we see that joyous thoughts dilate our
blood-vessels, and that a suitable quantity of wine, because it dilates
the vessels, also disposes us to joyous thoughts. If both the jest and the
wine work together, they supplement each other in producing the
emotional effect, and our demands on the jest are the more modest in
proportion as the wine takes upon itself a larger part of the task."[410]

Second Objection. If our theory be true, a necessary corollary of it ought to
be this: that any voluntary and cold-blooded arousal of the so-called
manifestations of a special emotion ought to give us the emotion itself. Now
this (the objection says) is not found to be the case. An actor can perfectly
simulate an emotion and yet be inwardly cold; and we can all pretend to cry
and not feel grief; and feign laughter without being amused.
Reply. In the majority of emotions this test is inapplicable; for many of the
manifestations are in organs over which we have no voluntary control. Few
people in pretending to cry can shed real tears, for example. But, within the
limits in which it can be verified, experience corroborates rather than
disproves the corollary from our theory, upon which the present objection
rests. Every one knows how panic is increased by flight, and how the giving

way to the symptoms of grief or anger increases those passions themselves.
Each fit of sobbing makes the sorrow more acute, and calls forth another fit
stronger still, until at last repose only ensues with lassitude and with the
apparent exhaustion of the machinery. In rage, it is notorious how we 'work
ourselves up' to a climax by repeated outbreaks of expression. Refuse to
express a passion, and it dies. Count ten before venting your anger, and its
occasion seems ridiculous. Whistling to keep up courage is no mere figure
of speech. On the other hand, sit all day in a moping posture, sigh, and reply
to everything with a dismal voice, and your melancholy lingers. There is no
more valuable precept in moral education than this, as all who have
experience know: if we wish to conquer undesirable emotional tendencies
in ourselves, we must assiduously, and in the first instance cold-bloodedly,
go through the outward movements of those contrary dispositions which we
prefer to cultivate. The reward of persistency will infallibly come, in the
fading out of the sullenness or depression, and the advent of real
cheerfulness and kindliness in their stead. Smooth the brow, brighten the
eye, contract the dorsal rather than the ventral aspect of the frame, and
speak in a major key, pass the genial compliment, and your heart must be
frigid indeed if it do not gradually thaw!
This is recognized by all psychologists, only they fail to see its full import.
Professor Bain writes, for example:
"We find that a feeble [emotional] wave... is suspended inwardly by
being arrested outwardly; the currents of the brain and the agitation of
the centres die away if the external vent is resisted at every point. It is
by such restraint that we are in the habit of suppressing pity, anger,
fear, pride—on many trifling occasions. If so, it is a fact that the
suppression of the actual movements has a tendency to suppress the
nervous currents that incite them, so that the external quiescence is
followed by the internal. The effect would not happen in any case if
there were not some dependence of the cerebral wave upon the free
outward vent or manifestation.... By the same interposition we may
summon up a dormant feeling. By acting out the external
manifestations, we gradually infect the nerves leading to them, and
finally waken up the diffusive current by a sort of action ab extra....
Thus it is that we are sometimes able to assume a cheerful tone of
mind by forcing a hilarious expression."[411]

We have a mass of other testimony of similar effect. Burke, in his treatise
on the Sublime and Beautiful, writes as follows of the physiognomist
Campanella:
"This man, it seems, had not only made very accurate observations on
human faces, but was very expert in mimicking such as were in any
way remarkable. When he had a mind to penetrate into the inclinations
of those he had to deal with, he composed his face, his gesture, and his
whole body, as nearly as he could, into the exact similitude of the
person he intended to examine; and then carefully observed what turn
of mind he seemed to acquire by the change. So that, says my author,
he was able to enter into the dispositions and thoughts of people as
effectually as if he had been changed into the very men. I have often
observed [Burke now goes on in his own person] that, on mimicking
the looks and gestures of angry, or placid, or frightened, or daring men,
I have involuntarily found my mind turned to that passion whose
appearance I strove to imitate; nay, I am convinced it is hard to avoid
it, though one strove to separate the passion from its corresponding
gestures."[412]
Against this it is to be said that many actors who perfectly mimic the
outward appearances of emotion in face, gait, and voice declare that they
feel no emotion at all. Others, however, according to Mr. Wm. Archer, who
has made a very instructive statistical inquiry among them, say that the
emotion of the part masters them whenever they play it well.[413] Thus:
"'I often turn pale,' writes Miss Isabel Bateman, 'in scenes of terror or
great excitement. I have been told this many times, and I can feel
myself getting very cold and shivering and pale in thrilling situations.'
'When I am playing rage or terror,' writes Mr. Lionel Brough, 'I believe
I do turn pale. My mouth gets dry, my tongue cleaves to my palate. In
Bob Acres, for instance (in the last act), I have to continually moisten
my mouth, or I shall become inarticulate. I have to "swallow the
lump," as I call it.' All artists who have had much experience of
emotional parts are absolutely unanimous.... 'Playing with the brain,'
says Miss Alma Murray, 'is far less fatiguing than playing with the
heart. An adventuress taxes the physique far less than a sympathetic

heroine. Muscular exertion has comparatively little to do with it.'...
'Emotion while acting,' writes Mr. Howe, 'will induce perspiration
much more than physical exertion. I always perspired profusely while
acting Joseph Surface, which requires little or no exertion.'... 'I suffer
from fatigue,' writes Mr. Forbes Robertson, 'in proportion to the
amount of emotion I may have been called upon to go through, and not
from physical exertion.'... 'Though I have played Othello,' writes Mr.
Coleman, 'ever since I was seventeen (at nineteen I had the honor of
acting the Moor to Macready's Iago), husband my resources as I may,
this is the one part, the part of parts, which always leaves me
physically prostrate. I have never been able to find a pigment that
would stay on my face, though I have tried every preparation in
existence. Even the titanic Edwin Forrest told me that he was always
knocked over in Othello, and I have heard Charles Kean, Phelps,
Brooke, Dillion, say the same thing. On the other hand, I have
frequently acted Richard III. without turning a hair.'"[414]

The explanation for the discrepancy amongst actors is probably that which
these quotations suggest. The visceral and organic part of the expression
can be suppressed in some men, but not in others, and on this it is probable
that the chief part of the felt emotion depends. Coquelin and the other actors
who are inwardly cold are probably able to affect the dissociation in a
complete way. Prof. Sikorsky of Kieff has contributed an important article
on the facial expression of the insane to the Neurologisches Centralblatt for
1887. Having practised facial mimicry himself a great deal, he says:
"When I contract my facial muscles in any mimetic combination, I feel
no emotional excitement, so that the mimicry is in the fullest sense of
the word artificial, although quite irreproachable from the expressive
point of view."[415]
We find, however, from the context that Prof. S.'s practice before the mirror
has developed in him such a virtuosity in the control of his facial muscles
that he can entirely disregard their natural association and contract them in
any order of grouping, on either side of the face isolatedly, and each one
alone. Probably in him the facial mimicry is an entirely restricted and
localized thing, without sympathetic changes of any sort elsewhere.

Third Objection. Manifesting an emotion, so far from increasing it, makes it
cease. Rage evaporates after a good outburst; it is pent-up emotions that
"work like madness in the brain."
Reply. The objection fails to discriminate between what is felt during and
what is felt after the manifestation. During the manifestation the emotion is
always felt. In the normal course of things this, being the natural channel of
discharge, exhausts the nerve-centres, and emotional calm ensues. But if
tears or anger are simply suppressed, whilst the object of grief or rage
remains unchanged before the mind, the current which would have invaded
the normal channels turns into others, for it must find some outlet of escape.
It may then work different and worse effects later on. Thus vengeful
brooding may replace a burst of indignation; a dry heat may consume the
frame of one who fain would weep, or he may, as Dante says, turn to stone

within; and then tears or a storming fit may bring a grateful relief. This is
when the current is strong enough to strike into a pathological path when
the normal one is dammed. When this is so, an immediate outpour may be
best. But here, to quote Prof. Bain again:
"There is nothing more implied than the fact that an emotion may be
too strong to be resisted, and we only waste our strength in the
endeavor. If we are really able to stem the torrent, there is no more
reason for refraining from the attempt than in the case of weaker
feelings. And undoubtedly the habitual control of the emotions is not
to be attained without a systematic restraint, extended to weak and
strong."
When we teach children to repress their emotional talk and display, it is not
that they may feel more—quite the reverse. It is that they may think more;
for, to a certain extent, whatever currents are diverted from the regions
below, must swell the activity of the thought-tracts of the brain. In
apoplexies and other brain injuries we get the opposite condition—an
obstruction, namely, to the passage of currents among the thought-tracts,
and with this an increased tendency of objects to start downward currents
into the organs of the body. The consequence is tears, laughter, and temperfits, on the most insignificant provocation, accompanying a proportional
feebleness in logical thought and the power of volitional attention and
decision,—just the sort of thing from which we try to wean our child. It is
true that we say of certain persons that "they would feel more if they
expressed less." And in another class of persons the explosive energy with
which passion manifests itself on critical occasions seems correlated with
the way in which they bottle it up during the intervals. But these are only
eccentric types of character, and within each type the law of the last
paragraph prevails. The sentimentalist is so constructed that 'gushing' is his
or her normal mode of expression. Putting a stopper on the 'gush' will only
to a limited extent cause more 'real' activities to take its place; in the main it
will simply produce listlessness. On the other hand, the ponderous and
bilious 'slumbering volcano,' let him repress the expression of his passions
as he will, will find them expire if they get no vent at all; whilst if the rare
occasions multiply which he deems worthy of their outbreak, he will find

them grow in intensity as life proceeds. On the whole, I cannot see that this
third objection carries any weight.

If our hypothesis is true, it makes us realize more deeply than ever how
much our mental life is knit up with our corporeal frame, in the strictest
sense of the term. Rapture, love, ambition, indignation, and pride,
considered as feelings, are fruits of the same soil with the grossest bodily
sensations of pleasure and of pain. But the reader will remember that we
agreed at the outset to affirm this only of what we then called the 'coarser'
emotions, and that those inward states of emotional sensibility which
appeared devoid at first sight of bodily results should be left out of our
account. We must now say a word or two about these latter feelings, the
'subtler' emotions, as we then agreed to call them.
THE SUBTLER EMOTIONS.
These are the moral, intellectual, and æsthetic feelings. Concords of sounds,
of colors, of lines, logical consistencies, teleological fitnesses, affect us with
a pleasure that seems ingrained in the very form of the representation itself,
and to borrow nothing from any reverberation surging up from the parts
below the brain. The Herbartian psychologists have distinguished feelings
due to the form in which ideas may be arranged. A mathematical
demonstration may be as 'pretty,' and an act of justice as 'neat,' as a drawing
or a tune, although the prettiness and neatness seem to have nothing to do
with sensation. We have, then, or some of us seem to have, genuinely
cerebral forms of pleasure and displeasure, apparently not agreeing in their
mode of production with the 'coarser' emotions we have been analyzing.
And it is certain that readers whom our reasons have hitherto failed to
convince will now start up at this admission, and consider that by it we give
up our whole case. Since musical perceptions, since logical ideas, can
immediately arouse a form of emotional feeling, they will say, is it not more
natural to suppose that in the case of the so-called 'coarser' emotions,
prompted by other kinds of objects, the emotional feeling is equally

immediate, and the bodily expression something that comes later and is
added on?

In reply to this we must immediately insist that æsthetic emotion, pure and
simple, the pleasure given us by certain lines and masses, and combinations
of colors and sounds, is an absolutely sensational experience, an optical or
auricular feeling that is primary, and not due to the repercussion backwards
of other sensations elsewhere consecutively aroused. To this simple primary
and immediate pleasure in certain pure sensations and harmonious
combinations of them, there may, it is true, be added secondary pleasures;
and in the practical enjoyment of works of art by the masses of mankind
these secondary pleasures play a great part. The more classic one's taste is,
however, the less relatively important are the secondary pleasures felt to be
in comparison with those of the primary sensation as it comes in.[416]
Classicism and romanticism have their battles over this point. Complex
suggestiveness, the awakening of vistas of memory and association, and the
stirring of our flesh with picturesque mystery and gloom, make a work of
art romantic. The classic taste brands these effects as coarse and tawdry, and
prefers the naked beauty of the optical and auditory sensations, unadorned
with frippery or foliage. To the romantic mind, on the contrary, the
immediate beauty of these sensations seems dry and thin. I am of course not
discussing which view is right, but only showing that the discrimination
between the primary feeling of beauty, as a pure incoming sensible quality,
and the secondary emotions which are grafted thereupon, is one that must
be made.
These secondary emotions themselves are assuredly for the most part
constituted of other incoming sensations aroused by the diffusive wave of
reflex effects which the beautiful object sets up. A glow, a pang in the
breast, a shudder, a fulness of the breathing, a flutter of the heart, a shiver
down the back, a moistening of the eyes, a stirring in the hypogastrium, and
a thousand unnamable symptoms besides, may be felt the moment the
beauty excites us. And these symptoms also result when we are excited by
moral perceptions, as of pathos, magnanimity, or courage. The voice breaks

and the sob rises in the struggling chest, or the nostril dilates and the fingers
tighten, whilst the heart beats, etc., etc.
As far as these ingredients of the subtler emotions go, then, the latter form
no exception to our account, but rather an additional illustration thereof. In
all cases of intellectual or moral rapture we find that, unless there be
coupled a bodily reverberation of some kind with the mere thought of the
object and cognition of its quality; unless we actually laugh at the neatness
of the demonstration or witticism; unless we thrill at the case of justice, or
tingle at the act of magnanimity; our state of mind can hardly be called
emotional at all. It is in fact a mere intellectual perception of how certain
things are to be called—neat, right, witty, generous, and the like. Such a
judicial state of mind as this is to be classed among awarenesses of truth; it
is a cognitive act. As a matter of fact, however, the moral and intellectual
cognitions hardly ever do exist thus unaccompanied. The bodily soundingboard is at work, as careful introspection will show, far more than we
usually suppose. Still, where long familiarity with a certain class of effects,
even æsthetic ones, has blunted mere emotional excitability as much as it
has sharpened taste and judgment, we do get the intellectual emotion, if
such it can be called, pure and undefiled. And the dryness of it, the
paleness, the absence of all glow, as it may exist in a thoroughly expert
critic's mind, not only shows us what an altogether different thing it is from
the 'coarser' emotions we considered first, but makes us suspect that almost
the entire difference lies in the fact that the bodily sounding-board,
vibrating in the one case, is in the other mute. "Not so very bad" is, in a
person of consummate taste, apt to be the highest limit of approving
expression. "Rien ne me choque" is said to have been Chopin's superlative
of praise of new music. A sentimental layman would feel, and ought to feel,
horrified, on being admitted into such a critic's mind, to see how cold, how
thin, how void of human significance, are the motives for favor or disfavor
that there prevail. The capacity to make a nice spot on the wall will
outweigh a picture's whole content; a foolish trick of words will preserve a
poem; an utterly meaningless fitness of sequence in one musical
composition set at naught any amount of 'expressiveness' in another.
I remember seeing an English couple sit for more than an hour on a piercing
February day in the Academy at Venice before the celebrated 'Assumption'
by Titian; and when I, after being chased from room to room by the cold,

concluded to get into the sunshine as fast as possible and let the pictures go,
but before leaving drew reverently near to them to learn with what superior
forms of susceptibility they might be endowed, all I overheard was the
woman's voice murmuring: "What a deprecatory expression her face wears!
What self-abnegation! How unworthy she feels of the honor she is
receiving!" Their honest hearts had been kept warm all the time by a glow
of spurious sentiment that would have fairly made old Titian sick. Mr.
Ruskin somewhere makes the (for him terrible) admission that religious
people as a rule care little for pictures, and that when they do care for them
they generally prefer the worst ones to the best. Yes! in every art, in every
science, there is the keen perception of certain relations being right or not,
and there is the emotional flush and thrill consequent thereupon. And these
are two things, not one. In the former of them it is that experts and masters
are at home. The latter accompaniments are bodily commotions that they
may hardly feel, but that may be experienced in their fulness by crétins and
philistines in whom the critical judgment is at its lowest ebb. The 'marvels'
of Science, about which so much edifying popular literature is written, are
apt to be 'caviare' to the men in the laboratories. And even divine
Philosophy itself, which common mortals consider so 'sublime' an
occupation, on account of the vastness of its data and outlook, is too apt to
the practical philosopher himself to be but a sharpening and tightening
business, a matter of 'points,' of screwing down things, of splitting hairs,
and of the 'intent' rather than the 'extent' of conceptions. Very little emotion
here!—except the effort of setting the attention fine, and the feeling of ease
and relief (mainly in the breathing apparatus) when the inconsistencies are
overcome and the thoughts run smoothly for a while. Emotion and
cognition seem then parted even in this last retreat; and cerebral processes
are almost feelingless, so far as we can judge, until they summon help from
parts below.
NO SPECIAL BRAIN-CENTRES FOR EMOTION.
If the neural process underlying emotional consciousness be what I have
now sought to prove it, the physiology of the brain becomes a simpler
matter than has been hitherto supposed. Sensational, associational, and
motor elements are all that the organ need contain. The physiologists who,
during the past few years, have been so industriously exploring the brain's

functions, have limited their explanations to its cognitive and volitional
performances. Dividing the brain into sensory and motor centres, they have
found their division to be exactly paralleled by the analysis made by
empirical psychology of the perceptive and volitional parts of the mind into
their simplest elements. But the emotions have been so ignored in all these
researches that one is tempted to suppose that if these investigators were
asked for a theory of them in brain-terms, they would have to reply, either
that they had as yet bestowed no thought upon the subject, or that they had
found it so difficult to make distinct hypotheses that the matter lay among
the problems of the future, only to be taken up after the simpler ones of the
present should have been definitively solved.
And yet it is even now certain that of two things concerning the emotions,
one must be true. Either separate and special centres, affected to them
alone, are their brain-seat, or else they correspond to processes occurring in
the motor and sensory centres already assigned, or in others like them, not
yet known. If the former be the case, we must deny the view that is current,
and hold the cortex to be something more than the surface of 'projection' for
every sensitive spot and every muscle in the body. If the latter be the case,
we must ask whether the emotional process in the sensory or motor centre
be an altogether peculiar one, or whether it resembles the ordinary
perceptive processes of which those centres are already recognized to be the
seat. Now if the theory I have defended be true, the latter alternative is all
that it demands. Supposing the cortex to contain parts, liable to be excited
by changes in each special sense-organ, in each portion of the skin, in each
muscle, each joint, and each viscus, and to contain absolutely nothing else,
we still have a scheme capable of representing the process of the emotions.
An object falls on a sense-organ, affects a cortical part, and is perceived; or
else the latter, excited inwardly, gives rise to an idea of the same object.
Quick as a flash, the reflex currents pass down through their preordained
channels, alter the condition of muscle, skin, and viscus; and these
alterations, perceived, like the original object, in as many portions of the
cortex, combine with it in consciousness and transform it from an objectsimply-apprehended into an object-emotionally-felt. No new principles
have to be invoked, nothing postulated beyond the ordinary reflex circuits,
and the local centres admitted in one shape or another by all to exist.

EMOTIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS.
The revivability in memory of the emotions, like that of all the feelings of
the lower senses, is very small. We can remember that we underwent grief
or rapture, but not just how the grief or rapture felt. This difficult ideal
revivability is, however, more than compensated in the case of the emotions
by a very easy actual revivability. That is, we can produce, not
remembrances of the old grief or rapture, but new griefs and raptures, by
summoning up a lively thought of their exciting cause. The cause is now
only an idea, but this idea produces the same organic irradiations, or almost
the same, which were produced by its original, so that the emotion is again
a reality. We have 'recaptured' it. Shame, love, and anger are particularly
liable to be thus revived by ideas of their object. Professor Bain admits[417]
that "in their strict character of emotion proper, they [the emotions] have the
minimum of revivability; but being always incorporated with the sensations
of the higher senses, they share in the superior revivability of sights and
sounds." But he fails to point out that the revived sights and sounds may be
ideal without ceasing to be distinct; whilst the emotion, to be distinct, must
become real again. Prof. Bain seems to forget that an 'ideal emotion' and a
real emotion prompted by an ideal object are two very different things.
An emotional temperament on the one hand, and a lively imagination for
objects and circumstances on the other, are thus the conditions, necessary
and sufficient, for an abundant emotional life. No matter how emotional the
temperament may be, if the imagination be poor, the occasions for touching
off the emotional trains will fail to be realized, and the life will be pro tanto
cold and dry. This is perhaps a reason why it may be better that a man of
thought should not have too strong a visualizing power. He is less likely to
have his trains of meditation disturbed by emotional interruptions. It will be
remembered that Mr. Galton found the members of the Royal Society and
of the French Academy of Sciences to be below par in visualizing power. If
I may speak of myself, I am far less able to visualize now, at the age of 46,
than in my earlier years; and I am strongly inclined to believe that the
relative sluggishness of my emotional life at present is quite as much
connected with this fact as it is with the invading torpor of hoary eld, or
with the omnibus-horse routine of settled professional and domestic life. I
say this because I occasionally have a flash of the old stronger visual

imagery, and I notice that the emotional commentary, so to call it, is then
liable to become much more acute than is its present wont. Charcot's
patient, whose case is given above on p. 58 ff., complained of his incapacity
for emotional feeling after his optical images were gone. His mother's
death, which in former times would have wrung his heart, left him quite
cold; largely, as he himself suggests, because he could form no definite
visual image of the event, and of the effect of the loss on the rest of the
family at home.
One final generality about the emotions remains to be noted: They blunt
themselves by repetition more rapidly than any other sort of feeling. This is
due not only to the general law of 'accommodation' to their stimulus which
we saw to obtain of all feelings whatever, but to the peculiar fact that the
'diffusive wave' of reflex effects tends always to become more narrow. It
seems as if it were essentially meant to be a provisional arrangement, on the
basis of which precise and determinate reactions might arise. The more we
exercise ourselves at anything, the fewer muscles we employ; and just so,
the oftener we meet an object, the more definitely we think and behave
about it; and the less is the organic perturbation to which it gives rise. The
first time we saw it we could perhaps neither act nor think at all, and had no
reaction but organic perturbation. The emotions of startled surprise, wonder,
or curiosity were the result. Now we look on with absolutely no emotion.
[418] This tendency to economy in the nerve-paths through which our
sensations and ideas discharge, is the basis of all growth in efficiency,
readiness, and skill. Where would the general, the surgeon, the presiding
chairman, be, if their nerve-currents kept running down into their viscera,
instead of keeping up amid their convolutions? But what they gain for
practice by this law, they lose, it must be confessed, for feeling. For the
world-worn and experienced man, the sense of pleasure which he gets from
the free and powerful flow of thoughts, overcoming obstacles as they arise,
is the only compensation for that freshness of the heart which he once
enjoyed. This free and powerful flow means that brain-paths of association
and memory have more and more organized themselves in him, and that
through them the stimulus is drafted off into nerves which lead merely to
the writing finger or the speaking tongue.[419] The trains of intellectual
association, the memories, the logical relations, may, however, be
voluminous in the extreme. Past emotions may be among the things

remembered. The more of all these trains an object can set going in us, the
richer our cognitive intimacy with it is. This cerebral sense of richness
seems itself to be a source of pleasure, possibly even apart from the
euphoria which from time to time comes up from respiratory organs. If
there be such a thing as a purely spiritual emotion, I should be inclined to
restrict it to this cerebral sense of abundance and ease, this feeling, as Sir
W. Hamilton would call it, of unimpeded and not overstrained activity of
thought. Under ordinary conditions, it is a fine and serene but not an excited
state of consciousness. In certain intoxications it becomes exciting, and it
may be intensely exciting. I can hardly imagine a more frenzied excitement
than that which goes with the consciousness of seeing absolute truth, which
characterizes the coming to from nitrous-oxide drunkenness. Chloroform,
ether, and alcohol all produce this deepening sense of insight into truth; and
with all of them it may be a 'strong' emotion; but then there also come with
it all sorts of strange bodily feelings and changes in the incoming
sensibilities. I cannot see my way to affirming that the emotion is
independent of these. I will concede, however, that if its independence is
anywhere to be maintained, these theoretic raptures seem the place at which
to begin the defence.
THE GENESIS OF THE VARIOUS EMOTIONS.
On a former page (pp. 453-4) I said that two questions, and only two, are
important, if we regard the emotions as constituted by feelings due to the
diffusive wave.
(1) What special diffusive effects do the various special objective and
subjective experiences excite? and
(2) How come they to excite them?
The works on physiognomy and expression are all of them attempts to
answer question 1. As is but natural, the effects upon the face have received
the most careful attention. The reader who wishes details additional to those
given above on pp. 443-7 is referred to the works mentioned in the note
below.[420]
As regards question 2, some little progress has of recent years been made in
answering it. Two things are certain:

a. The facial muscles of expression are not given us simply for expression's
sake;[421]
b. Each muscle is not affected to some one emotion exclusively, as certain
writers have thought.
Some movements of expression can be accounted for as weakened
repetitions of movements which formerly (when they were stronger) were of
utility to the subject. Others are similarly weakened repetitions of
movements which under other conditions were physiologically necessary
effects. Of the latter reactions the respiratory disturbances in anger and fear
might be taken as examples—organic reminiscences, as it were,
reverberations in imagination of the blowings of the man making a series of
combative efforts, of the pantings of one in precipitate flight. Such at least
is a suggestion made by Mr. Spencer which has found approval. And he
also was the first, so far as I know, to suggest that other movements in anger
and fear could be explained by the nascent excitation of formerly useful
acts.
"To have in a slight degree," he says, "such psychical states as
accompany the reception of wounds, and are experienced during flight,
is to be in a state of what we call fear. And to have in a slight degree
such psychical states as the processes of catching, killing, and eating
imply, is to have the desires to catch, kill, and eat. That the
propensities to the acts are nothing else than nascent excitations of the
psychical state involved in the acts, is proved by the natural language
of the propensities. Fear, when strong, expresses itself in cries, in
efforts to escape, in palpitations, in tremblings; and these are just the
manifestations that go along with an actual suffering of the evil feared.
The destructive passion is shown in a general tension of the muscular
system, in gnashing of teeth and protrusion of the claws, in dilated
eyes and nostrils, in growls; and these are weaker forms of the actions
that accompany the killing of prey. To such objective evidences every
one can add subjective evidences. Every one can testify that the
psychical state called fear consists of mental representations of certain
painful results; and that the one called anger consists of mental
representations of the actions and impressions which would occur
while inflicting some kind of pain."[422]

About fear I shall have more to say presently. Meanwhile the principle of
revival in weakened form of reactions useful in more violent dealings with
the object inspiring the emotion, has found many applications. So slight a
symptom as the snarl or sneer, the one-sided uncovering of the upper teeth,
is accounted for by Darwin as a survival from the time when our ancestors
had large canines, and unfleshed them (as dogs now do) for attack.
Similarly the raising of the eyebrows in outward attention, the opening of
the mouth in astonishment, come, according to the same author, from the
utility of these movements in extreme cases. The raising of the eyebrows
goes with the opening of the eye for better vision; the opening of the mouth
with the intensest listening, and with the rapid catching of the breath which
precedes muscular effort. The distention of the nostrils in anger is
interpreted by Spencer as an echo of the way in which our ancestors had to
breathe when, during combat, their "mouth was filled up by a part of an
antagonist's body that had been seized(!)." The trembling of fear is
supposed by Mantegazza to be for the sake of warming the blood(!). The
reddening of the face and neck is called by Wundt a compensatory
arrangement for relieving the brain of the blood-pressure which the
simultaneous excitement of the heart brings with it. The effusion of tears is
explained both by this author and by Darwin to be a blood-withdrawing
agency of a similar sort. The contraction of the muscles around the eyes, of
which the primitive use is to protect those organs from being too much
gorged with blood during the screaming fits of infancy, survives in adult life
in the shape of the frown, which instantly comes over the brow when
anything difficult or displeasing presents itself either to thought or action.
"As the habit of contracting the brows has been followed by infants
during innumerable generations, at the commencement of every crying
or screaming fit," says Darwin, "it has become firmly associated with
the incipient sense of something distressing or disagreeable. Hence,
under similar circumstances, it would be apt to be continued during
maturity, although never then developed, into a crying fit. Screaming
or weeping begins to be voluntarily restrained at an early period of life,
whereas frowning is hardly ever restrained at any age."[423]
The intermittent expirations which constitute laughter have, according to
Dr. Hecker, the purpose of counteracting the anæmia of the brain, which he

supposes to be brought about by the action of the joyous or comic stimulus
upon the vaso-motor nerves.[424] A smile is the weak vestige of a laugh. The
tight closure of the mouth in all effort is useful for retaining the air in the
lungs so as to fix the chest and give a firm basis of insertion for the muscles
of the flanks. Accordingly, we see the lips compress themselves upon every
slight occasion of resolve. The blood-pressure has to be high during the
sexual embrace; hence the palpitations, and hence also the tendency to
caressing action, which accompanies tender emotion in its fainter forms.
Other examples might be given; but these are quite enough to show the
scope of the principle of revival of useful action in weaker form.

Another principle, to which Darwin perhaps hardly does sufficient justice,
may be called the principle of reacting similarly to analogous-feeling
stimuli. There is a whole vocabulary of descriptive adjectives common to
impressions belonging to different sensible spheres—experiences of all
classes are sweet, impressions of all classes rich or solid, sensations of all
classes sharp. Wundt and Piderit accordingly explain many of our most
expressive reactions upon moral causes as symbolic gustatory movements.
As soon as any experience arises which has an affinity with the feeling of
sweet, or bitter, or sour, the same movements are executed which would
result from the taste in point.[425] "All the states of mind which language
designates by the metaphors bitter, harsh, sweet, combine themselves,
therefore, with the corresponding mimetic movements of the mouth."
Certainly the emotions of disgust and satisfaction do express themselves in
this mimetic way. Disgust is an incipient regurgitation or retching, limiting
its expression often to the grimace of the lips and nose; satisfaction goes
with a sucking smile, or tasting motion of the lips. In Mantegazza's loose if
learned work, the attempt is made, much less successfully, to bring in the
eye and ear as additional sources of symbolically expressive reaction. The
ordinary gesture of negation—among us, moving the head about its axis
from side to side—is a reaction originally used by babies to keep
disagreeables from getting into their mouth, and may be observed in
perfection in any nursery.[426] It is now evoked where the stimulus is only
an unwelcome idea. Similarly the nod forward in affirmation is after the

analogy of taking food into the mouth. The connection of the expression of
moral or social disdain or dislike, especially in women, with movements
having a perfectly definite original olfactory function, is too obvious for
comment. Winking is the effect of any threatening surprise, not only of
what puts the eyes in danger; and a momentary aversion of the eyes is very
apt to be one's first symptom of response to an unexpectedly unwelcome
proposition.—These may suffice as examples of movements expressive
from analogy.
But if certain of our emotional reactions can be explained by the two
principles invoked—and the reader will himself have felt how conjectural
and fallible in some of the instances the explanation is—there remain many
reactions which cannot so be explained at all, and these we must write
down for the present as purely idiopathic effects of the stimulus. Amongst
them are the effects on the viscera and internal glands, the dryness of the
mouth and diarrhœa and nausea of fear, the liver-disturbances which
sometimes produce jaundice after excessive rage, the urinary secretion of
sanguine excitement, and the bladder-contraction of apprehension, the
gaping of expectancy, the 'lump in the throat' of grief, the tickling there and
the swallowing of embarrassment, the 'precordial anxiety' of dread, the
changes in the pupil, the various sweatings of the skin, cold or hot, local or
general, and its flushings, together with other symptoms which probably
exist but are too hidden to have been noticed or named. It seems as if even
the changes of blood-pressure and heart-beat during emotional excitement
might, instead of being teleologically determined, prove to be purely
mechanical or physiological outpourings through the easiest drainagechannels—the pneumogastrics and sympathetic nerves happening under
ordinary circumstances to be such channels.
Mr. Spencer argues that the smallest muscles must be such channels; and
instances the tail in dogs, cats, and birds, the ears in horses, the crest in
parrots, the face and fingers in man, as the first organs to be moved by
emotional stimuli.[427] This principle (if it be one) would apply still more
easily to the muscles of the smaller arteries (though not exactly to the
heart); whilst the great variability of the circulatory symptoms would also
suggest that they are determined by causes into which utility does not enter.
The quickening of the heart lends itself, it is true, rather easily to
explanation by inherited habit, organic memory of more violent excitement;

and Darwin speaks in favor of this view (see his Expression, etc., pp. 74-5).
But, on the other hand, we have so many cases of reaction which are
indisputably pathological, as we may say, and which could never be
serviceable or derived from what was serviceable, that I think we should be
cautious about pushing our explanations of the varied heart-beat too far in
the teleological direction. Trembling, which is found in many excitements
besides that of terror, is, pace Mr. Spencer and Sig. Mantegazza, quite
pathological. So are terror's other strong symptoms. Professor Mosso, as the
total result of his study, writes as follows:
"We have seen that the graver the peril becomes, the more do the
reactions which are positively harmful to the animal prevail in number
and in efficacy. We already saw that the trembling and the palsy make
it incapable of flight or defence; we have also convinced ourselves that
in the most decisive moments of danger we are less able to see [or to
think] than when we are tranquil. In face of such facts we must admit
that the phenomena of fear cannot all be accounted for by 'selection.'
Their extreme degrees are morbid phenomena which show an
imperfection in the organism. We might almost say that Nature had not
been able to frame a substance which should be excitable enough to
compose the brain and spinal marrow, and yet which should not be so
excited by exceptional stimulation as to overstep in its reactions those
physiological bounds which are useful to the conservation of the
creature."[428]
Professor Bain, if I mistake not, had long previously commented upon fear
in a similar way.
Mr. Darwin accounts for many emotional expressions by what he calls the
principle of antithesis. In virtue of this principle, if a certain stimulus
prompted a certain set of movements, then a contrary-feeling stimulus
would prompt exactly the opposite movements, although these might
otherwise have neither utility nor significance. It is in this wise that Darwin
explains the expression of impotence, raised eyebrows, and shrugged
shoulders, dropped arms and open palms, as being the antithesis of the
frowning brow, the thrown-back shoulders, and clenched fists of rage,
which is the emotion of power. No doubt a certain number of movements
can be formulated under this law; but whether it expresses a causal

principle is more than doubtful. It has been by most critics considered the
least successful of Darwin's speculations on this subject.
To sum up, we see the reason for a few emotional reactions; for others a
possible species of reason may be guessed; but others remain for which no
plausible reason can even be conceived. These may be reactions which are
purely mechanical results of the way in which our nervous centres are
framed, reactions which, although permanent in us now, may be called
accidental as far as their origin goes. In fact, in an organism as complex as
the nervous system there must be many such reactions, incidental to others
evolved for utility's sake, but which would never themselves have been
evolved independently, for any utility they might possess. Sea-sickness, the
love of music, of the various intoxicants, nay, the entire æsthetic life of
man, shall have to trace to this accidental origin.[429] It would be foolish to
suppose that none of the reactions called emotional could have arisen in this
quasi-accidental way.
This is all I have to say about the emotions. If one should seek to name each
particular one of them of which the human heart is the seat, it is plain that
the limit to their number would lie in the introspective vocabulary of the
seeker, each race of men having found names for some shade of feeling
which other races have left undiscriminated. If then we should seek to break
the emotions, thus enumerated, into groups, according to their affinities, it
is again plain that all sorts of groupings would be possible, according as we
chose this character or that as a basis, and that all groupings would be
equally real and true. The only question would be, does this grouping or
that suit our purpose best? The reader may then class the emotions as he
will, as sad or joyous, sthenic or asthenic, natural or acquired, inspired by
animate or inanimate things, formal or material, sensuous or ideal, direct or
reflective, egoistic or non-egoistic, retrospective, prospective or immediate,
organismally or environmentally initiated, or what more besides. All these
are divisions which have been actually proposed. Each of them has its
merits, and each one brings together some emotions which the others keep
apart. For a fuller account, and for other classificatory schemes, I refer to
the Appendix to Bain's Emotions and the Will, and to Mercier's, Stanley's,
and Read's articles on the Emotions, in Mind, vols. ix, x, and xi. In vol. ix.
p. 421 there is also an article by the lamented Edmund Gurney in criticism
of the view which in this chapter I continue to defend.
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M. Guyau, "after a summer-day's tramp carried to the extreme of fatigue, I met a shepherd and asked
him for some milk. He went to fetch from his hut, under which a brook ran, a jar of milk plunged in
the water and kept at a coldness which was almost icy. In drinking this fresh milk into which all the
mountain had put its perfume, and of which each savory swallow seemed to give new life, I certainly
experienced a series of feelings which the word agreeable is insufficient to designate. It was like a
pastoral symphony, apprehended by the taste instead of by the ear" (quoted by F. Paulhan from 'Les
Problèmes de l'Æsthétique Contemporaine,' p. 63).—Compare the dithyrambic about whiskey of Col.
R. Ingersoll, to which the presidential campaign of 1888 gave such notoriety: "I send you some of the
most wonderful whiskey that ever drove the skeleton from a feast or painted landscapes in the brain
of man. It is the mingled souls of wheat and corn. In it you will find the sunshine and shadow that
chase each other over the billowy fields, the breath of June, the carol of the lark, the dews of the
night, the wealth of summer, and autumn's rich content—all golden with imprisoned light. Drink it,
and you will hear the voice of men and maidens singing the 'Harvest Home,' mingled with the
laughter of children. Drink it, and you will feel within your blood the star-lit dawns, the dreamy,
tawny dusks of many perfect days. For forty years this liquid joy has been within the happy staves of
oak, longing to touch the lips of man."—It is in this way that I should reply to Mr. Gurney's criticism
on my theory. My "view," this writer says (Mind, ix. 425), "goes far to confound the two things
which in my opinion it is the prime necessity of musical psychology to distinguish—the effect
chiefly sensuous of mere streams or masses of finely colored sound, and the distinctive musical
emotion to which the form of a sequence of sound, its melodic and harmonic individuality, even
realized in complete silence, is the vital and essential object. It is with the former of these two very
different things that the physical reactions, the stirring of the hair—the tingling and the shiver—are
by far most markedly connected.... If I may speak of myself, there is plenty of music from which I
have received as much emotion in silent representation as when presented by the finest orchestra; but
it is with the latter condition that I almost exclusively associate the cutaneous tingling and hairstirring. But to call my enjoyment of the form, of the note-after-noteness of a melody a mere critical

'judgment of right' [see below, p. 473] would really be to deny to me the power of expressing a fact
of simple and intimate expression in English. It is quintessentially emotion.... Now there are
hundreds of other bits of music ... which I judge to be right without receiving an iota of the emotion.
For purposes of emotion they are to me like geometrical demonstrations or like acts of integrity
performed in Peru." The Beethoven-rightness of which Gurney then goes on to speak, as something
different from the Clementi-rightness (even when the respective pieces are only heard in idea), is
probably a purely auditory-sensational thing. The Clementi-rightness also; only, for reasons
impossible to assign, the Clementi form does not give the same sort of purely auditory satisfaction as
the Beethoven form, and might better be described perhaps negatively as non-wrong, i.e., free from
positively unpleasant acoustic quality. In organizations as musical as Mr. Gurney's, purely acoustic
form gives so intense a degree of sensible pleasure that the lower bodily reverberation is of no
account. But I repeat that I see nothing in the facts which Mr. Gurney cites, to lead one to believe in
an emotion divorced from sensational processes of any kind.
[417] In his chapter on 'Ideal Emotion,' to which the reader is referred for farther details on this
subject.
[418] Those feelings which Prof. Bain calls 'emotions of relativity,' excitement of novelty, wonder,
rapture of freedom, sense of power, hardly survive any repetition of the experience. But as the text
goes on to explain, and as Goethe as quoted by Prof. Höffding says, this is because "the soul is
inwardly grown larger without knowing it, and can no longer be filled by that first sensation. The
man thinks that he has lost, but really he has gained. What he has lost in rapture, he has gained in
inward growth." "It is," as Prof. Höffding himself adds, in a beautiful figure of speech, "with our
virgin feelings, as with the first breath drawn by the new-born child, in which the lung expands itself
so that it can never be emptied to the same degree again. No later breath can feel just like that first
one." On this whole subject of emotional blunting, compare Höffding's Psychologie, vi. E., and
Bain's Emotions and Will, chapter iv. of the first part.
[419] M. Fr. Paulhan, in a little work full of accurate observations of detail (Les Phénomènes
Affectifs et les Lois de leur Apparition), seems to me rather to turn the truth upside down by his
formula that emotions are due to an inhibition of impulsive tendencies. One kind of emotion, namely,
uneasiness, annoyance, distress, does occur when any definite impulsive tendency is checked, and all
of M. P.'s illustrations are drawn from this sort. The other emotions are themselves primary impulsive
tendencies, of a diffusive sort (involving, as M. P. rightly says, a multiplicité des phénomènes); and
just in proportion as more and more of these multiple tendencies are checked, and replaced by some
few narrow forms of discharge, does the original emotion tend to disappear.
[420] A list of the older writings on the subject is given in Mantegazza's work, La Physionomie et
l'Expression, chap. I; others in Darwin's first chapter. Bell's Anatomy of Expression, Mosso's La
Paura, Piderit's Wissenschaftliches System der Mimik und Physiognomik, Duchenne's Mécanisme de
la Physionomie Humaine, are, besides Lange and Darwin, the most useful works with which I am
acquainted. Compare also Sully: Sensation and Intuition, chap. ii.
[421] One must remember, however, that just in so far forth as sexual selection may have played a
part in determining the human organism, selection of expressive faces must have increased the
average mobility of the human countenance.
[422] Psychol., § 213.
[423] Weeping in childhood is almost as regular a symptom of anger as it is of grief, which would
account (on Darwin's principles) for the frown of anger. Mr. Spencer has an account of the angry
frown as having arisen through the survival of the fittest, by its utility in keeping the sun out of one's
eyes when engaged in mortal combat(!). (Principles of Psychology, ii. 546.) Professor Mosso objects
to any explanation of the frown by its utility for vision, that it is coupled, during emotional

excitement, with a dilatation of the pupil which is very unfavorable for distinct vision, and that this
ought to have been weeded out by natural selection, if natural selection had the power to fix the
frown (see La Paura, chap. ix. § vi). Unfortunately this very able author speaks as if all the emotions
affected the pupil in the same way. Fear certainly does make it dilate. But Gratiolet is quoted by
Darwin and others as saying that the pupils contract in anger. I have made no observations of my
own on the point, and Mosso's earlier paper on the pupil (Turin, 1875) I have not seen. I must repeat,
with Darwin, that we need more minute observations on this subject.
[424] Physiologie u. Psychologie des Lachens und des Komischen (Berlin, 1873), pp. 13, 15.
[425] These movements are explained teleologically, in the first instance, by the efforts which the
tongue is forced to make to adapt itself to the better perception or avoidance of the sapid body. (Cf.
Physiol. Psych., ii. 423.)
[426] Professor Henle derives the negative wag of the head from an incipient shudder, and remarks
how fortunate is the abbreviation, as when a lady declines a partner in the ball-room. The clapping of
the hands for applause he explains as a symbolic abridgment of an embrace. The protrusion of the
lips (der prufende Zug) which goes with all sorts of dubious and questioning states of mind is derived
by Dr. Piderit from the tasting movement which we can see on any one's mouth when deciding
whether a wine is good or not.
[427] Loc. cit. § 497. Why a dog's face-muscles are not more mobile than they are Mr. Spencer fails
to explain, as also why different stimuli should innervate these small muscles in such different ways,
if easy drainage be the only principle involved. Charles Bell accounted for the special part played by
the facial muscles in expression by their being accessory muscles of respiration, governed by nerves
whose origin is close to the respiratory centre in the medulla oblongata. They are an adjuvant of
voice, and like it their function is communication. (See Bell's Anatomy of Expression. Appendix by
Alexander Shaw.)
[428] La Paura, Appendice, p. 295.
[429] See below, p. 627.

CHAPTER XXVI.[430]

WILL.
Desire, wish, will, are states of mind which everyone knows, and which no
definition can make plainer. We desire to feel, to have, to do, all sorts of
things which at the moment are not felt, had, or done. If with the desire
there goes a sense that attainment is not possible, we simply wish; but if we
believe that the end is in our power, we will that the desired feeling, having,
or doing shall be real; and real it presently becomes, either immediately
upon the willing or after certain preliminaries have been fulfilled.

The only ends which follow immediately upon our willing seem to be
movements of our own bodies. Whatever feelings and havings we may will
to get, come in as results of preliminary movements which we make for the
purpose. This fact is too familiar to need illustration; so that we may start
with the proposition that the only direct outward effects of our will are
bodily movements. The mechanism of production of these voluntary
movements is what befalls us to study now. The subject involves a good
many separate points which it is difficult to arrange in any continuous
logical order. I will treat of them successively in the mere order of
convenience; trusting that at the end the reader will gain a clear and
connected view.

The movements we have studied hitherto have been automatic and reflex,
and (on the first occasion of their performance, at any rate) unforeseen by
the agent. The movements to the study of which we now address ourselves,
being desired and intended beforehand, are of course done with full
prevision of what they are to be. It follows from this that voluntary
movements must be secondary, not primary functions of our organism. This
is the first point to understand in the psychology of Volition. Reflex,
instinctive, and emotional movements are all primary performances. The
nerve-centres are so organized that certain stimuli pull the trigger of certain
explosive parts; and a creature going through one of these explosions for
the first time undergoes an entirely novel experience. The other day I was
standing at a railroad station with a little child, when an express-train went
thundering by. The child, who was near the edge of the platform, started,
winked, had his breathing convulsed, turned pale, burst out crying, and ran
frantically towards me and hid his face. I have no doubt that this youngster
was almost as much astonished by his own behavior as he was by the train,
and more than I was, who stood by. Of course if such a reaction has many
times occurred we learn what to expect of ourselves, and can then foresee
our conduct, even though it remain as involuntary and uncontrollable as it
was before. But if, in voluntary action properly so-called, the act must be
foreseen, it follows that no creature not endowed with divinatory power can
perform an act voluntarily for the first time. Well, we are no more endowed

with prophetic vision of what movements lie in our power, than we are
endowed with prophetic vision of what sensations we are capable of
receiving. As we must wait for the sensations to be given us, so we must
wait for the movements to be performed involuntarily,[431] before we can
frame ideas of what either of these things are. We learn all our possibilities
by the way of experience. When a particular movement, having once
occurred in a random, reflex, or involuntary way, has left an image of itself
in the memory, then the movement can be desired again, proposed as an
end, and deliberately willed. But it is impossible to see how it could be
willed before.
A supply of ideas of the various movements that are possible left in the
memory by experiences of their involuntary performance is thus the first
prerequisite of the voluntary life.
Now the same movement involuntarily performed may leave many different
kinds of ideas of itself in the memory. If performed by another person, we
of course see it, or we feel it if the moving part strikes another part of our
own body. Similarly we have an auditory image of its effects if it produces
sounds, as for example when it is one of the movements made in
vocalization, or in playing on a musical instrument. All these remote effects
of the movement, as we may call them, are also produced by movements
which we ourselves perform; and they leave innumerable ideas in our mind
by which we distinguish each movement from the rest. It looks distinct; it
feels distinct to some distant part of the body which it strikes; or it sounds
distinct. These remote effects would then, rigorously speaking, suffice to
furnish the mind with the supply of ideas required.
But in addition to these impressions upon remote organs of sense, we have,
whenever we perform a movement ourselves, another set of impressions,
those, namely, which come up from the parts that are actually moved. These
kinæsthetic impressions, as Dr. Bastian has called them, are so many
resident effects of the motion. Not only are our muscles supplied with
afferent as well as with efferent nerves, but the tendons, the ligaments, the
articular surfaces, and the skin about the joints are all sensitive, and, being
stretched and squeezed in ways characteristic of each particular movement,
give us as many distinctive feelings as there are movements possible to
perform.

It is by these resident impressions that we are made conscious of passive
movements—movements communicated to our limbs by others. If you lie
with closed eyes, and another person noiselessly places your arm or leg in
any arbitrarily chosen attitude, you receive an accurate feeling of what
attitude it is, and can immediately reproduce it yourself in the arm or leg of
the opposite side. Similarly a man waked suddenly from sleep in the dark is
aware of how he finds himself lying. At least this is what happens when the
nervous apparatus is normal. But in cases of disease we sometimes find that
the resident impressions do not normally excite the centres, and that then
the sense of attitude is lost. It is only recently that pathologists have begun
to study these anæsthesias with the delicacy which they require; and we
have doubtless yet a great deal to learn about them. The skin may be
anæsthetic, and the muscles may not feel the cramp-like pain which is
produced by faradic currents sent through them, and yet the sense of passive
movement may be retained. It seems, in fact, to persist more obstinately
than the other forms of sensibility, for cases are comparatively common in
which all the other feelings in the limb but this one of attitude are lost. In
Chapter XX I have tried to make it appear that the articular surfaces are
probably the most important source of the resident kinæsthetic feelings. But
the determination of their special organ is indifferent to our present quest. It
is enough to know that the existence of these feelings cannot be denied.
When the feelings of passive movement as well as all the other feelings of a
limb are lost, we get such results as are given in the following account by
Professor A. Strümpell of his wonderful anæsthetic boy, whose only
sources of feeling were the right eye and the left ear:[432]
"Passive movements could be imprinted on all the extremities to the
greatest extent, without attracting the patient's notice. Only in violent
forced hyperextension of the joints, especially of the knees, there arose
a dull vague feeling of strain, but this was seldom precisely localized.
We have often, after bandaging the eyes of the patient, carried him
about the room, laid him on a table, given to his arms and legs the
most fantastic and apparently the most inconvenient attitudes, without
his having a suspicion of it. The expression of astonishment in his
face, when all at once the removal of the handkerchief revealed his
situation, is indescribable in words. Only when his head was made to
hang away down he immediately spoke of dizziness, but could not

assign its ground. Later he sometimes inferred from the sounds
connected with the manipulation that something special was being
done with him.... He had no feelings of muscular fatigue. If, with his
eyes shut, we told him to raise his arm and to keep it up, he did so
without trouble. After one or two minutes, however, the arm began to
tremble and sink without his being aware of it. He asserted still his
ability to keep it up.... Passively holding still his fingers did not affect
him. He thought constantly that he opened and shut his hand, whereas
it was really fixed."
Or we read of cases like this:
"Voluntary movements cannot be estimated the moment the patient
ceases to take note of them by his eyes. Thus, after having made him
close his eyes, if one asks him to move one of his limbs either wholly
or in part, he does it but cannot tell whether the effected movement is
large or small, strong or weak, or even if it has taken place at all. And
when he opens his eyes after moving his leg from right to left, for
example, he declares that he had a very inexact notion of the extent of
the effected movement.... If, having the intention of executing a certain
movement, I prevent him, he does not perceive it, and supposes the
limb to have taken the position he intended to give it."[433]
Or this:
"The patient, when his eyes were closed in the middle of an
unpractised movement, remained with the extremity in the position it
had when the eyes closed and did not complete the movement
properly. Then after some oscillations the limb gradually sank by
reason of its weight (the sense of fatigue being absent). Of this the
patient was not aware, and wondered, when he opened his eyes, at the
altered position of his limb."[434]
A similar condition can be readily reproduced experimentally in many
hypnotic subjects. All that is needed is to tell a suitably predisposed person
during the hypnotic trance that he cannot feel his limb, and he will be quite
unaware of the attitudes into which you may throw it.[435]

All these cases, whether spontaneous or experimental, show the absolute
need of guiding sensations of some kind for the successful carrying out of a
concatenated series of movements. It is, in fact, easy to see that, just as
where the chain of movements is automatic (see above, Vol. I. p. 116), each
later movement of the chain has to be discharged by the impression which
the next earlier one makes in being executed, so also, where the chain is
voluntary, we need to know at each movement just where we are in it, if we
are to will intelligently what the next link shall be. A man with no feeling of
his movements might lead off never so well, and yet be sure to get lost soon
and go astray.[436] But patients like those described, who get no kinæsthetic
impressions, can still be guided by the sense of sight. Thus Strümpell says
of his boy:
"One could always observe how his eye was directed first to the object
held before him, then to his own arm; and how it never ceased to
follow the latter during its entire movement. All his voluntary
movements took place under the unremitting lead of the eye, which as
an indispensable guide, was never untrue to its functions."
So in the Landry case:
"With his eyes open, he easily opposes the thumb to each of the other
fingers; with his eyes closed, the movement of opposition occurs, but
the thumb only by chance meets the finger which it seeks. With his
eyes open he is able, without hesitation, to bring his two hands
together; but when his eyes are closed his hands seek one another in
space, and only meet by chance."
In Charles Bell's well-known old case of anæsthesia the woman could only
hold her baby safely in her arms so long as she looked at it. I have myself
reproduced a similar condition in two hypnotic subjects whose arm and
hand were made anæsthetic without being paralyzed. They could write their
names when looking, but not when their eyes were closed. The modern
mode of teaching deaf mutes to articulate consists in making them attentive
to certain laryngeal, labial, thoracic, and other sensations, the reproduction
of which becomes a guide to their vocalization. Normally it is the remoter

sensations which we receive by the ear which keep us from going astray in
our speech. The phenomena of aphasia show this to be the usual case.[437]
This is perhaps all that need be said about the existence of passive
sensations of movement and their indispensableness for our voluntary
activity. We may consequently set it down as certain that, whether or no
there be anything else in the mind at the moment when we consciously will
a certain act, a mental conception made up of memory-images of these
sensations, defining which special act it is, must be there.

Now is there anything else in the mind when we will to do an act? We must
proceed in this chapter from the simpler to the more complicated cases. My
first thesis accordingly is, that there need be nothing else, and that in
perfectly simple voluntary acts there is nothing else, in the mind but the
kinæsthetic idea, thus defined, of what the act is to be.
A powerful tradition in Psychology will have it that something additional to
these images of passive sensation is essential to the mental determination of
a voluntary act. There must, of course, be a special current of energy going
out from the brain into the appropriate muscles during the act; and this
outgoing current (it is supposed) must have in each particular case a feeling
sui generis attached to it, or else (it is said) the mind could never tell which
particular current, the current to this muscle or the current to that one, was
the right one to use. This feeling of the current of outgoing energy has
received from Wundt the name of the feeling of innervation. I disbelieve in
its existence, and must proceed to criticise the notion of it, at what I fear
may to some prove tedious length.
At first sight there is something extremely plausible in the feeling of
innervation. The passive feelings of movement with which we have hitherto
been dealing all come after the movement's performance. But wherever a
movement is difficult and precise, we become, as a matter of fact, acutely
aware in advance of the amount and direction of energy which it is to
involve. One has only to play tenpins or billiards, or throw a ball, to catch
his will in the act, as it were, of balancing tentatively its possible efforts,
and ideally rehearsing various muscular contractions nearly correct, until it

gets just the right one before it, when it says 'Now go!' This premonitory
weighing feels so much like a succession of tentative sallyings forth of
power into the outer world, followed by correction just in time to avoid the
irrevocable deed, that the notion that outgoing nerve-currents rather than
mere vestiges of former passive sensibility accompany it, is a most natural
one to entertain.
We find accordingly that most authors have taken the existence of feelings
of innervation as a matter of course. Bain, Wundt, Helmholtz, and Mach
defend them most explicitly. But in spite of the authority which such writers
deservedly wield, I cannot help thinking that they are in this instance
wrong,—that the discharge into the motor nerves is insentient, and that all
our ideas of movement, including those of the effort which it requires, as
well as those of its direction, its extent, its strength, and its velocity, are
images of peripheral sensations, either 'remote,' or resident in the moving
parts, or in other parts which sympathetically act with them in consequence
of the 'diffusive wave.'
A priori, as I shall show, there is no reason why there should be a
consciousness of the motor discharge, and there is a reason why there
should not be such a consciousness. The presumption is thus against the
existence of the feeling of innervation; and the burden of proving it falls
upon those who believe in it. If the positive empirical evidence which they
offer prove also insufficient, then their case falls to the ground, and the
feeling in question must be ruled out of court.

In the first place, then, let me show that the assumption of the feeling of
innervation is unnecessary.
I cannot help suspecting that the scholastic prejudice that 'the effect must be
already in some way contained in the cause' has had something to do with
making psychologists so ready to admit the feeling of innervation. The
outgoing current being the effect, what psychic antecedent could contain or
prefigure it better than a feeling of it? But if we take a wide view, and
consider the psychic antecedents of our activities at large, we see that the
scholastic maxim breaks down everywhere, and that its verification in this

instance would rather violate than illustrate the general rule. In the diffusive
wave, in reflex action, and in emotional expression, the movements which
are the effects are in no manner contained by anticipation in the stimuli
which are their cause. The latter are subjective sensations or objective
perceptions, which do not in the slightest degree resemble or prefigure the
movements. But we get them, and, presto! there the movements are! They
are knocked out of us, they surprise us. It is just cause for wonder, as our
chapter on Instinct has shown us, that such bodily consequences should
follow such mental antecedents. We explain the mystery tant bien que mal
by our evolutionary theories, saying that lucky variations and heredity have
gradually brought it about that this particular pair of terms should have
grown into a uniform sequence. Meanwhile why any state of consciousness
at all should precede a movement, we know not—the two things seem so
essentially discontinuous. But if a state of consciousness there must be, why
then it may, for aught we can see, as easily be one sort of a state as another.
It is swallowing a camel and straining at a gnat for a man (all of whose
muscles will on certain occasions contract at a sudden touch or sound) to
suppose that on another occasion the idea of the feelings about to be
produced by their contraction is an insufficient mental signal for the latter,
and to insist that an additional antecedent is needed in the shape of 'a
feeling of the outgoing discharge.'
No! for aught we can see, and in the light of general analogy, the
kinæsthetic ideas, as we have defined them, or images of incoming feelings
of attitude and motion, are as likely as any feelings of innervation are, to be
the last psychic antecedents and determiners of the various currents
downwards into the muscles from the brain. The question "What are the
antecedents and determinants?" is a question of fact, to be decided by
whatever empirical evidence may be found.[438]
But before considering the empirical evidence, let me go on to show that
there is a certain a priori reason why the kinæsthetic images OUGHT to be
the last psychic antecedents of the outgoing currents, and why we should
expect these currents to be insentient; why, in short, the soi-disant feelings
of innervation should NOT exist.
It is a general principle in Psychology that consciousness deserts all
processes where it can no longer be of use. The tendency of consciousness
to a minimum of complication is in fact a dominating law. The law of

parsimony in logic is only its best known case. We grow unconscious of
every feeling which is useless as a sign to lead us to our ends, and where
one sign will suffice others drop out, and that one remains, to work alone.
We observe this in the whole history of sense-perception, and in the
acquisition of every art. We ignore which eye we see with, because a fixed
mechanical association has been formed between our motions and each
retinal image. Our motions are the ends of our seeing, our retinal images the
signals to these ends. If each retinal image, whichever it be, can suggest
automatically a motion in the right direction, what need for us to know
whether it be in the right eye or the left? That knowledge would be
superfluous complication. So in acquiring any art or voluntary function.
The marksman ends by thinking only of the exact position of the goal, the
singer only of the perfect sound, the balancer only of the point of the pole
whose oscillations he must counteract. The associated mechanism has
become so perfect in all these persons that each variation in the thought of
the end is functionally correlated with the one movement fitted to bring the
latter about. Whilst they were tyros, they thought of their means as well as
their end: the marksman of the position of his gun or bow, or the weight of
his stone; the pianist of the visible position of the note on the keyboard; the
singer of his throat or breathing; the balancer of his feet on the rope, or his
hand or chin under the pole. But little by little they succeeded in dropping
all this supernumerary consciousness, and they became secure in their
movements exactly in proportion as they did so.
Now if we analyze the nervous mechanism of voluntary action, we shall see
that by virtue of this principle of parsimony in consciousness the motor
discharge ought to be devoid of sentience. If we call the immediate psychic
antecedent of a movement the latter's mental cue, all that is needed for
invariability of sequence on the movement's part is a fixed connection
between each several mental cue, and one particular movement. For a
movement to be produced with perfect precision, it suffices that it obey
instantly its own mental cue and nothing else, and that this mental cue be
incapable of awakening any other movement. Now the simplest possible
arrangement for producing voluntary movements would be that the
memory-images of the movement's distinctive peripheral effects, whether
resident or remote,[439] themselves should severally constitute the mental
cues, and that no other psychic facts should intervene or be mixed up with
them. For a million different voluntary movements, we should then need a

million distinct processes in the brain-cortex (each corresponding to the
idea or memory-image of one movement), and a million distinct paths of
discharge. Everything would then be unambiguously determined, and if the
idea were right, the movement-would be right too. Everything after the idea
might then be quite insentient, and the motor discharge itself could be
unconsciously performed.
The partisans of the feeling of innervation, however, say that the motor
discharge itself must be felt, and that it, and not the idea of the movement's
distinctive effects, must be the proper mental cue. Thus the principle of
parsimony is sacrificed, and all economy and simplicity are lost. For what
can be gained by the interposition of this relay of feeling between the idea
of the movement and the movement? Nothing on the score of economy of
nerve-tracts; for it takes just as many of them to associate a million ideas of
movement with a million motor centres, each with a specific feeling of
innervation attached to its discharge, as to associate the same million ideas
with a million insentient motor centres. And nothing on the score of
precision; for the only conceivable way in which the feelings of innervation
might further precision would be by giving to a mind whose idea of a
movement was vague, a sort of halting stage with sharper imagery on which
to collect its wits before uttering its fiat. But not only are the conscious
discriminations between our kinæsthetic ideas much sharper than any one
pretends the shades of difference between feelings of innervation to be, but
even were this not the case, it is impossible to see how a mind with its idea
vaguely conceived could tell out of a lot of Innervationsgefühle, were they
never so sharply differentiated, which one fitted that idea exactly, and
which did not. A sharply conceived idea will, on the other hand, directly
awaken a distinct movement as easily as it will awaken a distinct feeling of
innervation. If feelings can go astray through vagueness, surely the fewer
steps of feeling there are interposed the more securely we shall act. We
ought then, on a priori grounds alone, to regard the Innervationsgefühl as a
pure encumbrance, and to presume that the peripheral ideas of movement
are sufficient mental cues.
The presumption being thus against the feelings of innervation, those who
defend their existence are bound to prove it by positive evidence. The
evidence might be direct or indirect. If we could introspectively feel them
as something plainly distinct from the peripheral feelings and ideas of

movement which nobody denies to be there, that would be evidence both
direct and conclusive. Unfortunately it does not exist.
There is no introspective evidence of the feeling of innervation. Wherever
we look for it and think we have grasped it, we find that we have really got
a peripheral feeling or image instead—an image of the way in which we
feel when the innervation is over, and the movement is in process of doing
or is done. Our idea of raising our arm, for example, or of crooking our
finger, is a sense, more or less vivid, of how the raised arm or the crooked
finger feels. There is no other mental material out of which such an idea
might be made. We cannot possibly have any idea of our ears' motion until
our ears have moved; and this is true of every other organ as well.
Since the time of Hume it has been a commonplace in psychology that we
are only conversant with the outward results of our volition, and not with
the hidden inner machinery of nerves and muscles which are what it
primarily sets at work.[440] The believers in the feeling of innervation
readily admit this, but seem hardly alive to its consequences. It seems to me
that one immediate consequence ought to be to make us doubt the existence
of the feeling in dispute. Whoever says that in raising his arm he is ignorant
of how many muscles he contracts, in what order of sequence, and in what
degrees of intensity, expressively avows a colossal amount of
unconsciousness of the processes of motor discharge. Each separate muscle
at any rate cannot have its distinct feeling of innervation. Wundt,[441] who
makes such enormous use of these hypothetical feelings in his psychologic
construction of space, is himself led to admit that they have no differences
of quality, but feel alike in all muscles, and vary only in their degrees of
intensity. They are used by the mind as guides, not of which movement, but
of how strong a movement, it is making, or shall make. But does not this
virtually surrender their existence altogether?[442]
For if anything be obvious to introspection it is that the degree of strength
of our muscular contractions is completely revealed to us by afferent
feelings coming from the muscles themselves and their insertions, from the
vicinity of the joints, and from the general fixation of the larynx, chest,
face, and body, in the phenomenon of effort, objectively considered. When
a certain degree of energy of contraction rather than another is thought of
by us, this complex aggregate of afferent feelings, forming the material of

our thought, renders absolutely precise and distinctive our mental image of
the exact strength of movement to be made, and the exact amount of
resistance to be overcome.
Let the reader try to direct his will towards a particular movement, and then
notice what constituted the direction of the will. Was it anything over and
above the notion of the different feelings to which the movement when
effected would give rise? If we abstract from these feelings, will any sign,
principle, or means of orientation be left by which the will may innervate
the right muscles with the right intensity, and not go astray into the wrong
ones? Strip off these images of result, and so far from leaving us with a
complete assortment of directions into which our will may launch itself,
you leave our consciousness in an absolute and total vacuum. If I will to
write "Peter" rather than "Paul," it is the thought of certain digital
sensations, of certain alphabetic sounds, of certain appearances on the
paper, and of no others, which immediately precedes the motion of my pen.
If I will to utter the word Paul rather than Peter, it is the thought of my
voice falling on my ear, and of certain muscular feelings in my tongue, lips,
and larynx, which guide the utterance. All these are incoming feelings, and
between the thought of them, by which the act is mentally specified with all
possible completeness, and the act itself, there is no room for any third
order of mental phenomenon. There is indeed the fiat, the element of
consent, or resolve that the act shall ensue. This, doubtless, to the reader's
mind, as to my own, constitutes the essence of the voluntariness of the act.
This fiat will be treated of in detail farther on. It may be entirely neglected
here, for it is a constant coefficient, affecting all voluntary actions alike, and
incapable of serving to distinguish them. No one will pretend that its quality
varies according as the right arm, for example, or the left is used.
An anticipatory image, then, of the sensorial consequences of a movement,
plus (on certain occasions) the fiat that these consequences shall become
actual, is the only psychic state which introspection lets us discern as the
forerunner of our voluntary acts. There is no introspective evidence
whatever of any still later or concomitant feeling attached to the efferent
discharge. The various degrees of difficulty with which the fiat is given
form a complication of the utmost importance, to be discussed farther on.

Now the reader may still shake his head and say: "But can you seriously
mean that all the wonderfully exact adjustment of my action's strength to its
ends is not a matter of outgoing innervation? Here is a cannon-ball, and
here a pasteboard box: instantly and accurately I lift each from the table, the
ball not refusing to rise because my innervation was too weak, the box not
flying abruptly into the air because it was too strong. Could representations
of the movement's different sensory effects in the two cases be so delicately
foreshadowed in the mind? or being there, is it credible that they should, all
unaided, so delicately graduate the stimulation of the unconscious motor
centres to their work?" Even so! I reply to both queries. We have a most
extremely delicate foreshadowing of the sensory effects. Why else the start
of surprise that runs through us if some one has filled the light-seeming box
with sand before we try to lift it, or has substituted for the cannon-ball
which we know a painted wooden imitation? Surprise can only come from
getting a sensation which differs from the one we expect. But the truth is
that when we know the objects well, the very slightest difference from the
expected weight will surprise us, or at least attract our notice. With
unknown objects we begin by expecting the weight made probable by their
appearance. The expectation of this sensation innervates our lift, and we
'set' it rather small at first. An instant verifies whether it is too small. Our
expectation rises, i.e., we think in a twinkling of a setting of the chest and
teeth, a bracing of the back, and a more violent feeling in the arms. Quicker
than thought we have them, and with them the burden ascends into the air.
[443] Bernhardt[444] has shown in a rough experimental way that our
estimation of the amount of a resistance is as delicately graduated when our
wills are passive, and our limbs made to contract by direct local
faradization, as when we ourselves innervate them. Ferrier[445] has repeated
and verified the observations. They admit of no great precision, and too
much stress should not be laid upon them either way; but at the very least
they tend to show that no added delicacy would accrue to our perception
from the consciousness of the efferent process, even if it existed.
Since there is no direct introspective evidence for the feelings of
innervation, is there any indirect or circumstantial evidence? Much is
offered; but on critical examination it breaks down. Let us see what it is.
Wundt says that were our motor feelings of an afferent nature,

"it ought to be expected that they would increase and diminish with the
amount of outer or inner work actually effected in contraction. This,
however, is not the case, but the strength of the motor sensation is
purely proportional to the strength of the impulse to movement, which
starts from the central organ innervating the motor nerves. This may be
proved by observations made by physicians in cases of morbid
alteration in the muscular effect. A patient whose arm or leg is half
paralyzed, so that he can only move the limb with great effort, has a
distinct feeling of this effort: the limb seems to him heavier than
before, appearing as if weighted with lead; he has, therefore, a sense of
more work effected than formerly, and yet the effected work is either
the same or even less. Only he must, to get even this effect, exert a
stronger innervation, a stronger motor impulse, than formerly."[446]
In complete paralysis, also, patients will be conscious of putting forth the
greatest exertion to move a limb which remains absolutely still upon the
bed, and from which of course no afferent muscular or other feelings can
come.[447]
But Dr. Ferrier in his Functions of the Brain (Am. Ed. pp. 222-4) disposes
very easily of this line of argument. He says:
"It is necessary, however, to exclude movements altogether before
such an explanation [as Wundt's] can be adopted. Now, though the
hemiplegic patient cannot move his paralyzed limb, though he is
conscious of trying hard, yet he will be found to be making powerful
muscular exertion of some kind. Vulpian has called attention to the
fact, and I have repeatedly verified it, that when a hemiplegic patient is
desired to close his paralyzed fist, in his endeavors to do so he
unconsciously performs this action with the sound one. It is, in fact,
almost impossible to exclude such a source of complication, and unless
this is taken into account very erroneous conclusions as to the cause of
the sense of effort may be drawn. In the fact of muscular contraction
and the concomitant centripetal impressions, even though the action is
not such as is desired, the conditions of the consciousness of effort
exist without our being obliged to regard it as depending on central
innervation or outgoing currents.

"It is, however, easy to make an experiment of a simple nature which
will satisfactorily account for the sense of effort, even when these
unconscious contractions of the other side, such as hemiplegics make,
are entirely excluded.
"If the reader will extend his right arm and hold his forefinger in the
position required for pulling the trigger of a pistol, he may without
actually moving his finger, but by simply making believe, experience a
consciousness of energy put forth. Here, then, is a clear case of
consciousness of energy without actual contraction of the muscles
either of the one hand or the other, and without any perceptible bodily
strain. If the reader will again perform the experiment, and pay careful
attention to the condition of his respiration, he will observe that his
consciousness of effort coincides with a fixation of the muscles of his
chest, and that in proportion to the amount of energy he feels he is
putting forth, he is keeping his glottis closed and actively contracting
his respiratory muscles. Let him place his finger as before, and
continue breathing all the time, and he will find that however much he
may direct his attention to his finger, he will experience not the
slightest trace of consciousness of effort until he has actually moved
the finger itself, and then it is referred locally to the muscles in action.
It is only when this essential and ever-present respiratory factor is, as it
has been, overlooked, that the consciousness of effort can with any
degree of plausibility be ascribed to the outgoing current. In the
contraction of the respiratory muscles there are the necessary
conditions of centripetal impressions, and these are capable of
originating the general sense of effort. When these active efforts are
withheld, no consciousness of effort ever arises, except in so far as it is
conditioned by the local contraction of the group of muscles towards
which the attention is directed, or by other muscular contractions
called unconsciously into play in the attempt.
"I am unable to find a single case of consciousness of effort which is
not explicable in one or other of the ways specified. In all instances the
consciousness of effort is conditioned by the actual fact of muscular
contraction. That it is dependent on centripetal impressions generated
by the act of contraction, I have already endeavored to show. When the
paths of the centripetal impressions or the cerebral centres of the same

are destroyed, there is no vestige of a muscular sense. That the central
organs for the apprehension of the impressions originating from
muscular contraction are different from those which send out the motor
impulse, has already been established. But when Wundt argues that
this cannot be so, because then the sensation would always keep pace
with the energy of muscular contraction, he overlooks the important
factor of the fixation of the respiratory muscles, which is the basis of
the general sense of effort in all its varying degrees."
To these remarks of Ferrier's I have nothing to add.[448] Any one may verify
them, and they prove conclusively that the consciousness of muscular
exertion, being impossible without movement effected somewhere, must be
an afferent and not an efferent sensation; a consequence, and not an
antecedent, of the movement itself. An idea of the amount of muscular
exertion requisite to perform a certain movement can consequently be
nothing other than an anticipatory image of the movement's sensible effects.
Driven thus from the body at large, where next shall the circumstantial
evidence for the feeling of innervation lodge itself? Where but in the
muscles of the eye, from which small retreat it judges itself inexpugnable.
Nevertheless, that fastness too must fall, and by the lightest of
bombardments. But, before trying the bombardment, let us recall our
general principles about optical vertigo, or illusory appearance of
movement in objects.
We judge that an object moves under two distinct sets of circumstances:
1. When its image moves on the retina, and we know that the eye is still.
2. When its image is stationary on the retina, and we know that the eye is
moving. In this case we feel that we follow the object.
In either of these cases a mistaken judgment about the state of the eye will
produce optical vertigo.
If in case 1 we think our eye is still when it is really moving, we get a
movement of the retinal image which we judge to be due to a real outward
motion of the object. This is what happens after looking at rushing water, or
through the windows of a moving railroad car, or after turning on one's heel
to giddiness. The eyes, without our intending to move them, go through a

series of involuntary rotations, continuing those they were previously
obliged to make to keep objects in view. If the objects had been whirling by
to our right, our eyes when turned to stationary objects will still move
slowly towards the right. The retinal image upon them will then move like
that of an object passing to the left. We then try to catch it by voluntarily
and rapidly rotating the eyes to the left, when the involuntary impulse again
rotates the eyes to the right, continuing the apparent motion; and so the
game goes on. (See above, pp. 89-91.)
If in case 2 we think our eyes moving when they are in reality still, we shall
judge that we are following a moving object when we are but fixating a
steadfast one. Illusions of this kind occur after sudden and complete
paralysis of special eye muscles, and the partisans of feelings of efferent
innervation regard them as experimenta crucis. Helmholtz writes:[449]
"When the external rectus muscle of the right eye, or its nerve, is
paralyzed, the eye can no longer be rotated to the right side. So long as
the patient turns it only to the nasal side it makes regular movements,
and he perceives correctly the position of objects in the visual field. So
soon, however, as he tries to rotate it outwardly, i.e., towards the right,
it ceases to obey his will, stands motionless in the middle of its course,
and the objects appear flying to the right, although position of eye and
retinal image are unaltered.[450]
"In such a case the exertion of the will is followed neither by actual
movement of the eye, nor by contraction of the muscle in question, nor
even by increased tension in it. The act of will produced absolutely no
effect beyond the nervous system, and yet we judge of the direction of
the line of vision as if the will had exercised its normal effects. We
believe it to have moved to the right, and since the retinal image is
unchanged, we attribute to the object the same movement we have
erroneously ascribed to the eye.... These phenomena leave no room for
doubt that we only judge the direction of the line of sight by the effort
of will with which we strive to change the position of our eyes. There
are also certain weak feelings in our eyelids,... and furthermore in
excessive lateral rotations we feel a fatiguing strain in the muscles. But
all these feelings are too faint and vague to be of use in the perception

of direction. We feel then what impulse of the will, and how strong a
one, we apply to turn our eye into a given position."
Partial paralysis of the same muscle, paresis, as it has been called, seems to
point even more conclusively to the same inference, that the will to
innervate is felt independently of all its afferent results. I will quote the
account given by a recent authority,[451] of the effects of this accident:
"When the nerve going to an eye muscle, e.g., the external rectus of
one side, falls into a state of paresis, the first result is that the same
volitional stimulus, which under normal circumstances would have
perhaps rotated the eye to its extreme position outwards, now is
competent to effect only a moderate outward rotation, say of 20º. If
now, shutting the sound eye, the patient looks at an object situated just
so far outwards from the paretic eye that this latter must turn 20º in
order to see it distinctly, the patient will feel as if he had moved it not
only 20º towards the side, but into its extreme lateral position, for the
impulse of innervation requisite for bringing it into view is a perfectly
conscious act, whilst the diminished state of contraction of the paretic
muscle lies for the present out of the ken of consciousness. The test
proposed by von Graefe, of localization by the sense of touch, serves
to render evident the error which the patient now makes. If we direct
him to touch rapidly the object looked at, with the forefinger of the
hand of the same side, the line through which the finger moves will not
be the line of sight directed 20º outward, but will approach more
nearly to the extreme possible outward line of vision."
A stone-cutter with the external rectus of the left eye paralyzed, will strike
his hand instead of his chisel with his hammer, until experience has taught
him wisdom.
It appears as if here the judgment of direction could only arise from the
excessive innervation of the rectus when the object is looked at. All the
afferent feelings must be identical with those experienced when the eye is
sound and the judgment is correct. The eyeball is rotated just 20º in the one
case as in the other, the image falls on the same part of the retina, the
pressures on the eyeball and the tensions of the skin and conjunctiva are
identical. There is only one feeling which can vary, and lead us to our

mistake. That feeling must be the effort which the will makes, moderate in
the one case, excessive in the other, but in both cases an efferent feeling,
pure and simple.
Beautiful and clear as this reasoning seems to be, it is based on an
incomplete inventory of the afferent data. The writers have all omitted to
consider what is going on in the other eye. This is kept covered during the
experiments, to prevent double images, and other complications. But if its
condition under these circumstances be examined, it will be found to
present changes which must result in strong afferent feelings. And the
taking account of these feelings demolishes in an instant all the conclusions
which the authors from whom I have quoted base upon their supposed
absence. This I will now proceed to show.[452]
Take first the case of complete paralysis and assume the right eye affected.
Suppose the patient desires to rotate his gaze to an object situated in the
extreme right of the field of vision. As Hering has so beautifully shown,
both eyes move by a common act of innervation, and in this instance both
move towards the right. But the paralyzed right eye stops short in the
middle of its course, the object still appearing far to the sight of its fixation
point. The left sound eye, meanwhile, although covered, continues its
rotation until the extreme rightward limit thereof has been reached. To an
observer looking at both eyes the left will seem to squint. Of course this
continued and extreme rotation produces afferent feelings of rightward
motion in the eyeball, which momentarily overpower the faint feelings of
central position in the diseased and uncovered eye. The patient feels by his
left eyeball as if he were following an object which by his right retina he
perceives he does not overtake. All the conditions of optical vertigo are here
present: the image stationary on the retina, and the erroneous conviction
that the eyes are moving.
The objection that a feeling in the left eyeball ought not to produce a
conviction that the right eye moves, will be considered in a moment. Let us
meanwhile turn to the case of simple paresis with apparent translocation of
the field.
Here the right eye succeeds in fixating the object, but observation of the left
eye will reveal to an observer the fact that it squints just as violently
inwards as in the former case. The direction which the finger of the patient

takes in pointing to the object, is the direction of this squinting and covered
left eye. As Graefe says (although he fails to seize the true import of his
own observation), "It appears to have been by no means sufficiently noticed
how significantly the direction of the line of sight of the secondarily
deviating eye [i.e., of the left,] and the line of direction of the pointed finger
agree."
The translocation would, in a word, be perfectly explained could we
suppose that the sensation of a certain degree of rotation in the left eyeball
were able to suggest to the patient the position of an object whose image
falls on the right retina alone.[453] Can, then, a feeling in one eye be
confounded with a feeling in the other? It most assuredly can, for not only
Donders and Adamük, by their vivisections, but Hering by his exquisite
optical experiments, have proved that the apparatus of innervation for both
eyes is single, and that they function as one organ—a double eye, according
to Hering, or what Helmholtz calls a Cyclopenauge. The retinal feelings of
this double organ, singly innervated, are naturally undistinguished as
respects our knowing whether they belong to the left retina or to the right.
We use them only to tell us where their objects lie. It takes long practice
directed specially ad hoc to teach us on which retina the sensations
severally fall. Similarly the different sensations which arise from the
positions of the eyeballs are used exclusively as signs of the position of
objects; an object directly fixated being localized habitually at the
intersection of the two optical axes, but without any separate consciousness
on our part that the position of one axis is different from another. All we are
aware of is a consolidated feeling of a certain 'strain' in the eyeballs,
accompanied by the perception that just so far in front and so far to the right
or to the left there is an object which we see. So that a 'muscular' process in
one eye is as likely to combine with a retinal process in the other eye to
effect a perceptive judgment, as two processes in one eye are likely so to
combine.

Another piece of circumstantial evidence for the feelings of innervation is
that adduced by Professor Mach, as follows:

"If we stand on a bridge, and look at the water flowing beneath, we
usually feel ourselves at rest, whilst the water seems in motion.
Prolonged looking at the water, however, commonly has for its result
to make the bridge with the observer and surroundings suddenly seem
to move in the direction opposed to that of the water, whilst the water
itself assumes the appearance of standing still. The relative motion of
the objects is in both cases the same, and there must therefore be some
adequate physiological ground why sometimes one, sometimes the
other part of them is felt to move. In order to investigate the matter
conveniently, I had the simple apparatus constructed which is
represented in Fig. 86. An oil-cloth with a simple pattern is
horizontally stretched over two cylinders (each 2 metres long and 3
feet apart) and kept in uniform motion by the help of a crank. Across
the cloth, and some 30 cm. above it, is stretched a string, with a knot x,
which serves as a fixation-point for the eye of the observer. If the
observer follow with his eyes the pattern of the cloth as it moves, he
sees it in movement, himself and the surroundings at rest. But if he
looks at the knot, he soon feels as if the entire room were moving
contrary to the direction of the cloth, whilst the latter seems to stand
still. This change in the mode of looking comes about in more or less
time according to one's momentary disposition, but usually it takes but
a few seconds. If one once understands the point, one can make the
two appearances alternate at will. Every following of the oil-cloth
makes the observer stationary; every fixation of the knot or inattention
to the oil-cloth, so that its pattern becomes blurred,, sets him in
apparent motion."[454]

Professor Mach proceeds to explain the phenomenon as follows:

FIG. 86.

"Moving objects exert, as is well known, a peculiar motor stimulation
upon the eye, they draw our attention and our look after them. If the
look really follows them ... we assume that they move. But if the eye,
instead of following the moving objects, remains steadfastly at rest, it
must be that the constant stimulus to motion which it receives is
neutralized by an equally constant current of innervation flowing into
its motor apparatus. But this is just what would happen if the
steadfastly fixated point were itself moving uniformly in the other
direction, and we were following it with our eyes. When this comes
about, whatever motionless things are looked at must appear in
motion."[455]
The knot x, the string, we ourselves, and all our stationary surroundings
thus appear in movement, according to Mach, because we are constantly
innervating our eyeballs to resist the drag exerted upon them by the pattern
or the flowing waves. I have myself repeated the observation many times
above flowing streams, but have never succeeded in getting the full illusion
as described by Mach. I gain a sense of the movement of the bridge and of
my own body, but the river never seems absolutely to stop: it still moves in
one direction, whilst I float away in the other. But, be the illusion partial or
complete, a different explanation of it from Professor Mach's seems to me
the more natural one to adopt. The illusion is said to cease when, our
attention being fully fixed on the moving oil-cloth, we perceive the latter
for what it is; and to recommence, on the contrary, when we perceive the
oil-cloth as a vaguely moving background behind an object which we

directly fixate and whose position with regard to our own body is
unchanged. This, however, is the sort of consciousness which we have
whenever we are ourselves borne in a vehicle, on horseback, or in a boat.
As we and our belongings go one way, the whole background goes the
other. I should rather, therefore, explain Professor Mach's illusion as similar
to the illusion at railroad-stations described above on page 90. The other
train moves, but it makes ours seem to move, because, filling the window as
it does, it stands for the time being as the total background. So here, the
water or oil-cloth stands for us as background überhaupt whenever we seem
to ourselves to be moving over it. The relative motion felt by the retina is
assigned to that one of its components which we look at more in itself and
less as a mere repoussoir. This may be the knot above the oil-cloth or the
bridge beneath our feet, or it may be, on the other hand, the oil-cloth's
pattern or the surface of the swirling stream. Similar changes may be
produced in the apparent motion of the moon and the clouds through which
it shines, by similarly altering the attention. Such alterations, however, in
our conception of which part of the visual field is substantive object and
which part background, seem to have no connection with feelings of
innervation. I cannot, therefore, regard the observation of Prof. Mach as any
proof that the latter feelings exist.[456]

The circumstantial evidence for the feeling of innervation thus seems to
break down like the introspective evidence. But not only can we rebut
experiments intended to prove it, we can also adduce experiments which
disprove it. A person who moves a limb voluntarily must innervate it in any
case, and if he feels the innervation he ought to be able to use the feeling to
define what his limb is about, even though the limb itself were anæsthetic.
If, however, the limb be totally anæsthetic, it turns out that he does not
know at all how much work it performs in its contraction—in other words,
he has no perception of the amount of innervation which he exerts. A
patient examined by Messrs. Gley and Marillier beautifully showed this.
His entire arms, and his trunk down to the navel, were insensible both
superficially and deeply, but his arms were not paralyzed:

"We take three stone bottles—two of them are empty and weigh each
350 grams; the third is full of mercury and weighs 1850 grams. We ask
L... to estimate their weight and tell us which is heaviest. He declares
that he finds them all three alike. With many days of interval we made
two series of six experiments each. The result was always the same.
The experiment, it need hardly be said, was arranged in such wise that
he could be informed neither by sight nor by hearing. He even
declared, holding in his hand the bottleful of mercury, that he found it
to have no weight.... We place successively in his hand (his eyes being
still bandaged) a piece of modelling wax, a stick of hard wood, a thick
India-rubber tube, a newspaper folded up lengthwise and rumpled, and
we make him squeeze these several objects. He feels no difference of
resistance and does not even perceive that anything is in his hand."[457]
M. Gley in another place[458] quotes experiments by Dr. Bloch which prove
that the sense which we have of our limbs' position owes absolutely nothing
to the feeling of innervation put forth. Dr. Bloch stood opposite the angle of
a screen whose sides made an angle of about 90º, and tried to place his
hands symmetrically, or so that both should fall on corresponding spots of
the two screen-sides, which were marked with squares for the purpose. The
average error being noted, one hand was then passively carried by an
assistant to a spot on its screen-side, and the other actively sought the
corresponding spot on the opposite side. The accuracy of the
correspondence proved to be as great as when both arms were innervated
voluntarily, showing that the consciousness of innervation in the first of the
two experiments added nothing to the sense of the limbs' position. Dr.
Bloch then tried, pressing a certain number of pages of a book between the
thumb and forefinger of one hand, to press an equal number between the
same fingers of the other hand. He did this just as well when the fingers in
question were drawn apart by India-rubber bands as when they were
uninterfered with, showing that the physiologically much greater
innervation-current required in the former case had no effect upon the
consciousness of the movement made, so far as its spatial character at any
rate was concerned.[459]
On the whole, then, it seems as probable as anything can well be, that these
feelings of innervation do not exist. If the motor cells are distinct structures,

they are as insentient as the motor nerve-trunks are after the posterior roots
are cut. If they are not distinct structures, but are only the last sensory cells,
those at the 'mouth of the funnel,'[460] then their consciousness is that of
kinæsthetic ideas and sensations merely, and this consciousness
accompanies the rise of activity in them rather than its discharge. The entire
content and material of our consciousness—consciousness of movement, as
of all things else—is thus of peripheral origin, and came to us in the first
instance through the peripheral nerves. If it be asked what we gain by this
sensationalistic conclusion, I reply that we gain at any rate simplicity and
uniformity. In the chapters on Space, on Belief, on the Emotions, we found
sensation to be a much richer thing than is commonly supposed; and this
chapter seems at this point to fall into line with those. Then, as for
sensationalism being a degrading belief, which abolishes all inward
originality and spontaneity, there is this to be said, that the advocates of
inward spontaneity may be turning their backs on its real citadel, when they
make a fight, on its behalf, for the consciousness of energy put forth in the
outgoing discharge. Let there be no such consciousness; let all our thoughts
of movements be of sensational constitution; still in the emphasizing,
choosing, and espousing of one of them rather than another, in the saying to
it, 'be thou the reality for me,' there is ample scope for our inward initiative
to be shown. Here, it seems to me, the true line between the passive
materials and the activity of the spirit should be drawn. It is certainly false
strategy to draw it between such ideas as are connected with the outgoing
and such as are connected with the incoming neural wave.[461]

If the ideas by which we discriminate between one movement and another,
at the instant of deciding in our mind which one we shall perform, are
always of sensorial origin, then the question arises, "Of which sensorial
order need they be?" It will be remembered that we distinguished two
orders of kinæsthetic impression, the remote ones, made by the movement
on the eye or ear or distant skin, etc., and the resident ones, made on the
moving parts themselves, muscles, joints, etc. Now do resident images,
exclusively, form what I have called the mental cue, or will remote ones
equally suffice?

There can be no doubt whatever that the mental cue may be either an image
of the resident or of the remote kind. Although, at the outset of our learning
a movement, it would seem that the resident feelings must come strongly
before consciousness (cf. p. 487), later this need not be the case. The rule,
in fact, would seem to be that they tend to lapse more and more from
consciousness, and that the more practised we become in a movement, the
more 'remote' do the ideas become which form its mental cue. What we are
interested in is what sticks in our consciousness; everything else we get rid
of as quickly as we can. Our resident feelings of movement have no
substantive interest for us at all, as a rule. What interest us are the ends
which the movement is to attain. Such an end is generally an outer
impression on the eye or ear, or sometimes on the skin, nose, or palate. Now
let the idea of the end associate itself definitely with the right motor
innervation, and the thought of the innervation's resident effects will
become as great an encumbrance as we formerly concluded that the feeling
of the innervation itself would be. The mind does not need it; the end alone
is enough.
The idea of the end, then, tends more and more to make itself all-sufficient.
Or, at any rate, if the kinæsthetic ideas are called up at all, they are so
swamped in the vivid kinæsthetic feelings by which they are immediately
overtaken that we have no time to be aware of their separate existence. As I
write, I have no anticipation, as a thing distinct from my sensation, of either
the look or the digital feel of the letters which flow from my pen. The
words chime on my mental ear, as it were, before I write them, but not on
my mental eye or hand. This comes from the rapidity with which oftenrepeated movements follow on their mental cue. An end consented to as
soon as conceived innervates directly the centre of the first movement of
the chain which leads to its accomplishment, and then the whole chain
rattles off quasi-reflexly, as was described on pp. 115-6 of Vol. I.
The reader will certainly recognize this to be true in all fluent and
unhesitating voluntary acts. The only special fiat there is at the outset of the
performance. A man says to himself, "I must change my shirt," and
involuntarily he has taken off his coat, and his fingers are at work in their
accustomed manner on his waistcoat-buttons, etc.; or we say, "I must go
downstairs," and ere we know it we have risen, walked, and turned the
handle of the door;—all through the idea of an end coupled with a series of

guiding sensations which successively arise. It would seem indeed that we
fail of accuracy and certainty in our attainment of the end whenever we are
preoccupied with much ideal consciousness of the means. We walk a beam
the better the less we think of the position of our feet upon it. We pitch or
catch, we shoot or chop the better the less tactile and muscular (the less
resident), and the more exclusively optical, (the more remote) our
consciousness is. Keep your eye on the place aimed at, and your hand will
fetch it; think of your hand, and you will very likely miss your aim. Dr.
Southard found that he could touch a spot with a pencil-point more
accurately with a visual than with a tactile mental cue. In the former case he
looked at a small object and closed his eyes before trying to touch it. In the
latter case he placed it with closed eyes, and then after removing his hand
tried to touch it again. The average error with touch (when the results were
most favorable) was 17.13 mm. With sight it was only 12.37 mm.[462]—All
these are plain results of introspection and observation. By what neural
machinery they are made possible we need not, at this present stage,
inquire.
In Chapter XVIII we saw how enormously individuals differ in respect to
their mental imagery. In the type of imagination called tactile by the French
authors, it is probable that the kinæsthetic ideas are more prominent than in
my account. We must not expect too great a uniformity in individual
accounts, nor wrangle overmuch as to which one 'truly' represents the
process.[463]
I trust that I have now made clear what that 'idea of a movement' is which
must precede it in order that it be voluntary. It is not the thought of the
innervation which the movement requires. It is the anticipation of the
movement's sensible effects, resident or remote, and sometimes very remote
indeed. Such anticipations, to say the least, determine what our movements
shall be. I have spoken all along as if they also might determine that they
shall be. This, no doubt, has disconcerted many readers, for it certainly
seems as if a special fiat, or consent to the movement were required in
addition to the mere conception of it, in many cases of volition; and this fiat
I have altogether left out of my account. This leads us to the next point in
the psychology of the Will. It can be the more easily treated now that we
have got rid of so much tedious preliminary matter.

IDEO-MOTOR ACTION.
The question is this: Is the bare idea of a movement's sensible effects its
sufficient mental cue (p. 497), or must there be an additional mental
antecedent, in the shape of a fiat, decision, consent, volitional mandate, or
other synonymous phenomenon of consciousness, before the movement can
follow?
I answer: Sometimes the bare idea is sufficient, but sometimes an additional
conscious element, in the shape of a fiat, mandate, or express consent, has
to intervene and precede the movement. The cases without a fiat constitute
the more fundamental, because the more simple, variety. The others involve
a special complication, which must be fully discussed at the proper time.
For the present let us turn to ideo-motor action, as it has been termed, or the
sequence of movement upon the mere thought of it, as the type of the
process of volition.
Wherever movement follows unhesitatingly and immediately the notion of
it in the mind, we have ideo-motor action. We are then aware of nothing
between the conception and the execution. All sorts of neuro-muscular
processes come between, of course, but we know absolutely nothing of
them. We think the act, and it is done; and that is all that introspection tells
us of the matter. Dr. Carpenter, who first used, I believe, the name of ideomotor action, placed it, if I mistake not, among the curiosities of our mental
life. The truth is that it is no curiosity, but simply the normal process
stripped of disguise. Whilst talking I become conscious of a pin on the
floor, or of some dust on my sleeve. Without interrupting the conversation I
brush away the dust or pick up the pin. I make no express resolve, but the
mere perception of the object and the fleeting notion of the act seem of
themselves to bring the latter about. Similarly, I sit at table after dinner and
find myself from time to time taking nuts or raisins out of the dish and
eating them. My dinner properly is over, and in the heat of the conversation
I am hardly aware of what I do, but the perception of the fruit and the
fleeting notion that I may eat it seem fatally to bring the act about. There is
certainly no express fiat here; any more than there is in all those habitual
goings and comings and rearrangements of ourselves which fill every hour
of the day, and which incoming sensations instigate so immediately that it is
often difficult to decide whether not to call them reflex rather than

voluntary acts. We have seen in Chapter IV that the intermediary terms of
an habitual series of acts leading to an end are apt to be of this quasiautomatic sort. As Lotze says:
"We see in writing or piano-playing a great number of very
complicated movements following quickly one upon the other, the
instigative representations of which remained scarcely a second in
consciousness, certainly not long enough to awaken any other volition
than the general one of resigning one's self without reserve to the
passing over of representation into action. All the acts of our daily life
happen in this wise: Our standing up, walking, talking, all this never
demands a distinct impulse of the will, but is adequately brought about
by the pure flux of thought."[464]
In all this the determining condition of the unhesitating and resistless
sequence of the act seems to be the absence of my conflicting notion in the
mind. Either there is nothing else at all in the mind, or what is there does
not conflict. The hypnotic subject realizes the former condition. Ask him
what he is thinking about, and ten to one he will reply 'nothing.' The
consequence is that he both believes everything he is told, and performs
every act that is suggested. The suggestion may be a vocal command, or it
may be the performance before him of the movement required. Hypnotic
subjects in certain conditions repeat whatever they hear you say, and imitate
whatever they see you do. Dr. Féré says that certain waking persons of
neurotic type, if one repeatedly close and open one's hand before their eyes,
soon begin to have corresponding feelings in their own fingers, and
presently begin irresistibly to execute the movements which they see. Under
these conditions of 'preparation' Dr. Féré found that his subjects could
squeeze the hand-dynamometer much more strongly than when abruptly
invited to do so. A few passive repetitions of a movement will enable many
enfeebled patients to execute it actively with greater strength. These
observations beautifully show how the mere quickening of kinæsthetic
ideas is equivalent to a certain amount of tension towards discharge in the
centres.[465]

We know what it is to get out of bed on a freezing morning in a room
without a fire, and how the very vital principle within us protests against the
ordeal. Probably most persons have lain on certain mornings for an hour at
a time unable to brace themselves to the resolve. We think how late we shall
be, how the duties of the day will suffer; we say, "I must get up, this is
ignominious," etc.; but still the warm couch feels too delicious, the cold
outside too cruel, and resolution faints away and postpones itself again and
again just as it seemed on the verge of bursting the resistance and passing
over into the decisive act. Now how do we ever get up under such
circumstances? If I may generalize from my own experience, we more often
than not get up without any struggle or decision at all. We suddenly find
that we have got up. A fortunate lapse of consciousness occurs; we forget
both the warmth and the cold; we fall into some revery connected with the
day's life, in the course of which the idea flashes across us, "Hollo! I must
lie here no longer"—an idea which at that lucky instant awakens no
contradictory or paralyzing suggestions, and consequently produces
immediately its appropriate motor effects. It was our acute consciousness of
both the warmth and the cold during the period of struggle, which paralyzed
our activity then and kept our idea of rising in the condition of wish and not
of will. The moment these inhibitory ideas ceased, the original idea exerted
its effects.
This case seems to me to contain in miniature form the data for an entire
psychology of volition. It was in fact through meditating on the
phenomenon in my own person that I first became convinced of the truth of
the doctrine which these pages present, and which I need here illustrate by
no farther examples.[466] The reason why that doctrine is not a self-evident
truth is that we have so many ideas which do not result in action. But it will
be seen that in every such case, without exception, that is because other
ideas simultaneously present rob them of their impulsive power. But even
here, and when a movement is inhibited from completely taking place by
contrary ideas, it will incipiently take place. To quote Lotze once more:
"The spectator accompanies the throwing of a billiard-ball, or the
thrust of the swordsman, with slight movements of his arm; the
untaught narrator tells his story with many gesticulations; the reader
while absorbed in the perusal of a battle-scene feels a slight tension
run through his muscular system, keeping time as it were with the

actions he is reading of. These results become the more marked the
more we are absorbed in thinking of the movements which suggest
them; they grow fainter exactly in proportion as a complex
consciousness, under the dominion of a crowd of other representations,
withstands the passing over of mental contemplation into outward
action."
The 'willing-game,' the exhibitions of so-called 'mind-reading,' or more
properly muscle-reading, which have lately grown so fashionable, are based
on this incipient obedience of muscular contraction to idea, even when the
deliberate intention is that no contraction shall occur.[467]
We may then lay it down for certain that every representation of a
movement awakens in some degree the actual movement which is its object;
and awakens it in a maximum degree whenever it is not kept from so doing
by an antagonistic representation present simultaneously to the mind.

The express fiat, or act of mental consent to the movement, comes in when
the neutralization of the antagonistic and inhibitory idea is required. But
that there is no express fiat needed when the conditions are simple, the
reader ought now to be convinced. Lest, however, he should still share the
common prejudice that voluntary action without 'exertion of will-power' is
Hamlet with the prince's part left out, I will make a few farther remarks.
The first point to start from in understanding voluntary action, and the
possible occurrence of it with no fiat or express resolve, is the fact that
consciousness is in its very nature impulsive.[468] We do not have a
sensation or a thought and then have to add something dynamic to it to get a
movement. Every pulse of feeling which we have is the correlate of some
neural activity that is already on its way to instigate a movement. Our
sensations and thoughts are but cross-sections, as it were, of currents whose
essential consequence is motion, and which no sooner run in at one nerve
than they run out again at another. The popular notion that mere
consciousness as such is not essentially a forerunner of activity, that the
latter must result from some superadded 'will-force,' is a very natural
inference from those special cases in which we think of an act for an

indefinite length of time without the action taking place. These cases,
however, are not the norm; they are cases of inhibition by antagonistic
thoughts. When the blocking is released we feel as if an inward spring were
let loose, and this is the additional impulse or fiat upon which the act
effectively succeeds. We shall study anon the blocking and its release. Our
higher thought is full of it. But where there is no blocking, there is naturally
no hiatus between the thought-process and the motor discharge. Movement
is the natural immediate effect of feeling, irrespective of what the quality of
the feeling may be. It is so in reflex action, it is so in emotional expression,
it is so in the voluntary life. Ideo-motor action is thus no paradox, to be
softened or explained away. It obeys the type of all conscious action, and
from it one must start to explain action in which a special fiat is involved.
It may be remarked in passing, that the inhibition of a movement no more
involves an express effort or command than its execution does. Either of
them may require it. But in all simple and ordinary cases, just as the bare
presence of one idea prompts a movement, so the bare presence of another
idea will prevent its taking place. Try to feel as if you were crooking your
finger, whilst keeping it straight. In a minute it will fairly tingle with the
imaginary change of position; yet it will not sensibly move, because its not
really moving is also a part of what you have in mind. Drop this idea, think
of the movement purely and simply, with all breaks off; and, presto! it takes
place with no effort at all.
A waking man's behavior is thus at all times the resultant of two opposing
neural forces. With unimaginable fineness some currents among the cells
and fibres of his brain are playing on his motor nerves, whilst other
currents, as unimaginably fine, are playing on the first currents, damming or
helping them, altering their direction or their speed. The upshot of it all is,
that whilst the currents must always end by being drained off through some
motor nerves, they are drained off sometimes through one set and
sometimes through another; and sometimes they keep each other in
equilibrium so long that a superficial observer may think they are not
drained off at all. Such an observer must remember, however, that from the
physiological point of view a gesture, an expression of the brow, or an
expulsion of the breath are movements as much as an act of locomotion is.
A king's breath slays as well as an assassin's blow; and the outpouring of
those currents which the magic imponderable streaming of our ideas

accompanies need not always be of an explosive or otherwise physically
conspicuous kind.
ACTION AFTER DELIBERATION.
We are now in a position to describe what happens in deliberate action, or
when the mind is the seat of many ideas related to each other in antagonistic
or in favorable ways.[469] One of the ideas is that of an act. By itself this
idea would prompt a movement; some of the additional considerations,
however, which are present to consciousness block the motor discharge,
whilst others, on the contrary, solicit it to take place. The result is that
peculiar feeling of inward unrest known as indecision. Fortunately it is too
familiar to need description, for to describe it would be impossible. As long
as it lasts, with the various objects before the attention, we are said to
deliberate; and when finally the original suggestion either prevails and
makes the movement take place, or gets definitively quenched by its
antagonists, we are said to decide, or to utter our voluntary fiat in favor of
one or the other course. The reinforcing and inhibiting ideas meanwhile are
termed the reasons or motives by which the decision is brought about.
The process of deliberation contains endless degrees of complication. At
every moment of it our consciousness is of an extremely complex object,
namely the existence of the whole set of motives and their conflict, as
explained on p. 275 of Vol. I. Of this object, the totality of which is realized
more or less dimly all the while, certain parts stand out more or less sharply
at one moment in the foreground, and at another moment other parts, in
consequence of the oscillations of our attention, and of the 'associative' flow
of our ideas. But no matter how sharp the foreground-reasons may be, or
how imminently close to bursting through the dam and carrying the motor
consequences their own way, the background, however dimly felt, is always
there; and its presence (so long as the indecision actually lasts) serves as an
effective check upon the irrevocable discharge. The deliberation may last
for weeks or months, occupying at intervals the mind. The motives which
yesterday seemed full of urgency and blood and life to-day feel strangely
weak and pale and dead. But as little to-day as to-morrow is the question
finally resolved. Something tells us that all this is provisional; that the
weakened reasons will wax strong again, and the stronger weaken; that

equilibrium is unreached; that testing our reasons, not obeying them, is still
the order of the day, and that we must wait awhile, patient or impatiently,
until our mind is made up 'for good and all.' This inclining, first to one then
to another future, both of which we represent as possible, resembles the
oscillations to and fro of a material body within the limits of its elasticity.
There is inward strain, but no outward rupture. And this condition, plainly
enough, is susceptible of indefinite continuance, as well in the physical
mass as in the mind. If the elasticity give way, however, if the dam ever do
break, and the currents burst the crust, vacillation is over and decision is
irrevocably there.
The decision may come in any one of many modes. I will try briefly to
sketch the most characteristic types of it, merely warning the reader that this
is only an introspective account of symptoms and phenomena, and that all
questions of causal agency, whether neural or spiritual, are relegated to a
later page.

The particular reasons for or against action are of course infinitely various
in concrete cases. But certain motives are more or less constantly in play.
One of these is impatience of the deliberative state; or to express it
otherwise, proneness to act or to decide merely because action and decision
are, as such, agreeable, and relieve the tension of doubt and hesitancy. Thus
it comes that we will often take any course whatever which happens to be
most vividly before our minds, at the moment when this impulse to decisive
action becomes extreme.
Against this impulse we have the dread of the irrevocable, which often
engenders a type of character incapable of prompt and vigorous resolve,
except perhaps when surprised into sudden activity. These two opposing
motives twine round whatever other motives may be present at the moment
when decision is imminent, and tend to precipitate or retard it. The conflict
of these motives so far as they alone affect the matter of decision is a
conflict as to when it shall occur. One says 'now,' the other says 'not yet.'
Another constant component of the web of motivation is the impulse to
persist in a decision once made. There is no more remarkable difference in

human character than that between resolute and irresolute natures. Neither
the physiological nor the psychical grounds of this difference have yet been
analyzed. Its symptom is that whereas in the irresolute all decisions are
provisional and liable to be reversed, in the resolute they are settled once
for all and not disturbed again. Now into every one's deliberations the
representation of one alternative will often enter with such sudden force as
to carry the imagination with itself exclusively, and to produce an
apparently settled decision in its own favor. These premature and spurious
decisions are of course known to everyone. They often seem ridiculous in
the light of the considerations that succeed them. But it cannot be denied
that in the resolute type of character the accident that one of them has once
been made does afterwards enter as a motive additional to the more genuine
reasons why it should not be revoked, or if provisionally revoked, why it
should be made again. How many of us persist in a precipitate course
which, but for a moment of heedlessness, we might never have entered
upon, simply because we hate to 'change our mind.'
FIVE TYPES OF DECISION.
Turning now to the form of the decision itself, we may distinguish four
chief types. The first may be called the reasonable type. It is that of those
cases in which the arguments for and against a given course seem gradually
and almost insensibly to settle themselves in the mind and to end by leaving
a clear balance in favor of one alternative, which alternative we then adopt
without effort or constraint. Until this rational balancing of the books is
consummated we have a calm feeling that the evidence is not yet all in, and
this keeps action in suspense. But some day we wake with the sense that we
see the thing rightly, that no new light will be thrown on the subject by
farther delay, and that the matter had better be settled now. In this easy
transition from doubt to assurance we seem to ourselves almost passive; the
'reasons' which decide us appearing to flow in from the nature of things, and
to owe nothing to our will. We have, however, a perfect sense of being free,
in that we are devoid of any feeling of coercion. The conclusive reason for
the decision in these cases usually is the discovery that we can refer the
case to a class upon which we are accustomed to act unhesitatingly in a
certain stereotyped way. It may be said in general that a great part of every
deliberation consists in the turning over of all the possible modes of

conceiving the doing or not doing of the act in point. The moment we hit
upon a conception which lets us apply some principle of action which is a
fixed and stable part of our Ego, our state of doubt is at an end. Persons of
authority, who have to make many decisions in the day, carry with them a
set of heads of classification, each bearing its motor consequence, and
under these they seek as far as possible to range each new emergency as it
occurs. It is where the emergency belongs to a species without precedent, to
which consequently no cut-and-dried maxim will apply, that we feel most at
a loss, and are distressed at the indeterminateness of our task. As soon,
however, as we see our way to a familiar classification, we are at ease
again. In action as in reasoning, then, the great thing is the quest of the
right conception. The concrete dilemmas do not come to us with labels
gummed upon their backs. We may name them by many names. The wise
man is he who succeeds in finding the name which suits the needs of the
particular occasion best. A 'reasonable' character is one who has a store of
stable and worthy ends, and who does not decide about an action till he has
calmly ascertained whether it be ministerial or detrimental to any one of
these.

In the next two types of decision, the final fiat occurs before the evidence is
all 'in.' It often happens that no paramount and authoritative reason for
either course will come. Either seems a case of a Good, and there is no
umpire as to which good should yield its place to the other. We grow tired
of long hesitation and inconclusiveness, and the hour may come when we
feel that even a bad decision is better than no decision at all. Under these
conditions it will often happen that some accidental circumstance,
supervening at a particular movement upon our mental weariness, will upset
the balance in the direction of one of the alternatives, to which then we feel
ourselves committed, although an opposite accident at the same time might
have produced the opposite result.
In the second type of case our feeling is to a certain extent that of letting
ourselves drift with a certain indifferent acquiescence in a direction
accidentally determined from without, with the conviction that, after all, we

might as well stand by this course as by the other, and that things are in any
event sure to turn out sufficiently right.
In the third type the determination seems equally accidental, but it comes
from within, and not from without. It often happens, when the absence of
imperative principle is perplexing and suspense distracting, that we find
ourselves acting, as it were, automatically, and as if by a spontaneous
discharge of our nerves, in the direction of one of the horns of the dilemma.
But so exciting is this sense of motion after our intolerable pent-up state,
that we eagerly throw ourselves into it. 'Forward now!' we inwardly cry,
'though the heavens fall.' This reckless and exultant espousal of an energy
so little premeditated by us that we feel rather like passive spectators
cheering on the display of some extraneous force than like voluntary agents,
is a type of decision too abrupt and tumultuous to occur often in humdrum
and cool-blooded natures. But it is probably frequent in persons of strong
emotional endowment and unstable or vacillating character. And in men of
the world-shaking type, the Napoleons, Luthers, etc., in whom tenacious
passion combines with ebullient activity, when by any chance the passion's
outlet has been dammed by scruples or apprehensions, the resolution is
probably often of this catastrophic kind. The flood breaks quite
unexpectedly through the dam. That it should so often do so is quite
sufficient to account for the tendency of these characters to a fatalistic mood
of mind. And the fatalistic mood itself is sure to reinforce the strength of the
energy just started on its exciting path of discharge.
There is a fourth form of decision, which often ends deliberation as
suddenly as the third form does. It comes when, in consequence of some
outer experience or some inexplicable inward charge, we suddenly pass
from the easy and careless to the sober and strenuous mood, or possibly the
other way. The whole scale of values of our motives and impulses then
undergoes a change like that which a change of the observer's level
produces on a view. The most sobering possible agents are objects of grief
and fear. When one of these affects us, all 'light fantastic' notions lose their
motive power, all solemn ones find theirs multiplied many-fold. The
consequence is an instant abandonment of the more trivial projects with
which we had been dallying, and an instant practical acceptance of the more
grim and earnest alternative which till then could not extort our mind's
consent. All those 'changes of heart,' 'awakenings of conscience,' etc., which

make new men of so many of us, may be classed under this head. The
character abruptly rises to another 'level,' and deliberation comes to an
immediate end.[470]
In the fifth and final type of decision, the feeling that the evidence is all in,
and that reason has balanced the books, may be either present or absent. But
in either case we feel, in deciding, as if we ourselves by our own wilful act
inclined the beam; in the former case by adding our living effort to the
weight of the logical reason which, taken alone, seems powerless to make
the act discharge; in the latter by a kind of creative contribution of
something instead of a reason which does a reason's work. The slow dead
heave of the will that is felt in these instances makes of them a class
altogether different subjectively from all the three preceding classes. What
the heave of the will betokens metaphysically, what the effort might lead us
to infer about a will-power distinct from motives, are not matters that
concern us yet. Subjectively and phenomenally, the feeling of effort, absent
from the former decisions, accompanies these. Whether it be the dreary
resignation for the sake of austere and naked duty of all sorts of rich
mundane delights, or whether it be the heavy resolve that of two mutually
exclusive trains of future fact, both sweet and good, and with no strictly
objective or imperative principle of choice between them, one shall
forevermore become impossible, while the other shall become reality, it is a
desolate and acrid sort of act, an excursion into a lonesome moral
wilderness. If examined closely, its chief difference from the three former
cases appears to be that in those cases the mind at the moment of deciding
on the triumphant alternative dropped the other one wholly or nearly out of
sight, whereas here both alternatives are steadily held in view, and in the
very act of murdering the vanquished possibility the chooser realizes how
much in that instant he is making himself lose. It is deliberately driving a
thorn into one's flesh; and the sense of inward effort with which the act is
accompanied is an element which sets the fourth type of decision in strong
contrast with the previous three varieties, and makes of it an altogether
peculiar sort of mental phenomenon. The immense majority of human
decisions are decisions without effort. In comparatively few of them, in
most people, does effort accompany the final act. We are, I think, misled
into supposing that effort is more frequent than it is, by the fact that during
deliberation we so often have a feeling of how great an effort it would take
to make a decision now. Later, after the decision has made itself with ease,

we recollect this and erroneously suppose the effort also to have been made
then.
The existence of the effort as a phenomenal fact in our consciousness
cannot of course be doubted or denied. Its significance, on the other hand, is
a matter about which the gravest difference of opinion prevails. Questions
as momentous as that of the very existence of spiritual causality, as vast as
that of universal predestination or free-will, depend on its interpretation. It
therefore becomes essential that we study with some care the conditions
under which the feeling of volitional effort is found.
THE FEELING OF EFFORT.
When, awhile back (p. 526), I said that consciousness (or the neural process
which goes with it) is in its very nature impulsive, I added in a note the
proviso that it must be sufficiently intense. Now there are remarkable
differences in the power of different sorts of consciousness to excite
movement. The intensity of some feelings is practically apt to be below the
discharging point, whilst that of others is apt to be above it. By practically
apt, I mean apt under ordinary circumstances. These circumstances may be
habitual inhibitions, like that comfortable feeling of the dolce far niente
which gives to each and all of us a certain dose of laziness only to be
overcome by the acuteness of the impulsive spur; or they may consist in the
native inertia, or internal resistance, of the motor centres themselves
making explosion impossible until a certain inward tension has been
reached and overpast. These conditions may vary from one person to
another and in the same person from time to time. The neural inertia may
wax or wane, and the habitual inhibitions dwindle or augment. The intensity
of particular thought-processes and stimulations may also change
independently, and particular paths of association grow more pervious or
less so. There thus result great possibilities of alteration in the actual
impulsive efficacy of particular motives compared with others. It is where
the normally less efficacious motive becomes more efficacious and the
normally more efficacious one less so that actions ordinarily effortless, or
abstinences ordinarily easy, either become impossible or are effected, if at
all, by the expenditure of effort. A little more description will make it
plainer what these cases are.

There is a certain normal ratio in the impulsive power of different sorts of
motive, which characterizes what may be called ordinary healthiness of
will, and which is departed from only at exceptional times or by exceptional
individuals. The states of mind which normally possess the most impulsive
quality are either those which represent objects of passion, appetite, or
emotion—objects of instinctive reaction, in short; or they are feelings or
ideas of pleasure or of pain; or ideas which for any reason we have grown
accustomed to obey so that the habit of reacting on them is ingrained; or
finally, in comparison with ideas of remoter objects, they are ideas of
objects present or near in space and time. Compared with these various
objects, all far-off considerations, all highly abstract conceptions,
unaccustomed reasons, and motives foreign to the instinctive history of the
race, have little or no impulsive power. They prevail, when they ever do
prevail, with effort; and the normal, as distinguished from the pathological,
sphere of effort is thus found wherever non-instinctive motives to behavior
are to rule the day.
Healthiness of will moreover requires a certain amount of complication in
the process which precedes the fiat or the act. Each stimulus or idea, at the
same time that it wakens its own impulse, must arouse other ideas
(associated and consequential) with their impulses, and action must follow,
neither too slowly nor too rapidly, as the resultant of all the forces thus
engaged. Even when the decision is very prompt, there is thus a sort of
preliminary survey of the field and a vision of which course is best before
the fiat comes. And where the will is healthy, the vision must be right (i.e.,
the motives must be on the whole in a normal or not too unusual ratio to
each other), and the action must obey the vision's lead.

Unhealthiness of will may thus come about in many ways. The action may
follow the stimulus or idea too rapidly, leaving no time for the arousal of
restraining associates—we then have a precipitate will. Or, although the
associates may come, the ratio which the impulsive and inhibitive forces
normally bear to each other may be distorted, and we then have a will which

is perverse. The perversity, in turn, may be due to either of many causes—
too much intensity, or too little, here; too much or too little inertia there; or
elsewhere too much or too little inhibitory power. If we compare the
outward symptoms of perversity together, they fall into two groups, in one of
which normal actions are impossible, and in the other abnormal ones are
irrepressible. Briefly, we may call them respectively the obstructed and the
explosive will.
It must be kept in mind, however, that since the resultant action is always
due to the ratio between the obstructive and the explosive forces which are
present, we never can tell by the mere outward symptoms to what
elementary cause the perversion of a man's will may be due, whether to an
increase of one component or a diminution of the other. One may grow
explosive as readily by losing the usual brakes as by getting up more of the
impulsive steam; and one may find things impossible as well through the
enfeeblement of the original desire as through the advent of new lions in the
path. As Dr. Clouston says, "the driver may be so weak that he cannot
control well-broken horses, or the horses may be so hard-mouthed that no
driver can pull them up." In some concrete cases (whether of explosive or
of obstructed will) it is difficult to tell whether the trouble is due to
inhibitory or to impulsive change. Generally, however, we can make a
plausible guess at the truth.
THE EXPLOSIVE WILL.
There is a normal type of character, for example, in which impulses seem to
discharge so promptly into movements that inhibitions get no time to arise.
These are the 'dare-devil' and 'mercurial' temperaments, overflowing with
animation, and fizzling with talk, which are so common in the Latin and
Celtic races, and with which the cold-blooded and long-headed English
character forms so marked a contrast. Monkeys these people seem to us,
whilst we seem to them reptilian. It is quite impossible to judge, as between
an obstructed and an explosive individual, which has the greatest sum of
vital energy. An explosive Italian with good perception and intellect will cut
a figure as a perfectly tremendous fellow, on an inward capital that could be
tucked away inside of an obstructed Yankee and hardly let you know that it
was there. He will be the king of his company, sing all the songs and make

all the speeches, lead the parties, carry out the practical jokes, kiss all the
girls, fight the men, and, if need be, lead the forlorn hopes and enterprises,
so that an onlooker would think he has more life in his little finger than can
exist in the whole body of a correct judicious fellow. But the judicious
fellow all the while may have all these possibilities and more besides, ready
to break out in the same or even a more violent way, if only the brakes were
taken off. It is the absence of scruples, of consequences, of considerations,
the extraordinary simplification of each moment's mental outlook, that
gives to the explosive individual such motor energy and ease; it need not be
the greater intensity of any of his passions, motives, or thoughts. As mental
evolution goes on, the complexity of human consciousness grows ever
greater, and with it the multiplication of the inhibitions to which every
impulse is exposed. But this predominance of inhibition has a bad as well as
a good side; and if a man's impulses are in the main orderly as well as
prompt, if he has courage to accept their consequences, and intellect to lead
them to a successful end, he is all the better for his hair-trigger organization,
and for not being 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.' Many of the
most successful military and revolutionary characters in history have
belonged to this simple but quick-witted impulsive type. Problems come
much harder to reflective and inhibitive minds. They can, it is true, solve
much vaster problems; and they can avoid many a mistake to which the
men of impulse are exposed. But when the latter do not make mistakes, or
when they are always able to retrieve them, theirs is one of the most
engaging and indispensable of human types.[471]
In infancy, and in certain conditions of exhaustion as well as in peculiar
pathological states, the inhibitory power may fail to arrest the explosions of
the impulsive discharge. We have then an explosive temperament
temporarily realized in an individual who at other times may be of a
relatively obstructed type. I cannot do better here than copy a few pages
from Dr. Clouston's excellent work:[472]
"Take a child of six months, and there is absolutely no such brainpower existent as mental inhibition; no desire or tendency is stopped
by a mental act.... At a year old the rudiments of the great faculty of
self-control are clearly apparent in most children. They will resist the
desire to seize the gas-flame, they will not upset the milk-jug, they will
obey orders to sit still when they want to run about, all through a

higher mental inhibition. But the power of control is just as gradual a
development as the motions of the hands.... Look at a more
complicated act, that will be recognized by any competent physiologist
to be automatic and beyond the control of any ordinary inhibitory
power, e.g., irritate and tease a child of one or two years sufficiently,
and it will suddenly strike out at you; suddenly strike at a man, and he
will either perform an act of defence or offence, or both, quite
automatically, and without power of controlling himself. Place a bright
tempting toy before a child of a year, and it will be instantly
appropriated. Place cold water before a man dying of thirst, and he will
take and drink it without power of doing otherwise. Exhaustion of
nervous energy always lessens the inhibitory power. Who is not
conscious of this? 'Irritability' is one manifestation of this. Many
persons have so small a stock of reserve brain-power—that most
valuable of all brain-qualities—that it is soon used up, and you see at
once that they lose their power of self-control very soon. They are
angels or demons just as they are fresh or tired. That surplus store of
energy or resistive force which provides, in persons normally
constituted, that moderate excesses in all directions shall do no great
harm so long as they are not too often repeated, not being present in
these people, overwork, over-drinking, or small debauches leave them
at the mercy of their morbid impulses without power of resistance....
Woe to the man who uses up his surplus stock of brain-inhibition too
near the bitter end, or too often!... The physiological word inhibition
can be used synonymously with the psychological and ethical
expression self-control, or with the will when exercised in certain
directions. It is the characteristic of most forms of mental disease for
self-control to be lost, but this loss is usually part of a general mental
affection with melancholic, maniacal, demented, or delusional
symptoms as the chief manifestation of the disease. There are other
cases, not so numerous, where the loss of the power of inhibition is the
chief and by far the most marked symptom.... I shall call this form
'Inhibitory Insanity.' Some of these cases have uncontrollable impulses
to violence and destruction, others to homicide, others to suicide
prompted by no depressed feelings, others to acts of animal
gratification (satyriasis, nymphomania, erotomania, bestiality), others
to drinking too much alcohol (dipsomania), others towards setting

things on fire (pyromania), others to stealing (kleptomania), and others
towards immoralities of all sorts. The impulsive tendencies and morbid
desires are innumerable in kind. Many of these varieties of Insanity
have been distinguished by distinct names. To dig up and eat dead
bodies (necrophilism), to wander from home and throw off the
restraints of society (planomania), to act like a wild beast
(lycanthropia), etc. Action from impulse in all these directions may
take place from a loss of controlling power in the higher regions of the
brain, or from an over-development of energy in certain portions of the
brain, which the normal power of inhibition cannot control. The driver
may be so weak that he cannot control well-broken horses, or the
horses may be so hard-mouthed that no driver can pull them up. Both
conditions may arise from purely cerebral disorder ... or may be
reflex.... The ego, the man, the will, may be non-existent for the time.
The most perfect examples of this are murders done during
somnambulism or epileptic unconsciousness, or acts done in the
hypnotic state. There is no conscious desire to attain the object at all in
such cases. In other cases there is consciousness and memory present,
but no power of restraining action. The simplest example of this is
where an imbecile or dement, seeing something glittering, appropriates
it to himself, or when he commits indecent sexual acts. Through
disease a previously sane and vigorous-minded person may get into the
same state. The motives that would lead other persons not to do such
acts do not operate in such persons. I have known a man steal who said
he had no intense longing for the article he appropriated at all, at least
consciously, but his will was in abeyance, and he could not resist the
ordinary desire of possession common to all human nature."
It is not only those technically classed imbeciles and dements who exhibit
this promptitude of impulse and tardiness of inhibition. Ask half the
common drunkards you know why it is that they fall so often a prey to
temptation, and they will say that most of the time they cannot tell. It is a
sort of vertigo with them. Their nervous centres have become a sluice-way
pathologically unlocked by every passing conception of a bottle and a glass.
They do not thirst for the beverage; the taste of it may even appear
repugnant; and they perfectly foresee the morrow's remorse. But when they
think of the liquor or see it, they find themselves preparing to drink, and do

not stop themselves: and more than this they cannot say. Similarly a man
may lead a life of incessant love-making or sexual indulgence, though what
spurs him thereto seems rather to be suggestions and notions of possibility
than any overweening strength in his affections or lusts. He may even be
physically impotent all the while. The paths of natural (or it may be
unnatural) impulse are so pervious in these characters that the slightest rise
in the level of innervation produces an overflow. It is the condition
recognized in pathology as 'irritable weakness.' The phase known as
nascency or latency is so short in the excitement of the neural tissues that
there is no opportunity for strain or tension to accumulate within them; and
the consequence is that with all the agitation and activity, the amount of real
feeling engaged may be very small. The hysterical temperament is the
playground par excellence of this unstable equilibrium. One of these
subjects will be filled with what seems the most genuine and settled
aversion to a certain line of conduct, and the very next instant follow the
stirring of temptation and plunge in it up to the neck. Professor Ribot well
gives the name of 'Le Règne des Caprices' to the chapter in which he
describes the hysterical temperament in his interesting little monograph
'The Diseases of the Will.'
Disorderly and impulsive conduct may, on the other hand, come about
where the neural tissues preserve their proper inward tone, and where the
inhibitory power is normal or even unusually great. In such cases the
strength of the impulsive idea is preternaturally exalted, and what would be
for most people the passing suggestion of a possibility becomes a gnawing,
craving urgency to act. Works on insanity are full of examples of these
morbid insistent ideas, in obstinately struggling against which the
unfortunate victim's soul often sweats with agony, ere at last it gets swept
away. One instance will stand for many; M. Ribot quotes it from Calmeil:
[473]

"Glénadal, having lost his father in infancy, was brought up by his
mother, whom he adored. At sixteen, his character, till then good and
docile, changed. He became gloomy and taciturn. Pressed with
questions by his mother, he decided at last to make a confession. 'To
you,' said he, 'I owe everything; I love you with all my soul; yet for
some time past an incessant idea drives me to kill you. Prevent so
terrible a misfortune from happening, in case some day the temptation

should overpower me: allow me to enlist.' Notwithstanding pressing
solicitations, he was firm in his resolve, went off, and was a good
soldier. Still a secret impulse stimulated him without cessation to
desert in order to come home and kill his mother. At the end of his
term of service the idea was as strong as on the first day. He enlisted
for another term. The murderous instinct persisted, but substituted
another victim. He no longer thought of killing his mother—the
horrible impulse pointed day and night towards his sister-in-law. In
order to resist the second impulse, he condemned himself to perpetual
exile. At this time one of his old neighbors arrived in the regiment.
Glénadal confesses all his trouble. 'Be at rest,' said the other. 'Your
crime is impossible; your sister-in-law has just died.' At these words
Glénadal rises like a delivered captive. Joy fills his heart. He travels to
the home of his childhood, unvisited for so many years. But as he
arrives he sees his sister-in-law living. He gives a cry, and the terrible
impulse seizes him again as a prey. That very evening he makes his
brother tie him fast. 'Take a solid rope, bind me like a wolf in the barn,
and go and tell Dr. Calmeil....' From him he got admission to an insane
asylum. The evening before his entrance he wrote to the director of the
establishment: 'Sir, I am to become an inmate of your house. I shall
behave there as if I were in the regiment. You will think me cured. At
moments perhaps I shall pretend to be so. Never believe me. Never let
me out on any pretext. If I beg to be released, double your
watchfulness; the only use I shall make of my liberty will be to commit
a crime which I abhor.'"[474]
The craving for drink in real dipsomaniacs, or for opium or chloral in those
subjugated, is of a strength of which normal persons can form no
conception. "Were a keg of rum in one corner of a room and were a cannon
constantly discharging balls between me and it, I could not refrain from
passing before that cannon in order to get the rum;" "If a bottle of brandy
stood at one hand and the pit of hell yawned at the other, and I were
convinced that I should be pushed in as sure as I took one glass, I could not
refrain:" such statements abound in dipsomaniacs' mouths. Dr. Mussey of
Cincinnati relates this case:

"A few years ago a tippler was put into an almshouse in this State.
Within a few days he had devised various expedients to procure rum,
but failed. At length, however, he hit upon one which was successful.
He went into the wood-yard of the establishment, placed one hand
upon the block, and with an axe in the other, struck it off at a single
blow. With the stump raised and streaming he ran into the house and
cried, 'Get some rum! get some rum! my hand is off!' In the confusion
and bustle of the occasion a bowl of rum was brought, into which he
plunged the bleeding member of his body, then raising the bowl to his
mouth, drank freely, and exultingly exclaimed, 'Now I am satisfied.'
Dr. J. E. Turner tells of a man who, while under treatment for inebriety,
during four weeks secretly drank the alcohol from six jars containing
morbid specimens. On asking him why he had committed this
loathsome act, he replied: 'Sir, it is as impossible for me to control this
diseased appetite as it is for me to control the pulsations of my heart.'"
[475]

The passion of love may be called a monomania to which all of us are
subject, however otherwise sane. It can coexist with contempt and even
hatred for the 'object' which inspires it, and whilst it lasts the whole life of
the man is altered by its presence. Alfieri thus describes the struggles of his
unusually powerful inhibitive power with his abnormally excited impulses
toward a certain lady:
"Contemptible in my own eyes, I fell into such a state of melancholy
as would, if long continued, inevitably have led to insanity or death. I
continued to wear my disgraceful fetters till towards the end of
January, 1775, when my rage, which had hitherto so often been
restrained within bounds, broke forth with the greatest violence. On
returning one evening from the opera (the most insipid and tiresome
amusement in Italy), where I had passed several hours in the box of the
woman who was by turns the object of my antipathy and my love, I
took the firm determination of emancipating myself forever from her
yoke. Experience had taught me that flight, so far from enabling me to
persevere in my resolutions, tended on the contrary to weaken and
destroy them; I was inclined therefore to subject myself to a still more
severe trial, imagining from the obstinacy and peculiarity of my

character that I should succeed most certainly by the adoption of such
measures as would compel me to make the greatest efforts. I
determined never to leave the house, which, as I have already said, was
exactly opposite that of the lady; to gaze at her windows, to see her go
in and out every day, to listen to the sound of her voice, though firmly
resolved that no advances on her part, either direct or indirect, no
tender remembrances, nor in short any other means which might be
employed, should ever again tempt me to a revival of our friendship. I
was determined to die or liberate myself from my disgraceful
thraldom. In order to give stability to my purpose, and to render it
impossible for me to waver without the imputation of dishonor, I
communicated my determination to one of my friends, who was
greatly attached to me, and whom I highly esteemed. He had lamented
the state of mind into which I had fallen, but not wishing to give
countenance to my conduct, and seeing the impossibility of inducing
me to abandon it, he had for some time ceased to visit at my house. In
the few lines which I addressed to him, I briefly stated the resolution I
had adopted, and as a pledge of my constancy I sent him a long tress of
my ugly red hair. I had purposely caused it to be cut off in order to
prevent my going out, as no one but clowns and sailors then appeared
in public with short hair. I concluded my billet by conjuring him to
strengthen and aid my fortitude by his presence and example. Isolated
in this manner in my own house, I prohibited all species of intercourse,
and passed the first fifteen days in uttering the most frightful
lamentations and groans. Some of my friends came to visit me, and
appeared to commiserate my situation, perhaps because I did not
myself complain; but my figure and whole appearance bespoke my
sufferings. Wishing to read something I had recourse to the gazettes,
whole pages of which I frequently ran over without understanding a
single word.... I passed more than two months till the end of March
1775, in a state bordering on frenzy; but about this time a new idea
darted into my mind, which tended to assuage my melancholy."
This was the idea of poetical composition, at which Alfieri describes his
first attempts, made under these diseased circumstances, and goes on:

"The only good that occurred to me from this whim was that of
gradually detaching me from love, and of awakening my reason which
had so long lain dormant. I no longer found it necessary to cause
myself to be tied with cords to a chair, in order to prevent me from
leaving my house and returning to that of my lady. This had been one
of the expedients I devised to render myself wise by force. The cords
were concealed under a large mantle in which I was enveloped, and
only one hand remained at liberty. Of all those who came to see me,
not one suspected I was bound down in this manner. I remained in this
situation for whole hours; Elias, who was my jailer, was alone
intrusted with the secret. He always liberated me, as he had been
enjoined, whenever the paroxysms of my rage subsided. Of all the
whimsical methods which I employed, however, the most curious was
that of appearing in masquerade at the theatre towards the end of the
carnival. Habited as Apollo, I ventured to present myself with a lyre,
on which I played as well as I was able and sang some bad verses of
my own composing. Such effrontery was diametrically opposite to my
natural character. The only excuse I can offer for such scenes was my
inability to resist an imperious passion. I felt that it was necessary to
place an insuperable barrier between its object and me; and I saw that
the strongest of all was the shame to which I should expose myself by
renewing an attachment which I had so publicly turned into ridicule."
[476]

Often the insistent idea is of a trivial sort, but it may wear the patient's life
out. His hands feel dirty, they must be washed. He knows they are not dirty;
yet to get rid of the teasing idea he washes them. The idea, however, returns
in a moment, and the unfortunate victim, who is not in the least deluded
intellectually, will end by spending the whole day at the wash-stand. Or his
clothes are not 'rightly' put on; and to banish the thought he takes them off
and puts them on again, till his toilet consumes two or three hours of time.
Most people have the potentiality of this disease. To few has it not
happened to conceive, after getting into bed, that they may have forgotten to
lock the front door, or to turn out the entry gas. And few of us have not on
some occasion got up to repeat the performance, less because they believed
in the reality of its omission than because only so could they banish the
worrying doubt and get to sleep.[477]

THE OBSTRUCTED WILL.
In striking contrast with the cases in which inhibition is insufficient or
impulsion in excess are those in which impulsion is insufficient or
inhibition of in excess. We all know the condition described on p. 404 of
Vol. I, in which the mind for a few moments seems to lose its focussing
power and to be unable to rally its attention to any determinate thing. At
such times we sit blankly staring and do nothing. The objects of
consciousness fail to touch the quick or break the skin. They are there, but
do not reach the level of effectiveness. This state of non-efficacious
presence is the normal condition of some objects, in all of us. Great fatigue
or exhaustion may make it the condition of almost all objects; and an apathy
resembling that then brought about is recognized in asylums under the name
of abulia as a symptom of mental disease. The healthy state of the will
requires, as aforesaid, both that vision should be right, and that action
should obey its lead. But in the morbid condition in question the vision may
be wholly unaffected, and the intellect clear, and yet the act either fails to
follow or follows in some other way. "Video meliora proboque, deteriora
sequor" is the classic expression of the latter condition of mind. The former
it is to which the name abulia peculiarly applies. The patients, says
Guislain,
"are able to will inwardly, mentally, according to the dictates of reason.
They experience the desire to act, but they are powerless to act as they
should.... Their will cannot overpass certain limits: one would say that
the force of action within them is blocked up: the I will does not
transform itself into impulsive volition, into active determination.
Some of these patients wonder themselves at the impotence with
which their will is smitten. If you abandon them to themselves, they
pass whole days in their bed or on a chair. If one speaks to them or
excites them, they express themselves properly though briefly; and
judge of things pretty well."[478]
In Chapter XXI, as will be remembered, it was said that the sentiment of
reality with which an object appealed to the mind is proportionate (amongst
other things) to its efficacy as a stimulus to the will. Here we get the
obverse side of the truth. Those ideas, objects, considerations, which (in

these lethargic states) fail to get to the will, fail to draw blood, seem, in so
far forth, distant and unreal. The connection of the reality of things with
their effectiveness as motives is a tale that has never yet been fully told. The
moral tragedy of human life comes almost wholly from the fact that the link
is ruptured which normally should hold between vision of the truth and
action, and that this pungent sense of effective reality will not attach to
certain ideas. Men do not differ so much in their mere feelings and
conceptions. Their notions of possibility and their ideals are not as far apart
as might be argued from their differing fates. No class of them have better
sentiments or feel more constantly the difference between the higher and
the lower path in life than the hopeless failures, the sentimentalists, the
drunkards, the schemers, the 'dead-beats,' whose life is one long
contradiction between knowledge and action, and who, with full command
of theory, never get to holding their limp characters erect. No one eats of the
fruit of the tree of knowledge as they do; as far as moral insight goes, in
comparison with them, the orderly and prosperous philistines whom they
scandalize are sucking babes. And yet their moral knowledge, always there
grumbling and rumbling in the background,—discerning, commenting,
protesting, longing, half resolving,—never wholly resolves, never gets its
voice out of the minor into the major key, or its speech out of the
subjunctive into the imperative mood, never breaks the spell, never takes
the helm into its hands. In such characters as Rousseau and Restif it would
seem as if the lower motives had all the impulsive efficacy in their hands.
Like trains with the right of way, they retain exclusive possession of the
track. The more ideal motives exist alongside of them in profusion, but they
never get switched on, and the man's conduct is no more influenced by
them than an express train is influenced by a wayfarer standing by the
roadside and calling to be taken aboard. They are an inert accompaniment
to the end of time; and the consciousness of inward hollowness that accrues
from habitually seeing the better only to do the worse, is one of the saddest
feelings one can bear with him through this vale of tears.

We now see at one view when it is that effort complicates volition. It does
so whenever a rarer and more ideal impulse is called upon to neutralize
others of a more instinctive and habitual kind; it does so whenever strongly
explosive tendencies are checked, or strongly obstructive conditions
overcome. The âme bien née, the child of the sunshine, at whose birth the
fairies made their gifts, does not need much of it in his life. The hero and
the neurotic subject, on the other hand, do. Now our spontaneous way of
conceiving the effort, under all these circumstances, is as an active force
adding its strength to that of the motives which ultimately prevail. When
outer forces impinge upon a body, we say that the resultant motion is in the
line of least resistance, or of greatest traction. But it is a curious fact that
our spontaneous language never speaks of volition with effort in this way.
Of course if we proceed a priori and define the line of least resistance as the
line that is followed, the physical law must also hold good in the mental
sphere. But we feel, in all hard cases of volition, as if the line taken, when
the rarer and more ideal motives prevail, were the line of greater resistance,
and as if the line of coarser motivation were the more pervious and easy
one, even at the very moment when we refuse to follow it. He who under
the surgeon's knife represses cries of pain, or he who exposes himself to
social obloquy for duty's sake, feels as if he were following the line of
greatest temporary resistance. He speaks of conquering and overcoming his
impulses and temptations.
But the sluggard, the drunkard, the coward, never talk of their conduct in
that way or say they resist their energy, overcome their sobriety, conquer
their courage, and so forth. If in general we class all springs of action as
propensities on the one hand and ideals on the other, the sensualist never
says of his behavior that it results from a victory over his ideals, but the
moralist always speaks of his as a victory over his propensities. The
sensualist uses terms of inactivity, says he forgets his ideals, is deaf to duty,
and so forth; which terms seem to imply that the ideal motives per se can be
annulled without energy or effort, and that the strongest mere traction lies in
the line of the propensities. The ideal impulse appears, in comparison with
this, a still small voice which must be artificially reinforced to prevail.
Effort is what reinforces it, making things seem as if, while the force of
propensity were essentially a fixed quantity, the ideal force might be of
various amount. But what determines the amount of the effort when, by its

aid, an ideal motive becomes victorious over a great sensual resistance? The
very greatness of the resistance itself. If the sensual propensity is small, the
effort is small. The latter is made great by the presence of a great antagonist
to overcome. And if a brief definition of ideal or moral action were
required, none could be given which would better fit the appearances than
this: It is action in the line of the greatest resistance..
The facts may be most briefly symbolized thus, P standing for the
propensity, I for the ideal impulse, and E for the effort:
I per se < P.
I + E > P.
In other words, if E adds itself to I, P immediately offers the least
resistance, and motion occurs in spite of it.
But the E does not seem to form an integral part of the I. It appears
adventitious and indeterminate in advance. We can make more or less as we
please, and if we make enough we can convert the greatest mental
resistance into the least. Such, at least, is the impression which the facts
spontaneously produce upon us. But we will not discuss the truth of this
impression at present; let us rather continue our descriptive detail.
PLEASURE AND PAIN AS SPRINGS OF ACTION.
Objects and thoughts of objects start our action, but the pleasures and pains
which action brings modify its course and regulate it; and later the thoughts
of the pleasures and the pains acquire themselves impulsive and inhibitive
power. Not that the thought of a pleasure need be itself a pleasure, usually it
is the reverse—nessun maggior dolore—as Dante says—and not that the
thought of pain need be a pain, for, as Homer says, "griefs are often
afterwards an entertainment." But as present pleasures are tremendous
reinforcers, and present pains tremendous inhibitors of whatever action
leads to them, so the thoughts of pleasures and pains take rank amongst the
thoughts which have most impulsive and inhibitive power. The precise
relation which these thoughts hold to other thoughts is thus a matter
demanding some attention.

If a movement feels agreeable, we repeat and repeat it as long as the
pleasure lasts. If it hurts us, our muscular contractions at the instant stop. So
complete is the inhibition in this latter case that it is almost impossible for a
man to cut or mutilate himself slowly and deliberately—his hand invincibly
refusing to bring on the pain. And there are many pleasures which, when
once we have begun to taste them, make it all but obligatory to keep up the
activity to which they are due. So widespread and searching is this
influence of pleasures and pains upon our movements that a premature
philosophy has decided that these are our only spurs to action, and that
wherever they seem to be absent, it is only because they are so far on
among the 'remoter' images that prompt the action that they are overlooked.
This is a great mistake, however. Important as is the influence of pleasures
and pains upon our movements, they are far from being our only stimuli.
With the manifestations of instinct and emotional expression, for example,
they have absolutely nothing to do. Who smiles for the pleasure of the
smiling, or frowns for the pleasure of the frown? Who blushes to escape the
discomfort of not blushing? Or who in anger, grief, or fear is actuated to the
movements which he makes by the pleasures which they yield? In all these
cases the movements are discharged fatally by the vis a tergo which the
stimulus exerts upon a nervous system framed to respond in just that way.
The objects of our rage, love, or terror, the occasions of our tears and
smiles, whether they be present to our senses, or whether they be merely
represented in idea, have this peculiar sort of impulsive power. The
impulsive quality of mental states is an attribute behind which we cannot
go. Some states of mind have more of it than others, some have it in this
direction, and some in that. Feelings of pleasure and pain have it, and
perceptions and imaginations of fact have it, but neither have it exclusively
or peculiarly. It is of the essence of all consciousness (or of the neural
process which underlies it) to instigate movement of some sort. That with
one creature and object it should be of one sort, with others of another sort,
is a problem for evolutionary history to explain. However the actual
impulsions may have arisen, they must now be described as they exist; and
those persons obey a curiously narrow teleological superstition who think
themselves bound to interpret them in every instance as effects of the secret
solicitancy of pleasure and repugnancy of pain.[479]

It might be that to reflection such a narrow teleology would justify itself,
that pleasures and pains might seem the only comprehensible and
reasonable motives for action, the only motives on which we ought to act.
That is an ethical proposition, in favor of which a good deal may be said.
But it is not a psychological proposition; and nothing follows from it as to
the motives upon which as a matter of fact we do act. These motives are
supplied by innumerable objects, which innervate our voluntary muscles by
a process as automatic as that by which they light a fever in our breasts. If
the thought of pleasure can impel to action, surely other thoughts may.
Experience only can decide which thoughts do. The chapters on Instinct and
Emotion have shown us that their name is legion; and with this verdict we
ought to remain contented, and not seek an illusory simplification at the
cost of half the facts.
If in these our first acts pleasures and pains bear no part, as little do they
bear in our last acts, or those artificially acquired performances which have
become habitual. All the daily routine of life, our dressing and undressing,
the coming and going from our work or carrying through of its various
operations, is utterly without mental reference to pleasure and pain, except
under rarely realized conditions. It is ideo-motor action. As I do not breathe
for the pleasure of the breathing, but simply find that I am breathing, so I do
not write for the pleasure of the writing, but simply because I have once
begun, and being in a state of intellectual excitement which keeps venting
itself in that way, find that I am writing still. Who will pretend that when he
idly fingers his knife-handle at the table, it is for the sake of any pleasure
which it gives him, or pain which he thereby avoids. We do all these things
because at the moment we cannot help it; our nervous systems are so
shaped that they overflow in just that way; and for many of our idle or
purely 'nervous' and fidgety performances we can assign absolutely no
reason at all.
Or what shall be said of a shy and unsociable man who receives point-blank
an invitation to a small party? The thing is to him an abomination; but your
presence exerts a compulsion on him, he can think of no excuse, and so
says yes, cursing himself the while for what he does. He is unusually sui
compos who does not every week of his life fall into some such blundering
act as this. Such instances of voluntas invita show not only that our acts
cannot all be conceived as effects of represented pleasure, but that they

cannot even be classed as cases of represented good. The class 'goods'
contains many more generally influential motives to action than the class
'pleasants.' Pleasures often attract us only because we deem them goods.
Mr. Spencer, e.g., urges us to court pleasures for their influence upon
health, which comes to us as a good. But almost as little as under the form
of pleasures do our acts invariably appear to us under the form of goods. All
diseased impulses and pathological fixed ideas are instances to the contrary.
It is the very badness of the act that gives it then its vertiginous fascination.
Remove the prohibition, and the attraction stops. In my university days a
student threw himself from an upper entry window of one of the college
buildings and was nearly killed. Another student, a friend of my own, had
to pass the window daily in coming and going from his room, and
experienced a dreadful temptation to imitate the deed. Being a Catholic, he
told his director, who said, 'All right! if you must, you must,' and added, 'Go
ahead and do it,' thereby instantly quenching his desire. This director knew
how to minister to a mind diseased. But we need not go to minds diseased
for examples of the occasional tempting-power of simple badness and
unpleasantness as such. Every one who has a wound or hurt anywhere, a
sore tooth, e.g., will ever and anon press it just to bring out the pain. If we
are near a new sort of stink, we must sniff it again just to verify once more
how bad it is. This very day I have been repeating over and over to myself a
verbal jingle whose mawkish silliness was the secret of its haunting power.
I loathed yet could not banish it.
Believers in the pleasure-and-pain theory must thus, if they are candid,
make large exceptions in the application of their creed. Action from 'fixed
ideas' is accordingly a terrible stumbling-block to the candid Professor
Bain. Ideas have in his psychology no impulsive but only a 'guiding'
function, whilst
"The proper stimulus of the will, namely, some variety of pleasure and
pain, is needed to give the impetus.... The intellectual link is not
sufficient for causing the deed to rise at the beck of the idea (except in
case of an 'idée fixe');" but "should any pleasure spring up or be
continued, by performing an action that we clearly conceive, the
causation is then complete; both the directing and the moving powers
are present."[480]

Pleasures and pains are for Professor Bain the 'genuine impulses of the
will.'[481]
"Without an antecedent of pleasurable or painful feeling—actual or
ideal, primary or derivative—the will cannot be stimulated. Through
all the disguises that wrap up what we call motives, something of one
or other of these two grand conditions can be detected."[482]
Accordingly, where Professor Bain finds an exception to this rule, he
refuses to call the phenomenon a 'genuinely voluntary impulse.' The
exceptions, he admits, 'are those furnished by never-dying spontaneity,
habits, and fixed ideas.'[483] Fixed ideas 'traverse the proper course of
volition.'[484]
"Disinterested impulses are wholly distinct from the attainment of
pleasure and the avoidance of pain.... The theory of disinterested
action, in the only form that I can conceive it, supposes that the action
of the will and the attainment of happiness do not square throughout."
[485]

Sympathy "has this in common with the Fixed Idea, that it clashes with the
regular outgoings of the will in favor, of our pleasures."[486]
Prof. Bain thus admits all the essential facts. Pleasure and pain are motives
of only part of our activity. But he prefers to give to that part of the activity
exclusively which these feelings prompt the name of 'regular outgoings'
and 'genuine impulses' of the will,[487] and to treat all the rest as mere
paradoxes and anomalies, of which nothing rational can be said. This
amounts to taking one species of a genus, calling it alone by the generic
name, and ordering the other co-ordinate species to find what names they
may. At bottom this is only verbal play. How much more conducive to
clearness and insight it is to take the genus 'springs of action' and treat it as
a whole; and then to distinguish within it the species 'pleasure and pain'
from whatever other species may be found!

There is, it is true, a complication in the relation of pleasure to action,
which partly excuses those who make it the exclusive spur. This
complication deserves some notice at our hands.
An impulse which discharges itself immediately is generally quite neutral
as regards pleasure or pain—the breathing impulse, for example. If such an
impulse is arrested, however, by an extrinsic force, a great feeling of
uneasiness is produced—for instance, the dyspnœa of asthma. And in
proportion as the arresting force is then overcome, relief accrues—as when
we draw breath again after the asthma subsides. The relief is a pleasure and
the uneasiness a pain; and thus it happens that round all our impulses,
merely as such, there twine, as it were, secondary possibilities of pleasant
and painful feeling, involved in the manner in which the act is allowed to
occur. These pleasures and pains of achievement, discharge, or fruition
exist, no matter what the original spring of action be. We are glad when we
have successfully got ourselves out of a danger, though the thought of the
gladness was surely not what suggested to us to escape. To have compassed
the steps towards a proposed sensual indulgence also makes us glad, and
this gladness is a pleasure additional to the pleasure originally proposed. On
the other hand, we are chagrined and displeased when any activity, however
instigated, is hindered whilst in process of actual discharge. We are 'uneasy'
till the discharge starts up again. And this is just as true when the action is
neutral, or has nothing but pain in view as its result, as when it was
undertaken for pleasure's express sake. The moth is probably as annoyed if
hindered from getting into the lamp-flame as the roué is if interrupted in his
debauch; and we are chagrined if prevented from doing some quite
unimportant act which would have given us no noticeable pleasure if done,
merely because the prevention itself is disagreeable.
Let us now call the pleasure for the sake of which the act may be done the
pursued pleasure. It follows that, even when no pleasure is pursued by an
act, the act itself may be the pleasantest line of conduct when once the
impulse has begun, on account of the incidental pleasure which then attends
its successful achievement and the pain which would come of interruption.
A pleasant act and an act pursuing a pleasure are in themselves, however,
two perfectly distinct conceptions, though they coalesce in one concrete
phenomenon whenever a pleasure is deliberately pursued. I cannot help
thinking that it is the confusion of pursued pleasure with mere pleasure of

achievement which makes the pleasure-theory of action so plausible to the
ordinary mind. We feel an impulse, no matter whence derived; we proceed
to act; if hindered, we feel displeasure; and if successful, relief. Action in
the line of the present impulse is always for the time being the pleasant
course; and the ordinary hedonist expresses this fact by saying that we act
for the sake of the pleasantness involved. But who does not see that for this
sort of pleasure to be possible, the impulse must be there already as an
independent fact? The pleasure of successful performance is the result of
the impulse, not its cause. You cannot have your pleasure of achievement
unless you have managed to get your impulse under headway beforehand
by some previous means.
It is true that on special occasions (so complex is the human mind) the
pleasure of achievement may itself become a pursued pleasure; and these
cases form another point on which the pleasure-theory is apt to rally. Take a
foot-ball game or a fox-hunt. Who in cold blood wants the fox for its own
sake, or cares whether the ball be at this goal or that? We know, however,
by experience, that if we can once rouse a certain impulsive excitement in
ourselves, whether to overtake the fox, or to get the ball to one particular
goal, the successful venting of it over the counteracting checks will fill us
with exceeding joy. We therefore get ourselves deliberately and artificially
into the hot impulsive state. It takes the presence of various instinctarousing conditions to excite it; but little by little, once we are in the field, it
reaches its paroxysm; and we reap the reward of our exertions in that
pleasure of successful achievement which, far more than the dead fox or the
goal-got ball, was the object we originally pursued. So it often is with
duties. Lots of actions are done with heaviness all through, and not till they
are completed does pleasure emerge, in the joy of being done with them.
Like Hamlet we say of each such successive task,
"O cursed spite,
That ever I was born to set it right!"
and then we often add to the original impulse that set us on, this additional
one, that "we shall feel so glad when well through with it," that thought also
having its impulsive spur. But because a pleasure of achievement can thus
become a pursued pleasure upon occasion, it does not follow that
everywhere and always that pleasure must be what is pursued. This,
however, is what the pleasure-philosophers seem to suppose. As well might

they suppose, because no steamer can go to sea without incidentally
consuming coal, and because some steamers may occasionally go to sea to
try their coal, that therefore no steamer can go to sea for any other motive
than that of coal-consumption.[488]
As we need not act for the sake of gaining the pleasure of achievement, so
neither need we act for the sake of escaping the uneasiness of arrest. This
uneasiness is altogether due to the fact that the act is already tending to
occur on other grounds. And these original grounds are what impel to its
continuance, even though the uneasiness of the arrest may upon occasion
add to their impulsive power.
To conclude, I am far from denying the exceeding prominence and
importance of the part which pleasures and pains, both felt and represented,
play in the motivation of our conduct. But I must insist that it is no
exclusive part, and that co-ordinately with these mental objects innumerable
others have an exactly similar impulsive and inhibitive power.[489]
If one must have a single name for the condition upon which the impulsive
and inhibitive quality of objects depends, one had better call it their interest.
'The interesting' is a title which covers not only the pleasant and the painful,
but also the morbidly fascinating, the tediously haunting, and even the
simply habitual, inasmuch as the attention usually travels on habitual lines,
and what-we-attend-to and what-interests-us are synonymous terms. It
seems as if we ought to look for the secret of an idea's impulsiveness, not in
any peculiar relations which it may have with paths of motor discharge,—
for all ideas have relations with some such paths,—but rather in a
preliminary phenomenon, the urgency, namely, with which it is able to
compel attention and dominate in consciousness. Let it once so dominate,
let no other ideas succeed in displacing it, and whatever motor effects
belong to it by nature will inevitably occur—its impulsion, in short, will be
given to boot, and will manifest itself as a matter of course. This is what we
have seen in instinct, in emotion, in common ideo-motor action, in hypnotic
suggestion, in morbid impulsion, and in voluntas invita,—the impelling
idea is simply the one which possesses the attention. It is the same where
pleasure and pain are the motor spurs—they drive other thoughts from
consciousness at the same time that they instigate their own characteristic
'volitional' effects. And this is also what happens at the moment of the fiat,
in all the five types of 'decision' which we have described. In short, one

does not see any case in which the steadfast occupancy of consciousness
does not appear to be the prime condition of impulsive power. It is still
more obviously the prime condition of inhibitive power. What checks our
impulses is the mere thinking of reasons to the contrary—it is their bare
presence to the mind which gives the veto, and makes acts, otherwise
seductive, impossible to perform. If we could only forget our scruples, our
doubts, our fears, what exultant energy we should for a while display!
WILL IS A RELATION BETWEEN THE MIND AND ITS 'IDEAS.'
In closing in, therefore, after all these preliminaries, upon the more intimate
nature of the volitional process, we find ourselves driven more and more
exclusively to consider the conditions which make ideas prevail in the
mind. With the prevalence, once there as a fact, of the motive idea the
psychology of volition properly stops. The movements which ensue are
exclusively physiological phenomena, following according to physiological
laws upon the neural events to which the idea corresponds. The willing
terminates with the prevalence of the idea; and whether the act then follows
or not is a matter quite immaterial, so far as the willing itself goes. I will to
write, and the act follows. I will to sneeze, and it does not. I will that the
distant table slide over the floor towards me; it also does not. My willing
representation can no more instigate my sneezing-centre than it can
instigate the table to activity. But in both cases it is as true and good willing
as it was when I willed to write.[490] In a word, volition is a psychic or
moral fact pure and simple, and is absolutely completed when the stable
state of the idea is there. The supervention of motion is a supernumerary
phenomenon depending on executive ganglia whose function lies outside
the mind.
In St. Vitus' dance, in locomotor ataxy, the representation of a movement
and the consent to it take place normally. But the inferior executive centres
are deranged, and although the ideas discharge them, they do not discharge
them so as to reproduce the precise sensations anticipated. In aphasia the
patient has an image of certain words which he wishes to utter, but when he
opens his mouth he hears himself making quite unintended sounds. This
may fill him with rage and despair—which passions only show how intact
his will remains. Paralysis only goes a step farther. The associated

mechanism is not only deranged but altogether broken through. The volition
occurs, but the hand remains as still as the table. The paralytic is made
aware of this by the absence of the expected change in his afferent
sensations. He tries harder, i.e., he mentally frames the sensation of
muscular 'effort,' with consent that it shall occur. It does so: he frowns, he
heaves his chest, he clinches his other fist, but the palsied arm lies passive
as before.[491]
We thus find that we reach the heart of our inquiry into volition when we
ask by what process it is that the thought of any given object comes to
prevail stably in the mind. Where thoughts prevail without effort, we have
sufficiently studied in the several chapters on sensation, association, and
attention, the laws of their advent before consciousness and of their stay.
We will not go over that ground again, for we know that interest and
association are the words, let their worth be what it may, on which our
explanations must perforce rely. Where, on the other hand, the prevalence
of the thought is accompanied by the phenomenon of effort, the case is
much less clear. Already in the chapter on attention we postponed the final
consideration of voluntary attention with effort to a later place. We have
now brought things to a point at which we see that attention with effort is
all that any case of volition implies. The essential achievement of the will,
in short, when it is most 'voluntary,' is to ATTEND to a difficult object and
hold it fast before the mind. The so-doing is the fiat; and it is a mere
physiological incident that when the object is thus attended to, immediate
motor consequences should ensue. A resolve, whose contemplated motor
consequences are not to ensue until some possibly far distant future
condition shall have been fulfilled, involves all the psychic elements of a
motor fiat except the word 'now;' and it is the same with many of our purely
theoretic beliefs. We saw in effect in the appropriate chapter, how in the last
resort belief means only a peculiar sort of occupancy of the mind, and
relation to the self felt in the thing believed; and we know in the case of
many beliefs how constant an effort of the attention is required to keep
them in this situation and protect them from displacement by contradictory
ideas.[492] (Compare above, p. 321.)
Effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will.[493] Every
reader must know by his own experience that this is so, for every reader
must have felt some fiery passion's grasp. What constitutes the difficulty for

a man laboring under an unwise passion of acting as if the passion were
unwise? Certainly there is no physical difficulty. It is as easy physically to
avoid a fight as to begin one, to pocket one's money as to squander it on
one's cupidities, to walk away from as towards a coquette's door. The
difficulty is mental; it is that of getting the idea of the wise action to stay
before our mind at all. When any strong emotional state whatever is upon
us the tendency is for no images but such as are congruous with it to come
up. If others by chance offer themselves, they are instantly smothered and
crowded out. If we be joyous, we cannot keep thinking of those
uncertainties and risks of failure which abound upon our path; if lugubrious,
we cannot think of new triumphs, travels, loves, and joys; nor if vengeful,
of our oppressor's community of nature with ourselves. The cooling advice
which we get from others when the fever-fit is on us is the most jarring and
exasperating thing in life. Reply we cannot, so we get angry; for by a sort of
self-preserving instinct which our passion has, it feels that these chill
objects, if they once but gain a lodgment, will work and work until they
have frozen the very vital spark from out of all our mood and brought our
airy castles in ruin to the ground. Such is the inevitable effect of reasonable
ideas over others—if they can once get a quiet hearing; and passion's cue
accordingly is always and everywhere to prevent their still small voice from
being heard at all. "Let me not think of that! Don't speak to me of that!"
This is the sudden cry of all those who in a passion perceive some sobering
considerations about to check them in mid-career. "Hæc tibi erit janua leti,"
we feel. There is something so icy in this cold-water bath, something which
seems so hostile to the movement of our life, so purely negative, in Reason,
when she lays her corpse-like finger on our heart and says, "Halt! give up!
leave off! go back! sit down!" that it is no wonder that to most men the
steadying influence seems, for the time being, a very minister of death.
The strong-willed man, however, is the man who hears the still small voice
unflinchingly, and who, when the death-bringing consideration comes,
looks at its face, consents to its presence, clings to it, affirms it, and holds it
fast, in spite of the host of exciting mental images which rise in revolt
against it and would expel it from the mind. Sustained in this way by a
resolute effort of attention, the difficult object erelong begins to call up its
own congeners and associates and ends by changing the disposition of the
man's consciousness altogether. And with his consciousness, his action
changes, for the new object, once stably in possession of the field of his

thoughts, infallibly produces its own motor effects. The difficulty lies in the
gaining possession of that field. Though the spontaneous drift of thought is
all the other way, the attention must be kept strained on that one object until
at last it grows, so as to maintain itself before the mind with ease. This
strain of the attention is the fundamental act of will. And the will's work is
in most cases practically ended when the bare presence to our thought of the
naturally unwelcome object has been secured. For the mysterious tie
between the thought and the motor centres next comes into play, and, in a
way which we cannot even guess at, the obedience of the bodily organs
follows as a matter of course.
In all this one sees how the immediate point of application of the volitional
effort lies exclusively in the mental world. The whole drama is a mental
drama. The whole difficulty is a mental difficulty, a difficulty with an object
of our thought. If I may use the word idea without suggesting associationist
or Herbartian fables, I will say that it is an idea to which our will applies
itself, an idea which if we let it go would slip away, but which we will not
let go. Consent to the idea's undivided presence, this is effort's sole
achievement. Its only function is to get this feeling of consent into the mind.
And for this there is but one way. The idea to be consented to must be kept
from flickering and going out. It must be held steadily before the mind until
it fills the mind. Such filling of the mind by an idea, with its congruous
associates, is consent to the idea and to the fact which the idea represents. If
the idea be that, or include that, of a bodily movement of our own, then we
call the consent thus laboriously gained a motor volition. For Nature here
'backs' us instantaneously and follows up our inward willingness by
outward changes on her own part. She does this in no other instance. Pity
she should not have been more generous, nor made a world whose other
parts were as immediately subject to our will!

On page 531, in describing the 'reasonable type' of decision, it was said that
it usually came when the right conception of the case was found. Where,
however, the right conception is an anti-inpulsive one, the whole
intellectual ingenuity of the man usually goes to work to crowd it out of
sight, and to find names for the emergency, by the help of which the

dispositions of the moment may sound sanctified, and sloth or passion may
reign unchecked. How many excuses does the drunkard find when each
new temptation comes! It is a new brand of liquor which the interests of
intellectual culture in such matters oblige him to test; moreover it is poured
out and it is sin to waste it; or others are drinking and it would be
churlishness to refuse; or it is but to enable him to sleep, or just to get
through this job of work; or it isn't drinking, it is because he feels so cold;
or it is Christmas-day; or it is a means of stimulating him to make a more
powerful resolution in favor of abstinence than any he has hitherto made; or
it is just this once, and once doesn't count, etc., etc., ad libitum—it is, in
fact, anything you like except being a drunkard. That is the conception that
will not stay before the poor soul's attention. But if he once gets able to pick
out that way of conceiving, from all the other possible ways of conceiving
the various opportunities which occur, if through thick and thin he holds to
it that this is being a drunkard and is nothing else, he is not likely to remain
one long. The effort by which he succeeds in keeping the right name
unwaveringly present to his mind proves to be his saving moral act.[494]
Everywhere then the function of the effort is the same: to keep affirming
and adopting a thought which, if left to itself, would slip away. It may be
cold and flat when the spontaneous mental drift is towards excitement, or
great and arduous when the spontaneous drift is towards repose. In the one
case the effort has to inhibit an explosive, in the other to arouse an
obstructed will. The exhausted sailor on a wreck has a will which is
obstructed. One of his ideas is that of his sore hands, of the nameless
exhaustion of his whole frame which the act of farther pumping involves,
and of the deliciousness of sinking into sleep. The other is that of the
hungry sea ingulfing him. "Rather the aching toil!" he says; and it becomes
reality then, in spite of the inhibiting influence of the relatively luxurious
sensations which he gets from lying still. But exactly similar in form would
be his consent to lie and sleep. Often it is the thought of sleep and what
leads to it which is the hard one to keep before the mind. If a patient
afflicted with insomnia can only control the whirling chase of his thoughts
so far as to think of nothing at all (which can be done), or so far as to
imagine one letter after another of a verse of scripture or poetry spelt slowly
and monotonously out, it is almost certain that here, too, specific bodily
effects will follow, and that sleep will come. The trouble is to keep the mind
upon a train of objects naturally so insipid. To sustain a representation, to

think, is, in short, the only moral act, for the impulsive and the obstructed,
for sane and lunatics alike. Most maniacs know their thoughts to be crazy,
but find them too pressing to be withstood. Compared with them the sane
truths are so deadly sober, so cadaverous, that the lunatic cannot bear to
look them in the face and say, "Let these alone be my reality!" But with
sufficient effort, as Dr. Wigan says,
"Such a man can for a time wind himself up, as it were, and determine
that the notions of the disordered brain shall not be manifested. Many
instances are on record similar to that told by Pinel, where an inmate
of the Bicêtre, having stood a long cross-examination, and given every
mark of restored reason, signed his name to the paper authorizing his
discharge 'Jesus Christ,' and then went off into all the vagaries
connected with that delusion. In the phraseology of the gentleman
whose case is related in an early part of this [Wigan's] work he had
'held himself tight' during the examination in order to attain his object;
this once accomplished he 'let himself down' again, and, if even
conscious of his delusion, could not control it. I have observed with
such persons that it requires a considerable time to wind themselves up
to the pitch of complete self-control, that the effort is a painful tension
of the mind.... When thrown off their guard by any accidental remark
or worn out by the length of the examination, they let themselves go,
and cannot gather themselves up again without preparation. Lord
Erskine relates the story of a man who brought an action against Dr.
Munro for confining him without cause. He underwent the most rigid
examination by the counsel for the defendant without discovering any
appearance of insanity, till a gentleman asked him about a princess
with whom he corresponded in cherry-juice, and he became instantly
insane."[495]
To sum it all up in a word, the terminus of the psychological process in
volition, the point to which the will is directly applied, is always an idea.
There are at all times some ideas from which we shy away like frightened
horses the moment we get a glimpse of their forbidding profile upon the
threshold of our thought. The only resistance which our will can possibly
experience is the resistance which such an idea offers to being attended to

at all. To attend to it is the volitional act, and the only inward volitional act
which we ever perform.

I have put the thing in this ultra-simple way because I want more than
anything else to emphasize the fact that volition is primarily a relation, not
between our Self and extra-mental matter (as many philosophers still
maintain) but between our Self and our own states of mind. But when, a
short while ago, I spoke of the filling of the mind with an idea as being
equivalent to consent to the idea's object, I said something which the reader
doubtless questioned at the time, and which certainly now demands some
qualification ere we pass beyond.
It is unqualifiedly true that if any thought do fill the mind exclusively, such
filling is consent. The thought, for that time at any rate, carries the man and
his will with it. But it is not true that the thought need fill the mind
exclusively for consent to be there; for we often consent to things whilst
thinking of other things, even of hostile things; and we saw in fact that
precisely what distinguishes our 'fifth type' of decision from the other types
(see p. 534) is just this coexistence with the triumphant thought of other
thoughts which would inhibit it but for the effort which makes it prevail.
The effort to attend is therefore only a part of what the word 'will' covers; it
covers also the effort to consent to something to which our attention is not
quite complete. Often, when an object has gained our attention exclusively,
and its motor results are just on the point of setting in, it seems as if the
sense of their imminent irrevocability were enough of itself to start up the
inhibitory ideas and to make us pause. Then we need a new stroke of effort
to break down the sudden hesitation which seizes upon us, and to persevere.
So that although attention is the first and fundamental thing in volition,
express consent to the reality of what is attended to is often an additional
and quite distinct phenomenon involved.
The reader's own consciousness tells him of course just what these words of
mine denote. And I freely confess that I am impotent to carry the analysis of
the matter any farther, or to explain in other terms of what this consent
consists. It seems a subjective experience sui generis, which we can
designate but not define. We stand here exactly where we did in the case of

belief. When an idea stings us in a certain way, makes as it were a certain
electric connection with our self, we believe that it is a reality. When it
stings us in another way, makes another connection with our Self, we say,
let it be a reality. To the word 'is' and to the words 'let it be' there correspond
peculiar attitudes of consciousness which it is vain to seek to explain. The
indicative and the imperative moods are as much ultimate categories of
thinking as they are of grammar. The 'quality of reality' which these moods
attach to things is not like other qualities. It is a relation to our life. It means
our adoption of the things, our caring for them, our standing by them. This
at least is what it practically means for us; what it may mean beyond that
we do not know. And the transition from merely considering an object as
possible, to deciding or willing it to be real; the change from the fluctuating
to the stable personal attitude concerning it; from the 'don't care' state of
mind to that in which 'we mean business,' is one of the most familiar things
in life. We can partly enumerate its conditions; and we can partly trace its
consequences, especially the momentous one that when the mental object is
a movement of our own body, it realizes itself outwardly when the mental
change in question has occurred. But the change itself as a subjective
phenomenon is something which we can translate into no simpler terms.
THE QUESTION OF 'FREE-WILL.'
Especially must we, when talking about it, rid our mind of the fabulous
warfare of separate agents called 'ideas.' The brain-processes may be agents,
and the thought as such may be an agent. But what the ordinary
psychologies call 'ideas' are nothing but parts of the total object of
representation. All that is before the mind at once, no matter how complex a
system of things and relations it may be, is one object for the thought. Thus,
'A-and-B-and-their-mutual-incompatibility-and-the-fact-that-only-one-canbe-true-or-can-become-real-notwithstanding-the-probability-or-desirabilityof-both' may be such a complex object; and where the thought is
deliberative its object has always some such form as this. When, now, we
pass from deliberation to decision, that total object undergoes a change. We
either dismiss A altogether and its relations to B, and think of B
exclusively; or after thinking of both as possibilities, we next think that A is
impossible, and that B is or forthwith shall be real. In either case a new
object is before our thought; and where effort exists, it is where the change

from the first object to the second one is hard. Our thought seems to turn in
this case like a heavy door on rusty hinges; only, so far as the effort feels
spontaneous, it turns, not as if by some one helping, but as if by an inward
activity, born for the occasion, of its own.
The psychologists who discussed 'the muscular sense' at the international
congress at Paris in 1889 agreed at the end that they needed to come to a
better understanding in regard to this appearance of internal activity at the
moment when a decision is made. M. Fouillée, in an article which I find
more interesting and suggestive than coherent or conclusive,[496] seems to
resolve our sense of activity into that of our very existence as thinking
entities. At least so I translate his words.[497] But we saw in Chapter X how
hard it is to lay a verifying finger plainly upon the thinking process as such,
and to distinguish it from certain objects of the stream. M. Fouillée admits
this; but I do not think he fully realizes how strong would be the position of
a man who should suggest (see Vol. I. p. 301) that the feeling of moral
activity itself which accompanies the advent of certain 'objects' before the
mind is nothing but certain other objects,—constrictions, namely, in the
brows, eyes, throat, and breathing apparatus, present then, but absent from
other pulses of subjective change. Were this the truth, then a part, at any
rate, of the activity of which we become aware in effort would seem merely
to be that of our body; and many thinkers would probably thereupon
conclude that this 'settles the claims' of inner activity, and dismisses the
whole notion of such a thing as a superfluity in psychological science.
I cannot see my way to so extreme a view; even although I must repeat the
confession made on pp. 296-7 of Vol. I, that I do not fully understand how
we come to our unshakable belief that thinking exists as a special kind of
immaterial process alongside of the material processes of the world. It is
certain, however, that only by postulating such thinking do we make things
currently intelligible; and it is certain that no psychologist has as yet denied
the fact of thinking, the utmost that has been denied being its dynamic
power. But if we postulate the fact of the thinking at all, I believe that we
must postulate its power as well; nor do I see how we can rightly equalize
its power with its mere existence, and say (as M. Fouillée seems to say) that
for the thought-process to go on at all is an activity, and an activity
everywhere the same; for certain steps forward in this process seem prima
facie to be passive, and other steps (as where an object comes with effort)

seem prima facie to be active in a supreme degree. If we admit, therefore,
that our thoughts exist, we ought to admit that they exist after the fashion in
which they appear, as things, namely, that supervene upon each other,
sometimes with effort and sometimes with ease; the only questions being, is
the effort where it exists a fixed function of the object, which the latter
imposes on the thought? or is it such an independent 'variable' that with a
constant object more or less of it may be made?
It certainly appears to us indeterminate, and as if, even with an unchanging
object, we might make more or less, as we choose. If it be really
indeterminate, our future acts are ambiguous or unpredestinate: in common
parlance, our wills are free. If the amount of effort be not indeterminate, but
be related in a fixed manner to the objects themselves, in such wise that
whatever object at any time fills our consciousness was from eternity bound
to fill it then and there, and compel from us the exact effort, neither more
nor less, which we bestow upon it,—then our wills are not free, and all our
acts are foreordained. The question of fact in the free-will controversy is
thus extremely simple. It relates solely to the amount of effort of attention or
consent which we can at any time put forth. Are the duration and intensity
of this effort fixed functions of the object, or are they not? Now, as I just
said, it seems as if the effort were an independent variable, as if we might
exert more or less of it in any given case. When a man has let his thoughts
go for days and weeks until at last they culminate in some particularly dirty
or cowardly or cruel act, it is hard to persuade him, in the midst of his
remorse, that he might not have reined them in; hard to make him believe
that this whole goodly universe (which his act so jars upon) required and
exacted it of him at that fatal moment, and from eternity made aught else
impossible. But, on the other hand, there is the certainty that all his
effortless volitions are resultants of interests and associations whose
strength and sequence are mechanically determined by the structure of that
physical mass, his brain; and the general continuity of things and the
monistic conception of the world may lead one irresistibly to postulate that
a little fact like effort can form no real exception to the overwhelming reign
of deterministic law. Even in effortless volition we have the consciousness
of the alternative being also possible. This is surely a delusion here; why is
it not a delusion everywhere?

My own belief is that the question of free-will is insoluble on strictly
psychologic grounds. After a certain amount of effort of attention has been
given to an idea, it is manifestly impossible to tell whether either more or
less of it might have been given or not. To tell that, we should have to
ascend to the antecedents of the effort, and defining them with
mathematical exactitude, prove, by laws of which we have not at present
even an inkling, that the only amount of sequent effort which could possibly
comport with them was the precise amount which actually came.
Measurements, whether of psychic or of neural quantities, and deductive
reasonings such as this method of proof implies, will surely be forever
beyond human reach. No serious psychologist or physiologist will venture
even to suggest a notion of how they might be practically made. We are
thrown back therefore upon the crude evidences of introspection on the one
hand, with all its liabilities to deception, and, on the other hand, upon a
priori postulates and probabilities. He who loves to balance nice doubts
need be in no hurry to decide the point. Like Mephistopheles to Faust, he
can say to himself, "dazu hast du noch eine lange Frist," for from
generation to generation the reasons adduced on both sides will grow more
voluminous, and the discussion more refined. But if our speculative delight
be less keen, if the love of a parti pris outweighs that of keeping questions
open, or if, as a French philosopher of genius says, "l'amour de la vie qui
s'indigne de tant de discours," awakens in us, craving the sense of either
peace or power,—then, taking the risk of error on our head, we must project
upon one of the alternative views the attribute of reality for us; we must so
fill our mind with the idea of it that it becomes our settled creed. The
present writer does this for the alternative of freedom, but since the grounds
of his opinion are ethical rather than psychological, he prefers to exclude
them from the present book.[498]

A few words, however, may be permitted about the logic of the question.
The most that any argument can do for determinism is to make it a clear and
seductive conception, which a man is foolish not to espouse, so long as he
stands by the great scientific postulate that the world must be one unbroken
fact, and that prediction of all things without exception must be ideally,

even if not actually, possible. It is a moral postulate about the Universe, the
postulate that what ought to be can be, and that bad acts cannot be fated,
but that good ones must be possible in their place, which would lead one to
espouse the contrary view. But when scientific and moral postulates war
thus with each other and objective proof is not to be had, the only course is
voluntary choice, for scepticism itself, if systematic, is also voluntary
choice. If, meanwhile, the will be undetermined, it would seem only fitting
that the belief in its indetermination should be voluntarily chosen from
amongst other possible beliefs. Freedom's first deed should be to affirm
itself. We ought never to hope for any other method of getting at the truth if
indeterminism be a fact. Doubt of this particular truth will therefore
probably be open to us to the end of time, and the utmost that a believer in
free-will can ever do will be to show that the deterministic arguments are
not coercive. That they are seductive, I am the last to deny; nor do I deny
that effort may be needed to keep the faith in freedom, when they press
upon it, upright in the mind.
There is a fatalistic argument for determinism, however, which is radically
vicious. When a man has let himself go time after time, he easily becomes
impressed with the enormously preponderating influence of circumstances,
hereditary habits, and temporary bodily dispositions over what might seem
a spontaneity born for the occasion. "All is fate," he then says; "all is
resultant of what pre-exists. Even if the moment seems original, it is but the
instable molecules passively tumbling in their preappointed way. It is
hopeless to resist the drift, vain to look for any new force coming in; and
less, perhaps, than anywhere else under the sun is there anything really
mine in the decisions which I make." This is really no argument for simple
determinism. There runs throughout it the sense of a force which might
make things otherwise from one moment to another, if it were only strong
enough to breast the tide. A person who feels the impotence of free effort in
this way has the acutest notion of what is meant by it, and of its possible
independent power. How else could he be so conscious of its absence and of
that of its effects? But genuine determinism occupies a totally different
ground; not the impotence but the unthinkability of free-will is what it
affirms. It admits something phenomenal called free effort, which seems to
breast the tide, but it claims this as a portion of the tide. The variations of
the effort cannot be independent, it says; they cannot originate ex nihilo, or
come from a fourth dimension; they are mathematically fixed functions of

the ideas themselves, which are the tide. Fatalism, which conceives of effort
clearly enough as an independent variable that might come from a fourth
dimension if it would come, but that does not come, is a very dubious ally
for determinism. It strongly imagines that very possibility which
determinism denies.
But what, quite as much as the inconceivability of absolutely independent
variables, persuades modern men of science that their efforts must be
predetermined, is the continuity of the latter with other phenomena whose
predetermination no one doubts. Decisions with effort merge so gradually
into those without it that it is not easy to say where the limit lies. Decisions
without effort merge again into ideo-motor, and these into reflex acts; so
that the temptation is almost irresistible to throw the formula which covers
so many cases over absolutely all. Where there is effort just as where there
is none, the ideas themselves which furnish the matter of deliberation are
brought before the mind by the machinery of association. And this
machinery is essentially a system of arcs and paths, a reflex system,
whether effort be amongst its incidents or not. The reflex way is, after all,
the universal way of conceiving the business. The feeling of ease is a
passive result of the way in which the thoughts unwind themselves. Why is
not the feeling of effort the same? Professor Lipps, in his admirably clear
deterministic statement, so far from admitting that the feeling of effort
testifies to an increment of force exerted, explains it as a sign that force is
lost. We speak of effort, according to him, whenever a force expends itself
(wholly or partly) in neutralizing another force, and so fails of its own
possible outward effect. The outward effect of the antagonistic force,
however, also fails in corresponding measure, "so that there is no effort
without counter-effort,... and effort and counter-effort signify only that
causes are mutually robbing each other of effectiveness."[499] Where the
forces are ideas, both sets of them, strictly speaking, are the seat of effort—
both those which tend to explode, and those which tend to check them. We,
however, call the more abundant mass of ideas ourselves; and, talking of its
effort as our effort, and of that of the smaller mass of ideas as the
resistance,[500] we say that our effort sometimes overcomes the resistances
offered by the inertias of an obstructed, and sometimes those presented by
the impulsions of an explosive, will. Really both effort and resistance are
ours, and the identification of our self with one of these factors is an illusion

and a trick of speech. I do not see how anyone can fail (especially when the
mythologic dynamism of separate 'ideas,' which Professor Lipps cleaves to,
is translated into that of brain-processes) to recognize the fascinating
simplicity of some such view as his. Nor do I see why for scientific
purposes one need give it up even if indeterminate amounts of effort really
do occur. Before their indeterminism, science simply stops. She can abstract
from it altogether, then; for in the impulses and inhibitions with which the
effort has to cope there is already a larger field of uniformity than she can
ever practically cultivate. Her prevision will never foretell, even if the effort
be completely predestinate, the actual way in which each individual
emergency is resolved. Psychology will be Psychology,[501] and Science
Science, as much as ever (as much and no more) in this world, whether free
will be true in it or not. Science, however, must be constantly reminded that
her purposes are not the only purposes, and that the order of uniform
causation which she has use for, and is therefore right in postulating, may
be enveloped in a wider order, on which she has no claims at all.
We can therefore leave the free-will question altogether out of our account.
As we said in Chapter VI (vol. I. p. 453), the operation of free effort, if it
existed, could only be to hold some one ideal object, or part of an object, a
little longer or a little more intensely before the mind. Amongst the
alternatives which present themselves as genuine possibles, it would thus
make one effective.[502] And although such quickening of one idea might be
morally and historically momentous, yet, if considered dynamically, it
would be an operation amongst those physiological infinitesimals which
calculation must forever neglect.
But whilst eliminating the question about the amount of our effort as one
which psychology will never have a practical call to decide, I must say one
word about the extraordinarily intimate and important character which the
phenomenon of effort assumes in our own eyes as individual men. Of
course we measure ourselves by many standards. Our strength and our
intelligence, our wealth and even our good luck, are things which warm our
heart and make us feel ourselves a match for life. But deeper than all such
things, and able to suffice unto itself without them, is the sense of the
amount of effort which we can put forth. Those are, after all, but effects,
products, and reflections of the outer world within. But the effort seems to
belong to an altogether different realm, as if it were the substantive thing

which we are, and those were but externals which we carry. If the
'searching of our heart and reins' be the purpose of this human drama, then
what is sought seems to be what effort we can make. He who can make
none is but a shadow; he who can make much is a hero. The huge world
that girdles us about puts all sorts of questions to us, and tests us in all sorts
of ways. Some of the tests we meet by actions that are easy, and some of the
questions we answer in articulately formulated words. But the deepest
question that is ever asked admits of no reply but the dumb turning of the
will and tightening of our heartstrings as we say, "Yes, I will even have it
so!" When a dreadful object is presented, or when life as a whole turns up
its dark abysses to our view, then the worthless ones among us lose their
hold on the situation altogether, and either escape from its difficulties by
averting their attention, or if they cannot do that, collapse into yielding
masses of plaintiveness and fear. The effort required for facing and
consenting to such objects is beyond their power to make. But the heroic
mind does differently. To it, too, the objects are sinister and dreadful,
unwelcome, incompatible with wished-for things. But it can face them if
necessary, without for that losing its hold upon the rest of life. The world
thus finds in the heroic man its worthy match and mate; and the effort
which he is able to put forth to hold himself erect and keep his heart
unshaken is the direct measure of his worth and function in the game of
human life. He can stand this Universe. He can meet it and keep up his faith
in it in presence of those same features which lay his weaker brethren low.
He can still find a zest in it, not by 'ostrich-like forgetfulness,' but by pure
inward willingness to face the world with those deterrent objects there. And
hereby he becomes one of the masters and the lords of life. He must be
counted with henceforth; he forms a part of human destiny. Neither in the
theoretic nor in the practical sphere do we care for, or go for help to, those
who have no head for risks, or sense for living on the perilous edge. Our
religious life lies more, our practical life lies less, than it used to, on the
perilous edge. But just as our courage is so often a reflex of another's
courage, so our faith is apt to be, as Max Müller somewhere says, a faith in
some one else's faith. We draw new life from the heroic example. The
prophet has drunk more deeply than anyone of the cup of bitterness, but his
countenance is so unshaken and he speaks such mighty words of cheer that
his will becomes our will, and our life is kindled at his own.

Thus not only our morality but our religion, so far as the latter is deliberate,
depend on the effort which we can make. "Will you or won't you have it
so?" is the most probing question we are ever asked; we are asked it every
hour of the day, and about the largest as well as the smallest, the most
theoretical as well as the most practical, things. We answer by consents or
non-consents and not by words. What wonder that these dumb responses
should seem our deepest organs of communication with the nature of
things! What wonder if the effort demanded by them be the measure of our
worth as men! What wonder if the amount which we accord of it be the one
strictly underived and original contribution which we make to the world!
THE EDUCATION OF THE WILL.
The education of the will may be taken in a broader or a narrower sense. In
the broader sense, it means the whole of one's training to moral and
prudential conduct, and of one's learning to adapt means to ends, involving
the 'association of ideas,' in all its varieties and complications, together with
the power of inhibiting impulses irrelevant to the ends desired, and of
initiating movements contributory thereto. It is the acquisition of these latter
powers which I mean by the education of the will in the narrower sense.
And it is in this sense alone that it is worth while to treat the matter here.
[503]

Since a willed movement is a movement preceded by an idea of itself, the
problem of the will's education is the problem of how the idea of a
movement can arouse the movement itself. This, as we have seen, is a
secondary kind of process; for framed as we are, we can have no a priori
idea of a movement, no idea of a movement which we have not already
performed. Before the idea can be generated, the movement must have
occurred in a blind, unexpected way, and left its idea behind. Reflex,
instinctive, or random execution of a movement must, in other words,
precede its voluntary execution. Reflex and instinctive movements have
already been considered sufficiently for the purposes of this book. 'Random'
movements are mentioned so as to include quasi-accidental reflexes from
inner causes, or movements possibly arising from such overflow of
nutrition in special centres as Prof. Bain postulates in his explanation of

those 'spontaneous discharges' by which he sets such great store in his
derivation of the voluntary life.[504]
Now how can the sensory process which a movement has previously
produced, discharge, when excited again, into the centre for the movement
itself? On the movement's original occurrence the motor discharge came
first and the sensory process second; now in the voluntary repetition the
sensory process (excited in weak or 'ideational' form) comes first, and the
motor discharge comes second. To tell how this comes to pass would be to
answer the problem of the education of the will in physiological terms.
Evidently the problem is that of the formation of new paths; and the only
thing to do is to make hypotheses, till we find some which seem to cover all
the facts.
How is a fresh path ever formed? All paths are paths of discharge, and the
discharge always takes place in the direction of least resistance, whether the
cell which discharges be 'motor' or 'sensory.' The connate paths of least
resistance are the paths of instinctive reaction; and I submit as my first
hypothesis that these paths all run one way, that is from 'sensory' cells into
'motor' cells and from motor cells into muscles, without ever taking the
reverse direction. A motor cell, for example, never awakens a sensory cell
directly, but only through the incoming current caused by the bodily
movements to which its discharge gives rise. And a sensory cell always
discharges or normally tends to discharge towards the motor region. Let this
direction be called the 'forward' direction. I call the law an hypothesis, but
really it is an indubitable truth. No impression or idea of eye, ear, or skin
comes to us without occasioning a movement, even though the movement
be no more than the accommodation of the sense-organ; and all our trains of
sensation and sensational imagery have their terms alternated and
interpenetrated with motor processes, of most of which we practically are
unconscious. Another way of stating the rule is to say that, primarily or
connately, all currents through the brain run towards the Rolandic region,
and that there they run out, and never return upon themselves. From this
point of view the distinction of sensory and motor cells has no fundamental
significance. All cells are motor; we simply call those of the Rolandic
region, those nearest the mouth of the funnel, the motor cells par
excellence.

A corollary of this law is that 'sensory' cells do not awaken each other
connately; that is, that no one sensible property of things has any tendency,
in advance of experience, to awaken in us the idea of any other sensible
properties which in the nature of things may go with it. There is no a priori
calling up of one 'idea' by another; the only a priori couplings are of ideas
with movements. All suggestions of one sensible fact by another take place
by secondary paths which experience has formed.

FIG. 87.

The diagram (Fig. 87)[505] shows what happens in a nervous system ideally
reduced to the fewest possible terms. A stimulus reaching the sense-organ
awakens the sensory cell, S; this by the connate or instinctive path
discharges the motor cell, M, which makes the muscle contract; and the
contraction arouses the second sensory cell, K, which may be the organ
either of a 'resident' or 'kinæsthetic,' or of a 'remote,' sensation. (See above,
p. 488.) This cell K again discharges into M. If this were the entire nervous
mechanism, the movement, once begun, would be self-maintaining, and
would stop only when the parts were exhausted. And this, according to M.
Pierre Janet, is what actually happens in catalepsy. A cataleptic patient is
anæsthetic, speechless, motionless. Consciousness, so far as we can judge,
is abolished. Nevertheless the limbs will retain whatever position is
impressed upon them from without, and retain it so long that if it be a
strained and unnatural position, the phenomenon is regarded by Charcot as
one of the few conclusive tests against hypnotic subjects shamming, since
hypnotics can be made cataleptic, and then keep their limbs outstretched for
a length of time quite unattainable by the waking will. M. Janet thinks that
in all these cases the outlying ideational processes in the brain are
temporarily thrown out of gear. The kinæsthetic sensation of the raised arm,
for example, is produced in the patient when the operator raises the arm,
this sensation discharges into the motor cell, which through the muscle
reproduces the sensation, etc., the currents running in this closed circle until
they grow so weak, by exhaustion of the parts, that the member slowly
drops. We may call this circle from the muscle to K, from K to M, and from
M to the muscle again, the 'motor circle.' We should all be cataleptics and
never stop a muscular contraction once begun, were it not that other
processes simultaneously going on inhibit the contraction. Inhibition is

therefore not an occasional accident; it is an essential and unremitting
element of our cerebral life. It is interesting to note that Dr. Mercier, by a
different path of reasoning, is also led to conclude that we owe to outside
inhibitions exclusively our power to arrest a movement once begun.[506]
One great inhibitor of the discharge of K into M seems to be the painful or
otherwise displeasing quality of the sensation itself of K; and conversely,
when this sensation is distinctly pleasant, that fact tends to further K's
discharge into M, and to keep the primordial motor circle agoing.
Tremendous as the part is which pleasure and pain play in our psychic life,
we must confess that absolutely nothing is known of their cerebral
conditions. It is hard to imagine them as having special centres; it is harder
still to invent peculiar forms of process in each and every centre, to which
these feelings may be due. And let one try as one will to represent the
cerebral activity in exclusively mechanical terms, I, for one, find it quite
impossible to enumerate what seem to be the facts and yet to make no
mention of the psychic side which they possess. However it be with other
drainage currents and discharges, the drainage currents and discharges of
the brain are not purely physical facts. They are psycho-physical facts, and
the spiritual quality of them seems a codeterminant of their mechanical
effectiveness. If the mechanical activities in a cell, as they increase, give
pleasure, they seem to increase all the more rapidly for that fact; if they give
displeasure, the displeasure seems to damp the activities. The psychic side
of the phenomenon thus seems, somewhat like the applause or hissing at a
spectacle, to be an encouraging or adverse comment on what the machinery
brings forth. The soul presents nothing herself; creates nothing; is at the
mercy of the material forces for all possibilities; but amongst these
possibilities she selects; and by reinforcing one and checking others, she
figures not as an 'epiphenomenon,' but as something from which the play
gets moral support. I shall therefore never hesitate to invoke the efficacy of
the conscious comment, where no strictly mechanical reason appears why a
current escaping from a cell should take one path rather than another.[507]
But the existence of the current, and its tendency towards either path, I feel
bound to account for by mechanical laws.

Having now considered a nervous system reduced to its lowest possible
terms, in which all the paths are connate, and the possibilities of inhibition
not extrinsic, but due solely to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the
feeling aroused, let us turn to the conditions under which new paths may be
formed. Potentialities of new paths are furnished by the fibres which
connect the sensory cells amongst themselves; but these fibres are not
originally pervious, and have to be made so by a process which I proceed
hypothetically to state as follows: Each discharge from a sensory cell in the
forward direction[508] tends to drain the cells lying behind the discharging
one of whatever tension they may possess. The drainage from the rearward
cells is what for the first time makes the fibres pervious. The result is a newformed 'path,' running from the cells which were 'rearward' to the cell
which was 'forward' on that occasion; which path, if on future occasions the
rearward cells are independently excited, will tend to carry off their activity
in the same direction so as to excite the forward cell, and will deepen itself
more and more every time it is used.
Now the 'rearward cells,' so far, stand for all the sensory cells of the brain
other than the one which is discharging; but such an indefinitely broad path
would practically be no better than no path, so here I make a third
hypothesis, which, taken together with the others, seems to me to cover all
the facts. It is that the deepest paths are formed from the most drainable to
the most draining cells; that the most drainable cells are those which have
just been discharging, and that the most draining cells are those which are
now discharging or in which the tension is rising towards the point of
discharge.[509] Another diagram, Fig. 88, will make the matter clear.

FIG. 88.

Take the operation represented by the previous diagram at the moment
when, the muscular contraction having occurred, the cell K is discharging
forward into M. Through the dotted line p it will, according to our third
hypothesis, drain S (which, in the supposed case, has just discharged into M
by the connate path P, and caused the muscular contraction), and the result
is that p will now remain as a new path open from S to K. When next S is
excited from without it will tend not only to discharge into M, but into K as
well. K thus gets excited directly by S before it gets excited by the
incoming current from the muscle; or, translated into psychic terms: when a
sensation has once produced a movement in us, the next time we have the
sensation, it tends to suggest the idea of the movement, even before the
movement occurs.[510]
The same principles also apply to the relations of K and M. M, lying in the
forward direction, drains K, and the path KM, even though it be no primary
or connate path, becomes a secondary or habitual one. Hereafter K may be
aroused in any way whatsoever (not as before from S or from without) and
still it will tend to discharge into M; or, to express it again in psychic terms,
the idea of the movement M's sensory effects will have become an
immediately antecedent condition to the production of the movement itself.
Here, then, we have the answer to our original question of how a sensory
process which, the first time it occurred, was the effect of a movement, can
later figure as the movement's cause.

It is obvious on this scheme that the cell which we have marked K may
stand for the seat of either a resident or a remote sensation occasioned by
the motor discharge. It may indifferently be a tactile, a visual, or an auditory
cell. The idea of how the arm feels when raised may cause it to rise; but no
less may the idea of some sound which it makes in rising, or of some
optical impression which it produces. Thus we see that the 'mental cue' may
belong to either of various senses; and that what our diagrams lead us to
infer is what really happens; namely, that in our movements, such as that of
speech, for example, in some of us it is the tactile, in others the acoustic,
Effectsbild, or memory-image, which seems most concerned in starting the

articulation (Vol. I. pp. 54-5). The primitive 'starters,' however, of all our
movements are not Effectsbilder at all, but sensations and objects, and
subsequently ideas derived therefrom.

Let us now turn to the more complex and serially concatenated movements
which oftenest meet us in real life. The object of our will is seldom a single
muscular contraction; it is almost always an orderly sequence of
contractions, ending with a sensation which tells us that the goal is reached.
But the several contractions of the sequence are not each distinctly willed;
each earlier one seems rather, by the sensation it produces, to call its
follower up, after the fashion described in Chapter VI, where we spoke of
habitual concatenated movements being due to a series of secondarily
organized reflex arcs (Vol. I. p. 116). The first contraction is the one
distinctly willed, and after willing it we let the rest of the chain rattle off of
its own accord. How now is such an orderly concatenation of movements
originally learned? or in other words, how are paths formed for the first
time between one motor centre and another, so that the discharge of the first
centre makes the others discharge in due order all along the line?
The phenomenon involves a rapid alternation of motor discharges and
resultant afferent impressions, for as long a time as it lasts. They must be
associated in one definite order; and the order must once have been learned,
i.e., it must have been picked out and held to more and more exclusively out
of the many other random orders which first presented themselves. The
random afferent impressions fell out, those that felt right were selected and
grew together in the chain. A chain which we actively teach ourselves by
stringing a lot of right-feeling impressions together differs in no essential
respect from a chain which we passively learn from someone else who
gives us impressions in a certain order. So to make our ideas more precise,
let us take a particular concatenated movement for an example, and let it be
the recitation of the alphabet, which someone in our childhood taught us to
say by heart.
What we have seen so far is how the idea of the sound or articulatory
feeling of A may make us say 'A,' that of B, 'B,' and so on. But what we

now want to see is why the sensation that A is uttered should make us say
'B,' why the sensation that B is uttered should make us say 'C,' and so on.

FIG. 89.

To understand this we must recall what happened when we first learned the
letters in their order. Someone repeated A, B, C, D to us over and over
again, and we imitated the sounds. Sensory cells corresponding to each
letter were awakened in succession in such wise that each one of them (by
virtue of our second law) must have 'drained' the cell just previously excited
and left a path by which that cell tended ever afterwards to discharge into
the cell that drained it. Let Sa, Sb, Sc in figure 89 stand for three of these
cells. Each later one of them, as it discharges motorwards, draws a current
from the previous one, Sb from Sa, and Sc from Sb. Cell Sb having thus
drained Sa, if Sa ever gets excited again, it tends to discharge into Sb; whilst
Sc having drained Sb, Sb later discharges into Sc, etc., etc.—all through the
dotted lines. Let now the idea of the letter A arise in the mind, or, in other
words, let Sa be aroused: what happens? A current runs from Sa not only
into the motor cell Ma for pronouncing that letter, but also into the cell Sb.
When, a moment later, the effect of Ma's discharge comes back by the
afferent nerve and re-excites Sa, this latter cell is inhibited from discharging
again into Ma and reproducing the 'primordial motor circle' (which in this
case would be the continued utterance of the letter A), by the fact that the
process in Sb, already under headway and tending to discharge into its own
motor associate Mb, is, under the existing conditions, the stronger drainagechannel for Sa's excitement. The result is that Mb discharges and the letter B
is pronounced; whilst at the same time Sc receives some of Sb's overflow;
and, a moment later when the sound of B enters the ear, discharges into the

motor cell for pronouncing C, by a repetition of the same mechanism as
before; and so on ad libitum. Figure 90 represents the entire set of processes
involved.

FIG. 90.

The only thing that one does not immediately see is the reason why 'under
the existing conditions' the path from Sa to Sb should be the stronger
drainage-channel for Sa's excitement. If the cells and fibres in the figure
constituted the entire brain we might suppose either a mechanical or a
psychical reason. The mechanical reason might lie in a general law that
cells like Sb and Mb, whose excitement is in a rising phase, are stronger
drainers than cells like Ma, which have just discharged; or it might lie in the
fact that an irradiation of the current beyond Sb into Sc and Mc has already
begun also; and in a still farther law that drainage tends in the direction of
the widest irradiations. Either of these suppositions would be a sufficient
mechanical reason why, having once said A, we should not say it again. But
we must not forget that the process has a psychical side, nor close our eyes
to the possibility that the sort of feeling aroused by incipient currents may
be the reason why certain of them are instantly inhibited and others helped
to flow. There is no doubt that before we have uttered a single letter, the
general intention to recite the alphabet is already there; nor is there any
doubt that to that intention corresponds a widespread premonitory rising of
tensions along the entire system of cells and fibres which are later to be
aroused. So long as this rise of tensions feels good, so long every current
which increases it is furthered, and every current which diminishes it is
checked; and this may be the chief one of the 'existing conditions' which
make the drainage-channel from Sa to Sb temporarily so strong.[511]

The new paths between the sensory cells of which we have studied the
formation are paths of 'association,' and we now see why associations run
always in the forward direction; why, for example, we cannot say the
alphabet backward, and why, although Sb discharges into Sc, there is no
tendency for Sc to discharge into Sb, or at least no more than for it to
discharge into Sa.[512] The first-formed paths had, according to the
principles which we invoked, to run from cells that had just discharged to
those that were discharging; and now, to get currents to run the other way,
we must go through a new learning of our letters with their order reversed.
There will then be two sets of association-pathways, either of them
possible, between the sensible cells. I represent them in Fig. 91, leaving out
the motor features for simplicity's sake. The dotted lines are the paths in the
backward direction, newly organized from the reception by the ear of the
letters in the order C B A.

FIG. 91.

The same principles will explain the formation of new paths successively
concatenated to no matter how great an extent, but it would obviously be
folly to pretend to illustrate by more intricate examples. I will therefore
only bring back the case of the child and flame (Vol. I. p. 25), to show how
easily it admits of explanation as a 'purely cortical transaction' (ibid. p. 80).
The sight of the flame stimulates the cortical centre S1 which discharges by
an instinctive reflex path into the centre M1 for the grasping-movement.
This movement produces the feeling of burn, as its effects come back to the
centre S2; and this centre by a second connate path discharges into M2, the
centre for withdrawing the hand. The movement of withdrawal stimulates
the centre S3, and this, as far as we are concerned, is the last thing that
happens. Now the next time the child sees the candle, the cortex is in
possession of the secondary paths which the first experience left behind. S2,

having been stimulated immediately after S1, drained the latter, and now S1
discharges into S2 before the discharge of M1 has had time to occur; in
other words, the sight of the flame suggests the idea of the burn before it
produces its own natural reflex effects. The result is an inhibition of M1, or
an overtaking of it before it is completed, by M2.—The characteristic
physiological feature in all these acquired systems of paths lies in the fact
that the new-formed sensory irradiations keep draining things forward, and
so breaking up the 'motor circles' which would otherwise accrue. But, even
apart from catalepsy, we see the 'motor circle' every now and then come
back. An infant learning to execute a simple movement at will, without
regard to other movements beyond it, keeps repeating it till tired. How
reiteratively they babble each new-learned word! And we adults often catch
ourselves reiterating some meaningless word over and over again, if by
chance we once begin to utter it 'absent-mindedly,' that is, without thinking
of any ulterior train of words to which it may belong.

FIG. 92.

One more observation before closing these already too protracted
physiological speculations. Already (Vol. I. p. 71) I have tried to shadow
forth a reason why collateral innervation should establish itself after loss of
brain-tissue, and why incoming stimuli should find their way out again,
after an interval, by their former paths. I can now explain this a little better.
Let S1 be the dog's hearing-centre when he receives the command 'Give

your paw.' This used to discharge into the motor centre M1, of whose
discharge S2 represents the kinæsthetic effect; but now M1 has been
destroyed by an operation, so that S1 discharges as it can, into other
movements of the body, whimpering, raising the wrong paw, etc. The
kinæsthetic centre S2 meanwhile has been awakened by the order S1, and
the poor animal's mind tingles with expectation and desire of certain
incoming sensations which are entirely at variance with those which the
really executed movements give. None of the latter sensations arouse a
'motor circle,' for they are displeasing and inhibitory. But when, by random
accident, S1 and S2 do discharge into a path leading through M2, by which
the paw is again given, and S2 is excited at last from without as well as
from within, there are no inhibitions and the 'motor circle' is formed: S1
discharges into M2 over and over again, and the path from the one spot to
the other is so much deepened that at last it becomes organized as the
regular channel of efflux when S1 is aroused. No other path has a chance of
being organized in like degree.

FIG. 93.

[430] Parts of this chapter have appeared in an essay called "The Feeling of Effort," published in the
Anniversary Memoirs of the Boston Society of Natural History, 1880; and parts in Scribner's
Magazine for Feb. 1888.
[431] I am abstracting at present for simplicity's sake, and so as to keep to the elements of the matter,
from the learning of acts by seeing others do them.
[432] Deutsches Archiv f. Klin. Medicin, xxii. 321.

[433] Landry: Mémoire sur la Paralysie du Sens Musculaire, Gazette des Hôpitaux, 1855, p. 270.
[434] Tàkacs: Ueber die Verspätung der Empfindungsleitung, Archiv für Psychiatrie, Bd. x. Heft 3, p.
533. Concerning all such cases see the remarks made above on pp. 205-6.
[435] Proceedings of American Soc. for Psychical Research, p. 95.
[436] In reality the movement cannot even be started correctly in some cases without the kinæsthetic
impression. Thus Dr. Strümpell relates how turning over the boy's hand made him bend the little
finger instead of the forefinger, when his eye was closed. "Ordered to point, e.g., towards the left
with his left arm, the arm was usually raised straight forward, and then wandered about in groping
uncertainty, sometimes getting the right position and then leaving it again. Similarly with the lower
limbs. If the patient, lying in bed, had, immediately after the tying of his eyes, to lay the left leg over
the right, it often happened that he moved it farther over towards the left, and that it lay over the side
of the bed in apparently the most intolerably-uncomfortable position. The turning of the head, too,
from right to left, or towards certain objects known to the patient, only ensued correctly when the
patient, immediately before his eye was bandaged, specially refreshed his perception as to what the
required movement was to be." In another anæsthetic of Dr. Strümpell's (described in the same essay)
the arm could not be moved at all unless the eyes were opened, however energetic the volition. The
variations in these hysteric cases are great. Some patients cannot move the anæsthetic part at all
when the eyes are closed. Others move it perfectly well, and can even write continuous sentences
with the anæsthetic hand. The causes of such differences are as yet incompletely unexplored. M.
Binet suggests (Revue Philosophique, xxv. 478) that in those who cannot move the hand at all the
sensation of light is required as a 'dynamogenic' agent (see above, p. 377); and that in those who can
move it skilfully the anæsthesia is only a pseudo-insensibility and that the limb is in reality governed
by a dissociated or secondary consciousness. This latter explanation is certainly correct. Professor G.
E. Müller (Pflüger's Archiv, xlv. 90) invokes the fact of individual differences of imagination to
account for the cases who cannot write at all. Their kinæsthetic images properly so called may be
weak, he says, and their optical images insufficiently powerful to supplement them without a 'fillip'
from sensation. Janet's observation that hysteric anæsthesias may carry amnesias with them would
perfectly legitimate Müller's supposition. What we now want is a minute examination of the
individual cases. Meanwhile Binet's article above referred to, and Bastian's paper in Brain for April
1887, contain important discussions of the question. In a later note I shall return to the subject again
(see p. 520).
[437] Professor Beaunis found that the accuracy with which a certain tenor sang was not lost when
his vocal cords were made anæsthetic by cocain. He concludes that the guiding sensations here are
resident in the laryngeal muscles themselves. They are much more probably in the ear. (Beaunis, Les
Sensations Internes (1889), p. 253).
[438] As the feeling of heat, for example, is the last psychic antecedent of sweating, as the feeling of
bright light is that of the pupil's contraction, as the sight or smell of carrion is that of the movements
of disgust, as the remembrance of a blunder may be that of a blush, so the idea of a movement's
sensible effects might be that of the movement itself. It is true that the idea of sweating will not
commonly make us sweat, nor that of blushing make us blush. But in certain nauseated states the idea
of vomiting will make us vomit; and a kind of sequence which is in this case realized only
exceptionally might be the rule with the so-called voluntary muscles. It all depends on the nervous
connections between the centres of ideation and the discharging paths. These may differ from one
sort of centre to another. They do differ somewhat from one individual to another. Many persons
never blush at the idea of their blunders, but only when the actual blunder is committed; others blush
at the idea; and some do not blush at all. According to Lotze, with some persons "It is possible to
weep at will by trying to recall that peculiar feeling in the trigeminal nerve which habitually precedes
tears. Some can even succeed in sweating voluntarily, by the lively recollection of the characteristic

skin-sensations, and the voluntary reproduction of an indescribable sort of feeling of relaxation,
which ordinarily precedes the flow of perspiration." (Med. Psych., p. 303.) The commoner type of
exceptional case is that in which the idea of the stimulus, not that of the effects, provokes the effects.
Thus we read of persons who contract their pupils at will by strongly imagining a brilliant light. A
gentleman once informed me (strangely enough I cannot recall who he was, but I have an impression
of his being a medical man) that he could sweat at will by imagining himself on the brink of a
precipice. The sweating palms of fear are sometimes producible by imagining a terrible object (cf.
Manouvrier in Rev. Phil., xxii. 203). One of my students, whose eyes were made to water by sitting
in the dentist's chair before a bright window, can now shed tears by imagining that situation again.
One might doubtless collect a large number of idiosyncratic cases of this sort. They teach us how
greatly the centres vary in their power to discharge through certain channels. All that we need, now,
to account for the differences observed between the psychic antecedents of the voluntary and
involuntary movements is that centres producing ideas of the movement's sensible effects should be
able to instigate the former, but be out of gear with the latter, unless in exceptional individuals. The
famous case of Col. Townsend, who could stop his heart at will, is well known. See, on this whole
matter, D. H. Tuke: Illustrations of the Influence of the Mind on the Body, chap. xiv. § 3; also J.
Braid: Observations on Trance or Human Hybernation (1850). The latest reported case of voluntary
control of the heart is by Dr. S. A. Pease, in Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, May 30, 1889.
[439] Prof. Harless, in an article which in many respects forestalls what I have to say (Der Apparat
des Willens, in Fichte's Zeitschrift f. Philos., Bd. 38, 1861), uses the convenient word Effectsbild to
designate these images.
[440] The best modern statement I know is by Jaccoud: Des Paraplégies et de l'Ataxie du
Mouvement (Paris, 1864), p. 591.
[441] Leidesdorf u. Meynert's Vierteljsch. f. Psychiatrie, Bd. i. Heft i. S. 36-7 (1867). Physiologische
Psychologie, 1st ed. S. 316.
[442] Professor Fouillée, who defends them in the Revue Philosophique, xxviii, 561 ff., also admits
(p. 574) that they are the same whatever be the movement, and that all our discrimination of which
movement we are innervating is afferent, consisting of sensations after, and of sensory images before,
the act.
[443] Cf. Souriau in Rev. Philosophique, xxii. 454.—Professor G. E. Müller thus describes some of
his experiments with weights: If, after lifting a weight of 8000 grams a number of times we suddenly
get a weight of only 500 grams to lift, "this latter weight is then lifted with a velocity which strikes
every onlooker, so that the receptacle for the weight with all its contents often flies high up as if it
carried the arm along with it, and the energy with which it is raised is sometimes so entirely out of
proportion to the weight itself, that the contents of the receptacle are slung out upon the table in spite
of the mechanical obstacles which such a result has to overcome. A more palpable proof that the
trouble here is a wrong adaptation of the motor impulse could not be given." Pflüger's Archiv, xlv.
47. Compare also p. 57, and the quotation from Hering on the same page.
[444] Archiv für Psychiatrie, iii. 618-635. Bernhardt strangely enough seems to think that what his
experiments disprove is the existence of afferent muscular feelings, not those of efferent innervation
—apparently because he deems that the peculiar thrill of the electricity ought to overpower all other
afferent feelings from the part. But it is far more natural to interpret his results the other way, even
aside from the certainty yielded by other evidence that passive muscular feelings exist. This other
evidence, after being compendiously summed up by Sachs in Reichert und Du Bois' Archiv (1874),
pp. 174-188, is, as far as the anatomical and physiological grounds go, again thrown into doubt by
Mays, Zeitschrift f. Biologie, Bd. xx.
[445] Functions of the Brain, p. 228.

[446] Vorlesungen über Menschen und Thierseele, i. 222.
[447] In some instances we get an opposite result. Dr. H. Charlton Bastian (British Medical Journal
(1869), p. 461, note), says:
"Ask a man whose lower extremities are completely paralyzed, whether, when he ineffectually wills
to move either of these limbs, he is conscious of an expenditure of energy in any degree
proportionate to that which he would have experienced if his muscles had naturally responded to his
volition. He will tell us rather that he has a sense only of his utter powerlessness, and that his volition
is a mere mental act, carrying with it no feelings of expended energy such as he is accustomed to
experience when his muscles are in powerful action, and from which action and its consequences
alone, as I think, he can derive any adequate notion of resistance."
[448] Münsterberg's words may be added: "In lifting an object in the hand I can discover no sensation
of volitional energy. I perceive in the first place a slight tension about the head, but that this results
from a contraction in the head muscles, and not from a feeling of the brain-discharge, is shown by the
simple fact that I get the tension on the right side of the head when I move the right arm, whereas the
motor discharge takes place in the opposite side of the brain.... In maximal contractions of body- and
limb-muscles there occur, as if it were to reinforce them, those special contractions of the muscles of
the face [especially frowning and clinching teeth] and those tensions of the skin of the head. These
sympathetic movements, felt particularly on the side which makes the effort, are perhaps the
immediate ground why we ascribe our awareness of maximal contraction to the region of the head,
and call it a consciousness of force, instead of a peripheral sensation." (Die Willenshandlung (1888),
pp. 73, 82.) Herr Münsterberg's work is a little masterpiece, which appeared after my text was
written. I shall have repeatedly to refer to it again, and cordially recommend to the reader its most
thorough refutation of the Innervationsgefühl-theory.
[449] Physiologische Optik, p. 600.
[450] [The left and sound eye is here supposed covered. If both eyes look at the same field there are
double images which still more perplex the judgment. The patient, however, learns to see correctly
before many days or weeks are over.—W. J.]
[451] Alfred Graefe, in Handbuch der gesammten Augenheilkunde, Bd. vi. pp. 18-21.
[452] Professor G. E. Müller (Zur Grundlegung der Psychophysik (1878), p. 318,) was the first to
explain the phenomenon after the manner advocated in the text. Still unacquainted with his book, I
published my own similar explanation two years later.
Professor Mach in his wonderfully original little work 'Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen,' p.
57, describes an artificial way of getting translocation, and explains the effect likewise by the feeling
of innervation. "Turn your eyes," he says, "as far as possible towards the left and press against the
right sides of the orbits two large lumps of putty. If you then try to look as quickly as possible
towards the right, this succeeds, on account of the incompletely spherical form of the eyes, only
imperfectly, and the objects consequently appear translocated very considerably towards the right.
The bare will to look rightwards gives to all images on the retina a greater rightwards value, to
express it shortly. The experiment is at first surprising."—I regret to say that I cannot myself make it
succeed—I know not for what reason. But even where it does succeed it seems to me that the
conditions are much too complicated for Professor Mach's theoretic conclusions to be safely drawn.
The putty squeezed into the orbit, and the pressure of the eyeball against it must give rise to
peripheral sensations strong enough, at any rate (if only of the right kind), to justify any amount of
false perception of our eyeball's position, quite apart from the innervation feelings which Professor
Mach supposes to coexist.

[453] An illusion in principle exactly analogous to that of the patient under discussion can be
produced experimentally in anyone in a way which Hering has described in his Lehre von
Binocularen Sehen, pp. 13-14. I will quote Helmholtz's account of it, which is especially valuable as
coming from a believer in the Innervationsgefühl: "Let the two eyes first look parallel, then let the
right eye be closed whilst the left still looks at the infinitely distant object a. The directions of both
eyes will thus remain unaltered, and a will be seen in its right place. Now accommodate the left eye
for a point f [a needle in Hering's experiment] lying on the optical axis between it and a, only very
near. The position of the left eye and its optical axis, as well as the place of the retinal image upon
it... are wholly unaltered by this movement. But the consequence is that an apparent movement of the
object occurs—a movement towards the left. As soon as we accommodate again for distance the
object returns to its old place. Now what alters itself in this experiment is only the position of the
closed right eye: its optical axis, when the effort is made to accommodate for the point f, also
converges towards this point.... Conversely it is possible for me to make my optical axes diverge,
even with closed eyes, so that in the above experiment the right eye should turn far to the right of a.
This divergence is but slowly reached, and gives me therefore no illusory movement. But when I
suddenly relax my effort to make it, and the right optical axis springs back to the parallel position, I
immediately see the object which the left eye fixates shift its position towards the left. Thus not only
the position of the seeing eye a, but also that of the closed eye b, influences our judgment of the
direction in which the seen object lies. The open eye remaining fixed, and the closed eye moving
towards the right or left, the object seen by the open eye appears also to move towards the right or
left" (Physiol. Optik, pp. 607-8.)
[454] Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen, p. 65.
[455] P. 68.
[456] I owe the interpretation in the text to my friend and former student, Mr. E. S. Drown, whom I
set to observe the phenomenon before I had observed it myself. Concerning the vacillations in our
interpretation of relative motion over retina and skin, see above, p. 173.
Herr Münsterberg gives additional reasons against the feeling of innervation, of which I will quote a
couple. First, our ideas of movement are all faint ideas, resembling in this the copies of sensations in
memory. Were they feelings of the outgoing discharge, they would be original states of
consciousness, not copies; and ought by analogy to be vivid like other original states.—Second, our
unstriped muscles yield no feelings in contracting, nor can they be contracted at will, differing thus in
two peculiarities from the voluntary muscles. What more natural than to suppose that the two
peculiarities hang together, and that the reason why we cannot contract our intestines, for example, at
will, is, that we have no memory-images of how their contraction feels? Were the supposed
innervation-feeling always the 'mental cue,' one doesn't see why we might not have it even where, as
here, the contractions themselves are unfelt, and why it might not bring the contractions about. (Die
Willenshandlung, pp 87-8.)
[457] Revue Philosophique, xxiii. 442.
[458] Ibid. xx. 604.
[459] Herr Sternberg (Pflüger's Archiv, xxxvii. p. 1) thinks that he proves the feeling of innervation
by the fact that when we have willed to make a movement we generally think that it is made. We
have already seen some of the facts on pp. 105-6, above. S. cites from Exner the fact that if we put a
piece of hard rubber between our back teeth and bite, our front teeth seem actually to approach each
other, although it is physically impossible for them to do so. He proposes the following experiment:
Lay the palm of the hand on a table with the forefinger overlapping its edge and flexed back as far as
possible, whilst the table keeps the other fingers extended; then try to flex the terminal joint of the
forefinger without looking. You do not do it, and yet you think that you do. Here again the

innervation, according to the author, is felt as an executed movement. It seems to me, as I said in the
previous place, that the illusion is in all these cases due to the inveterate association of ideas.
Normally our will to move has always been followed by the sensation that we have moved, except
when the simultaneous sensation of an external resistance was there. The result is that where we feel
no external resistance, and the muscles and tendons tighten, the invariably associated idea is intense
enough to be hallucinatory. In the experiment with the teeth, the resistance customarily met with
when our masseters contract is a soft one. We do not close our teeth on a thing like hard rubber once
in a million times; so when we do so, we imagine the habitual result.—Persons with amputated limbs
more often than not continue to feel them as if they were still there, and can, moreover, give
themselves the feeling of moving them at will. The life-long sensorial associate of the idea of
'working one's toes,' e.g. (uncorrected by any opposite sensation, since no real sensation of nonmovement can come from non-existing toes), follows the idea and swallows it up. The man thinks
that his toes are 'working' (cf. Proceedings of American Soc. for Psych. Research, p. 249).
Herr Loeb also comes to the rescue of the feeling of innervation with observations of his own made
after my text was written, but they convince me no more than the arguments of others. Loeb's facts
are these (Pflüger's Archiv, xliv. p. 1): If we stand before a vertical surface, and if, with our hands at
different heights, we simultaneously make with them what seem to us equally extensive movements,
that movement always turns out really shorter which is made with the arm whose muscles (in virtue
of the arm's position) are already the more contracted. The same result ensues when the arms are
laterally unsymmetrical. Loeb assumes that both arms contract by virtue of a common innervation,
but that although this innervation is relatively less effective upon the more contracted arm, our
feeling of its equal strength overpowers the disparity of the incoming sensations of movement which
the two limbs send back, and makes us think that the spaces they traverse are the same. "The
sensation of the extent and direction of our voluntary movements depends accordingly upon the
impulse of our will to move, and not upon the feelings set up by the motion in the active organ." Now
if this is the elementary law which Loeb calls it, why does it only manifest its effect when both hands
are moving simultaneously? Why not when the same hand makes successive movements? and
especially why not when both hands move symmetrically or at the same level, but one of them is
weighted? A weighted hand surely requires a stronger innervation than an unweighted one to move
an equal distance upwards; and yet, as Loeb confesses, we do not tend to overestimate the path which
it traverses under these circumstances. The fact is that the illusion which Loeb has studied is a
complex resultant of many factors. One of them, it seems to me, is an instinctive tendency to revert to
the type of the bilateral movements of childhood. In adult life we move our arms for the most part in
alternation; but in infancy the free movements of the arms are almost always similar on both sides,
symmetrical when the direction of motion is horizontal, and with the hands on the same level when it
is vertical. The most natural innervation, when the movements are rapidly performed, is one which
takes the movement hack to this form. Our estimation meanwhile of the lengths severally traversed
by the two hands is mainly based, as such estimations with closed eyes usually are (see Loeb's own
earlier paper, Untersuchungen über den Fühlraum der Hand, in Pflüger's Archiv, xli. 107), upon the
apparent velocity and duration of the movement. The duration is the same for both hands, since the
movements begin and end simultaneously. The velocities of the two hands are under the experimental
conditions almost impossible of comparison. It is well known how imperfect a discrimination of
weights we have when we 'heft' them simultaneously, one in either hand; and G. E. Müller has well
shown (Pflüger's Archiv, xlv. 57) that the velocity of the lift is the main factor in determining our
judgment of weight. It is hardly possible to conceive of more unfavorable conditions for making an
accurate comparison of the length of two movements than those which govern the experiments which
are under discussion. The only prominent sign is the duration, which would lead us to infer the
equality of the two movements. We consequently deem them equal, though a native tendency in our
motor centres keeps them from being so.

[460] This is by no means an unplausible opinion. See Vol. I. p. 65.
[461] Maine de Biran, Royer Collard, Sir John Herschel, Dr. Carpenter, Dr. Martineau, all seem to
posit a force-sense by which, in becoming aware of an outer resistance to our will, we are taught the
existence of an outer world. I hold that every peripheral sensation gives us an outer world. An insect
crawling on our skin gives us as 'outward' an impression as a hundred pounds weighing on our back.
—I have read M. A. Bertrand's criticism of my views (La Psychologie de l'Effort, 1889); but as he
seems to think that I deny the feeling of effort altogether, I can get no profit from it, despite his
charming way of saying things.
[462] Bowditch and Southard in Journal of Physiology, vol. iii. No. 3. It was found in these
experiments that the maximum of accuracy was reached when two seconds of time elapsed between
locating the object by eye or hand and starting to touch it. When the mark was located with one hand,
and the other hand had to touch it, the error was considerably greater than when the same hand both
located and touched it.
[463] The same caution must be shown in discussing pathological cases. There are remarkable
discrepancies in the effects of peripheral anæsthesia upon the voluntary power. Such cases as I
quoted in the text (p. 490) are by no means the only type. In those cases the patients could move their
limbs accurately when the eyes were open, and inaccurately when they were shut. In other cases,
however, the anæsthetic patients cannot move their limbs at all when the eyes are shut. (For reports
of two such cases see Bastian in 'Brain,' Binet in Rev. Philos., xxv. 478.) M. Binet explains these
(hysterical) cases as requiring the 'dynamogenic' stimulus of light (see above, p. 377). They might,
however, be cases of such congenitally defective optical imagination that the 'mental cue' was
normally 'tactile;' and that when this tactile cue failed through functional inertness of the kinæsthetic
centres, the only optical cue strong enough to determine the discharge had to be an actual sensation
of the eye.—There is still a third class of cases in which the limbs have lost all sensibility, even for
movements passively imprinted, but in which voluntary movements can be accurately executed even
when the eyes are closed. MM. Binet and Féré have reported some of these interesting cases, which
are found amongst the hysterical hemianæsthetics. They can, for example, write accurately at will,
although their eyes are closed and they have no feeling of the writing taking place, and many of them
do not know when it begins or stops. Asked to write repeatedly the letter a, and then say how many
times they have written it, some are able to assign the number and some are not. Some of them admit
that they are guided by visual imagination of what is being done. Cf. Archives de Physiologie, Oct.
1887, pp. 363-5. Now it would seem at first sight that feelings of outgoing innervation must exist in
these cases and be kept account of. There are no other guiding impressions, either immediate or
remote, of which the patient is conscious; and unless feelings of innervation be there, the writing
would seem miraculous. But if such feelings are present in these cases, and suffice to direct
accurately the succession of movements, why do they not suffice in those other anæsthetic cases in
which movement becomes disorderly when the eyes are closed? Innervation is there, or there would
be no movement; why is the feeling of the innervation gone? The truth seems to be, as M. Binet
supposes (Rev. Philos., xxiii. p. 479), that these cases are not arguments for the feeling of
innervation. They are pathological curiosities; and the patients are not really anæsthetic, but are
victims of that curious dissociation or splitting-off of one part of their consciousness from the rest
which we are just beginning to understand, thanks to Messrs. Janet, Binet, and Gurney, and in which
the split-off part (in this case the kinæsthetic sensations) may nevertheless remain to produce its
usual effects. Compare what was said above, p. 491.
[464] Medicinische Psychologie, p. 293. In his admirably acute chapter on the Will this author has
most explicitly maintained the position that what we call muscular exertion is an afferent and not an
efferent feeling; "We must affirm universally that in the muscular feeling we are not sensible of the
force on its way to produce an effect, but only of the sufferance already produced in our movable

organs, the muscles, after the force has, in a manner unobservable by us, exerted upon them its
causality" (p. 311). How often the battles of psychology have to be fought over again, each time with
heavier armies and bigger trains, though not always with such able generals!
[465] Ch. Féré: Sensation et Mouvement (1887), chapter iii.
[466] Professor A. Bain (Senses and Intellect, pp 336-48) and Dr. W. B. Carpenter (Mental
Physiology, chap. vi) give examples in abundance.
[467] For a full account, by an expert, of the 'willing-game,' see Mr. Stuart Cumberland's article: A
Thought-reader's Experiences in the Nineteenth century, xx. 867. M. Gley has given a good example
of ideo-motor action in the Bulletins de la Société de Psychologie Physiologique for 1889. Tell a
person to think intently of a certain name, and saying that you will then force her to write it, let her
hold a pencil, and do you yourself hold her hand. She will then probably trace the name involuntarily,
believing that you are forcing her to do it.
[468] I abstract here from the fact that a certain intensity of the consciousness is required for its
impulsiveness to be effective in a complete degree. There is an inertia in the motor processes as in all
other natural things. In certain individuals, and at certain times (disease, fatigue), the inertia is
unusually great, and we may then have ideas of action which produce no visible act, but discharge
themselves into merely nascent dispositions to activity or into emotional expression. The inertia of
the motor parts here plays the same rôle as is elsewhere played by antagonistic ideas. We shall
consider this restrictive inertia later on, it obviously introduces no essential alteration into the law
which the text lays down.
[469] I use the common phraseology here for mere convenience' sake. The reader who has made
himself acquainted with Chapter IX will always understand, when he hears of many ideas
simultaneously present to the mind and acting upon each other, that what is really meant is a mind
with one idea before it, of many objects, purposes, reasons, motives, related to each other, some in a
harmonious and some in an antagonistic way. With this caution I shall not hesitate from time to time
to fall into the popular Lockian speech, erroneous though I believe it to be.
[470] My attention was first emphatically called to this class of decisions by my colleague, Professor
C. C. Everett.
[471] In an excellent article on The 'Mental Qualities of an Athlete' in the Harvard Monthly, vol. vi.
p. 43, Mr. A. T. Dudley assigns the first place to the rapidly impulsive temperament. "Ask him how,
in some complex trick, he performed a certain act, why he pushed or pulled at a certain instant, and
he will tell you he does not know; he did it by instinct; or rather his nerves and muscles did it of
themselves.... Here is the distinguishing feature of the good player: the good player, confident in his
training and his practice, in the critical game trusts entirely to his impulse, and does not think out
every move. The poor player, unable to trust his impulsive actions, is compelled to think carefully all
the time. He thus not only loses the opportunities through his slowness in comprehending the whole
situation, but, being compelled to think rapidly all the time, at critical points becomes confused;
while the first-rate player, not trying to reason, but acting as impulse directs, is continually
distinguishing himself and plays the better under the greater pressure."
[472] T. B. Clouston, Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases (London 1883), pp. 310-318.
[473] In his Maladies de la Volonté, p. 77.
[474] For other cases of 'impulsive insanity,' see H. Maudsley's Responsibility in Mental Disease, pp.
133-170, and Forbes Winslow's Obscure Diseases of the Mind and Brain, chapters vi, vii, viii.
[475] Quoted by G. Burr, in an article on the Insanity of Inebriety in the N. Y. Psychological and
Medico-Legal Journal, Dec. 1874.

[476] Autobiography, Howells' edition (1877), pp. 192-6.
[477] See a paper on Insistent and Fixed Ideas by Dr. Cowles in American Journal of Psychology, i.
222; and another on the so-called Insanity of Doubt by Dr. Knapp, ibid. iii. 1. The latter contains a
partial bibliography of the subject.
[478] Quoted by Ribot, op cit. p. 39.
[479] The silliness of the old-fashioned pleasure-philosophy saute aux yeux. Take, for example, Prof.
Bain's explanation of sociability and parental love by the pleasures of touch: "Touch is the
fundamental and generic sense.... Even after the remaining senses are differentiated, the primary
sense continues to be a leading susceptibility of the mind. The soft warm touch, if not a first-class
influence, is at least an approach to that. The combined power of soft contact and warmth amounts to
a considerable pitch of massive pleasure; while there may be subtle influences not reducible to these
two heads, such as we term, from not knowing anything about them, magnetic or electric. The sort of
thrill from taking a baby in arms is something beyond mere warm touch; and it may rise to the
ecstatic height, in which case, however, there may be concurrent sensations and ideas.... In mere
tender emotion not sexual, there is nothing but the sense of touch to gratify, unless we assume the
occult magnetic influences.... In a word, our love pleasures begin and end in sensual contact. Touch is
both the alpha and omega of affection. As the terminal and satisfying sensation, the ne plus ultra, it
must be a pleasure of the highest degree.... Why should a more lively feeling grow up towards a
fellow-being than towards a perennial fountain? [This 'should' is simply delicious from the more
modern evolutionary point of view.] It must be that there is a source of pleasure in the companionship
of other sentient creatures, over and above the help afforded by them in obtaining the necessaries of
life. To account for this, I can suggest nothing but the primary and independent pleasure of the
animal embrace." [Mind, this is said not of the sexual interest, but of 'Sociability at Large.'] "For this
pleasure every creature is disposed to pay something, even when it is only fraternal. A certain amount
of material benefit imparted is a condition of the full heartiness of a responding embrace, the
complete fruition of this primitive joy. In the absence of those conditions the pleasure of giving ...
can scarcely be accounted for; we know full well that, without these helps, it would be a very meagre
sentiment in beings like ourselves.... It seems to me that there must be at the [parental instinct's]
foundation that intense pleasure in the embrace of the young which we find to characterize the
parental feeling throughout. Such a pleasure once created would associate itself with the prevailing
features and aspects of the young, and give to all of these their very great interest. For the sake of the
pleasure, the parent discovers the necessity of nourishing the subject of it, and comes to regard the
ministering function as a part or condition of the delight" (Emotions and Will, pp. 126, 127, 132, 133,
140). Prof. Bain does not explain why a satin cushion kept at about 98º F. would not on the whole
give us the pleasure in question more cheaply than our friends and babies do. It is true that the
cushion might lack the 'occult magnetic influences.' Most of us would say that neither a baby's nor a
friend's skin would possess them, were not a tenderness already there. The youth who feels ecstasy
shoot through him when by accident the silken palm or even the 'vesture's hem' of his idol touches
him, would hardly feel it were he not hard hit by Cupid in advance. The love creates the ecstasy, not
the ecstasy the love. And for the rest of us can it possibly be that all our social virtue springs from an
appetite for the sensual pleasure of having our hand shaken, or being slapped on the back?
[480] Emotion and Will, p. 352. But even Bain's own description belies his formula, for the idea
appears as the 'moving' and the pleasure as the 'directing' force.
[481] P. 398.
[482] P. 354.
[483] P. 355.
[484] P. 390.

[485] Pp. 295-6.
[486] P. 121.
[487] Cf. also Bain's note to Jas. Mill's Analysis, vol. ii. p. 305.
[488] How much clearer Hume's head was than that of his disciples! "It has been proved beyond all
controversy that even the passions commonly esteemed selfish carry the Mind beyond self directly to
the object; that though the satisfaction of these passions gives us enjoyment, yet the prospect of this
enjoyment is not the cause of the passions but, on the contrary, the passion is antecedent to the
enjoyment, and without the former the latter could never possibly exist," etc. (Essay on the Different
Species of Philosophy, § 1, note near the end.)
[489] In favor of the view in the text, one may consult H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, book i. chap.
iv; T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, bk. iii. chap. i. p. 179; Carpenter, Mental Physiol., chap vi; J.
Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, part ii, bk. i, chap. ii. i, and bk. ii, branch i. chap. i. i. § 3.
Against it see Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, chap. ii. § ii; H. Spencer, Data of Ethics, §§ 9-15; D.
G. Thompson, System of Psychology, part ix, and Mind, vi. 62. Also Bain, Senses and Intellect, 73844; Emotions and Will, 436.
[490] This sentence is written from the author's own consciousness. But many persons say that where
they disbelieve in the effects ensuing, as in the case of the table, they cannot will it. They "cannot
exert a volition that a table should move." This personal difference may be partly verbal. Different
people may attach different connotations to the word 'will.' But I incline to think that we differ
psychologically as well. When one knows that he has no power, one's desire of a thing is called a
wish and not a will. The sense of impotence inhibits the volition. Only by abstracting from the
thought of the impossibility am I able to imagine strongly the table sliding over the floor, to make the
bodily 'effort' which I do, and to will it to come towards me. It may be that some people are unable to
perform this abstraction, and that the image of the table stationary on the floor inhibits the
contradictory image of its moving, which is the object to be willed.
[491] A normal palsy occurs during sleep. We will all sorts of motions in our dreams, but seldom
perform any of them. In nightmare we become conscious of the non-performance, and make a
muscular 'effort.' This seems then to occur in a restricted way, limiting itself to the occlusion of the
glottis and producing the respiratory anxiety which wakes us up.
[492] Both resolves and beliefs have of course immediate motor consequences of a quasi-emotional
sort, changes of breathing, of attitude, internal speech movements, etc.; but these movements are not
the objects resolved on or believed. The movements in common volition are the objects willed.
[493] This volitional effort pure and simple must be carefully distinguished from the muscular effort
with which it is usually confounded. The latter consists of all those peripheral feelings to which a
muscular 'exertion' may give rise. These feelings, whenever they are massive and the body is not
'fresh,' are rather disagreeable, especially when accompanied by stopped breath, congested head,
bruised skin of fingers, toes, or shoulders, and strained joints. And it is only as thus disagreeable that
the mind must make its volitional effort in stably representing their reality and consequently bringing
it about. That they happen to be made real by muscular activity is a purely accidental circumstance.
A soldier standing still to be fired at expects disagreeable sensations from his muscular passivity. The
action of his will, in sustaining the expectation, is identical with that required for a painful muscular
effort. What is hard for both is facing an idea as real.
Where much muscular effort is not needed or where the 'freshness' is very great, the volitional effort
is not required to sustain the idea of movement, which comes then and stays in virtue of association's
simpler laws. More commonly, however, muscular effort involves volitional effort as well. Exhausted
with fatigue and wet and watching, the sailor on a wreck throws himself down to rest. But hardly are

his limbs fairly relaxed, when the order 'To the pumps!' again sounds in his ears. Shall he, can he,
obey it? Is it not better just to let his aching body lie, and let the ship go down if she will? So he lies
on, till, with a desperate heave of the will, at last he staggers to his legs, and to his task again. Again,
there are instances where the fiat demands great volitional effort though the muscular exertion be
insignificant, e.g., the getting out of bed and bathing one's self on a cold morning.
[494] Cf. Aristotle's Nichomachæan Ethics, vii. 3; also a discussion of the doctrine of 'The Practical
Syllogism' in Sir A. Grant's edition of this work, 2d ed. vol. i. p. 212 ff.
[495] The Duality of the Mind, pp. 141-2. Another case from the same book (p. 123): "A gentleman
of respectable birth, excellent education, and ample fortune, engaged in one of the highest
departments of trade,... and being induced to embark in one of the plausible speculations of the day ...
was utterly ruined. Like other men he could bear a sudden overwhelming reverse better than a long
succession of petty misfortunes, and the way in which he conducted himself on the occasion met with
unbounded admiration from his friends. He withdrew, however, into rigid seclusion, and being no
longer able to exercise the generosity and indulge the benevolent feelings which had formed the
happiness of his life, made himself a substitute for them by daydreams, gradually fell into a state of
irritable despondency, from which he only gradually recovered with the loss of reason. He now
fancied himself possessed of immense wealth, and gave without stint his imaginary riches. He has
ever since been under gentle restraint, and leads a life not merely of happiness, but of bliss; converses
rationally, reads the newspapers, where every tale of distress attracts his notice, and being furnished
with an abundant supply of blank checks, he fills up one of them with a munificent sum, sends it off
to the sufferer, and sits down to his dinner with a happy conviction that he has earned the right to a
little indulgence in the pleasures of the table; and yet, on a serious conversation with one of his old
friends, he is quite conscious of his real position, but the conviction is so exquisitely painful that he
will not let himself believe it."
[496] 'Le Sentiment de l'Effort, et la Conscience de l'Action,' in Revue Philosophique, xxviii. 561.
[497] P. 577.
[498] They will be found indicated, in somewhat popular form, in a lecture on 'The Dilemma of
Determinism,' published in the Unitarian Review (of Boston) for September 1884 (vol. xxii. p. 193).
[499] See Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens, pp. 594-5; and compare the conclusion of our own
chapter on Attention, Vol. I. pp. 448-454.
[500] Thus at least I interpret Prof. Lipps's words: "Wir wissen uns naturgemäss in jedem Streben
umsomehr aktiv, je mehr unser ganzes Ich bei dem Streben beheiligt ist," u. s. w. (p. 601).
[501] Such ejaculations as Mr. Spencer's: "Psychical changes either conform to law or they do not. If
they do not, this work, in common with all works on the subject, is sheer nonsense: no science of
Psychology is possible" (Principles of Psychology, i. 503),—are beneath criticism. Mr. Spencer's
work, like all the other 'works on the subject,' treats of those general conditions of possible conduct
within which all our real decisions must fall no matter whether their effort be small or great.
However closely psychical changes may conform to law, it is safe to say that individual histories and
biographies will never be written in advance no matter how 'evolved' psychology may become.
[502] Caricatures of the kind of supposition which free will demands abound in deterministic
literature. The following passage from John Fiske's Cosmic Philosophy (pt. ii. chap. xvii) is an
example: "If volitions arise without cause, it necessarily follows that we cannot infer from them the
character of the antecedent states of feeling. If, therefore, a murder has been committed, we have a
priori no better reason for suspecting the worst enemy than the best friend of the murdered man. If
we see a man jump from a fourth-story window, we must beware of too hastily inferring his insanity,
since he may be merely exercising his free-will; the intense love of life implanted in the human

breast being, as it seems, unconnected with attempts at suicide or at self-preservation. We can thus
frame no theory of human actions whatever. The countless empirical maxims of every-day life, the
embodiment as they are of the inherited and organized sagacity of many generations, become wholly
incompetent to guide us; and nothing which any one may do ought ever to occasion surprise. The
mother may strangle her first-born child, the miser may cast his long-treasured gold into the sea, the
sculptor may break in pieces his lately-finished statue, in the presence of no other feelings than those
which before led them to cherish, to hoard, and to create.
"To state these conclusions is to refute their premise. Probably no defender of the doctrine of freewill could be induced to accept them, even to save the theorem with which they are inseparably
wrapped up. Yet the dilemma cannot be avoided. Volitions are either caused or they are not. If they
are not caused, an inexorable logic brings us to the absurdities just mentioned. If they are caused, the
free-will doctrine is annihilated.... In truth, the immediate corollaries of the free-will doctrine are so
shocking, not only to philosophy but to common-sense, that were not accurate thinking a somewhat
rare phenomenon, it would be inexplicable how any credit should ever have been given to such a
dogma. This is but one of the many instances in which by the force of words alone men have been
held subject to chronic delusion.... Attempting, as the free-will philosophers do, to destroy the
science of history, they are compelled by an inexorable logic to pull down with it the cardinal
principles of ethics, politics, and jurisprudence. Political economy, if rigidly dealt with on their
theory, would fare little better; and psychology would become chaotic jargon.... The denial of
causation is the affirmation of chance, and 'between the theory of Chance and the theory of Law there
can be no compromise, no reciprocity, no borrowing and lending.' To write history on any method
furnished by the free-will doctrine would be utterly impossible."—All this comes from Mr. Fiske's
not distinguishing between the possibles which really tempts man and those which tempt him not at
all. Free-will, like psychology, deals with the former possibles exclusively.
[503] On the education of the Will from a pedagogic point of view, see an article by G. Stanley Hall
in the Princeton Review for November 1882, and some bibliographic references there contained.
[504] See his Emotions and Will, 'The Will,' chap. i. I take the name of random movements from
Sully, Outlines of Psychology, p. 593.
[505] This figure and the following ones are purely schematic, and must not be supposed to involve
any theory about protoplasmatic and axis-cylinder processes. The latter, according to Golgi and
others, emerge from the base of the cell, and each cell has but one. They alone form a nervous
network. The reader will of course also understand that none of the hypothetical constructions which
I make from now to the end of the chapter are proposed as definite accounts of what happens. All I
aim at is to make it clear in some more or less symbolic fashion that the formation of new paths, the
learning of habits, etc., is in some mechanical way conceivable. Compare what was said in Vol. I. p.
81, note.
[506] The Nervous System and the Mind (1888), pp. 75-6.
[507] Compare Vol. I. pp. 137, 142.
[508] That is, the direction towards the motor cells.
[509] This brain-scheme seems oddly enough to give a certain basis of reality to those hideously
fabulous performances of the Herbartian Vorstellungen. Herbart says that when one idea is inhibited
by another it fuses with that other and thereafter helps it to ascend into consciousness. Inhibition is
thus the basis of association in both schemes, for the 'draining' of which the text speaks is tantamount
to an inhibition of the activity of the cells which are drained, which inhibition makes the inhibited
revive the inhibiter on later occasions.
[510] See the luminous passage in Münsterberg: Die Willenshandlung, pp. 144-5.

[511] L. Lange's and Münsterberg's experiments with 'shortened' or 'muscular' reaction-time (see Vol.
I. p. 432) show how potent a fact dynamically this anticipatory preparation of a whole set of possible
drainage-channels is.
[512] Even as the proofs of these pages are passing through my hands, I receive Heft 2 of the
Zeitschrift für Psychologie u. Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, in which the irrepressible young
Münsterberg publishes experiments to show that there is no association between successive ideas,
apart from intervening movements. As my explanations have assumed that an earlier excited sensory
cell drains a later one, his experiments and inferences would, if sound, upset all my hypotheses. I
therefore can (at this late moment) only refer the reader to Herr M.'s article, hoping to review the
subject again myself in another place.

CHAPTER XXVII.

HYPNOTISM.
MODES OF OPERATING, AND SUSCEPTIBILITY.
The 'hypnotic,' 'mesmeric,' or 'magnetic' trance can be induced in various
ways, each operator having his pet method. The simplest one is to leave the
subject seated by himself, telling him that if he close his eyes and relax his
muscles and, as far as possible, think of vacancy, in a few minutes he will
'go off.' On returning in ten minutes you may find him effectually
hypnotized. Braid used to make his subjects look at a bright button held
near their forehead until their eyes spontaneously closed. The older
mesmerists made 'passes' in a downward direction over the face and body,
but without contact. Stroking the skin of the head, face, arms and hands,
especially that of the region round the brows and eyes, will have the same
effect. Staring into the eyes of the subject until the latter droop, making him
listen to a watch's ticking; or simply making him close his eyes for a minute
whilst you describe to him the feeling of falling into sleep, 'talk sleep' to
him, are equally efficacious methods in the hands of some operators; whilst
with trained subjects any method whatever from which they have been led
by previous suggestion to expect results will be successful.[513] The
touching of an object which they are told has been 'magnetized,' the
drinking of 'magnetized' water, the reception of a letter ordering them to
sleep, etc., are means which have been frequently employed. Recently M.

Liégeois has hypnotized some of his subjects at a distance of 1 1/2
kilometres by giving them an intimation to that effect through a telephone.
With some subjects, if you tell them in advance that at a certain hour of a
certain day they will become entranced, the prophecy is fulfilled. Certain
hysterical patients are immediately thrown into hypnotic catalepsy by any
violent sensation, such as a blow on a gong or the flashing of an intense
light in their eyes. Pressure on certain parts of the body (called zones
hypnogènes by M. Pitres) rapidly produces hypnotic sleep in some
hysterics. These regions, which differ in different subjects, are oftenest
found on the forehead and about the root of the thumbs. Finally, persons in
ordinary sleep may be transferred into the hypnotic condition by verbal
intimation or contact, performed so gently as not to wake them up.

Some operators appear to be more successful than others in getting control
of their subjects. I am informed that Mr. Gurney (who made valuable
contributions to the theory of hypnotism) was never able himself to
hypnotize, and had to use for his observations the subjects of others. On the
other hand, Dr. Liébeault claims that he hypnotizes 92% of all comers, and
Wetterstrand in Stockholm says that amongst 718 persons there proved to
be only 18 whom he failed to influence. Some of this disparity is
unquestionably due to differences in the personal 'authority' of the operator,
for the prime condition of success is that the subject should confidently
expect to be entranced. Much also depends on the operator's tact in
interpreting the physiognomy of his subjects, so as to give the right
commands, and 'crowd it on' to the subject, at just the propitious moments.
These conditions account for the fact that operators grow more successful
the more they operate. Bernheim says that whoever does not hypnotize 80
per cent of the persons whom he tries has not yet learned to operate as he
should. Whether certain operators have over and above this a peculiar
'magnetic power' is a question which I leave at present undecided.[514]
Children under three or four, and insane persons, especially idiots, are
unusually hard to hypnotize. This seems due to the impossibility of getting
them to fix their attention continuously on the idea of the coming trance.
All ages above infancy are probably equally hypnotizable, as are all races

and both sexes. A certain amount of mental training, sufficient to aid
concentration of the attention, seems a favorable condition, and so does a
certain momentary indifference or passivity as to the result. Native strength
or weakness of 'will' have absolutely nothing to do with the matter.
Frequent trances enormously increase the susceptibility of a subject, and
many who resist at first succumb after several trials. Dr. Moll says he has
more than once succeeded after forty fruitless attempts. Some experts are of
the opinion that every one is hypnotizable essentially, the only difficulty
being the more habitual presence in some individuals of hindering mental
preoccupations, which, however, may suddenly at some moment be
removed.

The trance may be dispelled instantaneously by saying in a rousing voice,
'All right, wake up!' or words of similar purport. At the Salpétrière they
awaken subjects by blowing on their eyelids. Upward passes have an
awakening effect; sprinkling cold water ditto. Anything will awaken a
patient who expects to be awakened by that thing. Tell him that he will
wake after counting five, and he will do so. Tell him to waken in five
minutes, and he is very likely to do so punctually, even though he interrupt
thereby some exciting histrionic performance which you may have
suggested.—As Dr. Moll says, any theory which pretends to explain the
physiology of the hypnotic state must keep account of the fact that so
simple a thing as hearing the word 'wake!' will end it.
THEORIES ABOUT THE HYPNOTIC STATE.
The intimate nature of the hypnotic condition, when once induced, can
hardly be said to be understood. Without entering into details of
controversy, one may say that three main opinions have been held
concerning it, which we may call respectively the theories of
1. Animal magnetism;
2. of Neurosis; and finally of
3. Suggestion.

According to the animal-magnetism theory there is a direct passage of force
from the operator to the subject, whereby the latter becomes the former's
puppet. This theory is nowadays given up as regards all the ordinary
hypnotic phenomena, and is only held to by some persons as an explanation
of a few effects exceptionally met with.

According to the neurosis-theory, the hypnotic state is a peculiar
pathological condition into which certain predisposed patients fall, and in
which special physical agents have the power of provoking special
symptoms, quite apart from the subjects mentally expecting the effect.
Professor Charcot and his colleagues at the Salpétrière hospital admit that
this condition is rarely found in typical form. They call it then le grand
hypnotisme, and say that it accompanies the disease hystero-epilepsy. If a
patient subject to this sort of hypnotism hear a sudden loud noise, or look at
a bright light unexpectedly, she falls into the cataleptic trance. Her limbs
and body offer no resistance to movements communicated to them, but
retain permanently the attitudes impressed. The eyes are staring, there is
insensibility to pain, etc., etc. If the eyelids be forcibly closed, the cataleptic
gives place to the lethargic condition, characterized by apparent abolition of
consciousness, and absolute muscular relaxation except where the muscles
are kneaded or the tendons struck by the operator's hand, or certain nervetrunks are pressed upon. Then the muscles in question, or those supplied by
the same nerve-trunk enter into a more or less steadfast tonic contraction.
Charcot calls this symptom by the name of neuro-muscular
hyperexcitability. The lethargic state may be primarily brought on by
fixedly looking at anything, or by pressure on the closed eyeballs. Friction
on the top of the head will make the patient pass from either of the two
preceding conditions into the somnambulic state, in which she is alert,
talkative, and susceptible to all the suggestions of the operator. The
somnambulic state may also be induced primarily, by fixedly looking at a
small object. In this state the accurately limited muscular contractions
characteristic of lethargy do not follow upon the above-described
manipulations, but instead of them there is a tendency to rigidity of entire
regions of the body, which may upon occasion develop into general tetanus,

and which is brought about by gently touching the skin or blowing upon it.
M. Charcot calls this by the name of cutaneo-muscular hyperexcitability.
Many other symptoms, supposed by their observers to be independent of
mental expectation, are described, of which I only will mention the more
interesting. Opening the eyes of a patient in lethargy causes her to pass into
catalepsy. If one eye only be opened, the corresponding half of the body
becomes cataleptic, whilst the other half remains in lethargy. Similarly,
rubbing one side of the head may result in a patient becoming hemilethargic
or hemicataleptic and hemisomnambulic. The approach of a magnet (or
certain metals) to the skin causes these half-states (and many others) to be
transferred to the opposite sides. Automatic repetition of every sound heard
('echolalia') is said to be produced by pressure on the lower cervical
vertebræ or on the epigastrium. Aphasia is brought about by rubbing the
head over the region of the speech-centre. Pressure behind the occiput
determines movements of imitation. Heidenhain describes a number of
curious automatic tendencies to movement, which are brought about by
stroking various portions of the vertebral column. Certain other symptoms
have been frequently noticed, such as a flushed face and cold hands,
brilliant and congested eyes, dilated pupils. Dilated retinal vessels and
spasm of the accommodation are also reported.

The theory of Suggestion denies that there is any special hypnotic state
worthy of the name of trance or neurosis. All the symptoms above
described, as well as those to be described hereafter, are results of that
mental susceptibility which we all to some degree possess, of yielding
assent to outward suggestion, of affirming what we strongly conceive, and
of acting in accordance with what we are made to expect. The bodily
symptoms of the Salpétrière patients are all of them results of expectation
and training. The first patients accidentally did certain things which their
doctors thought typical and caused to be repeated. The subsequent subjects
'caught on' and followed the established tradition. In proof of this the fact is
urged that the classical three stages and their grouped symptoms have only
been reported as spontaneously occurring, so far, at the Salpétrière, though
they may be superinduced by deliberate suggestion, in patients anywhere

found. The ocular symptoms, the flushed face, accelerated breathing, etc.,
are said not to be symptoms of the passage into the hypnotic state as such,
but merely consequences of the strain on the eyes when the method of
looking at a bright object is used. They are absent in the subjects at Nancy,
where simple verbal suggestion is employed. The various reflex effects
(aphasia, echolalia, imitation, etc.) are but habits induced by the influence
of the operator, who unconsciously urges the subject into the direction in
which he would prefer to have him go. The influence of the magnet, the
opposite effects of upward and downward passes, etc., are similarly
explained. Even that sleepy and inert condition, the advent of which seems
to be the prime condition of farther symptoms being developed, is said to be
merely due to the fact that the mind expects it to come; whilst its influence
on the other symptoms is not physiological, so to speak, but psychical, its
own easy realization by suggestion simply encouraging the subject to
expect that ulterior suggestions will be realized with equal ease. The radical
defenders of the suggestion-theory are thus led to deny the very existence of
the hypnotic state, in the sense of a peculiar trance-like condition which
deprives the patient of spontaneity and makes him passive to suggestion
from without. The trance itself is only one of the suggestions, and many
subjects in fact can be made to exhibit the other hypnotic phenomena
without the preliminary induction of this one.

The theory of suggestion may be said to be quite triumphant at the present
day over the neurosis-theory as held at the Salpétrière, with its three states,
and its definite symptoms supposed to be produced by physical agents apart
from co-operation of the subject's mind. But it is one thing to say this, and it
is quite another thing to say that there is no peculiar physiological condition
whatever worthy of the name of hypnotic trance, no peculiar state of
nervous equilibrium, 'hypotaxy,' 'dissociation,' or whatever you please to
call it, during which the subject's susceptibility to outward suggestion is
greater than at ordinary times. All the facts seem to prove that, until this
trance-like state is assumed by the patient, suggestion produces very
insignificant results, but that, when it is once assumed, there are no limits to
suggestion's power. The state in question has many affinities with ordinary

sleep. It is probable, in fact, that we all pass through it transiently whenever
we fall asleep; and one might most naturally describe the usual relation of
operator and subject by saying that the former keeps the latter suspended
between waking and sleeping by talking to him enough to keep his slumber
from growing profound, and yet not in such a way as to wake him up. A
hynotized patient, left to himself, will either fall sound asleep or wake up
entirely. The difficulty in hypnotizing refractory persons is that of catching
them at the right moment of transition and making it permanent. Fixing the
eyes and relaxing the muscles of the body produce the hypnotic state just as
they facilitate the advent of sleep. The first stages of ordinary sleep are
characterized by a peculiar dispersed attitude of the attention. Images come
before consciousness which are entirely incongruous with our ordinary
beliefs and habits of thought. The latter either vanish altogether or
withdraw, as it were, inertly into the background of the mind, and let the
incongruous images reign alone. These images acquire, moreover, an
exceptional vivacity; they become first 'hypnagogic hallucinations,' and
then, as the sleep grows deeper, dreams. Now the 'mono-ideism,' or else the
impotency and failure to 'rally' on the part of the background-ideas, which
thus characterize somnolescence, are unquestionably the result of a special
physiological change occurring in the brain at that time. Just so that similar
mono-ideism, or dissociation of the reigning fancy from those other
thoughts which might possibly act as its 'reductives,' which characterize the
hypnotic consciousness, must equally be due to a special cerebral change.
The term 'hypnotic trance,' which I employ, tells us nothing of what the
change is, but it marks the fact that it exists, and is consequently a useful
expression. The great vivacity of the hypnotic images (as gauged by their
motor effects), the oblivion of them when normal life is resumed, the abrupt
awakening, the recollection of them again in subsequent trances, the
anæsthesia and hyperæsthesia which are so frequent, all point away from
our simple waking credulity and 'suggestibility' as the type by which the
phenomena are to be interpreted, and make us look rather towards sleep and
dreaming, or towards those deeper alterations of the personality known as
automatism, double consciousness, or 'second' personality for the true
analogues of the hypnotic trance.[515] Even the best hypnotic subjects pass
through life without any one suspecting them to possess such a remarkable
susceptibility, until by deliberate experiment it is made manifest. The
operator fixes their eyes or their attention a short time to develop the

propitious phase, holds them in it by his talk, and the state being there,
makes them the puppets of all his suggestions. But no ordinary suggestions
of waking life ever took such control of their mind.
The suggestion-theory may therefore be approved as correct, provided we
grant the trance-state as its prerequisite. The three states of Charcot, the
strange reflexes of Heidenhain, and all the other bodily phenomena which
have been called direct consequences of the trance-state itself, are not such.
They are products of suggestion, the trance-state having no particular
outward symptoms of its own; but without the trance-state there, those
particular suggestions could never have been successfully made.[516]
THE SYMPTOMS OF THE TRANCE.
This accounts for the altogether indefinite array of symptoms which have
been gathered together as characteristic of the hypnotic state. The law of
habit dominates hypnotic subjects even more than it does waking ones. Any
sort of personal peculiarity, any trick accidentally fallen into in the first
instance by some one subject, may, by attracting attention, become
stereotyped, serve as a pattern for imitation, and figure as the type of a
school. The first subject trains the operator, the operator trains the
succeeding subjects, all of them in perfect good faith conspiring together to
evolve a perfectly arbitrary result. With the extraordinary perspicacity and
subtlety of perception which subjects often display for all that concerns the
operator with whom they are en rapport, it is hard to keep them ignorant of
anything which he expects. Thus it happens that one easily verifies on new
subjects what one has already seen on old ones, or any desired symptom of
which one may have heard or read.
The symptoms earliest observed by writers were all thought to be typical.
But with the multiplication of observed phenomena, the importance of most
particular symptoms as marks of the state has diminished. This lightens
very much our own immediate task. Proceeding to enumerate the symptoms
of the hypnotic trance, I may confine myself to those which are intrinsically
interesting, or which differ considerably from the normal functions of man.

First of all comes amnesia. In the earlier stages of hypnotism the patient
remembers what has happened, but with successive sittings he sinks into a
deeper condition, which is commonly followed by complete loss of
memory. He may have been led through the liveliest hallucinations and
dramatic performances, and have exhibited the intensest apparent emotion,
but on waking he can recall nothing at all. The same thing happens on
waking from sleep in the midst of a dream—it quickly eludes recall. But
just as we may be reminded of it, or of parts of it, by meeting persons or
objects which figured therein, so on being adroitly prompted, the hypnotic
patient will often remember what happened in his trance. One cause of the
forgetfulness seems to be the disconnection of the trance performances with
the system of waking ideas. Memory requires a continuous train of
association. M. Delbœuf, reasoning in this way, woke his subjects in the
midst of an action begun during trance (washing the hands, e.g.), and found
that they then remembered the trance. The act in question bridged over the
two states. But one can often make them remember by merely telling them
during the trance that they shall remember. Acts of one trance, moreover,
are usually recalled, either spontaneously or at command, during another
trance, provided that the contents of the two trances be not mutually
incompatible.
Suggestibility. The patient believes everything which his hypnotizer tells
him, and does everything which the latter commands. Even results over
which the will has normally no control, such as sneezing, secretion,
reddening and growing pale, alterations of temperature and heart-beat,
menstruation, action of the bowels, etc., may take place in consequence of
the operator's firm assertions during the hypnotic trance, and the resulting
conviction on the part of the subject, that the effects will occur. Since
almost all the phenomena yet to be described are effects of this heightened
suggestibility, I will say no more under the general head, but proceed to
illustrate the peculiarity in detail.
Effects on the voluntary muscles seem to be those most easily got; and the
ordinary routine of hypnotizing consists in provoking them first. Tell the
patient that he cannot open his eyes or his mouth, cannot unclasp his hands
or lower his raised arm, cannot rise from his seat, or pick up a certain object
from the floor, and he will be immediately smitten with absolute impotence
in these regards. The effect here is generally due to the involuntary

contraction of antagonizing muscles. But one can equally well suggest
paralysis, of an arm for example, in which case it will hang perfectly placid
by the subject's side. Cataleptic and tetanic rigidity are easily produced by
suggestion, aided by handling the parts. One of the favorite shows at public
exhibitions is that of a subject stretched stiff as a board with his head on one
chair and his heels on another. The cataleptic retention of impressed
attitudes differs from voluntary assumption of the same attitude. An arm
voluntarily held out straight will drop from fatigue after a quarter of an hour
at the utmost, and before it falls the agent's distress will be made manifest
by oscillations in the arm, disturbances in the breathing, etc. But Charcot
has shown that an arm held out in hypnotic catalepsy, though it may as soon
descend, yet does so slowly and with no accompanying vibration, whilst the
breathing remains entirely calm. He rightly points out that this shows a
profound physiological change, and is proof positive against simulation, as
far as this symptom is concerned. A cataleptic attitude, moreover, may be
held for many hours.—Sometimes an expressive attitude, clinching of the
fist, contraction of the brows, will gradually set up a sympathetic action of
the other muscles of the body, so that at last a tableau vivant of fear, anger,
disdain, prayer, or other emotional condition, is produced with rare
perfection. This effect would seem to be due to the suggestion of the mental
state by the first contraction. Stammering, aphasia, or inability to utter
certain words, pronounce certain letters, are readily producible by
suggestion.
Hallucinations of all the senses and delusions of every conceivable kind can
be easily suggested to good subjects. The emotional effects are then often
so lively, and the pantomimic display so expressive, that it is hard not to
believe in a certain 'psychic hyper-excitability,' as one of the concomitants
of the hypnotic condition. You can make the subject think that he is freezing
or burning, itching or covered with dirt, or wet; you can make him eat a
potato for a peach, or drink a cup of vinegar for a glass of champagne;[517]
ammonia will smell to him like cologne water; a chair will be a lion, a
broom-stick a beautiful woman, a noise in the street will be an orchestral
music, etc., etc., with no limit except your powers of invention and the
patience of the lookers on.[518] Illusions and hallucinations form the pièces
de résistance at public exhibitions. The comic effect is at its climax when it
is successfully suggested to the subject that his personality is changed into

that of a baby, of a street boy, of a young lady dressing for a party, of a
stump orator, or of Napoleon the Great. He may even be transformed into a
beast, or an inanimate thing like a chair or a carpet, and in every case will
act out all the details of the part with a sincerity and intensity seldom seen
at the theatre. The excellence of the performance is in these cases the best
reply to the suspicion that the subject may be shamming—so skilful a
shammer must long since have found his true function in life upon the
stage. Hallucinations and histrionic delusions generally go with a certain
depth of the trance, and are followed by complete forgetfulness. The subject
awakens from them at the command of the operator with a sudden start of
surprise, and may seem for a while a little dazed.
Subjects in this condition will receive and execute suggestions of crime,
and act out a theft, forgery, arson, or murder. A girl will believe that she is
married to her hypnotizer, etc. It is unfair, however, to say that in these
cases the subject is a pure puppet with no spontaneity. His spontaneity is
certainly not in abeyance so far as things go which are harmoniously
associated with the suggestion given him. He takes the text from his
operator; but he may amplify and develop it enormously as he acts it out.
His spontaneity is lost only for those systems of ideas which conflict with
the suggested delusion. The latter is thus 'systematized'; the rest of
consciousness is shut off, excluded, dissociated from it. In extreme cases
the rest of the mind would seem to be actually abolished and the hypnotic
subject to be literally a changed personality, a being in one of those 'second'
states which we studied in Chapter X. But the reign of the delusion is often
not as absolute as this. If the thing suggested be too intimately repugnant,
the subject may strenuously resist and get nervously excited in
consequence, even to the point of having an hysterical attack. The
conflicting ideas slumber in the background and merely permit those in the
foreground to have their way until a real emergency arises; then they assert
their rights. As M. Delbœuf says, the subject surrenders himself goodnaturedly to the performance, stabs with the pasteboard dagger you give
him because he knows what it is, and fires off the pistol because he knows it
has no ball; but for a real murder he would not be your man. It is
undoubtedly true that subjects are often well aware that they are acting a
part. They know that what they do is absurd. They know that the
hallucination which they see, describe, and act upon, is not really there.
They may laugh at themselves; and they always recognize the abnormality

of their state when asked about it, and call it 'sleep.' One often notices a sort
of mocking smile upon them, as if they were playing a comedy, and they
may even say on 'coming to' that they were shamming all the while. These
facts have misled ultra-skeptical people so far as to make them doubt the
genuineness of any hypnotic phenomena at all. But, save the consciousness
of 'sleep,' they do not occur in the deeper conditions; and when they do
occur they are only a natural consequence of the fact that the 'monoideism'
is incomplete. The background-thoughts still exist, and have the power of
comment on the suggestions, but no power to inhibit their motor and
associative effects. A similar condition is frequent enough in the waking
state, when an impulse carries us away and our 'will' looks on wonderingly
like an impotent spectator. These 'shammers' continue to sham in just the
same way, every new time you hypnotize them, until at last they are forced
to admit that if shamming there be, it is something very different from the
free voluntary shamming of waking hours.
Real sensations may be abolished as well as false ones suggested. Legs and
breasts may be amputated, children born, teeth extracted, in short the most
painful experiences undergone, with no other anæsthetic than the
hypnotizer's assurance that no pain shall be felt. Similarly morbid pains
may be annihilated, neuralgias, toothaches, rheumatisms cured. The
sensation of hunger has thus been abolished, so that a patient took no
nourishment for fourteen days. The most interesting of these suggested
anæsthesias are those limited to certain objects of perception. Thus a
subject may be made blind to a certain person and to him alone, or deaf to
certain words but to no others.[519] In this case the anæsthesia (or negative
hallucination, as it has been called) is apt to become systematized. Other
things related to the person to whom one has been made blind may also be
shut out of consciousness. What he says is not heard, his contact is not felt,
objects which he takes from his pocket are not seen, etc. Objects which he
screens are seen as if he were transparent. Facts about him are forgotten, his
name is not recognized when pronounced. Of course there is great variety in
the completeness of this systematic extension of the suggested anæsthesia,
but one may say that some tendency to it always exists. When one of the
subjects' own limbs is made anæsthetic, for example, memories as well as
sensations of its movements often seem to depart. An interesting degree of
the phenomenon is found in the case related by M. Binet of a subject to
whom it was suggested that a certain M. C. was invisible. She still saw M.

C., but saw him as a stranger, having lost the memory of his name and his
existence.—Nothing is easier than to make subjects forget their own name
and condition in life. It is one of the suggestions which most promptly
succeed, even with quite fresh ones. A systematized amnesia of certain
periods of one's life may also be suggested, the subject placed, for instance,
where he was a decade ago with the intervening years obliterated from his
mind.
The mental condition which accompanies these systematized anæsthesias
and amnesias is a very curious one. The anæsthesia is not a genuine
sensorial one, for if you make a real red cross (say) on a sheet of white
paper invisible to an hypnotic subject, and yet cause him to look fixedly at a
dot on the paper on or near the cross, he will, on transferring his eye to a
blank sheet, see a bluish-green after-image of the cross. This proves that it
has impressed his sensibility. He has felt it, but not perceived it. He had
actively ignored it, refused to recognize it, as it were. Another experiment
proves that he must distinguish it first in order thus to ignore it. Make a
stroke on paper or blackboard, and tell the subject it is not there, and he will
see nothing but the clean paper or board. Next, he not looking, surround the
original stroke with other strokes exactly like it, and ask him what he sees.
He will point out one by one all the new strokes and omit the original one
every time, no matter how numerous the new strokes may be, or in what
order they are arranged. Similarly, if the original single stroke to which he
is blind be doubled by a prism of sixteen degrees placed before one of his
eyes (both being kept open), he will say that he now sees one stroke, and
point in the direction in which the image seen through the prism lies.
Obviously, then, he is not blind to the kind of stroke in the least. He is blind
only to one individual stroke of that kind in a particular position on the
board or paper,—that is, to a particular complex object; and, paradoxical as
it may seem to say so, he must distinguish it with great accuracy from
others like it, in order to remain blind to it when the others are brought near.
He 'apperceives' it, as a preliminary to not seeing it at all! How to conceive
of this state of mind is not easy. It would be much simpler to understand the
process, if adding new strokes made the first one visible. There would then
be two different objects apperceived as totals,—paper with one stroke,
paper with two strokes; and, blind to the former, he would see all that was

in the latter, because he would have apperceived it as a different total in the
first instance.
A process of this sort occurs sometimes (not always) when the new strokes,
instead of being mere repetitions of the original one, are lines which
combine with it into a total object, say a human face. The subject of the
trance then may regain his sight of the line to which he had previously been
blind, by seeing it as part of the face.
When by a prism before one eye a previously invisible line has been made
visible to that eye, and the other eye is closed or screened, its closure makes
no difference; the line still remains visible. But if then the prism is
removed, the line will disappear even to the eye which a moment ago saw
it, and both eyes will revert to their original blind state.
We have, then, to deal in these cases neither with a sensorial anæsthesia, nor
with a mere failure to notice, but with something much more complex;
namely, an active counting out and positive exclusion of certain objects. It
is as when one 'cuts' an acquaintance, 'ignores' a claim, or 'refuses to be
influenced' by a consideration of whose existence one remains aware. Thus
a lover of Nature in America finds himself able to overlook and ignore
entirely the board- and rail-fences and general roadside raggedness, and
revel in the beauty and picturesqueness of the other elements of the
landscape, whilst to a newly-arrived European the fences are so
aggressively present as to spoil enjoyment.
Messrs. Gurney, Janet, and Binet have shown that the ignored elements are
preserved in a split-off portion of the subjects' consciousness which can be
tapped in certain ways, and made to give an account of itself (see Vol. I. p.
209).
Hyperæsthesia of the senses is as common a symptom as anæsthesia. On the
skin two points can be discriminated at less than the normal distance. The
sense of touch is so delicate that (as M. Delbœuf informs me) a subject after
simply poising on her finger-tips a blank card drawn from a pack of similar
ones can pick it out from the pack again by its 'weight.' We approach here
the line where, to many persons, it seems as if something more than the
ordinary senses, however sharpened, were required in explanation. I have
seen a coin from the operator's pocket repeatedly picked out by the subject
from a heap of twenty others,[520] by its greater 'weight' in the subject's

language.—Auditory hyperæsthesia may enable a subject to hear a watch
tick, or his operator speak, in a distant room.—One of the most
extraordinary examples of visual hyperæsthesia is that reported by Bergson,
in which a subject who seemed to be reading through the back of a book
held and looked at by the operator, was really proved to be reading the
image of the page reflected on the latter's cornea. The same subject was
able to discriminate with the naked eye details in a microscopic preparation.
Such cases of 'hyperæsthesia of vision' as that reported by Taguet and
Sauvaire, where subjects could see things mirrored by non-reflecting
bodies, or through opaque pasteboard, would seem rather to belong to
'psychical research', than to the present category.—The ordinary test of
visual hyperacuteness in hypnotism is the favorite trick of giving a subject
the hallucination of a picture on a blank sheet of card-board, and then
mixing the latter with a lot of other similar sheets. The subject will always
find the picture on the original sheet again, and recognize infallibly if it has
been turned over, or upside down, although the bystanders have to resort to
artifice to identify it again. The Subject notes peculiarities on the card, too
small for waking observation to detect.[521] If it be said that the spectators
guide him by their manner, their breathing, etc., that is only another proof of
his hyperæsthesia; for he undoubtedly is conscious of subtler personal
indications (of his operator's mental states especially) than he could notice
in his waking state. Examples of this are found in the so-called 'magnetic
rapport.' This is a name for the fact that in deep trance, or in lighter trance
whenever the suggestion is made, the subject is deaf and blind to everyone
but the operator or those spectators to whom the latter expressly awakens
his senses. The most violent appeals from anyone else are for him as if nonexistent, whilst he obeys the faintest signals on the part of his hypnotizer. If
in catalepsy, his limbs will retain their attitude only when the operator
moves them; when others move them they fall down, etc. A more
remarkable fact still is that the patient will often answer anyone whom his
operator touches, or at whom he even points his finger, in however
concealed a manner. All which is rationally explicable by expectation and
suggestion, if only it be farther admitted that his senses are acutely
sharpened for all the operator's movements.[522] He often shows great
anxiety and restlessness if the latter is out of the room. A favorite
experiment of Mr. E. Gurney's was to put the subject's hands through an
opaque screen, and cause the operator to point at one finger. That finger

presently grew insensible or rigid. A bystander pointing simultaneously at
another finger, never made that insensible or rigid. Of course the elective
rapport with their operator had been developed in these trained subjects
during the hypnotic state, but the phenomenon then occurred in some of
them during the waking state, even when their consciousness was absorbed
in animated conversation with a fourth party.[523] I confess that when I saw
these experiments I was impressed with the necessity for admitting between
the emanations from different people differences for which we have no
name, and a discriminative sensibility for them of the nature of which we
can form no clear conception, but which seems to be developed in certain
subjects by the hypnotic trance.—The enigmatic reports of the effect of
magnets and metals, even if they be due, as many contend, to unintentional
suggestion on the operator's part, certainly involve hyperæsthetic
perception, for the operator seeks as well as possible to conceal the moment
when the magnet is brought into play, and yet the subject not only finds it
out that moment in a way difficult to understand, but may develop effects
which (in the first instance certainly) the operator did not expect to find.
Unilateral contractures, movements, paralyses, hallucinations, etc., are
made to pass to the other side of the body, hallucinations to disappear, or to
change to the complementary color, suggested emotions to pass into their
opposites, etc. Many Italian observations agree with the French ones, and
the upshot is that if unconscious suggestion lie at the bottom of this matter,
the patients show an enormously exalted power of divining what it is they
are expected to do. This hyperæsthetic perception is what concerns us now.
[524] Its modus cannot yet be said to be defined.

Changes in the nutrition of the tissues may be produced by suggestion.
These effects lead into therapeutics—a subject which I do not propose to
treat of here. But I may say that there seems no reasonable ground for
doubting that in certain chosen subjects the suggestion of a congestion, a
burn, a blister, a raised papule, or a bleeding from the nose or skin, may
produce the effect. Messrs. Beaunis, Berjon, Bernheim, Bourru, Burot,
Charcot, Delbœuf, Dumontpallier, Focachon, Forel, Jendrássik, KrafftEbing, Liébeault, Liégeois, Lipp, Mabille, and others have recently vouched
for one or other of these effects. Messrs. Delbœuf and Liégeois have
annulled by suggestion, one the effects of a burn, the other of a blister.
Delbœuf was led to his experiments after seeing a burn on the skin
produced by suggestion, at the Salpétrière, by reasoning that if the idea of a
pain could produce inflammation it must be because pain was itself an
inflammatory irritant, and that the abolition of it from a real burn ought
therefore to entail the absence of inflammation. He applied the actual
cautery (as well as vesicants) to symmetrical places on the skin, affirming
that no pain should be felt on one of the sides. The result was a dry scorch
on that side, with (as he assures me) no after-mark, but on the other side a
regular blister with suppuration and a subsequent scar. This explains the
innocuity of certain assaults made on subjects during trance. To test
simulation, recourse is often had to sticking pins under their finger-nails or
through their tongue, to inhalations of strong ammonia, and the like. These
irritations, when not felt by the subject, seem to leave no afterconsequences. One is reminded of the reported non-inflammatory character
of the wounds made on themselves by dervishes in their pious orgies. On
the other hand, the reddenings and bleedings of the skin along certain lines,
suggested by tracing lines or pressing objects thereupon, put the accounts
handed down to us of the stigmata of the cross appearing on the hands, feet,
sides, and forehead of certain Catholic mystics in a new light. As so often
happens, a fact is denied until a welcome interpretation comes with it. Then
it is admitted readily enough; and evidence judged quite insufficient to back
a claim, so long as the church had an interest in making it, proves to be
quite sufficient for modern scientific enlightenment, the moment it appears
that a reputed saint can thereby be classed as 'a case of hystero-epilepsy.'

There remain two other topics, viz., post-hypnotic effects of suggestion, and
effects of suggestion in the waking state.
Post-hypnotic, or deferred, suggestions are such as are given to the patients
during trance, to take effect after waking. They succeed with a certain
number of patients even when the execution is named for a remote period—
months or even a year, in one case reported by M. Liégeois. In this way one
can make the patient feel a pain, or be paralyzed, or be hungry or thirsty, or
have an hallucination, positive or negative, or perform some fantastic action
after emerging from his trance. The effect in question may be ordered to
take place not immediately, but after an interval of time has elapsed, and the
interval may be left to the subject to measure, or may be marked by a
certain signal. The moment the signal occurs, or the time is run out, the
subject, who until then seems in a perfectly normal waking condition, will
experience the suggested effect. In many instances, whilst thus obedient to
the suggestion, he seems to fall into the hypnotic condition again. This is
proved by the fact that the moment the hallucination or suggested
performance is over he forgets it, denies all knowledge of it, and so forth;
and by the further fact that he is 'suggestible' during its performance, that is,
will receive new hallucinations, etc., at command. A moment later and this
suggestibility has disappeared. It cannot be said, however, that relapse into
the trance is an absolutely necessary condition for the post-hypnotic
carrying out of commands, for the subject may be neither suggestible nor
amnesic, and may struggle with all the strength of his will against the
absurdity of this impulse which he feels rising in him, he knows not why. In
these cases, as in most cases, he forgets the circumstance of the impulse
having been suggested to him in a previous trance; regards it as arising
within himself; and often improvises, as he yields to it, some more or less
plausible or ingenious motive by which to justify it to the lookers-on. He
acts, in short, with his usual sense of personal spontaneity and freedom; and
the disbelievers in the freedom of the will have naturally made much of
these cases in their attempts to show it to be an illusion.
The only really mysterious feature of these deferred suggestions is the
patient's absolute ignorance during the interval preceding their execution
that they have been deposited in his mind. They will often surge up at the
preappointed time, even though you have vainly tried a while before to
make him recall the circumstances of their production. The most important

class of post-hypnotic suggestions are, of course, those relative to the
patient's health—bowels, sleep, and other bodily functions. Among the
most interesting (apart from the hallucinations) are those relative to future
trances. One can determine the hour and minute, or the signal, at which the
patient will of his own accord lapse into trance again. One can make him
susceptible in future to another operator who may have been unsuccessful
with him in the past. Or more important still in certain cases, one can, by
suggesting that certain persons shall never be able hereafter to put him to
sleep, remove him for all future time from hypnotic influences which might
be dangerous. This, indeed, is the simple and natural safeguard against
those 'dangers of hypnotism' of which uninstructed persons talk so vaguely.
A subject who knows himself to be ultra-susceptible should never allow
himself to be entranced by an operator in whose moral delicacy he lacks
complete confidence; and he can use a trusted operator's suggestions to
protect himself against liberties which others, knowing his weakness, might
be tempted to take with him.
The mechanism by which the command is retained until the moment for its
execution arrives is a mystery which has given rise to much discussion. The
experiments of Gurney and the observations of M. Pierre Janet and others
on certain hysterical somnabulists seem to prove that it is stored up in
consciousness; not simply organically registered, but that the consciousness
which thus retains it is split off, dissociated from the rest of the subject's
mind. We have here, in short, an experimental production of one of those
'second' states of the personality of which we have spoken so often. Only
here the second state coexists as well as alternates with the first. Gurney
had the brilliant idea of tapping this second consciousness by means of the
planchette. He found that certain persons, who were both hypnotic subjects
and automatic writers, would if their hands were placed on a planchette
(after being wakened from a trance in which they had received the
suggestion of something to be done at a later time) write out unconsciously
the order, or something connected with it. This shows that something inside
of them, which could express itself through the hand alone, was continuing
to think of the order, and possibly of it alone. These researches have opened
a new vista of possible experimental investigations into the so-called
'second' states of the personality.

Some subjects seem almost as obedient to suggestion in the waking state as
in sleep, or even more so, according to certain observers. Not only muscular
phenomena, but changes of personality and hallucinations are recorded as
the result of simple affirmation on the operator's part, without the previous
ceremony of 'magnetizing' or putting into the 'mesmeric sleep.' These are all
trained subjects, however, so far as I know, and the affirmation must
apparently be accompanied by the patient concentrating his attention and
gazing, however briefly, into the eyes of the operator. It is probable
therefore that an extremely rapidly induced condition of trance is a
prerequisite for success in these experiments.

I have now made mention of all the more important phenomena of the
hypnotic trance. Of their therapeutic or forensic bearings this is not the
proper place to speak. The recent literature of the subject is quite
voluminous, but much of it consists in repetition. The best compendious
work on the subject is 'Der Hypnotismus,' by Dr. A. Moll (Berlin, 1889; and
just translated into English, N. Y., 1890), which is extraordinarily complete
and judicious. The other writings most recommendable are subjoined in the
note.[525] Most of them contain a historical sketch and much bibliography.
A complete bibliography has been published by M. Dessoir (Berlin, 1888).

[513] It should be said that the methods of leaving the patient to himself, and that of the simple
verbal suggestion of sleep (the so-called Nancy method introduced by Liébeault of that place), seem,
wherever applicable, to be the best, as they entail none of the after-inconveniences which
occasionally follow upon straining his eyes. A new patient should not be put through a great variety
of different suggestions in immediate succession. He should be waked up from time to time, and then
rehypnotized to avoid mental confusion and excitement. Before finally waking a subject you should
undo whatever delusive suggestions you may have implanted in him, by telling him that they are all
gone, etc., and that you are now going to restore him to his natural state. Headache, languor, etc.,
which sometimes follow the first trance or two, must be banished at the outset, by the operator
strongly assuring the subject that such things never come from hypnotism, that the subject must not
have them, etc.
[514] Certain facts would seem to point that way. Cf., e.g., the case of the man described by P.
Despine, Étude Scientifique sur le Somnambulisme, p. 286 ff.

[515] The state is not identical with sleep, however analogous in certain respects. The lighter stages
of it, particularly, differ from sleep and dreaming, inasmuch as they are characterized almost
exclusively by muscular inabilities and compulsions, which are not noted in ordinary somnolescence,
and the mind, which is confused in somnolescence, may be quite clearly conscious, in the lighter
state of trance, of all that is going on.
[516] The word 'suggestion' has been bandied about too much as if it explained all mysteries: When
the subject obeys it is by reason of the 'operator's suggestion'; when he proves refractory it is in
consequence of an 'auto-suggestion' which he has made to himself, etc., etc. What explains
everything explains nothing; and it must be remembered that what needs explanation here is the fact
that in a certain condition of the subject suggestions operate as they do at no other time; that through
them functions are affected which ordinarily elude the action of the waking will; and that usually all
this happens in a condition of which no after-memory remains.
[517] A complete fit of drunkenness may be the consequence of the suggested champagne. It is even
said that real drunkenness has been cured by suggestion.
[518] The suggested hallucination may be followed by a negative after-image, just as if it were a real
object. This can be very easily verified with the suggested hallucination of a colored cross on a sheet
of white paper. The subject, on turning to another sheet of paper, will see a cross of the
complementary color. Hallucinations have been shown by MM. Binet and Féré to be doubled by a
prism or mirror, magnified by a lens, and in many other ways to behave optically like real objects.
These points have been discussed already on p. 138 ff.
[519] M. Liégeois explains the common exhibition-trick of making the subject unable to get his arms
into his coat-sleeves again after he has taken his coat off, by an anæsthesia to the necessary parts of
the coat.
[520] Precautions being taken against differences of temperature and other grounds of suggestion.
[521] It should be said, however, that the bystander's ability to discriminate unmarked cards and
sheets of paper from each other is much greater than one would naturally suppose.
[522] I must repeat, however, that we are here on the verge of possibly unknown forces and modes of
communication. Hypnotization at a distance, with no grounds for expectation on the subject's part
that it was to be tried, seems pretty well established in certain very rare cases. See in general, for
information on these matters, the Proceedings of the Soc. for Psych. Research, passim.
[523] Here again the perception in question must take place below the threshold of ordinary
consciousness, possibly in one of those split-off selves or 'second' states whose existence we have so
often to recognize.
[524] I myself verified many of the above effects of the magnet on a blindfolded subject on whom I
was trying them for the first time, and whom I believe to have never heard of them before. The
moment, however, an opaque screen was added to the blindfolding, the effects ceased to coincide
with the approximation of the magnet, so that it looks as if visual perception had been instrumental in
producing them. The subject passed from my observation, so that I never could clear up the mystery.
Of course I gave him consciously no hint of what I was looking for.
[525] Binet and Féré, 'Animal Magnetism,' in the International Scientific Series; A. Bernheim.
'Suggestive Therapeutics' (N. Y., 1889); J. Liégeois, 'De la Suggestion' (1889); E. Gurney, two
articles in Mind, vol. ix.—In the recent revival of interest in the history of this subject, it seems a pity
that the admirably critical and scientific work of Dr. John Kearsley Mitchell of Philadelphia should
remain relatively so unknown. It is quite worthy to rank with Braid's investigations. See "Five
Essays" by the above author, edited by S. Weir Mitchell, Philadelphia, 1859, pp. 141-274.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

NECESSARY TRUTHS AND THE EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE.
In this final chapter I shall treat of what has sometimes been called
psychogenesis, and try to ascertain just how far the connections of things in
the outward environment can account for our tendency to think of, and to
react upon, certain things in certain ways and in no others, even though
personally we have had of the things in question no experience, or almost
no experience, at all. It is a familiar truth that some propositions are
necessary. We must attach the predicate 'equal' to the subject 'opposite sides
of a parallelogram' if we think those terms together at all, whereas we need
not in any such way attach the predicate 'rainy,' for example, to the subject
'to-morrow.' The dubious sort of coupling of terms is universally admitted
to be due to 'experience'; the certain sort is ascribed to the 'organic structure'
of the mind. This structure is in turn supposed by the so-called apriorists to
be of transcendental origin, or at any rate not to be explicable by
experience; whilst by evolutionary empiricists it is supposed to be also due
to experience, only not to the experience of the individual, but to that of his
ancestors as far back as one may please to go. Our emotional and instinctive
tendencies, our irresistible impulses to couple certain movements with the
perception or thought of certain things, are also features of our connate
mental structure, and like the necessary judgments, are interpreted by the
apriorists and the empiricists in the same warring ways.
I shall try in the course of the chapter to make plain three things:
1) That, taking the word experience as it is universally understood, the
experience of the race can no more account for our necessary or a priori
judgments than the experience of the individual can;
2) That there is no good evidence for the belief that our instinctive reactions
are fruits of our ancestors' education in the midst of the same environment,
transmitted to us at birth.
3) That the features of our organic mental structure cannot be explained at
all by our conscious intercourse with the outer environment, but must rather

be understood as congenital variations, 'accidental'[526] in the first instance,
but then transmitted as fixed features of the race.
On the whole, then, the account which the apriorists give of the facts is that
which I defend; although I should contend (as will hereafter appear) for a
naturalistic view of their cause.

The first thing I have to say is that all schools (however they otherwise
differ) must allow that the elementary qualities of cold, heat, pleasure, pain,
red, blue, sound, silence, etc., are original, innate, or a priori properties of
our subjective nature, even though they should require the touch of
experience to waken them into actual consciousness, and should slumber, to
all eternity, without it.
This is so on either of the two hypotheses we may make concerning the
relation of the feelings to the realities at whose touch they become alive.
For in the first place, if a feeling do not mirror the reality which wakens it
and to which we say it corresponds, if it mirror no reality whatever outside
of the mind, it of course is a purely mental product. By its very definition it
can be nothing else. But in the second place, even if it do mirror the reality
exactly, still it is not that reality itself, it is a duplication of it, the result of a
mental reaction. And that the mind should have the power of reacting in just
that duplicate way can only be stated as a harmony between its nature and
the nature of the truth outside of it, a harmony whereby it follows that the
qualities of both parties match.
The originality of these elements is not, then, a question for dispute. The
warfare of philosophers is exclusively relative to their FORMS OF
COMBINATION. The empiricist maintains that these forms can only follow the
order of combination in which the elements were originally awakened by
the impressions of the external world; the apriorists insist, on the contrary,
that some modes of combination, at any rate, follow from the natures of the
elements themselves, and that no amount of experience can modify this
result.
WHAT IS MEANT BY EXPERIENCE?

The phrase 'organic mental structure' names the matter in dispute. Has the
mind such a structure or not? Are its contents arranged from the start, or is
the arrangement they may possess simply due to the shuffling of them by
experience in an absolutely plastic bed? Now the first thing to make sure of
is that when we talk of 'experience,' we attach a definite meaning to the
word. Experience means experience of something foreign supposed to
impress us, whether spontaneously or in consequence of our own exertions
and acts. Impressions, as we well know, affect certain orders of sequence
and coexistence, and the mind's habits copy the habits of the impressions,
so that our images of things assume a time- and space-arrangement which
resembles the time- and space-arrangements outside. To uniform outer
coexistences and sequences correspond constant conjunctions of ideas, to
fortuitous coexistences and sequences casual conjunctions of ideas. We are
sure that fire will burn and water wet us, less sure that thunder will come
after lightning, not at all sure whether a strange dog will bark at us or let us
go by. In these ways experience moulds us every hour, and makes of our
minds a mirror of the time- and space-connections between the things in the
world. The principle of habit within us so fixes the copy at last that we find
it difficult even to imagine how the outward order could possibly be
different from what it is, and we continually divine from the present what
the future is to be. These habits of transition, from one thought to another,
are features of mental structure which were lacking in us at birth; we can
see their growth under experience's moulding finger, and we can see how
often experience undoes her own work, and for an earlier order substitutes a
new one. 'The order of experience,' in this matter of the time- and spaceconjunctions of things, is thus an indisputably vera causa of our forms of
thought. It is our educator, our sovereign helper and friend; and its name,
standing for something with so real and definite a use, ought to be kept
sacred and encumbered with no vaguer meaning.
If all the connections among ideas in the mind could be interpreted as so
many combinations of sense-data wrought into fixity in this way from
without, then experience in the common and legitimate sense of the word
would be the sole fashioner of the mind.
The empirical school in psychology has in the main contended that they can
be so interpreted. Before our generation, it was the experience of the
individual only which was meant. But when one nowadays says that the

human mind owes its present shape to experience, he means the experience
of ancestors as well. Mr. Spencer's statement of this is the earliest emphatic
one, and deserves quotation in full:[527]
"The supposition that the inner cohesions are adjusted to the outer
persistences by accumulated experience of those outer persistences is
in harmony with all our actual knowledge of mental phenomena.
Though in so far as reflex actions and instincts are concerned, the
experience-hypothesis seems insufficient; yet its seeming insufficiency
occurs only where the evidence is beyond our reach. Nay, even here
such few facts as we can get point to the conclusion that automatic
psychical connections result from the registration of experiences
continued for numberless generations.
"In brief, the case stands thus: It is agreed that all psychical relations,
save the absolutely indissoluble, are determined by experiences. Their
various strengths are admitted, other things equal, to be proportionate
to the multiplication of experiences. It is an unavoidable corollary that
an infinity of experiences will produce a psychical relation that is
indissoluble. Though such infinity of experiences cannot be received
by a single individual, yet it may be received by the succession of
individuals forming a race. And if there is a transmission of induced
tendencies in the nervous system, it is inferrible that all psychical
relations whatever, from the necessary to the fortuitous, result from the
experiences of the corresponding external relations; and are so brought
into harmony with them.
"Thus, the experience-hypothesis furnishes an adequate solution. The
genesis of instinct, the development of memory and reason out of it,
and the consolidation of rational actions and inferences into instinctive
ones, are alike explicable on the single principle that the cohesion
between psychical states is proportionate to the frequency with which
the relation between the answering external phenomena has been
repeated in experience.
"The universal law that, other things equal, the cohesion of psychical
states is proportionate to the frequency with which they have followed
one another in experience, supplies an explanation of the so-called
'forms of thought,' as soon as it is supplemented by the law that

habitual psychical successions entail some hereditary tendency to such
successions, which, under persistent conditions, will become
cumulative in generation after generation. We saw that the
establishment of those compound reflex actions called instincts is
comprehensible on the principle that inner relations are, by perpetual
repetition, organized into correspondence with outer relations. We
have now to observe that the establishment of those consolidated,
those indissoluble, those instinctive mental relations constituting our
ideas of Space and Time is comprehensible on the same principle. For
if even to external relations that are often experienced during the life of
a single organism, answering internal relations are established that
become next to automatic—if such a combination of psychical changes
as that which guides a savage in hitting a bird with an arrow becomes,
by constant repetition, so organized as to be performed almost without
thought of the processes of adjustment gone through—and if skill of
this kind is so far transmissible that particular races of men become
characterized by particular aptitudes, which are nothing else than
partially-organized psychical connections; then, if there exist certain
external relations which are experienced by all organisms at all instants
of their waking lives—relations which are absolutely constant,
absolutely universal—there will be established answering internal
relations that are absolutely constant, absolutely universal. Such
relations we have in those of Space and Time. The organization of
subjective relations adjusted to these objective relations has been
cumulative, not in each race of creatures only, but throughout
successive races of creatures; and such subjective relations have,
therefore, become more consolidated than all others. Being
experienced in every perception and every action of each creature,
these connections among outer existences must, for this reason too, be
responded to by connections among inner feelings, that are, above all
others, indissoluble. As the substrata of all other relations in the nonego, they must be responded to by conceptions that are the substrata of
all other relations in the ego. Being the constant and infinitelyrepeated elements of thought, they must become the automatic
elements of thought—the elements of thought which it is impossible to
get rid of—the 'forms of intuition.'

"Such, it seems to me, is the only possible reconciliation between the
experience-hypothesis and the hypothesis of the transcendentalists;
neither of which is tenable by itself. Insurmountable difficulties are
presented by the Kantian doctrine (as we shall hereafter see); and the
antagonist doctrine, taken alone, presents difficulties that are equally
insurmountable. To rest with the unqualified assertion that, antecedent
to experience, the mind is a blank, is to ignore the questions—whence
comes the power of organizing experiences? whence arise the different
degrees of that power possessed by different races of organisms, and
different individuals of the same race? If, at birth, there exists nothing
but a passive receptivity of impressions, why is not a horse as educable
as a man? Should it be said that language makes the difference, then
why do not the cat and the dog, reared in the same household, arrive at
equal degrees and kinds of intelligence? Understood in its current
form, the experience-hypothesis implies that the presence of a
definitely-organized nervous system is a circumstance of no moment—
a fact not needing to be taken into account! Yet it is the all-important
fact—the fact to which, in one sense, the criticisms of Leibnitz and
others pointed—the fact without which an assimilation of experiences
is inexplicable. Throughout the animal kingdom in general, the actions
are dependent on the nervous structure. The physiologist shows us that
each reflex movement implies the agency of certain nerves and
ganglia; that a development of complicated instincts is accompanied
by complication of the nervous centres and their commissural
connections; that the same creature in different stages, as larva and
imago for example, changes its instincts as its nervous structure
changes; and that as we advance to creatures of high intelligence, a
vast increase in the size and in the complexity of the nervous system
takes place. What is the obvious inference? It is that the ability to coordinate impressions and to perform the appropriate actions always
implies the pre-existence of certain nerves arranged in a certain way.
What is the meaning of the human brain? It is that the many
established relations among its parts stand for so many established
relations among the psychical changes. Each of the constant
connections among the fibres of the cerebral masses answers to some
constant connection of phenomena in the experiences of the race. Just
as the organized arrangement subsisting between the sensory nerves of

the nostrils and the motor nerves of the respiratory muscles not only
makes possible a sneeze, but also, in the newly-born infant, implies
sneezings to be hereafter performed; so, all the organized arrangements
subsisting among the nerves of the infant's brain not only make
possible certain combinations of impressions, but also imply that such
combinations will hereafter be made—imply that there are answering
combinations in the outer world—imply a preparedness to cognize
these combinations—imply faculties of comprehending them. It is true
that the resulting compound psychical changes do not take place with
the same readiness and automatic precision as the simple reflex action
instanced—it is true that some individual experiences seem required to
establish them. But while this is partly due to the fact that these
combinations are highly involved, extremely varied in their modes of
occurrence, made up therefore of psychical relations less completely
coherent, and hence need further repetitions to perfect them; it is in a
much greater degree due to the fact that at birth the organization of the
brain is incomplete, and does not cease its spontaneous progress for
twenty or thirty years afterwards. Those who contend that knowledge
results wholly from the experiences of the individual, ignoring as they
do the mental evolution which accompanies the autogenous
development of the nervous system, fall into an error as great as if they
were to ascribe all bodily growth and structure to exercise, forgetting
the innate tendency to assume the adult form. Were the infant born
with a full-sized and completely-constructed brain, their position
would be less untenable. But, as the case stands, the graduallyincreasing intelligence displayed throughout childhood and youth is
more attributable to the completion of the cerebral organization than to
the individual experiences—a truth proved by the fact that in adult life
there is sometimes displayed a high endowment of some faculty
which, during education, was never brought into play. Doubtless,
experiences received by the individual furnish the concrete materials
for all thought. Doubtless, the organized and semi-organized
arrangements existing among the cerebral nerves can give no
knowledge until there has been a presentation of the external relations
to which they correspond. And doubtless the child's daily observations
and reasonings aid the formation of those involved nervous
connections that are in process of spontaneous evolution; just as its

daily gambols aid the development of its limbs. But saying this is quite
a different thing from saying that its intelligence is wholly produced by
its experiences. That is an utterly inadmissible doctrine—a doctrine
which makes the presence of a brain meaningless—a doctrine which
makes idiotcy unaccountable.
"In the sense, then, that there exist in the nervous system certain preestablished relations answering to relations in the environment, there is
truth in the doctrine of 'forms of intuition'—not the truth which its
defenders suppose, but a parallel truth. Corresponding to absolute
external relations, there are established in the structure of the nervous
system absolute internal relations—relations that are potentially
present before birth in the shape of definite nervous connections; that
are antecedent to, and independent of, individual experiences; and that
are automatically disclosed along with the first cognitions. And, as
here understood, it is not only these fundamental relations which are
thus predetermined, but also hosts of other relations of a more or less
constant kind, which are congenitally represented by more or less
complete nervous connections. But these predetermined internal
relations, though independent of the experiences of the individual, are
not independent of experiences in general: they have been determined
by the experiences of preceding organisms. The corollary here drawn
from the general argument is that the human brain is an organized
register of infinitely-numerous experiences received during the
evolution of life, or rather during the evolution of that series of
organisms through which the human organism has been reached. The
effects of the most uniform and frequent of these experiences have
been successively bequeathed, principal and interest; and have slowly
amounted to that high intelligence which lies latent in the brain of the
infant—which the infant in after-life exercises and perhaps strengthens
or further complicates—and which, with minute additions, it bequeaths
to future generations. And thus it happens that the European inherits
from twenty to thirty cubic inches more brain than the Papuan. Thus it
happens that faculties, as of music, which scarcely exist in some
inferior human races, become congenital in superior ones. Thus it
happens that out of savages unable to count up to the number of their
fingers, and speaking a language containing only nouns and verbs,
arise at length our Newtons and Shakspeares."

This is a brilliant and seductive statement, and it doubtless includes a good
deal of truth. Unfortunately it fails to go into details; and when the details
are scrutinized, as they soon must be by us, many of them will be seen to be
inexplicable in this simple way, and the choice will then remain to us either
of denying the experiential origin of certain of our judgments, or of
enlarging the meaning of the word experience so as to include these cases
among its effects.
TWO MODES OF ORIGIN OF BRAIN STRUCTURE.
If we adopt the former course we meet with a controversial difficulty. The
'experience-philosophy' has from time immemorial been the opponent of
theological modes of thought. The word experience has a halo of antisupernaturalism about it; so that if anyone express dissatisfaction with any
function claimed for it, he is liable to be treated as if he could only be
animated by loyalty to the catechism, or in some way have the interests of
obscurantism at heart. I am entirely certain that, on this ground alone, what
I have erelong to say will make this a sealed chapter to many of my readers.
"He denies experience!" they will exclaim, "denies science; believes the
mind created by miracle; is a regular old partisan of innate ideas! That is
enough! we'll listen to such antediluvian twaddle no more." Regrettable as
is the loss of readers capable of such wholesale discipleship, I feel that a
definite meaning for the word experience is even more important than their
company. 'Experience' does not mean every natural, as opposed to every
supernatural, cause. It means a particular sort of natural agency, alongside
of which other more recondite natural agencies may perfectly well exist.
With the scientific animus of anti-supernaturalism we ought to agree, but
we ought to free ourselves from its verbal idols and bugbears.

Nature has many methods of producing the same effect. She may make a
'born' draughtsman or singer by tipping in a certain direction at an
opportune moment the molecules of some human ovum; or she may bring
forth a child ungifted and make him spend laborious but successful years at
school. She may make our ears ring by the sound of a bell, or by a dose of

quinine; make us see yellow by spreading a field of buttercups before our
eyes, or by mixing a little santonine powder with our food; fill us with
terror of certain surroundings by making them really dangerous, or by a
blow which produces a pathological alteration of our brain. It is obvious
that we need two words to designate these two modes of operating. In the
one case the natural agents produce perceptions which take cognizance of
the agents themselves; in the other case, they produce perceptions which
take cognizance of something else. What is taught to the mind by the
'experience,' in the first case, is the order of the experience itself—the 'inner
relation' (in Spencer's phrase) 'corresponds' to the 'outer relation' which
produced it, by remembering and knowing the latter. But in the case of the
other sort of natural agency, what is taught to the mind has nothing to do
with the agency itself, but with some different outer relation altogether. A
diagram will express the alternatives. B stands for our human brain in the
midst of the world. All the little o's with arrows proceeding from them are
natural objects (like sunsets, etc.), which impress it through the senses, and
in the strict sense of the word give it experience, teaching it by habit and
association what is the order of their ways. All the little x's inside the brain
and all the little x's outside of it are other natural objects and processes (in
the ovum, in the blood, etc.), which equally modify the brain, but mould it
to no cognition of themselves. The tinnitus aurium discloses no properties
of the quinine; the musical endowment teaches no embryology; the morbid
dread (of solitude, perhaps) no brain-pathology; but the way in which a
dirty sunset and a rainy morrow hang together in the mind copies and
teaches the sequences of sunsets and rainfall in the outer world.

FIG. 94.

In zoological evolution we have two modes in which an animal race may
grow to be a better match for its environment.
First, the so-called way of 'adaptation,' in which the environment may itself
modify its inhabitant by exercising, hardening, and habituating him to
certain sequences, and these habits may, it is often maintained, become
hereditary.
Second, the way of 'accidental variation,' as Mr. Darwin termed it, in which
certain young are born with peculiarities that help them and their progeny to
survive. That variations of this sort tend to become hereditary, no one
doubts.
The first mode is called by Mr. Spencer direct, the second indirect,
equilibration. Both equilibrations must of course be natural and physical
processes, but they belong to entirely different physical spheres. The direct
influences are obvious and accessible things. The causes of variation in the
young are, on the other hand, molecular and hidden. The direct influences
are the animal's 'experiences,' in the widest sense of the term. Where what is
influenced by them is the mental organism, they are conscious experiences,
and become the objects as well as the causes of their effects. That is, the
effect consists in a tendency of the experience itself to be remembered, or to
have its elements thereafter coupled in imagination just as they were
coupled in the experience. In the diagram these experiences are represented
by the o's exclusively. The x's, on the other hand, stand for the indirect
causes of mental modification—causes of which we are not immediately
conscious as such, and which are not the direct objects of the effects they
produce. Some of them are molecular accidents before birth; some of them
are collateral and remote combinations, unintended combinations, one
might say, of more direct effects wrought in the unstable and intricate braintissue. Such a result is unquestionably the susceptibility to music, which
some individuals possess at the present day. It has no zoological utility; it
corresponds to no object in the natural environment; it is a pure incident of
having a hearing organ, an incident depending on such instable and
inessential conditions that one brother may have it and another brother not.
Just so with the susceptibility to sea-sickness, which, so far from being
engendered by long experience of its 'object' (if a heaving deck can be
called its object) is erelong annulled thereby. Our higher æsthetic, moral,
and intellectual life seems made up of affections of this collateral and

incidental sort, which have entered the mind by the back stairs, as it were,
or rather have not entered the mind at all, but got surreptitiously born in the
house. No one can successfully treat of psychogenesis, or the factors of
mental evolution, without distinguishing between these two ways in which
the mind is assailed. The way of 'experience' proper is the front door, the
door of the five senses. The agents which affect the brain in this way
immediately become the mind's objects. The other agents do not. It would
be simply silly to say of two men with perhaps equal effective skill in
drawing, one an untaught natural genius, the other a mere obstinate plodder
in the studio, that both alike owe their skill to their 'experience.' The reasons
of their several skills lie in wholly disparate natural cycles of causation.[528]
I will then, with the reader's permission, restrict the word 'experience' to
processes which influence the mind by the front-door-way of simple habits
and association. What the back-door-effects may be will probably grow
clearer as we proceed; so I will pass right on to a scrutiny of the actual
mental structure which we find.
THE GENESIS OF THE ELEMENTARY MENTAL CATEGORIES.
We find: 1. Elementary sorts of sensation, and feelings of personal activity;
2. Emotions; desires; instincts; ideas of worth; æsthetic ideas;
3. Ideas of time and space and number;
4. Ideas of difference and resemblance, and of their degrees.
5. Ideas of causal dependence among events; of end and means; of subject
and attribute.
6. Judgments affirming, denying, doubting, supposing any of the above
ideas.
7. Judgments that the former judgments logically involve, exclude, or are
indifferent to, each other.
Now we may postulate at the outset that all these forms of thought have a
natural origin, if we could only get at it. That assumption must be made at
the outset of every scientific investigation, or there is no temptation to
proceed. But the first account of their origin which we are likely to hit upon

is a snare. All these mental affections are ways of knowing objects. Most
psychologists nowadays believe that the objects first, in some natural way,
engendered a brain from out of their midst, and then imprinted these various
cognitive affections upon it. But how? The ordinary evolutionist answer to
this question is exceedingly simple-minded. The idea of most speculators
seems to be that, since it suffices now for us to become acquainted with a
complex object, that it should be simply present to us often enough, so it
must be fair to assume universally that, with time enough given, the mere
presence of the various objects and relations to be known must end by
bringing about the latter's cognition, and that in this way all mental structure
was from first to last evolved. Any ordinary Spencerite will tell you that
just as the experience of blue objects wrought into our mind the color blue,
and hard objects got it to feel hardness, so the presence of large and small
objects in the world gave it the notion of size, moving objects made it aware
of motion, and objective successions taught it time. Similarly in a world
with different impressing things, the mind had to acquire a sense of
difference, whilst the like parts of the world as they fell upon it kindled in it
the perception of similarity. Outward sequences which sometimes held
good, and sometimes failed, naturally engendered in it doubtful and
uncertain forms of expectation, and ultimately gave rise to the disjunctive
forms of judgment; whilst the hypothetic form, 'if a, then b,' was sure to
ensue from sequences that were invariable in the outer world. On this view,
if the outer order suddenly were to change its elements and modes, we
should have no faculties to cognize the new order by. At most we should
feel a sort of frustration and confusion. But little by little the new presence
would work on us as the old one did; and in course of time another set of
psychic categories would arise, fitted to take cognizance of the altered
world.
This notion of the outer world inevitably building up a sort of mental
duplicate of itself if we only give it time, is so easy and natural in its
vagueness that one hardly knows how to start to criticise it. One thing,
however, is obvious, namely that the manner in which we now become
acquainted with complex objects need not in the least resemble the manner
in which the original elements of our consciousness grew up. Now, it is
true, a new sort of animal need only be present to me, to impress its image
permanently on my mind; but this is because I am already in possession of
categories for knowing each and all of its several attributes, and of a

memory for retracing the order of their conjunction. I now have preformed
categories for all possible objects. The objects need only awaken these from
their slumber. But it is a very different matter to account for the categories
themselves. I think we must admit that the origin of the various elementary
feelings is a recondite history, even after some sort of neural tissue is there
for the outer world to begin its work on. The mere existence of things to be
known is even now not, as a rule, sufficient to bring about a knowledge of
them. Our abstract and general discoveries usually come to us as lucky
fancies: and it is only après coup that we find that they correspond to some
reality. What immediately produced them were previous thoughts, with
which, and with the brain-processes of which, that reality had naught to do.
Why may it not have been so of the original elements of consciousness,
sensation, time, space, resemblance, difference, and other relations? Why
may they not have come into being by the back-door method, by such
physical processes as lie more in the sphere of morphological accident, of
inward summation of effects, than in that of the 'sensible presence' of
objects? Why may they not, in short, be pure idiosyncrasies, spontaneous
variations, fitted by good luck (those of them which have survived) to take
cognizance of objects (that is, to steer us in our active dealings with them),
without being in any intelligible sense immediate derivatives from them? I
think we shall find this view gain more and more plausibility as we
proceed.[529]
All these elements are subjective duplicates of outer objects. They are not
the outer objects. The secondary qualities among them are not supposed by
any educated person even to resemble the objects. Their nature depends
more on the reacting brain than on the stimuli which touch it off. This is
even more palpably true of the natures of pleasure and pain, effort, desire
and aversion, and of such feelings as those of cause and substance, of denial
and of doubt. Here then is a native wealth of inner forms whose origin is
shrouded in mystery, and which at any rate were not simply 'impressed'
from without, in any intelligible sense of the verb 'to impress.'

Their time- and space-relations, however, are impressed from without—for
two outer things at least the evolutionary psychologist must believe to
resemble our thoughts of them, these are the time and space in which the
objects lie. The time- and space-relations between things do stamp copies of
themselves within. Things juxtaposed in space impress us, continue to be
thought of as thus juxtaposed. Things sequent in time impress their
sequence on our memory. And thus, through experience in the legitimate
sense of the word there can be truly explained an immense number of our
mental habitudes, many of our abstract beliefs, and all our ideas of concrete
things, and of their ways of behavior. Such truths as that fire burns and
water wets, that glass refracts, heat melts snow, fishes live in water and die
on land, and the like, form no small part of the most refined education, and
are the all-in-all of education amongst the brutes and lowest men. Here the
mind is passive and tributary, a servile copy, fatally and unresistingly
fashioned from without. It is the merit of the associationist school to have
seen the wide scope of these effects of neighborhood in time and space; and
their exaggerated applications of the principle of mere neighborhood ought
not to blind us to the excellent service it has done to Psychology in their
hands. As far as a large part of our thinking goes, then, it can intelligibly be
formulated as a mere lot of habits impressed upon us from without. The
degree of cohesion of our inner relations, is, in this part of our thinking,
proportionate, in Mr. Spencer's phrase, to the degree of cohesion of the
outer relations; the causes and the objects of our thought are one; and we
are, in so far forth, what the materialistic evolutionists would have us
altogether, mere offshoots and creatures of our environment, and naught
besides.[530]
But now the plot thickens, for the images impressed upon our memory by
the outer stimuli are not restricted to the mere time- and space-relations, in
which they originally came, but revive in various manners (dependent on
the intricacy of the brain-paths and the instability of the tissue thereof), and
form secondary combinations such as the forms of judgment, which, taken
per se, are not congruent either with the forms in which reality exists or in
those in which experiences befall us, but which may nevertheless be
explained by the way in which experiences befall in a mind gifted with
memory, expectation, and the possibility of feeling doubt, curiosity, belief,
and denial. The conjunctions of experience befall more or less invariably,
variably, or never. The idea of one term will then engender a fixed, a

wavering, or a negative expectation of another, giving affirmative, the
hypothetical, disjunctive, interrogative, and negative judgments, and
judgments of actuality and possibility about certain things. The separation
of attribute from subject in all judgments (which violates the way in which
nature exists) may be similarly explained by the piecemeal order in which
our perceptions come to us, a vague nucleus growing gradually more
detailed as we attend to it more and more. These particular secondary
mental forms have had ample justice done them by associationists from
Hume downwards.
Associationists have also sought to account for discrimination, abstraction,
and generalization by the rates of frequency in which attributes come to us
conjoined. With much less success, I think. In the chapter on
Discrimination, I have, under the "law of dissociation by varying
concomitants," sought to explain as much as possible by the passive order
of experience. But the reader saw how much was left for active interest and
unknown forces to do. In the chapter on Imagination I have similarly striven
to do justice to the 'blended image' theory of generalization and abstraction.
So I need say no more of these matters here.
THE GENESIS OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES.
Our 'scientific' ways of thinking the outer reality are highly abstract ways.
The essence of things for science is not to be what they seem, but to be
atoms and molecules moving to and from each other according to strange
laws. Nowhere does the account of inner relations produced by outer ones
in proportion to the frequency with which the latter have been met, more
egregiously break down than in the case of scientific conceptions. The order
of scientific thought is quite incongruent either with the way in which
reality exists or with the way in which it comes before us. Scientific thought
goes by selection and emphasis exclusively. We break the solid plenitude of
fact into separate essences, conceive generally what only exists particularly,
and by our classifications leave nothing in its natural neighborhood, but
separate the contiguous, and join what the poles divorce. The reality exists
as a plenum. All its parts are contemporaneous, each is as real as any other,
and each as essential for making the whole just what it is and nothing else.
But we can neither experience nor think this plenum. What we experience,

what comes before us, is a chaos of fragmentary impressions interrupting
each other;[531] what we think is an abstract system of hypothetical data and
laws.[532]
This sort of scientific algebra, little as it immediately resembles the reality
given to us, turns out (strangely enough) applicable to it. That is, it yields
expressions which, at given places and times, can be translated into real
values, or interpreted as definite portions of the chaos that falls upon our
sense. It becomes thus a practical guide to our expectations as well as a
theoretic delight. But I do not see how any one with a sense for the facts can
possibly call our systems immediate results of 'experience' in the ordinary
sense. Every scientific conception is in the first instance a 'spontaneous
variation' in some one's brain.[533] For one that proves useful and applicable
there are a thousand that perish through their worthlessness. Their genesis is
strictly akin to that of the flashes of poetry and sallies of wit to which the
instable brain-paths equally give rise. But whereas the poetry and wit (like
the science of the ancients) are their 'own excuse for being,' and have to run
the gauntlet of no farther test, the 'scientific' conceptions must prove their
worth by being 'verified.' This test, however, is the cause of their
preservation, not that of their production; and one might as well account for
the origin of Artemus Ward's jokes by the 'cohesion' of subjects with
predicates in proportion to the 'persistence of the outer relations' to which
they 'correspond' as to treat the genesis of scientific conceptions in the same
ponderously unreal way.
The most persistent outer relations which science believes in are never
matters of experience at all, but have to be disengaged from under
experience by a process of elimination, that is, by ignoring conditions
which are always present. The elementary laws of mechanics, physics, and
chemistry are all of this sort. The principle of uniformity in nature is of this
sort; it has to be sought under and in spite of the most rebellious
appearances; and our conviction of its truth is far more like a religious faith
than like assent to a demonstration. The only cohesions which experience in
the literal sense of the word produces in our mind are, as we contended
some time back, the proximate laws of nature, and habitudes of concrete
things, that heat melts ice, that salt preserves meat, that fish die out of
water, and the like.[534] Such 'empirical truths' as these we admitted to form
an enormous part of human wisdom. The 'scientific' truths have to

harmonize with these truths, or be given up as useless; but they arise in the
mind in no such passive associative way as that in which the simpler truths
arise. Even those experiences which are used to prove a scientific truth are
for the most part artificial experiences of the laboratory gained after the
truth itself has been conjectured. Instead of experiences engendering the
'inner relations,' the inner relations are what engender the experiences here.
What happens in the brain after experience has done its utmost is what
happens in every material mass which has been fashioned by an outward
force,—in every pudding or mortar, for example, which I may make with
my hands. The fashioning from without brings the elements into
collocations which set new internal forces free to exert their effects in turn.
And the random irradiations and resettlements of our ideas, which
supervene upon experience, and constitute our free mental play, are due
entirely to these secondary internal processes, which vary enormously from
brain to brain, even though the brains be exposed to exactly the same 'outer
relations.' The higher thought-processes owe their being to causes which
correspond far more to the sourings and fermentations of dough, the setting
of mortar, or the subsidence of sediments in mixtures, than to the
manipulations by which these physical aggregates came to be compounded.
Our study of similar association and reasoning taught us that the whole
superiority of man depended on the facility with which in his brain the
paths worn by the most frequent outer cohesions could be ruptured. The
causes of the instability, the reasons why now this point and now that
become in him the seat of rupture, we saw to be entirely obscure. (Vol. I. p.
580; Vol. II. p. 364.) The only clear thing about the peculiarity seems to be
its interstitial character, and the certainty that no mere appeal to man's
'experience' suffices to explain it.
When we pass from scientific to æsthetic and ethical systems, every one
readily admits that, although the elements are matters of experience, the
peculiar forms of relation into which they are woven are incongruent with
the order of passively received experience. The world of æsthetics and
ethics is an ideal world, a Utopia, a world which the outer relations persist
in contradicting, but which we as stubbornly persist in striving to make
actual. Why do we thus invincibly crave to alter the given order of nature?
Simply because other relations among things are far more interesting to us
and more charming than the mere rates of frequency of their time- and

space-conjunctions. These other relations are all secondary and brain-born,
'spontaneous variations' most of them, of our sensibility, whereby certain
elements of experience, and certain arrangements in time and space, have
acquired an agreeableness which otherwise would not have been felt. It is
true that habitual arrangements may also become agreeable. But this
agreeableness of the merely habitual is felt to be a mere ape and counterfeit
of real inward fitness; and one sign of intelligence is never to mistake the
one for the other.
There are then ideal and inward relations amongst the objects of our
thought which can in no intelligible sense whatever be interpreted as
reproductions of the order of outer experience. In the æsthetic and ethical
realms they conflict with its order—the early Christian with his kingdom of
heaven, and the contemporary anarchist with his abstract dream of justice,
will tell you that the existing order must perish, root and branch, ere the true
order can come. Now the peculiarity of those relations among the objects of
our thought which are dubbed 'scientific' is this, that although they no more
are inward reproductions of the outer order than the ethical and æsthetic
relations are, yet they do not conflict with that order, but, once having
sprung up by the play of the inward forces, are found—some of them at
least, namely the only ones which have survived long enough to be matters
of record—to be congruent with the time- and space-relations which our
impressions affect.
In other words, though nature's materials lend themselves slowly and
discouragingly to our translation of them into ethical forms, but more
readily into æsthetic forms; to translation into scientific forms they lend
themselves with relative ease and completeness. The translation, it is true,
will probably never be ended. The perceptive order does not give way, nor
the right conceptive substitute for it arise, at our bare word of command.
[535] It is often a deadly fight; and many a man of science can say, like
Johannes Müller, after an investigation, 'Es klebt Blut an der Arbeit.' But
victory after victory makes us sure that the essential doom of our enemy is
defeat.[536]
THE GENESIS OF THE PURE SCIENCES.

I have now stated in general terms the relation of the natural sciences to
experience strictly so called, and shall complete what I have to say by
reverting to the subject on a later page. At present I will pass to the socalled pure or a priori sciences of Classification, Logic, and Mathematics.
My thesis concerning these is that they are even less than the natural
sciences effects of the order of the world as it comes to our experience. THE
PURE SCIENCES EXPRESS RESULTS OF COMPARISON exclusively; comparison is not
a conceivable effect of the order in which outer impressions are experienced
—it is one of the house-born (p. 627) portions of our mental structure;
therefore the pure sciences form a body of propositions with whose genesis
experience has nothing to do.

First, consider the nature of comparison. The relations of resemblance and
difference among things have nothing to do with the time- and space-order
in which we may experience the latter. Suppose a hundred beings created by
God and gifted with the faculties of memory and comparison. Suppose that
upon each of them the same lot of sensations are imprinted, but in different
orders. Let some of them have no single sensation more than once. Let
some have this one and others that one repeated. Let every conceivable
permutation prevail. And then let the magic-lantern show die out, and keep
the creatures in a void eternity, with naught but their memories to muse
upon. Inevitably in their long leisure they will begin to play with the items
of their experience and rearrange them, make classificatory series of them,
place gray between white and black, orange between red and yellow, and
trace all other degrees of resemblance and difference. And this new
construction will be absolutely identical in all the hundred creatures, the
diversity of the sequence of the original experiences having no effect as
regards this rearrangement. Any and every form of sequence will give the
same result, because the result expresses the relation between the inward
natures of the sensations; and to that the question of their outward
succession is quite irrelevant. Black will differ from white just as much in a
world in which they always come close together as in one in which they
always come far apart; just as much in one in which they appear rarely as in
one in which they appear all the time.

But the advocate of 'persistent outer relations' may still return to the charge:
These are what make us so sure that white and black differ, he may say; for
in a world where sometimes black resembled white and sometimes differed
from it, we could never be so sure. It is because in this world black and
white have always differed that the sense of their difference has become a
necessary form of thought. The pair of colors on the one hand and the sense
of difference on the other, inseparably experienced, not only by ourselves
but by our ancestors, have become inseparably connected in the mind. Not
through any essential structure of the mind, which made difference the only
possible feeling which they could arouse; no, but because they simply did
differ so often that at last they begat in us an impotency to imagine them
doing anything else, and made us accept such a fabulous account as that just
presented, of creatures to whom a single experience would suffice to make
us feel the necessity of this relation.
I know not whether Mr. Spencer would subscribe to this or not;—nor do I
care, for there are mysteries which press more for solution than the meaning
of this vague writer's words. But to me such an explanation of our
difference-judgment is absolutely unintelligible. We now find black and
white different, the explanation says, because we have always have so
found them. But why should we always have so found them? Why should
difference have popped into our heads so invariably with the thought of
them? There must have been either a subjective or an objective reason. The
subjective reason can only be that our minds were so constructed that a
sense of difference was the only sort of conscious transition possible
between black and white; the objective reason can only be that difference
was always there, with these colors, outside the mind as an objective fact.
The subjective reason explains outer frequency by inward structure, not
inward structure by outer frequency; and so surrenders the experiencetheory. The objective reason simply says that if an outer difference is there
the mind must needs know it—which is no explanation at all, but a mere
appeal to the fact that somehow the mind does know what is there.
The only clear thing to do is to give up the sham of a pretended explanation,
and to fall back on the fact that the sense of difference has arisen, in some
natural manner doubtless, but in a manner which we do not understand. It

was by the back-stairs way, at all events; and, from the very first, happened
to be the only mode of reaction by which consciousness could feel the
transition from one term to another of what (in consequence of this very
reaction) we now call a contrasted pair.

In noticing the differences and resemblances of things, and their degrees,
the mind feels its own activity, and has given the name of comparison
thereto. It need not compare its materials, but if once roused to do so, it can
compare them with but one result, and this a fixed consequence of the
nature of the materials themselves. Difference and resemblance are thus
relations between ideal objects, or conceptions as such. To learn whether
black and white differ, I need not consult the world of experience at all; the
mere ideas suffice. What I mean by black differs from what I mean by
white, whether such colors exist extra mentem meam or not. If they ever do
so exist, they will differ. White things may blacken, but the black of them
will differ from the white of them, so long as I mean anything definite by
these three words.[537]

I shall now in what follows call all propositions which express time- and
space-relations empirical propositions; and I shall give the name of
rational propositions to all propositions which express the results of a
comparison. The latter denomination is in a sense arbitrary, for resemblance
and difference are not usually held to be the only rational relations between
things. I will next proceed to show, however, how many other rational
relations commonly supposed distinct can be resolved into these, so that my
definition of rational propositions will end, I trust, by proving less arbitrary
than it now appears to be.
SERIES OF EVEN DIFFERENCE AND MEDIATE COMPARISON.

In Chapter XII we saw that the mind can at successive moments mean the
same, and that it gradually comes into possession of a stock of permanent
and fixed meanings, ideal objects, or conceptions, some of which are
universal qualities, like the black and white of our example, and some,
individual things. We now see that not only are the objects permanent
mental possessions, but the results of their comparison are permanent too.
The objects and their differences together form an immutable system. The
same objects, compared in the same way, always give the same results; if
the result be not the same, then the objects are not those originally meant.
This last principle, which we may call the axiom of constant result, holds
good throughout all our mental operations, not only when we compare, but
when we add, divide, class, or infer a given matter in any conceivable way.
Its most general expression would be "the Same operated on in the same
way gives the Same." In mathematics it takes the form of "equals added to,
or subtracted from, equals give equals," and the like. We shall meet with it
again.
The next thing which we observe is that the operation of comparing may be
repeated on its own results; in other words, that we can think of the various
resemblances and differences which we find and compare them with each
other, making differences and resemblances of a higher order. The mind
thus becomes aware of sets of similar differences, and forms series of terms
with the same kind and amount of difference between them, terms which, as
they succeed each other, maintain a constant direction of serial increase.
This sense of constant direction in a series of operations we saw in Chapter
XIII (p. 490) to be a cardinal mental fact. "A differs from B differs from C
differs from D, etc.," makes a series only when the differences are in the
same direction. In any such difference-series all terms differ in just the same
way from their predecessors. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,... the notes of the
chromatic scale in music, are familiar examples. As soon as the mind grasps
such a series as a whole, it perceives that two terms taken far apart differ
more than two terms taken near together, and that any one term differs
more from a remote than from a near successor, and this no matter what the
terms may be, or what the sort of difference may be, provided it is always
the same sort.

This PRINCIPLE OF MEDIATE COMPARISON might be briefly (though obscurely)
expressed by the formula "more than the more is more than the less"—the
words more and less standing simply for degrees of increase along a
constant direction of differences. Such a formula would cover all possible
cases, as, earlier than early is earlier than late, worse than bad is worse than
good, east of east is east of west; etc., etc., ad libitum.[538] Symbolically, we
might write it as a < b < c < d.... and say that any number of intermediaries
may be expunged without obliging us to alter anything in what remains
written.
The principle of mediate comparison is only one form of a law which holds
in many series of homogeneously related terms, the law that skipping
intermediary terms leaves relations the same. This AXIOM OF SKIPPED
INTERMEDIARIES or of TRANSFERRED RELATIONS occurs, as we soon shall see, in
logic as the fundamental principle of inference, in arithmetic as the
fundamental property of the number-series, in geometry as that of the
straight line, the plane and the parallel. It seems to be on the whole the
broadest and deepest law of man's thought.
In certain lists of terms the result of comparison may be to find nodifference, or equality in place of difference. Here also intermediaries may
be skipped, and mediate comparison be carried on with the general result
expressed by the axiom of mediate equality, "equals of equals are equal,"
which is the great principle of the mathematical sciences. This too as a
result of the mind's mere acuteness, and in utter independence of the order
in which experiences come associated together. Symbolically, again: a = b
= c = d..., with the same consequence as regards expunging terms which we
saw before.
CLASSIFICATORY SERIES.
Thus we have a rather intricate system of necessary and immutable ideal
truths of comparison, a system applicable to terms experienced in any order
of sequence or frequency, or even to terms never experienced or to be
experienced, such as the mind's imaginary constructions would be. These
truths of comparison result in Classifications. It is, for some unknown
reason, a great æsthetic delight for the mind to break the order of

experience, and class its materials in serial orders, proceeding from step to
step of difference, and to contemplate untiringly the crossings and
inosculations of the series among themselves. The first steps in most of the
sciences are purely classificatory. Where facts fall easily into rich and
intricate series (as plants and animals and chemical compounds do), the
mere sight of the series fills the mind with a satisfaction sui generis; and a
world whose real materials naturally lend themselves to serial classification
is pro tanto a more rational world, a world with which the mind will feel
more intimate, than with a world in which they do not. By the preevolutionary naturalists, whose generation has hardly passed away,
classifications were supposed to be ultimate insights into God's mind,
filling us with adoration of his ways. The fact that Nature lets us make them
was a proof of the presence of his Thought in her bosom. So far as the facts
of experience can not be serially classified, therefore, so far experience fails
to be rational in one of the ways, at least, which we crave.
THE LOGIC-SERIES.
Closely akin to the function of comparison is that of judging, predicating,
or subsuming. In fact, these elementary intellectual functions run into each
other so, that it is often only a question of practical convenience whether we
shall call a given mental operation by the name of one or of the other.
Comparisons result in groups of like things; and presently (through
discrimination and abstraction) in conceptions of the respects in which the
likenesses obtain. The groups are genera or classes, the respects are
characters or attributes. The attributes again may be compared, forming
genera of higher orders, and their characters singled out; so that we have a
new sort of series, that of predication, or of kind including kind. Thus
horses are quadrupeds, quadrupeds animals, animals machines, machines
liable to wear out, etc. In such a series as this the several couplings of terms
may have been made out originally at widely different times and under
different circumstances. But memory may bring them together afterwards;
and whenever it does so, our faculty of apprehending serial increase makes
us conscious of them as a single system of successive terms united by the
same relation.[539]

Now whenever we become thus conscious, we may become aware of an
additional relation which is of the highest intellectual importance, inasmuch
as upon it the whole structure of logic is reared. The principle of mediate
predication or subsumption is only the axiom of skipped intermediaries
applied to a series of successive predications. It expresses the fact that any
earlier term in the series stands to any later term in the same relation in
which it stands to any intermediate term; in other words, that whatever has
an attribute has all the attributes of that attribute; or more briefly still, that
whatever is of a kind is of that kind's kind. A little explanation of this
statement will bring out all that it involves.
We learned in the chapter on Reasoning what our great motive is for
abstracting attributes and predicating them. It is that our varying practical
purposes require us to lay hold of different angles of the reality at different
times. But for these we should be satisfied to 'see it whole,' and always
alike. The purpose, however, makes one aspect essential; so, to avoid
dispersion of the attention, we treat the reality as if for the time being it
were nothing but that aspect, and we let its supernumerary determinations
go. In short, we substitute the aspect for the whole real thing. For our
purpose the aspect can be substituted for the whole, and the two treated as
the same; and the word is (which couples the whole with its aspect or
attribute in the categoric judgment) expresses (among other things) the
identifying operation performed. The predication-series a is b, b is c, c is
d,... closely resembles for certain practical purposes the equation-series a =
b, b = c, c = d, etc.
But what is our purpose in predicating? Ultimately, it may be anything we
please; but proximately and immediately, it is always the gratification of a
certain curiosity as to whether the object in hand is or is not of a kind
connected with that ultimate purpose. Usually the connection is not
obvious, and we only find that the object S is of a kind connected with P,
after first finding that it is of a kind M, which itself is connected with P.
Thus, to fix our ideas by an example, we have a curiosity (our ultimate
purpose being conquest over nature) as to how Sirius may move. It is not
obvious whether Sirius is a kind of thing which moves in the line of sight or
not. When, however, we find it to be a kind of thing in whose spectrum the
hydrogen-line is shifted, and when we reflect that that kind of thing is a
kind of thing which moves in the line of sight; we conclude that Sirius does

so move. Whatever Sirius's attribute is, Sirius is; its adjective's adjective
can supersede its own adjective in our thinking, and this with no loss to our
knowledge, so long as we stick to the definite purpose in view.
Now please note that this elimination of intermediary kinds and transfer of
is's along the line, results from our insight into the very meaning of the
word is, and into the constitution of any series of terms connected by that
relation. It has naught to do with what any particular thing is or is not; but,
whatever any given thing may be, we see that it also is whatever that is,
indefinitely. To grasp in one view a succession of is's is to apprehend this
relation between the terms which they connect; just as to grasp a list of
successive equals is to apprehend their mutual equality throughout. The
principle of mediate subsumption thus expresses relations of ideal objects
as such. It can be discovered by a mind left at leisure with any set of
meanings (however originally obtained), of which some are predicable of
others. The moment we string them in a serial line, that moment we see that
we can drop intermediaries, treat remote terms just like near ones, and put a
genus in the place of a species. This shows that the principle of mediate
subsumption has nothing to do with the particular order of our experiences,
or with the outer coexistences and sequences of terms. Were it a mere
outgrowth of habit and association, we should be forced to regard it as
having no universal validity; for every hour of the day we meet things
which we consider to be of this kind or of that, but later learn that they have
none of the kind's properties, that they do not belong to the kind's kind.
Instead, however, of correcting the principle by these cases, we correct the
cases by the principle. We say that if the thing we named an M has not M's
properties, then we were either mistaken in calling it an M, or mistaken
about M's properties; or else that it is no longer M, but has changed. But we
never say that it is an M without M's properties; for by conceiving a thing as
of the kind M I mean that it shall have M's properties, be of M's kind, even
though I should never be able to find in the real world anything which is an
M. The principle emanates from my perception of what a lot of successive
is's mean. This perception can no more be confirmed by one set, or
weakened by another set, of outer facts, than the perception that black is not
white can be confirmed by the fact that snow never blackens, or weakened
by the fact that photographer's paper blackens as soon as you lay it in the
sun.

The abstract scheme of successive predications, extended indefinitely, with
all the possibilities of substitution which it involves, is thus an immutable
system of truth which flows from the very structure and form of our
thinking. If any real terms ever do fit into such a scheme, they will obey its
laws; whether they do is a question as to nature's facts, the answer to which
can only be empirically ascertained. Formal logic is the name of the
Science which traces in skeleton form all the remote relations of terms
connected by successive is's with each other, and enumerates their
possibilities of mutual substitution. To our principle of mediate
subsumption she has given various formulations, of which the best is
perhaps this broad expression, that the same can be substituted for the same
in any mental operation.[540]
The ordinary logical series contains but three terms—"Socrates, man,
mortal." But we also have 'Sorites'—Socrates, man, animal, machine, run
down, mortal, etc.—and it violates psychology to represent these as
syllogisms with terms suppressed. The ground of there being any logic at all
is our power to grasp any series as a whole, and the more terms it holds the
better. This synthetic consciousness of an uniform direction of advance
through a multiplicity of terms is, apparently, what the brutes and lower
men cannot accomplish, and what gives to us our extraordinary power of
ratiocinative thought. The mind which can grasp a string of is's as a whole
—the objects linked by them may be ideal or real, physical, mental, or
symbolic, indifferently—can also apply to it the principle of skipped
intermediaries. The logic-list is thus in its origin and essential nature just
like those graded classificatory lists which we erewhile described. The
'rational proposition' which lies at the basis of all reasoning, the dictum de
omni et nullo in all the various forms in which it may be expressed, the
fundamental law of thought, is thus only the result of the function of
comparison in a mind which has come by some lucky variation to
apprehend a series of more than two terms at once.[541] So far, then, both
Systematic Classification and Logic are seen to be incidental results of the
mere capacity for discerning difference and likeness, which capacity is a
thing with which the order of experience, properly so styled, has absolutely
nothing to do.

But how comes it (it may next be asked) when systematic classifications
have so little ultimate theoretic importance—for the conceiving of things
according to their mere degrees of resemblance always yields to other
modes of conceiving when these can be obtained—that the logical relations
among things should form such a mighty engine for dealing with the facts
of life?
Chapter XXII already gave the reason (see p. 335, above). This world might
be a world in which all things differed, and in which what properties there
were were ultimate and had no farther predicates. In such a world there
would be as many kinds as there were separate things. We could never
subsume a new thing under an old kind; or if we could, no consequences
would follow. Or, again, this might be a world in which innumerable things
were of a kind, but in which no concrete thing remained of the same kind
long, but all objects were in a flux. Here again, though we could subsume
and infer, our logic would be of no practical use to us, for the subjects of
our propositions would have changed whilst we were talking. In such
worlds, logical relations would obtain, and be known (doubtless) as they are
now, but they would form a merely theoretic scheme and be of no use for
the conduct of life. But our world is no such world. It is a very peculiar
world, and plays right into logic's hands. Some of the things, at least, which
it contains are of the same kind as other things; some of them remain
always of the kind of which they once were; and some of the properties of
them cohere indissolubly and are always found together. Which things these
latter things are we learn by experience in the strict sense of the word, and
the results of the experience are embodied in 'empirical propositions.'
Whenever such a thing is met with by us now, our sagacity notes it to be of
a certain kind; our learning immediately recalls that kind's kind, and then
that kind's kind, and so on; so that a moment's thinking may make us aware
that the thing is of a kind so remote that we could never have directly
perceived the connection. The flight to this last kind over the heads of the
intermediaries is the essential feature of the intellectual operation here.
Evidently it is a pure outcome of our sense for apprehending serial increase;
and, unlike the several propositions themselves which make up the series
(and which may all be empirical), it has nothing to do with the time- and
space-order in which the things have been experienced.

MATHEMATICAL RELATIONS.
So much for the a priori necessities called systematic classification and
logical inference. The other couplings of data which pass for a priori
necessities of thought are the mathematical judgments, and certain
metaphysical propositions. These latter we shall consider farther on. As
regards the mathematical judgments, they are all 'rational propositions' in
the sense defined on p. 644, for they express results of comparison and
nothing more. The mathematical sciences deal with similarities and
equalities exclusively, and not with coexistences and sequences. Hence they
have, in the first instance, no connection with the order of experience. The
comparisons of mathematics are between numbers and extensive
magnitudes, giving rise to arithmetic and geometry respectively.

Number seems to signify primarily the strokes of our attention in
discriminating things. These strokes remain in the memory in groups, large
or small, and the groups can be compared. The discrimination is, as we
know, psychologically facilitated by the mobility of the thing as a total (p.
173). But within each thing we discriminate parts; so that the number of
things which any one given phenomenon may be depends in the last
instance on our way of taking it. A globe is one, if undivided; two, if
composed of hemispheres. A sand-heap is one thing, or twenty thousand
things, as we may choose to count it. We amuse ourselves by the counting
of mere strokes, to form rhythms, and these we compare and name. Little by
little in our minds the number-series is formed. This, like all lists of terms in
which there is a direction of serial increase, carries with it the sense of those
mediate relations between its terms which we expressed by the axiom "the
more than the more is more than the less." That axiom seems, in fact, only a
way of stating that the terms do form an increasing series. But, in addition
to this, we are aware of certain other relations among our strokes of
counting. We may interrupt them where we like, and go on again. All the
while we feel that the interruption does not alter the strokes themselves. We
may count 12 straight through; or count 7 and pause, and then count 5, but
still the strokes will be the same. We thus distinguish between our acts of

counting and those of interrupting or grouping, as between an unchanged
matter and an operation of mere shuffling performed on it. The matter is the
original units or strokes; which all modes of grouping or combining simply
give us back unchanged. In short, combinations of numbers are
combinations of their units, which is the fundamental axiom of arithmetic,
[542] leading to such consequences as that 7 + 5 = 8 + 4 because both = 12.
The general axiom of mediate equality, that equals of equals are equal,
comes in here.[543] The principle of constancy in our meanings, when
applied to strokes of counting, also gives rise to the axiom that the same
number, operated on (interrupted, grouped) in the same way will always
give the same result or be the same. How shouldn't it? Nothing is supposed
changed.
Arithmetic and its fundamental principles are thus independent of our
experiences or of the order of the world. The matter of arithmetic is mental
matter; its principles flow from the fact that the matter forms a series,
which can be cut into by us wherever we like without the matter changing.
The empiricist school has strangely tried to interpret the truths of number as
results of coexistences among outward things. John Mill calls number a
physical property of things. 'One,' according to Mill, means one sort of
passive sensation which we receive, 'two' another, 'three' a third. The same
things, however, can give us different number-sensations. Three things
arranged thus, ---, for example, impress us differently from three things
arranged thus, -_-. But experience tells us that every real object-group
which can be arranged in one of these ways can always be arranged in the
other also, and that 2 + 1 and 3 are thus modes of numbering things which
'coexist' invariably with each other. The indefeasibility of our belief in their
'coexistence' (which is Mill's word for their equivalence) is due solely to the
enormous amount of experience we have of it. For all things, whatever
other sensations they may give us, give us at any rate number-sensations.
Those number-sensations which the same thing may be successively made
to arouse are the numbers which we deem equal to each other; those which
the same thing refuses to arouse are those which we deem unequal.
This is as clear a restatement as I can make of Mill's doctrine.[544] And its
failure is written upon its front. Woe to arithmetic, were such the only
grounds for its validity! The same real things are countable in numberless
ways, and pass from one numerical form, not only to its equivalent (as Mill

implies), but to its other, as the sport of physical accidents or of our mode
of attending may decide. How could our notion that one and one are
eternally and necessarily two ever maintain itself in a world where every
time we add one drop of water to another we get not two but one again? in a
world where every time we add a drop to a crumb of quicklime we get a
dozen or more?—had it no better warrant than such experiences? At most
we could then say that one and one are usually two. Our arithmetical
propositions would never have the confident tone which they now possess.
That confident tone is due to the fact that they deal with abstract and ideal
numbers exclusively. What we mean by one plus one is two; we make two
out of it; and it would mean two still even in a world where physically
(according to a conceit of Mill's) a third thing was engendered every time
one thing came together with another. We are masters of our meanings, and
discriminate between the things we mean and our ways of taking them,
between our strokes of numeration themselves, and our bundlings and
separatings thereof.
Mill ought not only to have said, "All things are numbered." He ought, in
order to prove his point, to have shown that they are unequivocally
numbered, which they notoriously are not. Only the abstract numbers
themselves are unequivocal, only those which we create mentally and hold
fast to as ideal objects always the same. A concrete natural thing can always
be numbered in a great variety of ways. "We need only conceive a thing
divided into four equal parts (and all things may be conceived as so
divided)," as Mill is himself compelled to say, to find the number four in it,
and so on.
The relation of numbers to experience is just like that of 'kinds' in logic. So
long as an experience will keep its kind we can handle it by logic. So long
as it will keep its number we can deal with it by arithmetic. Sensibly,
however, things are constantly changing their numbers, just as they are
changing their kinds. They are forever breaking apart and fusing.
Compounds and their elements are never numerically identical, for the
elements are sensibly many and the compounds sensibly one. Unless our
arithmetic is to remain without application to life, we must somehow make
more numerical continuity than we spontaneously find. Accordingly
Lavoisier discovers his weight-units which remain the same in compounds
and elements, though volume-units and quality-units all have changed. A

great discovery! And modern science outdoes it by denying that compounds
exist at all. There is no such thing as 'water' for 'science;' that is only a
handy name for H2 and O when they have got into the position H-O-H, and
then affect our senses in a novel way. The modern theories of atoms, of
heat, and of gases are, in fact, only intensely artificial devices for gaining
that constancy in the numbers of things which sensible experience will not
show. "Sensible things are not the things for me," says Science, "because in
their changes they will not keep their numbers the same. Sensible qualities
are not the qualities for me, because they can with difficulty be numbered at
all. These hypothetic atoms, however, are the things, these hypothetic
masses and velocities are the qualities for me; they will stay numbered all
the time."
By such elaborate inventions, and at such a cost to the imagination, do men
succeed in making for themselves a world in which real things shall be
coerced per fas aut nefas under arithmetical law.

The other branch of mathematics is geometry. Its objects are also ideal
creations. Whether nature contain circles or not, I can know what I mean by
a circle and can stick to my meaning; and when I mean two circles I mean
two things of an identical kind. The axiom of constant results (see above, p.
645) holds in geometry. The same forms, treated in the same way (added,
subtracted, or compared), give the same results—how shouldn't they? The
axioms of mediate comparison (p. 645), of logic (p. 648), and of number (p.
654) all apply to the forms which we imagine in space, inasmuch as these
resemble or differ from each other, form kinds, and are numerable things.
But in addition to these general principles, which are true of space-forms
only as they are of other mental conceptions, there are certain axioms
relative to space-forms exclusively, which we must briefly consider.
Three of them give marks of identity among straight lines, planes, and
parallels. Straight lines which have two points, planes which have three
points, parallels to a given line which have one point, in common, coalesce
throughout. Some say that the certainty of our belief in these axioms is due
to repeated experiences of their truth; others that it is due to an intuitive

acquaintance with the properties of space. It is neither. We experience lines
enough which pass through two points only to separate again, only we
won't call them straight. Similarly of planes and parallels. We have a
definite idea of what we mean by each of these words; and when something
different is offered us, we see the difference. Straight lines, planes, and
parallels, as they figure in geometry, are mere inventions of our faculty for
apprehending serial increase. The farther continuations of these forms, we
say, shall bear the same relation to their last visible parts which these did to
still earlier parts. It thus follows (from that axiom of skipped intermediaries
which obtains in all regular series) that parts of these figures separated by
other parts must agree in direction, just as contiguous parts do. This
uniformity of direction throughout is, in fact, all that makes us care for
these forms, gives them their beauty, and stamps them into fixed
conceptions in our mind. But obviously if two lines, or two planes, with a
common segment, were to part company beyond the segment, it could only
be because the direction of at least one of them had changed. Parting
company in lines and planes means changing direction, means assuming a
new relation to the parts that pre-exist; and assuming a new relation means
ceasing to be straight or plane. If we mean by a parallel a line that will
never meet a second line; and if we have one such line drawn through a
point, any new line drawn through that point which does not coalesce with
the first must be inclined to it, and if inclined to it must approach the
second, i.e., cease to be parallel with it. No properties of outlying space
need come in here: only a definite conception of uniform direction, and
constancy in sticking to one's point.
The other two axioms peculiar to geometry are that figures can be moved in
space without change, and that no variation in the way of subdividing a
given amount of space alters its total quantity.[545] This last axiom is similar
to what we found to obtain in numbers. 'The whole is equal to its parts' is an
abridged way of expressing it. A man is not the same biological whole if we
cut him in two at the neck as if we divide him at the ankles; but
geometrically he is the same whole, no matter in which place we cut him.
The axiom about figures being movable in space is rather a postulate than
an axiom. So far as they are so movable, then certain fixed equalities and
differences obtain between forms, no matter where placed. But if
translation through space warped or magnified forms, then the relations of
equality, etc., would always have to be expressed with a position-

qualification added. A geometry as absolutely certain as ours could be
invented on the supposition of such a space, if the laws of its warping and
deformation were fixed. It would, however, be much more complicated than
our geometry, which makes the simplest possible supposition; and finds,
luckily enough, that it is a supposition with which the space of our
experience seems to agree.
By means of these principles, all playing into each other's hands, the mutual
equivalences of an immense number of forms can be traced, even of such as
at first sight bear hardly any resemblance to each other. We move and turn
them mentally, and find that parts of them will superpose. We add
imaginary lines which subdivide or enlarge them, and find that the new
figures resemble each other in ways which show us that the old ones are
equivalent too. We thus end by expressing all sorts of forms in terms of
other forms, enlarging our knowledge of the kinds of things which certain
other kinds of things are, or to which they are equivalent.
The result is a new system of mental objects which can be treated as
identical for certain purposes, a new series of is's almost indefinitely
prolonged, just like the series of equivalencies among numbers, part of
which the multiplication-table expresses. And all this is in the first instance
regardless of the coexistences and sequences of nature, and regardless of
whether the figures we speak of have ever been outwardly experienced or
not.
CONSCIOUSNESS OF SERIES IS THE BASIS OF RATIONALITY.
Classification, logic, and mathematics all result, then, from the mere play of
the mind comparing its conceptions, no matter whence the latter may have
come. The essential condition for the formation of all these sciences is that
we should have grown capable of apprehending series as such, and of
distinguishing them as homogeneous or heterogeneous, and as possessing
definite directions of what I have called 'increase.' This consciousness of
series is a human perfection which has been gradually evolved, and which
varies greatly from man to man. There is no accounting for it as a result of
habitual associations among outward impressions, so we must simply
ascribe it to the factors, whatever they be, of inward cerebral growth. Once
this consciousness attained to, however, mediate thought becomes possible;

with our very awareness of a series may go an awareness that dropping
terms out of it will leave identical relations between the terms that remain;
and thus arises a perception of relations between things so naturally
separate that we should otherwise never have compared them together at
all.
The axiom of skipped intermediaries applies, however, only to certain
particular series, and among them to those which we have considered, in
which the recurring relation is either of difference, of likeness, of kind, of
numerical addition, or of prolongation in the same linear or plane direction.
It is therefore not a purely formal law of thinking, but flows from the nature
of the matters thought about. It will not do to say universally that in all
series of homogeneously related terms the remote members are related to
each other as the near ones are; for that will often be untrue. The series A is
not B is not C is not D.... does not permit the relation to be traced between
remote terms. From two negations no inference can be drawn. Nor, to
become more concrete, does the lover of a woman generally love her
beloved, or the contradictor of a contradictor contradict whomever he
contradicts. The slayer of a slayer does not slay the latter's victim; the
acquaintances or enemies of a man need not be each other's acquaintances
or enemies; nor are two things which are on top of a third thing necessarily
on top of each other.
All skipping of intermediaries and transfer of relations occurs within
homogeneous series. But not all homogeneous series allow of
intermediaries being skipped and relations transferred. It depends on which
series they are, on what relations they contain.[546] Let it not be said that it
is a mere matter of verbal association, due to the fact that language
sometimes permits us to transfer the name of a relation over skipped
intermediaries, and sometimes does not; as where we call men 'progenitors'
of their remote as well as of their immediate posterity, but refuse to call
them 'fathers' thereof. There are relations which are intrinsically
transferable, whilst others are not. The relation of condition, e.g., is
intrinsically transferable. What conditions a condition conditions what it
conditions—"cause of cause is cause of effect." The relations of negation
and frustration, on the other hand, are not transferable: what frustrates a
frustration does not frustrate what it frustrates. No changes of terminology
would annul the intimate difference between these two cases.

Nothing but the clear sight of the ideas themselves shows whether the
axiom of skipped intermediaries applies to them or not. Their connections,
immediate and remote, flow from their inward natures. We try to consider
them in certain ways, to bring them into certain relations, and we find that
sometimes we can and sometimes we cannot The question whether there
are or are not inward and essential connections between conceived objects
as such, really is the same thing as the question whether we can get any
new perception from mentally coupling them together, or pass from one to
another by a mental operation which gives a result. In the case of some
ideas and operations we get a result; but no result in the case of others.
Where a result comes, it is due exclusively to the nature of the ideas and of
the operation. Take blueness and yellowness, for example. We can operate
on them in some ways, but not in other ways. We can compare them; but we
cannot add one to or subtract it from the other. We can refer them to a
common kind, color; but we cannot make one a kind of the other, or infer
one from the other. This has nothing to do with experience. For we can add
blue pigment to yellow pigment, and subtract it again, and get a result both
times. Only we know perfectly that this is no addition or subtraction of the
blue and yellow qualities or natures themselves.[547]

There is thus no denying the fact that the mind is filled with necessary and
eternal relations which it finds between certain of its ideal conceptions, and
which form a determinate system, independent of the order of frequency in
which experience may have associated the conception's originals in time
and space.
Shall we continue to call these sciences 'intuitive,' innate,' or 'a priori'
bodies of truth, or not?[548] Personally I should like to do so. But I hesitate
to use the terms, on account of the odium which controversial history has
made the whole of their connotation for many worthy persons. The most
politic way not to alienate these readers is to flourish the name of the
immortal Locke. For in truth I have done nothing more in the previous
pages than to make a little more explicit the teachings of Locke's fourth
book:

"The immutability of the same relations between the same immutable
things is now the idea that shows him that if the three angles of a
triangle were once equal to two right angles, they will always be equal
to two right ones. And hence he comes to be certain that what was
once true in the case is always true; what ideas once agreed will
always agree.... Upon this ground it is that particular demonstrations in
mathematics afford general knowledge. If, then, the perception that the
same ideas will eternally have the same habitudes and relations be not
a sufficient ground of knowledge, there could be no knowledge of
general propositions in mathematics.... All general knowledge lies only
in our own thoughts, and consists barely in the contemplation of our
abstract ideas. Wherever we perceive any agreement or disagreement
amongst them, there we have general knowledge; and by putting the
names of those ideas together accordingly in propositions, can with
certainty pronounce general truths.... What is once known of such
ideas will be perpetually and forever true. So that, as to all general
knowledge, we must search and find it only in our own minds and it is
only the examining of our own ideas that furnisheth us with that.
Truths belonging to essences of things (that is, to abstract ideas) are
eternal, and are to be found out only by the contemplation of those
essences.... Knowledge is the consequence of the ideas (be they what
they will) that are in our minds, producing there certain general
propositions.... Such propositions are therefore called 'eternal truths,'...
because, being once made about abstract ideas so as to be true, they
will, whenever they can be supposed to be made again, at any time
past or to come, by a mind having those ideas, always actually be true.
For names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same ideas, and
the same ideas having immutably the same habitudes one to another,
propositions concerning any abstract ideas that are once true must
needs be eternal verities."
But what are these eternal verities, these 'agreements,' which the mind
discovers by barely considering its own fixed meanings, except what I have
said?—relations of likeness and difference, immediate or mediate, between
the terms of certain series. Classification is serial comparison, logic mediate
subsumption, arithmetic mediate equality of different bundles of attentionstrokes, geometry mediate equality of different ways of carving space. None

of these eternal verities has anything to say about facts, about what is or is
not in the world. Logic does not say whether Socrates, men, mortals or
immortals exist; arithmetic does not tell us where her 7's, 5's, and 12's are to
be found; geometry affirms not that circles and rectangles are real. All that
these sciences make us sure of is, that if these things are anywhere to be
found, the eternal verities will obtain of them. Locke accordingly never tires
of telling us that the
"universal propositions of whose truth or falsehood we can have
certain knowledge, concern not existence.... These universal and selfevident principles, being only our constant, clear, and distinct
knowledge of our own ideas more general or comprehensive, can
assure us of nothing that passes without the mind; their certainty is
founded only upon the knowledge of each idea by itself, and of its
distinction from others; about which we cannot be mistaken whilst
they are in our minds.... The mathematician considers the truth and
properties belonging to a rectangle or circle only as they are in idea in
his own mind. For it is possible he never found either of them existing
mathematically, i.e., precisely true, in his life. But yet the knowledge
he has of any truths or properties belonging to a circle, or any other
mathematical figure, are nevertheless true and certain even of real
things existing; because real things are no farther concerned nor
intended to be meant by any such propositions, than as things really
agree to those archetypes in his mind. Is it true of the idea of a triangle,
that its three angles are equal to two right ones? It is true also of a
triangle wherever it really exists. Whatever other figure exists that is
not exactly answerable to that idea in his mind is not at all concerned
in that proposition. And therefore he is certain all his knowledge
concerning such ideas is real knowledge: because, intending things no
farther than they agree with those his ideas, he is sure what he knows
concerning those figures when they have barely an ideal existence in
his mind will hold true of them also when they have a real existence in
matter." But "that any or what bodies do exist, that we are left to our
senses to discover to us as far as they can."[549]
Locke accordingly distinguishes between 'mental truth' and 'real truth.'[550]
The former is intuitively certain; the latter dependent on experience. Only

hypothetically can we affirm intuitive truths of real things—by supposing,
namely, that real things exist which correspond exactly with the ideal
subjects of the intuitive propositions.
If our senses corroborate the supposition all goes well. But note the strange
descent in Locke's hands of the dignity of a priori propositions. By the
ancients they were considered, without farther question, to reveal the
constitution of Reality. Archetypal things existed, it was assumed, in the
relations in which we had to think them. The mind's necessities were a
warrant for those of Being; and it was not till Descartes' time that
scepticism had so advanced (in 'dogmatic' circles) that the warrant must
itself be warranted, and the veracity of the Deity invoked as a reason for
holding fast to our natural beliefs.
But the intuitive propositions of Locke leave us as regards outer reality
none the better for their possession. We still have to "go to our senses" to
find what the reality is. The vindication of the intuitionist position is thus a
barren victory. The eternal verities which the very structure of our mind
lays hold of do not necessarily themselves lay hold on extra-mental being,
nor have they, as Kant pretended later,[551] a legislating character even for
all possible experience. They are primarily interesting only as subjective
facts. They stand waiting in the mind, forming a beautiful ideal network;
and the most we can say is that we hope to discover outer realities over
which the network may be flung so that ideal and real may coincide.

And this brings us back to 'science' from which we diverted our attention so
long ago (see p. 640). Science thinks that she has discovered the outer
realities in question. Atoms and ether, with no properties but masses and
velocities expressible by numbers, and paths expressible by analytic
formulas, these at last are things over which the mathematico-logical
network may be flung, and by supposing which instead of sensible
phenomena science becomes yearly more able to manufacture for herself a
world about which rational propositions may be framed. Sensible
phenomena are pure delusions for the mechanical philosophy. The 'things'
and qualities we instinctively believe in do not exist. The only realities are

swarming solids in everlasting motion, undulatory or continued, whose
expressionless and meaningless changes of position form the history of the
world, and are deducible from initial collocations and habits of movement
hypothetically assumed. Thousands of years ago men started to cast the
chaos of nature's sequences and juxtapositions into a form that might seem
intelligible. Many were their ideal prototypes of rational order: teleological
and æsthetic ties between things, causal and substantial bonds, as well as
logical and mathematical relations. The most promising of these ideal
systems at first were of course the richer ones, the sentimental ones. The
baldest and least promising were the mathematical ones; but the history of
the latter's application is a history of steadily advancing successes, whilst
that of the sentimentally richer systems is one of relative sterility and
failure.[552] Take those aspects of phenomena which interest you as a human
being most, and class the phenomena as perfect and imperfect, as ends and
means to ends, as high and low, beautiful and ugly, positive and negative,
harmonious and discordant, fit and unfit, natural and unnatural, etc., and
barren are all your results. In the ideal world the kind 'precious' has
characteristic properties. What is precious should be preserved; unworthy
things should be sacrificed for its sake; exceptions made on its account; its
preciousness is a reason for other things' actions, and the like. But none of
these things need happen to your 'precious' object in the real world. Call the
things of nature as much as you like by sentimental, moral, and æsthetic
names, no natural consequences follow from the naming. They may be of
the kinds you allege, but they are not of 'the kind's kind': and the last great
system-maker of this sort, Hegel, was obliged explicitly to repudiate logic
in order to make any inferences at all from the names he called things by.

But when you give things mathematical and mechanical names and call
them just so many solids in just such positions, describing just such paths
with just such velocities, all is changed. Your sagacity finds its reward in
the verification by nature of all the deductions which you may next proceed
to make. Your 'things' realize all the consequences of the names by which
you classed them. The modern mechanico-physical philosophy of which we
are all so proud, because it includes the nebular cosmogony, the

conservation of energy, the kinetic theory of heat and gases, etc., etc.,
begins by saying that the only facts are collocations and motions of
primordial solids, and the only laws the changes of motion which changes
in collocation bring. The ideal which this philosophy strives after is a
mathematical world-formula, by which, if all the collocations and motions
at a given moment were known, it would be possible to reckon those of any
wished-for future moment, by simply considering the necessary
geometrical, arithmetical, and logical implications. Once we have the world
in this bare shape, we can fling our net of a priori relations over all its
terms, and pass from one of its phases to another by inward thoughtnecessity. Of course it is a world with a very minimum of rational stuff. The
sentimental facts and relations are butchered at a blow. But the rationality
yielded is so superbly complete in form that to many minds this atones for
the loss, and reconciles the thinker to the notion of a purposeless universe,
in which all the things and qualities men love, dulcissima mundi nomina,
are but illusions of our fancy attached to accidental clouds of dust which
will be dissipated by the eternal cosmic weather as carelessly as they were
formed.
The popular notion that 'Science' is forced on the mind ab extra, and that
our interests have nothing to do with its constructions, is utterly absurd. The
craving to believe that the things of the world belong to kinds which are
related by inward rationality together, is the parent of Science as well as of
sentimental philosophy; and the original investigator always preserves a
healthy sense of how plastic the materials are in his hands.
"Once for all," says Helmholtz in beginning that little work of his
which laid the foundations of the 'conservation of energy,' "it is the
task of the physical sciences to seek for laws by which particular
processes in nature may be referred to general rules, and deduced from
such again. Such rules (for example the laws of reflection or refraction
of light, or that of Mariotte and Gay-Lussac for gas-volumes) are
evidently nothing but generic-concepts for embracing whole classes of
phenomena. The search for them is the business of the experimental
division of our Science. Its theoretic division, on the other hand, tries
to discover the unknown causes of processes from their visible effects;
tries to understand them by the law of causality.... The ultimate goal of
theoretic physics is to find the last unchanging causes of the processes

in Nature. Whether all processes be really ascribable to such causes,
whether, in other words, nature be completely intelligible, or whether
there be changes which would elude the law of a necessary causality,
and fall into a realm of spontaneity or freedom, is not here the place to
determine; but at any rate it is clear that the Science whose aim it is to
make nature appear intelligible [die Natur zu begreifen] must start with
the assumption of her intelligibility, and draw consequences in
conformity with this assumption, until irrefutable facts show the
limitations of this method.... The postulate that natural phenomena
must be reduced to changeless ultimate causes next shapes itself so
that forces unchanged by time must be found to be these causes. Now
in Science we have already found portions of matter with changeless
forces (indestructible qualities), and called them (chemical) elements.
If, then, we imagine the world composed of elements with inalterable
qualities, the only changes that can remain possible in such a world are
spatial changes, i.e. movements, and the only outer relations which can
modify the action of the forces are spatial too, or, in other words, the
forces are motor forces dependent for their effect only on spatial
relations. More exactly still: The phenomena of nature must be
reduced to [zurückgeführt, conceived as, classed as] motions of
material points with inalterable motor forces acting according to spacerelations alone.... But points have no mutual space-relations except
their distance,... and a motor force which they exert upon each other
can cause nothing but a change of distance—i.e. be an attractive or a
repulsive force.... And its intensity can only depend on distance. So
that at last the task of Physics resolves itself into this, to refer
phenomena to inalterable attractive and repulsive forces whose
intensity varies with distance. The solution of this task would at the
same time be the condition of Nature's complete intelligibility."[553]
The subjective interest leading to the assumption could not be more
candidly expressed. What makes the assumption 'scientific' and not merely
poetic, what makes a Helmholtz and his kin discoverers, is that the things of
Nature turn out to act as if they were of the kind assumed. They behave as
such mere drawing and driving atoms would behave; and so far as they
have been distinctly enough translated into molecular terms to test the
point, so far a certain fantastically ideal object, namely, the mathematical

sum containing their mutual distances and velocities, is found to be constant
throughout all their movements. This sum is called the total energy of the
molecules considered. Its constancy or 'conservation' gives the name to the
hypothesis of molecules and central forces from which it was logically
deduced.
Take any other mathematico-mechanical theory and it is the same. They are
all translations of sensible experiences into other forms, substitutions of
items between which ideal relations of kind, number, form, equality, etc.,
obtain, for items between which no such relations obtain; coupled with
declarations that the experienced form is false and the ideal form true,
declarations which are justified by the appearance of new sensible
experiences at just those times and places at which we logically infer that
their ideal correlates ought to be. Wave-hypotheses thus make us predict
rings of darkness and color, distortions, dispersions, changes of pitch in
sonorous bodies moving from us, etc.; molecule-hypotheses lead to
predictions of vapor-density, freezing point, etc.,—all which predictions fall
true.
Thus the world grows more orderly and rational to the mind, which passes
from one feature of it to another by deductive necessity, as soon as it
conceives it as made up of so few and so simple phenomena as bodies with
no properties but number and movement to and fro.
METAPHYSICAL AXIOMS.
But alongside of these ideal relations between terms which the world
verifies, there are other ideal relations not as yet so verified. I refer to those
propositions (no longer expressing mere results of comparison) which are
formulated in such metaphysical and æsthetic axioms as "The Principle of
things is one;" "The quantity of existence is unchanged;" "Nature is simple
and invariable;" "Nature acts by the shortest ways;" "Ex nihilo nihil fit;"
"Nothing can be evolved which was not involved;" "Whatever is in the
effect must be in the cause;" "A thing can only work where it is;" "A thing
can only affect another of its own kind;" "Cessante causa, cessat et
effectus;" "Nature makes no leaps;" "Things belong to discrete and
permanent kinds;" "Nothing is or happens without a reason;" "The world is
throughout rationally intelligible;" etc., etc., etc. Such principles as these,

which might be multiplied to satiety,[554] are properly to be called
postulates of rationality, not propositions of fact. If nature did obey them,
she would be pro tanto more intelligible; and we seek meanwhile so to
conceive her phenomena as to show that she does obey them. To a certain
extent we succeed. For example, instead of the 'quantity of existence' so
vaguely postulated as unchanged, Nature allows us to suppose that curious
sum of distances and velocities which for want of a better term we call
'energy.' For the effect being 'contained in the cause,' nature lets us
substitute 'the effect is the cause,' so soon as she lets us conceive both effect
and cause as the same molecules, in two successive positions.—But all
around these incipient successes (as all around the molecular world, so soon
as we add to it as its 'effects' those illusory 'things' of common-sense which
we had to butcher for its sake), there still spreads a vast field of
irrationalized fact whose items simply are together, and from one to another
of which we can pass by no ideally 'rational' way.
It is not that these more metaphysical postulates of rationality are absolutely
barren—though barren enough they were when used, as the scholastics used
them, as immediate propositions of fact.[555] They have a fertility as ideals,
and keep us uneasy and striving always to recast the world of sense until its
lines become more congruent with theirs. Take for example the principle
that 'nothing can happen without a cause.' We have no definite idea of what
we mean by cause, or of what causality consists in. But the principle
expresses a demand for some deeper sort of inward connection between
phenomena than their merely habitual time-sequence seems to us to be. The
word 'cause' is, in short, an altar to an unknown god; an empty pedestal still
marking the place of a hoped-for statue. Any really inward belongingtogether of the sequent terms, if discovered, would be accepted as what the
word cause was meant to stand for. So we seek, and seek; and in the
molecular systems we find a sort of inward belonging in the notion of
identity of matter with change of collocation. Perhaps by still seeking we
may find other sorts of inward belonging, even between the molecules and
those 'secondary qualities,' etc., which they produce upon our minds.
It cannot be too often repeated that the triumphant application of any one of
our ideal systems of rational relations to the real world justifies our hope
that other systems may be found also applicable. Metaphysics should take
heart from the example of physics, simply confessing that hers is the longer

task. Nature may be remodelled, nay, certainly will be remodelled, far
beyond the point at present reached. Just how far?—is a question which
only the whole future history of Science and Philosophy can answer.[556]
Our task being Psychology, we cannot even cross the threshold of that
larger problem.

Besides the mental structure which results in such metaphysical principles
as those just considered, there is a mental structure which expresses itself in
ÆSTHETIC AND MORAL PRINCIPLES.
The æsthetic principles are at bottom such axioms as that a note sounds
good with its third and fifth, or that potatoes need salt. We are once for all
so made that when certain impressions come before our mind, one of them
will seem to call for or repel the others as its companions. To a certain
extent the principle of habit will explain these æsthetic connections. When a
conjunction is repeatedly experienced, the cohesion of its terms grows
grateful, or at least their disruption grows unpleasant. But to explain all
æsthetic judgments in this way would be absurd; for it is notorious how
seldom natural experiences come up to our æsthetic demands. Many of the
so-called metaphysical principles are at bottom only expressions of æsthetic
feeling. Nature is simple and invariable; makes no leaps, or makes nothing
but leaps; is rationally intelligible; neither increases nor diminishes in
quantity; flows from one principle, etc., etc.,—what do all such principles
express save our sense of how pleasantly our intellect would feel if it had a
Nature of that sort to deal with? The subjectivity of which feeling is of
course quite compatible with Nature also turning out objectively to be of
that sort, later on.
The moral principles which our mental structure engenders are quite as
little explicable in toto by habitual experiences having bred inner cohesions.
Rightness is not mere usualness, wrongness not mere oddity, however
numerous the facts which might be invoked to prove such identity. Nor are
the moral judgments those most invariably and emphatically impressed on
us by public opinion. The most characteristically and peculiarly moral

judgments that a man is ever called on to make are in unprecedented cases
and lonely emergencies, where no popular rhetorical maxims can avail, and
the hidden oracle alone can speak; and it speaks often in favor of conduct
quite unusual, and suicidal as far as gaining popular approbation goes. The
forces which conspire to this resultant are subtle harmonies and discords
between the elementary ideas which form the data of the case. Some of
these harmonies, no doubt, have to do with habit; but in respect to most of
them our sensibility must assuredly be a phenomenon of supernumerary
order, correlated with a brain-function quite as secondary as that which
takes cognizance of the diverse excellence of elaborate musical
compositions. No more than the higher musical sensibility can the higher
moral sensibility be accounted for by the frequency with which outer
relations have cohered.[557] Take judgments of justice or equity, for
example. Instinctively, one judges everything differently, according as it
pertains to one's self or to some one else. Empirically one notices that
everybody else does the same. But little by little there dawns in one the
judgment "nothing can be right for me which would not be right for another
similarly placed;" or "the fulfilment of my desires is intrinsically no more
imperative than that of anyone else's;" or "what it is reasonable that another
should do for me, it is also reasonable that I should do for him;"[558] and
forthwith the whole mass of the habitual gets overturned. It gets seriously
overturned only in a few fanatical heads. But its overturning is due to a
back-door and not to a front-door process. Some minds are preternaturally
sensitive to logical consistency and inconsistency. When they have ranked a
thing under a kind, they must treat it as of that kind's kind, or feel all out of
tune. In many respects we do class ourselves with other men, and call them
and ourselves by a common name. They agree with us in having the same
Heavenly Father, in not being consulted about their birth, in not being
themselves to thank or blame for their natural gifts, in having the same
desires and pains and pleasures, in short in a host of fundamental relations.
Hence, if these things be our essence, we should be substitutable for other
men, and they for us, in any proposition in which either of us is involved.
The more fundamental and common the essence chosen, and the more
simple the reasoning,[559] the more wildly radical and unconditional will the
justice be which is aspired to. Life is one long struggle between conclusions
based on abstract ways of conceiving cases, and opposite conclusions
prompted by our instinctive perception of them as individual facts. The

logical stickler for justice always seems pedantic and mechanical to the man
who goes by tact and the particular instance, and who usually makes a poor
show at argument. Sometimes the abstract conceiver's way is better,
sometimes that of the man of instinct. But just as in our study of reasoning
we found it impossible to lay down any mark whereby to distinguish right
conception of a concrete case from confusion (see pp. 336, 350), so here we
can give no general rule for deciding when it is morally useful to treat a
concrete case as sui generis, and when to lump it with others in an abstract
class.[560]
An adequate treatment of the way in which we come by our æsthetic and
moral judgments would require a separate chapter, which I cannot
conveniently include in this book. Suffice it that these judgments express
inner harmonies and discords between objects of thought; and that whilst
outer cohesions frequently repeated will often seem harmonious, all
harmonies are not thus engendered, but our feeling of many of them is a
secondary and incidental function of the mind. Where harmonies are
asserted of the real world, they are obviously mere postulates of rationality,
so far as they transcend experience. Such postulates are exemplified by the
ethical propositions that the individual and universal good are one, and that
happiness and goodness are bound to coalesce in the same subject.
SUMMARY OF WHAT PRECEDES.
I will now sum up our progress so far by a short summary of the most
important conclusions which we have reached.
The mind has a native structure in this sense, that certain of its objects, if
considered together in certain ways, give definite results; and that no other
ways of considering, and no other results, are possible if the same objects
be taken.
The results are 'relations' which are all expressed by judgments of
subsumption and of comparison.
The judgments of subsumption are themselves subsumed under the laws of
logic.

Those of comparison are expressed in classifications, and in the sciences of
arithmetic and geometry.
Mr. Spencer's opinion that our consciousness of classificatory, logical, and
mathematical relations between ideas is due to the frequency with which the
corresponding 'outer relations' have impressed our minds, is unintelligible.
Our consciousness of these relations, no doubt, has a natural genesis. But it
is to be sought rather in the inner forces which have made the brain grow,
than in any mere paths of 'frequent' association which outer stimuli may
have ploughed in that organ.
But let our sense for these relations have arisen as it may, the relations
themselves form a fixed system of lines of cleavage, so to speak, in the
mind, by which we naturally pass from one object to another; and the
objects connected by these lines of cleavage are often not connected by any
regular time- and space-associations. We distinguish, therefore, between the
empirical order of things, and this their rational order of comparison; and,
so far as possible, we seek to translate the former into the latter, as being the
more congenial of the two to our intellect.
Any classification of things into kinds (especially if the kinds form series,
or if they successively involve each other) is a more rational way of
conceiving the things than is that mere juxtaposition or separation of them
as individuals in time and space which is the order of their crude
perception. Any assimilation of things to terms between which such
classificatory relations, with their remote and mediate transactions, obtain,
is a way of bringing the things into a more rational scheme.
Solids in motion are such terms; and the mechanical philosophy is only a
way of conceiving nature so as to arrange its items along some of the more
natural lines of cleavage of our mental structure.
Other natural lines are the moral and æsthetic relations. Philosophy is still
seeking to conceive things so that these relations also may seem to obtain
between them.
As long as things have not successfully been so conceived, the moral and
æsthetic relations obtain only between entia rationis, terms in the mind; and
the moral and æsthetic principles remain but postulates, not propositions,
with regard to the real world outside.

There is thus a large body of a priori or intuitively necessary truths. As a
rule, these are truths of comparison only, and in the first instance they
express relations between merely mental terms. Nature, however, acts as if
some of her realities were identical with these mental terms. So far as she
does this, we can make a priori propositions concerning natural fact. The
aim of both science and philosophy is to make the identifiable terms more
numerous. So far it has proved easier to identify nature's things with mental
terms of the mechanical than with mental terms of the sentimental order.
The widest postulate of rationality is that the world is rationally intelligible
throughout, after the pattern of some ideal system. The whole war of the
philosophies is over that point of faith. Some say they can see their way
already to the rationality; others that it is hopeless in any other but the
mechanical way. To some the very fact that there is a world at all seems
irrational. Nonentity would be a more natural thing than existence, for these
minds. One philosopher at least says that the relatedness of things to each
other is irrational anyhow, and that a world of relations can never be made
intelligible.[561]
With this I may be assumed to have completed the programme which I
announced at the beginning of the chapter, so far as the theoretic part of our
organic mental structure goes. It can be due neither to our own nor to our
ancestors' experience. I now pass to those practical parts of our organic
mental structure. Things are a little different here; and our conclusion,
though it lies in the same direction, can be by no means as confidently
expressed.
To be as short and simple as possible, I will take the case of instincts, and,
supposing the reader to be familiar with Chapter XXIV, I will plunge in
medias res.
THE ORIGIN OF INSTINCTS.
Instincts must have been either
1) Each specially created in complete form, or
2) Gradually evolved.

As the first alternative is nowadays obsolete, I proceed directly to the
second. The two most prominent suggestions as to the way in which
instincts may have been evolved are associated with the names of Lamarck
and Darwin.
Lamarck's statement is that animals have wants, and contract, to satisfy
them, habits which transform themselves gradually into so many
propensities which they can neither resist nor change. These propensities,
once acquired, propagate themselves by way of transmission to the young,
so that they come to exist in new individuals, anteriorly to all exercise. Thus
are the same emotions, the same habits, the same instincts, perpetuated
without variation from one generation to another, so long as the outward
conditions of existence remain the same.[562] Mr. Lewes calls this the theory
of 'lapsed intelligence.' Mr. Spencer's words are clearer than Lamarck's, so
that I will quote from him:[563]
"Setting out with the unquestionable assumption, that every new form
of emotion making its appearance in the individual or the race is a
modification of some pre-existing emotion, or a compounding of
several pre-existing emotions, we should be greatly aided by knowing
what always are the pre-existing emotions. When, for example, we
find that very few, if any, of the lower animals show any love of
accumulation, and that this feeling is absent in infancy; when we see
that an infant in arms exhibits anger, fear, wonder, while yet it
manifests no desire of permanent possession; and that a brute which
has no acquisitive emotion can nevertheless feel attachment, jealousy,
love of approbation,—we may suspect that the feeling which property
satisfies is compounded out of simpler and deeper feelings. We may
conclude that as when a dog hides a bone there must exist in him a
prospective gratification of hunger, so there must similarly, at first, in
all cases where anything is secured or taken possession of, exist an
ideal excitement of the feeling which that thing will gratify. We may
further conclude that when the intelligence is such that a variety of
objects come to be utilized for different purposes; when, as among
savages, divers wants are satisfied through the articles appropriated for
weapons, shelter, clothing, ornament,—the act of appropriating comes
to be one constantly involving agreeable associations, and one which is
therefore pleasurable, irrespective of the end subserved. And when, as

in civilized life, the property acquired is of a kind not conducing to one
order of gratifications, but is capable of ministering to all
gratifications, the pleasure of acquiring property grows more distinct
from each of the various pleasures subserved—is more completely
differentiated into a separate emotion.[564] It is well known that on
newly-discovered islands not inhabited by man, birds are so devoid of
fear as to allow themselves to be knocked over with sticks, but that in
the course of generations they acquire such a dread of man as to fly on
his approach, and that this dread is manifested by young as well as old.
Now unless this change be ascribed to the killing off of the least
fearful, and the preservation and multiplication of the more fearful,
which, considering the small number killed by man, is an inadequate
cause, it must be ascribed to accumulated experiences, and each
experience must be held to have a share in producing it. We must
conclude that in each bird that escapes with injuries inflicted by man,
or is alarmed by the outcries of other members of the flock,... there is
established an association of ideas between the human aspect and the
pains, direct and indirect, suffered from human agency. And we must
further conclude that the state of consciousness which impels the bird
to take flight is at first nothing more than an ideal reproduction of
those painful impressions which before followed man's approach; that
such ideal reproduction becomes more vivid and more massive as the
painful experiences, direct or sympathetic, increase; and that thus the
emotion, in its incipient state, is nothing else than an aggregation of
the revived pains before experienced. As, in the course of generations,
the young birds of this race begin to display a fear of man before they
have been injured by him, it is an unavoidable inference that the
nervous system of the race has been organically modified by these
experiences; we have no choice but to conclude that when a young
bird is thus led to fly, it is because the impression produced on its
senses by the approaching man entails, through an incipiently reflex
action, a partial excitement of all those nerves which, in its ancestors,
had been excited under the like conditions; that this partial excitement
has its accompanying painful consciousness; and that the vague painful
consciousness thus arising constitutes emotion proper—emotion
undecomposable into specific experiences, and therefore seemingly
homogeneous. If such be the explanation of the fact in this case, then it

is in all cases. If the emotion is so generated here, then it is so
generated throughout. If so, we must perforce conclude that the
emotional modifications displayed by different nations, and those
higher emotions by which civilized are distinguished from savage, are
to be accounted for on the same principle. And, concluding this, we are
led strongly to suspect that the emotions in general have severally thus
originated."[565]

Obviously the word 'emotion' here means instinct as well,—the actions we
call instinctive are expressions or manifestations of the emotions whose
genesis Mr. Spencer describes. Now if habit could thus bear fruit outside
the individual life, and if the modifications so painfully acquired by the
parents' nervous systems could be found ready-made at birth in those of the
young, it would be hard to overestimate the importance, both practical and
theoretical, of such an extension of its sway. In principle, instincts would
then be assimilated to 'secondarily-automatic' habits, and the origin of many
of them out of tentative experiments made during ancestral lives, perfected
by repetition, addition, and association through successive generations,
would be a comparatively simple thing to understand.
Contemporary students of instinct have accordingly been alert to discover
all the facts which would seem to establish the possibility of such an
explanation. The list is not very long, considering what a burden of
conclusions it has to bear. Let acquisitiveness and fear of man, as just
argued for by Spencer, lead it off. Other cases of the latter sort are the
increased shyness of the woodcock noticed to have occurred within sixty
years' observation by Mr. T. A. Knight, and the greater shyness everywhere
shown by large than by small birds, to which Darwin has called attention.
Then we may add—
The propensities of 'pointing,' 'retrieving,' etc., in sporting dogs, which seem
partly, at any rate, to be due to training, but which in well-bred stock are all
but innate. It is in these breeds considered bad for a litter of young if its sire
or dam have not been trained in the field.
Docility of domestic breeds of horses and cattle.
Tameness of young of tame rabbit—young wild rabbits being invincibly
timid.
Young foxes are most wary in those places where they are most severely
hunted.
Wild ducks, hatched out by tame ones, fly off. But if kept close for some
generations, the young are said to become tame.[566]
Young savages at a certain age will revert to the woods.

English greyhounds taken to the high plateau of Mexico could not at first
run well, on account of rarefied air. Their whelps entirely got over the
difficulty.
Mr. Lewes somewhere[567] tells of a terrier pup whose parents had been
taught to 'beg,' and who constantly threw himself spontaneously into the
begging attitude. Darwin tells of a French orphan-child, brought up out of
France, yet shrugging like his ancestors.[568]
Musical ability often increases from generation to generation in the families
of musicians.
The hereditarily epileptic guinea-pigs of Brown-Séquard, whose parents
had become epileptic through surgical operations on the spinal cord or
sciatic nerve. The adults often lose some of their hind toes, and the young,
in addition to being epileptic, are frequently born with the corresponding
toes lacking. The offspring of guinea-pigs whose cervical sympathetic nerve
has been cut on one side will have the ear larger, the eyeball smaller, etc.,
just like their parents after the operation. Puncture of the 'restiform body' of
the medulla will, in the same animal, congest and enlarge one eye, and
cause gangrene of one ear. In the young of such parents the same symptoms
occur.
Physical refinement, delicate hands and feet, etc., appear in families wellbred and rich for several generations.
The 'nervous' temperament also develops in the descendants of sedentary
brain-working people.
Inebriates produce offspring in various ways degenerate.
Nearsightedness is produced by indoor occupation for generations. It has
been found in Europe much more frequent among schoolchildren in towns
than among children of the same age in the country.
These latter cases are of the inheritance of structural rather than of
functional peculiarities. But as structure gives rise to function it may be said
that the principle is the same. Amongst other inheritances of adaptive[569]
structural change may be mentioned:
The 'Yankee' type.

Scrofula, rickets, and other diseases of bad conditions of life.
The udders and permanent milk of the domestic breeds of cow.
The 'fancy' rabbit's ears, drooping through lack of need to erect them. Dog's,
ass's, etc., in some breeds ditto.
The obsolete eyes of mole and various cave-dwelling animals.
The diminished size of the wing-bones of domesticated ducks, due to
ancestral disuse of flight.[570]
These are about all the facts which, by one author or another, have been
invoked as evidence in favor of the 'lapsed intelligence' theory of the origin
of instincts.

Mr. Darwin's theory is that of the natural selection of accidentally produced
tendencies to action.
"It would," says he, "be the most serious error to suppose that the
greater number of instincts have been acquired by habit in one
generation, and then transmitted by inheritance in succeeding
generations. It can clearly be shown that the most wonderful instincts
with which we are acquainted, namely, those of the hive-bee and of
many ants, could not possibly have been thus acquired.[571] It will be
universally admitted that instincts are as important as corporeal
structure for the welfare of each species, under its present conditions
of life. Under changed conditions of life, it is at least possible that
slight modifications of instinct might be profitable to a species; and if
it can be shown that instincts do vary ever so little, then I can see no
difficulty in natural selection preserving and continually accumulating
variations of instinct to any extent that may be profitable. It is thus, as
I believe, that all the most complex and wonderful instincts have
arisen.... I believe that the effects of habit are of quite subordinate
importance to the effects of the natural selection of what may be called
accidental variations of instincts;—that is, of variations produced by

the same unknown causes which produce slight deviations of bodily
structure."[572]
The evidence for Mr. Darwin's view is too complex to be given in this
place. To my own mind it is quite convincing. If, with the Darwinian theory
in mind, one re-reads the list of examples given in favor of the Lamarckian
theory, one finds that many of the cases are irrelevant, and that some make
for one side as well as for the other. This is so obvious in many of the cases
that it is needless to point it out in detail. The shrugging child and the
begging pup, e.g., prove somewhat too much. They are examples so unique
as to suggest spontaneous variation rather than inherited habit. In other
cases the observations much need corroboration, e.g., the effects of not
training for a generation in sporting dogs and race-horses, the difference
between young wild rabbits born in captivity and young tame ones, the
cumulative effect of many generations of captivity on wild ducks, etc.
Similarly, the increased wariness of the large birds, of those on islands
frequented by men, of the woodcock, of the foxes, may be due to the fact
that the bolder families have been killed off, and left none but the naturally
timid behind, or simply to the individual experience of older birds being
imparted by example to the young so that a new educational tradition has
occurred.—The cases of physical refinement, nervous temperament, Yankee
type, etc., also need much more discriminating treatment than they have yet
received from the Lamarckians. There is no real evidence that physical
refinement and nervosity tend to accumulate from generation to generation
in aristocratic or intellectual families; nor is there any that the change in that
direction which Europeans transplanted to America undergo is not all
completed in the first generation of children bred on our soil. To my mind,
the facts all point that way. Similarly the better breathing of the greyhounds
born in Mexico was surely due to a post-natal adaptation of the pups' thorax
to the rarer air.
Distinct neurotic degeneration may undoubtedly accumulate from parent to
child, and as the parent usually in this case grows worse by his own
irregular habits of life, the temptation lies near to ascribe the child's
deterioration to this cause. This, again, is a hasty conclusion. For neurotic
degeneration is unquestionably a disease whose original causes are
unknown; and like other 'accidental variations' it is hereditary. But it

ultimately ends in sterility; and it seems to me quite unfair to draw any
conclusions from its natural history in favor of the transmission of acquired
peculiarities. Nor does the degeneration of the children of alcoholics prove
anything in favor of their having inherited the shattered nervous system
which the alcohol has induced in their parents: because the poison usually
has a chance to directly affect their own bodies before birth, by acting on
the germinal matter from which they are formed whilst it is still nourished
by the alcoholized blood of the parent. In many cases, moreover, the
parental alcoholics are themselves degenerates neurotically, and the drinkhabit is only a symptom of their disease, which in some form or other they
also propagate to their children.
There remain the inherited mutilations of the guinea-pig. But these are such
startling exceptions to the ordinary rule with animals that they should
hardly be used as examples of a typical process. The docility of domestic
cattle is certainly in part due to man's selection, etc., etc. In a word, the
proofs form rather a beggarly array.
Add to this that the writers who have tried to carry out the theory of
transmitted habit with any detail are always obliged somewhere to admit
inexplicable variation. Thus Spencer allows that
"Sociality can begin only where, through some slight variation, there is
less tendency than usual for the individuals to disperse.... That slight
variations of mental nature, sufficient to initiate this process, may be
fairly assumed, all our domestic animals show us: differences in their
characters and likings are conspicuous. Sociality having thus
commenced, and survival of the fittest tending ever to maintain and
increase it, it will be further strengthened by the inherited effects of
habit."[573] Again, in writing of the pleasure of pity, Mr. Spencer says:
"This feeling is not one that has arisen through the inherited effects of
experiences, but belongs to a quite different group, traceable to the
survival of the fittest simply—to the natural selection of incidental
variations. In this group are included all the bodily appetites, together
with those simpler instincts, sexual and parental, by which every race
is maintained; and which must exist before the higher processes of
mental evolution can commence."[574]

The inheritance of tricks of manner and trifling peculiarities, such as
handwriting, certain odd gestures when pleased, peculiar movements during
sleep, etc., have also been quoted in favor of the theory of transmission of
acquired habits. Strangely enough; for of all things in the world these tricks
seem most like idiosyncratic variations. They are usually defects or oddities
which the education of the individual, the pressure of what is really
acquired by him, would counteract, but which are too native to be
repressed, and breaks through all artificial barriers, in his children as well as
in himself.

I leave my text practically just as it was written in 1885. I proceeded at that
time to draw a tentative conclusion to the effect that the origin of most of
our instincts must certainly be deemed fruits of the back-door method of
genesis, and not of ancestral experience in the proper meaning of the term.
Whether acquired ancestral habits played any part at all in their production
was still an open question in which it would be as rash to affirm as to deny.
Already before that time, however, Professor Weismann of Freiburg had
begun a very serious attack upon the Lamarckian theory,[575] and his
polemic has at last excited such a widespread interest among naturalists that
the whilom almost unhesitatingly accepted theory seems almost on the
point of being abandoned.
I will therefore add some of Weismann's criticisms of the supposed
evidence to my own. In the first place, he has a captivating theory of
descent of his own,[576] which makes him think it a priori impossible that
any peculiarity acquired during lifetime by the parent should be transmitted
to the germ. Into the nature of that theory this is not the place to go. Suffice
to say that it has made him a keener critic of Lamarck's and Spencer's
theory than he otherwise might have been. The only way in which the
germinal products can be influenced whilst in the body of the parent is,
according to Weismann, by good or bad nutrition. Through this they may
degenerate in various ways or lose vitality altogether. They may also be
infected through the blood by small-pox, syphilis, or other virulent diseases,
and otherwise be poisoned. But peculiarities of neural structure and habit in
the parents which the parents themselves were not born with, they can never

acquire unless perhaps accidentally through some coincidental variation of
their own. Accidental variations develop of course into idiosyncrasies
which tend to pass to later generations in virtue of the well-known law
which no one doubts.
Referring to the often-heard assertion that the increase of talent found in
certain families from one generation to another is due to the transmitted
effects of exercise of the faculty concerned (the Bachs, the Bernoullis,
Mozart, etc.), he sensibly remarks, that the talent being kept in exercise, it
ought to have gone on growing for an indefinite number of generations. As
a matter of fact, it quickly reaches a maximum, and then we hear no more
of it, which is what happens always when an idiosyncrasy is exposed to the
effects of miscellaneous intermarriage.
The hereditary epilepsy and other degenerations of the operated guinea-pigs
are explained by Professor Weismann as results of infection of the young by
the parent's blood. The latter he supposes to undergo a pathologic change in
consequence of the original traumatic injury. The obsolescence of disused
organs he explains very satisfactorily, without invoking any transmission of
the direct effects of disuse, by his theory of panmixy, for which I must refer
to his own writings. Finally, he criticises searchingly the stories we
occasionally hear of inherited mutilations in animals (dogs' ears and tails,
etc.), and cites a prolonged series of experiments of his own on mice, which
he bred for many generations, cutting off both parental tails each time,
without interfering in the least with the length of tail with which the young
continued to be born.
The strongest argument, after all, in favor of the Lamarckian theory remains
the a priori one urged by Spencer in his little work (much the solidest thing,
by the way, which he has ever written) 'The Factors of Organic Evolution.'
Since, says Mr. Spencer, the accidental variations of all parts of the body
are independent of each other, if the entire organization of animals were due
to such accidental variations alone, the amount of mutual adaptation and
harmony that we now find there could hardly possibly have come about in
any finite time. We must rather suppose that the divers varying parts
brought the other parts into harmony with themselves by exercising them ad
hoc, and that the effects of the exercise remained and were passed on to the
young. This forms, of course, a great presumption against the all-sufficiency
of the view of selection of accidental variations exclusively. But it must be

admitted that in favor of the contrary view, that adaptive changes are
inherited, we have as yet perhaps not one single unequivocal item of
positive proof.

I must therefore end this chapter on the genesis of our mental structure by
reaffirming my conviction that the so-called Experience-philosophy has
failed to prove its point. No more if we take ancestral experiences into
account than if we limit ourselves to those of the individual after birth, can
we believe that the couplings of terms within the mind are simple copies of
corresponding couplings impressed upon it by the environment. This indeed
is true of a small part of our cognitions. But so far as logical and
mathematical, ethical, æsthetical, and metaphysical propositions go, such an
assertion is not only untrue but altogether unintelligible; for these
propositions say nothing about the time- and space-order of things, and it is
hard to understand how such shallow and vague accounts of them as Mill's
and Spencer's could ever have been given by thinking men.
The causes of our mental structure are doubtless natural, and connected,
like all our other peculiarities, with those of our nervous structure. Our
interests, our tendencies of attention, our motor impulses, the æsthetic,
moral, and theoretic combinations we delight in, the extent of our power of
apprehending schemes of relation, just like the elementary relations
themselves, time, space, difference and similarity, and the elementary kinds
of feeling, have all grown up in ways of which at present we can give no
account. Even in the clearest parts of Psychology our insight is insignificant
enough. And the more sincerely one seeks to trace the actual course of
psychogenesis, the steps by which as a race we may have come by the
peculiar mental attributes which we possess, the more clearly one perceives
"the slowly gathering twilight close in utter night."
THE END.

[526] 'Accidental' in the Darwinian sense, as belonging to a cycle of causation inaccessible to the
present order of research.
[527] The passage is in § 207 of the Principles of Psychology, at the end of the chapter entitled
'Reason.' I italicize certain words in order to show that the essence of this explanation is to demand
numerically frequent experiences. The bearing of this remark will later appear. (Cf. pp. 641-2, infra.)
[528] Principles of Biology, part iii. chaps. xi, xii.—Goltz and Loeb have found that dogs become
mild in character when their occipital, and fierce when their frontal, brain-lobes are cut off. "A dog
which originally was cross in an extreme degree, never suffering himself to be touched, and even
refusing, after two days' fasting, to take a piece of bread from my hand, became, after a bilateral
operation on the occipital lobes, perfectly trustful and harmless. He underwent five operations on
these parts.... Each one of them made him more good-natured; so that at last (just as Goltz observed
of his dogs) he would let other dogs take away the very bones which he was gnawing" (Loeb,
Pflüger's Archiv, xxxix. 300). A course of kind treatment and training might have had a similar
effect. But how absurd to call two such different causes by the same name, and to say both times that
the beast's 'experience of outer relations' is what educates him to good-nature. This, however, is
virtually what all writers do who ignore the distinction between the 'front-door' and the back-door'
manners of producing mental change.
One of the most striking of these back-door affections is susceptibility to the charm of drunkenness.
This (taking drunkenness in the broadest sense, as teetotalers use the word) is one of the deepest
functions of human nature. Half of both the poetry and the tragedy of human life would vanish if
alcohol were taken away. As it is, the thirst for it is such that in the United States the cash-value of its
sales amounts to that of the sales of meat and of bread put together. And yet what ancestral 'outer
relation' is responsible for this peculiar reaction of ours? The only 'outer relation' could be the alcohol
itself, which, comparatively speaking, came into the environment but yesterday, and which, so far
from creating, is tending to eradicate, the love of itself from our mental structure, by letting only
those families of men survive in whom it is not strong. The love of drunkenness is a purely accidental
susceptibility of a brain, evolved for entirely different uses, and its causes are to be sought in the
molecular realm, rather than in any possible order of 'outer relations.'
[529] Mr. Grant Allen, in a brilliant article entitled Idiosyncrasy (Mind, viii. 498), seeks to show that
accidental morphological changes in the brain cannot possibly be imagined to result in any mental
change of a sort which would fit the animal to its environment. If spontaneous variation ever works
on the brain, its product, says Mr. Allen, ought to be an idiot or a raving madman, not a minister and
interpreter of Nature. Only the environment can change us in the direction of accommodation to
itself. But I think we ought to know a little better just what the molecular changes in the brain are on
which thought depends, before we talk so confidently about what the effect can be of their possible
variations. Mr. Allen, it should be said, has made a laudable effort to conceive them distinctly. To me
his conception remains too purely anatomical. Meanwhile this essay and another by the same author
in the Atlantic Monthly are probably as serious attempts as any that have been made towards
applying the Spencerian theory in a radical way to the facts of human history.
[530] In my own previous chapters on habit, memory, association, and perception, justice has been
done to all these facts.
[531] "The order of nature, as perceived at a first glance, presents at every instant a chaos followed
by another chaos. We must decompose each chaos into single facts. We must learn to see in the
chaotic antecedent a multitude of distinct antecedents, in the chaotic consequent a multitude of
distinct consequents. This, supposing it done, will not of itself tell us on which of the antecedents
each consequent is invariably attendant. To determine that point, we must endeavor to effect a
separation of the facts from one another, not in our minds only, but in nature. The mental analysis,

however, must take place first. And every one knows that in the mode of performing it, one intellect
differs immensely from another." (J. S. Mill, Logic, bk. iii. chap. vii. § 1.)
[532] I quote from an address entitled 'Reflex Action and Theism,' published in the 'Unitarian
Review' for November 1881, and translated in the Critique Philosophique for January and February
1882. "The conceiving or theorizing faculty works exclusively for the sake of ends that do not exist
at all in the world of the impressions received by way of our senses, but are set by our emotional and
practical subjectivity. It is a transformer of the world of our impressions into a totally different world,
the world of our conception; and the transformation is effected in the interests of our volitional
nature, and for no other purpose whatsoever. Destroy the volitional nature, the definite subjective
purposes, preferences, fondness for certain effects, forms, orders, and not the slightest motive would
remain for the brute order of our experience to be remodelled at all. But, as we have the elaborate
volitional constitution we do have, the remodelling must be effected, there is no escape. The world's
contents are given to each of us in an order so foreign to our subjective interests that we can hardly
by an effort of the imagination picture to ourselves what it is like. We have to break that order
altogether, and by picking out from it the items that concern us, and connecting them with others far
away, which we say 'belong' with them, we are able to make out definite threads of sequence and
tendency, to foresee particular liabilities and get ready for them, to enjoy simplicity and harmony in
the place of what was chaos. Is not the sum of your actual experience taken at this moment and
impartially added together an utter chaos? The strains of my voice, the lights and shades inside the
room and out, the murmur of the wind, the ticking of the clock, the various organic feelings you may
happen individually to possess, do these make a whole at all? Is it not the only condition of your
mental sanity in the midst of them that most of them should become non-existent for you, and that a
few others—the sounds, I hope, which I am uttering—should evoke from places in your memory, that
have nothing to do with this scene, associates fitted to combine with them in what we call a rational
train of thought?—rational because it leads to a conclusion we have some organ to appreciate. We
have no organ or faculty to appreciate the simply given order. The real world as it is given at this
moment is the sum total of all its beings and events now. But can we think of such a sum? Can we
realize for an instant what a cross-section of all existence at a definite point of time would be? While
I talk and the flies buzz, a sea gull catches a fish at the mouth of the Amazon, a tree falls in the
Adirondack wilderness, a man sneezes in Germany, a horse dies in Tartary, and twins are born in
France. What does that mean? Does the contemporaneity of these events with each other and with a
million more as disjointed as they form a rational bond between them, and unite them into anything
that means for us a world? Yet just such a collateral contemporaneity, and nothing else, is the real
order of the world. It is an order with which we have nothing to do but to get away from it as fast as
possible. As I said, we break it: we break it into histories, and we break it into arts, and we break it
into sciences; and then we begin to feel at home. We make ten thousand separate serial orders of it.
On any one of these, we may react as if the rest did not exist. We discover among its parts relations
that were never given to sense at all,—mathematical relations, tangents, squares, and roots and
logarithmic functions,—and out of an infinite number of these we call certain ones essential and
lawgiving, and ignore the rest. Essential these relations are, but only for our purpose, the other
relations being just as real and present as they; and our purpose is to conceive simply and to foresee.
Are not simple conception and prevision subjective ends, pure and simple? They are the ends of what
we call science; and the miracle of miracles, a miracle not yet exhaustively cleared up by any
philosophy, is that the given order lends itself to the remodelling. It shows itself plastic to many of
our scientific, to many of our æsthetic, to many of our practical purposes and ends." Cf. also
Hodgson: Philos. of Refl., ch. v; Lotze: Logik, §§ 342-351; Sigwart: Logik, §§ 60-63, 105.
[533] In an article entitled 'Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment,' published in the
Atlantic Monthly for October 1880, the reader will find some ampler illustrations of these remarks. I
have there tried to show that both mental and social evolution are to be conceived after the Darwinian

fashion, and that the function of the environment properly so called is much more that of selecting
forms, produced by invisible forces, than producing of such forms,—producing being the only
function thought of by the pre-Darwinian evolutionists, and the only one on which stress is laid by
such contemporary ones as Mr. Spencer and Mr. Allen.
[534] "It is perfectly true that our world of experience begins with such associations as lead us to
expect that what has happened to us will happen again. These associations lead the babe to look for
milk from its nurse and not from its father, the child to believe that the apple he sees will taste good;
and whilst they make him wish for it, they make him fear the bottle which contains his bitter
medicine. But whereas a part of these associations grows confirmed by frequent repetition, another
part is destroyed by contradictory experiences; and the world becomes divided for us into two
provinces, one in which we are at home and anticipate with confidence always the same sequences;
another filled with alternating, variable, accidental occurrences....
"Accident is, in a wide sphere, such an every-day matter that we need not be surprised if it sometimes
invades the territory where order is the rule. And one personification or another of the capricious
power of chance easily helps us over the difficulties which further reflection might find in the
exceptions. Yes, indeed, Exception has a peculiar fascination; it is a subject of astonishment, a
θαῦμα, and the credulity with which in this first stage of pure association we adopt our supposed
rules is matched by the equal credulity with which we adopt the miracles that interfere with them.
"The whole history of popular beliefs about nature refutes the notion that the thought of an universal
physical order can possibly have arisen through the purely passive reception and association of
particular perceptions. Indubitable as it is that all men infer from known cases to unknown, it is
equally certain that this procedure, if restricted to the phenomenal materials that spontaneously offer
themselves, would never have led to the belief in a general uniformity, but only to the belief that law
and lawlessness rule the world in motley alternation. From the point of view of strict empiricism
nothing exists but the sum of particular perceptions with their coincidences on the one hand, their
contradictions on the other.
"That there is more order in the world than appears at first sight is not discovered till the order is
looked for. The first impulse to look for it proceeds from practical needs: where ends must be
attained, we must know trustworthy means which infallibly possess a property or produce a result.
But the practical need is only the first occasion for our reflection on the conditions of a true
knowledge; even were there no such need, motives would still be present to carry us beyond the stage
of mere association. For not with an equal interest, or rather with an equal lack of interest, does man
contemplate those natural processes in which like is joined to like, and those in which like and unlike
are joined; the former processes harmonize with the conditions of his thinking, the latter do not; in
the former his concepts, judgments, inferences apply to realities, in the latter they have no such
application. And thus the intellectual satisfaction which at first comes to him without reflection, at
last excites in him the conscious wish to find realized throughout the entire phenomenal world those
rational continuities, uniformities, and necessities which are the fundamental element and guiding
principle of his own thought." (C. Sigwart: Logik, ii. 380-2.)
[535] Cf. Hodgson: Philosophy of Reflection, book ii, chap. v.
[536] The aspiration to be 'scientific' is such an idol of the tribe to the present generation, is so
sucked in with his mother's milk by every one of us, that we find it hard to conceive of a creature
who should not feel it, and harder still to treat it freely as the altogether peculiar and one-sided
subjective interest which it is. But as a matter of fact, few even of the cultivated members of the race
have shared it; it was invented but a generation or two ago. In the middle ages it meant only impious
magic; and the way in which it even now strikes orientals is charmingly shown in the letter of a
Turkish cadi to an English traveller asking him for statistical information, which Sir A. Bayard prints

at the end of his 'Nineveh and Babylon.' The document is too full of edification not to be given in
full. It runs thus:
"My Illustrious Friend, and Joy of my Liver!
"The thing you ask of me is both difficult and useless. Although I have passed all my days in this
place, I have neither counted the houses nor inquired into the number of the inhabitants; and as to
what one person loads on his mules and the other stows away in the bottom of his ship, that is no
business of mine. But, above all, as to the previous history of this city, God only knows the amount
of dirt and confusion that the infidels may have eaten before the coming of the sword of Islam. It
were unprofitable for us to inquire into it.
"O my soul! O my lamb! seek not after the things which concern thee not. Thou camest unto us and
we welcomed thee: go in peace.
"Of a truth thou hast spoken many words; and there is no harm done, or the speaker is one and the
listener is another. After the fashion of thy people thou hast wandered from one place to another, until
thou art happy and content in none. We (praise be to God) were born here, and never desire to quit it.
Is it possible, then, that the idea of a general intercourse between mankind should make any
impression on our understandings? God forbid!
"Listen, O my son! There is no wisdom equal unto the belief in God! He created the world, and shall
we liken ourselves unto Him in seeking to penetrate into the mysteries of His creation? Shall we say,
Behold this star spinneth round that star, and this other star with a tail goeth and cometh in so many
years! Let it go! He from whose hand it came will guide and direct it.
"But thou wilt say unto me, Stand aside, O man, for I am more learned than thou art, and have seen
more things. If thou thinkest that thou art in this respect better than I am, thou art welcome. I praise
God that I seek not that which I require not. Thou art learned in the things I care not for; and as for
that which thou hast seen, I spit upon it. Will much knowledge create thee a double belly, or wilt thou
seek Paradise with thine eyes?
"O my friend! if thou wilt be happy, say, There is no God but God! Do no evil, and thus wilt thou fear
neither man nor death: for surely thine hour will come!
"The meek in spirit (El Fakir)
"IMAUM ALI ZADI."
[537] "Though a man in a fever should from sugar have a bitter taste which at another time would
produce a sweet one, yet the idea of bitter in that man's mind would be as clear and distinct from the
idea of sweet as if he had tasted only gall. Nor does it make any more confusion between the two
ideas of sweet and bitter that the same sort of body produces at one time one and at another time
another idea by the taste, than it makes a confusion in two ideas of white and sweet, or white and
round, that the same piece of sugar produces them both in the mind at the same time." Locke's Essay,
bk. ii. ch. xi. § 3.
[538] Cf. Bradley, Logic, p. 226.
[539] This apprehension of them as forming a single system is what Mr. Bradley means by the act of
construction which underlies all reasoning. The awareness, which then supervenes, of the additional
relation of which I speak in the next paragraph of my text, is what this author calls the act of
inspection. Cf. Principles of Logic, bk. ii. pt. i. chap. iii.
[540] Realities fall under this only so far as they prove to be the same. So far as they cannot be
substituted for each other, for the purpose in hand, so far they are not the same; though for other

purposes and in other respects they might be substituted, and then be treated as the same. Apart from
purpose, of course, no realities ever are absolutely and exactly the same.
[541] A mind, in other words, which has got beyond the merely dichotomic style of thought which
Wundt alleges to be the essential form of human thinking (Physiol. Psych., ii. 312).
[542] Said to be expressed by Grassman in the fundamental Axiom of Arithmetic (a + b) + 1 = a + (b
+ 1).
[543] Compare Helmholtz's more technically expressed Essay Zählen u. Messen, in the
Philosophische Aufsätze, Ed. Zeller gewidmet (Leipzig, 1887), p. 17.
[544] For the original statements, cf. J. S. Mill's Logic, bk. ii. chap. vi. §§ 2, 3; and bk. iii. chap. xxiv.
§ 5.
[545] The subdivision itself consumes none of the space. In all practical experience our subdivisions
do consume space. They consume it in our geometrical figures. But for simplicity's sake, in geometry
we postulate subdivisions which violate experience and consume none of it.
[546] Cf. A. de Morgan: Syllabus of a proposed System of Logic (1860), pp. 46-56.
[547] Cf. Locke's Essay, bk. ii. chap. xvii. § 6.
[548] Some readers may expect me to plunge into the old debate as to whether the a priori truths are
'analytic' or 'synthetic.' It seems to me that the distinction is one of Kant's most unhappy legacies, for
the reason that it is impossible to make it sharp. No one will say that such analytic judgments as
"equidistant lines can nowhere meet" are pure tautologies. The predicate is a somewhat new way of
conceiving as well as of naming the subject. There is something 'ampliative' in our greatest truisms,
our state of mind is richer after than before we have uttered them. This being the case, the question
"at what point does the new state of mind cease to be implicit in the old?" is too vague to be
answered. The only sharp way of defining synthetic propositions would be to say that they express a
relation between two data at least. But it is hard to find any proposition which cannot be construed as
doing this. Even verbal definitions do it. Such painstaking attempts as that latest one by Mr. D. G.
Thompson to prove all necessary judgments to be analytic (System of Psychology, ii. pp. 232 ff.)
seem accordingly but nugæ difficiles, and little better than wastes of ink and paper. All philosophic
interest vanishes from the question, the moment one ceases to ascribe to any a priori truths (whether
analytic or synthetic) that "legislative character for all possible experience" which Kant believed in.
We ourselves have denied such legislative character, and contended that it was for experience itself to
prove whether its data can or cannot be assimilated to those ideal terms between which a priori
relations obtain. The analytic-synthetic debate is thus for us devoid of all significance. On the whole,
the best recent treatment of the question known to me is in one of A. Spir's works, his Denken und
Wirklichkeit, I think, but I cannot now find the page.
[549] Book iv. chaps. ix. § 1; vii. 14.
[550] Chap. v. §§ 6, 8.
[551] Kant, by the way, made a strange tactical blunder in his way of showing that the forms of our
necessary thought are underived from experience. He insisted on thought-forms with which
experience largely agrees, forgetting that the only forms which could not by any possibility be the
results of experience would be such as experience violated. The first thing a Kantian ought to do is to
discover forms of judgment to which no order in 'things' runs parallel. These would indeed be
features native to the mind. I owe this remark to Herr A. Spir, in whose 'Denken und Wirklichkeit' it
is somewhere contained. I have myself already to some extent proceeded, and in the pages which
follow shall proceed still farther, to show the originality of the mind's structure in this way.

[552] Yet even so late as Berkeley's time one could write: "As in reading other books a wise man will
choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical
remarks on the language: so in perusing the volume of nature methinks it is beneath the dignity of the
mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules, or showing how
it follows from them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, namely, to recreate and exalt the
mind with a prospect of the beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural things: hence, by proper
inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator," etc., etc.,
etc. (Principles of Human Knowledge, § 109.)

[553] Die Erhaltung der Kraft (1847), pp. 2-6.
[554] Perhaps the most influential of all these postulates is that the nature of the world must be such
that sweeping statements may be made about it.
[555] Consider, e.g., the use of the axioms 'nemo potest supra seipsum,' and 'nemo dat quod non
habet,' in this refutation of 'Darwinism,' which I take from the much-used scholastic compendium of
Logic and Metaphysics of Liberatore, 3d ed. (Rome, 1880): "Hæc hypothesis... aperte contradicit
principiis Metaphysicæ, quæ docent essentias rerum esse immutabiles, et effectum non posse
superare causam. Et sane, quando, juxta Darwin, species inferior se evolvit in superiorem, unde trahit
maiorem illam nobilitatem? Ex ejus carentia. At nihil dat quod non habet; et minus gignere nequit
plus, aut negatio positionem. Præterea in transformatione quæ fingitur, nature prioris speciei, servatur
aut destruitur? Si primum, mutatio erit tantum accidentalis, qualem reapse videmus in diversis
stirpibus animantium. Sin alterum asseritur, ut reapse fert hypothesis darwiniana, res tenderet ad
seipsam destruendam; cum contra omnia naturaliter tendant ad sui conservationem, et nonnisi per
actionem contrarii agentis corruant." It is merely a question of fact whether these ideally proper
relations do or do not obtain between animal and vegetable ancestors and descendants. If they do not,
what happens? simply this, that we cannot continue to class animal and vegetal facts under the kinds
between which those ideal relations obtain. Thus, we can no longer call animal breeds by the name of
'species'; cannot call generating a kind of 'giving,' or treat a descendant as an 'effect' of his ancestor.
The ideal scheme of terms and relations can remain, if you like; but it must remain purely mental,
and without application to life, which 'gangs its ain gait' regardless of ideal schemes. Most of us,
however, would prefer to doubt whether such abstract axioms as that 'a thing cannot tend to its own
destruction' express ideal relations of an important sort at all.
[556] Compare A. Riehl: Der Philosophische Kriticismus, Bd. ii. Thl. i Abschn. i. Cap. iii. § 6.
[557] As one example out of a thousand of exceptionally delicate idiosyncrasy in this regard, take
this: "I must quit society. I would rather undergo twice the danger from beasts and ten times the
danger from rocks. It is not pain, it is not death, that I dread,—it is the hatred of a man; there is
something in it so shocking that I would rather submit to any injury than incur or increase the hatred
of a man by revenging it.... Another sufficient reason for suicide is that I was this morning out of
temper with Mrs. Douglas (for no fault of hers). I did not betray myself in the least, but I reflected
that to be exposed to the possibility of such an event once a year, was evil enough to render life
intolerable. The disgrace of using an impatient word is to me overpowering." (Elton Hammond,
quoted in Henry Crabb Robinson's Diary, vol. i. p. 424.)
[558] Compare H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, bk. iii. chap. xiii. § 3.
[559] A gentleman told me that he had a conclusive argument for opening the Harvard Medical
School to women. It was this: "Are not women human?"—Which major premise of course had to be
granted. "Then are they not entitled to all the rights of humanity?" My friend said that he had never
met anyone who could successfully meet this reasoning.
[560] You reach the Mephistophelian point of view as well as the point of view of justice by treating
cases as if they belonged rigorously to abstract classes. Pure rationalism, complete immunity from
prejudice, consists in refusing to see that the case before one is absolutely unique. It is always
possible to treat the country of one's nativity, the house of one's fathers, the bed in which one's
mother died, nay, the mother herself if need be, on a naked equality with all other specimens of so
many respective genera. It shows the world in a clear frosty light from which all fuliginous mists of
affection, all swamp-lights of sentimentality, are absent. Straight and immediate action becomes easy
then—witness a Napoleon's or a Frederick's career. But the question always remains, "Are not the
mists and vapors worth retaining?" The illogical refusal to treat certain concretes by the mere law of
their genus has made the drama of human history. The obstinate insisting that tweedledum is not

tweedledee is the bone and marrow of life. Look at the Jews and the Scots, with their miserable
factions and sectarian disputes, their loyalties and patriotisms and exclusions,—their annals now
become a classic heritage, because men of genius took part and sang in them. A thing is important if
any one think it important. The process of history consists in certain folks becoming possessed of the
mania that certain special things are important infinitely, whilst other folks cannot agree in the belief.
The Shah of Persia refused to be taken to the Derby Day, saying "It is already known to me that one
horse can run faster than another." He made the question "which horse?" immaterial. Any question
can be made immaterial by subsuming all its answers under a common head. Imagine what college
ball-games and races would be if the teams were to forget the absolute distinctness of Harvard from
Yale and think of both as One in the higher genus College. The sovereign road to indifference,
whether to evils or to goods, lies in the thought of the higher genus. "When we have meat before us,"
says Marcus Aurelius, seeking indifference to that kind of good, "we must receive the impression
that this is the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body of a bird or of a pig; and again that this
Falernian is only a little grape-juice, and this purple robe some sheep's wool dyed with the blood of a
shell-fish. Such, then, are these impressions, and they reach the things themselves and penetrate
them, and we see what kind of things they are. Just in the same way ought we to act through life, and
where there are things which appear most worthy of our approbation, we ought to lay them bare and
look at their worthlessness and strip them of all the words by which they are exalted." (Long's
Translation, vi. 13.)
[561] "An sich, in seinem eignen Wesen, ist jedes reale Object mit sich selbst identisch und
unbedingt"—that is, the "allgemeinste Einsicht a priori" and the "allgemeinste aus Erfahrung" is
"Alles erkennbare ist bedingt." (A. Spir: Denken und Wirklichkeit. Compare also Herbart and Hegel.)
[562] Philosophie Zoölogique, 3me partie, chap. v., 'de l'Instinct.'
[563] It should be said that Mr. Spencer's most formal utterance about instinct is in his Principles of
Psychology, in the chapter under that name. Dr. Romanes has reformulated and criticised the doctrine
of this chapter in his Mental Evolution in Animals, chapter xvii. I must confess my inability to state
its vagueness in intelligible terms. It treats instincts as a further development of reflex actions, and as
forerunners of intelligence,—which is probably true of many. But when it ascribes their formation to
the mere 'multiplication of experiences,' which, at first simple, mould the nervous system to
'correspond to outer relations' by simple reflex actions, and, afterwards complex, make it 'correspond'
by 'compound reflex actions,' it becomes too mysterious to follow without more of a key than is
given. The whole thing becomes perfectly simple if we suppose the reflex actions to be accidental
inborn idiosyncrasies preserved.
[564] This account of acquisitiveness differs from our own. Without denying the associationist
account to be a true description of a great deal of our proprietary feeling, we admitted in addition an
entirely primitive form of desire. (See above, p. 420 ff.) The reader must decide as to the
plausibilities of the case. Certainly appearances are in favor of there being in us some cupidities quite
disconnected with the ulterior uses of the things appropriated. The source of their fascination lies in
their appeal to our æsthetic sense, and we wish thereupon simply to own them. Glittering, hard,
metallic, odd, pretty things; curious things especially; natural objects that look as if they were
artificial, or that mimic other objects,—these form a class of things which human beings snatch at as
magpies snatch rags. They simply fascinate us. What house does not contain some drawer or
cupboard full of senseless odds and ends of this sort, with which nobody knows what to do, but
which a blind instinct saves from the ash-barrel? Witness people returning from a walk on the seashore or in the woods, each carrying some lusus naturæ in the shape of stone or shell, or strip of bark
or odd-shaped fungus, which litter the house and grow daily more unsightly, until at last reason
triumphs over blind propensity and sweeps them away.

[565] Review of Bain in H. Spencer: Illustrations of Universal Progress (New York, 1864), pp. 311,
315.
[566] Ribot: De l'Herédité, 2me éd. p. 26.
[567] Quoted (without reference) in Spencer's Biology, vol. i. p. 247.
[568] Expression of Emotions (N. Y.), p. 287.
[569] 'Adaptive' changes are those produced by the direct effect of outward conditions on an organ or
organism. Sunburned complexion, horny hands, muscular toughness, are illustrations.
[570] For these and other facts cf. Th. Ribot: De l'Hérédité; W. B. Carpenter: Contemporary Review,
vol. 21, p. 295, 779, 867; H. Spencer: Princ. of Biol. pt. ii. ch. v, viii, ix, x; pt. iii. ch. xi, xii; C.
Darwin: Animals and Plants under Domestication, ch. xii, xiii. xiv; Sam'l Butler: Life and Habit; T.
A. Knight: Philos. Trans. 1837; E. Dupuy: Popular Science Monthly, vol. xi. p. 332; F. Papillon;
Nature and Life, p. 330; Crothers, in Pop. Sci. M., Jan. (or Feb.) 1889.
[571] [Because, being exhibited by neuter insects, the effects of mere practice cannot accumulate
from one generation to another.—W. J.]
[572] Origin of Species, chap. vii.
[573] Princ. of Psychol., ii. 561.
[574] Ibid. p. 263.
[575] Ueber die Vererbung (Jena, 1883). Prof. Weismann's Essays on Heredity have recently (1889)
been published in English in a collected form.
[576] Best expressed in the Essay on the Continuitat des Keimplasmas (1885).
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EDITOR'S PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION
The following papers have been gathered together from various sources, and are now available for
the first time to English readers. The subject of psychoanalysis is much in evidence, and is likely
to occupy still more attention in the near future, as the psychological content of the psychoses and
neuroses is more generally appreciated and understood. It is of importance, therefore, that the
fundamental writings of both the Viennese and Zürich Schools should be accessible for study.
Several of Freud's works have already been translated into English. Dr. Jung's "Wandlungen und
Symbole der Libido" was published in America in 1916 under the title of "The Psychology of the
Unconscious." That work, read in conjunction with these papers, offers a fairly complete picture of
the scientific and philosophic standpoint of the leader of the Zürich School. It is the task of the
future to judge and expand the findings of both schools, and to work at the development of the new
psychology, which is still in its infancy.
It will be a relief to many students of the unconscious to see it in another aspect than that of "a
wild beast couched, waiting its hour to spring." Some readers have gathered that view of it from
the writings of the Viennese School, a view which is at most that dangerous thing "a half-truth."
In the papers appearing for the first time in this edition (Chapters XIV. and XV.), Dr. Jung
develops his ideas of introversion and extroversion, a contribution of the first importance to
psychology. He agrees with Freud in regarding the neuroses to be the result of repression, but
differs in his view as to the origin of repression. He finds this to lie not in sexuality per se, but
rather in man's natural tendency to adapt to the demands of life one-sidedly, according to his type
of mentality. The born extrovert adapts by means of feeling, thought being under repression and
relatively infantile. The introvert's natural adaptation is by means of thought; feeling being more or
less repressed remains undeveloped. In either type the neglected co-function is behind the adapted
function. This inequality operating in the unconscious, brings about a conflict, which in certain
subjects amounts to a neurosis, and in others produces a limitation of individual development. This
view shifts the interpretation of repression on to a much more comprehensive basis than that of
sexuality, although there can scarcely be a repression that does not include this instinct on account
of its deep and far-reaching importance in man.
There is no doubt that some even scientific persons have a certain fear of whither the study of the
unconscious may lead. These fearful persons should be reminded that they possess an unconscious
in spite of themselves, and that they share it in common with every human being. It is an extension
of the individual. To study it is to deepen the self. All new discoveries have at one stage been
called dangerous, and all new philosophies have been deemed heresies. It is as though we would
once more consign radium to its dust-heaps, lest some day the new radiancy should over-power
mankind. Indeed this particular thing has proved at once most dangerous and most precious. Man
must learn to use his treasure, and in using it to submit to its own laws, which can only become
known when it is handled and investigated.
Those who read this book with the attention it requires, will find they gain an impression of many
new truths. The second edition is issued towards the end of the third year of the Great European
war, at a time when much we have valued and held sacred is in the melting-pot. But we believe
that out of the crucible new forms will arise. The study of psychoanalysis produces something of

the effect of a war in the psyche; indeed, we need to make conscious this war in the inner things of
the mind and soul if we would be delivered in the future from war in the external world. There is a
parallelism between individual and international neurosis. In the pain of the upheaval, one
recognises the birth-pangs of newer, and let us hope, truer thought, and more natural adaptations.
We need a renewal of our philosophy of life to replace much that has perished in the general
cataclysm, and it is because I see in the analytical psychology, which grows out of a scientific
study of the unconscious, the germs of such a new construction, that I have gathered the following
essays together. The translation is the work of various hands, the names of the different translators
being given in a footnote at the beginning of each essay; for the editing I am responsible. The
essays are, as far as possible, printed in chronological order, and those readers who are sufficiently
interested will be able to discern in them the gradual development of Dr. Jung's present position in
psychoanalysis.
CONSTANCE E. LONG.
2, HARLEY PLACE, W.
June, 1917.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION
In agreement with my honoured collaborator, Dr. C. E. Long, I have made certain additions to the
second edition. It should especially be mentioned that a new chapter upon "The Concept of the
Unconscious" has been added. This is a lecture I gave early in 1916 before the Zürich Union for
Analytical Psychology. It gives a general orientation of a most important problem in practical
analysis, viz. of the relation of the psychological ego to the psychological non-ego. Chapter XIV.
has been fundamentally altered, and I have used the opportunity to incorporate an article that
should describe the results of more recent researches. In accordance with my usual mode of
working, the description is as generalised as possible. My habit in my daily practical work is to
confine myself for some time to studying my human material. I then abstract as generalised a
formula as possible from the data collected, obtaining from it a point of view and applying it in my
practical work, until it has either been confirmed, modified, or else abandoned. If it has been
confirmed, I publish it as a general view-point, without giving the empirical material. I only
introduce the material amassed in the course of my practice in the form of example or illustration.
I therefore beg the reader not to consider the views I present as mere fabrications of my brain.
They are, as a matter of fact, the results of extensive experience and ripe reflection.
These additions will enable the reader of the second edition to become familiar with the recent
views of the Zürich School.
As regards the criticism encountered by the first edition of this work, I was pleased to find my
writings were received with much more open-mindedness among English critics than was the case
in Germany, where they are met with the silence born of contempt. I am particularly grateful to Dr.
Agnes Savill for an exceptionally understanding criticism in the Medical Press. My thanks are also
due to Dr. T. W. Mitchell for an exhaustive review in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical
Research. This critic takes exception to my heresy respecting causality. He considers that I am
entering upon a perilous, because unscientific, course, when I question the sole validity of the
causal view-point in psychology. I sympathise with him, but in my opinion the nature of the
human mind compels us to take the final point of view. For it cannot be disputed that,
psychologically speaking, we are living and working, day by day, according to the principle of
directed aim or purpose, as well as that of causality. A psychological theory must necessarily adapt
itself to this fact. What is plainly directed towards a goal cannot be given an exclusively causalistic
explanation, otherwise we should be led to the conclusion expressed in Moleschott's famous
enunciation: "Man is, what he eats." We must always bear the fact in mind that causality is a point
of view. It affirms the inevitable and immutable relation of a series of events: a-b-d-z. Since this
relation is fixed, and according to the view-point must necessarily be so, looked at logically the
order may also be reversed. Finality is also a view-point, that is justified empirically solely by the
existence of series of events, wherein the causal connection is indeed evident, but the meaning of
which only becomes intelligible as producing final effect. Ordinary daily life furnishes the best
instances of this. The causal explanation must be mechanistic, if we are not to postulate a
metaphysical entity as first cause. For instance, if we adopt Freud's sexual theory and assign
primary importance psychologically to the function of the genital glands, the brain is viewed as an
appendage of the genital glands. If we approach the Viennese idea of sexuality with all its vague
omnipotence, and trace it in a strictly scientific manner down to its psychological basis, we shall

arrive at the first cause, according to which psychic life is for the most, or the most important part,
tension and relaxation of the genital glands. If we assume for the moment that this mechanistic
explanation be "true," it would be the sort of truth which is exceptionally tiresome and rigidly
limited in scope. A similar statement would be that the genital glands cannot function without
adequate nourishment, with its inference that sexuality is an appendage-function of nutrition! The
truth contained in this is really an important chapter in the biology of lower forms of life.
But if we wish to work in a really psychological way, we shall want to know the meaning of
psychological phenomena. After learning the kinds of steel the various parts of a locomotive are
made of, and from what ironworks and mines they come, we do not really know anything about
the locomotive's function, that is to say, its meaning. But "function" as conceived by modern
science is by no means solely a causal concept; it is especially a final or "teleological" one. For it
is utterly impossible to consider the soul from the causal view-point only; we are obliged to
consider it also from the final point of view. As Dr. Mitchell also points out, it is impossible for us
to think of the causal determination conjointly with a final connection. That would be an obvious
contradiction. But our theory of cognition does not need to remain on a pre-Kantian level. It is well
known that Kant showed very clearly that the mechanistic and the teleological view-points are not
constituent (objective) principles, in some degree qualities of the object, but that they are purely
regulative (subjective) principles of thought, and as such they are not mutually inconsistent. I can,
for example, easily conceive the following thesis and antithesis:—
Thesis: Everything came into existence according to mechanistic laws.
Antithesis: Some things did not come into existence according to mechanistic laws only.
Kant says to this: Reason cannot prove either of these principles, because a priori purely empirical
laws of nature cannot give us a determinative principle regarding the potentiality of things.
As a matter of fact, modern physics has necessarily been converted from the idea of pure
mechanism to the final concept of the conservation of energy, because the mechanistic explanation
only recognises reversible processes, whereas the actual truth is that the process of nature is
irreversible. This fact led to the concept of an energy that tends towards relief of tension, and
therewith also towards a definite final state.
Obviously, I consider both these points of view necessary, the causal as well as the final, but would
at the same time lay stress upon the fact that since Kant's time we have come to know that the two
view-points are not antagonistic if they are regarded as regulative principles of thought, and not as
constituent principles of the process of nature itself.
When speaking of the reviews, I must also mention those that seem to me beside the mark. I was
once more struck by the fact that certain critics cannot distinguish between the theoretical
explanation given by the author, and the phantastic ideas provided by the patient. One of my critics
makes this confusion when discussing "Number Dreams." The associations to the quotation from
the Bible in Chapter V. are, as every attentive reader must readily perceive, not arbitrary
explanations of my own, but a cryptomnesic conglomeration emanating, not from my brain at all,
but from that of the patient. Surely it is not difficult to perceive upon reflection that this
conglomeration of numbers corresponds exactly to that unconscious psychological function from
which proceeded all the mysticism of numbers, Pythagoric, Kabbalistic, and so forth, existent from
untold ages.

I am grateful to my serious reviewers, and should like here to also express my thanks to Mrs.
Harold F. McCormick for her generous help in the production of this book.
C. G. JUNG.
June, 1917.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION
This volume contains a selection of articles and pamphlets on analytical psychology written at
intervals during the past fourteen years. These years have seen the development of a new
discipline, and as is usual in such a case, have involved many changes of view-point, of concept,
and of formulation.
It is not my intention to give a presentation of the fundamental concepts of analytical psychology
in this book; it throws some light, however, on a certain line of development which is especially
characteristic of the Zürich School of psychoanalysis.
As is well known, the merit of the discovery of the new analytical method of general psychology
belongs to Professor Freud of Vienna. His original view-points had to undergo many essential
modifications, some of them owing to the work done at Zürich, in spite of the fact that he himself
is far from agreeing with the standpoint of this school.
I am unable to explain fully the fundamental differences between the two schools, but would
indicate the following points: The Vienna School takes the standpoint of an exclusive sexualistic
conception, while that of the Zürich School is symbolistic. The Vienna School interprets the
psychological symbol semiotically, as a sign or token of certain primitive psychosexual processes.
Its method is analytical and causal.
The Zürich School recognises the scientific feasibility of such a conception, but denies its
exclusive validity, for it does not interpret the psychological symbol semiotically only, but also
symbolistically, that is, it attributes a positive value to the symbol.
The value does not depend merely on historical causes; its chief importance lies in the fact that it
has a meaning for the actual present, and for the future, in their psychological aspects. For to the
Zürich School the symbol is not merely a sign of something repressed and concealed, but is at the
same time an attempt to comprehend and to point out the way of the further psychological
development of the individual. Thus we add a prospective import to the retrospective value of the
symbol.
The method of the Zürich School is therefore not only analytical and causal, but also synthetic and
prospective, in recognition that the human mind is characterised by "causæ" and also by "fines"
(aims). The latter fact needs particular emphasis, because there are two types of psychology, the
one following the principle of hedonism, and the other following the principle of power. Scientific
materialism is pertinent to the former type, and the philosophy of Nietzsche to the latter. The
principle of the Freudian theory is hedonism, while that of Adler (one of Freud's earliest personal
pupils) is founded upon the principle of power.
The Zürich School, recognising the existence of these two types (also remarked by the late
Professor William James), considers that the views of Freud and Adler are one-sided, and only
valid within the limits of their corresponding type. Both principles exist within every individual,
but not in equal proportions.
Thus, it is obvious that each psychological symbol has two aspects, and should be interpreted
according to the two principles. Freud and Adler interpret in the analytical and causal way,

reducing to the infantile and primitive. Thus with Freud the conception of the "aim" is the
fulfilment of desire, with Adler it is the usurpation of power. Both authors take the standpoint in
their practical analytical work which brings to view only infantile and gross egoistic aims.
The Zürich School is convinced of the fact that within the limits of a diseased mental attitude the
psychology is such as Freud and Adler describe. It is, indeed, just on account of such impossible
and childish psychology that the individual is in a state of inward dissociation and hence neurotic.
The Zürich School, therefore, in agreement with them so far, also reduces the psychological
symbol (the phantasy products of the patient) to the fundamental infantile hedonism, or to the
infantile desire for power. But Freud and Adler content themselves with the result of mere
reduction, according to their scientific biologism and naturalism.
But here a very important question arises. Can man obey the fundamental and primitive impulses
of his nature without gravely injuring himself or his fellow beings? He cannot assert either his
sexual desire or his desire for power unlimitedly, and the limits are moreover very restricted. The
Zürich School has in view also the final result of analysis, and regards the fundamental thoughts
and impulses of the unconscious, as symbols, indicative of a definite line of future development.
We must admit there is, however, no scientific justification for such a procedure, because our
present-day science is based as a whole upon causality. But causality is only one principle, and
psychology essentially cannot be exhausted by causal methods only, because the mind lives by
aims as well. Besides this disputable philosophical argument, we have another of much greater
value in favour of our hypothesis, namely, that of vital necessity. It is impossible to live according
to the intimations of infantile hedonism, or according to a childish desire for power. If these are to
be retained they must be taken symbolically. Out of the symbolic application of infantile trends, an
attitude evolves which may be termed philosophic or religious, and these terms characterise
sufficiently the lines of further development of the individual. The individual is not only an
established and unchangeable complex of psychological facts, but also an extremely changeable
entity. By exclusive reduction to causes, the primitive trends of a personality are reinforced; this is
only helpful when at the same time these primitive tendencies are balanced by recognition of their
symbolic value. Analysis and reduction lead to causal truth; this by itself does not help living, but
brings about resignation and hopelessness. On the other hand, the recognition of the intrinsic value
of a symbol leads to constructive truth and helps us to live. It induces hopefulness and furthers the
possibility of future development.
The functional importance of the symbol is clearly shown in the history of civilisation. For
thousands of years the religious symbol proved a most efficacious means in the moral education of
mankind. Only a prejudiced mind could deny such an obvious fact. Concrete values cannot take
the place of the symbol; only new and more efficient symbols can be substituted for those that are
antiquated and outworn, such as have lost their efficacy through the progress of intellectual
analysis and understanding. The further development of mankind can only be brought about by
means of symbols which represent something far in advance of himself, and whose intellectual
meanings cannot yet be grasped entirely. The individual unconscious produces such symbols, and
they are of the greatest possible value in the moral development of the personality.
Man almost invariably has philosophic and religious views of the meaning of the world and of his
own life. There are some who are proud to have none. These are exceptions outside the common
path of mankind; they miss an important function which has proved itself to be indispensable to
the human mind.

In such cases we find in the unconscious, instead of modern symbolism, an antiquated archaic
view of the world and of life. If a requisite psychological function is not represented in the sphere
of consciousness, it exists in the unconscious in the form of an archaic or embryonic prototype.
This brief résumé may show what the reader cannot find in this collection of papers. The essays
are stations on the way of the more general views developed above.
C. G. JUNG.
ZÜRICH,
. January, 1916.
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ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER I
ON THE PSYCHOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY OF SOCALLED OCCULT PHENOMENA[1]
In that wide field of psychopathic deficiency where Science has demarcated
the diseases of epilepsy, hysteria and neurasthenia, we meet scattered
observations concerning certain rare states of consciousness as to whose
meaning authors are not yet agreed. These observations spring up
sporadically in the literature on narcolepsy, lethargy, automatisme
ambulatoire, periodic amnesia, double consciousness, somnambulism,
pathological dreamy states, pathological lying, etc.
These states are sometimes attributed to epilepsy, sometimes to hysteria,
sometimes to exhaustion of the nervous system, or neurasthenia, sometimes
they are allowed all the dignity of a disease sui generis. Patients
occasionally work through a whole graduated scale of diagnoses, from
epilepsy, through hysteria, up to simulation. In practice, on the one hand,
these conditions can only be separated with great difficulty from the socalled neuroses, sometimes even are indistinguishable from them; on the
other, certain features in the region of pathological deficiency present more
than a mere analogical relationship not only with phenomena of normal
psychology, but also with the psychology of the supernormal, of genius.
Various as are the individual phenomena in this region, there is certainly no
case that cannot be connected by some intermediate example with the other
typical cases. This relationship in the pictures presented by hysteria and
epilepsy is very close. Recently the view has even been maintained that
there is no clean-cut frontier between epilepsy and hysteria, and that a
difference is only to be noted in extreme cases. Steffens says, for example[2]
—"We are forced to the conclusion that in essence hysteria and epilepsy are
not fundamentally different, that the cause of the disease is the same, but is
manifest in a diverse form, in different intensity and permanence."

The demarcation of hysteria and certain borderline cases of epilepsy from
congenital and acquired psychopathic mental deficiency likewise presents
the greatest difficulties. The symptoms of one or other disease everywhere
invade the neighbouring realm, so violence is done to the facts when they
are split off and considered as belonging to one or other realm. The
demarcation of psychopathic mental deficiency from the normal is an
absolutely impossible task, the difference is everywhere only "more or
less." The classification in the region of mental deficiency itself is
confronted by the same difficulty. At best, certain classes can be separated
off which crystallise round some well-marked nucleus through having
peculiarly typical features. Turning away from the two large groups of
intellectual and emotional deficiency, there remain those deficiencies
coloured pre-eminently by hysteria or epilepsy (epileptoid) or neurasthenia,
which are not notably deficiency of the intellect or of feeling. It is
essentially in this region, insusceptible of any absolute classification, that
the above-named conditions play their part. As is well known, they can
appear as part manifestations of a typical epilepsy or hysteria, or can exist
separately in the realm of psychopathic mental deficiency, where their
qualifications of epileptic or hysterical are often due to the non-essential
accessory features. It is thus the rule to place somnambulism among
hysterical diseases, because it is occasionally a phenomenon of severe
hysteria, or because mild so-called hysterical symptoms may accompany it.
Binet says: "Il n'y a pas une somnambulisme, état nerveux toujours
identique à lui-même, il y a des somnambulismes." As one of the
manifestations of a severe hysteria, somnambulism is not an unknown
phenomenon, but as a pathological entity, as a disease sui generis, it must
be somewhat rare, to judge by its infrequency in German literature on the
subject. So-called spontaneous somnambulism, resting upon a foundation of
hysterically-tinged psychopathic deficiency, is not a very common
occurrence and it is worth while to devote closer study to these cases, for
they occasionally present a mass of interesting particulars.
Case of Miss Elise K., aged 40, single; book-keeper in a large business; no
hereditary taint, except that it is alleged a brother became slightly nervous
after family misfortune and illness. Well educated, of a cheerful, joyous
nature, not of a saving disposition, always occupied with some big idea. She
was very kind-hearted and gentle, did a great deal both for her parents, who
were living in very modest circumstances, and for strangers. Nevertheless

she was not happy, because she thought she did not understand herself. She
had always enjoyed good health till a few years ago, when she is said to
have been treated for dilatation of the stomach and tapeworm. During this
illness her hair became rapidly white, later she had typhoid fever. An
engagement was terminated by the death of her fiancé from paralysis. She
had been very nervous for a year and a half. In the summer of 1897 she
went away for change of air and treatment by hydropathy. She herself says
that for about a year she has had moments during work when her thoughts
seem to stand still, but she does not fall asleep. Nevertheless she makes no
mistakes in the accounts at such times. She has often been to the wrong
street and then suddenly noticed that she was not in the right place. She has
had no giddiness or attacks of fainting. Formerly menstruation occurred
regularly every four weeks, and without any pain, but since she has been
nervous and overworked it has come every fourteen days. For a long time
she has suffered from constant headache. As accountant and book-keeper in
a large establishment, the patient has had very strenuous work, which she
performs well and conscientiously. In addition to the strenuous character of
her work, in the last year she had various new worries. Her brother was
suddenly divorced. In addition to her own work, she looked after his
housekeeping, nursed him and his child in a serious illness, and so on. To
recuperate, she took a journey on the 13th September to see a woman friend
in South Germany. The great joy at seeing her friend from whom she had
been long separated, and her participation in some festivities, deprived her
of her rest. On the 15th, she and her friend drank half a bottle of claret. This
was contrary to her usual habit. They then went for a walk in a cemetery,
where she began to tear up flowers and to scratch at the graves. She
remembered absolutely nothing of this afterwards. On the 16th she
remained with her friend without anything of importance happening. On the
17th her friend brought her to Zürich. An acquaintance came with her to the
Asylum; on the way she spoke quite sensibly, but was very tired. Outside
the Asylum they met three boys, whom she described as the "three dead
people she had dug up." She then wanted to go to the neighbouring
cemetery, but was persuaded to come to the Asylum.
She is small, delicately formed, slightly anæmic. The heart is slightly
enlarged to the left, there are no murmurs, but some reduplication of the
sounds, the mitral being markedly accentuated. The liver dulness reaches to
the border of the ribs. Patella-reflex is somewhat increased, but otherwise

no tendon-reflexes. There is neither anæsthesia, analgesia, nor paralysis.
Rough examination of the field of vision with the hands shows no
contraction. The patient's hair is a very light yellow-white colour; on the
whole she looks her age. She gives her history and tells recent events quite
clearly, but has no recollection of what took place in the cemetery at C. or
outside the Asylum. During the night of the 17th-18th she spoke to the
attendant and declared she saw the whole room full of dead people—
looking like skeletons. She was not at all frightened, but was rather
surprised that the attendant did not see them too. Once she ran to the
window, but was otherwise quiet. The next morning, while still in bed, she
saw skeletons, but not in the afternoon. The following night at four o'clock
she awoke and heard the dead children in the neighbouring cemetery cry
out that they had been buried alive. She wanted to go out to dig them up,
but allowed herself to be restrained. Next morning at seven o'clock she was
still delirious, but recalled accurately the events in the cemetery at C. and
those on approaching the Asylum. She stated that at C. she wanted to dig up
the dead children who were calling her. She had only torn up the flowers to
free the graves and to be able to get at them. In this state Professor Bleuler
explained to her that later on, when in a normal state again, she would
remember everything. The patient slept in the morning, afterwards was
quite clear, and felt herself relatively well. She did indeed remember the
attacks, but maintained a remarkable indifference towards them. The
following nights, with the exception of those of the 22nd and the 25th
September, she again had slight attacks of delirium, when once more she
had to deal with the dead. The details of the attacks differed, however.
Twice she saw the dead in her bed, but she did not appear to be afraid of
them, she got out of bed frequently, however, because she did not want "to
inconvenience the dead"; several times she wanted to leave the room.
After a few nights free from attacks there was a slight one on the 30th Sept.,
when she called the dead from the window. During the day her mind was
clear. On the 3rd of October she saw a whole crowd of skeletons in the
drawingroom, as she afterwards related, during full consciousness.
Although she doubted the reality of the skeletons, she could not convince
herself that it was a hallucination. The following night, between twelve and
one o'clock—the earlier attacks were usually about this time—she was
obsessed with the idea of dead people for about ten minutes. She sat up in
bed, stared at a corner and said: "Well, come!—but they're not all there.

Come along! Why don't you come? The room is big enough, there's room
for all; when all are there, I'll come too." Then she lay down with the
words: "Now they're all there," and fell asleep again. In the morning she
had not the slightest recollection of any of these attacks. Very short attacks
occurred in the nights of the 4th, 6th, 9th, 13th and 15th of October,
between twelve and one o'clock. The last three occurred during the
menstrual period. The attendant spoke to her several times, showed her the
lighted street-lamps, and trees; but she did not react to this conversation.
Since then the attacks have altogether ceased. The patient has complained
about a number of troubles which she had had all along. She suffered much
from headache the morning after the attacks. She said it was unbearable.
Five grains of Sacch. lactis promptly alleviated this; then she complained of
pains in both fore-arms, which she described as if it were a teno-synovitis.
She regarded the bulging of the muscles in flexion as a swelling, and asked
to be massaged. Nothing could be seen objectively, and no attention being
paid to it, the trouble disappeared. She complained exceedingly and for a
long time about the thickening of a toenail, even after the thickened part
had been removed. Sleep was often disturbed. She would not give her
consent to be hypnotised for the night-attacks. Finally on account of
headache and disturbed sleep she agreed to hypnotic treatment. She proved
a good subject, and at the first sitting fell into deep sleep with analgesia and
amnesia.
In November she was again asked whether she could now remember the
attack on the 19th September which it had been suggested that she would
recall. It gave her great trouble to recollect it, and in the end she could only
state the chief facts, she had forgotten the details.
It should be added that the patient was not superstitious, and in her healthy
days had never particularly interested herself in the supernatural. During the
whole course of treatment, which ended on the 14th November, great
indifference was evinced both to the illness and the cure. Next spring the
patient returned for out-patient treatment of the headache, which had come
back during the very hard work of these months. Apart from this symptom
her condition left nothing to be desired. It was demonstrated that she had no
remembrance of the attacks of the previous autumn, not even of those of the
19th September and earlier. On the other hand, in hypnosis she could

recount the proceedings in the cemetery and during the nightly
disturbances.
By the peculiar hallucination and by its appearance our case recalls the
conditions which V. Kraft-Ebing has described as "protracted states of
hysterical delirium." He says: "Such conditions of delirium occur in the
slighter cases of hysteria. Protracted hysterical delirium is built upon a
foundation of temporary exhaustion. Excitement seems to determine an
outbreak, and it readily recurs. Most frequently there is persecutiondelirium with very violent anxiety, sometimes of a religious or erotic
character. Hallucinations of all the senses are not rare, but illusions of sight,
smell and feeling are the commonest, and most important. The visual
hallucinations are especially visions of animals, pictures of corpses,
phantastic processions in which dead persons, devils and ghosts swarm. The
illusions of hearing are simply sounds (shrieks, howlings, claps of thunder)
or local hallucinations, frequently with a sexual content."
This patient's visions of corpses, occurring almost always in attacks, recall
the states occasionally seen in hystero-epilepsy. There likewise occur
specific visions which, in contrast with protracted delirium, are connected
with single attacks.
(1) A lady 30 years of age with grande hystérie had twilight states in which
as a rule she was troubled by terrible hallucinations; she saw her children
carried away from her, wild beasts eating them up, and so on. She has
amnesia for the content of the individual attacks.[3]
(2) A girl of 17, likewise a semi-hysteric, saw in her attacks the corpse of
her dead mother approaching her to draw her to her. Patient has amnesia for
the attacks.[4]
These are cases of severe hysteria wherein consciousness rests upon a
profound stage of dreaming. The nature of the attack and the stability of the
hallucination alone show a certain kinship with our case, which in this
respect has numerous analogies with the corresponding states of hysteria.
For instance, with those cases where a psychical shock (rape, etc.) was the
occasion for the outbreak of hysterical attacks, and where at times the
original incident is lived over again, stereotyped in the hallucination. But
our case gets its specific mould from the identity of the consciousness in the

different attacks. It is an "Etat Second" with its own memory and separated
from the waking state by complete amnesia. This differentiates it from the
above-mentioned twilight states and links it to the so-called somnambulic
conditions.
Charcot[5] divides the somnambulic states into two chief classes:—
1. Delirium with well-marked incoordination of representation and action.
2. Delirium with co-ordinated action. This approaches the waking state.
Our case belongs to the latter class.
If by somnambulism be understood a state of systematised partial waking,[6]
any critical review of this affection must take account of those exceptional
cases of recurrent amnesias which have been observed now and again.
These, apart from nocturnal ambulism, are the simplest conditions of
systematised partial waking. Naef's case is certainly the most remarkable in
the literature. It deals with a gentleman of 32, with a very bad family
history presenting numerous signs of degeneration, partly functional, partly
organic. In consequence of over-work at the age of 17 he had a peculiar
twilight state with delusions, which lasted some days and was cured with a
sudden recovery of memory. Later he was subject to frequent attacks of
giddiness and palpitation of the heart and vomiting; but these attacks were
never attended by loss of consciousness. At the termination of some
feverish illness he suddenly travelled from Australia to Zürich, where he
lived for some weeks in careless cheerfulness, and only came to himself
when he read in the paper of his sudden disappearance from Australia. He
had a total and retrograde amnesia for the several months which included
the journey to Australia, his sojourn there and the return journey.
Azam[7] has published a case of periodic amnesia. Albert X., 12-1/2 years
old, of hysterical disposition, was several times attacked in the course of a
few years by conditions of amnesia in which he forgot reading, writing and
arithmetic, even at times his own language, for several weeks at a stretch.
The intervals were normal.
Proust[8] has published a case of Automatisme ambulatoire with pronounced
hysteria which differs from Naef's in the repeated occurrence of the attacks.
An educated man, 30 years old, exhibits all the signs of grande hystérie; he

is very suggestible, has from time to time, under the influence of
excitement, attacks of amnesia which last from two days to several weeks.
During these states he wanders about, visits relatives, destroys various
objects, incurs debts, and has even been convicted of "picking pockets."
Boileau describes a similar case[9] of wandering-impulse. A widow of 22,
highly hysterical, became terrified at the prospect of a necessary operation
for salpingitis; she left the hospital and fell into a state of somnambulism,
from which she awoke three days later with total amnesia. During these
three days she had travelled a distance of about 60 kilometres to fetch her
child.
William James has described a case of an "ambulatory sort."[10]
The Rev. Ansel Bourne, an itinerant preacher, 30 years of age,
psychopathic, had on a few occasions attacks of loss of consciousness
lasting one hour. One day (January 17, 1887) he suddenly disappeared from
Greene, after having taken 551 dollars out of the bank. He remained hidden
for two months. During this time he had taken a little shop under the name
of H. J. Browne in Norriston, Pa., and had carefully attended to all
purchases, although he had never done this sort of work before. On March
14, 1887, he suddenly awoke and went back home, and had complete
amnesia for the interval.
Mesnet[11] publishes the following case:—
F., 27 years old, sergeant in the African regiment, was wounded in the
parietal bone at Bazeilles. Suffered for a year from hemiplegia, which
disappeared when the wound healed. During the course of his illness the
patient had attacks of somnambulism, with marked limitation of
consciousness; all the senses were paralysed, with the exception of taste and
a small portion of the visual sense. The movements were co-ordinated, but
obstacles in the way of their performance were overcome with difficulty.
During the attacks he had an absurd collecting-mania. By various
manipulations one could demonstrate a hallucinatory content in his
consciousness; for instance, when a stick was put in his hand he would feel
himself transported to a battle scene, would place himself on guard, see the
enemy approaching, etc.

Guinon and Sophie Waltke[12] made the following experiments on hysterics:
—
A blue glass was held in front of the eyes of a female patient during a
hysterical attack; she regularly saw the picture of her mother in the blue sky.
A red glass showed her a bleeding wound, a yellow one an orange-seller or
a lady with a yellow dress.
Mesnet's case reminds one of the cases of occasional attacks of shrinkage of
memory.
MacNish[13] communicates a similar case.
An apparently healthy young lady suddenly fell into an abnormally long
and deep sleep—it is said without prodromal symptoms. On awaking she
had forgotten the words for and the knowledge of the simplest things. She
had again to learn to read, write, and count; her progress was rapid in this
re-learning. After a second attack she again woke in her normal state, but
without recollection of the period when she had forgotten things. These
states alternated for more than four years, during which consciousness
showed continuity within the two states, but was separated by an amnesia
from the consciousness of the normal state.
These selected cases of various forms of changes of consciousness all throw
a certain light upon our case. Naef's case presents two hysteriform eclipses
of memory, one of which is marked by the appearance of delusions, and the
other by its long duration, contraction of the field of consciousness, and
desire to wander. The peculiar associated impulses are specially clear in the
cases of Proust and Mesnet. In our case the impulsive tearing up of the
flowers, the digging up of the graves, form a parallel. The continuity of
consciousness which the patient presents in the individual attacks recalls the
behaviour of the consciousness in MacNish's case; hence our case may be
regarded as a transient phenomenon of alternating consciousness. The
dreamlike hallucinatory content of the limited consciousness in our case
does not, however, justify an unqualified assignment to this group of double
consciousness. The hallucinations in the second state show a certain
creativeness which seems to be conditioned by the auto-suggestibility of
this state. In Mesnet's case we noticed the appearance of hallucinatory
processes from simple stimulation of touch. The patient's subconsciousness

employs simple perceptions for the automatic construction of complicated
scenes which then take possession of the limited consciousness. A
somewhat similar view must be taken about our patient's hallucinations; at
least, the external conditions which gave rise to the appearance of the
hallucinations seem to strengthen our supposition. The walk in the cemetery
induces the vision of the skeletons; the meeting with the three boys arouses
the hallucination of children buried alive whose voices the patient hears at
night-time. She arrived at the cemetery in a somnambulic state, which on
this occasion was specially intense in consequence of her having taken
alcohol. She performed actions almost instinctively about which her
subconsciousness nevertheless did receive certain impressions. (The part
played here by alcohol must not be underestimated. We know from
experience that it does not only act adversely upon these conditions, but,
like every other narcotic, it gives rise to a certain increase of suggestibility.)
The impressions received in somnambulism subconsciously form
independent growths, and finally reach perception as hallucinations. Thus
our case closely corresponds to those somnambulic dream-states which
have recently been subjected to a penetrating study in England and France.
These lapses of memory, which at first seem without content, gain a content
by means of accidental auto-suggestion, and this content builds itself up
automatically to a certain extent. It achieves no further development,
probably on account of the improvement now beginning, and finally it
disappears altogether as recovery sets in. Binet and Féré have made
numerous experiments on the implanting of suggestions in states of partial
sleep. They have shown, for example, that when a pencil is put in the
anæsthetic hand of a hysteric, letters of great length are written
automatically whose contents are unknown to the patient's consciousness.
Cutaneous stimuli in anæsthetic regions are sometimes perceived as visual
images, or at least as vivid associated visual presentations. These
independent transmutations of simple stimuli must be regarded as primary
phenomena in the formation of somnambulic dream-pictures. Analogous
manifestations occur in exceptional cases within the sphere of waking
consciousness. Goethe,[14] for instance, states that when he sat down,
lowered his head and vividly conjured up the image of a flower, he saw it
undergoing changes of its own accord, as if entering into new combinations.

In half-waking states these manifestations are relatively frequent in the socalled hypnagogic hallucinations. The automatisms which the Goethe
example illustrates are differentiated from the truly somnambulic, inasmuch
as the primary presentation is a conscious one in this case; the further
development of the automatism is maintained within the definite limits of
the original presentation, that is, within the purely motor or visual region.
If the primary presentation disappears, or if it is never conscious at all, and
if the automatic development overlaps neighbouring regions, we lose every
possibility of a demarcation between waking automatisms and those of the
somnambulic state; this will occur, for instance, if the presentation of a
hand plucking the flower gets joined to the perception of the flower or the
presentation of the smell of the flower. We can then only differentiate it by
the more or less. In one case we then speak of the "waking hallucinations of
the normal," in the other, of the dream-vision of the somnambulists. The
interpretation of our patient's attacks as hysterical becomes more certain by
the demonstration of a probably psychogenic origin of the hallucination.
This is confirmed by her troubles, headache and teno-synovitis, which have
shown themselves amenable to suggestive treatment. The ætiological factor
alone is not sufficient for the diagnosis of hysteria; it might really be
expected a priori that in the course of a disease which is so suitably treated
by rest, as in the treatment of an exhaustion-state, features would be
observed here and there which could be interpreted as manifestations of
exhaustion. The question arises whether the early lapses and later
somnambulic attacks could not be conceived as states of exhaustion, socalled "neurasthenic crises." We know that in the realm of psychopathic
mental deficiency there can arise the most diverse epileptoid accidents,
whose classification under epilepsy or hysteria is at least doubtful. To quote
C. Westphal: "On the basis of numerous observations, I maintain that the
so-called epileptoid attacks form one of the most universal and commonest
symptoms in the group of diseases which we reckon among the mental
diseases and neuropathies; the mere appearance of one or more epileptic or
epileptoid attacks is not decisive for its course and prognosis. As
mentioned, I have used the concept of epileptoid in the widest sense for the
attack itself."[15]
The epileptoid moments of our case are not far to seek; the objection can,
however, be raised that the colouring of the whole picture is hysterical in

the extreme. Against this, however, it must be stated that every
somnambulism is not eo ipso hysterical. Occasionally states occur in typical
epilepsy which to experts seem parallel with somnambulic states,[16] or
which can only be distinguished by the existence of genuine convulsions.
[17]

As Diehl shows,[18] in neurasthenic mental deficiency crises also occur
which often confuse the diagnosis. A definite presentation-content can even
create a stereotyped repetition in the individual crisis. Lately Mörchen has
published a case of epileptoid neurasthenic twilight state.[19]
I am indebted to Professor Bleuler for the report of the following case:—
An educated gentleman of middle age—without epileptic antecedents—had
exhausted himself by many years of over-strenuous mental work. Without
other prodromal symptoms (such as depression, etc.) he attempted suicide
during a holiday; in a peculiar twilight state he suddenly threw himself into
the water from a bank, in sight of many persons. He was at once pulled out
and retained but a fleeting remembrance of the occurrence.
Bearing these observations in mind, neurasthenia must be allowed to
account for a considerable share in the attacks of our patient, Miss E. K.
The headaches and the teno-synovitis point to the existence of a relatively
mild hysteria, generally latent, but becoming manifest under the influence
of exhaustion. The genesis of this peculiar illness explains the relationship
which has been described between epilepsy, hysteria and neurasthenia.
Summary.—Miss Elise K. is a psychopathic defective with a tendency to
hysteria. Under the influence of nervous exhaustion she suffers from attacks
of epileptoid giddiness whose interpretation is uncertain at first sight. Under
the influence of an unusually large dose of alcohol the attacks develop into
definite somnambulism with hallucinations, which are limited in the same
way as dreams to accidental external perceptions. When the nervous
exhaustion is cured the hysterical manifestations disappear.
In the region of psychopathic deficiency with hysterical colouring, we
encounter numerous phenomena which show, as in this case, symptoms of
diverse defined diseases, which cannot be attributed with certainty to any
one of them. These phenomena are partially recognised to be independent;
for instance, pathological lying, pathological reveries, etc. Many of these

states, however, still await thorough scientific investigation; at present they
belong more or less to the domain of scientific gossip. Persons with habitual
hallucinations, and also the inspired, exhibit these states; they draw the
attention of the crowd to themselves, now as poet or artist, now as saviour,
prophet or founder of a new sect.
The genesis of the peculiar frame of mind of these persons is for the most
part lost in obscurity, for it is only very rarely that one of these remarkable
personalities can be subjected to exact observation. In view of the often
great historical importance of these persons, it is much to be wished that we
had some scientific material which would enable us to gain a closer insight
into the psychological development of their peculiarities. Apart from the
now practically useless productions of the pneumatological school at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, German scientific literature is very
poor in this respect; indeed, there seems to be real aversion from
investigation in this field. For the facts so far gathered we are indebted
almost exclusively to the labours of French and English workers. It seems at
least desirable that our literature should be enlarged in this respect. These
considerations have induced me to publish some observations which will
perhaps help to further our knowledge concerning the relationship of
hysterical twilight-states and enlarge the problems of normal psychology.
CASE OF SOMNAMBULISM IN A PERSON WITH NEUROPATHIC INHERITANCE
(SPIRITUALISTIC MEDIUM).
The following case was under my observation in the years 1899 and 1900.
As I was not in medical attendance upon Miss S. W., a physical
examination for hysterical stigmata unfortunately could not be made. I kept
a complete diary of the séances, which I filled up after each sitting. The
following report is a condensed account from these notes. Out of regard for
Miss S. W. and her family a few unimportant dates have been altered and a
few details omitted from the story, which for the most part is composed of
very intimate matters.
Miss S. W., 15½ years old. Reformed Church. The paternal grandfather was
highly intelligent, a clergyman with frequent waking hallucinations
(generally visions, often whole dramatic scenes with dialogues, etc.). A
brother of the grandfather was an imbecile eccentric, who also saw visions.

A sister of the grandfather, a peculiar, odd character. The paternal
grandmother after some fever in her 20th year (typhoid?) had a trance
which lasted three days, from which she did not awake until the crown of
her head had been burned by a red-hot iron. During states of excitement
later on she had fainting fits which were nearly always followed by a brief
somnambulism during which she uttered prophesies. Her father was
likewise a peculiar, original personality with bizarre ideas. All three had
waking hallucinations (second-sight, forebodings, etc.). A third brother was
also eccentric and odd, talented but one-sided. The mother has an inherited
mental defect often bordering on psychosis. The sister is a hysteric and
visionary and a second sister suffers from "nervous heart attacks." Miss S.
W. is slenderly built, skull somewhat rachitic, without pronounced
hydrocephalus, face rather pale, eyes dark with a peculiar penetrating look.
She has had no serious illnesses. At school she passed for average, showed
little interest, was inattentive. As a rule her behaviour was rather reserved,
sometimes giving place, however, to exuberant joy and exaltation. Of
average intelligence, without special gifts, neither musical nor fond of
books, her preference is for handwork—and day dreaming. She was often
absent-minded, misread in a peculiar way when reading aloud, instead of
the word Ziege (goat), for instance, said Gais, instead of Treppe (stair),
Stege; this occurred so often that her brothers and sisters laughed at her.
There were no other abnormalities; there were no serious hysterical
manifestations. Her family were artisans and business people with very
limited interests. Books of mystical content were never permitted in the
family. Her education was faulty; there were numerous brothers and sisters
and thus the education was given indiscriminately, and in addition the
children had to suffer a great deal from the inconsequent and vulgar, indeed
sometimes rough, treatment of their mother. The father, a very busy
business man, could not pay much attention to his children, and died when
S. W. was not yet grown up. Under these uncomfortable conditions it is no
wonder that S. W. felt herself shut in and unhappy. She was often afraid to
go home, and preferred to be anywhere rather than there. She was left a
great deal with playmates and grew up in this way without much polish.
The level of her education is relatively low and her interests
correspondingly limited. Her knowledge of literature is also very limited.
She knows the common school songs by heart, songs of Schiller and Goethe
and a few other poets, as well as fragments from a song book and the

psalms. Newspaper stories represent her highest level in prose. Up to the
time of her somnambulism she had never read any books of a serious
nature. At home and from friends she heard about table-turning and began
to take an interest in it. She asked to be allowed to take part in such
experiments, and her desire was soon gratified. In July 1899, she took part a
few times in table-turnings with some friends and her brothers and sisters,
but in joke. It was then discovered that she was an excellent "medium."
Some communications of a serious nature arrived which were received with
general astonishment. Their pastoral tone was surprising. The spirit said he
was the grandfather of the medium. As I was acquainted with the family I
was able to take part in these experiments. At the beginning of August,
1899, the first attacks of somnambulism took place in my presence. They
took the following course: S. W. became very pale, slowly sank to the
ground, or into a chair, shut her eyes, became cataleptic, drew several deep
breaths, and began to speak. In this stage she was generally quite relaxed;
the reflexes of the lids remained, as did also tactile sensation. She was
sensitive to unexpected noises and full of fear, especially in the initial stage.
She did not react when called by name. In somnambulic dialogues she
copied in a remarkably clever way her dead relations and acquaintances,
with all their peculiarities, so that she made a lasting impression upon
unprejudiced persons. She also so closely imitated persons whom she only
knew from descriptions that no one could deny her at least considerable
talent as an actress. Gradually gestures were added to the simple speech,
which finally led to "attitudes passionelles" and complete dramatic scenes.
She took up postures of prayer and rapture, with staring eyes, and spoke
with impassionate and glowing rhetoric. She then made use exclusively of a
literary German which she spoke with an ease and assurance quite contrary
to her usual uncertain and embarrassed manner in the waking state. Her
movements were free and of a noble grace, depicting most beautifully her
varying emotions. Her attitude during these states was always changing and
diverse in the different attacks. Now she would lie for ten minutes to two
hours on the sofa or the ground, motionless, with closed eyes; now she
assumed a half-sitting posture and spoke with changed tone and speech;
now she would stand up, going through every possible pantomimic gesture.
Her speech was equally diversified and without rule. Now she spoke in the
first person, but never for long, generally to prophesy her next attack; now
she spoke of herself (and this was the most usual) in the third person. She

then acted as some other person, either some dead acquaintance or some
chance person, whose part she consistently carried out according to the
characteristics she herself conceived. At the end of the ecstasy there usually
followed a cataleptic state with flexibilitas cerea, which gradually passed
over into the waking state. The waxy anæmic pallor which was an almost
constant feature of the attacks made one really anxious; it sometimes
occurred at the beginning of the attack, but often in the second half only.
The pulse was then small but regular and of normal frequency; the
breathing gentle, shallow, or almost imperceptible. As already stated, S. W.
often predicted her attacks beforehand; just before the attacks she had
strange sensations, became excited, rather anxious, and occasionally
expressed thoughts of death: "she will probably die in one of these attacks;
during the attack her soul only hangs to her body by a thread, so that often
the body could scarcely go on living." Once after the cataleptic attack
tachypnœa lasting two minutes was observed, with a respiration rate of 100
per minute. At first the attacks occurred spontaneously, afterwards S. W.
could provoke them by sitting in a dark corner and covering her face with
her hands. Frequently the experiment did not succeed. She had so-called
"good" and "bad" days. The question of amnesia after the attacks is
unfortunately very obscure. This much is certain, that after each attack she
was quite accurately orientated as to what she had gone through "during the
rapture." It is, however, uncertain how much she remembered of the
conversations in which she served as medium, and of changes in her
surroundings during the attack. It often seemed that she did have a fleeting
recollection, for directly after waking she would ask: "Who was here?
Wasn't X or Y here? What did he say?" She also showed that she was
superficially aware of the content of the conversations. She thus often
remarked that the spirits had communicated to her before waking what they
had said. But frequently this was not the case. If, at her request, the contents
of the trance speeches were repeated to her she was often annoyed about
them. She was then often sad and depressed for hours together, especially
when any unpleasant indiscretions had occurred. She would then rail
against the spirits and assert that next time she would beg her guides to
keep such spirits far away. Her indignation was not feigned, for in the
waking state she could but poorly control herself and her emotions, so that
every mood was at once mirrored in her face. At times she seemed only
slightly or not at all aware of the external proceedings during the attack.

She seldom noticed when any one left the room or came in. Once she
forbade me to enter the room when she was awaiting special
communications which she wished to keep secret from me. Nevertheless I
went in, and sat down with the three other sitters and listened to everything.
Her eyes were open and she spoke to those present without noticing me.
She only noticed me when I began to speak, which gave rise to a storm of
indignation. She remembered better, but still apparently only in indefinite
outlines, the remarks of those taking part which referred to the trance
speeches or directly to herself. I could never discover any definite rapport in
this connection.
In addition to these great attacks which seemed to follow a certain law in
their course, S. W. produced a great number of other automatisms.
Premonitions, forebodings, unaccountable moods and rapidly changing
fancies were all in the day's work. I never observed simple states of sleep.
On the other hand, I soon noticed that in the middle of a lively conversation
S. W. became quite confused and spoke without meaning in a peculiar
monotonous way, and looked in front of her dreamily with half-closed eyes.
These lapses usually lasted but a few minutes. Then she would suddenly
proceed: "Yes, what did you say?" At first she would not give any
particulars about these lapses, she would reply off-hand that she was a little
giddy, had a headache, and so on. Later she simply said: "they were there
again," meaning her spirits. She was subjected to the lapses much against
her will; she often tried to defend herself: "I do not want to, not now, come
some other time; you seem to think I only exist for you." She had these
lapses in the streets, in business, in fact anywhere. If this happened to her in
the street, she leaned against a house and waited till the attack was over.
During these attacks, whose intensity was most variable, she had visions;
frequently also, especially during the attacks where she turned extremely
pale, she "wandered"; or as she expressed it, lost her body, and got away to
distant places whither her spirits led her. Distant journeys during ecstasy
strained her exceedingly; she was often exhausted for hours after, and many
times complained that the spirits had again deprived her of much power,
such overstrain was now too much for her; the spirits must get another
medium, etc. Once she was hysterically blind for half an hour after one of
these ecstasies. Her gait was hesitating, feeling her way; she had to be led;
she did not see the candle which was on the table. The pupils reacted.
Visions occurred in great numbers without proper "lapses" (designating by

this word only the higher grade of distraction of attention). At first the
visions only occurred at the beginning of the sleep. Once after S. W. had
gone to bed the room became lighted up, and out of the general foggy light
there appeared white glittering figures. They were throughout concealed in
white veil-like robes, the women had a head-covering like a turban, and a
girdle. Afterwards (according to the statements of S. W.), "the spirits were
already there" when she went to bed. Finally she also saw the figures in
bright daylight, though still somewhat blurred and only for a short time,
provided there were no proper lapses, in which case the figures became
solid enough to take hold of. But S. W. always preferred darkness.
According to her account the content of the vision was for the most part of a
pleasant kind. Gazing at the beautiful figures she received a feeling of
delicious blessedness. More rarely there were terrible visions of a dæmonic
nature. These were entirely confined to the night or to dark rooms.
Occasionally S. W. saw black figures in the neighbouring streets or in her
room; once out in the dark courtyard she saw a terrible copper-red face
which suddenly stared at her and frightened her. I could not learn anything
satisfactory about the first occurrence of the vision. She states that once at
night, in her fifth or sixth year, she saw her "guide," her grandfather (whom
she had never known). I could not get any objective confirmation from her
relatives of this early vision. Nothing of the kind is said to have happened
until her first séance. With the exception of the hypnagogic brightness and
the flashes, there were no rudimentary hallucinations, but from the
beginning they were of a systematic nature, involving all the sense-organs
equally. So far as concerns the intellectual reaction to these phenomena it is
remarkable with what curious sincerity she regarded her dreams. Her entire
somnambulic development, the innumerable puzzling events, seemed to her
quite natural. She looked at her whole past in this light. Every striking event
of earlier years stood to her in necessary and clear relationship to her
present condition. She was happy in the consciousness of having found her
real life-task. Naturally she was unswervingly convinced of the reality of
her visions. I often tried to present her with some sceptical explanation, but
she invariably turned this aside; in her usual condition she did not clearly
grasp a reasoned explanation, and in the semi-somnambulic state she
regarded it as senseless in view of the facts staring her in the face. She once
said: "I do not know if what the spirits say and teach me is true, neither do I
know if they are those by whose names they call themselves, but that my

spirits exist there is no question. I see them before me, I can touch them, I
speak to them about everything I wish, as naturally as I'm now talking to
you. They must be real." She absolutely would not listen to the idea that the
manifestations were a kind of illness. Doubts about her health or about the
reality of her dream would distress her deeply; she felt so hurt by my
remarks that when I was present she became reserved, and for a long time
refused to experiment if I was there; hence I took care not to express my
doubts and thoughts aloud. From her immediate relatives and acquaintances
she received undivided allegiance and admiration—they asked her advice
about all kinds of things. In time she obtained such an influence upon her
followers that three of her brothers and sisters likewise began to have
hallucinations of a similar kind. Their hallucinations generally began as
night-dreams of a very vivid and dramatic kind; these gradually extended
into the waking time, partly hypnagogic, partly hypnopompic. A married
sister had extraordinary vivid dreams which developed from night to night,
and these appeared in the waking consciousness; at first as obscure
illusions, next as real hallucinations, but they never reached the plastic
clearness of S. W.'s visions. For instance, she once saw in a dream a black
dæmonic figure at her bedside in animated conversation with a white,
beautiful figure, which tried to restrain the black one; nevertheless the black
one seized her and tried to choke her, then she awoke. Bending over her she
then saw a black shadow with a human contour, and near by a white cloudy
figure. The vision only disappeared when she lighted a candle. Similar
visions were repeated dozens of times. The visions of the other two sisters
were of a similar kind, but less intense.
This particular type of attack with the complete visions and ideas had
developed in the course of less than a month, but never afterwards exceeded
these limits. What was later added to these was but the extension of all
those thoughts and cycles of visions which to a certain extent were already
indicated quite at the beginning. As well as the "great" attacks and the lesser
ones, there must also be noted a third kind of state comparable to "lapse"
states. These are the semi-somnambulic states. They appeared at the
beginning or at the end of the "great" attacks, but also appeared without any
connection with them. They developed gradually in the course of the first
month. It is not possible to give a more precise account of the time of their
appearance. In this state a fixed gaze, brilliant eyes, and a certain dignity

and stateliness of movement are noticeable. In this phase S. W. is herself,
her own somnambulic ego.
She is fully orientated to the external world, but seems to stand with one
foot, as it were, in her dream-world. She sees and hears her spirits, sees how
they walk about in the room among those who form the circle, and stand
first by one person, then by another. She is in possession of a clear
remembrance of her visions, her journeys and the instructions she receives.
She speaks quietly, clearly and firmly and is always in a serious, almost
religious frame of mind. Her bearing indicates a deeply religious mood, free
from all pietistic flavour, her speech is singularly uninfluenced by her
guide's jargon compounded of Bible and tract. Her solemn behaviour has a
suffering, rather pitiful aspect. She is painfully conscious of the great
differences between her ideal world at night and the rough reality of the
day. This state stands in sharp contrast to her waking existence; there is here
no trace of that unstable and inharmonious creature, that extravagant
nervous temperament which is so characteristic for the rest of her
relationships. Speaking with her, you get the impression of speaking with a
much older person who has attained through numerous experiences to a
sure harmonious footing. In this state she produced her best results, whilst
her romances correspond more closely to the conditions of her waking
interests. The semi-somnambulism usually appears spontaneously, mostly
during the table experiments, which sometimes announced by this means
that S. W. was beginning to know beforehand every automatic
communication from the table. She then usually stopped the table-turning
and after a short time passed more or less suddenly into an ecstatic state. S.
W. showed herself to be very sensitive. She could divine and reply to
simple questions thought of by a member of the circle who was not a
"medium," if only the latter would lay a hand on the table or on her hand.
Genuine thought-transference without direct or indirect contact could never
be achieved. In juxtaposition with the obvious development of her whole
personality the continued existence of her earlier ordinary character was all
the more startling. She imparted with unconcealed pleasure all the little
childish experiences, the flirtations and love-secrets, all the rudeness and
lack of education of her parents and contemporaries. To every one who did
not know her secret she was a girl of fifteen and a half, in no respect unlike
a thousand other such girls. So much the greater was people's astonishment
when they got to know her in her other aspect. Her near relatives could not

at first grasp this change: to some extent they never altogether understood
it, so there was often bitter strife in the family, some of them taking sides
for and others against S. W., either with enthusiastic over-valuation or with
contemptuous censure of "superstition." Thus did S. W., during the time I
watched her closely, lead a curious, contradictory life, a real "double life"
with two personalities existing side by side or closely following upon one
another and contending for the mastery. I now give some of the most
interesting details of the sittings in chronological order.
First and second sittings, August, 1899. S. W. at once undertook to lead the
"communications." The "psychograph," for which an upturned glass
tumbler was used, on which two fingers of the right hand were laid, moved
quick as lightning from letter to letter. (Slips of paper, marked with letter
and numbers, had been arranged in a circle round the glass.) It was
communicated that the "medium's" grandfather was present and would
speak to us. There then followed many communications in quick sequence,
of a most religious, edifying nature, in part in properly made words, partly
in words with the letters transposed, and partly in a series of reversed
letters. The last words and sentences were produced so quickly that it was
not possible to follow without first inverting the letters. The
communications were once interrupted in abrupt fashion by a new
communication, which announced the presence of the writer's grandfather.
On this occasion the jesting observation was made: "Evidently the two
'spirits' get on very badly together." During this attempt darkness came on.
Suddenly S. W. became very disturbed, sprang up in terror, fell on her knees
and cried "There, there, do you not see that light, that star there?" and
pointed to a dark corner of the room. She became more and more disturbed,
and called for a light in terror. She was pale, wept, "it was all so strange, she
did not know in the least what was the matter with her." When a candle was
brought she became calm again. The experiments were now stopped.
At the next sitting, which took place in the evening, two days later, similar
communications from S. W.'s grandfather were obtained. When darkness
fell S. W. suddenly leaned back on the sofa, grew pale, almost shut her
eyes, and lay there motionless. The eyeballs were turned upwards, the lidreflex was present as well as tactile sensation. The breathing was gentle,
almost imperceptible. The pulse small and weak. This attack lasted about
half an hour, when S. W. suddenly sighed and got up. The extreme pallor,

which had lasted throughout the whole attack, now gave place to her usual
pale pink colour. She was somewhat confused and distraught, indicated that
she had seen all sorts of things, but would tell nothing. Only after urgent
questioning would she relate that in an extraordinary waking condition she
had seen her grandfather arm-in-arm with the writer's grandfather. The two
had gone rapidly by in an open carriage, side by side.
III. In the third séance, which took place some days later, there was a
similar attack of more than half an hour's duration. S. W. afterwards told of
many white, transfigured forms who each gave her a flower of special
symbolic significance. Most of them were dead relatives. Concerning the
exact content of their talk she maintained an obstinate silence.
IV. After S. W. had entered into the somnambulic state she began to make
curious movements with her lips, and made swallowing gurgling noises.
Then she whispered very softly and unintelligibly. When this had lasted
some minutes she suddenly began to speak in an altered deep voice. She
spoke of herself in the third person. "She is not here, she has gone away."
There followed several communications of a religious kind. From the
content and the way of speaking it was easy to conclude that she was
imitating her grandfather, who had been a clergyman. The content of the
talk did not rise above the mental level of the "communications." The tone
of the voice was somewhat forced, and only became natural when, in the
course of the talk, the voice approximated to the medium's own.
(In later sittings the voice was only altered for a few moments when a new
spirit manifested itself.)
Afterwards there was amnesia for the trance-conversation. She gave hints
about a sojourn in the other world, and she spoke of an undreamed-of
blessedness which she felt. It must be further noted that her conversation in
the attack occurred quite spontaneously, and was not in response to any
suggestions.
Directly after this séance S. W. became acquainted with the book of
Justinus Kerner, "Die Seherin von Prevorst." She began thereupon to
magnetise herself towards the end of the attack, partly by means of regular
passes, partly by curious circles and figures of eight, which she described
symmetrically with both arms. She did this, she said, to disperse the severe

headaches which occurred after the attacks. In the August séances, not
detailed here, there were in addition to the grandfather numerous spirits of
other relatives who did not produce anything very remarkable. Each time
when a new one came on the scene the movement of the glass was changed
in a striking way; it generally ran along the rows of letters, touching one or
other of them, but no sense could be made of it. The orthography was very
uncertain and arbitrary, and the first sentences were frequently
incomprehensible or broken up into a meaningless medley of letters.
Generally automatic writing suddenly began at this point. Sometimes
automatic writing was attempted during complete darkness. The movements
began with violent backward jerks of the whole arm, so that the paper was
pierced by the pencil. The first attempt at writing consisted of numerous
strokes and zigzag lines about 8 cm. high. In later attempts there came first
unreadable words, in large handwriting, which gradually became smaller
and clearer. It was not essentially different from the medium's own. The
grandfather was again the controlling spirit.
V. Somnambulic attacks in September, 1899. S. W. sits upon the sofa, leans
back, shuts her eyes, breathes lightly and regularly. She gradually becomes
cataleptic, the catalepsy disappears after about two minutes, when she lies
in an apparently quiet sleep with complete muscular relaxation. She
suddenly begins to speak in a subdued voice: "No! you take the red, I'll take
the white, you can take the green, and you the blue. Are you ready? We will
go now." (A pause of several minutes during which her face assumes a
corpse-like pallor. Her hands feel cold and are very bloodless.) She
suddenly calls out with a loud, solemn voice: "Albert, Albert, Albert," then
whispering: "Now you speak," followed by a longer pause, when the pallor
of the face attains the highest possible degree. Again, in a loud solemn
voice, "Albert, Albert, do you not believe your father? I tell you many
errors are contained in N.'s teaching. Think about it." Pause. The pallor of
the face decreases. "He's very frightened. He could not speak any more."
(These words in her usual conversational tone.) Pause. "He will certainly
think about it," S. W. now speaks again in the same tone, in a strange idiom
which sounds like French or Italian, now recalling the former, now the
latter. She speaks fluently, rapidly, and with charm. It is possible to
understand a few words but not to remember the whole, because the
language is so strange. From time to time certain words recur, as wena,
wenes, wenai, wene, etc. The absolute naturalness of the proceedings is

bewildering. From time to time she pauses as if some one were answering
her. Suddenly she speaks in German, "Is time already up?" (In a troubled
voice.) "Must I go already? Goodbye, goodbye." With the last words there
passes over her face an indescribable expression of ecstatic blessedness.
She raises her arms, opens her eyes,—hitherto closed,—looks radiantly
upwards. She remains a moment thus, then her arms sink slackly, her eyes
shut, the expression of her face is tired and exhausted. After a short
cataleptic stage she awakes with a sigh. She looks around astonished: "I've
slept again, haven't I?" She is told she has been talking during the sleep,
whereupon she becomes much annoyed, and this increases when she learns
she has spoken in a foreign tongue. "But didn't I tell the spirits I don't want
it? It mustn't be. It exhausts me too much." Begins to cry. "Oh, God! Oh,
God! must then everything, everything, come back again like last time? Is
nothing spared me?" The next day at the same time there was another
attack. When S. W. has fallen asleep Ulrich von Gerbenstein suddenly
announces himself. He is an entertaining chatterer, speaks very fluently in
high German with a North-German accent. Asked what S. W. is now doing,
after much circumlocution he explains that she is far away, and he is
meanwhile here to look after her body, the circulation of the blood, the
respiration, etc. He must take care that meanwhile no black person takes
possession of her and harms her. Upon urgent questioning he relates that S.
W. has gone with the others to Japan, to appear to a distant relative and to
restrain him from a stupid marriage. He then announces in a whisper the
exact moment when the manifestation takes place. Forbidden any
conversation for a few minutes, he points to the sudden pallor occurring in
S. W., remarking that materialisation at such a great distance is at the cost
of correspondingly great force. He then orders cold bandages to the head to
alleviate the severe headache which would occur afterwards. As the colour
of the face gradually becomes more natural the conversation grows livelier.
All kinds of childish jokes and trivialities are uttered; suddenly U. von G.
says, "I see them coming, but they are still very far off; I see them there like
a star." S. W. points to the North. We are naturally astonished, and ask why
they do not come from the East, whereto U. von G. laughingly retorts: "Oh,
but they come the direct way over the North Pole. I am going now;
farewell." Immediately after S. W. sighs, wakes up, is ill-tempered,
complains of extremely bad headache. She saw U. von G. standing by her

body; what had he told us? She gets angry about the "silly chatter" from
which he cannot refrain.
VI. Begins in the usual way. Extreme pallor; lies stretched out, scarcely
breathing. Speaks suddenly, with loud, solemn voice: "Yes, be frightened; I
am; I warn you against N.'s teaching. See, in hope is everything that
belongs to faith. You would like to know who I am. God gives where one
least expects it. Do you not know me?" Then unintelligible whispering;
after a few minutes she awakes.
VII. S. W. soon falls asleep; lies stretched out on the sofa. Is very pale. Says
nothing, sighs deeply from time to time. Casts up her eyes, rises, sits on the
sofa, bends forward, speaks softly: "You have sinned grievously, have fallen
far." Bends forward still, as if speaking to some one who kneels before her.
She stands up, turns to the right, stretches out her hands, and points to the
spot over which she has been bending. "Will you forgive her?" she asks,
loudly. "Do not forgive men, but their spirits. Not she, but her human body
has sinned." Then she kneels down, remains quite still for about ten minutes
in the attitude of prayer. Then she gets up suddenly, looks to heaven with
ecstatic expression, and then throws herself again on her knees, with her
face bowed on her hands, whispering incomprehensible words. She remains
rigid in this position several minutes. Then she gets up, looks again
upwards with a radiant countenance, and lies down on the sofa; soon after
she wakes.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOMNAMBULIC PERSONALITIES.
At the beginning of many séances the glass was allowed to move by itself,
when occasionally the advice followed in stereotyped fashion: "You must
ask."
Since convinced spiritualists took part in the séances, all kinds of
spiritualistic wonders were of course demanded, and especially the
"protecting spirits." In reply, sometimes names of well-known dead people
were produced, sometimes unknown names, e.g. Berthe de Valours,
Elizabeth von Thierfelsenburg, Ulrich von Gerbenstein, etc. The controlling
spirit was almost without exception the medium's grandfather, who once
explained: "he loved her more than any one in this world because he had

protected her from childhood up, and knew all her thoughts." This
personality produced a flood of Biblical maxims, edifying observations, and
song-book verses; the following is a specimen:—

In true believing,
To faith in God cling ever nigh,
Thy heavenly comfort never leaving,
Which having, man can never die.
Refuge in God is peace for ever,
When earthly cares oppress the mind;
Who from the heart can pray is never
Bowed down by fate, howe'er unkind.
Numerous similar elaborations betrayed by their banal, unctuous contents their origin in some
tract or other. When S. W. had to speak in ecstasy, lively dialogues developed between the
circle-members and the somnambulic personality. The content of the answers received is
essentially just the same commonplace edifying stuff as that of the psychographic
communications. The character of this personality is distinguished by its dry and tedious
solemnity, rigorous conventionality and pietistic virtue (which is not consistent with the
historic reality). The grandfather is the medium's guide and protector. During the ecstatic state
he gives all kinds of advice, prophesies later attacks and the visions she will see on waking,
etc. He orders cold bandages, gives directions concerning the medium's lying down or the
date of the séances. His relationship to the medium is an extremely tender one. In liveliest
contrast to this heavy dream-person stands a personality, appearing first sporadically, in the
psychographic communications of the first séance. It soon disclosed itself as the dead brother
of a Mr. R., who was then taking part in the séance. This dead brother, Mr. P. R., was full of
commonplaces about brotherly love towards his living brother. He evaded particular
questions in all manner of ways. But he developed a quite astonishing eloquence towards the
ladies of the circle and in particular offered his allegiance to one whom Mr. P. R. had never
known when alive. He affirmed that he had already cared very much for her in his lifetime,
had often met her in the street without knowing who she was, and was now uncommonly
delighted to become acquainted with her in this unusual manner. With such insipid
compliments, scornful remarks to the men, harmless childish jokes, etc., he took up a large
part of the séance. Several of the members found fault with the frivolity and banality of this
"spirit," whereupon he disappeared for one or two séances, but soon reappeared, at first wellbehaved, often indeed uttering Christian maxims, but soon dropping back into the old tone.
Besides these two sharply differentiated personalities, others appeared who varied but little
from the grandfather's type; they were mostly dead relatives of the medium. The general
atmosphere of the first two months' séances was accordingly solemnly edifying, disturbed
only from time to time by Mr. P. R.'s trivial chatter. Some weeks after the beginning of the
séances, Mr. R. left our circle, whereupon a remarkable change took place in Mr. P. R.'s
conversation. He became monosyllabic, came less often, and after a few séances vanished
altogether, later on he reappeared but with great infrequency, and for the most part only when
the medium was alone with the particular lady mentioned. Then a new personality forced
himself into the foreground; in contrast to Mr. P. R., who always spoke the Swiss dialect, this
gentleman adopted an affected North-German way of speaking. In all else he was an exact
copy of Mr. P. R. His eloquence was somewhat remarkable, since S. W. had only a very
scanty knowledge of high German, whilst this new personality, who called himself Ulrich von

Gerbenstein, spoke an almost faultless German, rich in charming phrases and compliments.
[20]

Ulrich von Gerbenstein was a witty chatterer, full of repartee, an idler, a great admirer of the
ladies, frivolous, and most superficial.
During the winter of 1899-1900 he gradually came to dominate the situation more and more,
and took over one by one all the above-mentioned functions of the grandfather, so that under
his influence the serious character of the séances disappeared.
All suggestions to the contrary proved unavailing, and at last the séances had on this account
to be suspended for longer and longer intervals. There is a peculiarity common to all these
somnambulic personalities which must be noted. They have access to the medium's memory,
even to the unconscious portion, they are also au courant with the visions which she has in
the ecstatic state, but they have only the most superficial knowledge of her phantasies during
the ecstasy. Of the somnambulic dreams they know only what they occasionally pick up from
the members of the circle. On doubtful points they can give no information, or only such as
contradicts the medium's explanations. The stereotyped answer to these questions runs: "Ask
Ivenes."[21] "Ivenes knows." From the examples given of different ecstatic moments it is clear
that the medium's consciousness is by no means idle during the trance, but develops a striking
and multiplex phantastic activity. For the reconstruction of S. W.'s somnambulic self we have
to depend altogether upon her several statements; for in the first place her spontaneous
utterances connecting her with the waking self are few, and often irrelevant, and in the second
very many of these ecstatic states go by without gesture, and without speech, so that no
conclusions as to the inner happenings can afterwards be drawn from the external
appearances. S. W. is almost totally amnesic for the automatic phenomena during ecstasy as
far as they come within the territory of the new personalities of her ego. Of all the other
phenomena, such as loud talking, babbling, etc., which are directly connected with her own
ego she usually has a clear remembrance. But in every case there is complete amnesia only
during the first few minutes after the ecstasy. Within the first half-hour, during which there
usually prevails a kind of semi-somnambulism with a dreamlike manner, hallucinations, etc.,
the amnesia gradually disappears, whilst fragmentary memories emerge of what has occurred,
but in a quite irregular and arbitrary fashion.
The later séances were usually begun by our hands being joined and laid on the table,
whereon the table at once began to move. Meanwhile S. W. gradually became somnambulic,
took her hands from the table, lay back on the sofa, and fell into the ecstatic sleep. She
sometimes related her experiences to us afterwards, but showed herself very reticent if
strangers were present. After the very first ecstasy she indicated that she played a
distinguished rôle among the spirits. She had a special name, as had each of the spirits; hers
was Ivenes; her grandfather looked after her with particular care. In the ecstasy with the
flower-vision we learnt her special secret, hidden till then beneath the deepest silence. During
the séances in which her spirit spoke she made long journeys, mostly to relatives, to whom
she said she appeared, or she found herself on the Other Side, in "That space between the
stars which people think is empty, but in which there are really very many spirit-worlds." In
the semi-somnambulic state which frequently followed her attacks, she once described, in
peculiar poetic fashion, a landscape on the Other Side, "a wondrous, moon-lit valley, set aside
for the races not yet born." She represented her somnambulic ego as being almost completely

released from the body. It is a fully-grown but small, black-haired woman, of pronounced
Jewish type, clothed in white garments, her head covered with a turban. She understands and
speaks the language of the spirits, "for spirits still, from old human custom, do speak to one
another, although they do not really need to, since they mutually understand one another's
thoughts." She "does not really always talk with the spirits, but just looks at them, and so
understands their thoughts." She travels in the company of four or five spirits, dead relatives,
and visits her living relatives and acquaintances in order to investigate their life and their way
of thinking; she further visits all places which lie within the radius of these spectral
inhabitants. From her acquaintanceship with Kerner's book, she discovered and improved
upon the ideas of the black spirits who are kept enchanted in certain places, or exist partly
beneath the earth's surface (compare the "Seherin von Prevorst"). This activity caused her
much trouble and pain; in and after the ecstasy she complained of suffocating feelings, violent
headache, etc. But every fortnight, on Wednesdays, she could pass the whole night in the
garden on the Other Side in the company of holy spirits. There she was taught everything
concerning the forces of the world, the endless complicated relationships and affinities of
human beings, and all besides about the laws of reincarnation, the inhabitants of the stars, etc.
Unfortunately only the system of the world-forces and reincarnation achieved any expression.
As to the other matters she only let fall disconnected observations. For example, once she
returned from a railway journey in an extremely disturbed state. It was thought at first
something unpleasant had happened, till she managed to compose herself, and said, "A starinhabitant had sat opposite to her in the train." From the description which she gave of this
being, I recognised a well-known elderly merchant I happened to know, who has a rather
unsympathetic face. In connection with this experience she related all kinds of peculiarities of
these star-dwellers; they have no god-like souls, as men have, they pursue no science, no
philosophy, but in technical arts they are far more advanced than men. Thus on Mars a flyingmachine has long been in existence; the whole of Mars is covered with canals, these canals
are cleverly excavated lakes and serve for irrigation. The canals are quite superficial; the
water in them is very shallow. The excavating caused the inhabitants of Mars no particular
trouble, for the soil there is lighter than the earth's. The canals are nowhere bridged, but that
does not prevent communication, for everything travels by flying-machine. Wars no longer
occur on the stars, for no differences of opinion exist. The star-dwellers have not human
bodies, but the most laughable ones possible, such as one would never imagine. Human
spirits who are allowed to travel on the Other Side may not set foot on the stars. Equally,
wandering star-dwellers may not come to the earth, but must remain at a distance of twentyfive metres above the earth's surface. Should they transgress they remain in the power of the
earth, and must assume human bodies, and are only set free again after their natural death. As
men, they are cold, hard-hearted, cruel. S. W. recognises them by a singular expression in
which the "Spiritual" is lacking, and by their hairless, eyebrowless, sharply-cut faces.
Napoleon was a star-dweller.
In her journeys she does not see the places through which she hastens. She has a feeling of
floating, and the spirits tell her when she is at the right spot. Then, as a rule, she only sees the
face and upper part of the person to whom she is supposed to appear, or whom she wishes to
see. She can seldom say in what kind of surroundings she sees this person. Occasionally she
saw me, but only my head without any surroundings. She occupied herself much with the
enchanting of spirits, and for this purpose she wrote oracular sayings in a foreign tongue, on

slips of paper which she concealed in all sorts of queer places. An Italian murderer,
presumably living in my house, and whom she called Conventi, was specially displeasing to
her. She tried several times to cast a spell upon him, and without my knowledge hid several
papers about, on which messages were written; these were later found by chance. One such,
written in red ink, was as follows:
Conventi
Marche. 4 govi
Ivenes.
Conventi, go
orden, Astaf
vent.
Gen palus, vent allis
ton prost afta ben genallis.
Unfortunately, I never obtained any interpretation of this. S. W. was quite inaccessible in this
matter. Occasionally the somnambulic Ivenes speaks directly to the public. She does so in
dignified fashion, rather precociously, but she is not wearisomely unctuous and impossibly
twaddling as are her two guides; she is a serious, mature person, devout and pious, full of
womanly tenderness and great modesty, always yielding to the judgments of others. This
expression of plaintive emotion and melancholy resignation is peculiar to her. She looks
beyond this world, and unwillingly returns to reality; she bemoans her hard lot, and her
unsympathetic family surroundings. Associated with this there is something elevated about
her; she commands her spirits, despises the twaddling chatter of Gerbenstein, consoles others,
directs those in distress, warns and protects them from dangers to body and soul. She is the
intermediary for the entire intellectual output of all manifestations, but she herself ascribes it
to the direction of the spirits. It is Ivenes who entirely controls S. W.'s semi-somnambulic
state.
In semi-somnambulism S. W. gave some of those taking part in the séances the opportunity to
compare her with the "Seherin von Prevorst" (Prophetess of Prevorst). This suggestion was
not without results. S. W. gave hints of earlier existences which she had already lived
through, and after a few weeks she suddenly disclosed a whole system of reincarnations,
although she had never before mentioned anything of the kind. Ivenes is a spiritual being who
is something more than the spirits of other human beings. Every human spirit must
incorporate himself twice in the course of the centuries. But Ivenes must incorporate herself
at least once every two hundred years; besides herself only two other persons have
participated in this fate, namely, Swedenborg and Miss Florence Cook (Crookes's famous
medium). S. W. calls these two personages her brother and sister. She gave no information

about their pre-existences. In the beginning of the nineteenth century Ivenes was Frau Hauffe,
the Prophetess of Prevorst; at the end of the eighteenth century, a clergyman's wife in central
Germany (locality unknown). As the latter she was seduced by Goethe and bore him a child.
In the fifteenth century she was a Saxon countess, and had the poetic name of
Thierfelsenburg. Ulrich von Gerbenstein is a relative from that line. The interval of 300 years,
and her adventure with Goethe, must be atoned for by the sorrows of the Prophetess of
Prevorst. In the thirteenth century she was a noblewoman of Southern France, called de
Valours, and was burnt as a witch. From the thirteenth century to the Christian persecution
under Nero there were numerous reincarnations of which S. W. could give no detailed
account. In the Christian persecution under Nero she played a martyr's part. Then comes a
period of obscurity till the time of David, when Ivenes was an ordinary Jewess. After her
death she received from Astaf, an angel from a high heaven, the mandate for her future
wonderful career. In all her pre-existences she was a medium and an intermediary in the
intercourse between this side and the other. Her brothers and sisters are equally old and have
the like vocation. In her various pre-existences she was sometimes married, and in this way
gradually founded a whole system of relationships with whose endless complicated interrelations she occupied herself in many ecstasies. Thus, for example, about the eighth century
she was the mother of her earthly father and, moreover, of her grandfather, and mine. Hence
the striking friendship of these two old gentlemen, otherwise strangers. As Mme. de Valours
she was the present writer's mother. When she was burnt as a witch the writer took it much to
heart, and went into a cloister at Rouen, wore a grey habit, became Prior, wrote a work on
Botany and died at over eighty years of age. In the refectory of the cloister there hung a
picture of Mme. de Valours, in which she was depicted in a half-reclining position. (S. W. in
the semi-somnambulic state often took this position on the sofa. It corresponds exactly to that
of Mme. Recamier in David's well-known picture.) A gentleman who often took part in the
séances, who had some slight resemblance to the writer, was also one of her sons from that
period. Around this core of relationship there grouped themselves, more or less intimately
connected, all the persons in any way related or known to her. One came from the fifteenth
century, another—a cousin—from the eighteenth century, and so on.
From the three great family stocks grew by far the greater part of the present European
peoples. She and her brothers and sisters are descended from Adam, who arose by
materialisation; the other then-existing families, from whom Cain took his wife, were
descended from apes. S. W. produced from this circle of relationship an extensive familygossip, a very flood of romantic stories, piquant adventures, etc. Sometimes the target of her
romances was a lady acquaintance of the writer's who for some undiscoverable reason was
peculiarly antipathetic to her. She declared that this lady was an incarnation of a celebrated
Parisian poisoner, who had achieved great notoriety in the eighteenth century. She maintained
that this lady still continued her dangerous work, but in a much more ingenious way than
formerly; through the inspiration of the wicked spirits who accompany her she had discovered
a liquid which when merely exposed to the air attracted tubercle bacilli and formed a splendid
developing medium for them. By means of this liquid, which she was wont to mix with the
food, the lady had brought about the death of her husband (who had indeed died of
tuberculosis); also one of her lovers, and of her own brother, for the sake of his inheritance.
Her eldest son was an illegitimate child by her lover. As a widow she had secretly borne to
another lover an illegitimate child, and finally she had had an unnatural relationship with her

own brother (who was later on poisoned). In this way S. W. spun innumerable stories, in
which she believed quite implicitly. The persons of these stories appeared in the drama of her
visions, as did the lady before referred to, going through the pantomime of making confession
and receiving absolution of sins. Everything interesting occurring in her surroundings was
incorporated in this system of romances, and given an order in the network of relationships
with a more or less exact statement as to their pre-existences and the spirits influencing them.
It fared thus with all who made S. W.'s acquaintance: they were valued at a second or first
incarnation, according as they possessed a marked or indefinite character. They were
generally described as relatives, and always exactly in the same definite way. Only
subsequently, often several weeks later, after an ecstasy, there would make its appearance a
new complicated romance which explained the striking relationship through pre-existences or
through illegitimate relations. Persons sympathetic to S. W. were usually very near relatives.
Most of these family romances were very carefully made up, so that to contradict them was
impossible. They were always worked out with a quite bewildering certainty, and surprised
one by an extremely clever evaluation of certain details which she had noticed or taken from
somewhere. For the most part the romances had a ghastly character, murder by poison and
dagger, seduction and divorce, forgery of wills, played the chief rôle.
Mystic Science.—In reference to scientific questions S. W. put forward numerous
suggestions. Generally towards the end of the séances there was talk and debate about various
subjects of scientific and spiritistic nature. S. W. never took part in the discussion, but
generally sat dreamily in a corner in a semi-somnambulic state. She listened to one and
another, taking hold of the talk in a half-dream, but she could never relate anything
connectedly; if asked about it only partial explanations were given. In the course of the winter
hints emerged in various séances: "The spirits taught her about the world-forces and the
strange revelations from the other side, yet she would not tell anything now." Once she tried
to give a description, but only said: "On one side was the light, on the other the power of
attraction." Finally, in March 1900, when for some time nothing had been heard of the
teachings at the séances, she announced suddenly with a joyful face that she had now
received everything from the spirits. She drew out a long narrow strip of paper upon which
were numerous names. Although I asked for it she would not let it leave her hands, but
dictated the following scheme to me.

FIG. 1.
I can remember clearly that in the course of the winter of 1895 we spoke several times in S.
W.'s presence of the forces of attraction and repulsion in connection with Kant's "Natural
History of the Heavens"; we spoke also of the "Law of the Conservation of Energy," of the
different forces of energy, and of the question whether the force of gravity was perhaps a
form of movement. From this talk S. W. had plainly created the foundation of her mystic
system. She gave the following explanation: The natural forces are arranged in seven circles.
Outside these circles are three more, in which unknown forces intermediate between energy
and matter are found. Matter is found in seven circles which surround ten inner ones. In the
centre stands the primary force, which is the original cause of creation and is a spiritual force.
The first circle which surrounds the primary force is matter which is not really a force and
does not arise from the primary force, but it unites with the primary force and from this union
the first descendants are the spiritual forces; on the one hand the Good or Light Powers, on
the other the Dark Powers. The Power Magnesor consists most of primary force; the Power
Connesor, in which the dark might of matter is greatest, contains the least. The further
outwards the primary force streams forth, the weaker it becomes, but weaker too becomes the
power of matter, since its power is greatest where the collision with the primary power is
most violent, i.e. in the Power Connesor. Within the circles there are fresh analogous forces of
equal strength but making in the opposite direction. The system can also be described in a
single series beginning with primary force, Magnesor, Cafor, etc., proceeding from left to
right on the scheme and ascending with Tusa, Endos, ending with Connesor; only then the
survey of the grade of intensity is made more difficult. Every force in the outer circle is
combined from the nearest adjacent forces of the inner circle.
1. The Magnesor Group.—The so-called powers of Light descend in direct line from
Magnesor, but slightly influenced by the dark side. The powers Magnesor and Cafor form
together the so-called Life Force, which is no single power but is differently combined in
animals and plants. Between Magnesor and Cafor there exists the Life Force of Man. Morally

good men and those mediums who bring about interviews of good spirits on the earth have
most Magnesor. Somewhere about the middle there stand the life forces of animals, and in
Cafor that of plants. Nothing is known about Hefa, or rather S. W. can give no information.
Persus is the fundamental power which comes to light in the phenomenon of the forces of
locomotion. Its recognisable forces are Warmth, Light, Electricity, Magnetism, and two
unknown forces, one of which only exists in comets. Of the powers of the seventh circle S.
W. could only point out north and south magnetism and positive and negative electricity.
Deka is unknown. Smar is of peculiar significance, to be indicated below; it leads to—
2. Hypnos Group.—Hypnos and Hyfonismus are powers which only dwell within certain
beings, in those who are in a position to exert a magnetic influence upon others. Athialowi is
the sexual instinct. Chemical affinity is directly derived from it. In the ninth circle under it
arises indolence (that is the line of Smar). Svens and Kara are of unknown significance. Pusa
corresponds to Smar in the opposite sense.
3. The Connesor Group.—Connesor is the opposite pole of Magnesor. It is the dark and
wicked power equal in intensity to the good power of light. While the good power creates,
this one turns into the opposite. Endos is an elemental power of minerals. From these
(significance unknown) gravitation proceeds, which on its side is designated as the elemental
force of the forces of resistance that occur in phenomena (gravity, capillarity, adhesion and
cohesion). Nakus is the secret power of a rare stone which controls the effect of snake poison.
The two powers Smar and Pusa have a special importance. According to S. W., Smar
develops in the bodies of morally good men at the moment of death. This power enables the
soul to rise to the powers of light. Pusa behaves in the opposite way, for it is the power which
conducts morally bad people to the dark side in the state of Connesor.
In the sixth circle the visible world begins, which only appears to be so sharply divided from
the other side in consequence of the fickleness of our organs of sense. In reality the transition
is a very gradual one, and there are people who live on a higher stage of knowledge because
their perceptions and sensations are more delicate than those of others. Great seers are
enabled to see manifestations of force where ordinary people can perceive nothing. S. W. sees
Magnesor as a white or bluish vapour, which chiefly develops when good spirits are near.
Connesor is a dark vapour-like fluid, which, like Magnesor, develops on the appearance of
"black" spirits. For instance, the night before the beginning of great visions the shiny vapour
of Magnesor spreads in thick layers, out of which, the good spirits grow to visible white
forces. It is just the same with Connesor. But these powers have their different mediums. S.
W. is a Magnesor medium, as were the Prophetess of Prevorst and Swedenborg. The
materialisation mediums of the spiritualists are mostly Connesor mediums, because
materialisation takes place much more easily through Connesor on account of its close
connection with the properties of matter. In the summer of 1900 S. W. tried several times to
produce the circles of matter, but she never arrived at other than vague and incomprehensible
hints and afterwards spoke no more about this.
Conclusion.—The really interesting and valuable séances came to an end with the production
of the system of powers. Before this a gradual decline in the vividness of the ecstasies was
noticeable. Ulrich von Gerbenstein came increasingly to the front, and filled up the séances
with his childish chatter. The visions which S. W. had in the meantime likewise seem to have
lost vividness and plasticity of formation, for S. W. was afterwards only able to feel pleasant

sensations in the presence of good spirits, and disagreeableness in that of bad spirits. Nothing
new was produced. There was something of uncertainty in the trance talks, as if feeling and
seeking for the impression which she was making upon the audience, together with an
increasing staleness in the content. In the outward behaviour of S. W. there arose also a
marked shyness and uncertainty, so that the impression of wilful deception became ever
stronger. The writer therefore soon withdrew from the séances. S. W. experimented
afterwards in other circles, and six months after my leaving was caught cheating in flagranti
delicto. She wanted to arouse again by spiritualistic experiments the lost belief in her
supernatural powers; she concealed small objects in her dress, throwing them up in the air
during the dark séance. With this her part was played out. Since then, eighteen months have
passed during which I have not seen S. W. I have learnt from an observer who knew her in the
earlier days, that she has now and again strange states of short duration during which she is
very pale and silent, and has a fixed glittering look. I did not hear any more of visions. She is
said not to take part any longer in spiritualistic séances. S. W. is now in a large business, and
according to all accounts is an industrious and responsible person who does her work eagerly
and cleverly, giving entire satisfaction. According to the account of trustworthy persons, her
character has much improved; she has become quieter, more regular and sympathetic. No
other abnormalities have appeared in her. This case, in spite of its incompleteness, contains a
mass of psychological problems whose exposition goes far beyond the limits of this little
work. We must therefore be satisfied with a mere sketch of the various striking
manifestations. For the sake of a more lucid exposition it seems better to review the various
states separately.
1. The Waking State.—Here the patient shows various peculiarities. As we have seen, at
school she was often distracted, lost herself in a peculiar way, was moody; her behaviour
changes inconsequently, now quiet, shy, reserved, now lively, noisy and talkative. She cannot
be called unintelligent, but she strikes one sometimes as narrow-minded, sometimes as having
isolated intelligent moments. Her memory is good on the whole, but owing to her distraction
it is much impaired. Thus, despite much discussion and reading of Kerner's "Seherin von
Prevorst," for many weeks, she does not know, if directly asked, whether the author's name is
Koerner or Kerner, nor the name of the Prophetess. All the same, when it occasionally comes
up, the name Kerner is correctly written in the automatic communications. In general it may
be said that her character has something extremely impulsive, incomprehensible, protean.
Deducting the want of balance due to puberty, there remains a pathological residue which
expresses itself in reactions which follow no rule and a bizarre unaccountable character. This
character may be called déséquilibré, or unstable. Its specific mould is derived from traits
which can certainly be regarded as hysterical. This is decidedly so in the conditions of
distraction. As Janet[22] maintains, the foundation of hysterical anæsthesia is the loss of
attention. He was able to prove in youthful hysterics "a striking indifference and distracted
attention in the whole region of the emotional life." Misreading is a notable instance, which
beautifully illustrates hysterical dispersion of attention. The psychology of this process may
perhaps be viewed as follows: during reading aloud attention becomes paralysed for this act
and is directed towards some other object. Meanwhile the reading is continued mechanically,
the sense impressions are received as before, but in consequence of the dispersion the
excitability of the perceptive centre is lowered, so that the strength of the sense impression is
no longer adequate to fix the attention in such a way that perception as such is conducted

along the motor speech route; thus all the inflowing associations which at once unite with any
new sense impression are repressed. The further psychological mechanism permits of only
two possible explanations: (1) The admission of the sense impression is received
unconsciously (because of the increase of threshold stimulus), in the perceptive centre just
below the threshold of consciousness, and consequently is not incorporated in the attention
and conducted back to the speech route. It only reaches verbal expression through the
intervention of the nearest associations, in our case through the dialect expression[23] for the
object. (2) The sense impression is perceived consciously, but at the moment of its entrance
into the speech route it reaches a territory whose excitability is diminished by the dispersion
of attention. At this place the dialect word is substituted by association for the motor speech
image, and it is uttered as such. In either case it is certain that it is the acoustic dispersed
attention which fails to correct the error. Which of the two explanations is correct cannot be
proved in this case; probably both approach the truth, for the dispersion of attention seems to
be general, and in each case concerns more than one of the centres engaged in the act of
reading aloud. In our case this phenomenon has a special value, for we have here a quite
elementary automatic phenomenon. It may be called hysterical in so far as in this concrete
case a state of exhaustion and intoxication, with its parallel manifestations, can be excluded.
A healthy person only exceptionally allows himself to be so engaged by an object that he fails
to correct the errors of a dispersed attention—those of the kind described. The frequency of
these occurrences in the patient point to a considerable limitation of the field of
consciousness, in so far as she can only master a relative minimum of elementary sensations
flowing in at the same time. If we wish to describe more exactly the psychological state of the
"psychic shady side," we might call it either a sleeping or a dream-state, according as
passivity or activity predominated. There is, at all events, a pathological dream-state of very
rudimentary extension and intensity and its genesis is spontaneous; dream-states arising
spontaneously, with the production of automatisms, are generally regarded as hysterical on
the whole. It must be pointed out that these instances of misreading occurred frequently in our
subject, and that the term hysterical is employed in this sense; so far as we know, it is only on
a foundation of hysterical constitution that spontaneous states of partial sleep or dreams occur
frequently.
Binet[24] has studied experimentally the automatic substitution of some adjacent association
in his hysterics. If he pricked the anæsthetic hand of the patient without his noticing the prick,
he thought of "points"; if the anæsthetic finger was moved, he thought of "sticks" or
"columns." When the anæsthetic hand, concealed from the patient's sight by a screen, writes
"Salpêtrière," she sees in front of her the word "Salpêtrière" in white writing on a black
ground. This recalls the experiments above referred to of Guinon and Sophie Waltke.
We thus find in our subject, at a time when there was nothing to indicate the later phenomena,
rudimentary automatisms, fragments of dream manifestations, which imply in themselves the
possibility that some day more than one association would creep in between the perception of
the dispersed attention and consciousness. The misreading shows us, moreover, a certain
automatic independence of the psychical elements. This occasionally expands to a more or
less fleeting dispersion of attention, although with very slight results which are never in any
way striking or suspicious; this dispersedness approximates to that of the physiological
dream. The misreading can be thus conceived as a prodromal symptom of the later events;

especially as its psychology is prototypical for the mechanism of somnambulic dreams, which
are indeed nothing but a many-sided multiplication and manifold variation of the elementary
processes reviewed above. I never succeeded in demonstrating during my observations
similar rudimentary automatisms. It would seem that in course of time the states of dispersed
attention, to a certain extent beneath the surface of consciousness, at first of low degree have
grown into these remarkable somnambulic attacks; hence they disappeared during the waking
state, which was free from attacks. So far as concerns the development of the patient's
character, beyond a certain not very extensive ripening, no remarkable change could be
demonstrated during the observations lasting nearly two years. More remarkable is the fact
that in the two years since the cessation (complete?) of the somnambulic attacks, a
considerable change in character has taken place. We shall have occasion later on to speak of
the importance of this observation.
Semi-Somnambulism.—In S. W.'s case the following condition was indicated by the term
semi-somnambulism. For some time after and before the actual somnambulic attack the
patient finds herself in a state whose most salient feature can best be described as
"preoccupation." She only lends half an ear to the conversation around her, answers at
random, often gets absorbed in all manner of hallucinations; her face is solemn, her look
ecstatic, visionary, ardent. Closer observation discloses a far-reaching alteration of the entire
character. She is now serious, dignified; when she speaks her subject is always an extremely
serious one. In this condition she can talk so seriously, forcibly and convincingly, that one is
tempted to ask oneself if this is really a girl of fifteen and a half. One has the impression of a
mature woman possessed of considerable dramatic talent. The reason for this seriousness, this
solemnity of behaviour, is given in her explanation that at these times she stands at the
frontier of this world and the other, and associates just as truly with the spirits of the dead as
with living people. And, indeed, her conversation is usually divided between answers to real
objective questions and hallucinatory ones. I call this state semi-somnambulism because it
coincides with Richet's own definition. He[25] says: "La conscience de cet individu persiste
dans son intégrité apparente, toutefois des opérations très compliquées vont s'accomplir en
dehors de la conscience sans que le moi volontaire et conscient paraisse ressentir une
modification quelconque. Une autre personne sera en lui qui agira, pensera, voudra, sans que
la conscience, c'est à dire le moi réfléchi conscient, aît la moindre notion."
Binet[26] says of this term: "Le terme indique la parenté de cet état avec le somnambulisme
véritable, et en suite il laisse comprendre que la vie somnambulique qui se manifeste durant la
veille est réduite, déprimée, par la conscience normale qui la recouvre."
AUTOMATISMS.
Semi-somnambulism is characterised by the continuity of consciousness with that of the
waking state and by the appearance of various automatisms which give evidence of an
activity of the subconscious self, independent of that of consciousness.
Our case shows the following automatic phenomena:
(1) Automatic movements of the table.

(2) Automatic writing.
(3) Hallucinations.
1. Automatic Movements of the Table.—Before the patient came under my observation she
had been influenced by the suggestion of "table-turning," which she had first come across as a
game. As soon as she entered the circle there appeared communications from members of her
family which showed her to be a medium. I could only find out that, as soon as ever her hand
was placed on the table, the typical movements began. The resulting communications have no
interest for us. But the automatic character of the act itself deserves some discussion, for we
may, without more ado, set aside the imputation that there was any question of intentional and
voluntary pushing or pulling on the part of the patient.
As we know from the investigations of Chevreul,[27] Gley, Lehmann and others, unconscious
motor phenomena are not only of frequent occurrence among hysterical persons, and those
pathologically inclined in other directions, but they are also relatively easily produced in
normal persons who show no other spontaneous automatisms. I have made many experiments
on these lines, and can confirm this observation. In the great majority of instances all that is
required is enough patience to put up with an hour of quiet waiting. In most subjects, motor
automatisms will be obtained in a more or less high degree if contra-suggestions do not
intervene as obstacles. In a relatively small percentage the phenomena arise spontaneously,
i.e. directly under the influence of verbal suggestion or of some earlier auto-suggestion. In
this instance the case is powerfully affected by suggestion. In general, the particular
predisposition is subject to all those laws which also hold good for normal hypnosis.
Nevertheless, certain special circumstances are to be taken into account, conditioned by the
peculiarity of the case. It is not a question of a total hypnosis, but of a partial one, limited
entirely to the motor area of the arm, like the cerebral anæsthesia produced by "magnetic
passes" for a painful spot in the body. We touch the spot in question employing verbal
suggestion or making use of some existing auto-suggestion, using the tactile stimulus which
we know acts suggestively, to bring about the desired partial hypnosis. In accordance with
this procedure, refractory subjects can be brought easily enough to an exhibition of
automatism. The experimenter intentionally gives the table a slight push, or, better, a series of
rhythmic but very slight taps. After a short time he notices that the oscillations become
stronger, that they continue although he has interrupted his own intentional movements. The
experiment has succeeded, the subject has unsuspectingly taken up the suggestion. By this
procedure much more is obtained than by verbal suggestion. In very receptive persons and in
all those cases where movement seems to arise spontaneously, the purposeful tremulous
movements,[28] not perceptible by the subject, assume the rôle of agent provocateur.
In this way persons who, by themselves, have never obtained automatic movements of a
coarse calibre, sometimes assume the unconscious guidance of the table-movements,
provided that the tremors are strong and that the medium understands their meaning. In this
case the medium takes control of the slight oscillations and returns them considerably
strengthened, but rarely at exactly the same instant, generally a few seconds later, in this way
revealing the agent's conscious or unconscious thought. By means of this simple mechanism
there may arise those cases of thought-reading so bewildering at first sight. A very simple
experiment, that succeeds in many cases even with unpractised persons, will serve to illustrate

this. The experimenter thinks, say, of the number four, and then waits, his hands quietly
resting on the table, until he feels that the table makes the first inclination to announce the
number thought of. He lifts his hands off the table immediately, and the number four will be
correctly tilted out. It is advisable in this experiment to place the table upon a soft thick
carpet. By close attention the experimenter will occasionally notice a movement of the table
which is thus represented.

FIG. 2.
(1) Purposeful tremors too slight to be perceived by the subject.
(2) Several very small but perceptible oscillations of the table which indicate that the
subject is responding to them.
(3) The big movements (tilts) of the table, giving the number four that was thought of.
(ab) Denotes the moment when the operator's hands are removed.
This experiment succeeds excellently with well-disposed but inexperienced subjects. After a
little practice the phenomenon indicated is wont to disappear, since by practice the number is
read and reproduced directly from the purposeful movements.[29]
In a responsive medium these purposeful tremors of the experimenter act just as the
intentional taps in the experiment cited above; they are received, strengthened and
reproduced, although slightly wavering. Still they are perceptible and hence act suggestively
as slight tactile stimuli, and by the increase of partial hypnosis give rise to great automatic
movements. This experiment illustrates in the clearest way the increase step by step of autosuggestion. Along the path of this auto-suggestion are developed all the automatic phenomena
of a motor nature. How the intellectual content gradually mingles in with the purely motor
need scarcely be elucidated after this discussion. There is no need of a special suggestion for
the evoking of intellectual phenomena. From the outset it is a question of word-presentation,
at least from the side of the experimenter. After the first aimless motor irrelevancies of the
unpractised subject, some word-products or the intentions of the experimenter are soon
reproduced. Objectively the occurrence of an intellectual content must be understood as
follows:—

By the gradual increase of auto-suggestion the motor-range of the arm becomes isolated from
consciousness, that is to say, the perception of the slight movement-impulse is concealed from
consciousness.[30]
By the knowledge gained from consciousness that some intellectual content is possible, there
results a collateral excitation in the speech-area as the means immediately at hand for
intellectual notification. The motor part of word-presentation is necessarily chiefly concerned
with this aiming at notification.[31] In this way we understand the unconscious flowing over
of speech-impulse to the motor-area[32] and conversely the gradual penetration of partial
hypnosis into the speech-area.
In numerous experiments with beginners, as a rule I have observed at the beginning of
intellectual phenomena a relatively large number of completely meaningless words, also often
a series of meaningless single letters. Later on, all kinds of absurdities are produced, e.g.
words or entire sentences with the letters irregularly misplaced or with the order of the letters
all reversed—a kind of mirror-writing. The appearance of the letter or word indicates a new
suggestion; some sort of association is involuntarily joined to it, which is then realised.
Remarkably enough, these are not generally the conscious associations, but quite unexpected
ones, a circumstance showing that a considerable part of the speech-area is already
hypnotically isolated. The recognition of this automatism again forms a fruitful suggestion,
since invariably at this moment the feeling of strangeness arises, if it is not already present in
the pure motor-automatism. The question, "Who is doing this?" "Who is speaking?", is the
suggestion for the synthesis of the unconscious personality which as a rule does not like being
kept waiting too long. Any name is introduced, generally one charged with emotion, and the
automatic splitting of the personality is accomplished. How accidental and how vacillating
this synthesis is at its beginning, the following reports from the literature show. Myers[33]
communicates the following interesting observation on a Mr. A., a member of the Society for
Psychical Research, who was making experiments on himself in automatic writing.
THIRD DAY.
Question: What is man?
Answer: TEFI H HASL ESBLE LIES.
Is that an anagram? Yes.
How many words does it contain? Five.
What is the first word? SEE.
What is the second word? SEEEE.
See? Shall I interpret it myself? Try to.
Mr. A. found this solution: "Life is less able." He was astonished at this intellectual
information, which seemed to him to prove the existence of an intelligence independent of his
own. Therefore he went on to ask:

Who are you? Clelia.
Are you a woman? Yes.
Have you ever lived upon the earth? No.
Will you come to life? Yes.
When? In six years.
Why are you conversing with me? E if Clelia el.
Mr. A. interpreted this answer as: I Clelia feel.
FOURTH DAY.
Question: Am I the one who asks the questions? Yes.
Is Clelia there? No.
Who is here then? Nobody.
Does Clelia exist at all? No.
With whom then was I speaking yesterday? With no one.
Janet[34] conducted the following conversation with the subconsciousness of Lucie, who,
meanwhile, was engaged in conversation with another observer. "M'entendez-vous?" asks
Janet. Lucie answers by automatic writing, "Non." "Mais pour répondre il faut entendre?"
"Oui, absolument." "Alors comment faites-vous?" "Je ne sais." "Il faut bien qu'il y ait
quelqu'un qui m'entend?" "Oui." "Qui cela! Autre que Lucie. Eh bien! Une autre personne.
Voulez-vous que nous lui donnions un nom?" "Non." "Si, ce sera plus commode," "Eh bien,
Adrienne!" "Alors, Adrienne, m'entendez-vous?" "Oui."
From these quotations it will be seen in what way the subconscious personality is constructed.
It owes its origin purely to suggestive questions meeting a certain disposition of the medium.
The explanation is the result of the disintegration of the psychical complex; the feeling of the
strangeness of such automatisms then comes in to help, as soon as conscious attention is
directed to the automatic act. Binet[35] remarks on this experiment of Janet's: "Il faut bien
remarquer que si la personnalité d'Adrienne a pu se créer, c'est qu'elle a rencontré une
possibilité psychologique; en d'autres termes, il y avait là des phénomènes désagrégés vivant
séparés de la conscience normale du sujet." The individualisation of the subconsciousness
always denotes a considerable further step of great suggestive influence upon the further
formation of automatisms.[36] So, too, we must regard the origin of the unconscious
personalities in our case.
The objection that there is simulation in automatic table-turning may well be given up, when
one considers the phenomenon of thought-reading from the purposeful tremors which the
patient offered in such plenitude. Rapid, conscious thought-reading demands at the least an
extraordinary degree of practice, which it has been shown the patient did not possess. By

means of the purposeful tremors whole conversations can be carried on, as in our case. In the
same way the suggestibility of the subconscious can be proved objectively if, for instance, the
experimenter with his hand on the table desires that the hand of the medium should no longer
be able to move the table or the glass; contrary to all expectation and to the liveliest
astonishment of the subject, the table will immediately remain immovable. Naturally any
other desired suggestions can be realised, provided they do not overstep by their innervations
the region of partial hypnosis; this proves at the same time the limited nature of the hypnosis.
Suggestions for the legs and the other arm will thus not be obeyed. Table-turning was not an
automatism which belonged exclusively to the patient's semi-somnambulism: on the contrary,
it occurred in the most pronounced form in the waking state, and in most cases then passed
over into semi-somnambulism, the appearance of this being generally announced by
hallucinations, as it was at the first sitting.
2. Automatic Writing.—A second automatic phenomenon, which at the outset corresponds to
a higher degree of partial hypnosis, is automatic writing. It is, according to my experience,
much rarer and more difficult to produce than table-turning. As in table-turning, it is again a
matter of a primary suggestion, to the conscious when sensibility is retained, to the
unconscious when it is obliterated. The suggestion is, however, not a simple one, for it
already bears in itself an intellectual element. "To write" means "to write something." This
special element of the suggestion, which extends beyond the merely motor, often conditions a
certain perplexity on the part of the subject, giving rise to slight contrary suggestions which
hinder the appearance of the automatisms. I have observed in a few cases that the suggestion
is realised, despite its relative venturesomeness (e.g. one directed towards the waking
consciousness of a so-called normal person). However, it takes place in a peculiar way; it first
displaces the purely motor part of the central system concerned in hypnosis, and the deeper
hypnosis is then reached by auto-suggestion from the motor phenomenon, analogous to the
procedure in table-turning described above. The subject,[37] who has a pencil in his hand, is
purposely engaged in conversation whilst his attention is diverted from the writing. The hand
begins to make movements, beginning with many upward strokes and zigzag lines, or a
simple line is made. Occasionally it happens that the pencil does not touch the paper, but
writes in the air. These movements must be conceived as purely motor phenomena, which
correspond to the expression of the motor element in the presentation "write." This
phenomenon is somewhat rare; generally single letters are first written, and what was said
above of table-turning holds true of their combination into words and sentences. True mirrorwriting is also observed here and there. In the majority of cases, and perhaps in all
experiments with beginners who are not under some very special suggestion, the automatic
writing is that of the subject. Occasionally its character may be greatly changed,[38] but this is
secondary, and is always to be regarded as a symptom of the intruding synthesis of a
subconscious personality.

FIG. 3.
As stated, the patient's automatic writing never came to any very great
development. In these experiments, generally carried out in darkness, she
passed over into semi-somnambulism, or into ecstasy. The automatic
writing had thus the same effect as the preliminary table-turning.
3. The Hallucinations.—The nature of the passing into somnambulism in
the second séance is of psychological importance. As stated, the automatic
phenomena were progressing favourably when darkness came on. The most
interesting event of this séance, so far, was the brusque interruption of the
communication from the grandfather, which was the starting-point of
various debates amongst the members of the circle. These two momentous
occurrences, the darkness and the striking event, seem to have been the
foundation for a rapid deepening of hypnosis, in consequence of which the
hallucinations could be developed. The psychological mechanism of this
process seems to be as follows. The influence of darkness upon the
suggestibility of the sense-organs is well known.[39] Binet[40] states that it
has a special influence on hysterics, producing a state of sleepiness. As is
clear from the foregoing, the patient was in a state of partial hypnosis and
had constituted herself one with the unconscious personality in closest
relationship to her in the domain of speech. The automatic expression of
this personality is interrupted most unexpectedly by a new person, of whose
existence no one had any suspicion. Whence came this cleavage? Obviously
the eager expectation of this first séance had very much occupied the
patient. Her reminiscences of me and my family had probably grouped
themselves around this expectation; hence these suddenly come to light at
the climax of the automatic expression. That it was just my grandfather and
no one else—not, e.g., my deceased father, who, as she knew, was much
closer to me than the grandfather whom I had never known—perhaps
suggests where the origin of this new person is to be sought. It is probably a

dissociation of the personality already present which seized upon the
material next at hand for its expression, namely, upon the associations
concerning myself. How far this is parallel to the experiences revealed by
dream investigation (Freud's[41]) must remain undecided, for we have no
means of judging how far the effect mentioned can be considered a
"repressed" one. From the brusque interruption of the new personality, we
may conclude that the presentations concerned were very vivid, with
corresponding intensity of expectation. This perhaps was an attempt to
overcome a certain maidenly shyness and embarrassment. This event
reminds us vividly of the manner in which the dream presents to
consciousness, by a more or less transparent symbolism, things one has
never said to oneself clearly and openly. We do not know when this
dissociation of the new personality occurred, whether it had been slowly
prepared in the unconscious, or whether it first occurred in the séance. In
any case, this event meant a considerable increase in the extension of the
unconscious sphere rendered accessible through the hypnosis. At the same
time this event must be regarded as powerfully suggestive in regard to the
impression which it made upon the waking consciousness of the patient.
For the perception of this unexpected intervention of a new power must
inevitably excite a feeling of the strangeness of the automatisms, and would
easily suggest the thought that an independent spirit is here making itself
known. Hence the intelligible association that she would finally be able to
see this spirit. The situation that ensued at the second séance is to be
explained by the coincidence of this energising suggestion with the
heightened suggestibility conditioned by the darkness. The hypnosis, and
with it the series of dissociated presentations, break through to the visual
area, and the expression of the unconscious, hitherto purely motor, is made
objective, according to the measure of the specific energy of the new
system, in the shape of visual images with the character of hallucinations;
not as a mere accompanying phenomenon of the word-automatism, but as a
substituted function. The explanation of the situation that arose in the first
séance, at that time unexpected and inexplicable, is no longer presented in
words, but as a descriptive allegorical vision. The sentence "they do not
hate one another, but are friends," is expressed in a picture. We often
encounter events of this kind in somnambulism. The thinking of
somnambulists is given in plastic images which constantly break into this or
that sense-sphere and are made objective in hallucinations. The process of

reflection sinks into the subconscious; only its end-results arise to
consciousness either as presentations vividly tinged by the senses, or
directly as hallucinations. In our case the same thing occurred as in the
patient whose anæsthetic hand Binet pricked nine times, making her think
of the figure 9; or as in Flournoy's[42] Helen Smith, who, when asked during
business-hours about certain patterns, suddenly saw the number of days
(18) for which they had been lent, at a length of 20 mm. in front of her. The
further question arises, why does the automatism appear in the visual and
not in the acoustic sphere? There are several grounds for this choice of the
visual sphere.
(1) The patient is not gifted acoustically; she is, for instance, very
unmusical.
(2) There was no stillness corresponding to the darkness which might have
favoured the appearance of sounds; there was a lively conversation.
(3) The increased conviction of the near presence of spirits, because the
automatism felt so strange, could easily have aroused the idea that a spirit
might be seen, thus causing a slight excitation of the visual sphere.
(4) The entoptic phenomena in darkness favoured the occurrence of
hallucinations.
The reasons (3) and (4)—the entoptic phenomena in the darkness and the
probable excitation of the visual sphere—are of decisive importance for the
appearance of hallucinations. The entoptic phenomena in this case play the
same rôle in the auto-suggestion, the production of the automatism, as the
slight tactile stimuli in hypnosis of the motor centre. As stated, flashes
preceded the first hallucinatory twilight-state. Obviously attention was
already at a high pitch, and directed to visual perceptions, so that the retina's
own light, usually very weak, was seen with great intensity. The part played
by entoptic perceptions of light in the origin of hallucinations deserves
further consideration. Schüle[43] says: "The swarming of light and colour
which stimulates and animates the field of vision, although in the dark,
supplies the material for phantastic figures in the air before falling asleep.
As we know, absolute darkness is never seen; a few particles of the dark
field of vision are always illumined; flecks of light move here and there,
and combine into all kinds of figures; it only needs a moderately active

imagination to create out of them, as one does out of clouds, certain known
figures. The power of reasoning, fading as one falls asleep, leaves phantasy
free play to construct very vivid figures. In the place of the light spots,
haziness and changing colours of the dark visual field, there arise definite
outlines of objects."[44]
In this way hypnagogic hallucinations arise. The chief rôle naturally
belongs to the imagination, hence imaginative people in particular are
subject to hypnagogic hallucinations.[45] The hypnopompic hallucinations
described by Myers arise in the same way.
It is highly probable that hypnagogic pictures are identical with the dreampictures of normal sleep—forming their visual foundation. Maury[46] has
proved from self-observation that the pictures which hovered around him
hypnagogically were also the objects of the dreams that followed. G.
Trumbull Ladd[47] has shown this even more convincingly. By practice he
succeeded in waking himself suddenly two to five minutes after falling
asleep. He then observed that the figures dancing before the retina at times
represented the same contours as the pictures just dreamed of. He even
states that nearly every visual dream is shaped by the retina's own lightfigures. In our case the fantastic rendering of these pictures was favoured by
the situation. We must not underrate the influence of the over-excited
expectation which allowed the dull retina-light to appear with increased
intensity.[48] The further formation of the retinal appearances follows in
accordance with the predominating presentations. That hallucinations
appear in this way has been also observed in other visionaries. Jeanne
d'Arc[49] first saw a cloud of light, and only after some time there stepped
forth St. Michael, St. Catherine and St. Margaret. For a whole hour
Swedenborg[50] saw nothing but illuminated spheres and fiery flames. He
felt a mighty change in the brain, which seemed to him "release of light."
After the space of one hour he suddenly saw red figures which he regarded
as angels and spirits. The sun visions of Benvenuto Cellini[51] in Engelsburg
are probably of the same nature. A student who frequently saw apparitions
stated: "When these apparitions come, at first I only see single masses of
light and at the same time am conscious of a dull noise in the ears.
Gradually these contours become clear figures."

The appearance of hallucinations occurred in a quite classical way in
Flournoy's Helen Smith. I quote the cases in question from his article.[52]
"18 Mars. Tentative d'expérience dans l'obscurité. Mlle. Smith voit un
ballon tantôt luminieux, tantôt s'obscurcissant.
"25 Mars. Mlle. Smith commence à distinguer de vagues lueurs, de longs
rubans blancs, s'agitant du plancher au plafond, puis enfin une magnifique
étoile qui dans l'obscurité s'est montrée à elle seule pendant toute la séance.
"1 Avril. Mlle. Smith se sent très agitée, elle a des frissons, est partiellement
glacée. Elle est très inquiète et voit tout à coup se balançant au-dessus de la
table une figure grimaçante et très laide avec de longs cheveux rouges. Elle
voit alors un magnifique bouquet de roses de nuances diverses; tout à coup
elle voit sortir de dessous le bouquet un petit serpent, qui, rampant
doucement, vient sentir les fleurs, les regarde," etc.
Helen Smith[53] says in regard to the origin of her vision of March:
"La lueur rouge persista autour de moi et je me suis trouvée entourée de
fleurs extraordinaires."
At all times the complex hallucinations of visionaries have occupied a
peculiar place in scientific criticism. Macario[54] early separated these socalled intuition-hallucinations from others, since he maintains that they
occur in persons of an eager mind, deep understanding and high nervous
excitability. Hecker[55] expresses himself similarly but more
enthusiastically.
His view is that their condition is "the congenital high development of the
spiritual organ which calls into active, free and mobile play the life of the
imagination, bringing it spontaneous activity." These hallucinations are
"precursors or signs of mighty spiritual power." The vision is "an increased
excitation which is harmoniously adapted to the most complete health of
mind and body." The complex hallucinations do not belong to the waking
state, but prefer as a rule a partial waking state. The visionary is buried in
his vision even to complete annihilation. Flournoy was also always able to
prove in the visions of H.S. "un certain degré d'obnubilation." In our case
the vision is complicated by a state of sleep whose peculiarities we shall
review later.

THE CHANGE IN CHARACTER.
The most striking characteristic of the second stage in our case is the
change in character. We meet many cases in the literature which have
offered the symptom of spontaneous character-change. The first case in a
scientific publication is Weir-Mitchell's[56] case of Mary Reynolds.
This was the case of a young woman living in Pennsylvania in 1811. After a
deep sleep of about twenty hours she had totally forgotten her entire past
and everything she had learnt; even the words she spoke had lost their
meaning. She no longer knew her relatives. Slowly she re-learnt to read and
write, but her writing was from right to left. More striking still was the
change in her character. Instead of being melancholy, she was now cheerful
in the extreme. Instead of being reserved, she was buoyant and sociable.
Formerly taciturn and retiring, she was now merry and jocose. Her
disposition was totally changed.[57]
In this state she renounced her former retired life and liked to undertake
adventurous excursions unarmed, through wood and mountain, on foot and
horseback. In one of these excursions she encountered a large black bear,
which she took for a pig. The bear raised himself on his hind legs and
gnashed his teeth at her. As she could not drive her horse on any further, she
took an ordinary stick and hit the bear until it took to flight. Five weeks
later, after a deep sleep, she returned to her earlier state with amnesia for the
interval. These states alternated for about sixteen years. But her last twentyfive years Mary Reynolds passed exclusively in her second state.
Schroeder von der Kalk[58] reports on the following case: The patient
became ill at the age of sixteen with periodic amnesia, after a previous
tedious illness of three years. Sometimes in the morning after waking she
passed through a peculiar choreic state, during which she made rhythmical
movements with her arms. Throughout the whole day she would then
exhibit a childish, silly behaviour and lost all her educated capabilities.
(When normal she is very intelligent, well-read, speaks French well.) In the
second state she begins to speak faulty French. On the second day she is
again at times normal. The two states are completely separated by amnesia.
[59]

Hoefelt[60] reports on a case of spontaneous somnambulism in a girl who, in
her normal state, was submissive and modest, but in somnambulism was
impertinent, rude and violent. Azam's[61] Felida was, in her normal state,
depressed, inhibited, timid; and in the second state lively, confident,
enterprising to recklessness. The second state gradually became the chief
one, and finally so far suppressed the first state that the patient called her
normal states, lasting now but a short time, "crises." The amnesic attacks
had begun at 14½. In time the second state became milder and there was a
certain approximation between the character of the two states. A very
striking example of change in character is that worked out by Camuset,
Ribot, Legrand du Saulle, Richer, Voisin, and put together by Bourru and
Burot.[62] It is that of Louis V., a severe male hysteric with amnesic
alternating character. In the first stage he is rude, cheeky, querulous, greedy,
thievish, inconsiderate. In the second state he is an agreeable, sympathetic
character, industrious, docile and obedient. This amnesic change of
character has been used by Paul Lindau[63] in his drama "Der Andere" (The
Other One).
Rieger[64] reports on a case parallel to Lindau's criminal lawyer. The
unconscious personalities of Janet's Lucie and Léonie (Janet, l.c.) and
Morton Prince's[65] may also be regarded as parallel with our case. There
are, however, therapeutic artificial products whose importance lies in the
domain of the dissociation of consciousness and of memory.
In the above cases, the second state is always separated from the first by an
amnesic dissociation, and the change in character is, at times, accompanied
by a break in the continuity of consciousness. In our case there is no
amnesic disturbance; the passage from the first to the second stage follows
quite gradually and the continuity of consciousness remains. The patient
carries out in her waking state everything, otherwise unknown to her, from
the field of the unconscious that she has experienced during hallucinations
in the second stage.
Periodic changes in personality without amnesic dissociation are found in
the region of folie circulaire, but are rarely seen in hysterics, as
Renaudin's[66] case shows. A young man, whose behaviour had always been
excellent, suddenly began to display the worst tendencies. There were no
symptoms of insanity, but, on the other hand, the whole surface of the body

was anæsthetic. This state showed periodic intervals, and in the same way
the patient's character was subject to vacillations. As soon as the anæsthesia
disappeared he was manageable and friendly. When the anæsthesia returned
he was overcome by the worst instincts, which, it was observed, even
included the wish to murder.
Remembering that our patient's age at the beginning of the disturbances was
14-1/2, that is, the age of puberty had just been reached, one must suppose
that there was some connection between the disturbances and the
physiological character-changes at puberty. "There appears in the
consciousness of the individual during this period of life a new group of
sensations, together with the feelings and ideas arising therefrom; this
continuous pressure of unaccustomed mental states makes itself constantly
felt because the cause is always at work; the states are co-ordinated because
they arise from one and the same source, and must little by little bring about
deep-seated changes in the ego."[67] Vacillating moods are easily
recognisable; the confused new, strong feelings, the inclination towards
idealism, to exalted religiosity and mysticism, side by side with the falling
back into childishness, all this gives to adolescence its prevailing character.
At this epoch the human being first makes clumsy attempts at independence
in every direction; for the first time uses for his own purposes all that
family and school have contributed hitherto; he conceives ideals, constructs
far-reaching plans for the future, lives in dreams whose content is ambitious
and egotistic. This is all physiological. The puberty of a psychopathic is a
crisis of more serious import. Not only do the psychophysical changes run a
stormy course, but features of a hereditary degenerate character become
fixed. In the child these do not appear at all, or but sporadically. For the
explanation of our case we are bound to consider a specific disturbance of
puberty. The reasons for this view will appear from a further study of the
second personality. (For the sake of brevity we shall call the second
personality IVENES—as the patient baptised her higher ego).
Ivenes is the exact continuation of the everyday ego. She includes the whole
of her conscious content. In the semi-somnambulic state her intercourse
with the real external world is analogous to that of the waking state, that is,
she is influenced by recurrent hallucinations, but no more than persons who
are subject to non-confusional psychotic hallucinations. The continuity of
Ivenes obviously extends to the hysterical attack with its dramatic scenes,

visionary events, etc. During the attack itself she is generally isolated from
the external world; she does not notice what is going on around her, does
not know that she is talking loudly, etc. But she has no amnesia for the
dream-content of her attack. Amnesia for her motor expressions and for the
changes in her surroundings is not always present. That this is dependent
upon the degree of intensity of her somnambulic state and that there is
sometimes partial paralysis of individual sense organs is proved by the
occasion when she did not notice me; her eyes were then open, and most
probably she saw the others, although she only perceived me when I spoke
to her. This is a case of so-called systematised anæsthesia (negative
hallucination) which is often observed in hysterics.
Flournoy,[68] for instance, reports of Helen Smith that during the séances
she suddenly ceased to see those taking part, although she still heard their
voices and felt their touch; sometimes she no longer heard, although she
saw the movements of the lips of the speakers, etc.
Ivenes is just the continuation of the waking self. She contains the entire
consciousness of S. W.'s waking state. Her remarkable behaviour tells
decidedly against any analogy with cases of double consciousness. The
characteristics of Ivenes contrast favourably with the patient's ordinary self.
She is a calmer, more composed personality; her pleasing modesty and
accuracy, her uniform intelligence, her confident way of talking must be
regarded as an improvement of the whole being; thus far there is analogy
with Janet's Léonie. But this is the extent of the similarity. Apart from the
amnesia, they are divided by a deep psychological difference. Léonie II. is
the healthier, the more normal; she has regained her natural capabilities, she
shows remarkable improvement upon her chronic condition of hysteria.
Ivenes rather gives the impression of a more artificial product; there is
something thought out; despite all her excellences she gives the impression
of playing a part excellently; her world-sorrow, her yearning for the other
side of things, are not merely piety but the attributes of saintliness. Ivenes is
no mere human, but a mystic being who only partly belongs to reality. The
mournful features, the attachment to sorrow, her mysterious fate, lead us to
the historic prototype of Ivenes—Justinus Kerner's "Prophetess of
Prevorst." Kerner's book must be taken as known, and therefore I omit any
references to these common traits. But Ivenes is no copy of the prophetess;
she lacks the resignation and the saintly piety of the latter. The prophetess is

merely used by her as a study for her own original conception. The patient
pours her own soul into the rôle of the prophetess, thus seeking to create an
ideal of virtue and perfection. She anticipates her future. She incarnates in
Ivenes what she wishes to be in twenty years—the assured, influential,
wise, gracious, pious lady. It is in the construction of the second person that
there lies the far-reaching difference between Léonie II. and Ivenes. Both
are psychogenic. But Léonie I. receives in Léonie II. what really belongs to
her, while S. W. builds up a person beyond herself. It cannot be said "she
deceives herself" into, but that "she dreams herself" into the higher ideal
state.[69]
The realisation of this dream recalls vividly the psychology of the
pathological cheat. Delbruck[70] and Forel[71] have indicated the importance
of auto-suggestion in the formation of pathological cheating and reverie.
Pick[72] regards intense auto-suggestibility as the first symptom of the
hysterical dreamer, making possible the realisation of the "day-dream." One
of Pick's patients dreamt that she was in a morally dangerous situation, and
finally carried out an attempt at rape on herself; she lay on the floor naked
and fastened herself to a table and chairs. Or some dramatic person will be
created with whom the patient enters into correspondence by letter, as in
Bohn's case.[73] The patient dreamt herself into an engagement with a
totally imaginary lawyer in Nice, from whom she received letters which she
had herself written in disguised handwriting. This pathological dreaming,
with auto-suggestive deceptions of memory amounting to real delusions and
hallucinations, is pre-eminently to be found in the lives of many saints.[74]
It is only a step from the dreamlike images strongly stamped by the senses
to the true complex hallucinations.[75] In Pick's case, for instance, one sees
that the patient, who persuades herself that she is the Empress Elizabeth,
gradually loses herself in her dreams to such an extent that her condition
must be regarded as a true "twilight" state. Later it passes over into
hysterical delirium, when her dream-phantasies become typical
hallucinations. The pathological liar, who becomes involved through his
phantasies, behaves exactly like a child who loses himself in his play, or
like the actor who loses himself in his part.[76] There is here no fundamental
distinction from somnambulic dissociation of personality, but only a
difference of degree, which rests upon the intensity of the primary auto-

suggestibility or disintegration of the psychic elements. The more
consciousness becomes dissociated, the greater becomes the plasticity of
the dream situation, the less becomes the amount of conscious lying and of
consciousness in general. This being carried away by interest in the object
is what Freud calls hysterical identification. For instance, to Erler's[77]
acutely hysterical patient there appeared hypnagogically little riders made
of paper, who so took possession of her imagination that she had the feeling
of being herself one of them. Similar phenomena normally occur to us in
dreams in general, in which we think like "hysterics."[78]
The complete abandonment to the interesting image explains also the
wonderful naturalness of pseudological or somnambulic representation—a
degree unattainable in conscious acting. The less waking consciousness
intervenes by reflection and reasoning, the more certain and convincing
becomes the objectivation of the dream, e.g. the roof-climbing of
somnambulists.
Our case has another analogy with pseudologia phantastica: The
development of the phantasies during the attacks. Many cases are known in
the literature where the pathological lying comes on in attacks and during
serious hysterical trouble.[79]
Our patient develops her systems exclusively in the attack. In her normal
state she is quite incapable of giving any new ideas or explanations; she
must either transpose herself into somnambulism or await its spontaneous
appearance. This exhausts the affinity to pseudologia phantastica and to
pathological dream-states.
Our patient's state is even differentiated from pathological dreaming, since
it could never be proved that her dream-weavings had at any time
previously been the objects of her interest during the day. Her dreams occur
explosively, break forth with bewildering completeness from the darkness
of the unconscious. Exactly the same was the case in Flournoy's Helen
Smith. In many cases (see below), however, links with the perceptions of
the normal states can be demonstrated: it seems therefore probable that the
roots of every dream were originally images with an emotional
accentuation, which, however, only occupied waking consciousness for a
short time.[80] We must allow that in the origin of such dreams hysterical
forgetfulness[81] plays a part not to be underestimated.

Many images are buried which would be sufficient to put the consciousness
on guard; associated classes of ideas are lost and go on spinning their web
in the unconscious, thanks to the psychic dissociation; this is a process
which we meet again in the genesis of our dreams.
"Our conscious reflection teaches us that when exercising attention we
pursue a definite course. But if that course leads us to an idea which does
not meet with our approval, we discontinue and cease to apply our
attention. Now, apparently, the chain of thought thus started and abandoned,
may go on without regaining attention unless it reaches a spot of especially
marked intensity, which compels renewed attention. An initial rejection,
perhaps consciously brought about by the judgment on the ground of
incorrectness or unfitness for the actual purpose of the mental act, may
therefore account for the fact that a mental process continues unnoticed by
consciousness until the onset of sleep."[82]
In this way we may explain the apparently sudden and direct appearance of
dream-states. The entire carrying over of the conscious personality into the
dream-rôle involves indirectly the development of simultaneous
automatisms. "Une seconde condition peut amener la division de
conscience; ce n'est pas une altération de la sensibilité, c'est une attitude
particulière de l'esprit, la concentration de l'attention pour un point unique;
il résulte de cet état de concentration que l'esprit devient distrait pour la
reste et en quelque sorte insensible, ce qui ouvre la carrière aux actions
automatiques, et ces actions peuvent prendre un caractère psychique et
constituer des intelligences parasites, vivant côte à côte avec la personnalité
normale qui ne les connaît pas."[83]
Our subject's romances throw a most significant light on the subjective
roots of her dreams. They swarm with secret and open love-affairs, with
illegitimate births and other sexual insinuations. The central point of all
these ambiguous stories is a lady whom she dislikes, who is gradually made
to assume the form of her polar opposite, and whilst Ivenes becomes the
pinnacle of virtue, this lady is a sink of iniquity. But her reincarnation
doctrines, in which she appears as the mother of countless thousands,
arises in its naïve nakedness from an exuberant phantasy which is, of
course, very characteristic of the period of puberty. It is the woman's
premonition of the sexual feeling, the dream of fruitfulness, which the

patient has turned into these monstrous ideas. We shall not go wrong if we
seek for the curious form of the disease in the teeming sexuality of this toorich soil. Viewed from this standpoint, the whole creation of Ivenes, with
her enormous family, is nothing but a dream of sexual wish-fulfilment,
differentiated from the dream of a night only in that it persists for months
and years.
RELATION TO THE HYSTERICAL ATTACK.
So far one point in S. W.'s history has remained unexplained, and that is her
attack. In the second séance she was suddenly seized with a sort of fainting
fit, from which she awoke with a recollection of various hallucinations.
According to her own statement, she had not lost consciousness for a
moment. Judging from the external symptoms and the course of the attack,
one is inclined to regard it as a narcolepsy, or rather a lethargy; such, for
example, as Loewenfeld has described, and the more readily as we know
that previously one member of her family (her grandmother) has had an
attack of lethargy. It is possible to imagine that the lethargic disposition
(Loewenfeld) had descended to our subject. In spiritualistic séances it is not
usual to see hysterical convulsions. Our subject showed no sort of
convulsive symptoms, but in their place, perhaps, the peculiar sleepingstates. Ætiologically, at the outset, two moments must be taken into
consideration:
1. The irruption of hypnosis.
2. The psychic stimulation.
1. Irruption of Partial Hypnosis.—Janet observes that the subconscious
automatisms have a hypnotic influence and can bring about complete
somnambulism.[84]
He made the following experiment: While the patient, who was in the
completely waking state, was engaged in conversation by a second
observer, Janet stationed himself behind her and by means of whispered
suggestions made her unconsciously move her hand and by written signs
give an answer to questions. Suddenly the patient broke off the
conversation, turned round and with her supraliminal consciousness

continued the previously subconscious talk with Janet. She had fallen into
hypnotic somnambulism.[85]
There is here a state of affairs similar to our patient's. But it must be noted
that, for certain reasons discussed later, the sleeping state is not to be
regarded as hypnotic. We therefore come to the question of—
2. The Psychic Stimulation.—It is told of Bettina Brentano that the first
time she met Goethe she suddenly fell asleep on his knee.[86]
This ecstatic sleep in the midst of extremest torture, the so-called "witchsleep," is well known in the history of trials for witchcraft.[87]
With susceptible subjects relatively insignificant stimuli suffice to bring
about the somnambulic state. Thus a sensitive lady had to have a splinter
cut out of her finger. Without any kind of bodily change she suddenly saw
herself sitting by the side of a brook in a beautiful meadow, plucking
flowers. This condition lasted as long as the slight operation and then
disappeared spontaneously.[88]
Loewenfeld[89] has noticed unintentional inducement of hysterical lethargy
through hypnosis.
Our case has certain resemblances to hysterical lethargy[90] as described by
Loewenfeld, viz. the shallow breathing, the diminution of the pulse, the
corpse-like pallor of the face, and further the peculiar feeling of dying and
the thoughts of death.[91]
The retention of one sense is not inconsistent with lethargy: thus in certain
cases of trance the sense of hearing remains.[92]
In Bonamaison's[93] case not only was the sense of touch retained, but the
senses of hearing and smell were quickened. The hallucinatory content and
loud speaking is also met with in persons with hallucinations in lethargy.[94]
Usually there prevails total amnesia for the lethargic interval.
Loewenfeld's[95] case D. had, however, a fleeting recollection; in
Bonamaison's case there was no amnesia. Lethargic patients do not prove
susceptible to the usual waking stimuli, but Loewenfeld succeeded with his
patient St. in turning the lethargy into hypnosis by means of mesmeric
passes, thus combining it with the rest of consciousness during the attack.

[96]

Our patient showed herself absolutely insusceptible in the beginning of
the lethargy, but later on she began to speak spontaneously, was incapable
of giving any attention when her somnambulic ego was speaking, but could
attend when it was one of her automatic personalities. In this last case it is
probable that the hypnotic effect of the automatisms succeeded in achieving
a partial transformation of the lethargy into hypnosis. When we consider
that, according to Loewenfeld's view, the lethargic disposition must not be
"too readily identified with the peculiar condition of the nervous apparatus
in hysteria," then the idea of the family heredity of this disposition in our
case becomes not a little probable. The disease is much complicated by
these attacks.
So far we have seen that the patient's consciousness of her ego is identical
in all the states. We have discussed two secondary complexes of
consciousness and have followed them into the somnambulic attack, where
they appear as the patient's vision when she had lost her motor activity
during the attack. During the next attacks she was impervious to any
external incidents, but on the other hand developed, within the twilight
state, all the more intense activity, in the form of visions. It seems that many
secondary series of ideas must have split off quite early from the primary
unconscious personality, for already, after the first two séances, "spirits"
appeared by the dozen. The names were inexhaustible in variety, but the
differences between the personalities were soon exhausted and it became
apparent that they could all be subsumed under two types, the serioreligious type and the gay-hilarious. So far it was really only a matter of
two different unconscious personalities, which appeared under different
names but had no essential differences. The older type, the grandfather, who
had initiated the automatisms, also first began to make use of the twilight
state. I am not able to remember any suggestion which might have given
rise to the automatic speaking. According to the preceding view, the attack
in such circumstances might be regarded as a partial auto-hypnosis. The
ego-consciousness which remains and, as a result of its isolation from the
external world, occupies itself entirely with its hallucinations, is what is left
over of the waking consciousness. Thus the automatism has a wide field for
its activity. The independence of the individual central spheres which we
have proved at the beginning to be present in the patient, makes the
automatic act of speaking appear intelligible. Just as the dreamer on

occasion speaks in his sleep, so, too, a man in his waking hours may
accompany intensive thought with an unconscious whisper.[97] The peculiar
movements of the speech-musculature are to be noted. They have also been
observed in other somnambulists.[98]
These clumsy attempts must be directly paralleled with the unintelligent
and clumsy movements of the table or glass, and most probably correspond
to the preliminary activity of the motor portion of the presentation; that is to
say, a stimulus limited to the motor-centre which has not previously been
subordinated to any higher system. Whether the like occurs in persons who
talk in their dreams, I do not know. But it has been observed in hypnotised
persons.[99]
Since the convenient medium of speech was used as the means of
communication, the study of the subconscious personalities was
considerably lightened. Their intellectual compass is a relatively mediocre
one. Their knowledge is greater than that of the waking patient, including
also a few occasional details, such as the birthdays of dead strangers and the
like. The source of these is more or less obscure, since the patient does not
know whence in the ordinary way she could have procured the knowledge
of these facts. These are cases of so-called cryptomnesia, which are too
unimportant to deserve more extended notice. The intelligence of the two
subconscious persons is very slight; they produce banalities almost
exclusively, but their relation to the conscious ego of the patient when in the
somnambulic state is interesting. They are invariably aware of everything
that takes place during ecstasy and occasionally they render an exact report
from minute to minute.[100]
The subconscious persons only know the patient's phantastic changes of
thought very superficially; they do not understand these and cannot answer
a single question concerning the situation. Their stereotyped reference to
Ivenes is: "Ask Ivenes." This observation reveals a dualism in the character
of the subconscious personalities difficult to explain; for the grandfather,
who gives information by automatic speech, also appears to Ivenes and,
according to her account, teaches her about the objects in question. How is
it that, when the grandfather speaks through the patient's mouth, he knows
nothing of the very things which he himself teaches her in the ecstasies?

We must again return to the discussion of the first appearance of the
hallucinations. We picture the vision, then, as an irruption of hypnosis into
the visual sphere. That irruption does not lead to a "normal" hypnosis, but
to a "hystero-hypnosis," that is, the simple hypnosis is complicated by a
hysterical attack.
It is not a rare occurrence in the domain of hypnotism for normal hypnosis
to be disturbed, or rather to be replaced by the unexpected appearance of
hysterical somnambulism; the hypnotist in many cases then loses rapport
with the patient. In our case the automatism arising in the motor area plays
the part of hypnotist; the suggestions proceeding from it (called objective
auto-suggestions) hypnotise the neighbouring areas in which a certain
susceptibility has arisen. At the moment when the hypnotism flows over
into the visual sphere, the hysterical attack occurs which, as remarked,
effects a very deep-reaching change in a large portion of the psychical
region. We must now suppose that the automatism stands in the same
relationship to the attack as the hypnotist to a pathological hypnosis; its
influence upon the further structure of the situation is lost. The
hallucinatory appearance of the hypnotised personality, or rather of the
suggested idea, may be regarded as the last effect upon the somnambulic
personality. Thenceforward the hypnotist becomes only a figure with whom
the somnambulic personality occupies itself independently: he can only
state what is going on and is no longer the conditio sine qua non of the
content of the somnambulic attack. The independent ego-complex of the
attack, in our case Ivenes, has now the upper hand. She groups her own
mental products around the personality of the hypnotiser, that is, of the
grandfather, now degraded to a mere image. In this way we are enabled to
understand the dualism in the character of the grandfather. The grandfather
I. who speaks directly to those present, is a totally different person and a
mere spectator of his double, grandfather II., who appears as Ivenes'
teacher. Grandfather I. maintains energetically that both are one and the
same person, and that I. has all the knowledge which II. possesses, and is
only prevented from giving information by the difficulties of speech. (The
dissociation was of course not realized by the patient, who took both to be
one person.) Grandfather I., if closely examined, however, is not altogether
wrong, judging from one fact which seems to make for the identity of I. and
II., viz. that they are never both present together. When I. speaks
automatically, II. is not present; Ivenes remarks on his absence. Similarly,

during the ecstasy, when she is with II., she cannot say where I. is, or she
may learn only on returning from an imaginary journey that meanwhile I.
has been guarding her body. Conversely I. never says that he is going on a
journey with Ivenes and never explains anything to her. This behaviour
should be noted, for if I. is really separate from II., there seems no reason
why he should not speak automatically at the same time that II. appears, and
be present with II. in the ecstasy. Although this might have been supposed
possible, as a matter of fact it was never observed. How is this dilemma to
be resolved? At all events there exists an identity of I. and II., but it does
not lie in the region of the personality under discussion; it lies in the basis
common to both; that is, in the personality of the subject which in deepest
essence is one and indivisible. Here we come across the characteristic of all
hysterical dissociations of consciousness. They are disturbances which only
belong to the superficial, and none reaches so deep as to attack the strongknit foundation of the ego-complex.
In many such cases we can find the bridge which, although often wellconcealed, spans the apparently impassable abyss. For instance, by
suggestion, one of four cards is made invisible to a hypnotised person; he
thereupon names the other three. A pencil is placed in his hand with the
instruction to write down all the cards lying there; he correctly adds the
fourth one.[101]
In the aura of his hystero-epileptic attacks a patient of Janet's[102] invariably
had a vision of a conflagration, and whenever he saw an open fire he had an
attack; indeed, the sight of a lighted match was sufficient to bring about an
attack. The patient's visual field on the left side was limited to 30°, the right
eye was shut. The left eye was fixed in the middle of a perimeter whilst a
lighted match was held at 80°. The hystero-epileptic attack took place
immediately. Despite the extensive amnesia in many cases of double
consciousness, the patients' behaviour does not correspond to the degree of
their ignorance, but it seems rather as if a deeper instinct guided their
actions in accordance with their former knowledge. Not only this relatively
slight amnesic dissociation, but the severe amnesia of the epileptic twilightstate, formerly regarded as irreparabile damnum, does not suffice to cut the
inmost threads which bind the ego-complex in the twilight-state to the
normal ego. In one case the content of the twilight-state could be grafted on
to the waking ego-complex.[103]

Making use of these experiments for our case, we obtain the helpful
hypothesis that those layers of the unconscious beyond reach of the
dissociation endeavour to present the unity of automatic personality. This
endeavour is shattered in the deeper-seated and more elemental disturbance
of the hysterical attack,[104] which prevents a more complete synthesis by
the tacking on of associations which are to a certain extent the most original
individual property of supraliminal personality. As the Ivenes dream
emerged it was fitted on to the figures accidentally in the field of vision, and
henceforth remains associated with them.
RELATIONSHIP TO THE UNCONSCIOUS PERSONALITY.
As we have seen, the numerous personalities become grouped round two
types, the grandfather and Ulrich von Gerbenstein. The first produces
exclusively sanctimonious religiosity and gives edifying moral precepts.
The latter is, in one word, a "flapper," in whom there is nothing male except
the name. We must here add from the anamnesis that at fifteen the patient
was confirmed by a very bigoted clergyman, and at home she is
occasionally the recipient of sanctimonious moral talks. The grandfather
represents this side of her past, Gerbenstein the other half; hence the curious
contrast. Here we have personified the chief characteristics of her past. On
the one hand the sanctimonious person with a narrow education, on the
other the boisterousness of a lively girl of fifteen who often overshoots the
mark.[105] We find both sets of traits mixed in the patient in sharp contrast.
At times she is anxious, shy, and extremely reserved; at others boisterous to
a degree. She is herself often most painfully aware of these contradictions.
This circumstance gives us the key to the source of the two unconscious
personalities. The patient is obviously seeking a middle path between the
two extremes; she endeavours to repress them and strains after some ideal
condition. These strainings bring her to the puberty dream of the ideal
Ivenes, beside whose figure the unacknowledged trends of her character
recede into the background. They are not lost, however, but as repressed
ideas, analogous to the Ivenes idea, begin an independent existence as
automatic personalities.
S. W.'s behaviour recalls vividly Freud's[106] investigations into dreams
which disclose the independent growth of repressed thoughts. We can now

comprehend why the hallucinatory persons are separated from those who
write and speak automatically. The former teach Ivenes the secrets of the
Other Side, they relate all those phantastic tales about the extraordinariness
of her personality, they create scenes where Ivenes can appear dramatically
with the attributes of power, wisdom and virtue. These are nothing but
dramatic dissociations of her dream-self. The latter, the automatic persons,
are the ones to be overcome, they must have no part in Ivenes. With the
spirit-companions of Ivenes they have only the name in common. A priori,
it is not to be expected that in a case like ours, where these divisions are
never clearly defined, that two such characteristic individualities should
disappear entirely from a somnambulic ego-complex having so close a
relation with the waking consciousness. And in fact, we do meet them in
part in those ecstatic penitential scenes and in part in the romances
crammed with more or less banal, mischievous gossip.
COURSE.
It only remains to say a few words about the course of this strange
affection. The process reached its maximum in four to eight weeks. The
descriptions given of Ivenes and of the unconscious personalities belong
generally to this period. Thenceforth a gradual decline was noticeable; the
ecstasies grew meaningless and the influence of Gerbenstein became more
powerful. The phenomena gradually lost their distinctive features, the
characters which were at first well demarcated became by degrees
inextricably mixed. The psychological contribution grew smaller and
smaller until finally the whole story assumed a marked effect of fabrication.
Ivenes herself was much concerned about this decline; she became
painfully uncertain, spoke cautiously, feeling her way, and allowed her
character to appear undisguised. The somnambulic attacks decreased in
frequency and intensity. All degrees from somnambulism to conscious lying
were observable. Thus the curtain fell. The patient has since gone abroad.
We should not underestimate the importance of the fact that her character
has become pleasanter and more stable. Here we may recall the cases cited
in which the second state gradually replaced the first state. Perhaps this is a
similar phenomenon.

It is well known that somnambulic manifestations sometimes begin at
puberty.[107] The attacks of somnambulism in Dyce's case[108] began
immediately before puberty and lasted just till its termination. The
somnambulism of H. Smith is likewise closely connected with puberty.[109]
Schroeder von der Kalk's patient was 16 years old at the time of her illness;
Felida 14-1/2, etc. We know also that at this period the future character is
formed and fixed. In the case of Felida and of Mary Reynolds we saw that
the character in state II. replaced that of state I. It is not therefore
unthinkable that these phenomena of double consciousness are nothing but
character-formations for the future personality, or their attempts to burst
forth. In consequence of special difficulties (unfavourable external
conditions, psychopathic disposition of the nervous system, etc.), these new
formations, or attempts thereat, become bound up with peculiar
disturbances of consciousness. Occasionally the somnambulism, in view of
the difficulties that oppose the future character, takes on a marked
teleological meaning, for it gives the individual, who might otherwise be
defeated, the means of victory. Here I am thinking first of all of Jeanne
d'Arc, whose extraordinary courage recalls the deeds of Mary Reynolds' II.
This is perhaps the place to point out the similar function of the
"hallucination téléologique" of which the public reads occasionally,
although it has not yet been submitted to a scientific study.
THE UNCONSCIOUS ADDITIONAL CREATIVE WORK.
We have now discussed all the essential manifestations offered by our case
which are of significance for its inner structure. Certain accompanying
manifestations may be briefly considered: the unconscious additional
creative work. Here we shall encounter a not altogether unjustifiable
scepticism on the part of the representative of science. Dessoir's conception
of a second ego met with much opposition, and was rejected, as too
impossible in many directions. As is known, occultism has proclaimed a
pre-eminent right to this field and has drawn premature conclusions from
doubtful observations. We are indeed very far from being in a position to
state anything conclusive, since we have at present only most inadequate
material. Therefore if we touch on the field of the unconscious additional
creative work, it is only that we may do justice to all sides of our case. By

unconscious addition we understand that automatic process whose result
does not penetrate to the conscious psychic activity of the individual. To
this region above all belongs thought-reading through table movements. I
do not know whether there are people who can divine a whole long train of
thought by means of inductions from the intentional tremulous movements.
It is, however, certain that, assuming this to be possible, such persons must
be availing themselves of a routine achieved after endless practice. But in
our case long practice can be excluded without more ado, and there is
nothing left but to accept a primary susceptibility of the unconscious, far
exceeding that of the conscious.
This supposition is supported by numerous observations on somnambulists.
I will mention only Binet's[110] experiments, where little letters or some
such thing, or little complicated figures in relief were laid on the anæsthetic
skin of the back of the hand or the neck, and the unconscious perceptions
were then recorded by means of signs. On the basis of these experiments he
came to the following conclusion: "D'après les calculs que j'ai pu faire, la
sensibilité inconsciente d'une hystérique est à certains moments cinquante
fois plus fine que celle d'une personne normale." A second additional
creation coming under consideration in our case and in numerous other
somnambulists, is that condition which French investigators call
"cryptomnesia."[111] By this term is meant the becoming conscious of a
memory-picture which cannot be regarded as in itself primary, but at most
is secondary, by means of subsequent recalling or abstract reasoning. It is
characteristic of cryptomnesia that the picture which emerges does not bear
the obvious mark of the memory-picture, is not, that is to say, bound up
with the idiosyncratic super-conscious ego-complex.
Three ways may be distinguished in which the cryptomnesic picture is
brought to consciousness.
1. The picture enters consciousness without any intervention of the sensespheres (intra-psychically). It is an inrushing idea whose causal sequence is
hidden within the individual. In so far cryptomnesia is quite an everyday
occurrence, concerned with the deepest normal psychic events. How often it
misleads the investigator, the author or the composer into believing his
ideas original, whilst the critic quite well recognises their source! Generally
the individuality of the representation protects the author from the

accusation of plagiarism and proves his good faith; still, cases do occur of
unconscious verbal reproduction. Should the passage in question contain
some remarkable idea, the accusation of plagiarism, more or less conscious,
is justified. After all, a valuable idea is linked by numerous associations
with the ego-complex; at different times, in different situations, it has
already been meditated upon and thus leads by innumerable links in all
directions. It can therefore never so disappear from consciousness that its
continuity could be entirely lost from the sphere of conscious memory. We
have, however, a criterion by which we can always recognise objectively
intra-psychic cryptomnesia. The cryptomnesic presentation is linked to the
ego-complex by the minimum of associations. The reason for this lies in the
relation of the individual to the particular object, in the disproportion of
interest to object. Two possibilities occur: (1) The object is worthy of
interest but the interest is slight in consequence of dispersion or want of
understanding; (2) The object is not worthy of interest, consequently the
interest is slight. In both cases an extremely labile connection with
consciousness arises which leads to a rapid forgetting. The slight bridge is
soon destroyed and the acquired presentation sinks into the unconscious,
where it is no longer accessible to consciousness. Should it enter
consciousness by means of cryptomnesia, the feeling of strangeness, of its
being an original creation, will cling to it because the path by which it
entered the subconscious has become undiscoverable. Strangeness and
original creation are, moreover, closely allied to one another if one recalls
the numerous witnesses in belles-lettres to the nature of genius
("possession" by genius).[112]
Apart from certain striking cases of this kind, where it is doubtful whether it
is a cryptomnesia or an original creation, there are some cases in which a
passage of no essential content is reproduced, and that almost verbally, as in
the following example:—
About that time when Zarathustra lived on the blissful islands, it came
to pass that a ship cast anchor at that island on which the smoking
mountain standeth; and the sailors of that ship went ashore in order to
shoot rabbits! But about the hour of noon, when the captain and his
men had mustered again, they suddenly saw a man come through the
air unto them, and a voice said distinctly: "It is time! It is high time!"
But when that person was nighest unto them (he passed by them flying

quickly like a shadow, in the direction in which the volcano was
situated) they recognised with the greatest confusion that it was
Zarathustra. For all of them, except the captain, had seen him before,
and they loved him, as the folk love, blending love and awe in equal
parts. "Lo! there," said the old steersman, "Zarathustra goeth unto
hell!"
An extract of awe-inspiring import from the log of the ship "Sphinx" in
the year 1686, in the Mediterranean.
Just. Kerner, "Blätter aus Prevorst," vol. IV., p, 57.
The four captains and a merchant, Mr. Bell, went ashore on the island
of Mount Stromboli to shoot rabbits. At three o'clock they called the
crew together to go aboard, when, to their inexpressible astonishment,
they saw two men flying rapidly over them through the air. One was
dressed in black, the other in grey. They approached them very closely,
in the greatest haste; to their greatest dismay they descended amid the
burning flames into the crater of the terrible volcano, Mount
Stromboli. They recognised the pair as acquaintances from London.
Frau E. Förster-Nietzsche, the poet's sister, told me, in reply to my inquiry,
that Nietzsche took up Just. Kerner between the age of twelve and fifteen,
when stopping with his grandfather, Pastor Oehler, in Pobler, but certainly
never afterwards. It could never have been the poet's intention to commit a
plagiarism from a ship's log; if this had been the case, he would certainly
have omitted the very prosaic "to shoot rabbits," which was, moreover,
quite unessential to the situation. In the poetical sketch of Zarathustra's
journey into Hell there was obviously interpolated, half or wholly
unconsciously, that forgotten impression from his youth.
This is an instance which shows all the peculiarities of cryptomnesia. A
quite unessential detail, which deserves nothing but speedy forgetting, is
reproduced with almost verbal fidelity, whilst the chief part of the narrative
is, one cannot say altered, but recreated quite distinctively. To the
distinctive core, the idea of the journey to Hell, there is added a detail, the
old, forgotten impression of a similar situation. The original is so absurd
that the youth, who read everything, probably skipped through it, and
certainly had no deep interest in it. Here we get the required minimum of

associated links, for we cannot easily conceive a greater jump, than from
that old, absurd story to Nietzsche's consciousness in the year 1883. If we
picture to ourselves Nietzsche's mood at the time when "Zarathustra" was
composed,[113] and think of the ecstasy that at more than one point
approached the pathological, we shall comprehend the abnormal
reminiscence. The second of the two possibilities mentioned, the acceptance
of some object, not itself uninteresting, in a state of dispersion or half
interest from lack of understanding, and its cryptomnesic reproduction we
find chiefly in somnambulists; it is also found in the literary chronicles
dealing with dying celebrities.[114]
Amid the exhaustive selection of these phenomena we are chiefly
concerned with talking in a foreign tongue, the so-called glossolalia. This
phenomenon is mentioned everywhere when it is a question of similar
ecstatic conditions. In the New Testament, in the Acta Sanctorum,[115] in the
Witchcraft Trials, more recently in the Prophetess of Prevorst, in Judge
Edmond's daughter Laura, in Flournoy's Helen Smith. The last is unique
from the point of view of investigation; it is found also in Bresler's[116] case,
which is probably identical with Blumhardt's[117] Gottlieben Dittus. As
Flournoy shows, glossolalia is, so far as it really is independent speech, a
cryptomnesic phenomenon, [Greek: Kat' exochên]. The reader should
consult Flournoy's most interesting exposition.
In our case glossolalia was only once observed, when the only
understandable words were the scattered variations on the word "vena." The
source of this word is clear. A few days previously the patient had dipped
into an anatomical atlas for the study of the veins of the face, which were
given in Latin. She had used the word "vena" in her dreams, as happens
occasionally to normal persons. The remaining words and sentences in a
foreign language betray, at the first glance, their derivation from French, in
which the patient was somewhat fluent. Unfortunately I am without the
more accurate translations of the various sentences, because the patient
would not give them; but we may hold that it was a phenomenon similar to
Helen Smith's Martian language. Flournoy found that the Martian language
was nothing but a childish translation from French; the words were changed
but the syntax remained the same. Even more probable is the view that the
patient simply ranged next to each other meaningless words that rang
strangely, without any true word-formation;[118] she borrowed certain

characteristic sounds from French and Italian and combined them into a
kind of language, just as Helen Smith completed the lacunæ in the real
Sanscrit words by products of her own resembling that language. The
curious names of the mystical system can be reduced, for the most part, to
known roots. The writer vividly recalls the botanical schemes found in
every school atlas; the internal resemblance of the relationship of the
planets to the sun is also pretty clear; we shall not be going astray if we see
in the names reminiscences from popular astronomy. Thus can be explained
the names Persus, Fenus, Nenus, Sirum, Surus, Fixus, and Pix, as the
childlike distortions of Perseus, Venus, Sirius and Fixed Star, analogous to
the Vena variations. Magnesor vividly recalls Magnetism, whose mystic
significance the patient knew from the Prophetess of Prevorst. In Connesor,
the contrary to Magnesor, the prefix "con" is probably the French "contre."
Hypnos and Hyfonismus recall hypnosis and hypnotism (German
hypnotismus), about which there are the most superstitious ideas circulating
in lay circles. The most used suffixes in "us" and "os" are the signs by
which as a rule people decide the difference between Latin and Greek. The
other names probably spring from similar accidents to which we have no
clues. The rudimentary glossolalia of our case has not any title to be a
classical instance of cryptomnesia, for it only consisted in the unconscious
use of various impressions, partly optical, party acoustic, and all very close
at hand.
2. The cryptomnesic image arrives at consciousness through the senses (as
a hallucination). Helen Smith is the classic example of this kind. I refer to
the case mentioned on the date "18 Mars."[119]

3. The image arrives at consciousness by motor automatism. H. Smith had
lost her valuable brooch, which she was anxiously looking for everywhere.
Ten days later her guide Leopold informed her by means of the table where
the brooch was. Thus informed, she found it at night-time in the open field,
covered by sand.[120] Strictly speaking, in cryptomnesia there is not any
additional creation in the true sense of the word, since the conscious
memory experiences no increase of its function, but only an enrichment of
its content. By the automatism certain regions are merely made accessible
to consciousness in an indirect way, which were formerly sealed against it.
But the unconscious does not thereby accomplish any creation which
exceeds the capacity of consciousness qualitatively or quantitatively.
Cryptomnesia is only an apparent additional creation, in contrast to
hypermnesia, which actually represents an increase of function.[121]
We have spoken above of a receptivity of the unconscious greater than that
of the consciousness, chiefly in regard to the simple attempts at thoughtreading of numbers. As mentioned, not only our somnambulist but a
relatively large number of normal persons are able to guess from the
tremors lengthy thought-sequences, if they are not too complicated. These
experiments are, so to speak, the prototype of those rarer and incomparably
more astonishing cases of intuitive knowledge displayed at times by
somnambulists.[122] Zschokke[123] in his "Introspection" has shown us that
these phenomena do not belong only to the domain of somnambulism, but
occur among non-somnambulic persons. The formation of such knowledge
seems to be arrived at in various ways: first and foremost there is the
fineness, already noted, of unconscious perceptions; then must be
emphasised the importance of the enormous suggestibility of
somnambulists. The somnambulist not only incorporates every suggestive
idea to some extent, but actually lives in the suggestion, in the person of his
doctor or observer, with that abandonment characteristic of the suggestible
hysteric. The relation of Frau Hauffe to Kerner is a striking example of this.
That in such cases there is a high degree of association-concordance can
cause no astonishment; a condition which Richet might have taken more
account of in his experiments in thought-transference. Finally there are
cases of somnambulic additional creative work which are not to be
explained solely by hyperæsthesia of the unconscious activity of the senses
and association-concordance, but presuppose a highly developed

intellectual activity of the unconscious. The deciphering of the purposive
tremors demand an extreme sensitiveness and delicacy of feeling, both
psychological and physiological, to combine the individual perceptions into
a complete unity of thought, if it is at all permissible to make an analogy
between the processes of cognition in the realm of the unconscious and the
conscious. The possibility must always be considered that in the
unconscious, feeling and concept are not clearly separated, perhaps even
are one. The intellectual elevation which certain somnambulists display in
ecstasy, though a rare thing, is none the less one that has sometimes been
observed.[124] I would designate the scheme composed by our patient as just
one of those pieces of creative work that exceed the normal intelligence. We
have already seen whence one portion of this scheme probably came. A
second source is no doubt the life-crisis of Frau Hauffe, portrayed in
Kerner's book. The external form seems to be determined by these
adventitious facts. As already observed in the presentation of the case, the
idea of dualism arises from the conversations picked up piecemeal by the
patient during those dreamy states occurring after her ecstasies. This
exhausts my knowledge of the sources of S. W.'s creations. Whence arose
the root-idea the patient is unable to say. I naturally examined occultistic
literature pertinent to the subject, and discovered a store of parallels with
her gnostic system from different centuries scattered through all kinds of
work mostly quite inaccessible to the patient. Moreover, at her youthful age,
and with her surroundings, the possibility of any such study is quite
excluded. A brief survey of the system in the light of her own explanations
shows how much intelligence was used in its construction. How highly the
intellectual work is to be estimated is a matter of opinion. In any case,
considering her youth, her mentality must be regarded as quite
extraordinary.

CHAPTER II
THE ASSOCIATION METHOD
LECTURE I[125]
When you honoured me with an invitation to lecture at Clark University, a
wish was expressed that I should speak about my methods of work, and
especially about the psychology of childhood. I hope to accomplish this
task in the following manner:—
In my first lecture I will give to you the view points of my association
methods; in my second I will discuss the significance of the familiar
constellations; while in my third lecture I shall enter more fully into the
psychology of the child.
I might confine myself exclusively to my theoretical views, but I believe it
will be better to illustrate my lectures with as many practical examples as
possible. We will therefore occupy ourselves first with the association test
which has been of great value to me both practically and theoretically. The
history of the association method in vogue in psychology, as well as the
method itself, is, of course, so familiar to you that there is no need to
enlarge upon it. For practical purposes I make use of the following formula:
—
1. head
2. green
3. water
4. to sing
5. dead
6. long
7. ship
8. to pay
9. window

10. friendly
11. to cook
12. to ask
13. cold
14. stem
15. to dance
16. village
17. lake
18. sick
19. pride
20. to cook
21. ink
22. angry
23. needle
24. to swim
25. voyage
26. blue
27. lamp
28. to sin
29. bread
30. rich
31. tree
32. to prick
33. pity
34. yellow
35. mountain
36. to die
37. salt
38. new
39. custom
40. to pray
41. money
42. foolish
43. pamphlet
44. despise
45. finger

46. expensive
47. bird
48. to fall
49. book
50. unjust
51. frog
52. to part
53. hunger
54. white
55. child
56. to take care
57. lead pencil
58. sad
59. plum
60. to marry
61. house
62. dear
63. glass
64. to quarrel
65. fur
66. big
67. carrot
68. to paint
69. part
70. old
71. flower
72. to beat
73. box
74. wild
75. family
76. to wash
77. cow
78. friend
79. luck
80. lie
81. deportment

82. narrow
83. brother
84. to fear
85. stork
86. false
87. anxiety
88. to kiss
89. bride
90. pure
91. door
92. to choose
93. hay
94. contented
95. ridicule
96. to sleep
97. month
98. nice
99. woman
100. to abuse
This formula has been constructed after many years of experience. The
words are chosen and partially arranged in such a manner as to strike easily
almost all complexes which occur in practice. As shown above, there is a
regulated mixing of the grammatical qualities of the words. For this there
are definite reasons.[126]
Before the experiment begins the test person receives the following
instruction: "Answer as quickly as possible with the first word that occurs
to your mind." This instruction is so simple that it can easily be followed.
The work itself, moreover, appears extremely easy, so that it might be
expected any one could accomplish it with the greatest facility and
promptitude. But, contrary to expectation, the behaviour is quite otherwise.
I.—AN EXAMPLE OF A NORMAL REACTION TYPE.
Stimulus Reaction Time.
Reaction.
word.
Unit 0·2 second.

Reproduction.

head
green
water
to sing
dead
long
ship
to pay
window
friendly
table
to ask
cold
stem
to dance
lake
sick
pride
to cook
ink
angry
needle
to swim
voyage
blue
lamp
to sin
bread
rich
tree
to prick

9
11
14
6
11
6
7
9
9
10
9
10
7
6
9
8
8
6
7
5
10
9
10
9
10
6
8
10
9
6
9

foot
blouse
clear
children
do not like
short
forth
bills
room
children
chair
all kinds
warm
flower
I..
Zürich
sister
people
woman
black
children
to prick
healthy
England
pretty
light
much
good
nice
green
need

part of the body
light

I, tall

room

like

people

like
people
like, necessary

II.—AN EXAMPLE OF AN HYSTERICAL REACTION TYPE.

Stimulus
word.
needle
to swim

Reaction Time.
Unit 0·2 second.
7
to sew
9
water

Reaction.

Reproduction.
ship [127]

[128]

voyage
blue
lamp

35
10
7

to ride, motion, voyager
colour
to burn

to sin

22

bread
rich[129]
brown
to prick
pity
yellow
mountain
to die
salt

10
50
6
9
12
9
8
8
15

this idea is totally
strange to me, I do not
recognize it
to eat
money, I don't know
nature
needle
feeling
colour
high
to perish
salty (laughs) I don't
know
old
good
Deity
wealth
narrow minded, restricted
paper
that is a complicated, too
foolish
hand, not only hand, but
also foot, a joint,
member, extremity
to pay (laughs)

new
custom
to pray
money
foolish
pamphlet
despise

15
10
12
10
12
10
30

finger

8

dear

14

possession
green

NaCl
as an opposite
barbaric

bird
to fall

8
30

book
unjust
frog
to part
hunger
white

6
8
11
30
10
12

child

10

to take care 14
lead pencil 8
sad

9

plum

16

to marry

27

to fly
_tomber_, I will say no
more, what do you
mean by fall?
to read
just
quack
what does that mean?
to eat
colour, everything
possible, light
little, I did not hear
well, _bébé_
attention
to draw, everything
possible can be drawn
to weep, that is not
to be
always the case
to eat a plum, pluck what
fruit
do you mean by it? Is
that symbolic?
how can you? reunion, union union, alliance

The following diagrams illustrate the reaction times in an association
experiment in four normal test-persons. The height of each column denotes
the length of the reaction time.

FIG. 4.

FIG. 5.

FIG. 6.

FIG. 7.
The succeeding diagram shows the course of the reaction time in hysterical
individuals. The light cross-hatched columns denote the places where the
test-person was unable to react (so-called failures to react).

FIG. 8.

FIG. 9.

FIG. 10.
The first thing that strikes us is the fact that many test-persons show a
marked prolongation of the reaction time. This would seem to be suggestive
of intellectual difficulties,—wrongly however, for we are often dealing with
very intelligent persons of fluent speech. The explanation lies rather in the
emotions. In order to understand the matter, comprehensively, we must bear
in mind that the association experiments cannot deal with a separated
psychic function, for any psychic occurrence is never a thing in itself, but is
always the resultant of the entire psychological past. The association
experiment, too, is not merely a method for the reproduction of separated
word couplets, but it is a kind of pastime, a conversation between
experimenter and test-person. In a certain sense it is still more than that.
Words really represent condensed actions, situations, and things. When I
give a stimulus word to the test-person, which denotes an action, it is as if I
represented to him the action itself, and asked him, "How do you behave

towards it? What do you think of it? What would you do in this situation?"
If I were a magician, I should cause the situation corresponding to the
stimulus word to appear in reality, and placing the test-person in its midst, I
should then study his manner of reaction. The result of my stimulus words
would thus undoubtedly approach infinitely nearer perfection. But as we are
not magicians, we must be contented with the linguistic substitutes for
reality; at the same time we must not forget that the stimulus word will
almost without exception conjure up its corresponding situation. All
depends on how the test-person reacts to this situation. The word "bride" or
"bridegroom" will not evoke a simple reaction in a young lady; but the
reaction will be deeply influenced by the strong feeling tones evoked, the
more so if the experimenter be a man. It thus happens that the test-person is
often unable to react quickly and smoothly to all stimulus words. There are
certain stimulus words which denote actions, situations, or things, about
which the test-person cannot think quickly and surely, and this fact is
demonstrated in the association experiments. The examples which I have
just given show an abundance of long reaction times and other disturbances.
In this case the reaction to the stimulus word is in some way impeded, that
is, the adaptation to the stimulus word is disturbed. The stimulus words
therefore act upon us just as reality acts; indeed, a person who shows such
great disturbances to the stimulus words, is in a certain sense but
imperfectly adapted to reality. Disease itself is an imperfect adaptation;
hence in this case we are dealing with something morbid in the psyche,—
with something which is either temporarily or persistently pathological in
character, that is, we are dealing with a psychoneurosis, with a functional
disturbance of the mind. This rule, however, as we shall see later, is not
without its exceptions.
Let us, in the first place, continue the discussion concerning the prolonged
reaction time. It often happens that the test-person actually does not know
what to answer to the stimulus word. He waives any reaction, and for the
moment he totally fails to obey the original instructions, and shows himself
incapable of adapting himself to the experimenter. If this phenomenon
occurs frequently in an experiment, it signifies a high degree of disturbance
in adjustment. I would call attention to the fact that it is quite indifferent
what reason the test-person gives for the refusal. Some find that too many
ideas suddenly occur to them; others, that they suffer from a deficiency of
ideas. In most cases, however, the difficulties first perceived are so

deterrent that they actually give up the whole reaction. The following
example shows a case of hysteria with many failures of reaction:—
Stimulus Reaction Time.
Reaction.
Reproduction.
word.
Unit 0·2 second.
to sing
9
nice
+[130]
dead
15
awful
?
40
the time, the journey ?
long[131]
+
ship[132]
to pay
11
money
window
10
big
high
friendly
50
a man
human
to cook
10
soup
+
ink
9
black or blue
+
angry
bad
needle
9
to sew
+
lamp
14
light
+
to sin
bread
15
to eat
+
good, convenient
+
rich[133][134] 40
yellow
18
paper
colour
mountain
10
high
+
to die
15
awful
+
25
salty
+
salt[135]
new
good, nice
custom[136]
to pray
to buy, one is able
+
money[137] 35
pamphlet
16
to write
+
[138]
22
people
+
to despise
finger
dear
12
thing
+
bird
12
sings or flies
+

In example II. we find a characteristic phenomenon. The test-person is not
content with the requirements of the instruction, that is, she is not satisfied
with one word, but reacts with many words. She apparently does more and
better than the instruction requires, but in so doing she does not fulfil the
requirements of the instruction. Thus she reacts:—custom—good—
barbaric; foolish—narrow minded—restricted; family—big—small—
everything possible.
These examples show in the first place that many other words connect
themselves with the reaction word. The test person is unable to suppress the
ideas which subsequently occur to her. She also pursues a certain tendency
which perhaps is more exactly expressed in the following reaction: new—
old—as an opposite. The addition of "as an opposite" denotes that the testperson has the desire to add something explanatory or supplementary. This
tendency is also shown in the following reaction: finger—not only hand,
also foot—a limb—member—extremity.
Here we have a whole series of supplements. It seems as if the reaction
were not sufficient for the test-person, something else must always be
added, as if what has already been said were incorrect or in some way
imperfect. This feeling is what Janet designates the "sentiment
d'incomplétude," but this by no means explains everything. I go somewhat
deeply into this phenomenon because it is very frequently met with in
neurotic individuals. It is not merely a small and unimportant subsidiary
manifestation demonstrable in an insignificant experiment, but rather an
elemental and universal manifestation which plays a rôle in other ways in
the psychic life of neurotics.
By his desire to supplement, the test-person betrays a tendency to give the
experimenter more than he wants, he actually makes great efforts to find
further mental occurrences in order finally to discover something quite
satisfactory. If we translate this observation into the psychology of everyday
life, it signifies that the test-person has a constant tendency to give to others
more feeling than is required and expected. According to Freud, this is a
sign of a reinforced object-libido, that is, it is a compensation for an inner
want of satisfaction and voidness of feeling. This elementary observation
therefore displays one of the characteristics of hysterics, namely, the
tendency to allow themselves to be carried away by everything, to attach
themselves enthusiastically to everything, and always to promise too much

and hence perform too little. Patients with this symptom are, in my
experience, always hard to deal with; at first they are enthusiastically
enamoured of the physician, for a time going so far as to accept everything
he says blindly; but they soon merge into an equally blind resistance against
him, thus rendering any educative influence absolutely impossible.
We see therefore in this type of reaction an expression of a tendency to give
more than is asked or expected. This tendency betrays itself also in other
failures to follow the instruction:—
to quarrel—angry—different things—I always quarrel at home;
to marry—how can you marry?—reunion—union;
plum—to eat—to pluck—what do you mean by it?—is it symbolic?
to sin—this idea is quite strange to me, I do not recognise it.
These reactions show that the test-person gets away altogether from the
situation of the experiment. For the instruction was, that he should answer
only with the first word which occurs to him. But here we note that the
stimulus words act with excessive strength, that they are taken as if they
were direct personal questions. The test-person entirely forgets that we deal
with mere words which stand in print before us, but finds a personal
meaning in them; he tries to divine their intention and defend himself
against them, thus altogether forgetting the original instructions.
This elementary observation discloses another common peculiarity of
hysterics, namely, that of taking everything personally, of never being able
to remain objective, and of allowing themselves to be carried away by
momentary impressions; this again shows the characteristics of the
enhanced object-libido.
Yet another sign of impeded adaptation is the often occurring repetition of
the stimulus words. The test-persons repeat the stimulus word as if they had
not heard or understood it distinctly. They repeat it just as we repeat a
difficult question in order to grasp it better before answering. This same
tendency is shown in the experiment. The questions are repeated because
the stimulus words act on hysterical individuals in much the same way as
difficult personal questions. In principle it is the same phenomenon as the
subsequent completion of the reaction.

In many experiments we observe that the same reaction constantly
reappears to the most varied stimulus words. These words seem to possess a
special reproduction tendency, and it is very interesting to examine their
relationship to the test-person. For example, I have observed a case in
which the patient repeated the word "short" a great many times and often in
places where it had no meaning. The test-person could not directly state the
reason for the repetition of the word "short." From experience I knew that
such predicates always relate either to the test-person himself or to the
person nearest to him. I assumed that in this word "short" he designated
himself, and that in this way he helped to express something very painful to
him. The test-person is of very small stature. He is the youngest of four
brothers, who, in contrast to himself, are all tall. He was always the "child"
in the family; he was nicknamed "Short" and was treated by all as the "little
one." This resulted in a total loss of self-confidence. Although he was
intelligent, and despite long study, he could not decide to present himself
for examination; he finally became impotent, and merged into a psychosis
in which, whenever he was alone, he took delight in walking about in his
room on his toes in order to appear taller. The word "short," therefore, stood
to him for a great many painful experiences. This is usually the case with
the perseverated words; they always contain something of importance for
the individual psychology of the test-person.
The signs thus far discussed are not found spread about in an arbitrary way
through the whole experiment, but are seen in very definite places, namely,
where the stimulus words strike against emotionally accentuated
complexes. This observation is the foundation of the so-called "diagnosis of
facts" (Tatbestandsdiagnostik). This method is employed to discover, by
means of an association experiment, which is the culprit among a number of
persons suspected of a crime. That this is possible I will demonstrate by the
brief recital of a concrete case.
On the 6th of February, 1908, our supervisor reported to me that a nurse
complained to her of having been robbed during the forenoon of the
previous day. The facts were as follows: The nurse kept her money,
amounting to 70 francs, in a pocket-book which she had placed in her
cupboard where she also kept her clothes. The cupboard contained two
compartments, of which one belonged to the nurse who was robbed, and the
other to the head nurse. These two nurses and a third one, who was an

intimate friend of the head nurse, slept in the room where the cupboard was.
This room was in a section which was occupied in common by six nurses
who had at all times free access to the room. Given such a state of affairs it
is not to be wondered that the supervisor shrugged her shoulders when I
asked her whom she most suspected.
Further investigation showed that on the day of the theft, the abovementioned friend of the head nurse was slightly indisposed and remained
the whole morning in the room in bed. Hence, unless she herself was the
thief, the theft could have taken place only in the afternoon. Of four other
nurses upon whom suspicion could possibly fall, there was one who
attended regularly to the cleaning of the room in question, while the
remaining three had nothing to do in it, nor was it shown that any of them
had spent any time there on the previous day.
It was therefore natural that the last three nurses should be regarded for the
time being as less implicated, so I began by subjecting the first three to the
experiment.
From the information I had obtained of the case, I knew that the cupboard
was locked but that the key was kept near by in a very conspicuous place,
that on opening the cupboard the first thing which would strike the eye was
a fur boa, and, moreover, that the pocket-book was between some linen in
an inconspicuous place. The pocket-book was of dark reddish leather, and
contained the following objects: a 50-franc banknote, a 20-franc piece,
some centimes, a small silver watch-chain, a stencil used in the lunatic
asylum to mark the kitchen utensils, and a small receipt from Dosenbach's
shoeshop in Zürich.
Besides the plaintiff, only the head nurse knew the exact particulars of the
deed, for as soon as the former missed her money she immediately asked
the head nurse to help her find it, thus the head nurse had been able to learn
the smallest details, which naturally rendered the experiment still more
difficult, for she was precisely the one most suspected. The conditions for
the experiment were better for the others, since they knew nothing
concerning the particulars of the deed, and some not even that a theft had
been committed. As critical stimulus words I selected the name of the
robbed nurse, plus the following words: cupboard, door, open, key,
yesterday, banknote, gold, 70, 50, 20, money, watch, pocket-book, chain,

silver, to hide, fur, dark reddish, leather, centimes, stencil, receipt,
Dosenbach. Besides these words which referred directly to the deed, I took
also the following, which had a special effective value: theft, to take, to
steal, suspicion, blame, court, police, to lie, to fear, to discover, to arrest,
innocent.
The objection is often made to the last species of words that they may
produce a strong affective resentment even in innocent persons, and for that
reason one cannot attribute to them any comparative value. Nevertheless, it
may always be questioned whether the affective resentment of an innocent
person will have the same effect on the association as that of a guilty one,
and that question can only be authoritatively answered by experience. Until
the contrary is demonstrated, I maintain that words of the above-mentioned
type may profitably be used.
I distributed these critical words among twice as many indifferent stimulus
words in such a manner that each critical word was followed by two
indifferent ones. As a rule it is well to follow up the critical words by
indifferent words in order that the action of the first may be clearly
distinguished. But one may also follow up one critical word by another,
especially if one wishes to bring into relief the action of the second. Thus I
placed together "darkish red" and "leather," and "chain" and "silver."
After this preparatory work I undertook the experiment with the three
above-mentioned nurses. Following the order of the experiment, I shall
denote the friend of the head nurse by the letter A, the head nurse by B, and
the nurse who attended to the cleaning of the room by C. As examinations
of this kind can be rendered into a foreign tongue only with the greatest
difficulty, I will content myself with presenting the general results, and with
giving some examples. I first undertook the experiment with A, and judging
by the circumstances she appeared only slightly moved. B was next
examined; she showed marked excitement, her pulse being 120 per minute
immediately after the experiment. The last to be examined was C. She was
the most tranquil of the three; she displayed but little embarrassment, and
only in the course of the experiment did it occur to her that she was
suspected of stealing, a fact which manifestly disturbed her towards the end
of the experiment.

The general impression from the examination spoke strongly against the
head nurse B. It seemed to me that she evinced a very "suspicious," or I
might almost say, "impudent" countenance. With the definite idea of finding
in her the guilty one I set about adding up the results. You will see that I
was wrong in my surmise and that the test proved my error.
One can make use of many special methods of computing, but they are not
all equally good and equally exact. (One must always resort to calculation,
as appearances are enormously deceptive.) The method which is most to be
recommended is that of the probable average of the reaction time. It shows
at a glance the difficulties which the person in the experiment had to
overcome in the reaction.
The technique of this calculation is very simple. The probable average is the
middle number of the various reaction times arranged in a series. The
reaction times are, for example,[139] placed in the following manner: 5, 5, 5,
7, 7, 7, 7, 8, 9, 9, 9, 12, 13, 14. The number found in the middle (8) is the
probable average of this series.
The probable averages of the reaction are:
A B C
10·0 12·0 13·5.
No conclusions can be drawn from this result. But the average reaction
times calculated separately for the indifferent reactions, for the critical, and
for those immediately following the critical (post-critical) are more
interesting.
From this example we see that whereas A has the shortest reaction time for
the indifferent reactions, she shows in comparison to the other two persons
of the experiment, the longest time for the critical reactions.
THE PROBABLE AVERAGE OF THE REACTION TIME.

for
Indifferent reactions
Critical reactions
Post-critical reactions

A B C
10·0 11·0 12·0
16·0 13·0 15·0
10·0 11·0 13·0

The difference between the reaction times, let us say between the indifferent
and the critical, is 6 for A, 2 for B, and 3 for C, that is, it is more than
double for A when compared with the other two persons.
In the same way we can calculate how many complex indicators there are
on an average for the indifferent, critical, etc., reactions.
THE AVERAGE COMPLEX-INDICATORS FOR EACH REACTION.
for
Indifferent reactions
Critical reactions
Post-critical reactions

A B C
0·6 0·9 0·8
1·3 0·9 1·2
0·6 1·0 0·8

The difference between the indifferent and critical reactions for A = 0·7, for
B = 0, for C = 0·4. A is again the highest.
Another question to consider is, the proportion of imperfect reactions in
each case.
The result for A = 34%, for B = 28%, and for C = 30%.
Here, too, A reaches the highest value, and in this, I believe, we see the
characteristic moment of the guilt-complex in A. I am, however, unable to
explain here circumstantially the reasons why I maintain that memory
errors are related to an emotional complex, as this would lead me beyond
the limits of the present work. I therefore refer the reader to my work
"Ueber die Reproductionsstörrungen im Associationsexperiment" (IX
Beitrag der Diagnost. Associat. Studien).[140]
As it often happens that an association of strong feeling tone produces in
the experiment a perseveration, with the result that not only the critical
association, but also two or three successive associations are imperfectly
reproduced, it will be very interesting to see how many imperfect

reproductions are so arranged in the series in our cases. The result of
computation shows that the imperfect reproductions thus arranged in series
are for A 64·7%, for B 55·5%, and for C 30·0%.
Again we find that A has the greatest percentage. To be sure, this may
partially depend on the fact that A also possesses the greatest number of
imperfect reproductions. Given a small number of reactions, it is usual that
the greater the total number of the same, the more the imperfect reactions
will occur in groups. But this cannot account for the high proportion in our
case, where, on the other hand, B and C have not a much smaller number of
imperfect reactions when compared to A. It is significant that C with her
slight emotions during the experiment shows the minimum of imperfect
reproductions arranged in series.
As imperfect reproductions are also complex indicators, it is necessary to
see how they distribute themselves in respect to the indifferent, critical, etc.,
reactions.
It is hardly necessary to bring into prominence the differences between the
indifferent and the critical reactions of the various subjects as shown by the
resulting numbers of the table. In this respect, too, A occupies first place.
IMPERFECT REPRODUCTIONS WHICH OCCUR.
in
Indifferent reactions
Critical reactions
Post-critical reactions

A B C
10 12 11
19 9 12
5 7 7

Naturally, here, too, there is a probability that the greater the number of the
imperfect reproductions the greater is their number in the critical reactions.
If we suppose that the imperfect reproductions are distributed regularly and
without choice, among all the reactions, there will be a greater number of
them for A (in comparison with B and C) even as reactions to critical
words, since A has the greater number of imperfect reproductions.
Admitting such a uniform distribution of the imperfect reproductions, it is
easy to calculate how many we ought to expect to belong to each individual
kind of reaction.

From this calculation it appears that the disturbances of reproductions
which concern the critical reactions for A greatly surpass the number
expected, for C they are 0·9 higher, while for B they are lower.
IMPERFECT REPRODUCTIONS.
Which may be expected
Which really occur
PostPostIndifferent Critical
Indifferent Critical
For
critical
critical
Reactions. Reactions.
Reactions. Reactions.
Reactions.
Reactions.
A
11·2
12·5
10·2
10
19
5
B
9·2
10·3
8·4
12
9
7
C
9·9
11·1
9·0
11
12
7
All this points to the fact that in the subject A the critical stimulus words
acted with the greatest intensity, and hence the greatest suspicion falls on A.
Practically relying on the test one may assume the probability of this
person's guilt. The same evening A made a complete confession of the theft,
and thus the success of the experiment was confirmed.
Such a result is undoubtedly of scientific interest and worthy of serious
consideration. There is much in experimental psychology which is of less
use than the material exemplified in this test. Putting the theoretical interest
altogether aside, we have here something that is not to be despised from a
practical point of view, to wit, a culprit has been brought to light in a much
easier and shorter way than is customary. What has been possible once or
twice ought to be possible again, and it is well worth while to investigate
some means of rendering the method increasingly capable of rapid and sure
results.
This application of the experiment shows that it is possible to strike a
concealed, indeed an unconscious complex by means of a stimulus word;
and conversely we may assume with great certainty that behind a reaction
which shows a complex indicator there is a hidden complex, even though
the test-person strongly denies it. One must get rid of the idea that educated
and intelligent test-persons are able to see and admit their own complexes.
Every human mind contains much that is unacknowledged and hence
unconscious as such; and no one can boast that he stands completely above

his complexes. Those who persist in maintaining that they can, are not
aware of the spectacles upon their noses.
It has long been thought that the association experiment enables one to
distinguish certain intellectual types. That is not the case. The experiment
does not give us any particular insight into the purely intellectual, but rather
into the emotional processes. To be sure we can erect certain types of
reaction; they are not, however, based on intellectual peculiarities, but
depend entirely on the proportionate emotional states. Educated testpersons usually show superficial and linguistically deep-rooted
associations, whereas the uneducated form more valuable associations and
often of ingenious significance. This behaviour would be paradoxical from
an intellectual view-point. The meaningful associations of the uneducated
are not really the product of intellectual thinking, but are simply the results
of a special emotional state. The whole thing is more important to the
uneducated, his emotion is greater, and for that reason he pays more
attention to the experiment than the educated person, and his associations
are therefore more significant. Apart from those determined by education,
we have to consider three principal individual types:
1. An objective type with undisturbed reactions.
2. A so-called complex-type with many disturbances in the experiment
occasioned by the constellation of a complex.
3. A so-called definition-type. The peculiarity of this type consists in
the fact that the reaction always gives an explanation or a definition of
the content of the stimulus word; e.g.:
apple,—a tree-fruit;
table,—a piece of household furniture;
to promenade,—an activity;
father,—chief of the family.
This type is chiefly found in stupid persons, and it is therefore quite usual in
imbecility. But it can also be found in persons who are not really stupid, but
who do not wish to be taken as stupid. Thus a young student from whom
associations were taken by an older intelligent woman student reacted

altogether with definitions. The test-person was of the opinion that it was an
examination in intelligence, and therefore directed most of his attention to
the significance of the stimulus words; his associations, therefore, looked
like those of an idiot. All idiots, however, do not react with definitions;
probably only those react in this way who would like to appear smarter than
they are, that is, those to whom their stupidity is painful. I call this
widespread complex the "intelligence-complex." A normal test-person
reacts in a most overdrawn manner as follows:
anxiety—heart anguish;
to kiss—love's unfolding;
to kiss—perception of friendship.
This type gives a constrained and unnatural impression. The test-persons
wish to be more than they are, they wish to exert more influence than they
really have. Hence we see that persons with an intelligence-complex are
usually unnatural and constrained; that they are always somewhat stilted, or
flowery; they show a predilection for complicated foreign words, highsounding quotations, and other intellectual ornaments. In this way they wish
to influence their fellow-beings, they wish to impress others with their
apparent education and intelligence, and thus to compensate for their
painful feeling of stupidity. The definition-type is closely related to the
predicate-type, or, to express it more precisely, to the predicate-type
expressing personal judgment (Wertprädikattypus). For example:
flower—pretty;
money—convenient;
animal—ugly;
knife—dangerous;
death—ghastly.
In the definition type the intellectual significance of the stimulus word is
rendered prominent, but in the predicate type its emotional significance.
There are predicate-types which show great exaggeration where reactions
such as the following appear:
piano—horrible;
to sing—heavenly;

mother—ardently loved;
father—something good, nice, holy.
In the definition-type an absolutely intellectual make-up is manifested or
rather simulated, but here there is a very emotional one. Yet, just as the
definition-type really conceals a lack of intelligence, so the excessive
emotional expression conceals or overcompensates an emotional deficiency.
This conclusion is very interestingly illustrated by the following discovery:
—On investigating the influence of the familiar milieus on the associationtype it was found that young people seldom possess a predicate-type, but
that, on the other hand, the predicate-type increases in frequency with
advancing age. In women the increase of the predicate-type begins a little
after the 40th year, and in men after the 60th. That is the precise time when,
owing to the deficiency of sexuality, there actually occurs considerable
emotional loss. If a test-person evinces a distinct predicate-type, it may
always be inferred that a marked internal emotional deficiency is thereby
compensated. Still, one cannot reason conversely, namely, that an inner
emotional deficiency must produce a predicate-type, no more than that
idiocy directly produces a definition-type. A predicate-type can also betray
itself through the external behaviour, as, for example, through a particular
affectation, enthusiastic exclamations, an embellished behaviour, and the
constrained sounding language so often observed in society.
The complex-type shows no particular tendency except the concealment of
a complex, whereas the definition and predicate types betray a positive
tendency to exert in some way a definite influence on the experimenter. But
whereas the definition-type tends to bring to light its intelligence, the
predicate-type displays its emotion. I need hardly add of what importance
such determinations are for the diagnosis of character.
After finishing an association experiment I usually add another of a
different kind, the so-called reproduction experiment. I repeat the same
stimulus words and ask the test-persons whether they still remember their
former reactions. In many instances the memory fails, and as experience
shows, these locations are stimulus words which touched an emotionally
accentuated complex, or stimulus words immediately following such
critical words.

This phenomenon has been designated as paradoxical and contrary to all
experience. For it is known that emotionally accentuated things are better
retained in memory than indifferent things. This is quite true, but it does not
hold for the linguistic expression of an emotionally accentuated content. On
the contrary, one very easily forgets what he has said under emotion, one is
even apt to contradict himself about it. Indeed, the efficacy of crossexaminations in court depends on this fact. The reproduction method
therefore serves to render still more prominent the complex stimulus. In
normal persons we usually find a limited number of false reproductions,
seldom more than 19-20 per cent., while in abnormal persons, especially in
hysterics, we often find from 20-40 per cent. of false reproductions. The
reproduction certainty is therefore in certain cases a measure for the
emotivity of the test-person.
By far the larger number of neurotics show a pronounced tendency to cover
up their intimate affairs in impenetrable darkness, even from the doctor, so
that he finds it very difficult to form a proper picture of the patient's
psychology. In such cases I am greatly assisted by the association
experiment. When the experiment is finished, I first look over the general
course of the reaction times. I see a great many very prolonged intervals;
this means that the patient can only adjust himself with difficulty, that his
psychological functions proceed with marked internal frictions with
resistances. The greater number of neurotics react only under great and very
definite resistances; there are, however, others in whom the average
reaction times are as short as in the normal, and in whom the other complex
indicators are lacking, but, despite that fact, they undoubtedly present
neurotic symptoms. These rare cases are especially found among very
intelligent and educated persons, chronic patients who, after many years of
practice, have learned to control their outward behaviour and therefore
outwardly display very little if any trace of their neuroses. The superficial
observer would take them for normal, yet in some places they show
disturbances which betray the repressed complex.
After examining the reaction times I turn my attention to the type of the
association to ascertain with what type I am dealing. If it is a predicate-type
I draw the conclusions which I have detailed above; if it is a complex type I
try to ascertain the nature of the complex. With the necessary experience

one can readily emancipate one's judgment from the test-person's
statements and almost without any previous knowledge of the test-persons
it is possible under certain circumstances to read the most intimate
complexes from the results of the experiment. I look at first for the
reproduction words and put them together, and then I look for the stimulus
words which show the greatest disturbances. In many cases merely
assorting these words suffices to unearth the complex. In some cases it is
necessary to put a question here and there. The matter is well illustrated by
the following concrete example:
It concerns an educated woman of 30 years of age, married three years
previously. Since her marriage she has suffered from episodic excitement in
which she is violently jealous of her husband. The marriage is a happy one
in every other respect, and it should be noted that the husband gives no
cause for the jealousy. The patient is sure that she loves him and that her
excited states are groundless. She cannot imagine whence these excited
states originate, and feels quite perplexed over them. It is to be noted that
she is a catholic and has been brought up religiously, while her husband is a
protestant. This difference of religion did not admittedly play any part. A
more thorough anamnesis showed the existence of an extreme prudishness.
Thus, for example, no one was allowed to talk in the patient's presence
about her sister's childbirth, because the sexual moment suggested therein
caused her the greatest excitement. She always undressed in the adjoining
room and never in her husband's presence, etc. At the age of 27 she was
supposed to have had no idea how children were born. The associations
gave the results shown in the accompanying chart.
The stimulus words characterised by marked disturbances are the following:
yellow, to pray, to separate, to marry, to quarrel, old, family, happiness,
false, fear, to kiss, bride, to choose, contented. The strongest disturbances
are found in the following stimulus words: to pray, to marry, happiness,
false, fear, and contented. These words, therefore, more than any others,
seem to strike the complex. The conclusions that can be drawn from this is
that she is not indifferent to the fact that her husband is a protestant, that she
again thinks of praying, believes there is something wrong with marriage,
that she is false, entertains fancies of faithlessness, is afraid (of the
husband? of the future?), she is not contented with her choice (to choose)
and she thinks of separation. The patient therefore has a separation

complex, for she is very discontented with her married life. When I told her
this result she was affected and at first attempted to deny it, then to mince
over it, but finally she admitted everything I said and added more. She
reproduced a large number of fancies of faithlessness, reproaches against
her husband, etc. Her prudishness and jealousy were merely a projection of
her own sexual wishes on her husband. Because she was faithless in her
fancies and did not admit it to herself she was jealous of her husband.

For the stimulus words corresponding to the numbers, see the list on
pages 94 and 95.
The blue columns represent failures of reproductions, the green ones
represent repetitions of stimulus words, and the yellow columns show
those associations in which the patient either laughed or made
mistakes, using many words instead of one. The height of the columns
represent the length of the reaction time.
[To face p. 118.
It is impossible in a lecture to give a review of all the manifold uses of the
association experiment. I must content myself with having demonstrated to
you a few of its chief uses.

LECTURE II
THE FAMILIAL CONSTELLATIONS
Ladies and Gentlemen: As you have seen, there are manifold ways in which
the association experiment may be employed in practical psychology. I

should like to speak to you to-day about another use of this experiment
which is primarily of theoretical significance. My pupil, Miss Fürst, M.D.,
made the following researches: she applied the association experiment to 24
families, consisting altogether of 100 test-persons; the resulting material
amounted to 22,200 associations. This material was elaborated in the
following manner: Fifteen separate groups were formed according to
logical-linguistic standards, and the associations were arranged as follows:
Husband Wife Difference
I.Co-ordination
6·5
0·5
6
II.Sub and supraordination
7
—
7
III.Contrast
—
—
—
IV.Predicate expressing a personal judgment 8·5
95·0
86·5
V.Simple predicate
21·0
3·5
17·5
Relations of the verb to the
VI.
15·5
0·5
15·0
subject or complement
VII.Designation of time, etc.
11·0
—
11·0
VIII.Definition
11·0
—
11·0
IX.Coexistence
1·5
—
1·5
X.Identity
0·5
0·5
—
XI.Motor-speech combination
12·0
—
12·0
XII.Composition of words
—
—
—
XIII.Completion of words
—
—
—
XIV.Clang associations
—
—
—
XV.Defective reactions
—
—
—
Total
—
—
173·5
173·5
Average difference —— = 11·5
15
As can be seen from this example, I utilise the difference to demonstrate the
degree of the analogy. In order to find a basis for the sum of the
resemblance I have calculated the differences among all Dr. Fürst's testpersons, not related among themselves, by comparing every female testperson with all the other unrelated females; the same has been done for the
male test-persons.

The most marked difference is found in those cases where the two testpersons compared have no associative quality in common. All the groups
are calculated in percentages, the greatest difference possible being 200/15
= 13·3 per cent.
I. The average difference of male unrelated test-persons is 5·9 per cent., and
that of females of the same group is 6 per cent.
II. The average difference between male related test-persons is 4·1 per cent.,
and that between female related tests-persons is 3·8 per cent. From these
numbers we see that relatives show a tendency to agreement in the reaction
type.
III. Difference between fathers and children = 4·2.
"
" mothers " " = 3·5.
The reaction types of children come nearer to the type of the mother than to
the father.
IV. Difference between fathers and their sons
"
"
"
" " daughters
"
"
mothers " " sons
"
"
"
" " daughters

= 3·1.
= 4·9.
= 4·7.
= 3·0.

FIG. 11.
Tracing A. —— father; ..... mother; ++++ daughter.
I. Assoc. by co-ordination; II. sub and supraordination; III. contrast,
etc. (see previous page).
V. Difference between brothers = 4·7.
"
"
sisters = 5·1.
If the married sisters are omitted from the comparison we get the following
result:
Difference of unmarried sisters = 3·8. These observations show distinctly
that marriage destroys more or less the original agreement, as the husband
belongs to a different type.
Difference between unmarried brothers = 4·8.

Marriage seems to exert no influence on the association forms in men.
Nevertheless, the material which we have at our disposal is not as yet
enough to allow us to draw definite conclusions.
VI. Difference between husband and wife = 4·7.

FIG. 12.
Tracing B. —— husband; ..... wife.
This number sums up inadequately the different and very unequal values;
that is to say, there are some cases which show extreme difference and some
which show marked concordance.
The different results are shown in the tracings (Figs. 11-15).
In the tracings I have marked the number of associations of each quality
perpendicularly in percentages. The Roman letters written horizontally
represent the forms of association indicated in the above tables.
Tracing A. The father (black line) shows an objective type, while the
mother and daughter show the pure predicate type with a pronounced
subjective tendency.

Tracing B. The husband and wife agree well in the predicate objective type,
the predicate subjective being somewhat more numerous in the wife.
Tracing C. A very nice agreement between a father and his two daughters.

FIG. 13.
Tracing C. —— father; ..... 1st daughter; ++++ 2nd daughter.
Tracing D. Two sisters living together. The dotted line represents the
married sister.

FIG. 14.
Tracing D. —— single sister; ..... married sister.
Tracing E. Husband and wife. The wife is a sister of the two women of
tracing D. She approaches very closely to the type of her husband. Her
tracing is the direct opposite of that of her sisters.

FIG. 15.
Tracing E. —— husband; ..... wife.
The similarity of the associations is often very extraordinary. I will
reproduce here the associations of a mother and daughter.
Stimulus Word.
Mother.
Daughter.
to pay attention diligent pupil
pupil
law
command of God Moses
dear
child
father and mother
great
God
father
potato
bulbous root
bulbous root
family
many persons
5 persons
strange
traveller
traveller
brother
dear to me
dear
to kiss
mother
mother
burn
great pain
painful
door
wide
big
hay
dry
dry

month
air
coal
fruit
merry

many days
cool
sooty
sweet
happy child

31 days
moist
black
sweet
child

One might indeed think that in this experiment, where full scope is given to
chance, individuality would become a factor of the utmost importance, and
that therefore one might expect a very great diversity and lawlessness of
associations. But as we see the opposite is the case. Thus the daughter lives
contentedly in the same circle of ideas as her mother, not only in her
thought but in her form of expression; indeed, she even uses the same
words. What could be regarded as more inconsequent, inconstant, and
lawless than a fancy, a rapidly passing thought? It is not lawless, however,
neither is it free, but closely determined within the limits of the milieu. If,
therefore, even the superficial and manifestly most inconsequent formations
of the intellect are altogether subject to the milieu-constellation, what must
we not expect for the more important conditions of the mind, for the
emotions, wishes, hopes, and intentions? Let us consider a concrete
example, illustrated by tracing A.
The mother is 45 years old and the daughter 16 years. Both have a very
distinct predicate-type expressing personal judgment, both differ from the
father in the most striking manner. The father is a drunkard and a
demoralised creature. We can thus readily understand that his wife
experiences an emotional voidness which she naturally betrays by her
enhanced predicate-type. The same causes cannot, however, operate in the
case of the daughter, for, in the first place, she is not married to a drunkard,
and, in the second, life with all its hopes and promises still lies before her. It
is distinctly unnatural for the daughter to show an extreme predicate-type
expressing personal judgment. She responds to the stimuli of the
environment just like her mother. But whereas in the mother the type is in a
way a natural consequence of her unhappy condition of life, this condition
is entirely lacking in the daughter. The daughter simply imitates the mother;
she merely appears like the mother. Let us consider what this can signify for
a young girl. If a young girl reacts to the world like an old woman,
disappointed in life, this at once shows unnaturalness and constraint. But
more serious consequences are possible. As you know the predicate-type is

a manifestation of intensive emotions; the emotions are always involved.
Thus we cannot prevent ourselves from responding inwardly, at least, to the
feelings and passions of our immediate environment; we allow ourselves to
be infected and carried away by it. Originally the effects and their physical
manifestations had a biological significance; i.e. they were a protective
mechanism for the individual and the whole herd. If we manifest emotions,
we can with certainty expect to receive emotions in return. That is the
feeling of the predicate-type. What the 45-year-old woman lacks in
emotions, i.e. in love in her marriage relations she seeks to obtain in the
outside world, and for that reason she is an ardent participant in the
Christian Science movement. If the daughter imitates this situation she
copies her mother, she seeks to obtain emotions from the outside. But for a
girl of sixteen such an emotional state is, to say the least, quite dangerous;
like her mother, she reacts to her environment as a sufferer soliciting
sympathy. Such an emotional state is no longer dangerous in the mother, but
for obvious reasons it is quite dangerous in the daughter. Once freed from
her father and mother she will be like her mother, i.e. she will be a suffering
woman craving for inner gratification. She will thus be exposed to the great
danger of falling a victim to brutality and of marrying a brute and inebriate
like her father.
This conception is of importance in the consideration of the influence of
environment and education. The example shows what passes over from the
mother to the child. It is not the good and pious precepts, nor is it any other
inculcation of pedagogic truths that have a moulding influence upon the
character of the developing child, but what most influences him is the
peculiarly affective state which is totally unknown to his parents and
educators. The concealed discord between the parents, the secret worry, the
repressed hidden wishes, all these produce in the individual a certain
affective state with its objective signs which slowly but surely, though
unconsciously, works its way into the child's mind, producing therein the
same conditions and hence the same reactions to external stimuli. We know
the depressing effect mournful and melancholic persons have upon us. A
restless and nervous individual infects his surroundings with unrest and
dissatisfaction, a grumbler with his discontent, etc. Since grown-up persons
are so sensitive to surrounding influences, we should certainly expect this to
be even more noticeable among children, whose minds are as soft and
plastic as wax. The father and mother impress deeply into the child's mind

the seal of their personality; the more sensitive and mouldable the child the
deeper is the impression. Thus things that are never even spoken about are
reflected in the child. The child imitates the gesture, and just as the gesture
of the parent is the expression of an emotional state, so in turn the gesture
gradually produces in the child a similar feeling, as it feels itself, so to
speak, into the gesture. Just as the parents adapt themselves to the world, so
does the child. At the age of puberty when it begins to free itself from the
spell of the family, it enters into life with, so to say, a surface adaptation
entirely in keeping with that of the father and mother. The frequent and
often very deep depressions of puberty emanate from this; they are
symptoms which are rooted in the difficulty of new adjustment. The
youthful person at first tries to separate himself as much as possible from
his family; he may even estrange himself from it, but inwardly this only ties
him the more firmly to the parental image. I cite the case of a young
neurotic who ran away from his parents; he was estranged from, and almost
hostile to them, but he admitted to me that he possessed a special sanctum;
it was a strong box containing his old childhood books, old dried flowers,
stones, and even small bottles of water from the well at his home and from
a river along which he walked with his parents, etc.
The first attempts to assume friendship and love are constellated in the
strongest manner possible by the relation to parents, and here one can
usually observe how powerful are the influences of the familiar
constellations. It is not rare, for instance, for a healthy man whose mother
was hysterical to marry a hysteric, or for the daughter of an alcoholic to
choose an alcoholic for her husband. I was once consulted by an intelligent
and educated young woman of twenty-six who suffered from a peculiar
symptom. She thought that her eyes now and then took on a strange
expression which exerted a disagreeable influence on men. If she then
looked at a man he became self-conscious, turned away and said something
rapidly to his neighbour, at which both were either embarrassed or inclined
to laugh. The patient was convinced that her look excited indecent thoughts
in the men. It was impossible to convince her of the falsity of her
conviction. This symptom immediately aroused in me the suspicion that I
dealt with a case of paranoia rather than with a neurosis. But as was shown
only three days later by the further course of the treatment, I was mistaken,
for the symptom promptly disappeared after it had been explained by
analysis. It originated in the following manner: The lady had a lover who

deserted her in a very marked manner. She felt utterly forsaken; she
withdrew from all society and pleasure, and entertained suicidal ideas. In
her seclusion there accumulated unadmitted and repressed erotic wishes
which she unconsciously projected on men whenever she was in their
company. This gave rise to the conviction that her look excited erotic
wishes in men. Further investigation showed that her deserting lover was a
lunatic, which she had not apparently observed. I expressed my surprise at
her unsuitable choice, and added that she must have had a certain
predilection for loving mentally abnormal persons. This she denied, stating
that she had once before been engaged to be married to a normal man. He,
too, deserted her; and on further investigation it was found that he, too, had
been in an insane asylum shortly before,—another lunatic! This seemed to
me to confirm with sufficient certainty my belief that she had an
unconscious tendency to choose insane persons. Whence originated this
strange taste? Her father was an eccentric character, and in later years
entirely estranged from his family. Her whole love had therefore been
turned away from her father to a brother eight years her senior; him she
loved and honoured as a father, and this brother became hopelessly insane
at the age of fourteen. That was apparently the model from which the
patient could never free herself, after which she chose her lovers, and
through which she had to become unhappy. Her neurosis which gave the
impression of insanity, probably originated from this infantile model. We
must take into consideration that we are dealing in this case with a highly
educated and intelligent lady, who did not pass carelessly over her mental
experiences, who indeed reflected much over her unhappiness, without,
however, having any idea whence her misfortune originated.
There are things which unconsciously appear to us as a matter of course,
and it is for this reason that we do not see them truly, but attribute
everything to the so-called congenital character. I could cite any number of
examples of this kind. Every patient furnishes contributions to this subject
of the determination of destiny through the influence of the familiar milieu.
In every neurotic we see how the constellation of the infantile milieu
influences not only the character of the neurosis, but also life's destiny, even
in its minute details. The unhappy choice of a profession, and innumerable
matrimonial failures can be traced to this constellation. There are, however,
cases where the profession has been well chosen, where the husband or wife
leaves nothing to be desired, and where still the person does not feel well

but works and lives under constant difficulties. Such cases often appear
under the guise of chronic neurasthenia. Here the difficulty is due to the fact
that the mind is unconsciously split into two parts of divergent tendencies
which are impeding each other; one part lives with the husband or with the
profession, while the other lives unconsciously in the past with the father or
mother. I have treated a lady who, after suffering many years from a severe
neurosis, merged into a dementia præcox. The neurotic affection began with
her marriage. This lady's husband was kind, educated, well to do, and in
every respect suitable for her; his character showed nothing that would in
any way interfere with a happy marriage. The marriage was nevertheless
unhappy, all congenial companionship being excluded because the wife was
neurotic.
The important heuristic axiom of every psychoanalysis reads as follows: If
a person develops a neurosis this neurosis contains the counter-argument
against the relation of the patient to the individual with whom he is most
intimately connected. A neurosis in the husband loudly proclaims that he
has intensive resistances and contrary tendencies against his wife; if the
wife has a neurosis she has a tendency which diverges from her husband. If
the person is unmarried the neurosis is then directed against the lover or the
sweetheart or against the parents. Every neurotic naturally strives against
this relentless formulation of the content of his neurosis, and he often
refuses to recognise it at any cost, but still it is always justified. To be sure,
the conflict is not on the surface, but must generally be revealed through a
painstaking psychoanalysis.
The history of our patient reads as follows:
The father had a powerful personality. She was his favourite daughter, and
entertained for him a boundless veneration. At the age of seventeen she for
the first time fell in love with a young man. At that time she twice dreamt
the same dream, the impression of which never left her in all her later years;
she even imputed a mystic significance to it, and often recalled it with
religious dread. In the dream she saw a tall, masculine figure with a very
beautiful white beard; at this sight she was permeated with a feeling of awe
and delight as if she experienced the presence of God Himself. This dream
made the deepest impression on her, and she was constrained to think of it
again and again. The love affair of that period proved to be one of little
warmth, and was soon given up. Later the patient married her present

husband. Though she loved her husband she was led continually to compare
him with her deceased father; this comparison always proved unfavourable
to her husband. Whatever the husband said, intended, or did, was subjected
to this standard and always with the same result: "My father would have
done all this better and differently." Our patient's life with her husband was
not happy, she could neither respect nor love him sufficiently; she was
inwardly dissatisfied. She gradually developed a fervent piety, and at the
same time violent hysterical symptoms supervened. She began by going
into raptures now over this and now over that clergyman; she was looking
everywhere for a spiritual friend, and estranged herself more and more from
her husband. The mental trouble manifested itself about ten years after
marriage. In her diseased state she refused to have anything to do with her
husband and child; she imagined herself pregnant by another man. In brief,
the resistances against her husband, which hitherto had been laboriously
repressed, came out quite openly, and among other things manifested
themselves in insults of the gravest kind directed against him.
In this case we see how a neurosis appeared, as it were, at the moment of
marriage, i.e. this neurosis expresses the counter-argument against the
husband. What is the counter-argument? The counter-argument is the father
of the patient, for she verified her belief daily that her husband was not the
equal of her father. When the patient first fell in love there had appeared a
symptom in the form of an extremely impressive dream or vision. She saw
the man with the very beautiful white beard. Who was this man? On
directing her attention to the beautiful white beard she immediately
recognised the phantom. It was of course her father. Thus every time the
patient merged into a love affair the picture of her father inopportunely
appeared and prevented her from adjusting herself psychologically to her
husband.
I purposely chose this case as an illustration because it is simple, obvious,
and quite typical of many marriages which are crippled through the neurosis
of the wife. The cause of the unhappiness always lies in a too firm
attachment to the parents. The infantile relationship has not been given up.
We find here one of the most important tasks of pedagogy, namely, the
solution of the problem how to free the growing individual from his
unconscious attachments to the influences of the infantile milieu, in such a
manner that he may retain whatever there is in it that is suitable and reject

whatever is unsuitable. To solve this difficult question on the part of the
child seems to me impossible at present. We know as yet too little about the
child's emotional processes. The first and only real contribution to the
literature on this subject has in fact appeared during the present year. It is
the analysis of a five-year-old boy published by Freud.
The difficulties on the part of the child are very great. They should not,
however, be so great on the part of the parents. In many ways the parents
could manage the love of children more carefully, more indulgently, and
more intelligently. The sins committed against favourite children by the
undue love of the parents could perhaps be avoided through a wider
knowledge of the child's mind. For many reasons I find it impossible to say
anything of general validity concerning the bringing up of children as it is
affected by this problem. We are as yet very far from general prescriptions
and rules; indeed we are still in the realm of casuistry. Unfortunately, our
knowledge of the finer mental processes in the child is so meagre that we
are not yet in any position to say where the greatest trouble lies, whether in
the parents, in the child, or in the conception of the milieu. Only
psychoanalyses of the kind that Professor Freud has published in the
Jahrbuch, 1909,[141] will help us out of this difficulty. Such comprehensive
and profound observations should act as a strong inducement to all teachers
to occupy themselves with Freud's psychology. This psychology offers
more values for practical pedagogy than the physiological psychology of
the present.

LECTURE III
EXPERIENCES CONCERNING THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF
THE CHILD[142]
Ladies and Gentlemen: In our last lecture we saw how important the
emotional processes of childhood are for later life. In to-day's lecture I
should like to give you some insight into the psychic life of the child
through the analysis of a four-year-old girl. It is much to be regretted that
there are few among you who have had the opportunity of reading the

analysis of "Little Hans" (Kleiner Hans), which was published by Freud
during the current year.[143] I ought to begin by giving you the content of
that analysis, so that you might be in a position to compare Freud's results
with those obtained by me, and observe the marked, and astonishing
similarity between the unconscious creations of the two children. Without a
knowledge of the fundamental analysis of Freud, much in the report of the
following case will appear strange, incomprehensible, and perhaps
unacceptable to you. I beg you, however, to defer your final judgment and
to enter upon the consideration of these new subjects with a kindly
disposition, for such pioneer work in virgin soil requires not only the
greatest patience on the part of the investigator, but also the unprejudiced
attention of his audience. Because the Freudian investigations apparently
involve a discussion of the most intimate secrets of sexuality many people
have had a feeling of repulsion against them, and have therefore rejected
everything as a matter of course without any real disproof. This,
unfortunately, has almost always been the fate of Freud's doctrines up to the
present. One must not come to the consideration of these matters with the
firm conviction that they do not exist, for it may easily happen that for the
prejudiced they really do not exist. One should perhaps assume the author's
point of view for the moment and investigate these phenomena under his
guidance. Only in this way can the correctness or otherwise of our
observations be affirmed. We may err, as all human beings err. But the
continual holding up to us of our mistakes—perhaps they are worse than
mistakes—does not help us to see things more distinctly. We should prefer
to see wherein we err. That should be demonstrated to us in our own sphere
of experience. Thus far, however, no one has succeeded in meeting us on
our own ground, nor in giving us a different conception of the things which
we ourselves see. We still have to complain that our critics persist in
maintaining complete ignorance about the matters in question. The only
reason for this is that they have never taken the trouble to become
thoroughly acquainted with our method; had they done this they would have
understood us.
The little girl to whose sagacity and intellectual vivacity we are indebted for
the following observations is a healthy, lively child of emotional
temperament. She has never been seriously ill, and never, even in the realm
of the nervous system, had there been observed any symptoms prior to this

investigation. In the report which follows we shall have to waive any
connected description, for it is made up of anecdotes which treat of one
experience out of a whole cycle of similar ones, and which cannot,
therefore, be arranged scientifically and systematically, but must rather be
described somewhat in the form of a story. We cannot as yet dispense with
this manner of description in our analytical psychology, for we are still far
from being able in all cases to separate with unerring certainty what is
curious from what is typical.
When the little daughter, whom we will call Anna, was about three years
old, she once had the following conversation with her grandmother:
Anna: "Grandma, why are your eyes so dim?"
Grandma: "Because I am old."
A.: "But you will become young again."
G.: "No, do you know, I shall become older and older, and then I shall
die."
A.: "Well, and then?"
G.: "Then I shall be an angel."
A.: "And then will you be a little baby again?"
The child found here a welcome opportunity for the provisional solution of
a problem. For some time before she had been in the habit of asking her
mother whether she would ever have a living doll, a little child, a little
brother. This naturally included the question as to the origin of children. As
such questions appeared only spontaneously and indirectly, the parents
attached no significance to them, but responded to them as lightly and in
appearance as carelessly as the child seemed to ask them. Thus she once
received from her father the pretty story that children are brought by the
stork. Anna had already heard somewhere a more serious version, namely,
that children, are little angels living in heaven, and are brought from heaven
by the stork. This theory seems to have become the starting point for the
investigating activity of the little one. From the conversation with the

grandmother it could be seen that this theory was capable of wide
application, namely, it not only solved in a comforting manner the painful
idea of parting and dying, but at the same time also the riddle of the origin
of children. Such solutions which kill at least two birds with one stone were
formerly tenaciously adhered to in science, and cannot be removed from the
mind of the child without a certain amount of shock.
Just as the birth of a little sister was the turning point in the history of
"Little Hans," so in this case it was the birth of a brother, which happened
when Anna had reached the age of four years. The pregnancy of the mother
apparently remained unnoticed; i.e. the child never expressed herself on this
subject. On the evening before the birth, when labour pains were beginning,
the child was in her father's room. He took her on his knee and said, "Tell
me, what would you say if you should get a little brother to-night?" "I
would kill him" was the prompt answer. The expression "to kill" looks very
serious, but in reality it is quite harmless, for "to kill" and "to die" in child
language signify only to remove, either in the active or in the passive sense,
as has already been pointed out a number of times by Freud. "To kill" as
used by the child is a harmless word, especially so when we know that the
child uses the word "kill" quite promiscuously for all possible kinds of
destruction, removal, demolition, etc. It is, nevertheless, worth while to note
this tendency (see the analysis of Kleiner Hans, p. 5).
The birth occurred early in the morning, and later the father entered the
room where Anna slept. She awoke as he came in. He imparted to her the
news of the advent of a little brother, which she took with surprise and
strained facial expression. The father took her in his arms and carried her
into the lying-in room. She first threw a rapid glance at her somewhat pale
mother and then displayed something like a mixture of embarrassment and
suspicion as if thinking, "Now what else is going to happen?" (Father's
impression.) She displayed hardly any pleasure at the sight of the new
arrival, so that the cool reception she gave it caused general disappointment.
During the forenoon she kept very noticeably away from her mother; this
was the more striking as she was usually much attached to her. But once
when her mother was alone she ran into the room, embraced her and said,
"Well, aren't you going to die now?" Now a part of the conflict in the child's
psyche is revealed to us. Though the stork theory was never really taken
seriously, she accepted the fruitful re-birth hypothesis, according to which a

person by dying helps a child into life. Accordingly the mother, too, must
die; why, then, should the newborn child, against whom she already felt
childish jealousy, cause her pleasure? It was for this reason that she had to
seek a favourable opportunity of reassuring herself as to whether the mother
was to die, or rather was moved to express the hope that she would not die.
With this happy issue, however, the re-birth theory sustained a severe
shock. How was it possible now to explain the birth of her little brother and
the origin of children in general? There still remained the stork theory
which, though never expressly rejected, had been implicitly waived through
the assumption of the re-birth theory. The explanations next attempted
unfortunately remained hidden from the parents as the child went to stay
with her grandmother for a few weeks. From the latter's report the stork
theory was often discussed, and was naturally reinforced by the concurrence
of those about her.
When Anna returned to her parents, she again, on meeting her mother,
evinced the same mixture of embarrassment and suspicion which she had
displayed after the birth. The impression, though inexplicable, was quite
unmistakable to both parents. Her behaviour towards the baby was very
nice. During her absence a nurse had come into the house who, on account
of her uniform, made a deep impression on Anna; to be sure, the impression
at first was quite unfavourable as she evinced the greatest hostility to her.
Thus nothing could induce her to allow herself to be undressed and put to
sleep by this nurse. Whence this resistance originated was soon shown in an
angry scene near the cradle of the little brother in which Anna shouted at
the nurse, "This is not your little brother, he is mine!" Gradually, however,
she became reconciled to the nurse, and began to play nurse herself; she had
to have her white cap and apron, and "nursed" now her little brother, and
now her doll.
In contrast to her former mood she became unmistakably mournful and
dreamy. She often sat for a long time under the table singing stories and
making rhymes, which were partially incomprehensible but sometimes
contained the "nurse" theme ("I am a nurse of the green cross"). Some of
the stories, however, distinctly showed a painful feeling striving for
expression.

Here we meet with a new and important feature in the little one's life: that
is, we meet with reveries, even a tendency towards poetic fancies and
melancholic attacks. All of them things which we are wont first to
encounter at a later period of life, at a time when the youth or maiden is
preparing to sever the family tie and to enter independently upon life, but is
still held back by an inward, painful feeling of homesickness for the warmth
of the parental hearth. At such a time the youth begins to replace what is
lacking with poetic fancies in order to compensate for the deficiency. To
approximate the psychology of a four-year-old child to that of the youth
approaching puberty will at first sight seem paradoxical; the relationship
lies, however, not in the age but rather in the mechanism. The elegiac
reveries express the fact that a part of that love which formerly belonged,
and should belong, to a real object, is now introverted, that is, it is turned
inward into the subject and there produces an increased imaginative
activity. What is the origin of this introversion? Is it a psychological
manifestation peculiar to this age, or does it owe its origin to a conflict?
This is explained in the following occurrence. It often happened that Anna
was disobedient to her mother, she was insolent, saying, "I am going back
to grandma."
Mother: "But I shall be sad when you leave me."
Anna: "Oh, but you have my little brother."
This reaction towards the mother shows what the little one was really
aiming at with her threats to go away again; she apparently wished to hear
what her mother would say to her proposal, that is, to see what attitude her
mother would actually assume to her, whether her little brother had not
ousted her altogether from her mother's regard. One must, however, give no
credence to this little trickster. For the child could readily see and feel that,
despite the existence of the little brother, there was nothing essentially
lacking to her in her mother's love. The reproach to which she subjects her
mother is therefore unjustified, and to the trained ear this is betrayed by a
slightly affected tone. Such an unmistakable tone does not expect to be
taken seriously and hence it obtrudes itself more vehemently. The reproach
as such cannot be taken seriously by the mother, for it was only the
forerunner of other and this time more serious resistances. Not long after
the conversation narrated above, the following scene took place:

Mother: "Come, we are going into the garden now!"
Anna: "You are telling lies, take care if you are not telling the truth."
M.: "What are you thinking of? I am telling the truth."
A.: "No, you are not telling the truth."
M.: "You will soon see that I am telling the truth: we are going into the
garden now."
A.: "Indeed, is that true? Is that really true? Are you not lying?"
Scenes of this kind were repeated a number of times. This time the tone was
more rude and more vehement, and at the same time the accent on the word
"lie" betrayed something special which the parents did not understand;
indeed, at first they attributed too little significance to the spontaneous
utterances of the child. In this they merely did what education usually does
in general, ex officio. We usually pay little heed to children in every stage of
life; in all essential matters, they are treated as not responsible, and in all
unessential ma tters, they are trained with an automatic precision.
Under resistances there always lies a question, a conflict, of which we hear
later and on other occasions. But usually one forgets to connect the thing
heard with the resistances. Thus, on another occasion, Anna put to her
mother the following questions:—
Anna: "I should like to become a nurse when I grow big—why did you
not become a nurse?"
Mother: "Why, as I have become a mother I have children to nurse
anyway."
A. (Reflecting): "Indeed, shall I be a lady like you, and shall I talk to
you then?"
The mother's answer again shows whither the child's question was really
directed. Apparently Anna, too, would like to have a child to "nurse" just as
the nurse has. Where the nurse got the little child is quite clear. Anna, too,
could get a child in the same way if she were big. Why did not the mother
become such a nurse, that is to say, how did she get a child if not in the

same way as the nurse? Like the nurse, Anna, too, could get a child, but
how that fact might be changed in the future or how she might come to
resemble her mother in the matter of getting children is not clear to her.
From this resulted the thoughtful question, "Indeed, shall I be a lady like
you? Shall I be quite different?" The stork theory evidently had come to
naught, the dying theory met a similar fate; hence she now thinks one may
get a child in the same way, as, for example, the nurse got hers. She, too,
could get one in this natural way, but how about the mother who is no nurse
and still has children? Looking at the matter from this point of view, Anna
asks: "Why did you not become a nurse?" namely, "why have you not got
your child in the natural way?" This peculiar indirect manner of questioning
is typical, and evidently corresponds with the child's hazy grasp of the
problem, unless we assume a certain diplomatic uncertainty prompted by a
desire to evade direct questioning. We shall later find an illustration of this
possibility. Anna is evidently confronted with the question "Where does the
child come from?" The stork did not bring it; mother did not die; nor did
mother get it in the same way as the nurse. She has, however, asked this
question before and received the information from her father that the stork
brings children; this is positively untrue, she can never be deceived on this
point. Accordingly, papa and mama and all the others lie. This readily
explains her suspicion at the childbirth and her discrediting of her mother.
But it also explains another point, namely, the elegiac reveries which we
have attributed to a partial introversion. We know now what was the real
object from which love was removed and uselessly introverted, namely, it
had to be taken from the parents who deceived her and refused to tell her
the truth. (What can this be which must not be uttered? What is going on
here?) Such were the parenthetic questions of the child, and the answer was:
Evidently this must be something to be concealed, perhaps something
dangerous. Attempts to make her talk and to draw out the truth by means of
artful questions were futile, so resistance is placed against resistance, and
the introversion of love begins. It is evident that the capacity for
sublimation in a four-year-old child is still too slightly developed to be
capable of performing more than symptomatic services. The mind,
therefore, depends on another compensation, namely, it resorts to one of the
relinquished infantile devices for securing love by force, preferably that of
crying and calling the mother at night. This had been diligently practised
and exhausted during her first year. It now returns, and corresponding to the

period of life has become well determined and equipped with recent
impressions. It was just after the earthquakes in Messina, and this event was
discussed at the table. Anna was extremely interested in everything, she
repeatedly asked her grandmother to tell her how the earth shook, how the
houses fell in and many people lost their lives. After this she had nocturnal
fears, she could not be alone, her mother had to go to her and stay with her;
otherwise she feared that an earthquake would happen, that the house would
fall and kill her. During the day, too, she was much occupied with such
thoughts. While walking with her mother she annoyed her with such
questions as, "Will the house be standing when we return home? Are you
sure there is no earthquake at home? Will papa still be living?" About every
stone lying in the road she asked whether it was from an earthquake. A
building in course of erection was a house destroyed by the earthquake, etc.
Finally, she began to cry out frequently at night that the earthquake was
coming and that she heard the thunder. Each evening she had to be
solemnly assured that there was no earthquake coming.
Many means of calming her were tried, thus she was told, for example, that
earthquakes only occur where there are volcanoes. But then she had to be
satisfied that the mountains surrounding the city were not volcanoes. This
reasoning led the child by degrees to a desire for learning, as strong as it
was unnatural at her age, which showed itself in a demand that all the
geological atlases and text-books should be brought to her from her father's
library. For hours she rummaged through these works looking for pictures
of volcanoes and earthquakes, and asking questions continually. Here we
are confronted by an energetic effort to sublimate the fear into an eager
desire for knowledge, which at this age made a decidedly premature
exaction. But how many a gifted child suffering in exactly the same way
with such problems, is "cosseted" through this untimely sublimation, by no
means to its advantage. For, by favouring sublimation at this age one is
merely strengthening manifestation of neurosis. The root of the eager desire
for knowledge is fear, and fear is the expression of converted libido; that is,
it is the expression of an introversion which has become neurotic, which at
this age is neither necessary nor favourable for the development of the
child.
Whither this eager desire for knowledge was ultimately directed is
explained by a series of questions which arose almost daily. "Why is Sophie

(a younger sister) younger than I?" "Where was Freddie (the little brother)
before? Was he in heaven? What was he doing there? Why did he come
down just now, why not before?"
This state of affairs led the father to decide that the mother should tell the
child when occasion offered the truth concerning the origin of the little
brother. This having been done, Anna soon thereafter asked about the stork.
Her mother told her that the story of the stork was not true, but that Freddie
grew inside his mother like the flowers in a plant. At first he was very little,
and then he became bigger and bigger as a plant does. She listened
attentively without the slightest surprise, and then asked, "But did he come
out all by himself?"
Mother: "Yes."
Anna: "But he cannot walk!"
Sophie: "Then he crawled out."
Anna, overhearing her little sister's answer: "Is there a hole here? (pointing
to the breast) or did he come out of the mouth? Who came out of the
nurse?" She then interrupted herself and exclaimed, "No, no, the stork
brought baby brother down from heaven." She soon left the subject and
again wished to see pictures of volcanoes. During the evening following
this conversation she was calm. The sudden explanation produced in the
child a whole series of ideas, which manifested themselves in certain
questions. New unexpected perspectives were opened; she rapidly
approached the main problem, namely, the question, "Where did the baby
come out?" Was it from a hole in the breast or from the mouth? Both
suppositions are entirely qualified to form acceptable theories. We even
meet with recently married women who still entertain the theory of the hole
in the abdominal wall or of the Cæsarean section; this is supposed to betray
a very unusual degree of innocence. But as a matter of fact it is not
innocence; we are always dealing in such cases with infantile sexual
activities, which in later life have brought the vias naturales into ill repute.
It may be asked where the child got the absurd idea that there is a hole in
the breast, or that the birth takes place through the mouth. Why did she not
select one of the natural openings existing in the pelvis from which things

come out daily? The explanation is simple. Very shortly before, our little
one had invoked some educational criticism from her mother by a
heightened interest in both openings with their remarkable excretions,—an
interest not always in accord with the requirements of cleanliness and
decorum. Then for the first time she became acquainted with the
exceptional laws relating to these bodily regions and, being a sensitive
child, she soon learned that there was something here to be tabooed. This
region, therefore, must not be referred to. Anna had simply shown herself
docile and had so adjusted herself to the cultural demands that she thought
(at least spoke) of the simplest things last. The incorrect theories substituted
for correct laws sometimes persist for years until brusque explanations
come from without. It is, therefore, no wonder that such theories, the
forming of and adherence to which are favoured even by parents and
educationalists should later become determinants for important symptoms
in a neurosis, or of delusions in a psychosis, just as I have shown that in
dementia præcox[144] what has existed in the mind for years always remains
somewhere, though it may be hidden under compensations of a seemingly
different kind.

But even before this question was settled as to where the child really comes
out a new problem obtruded itself, viz. the children came out of the mother,
but how is it with the nurse? Did some one come out of her too? This
question was followed by the remark, "No, no, the stork brought down baby
brother from heaven." What is there peculiar about the fact that nobody
came out of the nurse? We recall that Anna identified herself with the nurse,
and planned to become a nurse later, for she, too, would like to have a child,
and she could have one as well as the nurse. But now when it is known that
the little brother grew in mama, how is it now?
This disquieting question is averted by a quick return to the stork-angel
theory which has never been really believed and which after a few trials is
at last definitely abandoned. Two questions, however, remain in the air. The
first reads as follows: Where does the child come out? The second, a
considerably more difficult one, reads: How does it happen that mama has
children while the nurse and the servants do not? All these questions did not
at first manifest themselves.
On the day following the explanation, while at dinner, Anna spontaneously
remarked: "My brother is in Italy, and has a house of cloth and glass, but it
does not tumble down."
In this case, as in the others, it was impossible to ask for an explanation; the
resistances were too great and Anna could not be drawn into conversation.
This former officious and pretty explanation is very significant. For some
three months the two sisters had been building a stereotyped fanciful
conception of a "big brother." This brother knows everything, he can do and
has everything, he has been and is in every place where the children are not;
he is owner of great cows, oxen, horses, dogs; everything is his, etc. Every
one has such a "big brother." We must not look far for the origin of this
fancy; the model for it is the father who seems to correspond to this
conception; he seems to be like a brother to mama. The children, too, have
their similar powerful "brother." This brother is very brave; he is at present
in dangerous Italy and inhabits an impossible fragile house, and it does not
tumble down. For the child this realises an important wish: the earthquake
is no longer to be dangerous; in consequence the child's fear disappeared
and did not return. The fear of earthquakes now entirely vanished. Instead

of calling her father to her bed to conjure away the fear, she now became
very affectionate and begged him every night to kiss her.
In order to test this new state of affairs the father showed her pictures
illustrating volcanoes and earthquake devastations. Anna remained
unaffected, she examined the pictures with indifference, remarking, "These
people are dead; I have already seen that quite often." The picture of a
volcanic eruption no longer had any attraction for her. Thus all her scientific
interest collapsed and vanished as suddenly as it came. During the days
following the explanation Anna had quite important matters to occupy
herself with; she disseminated her newly acquired knowledge among those
about her in the following manner: She began by again circumstantially
affirming what had been told her, viz. that Freddy, her younger sister, and
herself had grown in her mother, that papa and mama grew in their mothers,
and that the servants likewise grew in their respective mothers. By frequent
questions she tested the true basis of her knowledge, for her suspicion was
aroused in no small measure, so that it needed many confirmations to
remove all her uncertainties.
On one occasion the trustworthiness of the theory threatened to go to
pieces. About a week after the explanation, the father was taken ill with
influenza and had to remain in bed during the forenoon. The children knew
nothing about this, and Anna, coming into the parents' bedroom, saw what
was quite unusual, namely, that her father was remaining in bed. She again
took on a peculiar surprised expression; she remained at a distance from the
bed and would not come nearer; she was apparently again reserved and
suspicious. But suddenly she burst out with the question, "Why are you in
bed; have you a plant in your inside too?"
The father naturally had to laugh. He calmed her, however, by assuring her
that children never grow in the father, that only women can have children,
and not men; thereupon the child again became friendly. But though the
surface was calm the problems continued to work in the dark. A few days
later, while at dinner, Anna related the following dream: "I dreamed last
night of Noah's ark." The father then asked her what she had dreamed about
it, but Anna's answer was sheer nonsense. In such cases it is necessary only
to wait and pay attention. A few minutes later she said to her mother, "I
dreamed last night about Noah's ark, and there were a lot of little animals in
it." Another pause. She then began her story for the third time. "I dreamed

last night about Noah's ark, and there were a lot of baby animals in it, and
underneath there was a lid and that opened and all the baby animals fell
out."
The children really had a Noah's ark, but its opening, a lid, was on the roof
and not underneath. In this way she delicately intimated that the story of the
birth from mouth or breast is incorrect, and that she had some inkling where
the children came out.
A few weeks then passed without any noteworthy occurrences. On one
occasion she related the following dream: "I dreamed about papa and
mama; they had been sitting late in the study, and we children were there
too." On the face of this we find a wish of the children to be allowed to sit
up as long as the parents. This wish is here realised, or rather it is utilised to
express a more important wish, namely, to be present in the evening when
the parents are alone; of course, quite innocently, it was in the study where
she has seen all the interesting books, and where she has satiated her thirst
for knowledge; i.e. she was really seeking an answer to the burning
question, whence the little brother came. If the children were there they
would find out.[145] A few days later Anna had a terrifying dream from
which she awoke crying, "The earthquake is coming, the house has begun
to shake." Her mother went to her and calmed her by saying that the
earthquake was not coming, that everything was quiet, and that everybody
was asleep. Whereupon Anna said: "I would like to see the spring, when all
the little flowers are coming out and the whole lawn is full of flowers; I
would like to see Freddy, he has such a dear little face. What is papa
doing? What is he saying?" The mother said, "He is asleep, and isn't saying
anything now." Little Anna then remarked with a sarcastic smile: "He will
surely be sick again to-morrow."
This text should be read backwards. The last sentence was not meant
seriously, as it was uttered in a mocking tone. When the father was sick the
last time, Anna suspected that he had a "plant in his inside." The sarcasm
signifies: "To-morrow papa is surely going to have a child." But this also is
not meant seriously. Papa is not going to have a child; mama alone has
children; perhaps she will have another child to-morrow; but where from?
"What does papa do?" The formulation of the difficult problem seems here
to come to the surface. It reads: What does papa really do if he does not

bear children? The little one is very anxious to have a solution for all these
problems; she would like to know how Freddy came into the world, she
would like to see how the little flowers come out of the earth in the spring,
and these wishes are hidden behind the fear of earthquakes.
After this intermezzo Anna slept quietly until morning. In the morning her
mother asked her what she had dreamed. She did not at first recall anything,
and then said: "I dreamed that I could make the summer, and then some one
threw a Punch[146] down into the closet."
This peculiar dream apparently has two different scenes which are separated
by "then." The second part draws its material from the recent wish to
possess a Punch, that is, to have a boy doll just as mama has a little boy.
Some one threw Punch down into the closet; one often lets other things fall
down into the water closet. It is just like this that the children, too, come
out. We have here an analogy to the "Lumpf-theory" of little Hans.[147]
Whenever several scenes are found in one dream, each scene ordinarily
represents a particular variation of the complex elaboration. Here
accordingly the first part is only a variation of the theme found in the
second part. The meaning of "to see the spring" or "to see the little flowers
come out" we have already remarked. Anna now dreams that she can make
the summer, that is she can bring it about that the little flowers shall come
out. She herself can make a little child, and the second part of the dream
represents this just as one makes a motion in the w.c. Here we find the
egoistic wish which is behind the seemingly objective interest of the
previous night's conversation.
A few days later the mother was visited by a lady who expected soon to
become a mother. The children seemed to take no interest in the matter, but
the next day they amused themselves with the following play which was
directed by the elder girl; they took all the newspapers they could find in
their father's paper-basket and stuffed them under their clothes, so that the
imitation was unmistakable. During the night little Anna had another
dream: "I dreamed about a woman in the city; she had a very big stomach."
The chief actor in a dream is always the dreamer himself under some
definite aspect; thus the childish play of the day before is fully solved.
Not long after, Anna surprised her mother with the following performance:
She stuck her doll under her clothes, then pulled it out slowly head

downwards, and at the same time remarked, "Look, the baby is coming out,
now it is all out." By this means Anna tells her mother, "You see, thus I
apprehend the problem of birth. What do you think of it? Is that right?" The
play is really meant to be a question, for, as we shall see later, this idea had
to be officially confirmed. That rumination on this problem by no means
ended here, is shown by the occasional ideas conceived during the
following weeks. Thus she repeated the same play a few days later with her
Teddy Bear, who stands in the relation of an especially beloved doll. One
day, looking at a rose, she said to her grandmother, "See, the rose is getting
a baby." As her grandmother did not quite understand her, she pointed to the
enlarged calyx and said, "Don't you see it is quite fat here?"
Anna once quarrelled with her younger sister, and the latter exclaimed
angrily, "I will kill you." Whereupon Anna answered, "When I am dead you
will be all alone; then you will have to pray to God for a live baby." But the
scene soon changed: Anna was the angel, and the younger sister was forced
to kneel before her and pray to her that she should present to her a living
child. In this way Anna became the child-dispensing mother.
Oranges were once served at table. Anna impatiently asked for one and
said, "I am going to take an orange and swallow it all down into my
stomach, and then I shall get a baby." Who does not think here of fairy tales
in which childless women become pregnant by swallowing fruit, fish, and
similar things?[148] In this way Anna sought to solve the problem how the
children actually come into the mother. She thus enters into a formulation
which hitherto had not been defined with so much clearness. The solution
follows in the form of an analogy, which is quite characteristic of the
archaic thinking of the child. (In the adult, too, there is a kind of thinking by
metaphor which belongs to the stratum lying immediately below
consciousness; dreams bring the analogies to the surface; the same may be
observed also in dementia præcox.) In German as well as in numerous
foreign fairy tales one frequently finds such characteristic childish
comparisons. Fairy tales seem to be the myths of the child, and therefore
contain among other things the mythology which the child weaves
concerning the sexual processes. The spell of the fairy tale poetry, which is
felt even by the adult, is explained by the fact that some of the old theories
are still alive in our unconscious minds. We experience a strange, peculiar
and familiar feeling when a conception of our remotest youth is again

stimulated. Without becoming conscious it merely sends into consciousness
a feeble copy of its original emotional strength.
The problem how the child gets into the mother was difficult to solve. As
the only way of taking things into the body is through the mouth, it could
evidently be assumed that the mother ate something like a fruit, which then
grows inside her. But then comes another difficulty, namely, it is clear
enough what the mother produces, but it is not yet clear what the father is
good for.
What does the father do? Anna now occupied herself exclusively with this
question. One morning she ran into the parents' bedroom while they were
dressing, she jumped into her father's bed, lay face downwards, kicked with
her legs and called at the same time, "Look! does papa do that?" The
analogy to the horse of "little Hans" which raised such disturbance with its
legs, is very surprising.
With this last performance the problem seemed to be at rest entirely, at least
the parents found no opportunity to make any pertinent observations. That
the problem should come to a standstill just here is not at all surprising, for
this is really its most difficult part. Moreover, we know from experience
that not many children go beyond these limits during the period of
childhood. The problem is almost too difficult for the childish mind, which
still lacks much knowledge necessary to its solution.
This standstill lasted about five months, during which no phobias or other
signs of complex-elaboration appeared. After this lapse of time there
appeared premonitory signs of some new incidents. Anna's family lived at
that time in the country near a lake where the mother and children could
bathe. As Anna was afraid to wade farther into the water than knee-deep,
her father once put her into the water, which led to an outburst of crying. In
the evening while going to bed Anna asked her mother, "Do you not believe
that father wanted to drown me?" A few days later there was another
outburst of crying. She continued to stand in the gardener's way until he
finally placed her in a newly dug hole. Anna cried bitterly, and afterwards
maintained that the gardener wished to bury her. Finally she awoke during
the night with fearful crying. Her mother went to her in the adjoining room
and quieted her. She had dreamed that "a train passed and then fell in a
heap."

This tallies with the "stage coach" of "little Hans." These incidents showed
clearly enough that fear was again in the air, i.e. that a resistance had again
arisen preventing transference to the parents, and that therefore a great part
of her love was converted into fear. This time suspicion was not directed
against the mother, but against the father, who she was sure must know the
secret, but would never let anything out. What could the father be doing or
keeping secret? To the child this secret appeared as something dangerous,
so that she felt the worst might be expected from the father. (This feeling of
childish anxiety with the father as object we see again most distinctly in
adults, especially in dementia præcox, which lifts the veil of obscurity from
many unconscious processes, as though it were following psychoanalytic
principles.) It was for this reason that Anna came to the apparently absurd
conclusion that her father wanted to drown her. At the same time her fear
contained the thought that the object of the father had some relation to a
dangerous action. This stream of thought is no arbitrary interpretation.
Anna meanwhile grew a little older and her interest in her father took on a
special colouring which is hard to describe. Language has no words to
describe the quite unique kind of tender curiosity which shone in the child's
eyes.
Anna once took marked delight in assisting the gardener while he was
sowing grass, without apparently divulging the profound significance of her
play. About a fortnight later she began to observe with great pleasure the
young grass sprouting. On one of these occasions she asked her mother the
following question: "Tell me, how did the eyes grow into the head?" The
mother told her that she did not know. Anna, however, continued to ask
whether God or her papa could tell this? The mother then referred her to her
father, who might tell her how the eyes grew into the head. A few days later
there was a family reunion at tea. When the guests had departed, the father
remained at the table reading the paper and Anna also remained. Suddenly
approaching her father she said, "Tell me, how did the eyes grow into the
head?"
Father: "They did not grow into the head; they were there from the
beginning and grew with the head."
A.: "Were not the eyes planted?"
F.: "No, they grew in the head like the nose."

A.: "Did the mouth and the ears grow in the same way? and the hair, too?"
F.: "Yes, they all grew in the same way."
A.: "And the hair, too? But the mousies came into the world naked. Where
was the hair before? Aren't there little seeds for it?"
F.: "No; you see, the hair really came out of little grains which are like
seeds, but these were already in the skin long before and nobody sowed
them." The father was now getting concerned; he knew whither the little
one's thoughts were directed, but he did not wish to overthrow, for the sake
of a former false application, the opportunely established seed-theory which
she had most fortunately gathered from nature; but the child spoke with an
unwonted seriousness which demanded consideration.
Anna (evidently disappointed, and in a distressed tone): "But how did
Freddy get into mama? Who stuck him in? and who stuck you into your
mama? Where did he come out from?"
From this sudden storm of questions the father chose the last for his first
answer. "Just think, you know well enough that Freddy is a boy; boys
become men and girls women. Only women and not men can have children;
now just think, where could Freddy come out from?"
A. (Laughs joyfully and points to her genitals): "Did he come out here?"
Father: "Yes, of course, you certainly must have thought of this before?"
A. (Overlooking the question): "But how did Freddy get into mama? Did
anybody plant him? Was the seed planted?"
This very precise question could no longer be evaded by the father. He
explained to the child, who listened with the greatest attention, that the
mother is like the soil and the father like the gardener; that the father
provides the seed which grows in the mother, and thus gives origin to a
baby. This answer gave extraordinary satisfaction; she immediately ran to
her mother and said, "Papa has told me everything, now I know it all." She
did not, however, tell what she knew.
The new knowledge was, however, put into play the following day. Anna
went to her mother and said, "Think, mama, papa told me how Freddy was
a little angel and was brought from heaven by a stork." The mother was

naturally surprised and said, "No, you are mistaken, papa surely never told
you such a thing!" whereupon the little one laughed and ran away.
This was apparently a mode of revenge. Her mother did not wish or was not
able to tell her how the eyes grew into the head, hence she did not know
how Freddy got into her. It was for this reason that she again tried her with
the old story.
I wish to impress firmly upon parents and educationists this instructive
example of child psychology. In the learned psychological discussions on
the child's psyche we hear nothing about those parts which are so important
for the health and naturalness of our children, nor do we hear more about
the child's emotions and conflicts; and yet they play a most important rôle.
It very often happens that children are erroneously treated as quite
imprudent and irrational beings. Thus on indulgently remarking to an
intelligent father, whose four-year-old daughter masturbated excessively,
that care should be exercised in the presence of the child who slept in the
same room as the parents, I received the indignant reply, "I can absolutely
assure you that the child knows nothing about sexual matters." This recalls
that distinguished old neurologist who wished to deny the attribute "sexual"
to a childbirth phantasy which was represented in a dreamy state.
On the other hand, a child evincing neurotic talent exaggerated by neurosis
may be urged on by solicitous parents. How easy and tempting it would
have been, e.g. in the present case, to admire, excite, and develop
prematurely the child's eager desire for learning, and thereby develop an
unnatural blasé state and a precociousness masking a neurosis! In such
cases the parents must look after their own complexes and complex
tendencies and not make capital out of them at the expense of the child. The
idea should be dismissed once for all that children are to be held in bondage
by their parents or that they are their toys. They are characteristic and new
beings. In the matter of enlightenment on sexual things it can be affirmed
that they suffer from the preconceived opinion that the truth is harmful.
Many neurologists are of opinion that even in grown-ups enlightenment on
their own psychosexual processes is harmful and even immoral. Would not
the same persons perhaps refuse to admit the existence of the genitals
themselves?

One should not, however, go from this extreme of prudishness to the
opposite one, namely that of enlightenment à tout prix, which may turn out
as foolish as it is disagreeable. In this matter I believe much discretion is
advisable; still if children come upon an idea, they should be deceived no
more than adults.
I hope, ladies and gentlemen, that I have shown you what complicated
psychic processes psychoanalytic investigation reveals in the child, and
how great is the significance of these processes for the mental health as well
as for the general psychic development of the child. What I have been
unable to show is the universal validity of these observations.
Unfortunately, I am not in a position to demonstrate this, for I do not know
myself how much of it is universally valid. Only by accumulation of such
observations and further penetration into the problems broached shall we
gain a complete insight into the laws of psychical development. It is to be
regretted that we are at present still far from this goal. But I confidently
hope that educators and practical psychologists, whether physicians or
deep-thinking parents, will not leave us too long unassisted in this
immensely important and interesting field.
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CHAPTER III
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FATHER IN THE DESTINY
OF THE INDIVIDUAL[149]
Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt.
Freud has pointed out in many places[150] with unmistakable clearness that
the psychosexual relationship of the child towards his parents, particularly
towards the father, possesses an overwhelming importance in the content of
any later neurosis. This relationship is in fact the infantile channel par
excellence in which the libido flows back[151] when it encounters any
obstacles in later years, thus revivifying long-forgotten dreams of
childhood. It is ever so in life when we draw back before too great an
obstacle—the menace of some severe disappointment or the risk of some
too far-reaching decision—the energy stored up for the solution of the task
flows back impotent; the by-streams once relinquished as inadequate are
again filled up. He who has missed the happiness of woman's love falls
back, as a substitute, upon some gushing friendship, upon masturbation,
upon religiosity; should he be a neurotic he plunges still further back into
the conditions of childhood which have never been quite forsaken, to which
even the normal is fettered by more than one link—he returns to the
relationship to father and mother. Every psychoanalysis carried out at all
thoroughly shows this regression more or less plainly. One peculiarity
which stands out in the works and views of Freud is that the relationship to
the father is seen to possess an overwhelming importance. This importance
of the father in the moulding of the child's psycho-sexuality may also be
discovered in a quite other and remote field, in the investigation of the
family.[152] The most recent thorough investigations demonstrate the
predominating influence of the father often lasting for centuries. The
mother seems of less importance in the family.[153] If this is true for
heredity on the physical side how much more should we expect from the
psychological influences emanating from the father? These experiences,
and those gained more particularly in an analysis carried out conjointly with

Dr. Otto Gross, have impressed upon me the soundness of this view. The
problem has been considerably advanced and deepened by the
investigations of my pupil, Dr. Emma Fürst, into familial resemblances in
the reaction-type.[154] Fürst made association experiments on one hundred
persons belonging to twenty-four families. Of this extensive material, only
the results in nine families and thirty-seven persons (all uneducated) have
been worked out and published. But the painstaking calculations do already
permit some valuable conclusions. The associations are classified on the
KRÆPELIN-ASCHAFFENBURG scheme as simplified and modified by myself; the
difference is then calculated between each group of qualities of the subjects
experimented upon and the corresponding group of every other subject
experimented upon. Thus we finally get the differentiation of the mean in
reaction-type. The following is the result:—
Non-related men differ among themselves by 5·9.
Non-related women differ among themselves by 6·0.
Related men differ among themselves by 4·1.
Related women differ among themselves by 3·8.
Relatives, and especially related women, have therefore, on the average,
resemblance in reaction-type. This fact means that the psychological
adaptation of relatives differs but slightly.
An investigation into the various relationships gave the following:—
The mean difference of the husband and wife amounts to 4·7. The mean
deviation of this mean is, however, 3·7, a very high figure, which signifies
that the mean figure 4·7 is composed of very heterogeneous figures; there
are married couples in whom the reaction type is very close and others in
whom it is very slight. On the whole, however, father and son, mother and
daughter stand remarkably close.
The difference between father and son amounts to 3·1.
The difference between mother and daughter amounts to 3·0.
With the exception of a few cases of married couples (where the difference
fell to 1·4) these are the lowest differences. In Fürst's work there was a case
where the difference between the forty-five year old mother and her sixteen
year old daughter was only 0·5. But it was just in this case that the mother

and daughter differed from the father's type by 11·8. The father is a coarse,
stupid man, an alcoholic; the mother goes in for Christian Science. This
corresponds with the fact that mother and daughter exhibit an extreme
word-predicate type,[155] which is, in my experience, important
semeiotically for the diagnosis of insufficiency in the sexual object. The
word-predicate type transparently applies an excessive amount of emotion
externally and displays emotions with the unconscious, but nevertheless
obvious, endeavour to awaken echoing emotions in the experimenter. This
view closely corresponds with the fact that in Fürst's material the number of
word-predicates increases with the age of the subjects experimented upon.
The fact of the extreme similarity between the reaction-type of the offspring
and the parents is matter for thought. The association experiment is nothing
but a small section from the psychological life of a man. At bottom daily
life is nothing but an extensive and many-varied association experiment; in
essence we react in life just as we do in the experiments. Although this truth
is evident, still it requires a certain consideration and limitation. Let us take
as an instance the case of the unhappy mother of forty-five years and her
unmarried daughter of sixteen. The extreme word-predicate type of the
mother is, without doubt, the precipitate of a whole life of disappointed
hopes and wishes. One is not in the least surprised at the word-predicate
type here. But the daughter of sixteen has really not yet lived at all; her real
sexual object has not yet been found, and yet she reacts as if she were her
mother with endless disillusions behind her. She has the mother's
adaptation, and in so far she is identified with the mother. There is ample
evidence that the mother's adaptation must be attributed to her relationship
to the father. But the daughter is not married to the father and therefore does
not need this adaptation. She has taken it over from the influence of her
milieu, and later on will try to adapt herself to the world with this familial
disharmony. In so far as an ill-assorted marriage is unsuitable, the
adaptation resulting from it is unsuitable.
Clearly such a fate has many possibilities. To adapt herself to life, this girl
either will have to surmount the obstacles of her familial milieu, or, unable
to free herself from them, she will succumb to the fate to which such an
adaptation predisposes her. Deep within, unnoticed by any one, there may
go on a glossing over of the infantile disharmony, or a development of the
negative of the parents' character, accompanied by hindrances and conflicts

to which she herself has no clue. Or, growing up, she will come into painful
conflict with that world of actualities to which she is so ill-adapted till one
stroke of fate after another gradually opens her eyes to the fact that it is
herself, infantile and maladjusted, that is amiss. The source of infantile
adaptation to the parents is naturally the affective condition on both sides;
the psycho-sexuality of the parents on one side and that of the child on the
other. It is a kind of psychical infection; we know that it is not logical truth,
but affects and their psychical expressions[156] which are here the effective
forces. It is these that, with the power of the herd-instinct, press into the
mind of the child, there fashioning and moulding it. In the plastic years
between one and five there have to be worked out all the essential formative
lines which fit exactly into the parental mould. Psychoanalytic experience
teaches us that, as a rule, the first signs of the later conflict between the
parental constellation and individual independence, of the struggle between
repression and libido (Freud), occur before the fifth year.
The few following histories will show how this parental constellation
obstructs the adaptation of the offspring. It must suffice to present only the
chief events of these, that is the events of sexuality.
Case 1.—A well-preserved woman of 55; dressed poorly but carefully in
black with a certain elegance, the hair carefully dressed; a polite, obviously
affected manner, precise in speech, a devotee. The patient might be the wife
of a minor official or shopkeeper. She informs me, blushing and dropping
her eyes, that she is the divorced wife of a common peasant. She has come
to the hospital on account of depression, night terrors, palpitations, slight
nervous twitchings in the arms, thus presenting the typical features of a
slight climacteric neurosis. To complete the picture, she adds that she
suffers from severe anxiety-dreams; in her dreams some man seems to be
pursuing her, wild animals attack her, and so on.
Her anamnesis begins with the family history. (So far as possible I give her
own words.) Her father was a fine, stately, rather corpulent man of
imposing appearance. He was very happy in his marriage, for her mother
worshipped him. He was a clever man, a master-mechanic, and held a
dignified and honourable position. There were only two children, the
patient and an elder sister. The sister was the mother's, and the patient her
father's favourite. When the patient was five years old the father died

suddenly from a stroke, at the age of forty-two. The patient felt herself very
isolated and was from that time treated by the mother and the elder sister as
the Cinderella. She noticed clearly enough that her mother preferred her
sister to herself. Her mother remained a widow, her respect for her husband
being too great to allow her to marry a second time. She preserved his
memory "like a religious cult" and brought up her children in this way.
Later on the sister married, relatively young; the patient did not marry till
twenty-four. She never cared for young men, they all seemed insipid; her
mind turned always to more mature men. When about twenty she became
acquainted with a stately gentleman rather over forty, to whom she was
much drawn. For various reasons the friendship was broken off. At twentyfour she became acquainted with a widower who had two children. He was
a fine, stately, somewhat corpulent man, and had an imposing presence, like
her father; he was forty-four. She married him and respected him
enormously. The marriage was childless; the children by the first marriage
died from an infectious disease. After four years of married life her husband
also died. For eighteen years she remained his faithful widow. But at fortysix (just before the menopause) she experienced a great need of love. As
she had no acquaintances she went to a matrimonial agency and married the
first comer, a peasant of some sixty years who had been already twice
divorced on account of brutality and perverseness; the patient knew this
before marriage. She remained five unbearable years with him, when she
also obtained a divorce. The neurosis set in a little later.
No further discussion will be required for those with psychoanalytic
experience; the case is too obvious. For those unversed in psychoanalysis
let me point out that up to her forty-sixth year the patient did but reproduce
most faithfully the milieu of her earliest youth. The sexuality which
announced itself so late and so drastically, even here only led to a
deteriorated edition of the father-surrogate; to this she is brought by this
late-blossoming sexuality. Despite repression, the neurosis betrays the everfluctuating eroticism of the aging woman who still wants to please
(affectation) but dares not acknowledge her sexuality.
Case 2.—A man of thirty-four of small build and with a sensible, kindly
expression. He is easily embarrassed, blushes often. He came for treatment
on account of "nervousness." He says he is very irritable, readily fatigued,

has nervous indigestion, is often deeply depressed so that he has thought of
suicide.
Before coming to me for treatment he sent me a circumstantial
autobiography, or rather a history of his illness, in order to prepare me for
his visit. His story began: "My father was a very big and strong man." This
sentence awakened my curiosity; I turned over a page and there read:
"When I was fifteen a big lad of nineteen took me into the wood and
indecently assaulted me."
The numerous gaps in the patient's story induced me to obtain a more exact
anamnesis from him, which produced the following remarkable facts.
The patient is the youngest of three brothers. His father, a big, red-haired
man, was formerly a soldier in the Papal Swiss Guard, and then became a
policeman. He was a strict, gruff old soldier, who brought up his sons with
military precision; he commanded them, did not call them by name, but
whistled to them. He had spent his youth in Rome, where he acquired
syphilis, from the consequences of which he still suffered in old age. He
was fond of talking about his adventures in early life. His eldest son
(considerably older than the patient) was exactly like him, he was big,
strong and had reddish hair. The mother was a feeble woman, prematurely
aged; exhausted and tired of life, she died at forty when the patient was
eight years old. He preserved a tender and beautiful memory of his mother.
When he went to school he was always the whipping-boy and always the
object of his schoolfellows' mockery. The patient considers that his peculiar
dialect was to blame for this. Later he was apprenticed to a severe and
unkind master, under most trying conditions, from which all the other
apprentices had run away, finding them intolerable. Here he held out for
over two years. At fifteen the assault already mentioned took place, in
addition to some other slighter homosexual experiences. Then fate sent him
to France. There he made the acquaintance of a man from the South of
France, a great boaster and Don Juan. He dragged the patient into a brothel;
he went unwilling and out of fear. He was impotent there. Later he went to
Paris, where his brother, a master-mason, the replica of his father, was
leading a dissolute life. There the patient remained a long time, badly paid
and helping his sister-in-law out of pity. The brother often took him along to
a brothel, where the patient was always impotent. Here the brother asked

him to make over to him his inheritance, 6000 francs. He first consulted his
second brother, who was also in Paris, who urgently tried to dissuade him
from giving the money to his brother, because it would only be squandered.
Nevertheless the patient gave his all to his brother, who indeed soon
squandered it. And the second brother, who would have dissuaded him, was
also let in for 500 francs. To my astonished question why he had so lightheartedly given the money to his brother without any guarantee, he replied:
he had asked for it, he was not a bit sorry about the money; he would give
him another 6000 francs if he had it. The eldest brother came to grief
altogether and his wife divorced him. The patient returned to Switzerland
and remained for a year without regular employment, often suffering from
hunger. During this time he made the acquaintance of a family where he
became a frequent visitor. The husband belonged to some peculiar sect; he
was a hypocrite and neglected his family. The wife was elderly, ill and
weak, and moreover pregnant. There were six children and great poverty.
The patient developed warm affection for this woman and divided with her
the little he possessed. She brought him her troubles, and said she felt sure
she would die in childbed. Then he promised her (he who possessed
nothing) to take charge of the children himself and bring them up. The wife
did die in childbed. The orphanage-board interfered, however, and allowed
him only one child. So he had a child but no family, and naturally could not
bring it up by himself. He thus came to think of marrying. But as he had
never been in love with any woman he was in great perplexity. It then
occurred to him that his elder brother was divorced from his wife, and he
resolved to marry her. He wrote his intention to her in Paris. She was
seventeen years older than he, but not disinclined to the plan. She invited
him to come to Paris to talk matters over. On the eve of this journey fate,
however, willed that he should run a big iron nail into his foot so that he
could not travel. After a little while, when the wound was healed, he went
to Paris, and found that he had imagined his sister-in-law, and now his
fiancée, to be younger and prettier than she really was. The wedding took
place, and three months later the first coitus, at his wife's initiative. He
himself had no desire for it. They brought up the child together, he in the
Swiss and she in the French way, for she was a French woman. At the age
of nine the child was run over and killed by a cyclist. The patient then felt
very lonely and dismal at home. He proposed to his wife that she should
adopt a young girl, whereupon she broke out into a fury of jealousy. Then

for the first time he fell in love with a young girl, whilst at the same time
the neurosis started, with deep depression and nervous exhaustion, for
meanwhile his life at home had become a hell.
My proposition to separate from his wife was refused out of hand, because
he could not take upon himself to make the old woman unhappy on his
account. He clearly prefers to be tormented still further; for it would seem
that the recollection of his youth is more precious to him than any present
joys.
In this case also the whole movement of a life takes place in the magic
circle of the familial constellation. The relation to the father is the strongest
and most momentous issue; its masochistic homosexual colouring stands
out clearly everywhere. Even the unhappy marriage is determined in every
way through the father, for the patient marries the divorced wife of his
eldest brother, which is as if he married his mother. His wife is also the
representative of the mother-surrogate, of the friend who died in childbed.
The neurosis started at the moment when the libido had obviously
withdrawn from this relationship of infantile constellation, and approached,
for the first time, the sexual end determined by the individual. In this, as in
the previous case, the familial constellation proves to be by far the stronger;
the narrow field vouchsafed by a neurosis is all that remains for the display
of individuality.
Case 3.—A thirty-six year old peasant woman, of average intelligence,
healthy appearance and robust build, mother of three healthy children.
Comfortable family circumstances. Patient comes to the hospital for
treatment for the following reasons: for some weeks she has been terribly
wretched and anxious, has been sleeping badly, has terrifying dreams, and
suffers also during the day from anxiety and depression. All these things are
admittedly without foundation, she herself is surprised at them, and must
admit her husband is perfectly right when he insists they are all "stuff and
nonsense." All the same she cannot get away from them. Strange ideas
come to her too; she is going to die and is going to hell. She gets on very
well with her husband.
The psychoanalytic examination of the case immediately brought the
following: some weeks before, she happened to take up some religious

tracts which had long lain about the house unread. There she read that
swearers would go to hell. She took this very much to heart, and has since
thought it incumbent on her to prevent people swearing or she herself will
go to hell. About a fortnight before she read these tracts, her father, who
lived with her, suddenly died from a stroke. She was not actually present at
his death, but arrived when he was already dead. Her terror and grief were
very great.
In the days following the death she thought much about it all, wondering
why her father had to meet his end so abruptly. In the midst of such
meditations it suddenly occurred to her that the last words she had heard her
father say were: "I also am one of those who have fallen from the cart into
the devil's clutches." The remembrance filled her with grief, and she
recalled how often her father had sworn savagely. She wondered then
whether there really were a life after death, and whether her father were in
heaven or hell. During these musings she came across the tracts and began
to read them, getting to the place where it said that swearers go to hell.
Then came upon her great fear and terror; she overwhelmed herself with
reproaches, she ought to have stopped her father's swearing, deserved
punishment for her neglect. She would die and would be condemned to hell.
Henceforth she was full of sorrow, moody, tormented her husband with this
obsessive idea, and renounced all joy and happiness.
The patient's life-history (reproduced partly in her own words) is as follows:
—
She is the youngest of five brothers and sisters and was always her father's
favourite. The father gave her everything she wanted if he possibly could.
For instance, if she wanted a new dress and her mother refused it, she could
be sure her father would bring her one next time he went to town. The
mother died rather early. At twenty-four the patient married the man of her
choice, against her father's wishes. The father simply disapproved of her
choice although he had nothing particular against the man. After the
wedding she made her father come and live with them. That seemed a
matter of course, she said, since the other relations had never suggested
having him with them. The father was a quarrelsome swearer and drunkard.
Husband and father-in-law, as may easily be imagined, got on extremely
badly together. The patient would always meekly fetch her father spirits
from the inn, although this gave rise perpetually to anger and altercations.

But she finds her husband "all right." He is a good, patient fellow with only
one failing: he does not obey her father enough; she finds that
incomprehensible, and would rather have her husband knuckle under to her
father. All said and done, father is still father. In the frequent quarrels she
always took her father's part. But she has nothing to say against her husband
and he is usually right in his protests, but one must help one's father.
Soon it began to seem to her that she had sinned against her father by
marrying against his will, and she often felt, after one of these incessant
wrangles, that her love for her husband had quite vanished. And since her
father's death it is impossible to love her husband any longer, for his
disobedience was the most frequent occasion of her father's fits of raging
and swearing. At one time the quarrelling became too painful for the
husband, and he induced his wife to find rooms for her father elsewhere,
where he lived for two years. During this time husband and wife lived
together peaceably and happily. But by degrees the patient began to
reproach herself for letting her father live alone; in spite of everything he
was her father. And in the end, despite the husband's protests, she fetched
him home again because, as she said, in truth she did love her father better
than her husband. Scarcely was the old man back in the house before strife
was renewed. And so it went on till the father's sudden death.
After this recital she broke out into a whole series of lamentations: she must
separate from her husband: she would have done it long ago if it were not
for the children. She had indeed done an ill-deed, committed a very great
sin when she married her husband against her father's wish. She ought to
have taken the man whom her father had wanted her to have. He certainly
would have obeyed her father and then everything would have been right.
Oh, her husband was not by a long way so kind as her father, she could do
anything with her father, but not with her husband. Her father had given her
everything she wanted. Now she would best of all like to die, so that she
might be with her father.
When this outburst was over, I inquired eagerly on what grounds she had
refused the husband her father had suggested to her.
The father, a small peasant on a lean little farm, had taken as a servant, just
at the time when his youngest daughter came into the world, a miserable
little boy, a foundling. The boy developed in most unpleasant fashion: he

was so stupid that he could not learn to read or write or even speak quite
properly. He was an absolute idiot. As he approached manhood there
developed on his neck a series of ulcers, some of which opened and
continually discharged pus, giving such a dirty, ugly creature a horrible
appearance. His intelligence did not grow with his years, so he stayed on as
servant in the peasant's house without any recognised wage.
To this youth the father wanted to marry his favourite daughter.
The girl, fortunately, had not been disposed to yield, but now she regretted
it, since this idiot would unquestionably have been more obedient to her
father than her good man had been.
Here, as in the foregoing case, it must be clearly understood that the patient
is not at all weak-minded. Both possess normal intelligence, which
unfortunately the blinkers of the infantile constellation prevent their using.
That appears with quite remarkable clearness in this patient's life-story. The
father's authority is never questioned! It makes not the least difference that
he is a quarrelsome drunkard, the obvious cause of all the quarrels and
disturbances; on the contrary, the lawful husband must give way to the
bogey, and at last our patient even comes to regret that her father did not
succeed in completely destroying her life's happiness. So now she sets
about doing that herself through her neurosis, which compels in her the
wish to die, that she may go to hell, whither, be it noted, the father has
already betaken himself.
If we are ever disposed to see some demonic power at work controlling
mortal destiny, surely we can see it here in these melancholy silent tragedies
working themselves out slowly, torturingly, in the sick souls of our
neurotics. Some, step by step, continually struggling against the unseen
powers, do free themselves from the clutches of the demon who forces his
unsuspecting victims from one savage mischance to another: others rise up
and win to freedom, only to be dragged back later to the old paths, caught in
the noose of the neurosis. You cannot even maintain that these unhappy
people are neurotic or "degenerates." If we normal people examine our lives
from the psychoanalytic standpoint, we too perceive how a mighty hand
guides us insensibly to our destiny and not always is this hand a kindly one.
[157] We often call it the hand of God or of the Devil, for the power of the

infantile constellation has become mighty during the course of the centuries
in affording support and proof to all the religions.
But all this does not go so far as to say that we must cast the blame of
inherited sins upon our parents. A sensitive child whose intuition is only too
quick in reflecting in his own soul all the excesses of his parents must lay
the blame for his fate on his own characteristics. But, as our last case
shows, this is not always so, for the parents can (and unfortunately only too
often do) fortify the evil in the child's soul, preying upon the child's
ignorance to make him the slave of their complexes. In our case this attempt
on the part of the father is quite obvious. It is perfectly clear why he wanted
to marry his daughter to this brutish creature: he wanted to keep her and
make her his slave for ever. What he did is but a crass exaggeration of what
is done by thousands of so-called respectable, educated people, who have
their own share in this educational dust-heap of enforced discipline. The
fathers who allow their children no independent possession of their own
emotions, who fondle their daughters with ill-concealed eroticism and
tyrannical passion, who keep their sons in leading-strings, force them into
callings and finally marry them off "suitably," and the mothers who even in
the cradle excite their children with unhealthy tenderness, later on make
them into slavish puppets, and then at last, out of jealousy, destroy their
children's love-life fundamentally, they all act not otherwise than this stupid
and brutal boor.
It will be asked, wherein lies the parents' magic power to bind their children
to themselves, as with iron fetters, often for the whole of their lives? The
psychoanalyst knows that it is nothing but the sexuality on both sides.
We are always trying not to admit the child's sexuality. That view only
comes from wilful ignorance, which happens to be very prevalent again just
now.[158]
I have not given any real analysis of these cases. We therefore do not know
what happened within the hearts of these puppets of fate when they were
children. A profound insight into a child's mind as it grows and lives,
hitherto unattainable, is given in Freud's contribution to the first half-yearly
volume of Jahrbuch für Psychoanalytische u. Psychopathologische
Forschungen. If I venture, after Freud's masterly presentation, to offer

another small contribution to the study of the child-mind it is because the
psychoanalytic records of cases seem to me always valuable.
Case 4.—An eight year old boy, intelligent, rather delicate-looking, is
brought to me by his mother, on account of enuresis. During the
consultation the child always hangs on to his mother, a pretty, youthful
woman. The parents' marriage is a happy one, but the father is strict, and the
boy (the eldest child) is rather afraid of him. The mother compensates for
the father's strictness by corresponding tenderness, to which the boy
responds so much that he never gets away from his mother's apron-strings.
He never plays with his schoolfellows, never goes alone into the street
unless he has to go to school. He fears the boys' roughness and violence and
plays thoughtful games at home or helps his mother with housework. He is
extremely jealous of his father. He cannot bear it when the father shows
tenderness to the mother.
I took the boy aside and asked him about his dreams.
He dreams very often of a black snake which wants to bite his face. Then he
cries out, and his mother has to come from the next room to his bedside.
In the evening he goes quietly to bed. But when he falls asleep it seems to
him that a wicked black man with a sabre or gun lies on his bed—a tall,
thin man who wants to kill him.
His parents sleep in the adjoining room. It often seems to him that
something dreadful is going on there, as if there are great black snakes or
wicked men who want to kill his Mamma. Then he has to cry out and his
mother comes to comfort him.
Every time he wets his bed he calls his mother, who has to settle him down
again in dry things.
The father is a tall thin man. Every morning he stands at the washstand
naked in full view of the child, to perform a thorough ablution. The child
also tells me that at night he is often suddenly waked from sleep by a
strange sound in the next room; then he is always horribly afraid as if
something dreadful were going on in there, some struggle—but his mother
quiets him, says there's nothing to be afraid of.

It is not difficult to see whence comes the black snake and who the wicked
man is, and what is happening in the next room. It is equally easy to
understand the boy's aim when he calls out for his mother: he is jealous and
separates her from the father. This he does also in the daytime whenever he
sees his father caressing her. So far the boy is simply his father's rival for
his mother's love.
But now comes the circumstance that the snake and the bad man also
threaten him, there happens to him the same thing as to his mother in the
next room. Thus he identifies himself with his mother and proposes a
similar relationship for himself with his father. That is owing to his
homosexual component which feels like a woman towards the father. What
enuresis signifies in this case is, from the Freudian standpoint, not difficult
to understand. The micturition dream throws light upon it. Let me refer to
an analysis of the same kind in my article: "L'analyse des rêves, Année
psychologique" (1909). Enuresis must be regarded as an infantile sexsurrogate; in the dream-life of adults too it is easily used as a cloak for the
urge of sexual desire.
This little example shows what goes on in the mind of an eight year old
boy, when he is in a position of too much dependence upon his parents, but
the blame is also partly due to the too strict father and the too indulgent
mother.
The infantile attitude here, it is evident, is nothing but infantile sexuality. If
now we survey all the far-reaching possibilities of the infantile
constellation, we are forced to say that in essence our life's fate is identical
with the fate of our sexuality. If Freud and his school devote themselves
first and foremost to tracing out the individual's sexuality it is certainly not
in order to excite piquant sensations, but to gain a deeper insight into the
driving forces that determine that individual's fate. In this we are not saying
too much, rather understating the case. If we can strip off the veils
shrouding the problems of individual destiny, we can afterwards widen our
view from the history of the individual to the history of nations. And first of
all we can look at the history of religions, at the history of the phantasysystems of whole peoples and epochs. The religion of the Old Testament
elevated the paterfamilias to the Jehovah of the Jews whom the people had
to obey in fear and dread. The Patriarchs are an intermediate stage towards
the deity. The neurotic fear and dread of the Jewish religion, the imperfect,

not to say unsuccessful attempt at the sublimation of a still too barbarous
people, gave rise to the excessive severity of the Mosaic Law, the
ceremonial constraint of the neurotic.[159]
Only the prophets succeeded in freeing themselves from this constraint; in
them the identification with Jehovah, the complete sublimation, is
successful. They became the fathers of the people. Christ, the fulfilment of
prophecy, put an end to this fear of God and taught mankind that the true
relation to the Godhead is "love." Thus he destroyed the ceremonial
constraint of the Law and gave the example of a personal loving
relationship to God. The later imperfect sublimation of the Christian Mass
leads again to the ceremonial of the Church from which occasionally the
minds capable of sublimation among the saints and reformers have been
able to free themselves. Not without cause therefore does modern theology
speak of "inner" or "personal" experiences as having great enfranchising
power, for always the ardour of love transmutes the dread and constraint
into a higher, freer type of feeling.
What we see in the development of the world-process, the original source of
the changes in the Godhead, we see also in the individual. Parental power
guides the child like a higher controlling fate. But when he begins to grow
up, there begins also the conflict between the infantile constellation and the
individuality, the parental influence dating from the prehistoric (infantile)
period is repressed, sinks into the unconscious but is not thereby eliminated;
by invisible threads it directs the individual creations of the ripening mind
as they appear. Like everything that has passed into the unconscious, the
infantile constellation sends up into consciousness dim, foreboding feelings,
feelings of mysterious guidance and opposing influences. Here are the roots
of the first religious sublimations. In the place of the father, with his
constellating virtues and faults, there appears, on the one hand, an
altogether sublime deity, on the other the devil, in modern times for the
most part largely whittled away by the perception of one's own moral
responsibility. Elevated love is attributed to the former, a lower sexuality to
the latter. As soon as we approach the territory of the neurosis, the antithesis
is stretched to the utmost limit. God becomes the symbol of the most
complete sexual repression, the Devil the symbol of sexual lust. Thus it is
that the conscious expression of the father-constellation, like every
expression of an unconscious complex when it appears in consciousness,

gets its Janus-face, its positive and its negative components. A curious,
beautiful example of this crafty play of the unconscious is seen in the loveepisode in the Book of Tobias. Sarah, the daughter of Raguel in Ecbatana,
desires to marry; but her evil fate wills it that seven times, one after another,
she chooses a husband who dies on the marriage-night. The evil spirit
Asmodi, by whom she is persecuted, kills these husbands. She prays to
Jehovah to let her die rather than suffer this shame again. She is despised
even by her father's maid-servants. The eighth bridegroom, Tobias, is sent
to her by God. He too is led into the bridal-chamber. Then the old Raguel,
who has only pretended to go to bed, gets up again and goes out and digs
his son-in-law's grave beforehand, and in the morning sends a maid to the
bridal-chamber to make sure of the expected death. But this time Asmodi's
part is played out, Tobias is alive.
Unfortunately medical etiquette forbids me to give a case of hysteria which
fits in exactly with the above instance, except that there were not seven
husbands, but only three, ominously chosen under all the signs of the
infantile constellation. Our first case too comes under this category and in
our third we see the old peasant at work preparing to dedicate his daughter
to a like fate.
As a pious and obedient daughter (compare her beautiful prayer in chapter
iii.) Sarah has brought about the usual sublimation and cleavage of the
father-complex and on the one side has elevated her childish love to the
adoration of God, on the other has turned the obsessive force of her father's
attraction into the persecuting demon Asmodi. The legend is so beautifully
worked out that it displays the father in his twofold aspect, on the one hand
as the inconsolable father of the bride, on the other as the secret digger of
his son-in-law's grave, whose fate he foresees. This beautiful fable has
become a cherished paradigm for my analysis, for by no means infrequent
are such cases where the father-demon has laid his hand upon his daughter,
so that her whole life long, even when she does marry, there is never a true
union, because her husband's image never succeeds in obliterating the
unconscious and eternally operative infantile father-ideal. This is valid not
only for daughters, but equally for sons. A fine instance of such a fatherconstellation is given in Dr. Brill's recently published: "Psychological
factors in dementia præcox. An analysis."[160]

In my experience the father is usually the decisive and dangerous object of
the child's phantasy, and if ever it happens to be the mother, I have been
able to discover behind her a grandfather to whom she belonged in her
heart.
I must leave this question open: my experience does not go far enough to
warrant a decision. It is to be hoped that the experience of the coming years
will sink deeper shafts into this still dark land which I have been able but
momentarily to light up, and will discover to us more of the secret
workshop of that fate-deciding demon of whom Horace says:

"Scit Genius natale comes qui temperat astrum,
Naturæ deus humanæ, mortalis in unum,
Quodque caput, vultu mutabilis, albus et ater."

CHAPTER IV
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOUR[161]
About a year ago the school authorities in N. asked me to give a professional opinion as to the
mental condition of Marie X., a thirteen year old schoolgirl. Marie had been expelled from
school because she had been instrumental in originating an ugly rumour, spreading gossip
about her class-teacher. The punishment hit the child, and especially her parents, very hard, so
that the school authorities were inclined to readmit her if protected by a medical opinion. The
facts were as follows:—
The teacher had heard indirectly that the girls were attributing some equivocal sexual story to
him. On investigation it was found that Marie X. had one day related a dream to three girlfriends which ran somewhat as follows:—
"The class was going to the swimming-baths. I had to go to the boys' because there was no
more room. Then we swam a long way out in the lake (asked 'who did so': 'Lina P., the
teacher, and myself'). A steamer came along. The teacher asked us if we wished to get into it.
We came to K. A wedding was just going on there (asked 'whose': 'a friend of the teacher's').
We were also to take part in it. Then we went for a journey (who? 'I, Lina P., and the teacher').
It was like a honeymoon journey. We came to Andermatt, and there was no more room in the
hotel, so we were obliged to pass the night in a barn. The woman got a child there, and the
teacher became the godfather."
When I examined the child she told this dream. The teacher had likewise related the dream in
writing. In this earlier version the obvious blanks after the word "steamer" in the above text
were filled up as follows: "We got up. Soon we felt cold. An old man gave us a blouse which
the teacher put on." On the other hand, there was an omission of the passage about finding no
room in the hotel and being obliged to pass the night in the barn.
The child told the dream immediately, not only to her three friends but also to her mother. The
mother repeated it to me with only trifling differences from the two versions given above.
The teacher, in his further investigations, carried out with deepest misgivings, failed, like
myself, to get indications of any more dangerous material. There is therefore a strong
probability that the original recital could not have run very differently. (The passage about the
cold and the blouse seems to be an early interpolation, for it is an attempt to supply a logical
relationship. Coming out of the water one is wet, has on only a bathing dress, and is therefore
unable to take part in a wedding before putting on some clothes.) At first, of course, the
teacher would not allow that the whole affair had arisen only out of a dream. He rather
suspected it to be an invention. He was, however, obliged to admit that the innocent telling of
the dream was apparently a fact, and that it was unnatural to regard the child as capable of
such guile as to indicate some sexual equivocation in this disguised form. For a time he
wavered between the view that it was a question of cunning invention, and the view that it
was really a question of a dream, innocent in itself, which had been understood by the other

children in a sexual way. When his first indignation wore off he concluded that Marie X.'s
guilt could not be so great, and that her phantasies and those of her companions had
contributed to the rumour. He then did something really valuable. He placed Marie's
companions under supervision, and made them all write out what they had heard of the
dream.
Before turning our attention to this, let us cast a glance at the dream analytically. In the first
place, we must accept the facts and agree with the teacher that we have to do with a dream
and not with an invention; for the latter the ambiguity is too great. Conscious invention tries
to create unbroken transitions; the dream takes no account of this, but sets to work regardless
of gaps, which, as we have seen, here give occasion for interpolations during the conscious
revision. The gaps are very significant. In the swimming-bath there is no picture of
undressing, being unclothed, nor any detailed description of their being together in the water.
The omission of being dressed on the ship is compensated for by the above-mentioned
interpolation, but only for the teacher, thus indicating that his nakedness was in most urgent
need of cover. The detailed description of the wedding is wanting, and the transition from the
steamer to the wedding is abrupt. The reason for stopping overnight in the barn at Andermatt
is not to be found at first. The parallel to this is, however, the want of room in the swimmingbath, which made it necessary to go into the men's department; in the hotel the want of room
again emphasises the separation of the sexes. The picture of the barn is most insufficiently
filled out. The birth suddenly follows and quite without sequence. The teacher as godfather is
extremely equivocal. Marie's rôle in the whole story is throughout of secondary importance,
indeed she is only a spectator.
All this has the appearance of a genuine dream, and those of my readers who have a wide
experience of the dreams of girls of this age will assuredly confirm this view. Hence the
meaning of the dream is so simple that we may quietly leave its interpretation to her schoolcompanions, whose declarations are as follows:
AURAL WITNESSES.
Witness I.—"M. dreamed that she and Lina P. had gone swimming with our teacher. After
they had swum out in the lake pretty far, M. said she could not swim any further as her foot
hurt her so much. The teacher said she might sit on my[162] back. M. got up and they swam
out. After a time a steamer came along and they got up on it. Our teacher seems to have had a
rope by which he tied M. and L. together and dragged them out into the lake. They travelled
thus as far as Z., where they stepped out. But now they had no clothes on. The teacher bought
a jacket whilst M. and L. got a long, thick veil, and all three walked up the street along the
lake. This was when the wedding was going on. Presently they met the party. The bride had
on a blue silk dress but no veil. She asked M. and L. if they would be kind enough to give her
their veil. M. and L. gave it, and in return they were allowed to go to the wedding. They went
into the Sun Inn. Afterwards they went a honeymoon journey to Andermatt; I do not know
now whether they went to the Inn at A. or at Z. There they got coffee, potatoes, honey, and
butter."
"I must not say any more, only the teacher finally was made godfather."

Remarks.—The roundabout story concerning the want of room in the swimming-bath is
absent; Marie goes direct with her teacher to the bath. Their persons are more closely bound
together in the water by means of the rope fastening the teacher and the two girls together.
The ambiguity of the "getting up" in the first story has other consequences here, for the part
about the steamer in the first story now occurs in two places; in the first the teacher takes
Marie on his back. The delightful little slip "she could sit on my back" (instead of his), shows
the real part taken by the narrator herself in this scene. This makes it clear why the dream
brings the steamer somewhat abruptly into action, in order to give an innocent, harmless turn
to the equivocal "getting up" instead of another which is common, for instance, in music-hall
songs. The passage about the want of clothing, the uncertainty of which has been already
noticed, arouses the special interest of the narrator. The teacher buys a jacket, the girls get a
long veil (such as one only wears in case of death or at weddings). That the latter is meant is
shown by the remark that the bride had none (it is the bride who wears the veil). The narrator,
a girl-friend of Marie, here helps the dreamer to dream further: the possession of the veil
designates the bride or the brides, Marie and Lina. Whatever is shocking or immoral in this
situation is relieved by the girls giving up the veil; it then takes an innocent turn. The narrator
follows the same mechanism in the cloaking of the equivocal scene at Andermatt; there is
nothing but nice food, coffee, potatoes, honey, butter, a turning back to the infantile life
according to the well-known method. The conclusion is apparently very abrupt: the teacher
becomes a godfather.
Witness II.—M. dreamt she had gone bathing with L. P. and the teacher. Far out in the lake M.
said to the teacher that her leg was hurting her very much. Then the teacher said she could get
up on him. I don't know now whether the last sentence was really so told, but I think so. As
there was just then a ship on the lake the teacher said she should swim as far as the ship and
then get in. I don't remember exactly how it went on. Then the teacher or M., I don't really
remember which, said they would get out at Z. and run home. Then the teacher called out to
two gentlemen who had just been bathing there, that they might carry the children to land.
Then L. P. sat up on one man, and M. on the other fat man, and the teacher held on to the fat
man's leg and swam after them. Arrived on land they ran home. On the way the teacher met
his friend who had a wedding. M. said: "It was then the fashion to go on foot, not in a
carriage." Then the bride said she must now go along also. Then the teacher said it would be
nice if the two girls gave the bride their black veils, which they had got on the way. I can't
now remember how. The children gave it her, and the bride said they were really dear
generous children. Then they went on further and put up at the Sun Hotel. There they got
something to eat, I don't know exactly what. Then they went to a barn and danced. All the
men had taken off their coats except the teacher. Then the bride said he ought to take off his
coat also. Then the teacher hesitated but finally did so. Then the teacher was.... Then the
teacher said he was cold. I must not tell any more; it is improper. That's all I heard of the
dream.
Remarks.—The narrator pays special attention to the getting up, but is uncertain whether in
the original it referred to getting up on the teacher or the steamer. This uncertainty is,
however, amply compensated for by the elaborate invention of the two strangers who take the
girls upon their backs. The getting up is too valuable a thought for the narrator to surrender,
but she is troubled by the idea of the teacher seeing the object. The want of clothing likewise
arouses much interest. The bride's veil has, it is true, become the black veil of mourning

(naturally in order to conceal anything indelicate). There is not only no innocent twisting, but
it is conspicuously virtuous ("dear, generous children"); the amoral wish has become changed
into virtue which receives special emphasis, arousing suspicion as does every accentuated
virtue.
This narrator exuberantly fills in the blanks in the scene of the barn: the men take off their
coats; the teacher also, and is therefore ... i.e. naked and hence cold. Whereupon it becomes
too improper.
The narrator has correctly recognised the parallels which were suspected in the criticisms of
the original dream; she has filled in the scene about the undressing which belongs to the
bathing, for it must finally come out that the girls are together with the naked teacher.
Witness III.—M. told me she had dreamt: Once I went to the baths but there was no room for
me. The teacher took me into his dressing-room. I undressed and went bathing. I swam until I
reached the bank. Then I met the teacher. He said would I not like to swim across the lake
with him. I went, and L. P. also. We swam out and were soon in the middle of the lake. I did
not want to swim any further. Now I can't remember it exactly. Soon a ship came up, and we
got up on the ship. The teacher said, "I am cold," and a sailor gave us an old shirt. The three
of us each tore a piece of the shirt away. I fastened it round the neck. Then we left the ship
and swam away towards K.
L. P. and I did not want to go further, and two fat men took us upon their backs. In K. we got
a veil which we put on. In K. we went into the street. The teacher met his friend who invited
us to the wedding. We went to the Sun and played games. We also danced the polonaise; now
I don't remember exactly. Then we went for a honeymoon journey to Andermatt. The teacher
had no money with him, and stole some chestnuts in Andermatt. The teacher said, "I am so
glad that I can travel with my two pupils." Then there is something improper which I will not
write. The dream is now finished.
Remarks.—The undressing together now takes place in the narrow space of the dressing-room
at the baths. The want of dress on the ship gives occasion to a further variant. (The old shirt
torn in three.) In consequence of great uncertainty the getting up on the teacher is not
mentioned. Instead, the two girls get up on two fat men. As "fat" becomes so prominent it
should be noted that the teacher is more than a little plump. The setting is thoroughly typical;
each one has a teacher. The duplication or multiplication of the persons is an expression of
their significance, i.e. of the stored-up libido.[163] (Compare the duplication of the attribute in
dementia præcox in my "Psychology of Dementia Præcox.") In cults and mythologies the
significance of this duplication is very striking. (Cp. the Trinity and the two mystical formulas
of confession: "Isis una quæ es omnia. Hermes omnia solus et ter unus.") Proverbially we say
he eats, drinks, or sleeps "for two." The multiplication of the personality expresses also an
analogy or comparison—my friend has the same "ætiological value" (Freud) as myself. In
dementia præcox, or schizophrenia, to use Bleuler's wider and better term, the multiplication
of the personality is mainly the expression of the stored-up libido, for it is invariably the
person to whom the patient has transference who is subjected to this multiplication. ("There
are two professors N." "Oh, you are also Dr. J.; this morning another came to see me who
called himself Dr. J.") It seems that, corresponding to the general tendency in schizophrenia,
this splitting is an analytic degradation whose motive is to prevent the arousing of too violent

impressions. A final significance of the multiplication of personality which, however, does
not come exactly under this concept is the raising of some attribute of the person to a living
figure. A simple instance is Dionysos and his companion Phales, wherein Phales is the
equivalent of Phallos, the personification of the penis of Dionysos. The so-called attendants
of Dionysos (Satyri, Sileni, Mænades, Mimallones, etc.) consist of the personification of the
attributes of Dionysos.
The scene in Andermatt is portrayed with a nice wit, or more properly speaking, dreamt
further: "The teacher steals chestnuts," that is equivalent to saying he does what is prohibited.
By chestnuts is meant roasted chestnuts, which on account of the incision are known as a
female sexual symbol. Thus the remark of the teacher, that he was especially glad to travel
with his pupils, following directly upon the theft of the chestnuts, becomes intelligible. This
theft of the chestnuts is certainly a personal interpolation, for it does not occur in any of the
other accounts. It shows how intensive was the inner participation of the school companions
of Marie X. in the dream, resting upon similar ætiological requirements.
This is the last of the aural witnesses. The story of the veil, the pain in the feet, are items
which we may perhaps suspect to have been suggested in the original narrative. Other
interpolations are, however, absolutely personal, and are due to independent inner
participation in the meaning of the dream.
HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
(I.) The whole school had to go bathing with the teacher. M. X. had no place in the bath in
which to undress. Then the teacher said: "You can come into my room and undress with me."
She must have felt very uncomfortable. When both were undressed they went into the lake.
The teacher took a long rope and wound it round M. Then they both swam far out. But M. got
tired, and then the teacher took her upon his back. Then M. saw Lina P.; she called out to her,
Come along with me, and Lina came. Then they all swam out still farther. They met a ship.
Then the teacher asked, "May we get in? these girls are tired." The boat stopped, and they
could all get up. I do not know exactly how they came ashore again at K. Then the teacher got
an old night-shirt. He put it on. Then he met an old friend who was celebrating his wedding.
The teacher, M. and L. were invited. The wedding was celebrated at the Crown in K. They
wanted to play the polonaise. The teacher said he would not accompany them. Then the
others said he might as well. He did it with M. The teacher said: "I shall not go home again to
my wife and children. I love you best, M." She was greatly pleased. After the wedding there
was the honeymoon journey. The teacher, M. and L. had to accompany the others also. The
journey was to Milan. Afterwards they went to Andermatt, where they could find no place to
sleep. They went to a barn, where they could stop the night all together. I must not say any
more because it becomes highly improper.
Remarks.—The undressing in the swimming-bath is properly detailed. The union in the water
receives a further simplification for which the story of the rope led the way; the teacher
fastens himself to Marie. Lina P. is not mentioned at all; she only comes later when Marie is
already sitting upon the teacher. The dress is here a jacket. The wedding ceremony contains a
very direct meaning. "The teacher will not go home any more to wife and child." Marie is the
darling. In the barn they all found a place together, and then it becomes highly improper.

(II.) It was said that she had gone with the school to the swimming-baths to bathe. But as the
baths were over-full the teacher had called her to come to him. We swam out to the lake, and
L. P. followed us. Then the teacher took a string and bound us to one another. I do not know
now exactly how they again got separated. But after a long time they suddenly arrived at Z.
There a scene is said to have taken place which I would rather not tell, for if it were true it
would be too disgraceful; also now I don't know exactly how it is said to have been, for I was
very tired, only I also heard that M. X. is said to have told how she was always to remain with
our teacher, and he again and again caressed her as his favourite pupil. If I knew exactly I
would also say the other thing, but my sister only said something about a little child which
was born there, and of which the teacher was said to have been the godfather.
Remarks.—Note that in this story the improper scene is inserted in the place of the wedding
ceremony, where it is as apposite as at the end, for the attentive reader will certainly have
already observed that the improper scene could have taken place in the swimming-bath
dressing-room. The procedure has been adopted which is so frequent in dreams as a whole;
the final thoughts of a long series of dream images contain exactly what the first image of the
series was trying to represent. The censor pushes the complex away as long as possible
through ever-renewed disguises, displacements, innocent renderings, etc. It does not take
place in the bathing-room, in the water the "getting up" does not occur, on landing it is not on
the teacher's back that the girls are sitting, it is another pair who are married in the barn,
another girl has the child, and the teacher is only—godfather. All these images and situations
are, however, directed to pick out the complex, the desire for coitus. Nevertheless the action
still occurs at the back of all these metamorphoses, and the result is the birth placed at the end
of the scene.
(III.) Marie said: the teacher had a wedding with his wife, and they went to the "Crown" and
danced with one another. M. said a lot of wild things which I cannot repeat or write about, for
it is too embarrassing.
Remarks.—Here everything is too improper to be told. Note that the marriage takes place
with the wife.
(IV.) ... that the teacher and M. once went bathing, and he asked M. whether she wanted to
come along too. She said "yes." When they had gone out together they met L. P., and the
teacher asked whether she wished to come along. And they went out farther. Then I also
heard that she said that the teacher said L. P. and she were the favourite pupils. She also told
us that the teacher was in his swimming drawers. Then they went to a wedding, and the bride
got a little child.
Remarks.—The personal relationship to the teacher is strongly emphasised (the "favourite
pupils"), likewise the want of clothing ("swimming drawers").
(V.) M. and L. P. went bathing with the teacher. When M. and L. P. and the teacher had swum
a little way, M. said: "I cannot go any further, teacher, my foot hurts me." Then the teacher
said she should sit on his back, which M. did. Then a small steamer came along, and the
teacher got into the ship. The teacher had also two ropes, and he fastened both children to the
ship. Then they went together to Z. and got out there. Then the teacher bought himself a
dressing jacket and put it on, and the children had put a cloth over themselves. The teacher

had a bride, and they were in a barn. Both children were with the teacher and the bride in the
barn, and danced. I must not write the other thing, for it is too awful.
Remarks.—Here Marie sits upon the teacher's back. The teacher fastens the two children by
ropes to the ship, from which it can be seen how easily ship is put for teacher. The jacket
again emerges as the piece of clothing. It was the teacher's own wedding, and what is
improper comes after the dance.
(VI.) The teacher is said to have gone bathing with the whole school. M. could not find any
room, and she cried. The teacher is said to have told M. she could come into his dressingroom.
"I must leave out something here and there," said my sister, "for it is a long story." But she
told me something more which I must tell in order to speak the truth. When they were in the
bath the teacher asked M. if she wished to swim out into the lake with him. To which she
replied, "If I go along, you come also." Then we swam until about half-way. Then M. got
tired, and then the teacher pulled her by a cord. At K. they went on land, and from there to Z.
(The teacher was all the time dressed as in the bath.) There we met a friend, whose wedding it
was. We were invited by this friend. After the ceremony there was a honeymoon journey, and
we came to Milan. We had to pass one night in a barn where something occurred which I
cannot say. The teacher said we were his favourite pupils, and he also kissed M.
Remarks.—The excuse "I must leave out something here and there" replaces the undressing.
The teacher's want of clothing is emphasised. The journey to Milan is a typical honeymoon.
This passage also seems to be an independent fancy, due to some personal participation.
Marie clearly figures as the loved one.
(VII.) The whole school and the teacher went bathing. They all went into one room. The
teacher also. M. alone had no place, and the teacher said to her, "I have still room," she went.
Then the teacher said, "Lie on my back, I will swim out into the lake with you." I must not
write any more, for it is improper; I can hardly say it at all. Beyond the improper part which
followed I do not know any more of the dream.
Remarks.—The narrator approaches the basis. Marie is to lie upon the teacher's back in the
bathing compartment. Beyond the improper part she cannot give any more of the dream.
(VIII.) The whole school went bathing. M. had no room and was invited by the teacher into
his compartment. The teacher swam out with her and told her that she was his darling or
something like that. When they got ashore at Z. a friend was just having a wedding and he
invited them both in their swimming costumes. The teacher found an old dressing jacket and
put it over the swimming drawers. He (the teacher) also kissed M. and said he would not
return home to his wife any more. They were also both invited on the honeymoon journey. On
the journey they passed Andermatt, where they could not find any place to sleep, and so had
to sleep in the hay. There was a woman; the dreadful part now comes, it is not at all right to
make something serious into mockery and laughter. This woman got a small child. I will not
say any more now, for it becomes too dreadful.
Remarks.—The narrator is thoroughgoing. (He told her simply she was his darling. He kissed
her and said he would not go home to his wife.) The vexation about the silly tattling which
breaks through at the end suggests some peculiarity in the narrator. From subsequent

investigation it was found that this girl was the only one of the witnesses who had been early
and intentionally given an explanation about sex by her mother.
EPICRISIS.
So far as the interpretation of the dream is concerned, there is nothing for me to add; the
children have taken care of all the essentials, leaving practically nothing over for
psychoanalytic interpretation. Rumour has analysed and interpreted the dream. So far as I
know rumour has not hitherto been investigated in this new capacity. This case certainly
makes it appear worth while to fathom the psychology of rumour. In the presentation of the
material I have purposely restricted myself to the psychoanalytic point of view, although I do
not deny that my material offers numerous openings for the invaluable researches of the
followers of Stern, Claparède, and others.
The material enables us to understand the structure of the rumour, but psychoanalysis cannot
rest satisfied with that. The why and wherefore of the whole manifestation demands further
knowledge. As we have seen, the teacher, astonished by this rumour, was left puzzled by the
problem, wondering as to its cause and effect. How can a dream which is notoriously
incorrect and meaningless (for teachers are, as is well known, grounded in psychology)
produce such effects, such malicious gossip? Faced by this, the teacher seems to have
instinctively hit upon the correct answer. The effect of the dream can only be explained by its
being "le vrai mot de la situation," i.e. that the dream formed the fit expression for something
that was already in the air. It was the spark which fell into the powder magazine. The material
contains all the proofs essential for this view. I have repeatedly drawn attention to their own
unrecognised participation in the dream by Marie's school-companions, and the special points
of interest where any of them have added their own phantasies or dreams. The class consists
of girls between twelve and thirteen years of age, who therefore are in the midst of the
prodromata of puberty. The dreamer Marie X. is herself physically almost completely
developed sexually, and in this respect ahead of her class; she is therefore a leader who has
given the watchword for the unconscious, and thus brought to expression the sexual
complexes of her companions which were lying there ready prepared.
As can be easily understood, the occasion was most painful to the teacher. The supposition
that therein lay some secret motive of the schoolgirls is justified by the psychoanalytic axiom
—judge actions by their results rather than by their conscious motives.[164] Consequently it
would be probable that Marie X. had been especially troublesome to her teacher. Marie at first
liked this teacher most of all. In the course of the latter half-year her position had, however,
changed. She had become dreamy and inattentive, and towards the dusk of evening was afraid
to go into the streets for fear of bad men. She talked several times to her companions about
sexual things in a somewhat obscene way; her mother asked me anxiously how she should
explain the approaching menstruation to her daughter. On account of this alteration in conduct
Marie had forfeited the good opinion of her teacher, as was clearly evidenced for the first
time by a school report, which she and some of her friends had received a few days before the
outbreak of the rumour. The disappointment was so great that the girls had imagined all kinds
of fancied acts of revenge against the teacher; for instance, they might push him on to the
lines so that the train would run over him, etc. Marie was especially to the fore in these

murderous phantasies. On the night of this great outburst of anger, when her former liking for
her teacher seemed quite forgotten, that repressed part of herself announced itself in the
dream, and fulfilled its desire for sexual union with the teacher—as a compensation for the
hate which had filled the day.
On waking, the dream became a subtle instrument of her hatred, because the wish-idea was
also that of her school companions, as it always is in rumours of this kind. Revenge certainly
had its triumph, but the recoil upon Marie herself was still more severe. Such is the rule when
our impulses are given over to the unconscious. Marie X. was expelled from school, but upon
my report she was allowed to return to it.
I am well aware that this little communication is inadequate and unsatisfactory from the point
of view of exact science. Had the original story been accurately verified we should have
clearly demonstrated what we have now been only able to suggest. This case therefore only
posits a question, and it remains for happier observers to collect convincing experiences in
this field.

CHAPTER V
ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMBER-DREAMS[165]
The symbolism of numbers which greatly engaged the imaginative philosophy of earlier
centuries has again acquired a fresh interest from the analytic investigations of Freud and his
school. But in the material of number-dreams we no longer discover conscious puzzles of
symbolic concatenations of numbers but the unconscious roots of the symbolism of numbers.
There is scarcely anything quite fundamentally new to offer in this sphere since the
presentations of Freud, Adler and Stekel. It must here suffice to corroborate their experiences
by recording parallel cases. I have had under observation a few cases of this kind which are
worth reporting for their general interest.
The first three instances are from a middle-aged married man whose conflict of the moment
was an extra-conjugal love affair. The piece of the dream from which I take the symbolised
number is: in front of the manager his general subscription. The manager comments on the
high number of the subscription. It reads 2477.
The analysis of the dream brings out a rather ungentlemanly reckoning up of the expense of
the affair, which is foreign to the generous nature of the dreamer, and which the unconscious
makes use of as a resistance to this affair. The preliminary interpretation is, therefore, that the
number has some financial importance and origin. A rough estimate of the expenses so far
leads to a number which in fact approaches 2477 francs; a more exact reckoning, however,
gives 2387 francs, which could be only arbitrarily translated into 2477. I then left the numbers
to the free association of the patient; it occurs to him that the figure in the dream should be
divided as 24-77. Perhaps it is a telephone number; this supposition proves incorrect. The
next association is that it is the total of some numbers. A reminiscence then occurs to him that
he once told me that he had celebrated the 100th birthday of his mother and himself when his
mother was 65 and he was 35 years old. (Their birthdays are on the same day.)
In this way the patient arrived at the following series of associations:—
He is born on
His mistress
His wife
His mother (his father is long dead)
His two children
The patient is born
His mistress
He is now 36 years old, his mistress 25.

26 II.
28 VIII.
1 III.
26 II.
29 IV.
and 13 VII.
II. 75.
VIII. 85.

If this series of associations is written in the usual figures, the following addition is arrived at:
—
26. II. =
28. VIII. =
1. III. =
26. II. =
29. IV. =
13. VII. =
II. 75.=
VIII. 85=
25=
36=

262
288
13
262
294
137
275
885
25
36
——
2477

This series, which includes all the members of his family, gives the number 2477.
This construction led to a deeper layer of the dream's meaning. The patient is most closely
united to his family, but on the other hand very much in love. This situation provokes a severe
conflict. The detailed description of the manager's appearance (which I leave out for the sake
of brevity) pointed to the analyst, from whom the patient rightly fears and desires firm control
and criticism of his condition of dependence and bondage.
The dream which followed soon afterwards, reported in brief, runs: The analyst asks the
patient what he actually does at his mistress'? to which the patient replied he plays there, and
that indeed on a very high number, on 152. The analyst remarks: "You are sadly cheated."
The analysis displayed again a repressed tendency to reckon up the expense of the affair. The
amount spent monthly was close on 152 francs, it was from 148-158 francs. The remark that
he was being cheated alludes to the point at issue in the difficulties of the patient with his
mistress. She maintains that he had deflowered her; he, on the contrary, is firmly convinced
that she was not a virgin, and that she had already been seduced by some one else at the time
when he was seeking her favours and she was refusing him. The expression "number" leads
to the associations: number of the gloves, calibre-number. From there the next step was to the
fact that he recognized, at the first coitus, a noticeable width of the opening instead of the
expected resistance of the hymen. To him, this is proof of the deception. The unconscious
naturally makes use of this opportunity as an effective means of opposition to the
relationship. 152 proves at first refractory to further analysis. The number on a subsequent
occasion aroused the really not remote association, "house-number." Then came this series of
associations. When the patient first knew her the lady lived at X Street No. 17, then Y Street
No. 129, then Z Street No. 48.
Here the patient thought that he had clearly gone far beyond 152, the total being 194. It then
occurred to him that the lady had removed from No. 48 Z Street at his instigation for certain
reasons; it must therefore run 194 - 48 = 146. She now lives in A Street No. 6, therefore 146
+ 6 = 152.

The following dream was obtained during a later part of the analysis. The patient dreamt that
he had received an account from the analyst in which he was charged interest for delay in
payment from the period September 3rd to 29th. The interest on the total of 315 francs was 1
franc.
Under this reproach of meanness and avariciousness levelled at the analyst, the patient
covered, as analysis proved, a violent unconscious envy. Diverse things in the life of the
analyst can arouse the patient's envy; one fact here in particular had recently made a marked
impression. His physician had received an addition to the family. The disturbed relations
between the patient and his wife unfortunately does not permit such an expectation in his
case. Hence his ground for envy and invidious comparisons.
As before, the analysis of 315 produces a separation into 3—1—5. To three he associates—
his doctor has three children, just lately there is one in addition. He himself would have five
children were all living; as it is he has 3 - 1 = 2 living; for three of the children were stillborn.
The symbolism of the numbers is not exhausted by these associations.
The patient remarks that the period from 3rd to 29th September contains twenty-six days. His
next thought is to add this and the other figures of the dream:
26
315
1
___
342
___
With 342 he carries out the same operation as on 315, splitting it into 3—4—2. Whereas
before it came out that his doctor had three children, and then had another, and the patient had
five, now it runs: the doctor had three children, and now has four, patient has only two. He
remarks on this that the second figure sounds like a rectification in contrast with the wishfulfilment of the first.
The patient, who had discovered this explanation for himself without my help, declared
himself satisfied. His physician, however, was not; to him it seemed that the above
disclosures did not exhaust the rich possibilities that determined the unconscious images. The
patient had, for instance, added to the figure five that of the stillborn children; one was born
in the 9th month and two in the 7th. He also emphasised the fact that his wife had had two
miscarriages, one in the 5th week and the other in the 7th. Adding these figures together we
get the determination of the number 26.
Child of7 months
" "7 "
" "9 "
__
23 "
2 miscarriages (5 + 7 weeks)3 "
__

26"
__
It seems as if the number twenty-six were determined by the number of the lost times of
pregnancy. This time (twenty-six days) denotes, in the dream, a delay for which the patient
was charged one franc interest. He has, in fact, suffered a delay through the lost pregnancies,
for his doctor has, during the time the patient has known him, surpassed him with one child.
One franc must be one child. We have already seen the tendency of the patient to add together
all his children, even the dead ones, in order to outdo his rival. The thought that his physician
had outdone him by one child could easily react immediately upon the determination of 1. We
will therefore follow up this tendency of the patient and carry on his play with figures, by
adding to the figure 26 the two complete pregnancies of nine months each.
26 + 9 + 9 = 44
If we follow the tendency to split up the numbers we get 2 + 6 and 4 + 4, two groups of
figures which have only this in common, that each group gives 8 by addition. These numbers
are, as we must notice, composed entirely of the months of pregnancy given by the patient.
Compare with them those groups of figures which contain the information as to the doctor's
fecundity, viz. 315 and 342; it is to be noted that the resemblance lies in their sum-total giving
9 : 9 - 8 = 1. It looks as if here likewise the notion about the differentiation of 1 were carried
out. As the patient remarked, 315 seems thus a wish-fulfilment, 342 on the other hand a
rectification. An ingenious fancy playing round will discover the following difference
between the two numbers:
3 × 1 × 5 = 15.

3 × 4 × 2 = 24.

24 - 15 = 9

Here again we come upon the important figure 9, which neatly combines the reckoning of the
pregnancies and births.
It is difficult to say where the borderline of play begins; necessarily so, for the unconscious
product is the creation of a sportive fancy, of that psychic impulse out of which play itself
arises. It is repugnant to the scientific mind to have serious dealings with this element of play,
which on all sides loses itself in the vague. But it must be never forgotten that the human
mind has for thousands of years amused itself with just this kind of game; it were therefore
nothing wonderful if this historic past again compelled admission in dream to similar
tendencies. The patient pursues in his waking life similar phantastic tendencies about figures,
as is seen in the fact already mentioned of the celebration of the 100th birthday. Their
presence in the dream therefore need not surprise us. In a single example of unconscious
determination exact proofs are often lacking, but the sum of our experiences entitles us to rely
upon the accuracy of the individual discoveries. In the investigation of free creative phantasy
we are in the region, almost more than anywhere else, of broad empiricism; a high measure of
discretion as to the accuracy of individual results is consequently required, but this in nowise
obliges us to pass over in silence what is active and living, for fear of being execrated as
unscientific. There must be no parleying with the superstition-phobia of the modern mind; for
this itself is a means by which the secrets of the unconscious are kept veiled.
It is of special interest to see how the problems of the patient are mirrored in the unconscious
of his wife. His wife had the following dream: She dreamt, and this is the whole dream: "Luke

137." The analysis of the number gives the following. To 1 she associates: The doctor has
another child. He had three. If all her children were living she would have 7; now she has
only 3 - 1 = 2. But she desires 1 + 3 + 7 = 11 (a twin number, 1 and 1), which expresses her
wish that her two children had been pairs of twins, for then she would have reached the same
number of children as the doctor. Her mother once had twins. The hope of getting a child by
her husband is very precarious; this had for a long time turned her ideas in the unconscious
towards a second marriage. Other phantasies pictured her as "done with," i.e. having reached
the climacteric at 44. She is now 33 years old, therefore in 11 years she will have reached her
44th year. This is an important period as her father died in his 44th year. Her phantasy of the
44th year contains the idea of the death of her father. The emphasis on the death of her father
corresponds to the repressed phantasy of the death of her husband, who is the obstacle to a
second marriage. At this place the material belonging to the dream "Luke 137" comes in to
solve the conflict. The dreamer is, one soon discovers, in no wise well up in her Bible, she
has not read it for an incredible time, she is not at all religious. It would be therefore quite
purposeless to have recourse to associations here. The dreamer's ignorance of her Bible is so
great that she did not even know that the citation "Luke 137" could only refer to the Gospel of
St. Luke. When she turned up the New Testament she came to the Acts of the Apostles. As
chapter i. has only 26 verses and not 37, she took the 7th verse, "It is not for you to know the
times or the seasons, which the Father hath put in his own power."
But if we turn to Luke i. 37, we find the Annunciation of the Virgin.
Verse 35. The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall
overshadow thee: therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the
Son of God.
Verse 36. And, behold, thy cousin Elisabeth, she hath also conceived a son in her old age: and
this is the sixth month with her, who was called barren.
Verse 37. For with God nothing shall be impossible.
The necessary continuation of the analysis of "Luke 137" demanded the looking up of Luke
xiii. 7, where it says:
Verse 6. A certain man had a fig tree planted in his vineyard; and he came and sought fruit
thereon, and found none.
Verse 7. Then said he unto the dresser of his vineyard, Behold, these three years I come
seeking fruit on this fig tree, and find none: cut it down; why cumbereth it the ground?
The fig-tree, which from antiquity has been a symbol of the male genital, is to be cut down on
account of its unfruitfulness. This passage is in complete accord with innumerable sadistic
phantasies of the dreamer, concerned with the cutting or biting off of the penis. The relation
to her husband's unfruitful organ is obvious. That she withdraws her libido from her husband
is clear for he is impotent as regard herself; it is equally clear that she undergoes regression to
the father ("which the father hath put in his own power") and identifies herself with her
mother who had twins.[166] By thus advancing her age the dreamer places her husband in
regard to herself in the position of a son or boy, of an age at which impotency is normal.
Furthermore, the desire to overcome her husband is easily understood from, and amply

evidenced in her earlier analysis. It is therefore only a confirmation of what has been already
said, if, following up the matter of "Luke 137," we find in Luke vii. verse 12, Now when he
came nigh to the gate of the city, behold, there was a dead man carried out, the only son of his
mother, and she was a widow. (13) And when the Lord saw her, he had compassion on her,
and said unto her, Weep not. (14) And he came and touched the bier: and they that bare him
stood still. And he said, Young man, I say unto thee, Arise.
In the particular psychological situation of the dreamer, the allusion to the resurrection
presents a delightful meaning as the cure of her husband's impotency. Then the whole
problem would be solved. There is no need for me to point out in so many words the
numerous wish-fulfilments contained in this material; they are obvious to the reader.
The important combination of the symbol "Luke 137" must be conceived as cryptomnesia,
since the dreamer is quite unversed in the Bible. Both Flournoy[167] and myself[168] have
already drawn attention to the important effects of this phenomenon. So far as one can be
humanly certain, the question of any manipulation of the material with intent to deceive does
not come into consideration in this case. Those well posted in psychoanalysis will be able to
allay any such suspicion simply from the disposition and setting of the material as a whole.

CHAPTER VI
A CRITICISM OF BLEULER'S "THEORY OF SCHIZOPHRENIC
NEGATIVISM"[169]
Bleuler's work contains a noteworthy clinical analysis of "Negativism." Besides giving a very
precise and discerning summary of the various manifestations of negativism, the author
presents us with a new psychological conception well worthy of attention, viz. the concept of
ambivalency and of ambitendency, thus formulating the psychological axiom that every
tendency is balanced by its opposite tendency (to this must be added that positive action is
produced by a comparatively small leaning to one side of the scale). Similarly all other
tendencies, under the stress of emotions, are balanced by their opposites—thus giving an
ambivalent character to their expression. This theory rests on clinical observation of katatonic
negativism, which more than proves the existence of contrasting tendencies and values. These
facts are well known to psychoanalysis, where they are summed up under the concept of
resistance. But this must not be taken as meaning that every positive psychic action simply
calls up its opposite. One may easily gain the impression from Bleuler's work that his
standpoint is that, cum grano salis, the conception or the tendency of the Schizophrenic is
always accompanied by its opposite. For instance, Bleuler says:—
1. "Disposing causes of negativistic phenomena are: the ambitendency by which every
impulse is accompanied by its opposite."
2. "Ambivalency, which gives two opposed emotional expressions to the same idea, and
would regard that idea as positive and negative at the same time."
3. "The schizophrenic splitting of the psyche prevents any final summing up of the conflicting
and corresponding psychisms, so that the unsuitable impulse can be realised just as much as
the right one, and the negative thought substituted for the right one." "On this theory, negative
manifestations may directly arise, since non-selected positive and negative psychisms may
stand for one another," and so on.
If we investigate psychoanalytically a case of obvious ambivalency, i.e. of a more or less
unexpected negative reaction instead of a positive one, we find that there is a strict sequence
of psychological causes conditioning negative reaction. The tendency of this sequence is to
disturb the intention of the contrasting or opposite series, that is to say, it is resistance set up
by a complex. This fact, which has not yet been refuted by any other observations, seems to
me to contradict the above-mentioned formulæ. (For confirmation, see my "Psychology of
Dementia Præcox," p. 103.) Psychoanalysis has proved conclusively that a resistance always
has an intention and a meaning; that there is no such thing as a capricious playing with
contrasts. The systematic character of resistance holds good, as I believe I have proved, even
in schizophrenia. So long as this position, founded upon a great variety of experience, is not
disproved by any other observations, the theory of negativism must adapt itself to it. Bleuler
in a sense supports this when he says: "For the most part the negative reaction does not

simply appear as accidental, but is actually preferred to the right one." This is an admission
that negativism is of the nature of resistance. Once admit this, and the primary importance of
ambivalency disappears so far as negativism is concerned. The tendency to resistance remains
as the only fundamental principle. Ambivalency can in no sense be put on all fours with the
"schizophrenic splitting of the psyche," but must be regarded as a concept which gives
expression to the universal and ever-present inner association of pairs of opposites. (One of
the most remarkable examples of this is the "contrary meaning of root-words." See Freud's
"Essay on Dreams," Jahrbuch, vol. II., p. 179.) The same thing applies to ambitendency.
Neither is specific of schizophrenia, but applies equally to the neuroses and the normal. All
that is specific to katatonic negativism is the intentional contrast, i.e. the resistance. From this
explanation we see that resistance is something different from ambivalency; it is the dynamic
factor which makes manifest the everywhere latent ambivalency. What is characteristic of the
diseased mind is not ambivalency but resistance. This implies the existence of a conflict
between two opposite tendencies which has succeeded in raising the normally present
ambivalency into a struggle of opposing components. (Freud has very aptly called this, "The
separation of pairs of opposites.") In other words it is a conflict of wills, bringing about the
neurotic condition of "disharmony within the self." This condition is the only "splitting of the
psyche" known to us, and is not so much to be regarded as a predisposing cause, but rather as
a manifestation resulting from the inner conflict—the "incompatibility of the complex"
(Riklin).
Resistance, as the fundamental fact of schizophrenic dissociation, thus becomes something
which, in contra-distinction to ambivalency, is not eo ipso identical with the concept of the
state of feeling, but is a secondary and supplementary one, with its own special and quasi
independent psychological development; and this is identical with the necessary previous
history of the complex in every case. It follows that the theory of negativism coincides with
the theory of the complex, as the complex is the cause of the resistance.
Bleuler summarises the causes of negativism as follows:
(a) The autistic retirement of the patient into his own phantasies.
(b) The existence of a life-wound (complex) which must be protected from injury.
(c) The misconception of the environment and of its meaning.
(d) The directly hostile relation to environment.
(e) The pathological irritability of schizophrenics.
(f) The "press of ideas," and other aggravations of action and thought.
(g) Sexuality with its ambivalency on the emotional plane is often one of the roots of
negative reaction.
(a) Autistic withdrawal into one's own phantasies[170] is what I formerly designated as the
obvious overgrowth of the phantasies of the complex. The strengthening of the complex is
coincident with the increase of the resistance.

(b) The life-wound (Lebenswund) is the complex which, as a matter of course, is present in
every case of schizophrenia, and of necessity always carries with it the phenomena of autism
or auto-erotism (introversion), for complexes and involuntary egocentricity are inseparable
reciprocities. Points (a) and (b) are therefore identical. (Cf. "Psychology of Dementia
Præcox," chapters ii. and iii.)
(c) It is proved that the misconception of environment is an assimilation of the complex.
(d) The hostile relation to environment is the maximum of resistance as psychoanalysis
clearly shows. (d) goes with (a).
(e) "Irritability" proves itself psychoanalytically to be one of the commonest results of the
complex. I designated it complex-sensibility. Its generalised form (if one may use such an
expression) manifests itself as a damming up of the affect (= damming of the libido),
consequent on increased resistance. So-called neurasthenia is a classical example of this.
(f) Under the term "press of ideas," and similar intellectual troubles, may be classified the
"want of clearness and logic of the schizophrenic thinking," which Bleuler considers a
predisposing cause. I have, as I may presume is known, expressed myself with much reserve
on what he regards as the premeditation of the schizophrenic adjustment. Further and wider
experience has taught me that the laws of the Freudian psychology of dreams and the theory
of the neuroses must be turned towards the obscurities of schizophrenic thinking. The
painfulness of the elaborated complex necessitates a censorship of its expression.[171] This
principle has to be applied to schizophrenic disturbance in thinking; and until it has been
proved that this principle is not applicable to schizophrenia, there is no justification for setting
up a new principle; i.e. to postulate that schizophrenic disturbance of ideas is something
primary. Investigations of hypnagogic activity, as well as association reactions in states of
concentrated attention, give psychical results which up to now are indistinguishable from the
mental conditions in schizophrenia. For example excessive relaxation of attention suffices to
conjure up images as like as two peas to the phantasies and expressions of schizophrenia. It
will be remembered that I have attributed the notorious disturbances of attention in
schizophrenia to the special character of the complex; an idea which my experience since
1906 have further confirmed. There are good reasons for believing specific schizophrenic
thought-disturbance to be the result of a complex.
Now as regards the symptoms of thought-pressure, it is first and foremost a thoughtcompulsion, which, as Freud has shown, is first a thought-complex and secondly a
sexualisation of the thought. Then to the symptom of thought-pressure there is superadded at
least a demoniac impulse such as may be observed in every vigorous release or production of
libido.
Thought-pressure, on closer examination, is seen to be a result of schizophrenic introversion,
which necessarily leads to a sexualisation of the thought; i.e. to an autonomy of the complex.
[172]

(g) The transition to sexuality appears from the psychoanalytical standpoint difficult to
understand. If we consider that the development of resistance coincides in every case with the
history of the complex we must ask ourselves: Is the complex sexual or not? (It goes without
saying thatwe must understand sexuality in its proper sense of psycho-sexuality.) To this

question psychoanalysis gives the invariable answer: Resistance always springs from a
peculiar sexual development. The latter leads in the well-known manner to conflict, i.e. to the
complex. Every case of schizophrenia which has so far been analysed confirms this. It can
therefore claim at least to be a working hypothesis, and one to be followed up. In the present
state of our knowledge, it is therefore not easy to see why Bleuler only allows to sexuality a
quasi-determining influence on the phenomena of negativism; for psychoanalysis
demonstrates that the cause of negativism is resistance; and that with schizophrenia, as with
all other neuroses, this arises from the peculiar sexual development.
It can scarcely be doubted to-day that schizophrenia, with its preponderance of the
mechanisms of introversion, possesses the same mechanism as any other "psycho-neurosis."
In my opinion, at any rate, its peculiar symptoms (apart from the clinical and anatomical
standpoints) are only to be studied by psychoanalysis, i.e. when the investigation is mainly
directed to the genetic impetus. I have, therefore, endeavoured to indicate how Bleuler's
hypothesis stands in the light of the theory of complexes; I feel myself bound to emphasise
the complex-theory in this relation, and am not disposed to surrender this conception, which
is as illuminating as it was difficult to evolve.

CHAPTER VII
PSYCHOANALYSIS[173]
Psychoanalysis is not only scientific, but also technical in character; and from results
technical in their nature, has been developed a new psychological science which might be
called "analytical psychology."
Psychologists and doctors in general are by no means conversant with this particular branch
of psychology, owing to the fact that its technical foundations are as yet comparatively
unknown to them. Reason for this may be found in that the new method is exquisitely
psychological, and therefore belongs neither to the realm of medicine nor to that of
experimental psychology. The medical man has, as a rule, but little knowledge of psychology;
and the psychologist has no medical knowledge. There is therefore a lack of suitable soil in
which to plant the spirit of this new method. Furthermore, the method itself appears to many
persons so arbitrary that they cannot reconcile it with their scientific conscience. The
conceptions of Freud, the founder of this method, laid particular stress upon the sexual factor;
this fact has aroused strong prejudice, and many scientific men are repelled merely by this
feeling. I need hardly remark that such an antipathy is not a logical ground for rejecting a new
method. The facts being so, it is obvious that the psychoanalyst should discuss the principles
rather than the results of his method, when he speaks in public; for he who does not
acknowledge the scientific character of the method cannot acknowledge the scientific
character of its results.
Before I enter into the principles of the psychoanalytic method, I must mention two common
prejudices against it.
The first of these is that psychoanalysis is nothing but a somewhat deep and complicated form
of anamnesis. Now it is well known that the anamnesis is based upon the evidence supplied
by the patient's family, and upon his own conscious self-knowledge, revealed in reply to
direct questions. The psychoanalyst naturally develops his anamnesic data as carefully as any
other specialist; but this is merely the patient's history, and must not be confused with
analysis. Analysis is the reduction of an actual conscious content of a so-called accidental
nature, into its psychological determinants. This process has nothing to do with the anamnesic
reconstruction of the history of the illness.
The second prejudice, which is based, as a rule, upon a superficial knowledge of
psychoanalytic literature, is that psychoanalysis is a method of suggestion, by which a faith or
doctrine of living is imposed upon the patient, thereby effecting a cure in the manner of
mental healing or Christian Science. Many analysts, especially those who have worked in
psychoanalysis for a long time, previously used therapeutic suggestion, and are therefore
familiar with its workings. They know that the psychoanalyst's method of working is
diametrically opposed to that of the hypnotist. In direct contrast with therapeutic suggestion,
the psychoanalyst does not attempt to force anything upon his patient which the latter does

not see himself, and find reasonable with his own understanding. Faced with the constant
desire on the part of the neurotic patient to receive suggestions and advice, the analyst just as
constantly endeavours to lead him away from this passive receptive attitude, and make him
use his common sense and powers of criticism, that equipped with these he may become
fitted to meet the problems of life independently. We have often been accused of forcing
interpretations upon patients, interpretations that were frequently quite arbitrary in character. I
wish that one of these critics would make the attempt to force such arbitrary interpretations
upon my patients, who are often persons of great intelligence and high culture, and who are,
indeed, not infrequently my own colleagues. The impossibility of such an undertaking would
soon be laid bare. In psychoanalysis we are dependent upon the patient and his judgment, for
the reason that the very nature of analysis consists in leading him to a knowledge of his own
self. The principles of psychoanalysis are so entirely different from those of therapeutic
suggestion that they are not comparable.
An attempt has also been made to compare analysis with the reasoning method of Dubois,
which is in itself a rational process. This comparison does not however hold good, for the
psychoanalyst strictly avoids argument and persuasion with his patients. He must naturally
listen to and take note of the conscious problems and conflicts of his patient, but not for the
purpose of fulfilling his desire to obtain advice or direction with regard to his conduct. The
problems of a neurotic patient cannot be solved by advice and conscious argument. I do not
doubt that good advice at the right time can produce good results; but I do not know whence
one can obtain the belief that the psychoanalyst can always give the right advice at the right
time. The neurotic conflict is frequently, indeed as a rule, of such a character that advice
cannot possibly be given. Furthermore, it is well known that the patient only desires
authoritative advice in order that he may cast aside the burden of responsibility, referring
himself and others to the opinion of the higher authority.
In direct contrast to all previous methods, psychoanalysis endeavours to overcome the
disorders of the neurotic psyche through the subconscious, not through the conscious self. In
this work we naturally have need of the patient's conscious content, for his subconsciousness
can only be reached viâ the conscious. The material furnished by the anamnesis is the source
from which our work starts. The detailed recital usually furnishes many valuable clues which
make the psychogenic origin of the symptoms clear to the patient. This work is naturally only
necessary where the patient is convinced that his neurosis is organic in its origin. But even in
those cases where the patient is convinced from the very first of the psychic nature of his
illness, a critical survey of the history is very advantageous, since it discloses to him a
psychological concatenation of ideas of which he was unaware. In this manner those
problems which need special discussion are frequently brought to the surface. Work of this
kind may occupy many sittings. Finally the explanation of the conscious material reaches an
end, in so far as neither the patient nor the doctor can add anything to it that is decisive in
character. Under the most favourable circumstances the end comes with the formulation of
the problem which proved itself to be impossible of solution. Let us take, for instance, the
case of a man who was once well, but who became a neurotic between the age of 35 and 40.
His position in life is assured, and he has a wife and children. Parallel with his neurosis he
developed an intense resistance towards his professional work. He observed that the first
symptoms of neurosis became noticeable when he had to overcome a certain difficulty in
regard to it. Later on his symptoms became aggravated with each successive difficulty that

arose. An amelioration in his neurosis occurred whenever fortune favoured him in his
professional work. The problem that results from a critical discussion of the anamnesis is as
follows:—
The patient is aware that if he could improve his work, the mere satisfaction that would result
could bring about the much-desired improvement in his neurotic condition. He cannot,
however, make his work more efficient because of his great resistance against it. This
problem cannot be solved by any reasoning process.
Let us take another case. A woman of 40, the mother of four children, became neurotic four
years ago after the death of one of her children. A new period of pregnancy, followed by the
birth of another child, produced a great improvement in her condition. The patient now lived
in the thought that it would be a great help to her if she could have yet another child.
Believing, however, that this could not happen, she attempted to devote her energies to
philanthropic interests. But she failed to obtain the least satisfaction from this work. She
observed a distinct alleviation of her complaint whenever she succeeded in giving real, living
interest to any matter, but she felt entirely incapable of discovering anything that could bring
her lasting interest and satisfaction. It is clear that no process of reasoning can solve this
problem.
Here psychoanalysis must begin with the endeavour to solve the problem as to what prevents
the patient from developing interests above and beyond her longing for a child.
Since we cannot assume that we know from the very beginning what the solution of such
problems is, we must at this point trust to the clues furnished us by the individuality of the
patient. Neither conscious questioning nor rational advice can aid us in the discovery of these
clues, for the causes which prevent us from finding them are hidden from her consciousness.
There is, therefore, no clearly indicated path by which to reach these subconscious
inhibitions. The only rule that psychoanalysis lays down for our guidance in this respect, is to
let the patient speak of that which occurs to him at the moment. The analyst must observe
carefully what the patient says and, in the first instance, take due note thereof without
attempting to force his own opinions upon him. Thus we observe that the patient whom I first
mentioned begins by talking about his marriage, which we hitherto had reason to regard as
normal. We now learn that he constantly has difficulties with his wife, and that he does not
understand her in the least. This knowledge causes the physician to remark that the patient's
professional work is clearly not his only problem; but that his conjugal relations are also in
need of revision. This starts a train of thought in which many further ideas occur to the
patient, concerning his married life. Hereupon follow ideas about the love affairs he had
before his marriage. These experiences, related in detail, show that the patient was always
somewhat peculiar in his more intimate relations with women, and that this peculiarity took
the form of a certain childish egoism. This is a new and surprising point of view for him, and
explains to him many of his misfortunes with women.
We cannot in every case get so far as this on the simple principle of letting the patient talk;
few patients have their psychic material so much on the surface. Furthermore, many persons
have a positive resistance against speaking freely about what occurs to them on the spur of
the moment; it is often too painful to tell the doctor whom perhaps they do not entirely trust;
in other cases because apparently nothing occurs to them, they force themselves to speak of

matters about which they are more or less indifferent. This habit of not talking to the point by
no means proves that patients consciously conceal their unpleasant contents, for such
irrelevant speaking can occur quite unconsciously. In such cases it sometimes helps the
patient if he is told that he must not force himself, that he must only seize upon the very first
thoughts that present themselves, no matter how unimportant or ridiculous they may seem. In
certain cases even these instructions are of no use, and then the doctor is obliged to have
recourse to other expedients. One of these is the employment of the association test, which
usually gives excellent information as to the chief momentary tendencies of the individual.

A second expedient is dream analysis; this is the real instrument of
psychoanalysis. We have already experienced so much opposition to dream
analysis that a brief exposition of its principles is necessary. The
interpretation of dreams, as well as the meaning given to them, is, as we
know, in bad odour. It is not long since that oneirocritics were practised and
believed in; nor is the time long past when even the most enlightened
human beings were entirely under the ban of superstition. It is therefore
comprehensible that our age should still retain a certain lively fear of those
superstitions which have but recently been partially overcome. To this
timidity in regard to superstition, the opposition to dream analysis is in a
large measure due; but analysis is in no wise to blame for this. We do not
select the dream as our object because we pay it the homage of superstitious
admiration, but because it is a psychic product that is independent of the
patient's consciousness. We ask for the patient's free thoughts, but he gives
us little, or nothing; or at best something forced or irrelevant. Dreams are
free thoughts, free phantasies, they are not forced, and they are psychic
phenomena just as much as thoughts are.
It may be said of the dream that it enters into the consciousness as a
complex structure, the connection between the elements of which is not
conscious. Only by afterwards joining associations to the separate pictures
of the dream, can the origin of these pictures, in certain recollections of the
near and more remote past, be proved. One asks oneself: "Where have I
seen or heard that?" And by the same process of free association comes the
memory that one has actually experienced certain parts of the dream, some
of them yesterday, some at an earlier date. This is well known, and every
one will probably agree to it. Thus far the dream presents itself, as a rule, as
an incomprehensible composition of certain elements which are not in the
first instance conscious, but which are later recognised by the process of
free association. This might be disputed on the ground that it is an a priori
statement. I must remark, however, that this conception conforms to the
only generally recognised working hypothesis as to the genesis of dreams,
namely, the derivation of the dream from experiences and thoughts of the
recent past. We are, therefore, upon known ground. Not that certain dream
parts have under all circumstances been known to the individual, so that one
might ascribe to them the character of being conscious; on the contrary,
they are frequently, even generally, unrecognisable. Not until later do we

remember having consciously experienced this or that dream part. We may
therefore regard the dream from this point of view as a product that comes
from a subconscious origin. The technical unfolding of these subconscious
sources is a mode of procedure that has always been instinctively
employed. One simply tries to remember whence the dream parts come.
Upon this most simple principle the psychoanalytic method of solving
dreams is based. It is a fact that certain dream parts are derived from our
waking life and, indeed, from experiences which, owing to their notorious
lack of importance, would frequently have been consigned to certain
oblivion, and were therefore well on their way towards becoming definitely
subconscious. Such dream parts are the results of subconscious
representations (images).
The principles according to which psychoanalysis solves dreams are
therefore exceedingly simple, and have really been known for a long time.
The further procedure follows the same path logically and consistently. If
one spends considerable time over a dream, which really never happens
outside psychoanalysis, one can succeed in finding more and more
recollections for the separate dream parts. It is, however, not always
possible to discover recollections for certain other parts; and then one must
leave them for the time being, whether one likes it or not. When I speak of
"recollections" I naturally do not mean merely memories of certain concrete
experiences, but also of their inter-related meanings. The collected
recollections are known as the dream material. With this material one
proceeds according to a scientific method that is universally valid. If one
has any experimental material to work up, one compares its separate parts
and arranges them according to their similarities. Exactly the same course is
pursued in dealing with the dream material; one gathers together its
common characteristics, whether these be formal or material. In doing this
one must absolutely get rid of certain prejudices. I have always observed
that the beginner expects to find some tendency or other according to which
he endeavours to mould his material. I have noticed this particularly in the
cases of colleagues who were previously more or less violent opponents of
psychoanalysis, owing to their well-known prejudices and
misunderstandings. When fate willed that I should analyse them, and they
consequently gained at last an insight into the method of analysis, it was
demonstrated that the first mistake which they had been apt to make in their
own psychoanalytic practice was that they forced the material into accord

with their own preconceived opinions; that is, they allowed their former
attitude towards psychoanalysis, which they were not able to appreciate
objectively, but only according to subjective phantasies, to have its
influence upon their material. If one goes so far as to venture upon the task
of examining the dream material, one must permit no comparison to
frighten one away. The material consists, as a general rule, of very unequal
images, from which it is under some circumstances most difficult to obtain
the "tertium comparationis." I must forego giving you detailed examples of
this, since it is quite impossible to introduce such extensive material into a
lecture.
One pursues, then, the same method in classifying the unconscious content,
as is used everywhere in comparing materials for the purpose of drawing
conclusions from them. One objection has often been made, namely: why
should the dream have a subconscious content at all? This objection is
unscientific in my opinion. Every psychological moment has its own
history. Every sentence that I utter has, besides the meaning consciously
intended by me, a meaning that is historical; and this last may be entirely
different from the conscious meaning. I am purposely expressing myself
somewhat paradoxically. I certainly should not take it upon myself to
explain each sentence according to its individual-historical meaning. That is
easier in the case of larger and more complex formations. Every one is
certainly convinced of the fact that a poem—in addition to its manifest
contents—is also particularly characteristic of its author, in its form,
subject-matter, and the history of its origin. Whereas the poet gave skilful
expression to a fleeting mood in his song, the historian of literature sees in
it and beyond it, things which the poet would never have suspected. The
analysis which the literary critic makes of the subject-matter furnished by
the poet may be compared with psychoanalysis in its method, even to the
very errors which occur therein. The psychoanalytic method may be aptly
compared with historical analysis and synthesis. Let us assume, for
instance, that we do not understand the meaning of the rite of baptism as it
is practised in our churches to-day. The priest tells us that baptism means
the reception of the child into the Christian community. But we are not
satisfied with this. Why should the child be sprinkled with water, etc.? In
order that we may understand this rite we must gather together materials for
comparison from the history of the rite, that is, from the memories of

mankind appertaining to it; and this must be done from various points of
view.
Firstly—Baptism is clearly a rite of initiation, a consecration. Therefore
those memories, above all, must be assembled which preserve the rites of
initiation.
Secondly—The act of baptism is performed with water. This especial form
of procedure proves the necessity of welding together another chain of
memories concerning rites in which water was used.
Thirdly—The child is sprinkled with water when it is christened. In this
case we must gather together all the forms of the rite, where the neophyte is
sprinkled or where the child is submerged, etc.
Fourthly—We must recollect all the reminiscences in mythology and all the
superstitious customs which are in any respect similar to the symbolic act of
baptism.
In this manner we obtain a comparative study of the act of baptism. Thus
we ascertain the elements from which baptism is derived; we further
ascertain its original meaning, and at the same time make the acquaintance
of a world rich in religious mythology, which makes clear to us all the
multifarious and derived meanings of the act of baptism. Thus the analyst
deals with the dream. He gathers together historical parallels for each dream
part, even though they be very remote and attempts to construct the
psychological history of the dream and the meanings that underlie it. By
this monographic elaboration of the dream one gains, exactly as in the
analysis of the act of baptism, a deep insight into the wonderfully subtle and
significant network of subconscious determinations; an insight which, as I
have said, can only be compared with the historical understanding of an act
that we used only to consider from a very one-sided and superficial point of
view.
I cannot disguise the fact that in practice, especially at the beginning of an
analysis, we do not in all cases make complete and ideal analyses of
dreams, but that we more generally continue to gather together the dream
associations until the problem which the patient hides from us becomes so
clear that even he can recognize it. This problem is then subjected to

conscious elaboration until it is cleared up as far as possible, and once again
we stand before a question that cannot be answered.
You will now ask what course is to be pursued when the patient does not
dream at all; I can assure you that hitherto all patients, even those who
claimed never to have dreamed before, began to dream when they went
through analysis. But on the other hand it frequently occurs that patients
who began by dreaming vividly are suddenly no longer able to remember
their dreams. The empirical and practical rule, which I have hitherto
regarded as binding, is that the patient, if he does not dream, has sufficient
conscious material, which he keeps back for certain reasons. A common
reason is: "I am in the doctor's hands and am quite willing to be treated by
him. But the doctor must do the work, I shall remain passive in the matter."
Sometimes the resistances are of a more serious character. For instance,
persons who cannot admit certain morally grave sides to their characters,
project their deficiencies upon the doctor by calmly presuming that he is
more or less deficient morally, and that for this reason they cannot
communicate certain unpleasant things to him. If, then a patient does not
dream from the beginning or ceases to dream he retains material which is
susceptible of conscious elaboration. Here the personal relation between the
doctor and his patient may be regarded as the chief hindrance. It can
prevent them both, the doctor as well as the patient, from seeing the
situation clearly. We must not forget that, as the doctor shows, and must
show, a searching interest in the psychology of his patient, so, too, the
patient, if he has an active mind, gains some familiarity with the
psychology of the doctor and assumes a corresponding attitude towards
him. Thus the doctor is blind to the mental attitude of the patient to the
exact extent that he does not see himself and his own subconscious
problems. Therefore I maintain that a doctor must be analysed before he
practises analysis. Otherwise the practice of analysis can easily be a great
disappointment to him, because he can, under certain circumstances, reach a
point where further progress is impossible, a situation which may make him
lose his head. He is then readily inclined to assume that psychoanalysis is
nonsense, so as to avoid the admission that he has run his vessel ashore. If
you are sure of your own psychology you can confidently tell your patient
that he does not dream because there is still conscious material to be
disposed of. I say that one must be sure of one's self in such cases, for the

opinions and unsparing criticisms to which one sometimes has to submit,
can be excessively disturbing to one who is unprepared to meet them. The
immediate consequence of such a loss of personal balance on the part of the
doctor is that he begins to argue with his patient, in order to maintain his
influence over him; and this, of course, renders all further analysis
impossible.
I have told you that, in the first instance, dreams need only be used as
sources of material for analysis. At the beginning of an analysis it is not
only unnecessary, but also unwise, to make a so-called complete
interpretation of a dream; for it is very difficult indeed to make a complete
and really exhaustive interpretation. The interpretations of dreams that one
sometimes reads in psychoanalytic publications are often one-sided, and not
infrequently contestable formulations. I include among these certain onesided sexual reductions of the Viennese school. In view of the
comprehensive many-sidedness of the dream material one must beware,
above all, of one-sided formulations. The many-sidedness of the meaning of
a dream, not its singleness of meaning, is of the utmost value, especially at
the beginning of the psychoanalytic treatment. Thus, for instance, a patient
had the following dream not long after her treatment had begun: "She was
in a hotel in a strange city. Suddenly a fire broke out; and her husband and
her father, who were with her, helped her in the work of saving others." The
patient was intelligent, extraordinarily sceptical, and absolutely convinced
that dream analysis was nonsense. I had difficulty in inducing her to give
dream analysis even one trial. Indeed I saw at once that I could not inform
my patient of the real content of the dream under these circumstances
because her resistances were much too great. I selected the fire, the most
conspicuous occurrence of the dream, as the starting point for obtaining her
free associations. The patient told me that she had recently read in a
newspaper that a certain hotel in Z. had been burnt down; that she
remembered the hotel because she had once lived in it. At the hotel she had
made the acquaintance of a man, and from this acquaintance a somewhat
questionable love affair developed. In connection with this story the fact
came out that she had already had quite a number of similar adventures, all
of which had a certain frivolous character. This important bit of past history
was brought out by the first free association with a dream-part. It would
have been impossible in this case to make clear to the patient the very
striking meaning of the dream. With her frivolous mental attitude, of which

her scepticism was only a special instance, she could have calmly repelled
any attempt of this kind. But after the frivolity of her mental attitude was
recognised and proved to her, by the material that she herself had furnished,
it was possible to analyse the dreams which followed much more
thoroughly.
It is, therefore, advisable in the beginning to make use of dreams for the
purpose of reaching the important subconscious material by means of the
patient's free associations in connection with them. This is the best and most
cautious method, especially for those who are just beginning to practise
analysis. An arbitrary translation of the dreams is absolutely unadvisable.
That would be a superstitious practice based on the acceptance of wellestablished symbolic meanings. But there are no fixed symbolic meanings.
There are certain symbols that recur frequently, but we are not able to get
beyond general statements. For instance, it is quite incorrect to assume that
the snake, when it appears in dreams, has a merely phallic meaning; just as
incorrect as it is to deny that it may have a phallic meaning in some cases.
Every symbol has more than one meaning. I can therefore not admit the
correctness of exclusively sexual interpretations, such as appear in some
psychoanalytic publications, for my experience has made me regard them as
one-sided and therefore insufficient. As an example of this I will tell you a
very simple dream of a young patient of mine. It was as follows: "I was
going up a flight of stairs with my mother and sister. When we reached the
top I was told that my sister was soon to have a child."
I shall now show you how, on the strength of the hitherto prevailing point of
view, this dream may be translated so that it receives a sexual meaning. We
know that the incest phantasy plays a prominent part in the life of a
neurotic. Hence the picture "with my mother and sister" might be regarded
as an allusion in this direction. The "stairs" have a sexual meaning that is
supposedly well established; they represent the sexual act because of the
rhythmic climbing of steps. The child that my patient's sister is expecting is
nothing but the logical result of these premises. The dream, translated thus,
would be a clear fulfilment of infantile desires which as we know play an
important part in Freud's theory of dreams.
Now I have analysed this with the aid of the following process of reasoning:
If I say that the stairs are a symbol for the sexual act, whence do I obtain the
right to regard the mother, the sister, and the child as concrete; that is, as not

symbolic? If, on the strength of the claim that dream pictures are symbolic,
I give to certain of these pictures the value of symbols, what right have I to
exempt certain other dream parts from this process? If, therefore, I attach
symbolic value to the ascent of the stairs, I must also attach a symbolic
value to the pictures that represent the mother, the sister, and the child.
Therefore I did not translate the dream, but really analysed it. The result
was surprising. I will give you the free associations with the separate
dream-parts, word for word, so that you can form your own opinions
concerning the material. I should state in advance that the young man had
finished his studies at the university a few months previously; that he found
the choice of a profession too difficult to make; and that he thereupon
became a neurotic. In consequence of this he gave up his work. His neurosis
took, among other things, a decidedly homosexual form.
The patient's associations with his mother are as follows: "I have not seen
her for a long time, a very long time. I really ought to reproach myself for
this. It is wrong of me to neglect her so." "Mother," then, stands here for
something which is neglected in an inexcusable manner. I said to the
patient: "What is that?" And he replied, with considerable embarrassment,
"My work."
With his sister he associated as follows: "It is years since I have seen her. I
long to see her again. Whenever I think of her I recall the time when I took
leave of her. I kissed her with real affection; and at that moment I
understood for the first time what love for a woman can mean." It is at once
clear to the patient that his sister represents "love for woman."
With the stairs he has this association: "Climbing upwards; getting to the
top; making a success of life; being grown up; being great." The child
brings him the ideas: "New born; a revival; a regeneration; to become a new
man."
One only has to hear this material in order to understand at once that the
patient's dream is not so much the fulfilment of infantile desires, as it is the
expression of biological duties which he has hitherto neglected because of
his infantilism. Biological justice, which is inexorable, sometimes compels
the human being to atone in his dreams for the duties which he has
neglected in real life.

This dream is a typical example of the prospective and teleological function
of dreams in general, a function that has been especially emphasised by my
colleague Dr. Maeder. If we adhered to the one-sidedness of sexual
interpretation, the real meaning of the dream would escape us. Sexuality in
dreams is, in the first instance, a means of expression, and by no means
always the meaning and the object of the dream. The unfolding of the
prospective or teleological meaning of dreams is of particular importance as
soon as analysis is so far advanced that the eyes of the patient are more
easily turned upon the future, than upon his inner life and upon the past.
In connection with the application of symbolism, we can also learn from the
example furnished us by this dream, that there can be no fixed and
unalterable dream symbols, but at best a frequent repetition of fairly general
meanings. So far as the so-called sexual meaning of dreams, in particular, is
concerned, my experience has led me to lay down the following practical
rules:
If dream analysis at the beginning of the treatment shows that the dream has
an undoubted sexual meaning, this meaning is to be taken realistically; that
is, it is proved thereby that the sexual problem itself must be subjected to a
careful revision. If, for instance, an incest phantasy is clearly shown to be a
latent content of the dream, one must subject the patient's infantile relations
towards his parents and his brothers and sisters, as well as his relations
towards other persons who are fitted to play the part of his father or mother
in his mind, to a careful examination on this basis. But if a dream that
comes in a later stage of the analysis has, let us say, an incest phantasy as its
essential content, a phantasy that we have reason to consider disposed of,
concrete value must not be attached to it under all circumstances; it must be
regarded as symbolic. In this case symbolic value, not concrete value, must
be attached to the sexual phantasy. If we did not go beyond the concrete
value in this case, we should keep reducing the patient to sexuality, and this
would arrest the progress of the development of his personality. The
patient's salvation is not to be found by thrusting him back again into
primitive sexuality; this would leave him on a low plane of civilisation
whence he could never obtain freedom and complete restoration to health.
Retrogression to a state of barbarism is no advantage at all for a civilised
human being.

The above-mentioned formula, according to which the sexuality of a dream
is a symbolic or analogous expression, naturally also holds good in the case
of dreams occurring in the beginning of an analysis. But the practical
reasons that have induced us not to take into consideration the symbolic
value of this sexual phantasy, owe their existence to the fact that a genuine
realistic value must be given to the abnormal sexual phantasies of a
neurotic, in so far as the latter suffers himself to be influenced in his actions
by these phantasies. Experience teaches us that these phantasies not only
hinder him from adapting himself suitably to his situation, but that they also
lead him to all manner of really sexual acts, and occasionally even to incest.
Under these circumstances, it would be of little use to consider the symbolic
content of the dream only; the concrete content must first be disposed of.
These arguments are based upon a different conception of the dream from
that put forward by Freud; for, indeed, my experience has forced me to a
different conception. According to Freud, the dream is in its essence a
symbolic veil for repressed desires which are in conflict with the ideals of
the personality. I am obliged to regard the dream structure from a different
point of view. The dream for me is, in the first instance, the subliminal
picture of the psychological condition of the individual in his waking state.
It presents a résumé of the subliminal association material which is brought
together by the momentary psychological situation. The volitional meaning
of the dream which Freud calls the repressed desire, is, for me, essentially a
means of expression. The activity of the consciousness, speaking
biologically, represents the psychological effort which the individual makes
in adapting himself to the conditions of life. His consciousness endeavours
to adjust itself to the necessities of the moment, or, to put it differently:
there are tasks ahead of the individual, which he must overcome. In many
cases the solution is unknown; and for this reason the consciousness always
tries to find the solution by the way of analogous experience. We always try
to grasp what is unknown and in the future, according to our mental
understanding of what has gone before. Now we have no reasons for
assuming that the unconscious follows other laws than those which apply to
conscious thought. The unconscious, like the conscious, gathers itself about
the biological problems and endeavours to find solutions for these by
analogy with what has gone before, just as much as the conscious does.
Whenever we wish to assimilate something that is unknown, we arrive at it
by a process of comparison. A simple example of this is the well-known

fact that, when America was discovered by the Spaniards, the Indians took
the horses of the conquerors, which were strange to them, for large pigs,
because pigs were familiar to their experience. This is the mental process
which we always employ in recognising unknown things; and this is the
essential reason for the existence of symbolism. It is a process of
comprehension by means of analogy. The apparently repressed desires,
contained in the dream, are volitional tendencies which serve as languagematerial for subconscious expression. So far as this particular point is
concerned, I am in full accord with the views of Adler, another member of
Freud's school. With reference to the fact that subconscious materials of
expression are volitional elements or tendencies, I may say that this is
dependent upon the archaic nature of dream thinking, a problem with which
I have already dealt in previous researches.[174]
Owing to our different conception of the structure of the dream, the further
course of analysis also gains a different complexion from that which it had
until now. The symbolic valuation given to sexual phantasies in the later
stages of analysis necessarily leads less to the reduction of the patient's
personality into primitive tendencies, than to the extension and further
development of his mental attitude; that is, it tends to make his thinking
richer and deeper, thus giving him what has always been one of the most
powerful weapons that a human being can have in his struggle to adapt
himself to life. By following this new course logically, I have come to the
conclusion that these religious and philosophical motive forces—the socalled metaphysical needs of the human being—must receive positive
consideration at the hands of the analyst. Though he must not destroy the
motive forces that underlie them, by reducing them to their primitive,
sexual roots, he must make them serve biological ends as psychologically
valuable factors. Thus these instincts assume once more those functions that
have been theirs from time immemorial.
Just as primitive man was able, with the aid of religious and philosophical
symbol, to free himself from his original state, so, too, the neurotic can
shake off his illness in a similar way. It is hardly necessary for me to say,
that I do not mean by this, that the belief in a religious or philosophical
dogma should be thrust upon the patient; I mean simply that he has to
reassume that psychological attitude which, in an earlier civilisation, was
characterised by the living belief in a religious or philosophical dogma. But

the religious-philosophical attitude does not necessarily correspond to the
belief in a dogma. A dogma is a transitory intellectual formulation; it is the
result of the religious-philosophical attitude, and is dependent upon time
and circumstances. This attitude is itself an achievement of civilization; it is
a function that is exceedingly valuable from a biological point of view, for
it gives rise to the incentives that force human beings to do creative work
for the benefit of a future age, and, if necessary, to sacrifice themselves for
the welfare of the species.
Thus the human being attains the same sense of unity and totality, the same
confidence, the same capacity for self-sacrifice in his conscious existence
that belongs unconsciously and instinctively to wild animals. Every
reduction, every digression from the course that has been laid down for the
development of civilisation does nothing more than turn the human being
into a crippled animal; it never makes a so-called natural man of him. My
numerous successes and failures in the course of my analytic practice have
convinced me of the invariable correctness of this psychological
orientation. We do not help the neurotic patient by freeing him from the
demand made by civilisation; we can only help him by inducing him to take
an active part in the strenuous task of carrying on the development of
civilisation. The suffering which he undergoes in performing this duty takes
the place of his neurosis. But, whereas the neurosis and the complaints that
accompany it are never followed by the delicious feeling of good work well
done, of duty fearlessly performed, the suffering that comes from useful
work, and from victory over real difficulties, brings with it those moments
of peace and satisfaction which give the human being the priceless feeling
that he has really lived his life.

CHAPTER VIII
ON PSYCHOANALYSIS[175]
After many years' experience I now know that it is extremely difficult to
discuss psychoanalysis at public meetings and at congresses. There are so
many misconceptions of the matter, so many prejudices against certain
psychoanalytic views, that it becomes an almost impossible task to reach
mutual understanding in public discussion. I have always found a quiet
conversation on the subject much more useful and fruitful than heated
discussions coram publico. However, having been honoured by an
invitation from the Committee of this Congress as a representative of the
psychoanalytic movement, I will do my best to discuss some of the
fundamental theoretical conceptions of psychoanalysis. I must limit myself
to this part of the subject because I am quite unable to place before my
audience all that psychoanalysis means and strives for, all its various
applications, its psychology, its theoretical tendencies, its importance for
the realm of the so-called "Geisteswissenschaften," e.g. Mythology,
Comparative Religion, Philosophy, &c. But if I am to discuss certain
theoretical problems fundamental to psychoanalysis, I must presuppose my
audience to be well acquainted with the development and main results of
psychoanalytic researches. Unfortunately, it often happens that people
believe themselves entitled to judge psychoanalysis who have not even read
the literature. It is my firm conviction that no one is competent to form a
judgment concerning the subject until he has studied the fundamental works
on psychoanalysis.
In spite of the fact that Freud's theory of neurosis has been worked out in
great detail, it cannot be said to be, on the whole, very clear or easily
accessible. This justifies my giving you a very short abstract of his
fundamental views concerning the theory of neurosis.
You are aware that the original theory that hysteria and the related neuroses
take their origin in a trauma or shock of sexual character in early childhood,
was given up about fifteen years ago. It soon became obvious that the

sexual trauma could not be the real cause of a neurosis, since trauma is
found so universally; there is scarcely a human being who has not had some
sexual shock in early youth, and yet comparatively few have incurred a
neurosis in later life. Freud himself soon became aware that several of the
patients who related an early traumatic event, had only invented the story of
a so-called trauma; it had never taken place in reality, and was a mere
creation of phantasy. Moreover, on further investigation it became quite
obvious that even a trauma which had actually occurred was not always
responsible for the whole of the neurosis, although it does sometimes look
as if the structure of the neurosis depended entirely upon the trauma. If a
neurosis were the inevitable consequence of a trauma it would be quite
incomprehensible why neurotics are not incomparably more numerous.
This apparently heightened shock-effect was clearly based upon the
exaggerated and morbid phantasy of the patient. Freud also saw that this
same phantasy manifested itself in relatively early bad habits, which he
called infantile perversities. His new conception of the ætiology of a
neurosis was based upon this further understanding and traced the neurosis
back to some sexual activity in early infancy; this conception led on to his
recent view that the neurotic is "fixed" to a certain period of his early
infancy, because he still seems to preserve some trace of it, direct or
indirect, in his mental attitude. Freud also makes the attempt to classify or
to differentiate the neuroses, including dementia præcox, according to the
stage of the infantile development in which the fixation took place.
From the standpoint of this theory, the neurotic appears to be entirely
dependent upon his infantile past, and all his troubles in later life, his moral
conflicts, and deficiencies, seem to be derived from the powerful influence
of that period. The therapy and its main preoccupation are in full accord
with this view, and are chiefly concerned with the unravelling of this
infantile fixation, which is understood as an unconscious attachment of the
sexual libido to certain infantile phantasies and habits.
This is, so far as I can see, the essence of Freud's theory. But this
conception neglects the following important question: What is the cause of
this fixation of the libido to the old infantile phantasies and habits? We have
to remember that almost all persons have at some time had infantile
phantasies and habits exactly corresponding to those of a neurotic, but they
do not become fixed to them; consequently, they do not become neurotic

later on. The ætiological secret of the neurosis, therefore, does not consist in
the mere existence of infantile phantasies, but lies in the so-called fixation.
The manifold statements of the existence of infantile sexual phantasies in
neurotic cases are worthless, in so far as they attribute an ætiological value
to them, for the same phantasies can be found in normal individuals as well,
a fact which I have often proved. It is only the fixation which seems to be
characteristic. It is important to demand the nature of the proofs of the real
existence of this infantile fixation. Freud, an absolutely sincere and
thorough empiricist, would never have evolved this hypothesis had he not
had sufficient grounds for it. The grounds are found in the results of the
psychoanalytic investigations of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis discloses
the unconscious existence of manifold phantasies, which have their end root
in the infantile past and turn around the so-called "Kern-complex," or
nucleus-complex, which may be designated in male individuals as the
Œdipus-complex and in females as the Electra-complex. These terms
convey their own meaning exactly. The whole tragic fate of Œdipus and
Electra took place within the narrow confines of the family, just as the
child's fate lies wholly within the family boundaries. Hence the Œdipus
conflict is very characteristic of an infantile conflict, so also is the Electra
conflict. The existence of these conflicts in infancy is largely proven by
means of psychoanalytic experience. It is in the realm of this complex that
the fixation is supposed to have taken place. Through the highly potent and
effective existence of the nucleus-complex in the unconscious of neurotics,
Freud was led to the hypothesis, that the neurotic has a peculiar fixation or
attachment to it. Not the mere existence of this complex—for everybody
has it in the unconscious—but the very strong attachment to it is what is
typical of the neurotic. He is far more influenced by this complex than the
normal person; many examples in confirmation of this statement will be
found in every one of the recent psychoanalytic histories of neurotic cases.
We must admit that this conception is a very plausible one, because the
hypothesis of fixation is based upon the well-known fact, that certain
periods of human life, and particularly infancy, do sometimes leave
determining traces for ever. The only question is whether this principle is a
sufficient explanation or not. If we examine persons who have been
neurotic from infancy it seems to be confirmed, for we see the nucleuscomplex as a permanent and powerful activity throughout the whole life.
But if we take cases which never show any considerable traces of neurosis

except at the particular time when they break down, and there are many
such, this principle becomes doubtful. If there is such a thing as fixation, it
is not permissible to base upon it a new hypothesis, claiming that at times
during certain epochs of life the fixation becomes loosened and ineffective,
while at others it suddenly becomes strengthened and effective. In such
cases we find the nucleus-complex as active and as potent as in those which
apparently support the theory of fixation. Here a critical attitude is
peculiarly justifiable, when we consider the often-repeated observation that
the moment of the outbreak of the disease is by no means indifferent; as a
rule it is most critical. It usually occurs at the moment when a new
psychological adjustment, that is, a new adaptation, is demanded. Such
moments facilitate the outbreak of a neurosis, as every experienced
neurologist knows. This fact seems to me extremely significant. If the
fixation were indeed real we should expect to find its influence constant, i.e.
a neurosis continuous throughout life. This is obviously not the case. The
psychological determination of a neurosis is only partially due to an early
infantile predisposition; it is due to a certain actual cause as well. And if we
carefully examine the kind of infantile phantasies and events to which the
neurotic individual is attached, we shall be obliged to agree that there is
nothing in them specific for neurosis. Normal individuals have pretty much
the same kind of internal and external experiences, and are attached to them
to an even astonishing degree, without developing a neurosis. You will find
primitive people, especially, very much bound to their infantility. It now
begins to look as if this so-called fixation were a normal phenomenon, and
that the importance of infancy for the later mental attitude is natural and
prevails everywhere. The fact that the neurotic seems to be markedly
influenced by his infantile conflicts, shows that it is less a matter of fixation
than of a peculiar use which he makes of his infantile past. It looks as if he
exaggerated its importance, and attributed a very great artificial value to it
(Adler, a pupil of Freud's, expresses a very similar view). It would be unjust
to say that Freud confined himself to the hypothesis of fixation; he also was
conscious of the impression I have just discussed. He called this
phenomenon of reactivation or secondary exaggeration of infantile
reminiscences "regression." But in Freud's conception it appears as if the
incestuous desires of the Œdipus-complex were the real cause of the
regression to infantile phantasies. If this were the case, we should have to
postulate an unexpected intensity of the primary incestuous tendencies. This

view led Freud to his recent comparison between the so-called
psychological "incest-barrier" in children and the "incest-taboo" in
primitive man. He supposes that a real incestuous desire has led the
primitive man to the invention of a protective law; while to me it looks as if
the incest-taboo is one among numerous taboos of all sorts, and due to the
typical superstitious fear of primitive man, a fear existing independently of
incest and its interdiction. I am able to attribute as little particular strength
to incestuous desires in childhood as in primitive humanity. I do not even
seek the reason for regression in primary incestuous or any other sexual
desires. I must state that a purely sexual ætiology of neurosis seems to me
much too narrow. I base this criticism upon no prejudice against sexuality,
but upon an intimate acquaintance with the whole problem.
Therefore I suggest that the psychoanalytic theory should be liberated from
the purely sexual standpoint. In place of it I should like to introduce an
energic view-point into the psychology of neurosis.
All psychological phenomena can be considered as manifestations of
energy, in the same way as all physical phenomena are already understood
as energic manifestations since Robert Mayer discovered the law of the
conservation of energy. This energy is subjectively and psychologically
conceived as desire. I call it libido, using the word in the original meaning
of this term, which is by no means only sexual. Sallustius applies the term
exactly in the way we do here: "Magis in armis et militaribus equis, quam
in scortis et conviviis libidinem habebant."
From a broader standpoint libido can be understood as vital energy in
general, or as Bergson's élan vital. The first manifestation of this energy in
the suckling is the instinct of nutrition. From this stage the libido slowly
develops through manifold varieties of the act of sucking into the sexual
function. Hence I do not consider the act of sucking as a sexual act. The
pleasure in sucking can certainly not be considered as sexual pleasure, but
as pleasure in nutrition, for it is nowhere proved that pleasure is sexual in
itself. This process of development continues into adult life and is
connected with a constantly increased adaptation to the external world.
Whenever the libido, in the process of adaptation, meets an obstacle, an
accumulation takes place which normally gives rise to an increased effort to
overcome the obstacle. But if the obstacle seems to be insurmountable, and
the individual renounces the overcoming of it, the stored-up libido makes a

regression. In place of being employed in the increased effort, the libido
now gives up the present task and returns to a former and more primitive
way of adaptation. We meet with the best examples of such regressions very
frequently in hysterical cases where a disappointment in love or marriage
gives rise to the neurosis. There we find the well-known disturbances of
nutrition, resistance against eating, dyspeptic symptoms of all sorts, etc. In
these cases the regressive libido, turning away from its application to the
work of adaptation, holds sway over the function of nutrition and provokes
considerable disturbance. Such cases are obvious examples of regression.
Similar effects of regression are to be found in cases where there are no
troubles in the function of nutrition, and here we readily find a regressive
revival of reminiscences of a time long past. We find a revival of the images
of the parents, of the Œdipus-complex. Here things and events of infancy—
never before important—suddenly become so. They are regressively
reanimated. Take away the obstacle in the path of life and this whole system
of infantile phantasies at once breaks down and becomes again as inactive
and as ineffective as before. But do not let us forget that, to a certain extent,
it is at work influencing us always and everywhere. I cannot forbear to
mention that this view comes very near Janet's hypothesis of the
substitution of the "parties supérieures" of a function by its "parties
inférieures." I would also remind you of Claparède's conception of neurotic
symptoms as emotional reflexes of a primitive nature.
Therefore I no longer find the cause of a neurosis in the past, but in the
present. I ask, what is the necessary task which the patient will not
accomplish? The whole list of his infantile phantasies does not give me any
sufficient ætiological explanation, because I know that these phantasies are
only puffed up by the regressive libido, which has not found its natural
outlet into a new form of adjustment to the demands of life.
You may ask why the neurotic has a special inclination not to accomplish
his necessary tasks. Here let me point out that no living being adjusts itself
easily and smoothly to new conditions. The principle of the minimum of
effort is valid everywhere.
A sensitive and somewhat inharmonious character, as a neurotic always is,
will meet special difficulties and perhaps more unusual tasks in life than a
normal individual, who as a rule has only to follow the well-established line
of an ordinary life. For the neurotic there is no established way, for his aims

and tasks are apt to be of a highly individual character. He tries to follow
the more or less uncontrolled and half-conscious way of normal people, not
fully realizing his own critical and very different nature, which imposes
upon him more effort than the normal person is required to exert. There are
neurotics who have shown their increased sensitiveness and their resistance
against adaptation in the very first weeks of life, in their difficulty in taking
the mother's breast, and in their exaggerated nervous reactions, &c. For this
portion of a neurotic predisposition it will always be impossible to find a
psychological ætiology, for it is anterior to all psychology. But this
predisposition—you may call it "congenital sensitiveness" or by what name
you like—is the cause of the first resistances against adaptation. In such
case, the way of adaptation being blocked, the biological energy we call
libido does not find its appropriate outlet or activity and therefore replaces
an up-to-date and suitable form of adaptation by an abnormal or primitive
one.
In neurosis we speak of an infantile attitude or the predominance of
infantile phantasies and desires. In so far as infantile impressions and
desires are of obvious importance in normal people they are equally
influential in neurosis, but they have here no ætiological significance, they
are reactions merely, being chiefly secondary and regressive phenomena. It
is perfectly true, as Freud states, that infantile phantasies determine the
form and further development of neurosis, but this is not ætiology. Even
when we find perverted sexual phantasies of which we can prove the
existence in childhood, we cannot consider them of ætiological
significance. A neurosis is not really originated by infantile sexual
phantasies and the same must be said of the sexualism of neurotic phantasy
in general. It is not a primary phenomenon based upon a perverted sexual
disposition, but merely secondary and a consequence of a failure to apply
the stored-up libido in a suitable way. I realize that this is a very old view,
but this does not prevent its being true. The fact that the patient himself
very often believes that this infantile phantasy is the real cause of the
neurosis, does not prove that he is right in his belief, or that a theory
following the same belief is right either. It may look as if it were so, and I
must confess that indeed very many cases do have that appearance. At all
events, it is perfectly easy to understand how Freud came to this view.
Every one having any psychoanalytic experience will agree with me here.

To sum up: I cannot see the real ætiology of a neurosis in the various
manifestations of infantile sexual development and their corresponding
phantasies. The fact that they are exaggerated and put into the foreground in
neurosis is a consequence of the stored-up energy or libido. The
psychological trouble in neurosis, and neurosis itself, can be considered as
an act of adaptation that has failed. This formulation might reconcile
certain views of Janet's with Freud's view, that a neurosis is—under a
certain aspect—an attempt at self-cure; a view which can be and has been
applied to many diseases.
Here the question arises whether it is still advisable to bring to light all the
patient's phantasies by analysis, if we now consider them as of no
ætiological significance. Psychoanalysis hitherto has proceeded to the
unravelling of these phantasies because they were considered to be
ætiologically significant. My altered view concerning the theory of neurosis
does not change the procedure of psychoanalysis. The technique remains
the same. We no longer imagine we are unearthing the end-root of the
disease, but we have to pull up the sexual phantasies because the energy
which the patient needs for his health, that is, for his adaptation, is attached
to them. By means of psychoanalysis the connexion between the conscious
and the libido in the unconscious is re-established. Thus you restore this
unconscious libido to the command of conscious intention. Only in this way
can the formerly split-off energy become again applicable to the
accomplishment of the necessary tasks of life. Considered from this
standpoint, psychoanalysis no longer appears to be a mere reduction of the
individual to his primitive sexual wishes, but it becomes clear that, if rightly
understood, it is a highly moral task of immense educational value.

CHAPTER IX
ON SOME CRUCIAL POINTS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS[176]
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN DR. JUNG AND DR. LOŸ APPEARING IN
"PSYCHOTHERAPEUTISCHE ZEITFRAGEN." PUBLISHED BY DR. LOŸ,
SANATORIUM L'ABRI, TERRITET-MONTREUX, SWITZERLAND, 1914.

I
From Dr. Loÿ.
12th January, 1913.
What you said at our last conversation was extraordinarily stimulating. I
was expecting you to throw light upon the interpretation of my own and my
patients' dreams from the standpoint of Freud's "Interpretation of Dreams."
Instead, you put before me an entirely new conception: the dream as a
means of re-establishing the moral equipoise, fashioned in the realm below
the threshold of consciousness. That indeed is a fruitful conception. But still
more fruitful appears to me your other suggestion. You regard the problems
of psychoanalysis as much deeper than I had ever thought: it is no longer
merely a question of getting rid of troublesome pathological symptoms; the
analysed person gets to understand not his anxiety-experiences alone, but
his whole self most completely, and by means of this understanding he can
build up and fashion his whole life anew. But he himself must be the
builder, the Analyst only furnishes him with the necessary tools.
To begin with, I would ask you to consider what justification there is for the
original procedure of Breuer and Freud, now entirely given up both by
Freud himself and by you, but practised by Frank, for instance, as his only
method: I mean "the abreaction of the inhibited effects under light
hypnosis." Why have you given up the cathartic method? More particularly,

has light hypnosis in psychocatharsis a different value from suggestion
during sleep, long customary in treatment by suggestion? that is, has it only
the value which the suggestionist contributes, or does it claim to possess
only the value which the patient's belief bestows upon it? Or, again, is
suggestion in the waking-state equivalent to suggestion in hypnoidal states?
This Bernheim now asserts to be the case, after having used suggestion for
many years exclusively in hypnosis. You will tell me we must talk of
psychoanalysis, not of suggestion. But I really mean this: is not the
suggestion, by means of which the psychocatharsis in the hypnoidal state
produces therapeutic effects, (modified naturally, by the patients' age, etc.)
the main factor in the therapeutic success of the psychocatharsis? Frank, in
his "Affektstörungen," says: "these partial adjustments of effect,
suggestibility and suggestion, are almost altogether omitted in the
psychocathartic treatment in light sleep, in so far as the content of the
reproduced presentations is concerned." Is that really true? Frank himself
adds: "How can meditation upon the dreams of youth in itself lead to the
discharge of the stored-up anxiety, whether in hypnoidal states or under any
other conditions? Must one not suppose, with much greater probability, that
the anxiety-states would become more pronounced through such
concentration upon them?" [I have noticed that myself, and much more than
I at all liked.] One does indeed say to the patient: "First we must stir up,
then afterwards comes peace." And it does come. But does it not come in
spite of the stirring-up process, because gradually, by means of frequent
talks under light hypnosis, the patient gets such confidence in the doctor
that he becomes susceptible to direct suggestion, and that produces at first
improvement and finally, cure? I go still further: in an analysis in the
waking-state, is not the patient's belief that the method employed will cure
him, coupled with his ever-growing trust in the doctor, a main cause of his
cure? And I ask even further: in every systematically carried-out therapeutic
treatment, is not faith in it, trust in the doctor, a main factor in its success? I
will not indeed say the only factor, for one cannot deny that the physical,
dietetic and chemical procedures, when properly selected, have a real effect
in securing a cure, over and above the obvious effect of their indirect
suggestion.

II
From Dr. Jung.
28th January, 1913.
With regard to your question as to the applicability of the cathartic method,
the following is my standpoint: every method is good if it serves its
purpose, including every method of suggestion, even Christian Science,
Mental Healing, etc. "A truth is a truth, when it works." It is quite another
question whether a scientific physician can answer for it to his conscience
should he sell little bottles of Lourdes-water because that suggestion is at
times very useful. Even the so-called highly scientific suggestion-therapy
employs the wares of the medicine-man and the exorcising Schaman. And
please, why should it not? The public is not even now much more advanced
and continues to expect miracles from the doctor. And truly those doctors
should be deemed clever—worldly-wise in every respect—who understand
the art of investing themselves with the halo of the medicine-man. Not only
have they the biggest practices—they have also the best results. This is
simply because countless physical maladies (leaving out of count the
neuroses) are complicated and burdened with psychic elements to an extent
scarcely yet suspected. The medical exorcist's whole behaviour betrays his
full valuation of the psychic element when he gives the patient the
opportunity of fixing his faith firmly upon the doctor's mysterious
personality. Thus does he win the sick man's mind, which henceforth helps
him indeed to restore his body also to health. The cure works best when the
doctor really believes in his own formulæ, otherwise he may be overcome
by scientific doubt and so lose the correct, convincing tone. I, too, for a
time practised hypnotic suggestion enthusiastically. But there befell me
three dubious incidents which I want you to note:—
1. Once there came to me to be hypnotised for various neurotic troubles a
withered peasant-woman of some fifty years old. She was not easy to
hypnotise, was very restless, kept opening her eyes—but at last I did
succeed. When I waked her after about half an hour she seized my hand and
with many words testified to her overflowing gratitude. I said: "But you are
by no means cured yet, so keep your thanks till the end of the treatment."

She: "I am not thanking you for that, but—(blushing and whispering)—
because you have been so decent." So she said, looked at me with a sort of
tender admiration and departed. I gazed long at the spot where she had
stood—and asked myself, confounded, "So decent?"—good heavens! surely
she hadn't imagined, somehow or other.... This glimpse made me suspect
for the first time that possibly the loose-minded person, by means of that
notorious feminine (I should at that time have said "animal") directness of
instinct, understood more about the essence of hypnotism than I with all my
knowledge of the scientific profundity of the text-books. Therein lay my
harmlessness.
2. Next came a pretty, coquettish, seventeen-year-old girl with a harassed,
suspicious mother. The young daughter had suffered since early girlhood
from enuresis nocturna, which, among other difficulties, hindered her from
going to a boarding-school abroad.
At once I thought of the old woman and her wisdom. I tried to hypnotise the
girl; she laughed affectedly and prevented hypnosis for twenty minutes. Of
course I kept quiet and thought: I know why you laugh; you have already
fallen in love with me, but I will give you proof of my decency in gratitude
for your wasting my time with your challenging laughter. I succeeded in
hypnotising her. Success followed at once. The enuresis stopped, and I
therefore informed the young lady later that, instead of Wednesday, I would
not see her again for hypnosis till the following Saturday. On Saturday she
arrived with a cross countenance, presaging failure. The enuresis had come
back again. I remembered my wise old woman, and asked: "When did the
enuresis return?" She (unsuspecting), "Wednesday night." I thought to
myself, There it is again, she wants to show me that I simply must see her
on Wednesdays too; not to see me for a whole long week is too much for a
tender, loving heart. But I was quite resolved to give no help to such
annoying romancing, so I said, "To continue the hypnosis would be quite
wrong under these circumstances. We must drop it for quite three weeks, to
give the enuresis a chance to stop. Then come again for treatment." In my
malicious heart I knew I should then be on my holiday and so the course of
hypnotic treatment would come to an end. After the holidays my locum
tenens told me the young lady had been there with the news that the
enuresis had vanished, but her disappointment at not seeing me was very
keen. The old woman was right, thought I.

3. The third case gave my joy in suggestion its death-blow. This was the
manner of it. She was a lady of sixty-five who came stumbling into the
consulting-room with a crutch. She had suffered from pain in the knee-joint
for seventeen years, and this at times kept her in bed for many weeks. No
doctor had been able to cure her, and she had tried every possible remedy of
present-day medicine. After I had suffered the stream of her narrative to
flow over me for some ten minutes, I said, "I will try to hypnotise you,
perhaps that will do you good." She, "Oh yes, please do!" leaned her head
on one side and fell asleep before ever I said or did anything. She passed
into somnambulism and showed every form of hypnosis you could possibly
desire. After half an hour I had the greatest difficulty in waking her; when
at last she was awake she jumped up: "I am well, I am all right, you have
cured me." I tried to make timid objections, but her praises drowned me.
She could really walk. Then I blushed and said, embarrassed, to my
colleagues: "Look! behold the wondrously successful hypnotic therapy."
That day saw the death of my connection with treatment by suggestion; the
therapeutic praise won by this case shamed and humiliated me. When, a
year later, at the beginning of my hypnotic course, the good old lady
returned, this time with the pain in her back, I was already sunk in hopeless
cynicism; I saw written on her forehead that she had just read the notice of
the re-opening of my clinic in the newspaper, that vexatious romanticism
had provided her with a convenient pain in the back so that she might have
a pretext for seeing me, and again let herself be cured in the same theatrical
fashion. This proved true in every particular.
As you will understand, a man possessed of scientific conscience cannot
endure such cases without embarrassment. There ripened in me the resolve
to renounce suggestion altogether rather than to allow myself passively to
be transformed into a miracle-worker. I wanted to understand what really
went on in the souls of people. It suddenly seemed to me incredibly childish
to think of dispelling an illness with charms, and that this should be the only
result of our scientific endeavours for a psychotherapy. Thus for me the
discovery of Breuer and Freud was a veritable deliverance. I took up their
method with unalloyed enthusiasm and soon recognised how right Freud
was, when at a very early date, indeed so far back as the Studien ueber
Hysterie, he began to direct a searchlight upon the accompanying
circumstances of the so-called trauma. I too soon discovered that certainly
some traumata with an obvious etiological tinge are opportunely present.

But the greater number appeared highly improbable. So many of them
seemed so insignificant, even so normal, that at most one could regard them
as just providing the opportunity for the neurosis to appear. But what
especially spurred my criticism was the fact that so many traumata were
simply inventions of phantasy which had never really existed. This
perception was enough to make me sceptical about the whole traumatheory. (But I have dealt with these matters in detail in my lectures on the
theory of psychoanalysis).[177] I could no longer suppose that the hundred
and one cathartic experiences of a phantastically puffed-up or entirely
invented trauma were anything but the effect of suggestion. It is well
enough if it helps. If one only had not a scientific conscience and that
impulsion towards the truth! I found in many cases, especially when dealing
with more mentally gifted patients, that I must recognise the therapeutic
limitations of this method. It is, of course, a definite plan, and convenient
for the doctor, since it makes no particular demands upon his intellect for
new adaptations. The theory and practice are both of the pleasantest
simplicity: "The neurosis is caused by a trauma. The trauma is abreacted."
When the abreaction takes place under hypnotism, or with other magical
accessories (dark room, peculiar lighting, and the rest), I remember once
more the wise old woman, who opened my eyes not merely to the magic
influence of the mesmeric gestures, but also to the essential character of
hypnotism itself. But what alienated me once for all from this relatively
efficacious indirect method of suggestion, based as it is upon an equally
efficacious false theory, was the perception I obtained at the same time that,
behind the confused deceptive intricacies of neurotic phantasies, there
stands a conflict, which may be best described as a moral one. With this
there began for me a new era of understanding. Research and therapy now
coincided in the attempt to discover the causes and the rational solution of
this conflict. That is what psychoanalysis meant to me. Whilst I had been
getting this insight, Freud had built up his sexual theory of the neurosis, and
therewith had brought forward an enormous number of questions for
discussion, all of which I thought deserved the profoundest consideration.
Thus I have had the good fortune of co-operating with Freud for a long
time, and working with him in the investigation of the problem of sexuality
in neurosis. You, perhaps, know from some of my earlier work that I was
always dubious somewhat concerning the significance of sexuality.[178] This

has now become the exact point where I am no longer altogether of Freud's
opinion.
I have preferred to answer your questions in rather non-sequent fashion.
Whatever is still unanswered, let me now repeat: light hypnosis and
complete hypnosis are but varying grades of intensity of unconscious
attraction towards the hypnotist. Who can here venture to draw sharp
distinctions? To a critical intelligence it is unthinkable that suggestibility
and suggestion can be excluded in the cathartic method. They are present
everywhere and are universal human attributes, even with Dubois and the
psychoanalysts who think they work on purely rational lines. No technique,
no self-deception avails here—the doctor works, nolens volens—and
perhaps primarily—by means of his personality, that is by suggestion. In the
cathartic treatment, what is of far more importance to the patient than the
conjuring up of old phantasies is the being so often with the doctor, and
having confidence and belief in him personally, and in his method. The
belief, the self-confidence, perhaps also the devotion with which the doctor
does his work, are far more important things to the patient (imponderabilia
though they be) than the recalling of old traumata.[179]
Ultimately we shall some day know from the history of medicine
everything that has ever been of service; then perhaps at last we may come
to the really desirable therapy, to psychotherapy. Did not even the old
materia medica of filth have brilliant cures?—cures which only faded away
with the belief in it!
Because I recognise that the patient does attempt to lay hold of the doctor's
personality, in spite of all possible rational safeguards, I have formulated
the demand that the psychotherapeutist shall be held just as responsible for
the cleanness of his own hands as is the surgeon. I hold it to be an
absolutely indispensable preliminary that the psychoanalyst should himself
first undergo an analysis, for his personality is one of the chief factors in the
cure.
Patients read the doctor's character intuitively and they should find in him a
human being, with faults indeed, but also a man who has striven at every
point to fulfil his own human duties in the fullest sense. I think that this is
the first healing factor. Many times I have had the opportunity of seeing that
the analyst is successful with his treatment just in so far as he has succeeded

in his own moral development. I think this answer will satisfy your
question.

III
From Dr. Loÿ.
2nd February, 1913.
You answer several of my questions in a decidedly affirmative sense. You
take it as proved that in the cures by the cathartic method the main rôle is
played by faith in the doctor and in his method, and not by the "abreaction"
of real or imaginary traumata. I also. Equally I am at one with your view
that the cures of the old materia medica of filth, as well as the Lourdes
cures, or those of the Mental Healers, Christian Scientists and
Persuasionists, are to be attributed to faith in the miracle-worker, rather than
to any of the methods employed.
Now comes the ticklish point: the augur can remain an augur so long as he
himself believes the will of the gods is made manifest by the entrails of the
sacrificial beast. When he no longer believes, he has to ask himself: Shall I
continue to use my augur's authority to further the welfare of the State, or
shall I make use of my newer, and (I hope) truer convictions of to-day?
Both ways are possible. The first is called opportunism; the second the
pursuit of truth, and scientific honour. For a doctor, the first way brings
perhaps therapeutic success and fame; the second, reproach: such a man is
not taken seriously. What I esteem most highly in Freud and his school is
just this passionate desire for truth. But again, it is precisely here that
people pronounce a different verdict: "It is impossible for the busy
practitioner to keep pace with the development of the views of this
investigator and his initiates." (Frank, "Affektstörungen Einleitung.")
One can easily disregard this little quip, but one must take more seriously
one's self-criticism. We may have to ask ourselves whether, since science is
an undivided, ever-flowing stream, we are justified in relinquishing on

conscientious grounds any method or combination of methods by means of
which we know cures can be achieved?
Looking more closely at the fundamental grounds of your aversion to the
use of hypnosis (or semi-hypnosis, the degree matters nothing) in treatment
by suggestion, (which as a matter of fact every doctor and every therapeutic
method makes use of willy-nilly, no matter what it is called), it is clear that
what has disgusted you in hypnotism is at bottom nothing but the so-called
"transference" to the doctor, which you, with your unalloyed psychoanalytic
treatment, can get rid of as little as any one else, for indeed it plays a chief
part in the success of the treatment. Your insistence that the psychoanalyst
must be answerable for the cleanness of his own hands—(here I agree with
you unreservedly)——is an inevitable conclusion. But, after all, does
anything more "augurish" really cling to the use made of hypnosis in
psychotherapeutic treatment, than to the quite inevitable use made of the
"transference to the doctor" for therapeutic ends? In either case we must
perforce "take shares" in faith as a healing agent. As for the feeling which
the patient—whether man or woman—entertains for the doctor, is there
never anything in the background save conscious or unconscious sexual
desire? In many cases your view is most certainly correct; more than one
woman has been frank enough to confess that the beginning of hypnosis
was accompanied by voluptuous pleasure. But this is not true in all
instances—or how would you explain the underlying feeling in the
hypnotising of one animal by another, e.g. snake and bird? Surely you can
say that there the feeling of fear reigns, fear which is an inversion of the
libido, such as comes upon the bride in that hypnoidal state before she
yields to her husband wherein pure sexual desire rules, though possibly it
contains an element of fear. However this may be, from your three cases I
cannot draw any ethical distinction between the "unconscious readiness
towards the hypnotist" and the "transference to the doctor" which should
avail to condemn a combination of hypnotism and psychoanalysis as a
method of treatment. You will ask why I cling to the use of hypnotism; or
rather of hypnoidal states. Because I think there are cases that can be much
more rapidly cured thereby, than through a purely psychoanalytic treatment.
For example, in no more than five or six interviews I cured a fifteen-yearold girl who had suffered from enuresis nocturna from infancy, but was
otherwise thoroughly healthy, gifted, and pre-eminent at school: she had
previously tried all sorts of treatment without any result.

Perhaps I ought to have sought out the psychoanalytic connexion between
the enuresis and her psychosexual attitude and explained it to her, etc., but I
could not, she had only the short Easter holidays for treatment: so I just
hypnotised her and the tiresome trouble vanished. It was a lasting cure.
In psychoanalysis I use hypnosis to help the patient to overcome
"resistances."
Further, I use light hypnosis in association with psychoanalysis, to hasten
the advance when the "re-education" stage comes.
For example, a patient afflicted with washing-mania was sent to me after a
year's psychocathartic treatment by Dr. X. The symbolic meaning of her
washing-ceremonial was first made plain to her; she became more and more
agitated during the "abreaction" of alleged traumata in childhood, because
she had persuaded herself by auto-suggestion that she was too old to be
cured, that she saw no "images," etc. So I used hypnosis to help her to
diminish the number of her washings, "so that the anxiety-feeling would be
banished"; and to train her to throw things on the ground and pick them up
again without washing her hands afterwards, etc.
In view of these considerations, if you feel disposed to go further into the
matter, I should be grateful if you would furnish me with more convincing
reasons why hypnotic treatment must be dispensed with; and explain how to
do without it, or with what to replace it in such cases. Were I convinced, I
would give it up as you have done, but what convinced you has, so far, not
convinced me. Si duo faciunt idem, non est idem.
Now I want to consider another important matter to which you alluded, but
only cursorily, and to put one question: behind the neurotic phantasies there
stands, you say, almost always (or always) a moral conflict which belongs
to the present moment. That is perfectly clear to me. Research and therapy
coincide; their task is to search out the foundations and the rational solution
of the conflict. Good. But can the rational solution always be found?
"Reasons of expediency" so often bar the way, varying with the type of
patient, for instance children, young girls and women from "pious" catholic
or protestant families. Again that accursed opportunism! A colleague of
mine was perfectly right when he began to give sexual enlightenment to a
young French patient, a boy who was indulging in masturbation.

Whereupon, like one possessed, in rushed a bigoted grandmother, and a
disagreeable sequel ensued. How to act in these and similar cases? What to
do in cases where there arises a moral conflict between love and duty (a
conflict in married life)?—or in general between instinct and moral duty?
What to do in the case of a girl afflicted with hysterical or anxiety
symptoms, needing love and having no chance to marry, either because she
cannot find a suitable man or because, being "well-connected," she wants to
remain chaste? Simply try to get rid of the symptoms by suggestion? But
that is wrong as soon as one knows of a better way. How to reconcile these
two consciences: that of the man who does not want to confine his fidelity
to truth within his own four walls; and that of the doctor who must cure, or
if he dare not cure according to his real convictions (owing to opportunistmotives), must at least procure some alleviation? We live in the present, but
with the ideas and ideals of the future. That is our conflict. How resolve it?

IV

From Dr. Jung.
4th February, 1913.
You have put me in some perplexity by the questions in your yesterday's letter. You have
rightly grasped the spirit which dictated my last. I am glad you, too, recognise this spirit.
There are not very many who can boast of such tolerance. I should deceive myself if I
regarded my standpoint as that of a practical physician. First and foremost I am a scientist;
naturally that gives me a different outlook upon many problems. In my last letter I certainly
left out of count the doctor's practical needs, but chiefly that I might show you on what
grounds we might be moved to relinquish hypnotic therapy. To remove the first objection at
once, let me say that I did not give up hypnotism because I desired to avoid dealing with the
basic motives of the human soul, but rather because I wanted to battle with them directly and
openly. When once I understood what kind of forces play a part in hypnotism I gave it up,
simply to get rid of all the indirect advantages of this method. As we psychoanalysts see
regretfully every day—and our patients also—we do not work with the "transference to the
doctor,"[180] but against it and in spite of it. It is just not upon the faith of the sick man that we
can build, but upon his criticism. So much would I say at the outset upon this delicate
question.
As your letter shows, we are at one in regard to the theoretical aspect of treatment by
suggestion. So we can now apply ourselves to the further task of coming to mutual
understanding about the practical question.
Your remarks on the physician's dilemma—whether to be magician or scientist—bring us to
the heart of the discussion. I strive to be no fanatic—although there are not a few who
reproach me with fanaticism. I contend not for the application of the psychoanalytic method
solely and at all costs, but for the recognition of every method of investigation and treatment.
I was a medical practitioner quite long enough to realise that practice obeys, and should obey,
other laws than does the search after truth. One might almost say practice must first and
foremost submit to the laws of opportunism. The scientist does great injustice to the
practitioner if he reproaches him for not using the "one true" scientific method. As I said to
you in my last letter: "A truth is a truth, when it works." But on the other hand, the
practitioner must not reproach the scientist if in his search for truth and for newer and better
methods, he makes trial of unusual ways. After all, it is not the practitioner but the
investigator, and the latter's patient, who will have to bear any injury that may arise. The
practitioner must certainly use those methods which he knows how to use to greatest
advantage, and which give him the best relative results. My tolerance, indeed, extends, as you
see, even to Christian Science. But I deem it most uncalled for that Frank, a practising doctor,
should depreciate research in which he cannot participate, and particularly the very line of
research to which he owes his own method. It is surely time to cease this running down of
every new idea. No one asks Frank and all whom he represents to become psychoanalysts; we
grant them the right to their existence, why should they always seek to cut ours short?
As my own "cures" show you, I do not doubt the effect of suggestion. Only I had the idea that
I could perhaps discover something still better. This hope has been amply justified. Not for
ever shall it be said—

"The good attained is oft of fairer still
The enemy, calling it vain illusion, falsehood's snare."
I confess frankly were I doing your work I should often be in difficulties if I relied only on
psychoanalysis. I can scarcely imagine a general practice, especially in a sanatorium, with no
other means than psychoanalysis. At Dr. Bircher's sanatorium in Zürich the principle of
psychoanalysis is adopted completely by several of the assistants, but a whole series of other
important educative influences are also brought to bear upon the patients, without which
matters would probably go very badly. In my own purely psychoanalytic practice I have often
regretted that I could not avail myself of the other methods of re-education that are naturally
at hand in an institution—this, of course, only in special cases where one is dealing with
extremely uncontrolled, uneducated persons. Which of us has shown any disposition to assert
that we have discovered a panacea? There are cases in which psychoanalysis operates less
effectively than any other known method. But who has ever claimed psychoanalysis should
be employed in every sort of case, and on every occasion? Only a fanatic could maintain such
a view. Patients for whom psychoanalysis is suitable have to be selected. I unhesitatingly send
cases I think unsuitable to other doctors. As a matter of fact this does not happen often,
because patients have a way of sorting themselves out. Those who go to an analyst usually
know quite well why they go to him and not to some one else. However, there are very many
neurotics well suited for psychoanalysis. In these matters every scheme must be looked at in
due perspective. It is never quite wise to try to batter down a stone wall with your head.
Whether simple hypnotism, the cathartic treatment, or psychoanalysis shall be used, must be
determined by the conditions of the case and the preference of the particular doctor. Every
doctor will obtain the best results with the instrument he knows best.
But, barring exceptions, I must say definitely that for me, and for my patients also,
psychoanalysis proves itself better than any other method. This is not merely a matter of
feeling; from manifold experiences I know many cases can indeed be cured by
psychoanalysis which are refractory to all other methods of treatment. I have many colleagues
whose experience is the same, even men engaged exclusively in practice. It is scarcely to be
supposed that a method altogether contemptible would meet with so much support.
When once psychoanalysis has been applied in a suitable case, it is imperative that rational
solutions of the conflicts should be found. The objection is at once advanced that many
conflicts are intrinsically incapable of solution. That view is sometimes taken because only an
external solution is thought of—and that, at bottom, is no real solution at all. If a man cannot
get on with his wife he naturally thinks the conflict would be solved if he were to marry some
one else. If such marriages are examined they are seen to be no solution whatsoever. The old
Adam enters upon the new marriage and bungles it just as badly as he did the earlier one. A
real solution comes only from within, and only then because the patient has been brought to a
new standpoint.
Where an external solution is possible no psychoanalysis is necessary; in seeking an internal
solution we encounter the peculiar virtues of psychoanalysis. The conflict between "love and
duty" must be solved upon that particular plane of character where "love and duty" are no
longer in opposition, for indeed they really are not so. The familiar conflict between "instinct
and conventional morality" must be solved in such a way that both factors are taken

satisfactorily into account, and this is only possible through a change of character. This
change psychoanalysis can bring about. In such cases external solutions are worse than none
at all. Naturally the particular situation dictates which road the doctor must ultimately follow,
and what is then his duty. I regard the conscience-searching question of the doctor's
remaining true to his scientific convictions as rather unimportant in comparison with the
incomparably weightier question as to how he can best help his patient. The doctor must, on
occasion, be able to play the augur. Mundus vult decipi—but the cure is no deception. It is
true that there is a conflict between ideal conviction and concrete possibility. But we should ill
prepare the ground for the seed of the future, were we to forget the tasks of the present, and
sought only to cultivate ideals. That is but idle dreaming. Do not forget that Kepler cast
horoscopes for money, and that countless artists have been condemned to work for wages.

V.
From Dr. Loÿ.
9th February, 1913.
The selfsame passion for truth possesses us both when we think of pure research, and the
same desire to cure when we are considering therapy. For the scientist, as for the doctor, we
desire the fullest freedom in all directions, fullest freedom to select and use the methods
which promise the best fulfilment of their ends at any moment. Here we are at one; but there
remains a postulate we must establish to the satisfaction of others if we want recognition for
our views.
First and foremost there is a question that must be answered, an old question asked already in
the Gospels: What is Truth? I think clear definitions of fundamental ideas are most necessary.
How shall we contrive a working definition of the conception "Truth"? Perhaps an allegory
may help us.
Imagine a gigantic prism extending in front of the sun, so that its rays are broken up, but
suppose man entirely ignorant of this fact. I exclude the invisible, chemical and ultra-violet
rays. Men who live in a blue-lit region will say: "The sun sends forth blue light only." They
are right and yet they are wrong: from their standpoint they are capable of perceiving only a
fragment of truth. And so too with the inhabitants of the red, yellow, and in-between regions.
And they will all scourge and slay one another to force their belief in their fragment upon the
others—till, grown wiser through travelling in each others' regions, they come to the
harmonious agreement that the sun sends out light of varying colours. That comprehends
more truth, but it is not yet the Truth. Only when the giant lens shall have recombined the
split-up rays, and when the invisible, chemical and heat rays have given proof of their own
specific effects, will a view more in accordance with the facts be able to arise, and men will
perceive that the sun emits white light which is split up by the prism into differing rays with
different peculiarities, which rays can be recombined by the lens into one mass of white light.

This example shows sufficiently well that the road to Truth leads through far-reaching and
comparative observations, the results of which must be controlled by the help of freely chosen
experiments, until well-grounded hypotheses and theories can be put forward; but these
hypotheses and theories will fall to the ground as soon as a single new observation or
experiment contradicts them.
The way is difficult, and in the end all man ever attains to is relative truth. But such relative
truth suffices for the time being, if it serves to explain the most important actual
concatenations of the past, to light up present problems, to predict those of the future, so that
we are then in a position to achieve adaptation through our knowledge. But absolute truth
could be accessible only to omniscience, aware of all possible concatenations and
combinations; that is not possible, for the concatenations and their combinations are infinite.
Accordingly, we shall never know more than an approximate truth. Should new relationships
be discovered, new combinations built up, then the picture changes, and with it the entire
possibilities in knowledge and power. To what revolutions in daily life does not every new
scientific discovery lead: how absurdly little was the beginning of our first ideas of electricity,
how inconceivably great the results! Time and again it is necessary to repeat this
commonplace, because one sees how life is always made bitter for the innovators in every
scientific field, and now is it being made especially so for the disciples of the psychoanalytic
school. Of course, every one admits the truth of this platitude so long as it is a matter of
"academic" discussion, but only so long; just as soon as a concrete case has to be considered,
sympathies and antipathies rush into the foreground and darken judgment. And therefore the
scientist must fight tirelessly, appealing to logic and honour, for freedom of research in every
field, and must not permit authority, of no matter what political or religious tinge, to advance
reasons of opportunism to destroy or restrict this freedom; opportunist reasons may be and are
in place elsewhere, not here. Finally we must completely disavow that maxim of the Middle
Ages: "Philosophia ancilla Theologiæ," and no less, too, the war-cries of the university classrooms with their partisanship of one or other religious or political party. All fanaticism is the
enemy of science, which must above all things be independent.
And when we turn from the search for Truth back once more to therapeutics, we see
immediately that here too we are in agreement. In practice expediency must rule: the doctor
from the yellow region must adapt himself to the sick in the yellow region, as must the doctor
in the blue region, to his patients; both have the same object in view. And the doctor who
lives in the white light of the sun must take into consideration the past experiences of his
patients from the yellow or blue region, in spite of, or perhaps rather because of, his own
wider knowledge. In such cases the way to healing will be long and difficult, may indeed lead
more easily into a cul-de-sac, than in cases where he has to do with patients who, like
himself, have already come to a knowledge of the white sunlight, or, one might say, when his
patient-material has "already sorted itself out." With such sorted-out material the
psychoanalyst can employ psychoanalysis exclusively; and may deem himself happy in that
he need not "play the augur." Now, what are these psychoanalytic methods? If I understand
you aright, from beginning to end it is a question of dealing directly and openly with the basic
forces of the human soul, so that the analysed person, be he sick or sound or in some stage
between—for health and sickness flow over by imperceptible degrees into one another—shall
gradually have his eyes opened to the drama that is being acted within him. He has to come to
an understanding of the development of the hostile automatisms of his personality, and by

means of this understanding he must gradually learn to free himself from them; he must learn,
too, how to employ and strengthen the favourable automatisms. He must learn to make his
self-knowledge real, and of practical use, to control his soul's workings so that a balance may
be established between the spheres of emotion and reason. And what share in all this has the
physician's suggestion? I can scarcely believe that suggestion can be altogether avoided till
the patient feels himself really free. Such freedom, it goes without saying, is the main thing to
strive for, and it must be active. The sick man who simply obeys a suggestion, obeys it only
just so long as the "transference to the doctor" remains potent.
But if he wishes to be able to adjust himself to all circumstances he must have fortified
himself "from within." He should no longer need the crutches of faith, but be capable of
encountering all theoretical and practical problems squarely, and of solving them by himself.
That is surely your view? Or have I not understood correctly?
I next ask, must not every single case be treated differently, of course within the limits of the
psychoanalytic method? For if every case is a case by itself, it must indeed demand individual
treatment.
"Il n'y a pas de maladies, il n'y a que des malades," said a French doctor whose name escapes
me. But on broad lines, what course, from a technical point of view, does analysis take, and
what deviations occur most frequently? That I would gladly learn from you. I take for granted
that all "augurs' tricks," darkened rooms, masquerading, chloroform, are out of the question.
Psychoanalysis—purged so far as is humanly possible from suggestive influence—appears to
have an essential difference from Dubois' psychotherapy. With Dubois, from the beginning
conversation about the past is forbidden, and "the moral reasons for recovery" placed in the
forefront; whilst psychoanalysis uses the subconscious material from the patient's past as well
as present, for present self-understanding. Another difference lies in the conception of
morality: morals are above all "relative." But what essential forms shall they assume at those
moments when one can hardly avoid suggestion? You will say, the occasion must decide.
Agreed, as regards older people, or adults, who have to live in an unenlightened milieu. But if
one is dealing with children, the seed of the future, is it not a sacred duty to enlighten them as
to the shaky foundations of the so-called "moral" conceptions of the past, which have only a
dogmatic basis; is it not a duty to educate them into full freedom by courageously unveiling
Truth? I ask this not so much with regard to the analysing doctor as to the teacher. May not
the creation of free schools be looked for as one task for the psychoanalyst?

VI.
From Dr. Jung.
11th February, 1913.
The idea of the relativity of "Truth" has been current for ages, but whether true or not, it does
not stand in the way of anything save the beliefs of dogma and authority.

You ask me, or indeed tell me—what psychoanalysis is. Before considering your views,
permit me first to try and mark out the territory and definition of psychoanalysis.
Psychoanalysis is primarily just a method—but a method complying with all the rigorous
demands insisted upon to-day by the conception "method." Let it be made plain at once that
psychoanalysis is not an anamnesis, as those who know everything without learning are
pleased to believe. It is essentially a method for the exploration of the unconscious
associations, into which no question of the conscious self enters. Again, it is not a kind of
examination of the nature of an intelligence test, though this mistake is common in certain
circles. It is no cathartic method, abreacting real and phantastic "traumata," with or without
hypnosis. Psychoanalysis is a method which makes possible the analytic reduction of the
psychic content to its simplest expression, and the discovery of the line of least resistance in
the development of a harmonious personality. In neurosis, straightforward direction of life's
energies is lacking, because opposing tendencies traverse and hinder psychological
adaptation. Psychoanalysis, so far as our present knowledge of it goes, thus appears to be
simply a rational nerve-therapy.
For the technical application of psychoanalysis no programme can be formulated. There are
only general principles, and, for the individual case, working rules. (Here let me refer you to
Freud's work in volume I. of the Internationale Zeitschrift für Ärztliche Psychoanalyse.) My
one working rule is to conduct the analysis as a perfectly ordinary, sensible conversation, and
to avoid all appearance of medical magic.
The leading principle of the psychoanalytic technique is to analyse the psychic material which
offers itself then and there. Every interference on the part of the analyst, with the object of
inducing the analysis to follow some systematic course, is a gross mistake in technique. Socalled chance is the law and the order of psychoanalysis.
Naturally in the beginning of the analysis the anamnesis and the diagnosis come first. The
subsequent analytic process develops quite differently in every case. To give rules is wellnigh impossible. All one can say is that very frequently, quite at the beginning, a series of
resistances have to be overcome, resistances against both method and man. Patients having no
idea of psychoanalysis must first be given some understanding of the method. In those who
already know something of it there are very often many misconceptions to set right, and
frequently one has to deal also with many reproaches cast by scientific criticism. In either
case the misconceptions rest upon arbitrary interpretations, superficiality, or complete
ignorance of the facts.
If the patient is himself a doctor his special knowledge may prove extremely tiresome. To
intelligent colleagues it is best to give a complete theoretic exposition. With foolish and
limited persons you begin quietly with analysis. In the unconscious of such folk there is a
confederate that never refuses help. From the analysis of the very earliest dreams the
emptiness of the criticism is obvious; and ultimately of the whole beautiful edifice of
supposedly scientific scepticism nothing remains, save a little heap of personal vanity. I have
had amusing experiences here.
It is best to let the patient talk freely and to confine oneself to pointing out connexions here
and there. When the conscious material is exhausted we come to the dreams, which furnish us
with the subliminal material. If people have no dreams, as they allege, or if they forget them,

there is usually still some conscious material that ought to be produced and discussed, but is
kept back owing to resistances. When the conscious is emptied then come the dreams, which
are indeed, as you know, the chief material of the analysis.
How the "Analysis" is to be made and what is to be said to patients depends, firstly, upon the
material to be dealt with; secondly, on the doctor's skill; and, thirdly, on the patient's capacity.
I must insist that no one ought to undertake analysis except on the basis of a sound
knowledge of the subject; that necessitates an intimate understanding of the existing
literature. Without this, the work may be bungled.
I do not know what else to tell you beforehand. I must wait for further questions. In regard to
questions of morality and education let me say that these belong to the later stages of the
analysis, wherein they find—or should find—solutions for themselves. You cannot compile
recipes out of psychoanalysis.

VII
From Dr. Loÿ.
10th February, 1913.
You write that a solid knowledge of the psychoanalytic literature is necessary for initiation
into psychoanalysis. I should agree, but with a certain reservation: the more one reads, the
more one notices how many contradictions there are among the different writers, and less and
less does one know—until one has had sufficient personal experience—to which view to give
adherence, since quite frequently assertions are made without any proof. For example, I had
thought (strengthened in the view by my own experience of suggestion-therapy) that the
transference to the doctor might be an essential condition in the patient's cure. But you write:
"We psychoanalysts do not build upon the patient's faith, rather do we have to deal with his
criticism." And Stekel writes, on the other hand (Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, 3rd year,
vol. IV., p. 176, "Ausgänge der psychoanalytischen Kuren"): "Love for the doctor can become
a power essential to recovery. Neurotics never get well for love of themselves. They recover
out of love for the doctor. They give him that pleasure." Here again, surely, stress is laid on
the power of suggestion? And yet Stekel too thinks he is a psychoanalyst pure and simple. On
the other hand, you say in your letter of Jan. 20th that "the doctor's personality is one of the
main factors in the cure." Should not this expression be translated: "When the doctor inspires
respect in the patient and is worthy of his love, the patient will gladly follow his example and
endeavour to recover from his neurosis and fulfil his human duties in the widest sense"? I
think one can only emerge from all this uncertainty by means of much personal experience,
which will indicate also which way best suits one's own personality and brings the greatest
therapeutic success. This is a further reason for undergoing analysis oneself, to recognise
fully what one is. I was decidedly in agreement with your definition of psychoanalysis in its
first (negative) portion: psychoanalysis is neither an anamnesis nor a method of examination
after the fashion of a test for intelligence, nor yet a psychocatharsis. In your second (positive)
part, however, your definition: "Psychoanalysis is a method of discovering the line of least

resistance to the harmonious development of the whole personality," seems to me valid for
the patient's inertia, but not for the releasing of the sublimated libido with a view to the new
direction of life. You consider that the neurosis causes a lack of singleness of aim in life,
because opposing tendencies hinder psychic adaptation. True, but will not this psychic
adaptation eventuate quite differently according as the patient, when well, directs his life
either to the avoidance of pain merely (line of least resistance) or to the achievement of the
greatest pleasure?—In the first case he would be more passive, he would merely reconcile
himself "to the emptiness of reality" (Stekel, loc. cit., p. 187). In the second he would be
"filled with enthusiasm" for something or other or some person or other. But what will
determine this choice of his as to whether he will be passive rather than active in his "second
life"? In your view, will the determining factor manifest itself spontaneously in the course of
the analysis, and must the doctor carefully avoid swaying the balance to one side or other by
his influence? Or must he, if he does not renounce the right to canalise the patient's libido in
some particular direction, renounce the right to be called a psychoanalyst, and is he to be
regarded as "moderate" or altogether as "wild"?[181] (Cf. Furtmüller, "Wandlungen in der
Freudschen Schule," Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, vols. IV., V., 3rd year, p. 191.) But I
think you have already answered this question, since in your last letter you write: "Every
interference on the part of the analyst is a gross mistake in technique. So-called chance is the
law and the order of psychoanalysis." But, torn from its context, perhaps this does not quite
give your whole meaning. With regard to detailed explanation of the psychoanalytic method
before the beginning of the analysis, I think you agree with Freud and Stekel: give too little
rather than too much. For the knowledge instilled into a patient remains more or less halfknowledge, and half-knowledge engenders "the desire to know better" (than the analyst),
which only impedes progress. So, after brief explanation, first "let the patient talk," then and
there point out connexions, then after the exhaustion of the conscious material, take dreams.
But there another difficulty confronts me which I have already pointed out in our talks: you
find the patient adapting himself to the doctor's tone, language, jargon, whether from
conscious imitation, transference, or even resistance, when he can fight the analyst with his
own weapons; how then can you possibly prevent his beginning to produce all manner of
phantasies as supposedly real traumata of early childhood, and dreams supposedly
spontaneous which are in reality, though not designedly, directly or indirectly suggested? I
then told you that Forel ("Der Hypnotismus") made his patients dream just what he wanted,
and I have myself easily repeated the experiment. But if the analyst desires to suggest
nothing, should he remain silent for the most part and let the patient speak—except that in
interpreting dreams he may lay before the patient his own interpretation?

VIII
From Dr. Jung.
18th February, 1913.

I cannot but agree with your observation that confusion reigns in psychoanalytic literature.
Just at this moment different points of view are developing in the theoretical conception of
the analytic results; not to mention many individual deviations. Over against Freud's almost
purely causal conception, there has developed, apparently in absolute contradiction, Adler's
purely final view, but in reality the latter is an essential complement of Freud's theory. I hold
rather to a middle course, taking into account both standpoints. That discord still reigns round
the ultimate questions of psychoanalysis need not surprise us when we consider the difficulty.
The problem of the therapeutic effect of psychoanalysis is bound up in particular with
supremely difficult questions, so that it would indeed be astonishing if we had yet reached
final certitude. Stekel's statement to which you refer is very characteristic. What he says about
love for the doctor is obviously true, but it is a simple affirmation, and not a goal or plumbline of the analytic therapy. If his statement were the goal, many cures, it is true, would be
possible, but also many calamities might result which are avoidable. But the aim is so to
educate the patient that he will get well for his own sake and by reason of his own
determination, rather than to procure his doctor some sort of advantage; though of course it
would be absurd from the therapeutic standpoint not to allow the patient to get better because
in doing so he does the doctor a good turn also. It suffices if the patient knows it. But we must
not prescribe for him which path he should take to recovery. Naturally it seems to me (from
the psychoanalytic standpoint) an inadmissible use of suggestive influence if the patient is
compelled to get better out of love for the doctor. And indeed such compulsion may
sometimes take bitter revenge. The "you must and shall be saved" is no more to be
commended in nerve-therapy than in any other department of life. It contradicts the principle
of analytic treatment, which shuns all coercion and desires to let everything grow up from
within. I do not, as you know, object to influencing by use of suggestion in general, but
merely to a doubtful motivation. If the doctor demands that his patient shall get well from
love of himself, the patient may easily reckon on reciprocal services and will without doubt
try to extort them. I can but utter a warning against any such method. A far stronger motive
for recovery—also a far healthier and ethically more valuable one—consists in the patient's
thorough insight into the real state of affairs, the recognition of how things are now and how
they ought to be. The man of any sort of worth will then discern that he can hardly sit down at
ease in the quagmire of his neurosis.
With your rendering of what I said about the healing power of personality I cannot entirely
agree. I wrote that the doctor's personality has a power for healing because the patient reads
the doctor's personality: not that he produces a cure through love of the doctor. The doctor
cannot prevent the patient's beginning to behave himself towards his conflicts just as the
doctor himself behaves, for nothing is finer than a neurotic's intuition. But every strong
transference serves this same purpose. If the doctor makes himself charming, he buys off
from the patient a series of resistances which he should have overcome, and whose
overcoming will certainly have to be gone through later on. Nothing is won by this technique;
at most the beginning of the analysis is made easy for the patient (though this is not quite
without its use in certain cases). To be able to crawl through a barbed wire fence without
some enticing end in view testifies to an ascetic strength of will which you can expect neither
from the ordinary person nor from the neurotic. Even the Christian religion, whose moral
demands certainly reached a great height, thought it no scorn to represent the near approach
of the Kingdom of Heaven as goal and reward of earthly pain. In my view, the doctor may

well speak of the rewards which follow the toils of analysis. But he must not depict himself or
his friendship, in hints or promises, as reward, if he is not seriously determined to keep his
word.
In regard to your criticism of my outline-definition of the conception of psychoanalysis, it
must be observed that the road over the steep mountain is the line of least resistance only
when a ferocious bull waits for you in the pleasant valley-road. In other words, the line of
least resistance is a compromise with all demands, and not with inertia alone. It is prejudice
to think that the line of least resistance coincides with the path of inertia. (That's what we
thought in the days when we dawdled over Latin exercises.) Inertia is only an immediate
advantage and leads to consequences which produce the worst resistances; as a whole, it does
not lie in the direction of least resistance. Life along the line of least resistance is not
synonymous with a man's regardless pursuit of his own egoistic desires. He who lives thus
soon painfully perceives that he is not moving along the line of least resistance, for he is also
a social being, and not merely a bundle of egoistic instincts, as some people rather like to
depict him. This is best seen among primitive men and herd-animals, who all have a richly
developed social sense. Without it, indeed, the herd could not exist at all. Man as herd-animal
has therefore by no manner of means to subject himself to laws enforced on him from
without; he carries his social imperatives within himself, a priori, as an inborn necessity. As
you see, I here put myself in decided opposition to certain views—I think quite unjustified—
which have been put forth here and there inside the psychoanalytic movement.
So the line of least resistance does not signify eo ipso the avoidance of unpleasure so much as
the just balancing of unpleasure and pleasure. Painful activity by itself leads to no result but
exhaustion. Man must be able to take pleasure in his life, or the struggle of life has no reward.
What direction the patient's future life should take is not ours to judge. We must not imagine
we know better than his own nature—or we prove ourselves educators of the worst kind.
Psychoanalysis is but a means of removing stones from the path, and in no way a method (as
hypnotism often pretends to be) of putting anything into the patient which was not there
before. So we renounce any attempt to give a direction, and occupy ourselves only with
setting in proper relief all that analysis brings into the light of day, in order that the patient
may see clearly, and be in a position to draw the appropriate conclusions. Anything that he
has not himself won, he does not in the long run believe in; and all that he has received from
authority keeps him still infantile. He must rather be put in such a position as will enable him
to take control of his own life. It is the art of the psychoanalyst to follow the patient's
apparently mistaken paths without prejudice, and thus to discover his strayed and separated
sheep. Working on a system, according to a preconceived scheme, we spoil the best results of
the analysis. So I hold fast to the maxim you quote from me: "Every interference on the part
of the analyst is a gross mistake in technique. So-called chance is the law and the order of
psychoanalysis."
You surely recognise that the schoolmaster-view never releases us from the attempt to correct
Nature and the desire to force upon her our limited "truths." In nerve-therapy we get so many
wonderful experiences—unforeseen and impossible to foresee—that surely we ought to
dismiss all hope of being infallibly able to point out the right path. The roundabout way and
even the wrong way are necessary. If you deny this you must also deny that the errors in the

history of the whole world have been necessary. That indeed were a world-conception fit for a
schoolmaster. For psychoanalysis this view suits not at all.
The question as to how much the analyst involuntarily suggests to the patient is a very ticklish
one. Undoubtedly that has a much more important place than psychoanalysts have till now
admitted. Experience has convinced us that the patient rapidly avails himself of the ideas won
through the analysis, and of whatever comes to light through the shaping of the dreams. You
may obtain all manner of such impressions from Stekel's book: "Die Sprache des Traumes"
("The Language of the Dream"). I had once a most instructive experience: a very intelligent
lady had from the beginning extreme transference phantasies which appeared in wellrecognised erotic forms. Nevertheless she entirely declined to admit their existence. Of course
she was betrayed by the dreams in which my own person was hidden behind some other
figure, and often difficult to unveil. A long series of such dreams forced me at last to say: "So
you see it is always like that, and the person of whom one has really dreamt is replaced and
hidden by some one else in the manifest dream." Till then the patient had obstinately
contested this point. But this time she could no longer evade it, and had to admit my rule—
but only that she might play me a trick. Next day she brought me a dream in which she and I
appeared in a manifest lascivious situation. I was naturally perplexed and thought of my rule.
Her first association to the dream was the malicious question: "It's always true, isn't it, that
the person of whom one is really dreaming is replaced by some one else in the manifest
dream-content?"
Clearly, she had made use of her experience to find a protective formula by means of which
she secured the open expression of her phantasies in an apparently innocent way.
This example aptly shows how patients avail themselves of insight gained during analysis;
they use it symbolically. You get caught in your own net if you give credence to the idea of
unalterable, permanent symbols. That has already happened to more than one psychoanalyst.
It is therefore fallacious to try to prove any particular theory from the dreams arising in the
course of analysis. For this purpose the only conclusive dreams are those derived from
demonstrably uninfluenced persons. In such cases one would only have to exclude the
possibility of telepathic thought-reading. But if you concede this possibility you will have to
subject very many things to a rigorous re-examination and, among others, many judicial
verdicts.
But although we must do full justice to the force of suggestion, we must not overrate it. The
patient is no empty sack into which you may stuff whatever you like; on the contrary, he
brings his own predetermined contents which strive obstinately against suggestion and always
obtrude themselves afresh. Through analytic "suggestions," only the outward form is
determined, never the content—this is always being freshly impressed upon my notice. The
form is the unlimited, the ever-changing; but the content is fixed, and only to be assailed
slowly and with great difficulty. Were it not so, suggestion-therapy would be in every respect
the most effective, profitable, and easiest therapy,—a real panacea. That, alas! it is not, as
every honourable hypnotist will freely admit.
To return to your question as to how far it is conceivable that patients may deceive the doctor
by making use—perhaps involuntarily—of his expressions: this is indeed a very serious
problem. The analyst must exercise all possible care and practise unsparing self-criticism if

he would avoid, as far as possible, being led into error by patients' dreams. It may be admitted
that they almost always use modes of expression in their dreams learnt in analysis—some
more, some less. Interpretations of earlier symbols will themselves be used again as fresh
symbols in later dreams. It happens not seldom, for instance, that sexual situations which
appear in symbolic form in the earlier dreams, will appear "undisguised" in later ones, and
here again they are the symbolic expression of ideas of another character capable of further
analysis. The not infrequent dream of incestuous cohabitation is by no means an
"undisguised" content, but a dream as freshly symbolic and capable of analysis as all others.
You surely only reach the paradoxical view that such a dream is "undisguised" if you are
pledged to the sexual theory of neurosis.
That the patient may mislead the doctor for a longer or shorter time by means of deliberate
deception and misrepresentation is possible; just as occasionally happens in all other
departments of medicine. Therewith the patient injures himself most, since he has to pay for
every deception or suppression, with aggravated or additional symptoms. Deceptions are so
obviously disadvantageous to himself that in the end he can scarcely avoid the definite
relinquishment of such a course.
The technique of analysis we can best postpone for oral discussion.

IX
From Dr. Loÿ.
23rd February, 1913.
From your letter of 16th February I want first to single out the end, where you so admirably
assign to its proper place the power of suggestion in psychoanalysis: "The patient is no empty
sack, into which you can cram what you will; he brings his own predetermined content with
him, with which one has always to reckon afresh." With this I fully agree, my own experience
confirms it. And you add: "This content remains untouched by involuntary analytical
suggestion, but its form is altered, proteus-fashion, beyond measure." So it becomes a matter
of a sort of "mimicry" by which the patient seeks to escape the analyst, who is driving him
into a corner and therefore for the moment seems to him an enemy. Until at last, through the
joint work of patient and analyst—the former spontaneously yielding up his psychic content,
the latter only interpreting and explaining—the analysis succeeds in bringing so much light
into the darkness of the patient's psyche that he can see the true relationships and, without any
preconceived plan of the analyst's, can himself draw the right conclusions and apply them to
his future life. This new life will betake itself along the line of least resistance—or should we
not rather say, the least resistances, as a "compromise with all the necessities," in a just
balancing of pleasure and unpleasure? It is not we who must arbitrarily seek to determine how
matters stand for the patient and what will benefit him; his own nature decides. In other
words, we must assume the rôle of the accoucheur who can bring out into the light of day a
child already alive, but who must avoid a series of mistakes if the child is to remain able to
live and the mother is not to be injured. All this is very clear to me, since it is only the

application to the psychoanalytic method of a general principle which should have universal
validity: never do violence to Nature. Hence I also see that the psychoanalyst must follow his
patient's apparently "wrong roads" if the patient is ever to arrive at his own convictions and
be freed once and for all from infantile reliance on authority. We ourselves as individuals
have learnt or can only learn by making mistakes how to avoid them for the future, and
mankind as a whole has created the conditions of its present and future stages of development
quite as much by frequent travel along wrong paths as along the right road. Have not many
neurotics—I do not know if you will agree, but I think so—become ill partly for the very
reason that their infantile faith in authority has fallen to pieces? Now they stand before the
wreckage of their faith, weeping over it, in dire distress because they cannot find a substitute
which shall show them clearly whither their life's course should now turn. So they remain
stuck fast betwixt infancy which they must unwillingly renounce, and the serious duties of the
present and future (the moral conflict). I see, particularly in such cases, you are right in saying
it is a mistake to seek to replace the lost faith in authority by another similar faith, certain to
be useful only so long as the belief lasts. This applies to the deliberate use of suggestion in
psychoanalysis, and the building upon the transference to the doctor as the object of the
analytic therapy. I am no longer in doubt about your maxim: "Every interference on the
analyst's part is a gross mistake in technique. So-called chance is the law and the order of
psychoanalysis." Further, I am entirely in agreement with you when you say that altruism
necessarily must be innate in man considered as a herd-animal. The contrary would be the
thing to be wondered at.
I should be much disposed to agree that not the egoistic, but the altruistic instincts are
primary. Love and trust of the child for the mother who feeds it, nurses, cherishes and pets it,
—love of the man for his wife, regarded as the going out towards another's personality,—love
for offspring, care for it,—love for kinsfolk, etc. The egoistic instincts owe their origin to the
desire for exclusive possession of all that surrounds love, the desire to possess the mother
exclusively, in opposition to the father and the brothers and sisters, the desire to have a
woman for himself alone, the desire to possess exclusively ornaments, clothing, etc. But
perhaps you will say I am paradoxical and that the instincts, egoistic or altruistic, arise
together in the heart of man, and that every instinct is ambivalent in nature. But I have to ask
if the feelings and instincts are really ambivalent? Are they exactly bipolar? Are the qualities
of all emotions altogether comparable? Is love really the opposite of hate?
However that may be, in any case it is well that man bears the social law within himself, as an
inborn imperative; otherwise our civilised humanity would fare badly, having to subject
themselves to laws imposed on them from outside only: they would be impervious to the
inheritance of the earlier religious faiths, and would soon fall into complete anarchy. Man
would then have to ask himself whether it would not be better to maintain by force an
extreme belief in religious authority such as prevailed in the Middle Ages. For the benefits of
civilisation, which strove to grant every individual as much outward freedom as was
consistent with the freedom of others, would be well worth the sacrifice of free research. But
the age of this use of force against nature is past, civilised man has left this wrong track
behind, not arbitrarily, but obeying an inner necessity, and we may look joyfully towards the
future. Mankind, advancing in knowledge, will find its way across the ruins of faith in
authority to the moral autonomy of the individual.

X
From Dr. Jung.
March, 1913.
At various places in your letters it has struck me that the problem of "transference" seems to
you particularly critical. Your feeling is entirely justified. The transference is indeed at
present the central problem of analysis.
You know that Freud regards the transference as the projection of infantile phantasies upon
the doctor. To this extent the transference is an infantile-erotic relationship. All the same,
viewed from the outside, superficially, the thing by no means always looks like an infantileerotic situation. As long as it is a question of the so-called "positive" transference, the
infantile-erotic character can usually be recognised without difficulty. But if it is a "negative"
transference, you can see nothing but violent resistances which sometimes veil themselves in
seemingly critical or sceptical dress. In a certain sense the determining factor in such
circumstances is the patient's relation to authority, that is, in the last resort, to the father. In
both forms of transference the doctor is treated as if he were the father—according to the
situation either tenderly or with hostility. In this view the transference has the force of a
resistance as soon as it becomes a question of resolving the infantile attitude. But this form of
transference must be destroyed, inasmuch as the object of analysis is the patient's moral
autonomy. A lofty aim, you will say. Indeed lofty, and far off, but still not altogether so
remote, since it actually corresponds to one of the predominating tendencies of our stage of
civilisation, namely, that urge towards individualisation by which our whole epoch deserves
to be characterised. (Cf. Müller-Lyer: "Die Familie.") If a man does not believe in this
orientation and still bows before the scientific causal view-point, he will, of course, be
disposed merely to resolve this hostility, and to let the patient remain in a positive relationship
towards the father, thus expressing the ideal of an earlier epoch of civilisation. It is
commonly recognised that the Catholic Church represents one of the most powerful
organisations based upon this earlier tendency. I cannot venture to doubt that there are very
many individuals who feel happier under compulsion from others than when forced to
discipline themselves. (Cf. Shaw: "Man and Superman.") None the less, we do our neurotic
patients a grievous wrong if we try to force them all into the category of the unfree. Among
neurotics, there are not a few who do not require any reminders of their social duties and
obligations; rather are they born or destined to become the bearers of new social ideals. They
are neurotic so long as they bow down to authority and refuse the freedom to which they are
destined. Whilst we look at life only retrospectively, as is the case in the Viennese
psychoanalytic writings, we shall never do justice to this type of case and never bring the
longed-for deliverance. For in that fashion we can only educate them to become obedient
children, and thereby strengthen the very forces that have made them ill—their conservative
retardation and their submissiveness to authority. Up to a certain point this is the right way to
take with the infantile resistance which cannot yet reconcile itself with authority. But the
power which edged them out from their retrograde dependence on the father is not at all a
childish desire for insubordination, but the powerful urge towards the development of an

individual personality, and this struggle is their imperative life's task. Adler's psychology does
much greater justice to this situation than Freud's.
In the one case (that of infantile intractability) the positive transference signifies a highly
important achievement, heralding cure; in the other (infantile submissiveness) it portends a
dangerous backsliding, a convenient evasion of life's duty. The negative transference
represents in the first case an increased resistance, thus a backsliding and an evasion of duty,
but in the second it is an advance of healing significance. (For the two types, cf. Adler's
"Trotz und Gehorsam.")
The transference then is, as you see, to be judged quite differently in different cases.
The psychological process of "transference"—be it negative or positive—consists in the
libido entrenching itself, as it were, round the personality of the doctor, the doctor accordingly
representing certain emotional values. (As you know, by libido I understand very much what
Antiquity meant by the cosmogenic principle of Eros; in modern terminology simply
"psychic energy.") The patient is bound to the doctor, be it in affection, be it in opposition,
and cannot fail to follow and imitate the doctor's psychic adaptations. To this he finds himself
urgently compelled. And with the best will in the world and all technical skill, the doctor
cannot prevent him, for intuition works surely and instinctively, in despite of the conscious
judgment, be it never so strong. Were the doctor himself neurotic, and inadequate in response
to the demands of the external life, or inharmonious within, the patient would copy the defect
and build it up into the fabric of his own presentations: you may imagine the result.
Accordingly I cannot regard the transference as merely the transference of infantile-erotic
phantasies; no doubt that is what it is from one standpoint, but I see also in it, as I said in an
earlier letter, the process of the growth of feeling and adaptation. From this standpoint the
infantile erotic phantasies, in spite of their indisputable reality, appear rather as material for
comparison or as analogous pictures of something not understood as yet, than as independent
desires. This seems to me the real reason of their being unconscious. The patient, not
knowing the right attitude, tries to grasp at a right relationship to the doctor by way of
comparison and analogy with his infantile experiences. It is not surprising that he gropes back
for just the most intimate relations of his childhood, to discover the appropriate formula for
his attitude to the doctor, for this relationship also is very intimate, and to some extent
different from the sexual relationship, just as is that of the child towards its parents. This
relationship—child to parent—which Christianity has everywhere set up as the symbolic
formula for human relationships, provides a way of restoring to the patient that directness of
ordinary human emotion of which he had been deprived through the inroad of sexual and
social values (from the standpoint of power, etc.). The purely sexual, more or less primitive
and barbaric valuation, operates in far-reaching ways against a direct, simple human
relationship, and thereupon a blocking of the libido occurs which easily gives rise to neurotic
formations. By means of analysis of the infantile portion of the transference-phantasies, the
patient is brought back to the remembrance of his childhood's relationship, and this—stripped
of its infantile qualities—gives him a beautiful, clear picture of direct human intercourse as
opposed to the purely sexual valuation. I cannot regard it as other than a misconception to
judge the childish relationship retrospectively and therefore as exclusively a sexual one, even
though a certain sexual content can in no wise be denied to it.

Recapitulating, let me say this much of the positive transference:—
The patient's libido fastens upon the person of the doctor, taking the shape of expectation,
hope, interest, trust, friendship and love. Then the transference produces the projection upon
the doctor of infantile phantasies, often of predominatingly erotic tinge. At this stage the
transference is usually of a decidedly sexual character, in spite of the sexual component
remaining relatively unconscious. But this phase of feeling serves the higher aspect of the
growth of human feeling as a bridge, whereby the patient becomes conscious of the
defectiveness of his own adaptation, through his recognition of the doctor's attitude, which is
accepted as one suitable to life's demands, and normal in its human relationships. By help of
the analysis, and the recalling of his childish relationships, the road is seen which leads right
out of those exclusively sexual or "power" evaluations of social surroundings which were
acquired in puberty and strongly reinforced by social prejudices. This road leads on towards a
purely human relation and intimacy, not derived solely from the existence of a sexual or
power-relation, but depending much more upon a regard for personality. That is the road to
freedom which the doctor must show his patient.
Here indeed I must not omit to say that the obstinate clinging to the sexual valuation would
not be maintained so tenaciously if it had not also a very deep significance for that period of
life in which propagation is of primary importance. The discovery of the value of human
personality belongs to a riper age. For young people the search for the valuable personality is
very often merely a cloak for the evasion of their biological duty. On the other hand, an older
person's exaggerated looking back towards the sexual valuation of youth, is an undiscerning
and often cowardly and convenient retreat from a duty which demands the recognition of
personal values and his own enrolment among the ranks of the priesthood of a newer
civilisation. The young neurotic shrinks back in terror from the extension of his tasks in life,
the old from the dwindling and shrinking of the treasures he has attained.
This conception of the transference is, you will have noted, most intimately connected with
the acceptance of the idea of biological "duties." By this term you must understand those
tendencies or motives in human beings giving rise to civilisation, as inevitably as in the bird
they give rise to the exquisitely woven nest, and in the stag to the production of antlers. The
purely causal, not to say materialistic conception of the immediately preceding decades,
would conceive the organic formation as the reaction of living matter, and this doubtless
provides a position heuristically useful, but, as far as any real understanding goes, leads only
to a more or less ingenious and apparent reduction and postponement of the problem. Let me
refer you to Bergson's excellent criticism of this conception. From external forces but half the
result, at most, could ensue; the other half lies within the individual disposition of the living
material, without which it is obvious the specific reaction-formation could never be achieved.
This principle must be applied also in psychology. The psyche does not only react; it also
gives its own individual reply to the influences at work upon it, and at least half the resulting
configuration and its existing disposition is due to this. Civilisation is never, and again never,
to be regarded as merely reaction to environment. That shallow explanation we may abandon
peacefully to the past century. It is just these very dispositions which we must regard as
imperative in the psychological sphere; it is easy to get convincing proof daily of their
compulsive power. What I call "biological duty" is identical with these dispositions.

In conclusion, I must deal with a matter which seems to have caused you uneasiness, namely,
the moral question. Among our patients we see many so-called immoral tendencies, therefore
the thought involuntarily forces itself upon the psychotherapist as to how things would go if
all these desires were to be gratified. You will have discerned already from my earlier letters
that these desires must not be estimated too literally. As a rule it is rather a matter of
unmeasured and exaggerated demands, arising out of the patient's stored-up libido, which
have usurped a prominent position, usually quite against his own wish. In most cases the
canalisation of the libido for the fulfilment of life's simple duties, suffices to reduce these
exaggerated desires to zero. But in some cases it must be recognised that such "immoral"
tendencies are in no way removed by analysis; on the contrary, they appear more often and
more clearly, hence it becomes plain that they belong to the individual's biological duties.
And this is particularly true of certain sexual claims, whose aim is an individual valuation of
sexuality. This is not a question for pathology, it is a social question of to-day which
peremptorily demands an ethical solution. For many it is a biological duty to work for the
solution of this question, to discover some sort of practical solution. (Nature, it is well known,
does not content herself with theories.) To-day we have no real sexual morality, only a legal
attitude towards sexuality; just as the early Middle Ages had no genuine morality for financial
transactions, but only prejudices and a legal standpoint. We are not yet sufficiently advanced
in the domain of free sexual activity to distinguish between a moral and an immoral
relationship. We have a clear expression of this in the customary treatment, or rather illtreatment, of unmarried motherhood. For a great deal of sickening hypocrisy, for the high tide
of prostitution, and for the prevalence of sexual diseases, we may thank both our barbarous,
undifferentiated legal judgments about the sexual situation, and our inability to develop a
finer moral perception of the immense psychologic differences that may exist in free sexual
activity.
This reference to the existence of an exceedingly complicated and significant problem may
suffice to explain why we by no means seldom meet with individuals among our patients who
are quite specially called, because of their spiritual and social gifts, to take an active part in
the work of civilisation—for this they are biologically destined. We must never forget that
what to-day is deemed a moral law will to-morrow be cast into the melting-pot and
transformed, so that in the near or distant future it may serve as the basis of a new ethical
structure. This much we ought to have learnt from the history of civilisation, that the forms of
morality belong to the category of transitory things. The finest psychological tact is required
with these critical natures, so that the dangerous corners of infantile irresponsibility,
indolence and uncontrolledness may be turned, and a pure, untroubled vision of the
possibility of a moral autonomous activity made possible. Five per cent. on money lent is fair
interest, twenty per cent. is despicable usury. That point of view we have to apply equally to
the sexual situation.
So it comes about that there are many neurotics whose innermost delicacy of feeling prevents
their being at one with present-day morality, and they cannot adapt themselves to civilisation
as long as their moral code has gaps in it, the filling up of which is a crying need of the age.
We deceive ourselves greatly if we suppose that many married women are neurotic only
because they are unsatisfied sexually or because they have not found the right man, or
because they still have a fixation to their infantile sexuality. The real ground of the neurosis
is, in many cases, the inability to recognise the work that is waiting for them, of helping to

build up a new civilisation. We are all far too much at the standpoint of the "nothing-but"
psychology; we persist in thinking we can squeeze the new future which is pressing in at the
door into the framework of the old and the known. And thus the view is only of the present,
never of the future. But it was of most profound psychological significance when Christianity
first discovered, in the orientation towards the future, a redeeming principle for mankind. In
the past nothing can be altered, and in the present little, but the future is ours and capable of
raising life's intensity to its highest pitch. A little space of youth belongs to us, all the rest of
life belongs to our children.
Thus does your question as to the significance of the loss of faith in authority answer itself.
The neurotic is ill not because he has lost his old faith, but because he has not yet found a new
form for his finest aspirations.

CHAPTER X
ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS IN
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY[182]
When we speak of a thing as being "unconscious" we must not forget that from the point of
view of the functioning of the brain a thing may be unconscious to us in two ways—
physiologically or psychologically. I shall only deal with the subject from the latter point of
view. So that for our purposes we may define the unconscious as "the sum of all those
psychological events which are not apperceived, and so are unconscious."
The unconscious contains all those psychic events which, because of the lack of the necessary
intensity of their functioning, are unable to pass the threshold which divides the conscious
from the unconscious; so that they remain in effect below the surface of the conscious, and
flit by in subliminal phantom forms.
It has been known to psychologists since the time of Leibniz that the elements—that is to say,
the ideas and feelings which go to make up the conscious mind, the so-called conscious
content—are of a complex nature, and rest upon far simpler and altogether unconscious
elements; it is the combination of these which gives the element of consciousness. Leibniz
has already mentioned the perceptions insensibles—those vague perceptions which Kant
called "shadowy" representations, which could only attain to consciousness in an indirect
manner. Later philosophers assigned the first place to the unconscious, as the foundation upon
which the conscious was built.
But this is not the place to consider the many speculative theories nor the endless
philosophical discussions concerning the nature and quality of the unconscious. We must be
satisfied with the definition already given, which will prove quite sufficient for our purpose,
namely the conception of the unconscious as the sum of all psychical processes below the
threshold of consciousness.
The question of the importance of the unconscious for psychopathology may be briefly put as
follows: "In what manner may we expect to find unconscious psychic material behave in
cases of psychosis and neurosis?"
In order to get a better grasp of the situation in connexion with mental disorders, we may
profitably consider first how unconscious psychic material behaves in the case of normal
people, especially trying to visualize what in normal men is apt to be unconscious. As a
preliminary to this knowledge we must get a complete understanding of what is contained in
the conscious mind; and then, by a process of elimination we may expect to find what is
contained in the unconscious, for obviously—per exclusionem—what is in the conscious
cannot be unconscious. For this purpose we examine all activities, interests, passions, cares,
and joys, which are conscious to the individual. All that we are thus able to discover becomes,
ipso facto, of no further moment as a content of the unconscious, and we may then expect to

find only those things contained in the unconscious which we have not found in the conscious
mind.
Let us take a concrete example: A merchant, who is happily married, father of two children,
thorough and painstaking in his business affairs, and at the same time trying in a reasonable
degree to improve his position in the world, carries himself with self-respect, is enlightened in
religious matters, and even belongs to a society for the discussion of liberal ideas.
What can we reasonably consider to be the content of the unconscious in the case of such an
individual?
Considered from the above theoretical standpoint, everything in the personality that is not
contained in the conscious mind should be found in the unconscious. Let us agree, then, that
this man consciously considers himself to possess all the fine attributes we have just
described—no more, no less. Then it must obviously result that he is entirely unaware that a
man may be not merely industrious, thorough, and painstaking, but that he may also be
careless, indifferent, untrustworthy; for some of these last attributes are the common heritage
of mankind and may be found to be an essential component of every character. This worthy
merchant forgets that quite recently he allowed several letters to remain unanswered which he
could easily have answered at once. He forgets, too, that he failed to bring a book home
which his wife has asked him to get at the book-stall, where she had previously ordered it,
although he might easily have made a note of her wish. But such occurrences are common
with him. Therefore we are obliged to conclude that he is also lazy and untrustworthy. He is
convinced that he is a thoroughly loyal subject; but for all that he failed to declare the whole
of his income to the assessor, and when they raise his taxes, he votes for the Socialists.
He believes himself to be an independent thinker, yet a little while back he undertook a big
deal on the Stock Exchange, and when he came to enter the details of the transaction in his
books he noticed with considerable misgivings that it fell upon a Friday, the 13th of the
month. Therefore, he is also superstitious and not free in his thinking.
So here we are not at all surprised to find these compensating vices to be an essential content
of the unconscious. Obviously, therefore, the reverse is true—namely, that unconscious
virtues compensate for conscious deficiencies. The law which ought to follow as the result of
such deductions would appear to be quite simple—to wit, the conscious spendthrift is
unconsciously a miser; the philanthropist is unconsciously an egoist and misanthrope. But,
unfortunately, it is not quite so easy as that, although there is a basis of truth in this simple
rule. For there are essential hereditary dispositions of a latent or manifest nature which upset
the simple rule of compensation, and which vary greatly in individual cases. From entirely
different motives a man may, for instance, be a philanthropist, but the manner of his
philanthropy depends upon his originally inherited disposition, and the way in which the
philanthropic attitude is compensated depends upon his motives. It is not sufficient simply to
know that a certain person is philanthropic in order to diagnose an unconscious egoism. For
we must also bring to such a diagnosis a careful study of the motives involved.
In the case of normal people the principal function of the unconscious is to effect a
compensation and thus produce a balance. All extreme conscious tendencies are softened and
toned down through an effective opposite impulse in the unconscious. This compensating
agency, as I have tried to show in the case of the merchant, maintains itself through certain

unconscious, inconsequent activities, as it were, which Freud has very well described as
symptomatic acts (Symptom-handlungen).
To Freud we owe thanks also for having called attention to the importance of dreams, for by
means of them, also, we are able to learn much about this compensating function. There is a
fine historical example of this in the well-known dream of Nebuchadnezzar in the fourth
chapter of the Book of Daniel, where Nebuchadnezzar at the height of his power had a dream
which foretold his downfall. He dreamed of a tree which had raised its head even up to
heaven and now must be hewn down. This is a dream which is obviously a counterpoise to
the exaggerated feeling of royal power.
Now considering states in which the mental balance is disturbed, we can easily see, from
what has preceded, wherein lies the importance of the unconscious for psychopathology. Let
us ponder the question of where and in what manner the unconscious manifests itself in
abnormal mental conditions. The way in which the unconscious works is most clearly seen in
disturbances of a psychogenic nature, such as hysteria, compulsion neurosis, etc.
We have known for a long time that certain symptoms of these disturbances are produced by
unconscious psychic events. Just as clear, but less recognised, are the manifestations of the
unconscious in actually insane patients. As the intuitive ideas of normal men do not spring
from logical combinations of the conscious mind, so the hallucinations and delusions of the
insane arise, not out of conscious but out of unconscious processes.
Formerly, when we held a more materialistic view of psychiatry we were inclined to believe
that all delusions, hallucinations, stereotypic acts, etc., were provoked by morbid processes in
the brain cells. Such a theory, however, ignores that delusions, hallucinations, etc., are also to
be met with in certain functional disturbances, and not only in the case of functional
disturbances, but also in the case of normal people. Primitive people may have visions and
hear strange voices without having their mental processes at all disturbed. To seek to ascribe
symptoms of that nature directly to a disease of the brain cells I hold to be superficial and
unwarranted. Hallucinations show very plainly how a part of the unconscious content can
force itself across the threshold of the conscious. The same is true of a delusion whose
appearance is at once strange and unexpected by the patient.
The expression "mental balance" is no mere figure of speech, for its disturbance is a real
disturbance of that equilibrium which actually exists between the unconscious and conscious
content to a greater extent than has heretofore been recognised or understood. As a matter of
fact, it amounts to this—that the normal functioning of the unconscious processes breaks
through into the conscious mind in an abnormal manner, and thereby disturbs the adaptation
of the individual to his environment.
If we study attentively the history of any such person coming under our observation, we shall
often find that he has been living for a considerable time in a sort of peculiar individual
isolation, more or less shut off from the world of reality. This constrained condition of
aloofness may be traced back to certain innate or early acquired peculiarities, which show
themselves in the events of his life. For instance, in the histories of those suffering from
dementia præcox we often hear such a remark as this: "He was always of a pensive
disposition, and much shut up in himself. After his mother died he cut himself off still more
from the world, shunning his friends and acquaintances." Or again, we may hear, "Even as a

child he devised many peculiar inventions; and later, when he became an engineer, he
occupied himself with most ambitious schemes."

Without discussing the matter further it must be plain that a counterpoise is
produced in the unconscious as a compensation to the one-sidedness of the
conscious attitude. In the first case we may expect to find an increasing
pressing forward in the unconscious, of a wish for human intercourse, a
longing for mother, friends, relatives; while in the second case self-criticism
will try to establish a correcting balance. Among normal people a condition
never arises so one-sided that the natural corrective tendencies of the
unconscious entirely lose their value in the affairs of everyday life; but in
the case of abnormal people, it is eminently characteristic that the
individual entirely fails to recognise the compensating influences which
arise in the unconscious. He even continues to accentuate his one-sidedness;
this is in accord with the well-known psychological fact that the worst
enemy of the wolf is the wolf-hound, the greatest despiser of the negro is
the mulatto, and that the biggest fanatic is the convert; for I should be a
fanatic were I to attack a thing outwardly which inwardly I am obliged to
concede as right.
The mentally unbalanced man tries to defend himself against his own
unconscious, that is to say, he battles against his own compensating
influences. The man already dwelling in a sort of atmosphere of isolation,
continues to remove himself further and further from the world of reality,
and the ambitious engineer strives by increasingly morbid exaggerations of
invention to disprove the correctness of his own compensating powers of
self-criticism. As a result of this a condition of excitation is produced, from
which results a great lack of harmony between the conscious and
unconscious attitudes. The pairs of opposites are torn asunder, the resulting
division or strife leads to disaster, for the unconscious soon begins to
intrude itself violently upon the conscious processes. Then odd and peculiar
thoughts and moods supervene, and not infrequently incipient forms of
hallucination, which clearly bear the stamp of the internal conflict.
These corrective impulses or compensations which now break through into
the conscious mind, should theoretically be the beginning of the healing
process, because through them the previously isolated attitude should
apparently be relieved. But in reality this does not result, for the reason that
the unconscious corrective impulses which thus succeed in making
themselves apparent to the conscious mind, do so in a form that is
altogether unacceptable to consciousness.

The isolated individual begins to hear strange voices, which accuse him of
murder and all sorts of crimes. These voices drive him to desperation and in
the resulting agitation he attempts to get into contact with the surrounding
milieu, and does what he formerly had anxiously avoided. The
compensation, to be sure, is reached, but to the detriment of the individual.
The pathological inventor, who is unable to profit by his previous failures,
by refusing to recognise the value of his own self-criticism, becomes the
creator of still more preposterous designs. He wishes to accomplish the
impossible but falls into the absurd. After a while he notices that people talk
about him, make unfavourable remarks about him, and even scoff at him.
He believes a far-reaching conspiracy exists to frustrate his discoveries and
render them objects of ridicule. By this means his unconscious brings about
the same results that his self-criticism could have attained, but again only to
the detriment of the individual, because the criticism is projected into his
surroundings.
An especially typical form of unconscious compensation—to give a further
example—is the paranoia of the alcoholic. The alcoholic loses his love for
his wife; the unconscious compensation tries to lead him back again to his
duty, but only partially succeeds, for it causes him to become jealous of his
wife as if he still loved her. As we know, he may even go so far as to kill
both his wife and himself, merely out of jealousy. In other words, his love
for his wife has not been entirely lost, it has simply become subliminal; but
from the realm of the unconscious it can now only reappear in the form of
jealousy.
We see something of a similar nature in the case of religious converts. One
who turns from protestantism to catholicism has, as is well known, the
tendency to be somewhat fanatical. His protestantism is not entirely
relinquished, but has merely disappeared into the unconscious, where it is
constantly at work as a counter-argument against the newly acquired
catholicism. Therefore the new convert feels himself constrained to defend
the faith he has adopted in a more or less fanatical way. It is exactly the
same in the case of the paranoiac, who feels himself constantly constrained
to defend himself against all external criticism, because his delusional
system is too much threatened from within.

The strange manner in which these compensating influences break through
into the conscious mind derives its peculiarities from the fact that they have
to struggle against the resistances already existing in the conscious mind,
and therefore present themselves to the patient's mind in a thoroughly
distorted manner. And secondly, these compensating equivalents are
obliged necessarily to present themselves in the language of the
unconscious—that is, in material of a heterogeneous and subliminal nature.
For all the material of the conscious mind which is of no further value, and
can find no suitable employment, becomes subliminal, such as all those
forgotten infantile and phantastic creations that have ever entered the heads
of men, of which only the legends and myths still remain. For certain
reasons which I cannot discuss further here, this latter material is frequently
found in dementia præcox.
I hope I may have been able to give in this brief contribution, which I feel
to be unfortunately incomplete, a glimpse of the situation as it presents
itself to me of the importance of the unconscious in psychopathology. It
would be impossible in a short discourse to give an adequate idea of all the
work that has already been done in this field.
To sum up, I may say that the function of the unconscious in conditions of
mental disturbance is essentially a compensation of the content of the
conscious mind. But because of the characteristic condition of onesidedness of the conscious striving in all such cases, the compensating
correctives are rendered useless. It is, however, inevitable that these
unconscious tendencies break through into the conscious mind, but in
adapting themselves to the character of the one-sided conscious aims, it is
only possible for them to appear in a distorted and unacceptable form.

CHAPTER XI
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES[183]
It is well known that in their general physiognomy hysteria and dementia
præcox present a striking contrast, which is seen particularly in the attitude
of the sufferers towards the external world. The reactions provoked in the
hysteric surpass the normal level of intensity of feeling, whilst this level is
not reached at all by the precocious dement. The picture presented by these
contrasted illnesses is one of exaggerated emotivity in the one, and extreme
apathy in the other, with regard to the environment. In their personal
relations this difference is very marked. Abstraction creates some
exceptions here, for we remain in affective rapport with our hysterical
patients, which is not the case in dementia præcox.
The opposition between these two nosological types is also seen in the rest
of their symptomatology. From the intellectual point of view the products of
hysterical imagination may be accounted for in a very natural and human
way in each individual case by the antecedents and individual history of the
patient; while the inventions of the precocious dement, on the contrary, are
more nearly related to dreams than to normal consciousness, and they
display moreover an incontestably archaic tendency, wherein mythological
creations of primitive imagination are more in evidence than the personal
memories of the patient. From the physical point of view we do not find in
dementia præcox those symptoms so common in the hysteric, which
simulate well known or severe organic affections.
All this clearly indicates that hysteria is characterised by a centrifugal
tendency of the libido,[184] whilst in dementia præcox its tendency is
centripetal. The reverse occurs, however, where the illness has fully
established its compensatory effects. In the hysteric the libido is always
hampered in its movements of expansion and forced to regress upon itself;
one observes that such individuals cease to partake in the common life, are

wrapped up in their phantasies, keep their beds, or are unable to live outside
their sick-rooms, etc. The precocious dement, on the contrary, during the
incubation of his illness turns away from the outer world in order to
withdraw into himself; but when the period of morbid compensation
arrives, he seems constrained to draw attention to himself, and to force
himself upon the notice of those around him, by his extravagant,
insupportable, or directly aggressive conduct.
I propose to use the terms "extroversion" and "introversion" to describe
these two opposite directions of the libido, further qualifying them,
however, as "regressive" in morbid cases where phantasies, fictions, or
phantastic interpretations, inspired by emotivity, falsify the perceptions of
the subject about things, or about himself. We say that he is extroverted
when he gives his fundamental interest to the outer or objective world, and
attributes an all-important and essential value to it: he is introverted, on the
contrary, when the objective world suffers a sort of depreciation, or want of
consideration, for the sake of the exaltation of the individual himself, who
then monopolising all the interest, grows to believe no one but himself
worthy of consideration. I will call "regressive extroversion" the
phenomenon which Freud calls "transference" (Übertragung), by which the
hysteric projects into the objective world the illusions, or subjective values
of his feelings. In the same way I shall call "regressive introversion," the
opposite pathological phenomenon which we find in dementia præcox,
where the subject himself suffers these phantastical transfigurations.
It is obvious that these two contrary movements of the libido, as simple
psychic mechanisms, may play a part alternately in the same individual,
since after all they serve the same purpose by different methods—namely,
to minister to his well-being. Freud has taught us that in the mechanism of
hysterical transference the individual aims at getting rid of disagreeable
memories or impressions, in order to free himself from painful complexes,
by a process of "repression." Conversely in the mechanism of introversion,
the personality tends to concentrate itself upon its complexes, and with
them, to isolate itself from external reality, by a process which is not
properly speaking "repression," but which would be better rendered perhaps
by the term "depreciation" (Entwertung) of the objective world.
The existence of two mental affections so opposite in character as hysteria
and dementia præcox, in which the contrast rests on the almost exclusive

supremacy of extroversion or introversion, suggests that these two
psychological types may exist equally well in normal persons, who may be
characterised by the relative predominance of one or other of the two
mechanisms. Psychiatrists know very well that before either illness is fully
declared, patients already present the characteristic type, traces of which are
to be found from the earliest years of life. As Binet pointed out so well, the
neurotic only accentuates and shews in relief the characteristic traits of his
personality. One knows, of course, that the hysterical character is not
simply the product of the illness, but pre-existed it in a measure. And Hoch
has shown by his researches into the histories of his dementia præcox
patients, that this is also the case with them; dissociations or eccentricities
were present before the onset of the illness. If this is so, one may certainly
expect to meet the same contrast between psychological temperaments
outside the sphere of pathology. It is moreover easy to cull from literature
numerous examples which bear witness to the actual existence of these two
opposite types of mentality. Without pretending to exhaust the subject, I
will give a few striking examples.
In my opinion, we owe the best observations on this subject to the
philosophy of William James.[185] He lays down the principle that no matter
what may be the temperament of a "professional philosopher," it is this
temperament which he feels himself forced to express and to justify in his
philosophy. And starting from this idea, which is altogether in accord with
the spirit of psychoanalysis, divides philosophers into two classes: the
"tender-minded," who are only interested in the inner life and spiritual
things; and the "tough-minded," who lay most stress on material things and
objective reality. We see that these two classes are actuated by exactly
opposite tendencies of the libido: the "tender-minded" represent
introversion, the "tough-minded" extroversion.
James says that the tender-minded are characterised by rationalism; they are
men of principles and of systems, they aspire to dominate experience and to
transcend it by abstract reasoning, by their logical deductions, and purely
rational conceptions. They care little for facts, and the multiplicity of
phenomena hardly embarrasses them at all: they forcibly fit data into their
ideal constructions, and reduce everything to their a priori premises. This
was the method of Hegel in settling beforehand the number of the planets.
In the domain of mental pathology we again meet this kind of philosopher

in paranoiacs, who, without being disquieted by the flat contradictions
presented by experience, impose their delirious conceptions on the universe,
and find means of interpreting everything, and according to Adler
"arranging" everything, in conformity with their morbidly preconceived
system.
The other traits which James depicts in this type follow naturally from its
fundamental character. The tender-minded man, he says, is intellectual,
idealist, optimist, religious, partisan of free-will, a monist, and a dogmatist.
All these qualities betray the almost exclusive concentration of the libido
upon the intellectual life. This concentration upon the inner world of
thought is nothing else than introversion. In so far as experience plays a
rôle with these philosophers, it serves only as an allurement or fillip to
abstraction, in response to the imperative need to fit forcibly all the chaos of
the universe within well-defined limits, which are, in the last resort, the
creation of a spirit obedient to its subjective values.
The tough-minded man is positivist and empiricist. He regards only matters
of fact. Experience is his master, his exclusive guide and inspiration. It is
only empirical phenomena demonstrable in the outside world which count.
Thought is merely a reaction to external experience. In the eyes of these
philosophers principles are never of such value as facts; they can only
reflect and describe the sequence of phenomena and cannot construct a
system. Thus their theories are exposed to contradiction under the
overwhelming accumulation of empirical material. Psychic reality for the
positivist limits itself to the observation and experience of pleasure and
pain; he does not go beyond that, nor does he recognise the rights of
philosophical thought. Remaining on the ever-changing surface of the
phenomenal world, he partakes himself of its instability; carried away in the
chaotic tumult of the universe, he sees all its aspects, all its theoretical and
practical possibilities, but he never arrives at the unity or the fixity of a
settled system, which alone could satisfy the idealist or tender-minded. The
positivist depreciates all values in reducing them to elements lower than
themselves; he explains the higher by the lower, and dethrones it, by
showing that it is "nothing but such another thing," which has no value in
itself.
From these general characteristics, the others which James points out
logically follow. The positivist is a sensualist, giving greater value to the

specific realm of the senses than to reflection which transcends it. He is a
materialist and a pessimist, for he knows only too well the hopeless
uncertainty of the course of things. He is irreligious, not being in a state to
hold firmly to the realities of the inner world as opposed to the pressure of
external facts; he is a determinist and fatalist, only able to show resignation;
a pluralist, incapable of all synthesis; and finally a sceptic, as a last and
inevitable consequence of all the rest.
The expressions, therefore, used by James, show clearly that the diversity of
types is the result of a different localisation of the libido; this libido is the
magic power in the depth of our being, which, following the personality,
carries it sometimes towards internal life, and sometimes towards the
objective world. James compares, for example, the religious subjectivism of
the idealist, and the quasi-religious attitude of the contemporary empiricist:
"Our esteem for facts has not neutralised in us all religiousness. It is itself
almost religious. Our scientific temper is devout."[186]
A second parallel is furnished by Wilhelm Ostwald,[187] who divides
"savants" and men of genius into classics and romantics. The latter are
distinguished by their rapid reactions, their extremely prompt and abundant
production of ideas and projects, some of which are badly digested and of
doubtful value. They are admirable and brilliant masters, loving to teach, of
a contagious ardour and enthusiasm, which attracts many pupils, and makes
them founders of schools, exercising great personal influence. Herein our
type of extroversion is easily recognised. The classics of Ostwald are, on
the contrary, slow to react; they produce with much difficulty, are little
capable of teaching or of exercising direct personal influence, and lacking
enthusiasm are paralysed by their own severe criticism, living apart and
absorbed in themselves, making scarcely any disciples, but producing
works of finished perfection which often bring them posthumous fame. All
these characteristics correspond to introversion.
We find a further very valuable example in the æsthetic theory of Warringer.
Borrowing from A. Riegl his expression "Volonté d'art absolue" to express
the internal force which inspires the artist, he distinguishes two forms, viz.
sympathy (Einfühlung) and abstraction; and the term which he employs
indicates that here, too, we witness the activity of the push of the libido, the
stirring of the élan vital. "In the same way," says Warringer, "as the

sympathetic impulse finds its satisfaction in organic beauty, so abstract
impulse discovers beauty in the inorganic, which is the negation of all life,
in crystallised forms, and in a general manner wherever the severity of
abstract law reigns." Whilst sympathy represents the warmth of passion
which carries it into the presence of the object in order to assimilate it and
penetrate it with emotional values; abstraction, on the other hand, despoils
the object of all that could recall life, and grasps it by purely intellectual
thought, crystallised and fixed into the rigid forms of law,—the universal,
the typical. Bergson also makes use of these images of crystallisation,
solidification, etc., to illustrate the essence of intellectual abstraction.
Warringer's "abstraction" represents the process which I have already
remarked as a consequence of introversion, namely, the exaltation of the
intellect, in the place of the depreciated reality of the external world.
"Sympathy" corresponds in fact to extroversion, for, as Lipps has pointed
out, "What I perceive sympathetically in an object is, in a general manner
life, and life is power, internal work, effort, and execution. To live, in a
word, is to act, and to act is to experience intimately the force which we
give out; experience creates activity, which is essentially of a spontaneous
character." "Æsthetic enjoyment," said Warringer, "is the enjoyment of one's
own self projected into the "object," a formula which corresponds
absolutely with our definition of transference. This æsthetic conception
does not refer to the positivist in James's sense; it is rather the attitude of the
idealist for whom psychological reality only is interesting, and worthy of
consideration." Warringer adds, "what is essential lies not in the gradation
of the feeling, but pre-eminently in the feeling itself; that is to say, the inner
movement, the intimate life, the unfolding of the subject's own activity; the
value of a line or of a form, depends in our eyes on the biological value it
holds for us; that which gives beauty is solely our own vital feeling, which
we unconsciously project into it." This view corresponds exactly with my
own way of understanding the theory of the libido, in attempting to keep the
true balance between the two psychological opposites of introversion and
extroversion.
The polar opposite of sympathy is abstraction. The impulse of abstraction is
conceived by Warringer "as the result of a great internal conflict of the
human soul in the presence of the external world, and from the religious
standpoint, it corresponds to a strong transcendental colouring of all the

representations man has made to himself of reality." We recognise clearly in
this definition the primordial tendency to introversion. To the introverted
type the universe does not appear beautiful and desirable, but disquieting,
and even dangerous; it is a manifestation against which the subject puts
himself on the defensive; he entrenches himself in his inner fastness, and
fortifies himself therein by the invention of geometrical figures, full of
repose, perfectly clear even in their minutest details, the primitive magic
power of which assures him of domination over the surrounding world.
"The need of abstraction is the origin of all art," says Warringer. Here is a
great principle, which gains weighty confirmation from the fact that
precocious dements reproduce forms and figures which present the closest
analogy to those of primitive humanity, not only in their thoughts but also
in their drawings.
We should recall that Schiller had already tried to formulate the same
presentation in what he calls the naïve and sentimental types. The latter is in
quest of nature, whilst the former is itself "all nature." Schiller also saw that
these two types result from the predominance of psychological mechanisms
which might be met with in one and the same individual. "It is not only in
the same poet," he said, "but even in the same work that these two types of
mentality are found united.... The naïve poet pursues only nature and
feeling in their simplicity, and all his effort is limited to the imitation and
reproduction of reality. The sentimental poet, on the contrary, reflects the
impression he receives from objects. The object here is allied to an idea,
and the poetic power of the work depends on this alliance." These
quotations shew what types Schiller had in view, and one recognises their
fundamental identity with those with which we are here dealing.
We find another instance in Nietzsche's contrast between the minds of
Apollo and of Dionysus. The example which Nietzsche uses to illustrate
this contrast is instructive—namely, that between a dream and intoxication.
In a dream the individual is shut up in himself, in intoxication, on the
contrary, he forgets himself to the highest degree, and, set free from his selfconsciousness, plunges into the multiplicity of the objective world. To
depict Apollo, Nietzsche borrows the words of Schopenhauer, "As upon a
tumultuous sea, which disgorges and swallows by turns, lost to view in the
mountains of foaming waves, the mariner remains seated tranquilly on his
plank, full of confidence in his frail barque; so individual man, in a world of

troubles, lives passive and serene, relying with confidence on the principle
of 'individuation.'" "Yes," continues Nietzsche, "we might say that the
unshakeable confidence in this principle, and the calm security of those
whom it has inspired, have found in Apollo their most sublime expression,
and we may always recognise in him the most splendid and divine
personification of the principle of making an individual." The Apollien
state, as Nietzsche conceives it, is consequently the withdrawal into oneself,
that is, introversion. Conversely in the Dionysian state, psychic
intoxication, indicates in his view the unloosening of a torrent of libido
which expends itself upon things. "This is not only," says Nietzsche, "the
alliance of man with man, which finds itself confirmed afresh under the
Dionysian enchantment; it is alienated Nature, hostile or enslaved, which
also celebrates her reconciliation with her prodigal child,—man.
Spontaneously Earth offers her gifts and the wild beasts from rock and
desert draw near peacefully. The car of Dionysus is lost under flowers and
garlands; panthers and tigers approach under his yoke."
If we change Beethoven's "Hymn of Praise" into a picture, and giving rein
to our imagination, contemplate the millions of beings prostrated and
trembling in the dust, at such a moment the Dionysian intoxication will be
near at hand. Then is the slave free; then all the rigid and hostile barriers
which poverty and arbitrary or insolent custom have established between
man and man are broken down. Now, by means of this gospel of universal
harmony, each feels himself not only reunited, reconciled, fused with his
neighbour, but actually identified with him, as if the veil of "Maïa was torn
away, nothing remaining of it but a few shreds floating before the mystery
of the Primordial Unity."[188] It would be superfluous to add comment to
these quotations.
In concluding this series of examples culled outside my own special
domain, I will quote the linguistic hypothesis of Finck,[189] where we also
see the duality in question. The structure of language, according to Finck,
presents two principal types: in one the subject is generally conceived as
active: "I see him," "I strike him down;" in the other the subject experiences
and feels, and it is the object which acts: "He appears to me," "He succumbs
to me." The first type clearly shews the libido as going out of the subject,—
this is a centrifugal movement; the second as coming out of the object,—

this movement is centripetal. We meet with this latter introverted type
especially in the primitive languages of the Esquimaux.
In the domain of psychiatry also these two types have been described by
Otto Gross,[190] who distinguishes two forms of mental debility: the one a
diffuse and shallow consciousness, the other a concentrated and deep
consciousness. The first is characterised by weakness of the consecutive
function, the second by its excessive reinforcement. Gross has recognised
that the consecutive function is in intimate relation with affectivity, from
which we might infer that he is dealing once more with our two
psychological types. The relation he establishes between maniac depressive
insanity and the state of diffuse or extended and shallow mental disease
shows that the latter represents the extroverted type; and the relation
between the psychology of the paranoiac and repressed mentality, indicates
the identity of the former with the introverted type.
After the foregoing considerations no one will be astonished to find that in
the domain of psychoanalysis we also have to reckon with the existence of
these two psychological types.
On the one side we meet with a theory which is essentially reductive,
pluralist, causal and sensualist; this is Freud's standpoint. This theory limits
itself rigidly to empirical facts, and traces back complexes to their
antecedents and their elemental factors. It regards the psychological life as
being only an effect, a reaction to the environment, and accords the greatest
rôle and the largest place to sensation. On the other side we have the
diametrically opposed theory of Adler[191] which is an entirely
philosophical and finalistic one. In it phenomena are not reducible to earlier
and very primitive factors, but are conceived as "arrangements," the
outcome of intentions and of ends of an extremely complex nature. It is no
longer the view of causality but of finality which dominates researches: the
history of the patient and the concrete influences of the environment are of
much less importance than the dominating principles, the "fictions
directrices," of the individual. It is not essential for him to depend upon the
object, and to find in it his fill of subjective enjoyment, but to protect his
own individuality and to guarantee it against the hostile influences of the
environment.

Whilst Freud's psychology has for its predominant note the centrifugal
tendency, which demands its happiness and satisfaction in the objective
world, in that of Adler the chief rôle belongs to the centripetal movement,
which tends to the supremacy of the subject, to his triumph and his liberty,
as opposed to the overwhelming forces of existence. The expedient to
which the type described by Freud has recourse is "infantile transference,"
by means of which he projects phantasy into the object and finds a
compensation for the difficulties of life in this transfiguration. In the type
described by Adler what is characteristic is, on the contrary, the "virile
protest," personal resistance, the efficacious safeguard which the individual
provides for himself, in affirming and stubbornly enclosing himself in his
dominating ideas.
The difficult task of elaborating a psychology which should pay equal
attention to the two types of mentality belongs to the future.

CHAPTER XII
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DREAMS[192]
A dream is a psychic structure which at first sight appears to be in striking
contrast with conscious thought, because judging by its form and substance
it apparently does not lie within the continuity of development of the
conscious contents, it is not integral to it, but is a mere external and
apparently accidental occurrence. Its mode of genesis is in itself sufficient
to isolate a dream from the other contents of the conscious, for it is a
survival of a peculiar psychic activity which takes place during sleep, and
does not originate in the manifest and clearly logical and emotional
continuity of the event experienced.
But a careful observer should have no difficulty in discovering that a dream
is not entirely severed from the continuity of the conscious, for in almost
every dream certain details are found which have their origin in the
impressions, thoughts, or states of mind of one of the preceding days. In so
far a certain continuity does exist, albeit a retrograde one. But any one
keenly interested in the dream problem cannot have failed to observe that a
dream has also a progressive continuity—if such an expression be permitted
—since dreams occasionally exert a remarkable influence upon the
conscious mental life, even of persons who cannot be considered
superstitious or particularly abnormal. These occasional after-effects are
usually seen in a more or less distinct change in the dreamer's frame of
mind.
It is probably in consequence of this loose connection with the other
conscious contents, that the recollected dream is so extremely unstable.
Many dreams baffle all attempts at reproduction, even immediately after
waking; others can only be remembered with doubtful accuracy, and
comparatively few can be termed really distinct and clearly reproduceable.
This peculiar reaction with regard to recollection may be understood by
considering the characteristics of the various elements combined in a
dream. The combination of ideas in dreams is essentially phantastic; they

are linked together in a sequence which, as a rule, is quite foreign to our
current way of thinking, and in striking contrast to the logical sequence of
ideas which we consider to be a special characteristic of conscious mental
processes.
It is to this characteristic that dreams owe the common epithet of
"meaningless." Before pronouncing this verdict, we must reflect that
dreams and their chains of ideas are something that we do not understand.
Such a verdict would therefore be merely a projection of our noncomprehension upon its object. But that would not prevent its own peculiar
meaning being inherent in a dream.
In spite of the fact that for centuries endeavours have been made to extract a
prophetic meaning from dreams, Freud's discovery is practically the first
successful attempt to find their real significance. His work merits the term
"scientific," because he has evolved a technique which, not only he, but
many other investigators also assert achieves its object, namely, the
understanding of the meaning of the dream. This meaning is not identical
with the one which the manifest dream content seems to indicate.
This is not the place for a critical discussion of Freud's psychology of
dreams. But I will try to give a brief summary of what may be regarded as
more or less established facts of dream psychology to-day.
The first question we must discuss is, whence do we deduce the justification
for attributing to dreams any other significance than the one indicated in the
unsatisfying fragmentary meaning of the manifest dream content?
As regards this point a particularly weighty argument is the fact that Freud
discovered the hidden meaning of dreams by empiric and not deductive
methods. A further argument in favour of a possible hidden, as opposed to
the manifest meaning of dreams, is obtained by comparing dreamphantasies with other phantasies (day-dreams and the like) in one and the
same individual. It is not difficult to conceive that such day-phantasies have
not merely a superficial, concrete meaning, but also a deeper psychological
meaning. It is solely on account of the brevity that I must impose upon
myself, that I do not submit materials in proof of this. But I should like to
point out that what may be said about the meaning of phantasies, is well
illustrated by an old and widely diffused type of imaginative story, of which

Æsop's Fables are typical examples, wherein, for instance, the story is some
objectively impossible phantasy about the deeds of a lion and an ass. The
concrete superficial meaning of the fable is an impossible phantasm, but the
hidden moral meaning is plain upon reflection. It is characteristic that
children are pleased and satisfied with the exoteric meaning of the story.
However, the best argument for the existence of a hidden meaning in
dreams is provided by conscientious application of the technical procedure
to solve the manifest dream content.
This brings us to our second main point, viz.—the question of analytic
procedure. Here again I desire neither to defend nor to criticise Freud's
views and discoveries, but rather to confine myself to what seem to me to
be firmly established facts.
The fact that a dream is a psychic structure, does not give us the slightest
ground for assuming that it obeys laws and designs other than those
applicable to any other psychic structure. According to the maxim:
principia explicandi prœter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda, we have
to treat dreams, in analysis, just as any other psychic structure, until
experience teaches us some better way.
We know that every psychic construction considered from the standpoint of
causality, is the resultant of previous psychic contents. Moreover, we know
also that every psychic structure, considered from the standpoint of finality,
has its own peculiar meaning and purpose in the actual psychic process.
This standard must also be applied to dreams. When, therefore, we seek a
psychological explanation of a dream, we must first know what were the
preceding experiences out of which it is combined. We must trace the
antecedents of every element in the dream picture. For example: some one
dreams "that he is walking in a street, a child is running in front of him,
who is suddenly run over by a motor-car." We will trace the antecedents of
this dream-picture, with the aid of the dreamer's recollections.
He recognises the street as one down which he had walked on the previous
day. The child he acknowledges as his brother's child, whom he had seen on
the previous evening when visiting his brother. The motor accident reminds
him of an accident that had actually occurred a few days before, but of
which he had only read an account in a newspaper. Popular opinion is

known to be satisfied with this kind of explanation. People say: "Oh, that is
why I dreamt such and such a thing!"
Obviously this explanation is absolutely unsatisfactory from a scientific
standpoint. The dreamer walked down many streets on the previous day;
why was this particular one selected? He had read about several accidents;
why did he select just this one? The mere disclosure of an antecedent is by
no means sufficient; for a plausible determination of the dream presentation
can only be obtained from the competition of various determinants. The
collection of additional material proceeds, according to the principle of
recollection that has been called the Association Method. The result, as will
easily be understood, is the admission of a mass of multifarious and quite
heterogeneous material, having apparently nothing in common but the fact
of its evident associative connection with the dream contents, since it has
been reproduced by means of this content.
How far the collection of such material should go, is an important question
from the technical point of view. Since the entire psychic content of a life
may be ultimately disclosed from any single starting point, theoretically the
whole previous life-experience might be found in every dream. But we only
need to assemble just so much material as is absolutely necessary in order
to comprehend the dream's meaning. The limitation of the material is
obviously an arbitrary proceeding, according to that principle of Kant's
whereby to comprehend is "to perceive to the extent necessary for our
purpose." For instance, when undertaking a survey of the causes of the
French Revolution, we could, in amassing our material, include not only the
history of medieval France but also that of Rome and Greece, which
certainly would not be "necessary for our purpose," since we can
comprehend the historical genesis of the Revolution from much more
limited material.
Except for the aforesaid arbitrary limitation, the collecting of material lies
outside the investigator's discretion. The material gathered must now be
sifted and examined, according to principles which are always applied to
the examination of historical or any empirical scientific material. The
method is an essentially comparative one, that obviously cannot be applied
automatically, but is largely dependent upon the skill and aim of the
investigator.

When a psychological fact has to be explained, it must be remembered that
psychological data necessitate a twofold point of view, namely, that of
causality and that of finality. I use the word finality intentionally, in order to
avoid confusion with the idea of "teleology." I use finality to denote
immanent psychological teleology. In so far as we apply the view point of
causality to the material that has been associated with the dream, we reduce
the manifest dream content to certain fundamental tendencies or ideas.
These, as one would expect, are elementary and universal in character.
For instance, a young patient dreams as follows: "I am standing in a strange
garden, and pluck an apple from a tree. I look about cautiously, to make
sure no one sees me."
The associated dream material is a memory of having once, when a boy,
plucked a couple of pears surreptitiously from another person's garden.
The feeling of having a bad conscience, which is a prominent feature in the
dream, reminds him of a situation he experienced on the previous day. He
met a young lady in the street—a casual acquaintance—and exchanged a
few words with her. At that moment a gentleman passed whom he knew,
whereupon our patient was suddenly seized with a curious feeling of
embarrassment, as if he had done something wrong. He associated the apple
with the scene in Paradise, together with the fact that he had never really
understood why the eating of the forbidden fruit should have been fraught
with such dire consequences for our first parents. This had always made
him feel angry; it seemed to him an unjust act of God, for God had made
men as they were, with all their curiosity and greed.
Another association was, that sometimes his father had punished him for
certain things in a way that seemed to him incomprehensible. The worst
punishment had been bestowed after he had secretly watched girls bathing.
That led up to the confession that he had recently begun a love affair with a
housemaid, but had not yet carried it through to a conclusion. On the day
before the dream he had had a rendezvous with her.
Upon reviewing this material we see that the dream contains a very
transparent reference to the last-named incident. The connecting associative
material shows that the apple episode is palpably meant for an erotic scene.
For various other reasons, too, it may be considered extremely probable that

this experience of the previous day is operative even in this dream. In the
dream the young man plucks the apple of Paradise, which in reality he has
not yet plucked. The remainder of the material associated with the dream is
concerned with another experience of the previous day, namely, with the
peculiar feeling of a bad conscience, which seized the dreamer when he was
talking to his casual lady acquaintance; this, again, was connected with the
fall of man in Paradise, and finally with an erotic misdemeanour of his
childhood, for which his father had punished him severely. All these
associations are linked together by the idea of guilt.
In the first place we will consider this material from Freud's view-point of
causality; in other words, we will "interpret" it, to use Freud's expression. A
wish has been left unfulfilled from the day before the dream. In the dream
this wish is realised in the symbolical apple scene. But why is this
realisation disguised and hidden under a symbolic image instead of being
expressed in a distinctly sexual thought? Freud would refer to the
unmistakable sense of guilt shown up by the material, and say the morality
that has been inculcated in the young man from childhood is bent on
repressing such wishes, and to that end brands the natural craving as
immoral and reprehensible. The suppressed immoral thought can therefore
only achieve expression by means of a symbol. As these thoughts are
incompatible with the moral content of the conscious ego, a psychic factor
adopted by Freud called the Censor, prevents this wish from passing
undisguised into consciousness.
Reviewing the dream from the standpoint of finality, which I contrast with
that of Freud, does not—as I wish to establish explicitly—involve a denial
of the dream's causæ, but rather a different interpretation of the associative
material collected around the dream. The material facts remain the same,
but the standard by which they are measured is altered. The question may
be formulated simply as follows: What is this dream's purpose? What
should it effect? These questions are not arbitrary, in as much as they may
be applied to every psychic activity. Everywhere the question of the "why"
and "wherefore" may be raised.
It is clear that the material added by the dream to the previous day's erotic
experience, chiefly emphasises the sense of guilt in the erotic act. The same
association has already been shown to be operative in another experience of
the previous day, in the meeting with his casual lady acquaintance, when

the feeling of a bad conscience was automatically and inexplicably aroused,
as if, in that instance, too, the young man had done something wrong. This
experience also plays a part in the dream, which is even intensified by the
association of additional, appropriate material; the erotic experience of the
day before, being depicted by the story of the Fall which was followed by
such a severe punishment.
I maintain that there exists in the dreamer an unconscious propensity or
tendency to conceive his erotic experiences as guilty. It is most
characteristic that the association with the Fall of Man should ensue, the
young man having never really grasped why the punishment should have
been so drastic. This association throws light upon the reasons why the
dreamer did not think simply, "I am doing what is not right." Obviously he
does not know that he might condemn his own conduct as morally wrong.
This is actually the case. His conscious belief is that his conduct does not
matter in the least morally, as all his friends were acting in the same way;
besides, for other reasons too, is unable to understand why a fuss should be
made about it.
Whether this dream should be considered full or void of meaning depends
upon a very important question, viz. whether the standpoint of morality,
handed down to us through the ages by our forefathers is held to be full or
void of meaning. I do not wish to wander off into a philosophical discussion
of this question, but would merely observe that mankind must obviously
have had very strong reasons for devising this morality, otherwise it would
be truly incomprehensible why such restraints should be imposed upon one
of man's strongest cravings. If we attach due value to this fact, we are
bound to pronounce this dream to be full of meaning, for it reveals to the
young man the necessity of facing his erotic conduct boldly from the view
point of morality. Primitive races have in some respects extremely strict
legislation concerning sexuality. This fact proves that sexual morality is a
not-to-be-neglected factor in the soul's higher functions, but deserves to be
taken fully into account. In the case in question it should be added, that the
young man—influenced by his friends' example—somewhat thoughtlessly
let himself be guided exclusively by his erotic cravings, unmindful of the
fact that man is a morally responsible being and must perforce submit—
voluntarily or involuntarily—to a morality that he himself has created.

In this dream we can discern a compensating function of the unconscious,
consisting in the fact that those thoughts, propensities, and tendencies of a
human personality, which in conscious life are too seldom recognised, come
spontaneously into action in the sleeping state, when to a large extent the
conscious process is disconnected.
The question might certainly be raised, of what use is this to the dreamer if
he does not understand the dream?
To this I must remark that to understand is not an exclusively intellectual
process, for—as experience proves—man may be influenced—nay, even
very effectually convinced—by innumerable things, of which he has no
intellectual understanding. I will merely remind my readers of the efficacy
of religious symbols.
The example given above might suggest the thought that the function of
dreams is a distinctly "moral" one. Such it appears to be in this case, but if
we recall the formula according to which dreams contain the subliminal
materials of a given moment, we cannot speak simply of a "moral" function.
For it is worthy of note that the dreams of those persons whose actions are
morally unexceptionable, bring materials to light that might well be
characterised as "immoral" in the current meaning of that term. Thus it is
significant that St. Augustine was glad that God did not hold him
responsible for his dreams. The unconscious is the unknown of a given
moment, therefore it is not surprising that all those aspects that are essential
for a totally different point of view should be added by dreams to the
conscious psychological factors of a given moment. It is evident that this
function of dreams signifies a psychological adjustment, a compensation
essential for properly balanced action. In the conscious process of reflection
it is indispensable that, so far as possible, we should realise all the aspects
and consequences of a problem, in order to find the right solution. This
process is continued automatically in the more or less unconscious state of
sleep, wherever—as our previous experience seems to show—all those
other points of view occur to the dreamer (at least by way of allusion) that
during the day were underestimated or even totally ignored; in other words,
were comparatively unconscious.
As regards the much-discussed symbolism of dreams, the value attached to
it varies according to whether the standpoint of causality or of finality is

adopted. According to Freud's causal view point it proceeds from a craving,
viz. from the suppressed dream-wish. This craving is always somewhat
simple and primitive, and is able to disguise itself under manifold forms.
For instance, the young man in question might just as well have dreamt that
he had to open a door with a key, or that he had to travel by aeroplane, or
that he was kissing his mother, etc. From this standpoint all those things
would have had the same meaning. In this way, the typical adherents of
Freud's school have come to the point of interpreting—to give a gross
instance—almost all long objects in dreams as phallic symbols.
From the view-point of finality, the various dream pictures have each their
own peculiar value. For instance, if the young man, instead of dreaming of
the apple scene, had dreamt he had to open a door with a key, the altered
dream picture would have furnished associative material of an essentially
different character; that, again, would have resulted in the conscious
situation being supplemented by associations of a totally different kind from
those connected with the apple scene. From this point of view, it is the
diversity of the dream's mode of expression that is full of meaning, and not
the uniformity in its significance. The causal view-point tends by its very
nature towards uniformity of meaning, that is, towards a fixed significance
of symbols. On the other hand, the final view-point perceives in an altered
dream picture, the expression of an altered psychological situation. It
recognises no fixed meaning of symbols. From this standpoint all the dream
pictures are important in themselves, each one having a special significance
of its own, to which it owes its inclusion in the dream. Keeping to our
previous example, we see that from the standpoint of finality the symbol in
this dream is approximately equivalent to a parable; it does not conceal, but
it teaches. The apple scene recalls vividly the sense of guilt, at the same
time disguising the real deed of our first parents.
It is obvious we reach very dissimilar interpretations of the meaning of the
dream, according to the point of view adopted. The question now arises,
which is the better or truer version? After all, for us therapeuts it is a
practical and not a merely theoretical necessity that leads us to seek for
some comprehension of the meaning of dreams. In treating our patients we
must for practical reasons endeavour to lay hold of any means that will
enable us to train them effectually. It should be quite evident from the
foregoing example, that the material associated with the dream has opened

up a question calculated to make many matters clear to the young man,
which, hitherto, he has heedlessly overlooked. But by disregarding these
things he was really overlooking something in himself, for he possesses a
moral standard and a moral need just like any other man. By trying to live
without taking this fact into consideration, his life is one-sided and
incomplete, so to say inco-ordinate; with the same consequences for the
psychological life as a one-sided and incomplete diet would have for the
physical. In order to develop a person's individuality and independence to
the uttermost, we need to bring to fruition all those functions that have
hitherto attained but little conscious development or none at all. In order to
achieve this aim, we must for therapeutic reasons enter into all those
unconscious aspects of things brought forward by the dream material. This
makes it abundantly clear that the view-point of finality is singularly
important as an aid to the practical development of the individual.
The view-point of causality is obviously more in accord with the scientific
spirit of our time, with its strictly causalistic reasoning. Much may be said
for Freud's view as a scientific explanation of dream psychology. But I must
dispute its completeness, for the psyche cannot be conceived merely from
the causal aspect, but necessitates also a final view-point. Only a
combination of both points of view—which has not yet been attained to the
satisfaction of the scientific mind, owing to great difficulties both of a
practical and theoretical nature—can give us a more complete conception of
the essence of dreams.
I would like to treat briefly of some further problems of dream psychology,
that border on the general discussion of dreams. Firstly, as to the
classification of dreams; I do not wish to overestimate either the practical or
theoretical significance of this question. I investigate yearly some 15002000 dreams, and this experience enables me to state that typical dreams
actually do exist. But they are not very frequent, and from the view-point of
finality they lose much of the importance which attaches to them as a result
of the fixed significance of symbols according to the causal view-point. It
seems to me that the typical themes of dreams are of far greater importance,
for they permit of a comparison with the themes of mythology. Many of
these mythological themes—in the study of which Frobenius has rendered
notable service—are also found in dreams, often with precisely the same

significance. Unfortunately the limited time at my disposal, does not permit
me to lay detailed materials before you: this has been done elsewhere.[193]
But I desire to emphasise the fact that the comparison of the typical themes
of dreams with those of mythology obviously suggests the idea (already put
forward by Nietzsche) that from a phylogenetic point of view dreamthought should be conceived as an older form of thought. Instead of
multiplying examples in explanation of my meaning, I will briefly refer you
to our specimen dream. As you remember, that dream introduced the apple
scene as a typical representation of erotic guilt. The gist of its purport is: "I
am doing wrong in acting like this." But it is characteristic that a dream
never expresses itself in a logically abstract way, but always in the language
of parable or simile. This peculiarity is also a characteristic feature of
primitive languages, whose flowery idioms always strike us. If you call to
mind the writings of ancient literature—e.g. the language of simile in the
Bible—you will find that what nowadays is expressed by means of abstract
expressions, could then only be expressed by means of simile. Even such a
philosopher as Plato did not disdain to express certain fundamental ideas by
means of concrete simile.
Just as the body bears traces of its phylogenetic development, so also does
the human mind. There is therefore nothing surprising in the possibility of
the allegories of our dreams being a survival of archaic modes of thought.
The theft of the apple in our example is a typical theme of dreams, often
recurring with various modifications. It is also a well-known theme in
mythology, and is found not only in the story of the Garden of Eden, but in
numerous myths and fables of all ages and climes. It is one of those
universally human symbols, which can reappear in any one, at any time.
Thus, dream psychology opens up a way to a general comparative
psychology, from which we hope to attain the same sort of understanding of
the development and structure of the human soul, as comparative anatomy
has given us concerning the human body.

CHAPTER XIII
THE CONTENT OF THE PSYCHOSES[194]
INTRODUCTION
My short sketch on the Content of the Psychoses which first appeared in the
series of "Schriften zur Angewandten Seelenkunde" under Freud's
editorship was designed to give the non-professional but interested public
some insight into the psychological point of view of recent psychiatry. I
chose by way of example a case of the mental disorder known as Dementia
Præcox, which Bleuler calls Schizophrenia. Statistically this extensive
group contains by far the largest number of cases of psychosis. Many
psychiatrists would prefer to limit it, and accordingly make use of other
nomenclature and classification. From the psychological standpoint the
change of name is unimportant, for it is of less value to know what a thing
is called than to know what it is. The cases of mental disorder sketched in
this essay belong to well-known and frequently occurring types, familiar to
the alienist. The facts will not be altered if these disorders are called by
some other name than dementia præcox.
I have presented my view of the psychological basis in a work[195] whose
scientific validity has been contested upon all sorts of grounds. For me it is
sufficient justification that a psychiatrist of Bleuler's standing has fully
accepted, in his great monograph on the disease, all the essential points in
my work. The difference between us is as to the question whether, in
relation to the anatomical basis, the psychological disorders should be
regarded as primary or secondary. The resolution of this weighty question
depends upon the general problem as to whether the prevailing dogma in
psychiatry—"disorders of the mind are disorders of the brain"—presents a
final truth or not. This dogma leads to absolute sterility as soon as universal
validity is ascribed to it. There are undoubted psychogenic mental diseases
(the so-called hysterical) which are properly regarded as functional in

contrast with organic diseases which rest upon demonstrable anatomical
changes. Disorders of the brain should only be called organic when the
psychic symptoms depend upon an undoubtedly primary disease of the
brain. Now in dementia præcox this is by no means a settled question.
Definite anatomical changes are present, but we are very far from being
able to relate the psychological symptoms to these changes. We have, at
least, positive information as to the functional nature of early schizophrenic
conditions; moreover the organic character of paranoia and many paranoid
forms is still in great uncertainty. This being so it is worth while to inquire
whether manifestations of degeneration could not also be provoked by
psychological disturbance of function. Such an idea is only
incomprehensible to those who smuggle materialistic preconceptions into
their scientific theories. This question does not even rest upon some
fundamental and arbitrary spiritualism, but upon the following simple
reflection. Instead of assuming that some hereditary disposition, or a
toxæmia, gives rise directly to organic processes of disease, I incline to the
view that upon the basis of predisposition, whose nature is at present
unknown to us, there arises a non-adaptable psychological function which
can proceed to develop into manifest mental disorder; this may secondarily
determine organic degeneration with its own train of symptoms. In favour
of this conception is the fact that we have no proof of the primary nature of
the organic disorder, but overwhelming proofs exist of a primary
psychological fault in function, whose history can be traced back to the
patient's childhood. In perfect agreement with this conception is the fact
that analytic practice has given us experience of cases where patients on the
borderline of dementia præcox have been brought back to normal life.
Even if anatomical lesions or organic symptoms were constantly present,
science ought not to imagine the psychological standpoint could advisedly
be neglected, or the undoubted psychological relationship be given up as
unimportant. If, for instance, carcinoma were to prove an infectious disease
the peculiar growth and degenerative process of carcinomatous cells would
still be a constant factor requiring investigation on its own account. But, as I
have said, the correlation between the anatomical findings and the
psychological picture of the disease is so loose that it is extremely desirable
to study the psychological side of it thoroughly.

PART I
Psychiatry is the stepchild of medicine. All the other branches of medicine
have one great advantage over it—the scientific methods can be applied;
there are things to be seen, and felt, physical and chemical methods of
investigation to be followed: the microscope shows the dreaded bacillus, the
surgeon's knife halts at no difficulty and gives us glimpses of most
inaccessible organs of vital importance. Psychiatry, which engages in the
exploration of the mind, stands ever at the door seeking in vain to weigh
and measure as in the other departments of science. We have long known
that we have to do with a definite organ, the brain; but only beyond the
brain, beyond the morphological basis do we reach what is important for us
—the mind; as indefinable as it ever was, still eluding any explanation, no
matter how ingenious. Former ages, endowing the mind with substance, and
personifying every incomprehensible occurrence in nature, regarded mental
disorder as the work of evil spirits; the patient was looked upon as one
possessed, and the methods of treatment were such as fitted this conception.
This mediæval conception occasionally gains credence and expression even
to-day. A classical example is the driving out of the devil which the elder
Pastor Blumhardt carried out successfully in the famous case of Gottlieb in
Deltus.[196] To the honour of the Middle Ages let it also be said that there
are to be found early evidences of a sound rationalism. In the sixteenth
century at the Julius Hospital in Würzburg mental patients were already
treated side by side with others physically ill, and the treatment seems to
have been really humane. With the opening of the modern era, and with the
dawn of the first scientific ideas, the original barbaric personification of the
unknown Great Power gradually disappeared. A change arose in the
conception of mental disease in favour of a more philosophic moral
attitude. The old view that every misfortune was the revenge of the
offended gods returned new-clothed to fit the times. Just as physical
diseases can, in many cases, be regarded as self-inflicted on account of
negligence, mental diseases were likewise considered to be due to some
moral injury, or sin. Behind this conception the angry godhead also stood.
Such views played a great rôle, right up to the beginning of last century,
especially in Germany. In France, however, about the same time a new idea
was appearing, destined to sway psychiatry for a hundred years. Pinel,
whose statue fittingly stands at the gateway of the Salpetrière in Paris, took

away the chains from the insane and thus freed them from the symbol of the
criminal. In a very real way he formulated for the world the humane and
scientific conception of modern times. A little later Esquirol and Bayle
discovered that certain forms of insanity ended in death, after a relatively
short time, and that certain constant changes in the brain could be
demonstrated post mortem. Esquirol had described as an entity general
paralysis of the insane, or as it was popularly called "softening of the
brain," a disease which is always bound up with chronic inflammatory
degeneration of the cerebral matter. Thus was laid the foundation of the
dogma which you will find repeated in every text-book of psychiatry, viz.
"diseases of the mind are diseases of the brain." Confirmation of this
conception was added about the same time by Gall's discoveries which
traced partial or complete loss of the power of speech—a psychical capacity
—to a lesion in the region of the left lower frontal convolution. Somewhat
later this view proved to be of general applicability. Innumerable cases of
extreme idiocy or other intense mental disorders were found to be caused
by tumours of the brain. Towards the end of the nineteenth century
Wernicke (recently deceased) localised the speech centre in the left
temporal lobe. This epoch-making discovery raised hopes to the highest
pitch. It was expected that at no distant day every characteristic and every
psychical activity would be assigned a place in the cortical grey matter.
Gradually, increased attempts were made to trace the primary mental
changes in the psychoses back to certain parallel changes in the brain.
Meynert, the famous Viennese psychiatrist, described a formal scheme in
which the alteration in blood-supply in certain regions was to play the chief
part in the origin of the psychoses. Wernicke made a similar but far more
ingenious attempt at a morphological explanation of psychical disorders.
The visible result of this tendency is seen in the fact that even the smallest
and least renowned asylum has, to-day, its anatomical laboratory where
cerebral sections are cut, stained, and microscoped. Our numerous
psychiatric journals are full of morphological contributions, investigations
into the structure and distribution of cells in the cortex, and other varying
source of disorders in the different mental diseases.
Psychiatry has come into fame as gross materialism. And quite rightly, for it
is on the road—or rather reached it long ago—to put the organ, the
instrument, above function. Function has become the dependent accessory
of its organs, the mind the dependent accessory of the brain. In modern

mental therapy the mind has been the loser, whilst great progress has been
made in cerebral anatomy; of the mind we know less than nothing. Current
psychiatry behaves like a man who thinks he can unriddle the meaning and
importance of a building by a mineralogical investigation of its stones. Let
us attempt to realise in which mental diseases obvious changes in the brain
are found, and what is their proportion.
In the last four years we have received 1325 patients at Burgholzi;[197] 331
a year. Of these 9 per cent. suffered from congenital psychic anomalies. By
this is understood a certain inborn defect of the psyche. Of these 9 per cent.,
about a quarter were imbeciles. Here we meet certain changes in the brain
such as microcephalus, hydrocephalus, malformations or absence of
portions of the brain. The remaining three-quarters of these congenital
defects present no typical changes in the brain.
Three per cent. of our patients suffer from epileptic mental troubles. In the
course of epilepsy there arises gradually a typical degeneration of the brain.
The degeneration is, however, only discoverable in severe cases and when
the disease has existed for some time. If the attacks have only existed for a
relatively short time, not more than a few years, the brain as a rule shows
nothing. Seventeen per cent. of our patients suffer from progressive
paralysis and senile dementia. Both diseases present characteristic changes
in the brain. In paralysis there is most extensive shrinkage of the brain, so
that the cortex is often reduced by one half. The frontal portions of the brain
more especially, may be reduced to a third of the normal weight. There is a
similar destruction of substance in senile decay.
Fourteen per cent. of the patients annually received are cases of poisoning,
at least 13 per cent. of these being due to alcohol. As a rule in slight cases
nothing is to be found in the brain; in only a relatively few severe cases is
there shrinkage of the cortex, generally of slight degree. The number of
these severe cases amounts to less than 1 per cent. of the yearly cases of
alcoholism.
Six per cent. of the patients suffer from so-called maniacal depressive
insanity which includes the maniacs and the melancholics. The essence of
this disease is readily intelligible to the public. Melancholia is a condition
of abnormal sadness without disorder of intelligence or memory. Mania is
the opposite, the rule being an abnormally excited state with great

restlessness; likewise without deep disturbance of intelligence and memory.
In this disease there are no demonstrable morphological changes in the
brain.
Forty-five per cent. of the patients suffer from the real and common mental
disease called dementia præcox. The name is a very unhappy one, for the
dementia is not always precocious, nor in all cases is there dementia.
Unfortunately the disease is too often incurable; even in the best cases, in
those that recover, where the outside public would not observe any
abnormality, there is always present some defect in the emotional life. The
picture presented by the disease is extraordinarily diverse; generally there is
some disorder of feeling, frequently delusions and hallucinations. As a rule
there is nothing to be found in the brain. Even in cases of a most severe
type, lasting for years, an intact brain is not infrequently found post mortem.
In a few cases only certain slight changes are present which, however,
cannot as yet be reduced to any law.
To sum up: in round figures a quarter of our insane patients show more or
less clearly extensive changes and destruction of the brain, while threefourths have a brain which seems to be generally unimpaired or at most
exhibit such changes as give no explanation of the psychological
disturbance.
These figures offer the best possible proof that the purely morphological
view-point of modern psychiatry leads only very indirectly, if at all, to the
understanding of the mental disorder, which is our aim. We must take into
account the fact that those mental diseases which show the most marked
disturbances of the brain end in death; for this reason the chronic inmates of
the asylum form its real population, consisting of some 70 to 80 per cent. of
cases of dementia præcox, that is, of patients in whom anatomical changes
are practically non-existent. The psychiatry of the future must come to grips
with the core of the thing; the path is thus made clear—it can only be by
way of psychology. Hence in our Zürich clinic we have entirely discarded
the anatomical view and turned to the psychological investigation of
insanity. As most of our patients suffer from dementia præcox we were
naturally concerned with this as our chief problem.

The older asylum physicians paid great attention to the psychological
precursors of mental disorder, just as the public still does, following a true
instinct. We accepted this hint and carefully investigated the previous
psychological history wherever possible. Our trouble was richly rewarded,
for we often found, to our surprise, that the disease broke out at a moment
of some great emotion which, in its turn, had arisen in a so-called normal
way. We found, moreover, that in the mental disease which ensued a
number of symptoms occurred which it was quite labour in vain to study
from the morphological standpoint. These same symptoms, however, were
comprehensible when considered from the standpoint of the individual's
previous history. Freud's fundamental investigations into the psychology of
hysteria and dreams afforded us the greatest stimulus and help in our work.

A few instances of the latest method in psychiatry will make the subject clearer than mere dry
theory. In order to bring home to you the difference in our conception I will first describe the
medical history in the older fashion, and subsequently give the solution characteristic of the
new departure.
The case to be considered is that of a cook aged 32; she had no hereditary taint, was always
industrious and conscientious, and had never been noticeable for eccentric behaviour or the
like. Quite recently she became acquainted with a young man whom she wished to marry.
From that time on she began to show certain peculiarities. She often spoke of his not liking
her much, was frequently out of sorts, ill-tempered, and sat alone brooding; once she
ornamented her Sunday hat very strikingly with red and green feathers, another day she
bought a pair of pince-nez in order to wear them when she went out walking with her fiancé.
One day the sudden idea that her teeth were rather ugly would not let her rest, and she
resolved to get a plate, although there was no absolute need. She had all her teeth out under
an anæsthetic. The night after the operation she suddenly had a severe anxiety-attack. She
cried and moaned that she was damned for ever, for she had committed a great sin; she should
not have allowed her teeth to be extracted. People must pray for her, that God might pardon
her sin. In vain her friends attempted to talk her out of her fears, to assure her that the
extraction of teeth was really no sin; it availed nothing. At day-break she became somewhat
quieter; she worked throughout the day. On following nights the attacks were repeated. When
consulted by the patient I found her quiet, but she wore a rather vacant expression. I talked to
her about the operation, and she assured me it was not so dreadful to have teeth extracted, but
still it was a great sin, from which position, despite every persuasion, she could not be moved.
She continually repeated in plaintive, pathetic tones, "I should not have allowed my teeth to
be extracted; oh yes, that was a great sin which God will never forgive me." She gave the
impression of real insanity. A few days later her condition grew worse, and she had to be
brought into the asylum. The anxiety-attack had extended and was persistent, and the mental
disorder lasted for months.
The history shows a series of entirely unrelated symptoms. Why all the queer story of the hat
and pince-nez? Why those anxiety-attacks? Why this delusion that the extraction of her teeth
was an unpardonable sin? Nothing here is clear. The morphologically-minded psychiatrist
would say: This is just a typical case of dementia præcox; it is the essence of insanity, of
madness, to talk of nothing but mysteries; the standpoint of the diseased mind towards the
world is displaced, is "mad." What is no sin for the normal, the patient finds a sin. It is a
bizarre delusion characteristic of dementia præcox. The extravagant lamentation about this
supposed sin is what is known as "inadequate"[198] emotional emphasis. The queer
ornamentation of the hat, the pince-nez, are bizarre notions such as are very common in these
patients. Somewhere in the brain certain cells have fallen into disorder, and manufacture
illogical, senseless ideas of one kind and another which are quite without psychological
meaning. The patient is obviously a hereditary degenerate with a weak brain, having a kink
which is the origin of the disorder. For some reason or other the disease has suddenly broken
out. It could just as easily have broken out at any other time. Perhaps we should have had to
capitulate to these arguments had real psychological analysis not come to our aid. In filling up
the certificate required for her removal to the asylum, it transpired that many years ago she
had had an affair which terminated; her lover left her with an illegitimate child. Nobody had

been told of this. When she was again in love a dilemma arose, and she asked herself, What
will this new lover say about it? At first she postponed the marriage, becoming more and
more worried, and then the eccentricities began. To understand these we must immerse
ourselves in the psychology of a naïve soul. If we have to disclose some painful secret to a
beloved person we try first to strengthen his love in order to obtain beforehand a guarantee of
his forgiveness. We do it by flattery or by caresses, or we try to impress the value of our own
personality in order to raise it in the eyes of the other. Our patient decked herself out with
beautiful feathers, which to her simple taste seemed precious. The wearing of "pince-nez"
increases the respect of children even of a mature age. And who does not know people who
will have their teeth extracted, out of pure vanity, in order that they may wear a plate to
improve their appearance?
After such an operation most people have a slight, nervous reaction, and then everything
becomes more difficult to bear. This was, as a matter of fact, just the moment when the
catastrophe did occur, in her terror lest her fiancé should break with her when he heard of her
previous life. That was the first anxiety-attack. Just as the patient had not acknowledged her
secret in all these years, so she now sought to guard it, and shifted the fear in her guilty
conscience on to the extraction of the teeth; she thus followed a method well known to us, for
when we dare not acknowledge some great sin we deplore some small sin with the greater
emphasis.
The problem seemed insoluble to the weak and sensitive mind of the patient, hence the affect
became insurmountably great; this is the mental desire as presented from the psychological
side. The series of apparently meaningless events, the so-called madness, have now a
meaning; a significance appertains to the delusions, making the patient more human to us.
Here is a person like ourselves, beset by universal human problems, no longer merely a
cerebral machine thrown out of gear. Hitherto we thought that the insane patient revealed
nothing to us by symptoms, save the senseless products of his disordered cerebral cells, but
that was academic wisdom reeking of the study. When we penetrate into the human secrets of
our patients, we recognise mental disease to be an unusual reaction to emotional problems
which are in no wise foreign to ourselves, and the delusion discloses the psychological
system upon which it is based.
The light which shines forth from this conception seems to us so enormously powerful
because it forces us into the innermost depths of that tremendous disorder which is most
common in our asylums, and hitherto least understood; by reason of the craziness of the
symptoms it is the type that strikes the public as madness in excelsis.
The case which I have just sketched is a simple one. It is transparent. My second example is
somewhat more complicated. It is the case of a man between 30 and 40 years of age; he is a
foreign archæologist of great learning and most unusual intelligence. He was a precocious
boy of quite excellent character, great sensitiveness and rare gifts. Physically he was small,
always weakly, and a stammerer. He grew up and was educated abroad, and afterwards
studied for several terms at B——. So far there had been no disorder of any kind. On the
completion of his university career he became zealously absorbed in his archæological work,
which gradually engulfed him to such an extent that he was dead to the world and all its
pleasures. He worked incessantly, and buried himself entirely in his books. He became quite
unsociable; before, awkward and shy in society, he now fled from it altogether, and saw no

one beyond a few friends. He thus led the life of a hermit devoted entirely to science. A few
years later, on a holiday tour, he revisited B——, where he remained a few days. He walked a
great deal in the environs of the town. His few acquaintances now found him somewhat
strange, taciturn, and nervous. After a somewhat protracted walk he seemed tired, and said
that he did not feel very well. He then remarked he must get himself hypnotised, he felt his
nerves unsteady. On top of this he was attacked by physical illness, viz. inflammation of the
lungs. Very soon a peculiar state of excitement supervened which led to suicidal ideas. He
was brought to the asylum, where for weeks he remained in an extremely excited state. He
was completely deranged, and did not know where he was; he spoke in broken sentences
which no one could understand. He was often so excited and aggressive that it took several
attendants to hold him. He gradually became quieter, and one day came to himself, as if
waking out of a long, confused dream. He soon completely regained his health, and was
discharged as cured. He returned to his home and again immersed himself in books. In the
following years he published several remarkable works, but, as before, his life was that of a
hermit living entirely in his books and dead to the world. He then gradually acquired the
name of a dried-up misanthrope, lost to all meaning of the beauty of life. A few years after his
first illness a brief holiday brought him again to B——. As before he took his solitary walks
in the environs. One day he was suddenly overcome by a faint feeling, and lay down in the
street. He was carried into a neighbouring house where he immediately became extremely
excited. He began to perform gymnastics, jumped over the rails of the bed, turned somersaults
in the room, began to declaim in a loud, voice, sang his own improvisations, etc. He was
again brought to the asylum. The excitement continued. He extolled his wonderful muscles,
his beautiful figure, his enormous strength. He believed that he had discovered a natural law
by which a wonderful voice could be developed. He regarded himself as a great singer, and a
marvellous reciter, and at the same time he was a great inspired poet and composer to whom
verse and melody came spontaneously.
All this was in pitiable and very remarkable contrast to reality. He is a small weakly man of
unimposing build, with poorly developed muscles betraying at the first glance the atrophying
effect of his studious life. He is unmusical, his voice is weak and he sings out of tune; he is a
bad speaker, because of his stutter. For weeks he occupied himself in the asylum with peculiar
jumping, and contortions of the body which he called gymnastics, he sang and declaimed.
Then he became more quiet and dreamy, often stared thoughtfully in front of him for a long
time, now and then sang a love song which, despite its want of musical expression, betrayed a
pretty feeling for love's aspirations. This also was in complete contrast with the dryness and
isolation of his normal life. He gradually became accessible for lengthy conversations.
We will break off the history of the disease here, and sum up what is furnished so far by
observation of the patient.
In the first illness the delirium broke out unexpectedly, and was followed by a mental disorder
with confused ideas and violence which lasted for several weeks. Complete recovery
appeared to have taken place. Six years later there was a sudden outbreak of mania, grandiose
delusions, bizarre actions, followed by a twilight-stage gradually leading to recovery. Here we
again see a typical case of dementia præcox, of the katatonic variety, especially characterised
by peculiar movements and actions. In psychiatry the views obtaining at present would regard
this as localised cellular disease of some part of the cortex, exhibiting confusional states,

delusions of grandeur, peculiar contortions of the muscles, or twilight-states, which taken all
together have as little psychological meaning as the bizarre shapes of a drop of lead thrown
into water.
This is not my view. It was certainly no accidental freak of the brain-cells that created the
dramatic contrasts shown in the second illness. We can see that these contrasts, the so-called
grandiose delusions, were very subtly determined by the deficiencies in the patient's
personality. Without doubt, any one of us would naturally regard these deficiencies seriously
in ourselves. Who would not have the desire to find compensation for the aridness of his
profession and of his life in the joys of poetry and music and to restore to his body the natural
power and beauty stolen from it by the study's atmosphere? Do we not recall with envy the
energy of a Demosthenes who, despite his stammering, became a great orator? If our patient
thus fulfilled the obvious gaps in his physical and mental life by delusional wishes, the
supposition is warranted that the whispered love-song which he sang from time to time filled
up a painful blank in his being, which became more painful the more it was concealed. The
explanation is not far to seek. It is simply the old story, born anew in every human soul, in a
guise befitting the destined creature's highest sensibilities.
When our patient was a student he learnt to know and love a girl-student. Together they made
many excursions in the environs of the town, but his exceeding timidity and bashfulness (the
lot of the stammerer) never permitted him an opportunity of getting out the appropriate
words. Moreover, he was poor and had nothing to offer her but hopes. The time came for the
termination of his studies; she went away, and he also, and they never saw one another again.
And not long afterwards he heard she had married some one else. Then he relinquished his
hopes, but he did not know that Eros never emancipates his slaves.
He buried himself in abstract learning, not to forget, but to work for her in his thoughts. He
wanted to keep the love in his heart quite secret, and never to betray that secret. He would
dedicate his works to her without her ever knowing it. The compromise succeeded, but not for
long. Once he travelled through the town where he heard she lived—it seems to have been an
accident that he travelled through that town. He did not leave the train, which only made a
short halt there. From the window he saw standing in the distance a young woman with a
little child, and thought it was she. Impossible to say whether it was really so or not. He does
not think he felt any peculiar feeling at that moment; anyway he gave himself no trouble to
ascertain whether it was she, which makes the presumption strong that it was not really she.
The unconscious wanted to be left in peace with its illusion. Shortly afterwards he again came
to B——, the place of old memories. Then he felt something strange stir in his soul, an
uneasy feeling, akin to Nietzsche's—
"Not for long shalt thou thirst, O burning heart!
There is promise in the air,
Winds come to me from unknown mouths—
The healing coolness comes."
Civilised man no longer believes in demons, he calls in the doctor. Our patient wanted to be
hypnotised. Then madness overcame him. What was going on in him?

He answered this question in broken sentences, with long pauses, in that twilight-stage that
heralds convalescence. I give as faithfully as may be his own words. When he fell ill he
suddenly lost the well-regulated world and found himself in the chaos of an overmastering
dream, a sea of blood and fire; the world was out of joint; everywhere conflagration, volcanic
outbreaks, earthquakes, mountains fell in, followed by enormous battles where the peoples
fell upon one another; he became involved more and more in the battle of nature, he was right
in the midst of those fighting, wrestling, defending himself, enduring unutterable misery and
pain; gradually he was exalted and strengthened by a strange calming feeling that some one
was watching his struggles, that his loved one saw all from afar. That was the time when he
showed real violence to the attendants. He felt his strength increasing and saw himself at the
head of great armies which he would lead to victory. Then more great battles and at length
victory. He would try to get his loved one as prize of victory. As he drew near her the illness
ceased, and he awoke from a long dream.
His daily life again began to follow the regular routine. He shut himself up in his work and
forgot the abyss within himself. A few years later he is again at B—— Demon or Destiny?
Again he followed the old trail and again was overborne by old memories. But this time he
was not immersed in the depths of confusion. He remained orientated and en rapport with his
surroundings. The struggle was considerably milder, but he did gymnastics, practised the arts,
and made good his deficiencies; then followed the dreamy stage with the love-songs,
corresponding to the period of victory in the first psychosis. In this state, according to his own
words, he had a dreamlike feeling as if he stood upon the borders of two worlds and knew not
whether truth stood on the right or on the left. He told me, "It is said she is married, but I
believe she is not, but is still waiting for me; I feel that it must be so. It is ever to me as if she
were not married, and as if success were yet attainable."
Our patient here portrayed but a pale copy of the scene in the first attack of psychosis, when
he, the victor, stood before his mistress. In the course of a few weeks after this conversation
the scientific interests of the patient again began to predominate. He spoke with obvious
unwillingness about his intimate life, he repressed it more and more, and finally turned away
from it as if it did not belong to himself. Thus gradually the gate of the under-world became
closed. There remained nothing but a certain tense expression, and a look which, though fixed
on the outer world, was turned inwards at the same time; and this alone hinted at the silent
activity of the unconscious, preparing new solutions for his insoluble problem. This is the socalled cure in dementia præcox.
Hitherto we psychiatrists used not to be able to suppress a laugh when we read an artist's
attempts to portray a psychosis. These attempts have been generally regarded as quite useless,
for the writer introduces into his conception of the psychosis psychological relationships quite
foreign to the clinical picture of the disease. But the artist has not simply proceeded to copy a
case out of a psychiatric text-book; he knows as a rule better than the psychiatrist.
The case which I have sketched is not unique, it is typical of a whole class for which the artist
Spitteler has created a model of universal validity; the model is Imago. I may take for granted
that you know his book of that name. The psychological gulf, however, between the creation
of the artist and the insane person is great. The world of the artist is one of solved problems;
the world of reality, that of unsolved problems. The mental patient is a faithful image of this
reality. His solutions are unsatisfying illusions, his cure a temporary giving up of the problem,

which yet goes on working in the depths of the unconscious, and at the appointed time again
rises to the surface and creates new illusions with new scenery; part of the history of mankind
is here seen abridged.
Psychological analysis is far from being able to explain in complete and illuminating fashion
all cases of the disease with which we are here concerned. On the contrary, the majority
remain obscure and difficult to understand, and chiefly because only a certain proportion of
patients recover. Our last patient is noteworthy because his return to a normal state afforded
us a survey of the period of his illness. Unfortunately the advantage of this standpoint is not
always possible to us, for a great number of persons never find their way back from their
dreams. They are lost in the maze of a magic garden where the same old story is repeated
again and again in a timeless present. For patients the hands of the clock of the world remain
stationary; there is no time, no further development. It makes no difference to them whether
they dream for two days or thirty years. I had a patient in my ward who was five years
without uttering a word, in bed, and entirely buried in himself. For years I visited him twice
daily, and as I reached his bedside I could see at once that there was no change. One day I
was just about to leave the room when a voice I did not recognise called out—"Who are you?
What do you want here?" I saw with astonishment that it was the dumb patient who had
suddenly regained his voice, and obviously his senses also. I told him I was his doctor,
whereupon he asked angrily, why was he kept a prisoner here, and why did no one ever speak
to him? He said this in an injured voice just like a normal person whom one had neglected for
a couple of days. I informed him that he had been in bed quite speechless for five years and
had responded to nothing, whereat he looked at me fixedly and without understanding.
Naturally I tried to discover what had gone on in him during these five years, but could learn
nothing. Another patient with a similar symptom, when asked why he had remained silent for
years, maintained, "Because I wanted to spare the German language."[199] These examples
show that it is often impossible to lift the veil of the secret, for the patients themselves have
neither interest nor pleasure in explaining their strange experiences, in which as a rule they
realise nothing peculiar.
Occasionally the symptoms themselves are a sign-post to the understanding of the psychology
of the disease.
We had a patient who was for thirty-five years an inmate at Burghölzli. For decades she lay in
bed, she never spoke or reacted to anything, her head was always bowed, her back bent and
the knees somewhat drawn up. She was always making peculiar rubbing movements with her
hands, so as to give rise during the course of years to thick horny patches on her hands. She
kept the thumb and index finger of her right hand together as in the movement of sewing.
When she died I tried to discover what she had been formerly. Nobody in the asylum recalled
ever having seen her out of bed. Only our chief attendant had a memory of having seen her
sitting in the same attitude as that she afterwards took up in bed, at which time she was
making rapid movements of extension of the arm across the right knee; it was said of her that
she was sewing shoes, later that she was polishing shoes. As time went on the movements
became more limited till finally there remained but a slight rubbing movement, and only the
finger and thumb retained the sewing position. In vain I consulted our old attendant, she knew
nothing about the patient's previous history. When the seventy-year-old brother came to the
funeral I asked him what had been the cause of his sister's illness; he told me that she had had

a love-affair, but for various reasons it had come to nothing. The girl had taken this so to heart
that she became low-spirited. In answer to a query about her lover it was found that he was a
shoemaker.
Unless you see here some strange play of accident, you must agree that the patient had kept
the memory-picture of her lover unaltered in her heart for thirty-five years.
One might easily think that these patients who give an impression of imbecility are only
burnt-out ruins of humanity. But such is probably not the case. One can often prove directly
that such patients register everything going on around them even with a certain curiosity, and
have an excellent memory for it all. This is the reason why many patients become for a time
pretty sensible again, and develop mental powers which one believed they had long since lost.
Such intervals occur occasionally during serious physical disease, or just before death. We
had a patient with whom it was impossible to carry on a sane conversation; he only produced
a mad medley of delusions and words. He once fell seriously ill physically, and I expected it
would be very difficult to treat him. Not at all. He was quite changed, he became friendly and
amiable, and carried out all his doctor's orders patiently and gratefully. His eyes lost their evil
darting looks, and shone quietly and understandingly. One morning I came to his room with
the usual greeting: "Good morning. How are you getting on?" The patient answered me in the
well-known way: "There again comes one of the dog and monkey troupe wanting to play the
Saviour." Then I knew his physical trouble was over. From that moment the whole of his
reason was as if "blown away" again.
From these observations we see that reason still survives, but is pushed away into some
corner by the complete preoccupation of the mind with diseased thoughts.
Why is the mind compelled to exhaust itself in the elaboration of diseased nonsense? On this
difficult question our new insight throws considerable light. To-day we can say that the
pathological images dominate the interests of the patient so completely, because they are
simply derivatives of the most important questions that used to occupy the person when
normal—what in insanity is now an incomprehensible maze of symptoms used to be fields of
vital interest to the former personality.
I will cite as an example a patient who was twenty years in the asylum. She was always a
puzzle to the physicians, for the absurdity of her delusions exceeded anything that the boldest
imagination could create.
She was a dressmaker by trade, born in 1845, of very poor family. Her sister early went
wrong and was finally lost in the swamp of prostitution. The patient herself led an
industrious, respectable, reserved life. She fell ill in 1886 in her 39th year—at the threshold of
the age when so many a dream is brought to naught. Her illness consisted in delusions and
hallucinations which increased rapidly, and soon became so absurd that no one could
understand her wishes and complaints. In 1887 she came to the asylum. In 1888 her
statements, so far as the delusions were concerned, were not intelligible. She maintained such
monstrous things as that: "At night her spinal marrow had been torn out; pains in the back had
been caused by substances that went through the walls and were covered with magnetism."
"The monopoly fixed the sorrows which are not in the body and do not fly about in the air."
"Excursions are made by breathing in chemistry, and by suffocation regions are destroyed."

In 1892 the patient styled herself the "Bank Note Monopoly, Queen of the Orphans,
Proprietress of the Burghölzli Asylum;" she said: "Naples and I must provide the world with
macaroni" (Nudel).
In 1896 she became "Germania and Helvetia from exclusively pure butter"; she also said, "I
am Noah's Ark, the boat of salvation and respect."
Since then the disease has greatly increased; her last creation is the delusion that she is the
"lily red sea monster and the blue one."
These instances will show you how far the incomprehensibility of such pathological
formations go. Our patient was for years the classic example of meaningless delusional ideas
in dementia præcox; and many hundreds of medical students have received from the
demonstration of this case a permanent impression of the sinister power of insanity. But even
this case has not withstood the newer technique of psychoanalysis. What the patient says is
not at all meaningless; it is full of significance, so that he who has the key can understand
without overmuch difficulty.
Time does not allow me to describe the technique by means of which I succeeded in lifting
the veil of her secret. I must content myself by giving a few examples to make the strange
changes of thought and of speech in this patient clear to you.
She said of herself that she was Socrates. The analysis of this delusion presented the
following ideas: Socrates was the wisest man, the man of greatest learning; he was
infamously accused, and had to die in prison at the hands of strange men. She was the best
dressmaker, but "never unnecessarily cut a thread, and never allowed a piece of material to lie
about on the floor." She worked ceaselessly, and now she has been falsely accused, wicked
men have shut her up, and she will have to die in the asylum.
Therefore she is Socrates; this is, as you see, simple metaphor, based upon obvious analogy.
Take another example: "I am the finest professor and the finest artist in the world."
The analysis furnishes the remarks that she is the best dressmaker and chooses the most
beautiful models which show up well and waste little material; she puts on the trimming only
where it can be seen. She is a professor, and an artist in her work. She makes the best clothes
and calls them absurdly "The Schnecke Museum-clothes." Her customers are only such
persons as frequent the Schnecke House and the Museum (the Schnecke House is the
aristocratic club. It is near the Museum and the Library, another rendezvous of the aristocratic
set of Zürich), for she is the best dressmaker and makes only Schnecke Museum[200] clothing.
The patient also calls herself Mary Stuart. Analysis showed the same analogy as with
Socrates: innocent suffering and death of a heroine.
"I am the Lorelei." Analysis: This is an old and well-known song: "I know not what it
means," etc. Whenever she wants to speak about her affairs people do not understand her, and
say they don't know what it means; hence she is the Lorelei.
"I am Switzerland." Analysis: Switzerland is free, no one can rob Switzerland of her freedom.
The patient does not belong to the asylum, she would be free like Switzerland, hence she is
Switzerland.

"I am a crane." Analysis: In the "Cranes of Ibykus" it is said: "Whosoever is free of sin and
fault shall preserve the pure soul of a child." She has been brought innocent to the asylum and
has never committed a crime—hence she is a crane.
"I am Schiller's Bell." Analysis: Schiller's Bell is the greatest work of the great master. She is
the best and most industrious dressmaker, and has achieved the highest rung in the art of
dressmaking—hence she is Schiller's Bell.
"I am Hufeland." Analysis: Hufeland was the best doctor. She suffers intolerably in the
asylum and is moreover treated by the worst doctors. She is, however, so prominent a
personality that she had a claim to the best doctors, that is to a doctor like Hufeland—hence
she is Hufeland.
The patient used the expression "I am" in a very arbitrary way. Sometimes it meant "it
belongs to me" or "it is proper for me"; sometimes it means "I should have." This is seen from
the following analysis:
"I am the master-key." Analysis: The master-key is the key that opens all the doors of the
asylum. Properly, according to all rights, the patient should long since have obtained this key
for she has been for many years "the proprietress of the Burghölzli Asylum." She expresses
this reflection very much simplified in the sentence, "I am the master-key."
The chief content of her delusions is concentrated in the following words:—
"I am the monopoly." Analysis: The patient means the banknote monopoly, which has
belonged to her for some time. She believes that she possesses the monopoly of the entire
bank notes of the world, thus creating enormous riches for herself, in compensation for the
poverty and lowliness of her lot. Her parents died early; hence she is the Queen of the
Orphans. Her parents lived and died in great poverty. Her blessings are extended to them also,
the dreamlike delusions of the patient benefit them in many ways. She says textually: "My
parents are clothed by me, my sorely-tried mother, full of sorrow—I sat with her at table—
covered in white with superfluity."
This is another of these malleable hallucinations which the patient had daily. It is one of those
scenes of wish-fulfilment, with poverty on one side and riches on the other, recalling
Hauptmann's Hannele; more especially that scene where Gottwald says: "She was clothed in
rags—now she is bedeckt in silken robes; and she ran about barefoot—now she has shoes of
glass to her feet. Soon she will live in a golden castle and eat each day of baked meats. Here
has she lived on cold potatoes...."
The wish-fulfilments of our patient go even further. Switzerland has to furnish her with an
income of 150,000 francs. The Director of the Burghölzli owes her 80,000 francs damages for
wrongful incarceration. She is the proprietress of a distant island with silver mines, the
"mightiest silver island in the world." Therefore she is also the greatest orator, possesses the
most wonderful eloquence, for, as she says, "Speech is silver, silence gold." To her all the
beautiful landed estates belong—all the rich quarters, towns and lands, she is the proprietress
of a world, even a "threefold proprietress of the world." Whilst poor Hannele was only
elevated to the side of the Heavenly Bridegroom, our patient has the "Key of Heaven," she is
not only the honoured earthly queens Mary Stuart and Queen Louise of Prussia, but she is
also the Queen of Heaven, the Mother of God as well as the Godhead. Even in this earthly

world where she was but a poor, ill-regarded homely dressmaker she attained fulfilments of
her human wishes, for she had taken three husbands from the best families in the town and
her fourth was the Emperor Francis. From these marriages there were two phantom children
—a little boy and a little girl. Just as she clothed, fed and feasted her parents, so she provided
for the future of her children. To her son she bequeathed the great bazaar of Zürich, therefore
her son is a "Zur," for the proprietor of a Bazaar is a "Zur." The daughter resembles her
mother; hence she becomes the proprietress of the asylum and takes her mother's place so that
the mother is released from captivity. The daughter therefore receives the title of "Agency of
Socrates," for she replaces Socrates in captivity.
These instances by no means exhaust the delusional fancies of the patient. But they will give
you some idea, I hope, of the richness of her inner life although she was apparently so dull
and apathetic, or, as was said imbecile, and sat for twenty years in her workroom, where she
mechanically repaired her linen, occasionally uttering a complex of meaningless fragments
which no one had hitherto been able to understand. Her odd lack of words can now be seen in
another light; they are fragments of enigmatical inscriptions, of fairy-story phantasies, which
have escaped from the hard world to found a world of their own. Here the tables are ever
laden, and a thousand feasts are celebrated in golden palaces. The patient can only spare a
few mysterious symbols for the gloomy dim shores of reality; they need not be understood,
for our understanding has not been necessary for her for this long time.
Nor is this patient at all unique. She is one of a type. Similar phantasies are always found in
patients of this kind, though not always in such profusion.
The parallels with Hauptmann's Hannele show that here likewise the artist has shown us the
way with the free creation of his own phantasy. From this coincidence, which is not
accidental, we may conclude that there is something common both to the artist and the insane
and not to them alone. Every human being has also within himself that restless creative
phantasy which is ever engaged in assuaging the harshness of reality. Whoever gives himself
unsparingly and carefully to self-observation, will realise that there dwells within him
something which would gladly hide and cover up all that is difficult and questionable in life,
and thus procure an easy and free path. Insanity grants the upper hand to this something.
When once it is uppermost, reality is more or less quickly driven out. It becomes a distant
dream, and the dream which enchains the patient wholly or in part, and often for life, has now
the attributes of reality. We normal persons, who have to do entirely with reality, see only the
products of disordered fancy, but not the wealth of that side of the mind which is turned away
from us. Unfortunately only too often no further knowledge reaches us of the things which
are transpiring on that other side, because all the bridges are broken down which unite this
side with that.
We do not know to-day whether these new views are of universal or only of limited validity;
the more carefully and perseveringly we examine our patients, the more we shall meet cases,
which, despite apparent total imbecility, will yet afford us at least some fragmentary insight
into the obscurities of the psychical life. This life is far removed from that mental poverty
which the prevailing theories were compelled to accept.
However far we are from being able to understand fully the concatenations of that obscure
world, at least we may maintain, with complete assurance, that in dementia præcox there is no

symptom which can be described as psychologically baseless and meaningless. The most
absurd things are in reality symbols of ideas which are not only generally understandable, but
also universally operative in the human heart. In insanity we do not discover anything new
and unknown, but we look at the foundation of our own being, the source of those lifeproblems in which we are all engaged.
PART II.[201]
The number of psychoanalytic investigations into the psychology of dementia præcox has
considerably increased since the publication of my book upon the subject.[202] When, in 1903,
I made the first analysis of a case of dementia præcox, there dawned on me a premonition of
the possibilities of future discoveries in this sphere. This has been confirmed.
Freud first submitted a case of paranoid dementia to closer psychological investigation.[203]
This he was enabled to do by means of an analytic technique perfected through his rich
experiences with neurotics. He selected the famous autobiography of P. Schreber,
"Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken." The patient could not be analysed personally, but
having published his most interesting autobiography all the material wanted for an analysis
was to be found in it.
In this study Freud shows out of what infantile forms of thought and instincts the delusional
system was built up. The peculiar delusions which the patient had about his doctor whom he
identified with God or with a god-like being, and certain other surprising and really
blasphemous ideas, Freud was able to reduce most ingeniously to his infantile relationship to
his father. This case also presented similar bizarre and grotesque concatenations of ideas to
the one I have described. As the author himself says, his work confines itself to the task of
pointing out those universally existent and undifferentiated foundations out of which we may
say every psychological formation is historically developed.[204] This reductive analytical
process did not, however, furnish such enlightening results in regard to the rich and surprising
symbolism in patients of this kind as we had been accustomed to expect from the same
method in the realm of the psychology of hysteria. In reading certain works of the Zürich
school, for example, Maeder,[205] Spielrein,[206] Nelken,[207] Grebelskaja,[208] Itten,[209] one is
powerfully impressed by the enormous symbol-formation in dementia præcox.
Some of the authors still proceed essentially by the method of analytic reduction, tracing back
the complicated delusional formation into its simpler and more universal components, as I
have done in the preceding pages. One cannot, however, resist the feeling that this method
hardly does justice to the fulness and the almost overpowering wealth of phantastic symbolformation, although it does undoubtedly throw a light upon the subject in certain directions.
Let me illustrate with an example. We should be thankful for a commentary upon "Faust"
which traced back all the diverse material of Part II. to its historical sources, or for a
psychological analysis of Part I. which pointed out how the dramatic conflict corresponds to a
personal conflict in the soul of the poet; we should be glad of an exposition which pointed out
how this subjective conflict is itself based upon those ultimate and universal human things
which are nowise foreign to us since we all carry the seeds of them in our hearts.
Nevertheless we should be a little disappointed. We do not read "Faust" just in order to

discover that also we are, in all things, "human, all too human." Alas, we know that but too
well already. Let any one who has not yet learnt it go for a little while out into the world and
look at it without preconceptions and with open eyes. He will turn back from the might and
power of the "too human," hungrily he will pick up his "Faust," not to find again what he has
just left, but to learn how a man like Goethe shakes off these elemental human things and
finds freedom for his soul. When we once know who was the "Proktophantasmist," to what
chronological events the mass of symbols in Part II. relates, how it is all intimately bound up
with the poet's own soul and conditioned by it, we come to regard this determination as less
important than the problem itself—what does the poet mean by his symbolic creation?
Proceeding purely reductively, one discovers the final meaning in these universal human
things; and demands nothing further from an explanation than that the unknown and
complicated shall be reduced to the known and simple. I should like to designate this kind of
understanding as retrospective understanding. But there is another kind of understanding,
which is not analytic reduction, but is of a synthetic or constructive nature. I would designate
this prospective understanding, and the corresponding method as the Constructive method.
It is common knowledge that present-day scientific explanation rests upon the basis of the
causal principle. Scientific explanation is causal explanation. We are therefore naturally
inclined, whenever we think scientifically, to explain causally, to understand a thing and to
regard it as explained whenever it is reduced analytically to its cause and general principle. In
so far Freud's psychological method of interpretation is strictly scientific.
If we apply this method to "Faust" it must become clear that something more is required for a
true understanding. It will even seem to us that we have not gathered the poet's deepest
meaning if we only see in it universal foregone human conclusions. What we really want to
find out is how this man has redeemed himself as an individual, and when we arrive at this
comprehension then we shall also understand the symbol given by Goethe. It is true we may
then fall into the error that we understand Goethe himself. But let us be cautious and modest,
simply saying we have thereby arrived at an understanding of ourselves. I am thinking here of
Kant's thought-compelling definition of comprehension, as "the realisation of a thing to the
extent which is sufficient for our purpose."
This understanding is, it is true, subjective, and therefore not scientific for those to whom
science and explanation by the causal principle are identical. But the validity of this
identification is open to question. In the sphere of psychology I must emphasise my doubt on
this point.
We speak of "objective" understanding when we have given a causal explanation. But at
bottom, understanding is a subjective process upon which we confer the quality "objective"
really only to differentiate it from another kind of understanding which is also a
psychological and subjective process, but upon which, without further ado, we bestow the
quality "subjective." The attitude of to-day only grants scientific value to "objective"
understanding on account of its universal validity. This standpoint is incontestably correct
wherever it is not a question of the psychological process itself, and hence it is valid in all
sciences apart from pure psychology.
To interpret Faust objectively, i.e. from the causal standpoint, is as though a man were to
consider a sculpture from the historical, technical and—last but not least—from the

mineralogical standpoint. But where lurks the real meaning of the wondrous work? Where is
the answer to that most important question: what aim had the artist in mind, and how are we
ourselves to understand his work subjectively? To the scientific spirit this seems an idle
question which anyhow has nothing to do with science. It comes furthermore into collision
with the causal principle, for it is a purely speculative constructive view. And the modern
world has overthrown this spirit of scholasticism.
But if we would approach to an understanding of psychological things we must remember the
fact of the subjective conditioning of all knowledge. The world is as we see it and not simply
objective; this holds true even more of the mind. Of course it is possible to look at the mind
objectively, just as at Faust, or a Gothic Cathedral. In this objective conception there is
comprised the whole worth and worthlessness of current experimental psychology and
psychoanalysis. The scientific mind, thinking causally, is incapable of understanding what is
ahead; it only understands what is past, that is, retrospective. Like Ahriman, the Persian devil,
it has the gift of After-Knowledge. But this spirit is only one half of a complete
comprehension. The other more important half is prospective or constructive; if we are not
able to understand what lies ahead, then nothing is understood. If psychoanalysis, following
Freud's orientation, should succeed in presenting an uninterrupted and conclusive connection
between Goethe's infantile sexual development and his work, or, following Adler, between
the infantile struggle for power and the adult Goethe and his work, an interesting proposition
would have been solved—we should have learnt how a masterpiece can be reduced to the
simplest thinkable elements, which are universal, and to be found working within the depths
of everything and everybody. But did Goethe construct his work to this end? Was it his
intention that it should be thus conceived?
It must be sufficiently clear that such an understanding, though undoubtedly scientific, would
be entirely, utterly, beside the mark. This statement is valid for psychology in general. To
understand the psyche causally, means to understand but half of it. The causal understanding
of Faust enlightens us as to how it became a finished work of art, but reveals nothing of the
living meaning of the poet. That meaning only lives if we experience it, in and through
ourselves. In so far as our actual present life is for us something essentially new and not a
repetition of all that has gone before, the great value of such a work is to be seen, not in its
causal development, but in its living reality for our own lives. We should be indeed
depreciating a work like Faust if we were only to regard it as something that has been
perfected and finished; it is only understood when conceived as a becoming and as an ever
new-experiencing.
Thus we must regard the human psyche. Only on one side is the mind a Has Been, and as
such subordinate to the causal principle. On the other side the mind is a Becoming that can
only be grasped synthetically or constructively. The causal standpoint asks how it is this
actual mind has become what it appears to-day? The constructive standpoint asks how a
bridge can be built from this actual psyche to its own future?
Just as the causal method finally reaches the general principles of human psychology by the
analysis and reduction of individual events, so does the constructive standpoint reach aims
that are general by the synthesis of individual tendencies. The mind is a point of passage and
thus necessarily determined from two sides. On the one side it offers a picture of the

precipitate of the past, and on the other side a picture of the germinating knowledge of all that
is to come, in so far as the psyche creates its own future.
What has been is, on the one hand, the result and apex of all that was—as such it appears to
the causal standpoint; on the other hand, it is an expression of all that is to be. The future is
only apparently like the past, but in its essence always new and unique, (the causal standpoint
would like to invert this sentence) thus the actual formula is incomplete, germlike so to say, in
relation to what is to be.
To get any conception of this expression of what is to be we are forced to apply a constructive
interest to it. I almost felt myself tempted to say, "a scientific interest." But modern science is
identical with the causal principle. So long as we consider the actual mind causally, that is
scientifically, we elude the mind as a Becoming. This other side of the psyche can never be
grasped by the exclusive use of the causal principle, but only by means of the constructive
standpoint. The causal standpoint reduces things to their elements, the constructive standpoint
elaborates them into something higher and more complicated. This latter standpoint is
necessarily a speculative one.
Constructive understanding is, however, differentiated from scholastic speculation because it
imposes no general validity, but only subjective validity. When the speculative philosopher
believes he has comprehended the world once for all by his System, he deceives himself; he
has only comprehended himself and then naïvely projected that view upon the world. In
reaction against this, the scientific method of the modern world has almost put an end to
speculation and gone to the other extreme. It would create an "objective" psychology. In
opposition to such efforts, the stress which Freud has placed upon individual psychology is of
immortal merit. The extraordinary importance of the subjective in the development of the
objective mental process was thus first brought adequately into prominence.
Subjective speculation lays no claim to universal validity, it is identical with constructive
understanding. It is a subjective creation, which, looked at externally, easily seems to be a socalled infantile phantasy, or at least an unmistakable derivative of it; from an objective
standpoint it must be judged as such, in so far as objective is regarded as identical with
scientific or causal. Looked at from within, however, constructive understanding means
redemption.
"Creation—that is the great redemption from suffering and easiness of living."[210]
Starting from these considerations as to the psychology of those mental patients to whom the
Schreber case belongs, we must, from the "objective-scientific" standpoint, reduce the
structural phantasy of the patient to its simple and most generally valid elements. This Freud
had done. But that is only half of the work to be done. The other half is the constructive
understanding of Schreber's system. The question is: What end, what freedom, did the patient
hope to achieve by the creation of his system?
The scientific thinker of to-day will regard this question as inappropriate. The psychiatrist
will certainly smile at it, for he is thoroughly assured of the universal validity of his
causalism, he knows the psyche merely as something that is made, descendent, reactive. Not
uncommonly there lurks the unconscious prejudice that the psyche is a brain-secretion.

Looking at such a morbid system without preconception, and asking ourselves what goal this
delusional system is aiming at, we see, in fact, firstly, that it is endeavouring to get at
something, and secondly, that the patient also devotes all his will-power to the service of the
system. There are patients who develop their delusions with scientific thoroughness, often
dragging in an immense material of comparison and proof. Schreber certainly belongs to this
class. Others do not proceed so thoroughly and learnedly, but content themselves with
heaping up synonymous expressions for that at which they are aiming. The case of the patient
I have described, who assumes all kinds of titles, is a good instance of this.
The patient's unmistakable striving to express something through and by means of his
delusion Freud conceives retrospectively, as the satisfaction of his infantile wishes by means
of imagination. Adler reduces it to the desire for power.
For him the delusion-formation is a "manly protest," a means of gaining security for himself
against his menaced superiority. Thus characterised, this struggle is likewise infantile and the
means employed—the delusional creation—is infantile because insufficient for its purpose;
one can therefore understand why Freud declines to accept Adler's point of view. Freud,
rightly on the whole, subsumes this infantile struggle for power under the concept of the
infantile wish.
The constructive standpoint is different. Here the delusional system is neither infantile nor,
upon the whole, eo ipso pathological but subjective, and hence justified within the scope of
the subjective. The constructive standpoint absolutely denies the conception that the
subjective phantasy-creation is merely an infantile wish, symbolically veiled; or that it is
merely that in a higher degree; it denies that it is a convulsive and egoistic adhesion to the
fiction of its own superiority, in so far as these are to be regarded as finalistic explanations.
The subjective activity of the mind can be judged from without, just as one can, in the end, so
judge everything. But this judgment is inadequate, because it is the very essence of the
subjective that it cannot be judged objectively. We cannot measure distance in pints. The
subjective can be only understood and judged subjectively, that is, constructively. Any other
judgment is unfair and does not meet the question.
The absolute credit which the constructive standpoint confers upon the subjective, naturally
seems to the "scientific" spirit as an utter violation of reason. But this scientific spirit can only
take up arms against it so long as the constructive is not avowedly subjective. The
constructive comprehension also analyses, but it does not reduce. It decomposes the delusion
into typical components. What is to be regarded as the type at a given time is shown from the
attainment of experience and knowledge reached at that time.
Even the most individual delusional systems are not absolutely unique, occurring only once,
for they offer striking and obvious analogies with other systems. From the comparative
analysis of many systems the typical formations are drawn. If one can speak of reduction at
all, it is only a question of reduction to general type, but not to some universal principle
obtained inductively or deductively, such as "Sexuality" or "Struggle for Power." This
paralleling with other typical formations only serves for a widening of the basis upon which
the construction is to be built. If one were to proceed entirely subjectively one would go on
constructing in the language of the patient and in his mental range. One would arrive at some
structure which was illuminating to the patient and to the investigator of the case but not to

the outer scientific public. The public would be unable to enter into the peculiarities of the
speech and thought of the individual case in question without further help.
The works of the Zürich school referred to contain careful and detailed expositions of
individual material. In these materials there are very many typical formations which are
unmistakably analogies with mythological formations[211]. There arose from the perception of
this relationship a new and valuable source for comparative study. The acceptance of the
possibility of such a comparison will not be granted immediately, but the question is only
whether the materials to be compared really are similar or not. It will also be contended that
pathological and mythological formations are not immediately comparable. But this objection
must not be raised a priori, for only a conscientious comparison can determine whether any
true parallelism exists or not. At the present moment all we know is that they are both
structures of the imagination which, like all such products, rest essentially upon the activity of
the unconscious. Experience must teach us whether such a comparison is valid. The results
hitherto obtained are so encouraging that further work along these lines seems to me most
hopeful and important. I made practical use of the constructive method in a case which
Flournoy published in the Archives de Psychologie, although he offered no opinion as to its
nature at that time.
The case dealt with a rather neurotic young lady who, in Flournoy's publication, described
how surprised she was at the connected phantasy-formations which penetrated from the
unconscious into the conscious. I subjected these phantasies, which the lady herself
reproduced in some detail, to my constructive methods and gave the results of these
investigations in my book, "The Psychology of the Unconscious."
This book has, I regret to say, met with many perhaps inevitable misunderstandings. But I
have had one precious consolation, for my book received the approval of Flournoy himself,
who published the original case which he knew personally. It is to be hoped that later works
will make the standpoint of the Zürich school intelligible to a wider public. Whoever, by the
help of this work, has taken the trouble to grasp the essence of the constructive method, will
readily imagine how great are the difficulties of investigation, and how much greater still are
the difficulties of objective presentation of such investigations.
Among the many difficulties and opportunities for misunderstanding I should like to adduce
one difficulty which is especially characteristic. In an intensive study of Schreber's or any
similar case, it will be discovered that these patients are consumed by the desire for a new
world-philosophy which may be of the most bizarre kind. Their aim is obviously to create a
system such as will help them in the assimilation of unknown psychical phenomena, i.e.
enable them to adapt their own unconscious to the world. This arrangement produces a
subjective system which must be considered as a necessary transition-stage on the path to the
adaptation of their personality in regard to the world in general. But the patient remains
stationary at this transitory stage and assumes his subjective view is the world's, hence he
remains ill. He cannot free himself from his subjectivism and does not find the link to
objective thinking, i.e. to society. He does not reach the real summit of self-understanding, for
he remains with a merely subjective understanding of himself. But a mere subjective
understanding is not real and adequate. As Feuerbach says: Understanding is only real when

it is in accord with that of some other rational beings. Then it becomes objective[212] and the
link with life is reached.
I am convinced that not a few will raise the objection that in the first place the psychological
process of adaptation does not proceed by the method of first creating a world-philosophy;
secondly, that it is in itself a sign of unhealthy mental disposition even to make the attempt to
adapt oneself by way of a "world-philosophy."
Undoubtedly there are innumerable persons who are capable of adaptation without creating
any preliminary philosophy. If they ever arrive at any general theory of the world it is always
subsequently. But, on the other hand, there are just as many who are only able to adapt
themselves by means of a preliminary intellectual formulation. To everything which they do
not understand they are unable to adapt themselves. Generally it comes about that they do
adapt themselves just in so far as they can grasp the situation intellectually. To this latter
group seem to belong all those patients to whom we have been giving our consideration.
Medical experience has taught us that there are two large groups of functional nervous
disorders. The one embraces all those forms of disease which are designated hysterical, the
other all those forms which the French school has designated psychasthenic. Although the
line of demarcation is rather uncertain, one can mark off two psychological types which are
obviously different; their psychology is diametrically opposed. I have called these—the
Introverted and Extroverted types. The hysteric belongs to the type of Extroversion, the
psychasthenic to the type of Introversion, as does dementia præcox, in so far as we know it
to-day. This terminology, Introversion and Extroversion, is bound up with my way of
regarding mental phenomena as forms of energy. I postulate a hypothetical fundamental
striving which I designate libido.[213] In the classical use of the word, libido never had an
exclusively sexual connotation as it has in medicine. The word interest, as Claparède once
suggested to me, could be used in this special sense, if this expression had to-day a less
extensive application. Bergson's concept, élan vital, would also serve if this expression were
less biological and more psychological. Libido is intended to be an energising expression for
psychological values. The psychological value is something active and determining; hence it
can be regarded from the energic standpoint without any pretence of exact measurement.
The introverted type is characterised by the fact that his libido is turned towards his own
personality to a certain extent—he finds within himself the unconditioned value. The
extroverted type has his libido to a certain extent externally; he finds the unconditioned value
outside himself. The introvert regards everything from the aspect of his own personality; the
extrovert is dependent upon the value of his object. I must emphasise the statement that this
question of types is the question of our psychology, and that every further advance must
probably proceed by way of this question. The difference between these types is almost
alarming in extent. So far there is only one small preliminary communication by myself[214]
on this theory of type, which is particularly important for the conception of dementia præcox.
On the psychiatric side Gross[215] has called attention to the existence of two psychological
types. His two types are (1) those with limited but deep consciousness, and (2) those with
broad but superficial consciousness. The former correspond to my introverted and the latter to
my extroverted type. In my article I have collected some other instances among which I
would especially call attention to the striking description of the two types given by William

James in his book on "Pragmatism." Fr. Th. Vischer has differentiated the two types very
wittily by her division of the learned into "reason-mongers," and "matter-mongers." In the
sphere of psychoanalysis Freud follows the psychology of Extraversion, Adler that of
Introversion. The irreconcilable opposition between the views of Freud and those of Adler
(see especially his book "Über den nervösen Charakter") is readily explained by the existence
of two diametrically opposed psychological types which view the same things from entirely
different aspects. An Extrovert can hardly, or only with great difficulty, come to any
understanding with an Introvert, on any delicate psychological question.
An Extrovert can hardly conceive the necessity which compels the Introvert to conquer the
world by means of a system. And yet this necessity exists, otherwise we should have no
philosophical systems and dogmas, presumed to be universally valid. Civilised humanity
would be only empiricists and the sciences only the experimental sciences. Causalism and
empiricism are undoubtedly mighty forces in our present-day mental life but it may come to
be otherwise.
This difference in type is the first great obstacle which stands in the way of an understanding
concerning fundamental conceptions of our psychology. A second objection arises from the
circumstance that the constructive method, faithful to itself, must adapt itself to the lines of
the delusion. The direction along which the patient develops his morbid thoughts has to be
accepted seriously, and followed out to its end; the investigator thus places himself at the
standpoint of the psychosis. This procedure may expose him to the suspicion of being
deranged himself; or at least risks a misunderstanding which is considered terribly disgraceful
—he may himself have some world-philosophy! The confirmation of such a possibility is as
bad as being "unscientific." But every one has a world-philosophy though not every one
knows he has. And those who do not know it have simply an unconscious and therefore
inadequate and archaic philosophy. But everything psychological that is allowed to remain in
the mind neglected and not developed, remains in a primitive state. A striking instance of how
universal theories are influenced by unconscious archaic points of view has been furnished by
a famous German historian whose name matters to us not at all. This historian took it for
granted that once upon a time people propagated themselves through incest, for in the first
human families the brother was assigned to the sister. This theory is wholly based upon his
still unconscious belief in Adam and Eve as the first and only parents of mankind. It is on the
whole better to discover for oneself a modern world-philosophy, or at least to make use of
some decent system which will prevent any errors of that kind.
One could put up with being despised as the possessor of a world-philosophy; but there is a
greater danger. The public may come to believe the philosophy, beaten out by the constructive
method, is to be regarded as a theoretical and objectively valid insight into the meaning of the
world in general.
I must now again point out that it is an obstinate, scholastic misunderstanding not to be able
to distinguish between a world-philosophy which is only psychological, and an extrapsychological theory, which concerns the objective thing. It is absolutely essential that the
student of the results of the constructive method should be able to draw this distinction. In its
first results the constructive method does not produce anything that could be called a
scientific theory; it furnishes the psychological lines of development, a path so to say. I must
here refer the reader to my book, "Psychology of the Unconscious."

The analytic reductive method has the advantage of being much simpler than the constructive
method. The former reduces to well-known universal elements of an extremely simple nature.
The latter has, with extremely complicated material, to construct the further path to some
often unknown end. This obliges the psychologist to take full account of all those forces
which are at work in the human mind. The reductive method strives to replace the religious
and philosophical needs of man, by their more elementary components, following the
principle of the "nothing but," as James so aptly calls it. But to construct aright, we must
accept the developed aspirations as indispensable components, essential elements, of spiritual
growth. Such work extends far beyond empirical concepts but that is in accordance with the
nature of the human soul which has never hitherto rested content with experience alone.
Everything new in the human mind proceeds from speculation. Mental development proceeds
by way of speculation, never by way of limitation to mere experience. I realise that my views
are parallel with those of Bergson, and that in my book the concept of the libido which I have
given, is a concept parallel to that of "élan vital"; my constructive method corresponds to
Bergson's "intuitive method." I, however, confine myself to the psychological side and to
practical work. When I first read Bergson a year and a half ago I discovered to my great
pleasure everything which I had worked out practically, but expressed by him in consummate
language and in a wonderfully clear philosophic style.
Working speculatively with psychological material there is a risk of being sacrificed to the
general misunderstanding which bestows the value of an objective theory upon the line of
psychological evolution thus elaborated. So many people feel themselves in this way at pains
to find grounds whether such a theory is correct or not. Those who are particularly brilliant
even discover that the fundamental concepts can be traced back to Heraclitus or some one
even earlier. Let me confide to these knowing folk that the fundamental ideas employed in the
constructive method stretch back even beyond any historical philosophy, viz. to the dynamic
"views" of primitive peoples. If the result of the constructive method were scientific theory, it
would go very ill with it, for then it would be a falling back to the deepest superstition. But
since the constructive method results in something far removed from scientific theory the
great antiquity of the basic concepts therein must speak in favour of its extreme correctness.
Not until the constructive method has presented us with much practical experience can we
come to the construction of a scientific theory, a theory of the psychological lines of
development. But we must first of all content ourselves with confirming these lines
individually.

FOREWORD TO CHAPTER XIV
This essay was originally written in 1913, when I limited myself entirely to
presenting an essential part of the psychological point of view inaugurated
by Freud. A few months ago my Swiss publisher asked for a second and
revised edition. The many and great changes which the last few years have
brought about in our understanding of the psychology of the unconscious
necessitated a substantial enlargement of my essay. In this new edition some
expositions about Freud's theories are shortened, whilst Adler's
psychological views are more fully considered, and—so far as the scope of
this paper permits—a general outline of my own views are given. I must at
the outset draw the reader's attention to the fact that this is no longer an easy
"popular" scientific paper, but a presentation making great demands upon
the patience and attention of the reader. The material is extremely
complicated and difficult. I do not for a moment deceive myself into
thinking this contribution is in any way conclusive or adequately
convincing. Only detailed scientific treatises about the various problems
touched upon in these pages could really do justice to the subject. Any one
who wishes to go deeply into the questions that are raised here must be
referred to the special literature of the subject. My attention is solely to give
the orientation in regard to the newest concepts of the inner nature of
unconscious psychology. I consider the subject of the unconscious to be
specially important and opportune at this moment. In my opinion, it would
be a great loss if this problem, concerning every one so closely as it does,
were to disappear from the horizon of the educated lay public, by being
interned in some inaccessible specialised scientific journal. The
psychological events that accompany the present war—the incredible
brutalisation of public opinion, the epidemic of mutual calumnies, the
unsuspected mania for destruction, the unexampled flood of mendacity, and
man's incapacity to arrest the bloody demon—are they not, one and all,
better adapted than anything else, to force obtrusively the problem of the
chaotic unconscious—which slumbers uneasily beneath the ordered world
of consciousness,—before the eyes of every thinking individual? This war
has inexorably shown to the man of culture that he is still a barbarian. It
testifies also what an iron scourge awaits him, if ever again it should occur

to him to make his neighbour responsible for his own bad qualities. The
psychology of the individual corresponds to the psychology of nations.
What nations do, each individual does also, and as long as the individual
does it, the nation will do it too. A metamorphosis in the attitude of the
individual is the only possible beginning of a transformation in the
psychology of the nation. The great problems of humanity have never been
solved by universal laws, but always and only by a remodelling of the
attitude of the individual. If ever there was a time when self-examination
was the absolutely indispensable and the only right thing, it is now, in the
present catastrophic epoch. But he who bethinks himself about his own
being strikes against the confines of the unconscious, which indeed contains
precisely that which it is most needful for him to know.
C. G. JUNG.
KÜSNACHT-ZÜRICH,
March, 1917.

CHAPTER XIV
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
PROCESSES[216]
Being a Survey of the Modern Theory and Method of Analytical Psychology

I.—THE BEGINNINGS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
In common with other sciences, psychology had to go through its
scholastic-philosophic stage, and to some extent this has lasted on into the
present time. This philosophic psychology has incurred our condemnation
in that it decides ex cathedra what is the nature of the soul, and whence and
how it derives its attributes. The spirit of modern scientific investigation has
summarily disposed of all these phantasies and in their place has established
an exact empiric method. We owe to this our present-day experimental
psychology or "psychophysiology," as the French call it. This new direction
originated with Fechner, that Janus-minded spirit, who in his remarkable
Psychophysik (1860) embarked on the mighty enterprise of introducing the
physical standpoint into the conception of psychical phenomena. The whole
idea of this work—and not least its astonishing mistakes—proved most
fruitful in results. For Wundt, Fechner's young contemporary, carried on his
work, and it is Wundt's great erudition, enormous power of work and genius
for elaborating methods of experimental research, which have given to
modern psychology its prevailing direction.
Until quite recently experimental psychology remained essentially
academic. The first notable attempt to utilise some few at any rate of its
innumerable experimental methods in the service of practical psychology
came from the psychiatrists of the former Heidelberg school (Kræpelin,
Aschaffenburg, etc.); it is quite intelligible that the psychotherapists should
be the first to feel the urgent need for more exact knowledge of psychic
processes.

Next came pedagogy, making its own demands upon psychology. Out of
this has recently grown up an "experimental pedagogy," and in this field
Neumann in Germany and Binet in France have rendered signal services.
The physician, the so-called "nerve-specialist," has the most urgent need of
psychological knowledge if he would really help his patients, for neurotic
disturbances, such as hysteria, and all things classed as "nervousness," are
of psychic origin, and necessarily demand psychic treatment. Cold water,
light, air, electricity, magnetism, etc., are only effective temporarily, and
quite often are of no use at all. They are frequently introduced into
treatment in a not very commendable fashion, simply because reliance is
placed upon their suggestive effect. But it is in his soul that the patient is
really sick; in those most complicated and lofty functions which we
scarcely dare to include in the province of medicine. The doctor must
needs, in such a case, be a psychologist, must needs understand the human
soul. He cannot evade the urgent demand upon him. So he naturally turns
for help to psychology, since his psychiatry text-books have nothing to offer
him. But modern experimental psychology is very far from being able to
afford him any connected insight into the most vital psychic processes, that
is not its aim. As far as possible it tries to isolate those simple elementary
phenomena which border on the physiological, and then study them in an
isolated state. It quite ignores the infinite variation and movement of the
mental life of the individual, and accordingly, its knowledge and its facts
are so many isolated details, uninspired by any comprehensive idea capable
of bringing them into co-ordination. Hence it comes about that the inquirer
after the secrets of the human soul, learns rather less than nothing from
experimental psychology. He would be better advised to abandon exact
science, take off his scholar's gown, say farewell to his study, and then,
strong in manly courage, set out to wander through the world; alike through
the horrors of prisons, lunatic asylums and hospitals, through dreary
outlying taverns, through brothels and gambling-halls, into elegant
drawing-rooms, the Stock Exchanges, socialist meetings, churches, revival
gatherings of strange religious sects, experiencing in his own person love
and hate and every kind of suffering. He would return laden with richer
knowledge than his yard-long text-books could ever have given him, and
thus equipped, he can indeed be a physician to his patients, for he
understands the soul of man. He may be pardoned if his respect for the
"corner-stones" of experimental psychology is no longer very considerable.

There is a great gulf fixed between what science calls "psychology," on the
one hand, and what the practice of everyday life expects from psychology
on the other.
This need became the starting-point of a new psychology whose inception
we owe first and foremost to the genius of Sigmund Freud, of Vienna, to his
researches into functional nervous disease. The new type of psychology
might be described as "analytical psychology." Professor Bleuler has coined
the name "Deep Psychology,"[217] to indicate that the Freudian psychology
takes as its province the deeper regions, the "hinterland" of the soul, the
"unconscious." Freud names his method of investigation "psychoanalysis."
Before we approach the matter more closely, we must first consider the
relationship of the new psychology to the earlier science. Here we
encounter a singular little farce which once again proves the truth of
Anatole France's apothegm: "Les savants ne sont pas curieux."
The first important piece of work[218] in this new field awakened only the
faintest echo, in spite of the fact that it offered a new and fundamental
conception of the neuroses. Certain writers expressed their approbation, and
then, on the next page, proceeded to explain their cases of hysteria in the
good old way. It was much as if a man should subscribe fully to the idea of
the earth's being spherical, and yet continue to represent it as flat. Freud's
next publications[219] were practically unnoticed, although they contributed
findings of immeasurable importance to the domain of psychiatry. When in
1900 he produced the first real psychological elucidation of the dream[220]
(previously there had reigned over this territory a suitable nocturnal
darkness), he was ridiculed; and when in the middle of the last decade he
began to illumine the psychology of sexuality itself,[221] and at the same
time the "Zürich school" decided to range itself on his side, a storm of
abuse, sometimes of the coarsest kind, burst upon him, nor has it yet ceased
to rage. At the last South-West German Congress of alienists in BadenBaden, the adherents of the new psychology had the pleasure of hearing
Hoche, University Professor of Psychiatry at Freiburg in Breisgau, describe
the movement in a long and much-applauded address, as an outbreak of
mental aberration among doctors. The old proverb: "Medicus medicum non
decimat" was here quite put to shame. How carefully the question had been
studied was shewn by the naïve remark of one of the most distinguished

neurologists of Paris, which I myself heard at the International Congress in
1907: "It is true I have not read Freud's works (he did not happen to know
any German!), but as for his theories, they are nothing but a mauvaise
plaisanterie." Freud, dignified, masterly, once said to me, I first became
clearly conscious of the value of my discoveries when they were met
everywhere with resistance and anger; since that time I have judged the
value of my work according to the degree of opposition provoked. It is
against my sexual theory that the greatest indignation is felt, so it would
seem therein lies my best work. Perhaps after all the real benefactors of
mankind are its false teachers, for opposition to the false doctrine pushes
men willy nilly into truth. Your truth-teller is a pernicious fellow, he drives
men into error."
The reader must now calmly accept the idea that in this psychology he is
dealing with something quite unique, if not indeed with some altogether
irrational, sectarian, or occult wisdom; for what else could possibly provoke
all the scientific authorities to turn away on the very threshold and utterly
refuse to cross it?
Accordingly, we must look more closely into this psychology. As long ago
as Charcot's time it was recognised that neurotic symptoms are
"psychogenic," that is, that they have their origin in the psyche. It was also
known, thanks mainly to the work of the Nancy School, that every
hysterical symptom can be exactly reproduced by means of suggestion. But
how a hysterical system arises, and its relationship to psychic causes, were
altogether unknown. In the beginning of the eighties Dr. Breuer, an old
Viennese doctor, made a discovery[222] which was really the true startingpoint of the new psychology. He had a very intelligent young patient (a
woman) suffering from hysteria, who exhibited the following symptoms
among others: A spastic paralysis of the right arm, occasional disturbances
of consciousness or twilight-states, and loss of the power of speech in so far
as she no longer retained any knowledge of her mother-tongue, and could
only express herself in English (so-called systematic aphasia). They sought
at that time, and still seek, in such a case to establish some theory of
anatomical disturbance, although there was just as little disturbance in the
arm-centre in the brain as in that of any normal man who boxes another's
ears. The symptomatology of hysteria is full of anatomical impossibilities;
such as the case of the lady who had lost her hearing completely through

some hysterical malady. None the less she often used to sing, and once
when she was singing her doctor sat down at the piano unnoticed by her and
softly accompanied her. Passing from one strophe to another he suddenly
altered the key, and she, quite unconscious of what she was doing, sang on
in the altered key. Thus she heard—yet did not hear. The various forms of
systematic blindness present similar phenomena. We have the case of a man
suffering from complete hysterical blindness. In the course of the treatment
he recovers his sight, but at first, and for some long time, only partially: he
could see everything with one exception—people's heads. He saw all the
people around him without heads. Thus he saw—yet did not see. From a
large number of like experiences it has long been concluded that it is only
the patient's consciousness which does not see, does not hear, but the sensefunction has nothing at all the matter with it. This state of affairs is directly
contradictory to the essence of an organic disturbance, which always
materially involves the function.
After this digression let us return to Breuer's case. Since there was no
organic cause for the disturbance, the case was clearly to be regarded as
hysterical, that is, psychogenic. Dr. Breuer had noticed that if during her
twilight-states (whether spontaneous or artificially induced) he let the
patient freely express the reminiscences and phantasies that thronged in
upon her, her condition was afterwards much improved for some hours. He
made systematic use of this observation in her further treatment. The patient
herself invented the appropriate name for it of "talking cure" or, in jest,
"chimney sweeping."
Her illness began whilst she was nursing her dying father. It is easy to
understand that her phantasies busied themselves mainly with this
disturbing time. In the twilight-states memories of this period reappeared
with photographic fidelity, distinct in every detail: no waking recollection is
ever so plastically and exactly reproduced. The term hypermnesia is applied
to this heightening of the power of memory, which occurs without difficulty
in certain states of contracted consciousness. Remarkable things now came
to light. Out of the many things told, one ran somewhat as follows.[223]
On a certain night she was in a state of great anxiety about her father's high
temperature. She sat by his bed, waiting for the surgeon who was coming
from Vienna to perform an operation. Her mother had gone out of the room

for a little while, and Anna (the patient) sat by the bed, with her right arm
hanging over the back of her chair. She fell into a kind of waking-dream in
which she saw a black snake come out from the wall and approach the sick
man, prepared to bite. (It is very probable that some real snakes had been
seen in the fields behind the house, and that she had been frightened by
them; this would furnish the material for her hallucination.) She wanted to
drive the creature away, but felt paralysed; her right arm, hanging over the
chair, had "gone to sleep," was anæsthetic and paretic, and as she looked
her fingers turned into little snakes with death's heads (the nails). Probably
she tried to drive the snake away with her paralysed right hand, and thereby
the anæsthesia and paralysis became associated with the snakehallucination. Even after the snake had disappeared, her terror remained
great. She tried to pray, but found she had no words in any language, until
at length she managed to remember some English nursery rhymes, and then
she could go on thinking and praying in that language.
This was the actual scene in which the paralysis and speech-disturbance
arose; the describing it served to remove the speech-trouble, and in this
same fashion the case was finally completely cured.
I must restrict myself to this one instance. In Breuer and Freud's book there
is a wealth of similar examples. It is easy to understand that scenes such as
these make a very strong impression, and accordingly there is an inclination
to attribute a causal significance to them in the genesis of the symptoms.
The then current conception of hysteria, arising from the English "nervous
shock" theory, which Charcot strongly supported, came in conveniently to
elucidate Breuer's discovery, hence arose the trauma-theory maintaining
that the hysterical symptom and in so far as the symptoms comprise the
disease, hysteria itself, arises from some psychic injury (or trauma), the
effect of which is retained in the unconscious indefinitely. Freud, working
as Breuer's colleague, amply confirmed this discovery. It was fully
demonstrated that not one out of the many hundred hysterical symptoms
came down ready made from heaven; they had already been conditioned by
past psychic experiences. To some extent, therefore, this new conception
opened up a field of very important empirical work. But Freud's tireless
spirit of inquiry could not long rest content at this superficial layer, since
already there obtruded deeper and more difficult problems. It is obvious
enough that moments of great fear and anxiety, such as Breuer's patient

went through, would leave behind a lasting effect, but how is it that these
happenings are themselves already deeply stamped with the mark of
morbidity? Must we suppose that the trying sick-nursing in itself produce
such a result? If so, such effects should occur much more frequently, for
there are, unfortunately, many trying cases of sick-nursing, and the nurse's
nervous constitution is by no means always of the soundest. To this problem
medicine gives its admirable answer; the "x" in the calculation is
predisposition; there is a tendency to these things. But for Freud the
problem was, what exactly constitutes this predisposition? This question led
logically to an investigation of all that had preceded the psychic trauma. It
is a matter of common observation that distressing scenes have markedly
different effects upon the different participants, and that things which to
some are quite indifferent or even pleasant, such as frogs, mice, snakes,
cats, excite the greatest aversion in others. There are the cases of women
who can calmly be present at a very bad operation, but who tremble all over
with horror and nausea at the touch of a cat. By way of illustration let me
give the case of a young lady suffering from severe hysteria following a
sudden fright.[224] She had been at a social gathering, and was on her way
home at midnight accompanied by several acquaintances, when a carriage
came up behind them at full speed. All the others moved out of the way, but
she, beside herself with fright, ran down the middle of the road just in front
of the horses. The coachman cracked his whip and cursed and swore in
vain. She ran down the whole length of the street till a bridge was reached.
There her strength failed her, and to escape the horses' feet in her despair
she would have jumped into the water had not passers-by prevented her.
This same lady happened to be in Petrograd during that sanguinary
Revolution of the 22nd of January, and saw a street cleared by the volleys
of soldiers. All around her people were dropping down dead or wounded,
but she retained her calmness and self-possession, and caught sight of a
door which gave her escape into another street. These terrible moments
agitated her neither at the time nor later on. She was quite well afterwards,
indeed felt better than usual.
Essentially similar reactions can quite often be observed. Hence it follows
that the intensity of the trauma is of small pathogenic importance; the
peculiar circumstances determine its pathogenic effect. Here, then, we have
the key which enables us to unlock at least one of the anterooms to an

understanding of predisposition. We must now ask what were the unusual
circumstances in this carriage scene? The terror and apprehension began as
soon as the lady heard the trampling horses. For a moment she thought this
portended some terrible fate, her death, or something equally frightful; the
next, she lost all sense of what she was doing.
This powerful impression was evidently connected in some way with the
horses. The predisposition of the patient to react in such an exaggerated
fashion to a not very remarkable incident, might result from the fact that
horses had some special significance for her. It might be suspected that she
had experienced some dangerous accident with them; this actually turned
out to be the case. When a child of about seven years old she was out for a
drive with the coachman; the horses shied and galloped at full speed
towards a steep river-bank. The coachman jumped down, and shouted to her
to do the same, but in her extreme terror she could scarcely bring herself to
obey. She did, however, just manage to jump out in the nick of time, whilst
the horses and carriage were dashed to pieces below. No proof is needed
that such an experience must leave a lasting impression behind it. But it
does not offer any explanation for such an exaggerated reaction to an
inadequate stimulus. So far we only know that this later symptom had its
prologue in childhood, but its pathological aspect remains obscure. To
penetrate into the heart of such a mystery it was necessary to accumulate
further material. And the greater our experience the clearer does it become
that in all cases with such traumatic experiences analysed up to the present,
there co-exists a special kind of disturbance which can only be described as
a derangement in the sphere of love. Not all of us give due credit to the
anomalous nature of love, reaching high as heaven, sinking low as hell,
uniting in itself all extremes of good and evil, of lofty and low.[225]
As soon as Freud recognised this, a decisive change came about in his view.
In his earlier researches, whilst more or less dominated by Charcot's
trauma-theory, he had sought for the origin of the neurosis in actual
traumatic experiences; but now the centre of gravity shifted to a very
different point. This is best demonstrated by reference to our case; we can
understand that horses might easily play a significant part in the patient's
life, but it is not clear why there should be this later reaction, so
exaggerated, so uncalled for. It is not her fear of horses which forms the
morbid factor in this curious story; to get at the real truth we must

remember our empirical conclusion, that, side by side with traumatic
experiences, there is also invariably present some disturbance in the sphere
of love. We must now go on to inquire whether perhaps there is anything
unsatisfactory in this respect in the case under review.
Our patient has a young man friend, to whom she is thinking of becoming
engaged, she loves him and expects to be happy with him. At first nothing
more is discoverable; but the investigator must not let himself be deterred
by a negative result in the beginning of this preliminary questioning. When
the direct way does not lead to the desired end, an indirect way may be
taken. We accordingly turn our attention back to that strange moment when
she ran away in front of the horses. We inquire who were her companions
and what kind of social gathering was it, and find it was a farewell-party to
her best friend, on her departure to a foreign health-resort on account of a
nervous breakdown. We are told this friend is happily married and is the
mother of one child. We may well doubt the assertion that she is happy. If
she really were so, it is hardly to be supposed she would be "nervous" and
in need of a cure. When I attacked the situation from a different vantageground, I learnt that our patient—after this episode—had been taken by her
friends to the nearest safe place—her host's house. In her exhausted state he
took charge of her. When the patient came to this part of her story, she
suddenly broke off, was embarrassed, fidgeted and tried to turn the subject.
Evidently some disagreeable reminiscences had suddenly cropped up. After
obstinate resistances had been overcome, she admitted something very
strange had happened that night. Her host had made her a passionate
declaration of love, thus occasioning a situation that, in the absence of his
wife, might well be considered both painful and difficult. Ostensibly this
declaration came upon her like a "bolt from the blue." But a small dose of
criticism applied to such an assertion soon apprises us that these things
never do drop suddenly from the sky; they always have their previous
history. It was a task of the following weeks to dig out piecemeal a long
love-story. I will attempt to sketch in the picture as it appeared finally.
As a child the patient was a thorough tomboy, loved boys' boisterous
games, laughed at her own sex, and would have nothing to do with feminine
ways or occupations. After puberty, just when the sex-issue should have
meant much to her, she began to shun all society; she seemingly hated and
despised everything which could remind her even remotely of the biological

destiny of mankind, and lived in a world of phantasy which had nothing in
common with rude reality. Thus, till her twenty-fourth year, she escaped all
the little adventures, hopes and expectations which ordinarily move a girl at
this age. But finally she got to know the two men who were destined to
destroy the thorny hedge which had grown up around her. Mr. A. was her
best friend's husband; Mr. B. was their bachelor-friend. She liked both; but
pretty soon found B. the more sympathetic, and an intimacy grew up
between them which made an engagement seem likely. Through her
friendship with him and with Mrs. A., she often met Mr. A. His presence
excited her inexplicably, made her nervous. Just at this time she went to a
big party. All her friends were there. She became lost in thought, and in a
reverie was playing with her ring, when suddenly it slipped out of her hand
and rolled under the table. Both men tried to find it and Mr. B. managed to
get it. With a meaning smile he put the ring back on her finger, and said,
"You know what that means!" Overcome by some strange, irresistible
feeling, she tore the ring from her finger and flung it out of the open
window. Naturally a painful moment for all ensued, and she soon went
away, much depressed. A little while after, so-called chance brought her for
her summer holidays to the health-resort where A. and his wife were
staying. It was then that Mrs. A. began to suffer from nerve-trouble, and
frequently felt too unwell to leave the house. So our patient could often go
out for walks alone with A. One day they were out in a small boat. She was
boisterously merry and fell overboard. Mr. A. saved her with difficulty as
she could not swim, and he managed to lift her into the boat in a halfunconscious state. Then he kissed her. This romantic event wove fast the
bonds between them. In self-defence she did her best to get herself engaged
to B. and to persuade herself that she loved him. Of course this queer
comedy could not escape the sharp eye of feminine jealousy. Mrs. A., her
friend, guessed the secret, and was so much upset by it that her nervous
condition grew bad enough to necessitate her trying a cure at a foreign
health-resort. At the farewell gathering the demon came to our patient and
whispered: "To-night he will be alone, something must happen to you so
that you can go to his house." And so indeed it came about; her strange
behaviour made her friends take her to his house, and thus she achieved her
desire.
After this explanation the reader will probably be inclined to assume that
only diabolical subtlety could think out and set in motion such a chain of

circumstances. There is no doubt about the subtlety, but the moral
evaluation is less certain. I desire to lay special emphasis upon the fact that
the patient was in no sense conscious of the motives of this dramatic
performance. The incident apparently just came about of itself without any
conscious motive whatsoever. But the whole previous history makes it
perfectly clear that everything was most ingeniously directed towards the
other aim; whilst the conscious self was apparently working to bring about
the engagement to Mr. B., the unconscious compulsion to take the other
road was still stronger.
So once more we must return to our original question, whence comes the
pathological, the peculiar and exaggerated reaction to the trauma? Relying
on a conclusion obtained from other analogous experiences, we ventured
the conjecture that in the present case we had to do with a disturbance in the
love-life, in addition to the trauma. This supposition was thoroughly borne
out; the trauma, which was apparently the cause of the illness, was merely
the occasion for some factor, till then unconscious, to manifest itself. This
was the significant erotic conflict. With this finding the trauma loses its
pathogenic significance and is replaced by a much deeper and more
comprehensive conception, which regards the erotic conflict as the
pathogenic agent. This conception may be described as the sexual theory of
the neurosis.
I am often asked why it is just the erotic conflict rather than any other
which is the cause of the neurosis. There is but one answer to this. No one
asserts that this ought necessarily to be the case, but as a simple matter of
fact it is always found to be so, notwithstanding all the cousins and aunts,
godparents, and teachers, who rage against it. Despite all the indignant
assertions to the contrary, the problem and conflicts of love are of
fundamental importance for humanity,[226] and with increasingly careful
study, it comes out ever more clearly that the love-life is of immensely
greater importance than the individual suspects.
As a consequence of the recognition that the true root of the neurosis is not
the trauma, but the hidden erotic conflict, the trauma loses its pathogenic
significance.

II.—THE SEXUAL THEORY.

Thus, it will be seen, the theory had to be shifted on to an entirely different
basis, for the investigation now had to face the erotic conflict itself. Our
example shows that this contains extremely abnormal elements and cannot,
primâ facie, be compared with an ordinary love conflict. It is surprising,
indeed hardly credible, that only the postulated affection should be
conscious, whilst the real passion remained unknown to the patient. But in
this case it is beyond dispute that the real erotic relation remained
unillumined, whilst the field of consciousness was dominated by the
assumption. If we try to formulate this fact, something like the following
proposition results: in a neurosis, two erotic tendencies exist which stand in
extreme opposition to one another, and one at least is unconscious. Against
this formula the objection can be raised that it has obviously been derived
from this one particular case, and is therefore lacking in general validity.
The criticism will be the more readily urged because no one unpossessed of
special reasons is willing to admit that the erotic conflict is of universal
prevalence. On the contrary, it is assumed that this conflict belongs more
properly to the sphere of novels, since it is generally depicted as something
in the nature of such wild adventures as are described by Karin Michaelis in
her "Aberrations of Marriage," or by Forel in "The Sexual Question." But
indeed this is not the case; for we know the wildest and most moving
dramas are not played on the stage, but every day in the hearts of ordinary
men and women who pass by without exciting attention, and who betray to
the world, save through the symbol of a nervous breakdown, nothing of the
conflicts that rage within them. But what is so difficult for the layman to
grasp is the fact that in most cases patients have no suspicion whatever of
the internecine war raging in their unconscious. But remembering that there
are many people who understand nothing at all about themselves, we shall
be less surprised at the realisation that there are also people who are utterly
unaware of their actual conflicts.
If the reader is now inclined to admit the possible existence of pathogenic,
and perhaps even of unconscious conflicts, he will certainly protest that
they are not erotic conflicts. If this kind reader should happen himself to be
somewhat nervous, the mere suggestion will arouse his indignation, for we
are all inclined, as a result of our education in school and at home, to cross
ourselves three times where we meet such words as "erotic" and "sexual"—
and so we are conveniently able to think that nothing of that nature exists,

or at least very seldom, and at a great distance from ourselves. But it is just
this attitude which in the first instance brings about neurotic conflicts.
We recognise that the course of civilisation consists in the progressive
mastering of the animal element in man; it is a process of domestication
which cannot be carried through without rebellion on the part of the animal
nature still thirsting for its liberty. Humanity forces itself to endure the
restrictions of the civilising process; but from time to time there comes a
frenzied bursting of all bonds. Antiquity had experience of it in that wave of
Dionysian orgies, surging hither from the East, which became an essentially
characteristic element of antique culture. Its spirit was partly instrumental in
causing the numerous sects and philosophic schools of the last century
before Christ, to develop the Stoic ideal into asceticism; and in producing
from the polytheistic chaos of those times, the ascetic twin-religions of
Mithras and of Christ. A second clearly marked wave of the Dionysian
impulse towards freedom swept over the Western world during the
Renaissance. It is difficult to judge of one's own time, but we gain some
insight if we note how the Arts are developing, what is the prevailing type
of public taste, what men read and write, what societies they found, what
"questions" are the order of the day, and against what the Philistines are
fighting. We find in the long list of our present social problems that the
sexual question occupies by no means the last place. It agitates men and
women who would shake the foundations of sexual morality, and throw off
the burden of moral shame which past centuries have heaped upon Eros.
The existence of these aspirations and endeavours cannot be simply denied,
or declared indefensible; they exist and are therefore presumably not
without justification. It is both more interesting and more useful to study
carefully the basic causes of these movements than to chime in with the
lamentations of the professional mourners over morals, who prophesy with
unction the moral downfall of humanity. The moralist least of all trusts
God, for he thinks that the beautiful tree of humanity can only thrive by dint
of being pruned, bound, and trained on a trellis, whereas Father-Sun and
Mother-Earth have combined to make it grow joyfully in accordance with
its own laws, which are full of the deepest meaning.
Serious people are aware that a very real sexual problem does exist at the
present time. The rapid development of the towns, coupled with methods of
work brought about by the extraordinary division of labour, the increasing

industrialisation of the country and the growing security of life, combine to
deprive humanity of many opportunities of expending emotional energy.
Think of the life of the peasant, whose work so rich and full of change,
affords him unconscious satisfaction by means of its symbolic content; a
like satisfaction the factory-hand and the clerk can never know. Think of a
life with nature; of those wonderful moments when, as lord and fructifier,
man drives the plough through the earth, and with kingly gesture scatters
the seed of the future harvest; see his justifiable awe before the destructive
power of the elements, his joy in the fruitfulness of his wife, who gives him
daughters and sons, who mean to him increased working power and
enhanced prosperity. Alas! from all this we town-dwellers, we modern
machines, are far, far removed.
Must we not admit that we are already deprived of the most natural and
most beautiful of all satisfactions, since we can no longer contemplate the
arrival of our own seed, the "blessing" of children, with unmixed pleasure?
Marriages where no artifices are resorted to are rare. Is this not an allimportant departure from the joys which Mother Nature gave her first-born
sons? Can such a state of affairs bring satisfaction? Note how men slink to
their work, watch their faces at an early morning hour in the tram-cars. One
of them makes his little wheels, and another writes trivial things which do
not interest him. What wonder is it if such men belong to as many clubs as
there are days in the week, and that among women little societies flourish,
where they pour out on some particular hero or cause those unsatisfied
desires which the man dulls at his restaurant or club, imbibing beer and
playing at being important? To these sources of dissatisfaction is added a
more serious factor. Nature has provided defenceless, weaponless man with
a great amount of energy to enable him not merely to bear passively the
grave dangers of existence, but also to conquer them. Mother Nature has
equipped her son for tremendous hardships and has placed a costly
premium on the overcoming of them, as Schopenhauer quite understood
when he said that "happiness is really but the termination of unhappiness."
Civilized people are, as a rule, shielded from the immediately pressing
dangers, and they are therefore daily tempted to excess, for in man the
animal always becomes rampant when he is not constrained by fierce
necessity. Are we then indeed unrestrained? In what orgiastic festivals do
we dispose of the surplus of vital power? Our moral views do not permit us
that outlet.

But reckon up in how many directions we are met by unsatisfied longings;
the denial of procreation and begetting, for which purpose nature has
endowed us with great energy; the unending monotony of our highly
developed modern methods of "division of labour," which excludes any
interest in the work itself; and above all our effortless security against war,
lawlessness, robbery, epidemics, infant and woman mortality—all this gives
a sum of surplus energy which must needs find an outlet. But how? A
relatively few create quasi-natural dangers for themselves in reckless sport;
many more, seeking to find some equivalent for their more primitive
energy, take to alcoholic excess; others expend themselves in the rush of
money-making, or in the morbid performance of duties, in perpetual overwork. By such means they try to escape a dangerous storing-up of energy
which might force mad outlets for itself. It is for such reasons that we have
to-day a sexual question. It is in this direction that men's energy would like
to expend itself as it has done from time immemorial in periods of security
and abundance. Under such circumstances it is not only rabbits that
multiply; men and women, too, become the sport of these accesses of
nature: the sport, because their moral views have confined them in a narrow
cage, the excessive narrowness of which was not felt so long as harsh
external necessity pressed upon them with even greater constraint. But now
the man of the cities finds the space too circumscribed. He is surrounded by
alluring temptation, and like an invisible procureur there slinks through
society the knowledge of preventive methods which evade all
consequences. Why then moral restraint? Out of religious consideration for
an angry God? Apart from the prevalence of widespread unbelief, even the
believing man might quietly ask himself whether, if he himself were God,
he would punish the youthful erotic uncontrol of John and Mary with twice
twenty-four years of imprisonment and seething in boiling oil. Such ideas
are no longer compatible with our decorous conception of God. The God of
our time is necessarily much too tolerant to make a great fuss over it;
(knavishness and hypocrisy are a thousand times worse). In this way the
somewhat ascetic and hypocritical sexual morality of our time has had the
ground cut from under its feet. Or is it the case that we are now protected
from dissoluteness by superior wisdom, recognition of the nothingness of
human happenings? Unfortunately we are very far from that; rather does the
hypnotic power of tradition keep us in bonds, and through cowardice and
thoughtlessness and habit the herd goes tramping on in this same path. But

man possesses in the unconscious a fine scent for the spirit of his time; he
has an inkling of his own possibilities and he feels in his innermost heart
the instability of the foundations of present-day morality, no longer
supported by living religious conviction. It is thus the greater number of the
erotic conflicts of our time originate. Instinct thirsting for liberty thrusts
itself up against the yielding barriers of morality: men are tempted, they
desire and do not desire. And because they will not and cannot think out to
its logical conclusion what it is they really desire, their erotic conflict is
largely unconscious; whence comes neurosis. Neurosis then is most
intimately bound up with the problem of our times and represents an
unsuccessful attempt of the individual to solve the general problem in his
own person. Neurosis is a tearing in two of the inner self. For most men the
reason of this cleavage is the fact that their conscious self desires to hold to
its moral ideal, whilst the unconscious strives after the amoral ideal,
steadfastly rejected by the conscious self. People of this kind would like to
appear more decent than they really are. But the conflict is often of an
opposite kind. There are those who do not outwardly live a decent life at all
and do not place the slightest constraint upon their sexuality, but in reality
this is a sinful pose assumed for goodness knows what reasons, for down
below they have a decorous soul which has somehow gone astray in their
unconscious, just as has the real immoral nature in the case of apparently
moral people. Extremes of conduct always arouse suspicions of the opposite
tendencies in the unconscious.
It was necessary to make this general statement in order to elucidate the
idea of the "erotic conflict" in analytical psychology, for it is the key to the
conception of neurosis. We can now proceed to consider the psychoanalytic
technique. Obviously the main problem is, how to arrive by the shortest and
best path at a knowledge of the patient's "unconscious." The method first
used was hypnotism, the patient being questioned, on the production of
spontaneous phantasies observed while in a state of hypnotic concentration.
This method is still occasionally used, but in comparison with the present
technique is primitive and frequently unsatisfactory. A second method,
evolved by the Psychiatric Clinic, Zürich, was the so-called association
method,[227] which is chiefly of theoretic, experimental value. Its result is
an extensive, though superficial orientation, concerning the unconscious

conflict ("complex").[228] The more penetrating method is that of dreamanalysis whose discovery belongs to Sigmund Freud.[229]
Of the dream it can be said that "the stone which the builders rejected has
become the head of the corner." It is only in modern times that the dream
(that fleeting and seemingly insignificant product of the soul), has met with
such complete contempt. Formerly it was esteemed, as a harbinger of fate, a
warning or a consolation, a messenger of the gods. Now we use it as a
messenger of the unconscious; it must disclose to us the secrets which our
unconscious self enviously hides from our consciousness, and it does so
with astonishing completeness.
On analytical investigation it becomes plain that the dream, as we
remember it, is only a façade which conceals the contents within the house.
But if, observing certain technical rules, we get the dreamer to talk about
the details of his dream, it soon appears that his free associations group
themselves in certain directions and round certain topics. These appear to
be of personal significance, and have a meaning which at first sight would
not be suspected. Careful comparison shows that they are in close and
subtle symbolic connection with the dream-façade.[230] This particular
complex of ideas in which all the threads of the dream unite, is the conflict
for which we are seeking; is its particular form at the moment, conditioned
by the immediate circumstances. What is painful and incompatible is in this
way so covered up or split that we can call it a wish-fulfilment; but we must
immediately add that the wishes fulfilled in the dream do not seem at first
sight to be our wishes, but rather the very opposite. For instance, a daughter
loves her mother tenderly, but she dreams that her mother is dead; this
causes her great grief. Such dreams, where apparently there is no trace of
any wish-fulfilment are innumerable, and are a constant stumbling-block to
our learned critics, for—incredible dictu—they still cannot grasp the simple
distinction between the manifest and the latent content of the dream. We
must guard against such an error; the conflict dealt with in the dream is an
unconscious one, and equally so also is the manner its solution. Our
dreamer has, as a matter of fact, the wish to get away from her mother—
expressed in the language of the unconscious, she wants her mother to die.
Now we know that a certain section of the unconscious contains all our lost
memories, and also all those infantile impulses that cannot find any
application in adult life—a series, that is, of ruthless childish desires. We

may say that for the most part the unconscious bears an infantile stamp; like
the child's simple wish: "Daddy, when Mummie is dead, will you marry
me?" In a dream that infantile expression of a wish is the substitute for a
recent wish to marry, which is painful to the dreamer for reasons still
undiscovered. This thought, or rather the seriousness of its corresponding
intention, is said to be "repressed into the unconscious" and must there
necessarily express itself in an infantile way, for the material which is at the
disposal of the unconscious consists chiefly of infantile memories. As the
latest researches of the Zürich school have shown,[231] these are not only
infantile memories but also "racial" memories, extending far beyond the
limits of individual existence.
Important desires which have not been sufficiently gratified, or have been
"repressed," during the day find their symbolic substitution in dreams.
Because moral tendencies usually predominate in waking hours, these
ungratified desires which strive to realise themselves symbolically in the
dream are, as rule, erotic ones. It is, therefore, somewhat rash to tell dreams
before one who understands, for the symbolism is often extremely
transparent to him who knows the rules! The clearest in this respect are
"anxiety-dreams" which are so common, and which invariably symbolise a
strong erotic desire.
Often the dream apparently deals with quite irrelevant details, thereby
making a ridiculous impression; or else it is so unintelligible that we are
simply amazed at it, and accordingly have to overcome considerable
resistance in ourselves before we can set to work seriously to unravel its
symbolic weaving by patient work. But when at last we penetrate into its
real meaning we find ourselves at a bound in the very heart of the dreamer's
secrets, and find to our astonishment that an apparently senseless dream is
quite full of sense, and deals with extraordinarily important and serious
problems of the soul. Having acquired this knowledge we cannot refrain
from giving rather more credit to the old superstitions concerning the
meaning of dreams for which our rationalising tendencies, until lately, had
no use.
As Freud says: "Dream-analysis is the via regia to the unconscious."
Dream-analysis leads us into the deepest personal secrets, and it is therefore
an invaluable instrument in the hand of the psychotherapist and educator.

The objections of the opponents of this method are based, as might be
expected, upon argument, which (setting aside undercurrents of personal
feeling) show the bias of present-day Scholasticism. It so happens that it is
just the analysis of dreams which mercilessly uncovers the deceptive morals
and hypocritical affectations of man, and shows him the under side of his
character; can we wonder if many feel that their toes have been rather
painfully trodden upon? In connection with the dream-analysis I am always
reminded of the striking statue of Carnal Pleasure in Bâle Cathedral, which
shows in front the sweet smile of archaic sculpture, but behind is covered
with toads and serpents. Dream-analysis reverses the figure and for once
shows the other side. The ethical value of this reality-correction
(Wirklichkeitscorrectur) cannot be disputed. It is a painful but extremely
useful operation, which makes great demands on both physician and
patient.
Psychoanalysis, in so far as we are considering it as a therapeutic technique,
consists mainly of the analysis of many dreams; the dreams in the course of
the treatment bringing up successively the contents of the unconscious in
order that they may be subjected to the disinfecting power of daylight, and
in this process many a valuable thing believed to have been lost is found
again. It is not surprising that for those persons who have adopted a certain
pose towards themselves, psychoanalysis is at times a real torture, since in
accordance with the old mystic saying, "Give all thou hast, then only shalt
thou receive," there is first the necessity to get rid of almost all the dearly
cherished illusions, to permit the advent of something deeper, finer, and
greater, for only through the mystery of self-sacrifice is it possible to be
"born-again." It is indeed ancient wisdom which again sees the daylight in
psychoanalytic treatment, and it is a curious thing that this kind of psychic
re-education proves to be necessary at the height of our modern culture; this
education which in more than one respect can be compared to the technique
of Socrates, even though psychoanalysis penetrates to much greater depths.
We always find in a patient some conflict, which at a particular point, is
connected with the great problems of society; so that when the analysis has
arrived at this point the apparently individual conflict is revealed as a
universal conflict of the environment and the epoch. Neurosis is thus,
strictly speaking, nothing but an individual attempt, however unsuccessful,
at a solution of the general problem; it must be so, for a general problem, a

"question," is not an end in itself; it only exists in the hearts and heads of
individual men and women. The "question" which troubles the patient is—
whether you like it or not—the "sexual" question, or more precisely, the
problem of present-day sexual morality. His increased demands upon life
and the joy of life, upon glowing reality, can stand the necessary limitations
which reality sets, but not the arbitrary, ill-supported prohibitions of
present-day morals, which would curb too much the creative spirit rising up
from the depths of the darkness of the beasts that perish. For the neurotic
has in him the soul of a child that can but ill-endure arbitrary limitations of
which it does not see the meaning; it tries to adopt the moral standard, but
thereby only falls into deeper disunion and distress within itself. On the one
hand it tries to suppress itself, and on the other to free itself—this is the
struggle that is called Neurosis. If this conflict were altogether clear to
consciousness it would of course never give rise to neurotic symptoms;
these only arise when we cannot see the other side of our character, and the
urgency of the problems of that other side. In these circumstances
symptoms arise which partially express what is unrecognised in the soul.
The symptom is, therefore, an indirect expression of unrecognised desires,
which, were they conscious, would be in violent opposition to the sufferer's
moral views. As we have already said, this dark side of the soul does not
come within the purview of consciousness, and therefore the patient cannot
deal with it, correct it, resign himself to it, or renounce it, for he cannot be
said to possess the unconscious impulses. By being repressed from the
hierarchy of the conscious soul, they have become autonomous complexes
which can be brought again under control by analysis of the unconscious,
though not without great resistance. There are a great many patients whose
great boast it is that the erotic conflict does not exist for them; they are sure
that the sexual question is nonsense, that they have, so to say, no sexuality.
These people do not see that other things of unknown origin cumber their
path, such as hysterical whims, underhand tricks, from which they make
themselves, or those nearest them, suffer; nervous stomach-catarrh, pain
here and there, irritability without reason, and a whole host of nervous
symptoms. All which things show what is wrong with them, for relatively,
only a few specially favoured by fate, avoid the great conflict.
Analytical psychology has already been reproached with setting at liberty
the animal instincts of men, hitherto happily repressed, and causing thereby
untold harm. This childish apprehension clearly proves how little trust is

put in the efficacy of present-day moral principles. It is pretended that only
morals can restrain men from dissoluteness; a much more efficient
regulator, however, is necessity, which sets much more real and convincing
bounds than any moral principles. It is true that analysis liberates animal
instincts, but not, as some have said, just in order to let them loose, but
rather to make them available for higher application, in so far as this is
possible to the particular individual, and in so far as such "sublimated"
application is required. Under all circumstances it is an advantage to be in
full possession of one's own personality, for otherwise the repressed desires
will get in the way in a most serious manner, and overthrow us just in that
place where we are most vulnerable. It is surely better that a man learn to
tolerate himself, and instead of making war on himself convert his inner
difficulties into real experiences, rather than uselessly repeat them again
and again in phantasy. Then at least he lives, and does not merely consume
himself in fruitless struggles. But when men are educated to recognise the
baser side of their own natures, it may be hoped they will learn to
understand and love their fellow-men better too. A decrease of hypocrisy
and an increase of tolerance towards oneself, can have only good results in
tolerance towards one's neighbours, for men are only too easily disposed to
extend to others the unfairness and violence which they do to their own
natures.
Freud's theory of repression does, indeed, seem to postulate the existence
only of people who, being too moral, are continually repressing the
immorality of their natural instincts. According to this idea, the immoral
man who allows his natural instincts an unbridled existence should be proof
against neurosis. But daily experience proves this is obviously not the case;
he may be just as neurotic as other men. If we analyse him, we find that it is
simply his decency that has been repressed. Therefore, when an immoral
man is neurotic, he represents what Nietzsche appropriately described as
"the pale criminal," a man who does not stand upon the same level as his
deed.[232]
The opinion may be held, that in such a case the repressed remnants of
decency are merely infantile traditional legacies, that impose unnecessary
fetters upon natural instincts, for which reason they should be eradicated.
The principle "écraser l'infâme" would be the natural culmination of such
an absolute let-instinct-live theory.[233] That would obviously be quite

phantastic and nonsensical. It should, indeed, never be forgotten—and the
Freudian School needs this reminder—that morality was not brought down
upon tables of stone from Sinai and forced upon the people, but that
morality is a function of the human soul, which is as old as humanity itself.
Morality is not inculcated from without. Man has it primarily within
himself—not the law indeed, but the essence of morals.
After all, does a more moral view-point exist than the let-instinct-live
theory? Is there a more heroic morality than this? That is why Nietzsche,
the heroic, is especially partial to it. It is natural and inborn cowardice that
makes people say, "God preserve me from following my instincts," thinking
that they thus prove their high moral standard. They do not understand that
following one's bent is really much too costly for them, too strenuous, too
dangerous, and finally it cuts somewhat against that sense of decency which
most people associate rather with taste than with a categorical imperative.
The unpardonable fault of the let-instinct-live theory is, that it is much too
heroic, too idealogic for the multitude.
There is, therefore, probably no other way for the immoral man but to
accept the moral corrective of his unconscious, just as he who is moral must
come to terms as best he may, with his demons of the netherworld. It cannot
be gainsaid that the Freudian School is so convinced of the fundamental,
and even exclusive importance of sexuality in neurosis, that it has been
courageous enough to face the consequences of its convictions by
heroically attacking the sexual morality of the present day. Many different
opinions prevail upon this subject. What is significant is, that the problem
of sexual morality is being widely discussed at the present time. This is
doubtless both useful and necessary, for hitherto we have not really had any
sexual morality at all, but merely a low barbaric view, quite insufficiently
differentiated. In the Middle Ages, usury was considered absolutely
despicable, for at that time the morality of finance was not casuistically
differentiated; there was nothing but a kind of lump-morality. So nowadays,
there exists nothing but sexual morality in the lump. A girl who has an
illegitimate child is condemned, without any inquiry as to whether she is a
decent person or not. Any form of love that has no legal sanction is
immoral, no matter whether it occurs between thoughtful people of value or
irresponsible scamps. People are still barbarically hypnotised by the thing
itself, to such an extent that they forget the individual.

Therefore the discussion of and attack upon sexual morality of the present
day signifies at bottom, a moral deed, constraining people towards a
differentiated and really ethical conception of the subject.
As already stated, Freud sees the great conflict between the ego and natural
instinct chiefly under its sexual aspect. This aspect does exist, but a big
query should be placed behind its actuality. The question is whether what
appears in a sexual form must always essentially be sexuality? It is
conceivable that one instinct may disguise itself under another. Freud
himself has supplied several notable instances of such a disguise, proving
therewith, convincingly, that many of the deeds and aims of human kind
are, at bottom, nothing but somewhat figurative expressions substituted, on
account of embarrassment, in place of important elementary things. The
substitution is not seen through on account of reasons of mutual
consideration. There is nothing to hinder certain elementary things being
also pushed conveniently into the foreground, in place of more necessary
but less pleasant ones, under the illusion that the elementary things only are
really in question.
The theory of sexuality although one-sided is absolutely right up to a
certain point. It would, therefore, be just as false to repudiate it as to accept
it as universally valid.

III.—THE OTHER VIEWPOINT: THE WILL TO POWER.
We have so far considered the problem of the psychology of unconscious
processes mainly from the point of view of Freud. We have thereby
doubtless gained an inkling of a real truth, which perhaps our pride, our
consciousness of civilisation, tries to deny, although something else in us
affirms it. This situation is extremely irritating to some people, arousing
resistances, and at the same time they are terror-stricken by it, a fact which
they are most unwilling to acknowledge. There is something terrible in
admitting this conflict, for it is an acknowledgment of being swayed by
instinct. Has it ever been understood what it means to confess to the sway
of instinct? Nietzsche desired to be so swayed and advocated it most
seriously. He even sacrificed himself throughout his whole life, with rare
passion, to the idea of the Superman, that is to the idea of the man who,
obeying his instincts, transcends even his very self. And what was the

course of his life? It turned out as Nietzsche himself prophesied in the
passage in "Zarathustra" relating to the fatal fall of the rope-dancer, of the
man who did not want to be "surpassed." Zarathustra says to the dying ropedancer: "Thy soul will be dead even sooner than thy body." And later, the
dwarf says to Zarathustra: "Oh, Zarathustra, thou stone of wisdom! Thou
threwest thyself high, but every thrown-stone must fall! Condemned of
thyself, and to thine own stoning: oh, Zarathustra, far indeed threwest thou
the stone—but upon thyself will it recoil!"
When he cried his "ecce homo" over himself, it was again too late, and the
crucifixion of the soul began even before the body was dead. He who thus
taught yea-saying to the instincts of life, must have his own career looked at
critically, in order to discover the effects of this teaching upon the teacher.
But if we consider his life from this point of view, we must say that
Nietzsche lived beyond instinct, in the lofty atmosphere of heroic
"sublimity." This height could only be maintained by means of most careful
diet, choice climate and above all by many opiates. Finally, the tension of
this living shattered his brain. He spoke of yea-saying, but lived the nay.
His horror of people, especially of the animal man, who lives by instinct,
was too great. He could not swallow the toad of which he so often dreamt,
and which he feared he must yet gulp down. The Zarathustrian lion roared
all the "higher" men, who craved for life, back into the cavernous depths of
the unconscious. That is why his life does not convince us of the truth of his
teaching. The "higher man" should be able to sleep without chloral, and be
competent to live in Naumburg or Basle despite "the fogs and shadows." He
wants woman and offspring; he needs to feel he has some value and
position in the herd, he longs for innumerable commonplaces, and not least
for what is humdrum: it is this instinct that Nietzsche did not recognise; it
is, in other words, the natural animal instinct for life.
But how did he live if it was not from natural impulse? Should Nietzsche
really be accused of a practical denial of his natural instincts? He would
hardly agree to that; indeed he might even prove, and that without difficulty,
that he really was following his instincts in the highest sense. But we may
well ask how is it possible that human instincts could have led him so far
from humanity, into absolute isolation, into an aloofness from the herd
which he supported with loathing and disgust? One would have thought that
instinct would have united, would have coupled and begot, that it would

tend towards pleasure and good cheer, towards gratification of all sensual
desires. But we have quite overlooked the fact that this is only one of the
possible directions of instinct. There exists not only the instinct for the
preservation of the species (the sexual instinct), but also the instinct for the
preservation of the self.
Nietzsche obviously speaks of this latter instinct, that is of the will to
power. Whatever other kinds of instinct may exist are for him only a
consequence of the will to power. Viewed from the standpoint of Freud's
sexual-psychology this is a gross error, a misconception of biology, a bad
choice made by a decadent neurotic human being. For it would be easy for
any adherent of sexual psychology to prove that all that was too lofty, too
heroic, in Nietzsche's conception of the world and of life, was nothing but a
consequence of the repression and misconception of "instinct," that is of the
instinct that this psychology considers fundamental.
This brings us to the question of perception, or rather it were better to say of
the various lenses through which the world may be perceived. For it would
hardly be permissible to pronounce a judgment on a life like Nietzsche's. It
was lived with rare consistency, from the beginning to the fateful end, in
accordance with his underlying natural fundamental instinct for power. It
would hardly do to pronounce it to be merely figurative, otherwise we
should make the same unjust condemnation that Nietzsche pronounced
upon his polar opposite Richard Wagner, of whom he said, "Everything in
him is false; what is genuine is hidden or disguised. He is an actor, in every
bad and good meaning of the word." Why this judgment? Wagner is a
precise representative of that other fundamental instinct, which Nietzsche
overlooked, and upon which Freud's psychology is based. If we inquire
whether the other main instinct—that of power—was unconsidered by
Freud, we shall find that he has included it under the name of the "ego
instinct." But these ego instincts drag out an obscure existence, according to
his psychology, alongside the broad, all-too-broad, development of the
sexual theme. In reality, however, human nature wages a cruel and hardlyto-be-ended warfare between the ego-principle and that of formless instinct.
The ego is all barriers; instinct, on the other hand, is without any limits.
Both principles are equally powerful. In a certain sense men may account
themselves fortunate in being conscious of only one instinct: therefore he
who is wise avoids getting to know the other. But if, after all, he does get to

know the other instinct, he is indeed a lost man. For then he enters upon the
Faustian conflict. Goethe has shown us in the first part of "Faust" what the
acceptance of instinct involves, and in the second part, what the acceptance
of the ego and of his gruesome unconscious world would signify.
Everything that is insignificant, petty, and cowardly in us shrinks from it,
and would avoid it—and there is one admirable means of doing so. Namely,
by discovering that the other thing in us is "another fellow," a live man who
actually thinks, feels, does and desires all the things that are despicable and
odious. In this way the bogey is seized, and the battle against him is begun
to our satisfaction. Hence arise, also, those chronic idiosyncrasies of which
the history of morals has preserved a few examples for us. The instance of
Nietzsche contra Wagner, already cited, is particularly transparent. But
ordinary human life is crammed full of such cases. It is by these ingenuous
devices that man saves himself from the Faustian catastrophe for which he
evidently lacks both courage and strength. But a sincere man knows that
even his bitterest opponent, or any number of them, does not by any means
equal his one worst adversary, that is his other self who "bides within his
breast." Nietzsche unconsciously had Wagner in himself, that is why he
envied him his Parsifal. But even worse, he was a Saul and also had Paul
within. That is why Nietzsche became a stigmatised outcast of the Spirit; he
had like Saul to experience Christification when "the other self" inspired
him with his "ecce homo." Which man in him "broke down before the
cross," Wagner or Nietzsche?
It was ordained by destiny that one of Freud's earliest pupils, Adler,[234]
should formulate a view of neurosis as founded exclusively upon the
principle of power. It is interesting and even fascinating to observe how
totally different the same things appear when viewed in another light. In
order to emphasise the main contrast, I would like at once to draw attention
to the fact that, according to Freud, everything is a strictly causal
consequence of previously-occurring facts; Adler, on the contrary, sees
everything as a finally conditioned arrangement. To take a simple example:
A young woman begins to have attacks of terror. She wakes at night from
some nightmare with a piercing cry; calming herself with difficulty, she
clings to her husband, imploring him not to leave her, making him repeat
again and again that he loves her, etc. Gradually a nervous asthma develops,
attacks of which also come on during the day.

In such a case, the Freudian system begins at once to burrow in the inner
causality of the illness: What did the initial anxiety-dreams contain. She
recalls wild bulls, lions, tigers, bad men. What does the patient associate
with them? She told a story of something that had happened to her when
she was still single. It ran as follows: She was staying at a summer-resort in
the mountains, a great deal of tennis was played, the usual acquaintances
being made. There was a young Italian who played particularly well, and
who also knew how to handle the guitar in the evenings. A harmless
flirtation developed, leading once to a moon-light walk. On this occasion,
the Italian temperament "unexpectedly" broke through, running away with
the young man to the great terror of the unsuspecting girl. He "looked at her
with such a look," that she could never forget it. This look follows her even
in her dreams; the wild animals that persecuted her had it. As a matter of
fact, does this look originally come from the Italian? Another reminiscence
enlightens us. The patient had lost her father through an accident, when she
was about fourteen years old. The father was a man of the world, and
travelled a great deal. Not long before his death he took her to Paris, where,
among other things, they visited the Follies Bergères. Something happened
there that at the time made a deep impression upon her. As they were
leaving the theatre, a rouged female suddenly pressed close up to her father
in an impertinent way. She looked at her father in fear as to what he would
do—and then she saw that look, that animal glare in his eyes. An
inexplicable something clung to her day and night. From this moment her
attitude to her father was quite changed. At one instant she was irritable and
full of venomous moods, at another she loved him extravagantly; then
causeless fits of crying suddenly began, and, for a time, whenever her father
was at home, she was tormented by terrible choking at table, with apparent
attacks of suffocation, which were usually followed by voicelessness lasting
from one to two days. When the news of her father's sudden death arrived,
she was overcome by uncontrolled grief ending in hysterical laughter. But
she soon calmed down, her condition improving quickly, and the neurotic
symptoms disappearing almost completely. It seemed as if a veil of
forgetfulness had descended over the past. Only the experience with the
Italian roused something in her of which she was afraid. She had broken off
completely with the young man. A few years later she married. The present
neurosis only began after the birth of her second child, that is at the moment

when she discovered that her husband took a certain tender interest in
another woman.

This history raises a number of questions. For instance, what do we know
about the mother? It should be said of her that she was very nervous, and
had tried many kinds of sanatoria and systems of cure. She also had
symptoms of fear and nervous asthma. The relations between her and her
husband had been very strained as far back as the patient could remember.
The mother did not understand the father; the daughter always felt that she
understood him better. She was moreover her father's declared favourite,
being inwardly correspondingly cool towards her mother.
These facts are indications for a survey of the meaning of the illness.
Behind the present symptoms phantasies are operative, connected in the
first place with the young Italian, but further clearly referring to the father,
whose unhappy marriage furnished the little daughter with an early
opportunity of acquiring a position that really should have been filled by
her mother. Behind this conquest there lies, of course, a phantasy of being
the woman who was really suited to her father. The first attack of neurosis
broke out at the moment when this phantasy received a violent shock,
presumably similar to that the mother had once experienced (a fact that was,
however, unknown to the child). The symptoms are easily comprehensible
as the expression of disappointed and rejected love. The choking is based
upon a sensation of tightening in the throat that is a well-known
accompanying phenomenon of violent effects which we cannot quite
"swallow." The metaphors of language often refer to similar physiological
occurrences. When the father died, it seemed that her consciousness
sorrowed deeply but her unconscious laughed, after the manner of Till
Eulenspiegel, who was sad when he went downhill but was jolly when
climbing laboriously, happy in anticipation of what was coming. When the
father was at home the girl was low-spirited and ill, but whenever he was
away she felt much better. Herein she resembles numerous husbands and
wives who as yet are mutually hiding from each other the secret that they
are not under all circumstances indispensable to one another.
That the unconscious had some right to laugh was shown by the subsequent
period of good health. She succeeded in letting all that had passed retire
behind the trap-door. The experience with the Italian, however, threatened
to bring the netherworld up again. But she quickly pulled the handle and
shut the door. She remained quite well until the dragon of neurosis came
creeping in, just when she imagined herself to be already safely out of her

troubles, in the so-to-say perfected state of wife and mother. Sexual
psychology finds the cause of the neurosis in the fact that the patient is not
at bottom free from the father. This forces her to resuscitate her former
experience at the moment when she discovered in the Italian the very same
disturbing something that had formerly made such a deep impression upon
her when perceived in her father. These recollections were naturally revived
by the analogous experience with another man, and formed the startingpoint of the neurosis. It might therefore be said that the content and cause of
the neurosis lay in the conflict between the phantastic infantile-erotic
relation to the father on the one hand, and her love for the husband on the
other.
But if we now consider the course of the same illness from the standpoint of
the other instinct, that is, of the will to power, a different complexion is put
upon the matter. Her parents' unhappy marriage afforded an excellent
opportunity for the exhibition of childish instinct for power. The instinct for
power desires that, under all circumstances, the ego should be "on top,"
whether by straight or crooked means. At all costs the integrity of the
personality must be preserved.
Every attempt, even what appears to be an attempt of the surroundings, to
bring about the slightest subjection of the individual, is retorted to by the
"masculine protest," as Adler expresses it. The mother's disappointment and
her taking refuge in a neurosis brought about an opportunity for the
development of power and the attainment of a dominating position. Love
and excellence of conduct are, as everybody knows, extremely well-adapted
weapons for the purposes of the instinct for power. Virtue is not seldom
made the means of forcing recognition from others. Already as a child she
knew how to obtain a privileged position with her father by means of
specially pleasing and amiable behaviour, even occasionally to supplant her
mother. This was not out of love for her father, although love was a good
means of obtaining the coveted superiority. The hysterical laughter at the
death of her father is a striking proof of this fact. One is inclined to consider
such an explanation as a deplorable depreciation of love, if not actually a
malicious insinuation. But let us pause a moment, reflect, and look at the
world as it really is. Have we never seen those innumerable people who
love, and believe in their love, only until its purpose is achieved, and who
then turn away as if they had never loved? And, after all, does not Nature

herself do the same? In fact, is a "purposeless" love possible? If so, it
belongs to the highest human virtues, which confessedly are extremely rare.
Perhaps there is a general disposition to reflect as little as possible about the
nature and purpose of love; discoveries might be made which would show
the value of one's own love to be less considerable than we had supposed.
However, it were dangerous to life to subtract anything from the value of
fundamental instincts, perhaps specially so to-day, when we seem to have
only a minimum of values left.
So the patient had an attack of hysterical laughter at the death of her father;
she had finally arrived at the top. It was hysterical laughter, therefore a
psychogenic symptom, that is, something proceeding from unconscious
motives and not from those of the conscious ego. That is a difference that
should not be underrated, for it enables us to recognise whence and how
human virtues arise. Their contraries led to hell, that is, in modern terms, to
the unconscious, where the counterparts of our conscious virtue have long
been gathering. That is why our very virtue makes us desire to know
nothing of the unconscious; indeed, it is even the summit of virtuous
wisdom to maintain that there is no unconscious at all. But unfortunately we
are all in a like predicament with Brother Medardus in E. T. A. Hoffman's
"The Elixir of the Devil": somewhere or other there exists a sinister, terrible
brother, our own incarnate counterpart bound to us by flesh and blood, who
comprehends everything, maliciously hoarding whatever we most desire
should disappear beneath the table.
The first outbreak of neurosis occurred in our patient at the moment when
she became aware of the fact that there was something in her father which
she did not control. And then it dawned upon her of what use her mother's
neurosis was. When one meets with an obstacle that cannot be overcome by
sensible and charming means, there yet exists an arrangement hitherto
unknown to her which her mother had been beforehand in discovering, and
that is neurosis. That is the reason why she now imitates her mother. But,
the astonished reader asks, what is supposed to be the use of neurosis?
What does it effect? Whoever has had a pronounced case of neurosis in his
immediate environment, knows all that can be "effected" by a neurosis. In
fact, there is altogether no better means of tyrannising over a whole
household than by a striking neurosis. Heart attacks, choking fits,
convulsions of all kinds achieve enormous effects, that can hardly be

surpassed. Picture the fountains of pity let loose, the sublime anxiety of the
dear kind parents, the hurried running to and fro of the servants, the
incessant sounding of the call to the telephone, the hasty arrival of the
physicians, the delicacy of the diagnosis, the detailed examinations, the
lengthy courses of treatment, the considerable expense; and there, in the
midst of all the uproar, lies the innocent sufferer, to whom the household is
even overflowingly grateful, when he has recovered from the "spasms."
The girl discovered this incomparable "arrangement" (to use Adler's term),
applying it on occasion when the father was there with success. It became
unnecessary when the father died, for now she was finally uppermost. The
Italian was soon dismissed, because he laid too much stress upon her
femininity by an inopportune reminder of his manliness. When the way
opened to the possibility of a suitable marriage, she loved, adapting herself
without any complaint to the deplorable rôle of the queen bee. As long as
she held the position of admired superiority, everything went splendidly.
But when her husband evinced a small outside interest, she was obliged
again to have recourse to the extremely efficacious "arrangement," that is,
to the indirect application of power, because she had once again come upon
that thing—this time in her husband—that had already previously
withdrawn her father from her influence.
That is how the matter appears from the standpoint of the psychology of
power. I fear that the reader will feel as did the Kadi, before whom the
counsel of one party spoke first. When he had ended, the Kadi said: "Thou
hast spoken well. I perceive that thou art right." Then spoke the counsel for
the other party, and when he had ended, the Kadi scratched himself behind
his ear and said: "Thou hast spoken well. I perceive that thou also art right."
There is no doubt that the instinct for power plays a most extraordinary
part. It is true that the complexes of neurotic symptoms are also exquisite
"arrangements," that inexorably realise their aims with incredible obstinacy
and unequalled cunning. The neurosis is final; that is, it is directed towards
an aim. Adler merits considerable distinction for having demonstrated this.
Which of the two points of view is right? That is a question that might well
cause much brain-racking. For the two explanations cannot be simply
combined, being absolutely contradictory. In one case, it is love and its
course that is the principal and decisive fact; and in the other case, it is the
power of the ego. In the first case the ego is merely a kind of appendage to

the passion for love; and in the second love is upon occasion merely a
means to the end, that of gaining the upper hand. Whoever has the power of
the ego most at heart rebels against the former conception, whilst he who
cares most about love, will never be able to be reconciled to the latter.

IV.—THE TWO TYPES OF PSYCHOLOGY.
It is at this point that our most recent researches may suitably be introduced.
We have found, in the first place, that there are two types of human
psychology.[235] In the one type the fundamental function is feeling, and in
the other it is thought. The one feels his way into the object, the other thinks
about it. The one adapts himself to his surroundings by feeling, thinking
coming later; whilst the other adapts himself by means of thought, preceded
by understanding. The one who feels his way transfers himself to some
extent to the object; whilst the other withdraws himself from the object to
some extent, or pauses before it and reflects about it. The first we called the
extroverted type, because in the main he goes outside himself to the object,
the latter is called the introverted type, because in a major degree he turns
away from the object, withdrawing into himself and thinking about it.
These remarks only give the broadest outline of the two types. But even this
quite inadequate sketch enables us to recognise that the two theories are the
outcome of the contrast between the two types. The sexual theory is
promulgated from the standpoint of feeling, the power theory from that of
thought; for the extrovert always places the accent upon the feelings that are
connected with the object, whereas the introvert always puts the accent
upon the ego, and is as much detached by thought from the object as
possible.
The irreconcilable contradictions of the two theories are now to be
understood, because both theories are the product of a one-sided
psychology. We find an instance of the contrast of types in Nietzsche and
Wagner. The dissension between the two is due to the contrast in their ideas
of psychological values. What is most prized by the one is "affectation" for
the other, and is deemed false to the very core. Each depreciates the other.
If we apply the sexual theory to an extrovert it tallies with the facts of the
case; but if we apply it to an introvert, we simply maltreat and do violence
to his psychology. The same applies to the contrary case. The relative

rightness of the two hostile theories is explained by the fact that each one
draws its material from cases that prove the correctness of the theory. There
is a remnant of persons whom neither theory fits—has not every rule its
exceptions?
Criticism of both theories is indispensable. Recognition of facts showed the
necessity of overcoming their contrast, and of evolving a theory that should
do justice not only to one or the other type, but equally to both.
Even the layman will to some extent have been struck by the fact that in
spite of their correctness both theories really have a very unpleasant
character and one not altogether pertinent under all circumstances to the
strict views of science. The sexual theory is unæsthetic and unsatisfying
intellectually. The power theory, on the other hand, is decidedly venomous.
Both inevitably reduce high-flown ideals, heroic attitudes, pathos, and deep
convictions, in a painful manner to a reality which is hackneyed and trite;
that is, if these theories are applied to such things—but they should
certainly not be so applied. Both theories are really only therapeutic
instruments out of the tool-chest of the physician, whose sharp and
merciless knife cuts out all that is pernicious and diseased. It was just such a
misapplication of theory Nietzsche tried with his destructive criticism of
ideals. He regarded ideals as rampant diseases of the soul of humanity; as
indeed they really are. However, in the hands of a good physician who
really knows the human soul, who, as Nietzsche says, "has a finger for the
slightest shade," who applies the treatment only to what is really diseased in
a soul—in such hands both theories prove wholesome caustics. The
application must be adapted to the individual case. It is a dangerous therapy
in the hands of those who do not understand how to deal out the treatment.
These applications of criticism do good when there is something that should
and must be destroyed, dissolved or brought low, but can easily damage
what is being built up, or growing in response to life's requirements.
Both theories might, therefore, be allowed to pass without attack, in so far
as they, like medicinal poisons, are entrusted to the safe hands of the
physician. But fate has ordained that they should not remain solely in the
care of those who are qualified to use them. First of all they naturally
became known to the medical public. Every practising physician has an
indefinitely high percentage of neurotics among his patients; he is therefore
more or less obliged to look out for new and suitable systems of treatment.

He ultimately lights upon the difficult method of psychoanalysis. He is at
first not competent for this, for how should he have learnt about the secrets
of the human soul? Certainly not through his academic studies. The
smattering of psychiatry that he acquired for his examination barely suffices
to enable him to recognise the symptoms of the commonest mental
disturbances, and is far from giving him any sufficient insight into the
human soul. He is, therefore, practically quite unprepared to apply the
analytic method. An unusually far-reaching knowledge of the soul is indeed
necessary in order to be able to apply this caustic treatment with advantage.
One must be in a position to differentiate elements that are diseased and
should be discarded, from those which are valuable and should be retained.
This is plainly a matter of great difficulty. Any one who wishes to get a
vivid impression of the way in which a psychologysing physician may
unwarrantably violate a patient through an ignoble pseudo-scientific
prejudice, should read what Moebius has written about Nietzsche. Or he
may study various psychiatric writings about the "case of Christ," and will
surely not hesitate to lament the lot of the patient whose fate it is to meet
with such "understanding." Psychoanalysis—greatly to the regret of the
medical man who, however, had not accepted it—then passed over into the
hands of the teaching profession. This is right: for it is really, when rightly
understood and handled, an educational method, and one of the social
sciences. I would, however, never personally recommend that Freud's
purely sexual analysis should be exclusively applied as an educational
method. It might do much harm because of its one-sidedness. In order to
make psychoanalysis available for educational purposes, all the
metamorphoses that have been the work of the last few years were needed.
The method had to be expanded from a general psychological point of view.
But the two theories of which I have spoken are not general theories. They
are, as I have said, caustics to be applied, so to say, "locally," for they are
both destructive and reductive. They explain to the patient that his
symptoms come from here or there, and are "nothing but" this or that. It
would be very unjust to wish to maintain that this reductive theory is wrong
in a given case, but when exalted into a general explanation of the nature of
the soul—whether sick or healthy—a reductive theory becomes impossible.
For the human soul, whether it be sick or healthy, cannot be merely
reductively explained. Sexuality it is true is always and everywhere present;
the instinct for power certainly does penetrate the heights and the depths of

the soul; but the soul itself is not solely either the one or the other, or even
both together, it is also that which it has made and will make out of them
both. A person is only half understood when one knows how everything in
him came about. Only a dead man can be explained in terms of the past, a
living one must be otherwise explained. Life is not made up of yesterdays
only, nor is it understood nor explained by reducing to-day to yesterday.
Life has also a to-morrow, and to-day is only understood if we are able to
add the indications of to-morrow to our knowledge of what was yesterday.
This holds good for all expressions of psychological life, even for
symptoms of disease. Symptoms of neurosis are not merely consequences
of causes that once have been, whether they were "infantile sexuality" or
"infantile instinct for power." They are endeavours towards a new synthesis
of life. It must immediately be added, however, they are endeavours that
have miscarried. None the less they are attempts; they represent the
germinal striving which has both meaning and value. They are embryos that
failed to achieve life, owing to unpropitious conditions of an internal and
external nature.
The reader will now probably propound the question: What possible value
and meaning can a neurosis have? Is it not a most useless and repulsive pest
of humanity? Can being nervous do anybody good? Possibly, in a way
similar to that of flies and other vermin, which were created by God in
order that man might exercise the useful virtue of patience. Stupid as this
thought is from the standpoint of natural science, it might be quite shrewd
from that of psychology; that is, if we substitute "nervous symptoms" in the
place of "vermin." Even Nietzsche, who had an uncommon disdain for
anything stupid and trite in thought, more than once acknowledged how
much he owed to his illness. I have known more than one person who
attributed all his usefulness, and the justification for his existence even, to a
neurosis, that hindered all decisive stupidities of his life, compelling him to
lead an existence which developed what was valuable in him; material that
would have been crushed had not the neurosis with its iron grip forced the
man to keep to the place where he really belonged. There are people the
meaning of whose life—whose real significance—lies in the unconscious;
in consciousness lies only all that is vain and delusive. With others the
reverse is the case, and for them the neurosis has another significance. An
extended reduction is appropriate to the one, but emphatically unsuitable to
the other.

The reader will now, indeed, be inclined to agree to the possibility of certain
cases of neurosis having such a significance but will nevertheless be ready
to deny an expediency that is so far-reaching and full of meaning to
ordinary cases of this illness. What value, for instance, might there be in the
afore-mentioned case of asthma and hysterical attacks of fear? I confess that
the value here is not so obvious, especially if the case be looked at from the
standpoint of a reductive theory, that is, from that of a chronique
scandaleuse of the psychological development of an individual.
We perceive that both the theories hitherto discussed have this one point in
common, viz. they relentlessly disclose everything that is valueless in
people. They are theories, or rather hypotheses, which explain wherein the
cause of the sickness lies. They are accordingly concerned not with the
values of a person, but with his lack of value that makes itself evident in a
disturbing way. From this point of view, it is possible to be reconciled to
both standpoints.
A "value" is a possibility by means of which energy may attain
development. But in so far as a negative value is also a possibility through
which energy may attain development—as may, for instance, be clearly
seen in the very considerable manifestations of energy shown in neurosis—
it also stands for a value, albeit it brings about manifestations of energy
which are useless and harmful. In itself energy is neither useful nor harmful,
neither full of value nor lacking in it; it is indifferent, everything depending
upon the form into which it enters. The form gives the quality to the energy.
On the other side, mere form without energy is also indifferent. Therefore in
order to bring about a positive value, on the one hand energy is necessary,
and upon the other a valuable form. In a neurosis psychic energy is
undoubtedly present, but in an inferior and not realisable form. Both the
analytic methods that have been discussed above are of service only as
solvents of this inferior form. They prove themselves good here as caustics.
By these methods we gain energy that is certainly free, but which, being as
yet unapplied, is indifferent. Hitherto the supposition prevailed, that this
newly acquired energy was at the patient's conscious disposal, that he might
apply it in any way he liked. In so far as it was thought that the energy was
nothing but the sexual impulse, people spoke of a sublimated application of
the same, under the presumption that the patient could, without further ado,
transfer what was thought of as sexual energy into a "sublimation"; that is,

into a non-sexual form of use. It might, for instance, be transferred to the
cultivation of an art, or to some other good or useful activity. According to
this concept, the patient had the possibility of deciding, either arbitrarily or
from inclination, how his energy should be sublimated.
This conception may be accorded a justification for its existence, in so far
as it is at all possible for a human being to assign a definite direction to his
life, in which its course should run. But we know that there is no human
forethought nor philosophy which can enable us to give our lives a
prescribed direction, except for quite a short distance. Destiny lies before
us, perplexing us, and teeming with possibilities, and yet only one of these
many possibilities is our own particular right way. Who should presume to
designate the one possibility beforehand, even though he have the most
complete knowledge of his own character that a man can have? Much can
certainly be attained by means of will-power. But having regard to the fate
of certain personalities with particularly strong wills, it is entirely
misleading for us to want at all costs to change our own fate by power of
will. Our will is a function that is directed by our powers of reflection; it
depends, therefore, upon how our powers of reflection are constituted. In
order to deserve its name reflection must be rational, that is, according to
reason. But has it ever been proved, or can it ever be proved, that life and
destiny harmonise with our human reason, that is, that they are exclusively
rational? On the contrary, we have ground for supposing that they are also
irrational, that is to say, that in the last resort they too are based in regions
beyond the human reason. The irrationality of the great process is shown by
its so-called accidentalness, which perforce we ought to deny, since,
obviously, we cannot think of a process not being causally and necessarily
conditioned. But actually, accidentality exists everywhere, and does so
indeed so obtrusively that we might as well pocket our causal philosophy!
The rich store of life both is, and is not, determined by law; it is at the same
time rational and irrational. Therefore, the reason and the will founded upon
it are only valid for a short distance. The further we extend this rationally
chosen direction, the surer we may be that we are thereby excluding the
irrational possibilities of life, which have, however, just as good a right to
be lived. Aye, we even injure ourselves, since we cut off the wealth of
accidental eventualities by a too rigid and conscious direction. It was
certainly very expedient for man to be able to give his life a direction; it
would, therefore, be quite right to maintain that the attainment of

reasonableness was the greatest achievement of mankind. But that is not to
say that under all circumstances, this must or will always continue to be the
case. The present fearful catastrophic world-war has tremendously upset the
most optimistic upholder of rationalism and culture.
In 1913 Ostwald wrote[236] as follows: "The whole world agrees that the
present state of armed peace is untenable, and is gradually becoming an
impossible condition. It demands tremendous sacrifices from individual
nations far surpassing the outlay for cultural purposes, without any positive
values being gained thereby. Therefore, if mankind could discover ways and
means of putting an end to these preparations for a war that will never
come, this conscripting of a considerable part of the nation at the best and
most capable age for training for war purposes, if it could overcome all the
innumerable other injuries caused by the present customs, such an
enormous saving of energy would be effected, that an undreamt-of
development of the evolution of culture might be expected. For like a handto-hand fight, war is the oldest, and also the most unsuitable of all possible
means of solving a conflict between wills, being indeed accompanied by the
most deplorable waste of energy. The complete setting aside of potential as
well as of actual warfare is, therefore, absolutely one of the most important
tasks of culture in our time, a real necessity from the point of view of
energy."
But the irrationality of destiny ordained otherwise than the rationality of the
well-meaning thinker; since it not only determined to use the piled-up
weapons and soldiers, but much more than that, it brought about a
tremendous insane devastation and unparalleled slaughter. From this
catastrophe humanity may possibly draw the conclusion, that only one side
of fate can be mastered by rational intention.
What can be said of mankind in general applies also to individuals, for
mankind as a whole consists of nothing but individuals. And whatever the
psychology of mankind is, that is also the psychology of the individual. We
are experiencing in the world-war a fearful balancing-up with the rational
intentionality of organised culture. What is called "will" in the individual, is
termed "imperialism" among nations, for the will is a demonstration of
power over fate, that is, exclusion of what is accidental. The organisation of
culture is a rational and "expedient" sublimation of free and indifferent

energies, brought about by design and intention. The same is the case in the
individual. And just as the hope of a universal international organisation of
culture has experienced a cruel right-about through this war, so also must
the individual, in the course of his life, often find that so-called "disposable"
energies do not suffer themselves to be disposed of.
I was once consulted by a business man of about forty-five, whose case is a
good illustration of the foregoing. He was a typical American self-made
man, who had worked himself up from the bottom. He had been successful,
and had founded a very extensive business. He had also gradually organised
the business in such a way that he could now retire from its management.
He had indeed resigned two years before I saw him. Until then he had only
lived for his business, concentrating all his energy upon it, with that
incredible intensity and one-sidedness that is so peculiar to the successful
American man of business. He had bought himself a splendid country seat,
where he thought he would "live," which he imagined to mean keeping
horses, automobiles, playing golf and tennis, attending and giving parties,
etc. But he had reckoned without his host. The energy that had become
"disposable" did not enter into these tempting prospects, but betook itself
capriciously to quite other ways. A couple of weeks after the
commencement of his longed-for life of bliss, he began to brood over
peculiar vague physical sensations. A few more weeks sufficed to plunge
him into an unprecedented state of hypochondria. His nerves broke down
completely. He, who was physically an uncommonly strong and
exceptionally energetic man, became like a whining child. And that put an
end to all his paradise. He fell from one apprehension to another, worrying
himself almost to death. He then consulted a celebrated specialist, who
immediately perceived quite rightly that there was nothing wrong with the
man but lack of employment. The patient saw the sense of this, and betook
himself to his former position. But to his great disappointment no interest
for his business presented itself. Neither the application of patience nor
determination availed to help. His energy would not by any means be
forced back into the business. His condition naturally became worse than
before. Energy that hitherto had been actively creative was now turned back
into himself, with fearfully destructive force. His creative genius rose up, so
to speak, in revolt against him, and instead of, as before, producing great
organisations in the world, his demon now created equally clever systems of
hypochondriac fallacies, by which the man was absolutely crushed. When I

saw him, he was already a hopeless moral ruin. I tried to make clear to him
that such a gigantic amount of energy might indeed be withdrawn from
business, but the problem remained as to where it should go. The finest
horses, the fastest automobiles, and the most amusing parties are in
themselves no inducement for energy, although it is certainly quite rational
to think that a man who has devoted his whole life to serious work, has a
natural right to enjoy himself. This would necessarily be the case if things
happened "humanly" in destiny; first would come work, then well-earned
leisure. But things happen irrationally and inconveniently enough, energy
requires a congenial channel, otherwise it is dammed up and becomes
destructive. My arguments met with no response, as was indeed to be
expected. Such an advanced case can only be taken care of till death; it
cannot be cured.
This case clearly illustrates the fact that it does not lie in our power to
transfer a "disposable" energy to whatever rationally chosen object we may
like. Exactly the same may be said of those apparently available energies
that are made available by the fact that the psychoanalytical caustic has
destroyed their unsuitable forms. These energies can be arbitrarily applied,
as has already been said, at the very most only for a short time. They resist
following the rationally presented possibilities for any length of time.
Psychic energy is indeed a fastidious thing, that insists upon having its own
conditions fulfilled. There may be ever so much energy existing, but we
cannot make it useful, so long as we do not succeed in finding a congenial
channel for it.
The whole of my research work for the last years has been concentrated
upon this question. The first stage of this work was to discover the extent to
which the two theories discussed above were tenable. The second stage
consisted in the recognition of the fact, that these two theories correspond to
two opposite psychological types, which I have designated the introversion
and the extroversion types. William James[237] was struck by the existence
of these two types among thinkers. He differentiated them as the "toughminded," and the "tender-minded." Similarly, Ostwald[238] discovered an
analogous difference in the classical and romantic types among great
scholars. I am not therefore alone in my ideas about the types, as is testified
by mentioning only these two well-known names out of many others.
Historical researches have proved to me that not a few of the great

controversies in the history of thought were based upon the contrast
between the types. The most significant case of this kind is the contrast
between nominalism and realism, which, beginning with the difference
between the Platonic and the Megarian schools, descended to scholastic
philosophy, where Abelard won the immortal distinction of at least having
ventured an attempt to unite the two contradictory standpoints in
conceptualism. This conflict has continued down to the present day, where
it finds expression in the antagonism of spiritualism and materialism.
Just as in the general history of thought, so too every individual has a share
in this contrast of types. Close investigation proves that people of opposite
types have an unconscious predilection for marrying each other, that they
may mutually complement one another. Each type has one function that is
specially well developed, the introvert using his thought as the function of
adaptation, thinking beforehand about how he shall act; whilst the extrovert,
on the contrary, feels his way into the object by acting. To some extent he
acts beforehand. Hence by daily application the one has developed his
thought, and the other his feeling. In extreme cases the one limits himself to
thinking and observing, and the other to feeling and acting. It is true that the
introvert feels also, very deeply indeed, almost too deeply; that is why an
English investigator[239] has gone so far as to describe his as "the emotional
type." True, the emotion is there, but it all remains inside, and the more
passionate and deeper his feeling is, the quieter is his outward demeanour.
As the proverb puts it, "Still waters run deep." Similarly, the extrovert
thinks also, but that likewise mostly inside, whilst his feelings visibly go
outside, that is why he is held to be full of feeling whilst the introvert is
considered cold and dry. But as the feeling of the thinker goes inwards, it is
not developed as a function adapted to external situations, but remains in a
relatively undeveloped state. Similarly the thinking of one who feels
remains also relatively undeveloped.
But if comparatively well-adapted individuals are under consideration, then
the introvert will normally be found to have his feeling directed outwards,
and the result may be extraordinarily deceptive. He shows feelings; he is
amiable, sympathetic, even emotional. But a critical examination of the
expressions of his feelings reveals that they are markedly conventional.
They are not individualised. He shows to every one, without any essential
difference, the same friendliness and the same sympathy; whilst the

extrovert's expressions of feeling are throughout delicately graded and
individualised. With the introvert the expression of feelings is really a
gesture that is artificially adopted and conventional. Similarly, the extrovert
may apparently think, and that even very clearly and scientifically. But
upon closer investigation, his thoughts are found to be really foreign
property, merely conventional forms which have been artificially acquired.
They lack anything individual and original, and are just as lukewarm and
colourless as the conventional feelings of the introvert. Under these
conventional disguises, quite other things are slumbering in both, which
occasionally when awakened by some overpowering effect, suddenly break
out to the astonishment and horror of the environment.
Most civilised people incline more to one type than the other. Taken
together they would supplement each other exceedingly well. That is why
they are so apt to marry one another, and so long as they are fully occupied
with adapting themselves to the necessities of life they suit one another
splendidly. But if the man has earned a competence, or if a big legacy drop
from the sky, terminating the external urgencies of life, then they have time
to occupy themselves with each other. Until now they stood back to back,
defending themselves against want. But now they turn to each other
expecting to understand one another; and they make the discovery that they
have never understood one another. They speak different languages. Thus
the conflict between the two types of psychology begins. This conflict is
venomous, violent and full of mutual depreciation, even if it be conducted
very quietly in the utmost intimacy. This is so because the value of the one
is the worthlessness of the other. The one, starting from the standpoint of his
valuable thinking, takes for granted that the feelings of the other correspond
to his own inferior feelings, this because he knows absolutely nothing of
any other feelings. But the other, starting from the standpoint of his
valuable feelings, assumes that his partner has the same inferior thought
that he himself has. Evidently there is plenty of work here for Goethe's
Homunculus, who had to find out "why husband and wife get on so badly."
Now as many cases of neurosis have a basis in such differences, I, as a
physician, found myself obliged to relieve the Homunculus of some of his
ungrateful task. I am glad to be able to say that many a sufferer has been
helped in grave difficulties by the enlightenment I could give.

The third stage of the path of increasing understanding consisted in
formulating a theory of the psychology of types which would be of practical
use for the development of man. Viewed from the newly-gained standpoint,
there resulted, first of all, a totally new theory of psychogenic disturbances.
The foundation of the facts remains the same: the first hypothesis of every
neurosis is the existence of an unconscious conflict. According to Freud's
theory, this is an erotic conflict, or to speak more exactly, a battle of the
moral consciousness against the unconscious infantile sexual world of
phantasy and its transference to external objects. According to Adler's
theory, it is a battle of the superiority of the ego against all oppressive
influences, whether from inside or outside.
But the new idea asserts that the neurotic conflict always takes place
between the adapted function and the co-function that is undifferentiated,
and that lies to a great extent in the unconscious; therefore in the case of
the introvert, between thought and unconscious feeling, but in that of the
extrovert, between feeling and unconscious thought.[240] Another theory of
the etiological moment results from this. If a man who naturally adapts
himself by thinking is faced by a demand that cannot be met by thinking
alone, but which requires differentiated feeling, the traumatic or pathogenic
conflict breaks out. On the contrary, the critical moment comes to the man
who adapts by feeling when he is faced by a problem requiring
differentiated thought. The afore-mentioned case of the business man is a
clear example of this. The man was an introvert, who all through his life
had left every consideration of sentiment in the background, that is, in the
unconscious. But when, for the first time in his life, he found himself in a
situation in which nothing could be done except by means of differentiated
feeling, he failed utterly. At the same time, a very instructive phenomenon
occurred; his unconscious feelings manifested themselves as physical
sensations of a vague nature. This fact harmonises with a generally
accepted experience in our psychology, to wit, that undeveloped feelings
partake of the character of vague physical sensations, since undifferentiated
feelings are as yet identical with subjective physical sensations.
Differentiated feelings are of a more "abstract" objective nature. This
phenomenon may well be the unconscious basis of the earliest statement of
psychological types that is known to me; namely, the three types of the
Valentinian School. They held the undifferentiated type to be the so-called

hylic (material) man. He was ranked below the differentiated types, that is,
the psychic (soulful) man, who corresponds to the extroversion type; and
the pneumatic (spiritual) man, who corresponds to the introversion type.
For these gnostics the "pneumatikos" stood of course the highest.
Christianity, with its "psychic" (spiritual) nature (principle of love), has
indeed contested this privilege of the gnosis. But even this page may be
turned in the course of time: since, if the signs of the age are not deceptive,
we are now in the great final settlement of the Christian epoch. We know
that, evolution not being uniformly continuous, when one form of creation
has been outlived, the evolutionary tendency harks back to resume that
form which, after having made a beginning, was left behind in an
undeveloped state.
After this brief digression to generalities, let us return to our case. If a
similar disturbance were to take place in an extrovert, he would have what
are called hysterical symptoms, that is, symptoms that are also of an
apparently physical nature, which, as our theory indicates, would this time
represent the patient's unconscious undifferentiated thought. As a matter of
fact, we find also a widespread region of phantasy as the basis of hysterical
symptoms, of which many have been described in detail in the literature of
the subject. They are phantasies of a pronounced sexual, that is physical
complexion. But in reality they are undifferentiated thoughts, which in
common with the undifferentiated feelings are to some extent physical, and
therefore appear as what may be called physical symptoms.
By taking up again here the thread that was dropped before, we can now
clearly see why it is precisely in the neurosis that those values which are
most lacking to the individual lie hidden. We might also now return to the
case of the young woman, and apply to it the newly-won insight. She is an
extrovert with an hysterical neurosis. Let us suppose that this patient had
been "analysed," that is, that the treatment having made it clear to her what
kind of unconscious thoughts lay behind her symptoms, she had regained
possession of the psychic energy which by becoming unconscious had
constituted the strength of the symptoms. The following practical question
now arises: what can be done with the so-called available energy? It would
be rational, and in accordance with the psychological type of the invalid, to
extrovert this energy again, that is to transfer it to an object, as for instance
to philanthropic or some other useful activities. This way is possible only in

exceptional cases—there are energetic natures who do not shrink from care
and trouble in a useful cause, there are people who care immensely about
just such occupations—otherwise it is not feasible. For it must not be
forgotten, that in the case under consideration, the libido (that is the
technical expression for the psychic energy) has found its object already
unconsciously in the young Italian, or an appropriate real human substitute.
Under these circumstances such a desirable sublimation, however natural, is
out of the question. For the object of the energy usually affords a better
channel than an ethical activity, however attractive. Unfortunately there are
many people who always speak of a person, not as he is, but as he would be
if their desires for him were realised. But the physician is necessarily
concerned with the actual personality, which will obdurately remain the
same, until its real character has been recognised on all sides. An analysis
must necessarily be based upon the recognition of naked reality, not upon
any arbitrarily selected phantasies about a person, however desirable.
The fact is that the so-called available energy unfortunately cannot be
arbitrarily directed as desired. It follows its own channel, one which it had
already found, even before we had quite released it from its bondage to the
unadapted form. For we now make the discovery that the phantasies which
were formerly occupied with the young Italian, have been transferred to the
physician himself. The physician has therefore himself become the object of
the unconscious libido. If this is not the case, or if the patient will on no
account acknowledge the fact of transference, or again, if the physician
either does not understand the phenomenon at all, or does so wrongly, then
violent resistances make their appearance, which aim at completely
breaking off relations with the doctor. At this point patients leave and look
for another doctor or for people who "understand" them; or if they
hopelessly relinquish this search they go to pieces.
But if the transference to the physician takes place and is accepted, a natural
channel has thereby been found, which not only replaces the former, but
also makes a discharge of the energic process possible, and provides a
course that is relatively free from conflict. Therefore if the libido is allowed
its natural course, it will of its own accord find its way into the transference.
Where this is not the case, it is always a question either of arbitrary
rebellion against the laws of Nature, or of some deficiency in the
physician's work.

Into the transference every conceivable infantile phantasy is first of all
projected; these must then be subjected to the caustic, that is, analytically
dissolved. This was formerly called the dissolution of the transference.
Thereby the energy is freed from this unsuitable form also, and once again
we are confronted by the problem of disposable energy. We shall find that
an object affording the most favourable channel has been chosen by Nature
even before our search began.

V.—THE PERSONAL AND THE IMPERSONAL UNCONSCIOUS
The fourth stage of our newly won insight is now reached. The analytical
dissolution of the infantile transference phantasies was continued until it
became sufficiently clear, even to the patient, that he was making his
physician into father, mother, uncle, guardian, teacher, friend or any other
kind of surrogate for parental authority conceivable. But, as experience is
constantly proving, further phantasies make their appearance, representing
the physician as saviour or as some other divine being. Obviously this is in
flagrant contradiction to the sane reasoning of consciousness. Moreover, it
appears that these divine attributes considerably overstep the bounds of the
Christian conception in which we grew up. They even assume the guise of
heathen allurements, and, for instance, not infrequently assume the form of
animals.
The transference is in itself nothing but a projection of unconscious
contents on to the analyst. At first it is the so-called superficial contents that
are projected. During this stage the physician is interesting as a possible
lover (somewhat after the manner of the young Italian in our case). Later
on, he is a representation of the father, and is the symbol either of kindness
or of severity, according to what the patient formerly imputed to his real
father. Occasionally the doctor even appears to the patient as a kind of
mother, which, though sounding somewhat strange, really lies well within
the bounds of possibility. All these projections of phantasy have an
underlying basis of personal reminiscences.
But presently other forms of phantasy appear, bearing an extravagantly
effusive and impossible character. The physician now appears to be
endowed with uncanny qualities; he may be either a wizard or a demoniacal
criminal, or his counterpart of virtue, a saviour. Later on he appears as an

incomprehensible mixture of both sides. It should be clearly understood that
the physician does not appear to the patient's consciousness in these forms,
but that phantasies come up to the surface representing the doctor in this
guise. If, as is not seldom the case, the patient cannot forthwith perceive
that his view of the physician is a projection of his own unconscious, then
he will probably behave rather foolishly. Difficulties often arise at this stage
of analysis, making severe demands upon the good will and patience of
both physician and patient. In a few exceptional cases, a patient cannot
refrain from disseminating the stupidest tales about the physician. Such
people cannot get it into their head that, as a matter of fact, their phantasies
originate in themselves, and have nothing or very little to do with the
physician's actual character. The pertinacity of this error arises from the
circumstance that there is no foundation of personal memory for this
particular kind of projection. It is occasionally possible to prove that similar
phantasies, for which neither parent gave reasonable occasion, had at some
time in childhood been attached to the father or mother.
In one of his shorter books, Freud has shown how Leonardo da Vinci was
influenced in his later life by the fact that he had two mothers. The fact of
the two mothers (or the double descent) had indeed a reality in Leonardo's
case, but it plays a part with other artists as well. Benvenuto Cellini had this
phantasy of a double descent. It is unquestionably a mythological theme;
many heroes of legend have two mothers. The phantasy is not founded upon
the actual fact of the hero's having two mothers, but is a widespread
"primordial image" belonging to the secrets of the universal history of the
human mind. It does not belong to the sphere of personal reminiscences.
In every individual, in addition to the personal memories, there are also, in
Jacob Burckhardt's excellent phrase, the great "primordial images," the
inherited potentialities of human imagination. They have always been
potentially latent in the structure of the brain. The fact of this inheritance
also explains the otherwise incredible phenomenon, that the matter and
themes of certain legends are met with all the world over in identical forms.
Further, it explains how it is that persons who are mentally deranged are
able to produce precisely the same images and associations that are known
to us from the study of old manuscripts. I gave some examples of this in my
book on "The Psychology of the Unconscious." I do not hereby assert the

transmission of representations, but only of the possibility of such
representations, which is a very different thing.
It is therefore in this further stage of the transference that those phantasies
are produced that have no basis in personal reminiscence. Here it is a matter
of the manifestation of the deeper layers of the unconscious, where the
primordial universally-human images are lying dormant.
This discovery leads to the fourth stage of the new conception: that is, to the
recognition of a differentiation in the unconscious itself. We are now
obliged to differentiate a personal unconscious and an impersonal or superpersonal unconscious. We also term the latter the absolute or collective
unconscious, because it is quite detached from what is personal, and
because it is also absolutely universal, wherefore its contents may be found
in every head, which of course is not the case with the personal contents.
The primordial images are quite the most ancient, universal, and deep
thoughts of mankind. They are feeling just as much as thought, and might
therefore be termed original thought-feelings.
We have therewith now found the object selected by the libido when it was
freed from the personal-infantile form of transference. Namely, that it sinks
down into the depths of the unconscious, reviving what has been dormant
there from immemorial ages. It has discovered the buried treasure out of
which mankind from time to time has drawn, raising thence its gods and
demons, and all those finest and most tremendous thoughts without which
man would cease to be man.
Let us take as an example one of the greatest thoughts to which the
nineteenth century gave birth—the idea of the conservation of energy.
Robert Mayer is the originator of this idea. He was a physician, not a
physicist nor a natural philosopher, to either of whom the creation of such
an idea would have been more germane. It is of great importance to realise
that in the real sense of the word, Robert Mayer's idea was not created.
Neither was it brought about through the fusion of the then-existent
conceptions and scientific hypotheses. It grew in the originator, and was
conditioned by him. Robert Mayer wrote (1841) to Griesinger as follows: "I
by no means concocted the theory at the writing-desk." He goes on to report
about certain physiological investigations that he made in 1840-41 as doctor

on board ship, and continues: "If one wishes to be enlightened about
physiological matters, some knowledge of physical processes is
indispensable, unless one prefers to work from the metaphysical side, which
is immensely distasteful to me. I therefore kept to physics, clinging to the
subject with such ardour that, although it may well seem ridiculous to say
so, I cared little about what part of the world we were in. I preferred to
remain aboard where I could work uninterruptedly, and where many an hour
gave me such a feeling of being inspired in a way I can never remember
having experienced either before or since.
"A few flashes of thought that thrilled through me"—this was in the harbour
of Surabaja—"were immediately diligently pursued, leading again in their
turn to new subjects. Those times are passed, but subsequent quiet
examination of what then emerged, has taught me that it was a truth which
can not only be subjectively felt, but also proved objectively; whether this
could be done by one who has so little knowledge of physics as I have, is a
matter which obviously, I must leave undecided."
Heim, in his book on Energetics, expresses the opinion: "that Robert
Mayer's new thought did not gradually detach itself by dint of revolving it
in his mind, from the conceptions of power transmitted from the past, but
belongs to those ideas that are intuitively conceived, which, originating in
other spheres of a mental kind, surprise thought, as it were, compelling it to
transform its inherited notions conformably with those ideas."
The question now arises, whence did this new idea that forced itself upon
consciousness with such elemental power spring? And whence did it derive
such strength that it was able to effect consciousness so forcibly that it
could be completely withdrawn from all the manifold impressions of a first
voyage in the tropics? These questions are not easy to answer. If we apply
our theory to this case the explanation would run as follows: The idea of
energy and of its conservation must be a primordial image that lay dormant
in the absolute unconscious. This conclusion obviously compels us to prove
that a similar primordial image did really exist in the history of the human
mind, and continued to be effective through thousands of years. As a matter
of fact, evidence of this can be produced without difficulty. Primitive
religions, in the most dissimilar regions of the earth, are founded upon this
image. These are the so-called dynamistic religions, whose sole and
distinctive thought is the existence of some universal magical power upon

which everything depends. The well-known English scholars, Taylor and
Frazer, both wrongly interpreted this idea as animism. Primitive peoples do
not mean souls or spirits by their conception of power, but in reality
something that the American investigator Lovejoy[241] most aptly terms
"primitive energetics."
In an investigation appertaining to this subject, I showed that this notion
comprises the idea of soul, spirit, God, health, physical strength, fertility,
magic power, influence, might, prestige, curative remedies, as well as
certain states of mind which are characterised by the setting loose of affects.
Among certain Polynesians "Melungu" (that is this primitive concept of
energy) is spirit, soul, demoniacal being, magic, prestige. If anything
astonishing happens, the people cry "Melungu." This notion of power is
also the first rendering of the concept of God among primitive peoples. The
image has undergone many variations in the course of history. In the Old
Testament this magic power is seen in the burning bush, and shines in the
face of Moses. It is manifest in the Gospels as the outpouring of the Holy
Spirit, as cloven tongues of fire from heaven. In Heraclitus it appears as
universal energy, as "eternally living fire"; for the Persians it is the fiery
brightness, haôma, divine mercy; for the Stoics it is heimarmene, the power
of destiny. In mediæval legend it is seen as the aura, or the halo of the saint.
It blazes forth in great flames from the hut where the saint is lying in
ecstasy. The saints reflect the sum of this power, the storehouse of light, in
their faces. According to ancient concepts this power is the soul itself; the
idea of its immortality contains that of its conservation. The Buddhistic and
primitive conception of the metempsychosis (transmigration of souls)
contains the idea of its unlimited capacity for transformation under
constant conservation.
This thought has obviously therefore been imprinted on the human brain for
untold ages. That is why it lies ready in the unconscious of every one. Only
certain conditions are needed in order to let it appear again. These
conditions were obviously fulfilled in the example of Robert Mayer. The
greatest and best thoughts form themselves upon these primordial images,
which are the ancient common property of humanity.
After this instance of the nascence of new ideas out of the treasury of
primordial images, we will resume the further delineation of the process of

transference. It was seen that the libido of the patient seizes upon its new
object in those apparently preposterous and peculiar phantasies, namely the
contents of the absolute unconscious. As I already observed, the
unacknowledged projection of primordial images upon the physician
constitutes a danger for further treatment which should not be undervalued.
The images contain not only every beautiful and great thought and feeling
of humanity, but also every deed of shame and devilry of which human
beings have ever been capable. Now, if the patient cannot differentiate the
physician's personality from these projections, there is an end to mutual
understanding, and human relations become impossible. If however the
patient avoids this Charybdis, he falls into the Scylla of introjecting these
images, that is, he does not ascribe their qualities to the physician but to
himself. This peril is just as great. If he projects, he vacillates between an
extravagant and morbid deification, and a spiteful contempt of his
physician. In the case of introjection, he falls into a ludicrous selfdeification or moral self-laceration. The mistake that he makes in both cases
consists in attributing the contents of the absolute unconscious to himself
personally. Thus he makes himself into both God and devil. This is the
psychological reason why human beings have always needed demons, and
could not live without gods. There is the exception, of course, of a few
specially clever specimens of the homo occidentalis of yesterday and the
day before—supermen whose God is dead, wherefore they themselves
become gods. There is also the example of Nietzsche, who confessedly
required chloral in order to be able to exist. These supermen even become
rationalistic petty gods, with thick skulls and cold hearts. The concept of
God is simply a necessary psychological function of an irrational nature that
has altogether no connection with the question of God's existence. This
latter question is one of the most fatuous that can be put. It is indeed
sufficiently evident that man cannot conceive a God, much less realise that
he actually exists, so little is he able to imagine a process that is not
causally conditioned. Theoretically, of course, no accidentality can exist,
that is certain, once and for all. On the other hand, in practical life, we are
continually stumbling upon accidental happenings. It is similar with the
existence of God; it is once and for all an absurd problem. But the
consensus gentium has spoken of gods for æons past, and will be speaking
of them in æons to come. Beautiful and perfect as man may think his
reason, he may nevertheless assure himself that it is only one of the possible

mental functions, coinciding merely with the corresponding side of the
phenomena of the universe. All around is the irrational, that which is not
congruous with reason. And this irrationalism is likewise a psychological
function, namely the absolute unconscious; whilst the function of
consciousness is essentially rational. Consciousness must have rational
relations, first of all in order to discover some order in the chaos of
disordered individual phenomena in the universe; and secondly, in order to
labour at whatever lies within the area of human possibility. We are
laudably and usefully endeavouring to exterminate so far as is practicable
the chaos of what is irrational, both in and around us. Apparently we are
making considerable progress with this process. A mental patient once said
to me, "Last night, doctor, I disinfected the whole heavens with sublimate,
and yet did not discover any God." Something of the kind has happened to
us. Heraclitus, the ancient, that really very wise man, discovered the most
wonderful of all psychological laws, namely, the regulating function of
antithesis. He termed this "enantiodromia" (clashing together), by which he
meant that at some time everything meets with its opposite. (Here I beg to
remind the reader of the case of the American business man, which shows
the enantiodromia most distinctly.) The rational attitude of civilisation
necessarily terminates in its antithesis, namely in the irrational devastation
of civilisation. Man may not identify himself with reason, for he is not
wholly a rational being, and never can or ever will become one. That is a
fact of which every pedant of civilisation should take note. What is
irrational cannot and may not be stamped out. The gods cannot and may not
die. Woe betide those men who have disinfected heaven with rationalism;
God-Almightiness has entered into them, because they would not admit
God as an absolute function. They are identified with their unconscious, and
are therefore its sport. (For where God is nearest, there the danger is
greatest.) Is the present war supposed to be a war of economics? That is a
neutral American "business-like" standpoint, that does not take the blood,
tears, unprecedented deeds of infamy and great distress into account, and
which completely ignores the fact that this war is really an epidemic of
madness. The several parties project their unconscious upon each other,
hence the mad confusion of ideas in every head. This is the enantiodromia
that occurs in the individual life of man, as well as in that of peoples. The
legend of the Tower of Babel turns out to be a tenable truth.

Only he escapes from the cruel law of enantiodromia who knows how to
separate himself from the unconscious—not by repressing it, for then it
seizes him from behind—but by presenting it visibly to himself as
something that is totally different from him.
This gives the solution of the Scylla and Charybdis problem which I
described above. The patient must learn to differentiate in his thoughts
between what is the ego and what is the non-ego. The latter is the collective
psyche or absolute unconscious. By this means he will acquire the material
with which henceforward, for a long time, he will have to come to terms.
Thereby the energy, that before was invested in unsuitable pathological
forms, will have found its appropriate sphere. In order to differentiate the
psychological ego from the psychological non-ego, man must necessarily
stand upon firm feet in his ego-function; that is, he must fulfil his duty
towards life completely, so that he may in every respect be a vitally living
member of human society. Anything that he neglects in this respect
descends into the unconscious and reinforces its position, so that he is in
danger of being swallowed up by it, if his ego-function is not established.
Severe penalties are attached to that. As indicated by old Synesius, the
"spiritualised soul (pneumatike psyché) becomes god and demon, a state in
which it suffers the divine penalties," that is, it suffers being torn asunder by
the Zagreus, an experience which Nietzsche also underwent at the
beginning of his insanity, where, in "Ecce Homo," the God whom he was
despairingly resisting in front assailed him from behind. Enantiodromia is
the being torn asunder into the pairs of opposites, which opposites are only
proper to "the god," and therefore also to the deified man, who owes
likeness to God to his having prevailed over his gods.
VI.—THE SYNTHETIC OR CONSTRUCTIVE METHOD
We now reach the fifth stage of progressive understanding. The coming to
terms with the unconscious is a technical performance to which the name of
transcendental function has been given because a new function is produced,
which being based upon both real and imaginary, or rational and irrational
data, makes a bridge between the rational and irrational functions of the
psyche. The basis of the transcendental function is a new method of treating
psychological materials such as dreams and phantasies. The theories
previously discussed were based upon an exclusively causal-reductive
procedure, which reduces the dream or phantasy to its component

reminiscences, and the instinctive processes that underlie them. I have
already stated the justification as well as the limitations of this proceeding.
It reaches the end of its usefulness at the moment when the dream symbols
no longer permit of a reduction to personal reminiscences or aspirations;
that is when the images of the absolute unconscious begin to be produced. It
would be quite inappropriate to reduce these collective ideas to what is
personal, and not only inappropriate but even actually pernicious, a fact that
has been impressed upon me by disagreeable experiences. The values of the
images or symbols of the absolute unconscious are only disclosed if they
are subjected to a synthetic (not analytical) treatment. Just as analysis (the
causally reductive procedure) disintegrates the symbol into its components,
so the synthetic procedure synthesises the symbol into a universal and
comprehensible expression. The synthetic procedure is by no means easy; I
will therefore give an example, by means of which I can explain the whole
process.
A patient had the following dream. She was just at the critical juncture
between the analysis of the personal unconscious and the commencement of
the production of the absolute unconscious. "I am on the point of crossing a
broad and rapid stream. There is no bridge, but I find a ford where I can
cross. As I am just on the point of doing so, a big crab that lay hidden in the
water seizes my foot and does not let it go." She awoke in fear. Associations
with the dream were as follows:—
1. Stream.—It forms a boundary that is difficult to cross. I must surmount
an obstacle; I suppose it refers to the fact that I am getting on very slowly; I
suppose I ought to reach the other side.
2. Ford.—An opportunity for getting safely across, a possible way;
otherwise the stream would be too difficult. The possibility of surmounting
the obstacle lies in the analytical treatment.
3. Crab.—The crab lay quite hidden in the water; I did not see it at first.
Cancer is a fearful incurable illness. (A series of recollections of Mrs. X.,
who died of cancer, followed.) I am afraid of this illness. A crab[242] is an
animal that walks backwards; obviously it wants to pull me down into the
stream. It clutched me in a gruesome way, and I was awfully afraid. What
prevents my getting across? Oh yes, I had another great scene with my
friend.

It must be explained that there is something special about this friendship.
We have here an ardent attachment, bordering on the homosexual. It has
been going on for years. The friend is in many respects like the patient, and
is also nervous. They have pronounced artistic interests in common. But the
patient is the stronger personality of the two. They are both nervous, and
their mutual relation being too engrossing, cuts them off too much from
other possibilities of life. In spite of an "ideal friendship" they have at times
tremendous scenes, owing to their mutual irritability. Evidently the
unconscious wishes to put some distance between them, but they refuse to
pay attention to it. A "scene" usually begins by one of them finding that she
does not yet understand the other well enough, and that they ought to talk
more openly together; whereupon both make enthusiastic endeavours to talk
things out. Misunderstandings supervene almost directly, provoking fresh
scenes, each worse than the last. The quarrel was in its way and faute de
mieux a pleasure to both of them, which they were unwilling to relinquish.
My patient, especially, was unable for a very long time to renounce the
sweet pain of not being understood by her best friend, although, as she said,
every scene "tired her to death." She had long since realised that this
friendship had become superfluous, and that it was only from mistaken
ambition that she clung to the belief that she could yet make something
ideal out of it. The patient had formerly had an extravagant, fantastic
relation to her mother, and after her mother's death had transferred her
feelings to her friend.

VII.—ANALYTICAL (CAUSAL-REDUCTIVE) INTERPRETATION.[243]
This interpretation may be summed up in a sentence: "I understand that I
ought to get to the other side of the stream (that is, give up the relation with
the friend), but I would much rather that my friend did not let me out of her
claws (embrace)." That is, expressed as an infantile wish: Mother would
like to attract me to herself again by the well-known mode of enthusiastic
embraces. The incompatibility of the wish lies in the strong under-current of
homosexuality, the existence of which had been abundantly proved by
obvious facts. The crab seizes her foot. The patient having big, "manly"
feet, she plays a masculine part towards her friend, having also
corresponding sexual fantasies. The foot is known to have phallic
significance. (Detailed evidence of this is to be found in Aigremont's

writings.) The complete interpretation would run as follows: The reason
why she will not let her friend go is because her unconscious homosexual
wishes are set upon her. As these wishes are morally and æsthetically
incompatible with the tendency of the conscious personality, they are
repressed, and therefore unconscious. The fear is an expression of this
repressed wish.
This interpretation is exceedingly depreciative of the patient's high-pitched
conscious ideal of friendship. It is true at this point in analysis she would no
longer have taken this interpretation amiss. Some time before certain facts
had sufficiently convinced her of her homosexual tendency, so that she was
able to acknowledge the existence of this inclination frankly, although it
was of course painful for her to do so. Therefore if, at this stage of the
treatment, I had informed her that this was the interpretation, I should not
have encountered resistances from her. She had already overcome the
painfulness of this unwelcome tendency by understanding it. But she would
have said to me: "Why do we analyse this dream at all? It is only repeating
what I have now known for a long while." It is true this interpretation does
not reveal anything new to the patient, and it is therefore uninteresting and
ineffective. This kind of interpretation would at the beginning of the
treatment have been impossible in this case, because the patient's
prudishness would under no circumstances have acknowledged it. The
"venom" of understanding had to be instilled very carefully, and in the
smallest of doses, until the patient gradually became more enlightened. But
when the analytical or causal-reductive interpretation, instead of furnishing
something new, persistently brings the same material in different variations,
then the moment has come when another mode of interpretation is called
for. The causal-reductive procedure has certain drawbacks. First, it does not
take strictly into account the patient's associations—e.g. in this case the
association of the illness ("cancer") with "crab" (Krebs = cancer). Second,
the particular choice of symbol remains obscure. For instance, why does the
friend-mother appear as a crab? A prettier and more plastic representation
would have been a nymph. ("Half dragged she him, half sank he down,"[244]
etc.) An octopus, a dragon, a serpent, or a fish could have performed the
same services. Third, the causal-reductive procedure completely ignores
that a dream is a subjective phenomenon, and that consequently even an
exhaustive interpretation can never connect the crab with the mother or the

friend, but only with the dreamer's idea of them. The whole dream is the
dreamer; she is the stream, the crossing, and the crab. That is to say these
details are expressions of psychological conditions and tendencies in the
subject's unconscious.

I have therefore introduced the following terminology. I call interpretations
in which the dream symbols are treated as representations of the real objects
interpretation upon the objective plane. The opposite interpretation is that
which connects every fragment of the dream (e.g. all the persons who do
anything) with the dreamer himself. This is interpretation upon the
subjective plane. Objective interpretation is analytical, because it dissects
the dream contents into complexes of reminiscence, and finds their relation
to real conditions. Subjective interpretation is synthetic, because it detaches
the fundamental underlying complexes of reminiscence from their actual
causes, regarding them as tendencies or parts of the subject, and
reintegrating them with the subject. (In experiencing something I do not
merely experience the object, but in the first place myself, although this is
only the case if I render myself account of the experience.)
The synthetic or constructive procedure of interpretation[245] is therefore
based upon the version on the subjective plane.

VIII.—THE SYNTHETIC (CONSTRUCTIVE) INTERPRETATION.
The patient is unconscious of the fact that it is in herself that the obstacle
lies which should be overcome, the boundary that is difficult to cross which
impedes further progress. But it is possible to cross the boundary. It is true
that just here a peculiar and unexpected peril threatens, namely, something
"animal" (non-human or super-human) which moves backwards and goes
into the depths of the stream, wanting to draw down the dreamer as a whole
personality. This danger is, moreover, like the deadly disease of cancer,
which begins secretly somewhere, and is incurable (overpowering). The
patient imagines that her friend hinders her, pulling her down. So long as
this is her belief she must perforce influence her friend, "draw her up,"
teach, improve, educate her, and make futile and impractically idealistic
efforts in order to avoid being dragged down herself. Of course, the friend
makes similar endeavours, being in a like case with the patient. So both of
them keep jumping upon each other like fighting cocks, each trying to fly
over the other's head. The higher the point to which the one screws herself,
the higher must the other also try to get. Why? Because each thinks the fault
lies in the other, in the object. Interpretation of the dream on the subjective
plane brings deliverance from this absurdity, for it shows the patient that

she has something in herself that is hindering her from crossing the
boundary; that is, from getting out of the one position or attitude into
another. To interpret change of place as change of attitude is supported by
the mode of expression in certain primitive languages, where, e.g., the
phrase "I am on the point of going," is "I am at the place of going." In order
to understand the language of dreams, we need plenty of parallels from the
psychology of primitive peoples, as well as from historical symbolism. This
is so because dreams originate in the unconscious, which contains the
residual potentialities of function of all preceding epochs of the history of
the evolution of man.
Obviously, in our interpretation everything now depends upon
understanding what is meant by the crab. We know that it symbolizes
something that comes to light in the friend (she connects the crab with the
friend), and also something that came to light in the mother. Whether both
mother and friend really have this quality in them is irrelevant as regards
the patient. The situation will only be changed when the patient herself has
changed. Nothing can be changed in the mother because she is dead. The
friend cannot be urged to alter; if she wants to alter herself, that is her own
affair. The fact that the quality in question is associated with the mother
indicates that it is something infantile. What is there in common in the
patient's relation both to her mother and her friend? What is common to
both is a violently extravagant demand for love, the patient feeling herself
overwhelmed by its passion. This claim is an overpowering infantile
craving which is characteristically blind. What is in question here is a part
of her libido that has not been educated, differentiated, nor humanized,
retaining still the compulsive character of an instinct, because it has not yet
been tamed by domestication. An animal is a perfectly appropriate symbol
for this rôle of libido. But why is the animal a crab in this particular
instance? The patient associates cancer with it, of which disease Mrs. X.
died at the age the patient has just reached. It may, therefore, well be that
this is an allusion to an identification with Mrs. X. We must therefore make
inquiries about this Mrs. X. The patient relates the following facts about
her: Mrs. X. was widowed early; she was very cheerful and enjoyed life.
She had a number of adventures with men, especially with one particular
man, a gifted artist, who the patient herself knew personally and who
always impressed her as very fascinating and weird.

An identification can only result from an unrecognized unconscious
resemblance. Now what is the resemblance between our patient and Mrs.
X.? I was able here to remind the patient of a series of former fantasies and
dreams, which had shown plainly that she also had a frivolous vein in her,
although anxiously repressing it, because she vaguely feared it might
seduce her to an immoral life. We have now gained a further essential
contribution for a right understanding of the "animal" rôle, which evidently
represents an untamed, instinctive greed, which in this case is directed to
men. At the same time we understand a further reason why she cannot let
go of her friend. She must cling to her in order not to fall a prey to this other
tendency, which seems so much more dangerous. By these means she
remains at an infantile homosexual stage, which serves her as a defence.
(Experience proves this erection of defences to be one of the most effective
motives for the retention of unadapted, infantile relations.) But in this
missing libido in the animal rôle lies her well-being, the germ of her future
healthy personality, which does not shrink from the hazards of human life.
But the patient had drawn another conclusion from the fate of Mrs. X.,
having conceived her severe illness and early death as a punishment of fate
for her gay life which the patient, although certainly not confessing to this
feeling, always envied her. When Mrs. X. died, the patient pulled a long
face, beneath which a "human, all too human," malicious satisfaction was
hidden. As a punishment for this tendency the patient, taking Mrs. X.'s
example as a warning, deterred herself from living and from further
development, and burdened herself with the misery of this unsatisfying
friendship. Of course this concatenation had not been consciously clear to
her, otherwise she would never have acted as she had done. The truth of this
conclusion can be proved by the material.
The history of this identification by no means ends here. The patient
subsequently emphasized the fact that Mrs. X. had a not inconsiderable
artistic capacity which developed only after her husband's death and which
led to her friendship with the artist. This fact seems to be one of the
essential incentives to the identification, if we call to mind that the patient
had already told us what a striking impression she had received from the
artist. A fascination of this kind is never exclusively exercised by one
person only upon the other. It is a phenomenon of reciprocal relation
between two persons in so far as the fascinated person must provide a

suitable predisposition. But she must be unconscious of this predisposition,
otherwise there will be no fascination. Fascination is a phenomenon of
compulsion which lacks conscious ground; that is, it is not a process of the
will, but a phenomenon coming to the surface from the unconscious, and
forcing itself compulsorily upon consciousness. All compulsions arise from
unconscious motives. It must therefore be assumed that the patient
possesses a similar unconscious predisposition to that of the artist. She
becomes identified with this artist, and is also identified with him as man.
Here we are at once reminded of the analysis of the dream, where we met
an allusion to the "masculine" foot. As a matter of fact, the patient plays a
thoroughly masculine part towards her friend, being the active one who
continually takes the lead, commanding her friend and occasionally even
forcing her somewhat violently to some course that only the patient desires.
Her friend is distinctly feminine both in her external appearance and
otherwise, whilst the patient is also externally of a somewhat masculine
type. Her voice is stronger and deeper than that of her friend. She now
describes Mrs. X. as a very feminine woman, her gentleness and amiability
being comparable to that of her friend, so she thinks. This gives us a new
clue. The patient is obviously playing towards her friend the artist's part
towards Mrs. X. Thus she unconsciously completes her identification with
Mrs. X. and her lover. In this way she is giving expression to her frivolous
vein which she had repressed so carefully. She is not living it consciously,
however, but is herself played upon by her own unconscious tendency.
We now know a great deal about the crab: it represents the inner
psychology of this untamed part of the libido. The unconscious
identifications always keep drawing her on. They have this power because
being unconscious they cannot be subjected to insight and correction. The
crab is the symbol of the unconscious contents. These contents are always
seducing the patient to retain her relation to the friend. (The "crab goes
backwards.") But the relation to the friend is synonymous with illness, she
became nervous through it (hence the association of illness).
Strictly speaking, this really belongs to the analysis on the objective plane.
But we must not forget that we only arrive at understanding by applying the
subjective interpretation, which thereby proves itself to be an important
heuristic principle. For practical purposes we might rest quite satisfied with
the result we have already reached. But we seek here to satisfy all the

requirements of the theory. Not all the associations have yet been used;
neither is the significance of the choice of symbols yet demonstrated
sufficiently.
We will now recur to the patient's remark that the crab lay hidden under the
water in the stream, and that she had not seen it at first. She had not at first
perceived the unconscious relations that have just been elucidated; they lay
hidden in the water. But the stream is the obstacle preventing her from
going across. It is precisely the unconscious relations binding her to her
friend that have been hindering her. The unconscious was the obstacle. In
this case, therefore, the water signifies the unconscious, or, it were better to
say, the being unconscious the being hidden, for the crab is also something
unconscious, namely, the portion of the libido that was hidden in the
unconscious.

IX.—THE DOMINANTS OF THE SUPER-PERSONAL UNCONSCIOUS.
The task now lies before us of raising the unconscious data and their
relations that have been hitherto understood upon the objective plane, to the
subjective plane. To this end we must once more separate them from their
objects, conceiving them as images, related in a subjective way to functioncomplexes in the patient's own unconscious. Raised to the subjective plane,
Mrs. X. is the person who showed the patient the way to do something that
the patient herself feared while unconsciously desiring it. Mrs. X. therefore
represents that which the patient would like to become, and yet does not
quite want to. In a certain sense Mrs. X. is a picture of the patient's future
character. The fascinating artist cannot be raised to the subjective plane,
because the unconscious artistic gift lying dormant in the patient has
already been covered over by Mrs. X. It would be quite right to say that the
artist is the image of the masculine element in the patient, which not being
consciously realised, is still lying in the unconscious. In a certain sense this
is indeed true, the patient actually deluding herself as regards this matter.
That is, she seems to herself to be particularly tender, sensitive and
feminine, with nothing in the least masculine about her. She was
indignantly amazed when I drew her attention to her masculine traits. But
the reason why she is fascinated by something mysterious in the artist
cannot be attributed to what is masculine in her. That seems to be

completely unknown to her. And yet it must be hiding somewhere, for she
has produced this feeling out of herself.
Whenever a part of libido similar to this cannot be found, experience
teaches us that it has always been projected. But into whom? Is it still
attached to the artist? He has long ago disappeared from her horizon, and
can hardly have taken the projection with him, because it was firmly fixed
in the patient's unconscious. A similar projection is always actually present,
that is, there must somewhere be some one upon whom this amount of
libido is actually projected, otherwise she would have felt it consciously.
Thus we once more reach the objective plane, for we cannot discover this
missing projection in any other way. The patient does not know any man
except myself who means anything at all to her, and as her doctor I mean a
good deal to her. Therefore she has probably projected this part upon me. It
is true I had never noticed anything of the kind. But the exquisitely
deceptive rôles are never presented to the analyst on the surface, coming to
light always only outside the hour of treatment. I therefore carefully
inquire: "Tell me what do I seem like to you when you are not with me? Am
I just the same then?" Reply: "When I am with you, you are very pleasant
and kind; but when I am alone, or have not seen you for rather a long time,
then the picture I have in my mind of you changes in an extraordinary way.
Sometimes you seem quite idealized, and then again different." She
hesitates; I help by saying: "Yes, what am I like then?" Reply: "Sometimes
quite dangerous, sinister like an evil magician or demon. I do not know how
I get hold of such ideas. You are not really a bit like that."
So this part was attached to me as part of a transference; that is why it was
lacking in her inventory. Therewith we recognize a further important thing.
I was confused with (identified with) the artist, and in her unconscious
fantasy she is Mrs. X. I was easily able to prove this fact by means of
material that had previously been brought to light (sexual fantasies). But I
myself then am the obstacle, the crab, that is hindering her from getting
across. The state of affairs would be critical if at this particular point we
were to limit ourselves to the objective plane of interpretation. What would
be the use of my explaining: "But I am not this artist at all, I am not in the
least weird as he is, nor am I like an evil magician." That would leave the
patient quite unconvinced because she would know as well I do that the
projection would continue to exist all the same, and that it is really I who

am hindering her further progress. It is at this point that many a treatment
has come to a standstill. For there is no other way for the patient here of
escaping from the embrace of the unconscious, but for the physician to raise
himself to the subjective plane, where he is to be regarded as an image. But
an image of what? This is where the greatest difficulty lies. The doctor will
say: "An image of something in the patient's unconscious." But the patient
may object: "What, am I to suppose myself to be a man, a mysteriously
fascinating one to boot, a wicked wizard and a demon? No, I cannot accept
that; it is nonsense. I'd sooner believe that you are all that." She is really, so
to speak, quite right. It is too preposterous to want to transfer such things to
herself. She cannot permit herself to be made into a demon, any more than
can the physician. Her eyes flash, a wicked expression appears upon her
face, a glimmer of an unknown hate never seen before, something snakelike seeming to creep into her. I am suddenly faced by the possibility of a
fatal misunderstanding with her. What is it? Is it disappointed love? Is she
offended? Does she feel depreciated? There seems to lurk something of the
beast of prey, something really demoniac in her glance. Is she then after all
a demon? Or am I myself the beast of prey, the demon, and is this a terrified
victim sitting before me, who is trying to defend herself with the brute force
of despair against my wicked spells? But either idea must be nonsense,
phantastical delusion. What have I come in contact with? What new string
is vibrating? But it is only for a passing moment. The expression upon the
patient's face becoming quiet again, she says, as if relieved: "It is
extraordinary. I feel as if you had touched the point which I could never get
over in relation to my friend. It is a horrible feeling, something non-human,
wicked, and cruel. I cannot describe how queer this feeling is. At such
moments it makes me hate and despise my friend, although I struggle
against it with all my might and main."
An explanatory light is thrown upon what has happened by this observation.
I have now taken the friend's place. The friendship has been overcome, the
ice of repression is broken. The patient has without knowing it entered upon
a new phase of her existence. I know that now upon me will fall everything
painful and bad in the relation to the friend. So also will whatever was good
in it, although in violent conflict with the mysterious unknown quantity X,
about which the patient could never get clear. A new phase, therefore, of the
transference supervenes, which, however, does not as yet make clearly
apparent what the X that is projected upon me consists of.

It is quite certain, that the most troublesome misunderstandings threaten if
the patient should stick at this stage of the transference. In that case she will
necessarily treat me as she treated her friend; that is the X will continually
be somewhere in the air giving rise to misunderstandings. The end would
probably be that she would see the evil demon in me, because she is quite
unable to accept the fact that she is herself the demon. All insoluble
conflicts are brought about in this way. And an insoluble conflict signifies a
standstill in life.
Another possibility is, that the patient should disregard the obscure point by
applying her old preventative against this new difficulty. That is, she would
repress it again, instead of keeping it conscious, which is the necessary and
obvious demand of the whole method. Nothing is gained by such
repression; on the contrary, the X threatens more from the unconscious
where it is considerably more unpleasant.
Whenever such an unacceptable image emerges, one must decide whether
at bottom it is destined to represent a human quality or not. "Magician" and
"demon" may represent qualities that are described in this particular
fashion, in order that they may speedily be recognized as not human but
mythological qualities. Magician and demon being mythological figures
aptly express the unknown "non-human" feelings which had surprised the
patient. These attributes are not applicable to a human personality; being as
a rule judgments of character intuitively and not critically approved, which
are projected upon our fellow-beings, inevitably doing serious injury to
human relations.
Such attributes always indicate that contents of the super-personal or
absolute unconscious are being projected. Neither demons nor wicked
magicians are reminiscences of personal experiences, although every one
has, of course, at some time or other heard or read of them. Although one
has heard of a rattle-snake, it would hardly be appropriate to describe a
lizard or a blind-worm as a rattle-snake, simply because one was startled by
their rustling. Similarly, one would hardly term a fellow-being a demon,
unless some kind of demoniacal influence were closely associated with him.
If, however, the demoniacal influence were really part of his personal
character, it would show itself everywhere, and then this human being
would be a demon, a kind of werwolf. But such an ascription is mythology;
in other words, it is from the collective and not from the individual psyche.

Inasmuch as through our unconscious we have a share in the historical
collective psyche, we naturally dwell unconsciously in a world of
werwolves, demons, magicians, etc., these being things which have always
affected man most profoundly. We have just as much a part in gods and
devils, saviours and criminals. But it would be absurd to want to ascribe to
one's personal self the possibilities that are potentially existing in the human
unconscious. It is, therefore, essential to make as clear a distinction as
possible between the personal and the impersonal assets of our psyche. This
is by no means intended to nullify the occasional great effects due to the
existence of the contents of the absolute unconscious; but these contents of
the collective psyche should be differentiated from those belonging to the
individual psyche. For simple-minded people, of course, these things were
never separated, the projection of gods, demons, etc., not having been
understood as a psychological function were simply accounted
concretistical realities. Their projectional character was never perceived. It
was only with the advent of the epoch of scepticism that it was realized that
the gods did not really exist except as projections. With that the matter was
set at rest. But the psychological function corresponding to it was by no
means set at rest, for it lapsed into the unconscious and began to poison
men with a surplus of libido that had hitherto been invested in the cult of
idols or gods. Obviously, the depreciation and repression of such a powerful
function as that of religion has serious consequences for the psychology of
the individual. The reflux of this libido strengthens the unconscious
prodigiously, so that it begins to exercise a powerful compulsory influence
upon consciousness and its archaic collective contents. One period of
scepticism came to a close with the horrors of the French Revolution. At the
present time we are again experiencing an ebullition of the unconscious
destructive powers of the collective psyche. The result is an unparalleled
general slaughter. That is just what the unconscious was tending towards.
This tendency had previously been inordinately strengthened by the
rationalism of modern life, which by depreciating everything irrational,
caused the function of irrationalism to sink into the unconscious. But the
function once in the unconscious will from thence work unceasing havoc,
like an incurable disease whose centre cannot be eradicated. For then the
individual and the nation alike are compelled to live irrationally, and even
to apply their highest idealism and their best wit to make this madness of
irrationalism as complete as possible. We see examples of this on a small

scale in our patient. She turned from a possibility of life that seemed to her
irrational (Mrs. X.) in order to live it in a pathological form, to her own
loss, and with an unsuitable object.
There is, indeed, no possible alternative but to acknowledge irrationalism as
a psychological function that is necessary and always existent. Its results
are not to be taken as concrete realities (that would involve repression), but
as psychological realities. They are realities because they are effective
things, that is, they are actualities.
The collective unconscious is the sediment of all the experience of the
universe of all time, and is also an image of the universe that has been in
process of formation for untold ages. In the course of time certain features
have become prominent in this image, the so-called dominants. These
dominants are the ruling powers, the gods; that is, the representations
resulting from dominating laws and principles, from average regularities in
the issue of the images that the brain has received as a consequence of
secular processes.
In so far as the images formed in the brain are relatively faithful portrayals
of psychic happenings they will correspond to their dominants; that is, their
general characteristic features, made prominent by the accumulation of
similar experiences, will correspond to certain physical fundamental facts
that are also universal. Hence it is possible to transfer unconscious images
to physical events direct as intuitive ideas; e.g. ether the primeval breath or
soul-substance appears in man's conceptions the whole world over; so, too,
energy, the magic force, which is equally widespread.
On account of their connection with physical things the dominants usually
make their appearance as projections, appearing, indeed—if the projections
are unconscious—in the persons of the immediate environment, as a rule in
the form of abnormal under- or over-valuations, which excite
misunderstandings, conflict, infatuations, and various kinds of folly. People
say: "He makes a god of So-and-so," or "So-and-so is X.'s bête noire." They
also give rise to the formation of modern myths, that is, fantastic rumours,
suspicions and prejudices.
The dominants of the collective unconscious are therefore extremely
important things of significant effect, to which great attention should be

paid. They must not be repressed, but must be given most careful
consideration. They usually appear as projections, and since projections are
only attached where there is some external stimulus, it is very difficult to
appraise them aright, on account of the relation of the unconscious images
with the object. If some one projects the dominant of "devil" into a fellowbeing, this occurs because this other person has something in him that
makes the attachment of the devil dominant possible. But that is by no
means to say that this person is therefore, so to speak, a devil; on the
contrary, he may be a particularly good fellow, but being antipathetic to the
one who projects, a "devilish effect" is brought about between the two. This
does not mean that the one who projects is a devil, although he must
recognize that he too, just as much, has something devilish in him, and has
been gulled by it, inasmuch as he projected it; but that does not make him a
devil; indeed, he may be just as decent a man as the other. In such a case the
appearance of the devil dominant means: the two persons are incompatible
(for the moment and for the near future), wherefore the unconscious splits
them asunder and holds them apart from each other.
One of the dominants that is almost always met in the analysis of
projections of collective unconscious contents is the "magical demon;" it is
of preponderating sinister effect. "The Golem," by Meyrink, is a good
example of this; also the Thibetan wizard in Meyrink's "Fledermäusen,"
who lets the world-war loose by magic. Obviously Meyrink formed this
image independently and freely out of his unconscious, by giving word and
picture to a feeling similar to the one that my patient had projected upon
me. The dominant of magic also appears in "Zarathustra," whilst in "Faust"
it is, so to say, the hero himself.
The picture of this demon is the lowest and most elementary concept of
God. It is the dominant of the primitive tribal magic-man, or a singularly
gifted personality endowed with magic power. This figure very frequently
makes an appearance in my patient's unconscious as a dark-skinned being of
Mongolian type.
An important step forward has been taken by the recognition of the
dominants of the absolute unconscious. The magical or demoniac effect of
the fellow-being is made to disappear by the feeling being realised as a
definite projection of the absolute unconscious. On the other hand, a
completely new and unsuspected task now lies before us: namely, the

question in what way the ego should come to terms with this psychological
non-ego. Should one rest satisfied with having verified the effective
existence of unconscious dominants, leaving the matter to take care of
itself?
To leave it at this point would be the means of creating a permanent state of
dissociation in the subject, a conflict between the individual psyche and the
collective psyche. Upon the one side we should have the differentiated
modern ego, whilst upon the other a kind of uncivilized negro
representative of a thoroughly primitive state. That would mean that we
should have what really does exist, a crust of civilization over a darkskinned brute; the cleavage would be distinct and demonstrable before our
very eyes. But such a dissociation requires immediate synthesis and
cultivation of what is undeveloped. There must be a union of these two
aspects.
Before entering upon this new question let us first return to the dream from
which we started. The discussion has given us a broader understanding of
the dream, and especially of an essential part of it, namely, the fear. This
fear is a demoniac fear of the dominants of the collective unconscious. We
saw that the patient identifies herself with Mrs. X., expressing thereby that
she also has some relation to the mysterious artist. It was apparent also that
she identified the physician (myself) with the artist; and further that when
taken upon the subjective plane, the image of the wizard dominants of the
collective unconscious represented me.
All this is covered in the dream by the symbol of the crab which walks
backwards. The crab stands for the living content of the unconscious that
can by no means be exhausted or rendered inoperative by analysis on the
objective plane. But what we were able to do was to detach the
mythological or collective psychological contents from the objects of
consciousness, and to consolidate them as psychological realities outside
the individual psyche.
So long as the absolute unconscious and the individual psyche are coupled
together without differentiation, no progress can be made, or, as the dream
expresses it, no boundary be crossed. If the dreamer does nevertheless
prepare to cross the boundary, the unconscious that was hitherto unnoticed
becomes animated, seizing her and dragging her down. The dream and its

material characterize the absolute unconscious, on the one side as a lower
animal living hidden in the depths of the water; and on the other side, as a
dangerous disease that can only be cured by a timely operation. To what
extent this characterization is appropriate has already been seen. As was
pointed out, the animal symbol specially refers to what is extra human, that
is super-personal; for the contents of the absolute unconscious are not
merely the residue of archaic human functions, but also the residue of
functions of the animal ancestry of mankind, whose duration of life was
indeed vastly greater than the relatively brief epoch of specifically human
existence. If such residues are active, they are apt, as nothing else is, not
merely to arrest the progress of development, but also to divert the libido
into regressive channels, until the quantity which the absolute unconscious
has activated has been absorbed. The energy becomes profitable again after
it has been consciously contrasted with the absolute unconscious, a process
which enables it to be converted into a valuable source from which to draw.
This transference of energy was established by religions in a concretistic
manner through cultural communication with the gods (the dominants of
the absolute unconscious). But these modes and customs are too much at
variance with our intellect and our moral sense for us to be able to declare
this solution of the problem as still binding, or even possible. If, on the
other hand, we apprehend the images of the unconscious as collective
unconscious dominants, therefore as collective-psychological phenomena or
functions, this hypothesis is in no way opposed to our intellect and
conscience. This solution is rationally acceptable. We have thus gained the
possibility of coming to terms with the activated residues of our ancestral
history. This mode of settlement makes it possible to traverse the boundary
line hitherto limiting us, and is therefore appropriately termed the
transcendental function, which is synonymous with progressive
development to a new attitude. In the dream this development is indicated
by the other side of the stream.
The similarity to hero-myths is striking. The typical combat of the hero with
the monster (the unconscious content) frequently takes place on the banks
of some water; sometimes at a ford. This circumstance is prominent in
legends of Red Indians, as, for example, in Longfellow's "Hiawatha." In the
decisive battle the hero is swallowed by a monster (cf. story of Jonah), as
Frobenius[246] has shown by means of extensive material. But inside the

monster the hero begins to come to terms with the beast in his own way:
whilst the creature swims with him towards the sunrise, he cuts off a
valuable piece of the viscera, e.g. the heart, by which the monster lived, that
is, the valuable energy by which the unconscious was activated. Through
this deed he kills the monster, who then drifts to land, where the hero, born
anew through the transcendental function (the "night-journey under the sea"
of Frobenius), steps forth, often in company with all those beings whom the
monster had previously swallowed. This enables the normal state to be
restored, as the unconscious having been robbed of its energy no longer
occupies a preponderating position. In this way the myth—which is the
dream of a people—graphically describes the problem with which our
patient is concerned.[247]
The problem of how to come to terms with the absolute unconscious is a
question apart. I must content myself here with a general survey of the new
theory of the unconscious up to the transcendental function, leaving the
presentation of the transcendental function itself to a later work.

X.—THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TYPES OF INTROVERSION AND
EXTROVERSION IN THE ANALYTICAL PROCESS.
The description of the analysis of the unconscious would be incomplete if a
word were not said about the question whether this method is equally
applicable to the two types. As a matter of fact, both the development and
the conception of the unconscious are different for each type. Although
making every effort to find out a formulation that shall be as universally
valid as possible, we must emphatically impress upon our minds the fact
that the two modes of conception of the types are essentially different; a
universal formulation that is just, only becomes possible when both
standpoints are given equal consideration. I do not conceal from myself the
fact that this subject is of less interest to the layman than to the specialist.
Nevertheless, certain aspects of the question are of such a general character
that the layman should not find the perusal of this last section entirely
without interest.
Let us first consider the concept of the unconscious. I have here introduced
the unconscious under the conception of a psychological function, namely,
the function of the sum of all those psychic contents which do not reach the

threshold of consciousness. I have divided the unconscious materials into
personal—that is to reminiscences attributable to personal experiences,
combinations and tendencies—and into impersonal collective contents, that
is, those whose contents cannot be attributed to personal experiences.
The contents of the psyche are fundamentally images indicating function on
the one hand, and upon the other objects and the world generally. The
conscious contains the recent object-images; the personal unconscious, the
object-images of the individual past, so far as they have either been
forgotten or repressed; whilst the absolute or collective unconscious
contains the inherited world-images generally, under the form of primordial
images or mythical themes. All psychic images have two sides: the one,
being directed towards the object, is as faithful a likeness of the object as
possible, framed without any intention or obligation to be anything else.
The other side is directed towards the soul, that is towards the psychic
function and the laws peculiar to it.
Let us take as an example, a primordial image out of a hero-myth. There is
in the West a demon ancestress with a large mouth. The hero creeps into it,
and at the same moment a certain little bird sings; the ancient dame shuts
her mouth with a bang, and the hero disappears.
The side of the image directed towards the physical object means, the sun
goes down in the evening into the mouth of the ocean. At this hour a certain
little bird sings (which is an objective fact), and the sun disappears into the
depths of the sea.
The side of the image directed towards the soul, that is the idea, signifies:
The energy contained in consciousness disappears (like the sun in the
evening) into the monster of the unconscious.
If we consider the collective-unconscious from the side of the soul or idea,
it is something entirely distinct, and it must be differentiated, abstracted
from the object, if its contents are to attain the perfection of an idea. If, on
the other hand, we consider the collective-unconscious from the side of the
physical object, that is as an image of the object, it is weaker and less clear
than the object itself, and can only be brought to perfection if it is
objectified, that is projected on to the object itself.

As previously explained, there are two types of human psychology that can
be clearly distinguished, viz. introversion and extroversion. The introvert is
characterised by the thought standpoint; the extrovert by the feeling
standpoint. As I showed, they are quite different in their relation to the
object: the introvert abstracting from the object and thinking about it, whilst
the extrovert goes to the object and feels himself into it. The accent of value
lies upon the ego for the introvert, but upon the object for the extrovert. The
former's chief concern is the preservation of the ego; that of the latter the
preservation of the object. The two types will adopt a different attitude
towards the unconscious, namely, the introvert will and must seize the ideaside of the unconscious image; the extrovert, on the other hand, seizing the
side of the physical reflection. The introvert will purify as far as possible
the idea-side from the "alloy" of the concretistic admixture of the physical
image, in order to arrive at the abstract idea; whilst, on the other hand, the
extrovert will purify the physical image as far as possible from the
"phantastic" admixture of the enveloping ideas. The former, by raising
himself to a world of idea, will endeavour to overcome the disturbing
influence of the unconscious; whilst the latter will approach the object as
near as possible and project the unconscious image into the physical object,
thus freeing himself from the grip of the unconscious.
What for the extrovert is a phantastic and disturbing admixture in the
unconscious picture, is for the introvert precisely that which has the most
value, for it is the germ of the pure idea, and vice versâ; what for the
introvert are merely concretistical "imperfections," survivals of a physical
origin, are for the extrovert a most valuable hint, the bridge by which the
unconscious can be united with the object.
This description makes it manifest that the two types go contrary ways in
the course of the development of their unconscious, arriving therefore at
opposite extremes: the one at the idea, the other at the object of his feeling.
The psychological characteristics of the types are eventually pushed to
extremes, where according to the enantiodromic law the moment has
arrived when in each case the "other" function enters into its fully
acknowledged right, that is, feeling in the case of the introvert, and thought
in that of the extrovert. The introvert attains the lacking function of
autonomous feeling by means of a differentiation and enhancement of his
thought; whilst the extrovert, on the other hand, attains his thinking by the

way of an increasingly differentiated love. These functions that hitherto
were secondary are found at first in the unconscious, gradually reaching
consciousness in the course of development. At first they are unconscious
functions in a state that is more or less incompatible with consciousness and
have the typical qualities of unconscious contents. These qualities are such
as are not tolerated in consciousness. The lunatic Schreber[248] says most
aptly that the language of God (the unconscious) is a somewhat archaic but
vigorous German, of which he gives a few striking examples. As the
contrary function that emerges from the unconscious into consciousness
differs to such an extent from what appears to be acceptable to
consciousness, the necessity arises of a technique for coming to terms with
the contrary function. It is impossible to accept the contrary function as it
stands, as it always drags extraneous qualities and accompanying
circumstances with it from the absolute unconscious. Through the abovedescribed development the extrovert has acquired an adaptation to the
object that is absolutely real and free from all phantasies; he will therefore
be able to turn his attention towards the "alloy" which for the introvert was
the valuable germ of idea. From this he will then develop similar ideas to
those which the introvert has already developed. Vice versâ, the introvert
will now be able to turn his attention to those materials which before he was
obliged to reject, as being side-tracks on the road to physical reality; that is,
he will carry out the same clearing and winnowing in his feeling-relations,
that the extrovert has already completed.
The development of the contrary function that was hitherto unconscious,
leads to individuation beyond the type, and thereby to a new relation to the
world and mind. The process which begins with the complementation of the
types is the transcendental function, which leads to the new adaptation by
means of the clearing and winnowing of unconscious feelings and thoughts
that have been brought up by the contrary function that had been neglected.
Following the old maxim: "naturam si sequemur ducem nunquam
aberrabimus," we have obeyed the natural impulse of the thinker to carry
the principle of thought through to its utmost perfection attainable, as also
that of the feeler, of carrying the principle of feeling through to the end. By
these means the salutary extreme was produced, to wit, the hunger, the
desire for the compensatory function. For, by means of thought, the one is
landed in a lifeless ice-cold world of crystalline ideas; whereas, by means of

feeling, the other reaches a limitless ocean of never ending flood of
sentiment. The former will, therefore, yearn for living warmth of feeling,
and the latter for the restrictive precision and solidity of thought.
An enrichment of the individual is attained by this compensatory process,
giving him greater decision and the possibility of a harmony that is
complete in itself. The assimilation of the contrary function discloses new
inner springs, which guarantee to the individual considerably greater
independence from external conditions. This acquisition is an indisputable
advantage that none would like to surrender in face of the fact so
unavoidably connected with it, that a new adaptation and orientation of this
kind places the individual in a certain contrast to the great bulk of people
who yet have the old attitude. This contrast is no drawback; it is rather a
welcome and effective spur to life and work, for thereby is created the
channel required by our psychic energy for its development.

XI.—GENERAL REMARKS ON THE THERAPY.
I have still to draw the reader's attention to an important fact. Throughout
the course of this paper, I have seemed to associate the idea of disturbance
or even of peril with the unconscious. But it would give a false impression
if we were only to emphasize the dangerous side of the unconscious. The
unconscious is a source of danger when the individual is not at one with it.
If we succeed in establishing the function or attitude that I call
transcendental, the disharmony ceases, and we are permitted to enjoy the
favourable side of the unconscious. In such case the unconscious
vouchsafes us that furtherance and assistance which bountiful Nature is
always ready to give to man in overflowing abundance. The unconscious
possesses possibilities of wisdom that are completely closed to
consciousness, for the unconscious has at its disposal not only all the
psychic contents that are under the threshold because they had been
forgotten or overlooked, but also the wisdom of the experience of untold
ages, deposited in the course of time and lying potential in the human brain.
The unconscious is continually active, creating combinations of its
materials; these serve to indicate the future path of the individual. It creates
prospective combinations just as our consciousness does, only they are
considerably superior to the conscious combinations both in refinement and

extent. The unconscious may therefore be an unparalleled guide for human
beings.
The reader must on no account suppose that the complicated psychological
changes described must all be passed through in every individual case. In
practice the treatment is adjusted according to the therapeutic result
attained. The particular result arrived at may be reached at any stage of the
treatment, quite apart from the seriousness or duration of the malady. The
treatment of a serious case may last a long time, without the higher phases
of the evolution ever being reached, or needing to be reached. There are
comparatively few people who, after attaining the desired therapeutical
result, pursue the further stages of evolution for the sake of their own
development. It is, therefore, not the seriousness of the case which obliges
one to pass through the whole development. In any case, only those people
attain a higher degree of differentiation who are by nature destined and
called to it, that is, who have both a capacity and tendency towards the
higher differentiation. This is a matter in which people are extremely
different, just as among species of animals there are some that are stationary
and conservative, and others that are evolutionary. Nature is aristocratic, but
not in the sense of having reserved the possibility of differentiation
exclusively for those species that stand high. Similarly, the possibility of the
psychological development of human beings is not reserved for specially
gifted individuals. In other words: neither special intelligence nor any other
talent is necessary in order to achieve a far-reaching psychological
development, inasmuch as in this development moral qualities step in to
supplement where intellect does not suffice. But it must not be supposed
under any circumstances that the treatment consists in grafting general
formulas and complicated doctrines on to people; this is not so. Each one
can acquire that which he needs, after his own fashion and in his own
language. What I have here presented is only the intellectual formulation of
the subject, founded upon preliminary scientific study of an empirical as
well as a theoretical nature; but this formulation does not become a subject
of discussion in the ordinary practical analytical work. The brief notes of
cases that I have inserted give an approximate idea of the practical side of
analysis.
The reader should realize that our new understanding of psychology has a
side that is entirely practical, and another that is entirely theoretical. It is not

merely a practical method of treatment or education, but it is also a
scientific theory, that is closely related to other co-ordinated sciences.

CONCLUSION.
In conclusion, I must beg the reader to pardon me for having ventured to
say so many new and abstruse things in such a brief compass. I lay myself
open to adverse criticism, because I conceive it to be the duty of every one
who isolates himself by taking his own path, to tell others what he has
found or discovered, whether it be a refreshing spring for the thirsty, or a
sandy desert of sterile error. The one helps, the other warns. Not the opinion
of any individual contemporary will decide the truth and error of what has
been discovered, but rather future generations and destiny. There are things
that are not yet true to-day, perhaps we are not yet permitted to recognize
them as true, although they may be true to-morrow. Therefore every pioneer
must take his own path, alone but hopeful, with the open eyes of one who is
conscious of its solitude and of the perils of its dim precipices. Our age is
seeking a new spring of life. I found one and drank of it and the water tasted
good. That is all that I can or want to say. My intention and my duty to
society is fulfilled when I have described, as well as I can, the way that led
me to the spring; the reproaches of those who do not follow this way have
never troubled me, nor ever will. New ideas always encounter resistance
from the old. That always was and always will be the case; it appertains to
the self-regulation of mental progress.

CHAPTER XV
THE CONCEPTION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS[249]
I.—THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PERSONAL AND THE
IMPERSONAL UNCONSCIOUS
Since the breach with the Viennese school upon the question of the
fundamental explanatory principle of analysis—that is, the question if it be
sexuality or energy—our concepts have undergone considerable
development. After the prejudice concerning the explanatory basis had been
removed by the acceptance of a purely abstract view of it, the nature of
which was not anticipated, interest was directed to the concept of the
unconscious.
According to Freud's theory the contents of the unconscious are limited to
infantile wish-tendencies, which are repressed on account of the
incompatibility of their character. Repression is a process which begins in
early childhood under the moral influence of environment; it continues
throughout life. These repressions are done away with by means of analysis,
and the repressed wishes are made conscious. That should theoretically
empty the unconscious, and, so to say, do away with it; but in reality the
production of infantile sexual wish-fantasies continues into old age.
According to this theory, the unconscious contains only those parts of the
personality which might just as well be conscious, and have really only
been repressed by the processes of civilisation. According to Freud the
essential content of the unconscious would therefore be personal. But
although, from such a view-point the infantile tendencies of the
unconscious are the more prominent, it would be a mistake to estimate or
define the unconscious from this alone, for it has another side.
Not only must the repressed materials be included in the periphery of the
unconscious, but also all the psychic material that does not reach the
threshold of consciousness. It is impossible to explain all these materials by

the principle of repression, for in that case by the removal of the repression
a phenomenal memory would be acquired, one that never forgets anything.
As a matter of fact repression exists, but it is a special phenomenon. If a socalled bad memory were only the consequence of repression, then those
persons who have an excellent memory should have no repression, that is,
be incapable of being neurotic. But experience teaches us that this is not the
case. There are, undoubtedly, cases with abnormally bad memories, where it
is clear that the main cause must be attributed to repression. But such cases
are comparatively rare.
We therefore emphatically say that the unconscious contains all that part of
the psyche that is found under the threshold, including subliminal senseperceptions, in addition to the repressed material. We also know—not only
on account of accumulated experience, but also for theoretical reasons—
that the unconscious must contain all the material that has not yet reached
the level of consciousness. These are the germs of future conscious
contents. We have also every reason to suppose that the unconscious is far
from being quiescent, in the sense that it is inactive, but that it is probably
constantly busied with the formation and re-formation of so-called
unconscious phantasies. Only in pathological cases should this activity be
thought of as comparatively autonomous, for normally it is co-ordinated
with consciousness.
It may be assumed that all these contents are of a personal nature in so far
as they are acquisitions of the individual life. As this life is limited, the
number of acquisitions of the unconscious must also be limited, wherefore
an exhaustion of the contents of the unconscious through analysis might be
held to be possible. In other words, by the analysis of the unconscious the
inventory of unconscious contents might be completed, possibly in the
sense that the unconscious cannot produce anything besides what is already
known and accepted in the conscious. Also, as has already been said, we
should have to accept the fact that the unconscious activity had thereby
been paralysed, and that by the removal of the repression we could stop the
conscious contents from descending into the unconscious. Experience
teaches us that is only possible to a very limited extent. We urge our
patients to retain their hold upon repressed contents that have been brought
to consciousness, and to insert them in their scheme of life. But, as we may
daily convince ourselves, this procedure seems to make no impression upon

the unconscious, inasmuch as it goes on producing apparently the same
phantasies, namely, the so-called infantile-sexual ones, which according to
the earlier theory were based upon personal repressions. If in such cases
analysis be systematically continued, an inventory of incompatible wishphantasies is gradually revealed, whose combinations amaze us. In addition
to all the sexual perversions every conceivable kind of crime is discovered,
as well as every conceivable heroic action and great thought, whose
existence in the analysed person no one would have suspected.
In order to give an example of this, I would like to refer to Maeder's
Schizophrenic patient who called the world his picture-book. He was a
locksmith's apprentice who fell ill very early in life; he had never been
blessed with intellectual gifts. As regards his idea that the world was his
picture-book and that he was turning its pages over when he looked about in
the world, it is just Schopenhauer's world, conceived as will and
representation, expressed in primitive picture-language. This idea has just
as universal a character as Schopenhauer's. The difference consists in the
fact that the patient's notion has stood still at an embryonic stage in a
process of growth, whereas with Schopenhauer the same idea has been
changed from a mere image into an abstraction expressed in terms that are
universally valid.
It would be false to assume that the patient's idea had a personal character
and value. That would be to attribute to him the dignity of a philosopher.
But he alone is a philosopher who raises an image that has naturally sprung
up into an abstract idea, thereby translating it into terms of universal
validity. Schopenhauer's philosophical conception is his personal value,
whereas the notion of the patient has merely an impersonal value of natural
growth, in which personal proprietary rights can only be acquired by
making an abstraction of the images, and translating them into terms that
are universally valid. But it would be wrong if an exaggerated sense of the
value of this achievement led us to ascribe to the philosopher the merit of
having made or conceived the original image itself. The primordial image
has also sprung up naturally in the philosopher, and is nothing but a part of
the universal human heritage in which, theoretically at least, every one has
a share. The golden apples come from the same tree whether they are
gathered by a locksmith's apprentice or a Schopenhauer.

The recognition of such primordial images obliges me to differentiate
between the contents of the unconscious; a differentiation of another kind
than that between the pre-conscious and unconscious, or between the
subconscious and unconscious. The justification for those distinctions
cannot be discussed here; they have a value of their own and probably merit
to be carried further as affording a point of view. The differentiation which I
propose follows obviously from what has previously been said, namely, that
in the so-called unconscious we must differentiate a layer which may be
termed the personal unconscious. The materials contained in this layer are
of a personal kind, inasmuch as on the one hand they may be characterised
as acquisitions of the individual existence, and on the other as
psychological factors which might just as well be conscious. It is, for
instance, comprehensible that incompatible psychological elements
succumb to repression on the one hand and are therefore unconscious, but
on the other hand there exists the possibility of bringing the repressed
contents into consciousness and keeping them there, once they are known
and recognised. We recognise these materials as personal contents, because
we can prove their effects, their partial appearance, or their origin to lie in
our personal past. They are integral constituents of the personality, and
belong to a complete inventory of the same. They are constituents whose
omission in consciousness implies an inferiority in one respect or another,
not indeed an inferiority bearing the psychological character of an organic
deformity or a natural defect, but rather the character of a neglect which
arouses a moral reaction. The feeling of moral inferiority always indicates
that in the portion omitted is something that according to the feelings
should not be missing; or in other words, could be conscious if we took
sufficient trouble about it. The sense of moral inferiority is not the result of
a collision with the universal, in a certain sense arbitrary, moral law, but
rather the result of a conflict with the personal ego, which by reason of the
psychic economy demands an adjustment of the deficiency. Wherever a
feeling of inferiority appears, it reveals not only the presence of a demand
for the assimilation of an unconscious constituent, but also the possibility of
such an assimilation. It is, after all, a person's moral qualities that make him
assimilate his unconscious self and retain it in consciousness, whether he be
forced to it by a recognition of its necessity, or by a painful neurosis. He
who continues to tread this path of the realisation of his unconscious self,
necessarily transposes the content of the personal unconscious into

consciousness, whereby the periphery of the personality is considerably
enlarged.

II—THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ASSIMILATION OF THE
UNCONSCIOUS.
This process of assimilating the unconscious leads to remarkable results.
Some people build up from it an unmistakable, even unpleasantly increased
self-consciousness or self-confidence; they "know everything," and are
completely aware of everything so far as their unconscious is concerned.
They think themselves accurately informed about everything that comes up
from the unconscious. Others are increasingly oppressed by the contents of
the unconscious, they lose their self-reliance or their self-consciousness
more and more, and come near to a state of depressed resignation in regard
to all the extraordinary things the unconscious produces. The former
undertake in the exuberance of their self-confidence, a responsibility for
their unconscious that goes much too far, beyond every reasonable
possibility; the latter ultimately decline to accept any responsibility in the
depressing recognition of the powerlessness of the ego confronted by
relentless Destiny, working through the unconscious.
If we give the two types close analytical consideration, we shall discover
that behind the optimistic self-confidence of the former there is hidden a
just as deep, or rather a far deeper, helplessness; a helplessness to which the
conscious optimism acts as an unsuccessful effort at compensation. Behind
the pessimistic resignation of the latter there is hidden a defiant desire for
power, far exceeding in self-confidence the conscious optimism of the
former type.
This condition of the personality may well be expressed by the idea of
"God-Almightiness" (Gottähnlichkeit),[250] to which Adler has particularly
drawn our attention.
When the devil wrote the serpent's words in the student's album, Eritis sicut
Deus scientes bonum et malum, he added:

"Follow the ancient text and the snake thou wast ordered to trample!
With all thy likeness to God, thou'lt yet be a sorry example."
The idea of "likeness to God," or "God-Almightiness," is not a scientific one, although it
characterises the psychological state of affairs most exactly. Still we must examine whence
this attitude comes, and ask why it merits the name of "God-Almightiness." As the expression
denotes, the patient's abnormal condition is constituted by the fact that he ascribes to himself
qualities or values which obviously do not belong to him, for "God-Almightiness" means
being like the spirit which is set above the human spirit.
If for psychological purposes we abstract from the hypostasis of the God-idea, we find that
this expression does not only include every dynamic fact discussed in my book on "The
Psychology of the Unconscious,"[251] but also a certain mental function having a collective
character, which is of another order from that of the individual character of the mind. In the
same way as the individual is not only an isolated and separate, but also a social being, so
also the human mind is not only something isolated and absolutely individual, but also a
collective function. And just as certain social functions or impulses are, so to speak, opposed
to the ego-centric interests of the individual, so also the human mind has certain functions or
tendencies which, on account of their collective nature, are to some extent opposed to the
personal mental functions. This is due to the fact that every human being is born with a highly
differentiated brain, which gives him the possibility of attaining a rich mental function that he
has neither acquired ontogenetically nor developed. In proportion as human brains are
similarly differentiated, the corresponding mental functions are collective and universal. This
circumstance explains the fact that the unconscious of far-separated peoples and races
possesses a remarkable number of points of agreement. One example among many others
which has been demonstrated is the extraordinary unanimity shown by the autochthonous
forms and themes of myths.
The universal similarity of brains results in a universal possibility of a similar mental
function. This function is the collective psyche, which is divided into collective mind and
collective soul.[252] In so far as there exist differentiations corresponding to race, descent, or
even family, so, beyond the level of the "universal" collective psyche, we find a collective
psyche limited by race, descent, and family. To quote P. Janet, the collective psyche contains
the "parties inférieures" of the mental function, that is, the part of the mental function which,
being fixed and automatic in its action, inherited and present everywhere, is therefore superpersonal or impersonal. The conscious and the personal unconscious contain as personal
differentiations the "parties supérieures" of the mental function, therefore the part that has
been acquired and developed ontogenetically.
An individual therefore who joins the a priori and unconsciously-given collective psyche on
to his ontogenetically acquired assets, enlarges thereby the periphery of his personality in an
unjustifiable way, with the corresponding consequences. Inasmuch as the collective psyche is
the "partie inférieure" of the mental function, and therefore is the fundamental structure
underlying every personality, it weighs heavily upon and depreciates the personality; a fact
that is expressed in the afore-mentioned stifling of self-confidence, and in the unconscious
increase of the ego-emphasis up to the point of a morbid will to power. Inasmuch as the

collective psyche ranks even above the personality, because it is the mother foundation upon
which all personal differentiations are based, and because it is the common mental function of
the sum total of the individual, therefore its incorporation in the personality may evoke
inflation of self-confidence, an inflation which is then compensated by an extraordinary sense
of inferiority in the unconscious.
A dissolution of the pairs of opposites in the personality sets in if, through the assimilation of
the unconscious, the collective psyche be included in the inventory of the personal mental
functions. Alongside the pairs of opposites already alluded to that are so particularly evident
in the neurotic, viz. megalomania and sense of inferiority, there are also many other pairs, of
which I will only mention the specifically moral pair, that is, good and evil (scientes bonum et
malum). They accompany the increase or depreciation of self-confidence. The specific virtues
and vices of humanity are contained in the collective psyche, just as everything else is. One
man ascribes all the collective virtue to himself as his own personal merit; another accounts
as personal guilt what is but collective vice. Both are just as illusionary as the sense of
greatness and of inferiority, for imaginary virtues as well as imaginary vices are only the pairs
of moral opposites contained in the collective psyche, which have become perceptible or have
artificially been made conscious. How far the collective psyche contains these pairs of
opposites is shown by primitive peoples, whose great virtue is praised by one observer;
whereas another observer of the same race reports only the worst impressions. Both views are
true of primitive man, whose personal differentiation is only beginning; his mental function is
essentially collective. He is more or less identified with the collective psyche, and therefore
without any personal responsibility or inner conflict; his virtues and vices are collective.
Conflict only begins when a conscious personal development of the mind has already started,
whereby the reason becomes aware of the irreconcilable nature of the pairs of opposites. The
struggle to repress is the consequence of this realisation. Man wants to be good, therefore the
bad must be repressed; this puts an end to the paradise of the collective psyche.
The repression of the collective psyche, in so far as it was conscious, was a necessity for the
development of the personality, because collective psychology and personal psychology are
in a certain sense irreconcilable. In the history of thought, whenever a fresh psychological
attitude acquires collective value the formation of schisms begins. Nowhere is this more
clearly seen than in the history of religion. A collective point of view, although it may be
necessary, is always dangerous for the individual. It is dangerous because it is apt to choke
and smother personal differentiation. It has derived this capacity from the collective psyche,
which is itself a result of psychological differentiation of the strong gregarious instincts of
humanity. Collective thought and feeling, and collective accomplishment, are relatively easy
in comparison with individual function and performance; a fact that is only too prone to lead
to a fining down to the collective level, and is peculiarly disastrous to personal development.
The concomitant loss of personality is replaced—as is always the case in psychology—by an
unconscious all-compelling binding to and identification with the collective psyche. It cannot
be denied, and should be warningly emphasized that in the analysis of the unconscious, the
collective psychology is merged into the personal psychology, with the afore-mentioned
unpleasant consequences. These consequences are either bad for the individual's vital feeling
(Lebensgefühl), or they injure his fellow-beings if he have any power over his environment.
Being identified with the collective psyche he will inevitably try to force the claims of his
unconscious upon others, for identification with the collective psyche is accompanied by a

feeling of universal validity ("God-Almightiness"), which disregards the different psychology
of his fellows.
The worst abuses of this kind may be removed by a clear understanding and appreciation of
the fact that there are totally different psychological types, and that a psychology of one type
cannot be forced into the mould of another. It is indeed almost impossible for one type to
understand the other completely, and a perfect comprehension of another's individuality is
impossible. Due regard for another's individuality is not only advisable but is absolutely
essential in analysis, if the development of the other's personality is not to be stifled. It should
not be forgotten that the one type thinks that he is leaving another person free when he grants
him freedom of action, and the other type when he grants him freedom of thought. In analysis
both must be conceded, in so far as reasons of self-preservation permit the analyst to accord
them. An excessive desire to understand or explain things is just as useless and injurious as a
lack of comprehension.
The collective natural propensities and primary forms of idea and feeling which analysis of
the unconscious has shown to be effective are an acquisition for the conscious personality
which cannot be admitted unreservedly without prejudicial results.
In practical treatment[253] it is therefore of the utmost importance to keep the aim of
individual development constantly before us. If for instance the collective psyche be
conceived as a personal possession or as a personal burden, an unbearable weight or strain is
put upon the personality. Hence we must make a clear distinction between the personal and
the collective psyche. In practice this distinction is not easy because the personal grows out of
the collective psyche, and is most closely joined with it. It is therefore difficult to say which
materials are to be termed collective and which personal. There is no doubt, for instance, that
the archaic symbols so often found in phantasies and dreams are collective factors. All
primary propensities and forms of thought and feeling are collective; so is everything about
which men are universally agreed, or which is universally understood, said or done. Upon
close consideration it is astonishing to note how much of our so-called individual psychology
is really collective; so much that the individual element quite disappears. Individuation,
however, is an indispensable psychological requirement. The crushing predominance of what
is collective should make us realise what peculiar care and attention must be given to the
delicate plant "individuality," if it is to develop.
Human beings have a capacity which is of the utmost use for purposes of collectivism and
most prejudicial to individuation, and that is the capacity to imitate. Collective psychology
cannot dispense with imitation, without which the organization of the State and Society
would be impossible. Imitation includes the idea of suggestibility, suggestive effect, and
mental infection.
But we see daily how the mechanism of imitation is used, or rather abused, for the purposes
of personal differentiation; some prominent personality, or peculiar trait or activity is simply
imitated, which at least brings about an external differentiation from the environment. As a
rule this delusive attempt to attain individual differentiation by means of imitation comes to a
standstill as mere affectation, the individual remaining on the same plane as before, only a
few degrees more sterile than formerly, and under an unconscious compulsory bondage to his
environment.

In order to find out what is really individual in us, we should have to give the matter deep
thought, and we should certainly become aware how exceedingly difficult such a discovery is.

III.—THE INDIVIDUAL AS AN EXCERPT OF THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE.
We now come to a problem the overlooking of which would cause the greatest confusion.
As I said before, the immediate result of the analysis of the unconscious is that additional
personal portions of the unconscious are incorporated into the conscious. I called those parts
of the unconscious which are repressed but capable of being made conscious, the personal
unconscious. I showed moreover that through the annexation of the deeper layers of the
unconscious, which I called the impersonal unconscious, an extension of the personality is
brought about which leads to the state of God-Almightiness ("Gottähnlichkeit"). This state is
reached by a continuation of the analytical work, by means of which we have already reintroduced what is repressed to consciousness. By continuing analysis further we incorporate
some distinctly impersonal universal basic qualities of humanity with the personal
consciousness, which brings about the aforesaid enlargement, and this to some extent may be
described as an unpleasant consequence of analysis.
From this standpoint, the conscious personality seems to be a more or less arbitrary excerpt of
the collective psyche. It appears to consist of a number of universal basic human qualities of
which it is à priori unconscious, and further of a series of impulses and forms which might
just as well have been conscious, but were more or less arbitrarily repressed, in order to attain
that excerpt of the collective psyche, which we call personality. The term persona is really an
excellent one, for persona was originally the mask which an actor wore, that served to
indicate the character in which he appeared. For if we really venture to undertake to decide
what psychic material must be accounted personal and what impersonal, we shall soon reach
a state of great perplexity; for, in truth, we must make the same assertion regarding the
contents of the personality as we have already made with respect to the impersonal
unconscious, that is to say that it is collective, whereas we can only concede individuality to
the bounds of the persona, that is to the particular choice of personal elements, and that only
to a very limited extent. It is only by virtue of the fact that the persona is a more or less
accidental or arbitrary excerpt of the collective psyche that we can lapse into the error of
deeming it to be in toto individual, whereas as its name denotes, it is only a mask of the
collective psyche; a mask which simulates individuality, making others and oneself believe
that one is individual, whilst one is only acting a part through which the collective psyche
speaks.
If we analyse the persona we remove the mask and discover that what appeared to be
individual is at bottom collective. We thus trace "the Little God of the World" back to his
origin, that is, to a personification of the collective psyche. Finally, to our astonishment, we
realise that the persona was only the mask of the collective psyche. Whether we follow Freud
and reduce the primary impulse to sexuality, or Adler and reduce it to the elementary desire
for power, or reduce it to the general principle of the collective psyche which contains the
principles of both Freud and Adler, we arrive at the same result; namely, the dissolution of the
personal into the collective. Therefore in every analysis that is continued sufficiently far, the
moment arrives when the aforesaid God-Almightiness must be realised. This condition is

often ushered in by peculiar symptoms; for instance, by dreams of flying through space like a
comet, of being either the earth, the sun, or a star, or of being either extraordinarily big or
small, of having died, etc. Physical sensations also occur, such as sensations of being too
large for one's skin, or too fat; or hypnagogic feelings of endless sinking or rising occur, of
enlargement of the body or of dizziness. This state is characterised psychologically by an
extraordinary loss of orientation about one's personality, about what one really is, or else the
individual has a positive but mistaken idea of that which he has just become. Intolerance,
dogmatism, self-conceit, self-depreciation, contempt and belittling of "not analysed" fellowbeings, and also of their opinions and activities, all very frequently occur. An increased
disposition to physical disorders may also occasionally be observed, but this occurs only if
pleasure be taken therein, thus prolonging this stage unduly.
The wealth of the possibilities of the collective psyche is both confusing and dazzling. The
dissolution of the persona results in the release of phantasy, which apparently is nothing else
but the functioning of the collective psyche. This release brings materials into consciousness
of whose existence we had no suspicion before. A rich mine of mythological thought and
feeling is revealed. It is very hard to hold one's own against such an overwhelming
impression. That is why this phase must be reckoned one of the real dangers of analysis, a
fact that should not be concealed.
As may easily be understood, this condition is hardly bearable, and one would like to put an
end to it as soon as possible, for the analogy with a mental derangement is too close. The
essence of the most frequent form of derangement—dementia præcox or schizophrenia—
consists, as is well known, in the fact that the unconscious to a large extent ejects and replaces
the conscious. The unconscious is given the value of reality, being substituted for the reality
function. The unconscious thoughts become audible as voices, or visible as visions, or
perceptible as physical hallucinations, or they become fixed ideas of a kind that supersede
reality. In a similar, although not in the same way, by the resolution of the persona of the
collective psyche, the unconscious is drawn into the conscious. The difference between this
state of mind and that of mental derangement consists in the fact that the unconscious is
brought up by the help of the conscious analysis; at least that is the case in the beginning of
analysis, when there are still strong cultural resistances against the unconscious to be
overcome. Later on, after the removal of the barriers erected by time and custom, the
unconscious usually proceeds, so to say, in a peremptory manner, sometimes even discharging
itself in torrents into the consciousness. In this phase the analogy with mental derangement is
very close. But it would only be a real mental disorder should the content of the unconscious
take the place of the conscious reality, that is, in other words, if the contents of the
unconscious were believed absolutely and without reserve.

IV.—THE ENDEAVOURS TO FREE THE INDIVIDUALITY FROM THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE.
1. The Regressive Restoration of the Persona.
The unbearableness of thus being identified with the collective psyche forces us to find a
radical solution. There are two ways open. The first possibility is the regressive one of trying
to restore the persona to its former condition, by endeavouring to restrain the unconscious by
the application of a reductive theory; for instance, by declaring it to be nothing but long-

repressed and overdue infantile sexuality, for which it would really be best to substitute the
normal sexual function. This solution is based upon the unmistakable sexualistic symbolism
of the language of the unconscious, and upon the concretistic interpretation of the same. Or an
attempt may be made to apply the power theory, by conceiving the God-Almightiness as a
"virile protest," and as an infantile striving for power and self-preservation: a theory for
which support is found in the unmistakable pretensions to power that the unconscious
material contains. A further possibility would be to declare the unconscious to be the archaic
collective psychology of primitive man, an explanation that would not only cover the
sexualistic symbolism and the "God-Almighty" aiming for power of the unconscious content,
but would also apparently do justice to the religious, philosophical, and mythological aspects
and tendencies of the unconscious content. In every case the conclusion arrived at is the same,
viz. that the unconscious is nothing but this or that, which has already been adequately
recognised and acknowledged as infantile, useless, meaningless, impossible, and out of date.
There is nothing to be done but to shrug one's shoulders and resign one's self to the inevitable.
To the patient there seems to be no alternative, if one wishes to continue to live sensibly, but
to restore in so far as is possible that extract of the collective psyche termed persona, to lay
the fact of analysis silently aside, and do one's utmost to forget that one possesses an
unconscious. We shall find support in Faust's words:—
"The sphere of earth is known enough to me;
The view beyond is barred immutably:
A fool, who there his blinking eyes directeth,
And o'er his clouds of peers a place expecteth!
Firm let him stand, and look around him well!
This world means something to the capable.
Why needs he through Eternity to wend?
He here acquires what he can apprehend.
Thus let him wander down his earthly day;
When spirits haunt go quietly his way;
In marching onward, bliss and torment find,
Though every moment, with unsated mind!"
This would be a happy solution if one really could succeed in throwing off the unconscious to
such an extent as to withdraw the libido from it, and so render it inoperative. But experience
proves that energy cannot be withdrawn from the unconscious; it continues operative, for the
unconscious contains and is indeed itself the source of libido, from which issue the primary
psychic elements, thought-feelings, or feeling-thoughts—undifferentiated germs of idea and
sentiment. It would therefore be a delusion to believe that by means of some, so to say,
magical theory or method, the libido could be conclusively wrested from the unconscious, or
that it could be to a certain extent disconnected. One may yield to this illusion for a time, but
some day he will be obliged to declare with Faust:—
"Now fills the air so many a haunting shape,
That no one knows how best he may escape.
What though one day with rational brightness beams,
The night entangles us in webs of dreams.

From our young fields of life we come, elate:
There croaks a bird; what croaks he? Evil fate!
By superstition constantly ensnared,
It grows to us and warns and is declared.
Intimidated thus we stand alone.—
The portal jars, yet entrance is there none.
Is any one here?
CARE: Yes! must be my reply.
FAUST: And, thou, who art thou, then?
CARE: Well—here am I.
FAUST: Avaunt!
CARE: I am where I should be:
Though no ear should choose to hear me,
Yet the shrinking heart must fear me;
Though transformed to mortal eyes,
Grimmest power I exercise."
The unconscious cannot be "analysed" to a finish, and thus brought to a standstill. No one can
wrest active force from it for any length of time. Therefore to act according to the method just
described is only to deceive one's self, and is nothing but a new edition of an ordinary
repression.
2. The Identification with the Collective Psyche.
The second way would be that of identification with the collective psyche. That would mean
the symptom of "God-Almightiness" developed into a system; in other words, one would be
the fortunate possessor of the absolute truth, that had yet to be discovered; of the conclusive
knowledge, which would be the people's salvation. This attitude is not necessarily
megalomania ("Grössenwahn") in a direct form, but the well-known milder form of having a
prophetic mission. Weak minds which, as is so often the case, have correspondingly an undue
share of vanity and misplaced naïveté at their disposal, run a considerable risk of succumbing
to this temptation. The obtaining access to the collective psyche signifies a renewal of life for
the individual, whether this renewal of life be felt as something pleasant or unpleasant. It
would seem desirable to retain a hold upon this renewal: for one person, because it increases
his feeling for life ("Lebensgefühl"); for another, because it promises a great accretion to his
knowledge. Therefore both of them, not wishing to deprive themselves of the rich values that
lie buried in the collective psyche, will endeavour by every means possible to retain their
newly gained union with the primal cause of life. Identification appears to be the nearest way
to it, for the merging of the persona in the collective psyche is a veritable lure to unite one's
self with this "ocean of divinity," and, oblivious of the past, to become absorbed in it. This
piece of mysticism belongs to every finer individual, just as the "yearning for the mother"—
the looking back to the source whence one originated—is innate in every one.

As I have demonstrated explicitly before,[254] there is a special value and a special necessity
hidden in the regressive longing—which, as is well-known, Freud conceives as "infantile
fixation" or as "incest-wish." This necessity and longing is particularly emphasized in myths,
where it is always the strongest and best of people, in other words, the hero, who follows the
regressive longing and deliberately runs into danger of letting himself be devoured by the
monster of the maternal first cause. But he is a hero only because, instead of letting himself
be finally devoured by the monster, he conquers it, and that not only once but several times. It
is only through the conquest of the collective psyche that its true value can be attained,
whether it be under the symbol of capture of treasure, of an invincible weapon, of a magical
means of defence, or whatever else the myth devises as the most desirable possession. Hence
whoever identifies himself with the collective psyche, also reaches the treasure which the
dragon guards, but against his will and to his own great injury, by thus allowing himself
(mythologically speaking) to be devoured by the monster and merged with it.
Identification with the collective psyche is therefore a failure; this way ends just as
disastrously as did the first, which led to the severance of the persona from the collective
psyche.

V.—LEADING PRINCIPLES FOR THE TREATMENT OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY.
In order to solve the problem how practical treatment can overcome the assimilation of the
collective psyche, we must first of all make quite clear to ourselves what was the error of the
two ways already described. We saw that neither the one way nor the other led to any
appropriate result. The first way simply leads the patient back to the point of departure,
having lost the vital values contained in the collective psyche. The second way leads him
straight into the collective psyche, having lost that detached human existence which alone
renders possible a bearable and satisfying life. There are on both sides values that should not
be lost to the individual.
The mistake is, therefore, neither in the collective psyche nor in the individual psyche, but in
allowing the one to exclude the other. The monistic tendency assists this propensity, for it
always suspects and looks for one principle everywhere. As a general psychological tendency,
monism is a peculiarity of differentiated feeling and thought, corresponding to the keen desire
to make the one or the other function the supreme psychological principle. The introversion
type only knows the thought principle, and the extroversion type only that of feeling. This
psychological monism—or it would be better to say monotheism—has the advantage of
simplicity, and the disadvantage of one-sidedness. On the one hand, it signifies the exclusion
of the variety and true riches of life; whilst on the other, it means the practicability of
realizing the ideals of the present day and of the near past. But it does not in itself signify any
actual possibility of human progress.
In the same way rationalism tends towards exclusiveness. Its essence is to exclude instantly
whatever is opposed to its standpoint, whether it be intellectually logical or emotionally so. In
regard to reason it is both monistic and autocratic. Special thanks are due to Bergson for
having broken a lance for the right of the irrational to exist. Psychology will probably be
obliged to acknowledge and to submit to a plurality of principles, in spite of the fact that this
does not suit the scientific mind. Only so can psychology be saved from ship-wreck.

But with regard to individual psychology science must waive its claims. For to speak of a
scientific individual psychology is in itself a contradictio in adjecto. It is necessarily always
only the collective part of an individual psychology that can be the subject of scientific study,
for the individual is—according to definition—something unique and incomparable. A
"scientific" individual psychology is a denial of individual psychology. It may justly be
suspected that individual psychology is indeed a projection of the psychology of him who
defines it. Every individual psychology must have its own text-book, for the universal textbook only contains collective psychology.
These remarks are intended to prepare for what has to be said about the treatment of the
aforesaid problem. The fundamental error of both the afore-mentioned ways is simply that the
subject is collectively identified with the one or the other part of his psychology. His
psychology is individual as well as collective, but not in such a manner as to merge the
individual with what is collective, or the collective with what is individual. The persona must
be strictly separated from the concept of the individual, in so far as the persona can be
absolutely merged with the collective. But what is individual is just that which can never be
absorbed in the collective, and is, too, never identical with the collective. Therefore, an
identification with the collective or an arbitrary cutting-off from the collective is equivalent to
illness; it is pathological.
As has already been indicated, what is individual appears at first as the particular selection of
those elements of the collective psyche that contribute to the composition of the persona. As I
said before, the components are not individual but collective. It is only their combination, or
the selection as a model of particular groups that had already been combined, which is
individual. That would be the individual nucleus which is concealed by the personal mask. By
the particular differentiation of the persona, the resistance is shown of the individuality to the
collective psyche. By analysing the persona, we transfer a greater value to the individuality,
increasing thereby its conflict with collectivity. This conflict obviously is a psychological
conflict in the individual. The dissolution of the compromise between the two halves of a pair
of opposites increases the effectiveness of the contrast. This conflict does not exist within the
sphere of purely unconscious natural life, although the purely physiological life of the
individual also has to comply with collective demands.
The natural unconscious attitude is harmonious; the body, with its capacities and needs,
providing immediately indications and limitations, that prevent intemperance and lack of
proportion. A differentiated psychological function, however, always inclines towards
disproportion, on account of the one-sidedness which is cultivated by the conscious
rationality of intention. What is called mental individuality, is, also, an expression of the
individual corporeity, being, so to speak, identical with it. This sentence might obviously also
be reversed, a fact that does not materially alter the real psychological data concerning the
intimate relation of the individuality to the body. At the same time, the body is also that which
makes the subject resemble all others to a great extent, although it is the individual body that
is differentiated from all others.
Similarly the mental or moral individuality differs from all others, although in every respect it
is so constituted as to place one person on an equality with all others. Every living creature
that is able freely to develop itself individually without any coercion at all, will, through the

perfecting of its individuality, soonest realize the ideal type of its species, and therefore,
figuratively speaking, will have collective validity.
The persona is always identical with a typical attitude, in which one pyschological function
dominates, e.g. feeling, or thought, or intuition. This one-sidedness always causes the relative
repression of the other functions. In consequence of this circumstance, the persona is
hindering to the development of the individual. The dissolution of the persona is, therefore, an
indispensable condition of individuation. It is, therefore, to some extent impossible to achieve
individuation by means of conscious intention; for conscious intention leads to a conscious
attitude, which excludes everything that "does not suit." But the assimilation of the
unconscious contents leads, on the contrary, to a condition in which conscious intention is
excluded, being replaced by a process of development that appears to us irrational. This
process alone signifies individuation, its product being individuality as defined above, viz. as
something individual that is at the same time universal. So long as the persona exists
individuality is repressed, betraying itself at most by the particular selection of personal
requisites, of what might be called the actor's costumes. Only when the unconscious is
assimilated does the individuality become more prominent, and with it also that uniting
psychological phenomenon between the ego and non-ego, expressed by the word attitude, is
now no longer a typical attitude but an individual one.
What is paradoxical in these formulations arises from the same cause from which the conflict
about the "universalia" formerly arose. The phrase "animal nullumque animal genus est"
makes the fundamental paradox clearly comprehensible. What exists "really" is individual:
that which is universal is existing psychologically, but being caused by the real-existing
similarities of individual things. The individual is, therefore, the individual thing that has, to a
greater or less extent, those attributes upon which the collective conception of "collectivity"
rests; and the more individual he is, the more he develops those attributes that are the basis of
a collective concept of human nature.
If a grotesque figure, suggested by the initial situation of our problem be permitted, it is
Buridan's ass between the two bundles of hay. His questioning is obviously wrong: the
question is not whether the hay-bundle on the right or the left be the better one, or whether he
should begin to eat on the right or the left hand, but what he himself would like to do, what he
is eager for—that is the point. He is thinking of the hay and not of himself, and therefore he
does not know what he really wants.
The question is: what at this moment is the natural direction of the growth of this individual?
This question cannot be settled by any philosophy, religion or good advice, but solely by an
unprejudiced review of the psychological germs of life which have resulted from the natural
co-operation of the conscious and unconscious on the one hand, and of the individual and the
collective on the other. One person looks for them in the conscious, and another in the
unconscious. But the conscious is only one side, and the unconscious is only the other. For it
should never be forgotten that dreams are compensatory or complementary to consciousness.
Were this not the case, we should be obliged to regard dreams as a source of knowledge
superior to the conscious. This view would undoubtedly carry us back to the mentality of the
augur, and we should have to accept all the consequences of such a superstitious attitude,
unless, indeed, we look upon dreams as valueless, as does the vulgar mind.

We find the unifying function that we are seeking, in the phantasies in which everything that
has any effectual determination is present. But phantasies have a bad reputation among
psychologists. The psychoanalytical theories hitherto obtaining have treated them
accordingly. For both Freud and Adler the phantasy is nothing but a so-called "symbolic"
disguise of what both investigators suppose to be the primary propensities and aims. But in
opposition to these views it should be emphasised—not for theoretical but for essentially
practical reasons—that the phantasy may indeed be thus causally explained and depreciated,
but that it nevertheless is the creative soil for everything that has ever brought development to
humanity. The phantasy as a psychological function has a peculiar non-reducible value of its
own, whose roots are in both the conscious and the unconscious contents, and in what is
collective as well as in what is individual.
But whence comes the bad reputation of the phantasy? It owes that reputation chiefly to the
circumstance that it ought not to be taken literally. It is worthless if understood
concretistically. If we understand semiotically, as Freud does, it is interesting from the
scientific standpoint. But if it be understood hermeneutically, as an actual symbol, it provides
us with the cue that we need in order to develop our life in harmony with ourselves.
For the significance of a symbol is not that it is a disguised indication of something that is
generally known,[255] but that it is an endeavour to elucidate by analogy what is as yet
completely unknown and only in process of formation.[256] The phantasy represents to us that
which is just developing under the form of a more or less apposite analogy. By analytical
reduction to something universally known, we destroy the actual value of the symbol; but it is
appropriate to its value and meaning to give it an hermeneutical interpretation.
The essence of hermeneutics—an art that was formerly much practised—consists in adding
more analogies to that already given by the symbol: in the first place, subjective analogies
given by the patient as they occur to him; and in the second place, objective analogies
provided by the analyst out of his general knowledge. The initial symbol is much enlarged
and enriched by this procedure, the result being a highly complex and many-sided picture,
which may now be reduced to tertia comparationis. Thence result certain psychological lines
of development of an individual as well as collective nature. No science upon earth could
prove the accuracy of these lines; on the contrary, rationalism could very easily prove that
they are wrong. But these lines vindicate their validity by their value for life. The chief thing
in practical treatment is that people should get a hold of their own life, not that the principle
of their life should be provable or "right."
Of course, true to the spirit of scientific superstition suggestion will be mooted. But it should
long ago have been realised that a suggestion is only accepted by one it suits. Beyond that
there is no suggestion, otherwise the treatment of neurosis would be extremely simple, for we
should only need to suggest health. This pseudo-scientific talk about suggestion is based upon
the unconscious superstition that suggestion actually possesses some real magic power. No
one succumbs to suggestion unless from the very bottom of his heart he be willing to cooperate.
By means of the hermeneutical treatment of the phantasies we arrive at the synthesis of the
individual with the collective psyche, put theoretically, that is, but practically, one
indispensable condition is yet lacking. For it belongs to the regressive disposition of the

neurotic—a disposition in which he has been confirmed in the course of his illness—to take
neither himself nor the world seriously, but always to rely on this or that method or
circumstance to effect a cure, quite apart from his own serious co-operation. "But you can't
wash the dog without getting his skin wet." No cure can be effected without unlimited
willingness and absolute seriousness on the part of the patient. There are no magical cures for
neurosis. Just as soon as we begin to elaborate the symbolic outlines of the path, the patient
must begin to walk thereon. If he delude himself and shirk it, no cure can result. He must
really work and live according to what he has seen and recognised as the direction for the
time being of his individual life-line, and must continue thereon until a distinct reaction of his
unconscious shows him that he is beginning in good faith to go a wrong way.
He who does not possess this moral function of faithfulness to himself will never get rid of
his neurosis; but he who has this faithfulness can find the way out.
Neither physician nor patient must yield to the delusion that "being analysed" is in itself
sufficient to remove a neurosis. That would be deception and self-delusion. Ultimately it is
infallibly the moral factor that decides between health and illness.
By the construction of the individual's life-line the ever-varying trends and tendencies of his
libido are made conscious. These life-lines are not identical with the "directing fictions"
discovered by Adler, which are none other than arbitrary attempts to cut the persona off from
the collective psyche, and to give it independence. It might rather be said that the "directing
fiction" is an unsuccessful attempt to construct a life-line. The unsuitability of the "directing
fiction" is also proved by the fact that the lines are tenaciously retained for much too long a
time. The hermeneutically constructed life-line is short, for life follows no straight lines that
indicate the future long beforehand, for, as Nietzsche says, "All truth is crooked." Life-lines
are therefore neither principles nor ideals of universal validity, but points of view and
adaptations of ephemeral validity. An abatement of vital intensity, a perceptible loss of libido,
or an excessive passion or ecstasy—all show that one such line is left, and that a new line
begins, or rather should begin. Sometimes it is enough to leave the revealing of the new line
to the unconscious; but this course should indeed not be recommended to the neurotic under
all circumstances, though there are cases where what is needed is to learn to trust to so-called
chance. However, it is not advisable to let one's self drift for any length of time; a watchful
eye should at least be kept upon the reactions of the unconscious, that is to say, upon the
dreams: these indicate like a barometer the one-sidedness of our attitude.[257] Therefore, I
consider it necessary, in contrast to some other analysts, for the patient after analysis to
remain in contact with the unconscious, if he would avoid a relapse. That is why I am
convinced that the real end of analysis is reached when the patient has acquired adequate
knowledge of the method to remain in contact with the unconscious, and sufficient
psychological knowledge to be able to understand approximately his ever-changing life-line;
otherwise he is not in a position to follow the direction of the libido currents in the
unconscious, and thereby to gain conscious support in the development of his individuality.
Every serious case of neurosis needs this weapon in order to maintain the cure.
In this sense analysis is not a method that is a medical monopoly, but rather an art or
technique or science of psychological life, which he who has been cured must continue to
foster, for the sake of his own welfare and that of his environment. If he understands this
aright he will not pose as a psychoanalytical prophet nor as a public reformer, but truly

understanding the common weal, he will first himself reap the benefit of the self-knowledge
acquired in his treatment, and then he will let the example of his life work what good it can,
rather than indulge in aggressive talk and missionary propaganda.

SUMMARY.
A. Psychological Material must be divided into CONSCIOUS and UNCONSCIOUS Contents.
1. The conscious contents are partly personal, in so far as their universal validity is not
recognised; and partly impersonal, that is, collective, in so far as their universal validity is
recognised.
2. The unconscious contents are partly personal, in so far as they concern solely repressed
materials of a personal nature, that have once been relatively conscious and whose universal
validity is therefore not recognised when they are made conscious; partly impersonal, in so
far as the materials concerned are recognised as impersonal and of purely universal validity,
of whose earlier even relative consciousness we have no means of proof.
B. The Composition of the Persona.
1. The conscious personal contents constitute the conscious personality, the conscious ego.
2. The unconscious personal contents constitute the self, the unconscious or subconscious
ego.
3. The conscious and unconscious contents of a personal nature constitute the persona.
C. The Composition of the Collective Psyche.
1. The conscious and unconscious contents of an impersonal or collective nature compose the
psychological non-ego, the image of the object. These materials can appear analytically as
projections of feeling or of opinion, but they are a priori collectively identical with the
object-imago, that is they appear as qualities of the object, and are only a posteriori
recognised as subjective psychological qualities.
2. The persona is that grouping of conscious and unconscious contents which is opposed as
ego to the non-ego. The general comparison of personal contents of different individuals
establishes their far-reaching similarity, extending even to identity, by which the individual
nature of personal contents, and therewith of the persona, is for the most part suspended. To
this extent the persona must be considered an excerpt of the collective psyche, and also a
component of the collective psyche.
3. The collective psyche is therefore composed of the object-imago and the persona.
D. What is Individual.
1. What is individual appears partly as the principle that decides the selection and limitation
of the contents that are accepted as personal.

2. What is individual is the principle by which an increasing differentiation from the
collective psyche is made possible and enforced.
3. What is individual manifests itself partly as an impediment to collective accomplishment,
and as a resistance against collective thinking and feeling.
4. What is individual is the uniqueness of the combination of universal (collective)
psychological elements.
E. We must divide the Conscious and Unconscious Contents into Individualistic and
Collectivistic.
1. A content is individualistic whose developing tendency is directed towards the
differentiation from the collective.
2. A content is collectivistic whose developing tendency aims at universal validity.
3. There are insufficient criteria by which to designate a given content as simply individual or
collective, for uniqueness is very difficult to prove, although it is a perpetually and
universally recurrent phenomenon.
4. The life-line of an individual is the resultant of the individualistic and collectivistic
tendency of the psychological process at any given moment.
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THE END
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Preface.
IN reading the history of nations, we find that, like individuals, they
have their whims and their peculiarities; their seasons of excitement
and recklessness, when they care not what they do. We find that
whole communities suddenly fix their minds upon one object, and go
mad in its pursuit; that millions of people become simultaneously
impressed with one delusion, and run after it, till their attention is
caught by some new folly more captivating than the first. We see one
nation suddenly seized, from its highest to its lowest members, with
a fierce desire of military glory; another as suddenly becoming crazed
upon a religious scruple; and neither of them recovering its senses
until it has shed rivers of blood and sowed a harvest of groans and
tears, to be reaped by its posterity. At an early age in the annals of
Europe its population lost their wits about the sepulchre of Jesus,
and crowded in frenzied multitudes to the Holy Land; another age
went mad for fear of the devil, and offered up hundreds of thousands
of victims to the delusion of witchcraft. At another time, the many
became crazed on the subject of the philosopher’s stone, and
committed follies till then unheard of in the pursuit. It was once
thought a venial offence, in very many countries of Europe, to
destroy an enemy by slow poison. Persons who would have revolted
at the idea of stabbing a man to the heart, drugged his pottage
without scruple. Ladies of gentle birth and manners caught the
contagion of murder, until poisoning, under their auspices, became
quite fashionable. Some delusions, though notorious to all the world,
have subsisted for ages, flourishing as widely among civilised and

polished nations as among the early barbarians with whom they
originated,—that of duelling, for instance, and the belief in omens
and divination of the future, which seem to defy the progress of
knowledge to eradicate them entirely from the popular mind. Money,
again, has often been a cause of the delusion of multitudes. Sober
nations have all at once become desperate gamblers, and risked
almost their existence upon the turn of a piece of paper. To trace the
history of the most prominent of these delusions is the object of the
present pages. Men, it has been well said, think in herds; it will be
seen that they go mad in herds, while they only recover their senses
slowly, and one by one.
Some of the subjects introduced may be familiar to the reader; but
the Author hopes that sufficient novelty of detail will be found even
in these, to render them acceptable, while they could not be wholly
omitted in justice to the subject of which it was proposed to treat.
The memoirs of the South-Sea madness and the Mississippi delusion
are more complete and copious than are to be found elsewhere; and
the same may be said of the history of the Witch Mania, which
contains an account of its terrific progress in Germany, a part of the
subject which has been left comparatively untouched by Sir Walter
Scott in his Letters on Demonology and Witchcraft, the most
important that have yet appeared on this fearful but most interesting
subject.
Popular delusions began so early, spread so widely, and have
lasted so long, that instead of two or three volumes, fifty would
scarcely suffice to detail their history. The present may be considered
more of a miscellany of delusions than a history—a chapter only in
the great and awful book of human folly which yet remains to be

written, and which Porson once jestingly said he would write in five
hundred volumes! Interspersed are sketches of some lighter matters,
—amusing instances of the imitativeness and wrongheadedness of
the people, rather than examples of folly and delusion.
Religious matters have been purposely excluded as incompatible
with the limits prescribed to the present work; a mere list of them
would alone be sufficient to occupy a volume.

JOHN LAW.

MONEY MANIA.—THE MISSISSIPPI SCHEME.

Some in clandestine companies combine;
Erect new stocks to trade beyond the line;
With air and empty names beguile the town,
And raise new credits first, then cry ’em down;
Divide the empty nothing into shares,
And set the crowd together by the ears.—Defoe.

THE personal character and career of one man are so intimately connected
with the great scheme of the years 1719 and 1720, that a history of the
Mississippi madness can have no fitter introduction than a sketch of the
life of its great author John Law. Historians are divided in opinion as to
whether they should designate him a knave or a madman. Both epithets
were unsparingly applied to him in his lifetime, and while the unhappy
consequences of his projects were still deeply felt. Posterity, however, has
found reason to doubt the justice of the accusation, and to confess that
John Law was neither knave nor madman, but one more deceived than
deceiving, more sinned against than sinning. He was thoroughly
acquainted with the philosophy and true principles of credit. He
understood the monetary question better than any man of his day; and if
his system fell with a crash so tremendous, it was not so much his fault as
that of the people amongst whom he had erected it. He did not calculate
upon the avaricious frenzy of a whole nation; he did not see that
confidence, like mistrust, could be increased almost ad infinitum, and that
hope was as extravagant as fear. How was he to foretell that the French
people, like the man in the fable, would kill, in their frantic eagerness, the

fine goose he had brought to lay them so many golden eggs? His fate was
like that which may be supposed to have overtaken the first adventurous
boatman who rowed from Erie to Ontario. Broad and smooth was the river
on which he embarked; rapid and pleasant was his progress; and who was
to stay him in his career? Alas for him! the cataract was nigh. He saw, when
it was too late, that the tide which wafted him so joyously along was a tide
of destruction; and when he endeavoured to retrace his way, he found that
the current was too strong for his weak efforts to stem, and that he drew
nearer every instant to the tremendous falls. Down he went over the sharp
rocks, and the waters with him. He was dashed to pieces with his bark, but
the waters, maddened and turned to foam by the rough descent, only
boiled and bubbled for a time, and then flowed on again as smoothly as
ever. Just so it was with Law and the French people. He was the boatman,
and they were the waters.
John Law was born at Edinburgh in the year 1671. His father was the
younger son of an ancient family in Fife, and carried on the business of a
goldsmith and banker. He amassed considerable wealth in his trade,
sufficient to enable him to gratify the wish, so common among his
countrymen, of adding a territorial designation to his name. He purchased
with this view the estates of Lauriston and Randleston, on the Frith of
Forth, on the borders of West and Mid Lothian, and was thenceforth
known as Law of Lauriston. The subject of our memoir, being the eldest
son, was received into his father’s counting-house at the age of fourteen,
and for three years laboured hard to acquire an insight into the principles
of banking as then carried on in Scotland. He had always manifested great
love for the study of numbers, and his proficiency in the mathematics was
considered extraordinary in one of his tender years. At the age of seventeen
he was tall, strong, and well made; and his face, although deeply scarred
with the small-pox, was agreeable in its expression, and full of intelligence.
At this time he began to neglect his business, and becoming vain of his
person, indulged in considerable extravagance of attire. He was a great

favourite with the ladies, by whom he was called Beau Law; while the other
sex, despising his foppery, nicknamed him Jessamy John. At the death of
his father, which happened in 1688, he withdrew entirely from the desk,
which had become so irksome, and being possessed of the revenues of the
paternal estate of Lauriston, he proceeded to London, to see the world.
He was now very young, very vain, good-looking, tolerably rich, and
quite uncontrolled. It is no wonder that, on his arrival in the capital, he
should launch out into extravagance. He soon became a regular frequenter
of the gaming-houses, and by pursuing a certain plan, based upon some
abstruse calculation of chances, he contrived to gain considerable sums. All
the gamblers envied him his luck, and many made it a point to watch his
play, and stake their money on the same chances. In affairs of gallantry he
was equally fortunate; ladies of the first rank smiled graciously upon the
handsome Scotchman—the young, the rich, the witty, and the obliging. But
all these successes only paved the way for reverses. After he had been for
nine years exposed to the dangerous attractions of the gay life he was
leading, he became an irrecoverable gambler. As his love of play increased
in violence, it diminished in prudence. Great losses were only to be
repaired by still greater ventures, and one unhappy day he lost more than
he could repay without mortgaging his family estate. To that step he was
driven at last. At the same time his gallantry brought him into trouble. A
love affair, or slight flirtation, with a lady of the name of Villiers, 1 exposed
him to the resentment of a Mr. Wilson, by whom he was challenged to fight
a duel. Law accepted, and had the ill fortune to shoot his antagonist dead
upon the spot. He was arrested the same day, and brought to trial for
murder by the relatives of Mr. Wilson. He was afterwards found guilty, and
sentenced to death. The sentence was commuted to a fine, upon the ground
that the offence only amounted to manslaughter. An appeal being lodged
by a brother of the deceased, Law was detained in the King’s Bench,
whence, by some means or other, which he never explained, he contrived to
escape; and an action being instituted against the sheriffs, he was

advertised in the Gazette, and a reward offered for his apprehension. He
was described as “Captain John Law, a Scotchman, aged twenty-six; a very
tall, black, lean man; well shaped, above six feet high, with large pock-holes
in his face; big nosed, and speaking broad and loud.” As this was rather a
caricature than a description of him, it has been supposed that it was
drawn up with a view to favour his escape. He succeeded in reaching the
Continent, where he travelled for three years, and devoted much of his
attention to the monetary and banking affairs of the countries through
which he passed. He stayed a few months in Amsterdam, and speculated to
some extent in the funds. His mornings were devoted to the study of
finance and the principles of trade, and his evenings to the gaming-house.
It is generally believed that he returned to Edinburgh in the year 1700. It is
certain that he published in that city his Proposals and Reasons for
constituting a Council of Trade. This pamphlet did not excite much
attention.
In a short time afterwards he published a project for establishing what
he called a Land-bank, 2 the notes issued by which were never to exceed the
value of the entire lands of the state, upon ordinary interest, or were to be
equal in value to the land, with the right to enter into possession at a
certain time. The project excited a good deal of discussion in the Scottish
Parliament, and a motion for the establishment of such a bank was brought
forward by a neutral party, called the Squadrone, whom Law had
interested in his favour. The Parliament ultimately passed a resolution to
the effect, that, to establish any kind of paper credit, so as to force it to
pass, was an improper expedient for the nation.
Upon the failure of this project, and of his efforts to procure a pardon for
the murder of Mr. Wilson, Law withdrew to the Continent, and resumed
his old habits of gaming. For fourteen years he continued to roam about, in
Flanders, Holland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and France. He soon became
intimately acquainted with the extent of the trade and resources of each,
and daily more confirmed in his opinion that no country could prosper

without a paper currency. During the whole of this time he appears to have
chiefly supported himself by successful play. At every gambling-house of
note in the capitals of Europe he was known and appreciated as one better
skilled in the intricacies of chance than any other man of the day. It is
stated in the Biographie Universelle that he was expelled, first from
Venice, and afterwards from Genoa, by the magistrates, who thought him a
visitor too dangerous for the youth of those cities. During his residence in
Paris he rendered himself obnoxious to D’Argenson, the lieutenant-general
of the police, by whom he was ordered to quit the capital. This did not take
place, however, before he had made the acquaintance, in the saloons, of the
Duke de Vendôme, the Prince de Conti, and of the gay Duke of Orleans, the
latter of whom was destined afterwards to exercise so much influence over
his fate. The Duke of Orleans was pleased with the vivacity and good sense
of the Scottish adventurer, while the latter was no less pleased with the wit
and amiability of a prince who promised to become his patron. They were
often thrown into each other’s society, and Law seized every opportunity to
instil his financial doctrines into the mind of one whose proximity to the
throne pointed him out as destined, at no very distant date, to play an
important part in the government.

THE REGENT OF FRANCE.

Shortly before the death of Louis XIV., or, as some say, in 1708, Law
proposed a scheme of finance to Desmarets, the comptroller. Louis is
reported to have inquired whether the projector were a Catholic, and on

being answered in the negative, to have declined having any thing to do
with him. 3
It was after this repulse that he visited Italy. His mind being still
occupied with schemes of finance, he proposed to Victor Amadeus, duke of
Savoy, to establish his land-bank in that country. The duke replied that his
dominions were too circumscribed for the execution of so great a project,
and that he was by far too poor a potentate to be ruined. He advised him,
however, to try the king of France once more; for he was sure, if he knew
any thing of the French character, that the people would be delighted with
a plan, not only so new, but so plausible.
Louis XIV. died in 1715, and the heir to the throne being an infant only
seven years of age, the Duke of Orleans assumed the reins of government,
as regent, during his minority. Law now found himself in a more
favourable position. The tide in his affairs had come, which, taken at the
flood, was to waft him on to fortune. The regent was his friend, already
acquainted with his theory and pretensions, and inclined, moreover, to aid
him in any efforts to restore the wounded credit of France, bowed down to
the earth by the extravagance of the long reign of Louis XIV.
Hardly was that monarch laid in his grave ere the popular hatred,
suppressed so long, burst forth against his memory. He who, during his
life, had been flattered with an excess of adulation, to which history
scarcely offers a parallel, was now cursed as a tyrant, a bigot, and a
plunderer. His statues were pelted and disfigured; his effigies torn down,
amid the execrations of the populace, and his name rendered synonymous
with selfishness and oppression. The glory of his arms was forgotten, and
nothing was remembered but his reverses, his extravagance, and his
cruelty.
The finances of the country were in a state of the utmost disorder. A
profuse and corrupt monarch, whose profuseness and corruption were
imitated by almost every functionary, from the highest to the lowest grade,
had brought France to the verge of ruin. The national debt amounted to

3000 millions of livres, the revenue to 145 millions, and the expenses of
government to 142 millions per annum; leaving only three millions to pay
the interest upon 3000 millions. The first care of the regent was to discover
a remedy for an evil of such magnitude, and a council was early summoned
to take the matter into consideration. The Duke de St. Simon was of
opinion that nothing could save the country from revolution but a remedy
at once bold and dangerous. He advised the regent to convoke the statesgeneral, and declare a national bankruptcy. The Duke de Noailles, a man of
accommodating principles, an accomplished courtier, and totally averse
from giving himself any trouble or annoyance that ingenuity could escape
from, opposed the project of St. Simon with all his influence. He
represented the expedient as alike dishonest and ruinous. The regent was
of the same opinion, and this desperate remedy fell to the ground.
The measures ultimately adopted, though they promised fair, only
aggravated the evil. The first, and most dishonest measure was of no
advantage to the state. A recoinage was ordered, by which the currency was
depreciated one-fifth; those who took a thousand pieces of gold or silver to
the mint received back an amount of coin of the same nominal value, but
only four-fifths of the weight of metal. By this contrivance the treasury
gained seventy-two millions of livres, and all the commercial operations of
the country were disordered. A trifling diminution of the taxes silenced the
clamours of the people, and for the slight present advantage the great
prospective evil was forgotten.
A Chamber of Justice was next instituted to inquire into the
malversations of the loan-contractors and the farmers of the revenues. Taxcollectors are never very popular in any country, but those of France at this
period deserved all the odium with which they were loaded. As soon as
these farmers-general, with all their hosts of subordinate agents, called
maltôtiers, 4 were called to account for their misdeeds, the most
extravagant joy took possession of the nation. The Chamber of Justice,
instituted chiefly for this purpose, was endowed with very extensive

powers. It was composed of the presidents and councils of the parliament,
the judges of the Courts of Aid and of Requests, and the officers of the
Chamber of Account, under the general presidence of the minister of
finance. Informers were encouraged to give evidence against the offenders
by the promise of one-fifth part of the fines and confiscations. A tenth of all
concealed effects belonging to the guilty was promised to such as should
furnish the means of discovering them.
The promulgation of the edict constituting this court caused a degree of
consternation among those principally concerned, which can only be
accounted for on the supposition that their peculation had been enormous.
But they met with no sympathy. The proceedings against them justified
their terror. The Bastille was soon unable to contain the prisoners that
were sent to it, and the gaols all over the country teemed with guilty or
suspected persons. An order was issued to all innkeepers and postmasters
to refuse horses to such as endeavoured to seek safety in flight; and all
persons were forbidden, under heavy fines, to harbour them or favour their
evasion. Some were condemned to the pillory, others to the galleys, and the
least guilty to fine and imprisonment. One only, Samuel Bernard, a rich
banker and farmer-general of a province remote from the capital, was
sentenced to death. So great had been the illegal profits of this man,—
looked upon as the tyrant and oppressor of his district,—that he offered six
millions of livres, or 250,000l. sterling, to be allowed to escape.
His bribe was refused, and he suffered the penalty of death. Others,
perhaps more guilty, were more fortunate. Confiscation, owing to the
concealment of their treasures by the delinquents, often produced less
money than a fine. The severity of the government relaxed, and fines,
under the denomination of taxes, were indiscriminately levied upon all
offenders; but so corrupt was every department of the administration, that
the country benefited but little by the sums which thus flowed into the
treasury. Courtiers and courtiers’ wives and mistresses came in for the
chief share of the spoils. One contractor had been taxed, in proportion to

his wealth and guilt, at the sum of twelve millions of livres. The Count * * *,
a man of some weight in the government, called upon him, and offered to
procure a remission of the fine if he would give him a hundred thousand
crowns. “Vous êtes trop tard, mon ami,” replied the financier; “I have
already made a bargain with your wife for fifty thousand.” 5
About a hundred and eighty millions of livres were levied in this manner,
of which eighty were applied in payment of the debts contracted by the
government. The remainder found its way into the pockets of the courtiers.
Madame de Maintenon, writing on this subject, says,—“We hear every day
of some new grant of the regent. The people murmur very much at this
mode of employing the money taken from the peculators.” The people,
who, after the first burst of their resentment is over, generally express a
sympathy for the weak, were indignant that so much severity should be
used to so little purpose. They did not see the justice of robbing one set of
rogues to fatten another. In a few months all the more guilty had been
brought to punishment, and the Chamber of Justice looked for victims in
humbler walks of life. Charges of fraud and extortion were brought against
tradesmen of good character in consequence of the great inducements held
out to common informers. They were compelled to lay open their affairs
before this tribunal in order to establish their innocence. The voice of
complaint resounded from every side; and at the expiration of a year the
government found it advisable to discontinue further proceedings. The
Chamber of Justice was suppressed, and a general amnesty granted to all
against whom no charges had yet been preferred.
In the midst of this financial confusion Law appeared upon the scene. No
man felt more deeply than the regent the deplorable state of the country,
but no man could be more averse from putting his shoulders manfully to
the wheel. He disliked business; he signed official documents without
proper examination, and trusted to others what he should have undertaken
himself. The cares inseparable from his high office were burdensome to
him. He saw that something was necessary to be done; but he lacked the

energy to do it, and had not virtue enough to sacrifice his ease and his
pleasures in the attempt. No wonder that, with this character, he listened
favourably to the mighty projects, so easy of execution, of the clever
adventurer whom he had formerly known, and whose talents he
appreciated.
When Law presented himself at court he was most cordially received. He
offered two memorials to the regent, in which he set forth the evils that had
befallen France, owing to an insufficient currency, at different times
depreciated. He asserted that a metallic currency, unaided by a paper
money, was wholly inadequate to the wants of a commercial country, and
particularly cited the examples of Great Britain and Holland to shew the
advantages of paper. He used many sound arguments on the subject of
credit, and proposed as a means of restoring that of Prance, then at so low
an ebb among the nations, that he should be allowed to set up a bank,
which should have the management of the royal revenues, and issue notes
both on that and on landed security. He further proposed that this bank
should be administered in the king’s name, but subject to the control of
commissioners to be named by the States-General.
While these memorials were under consideration, Law translated into
French his essay on money and trade, and used every means to extend
through the nation his renown as a financier. He soon became talked of.
The confidants of the regent spread abroad his praise, and every one
expected great things of Monsieur Lass. 6
On the 5th of May, 1716, a royal edict was published, by which Law was
authorised, in conjunction with his brother, to establish a bank under the
name of Law and Company, the notes of which should be received in
payment of the taxes. The capital was fixed at six millions of livres, in
twelve thousand shares of five hundred livres each, purchasable one fourth
in specie, and the remainder in billets d’état. It was not thought expedient
to grant him the whole of the privileges prayed for in his memorials until
experience should have shewn their safety and advantage.

Law was now on the high road to fortune. The study of thirty years was
brought to guide him in the management of his bank. He made all his notes
payable at sight, and in the coin current at the time they were issued. This
last was a master-stroke of policy, and immediately rendered his notes
more valuable than the precious metals. The latter were constantly liable to
depreciation by the unwise tampering of the government. A thousand livres
of silver might be worth their nominal value one day, and be reduced onesixth the next, but a note of Law’s bank retained its original value. He
publicly declared at the same time, that a banker deserved death if he made
issues without having sufficient security to answer all demands. The
consequence was, that his notes advanced rapidly in public estimation, and
were received at one per cent more than specie. It was not long before the
trade of the country felt the benefit. Languishing commerce began to lift up
her head; the taxes were paid with greater regularity and less murmuring;
and a degree of confidence was established that could not fail, if it
continued, to become still more advantageous. In the course of a year,
Law’s notes rose to fifteen per cent premium, while the billets d’état, or
notes issued by the government as security for the debts contracted by the
extravagant Louis XIV., were at a discount of no less than seventy-eight
and a half per cent. The comparison was too great in favour of Law not to
attract the attention of the whole kingdom, and his credit extended itself
day by day. Branches of his bank were almost simultaneously established at
Lyons, Rochelle, Tours, Amiens, and Orleans.
The regent appears to have been utterly astonished at his success, and
gradually to have conceived the idea that paper, which could so aid a
metallic currency, could entirely supersede it. Upon this fundamental error
he afterwards acted. In the mean time, Law commenced the famous project
which has handed his name down to posterity. He proposed to the regent
(who could refuse him nothing) to establish a company that should have
the exclusive privilege of trading to the great river Mississippi and the
province of Louisiana, on its western bank. The country was supposed to

abound in the precious metals; and the company, supported by the profits
of their exclusive commerce, were to be the sole farmers of the taxes and
sole coiners of money. Letters patent were issued, incorporating the
company, in August 1717. The capital was divided into two hundred
thousand shares of five hundred livres each, the whole of which might be
paid in billets d’état, at their nominal value, although worth no more than a
hundred and sixty livres in the market.
It was now that the frenzy of speculating began to seize upon the nation.
Law’s bank had effected so much good, that any promises for the future
which he thought proper to make were readily believed. The regent every
day conferred new privileges upon the fortunate projector. The bank
obtained the monopoly of the sale of tobacco, the sole right of refinage of
gold and silver, and was finally erected into the Royal Bank of France.
Amid the intoxication of success, both Law and the regent forgot the
maxim so loudly proclaimed by the former, that a banker deserved death
who made issues of paper without the necessary funds to provide for them.
As soon as the bank, from a private, became a public institution, the regent
caused a fabrication of notes to the amount of one thousand millions of
livres. This was the first departure from sound principles, and one for
which Law is not justly blameable. While the affairs of the bank were under
his control, the issues had never exceeded sixty millions. Whether Law
opposed the inordinate increase is not known; but as it took place as soon
as the bank was made a royal establishment, it is but fair to lay the blame
of the change of system upon the regent.
Law found that he lived under a despotic government; but he was not yet
aware of the pernicious influence which such a government could exercise
upon so delicate a framework as that of credit. He discovered it afterwards
to his cost, but in the meantime suffered himself to be impelled by the
regent into courses which his own reason must have disapproved. With a
weakness most culpable, he lent his aid in inundating the country with
paper money, which, based upon no solid foundation, was sure to fall,

sooner or later. The extraordinary present fortune dazzled his eyes, and
prevented him from seeing the evil day that would burst over his head,
when once, from any cause or other, the alarm was sounded. The
parliament were from the first jealous of his influence as a foreigner, and
had, besides, their misgivings as to the safety of his projects. As his
influence

extended,

their

animosity

increased.

D’Aguesseau,

the

chancellor, was unceremoniously dismissed by the regent for his
opposition to the vast increase of paper money, and the constant
depreciation of the gold and silver coin of the realm. This only served to
augment the enmity of the parliament, and when D’Argenson, a man
devoted to the interests of the regent, was appointed to the vacant
chancellorship, and made at the same time minister of finance, they
became more violent than ever. The first measure of the new minister
caused a further depreciation of the coin. In order to extinguish the billets
d’état, it was ordered that persons bringing to the mint four thousand
livres in specie and one thousand livres in billets d’état, should receive back
coin to the amount of five thousand livres. D’Argenson plumed himself
mightily upon thus creating five thousand new and smaller livres out of the
four thousand old and larger ones, being too ignorant of the true principles
of trade and credit to be aware of the immense injury he was inflicting
upon both.
The parliament saw at once the impolicy and danger of such a system,
and made repeated remonstrances to the regent. The latter refused to
entertain their petitions, when the parliament, by a bold and very unusual
stretch of authority, commanded that no money should be received in
payment but that of the old standard. The regent summoned a lit de justice,
and annulled the decree. The parliament resisted, and issued another.
Again the regent exercised his privilege, and annulled it, till the parliament,
stung to fiercer opposition, passed another decree, dated August 12th, 1718,
by which they forbade the bank of Law to have any concern, either direct or
indirect, in the administration of the revenue; and prohibited all

foreigners, under heavy penalties, from interfering, either in their own
names, or in that of others, in the management of the finances of the state.
The parliament considered Law to be the author of all the evil, and some of
the councillors, in the virulence of their enmity, proposed that he should be
brought to trial, and, if found guilty, be hung at the gates of the Palais de
Justice.

PALAIS ROYAL FROM THE GARDEN.

Law, in great alarm, fled to the Palais Royal, and threw himself on the
protection of the regent, praying that measures might be taken to reduce
the parliament to obedience. The regent had nothing so much at heart,
both on that account and because of the disputes that had arisen relative to
the legitimation of the Duke of Maine and the Count of Thoulouse, the sons
of the late king. The parliament was ultimately overawed by the arrest of
their president and two of the councillors, who were sent to distant prisons.
Thus the first cloud upon Law’s prospects blew over: freed from
apprehension of personal danger, he devoted his attention to his famous
Mississippi project, the shares of which were rapidly rising, in spite of the
parliament. At the commencement of the year 1719, an edict was published,
granting to the Mississippi Company the exclusive privilege of trading to
the East Indies, China, and the South Seas, and to all the possessions of the
French East India Company, established by Colbert. The Company, in

consequence of this great increase of their business, assumed, as more
appropriate, the title of Company of the Indies, and created fifty thousand
new shares. The prospects now held out by Law were most magnificent. He
promised a yearly dividend of two hundred livres upon each share of five
hundred, which, as the shares were paid for in billets d’état at their
nominal value, but worth only 100 livres, was at the rate of about 120 per
cent profit.

LAW’S HOUSE; RUE DE QUINCAMPOIX.

The public enthusiasm, which had been so long rising, could not resist a
vision so splendid. At least three hundred thousand applications were
made for the fifty thousand new shares, and Law’s house in the Rue de
Quincampoix was beset from morning to night by the eager applicants. As
it was impossible to satisfy them all, it was several weeks before a list of the
fortunate new stockholders could be made out, during which time the
public impatience rose to a pitch of frenzy. Dukes, marquises, counts, with
their duchesses, marchionesses, and countesses, waited in the streets for
hours every day before Mr. Law’s door to know the result. At last, to avoid

the jostling of the plebeian crowd, which, to the number of thousands,
filled the whole thoroughfare, they took apartments in the adjoining
houses, that they might be continually near the temple whence the new
Plutus was diffusing wealth. Every day the value of the old shares
increased, and the fresh applications, induced by the golden dreams of the
whole nation, became so numerous that it was deemed advisable to create
no less than three hundred thousand new shares, at five thousand livres
each, in order that the regent might take advantage of the popular
enthusiasm to pay off the national debt. For this purpose, the sum of
fifteen hundred millions of livres was necessary. Such was the eagerness of
the nation, that thrice the sum would have been subscribed if the
government had authorised it.
Law was now at the zenith of his prosperity, and the people were rapidly
approaching the zenith of their infatuation. The highest and the lowest
classes were alike filled with a vision of boundless wealth. There was not a
person of note among the aristocracy, with the exception of the Duke of St.
Simon and Marshal Villars, who was not engaged in buying or selling stock.
People of every age and sex and condition in life speculated in the rise and
fall of the Mississippi bonds. The Rue de Quincampoix was the grand
resort of the jobbers, and it being a narrow, inconvenient street, accidents
continually occurred in it, from the tremendous pressure of the crowd.
Houses in it, worth, in ordinary times, a thousand livres of yearly rent,
yielded as much as twelve or sixteen thousand. A cobbler, who had a stall
in it, gained about two hundred livres a day by letting it out, and furnishing
writing materials to brokers and their clients. The story goes, that a
hunchbacked man who stood in the street gained considerable sums by
lending his hump as a writing-desk to the eager speculators! The great
concourse of persons who assembled to do business brought a still greater
concourse of spectators. These again drew all the thieves and immoral
characters of Paris to the spot, and constant riots and disturbances took

place. At nightfall, it was often found necessary to send a troop of soldiers
to clear the street.

THE HUNCHBACK.

Law, finding the inconvenience of his residence, removed to the Place
Vendôme, whither the crowd of agioteurs followed him. That spacious
square soon became as thronged as the Rue de Quincampoix: from
morning to night it presented the appearance of a fair. Booths and tents
were erected for the transaction of business and the sale of refreshments,
and gamblers with their roulette tables stationed themselves in the very
middle of the place, and reaped a golden, or rather a paper, harvest from
the throng. The boulevards and public gardens were forsaken; parties of
pleasure took their walks in preference in the Place Vendôme, which
became the fashionable lounge of the idle, as well as the general
rendezvous of the busy. The noise was so great all day, that the chancellor,
whose court was situated in the square, complained to the regent and the
municipality, that he could not hear the advocates. Law, when applied to,
expressed his willingness to aid in the removal of the nuisance, and for this

purpose entered into a treaty with the Prince de Carignan for the Hôtel de
Soissons, which had a garden of several acres in the rear. A bargain was
concluded, by which Law became the purchaser of the hotel at an
enormous price, the prince reserving to himself the magnificent gardens as
a new source of profit. They contained some fine statues and several
fountains, and were altogether laid out with much taste. As soon as Law
was installed in his new abode, an edict was published, forbidding all
persons to buy or sell stock any where but in the gardens of the Hôtel de
Soissons. In the midst, among the trees, about five hundred small tents and
pavilions were erected, for the convenience of the stock-jobbers. Their
various colours, the gay ribands and banners which floated from them, the
busy crowds which passed continually in and out—the incessant hum of
voices, the noise, the music, and the strange mixture of business and
pleasure on the countenances of the throng, all combined to give the place
an air of enchantment that quite enraptured the Parisians. The Prince de
Carignan made enormous profits while the delusion lasted. Each tent was
let at the rate of five hundred livres a month; and, as there were at least five
hundred of them, his monthly revenue from this source alone must have
amounted to 250,000 livres, or upwards of 10,000l. sterling.

HOTEL DE SOISSONS.

The honest old soldier, Marshal Villars, was so vexed to see the folly
which had smitten his countrymen, that he never could speak with temper
on the subject. Passing one day through the Place Vendôme in his carriage,

the choleric gentleman was so annoyed at the infatuation of the people,
that he abruptly ordered his coachman to stop, and, putting his head out of
the carriage window, harangued them for full half an hour on their
“disgusting avarice.” This was not a very wise proceeding on his part.
Hisses and shouts of laughter resounded from every side, and jokes
without number were aimed at him. There being at last strong symptoms
that something more tangible was flying through the air in the direction of
his head, the marshal was glad to drive on. He never again repeated the
experiment.
Two sober, quiet, and philosophic men of letters, M. de la Motte and the
Abbé Terrason, congratulated each other, that they, at least, were free from
this strange infatuation. A few days afterwards, as the worthy abbé was
coming out of the Hôtel de Soissons, whither he had gone to buy shares in
the Mississippi, whom should he see but his friend La Motte entering for
the same purpose. “Ha!” said the abbé smiling, “is that you?” “Yes,” said La
Motte, pushing past him as fast as he was able; “and can that be you?” The
next time the two scholars met, they talked of philosophy, of science, and of
religion, but neither had courage for a long time to breathe one syllable
about the Mississippi. At last, when it was mentioned, they agreed that a
man ought never to swear against his doing any one thing, and that there
was no sort of extravagance of which even a wise man was not capable.
During this time, Law, the new Plutus, had become all at once the most
important personage of the state. The ante-chambers of the regent were
forsaken by the courtiers, Peers, judges, and bishops thronged to the Hôtel
de Soissons; officers of the army and navy, ladies of title and fashion, and
every one to whom hereditary rank or public employ gave a claim to
precedence, were to be found waiting in his ante-chambers to beg for a
portion of his India stock. Law was so pestered that he was unable to see
one-tenth part of the applicants, and every manœuvre that ingenuity could
suggest was employed to gain access to him. Peers, whose dignity would
have been outraged if the regent had made them wait half an hour for an

interview, were content to wait six hours for the chance of seeing Monsieur
Law. Enormous fees were paid to his servants, if they would merely
announce their names. Ladies of rank employed the blandishments of their
smiles for the same object; but many of them came day after day for a
fortnight before they could obtain an audience. When Law accepted an
invitation, he was sometimes so surrounded by ladies, all asking to have
their names put down in his lists as shareholders in the new stock, that, in
spite of his well-known and habitual gallantry, he was obliged to tear
himself away par force. The most ludicrous stratagems were employed to
have an opportunity of speaking to him. One lady, who had striven in vain
during several days, gave up in despair all attempts to see him at his own
house, but ordered her coachman to keep a strict watch whenever she was
out in her carriage, and if he saw Mr. Law coming, to drive against a post
and upset her. The coachman promised obedience, and for three days the
lady was driven incessantly through the town, praying inwardly for the
opportunity to be overturned. At last she espied Mr. Law, and, pulling the
string, called out to the coachman, “Upset us now! for God’s sake, upset us
now!” The coachman drove against a post, the lady screamed, the coach
was overturned, and Law, who had seen the accident, hastened to the spot
to render assistance. The cunning dame was led into the Hôtel de Soissons,
where she soon thought it advisable to recover from her fright, and, after
apologising to Mr. Law, confessed her stratagem. Law smiled, and entered
the lady in his books as the purchaser of a quantity of India stock. Another
story is told of a Madame de Boucha, who, knowing that Mr. Law was at
dinner at a certain house, proceeded thither in her carriage, and gave the
alarm of fire. The company started from table, and Law among the rest;
but, seeing one lady making all haste into the house towards him, while
every body else was scampering away, he suspected the trick, and ran off in
another direction.

Many other anecdotes are related, which even though they may be a little
exaggerated, are nevertheless worth preserving, as shewing the spirit of
that singular period. 7 The regent was one day mentioning, in the presence
of D’Argenson, the Abbé Dubois, and some other persons, that he was
desirous of deputing some lady, of the rank at least of a duchess, to attend
upon his daughter at Modena; “but,” added he, “I do not exactly know
where to find one.” “No!” replied one, in affected surprise; “I can tell you
where to find every duchess in France: you have only to go to Mr. Law’s;
you will see them every one in his ante-chamber.”
M. de Chirac, a celebrated physician, had bought stock at an unlucky
period, and was very anxious to sell out. Stock, however, continued to fall
for two or three days, much to his alarm. His mind was filled with the
subject, when he was suddenly called upon to attend a lady who imagined
herself unwell. He arrived, was shewn up stairs, and felt the lady’s pulse. “It
falls! it falls! good God! it falls continually!” said he musingly, while the
lady looked up in his face all anxiety for his opinion. “Oh, M. de Chirac,”
said she, starting to her feet and ringing the bell for assistance; “I am
dying! I am dying! it falls! it falls! it falls!” “What falls?” inquired the doctor

in amazement. “My pulse! my pulse!” said the lady; “I must be dying.”
“Calm your apprehensions, my dear madam,” said M. de Chirac; “I was
speaking of the stocks. The truth is, I have been a great loser, and my mind
is so disturbed, I hardly know what I have been saying.”
The price of shares sometimes rose ten or twenty per cent in the course
of a few hours, and many persons in the humbler walks of life, who had
risen poor in the morning, went to bed in affluence. An extensive holder of
stock, being taken ill, sent his servant to sell two hundred and fifty shares,
at eight thousand livres each, the price at which they were then quoted. The
servant went, and, on his arrival in the Jardin de Soissons, found that in
the interval the price had risen to ten thousand livres. The difference of two
thousand livres on the two hundred and fifty shares, amounting to
500,000 livres, or 20,000l. sterling, he very coolly transferred to his own
use, and giving the remainder to his master, set out the same evening for
another country. Law’s coachman in a very short time made money enough
to set up a carriage of his own, and requested permission to leave his
service. Law, who esteemed the man, begged of him as a favour, that he
would endeavour, before he went, to find a substitute as good as himself.
The coachman consented, and in the evening brought two of his former
comrades, telling Mr. Law to choose between them, and he would take the
other. Cookmaids and footmen were now and then as lucky, and, in the
full-blown pride of their easily-acquired wealth, made the most ridiculous
mistakes. Preserving the language and manners of their old, with the finery
of their new station, they afforded continual subjects for the pity of the
sensible, the contempt of the sober, and the laughter of every body. But the
folly and meanness of the higher ranks of society were still more
disgusting. One instance alone, related by the Duke de St. Simon, will shew
the unworthy avarice which infected the whole of society. A man of the
name of André, without character or education, had, by a series of welltimed speculations in Mississippi bonds, gained enormous wealth in an
incredibly short space of time. As St. Simon expresses it, “he had amassed

mountains of gold.” As he became rich, he grew ashamed of the lowness of
his birth, and anxious above all things to be allied to nobility. He had a
daughter, an infant only three years of age, and he opened a negotiation
with the aristocratic and needy family of D’Oyse, that this child should,
upon certain conditions, marry a member of that house. The Marquis
D’Oyse, to his shame, consented, and promised to marry her himself on her
attaining the age of twelve, if the father would pay him down the sum of a
hundred thousand crowns, and twenty thousand livres every year until the
celebration of the marriage. The marquis was himself in his thirty-third
year. This scandalous bargain was duly signed and sealed, the stockjobber
furthermore agreeing to settle upon his daughter, on the marriage-day, a
fortune of several millions. The Duke of Brancas, the head of the family,
was present throughout the negotiation, and shared in all the profits. St.
Simon, who treats the matter with the levity becoming what he thought so
good a joke, adds, “that people did not spare their animadversions on this
beautiful marriage,” and further informs us, “that the project fell to the
ground some months afterwards by the overthrow of Law, and the ruin of
the ambitious Monsieur André.” It would appear, however, that the noble
family never had the honesty to return the hundred thousand crowns.
Amid events like these, which, humiliating though they be, partake
largely of the ludicrous, others occurred of a more serious nature.
Robberies in the streets were of daily occurrence, in consequence of the
immense sums, in paper, which people carried about with them.
Assassinations were also frequent. One case in particular fixed the
attention of the whole of France, not only on account of the enormity of the
offence, but of the rank and high connexions of the criminal.

The Count d’Horn, a younger brother of the Prince d’Horn, and
related to the noble families of D’Aremberg, De Ligne, and De
Montmorency, was a young man of dissipated character, extravagant
to a degree, and unprincipled as he was extravagant. In connexion
with two other young men as reckless as himself, named Mille, a
Piedmontese captain, and one Destampes, or Lestang, a Fleming, he
formed a design to rob a very rich broker, who was known,
unfortunately for himself, to carry great sums about his person. The
count pretended a desire to purchase of him a number of shares in
the Company of the Indies, and for that purpose appointed to meet
him in a cabaret, or low public-house, in the neighbourhood of the

Place Vendôme. The unsuspecting broker was punctual to his
appointment; so were the Count d’Horn and his two associates,
whom he introduced as his particular friends. After a few moments’
conversation, the Count d’Horn suddenly sprang upon his victim,
and stabbed him three times in the breast with a poniard. The man
fell heavily to the ground, and, while the count was employed in
rifling his portfolio of bonds in the Mississippi and Indian schemes
to the amount of one hundred thousand crowns, Mille, the
Piedmontese, stabbed the unfortunate broker again and again, to
make sure of his death, But the broker did not fall without a struggle,
and his cries brought the people of the cabaret to his assistance.
Lestang, the other assassin, who had been set to keep watch at a
staircase, sprang from a window and escaped; but Mille and the
Count d’Horn were seized in the very act.
This crime, committed in open day, and in so public a place as a
cabaret, filled Paris with consternation. The trial of the assassins
commenced on the following day; and the evidence being so clear,
they were both found guilty, and condemned, to be broken alive on
the wheel. The noble relatives of the Count d’Horn absolutely
blocked up the ante-chambers of the regent, praying for mercy on the
misguided youth, and alleging that he was insane. The regent
avoided them as long as possible, being determined that, in a case so
atrocious, justice should take its course. But the importunity of these
influential suitors was not to be overcome so silently; and they at last
forced themselves into the presence of the regent, and prayed him to
save their house the shame of a public execution. They hinted that
the Princes d’Horn were allied to the illustrious family of Orleans;
and added, that the regent himself would be disgraced if a kinsman

of his should die by the hands of a common executioner. The regent,
to his credit, was proof against all their solicitations, and replied to
their last argument in the words of Corneille:
“Le crime fait la honte, et non pas l’échafaud:”
adding, that whatever shame there might be in the punishment he
would very willingly share with the other relatives. Day after day they
renewed their entreaties, but always with the same result. At last
they thought, that if they could interest the Duke de St. Simon in
their favour—a man, for whom the regent felt sincere esteem—they
might succeed in their object. The duke, a thorough aristocrat, was as
shocked as they were that a noble assassin should die by the same
death as a plebeian felon, and represented to the regent the impolicy
of making enemies of so numerous, wealthy, and powerful a family.
He urged, too, that in Germany, where the family of D’Aremberg had
large possessions, it was the law, that no relative of a person broken
on the wheel could succeed to any public office or employ until a
whole generation had passed away. For this reason, he thought the
punishment of the guilty count might be transmuted into beheading,
which was considered all over Europe as much less infamous. The
regent was moved by this argument, and was about to consent, when
Law, who felt peculiarly interested in the fate of the murdered man,
confirmed him in his former resolution to let the law take its course.
The relatives of D’Horn were now reduced to the last extremity.
The Prince de Robec Montmorency, despairing of other methods,
found means to penetrate into the dungeon of the criminal, and
offering him a cup of poison, implored him to save them from
disgrace. The Count d’Horn turned away his head, and refused to

take it. Montmorency pressed him once more; and losing all patience
at his continued refusal, turned on his heel, and exclaiming, “Die,
then, as thou wilt, mean-spirited wretch! thou art fit only to perish by
the hands of the hangman!” left him to his fate.
D’Horn himself petitioned the regent that he might be beheaded;
but Law, who exercised more influence over his mind than any other
person, with the exception of the notorious Abbé Dubois, his tutor,
insisted that he could not in justice succumb to the self-interested
views of the D’Horns. The regent had from the first been of the same
opinion; and within six days after the commission of their crime,
D’Horn and Mille were broken on the wheel in the Place de Grève.
The other assassin, Lestang, was never apprehended.
This prompt and severe justice was highly pleasing to the populace
of Paris. Even M. de Quincampoix, as they called Law, came in for a
share of their approbation for having induced the regent to shew no
favour to a patrician. But the number of robberies and assassinations
did not diminish; no sympathy was shewn for rich jobbers when they
were plundered. The general laxity of public morals, conspicuous
enough before, was rendered still more so by its rapid pervasion of
the middle classes, who had hitherto remained comparatively pure
between the open vices of the class above and the hidden crimes of
the class below them. The pernicious love of gambling diffused itself
through society, and bore all public and nearly all private virtue
before it.
For a time, while confidence lasted, an impetus was given to trade
which could not fail to be beneficial. In Paris especially the good
results were felt. Strangers flocked into the capital from every part,
bent not only upon making money, but on spending it. The Duchess

of Orleans, mother of the regent, computes the increase of the
population during this time, from the great influx of strangers from
all parts of the world, at 305,000 souls. The housekeepers were
obliged to make up beds in garrets, kitchens, and even stables, for
the accommodation of lodgers; and the town was so full of carriages
and vehicles of every description, that they were obliged, in the
principal streets, to drive at a foot-pace for fear of accidents. The
looms of the country worked with unusual activity to supply rich
laces, silks, broad-cloth, and velvets, which being paid for in
abundant paper, increased in price four-fold. Provisions shared the
general advance. Bread, meat, and vegetables were sold at prices
greater than had ever before been known; while the wages of labour
rose in exactly the same proportion. The artisan who formerly gained
fifteen sous per diem now gained sixty. New houses were built in
every direction; an illusory prosperity shone over the land, and so
dazzled the eyes of the whole nation, that none could see the dark
cloud on the horizon announcing the storm that was too rapidly
approaching.
Law himself, the magician whose wand had wrought so surprising
a change, shared, of course, in the general prosperity. His wife and
daughter were courted by the highest nobility, and their alliance
sought by the heirs of ducal and princely houses. He bought two
splendid estates in different parts of France, and entered into a
negotiation with the family of the Duke de Sully for the purchase of
the marquisate of Rosny. His religion being an obstacle to his
advancement, the regent promised, if he would publicly conform to
the Catholic faith, to make him comptroller-general of the finances.
Law, who had no more real religion than any other professed

gambler, readily agreed, and was confirmed by the Abbé de Tencin in
the cathedral of Melun, in presence of a great crowd of spectators 8.
On the following day he was elected honorary churchwarden of the
parish of St. Roch, upon which occasion he made it a present of the
sum of five hundred thousand livres. His charities, always
magnificent, were not always so ostentatious. He gave away great
sums privately, and no tale of real distress ever reached his ears in
vain.
At this time he was by far the most influential person of the state.
The Duke of Orleans had so much confidence in his sagacity and the
success of his plans, that he always consulted him upon every matter
of moment. He was by no means unduly elevated by his prosperity,
but remained the same simple, affable, sensible man that he had
shewn himself in adversity. His gallantry, which was always
delightful to the fair objects of it, was of a nature so kind, so
gentlemanly, and so respectful, that not even a lover could have
taken offence at it. If upon any occasion he shewed any symptoms of
haughtiness, it was to the cringing nobles who lavished their
adulation upon him till it became fulsome. He often took pleasure in
seeing how long he could make them dance attendance upon him for
a single favour. To such of his own countrymen as by chance visited
Paris, and sought an interview with him, he was, on the contrary, all
politeness and attention. When Archibald Campbell, Earl of Islay,
and afterwards Duke of Argyle, called upon him in the Place
Vendôme, he had to pass through an ante-chamber crowded with
persons of the first distinction, all anxious to see the great financier,
and have their names put down as first on the list of some new
subscription. Law himself was quietly sitting in his library, writing a

letter to the gardener at his paternal estate of Lauriston about the
planting of some cabbages! The earl stayed for a considerable time,
played a game of piquet with his countryman, and left him, charmed
with his ease, good sense, and good breeding.
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Among the nobles who, by means of the public credulity at this
time, gained sums sufficient to repair their ruined fortunes, may be
mentioned the names of the Dukes de Bourbon, de Guiche, de la
Force, 10 de Chaulnes, and d’Antin; the Marechal d’Estrées; the
Princes de Rohan, de Poix, and de Léon. The Duke de Bourbon, son
of Louis XIV. by Madame de Montespan, was peculiarly fortunate in
his speculations in Mississippi paper. He rebuilt the royal residence
of Chantilly in a style of unwonted magnificence; and being
passionately fond of horses, he erected a range of stables, which were
long renowned throughout Europe, and imported a hundred and fifty
of the finest racers from England to improve the breed in France. He
bought a large extent of country in Picardy, and became possessed of
nearly all the valuable lands lying between the Oise and the Somme.
When fortunes such as these were gained, it is no wonder that Law
should have been almost worshipped by the mercurial population.
Never was monarch more flattered than he was. All the small poets

and littérateurs of the day poured floods of adulation upon him.
According to them, he was the saviour of the country, the tutelary
divinity of France; wit was in all his words, goodness in all his looks,
and wisdom in all his actions. So great a crowd followed his carriage
whenever he went abroad, that the regent sent him a troop of horse
as his permanent escort to clear the streets before him.
It was remarked at this time that Paris had never before been so
full of objects of elegance and luxury. Statues, pictures, and
tapestries were imported in great quantities from foreign countries,
and found a ready market. All those pretty trifles in the way of
furniture and ornament which the French excel in manufacturing
were no longer the exclusive playthings of the aristocracy, but were
to be found in abundance in the houses of traders and the middle
classes in general. Jewellery of the most costly description was
brought to Paris as the most favourable mart; among the rest, the
famous diamond bought by the regent, and called by his name, and
which long adorned the crown of France. It was purchased for the
sum of two millions of livres, under circumstances which shew that
the regent was not so great a gainer as some of his subjects by the
impetus which trade had received. When the diamond was first
offered to him, he refused to buy it, although he desired above all
things to possess it, alleging as his reason, that his duty to the
country he governed would not allow him to spend so large a sum of
the public money for a mere jewel. This valid and honourable excuse
threw all the ladies of the court into alarm, and nothing was heard
for some days but expressions of regret that so rare a gem should be
allowed to go out of France, no private individual being rich enough
to buy it. The regent was continually importuned about it, but all in

vain, until the Duke de St. Simon, who with all his ability was
something of a twaddler, undertook the weighty business. His
entreaties being seconded by Law, the good-natured regent gave his
consent, leaving to Law’s ingenuity to find the means to pay for it.
The owner took security for the payment of the sum of two millions
of livres within a stated period, receiving in the mean time the
interest of five per cent upon that amount, and being allowed,
besides, all the valuable clippings of the gem. St. Simon, in his
Memoirs, relates with no little complacency his share in this
transaction. After describing the diamond to be as large as a
greengage, of a form nearly round, perfectly white, and without flaw,
and weighing more than five hundred grains, he concludes with a
chuckle, by telling the world “that he takes great credit to himself for
having induced the regent to make so illustrious a purchase.” In
other words, he was proud that he had induced him to sacrifice his
duty, and buy a bauble for himself at an extravagant price out of the
public money.
Thus the system continued to flourish till the commencement of
the year 1720. The warnings of the parliament, that too great a
creation of paper money would, sooner or later, bring the country to
bankruptcy, were disregarded. The regent, who knew nothing
whatever of the philosophy of finance, thought that a system which
had produced such good effects could never be carried to excess. If
five hundred millions of paper had been of such advantage, five
hundred millions additional would be of still greater advantage. This
was the grand error of the regent, and which Law did not attempt to
dispel. The extraordinary avidity of the people kept up the delusion;
and the higher the price of Indian and Mississippi stock, the more

billets de banque were issued to keep pace with it. The edifice thus
reared might not unaptly be compared to the gorgeous palace erected
by Potemkin, that princely barbarian of Russia, to surprise and
please his imperial mistress: huge blocks of ice were piled one upon
another; ionic pillars, of chastest workmanship, in ice, formed a
noble portico; and a dome, of the same material, shone in the sun,
which had just strength enough to gild, but not to melt it. It glittered
afar, like a palace of crystals and diamonds; but there came one
warm breeze from the south, and the stately building dissolved away,
till none were able even to gather up the fragments. So with Law and
his paper system. No sooner did the breath of popular mistrust blow
steadily upon it, than it fell to ruins, and none could raise it up again.
The first slight alarm that was occasioned was early in 1720. The
Prince de Conti, offended that Law should have denied him fresh
shares in India stock, at his own price, sent to his bank to demand
payment in specie of so enormous a quantity of notes, that three
wagons were required for its transport. Law complained to the
regent, and urged on his attention the mischief that would be done, if
such an example found many imitators. The regent was but too well
aware of it, and, sending for the Prince de Conti, ordered him, under
penalty of his high displeasure, to refund to the bank two-thirds of
the specie which he had withdrawn from it. The prince was forced to
obey the despotic mandate. Happily for Law’s credit, De Conti was an
unpopular man: every body condemned his meanness and cupidity,
and agreed that Law had been hardly treated. It is strange, however,
that so narrow an escape should not have made both Law and the
regent more anxious to restrict their issues. Others were soon found
who imitated, from motives of distrust, the example which had been

set by De Conti in revenge. The more acute stockjobbers imagined
justly that prices could not continue to rise for ever. Bourdon and La
Richardière, renowned for their extensive operations in the funds,
quietly and in small quantities at a time, converted their notes into
specie, and sent it away to foreign countries. They also bought as
much as they could conveniently carry of plate and expensive
jewellery, and sent it secretly away to England or to Holland.
Vermalet, a jobber, who sniffed the coming storm, procured gold and
silver coin to the amount of nearly a million of livres, which he
packed in a farmer’s cart, and covered over with hay and cow-dung.
He then disguised himself in the dirty smock-frock, or blouse, of a
peasant, and drove his precious load in safety into Belgium. From
thence he soon found means to transport it to Amsterdam.
Hitherto no difficulty had been experienced by any class in
procuring specie for their wants. But this system could not long be
carried on without causing a scarcity. The voice of complaint was
heard on every side, and inquiries being instituted, the cause was
soon discovered. The council debated long on the remedies to be
taken, and Law, being called on for his advice, was of opinion, that
an edict should be published, depreciating the value of coin five per
cent below that of paper. The edict was published accordingly; but
failing of its intended effect, was followed by another, in which the
depreciation was increased to ten per cent. The payments of the bank
were at the same time restricted to one hundred livres in gold, and
ten in silver. All these measures were nugatory to restore confidence
in the paper, though the restriction of cash payments within limits so
extremely narrow kept up the credit of the bank.
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Notwithstanding every effort to the contrary, the precious metals
continued to be conveyed to England and Holland. The little coin
that was left in the country was carefully treasured, or hidden until
the scarcity became so great, that the operations of trade could no
longer be carried on. In this emergency, Law hazarded the bold
experiment of forbidding the use of specie altogether. In February
1720 an edict was published, which, instead of restoring the credit of
the paper, as was intended, destroyed it irrecoverably, and drove the
country to the very brink of revolution. By this famous edict it was
forbidden to any person whatever to have more than five hundred
livres (20l.) of coin in his possession, under pain of a heavy fine, and
confiscation of the sums found. It was also forbidden to buy up
jewellery, plate, and precious stones, and informers were encouraged

to make search for offenders, by the promise of one-half the amount
they might discover. The whole country sent up a cry of distress at
this unheard-of tyranny. The most odious persecution daily took
place. The privacy of families was violated by the intrusion of
informers and their agents. The most virtuous and honest were
denounced for the crime of having been seen with a louis d’or in their
possession. Servants betrayed their masters, one citizen became a
spy upon his neighbour, and arrests and confiscations so multiplied,
that the courts found a difficulty in getting through the immense
increase of business thus occasioned. It was sufficient for an
informer to say that he suspected any person of concealing money in
his house, and immediately a search-warrant was granted. Lord
Stair, the English ambassador, said, that it was now impossible to
doubt of the sincerity of Law’s conversion to the Catholic religion; he
had established the inquisition, after having given abundant
evidence of his faith in transubstantiation, by turning so much gold
into paper.
Every epithet that popular hatred could suggest was showered
upon the regent and the unhappy Law. Coin, to any amount above
five hundred livres, was an illegal tender, and nobody would take
paper if he could help it. No one knew to-day what his notes would
be worth to-morrow. “Never,” says Duclos, in his Secret Memoirs of
the Regency, “was seen a more capricious government—never was a
more frantic tyranny exercised by hands less firm. It is inconceivable
to those who were witnesses of the horrors of those times, and who
look back upon them now as on a dream, that a sudden revolution
did not break out—that Law and the regent did not perish by a
tragical death. They were both held in horror, but the people

confined themselves to complaints; a sombre and timid despair, a
stupid consternation, had seized upon all, and men’s minds were too
vile even to be capable of a courageous crime.” It would appear that,
a one time, a movement of the people was organised. Seditious
writings were posted up against the walls, and were sent, in handbills, to the houses of the most conspicuous people. One of them,
given in the Mémoires de la Régence, was to the following effect:
—“Sir and madam,—This is to give you notice that a St.
Bartholomew’s Day will be enacted again on Saturday and Sunday, if
affairs do not alter. You are desired not to stir out, nor you, nor your
servants. God preserve you from the flames! Give notice to your
neighbours. Dated, Saturday, May 25th, 1720.” The immense
number of spies with which the city was infested rendered the people
mistrustful of one another, and beyond some trifling disturbances
made in the evening by an insignificant group, which was soon
dispersed, the peace of the capital was not compromised.

The value of shares in the Louisiana, or Mississippi stock, had
fallen very rapidly, and few indeed were found to believe the tales
that had once been told of the immense wealth of that region. A last

effort was therefore tried to restore the public confidence in the
Mississippi project. For this purpose, a general conscription of all the
poor wretches in Paris was made by order of government. Upwards
of six thousand of the very refuse of the population were impressed,
as if in time of war, and were provided with clothes and tools to be
embarked for New Orleans, to work in the gold mines alleged to
abound there. They were paraded day after day through the streets
with their pikes and shovels, and then sent off in small detachments
to the out-ports to be shipped for America. Two-thirds of them never
reached their destination, but dispersed themselves over the country,
sold their tools for what they could get, and returned to their old
course of life. In less than three weeks afterwards, one-half of them
were to be found again in Paris. The manœuvre, however, caused a
trifling advance in Mississippi stock. Many persons of
superabundant gullibility believed that operations had begun in
earnest in the new Golconda, and that gold and silver ingots would
again be found in France.
In a constitutional monarchy some surer means would have been
found for the restoration of public credit. In England, at a
subsequent period, when a similar delusion had brought on similar
distress, how different were the measures taken to repair the evil; but
in France, unfortunately, the remedy was left to the authors of the
mischief. The arbitrary will of the regent, which endeavoured to
extricate the country, only plunged it deeper into the mire. All
payments were ordered to be made in paper, and between the 1st of
February and the end of May, notes were fabricated to the amount of
upwards of 1500 millions of livres, or 60,000,000l. sterling. But the
alarm once sounded, no art could make the people feel the slightest

confidence in paper which was not exchangeable into metal. M.
Lambert, the president of the parliament of Paris, told the regent to
his face that he would rather have a hundred thousand livres in gold
or silver than five millions in the notes of his bank. When such was
the general feeling, the superabundant issues of paper but increased
the evil, by rendering still more enormous the disparity between the
amount of specie and notes in circulation. Coin, which it was the
object of the regent to depreciate, rose in value on every fresh
attempt to diminish it. In February, it was judged advisable that the
Royal Bank should be incorporated with the Company of the Indies.
An edict to that effect was published and registered by the
parliament. The state remained the guarantee for the notes of the
bank, and no more were to be issued without an order in council. All
the profits of the bank, since the time it had been taken out of Law’s
hands and made a national institution, were given over by the regent
to the Company of the Indies. This measure had the effect of raising
for a short time the value of the Louisiana and other shares of the
company, but it failed in placing public credit on any permanent
basis.
A council of state was held in the beginning of May, at which Law,
D’Argenson (his colleague in the administration of the finances), and
all the ministers were present. It was then computed that the total
amount of notes in circulation was 2600 millions of livres, while the
coin in the country was not quite equal to half that amount. It was
evident to the majority of the council that some plan must be
adopted to equalise the currency. Some proposed that the notes
should be reduced to the value of the specie, while others proposed
that the nominal value of the specie should be raised till it was on an

equality with the paper. Law is said to have opposed both these
projects, but failing in suggesting any other, it was agreed that the
notes should be depreciated one half. On the 21st of May, an edict
was accordingly issued, by which it was decreed that the shares of the
Company of the Indies, and the notes of the bank, should gradually
diminish in value, till at the end of a year they should only pass
current for one-half of their nominal worth. The parliament refused
to register the edict—the greatest outcry was excited, and the state of
the country became so alarming, that, as the only means of
preserving tranquillity, the council of the regency was obliged to
stultify its own proceedings, by publishing within seven days another
edict, restoring the notes to their original value.
On the same day (the 27th of May) the bank stopped payment in
specie. Law and D’Argenson were both dismissed from the ministry.
The weak, vacillating, and cowardly regent threw the blame of all the
mischief upon Law, who, upon presenting himself at the Palais
Royal, was refused admittance. At nightfall, however, he was sent
for, and admitted into the palace by a secret door, 12 when the regent
endeavoured to console him, and made all manner of excuses for the
severity with which in public he had been compelled to treat him. So
capricious was his conduct, that, two days afterwards, he took him
publicly to the opera, where he sat in the royal box alongside of the
regent, who treated him with marked consideration in face of all the
people. But such was the hatred against Law that the experiment had
well nigh proved fatal to him. The mob assailed his carriage with
stones just as he was entering his own door; and if the coachman had
not made a sudden jerk into the court-yard, and the domestics closed
the gate immediately, he would, in all probability, have been dragged

out and torn to pieces. On the following day, his wife and daughter
were also assailed by the mob as they were returning in their carriage
from the races. When the regent was informed of these occurrences
he sent Law a strong detachment of Swiss guards, who were
stationed night and day in the court of his residence. The public
indignation at last increased so much, that Law, finding his own
house, even with this guard, insecure, took refuge in the Palais Royal,
in the apartments of the regent.
The Chancellor, D’Aguesseau, who had been dismissed in 1718 for
his opposition to the projects of Law, was now recalled to aid in the
restoration of credit. The regent acknowledged too late, that he had
treated with unjustifiable harshness and mistrust one of the ablest,
and perhaps the sole honest public man of that corrupt period. He
had retired ever since his disgrace to his country house at Fresnes,
where, in the midst of severe but delightful philosophic studies, he
had forgotten the intrigues of an unworthy court. Law himself, and
the Chevalier de Conflans, a gentleman of the regent’s household,
were despatched in a post-chaise with orders to bring the exchancellor to Paris along with them. D’Aguesseau consented to
render what assistance he could, contrary to the advice of his friends,
who did not approve that he should accept any recal to office of
which Law was the bearer. On his arrival in Paris, five counsellors of
the parliament were admitted to confer with the Commissary of
Finance; and on the 1st of June an order was published abolishing
the law which made it criminal to amass coin to the amount of more
than five hundred livres. Every one was permitted to have as much
specie as he pleased. In order that the bank-notes might be
withdrawn, twenty-five millions of new notes were created, on the

security of the revenues of the city of Paris, at two-and-a-half per
cent. The bank-notes withdrawn were publicly burned in front of the
Hôtel de Ville. The new notes were principally of the value of ten
livres each; and on the 10th of June the bank was re-opened, with a
sufficiency of silver coin to give in change for them.

D’AGUESSEAU.

These measures were productive of considerable advantage. All the
population of Paris hastened to the bank to get coin for their small
notes; and silver becoming scarce, they were paid in copper. Very few
complained that this was too heavy, although poor fellows might be
continually seen toiling and sweating along the streets, laden with
more than they could comfortably carry, in the shape of change for
fifty livres. The crowds around the bank were so great, that hardly a
day passed that some one was not pressed to death. On the 9th of
July, the multitude was so dense and clamorous that the guards
stationed at the entrance of the Mazarin Gardens closed the gate and
refused to admit any more. The crowd became incensed, and flung
stones through the railings upon the soldiers. The latter, incensed in
their turn, threatened to fire upon the people. At that instant one of
them was hit by a stone, and, taking up his piece, he fired into the
crowd. One man fell dead immediately, and another was severely
wounded. It was every instant expected that a general attack would

have been commenced upon the bank; but the gates of the Mazarin
Gardens being opened to the crowd, who saw a whole troop of
soldiers, with their bayonets fixed ready to receive them, they
contented themselves by giving vent to their indignation in groans
and hisses.
Eight days afterwards the concourse of people was so tremendous
that fifteen persons were squeezed to death at the doors of the bank.
The people were so indignant that they took three of the bodies on
stretchers before them, and proceeded, to the number of seven or
eight thousand, to the gardens of the Palais Royal, that they might
shew the regent the misfortunes that he and Law had brought upon
the country. Law’s coachman, who was sitting at the box of his
master’s carriage, in the court-yard of the palace, happened to have
more zeal than discretion, and, not liking that the mob should abuse
his master, he said, loud enough to be overheard by several persons,
that they were all blackguards, and deserved to be hanged. The mob
immediately set upon him, and thinking that Law was in the
carriage, broke it to pieces. The imprudent coachman narrowly
escaped with his life. No further mischief was done; a body of troops
making their appearance, the crowd quietly dispersed, after an
assurance had been given by the regent that the three bodies they
had brought to shew him should be decently buried at his own
expense. The parliament was sitting at the time of this uproar, and
the president took upon himself to go out and see what was the
matter. On his return he informed the councillors that Law’s carriage
had been broken by the mob. All the members rose simultaneously,
and expressed their joy by a loud shout, while one man, more zealous

in his hatred than the rest, exclaimed, “And Law himself, is he torn
to pieces?” 13
Much, undoubtedly, depended on the credit of the Company of the
Indies, which was answerable for so great a sum to the nation. It was
therefore suggested in the council of the ministry, that any privileges
which could be granted to enable it to fulfil its engagements, would
be productive of the best results. With this end in view, it was
proposed that the exclusive privilege of all maritime commerce
should be secured to it, and an edict to that effect was published. But
it was unfortunately forgotten that by such a measure all the
merchants of the country would be ruined. The idea of such an
immense privilege was generally scouted by the nation, and petition
on petition was presented to the parliament that they would refuse to
register the decree. They refused accordingly, and the regent,
remarking that they did nothing but fan the flame of sedition, exiled
them to Blois. At the intercession of D’Aguesseau, the place of
banishment was changed to Pontoise, and thither accordingly the
councillors repaired, determined to set the regent at defiance. They
made every arrangement for rendering their temporary exile as
agreeable as possible. The president gave the most elegant suppers,
to which he invited all the gayest and wittiest company of Paris.
Every night there was a concert and ball for the ladies. The usually
grave and solemn judges and councillors joined in cards and other
diversions, leading for several weeks a life of the most extravagant
pleasure, for no other purpose than to shew the regent of how little
consequence they deemed their banishment, and that, when they
willed it, they could make Pontoise a pleasanter residence than Paris.

Of all the nations in the world the French are the most renowned
for singing over their grievances. Of that country it has been
remarked with some truth, that its whole history may be traced in its
songs. When Law, by the utter failure of his best-laid plans, rendered
himself obnoxious, satire of course seized hold upon him; and while
caricatures of his person appeared in all the shops, the streets
resounded with songs, in which neither he nor the regent was spared.
Many of these songs were far from decent; and one of them in
particular counselled the application of all his notes to the most
ignoble use to which paper can be applied. But the following,
preserved in the letters of the Duchess of Orleans, was the best and
the most popular, and was to be heard for months in all the
carrefours in Paris. The application of the chorus is happy enough:
Aussitôt que Lass arriva
Dans notre bonne ville,
Monsieur le Régent publia
Que Lass serait utile
Pour rétablir la nation.
La faridondaine! la faridondon!
Mais il nous a tous enrichi,
Biribi!
A la façon de Barbari,
Mon ami!
Ce parpaillot, pour attirer
Tout l’argent de la France,
Songea d’abord à s’assurer

De notre confiance.
Il fit son abjuration,
La faridondaine! la faridondon!
Mais le fourbe s’est converti,
Biribi!
A la façon de Barbari,
Mon ami!
Lass, le fils aîné de Satan
Nous met tous à l’aumône,
Il nous a pris tout notre argent
Et n’en rend à personne.
Mais le Régent, humain et bon,
La faridondaine! la faridondon!
Nous rendra ce qu’on nous a pris,
Biribi!
A la façon de Barbari,
Mon ami!
The following epigram is of the same date:
Lundi, j’achetai des actions;
Mardi, je gagnai des millions;
Mercredi, j’arrangeai mon ménage,
Jeudi, je pris un équipage,
Vendredi, je m’en fus au bal,
Et Samedi, à l’hôpital.

Among the caricatures that were abundantly published, and that
shewed as plainly as graver matters, that the nation had awakened to
a sense of its folly, was one, a fac-simile of which is preserved in the
Mémoires de la Régence. It was thus described by its author: “The
‘Goddess of Shares,’ in her triumphal car, driven by the Goddess of
Folly. Those who are drawing the car are impersonations of the
Mississippi, with his wooden leg, the South Sea, the Bank of
England, the Company of the West of Senegal, and of various
assurances. Lest the car should not roll fast enough, the agents of
these companies, known by their long fox-tails and their cunning
looks, turn round the spokes of the wheels, upon which are marked
the names of the several stocks and their value, sometimes high and
sometimes low, according to the turns of the wheel. Upon the ground
are the merchandise, day-books and ledgers of legitimate commerce,
crushed under the chariot of Folly. Behind is an immense crowd of
persons, of all ages, sexes, and conditions, clamoring after Fortune,
and fighting with each other to get a portion of the shares which she
distributes so bountifully among them. In the clouds sits a demon,
blowing bubbles of soap, which are also the objects of the admiration
and cupidity of the crowd, who jump upon one another’s backs to
reach them ere they burst. Right in the pathway of the car, and
blocking up the passage, stands a large building, with three doors,
through one of which it must pass, if it proceeds farther, and all the
crowd along with it. Over the first door are the words, ‘Hôpital des
Foux,’ over the second, ‘Hôpital des Malades,’ and over the third,
‘Hôpital des Gueux.’” Another caricature represented Law sitting in a
large cauldron, boiling over the flames of popular madness,
surrounded by an impetuous multitude, who were pouring all their

gold and silver into it, and receiving gladly in exchange the bits of
paper which he distributed among them by handfuls.
While this excitement lasted, Law took good care not to expose
himself unguarded in the streets. Shut up in the apartments of the
regent, he was secure from all attack; and whenever he ventured
abroad, it was either incognito, or in one of the royal carriages, with
a powerful escort. An amusing anecdote is recorded of the
detestation in which he was held by the people, and the ill-treatment
he would have met had he fallen into their hands. A gentleman of the
name of Boursel was passing in his carriage down the Rue St.
Antoine, when his farther progress was stayed by a hackney-coach
that had blocked up the road. M. Boursel’s servant called impatiently
to the hackney-coachman to get out of the way, and, on his refusal,
struck him a blow on the face. A crowd was soon drawn together by
the disturbance, and M. Boursel got out of the carriage to restore
order. The hackney-coachman, imagining that he had now another
assailant, bethought him of an expedient to rid himself of both, and
called out as loudly as he was able, “Help! help! murder! murder!
Here are Law and his servant going to kill me! Help! help!” At this
cry the people came out of their shops, armed with sticks and other
weapons, while the mob gathered stones to inflict summary
vengeance upon the supposed financier. Happily for M. Boursel and
his servant, the door of the church of the Jesuits stood wide open,
and, seeing the fearful odds against them, they rushed towards it
with all speed. They reached the altar, pursued by the people, and
would have been ill-treated even there, if, finding the door open
leading to the sacristy, they had not sprang through, and closed it
after them. The mob were then persuaded to leave the church by the

alarmed and indignant priests, and finding M. Boursel’s carriage still
in the streets, they vented their ill-will against it, and did it
considerable damage.
The twenty-five millions secured on the municipal revenues of the
city of Paris, bearing so low an interest as two and a half per cent,
were not very popular among the large holders of Mississippi stock.
The conversion of the securities was, therefore, a work of
considerable difficulty; for many preferred to retain the falling paper
of Law’s Company, in the hope that a favourable turn might take
place. On the 15th of August, with a view to hasten the conversion, an
edict was passed, declaring that all notes for sums between one
thousand and ten thousand livres, should not pass current, except for
the purchase of annuities and bank accounts, or for the payment of
instalments still due on the shares of the company.
In October following another edict was passed, depriving these
notes of all value whatever after the month of November next
ensuing. The management of the mint, the farming of the revenue,
and all the other advantages and privileges of the India, or
Mississippi Company, were taken from them, and they were reduced
to a mere private company. This was the death-blow to the whole
system, which had now got into the hands of its enemies. Law had
lost all influence in the Council of Finance, and the company, being
despoiled of its immunities, could no longer hold out the shadow of a
prospect of being able to fulfil its engagements. All those suspected
of illegal profits at the time the public delusion was at its height, were
sought out and amerced in heavy fines. It was previously ordered
that a list of the original proprietors should be made out, and that
such persons as still retained their shares should place them in

deposit with the company, and that those who had neglected to
complete the shares for which they had put down their names,
should now purchase them of the company, at the rate of 13,500
livres for each share of 500 livres. Rather than submit to pay this
enormous sum for stock which was actually at a discount, the
shareholders packed up all their portable effects, and endeavoured to
find a refuge in foreign countries. Orders were immediately issued to
the authorities at the ports and frontiers, to apprehend all travellers
who sought to leave the kingdom, and keep them in custody, until it
was ascertained whether they had any plate or jewellery with them,
or were concerned in the late stock-jobbing. Against such few as
escaped, the punishment of death was recorded, while the most
arbitrary proceedings were instituted against those who remained.
Law himself, in a moment of despair, determined to leave a
country where his life was no longer secure. He at first only
demanded permission to retire from Paris to one of his country-seats
—a permission which the regent cheerfully granted. The latter was
much affected at the unhappy turn affairs had taken, but his faith
continued unmoved in the truth and efficacy of Law’s financial
system. His eyes were opened to his own errors; and during the few
remaining years of his life he constantly longed for an opportunity of
again establishing the system upon a securer basis. At Law’s last
interview with the prince, he is reported to have said,—“I confess
that I have committed many faults. I committed them because I am a
man, and all men are liable to error; but I declare to you most
solemnly that none of them proceeded from wicked or dishonest
motives, and that nothing of the kind will be found in the whole
course of my conduct.”
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Two or three days after his departure the regent sent him a very
kind letter, permitting him to leave the kingdom whenever he
pleased, and stating that he had ordered his passports to be made
ready. He at the same time offered him any sum of money he might
require. Law respectfully declined the money, and set out for
Brussels in a post-chaise belonging to Madame de Prie, the mistress
of the Duke of Bourbon, escorted by six horse-guards. From thence
he proceeded to Venice, where he remained for some months, the
object of the greatest curiosity to the people, who believed him to be
the possessor of enormous wealth. No opinion, however, could be
more erroneous. With more generosity than could have been

expected from a man who during the greatest part of his life had
been a professed gambler, he had refused to enrich himself at the
expense of a ruined nation. During the height of the popular frenzy
for Mississippi stock, he had never doubted of the final success of his
projects in making France the richest and most powerful nation of
Europe. He invested all his gains in the purchase of landed property
in France—a sure proof of his own belief in the stability of his
schemes. He had hoarded no plate or jewellery, and sent no money,
like the dishonest jobbers, to foreign countries. His all, with the
exception of one diamond, worth about five or six thousand pounds
sterling, was invested in the French soil; and when he left that
country, he left it almost a beggar. This fact alone ought to rescue his
memory from the charge of knavery, so often and so unjustly brought
against him.
As soon as his departure was known, all his estates and his
valuable library were confiscated. Among the rest, an annuity of
200,000 livres (8000l. sterling) on the lives of his wife and children,
which had been purchased for five millions of livres, was forfeited,
notwithstanding that a special edict, drawn up for the purpose in the
days of his prosperity, had expressly declared that it should never be
confiscated for any cause whatever. Great discontent existed among
the people that Law had been suffered to escape. The mob and the
parliament would have been pleased to have seen him hanged. The
few who had not suffered by the commercial revolution rejoiced that
the quack had left the country; but all those (and they were by far the
most numerous class) whose fortunes were implicated regretted that
his intimate knowledge of the distress of the country, and of the

causes that had led to it, had not been rendered more available in
discovering a remedy.
At a meeting of the Council of Finance and the General Council of
the Regency, documents were laid upon the table, from which it
appeared that the amount of notes in circulation was 2700 millions.
The regent was called upon to explain how it happened that there
was a discrepancy between the dates at which these issues were
made and those of the edicts by which they were authorised. He
might have safely taken the whole blame upon himself, but he
preferred that an absent man should bear a share of it; and he
therefore stated that Law, upon his own authority, had issued 1200
millions of notes at different times, and that he (the regent), seeing
that the thing had been irrevocably done, had screened Law by
antedating the decrees of the council which authorised the
augmentation. It would have been more to his credit if he had told
the whole truth while he was about it, and acknowledged that it was
mainly through his extravagance and impatience that Law had been
induced to overstep the bounds of safe speculation. It was also
ascertained that the national debt, on the 1st of January 1721,
amounted to upwards of 3100 millions of livres, or more than
124,000,000l. sterling, the interest upon which was 3,196,000l. A
commission, or visa, was forthwith appointed to examine into all the
securities of the state creditors, who were to be divided into five
classes; the first four comprising those who had purchased their
securities with real effects, and, the latter comprising those who
could give no proofs that the transactions they had entered into were
real and bonâ fide. The securities of the latter were ordered to be
destroyed, while those of the first four classes were subjected to a

most rigid and jealous scrutiny. The result of the labours of the visa,
was a report, in which they counselled the reduction of the interest
upon these securities to fifty-six millions of livres. They justified,
this, advice by a statement of the various acts of peculation and
extortion which they had discovered; and an edict to that effect was
accordingly published and duly registered by the parliaments of the
kingdom.

D’ARGENSON.

Another tribunal was afterwards established, under the title of the
Chambre de l’Arsenal, which took cognisance of all the
malversations committed in the financial departments of the
government, during the late unhappy period. A Master of Requests,
named Falhonet, together with the Abbé Clement, and two clerks in
their employ, had been concerned in divers acts of peculation to the
amount of upwards of a million of livres. The first two were
sentenced to be beheaded, and the latter to be hanged; but their
punishment was afterwards commuted into imprisonment for life in
the Bastille. Numerous other acts of dishonesty were discovered, and
punished, by fine and imprisonment.
D’Argenson shared with Law and the regent the unpopularity
which had alighted upon all those concerned in the Mississippi

madness. He was dismissed from his post of Chancellor to make
room for D’Aguesseau; but he retained the title of Keeper of the
Seals, and was allowed to attend the councils whenever he pleased.
He thought it better, however, to withdraw from Paris, and live for a
time a life of seclusion at his country-seat. But he was not formed for
retirement; and becoming moody and discontented, he aggravated a
disease under which he had long laboured, and died in less than a
twelve-month. The populace of Paris so detested him, that they
carried their hatred even to his grave. As his funeral procession
passed to the church of St. Nicholas du Chardonneret, the buryingplace of his family, it was beset by a riotous mob, and his two sons,
who were following as chief mourners, were obliged to drive as fast
as they were able down a by-street to escape personal violence.
As regards Law, he for some time entertained a hope that he
should be recalled to France, to aid in establishing its credit upon a
firmer basis. The death of the regent in 1723, who expired suddenly
as he was sitting by the fireside conversing with his mistress, the
Duchess de Phalaris, deprived him of that hope, and he was reduced
to lead his former life of gambling. He was more than once obliged to
pawn his diamond, the sole remnant of his vast wealth, but
successful play generally enabled him to redeem it. Being persecuted
by his creditors at Rome, he proceeded to Copenhagen, where he
received permission from the English ministry to reside in his native
country, his pardon for the murder of Mr. Wilson having been sent
over to him in 1719. He was brought over in the admiral’s ship—a
circumstance which gave occasion for a short debate in the House of
Lords. Earl Coningsby complained that a man who had renounced
both his country and his religion, should have been treated with such

honour, and expressed his belief that his presence in England, at a
time when the people were so bewildered by the nefarious practices
of the South-Sea directors, would be attended with no little danger.
He gave notice of a motion on the subject; but it was allowed to drop,
no other member of the House having the slightest participation in
his lordship’s fears. Law remained for about four years in England,
and then proceeded to Venice, where he died in 1729, in very
embarrassed circumstances. The following epitaph was written at the
time:
“Ci gît cet Ecossais célébre,
Ce calculateur sans égal,
Qui, par les régles de l’algébre,
A mis la France à l’hôpital.”
His brother, William Law, who had been concerned with him in
the administration both of the bank and the Louisiana Company, was
imprisoned in the Bastille for alleged malversation, but no guilt was
ever proved against him. He was liberated after fifteen months, and
became the founder of a family, which is still known in France under
the title of Marquises of Lauriston.
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In the next chapter will be found an account of the madness which
infected the people of England at the same time, and under very
similar circumstances, but which, thanks to the energies and good
sense of a constitutional government, was attended with results far
less disastrous than those which were seen in France.

SOUTH-SEA HOUSE.

THE SOUTH-SEA BUBBLE.

At length corruption, like a general flood,
Did deluge all; and avarice creeping on,
Spread, like a low-born mist, and hid the sun.
Statesmen and patriots plied alike the stocks,
Peeress and butler shared alike the box;
And judges jobbed, and bishops bit the town,
And mighty dukes packed cards for half-a-crown:
Britain was sunk in lucre’s sordid charms.—Pope.

THE South-Sea Company was originated by the celebrated Harley Earl of
Oxford, in the year 1711, with the view of restoring public credit, which had
suffered by the dismissal of the Whig ministry, and of providing for the
discharge of the army and navy debentures, and other parts of the floating
debt, amounting to nearly ten millions sterling. A company of merchants,
at that time without a name, took this debt upon themselves, and the
government agreed to secure them for a certain period the interest of six
per cent. To provide for this interest, amounting to 600,000l. per annum,
the duties upon wines, vinegar, India goods, wrought silks, tobacco, whalefins, and some other articles, were rendered permanent. The monopoly of
the trade to the South Seas was granted, and the company, being
incorporated by act of parliament, assumed the title by which it has ever
since been known. The minister took great credit to himself for his share in
this transaction, and the scheme was always called by his flatterers “the
Earl of Oxford’s masterpiece.”

HARLEY EARL OF OXFORD

Even at this early period of its history the most visionary ideas were
formed by the company and the public of the immense riches of the eastern
coast of South America. Every body had heard of the gold and silver mines
of Peru and Mexico; every one believed them to be inexhaustible, and that
it was only necessary to send the manufactures of England to the coast to
be repaid a hundred fold in gold and silver ingots by the natives. A report,
industriously spread, that Spain was willing to concede four ports on the
coasts of Chili and Peru for the purposes of traffic, increased the general
confidence, and for many years the South-Sea Company’s stock was in high
favour.
Philip V. of Spain, however, never had any intention of admitting the
English to a free trade in the ports of Spanish America. Negotiations were
set on foot, but their only result was the assiento contract, or the privilege
of supplying the colonies with negroes for thirty years, and of sending once
a year a vessel, limited both as to tonnage and value of cargo, to trade with
Mexico, Peru, or Chili. The latter permission was only granted upon the
hard condition, that the King of Spain should enjoy one-fourth of the
profits, and a tax of five per cent on the remainder. This was a great
disappointment to the Earl of Oxford and his party, who were reminded
much oftener than they found agreeable of the
“Parturiunt montes, nascitur ridiculus mus.”

But the public confidence in the South-Sea Company was not shaken. The
Earl of Oxford declared that Spain would permit two ships, in addition to
the annual ship, to carry out merchandise during the first year; and a list
was published, in which all the ports and harbours of these coasts were
pompously set forth as open to the trade of Great Britain. The first voyage
of the annual ship was not made till the year 1717, and in the following year
the trade was suppressed by the rupture with Spain.
The king’s speech, at the opening of the session of 1717, made pointed
allusion to the state of public credit, and recommended that proper
measures should be taken to reduce the national debt. The two great
monetary corporations, the South-Sea Company and the Bank of England,
made proposals to parliament on the 20th of May ensuing. The South-Sea
Company prayed that their capital stock of ten millions might be increased
to twelve, by subscription or otherwise, and offered to accept five per cent
instead of six upon the whole amount. The bank made proposals equally
advantageous. The house debated for some time, and finally three acts
were passed, called the South-Sea Act, the Bank Act, and the General Fund
Act. By the first, the proposals of the South-Sea Company were accepted,
and that body held itself ready to advance the sum of two millions towards
discharging the principal and interest of the debt due by the state for the
four lottery funds, of the ninth and tenth years of Queen Anne. By the
second act, the bank received a lower rate of interest for the sum of
1,775,027l. 15s. due to it by the state, and agreed to deliver up to be
cancelled as many exchequer bills as amounted to two millions sterling,
and to accept of an annuity of one hundred thousand pounds, being after
the rate of five per cent, the whole redeemable at one year’s notice. They
were further required to be ready to advance, in case of need, a sum not
exceeding 2,500,000l. upon the same terms of five per cent interest,
redeemable by parliament. The General Fund Act recited the various
deficiencies, which were to be made good by the aids derived from the
foregoing sources.

The name of the South-Sea Company was thus continually before the
public. Though their trade with the South American States produced little
or no augmentation of their revenues, they continued to flourish as a
monetary corporation. Their stock was in high request, and the directors,
buoyed up with success, began to think of new means for extending their
influence. The Mississippi scheme of John Law, which so dazzled and
captivated the French people, inspired them with an idea that they could
carry on the same game in England. The anticipated failure of his plans did
not divert them from their intention. Wise in their own conceit, they
imagined they could avoid his faults, carry on their schemes for ever, and
stretch the cord of credit to its extremest tension, without causing it to
snap asunder.
It was while Law’s plan was at its greatest height of popularity, while
people were crowding in thousands to the Rue Quincampoix, and ruining
themselves with frantic eagerness, that the South-Sea directors laid before
parliament their famous plan for paying off the national debt. Visions of
boundless wealth floated before the fascinated eyes of the people in the two
most celebrated countries of Europe. The English commenced their career
of extravagance somewhat later than the French; but as soon as the
delirium seized them, they were determined not to be outdone. Upon the
22d of January, 1720, the House of Commons resolved itself into a
committee of the whole house, to take into consideration that part of the
king’s speech at the opening of the session which related to the public
debts, and the proposal of the South-Sea Company towards the redemption
and sinking of the same. The proposal set forth at great length, and under
several heads, the debts of the state, amounting to 30,981,712l., which the
company were anxious to take upon themselves, upon consideration of five
per cent per annum, secured to them until Midsummer 1727; after which
time, the whole was to become redeemable at the pleasure of the
legislature, and the interest to be reduced to four per cent. The proposal
was received with great favour; but the Bank of England had many friends

in the House of Commons, who were desirous that that body should share
in the advantages that were likely to accrue. On behalf of this corporation it
was represented, that they had performed great and eminent services to
the state in the most difficult times, and deserved, at least, that if any
advantage was to be made by public bargains of this nature, they should be
preferred before a company that had never done any thing for the nation.
The further consideration of the matter was accordingly postponed for five
days. In the mean time, a plan was drawn up by the governors of the bank.
The South-Sea Company, afraid that the bank might offer still more
advantageous terms to the government than themselves, reconsidered their
former proposal, and made some alterations in it, which they hoped would
render it more acceptable. The principal change was a stipulation that the
government might redeem these debts at the expiration of four years,
instead of seven, as at first suggested. The bank resolved not to be
outbidden in this singular auction, and the governors also reconsidered
their first proposal, and sent in a new one.
Thus, each corporation having made two proposals, the house began to
deliberate. Mr. Robert Walpole was the chief speaker in favour of the bank,
and Mr. Aislabie, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the principal advocate
on behalf of the South-Sea Company. It was resolved, on the 2d of
February, that the proposals of the latter were most advantageous to the
country. They were accordingly received, and leave was given to bring in a
bill to that effect.
Exchange Alley was in a fever of excitement. The company’s stock, which
had been at a hundred and thirty the previous day, gradually rose to three
hundred, and continued to rise with the most astonishing rapidity during
the whole time that the bill in its several stages was under discussion. Mr.
Walpole was almost the only statesman in the House who spoke out boldly
against it. He warned them, in eloquent and solemn language, of the evils
that would ensue. It countenanced, he said, “the dangerous practice of
stock-jobbing, and would divert the genius of the nation from trade and

industry. It would hold out a dangerous lure to decoy the unwary to their
ruin, by making them part with the earnings of their labour for a prospect
of imaginary wealth. The great principle of the project was an evil of firstrate magnitude; it was to raise artificially the value of the stock, by exciting
and keeping up a general infatuation, and by promising dividends out of
funds which could never be adequate to the purpose.” In a prophetic spirit
he added, that if the plan succeeded, the directors would become masters
of the government, form a new and absolute aristocracy in the kingdom,
and control the resolutions of the legislature. If it failed, which he was
convinced it would, the result would bring general discontent and ruin
upon the country. Such would be the delusion, that when the evil day came,
as come it would, the people would start up, as from a dream, and ask
themselves if these things could have been true. All his eloquence was in
vain. He was looked upon as a false prophet, or compared to the hoarse
raven, croaking omens of evil. His friends, however, compared him to
Cassandra, predicting evils which would only be believed when they came
home to men’s hearths, and stared them in the face at their own boards.
Although, in former times, the house had listened with the utmost
attention to every word that fell from his lips, the benches became deserted
when it was known that he would speak on the South-Sea question.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE

The bill was two months in its progress through the House of Commons.
During this time every exertion was made by the directors and their
friends, and more especially by the chairman, the noted Sir John Blunt, to

raise the price of the stock. The most extravagant rumours were in
circulation. Treaties between England and Spain were spoken of, whereby
the latter was to grant a free trade to all her colonies; and the rich produce
of the mines of Potosi-la-Paz was to be brought to England until silver
should become almost as plentiful as iron. For cotton and woollen goods,
with which we could supply them in abundance, the dwellers in Mexico
were to empty their golden mines. The company of merchants trading to
the South Seas would be the richest the world ever saw, and every hundred
pounds invested in it would produce hundreds per annum to the
stockholder. At last the stock was raised by these means to near four
hundred; but, after fluctuating a good deal, settled at three hundred and
thirty, at which price it remained when the bill passed the Commons by a
majority of 172 against 55.
In the House of Lords the bill was hurried through all its stages with
unexampled rapidity. On the 4th of April it was read a first time; on the
5th, it was read a second time; on the 6th, it was committed; and on the
7th, was read a third time and passed.
Several peers spoke warmly against the scheme; but their warnings fell
upon dull, cold ears. A speculating frenzy had seized them as well as the
plebeians. Lord North and Grey said the bill was unjust in its nature, and
might prove fatal in its consequences, being calculated to enrich the few
and impoverish the many. The Duke of Wharton followed; but, as he only
retailed at second-hand the arguments so eloquently stated by Walpole in
the Lower House, he was not listened to with even the same attention that
had been bestowed upon Lord North and Grey. Earl Cowper followed on
the same side, and compared the bill to the famous horse of the siege of
Troy. Like that, it was ushered in and received with great pomp and
acclamations of joy, but bore within it treachery and destruction. The Earl
of Sunderland endeavoured to answer all objections; and on the question
being put, there appeared only seventeen peers against, and eighty-three in

favour of the project. The very same day on which it passed the Lords, it
received the royal assent, and became the law of the land.
It seemed at that time as if the whole nation had turned stockjobbers.
Exchange Alley was every day blocked up by crowds, and Cornhill was
impassable for the number of carriages. Every body came to purchase
stock. “Every fool aspired to be a knave.” In the words of a ballad published
at the time, and sung about the streets, 16
“Then stars and garters did appear
Among the meaner rabble;
To buy and sell, to see and hear
The Jews and Gentiles squabble.
The greatest ladies thither came,
And plied in chariots daily,
Or pawned their jewels for a sum
To venture in the Alley.”
The inordinate thirst of gain that had afflicted all ranks of society was
not to be slaked even in the South Sea. Other schemes, of the most
extravagant kind, were started. The share-lists were speedily filled up, and
an enormous traffic carried on in shares, while, of course, every means
were resorted to to raise them to an artificial value in the market.

CORNHILL, 1720.

Contrary to all expectation, South-Sea stock fell when the bill received
the royal assent. On the 7th of April the shares were quoted at three
hundred and ten, and on the following day at two hundred and ninety.
Already the directors had tasted the profits of their scheme, and it was not
likely that they should quietly allow the stock to find its natural level
without an effort to raise it. Immediately their busy emissaries were set to
work. Every person interested in the success of the project endeavoured to
draw a knot of listeners around him, to whom he expatiated on the
treasures of the South American seas. Exchange Alley was crowded with
attentive groups. One rumour alone, asserted with the utmost confidence,
had an immediate effect upon the stock. It was said that Earl Stanhope had
received overtures in France from the Spanish government to exchange
Gibraltar and Port Mahon for some places on the coast of Peru, for the
security and enlargement of the trade in the South Seas. Instead of one
annual ship trading to those ports, and allowing the king of Spain twentyfive per cent out of the profits, the company might build and charter as
many ships as they pleased, and pay no per centage whatever to any foreign
potentate.
“Visions of ingots danced before their eyes,”

and stock rose rapidly. On the 12th of April, five days after the bill had
become law, the directors opened their books for a subscription of a
million, at the rate of 300l. for every 100l. capital. Such was the concourse
of persons of all ranks, that this first subscription was found to amount to
above two millions of original stock. It was to be paid at five payments, of
60l. each for every 100l. In a few days the stock advanced to three hundred
and forty, and the subscriptions were sold for double the price of the first
payment. To raise the stock still higher, it was declared, in a general court
of directors, on the 21st of April, that the midsummer dividend should be
ten per cent, and that all subscriptions should be entitled to the same.
These resolutions answering the end designed, the directors, to improve
the infatuation of the monied men, opened their books for a second
subscription of a million, at four hundred per cent. Such was the frantic
eagerness of people of every class to speculate in these funds, that in the
course of a few hours no less than a million and a half was subscribed at
that rate.
In the mean time, innumerable joint-stock companies started up every
where. They soon received the name of Bubbles, the most appropriate that
imagination could devise. The populace are often most happy in the
nicknames they employ. None could be more apt than that of Bubbles.
Some of them lasted for a week or a fortnight, and were no more heard of,
while others could not even live out that short span of existence. Every
evening produced new schemes, and every morning new projects. The
highest of the aristocracy were as eager in this hot pursuit of gain as the
most plodding jobber in Cornhill. The Prince of Wales became governor of
one company, and is said to have cleared 40,000l. by his speculations. 17
The Duke of Bridgewater started a scheme for the improvement of London
and Westminster, and the Duke of Chandos another. There were nearly a
hundred different projects, each more extravagant and deceptive than the
other, To use the words of the Political State, they were “set on foot and
promoted by crafty knaves, then pursued by multitudes of covetous fools,

and at last appeared to be, in effect, what their vulgar appellation denoted
them to be—bubbles and mere cheats.” It was computed that near one
million and a half sterling was won and lost by these unwarrantable
practices, to the impoverishment of many a fool, and the enriching of many
a rogue.
Some of these schemes were plausible enough, and, had they been
undertaken at a time when the public mind was unexcited, might have
been pursued with advantage to all concerned. But they were established
merely with the view of raising the shares in the market. The projectors
took the first opportunity of a rise to sell out, and next morning the scheme
was at an end. Maitland, in his History of London, gravely informs us, that
one of the projects which received great encouragement, was for the
establishment of a company “to make deal boards out of saw-dust.” This is
no doubt intended as a joke; but there is abundance of evidence to shew
that dozens of schemes, hardly a whit more reasonable, lived their little
day, ruining hundreds ere they fell. One of them was for a wheel for
perpetual motion—capital one million; another was “for encouraging the
breed of horses in England, and improving of glebe and church lands, and
repairing and rebuilding parsonage and vicarage houses.” Why the clergy,
who were so mainly interested in the latter clause, should have taken so
much interest in the first, is only to be explained on the supposition that
the scheme was projected by a knot of the fox-hunting parsons, once so
common in England. The shares of this company were rapidly subscribed
for. But the most absurd and preposterous of all, and which shewed, more
completely than any other, the utter madness of the people, was one
started by an unknown adventurer, entitled “A company for carrying on
an undertaking of great advantage, but nobody to know what it is.” Were
not the fact stated by scores of credible witnesses, it would be impossible to
believe that any person could have been duped by such a project. The man
of genius who essayed this bold and successful inroad upon public
credulity, merely stated in his prospectus that the required capital was half

a million, in five thousand shares of 100l. each, deposit 2l. per share. Each
subscriber, paying his deposit, would be entitled to 100l. per annum per
share. How this immense profit was to be obtained, he did not condescend
to inform them at that time, but promised that in a month full particulars
should be duly announced, and a call made for the remaining 98l. of the
subscription. Next morning, at nine o’clock, this great man opened an
office in Cornhill. Crowds of people beset his door, and when he shut up at
three o’clock, he found that no less than one thousand shares had been
subscribed for, and the deposits paid. He was thus, in five hours, the
winner of 2000l. He was philosopher enough to be contented with his
venture, and set off the same evening for the Continent. He was never
heard of again.
Well might Swift exclaim, comparing Change Alley to a gulf in the South
Sea:
“Subscribers here by thousands float,
And jostle one another down,
Each paddling in his leaky boat,
And here they fish for gold and drown.
Now buried in the depths below,
Now mounted up to heaven again,
They reel and stagger to and fro,
At their wit’s end, like drunken men.
Meantime, secure on Garraway cliffs,
A savage race, by shipwrecks fed,
Lie waiting for the foundered skiffs,
And strip the bodies of the dead.”

Another fraud that was very successful was that of the “Globe Permits,”
as they were called. They were nothing more than square pieces of playingcards, on which was the impression of a seal, in wax, bearing the sign of the
Globe Tavern, in the neighbourhood of Exchange Alley, with the
inscription of “Sail-Cloth Permits.” The possessors enjoyed no other
advantage from them than permission to subscribe at some future time to a
new sail-cloth manufactory, projected by one who was then known to be a
man of fortune, but who was afterwards involved in the peculation and
punishment of the South-Sea directors. These permits sold for as much as
sixty guineas in the Alley.
Persons of distinction, of both sexes, were deeply engaged in all these
bubbles; those of the male sex going to taverns and coffee-houses to meet
their brokers, and the ladies resorting for the same purpose to the shops of
milliners and haberdashers. But it did not follow that all these people
believed in the feasibility of the schemes to which they subscribed; it was
enough for their purpose that their shares would, by stock-jobbing arts, be
soon raised to a premium, when they got rid of them with all expedition to
the really credulous. So great was the confusion of the crowd in the alley,
that shares in the same bubble were known to have been sold at the same
instant ten per cent higher at one end of the alley than at the other.
Sensible men beheld the extraordinary infatuation of the people with
sorrow and alarm. There were some both in and out of parliament who
foresaw clearly the ruin that was impending. Mr. Walpole did not cease his
gloomy forebodings. His fears were shared by all the thinking few, and
impressed most forcibly upon the government. On the 11th of June, the day
the parliament rose, the king published a proclamation, declaring that all
these unlawful projects should be deemed public nuisances, and
prosecuted accordingly, and forbidding any broker, under a penalty of five
hundred pounds, from buying or selling any shares in them.
Notwithstanding this proclamation, roguish speculators still carried them
on, and the deluded people still encouraged them. On the 12th of July, an

order of the Lords Justices assembled in privy council was published,
dismissing all the petitions that had been presented for patents and
charters, and dissolving all the bubble companies. The following copy of
their lordships’ order, containing a list of all these nefarious projects, will
not be deemed uninteresting at the present time, when, at periodic
intervals, there is but too much tendency in the public mind to indulge in
similar practices:
“At the Council Chamber, Whitehall, the 12th day of July,
1720. Present, their Excellencies the Lords Justices in
Council.
“Their Excellencies the Lords Justices, in council, taking into
consideration the many inconveniences arising to the public from
several projects set on foot for raising of joint-stock for various
purposes, and that a great many of his majesty’s subjects have been
drawn in to part with their money on pretence of assurances that their
petitions for patents and charters to enable them to carry on the same
would be granted: to prevent such impositions, their excellencies this
day ordered the said several petitions, together with such reports from
the Board of Trade, and from his majesty’s attorney and solicitorgeneral, as had been obtained thereon, to be laid before them; and
after mature consideration thereof, were pleased, by advice of his
majesty’s privy council, to order that the said petitions be dismissed,
which are as follow:
“1. Petition of several persons, praying letters patent for carrying on
a fishing trade by the name of the Grand Fishery of Great Britain.
“2. Petition of the Company of the Royal Fishery of England, praying
letters patent for such further powers as will effectually contribute to
carry on the said fishery.

“3. Petition of George James, on behalf of himself and divers
persons of distinction concerned in a national fishery, praying letters
patent of incorporation, to enable them to carry on the same.
“4. Petition of several merchants, traders, and others, whose names
are thereunto subscribed, praying to be incorporated for reviving and
carrying on a whale fishery to Greenland and elsewhere.
“5. Petition of Sir John Lambert and others thereto subscribing, on
behalf of themselves and a great number of merchants, praying to be
incorporated for carrying on a Greenland trade, and particularly a
whale fishery in Davis’s Straits.
“6. Another petition for a Greenland trade.
“7. Petition of several merchants, gentlemen, and citizens, praying to
be incorporated for buying and building of ships to let or freight.
“8. Petition of Samuel Antrim and others, praying for letters patent
for sowing hemp and flax.
“9. Petition of several merchants, masters of ships, sail-makers, and
manufacturers of sail-cloth, praying a charter of incorporation, to
enable them to carry on and promote the said manufactory by a jointstock.
“10. Petition of Thomas Boyd and several hundred merchants,
owners and masters of ships, sail-makers, weavers, and other traders,
praying a charter of incorporation, empowering them to borrow
money for purchasing lands, in order to the manufacturing sail-cloth
and fine holland.
“11. Petition on behalf of several persons interested in a patent
granted by the late King William and Queen Mary for the making of
linen and sail-cloth, praying that no charter may be granted to any
persons whatsoever for making sail-cloth, but that the privilege now
enjoyed by them may be confirmed, and likewise an additional power
to carry on the cotton and cotton-silk manufactures.

“12. Petition of several citizens, merchants, and traders in London,
and others, subscribers to a British stock for a general insurance from
fire in any part of England, praying to be incorporated for carrying on
the said undertaking.
“13. Petition of several of his majesty’s loyal subjects of the city of
London and other parts of Great Britain, praying to be incorporated
for carrying on a general insurance from losses by fire within the
kingdom of England.
“14. Petition of Thomas Surges and others his majesty’s subjects
thereto subscribing, in behalf of themselves and others, subscribers to
a fund of 1,200,000l. for carrying on a trade to his majesty’s German
dominions, praying to be incorporated by the name of the Harburg
Company.
“15. Petition of Edward Jones, a dealer in timber, on behalf of
himself and others, praying to be incorporated for the importation of
timber from Germany.
“16. Petition of several merchants of London, praying a charter of
incorporation for carrying on a salt-work.
“17. Petition of Captain Macphedris of London, merchant, on behalf
of himself and several merchants, clothiers, hatters, dyers, and other
traders, praying a charter of incorporation empowering them to raise a
sufficient sum of money to purchase lands for planting and rearing a
wood called madder, for the use of dyers.
“18. Petition of Joseph Galendo of London, snuff-maker, praying a
patent for his invention to prepare and cure Virginia tobacco for snuff
in Virginia, and making it into the same in all his majesty’s
dominions.”

List of Bubbles.

The following Bubble-Companies were by the same order declared to be
illegal, and abolished accordingly:
1. For the importation of Swedish iron.
2. For supplying London with sea-coal. Capital, three millions.
3. For building and rebuilding houses throughout all England Capital,
three millions.
4. For making of muslin.
5. For carrying on and improving the British alum-works.
6. For effectually settling the island of Blanco and Sal Tartagus.
7. For supplying the town of Deal with fresh water.
8. For the importation of Flanders lace.
9. For improvement of lands in Great Britain. Capital, four millions.
10. For encouraging the breed of horses in England, and improving of
glebe and church lands, and for repairing and rebuilding parsonage
and vicarage houses.
11. For making of iron and steel in Great Britain,
12. For improving the land in the county of Flint. Capital, one million.
13. For purchasing lands to build on. Capital, two millions.
14. For trading in hair.
15. For erecting salt-works in Holy Island. Capital, two millions.
16. For buying and selling estates, and lending money on mortgage.
17. For carrying on an undertaking of great advantage; but nobody to
know what it is.
18. For paving the streets of London. Capital, two millions.
19. For furnishing funerals to any part of Great Britain.
20. For buying and selling lands and lending money at interest. Capital,
five millions.
21. For carrying on the royal fishery of Great Britain. Capital, ten millions.
22. For assuring of seamen’s wages.
23. For erecting loan-offices for the assistance and encouragement of the
industrious. Capital, two millions.

24. For purchasing and improving leaseable lands. Capital, four millions.
25. For importing pitch and tar, and other naval stores, from North
Britain and America.
26. For the clothing, felt, and pantile trade.
27. For purchasing and improving a manor and royalty in Essex.
28. For insuring of horses. Capital, two millions.
29. For exporting the woollen manufacture, and importing copper, brass,
and iron. Capital, four millions.
30. For a grand dispensary. Capital, three millions.
31. For erecting mills and purchasing lead-mines. Capital, two millions.
32. For improving the art of making soap.
33. For a settlement on the island of Santa Cruz.
34. For sinking pits and smelting lead ore in Derbyshire.
35. For making glass bottles and other glass.
36. For a wheel for perpetual motion. Capital, one million.
37. For improving of gardens.
38. For insuring and increasing children’s fortunes.
39. For entering and loading goods at the Custom-house, and for
negotiating business for merchants.
40. For carrying on a woollen manufacture in the North of England.
41. For importing walnut-trees from Virginia, Capital, two millions.
42. For making Manchester stuffs of thread and cotton.
43. For making Joppa and Castile soap.
44. For improving the wrought-iron and steel manufactures of this
kingdom. Capital four millions.
45. For dealing in lace, hollands, cambrics, lawns, &c. Capital, two
millions.
46. For trading in and improving certain commodities of the produce of
this kingdom, &c. Capital three millions.
47. For supplying the London markets with cattle.
48. For making looking-glasses, coach-glasses, &c. Capital, two millions.

49. For working the tin and lead mines in Cornwall and Derbyshire.
50. For making rape-oil.
51. For importing beaver fur. Capital, two millions.
52. For making pasteboard and packing-paper.
53. For importing of oils and other materials used in the woollen
manufacture.
54. For improving and increasing the silk manufactures.
55. For lending money on stock, annuities, tallies, &c.
56. For paying pensions to widows and others, at a small discount.
Capital, two millions.
57. For improving malt liquors. Capital, four millions.
58. For a grand American fishery.
59. For purchasing and improving the fenny lands in Lincolnshire.
Capital, two millions.
60. For improving the paper manufacture of Great Britain.
61. The Bottomry Company.
62. For drying malt by hot air.
63. For carrying on a trade in the river Oronooko.
64. For the more effectual making of baize, in Colchester and other parts
of Great Britain.
65. For buying of naval stores, supplying the victualling, and paying the
wages of the workmen.
66. For employing poor artificers, and furnishing merchants and others
with watches.
67. For improvement of tillage and the breed of cattle.
68. Another for the improvement of our breed in horses.
69. Another for a horse-insurance.
70. For carrying on the corn trade of Great Britain.
71. For insuring to all masters and mistresses the losses they may sustain
by servants. Capital, three millions.
72. For erecting houses or hospitals for taking in and maintaining
illegitimate children. Capital, two millions.

73. For bleaching coarse sugars, without the use of fire or loss of
substance.
74. For building turnpikes and wharfs in Great Britain.
75. For insuring from thefts and robberies.
76. For extracting silver from lead.
77. For making china and delft ware. Capital, one million.
78. For importing tobacco, and exporting it again to Sweden and the north
of Europe. Capital, four millions.
79. For making iron with pit coal.
80. For furnishing the cities of London and Westminster with hay and
straw. Capital, three millions.
81. For a sail and packing-cloth manufactory in Ireland.
82. For taking up ballast.
83. For buying and fitting out ships to suppress pirates.
84. For the importation of timber from Wales. Capital, two millions.
85. For rock-salt.
86. For the transmutation of quicksilver into a malleable fine metal.

CHANGE-ALLEY. 18

Besides these bubbles, many others sprang up daily, in-spite of the
condemnation of the government and the ridicule of the still sane portion
of the public. The print-shops teemed with caricatures, and the newspapers
with epigrams and satires, upon the prevalent folly. An ingenious
cardmaker published a pack of South-Sea playing-cards, which are now
extremely rare, each card containing, besides the usual figures, of a very
small size, in one corner, a caricature of a bubble-company, with
appropriate verses underneath. One of the most famous bubbles was
“Puckle’s Machine Company,” for discharging round and square cannonballs and bullets, and making a total revolution in the art of war. Its
pretensions to public favour were thus summed up on the eight of spades:
“A rare invention to destroy the crowd
Of fools at home instead of fools abroad.
Fear not, my friends, this terrible machine,
They’re only wounded who have shares therein.”

TREE CARICATURE 19

The nine of hearts was a caricature of the English Copper and Brass
Company, with the following epigram:
“The headlong-fool that wants to be a swopper
Of gold and silver coin for English copper,
May, in Change Alley, prove himself an ass,
And give rich metal for adultrate brass.”
The eight of diamonds celebrated the company for the colonisation of
Acadia, with this doggrel:
“He that is rich and wants to fool away
A good round sum in North America,
Let him subscribe himself a headlong sharer,
And asses’ ears shall honour him or bearer.”

And in a similar style every card of the pack exposed some knavish
scheme, and ridiculed the persons who were its dupes. It was computed
that the total amount of the sums proposed for carrying on these projects
was upwards of three hundred millions sterling.

MERCHANT’S GATEWAY

It is time, however, to return to the great South-Sea gulf, that swallowed
the fortunes of so many thousands of the avaricious and the credulous. On
the 29th of May, the stock had risen as high as five hundred, and about
two-thirds of the government annuitants had exchanged the securities of
the state for those of the South-Sea company. During the whole of the
month of May the stock continued to rise, and on the 28th it was quoted at
five hundred and fifty. In four days after this it took a prodigious leap,
rising suddenly from five hundred and fifty to eight hundred and ninety. It
was now the general opinion that the stock could rise no higher, and many
persons took that opportunity of selling out, with a view of realising their
profits. Many noblemen and persons in the train of the king, and about to
accompany him to Hanover, were also anxious to sell out. So many sellers,
and so few buyers, appeared in the Alley on the 3d of June, that the stock
fell at once from eight hundred and ninety to six hundred and forty. The
directors were alarmed, and gave their agents orders to buy. Their efforts

succeeded. Towards evening, confidence was restored, and the stock
advanced to seven hundred and fifty. It continued at this price, with some
slight fluctuation, until the company closed their books on the 22d of June.
It would be needless and uninteresting to detail the various arts
employed by the directors to keep up the price of stock. It will be sufficient
to state that it finally rose to one thousand per cent. It was quoted at this
price in, the commencement of August. The bubble was then full-blown,
and began to quiver and shake preparatory to its bursting.
Many of the government annuitants expressed dissatisfaction against the
directors. They accused them of partiality in making out the lists for shares
in each subscription. Further uneasiness was occasioned by its being
generally known that Sir John Blunt the chairman, and some others, had
sold out. During the whole of the month of August the stock fell, and on the
2d of September it was quoted at seven hundred only.
The state of things now became alarming. To prevent, if possible, the
utter extinction of public confidence in their proceedings, the directors
summoned a general court of the whole corporation, to meet in Merchant
Tailors’ Hall on the 8th of September. By nine o’clock in the morning, the
room was filled to suffocation; Cheapside was blocked up by a crowd
unable to gain admittance, and the greatest excitement prevailed. The
directors and their friends mustered in great numbers. Sir John Fellowes,
the sub-governor, was called to the chair. He acquainted the assembly with
the cause of their meeting; read to them the several resolutions of the court
of directors, and gave them an account of their proceedings; of the taking
in the redeemable and unredeemable funds, and of the subscriptions in
money. Mr. Secretary Craggs then made a short speech, wherein he
commended the conduct of the directors, and urged that nothing could
more effectually contribute to the bringing this scheme to perfection than
union among themselves. He concluded with a motion for thanking the
court of directors for their prudent and skilful management, and for
desiring them to proceed in such manner as they should think most proper

for the interest and advantage of the corporation. Mr. Hungerford, who
had rendered himself very conspicuous in the House of Commons for his
zeal in behalf of the South-Sea company, and who was shrewdly suspected
to have been a considerable gainer by knowing the right time to sell out,
was very magniloquent on this occasion. He said that he had seen the rise
and fall, the decay and resurrection of many communities of this nature,
but that, in his opinion, none had ever performed such wonderful things in
so short a time as the South-Sea company. They had done more than the
crown, the pulpit, or the bench could do. They had reconciled all parties in
one common interest; they had laid asleep, if not wholly extinguished, all
the domestic jars and animosities of the nation. By the rise of their stock,
monied men had vastly increased their fortunes; country gentlemen had
seen the value of their lands doubled and trebled in their hands. They had
at the same time done good to the Church, not a few of the reverend clergy
having got great sums by the project. In short, they had enriched the whole
nation, and he hoped they had not forgotten themselves. There was some
hissing at the latter part of this speech, which for the extravagance of its
eulogy was not far removed from satire; but the directors and their friends,
and all the winners in the room, applauded vehemently. The Duke of
Portland spoke in a similar strain, and expressed his great wonder why any
body should be dissatisfied; of course, he was a winner by his speculations,
and in a condition similar to that of the fat alderman in Joe Miller’s Jests,
who, whenever he had eaten a good dinner, folded his hands upon his
paunch, and expressed his doubts whether there could be a hungry man in
the world.

MR. SECRETARY CRAGGS.

Several resolutions were passed at this meeting, but they had no effect
upon the public. Upon the very same evening the stock fell to six hundred
and forty, and on the morrow to five hundred and forty. Day after day it
continued to fall, until it was as low as four hundred. In a letter dated
September 13th, from Mr. Broderick, M.P., to Lord Chancellor Middleton,
and published in Coxe’s Walpole, the former says: “Various are the
conjectures why the South-Sea directors have suffered the cloud to break
so early. I made no doubt but they would do so when they found it to their
advantage. They have stretched credit so far beyond what it would bear,
that specie proves insufficient to support it. Their most considerable men
have drawn out, securing themselves by the losses of the deluded,
thoughtless numbers, whose understandings have been overruled by
avarice and the hope of making mountains out of mole-hills. Thousands of
families will be reduced to beggary. The consternation is inexpressible—the
rage beyond description, and the case altogether so desperate, that I do not
see any plan or scheme so much as thought of for averting the blow, so that
I cannot pretend to guess what is next to be done.” Ten days afterwards,
the stock still falling, he writes: “The company have yet come to no
determination, for they are in such a wood that they know not which way to
turn. By several gentlemen lately come to town, I perceive the very name of
a South-Sea-man grows abominable in every country. A great many
goldsmiths are already run off, and more will daily. I question whether
one-third, nay, one-fourth of them can stand it. From the very beginning, I

founded my judgment of the whole affair upon the unquestionable maxim,
that ten millions (which is more than our running cash) could not circulate
two hundred millions, beyond which our paper credit extended. That,
therefore, whenever that should become doubtful, be the cause what it
would, our noble state machine must inevitably fall to the ground.”
On the 12th of September, at the earnest solicitation of Mr. Secretary
Craggs, several conferences were held between the directors of the South
Sea and the directors of the Bank. A report which was circulated, that the
latter had agreed to circulate six millions of the South-Sea company’s
bonds, caused the stock to rise to six hundred and seventy; but in the
afternoon, as soon as the report was known to be groundless, the stock fell
again to five hundred and eighty; the next day to five hundred and seventy,
and so gradually to four hundred. 20
The ministry were seriously alarmed at the aspect of affairs. The
directors could not appear in the streets without being insulted; dangerous
riots were every moment apprehended. Despatches were sent off to the
king at Hanover, praying his immediate return. Mr. Walpole, who was
staying at his country seat, was sent for, that he might employ his known
influence with the directors of the Bank of England to induce them to
accept the proposal made by the South-Sea company for circulating a
number of their bonds.
The Bank was very unwilling to mix itself up with the affairs of the
company; it dreaded being involved in calamities which it could not relieve,
and received all overtures with visible reluctance. But the universal voice of
the nation called upon it to come to the rescue. Every person of note in
commercial politics was called in to advise in the emergency. A rough draft
of a contract drawn up by Mr. Walpole was ultimately adopted as the basis
of further negotiations, and the public alarm abated a little.
On the following day, the 20th of September, a general court of the
South-Sea company was held at Merchant Tailors’ Hall, in which
resolutions were carried, empowering the directors to agree with the Bank

of England, or any other persons, to circulate the company’s bonds, or
make any other agreement with the Bank which they should think proper.
One of the speakers, a Mr. Pulteney, said it was most surprising to see the
extraordinary panic which had seized upon the people. Men were running
to and fro in alarm and terror, their imaginations filled with some great
calamity, the form and dimensions of which nobody knew:

“Black it stood as night—
Fierce as ten furies—terrible as hell.”
At a general court of the Bank of England held two days
afterwards, the governor informed them of the several meetings that
had been held on the affairs of the South-Sea company, adding that
the directors had not yet thought fit to come to any decision upon the
matter. A resolution was then proposed, and carried without a
dissentient voice, empowering the directors to agree with those of
the South Sea to circulate their bonds, to what sum, and upon what
terms, and for what time, they might think proper.
Thus both parties were at liberty to act as they might judge best for
the public interest. Books were opened at the Bank for a subscription
of three millions for the support of public credit, on the usual terms
of 15l. per cent deposit, 3l. per cent premium, and 5l. per cent
interest. So great was the concourse of people in the early part of the
morning, all eagerly bringing their money, that it was thought the
subscription would be filled that day; but before noon, the tide
turned. In spite of all that could be done to prevent it, the South-Sea
company’s stock fell rapidly. Their bonds were in such discredit, that
a run commenced upon the most eminent goldsmiths and bankers,
some of whom, having lent out great sums upon South-Sea stock,
were obliged to shut up their shops and abscond. The Sword-blade

company, who had hitherto been the chief cashiers of the South-Sea
company, stopped payment. This being looked upon as but the
beginning of evil, occasioned a great run upon the Bank, who were
now obliged to pay out money much faster than they had received it
upon the subscription in the morning. The day succeeding was a
holiday (the 29th of September), and the Bank had a little breathing
time. They bore up against the storm; but their former rivals, the
South-Sea company, were wrecked upon it. Their stock fell to one
hundred and fifty, and gradually, after various fluctuations, to one
hundred and thirty-five.
The Bank, finding they were not able to restore public confidence,
and stem the tide of ruin, without running the risk of being swept
away with those they intended to save, declined to carry out the
agreement into which they had partially entered. They were under no
obligation whatever to continue; for the so-called Bank contract was
nothing more than the rough draught of an agreement, in which
blanks had been left for several important particulars, and which
contained no penalty for their secession. “And thus,” to use the
words of the Parliamentary History, “were seen, in the space of eight
months, the rise, progress, and fall of that mighty fabric, which,
being wound up by mysterious springs to a wonderful height, had
fixed the eyes and expectations of all Europe, but whose foundation,
being fraud, illusion, credulity, and infatuation, fell to the ground as
soon as the artful management of its directors was discovered.”
In the hey-day of its blood, during the progress of this dangerous
delusion, the manners of the nation became sensibly corrupted. The
parliamentary inquiry, set on foot to discover the delinquents,
disclosed scenes of infamy, disgraceful alike to the morals of the

offenders and the intellects of the people among whom they had
arisen. It is a deeply interesting study to investigate all the evils that
were the result. Nations, like individuals, cannot become desperate
gamblers with impunity. Punishment is sure to overtake them sooner
or later. A celebrated writer 21 is quite wrong when he says, “that such
an era as this is the most unfavourable for a historian; that no reader
of sentiment and imagination can be entertained or interested by a
detail of transactions such as these, which admit of no warmth, no
colouring, no embellishment; a detail of which only serves to exhibit
an inanimate picture of tasteless vice and mean degeneracy.” On the
contrary,—and Smollett might have discovered it, if he had been in
the humour,—the subject is capable of inspiring as much interest as
even a novellist can desire. Is there no warmth in the despair of a
plundered people?—no life and animation in the picture which might
be drawn of the woes of hundreds of impoverished and ruined
families? of the wealthy of yesterday become the beggars of to-day?
of the powerful and influential changed into exiles and outcasts, and
the voice of self-reproach and imprecation resounding from every
corner of the land? Is it a dull or uninstructive picture to see a whole
people shaking suddenly off the trammels of reason, and running
wild after a golden vision, refusing obstinately to believe that it is not
real, till, like a deluded hind running after an ignis fatuus, they are
plunged into a quagmire? But in this false spirit has history too often
been written. The intrigues of unworthy courtiers to gain the favour
of still more unworthy kings, or the records of murderous battles and
sieges, have been dilated on, and told over and over again, with all
the eloquence of style and all the charms of fancy; while the
circumstances which have most deeply affected the morals and

welfare of the people have been passed over with but slight notice, as
dry and dull, and capable of neither warmth nor colouring.

CARICATURE. 22

During the progress of this famous bubble, England presented a
singular spectacle. The public mind was in a state of unwholesome
fermentation. Men were no longer satisfied with the slow but sure
profits of cautious industry. The hope of boundless wealth for the
morrow made them heedless and extravagant for to-day. A luxury,
till then unheard-of, was introduced, bringing in its train a
corresponding laxity of morals. The over-bearing insolence of
ignorant men, who had arisen to sudden wealth by successful
gambling, made men of true gentility of mind and manners blush
that gold should have power to raise the unworthy in the scale of
society. The haughtiness of some of these “cyphering cits,” as they
were termed by Sir Richard Steele, was remembered against them in

the day of their adversity. In the parliamentary inquiry, many of the
directors suffered more for their insolence than for their peculation.
One of them, who, in the full-blown pride of an ignorant rich man,
had said that he would feed his horse upon gold, was reduced almost
to bread and water for himself; every haughty look, every
overbearing speech, was set down, and repaid them a hundredfold in
poverty and humiliation.
The state of matters all over the country was so alarming, that
George I. shortened his intended stay in Hanover, and returned in all
haste to England. He arrived on the 11th of November, and
parliament was summoned to meet on the 8th of December. In the
mean time, public meetings were held in every considerable town of
the empire, at which petitions were adopted, praying the vengeance
of the legislature upon the South-Sea directors, who, by their
fraudulent practices, had brought the nation to the brink of ruin.
Nobody seemed to imagine that the nation itself was as culpable as
the South-Sea company. Nobody blamed the credulity and avarice of
the people,—the degrading lust of gain, which had swallowed up
every nobler quality in the national character, or the infatuation
which had made the multitude run their heads with such frantic
eagerness into the net held out for them by scheming projectors.
These things were never mentioned. The people were a simple,
honest, hard-working people, ruined by a gang of robbers, who were
to be hanged, drawn, and quartered without mercy.
This was the almost unanimous feeling of the country. The two
Houses of Parliament were not more reasonable. Before the guilt of
the South-Sea directors was known, punishment was the only cry.
The king, in his speech from the throne, expressed his hope that they

would remember that all their prudence, temper, and resolution
were necessary to find out and apply the proper remedy for their
misfortunes. In the debate on the answer to the address, several
speakers indulged in the most violent invectives against the directors
of the South-Sea project. The Lord Molesworth was particularly
vehement. “It had been said by some, that there was no law to punish
the directors of the South-Sea company, who were justly looked upon
as the authors of the present misfortunes of the state. In his opinion,
they ought upon this occasion to follow the example of the ancient
Romans, who, having no law against parricide, because their
legislators supposed no son could be so unnaturally wicked as to
embrue his hands in his father’s blood, made a law to punish this
heinous crime as soon as it was committed. They adjudged the guilty
wretch to be sown in a sack, and thrown alive into the Tiber. He
looked upon the contrivers and executors of the villanous South-Sea
scheme as the parricides of their country, and should be satisfied to
see them tied in like manner in sacks, and thrown into the Thames.”
Other members spoke with as much want of temper and discretion.
Mr. Walpole was more moderate. He recommended that their first
care should be to restore public credit. “If the city of London were on
fire, all wise men would aid in extinguishing the flames, and
preventing the spread of the conflagration, before they inquired after
the incendiaries. Public credit had received a dangerous wound, and
lay bleeding, and they ought to apply a speedy remedy to it. It was
time enough to punish the assassin afterwards.” On the 9th of
December an address, in answer to his majesty’s speech, was agreed
upon, after an amendment, which was carried without a division,
that words should be added expressive of the determination of the

house not only to seek a remedy for the national distresses, but to
punish the authors of them.
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The inquiry proceeded rapidly. The directors were ordered to lay
before the house a full account of all their proceedings. Resolutions
were passed to the effect that the calamity was mainly owing to the
vile arts of stock-jobbers, and that nothing could tend more to the
reestablishment of public credit than a law to prevent this infamous
practice. Mr. Walpole then rose, and said, that “as he had previously
hinted, he had spent some time upon a scheme for restoring public
credit, but that the execution of it depending upon a position which
had been laid down as fundamental, he thought it proper, before he
opened out his scheme, to be informed whether he might rely upon
that foundation. It was, whether the subscription of public debts and
encumbrances, money subscriptions, and other contracts, made with
the South-Sea company, should remain in the present state?” This
question occasioned an animated debate. It was finally agreed, by a

majority of 259 against 117, that all these contracts should remain in
their present state, unless altered for the relief of the proprietors by a
general court of the South-Sea company, or set aside by due course of
law. On the following day, Mr. Walpole laid before a committee of
the whole house his scheme for the restoration of public credit,
which was, in substance, to engraft nine millions of South-Sea stock
into the Bank of England, and the same sum into the East India
company, upon certain conditions. The plan was favourably received
by the house. After some few objections, it was ordered that
proposals should be received from the two great corporations. They
were both unwilling to lend their aid, and the plan met with a warm
but fruitless opposition at the general courts summoned for the
purpose of deliberating upon it. They, however, ultimately agreed
upon the terms on which they would consent to circulate the SouthSea bonds, and their report being presented to the committee, a bill
was brought in under the superintendence of Mr. Walpole, and safely
carried through both Houses of Parliament.
A bill was at the same time brought in for restraining the SouthSea directors, governor, sub-governor, treasurer, cashier, and clerks
from leaving the kingdom for a twelvemonth, and for discovering
their estates and effects, and preventing them from transporting or
alienating the same. All the most influential members of the House
supported the bill. Mr. Shippen, seeing Mr. Secretary Craggs in his
place, and believing the injurious rumours that were afloat of that
minister’s conduct in the South-Sea business, determined to touch
him to the quick. He said, he was glad to see a British House of
Commons resuming its pristine vigour and spirit, and acting with so
much unanimity for the public good. It was necessary to secure the

persons and estates of the South-Sea directors and their officers;
“but,” he added, looking fixedly at Mr. Craggs as he spoke, “there
were other men in high station, whom, in time, he would not be
afraid to name, who were no less guilty than the directors.” Mr.
Craggs arose in great wrath, and said, that if the innuendo were
directed against him, he was ready to give satisfaction to any man
who questioned him, either in the House or out of it. Loud cries of
order immediately arose on every side. In the midst of the uproar,
Lord Molesworth got up, and expressed his wonder at the boldness
of Mr. Craggs in challenging the whole House of Commons. He, Lord
Molesworth, though somewhat old, past sixty, would answer Mr.
Craggs whatever he had to say in the House, and he trusted there
were plenty of young men beside him, who would not be afraid to
look Mr. Craggs in the face out of the House. The cries of order again
resounded from every side; the members arose simultaneously; every
body seemed to be vociferating at once. The speaker in vain called
order. The confusion lasted several minutes, during which Lord
Molesworth and Mr. Craggs were almost the only members who kept
their seats. At last, the call for Mr. Craggs became so violent, that he
thought proper to submit to the universal feeling of the House, and
explain his unparliamentary expression. He said, that by giving
satisfaction to the impugners of his conduct in that House, he did not
mean that he would fight, but that he would explain his conduct.
Here the matter ended, and the House proceeded to debate in what
manner they should conduct their inquiry into the affairs of the
South-Sea company, whether in a grand or a select committee.
Ultimately, a secret committee of thirteen was appointed, with power
to send for persons, papers, and records.

The Lords were as zealous and as hasty as the Commons. The
Bishop of Rochester said the scheme had been like a pestilence. The
Duke of Wharton said the House ought to shew no respect of
persons; that, for his part, he would give up the dearest friend he
had, if he had been engaged in the project. The nation had been
plundered in a most shameful and flagrant manner, and he would go
as far as any body in the punishment of the offenders. Lord Stanhope
said, that every farthing possessed by the criminals, whether
directors or not directors, ought to be confiscated, to make good the
public losses.
During all this time the public excitement was extreme. We learn
from Coxe’s Walpole, that the very name of a South-Sea director was
thought to be synonymous with every species of fraud and villany.
Petitions from counties, cities, and boroughs, in all parts of the
kingdom, were presented, crying for the justice due to an injured
nation and the punishment of the villanous peculators. Those
moderate men, who would not go to extreme lengths, even in the
punishment of the guilty, were accused of being accomplices, were
exposed to repeated insults and virulent invectives, and devoted,
both in anonymous letters and public writings, to the speedy
vengeance of an injured people. The accusations against Mr. Aislabie,
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Craggs, another member of the
ministry, were so loud, that the House of Lords resolved to proceed
at once into the investigation concerning them. It was ordered, on
the 21st of January, that all brokers concerned in the South-Sea
scheme should lay before the House an account of the stock or
subscriptions bought or sold by them for any of the officers of the
Treasury or Exchequer, or in trust for any of them, since Michaelmas

1719. When this account was delivered, it appeared that large
quantities of stock had been transferred to the use of Mr. Aislabie.
Five of the South-Sea directors, including Mr. Edward Gibbon, the
grandfather of the celebrated historian, were ordered into the
custody of the black rod. Upon a motion made by Earl Stanhope, it
was unanimously resolved, that the taking in or giving credit for
stock without a valuable consideration actually paid or sufficiently
secured; or the purchasing stock by any director or agent of the
South-Sea company, for the use or benefit of any member of the
administration, or any member of either House of Parliament,
during such time as the South-Sea bill was yet pending in
parliament, was a notorious and dangerous corruption. Another
resolution was passed a few days afterwards, to the effect that several
of the directors and officers of the company having, in a clandestine
manner, sold their own stock to the company, had been guilty of a
notorious fraud and breach of trust, and had thereby mainly caused
the unhappy turn of affairs that had so much affected public credit.
Mr. Aislabie resigned his office as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and
absented himself from parliament, until the formal inquiry into his
individual guilt was brought under the consideration of the
legislature.
In the mean time, Knight, the treasurer of the company, and who
was entrusted with all the dangerous secrets of the dishonest
directors, packed up his books and documents, and made his escape
from the country. He embarked in disguise, in a small boat on the
river, and proceeding to a vessel hired for the purpose, was safely
conveyed to Calais. The Committee of Secrecy informed the House of
the circumstance, when it was resolved unanimously that two

addresses should be presented to the king; the first praying that he
would issue a proclamation offering a reward for the apprehension of
Knight; and the second, that he would give immediate orders to stop
the ports, and to take effectual care of the coasts, to prevent the said
Knight, or any other officers of the South-Sea company, from
escaping out of the kingdom. The ink was hardly dry upon these
addresses before they were carried to the king by Mr. Methuen,
deputed by the House for that purpose. The same evening a royal
proclamation was issued, offering a reward of two thousand pounds
for the apprehension of Knight. The Commons ordered the doors of
the House to be locked, and the keys to be placed on the table.
General Ross, one of the members of the Committee of Secrecy,
acquainted them that they had already discovered a train of the
deepest villany and fraud that hell had ever contrived to ruin a
nation, which in due time they would lay before the House. In the
mean time, in order to a further discovery, the Committee thought it
highly necessary to secure the persons of some of the directors and
principal South-Sea officers, and to seize their papers. A motion to
this effect having been made, was carried unanimously. Sir Robert
Chaplin, Sir Theodore Janssen, Mr. Sawbridge, and Mr. F. Eyles,
members of the House, and directors of the South-Sea company,
were summoned to appear in their places, and answer for their
corrupt practices. Sir Theodore Janssen and Mr. Sawbridge
answered to their names, and endeavoured to exculpate themselves.
The House heard them patiently, and then ordered them to
withdraw. A motion was then made, and carried nemine
contradicente, that they had been guilty of a notorious breach of
trust—had occasioned much loss to great numbers of his majesty’s

subjects, and had highly prejudiced the public credit. It was then
ordered that, for their offence, they should be expelled the House,
and taken into the custody of the sergeant-at-arms. Sir Robert
Chaplin and Mr. Eyles, attending in their places four days
afterwards, were also expelled the House. It was resolved at the same
time to address the king to give directions to his ministers at foreign
courts to make application for Knight, that he might be delivered up
to the English authorities, in case he took refuge in any of their
dominions. The king at once agreed, and messengers were
despatched to all parts of the continent the same night.
Among the directors taken into custody was Sir John Blunt, the
man whom popular opinion has generally accused of having been the
original author and father of the scheme. This man, we are informed
by Pope, in his epistle to Allen Lord Bathurst, was a dissenter, of a
most religious deportment, and professed to be a great believer. 24 He
constantly declaimed against the luxury and corruption of the age,
the partiality of parliaments, and the misery of party spirit. He was
particularly eloquent against avarice in great and noble persons. He
was originally a scrivener, and afterwards became, not only a
director, but the most active manager of the South-Sea company.
Whether it was during his career in this capacity that he first began
to declaim against the avarice of the great, we are not informed. He
certainly must have seen enough of it to justify his severest
anathema; but if the preacher had himself been free from the vice he
condemned, his declamations would have had a better effect. He was
brought up in custody to the bar of the House of Lords, and
underwent a long examination. He refused to answer several
important questions. He said he had been examined already by a

committee of the House of Commons, and as he did not remember
his answers, and might contradict himself, he refused to answer
before another tribunal. This declaration, in itself an indirect proof of
guilt, occasioned some commotion in the House. He was again asked
peremptorily whether he had ever sold any portion of the stock to
any member of the administration, or any member of either House of
Parliament, to facilitate the passing of the bill. He again declined to
answer. He was anxious, he said, to treat the House with all possible
respect, but he thought it hard to be compelled to accuse himself.
After several ineffectual attempts to refresh his memory, he was
directed to withdraw. A violent discussion ensued between the
friends and opponents of the ministry. It was asserted that the
administration were no strangers to the convenient taciturnity of Sir
John Blunt. The Duke of Wharton made a reflection upon the Earl
Stanhope, which the latter warmly resented. He spoke under great
excitement, and with such vehemence as to cause a sudden
determination of blood to the head. He felt himself so ill that he was
obliged to leave the House and retire to his chamber. He was cupped
immediately, and also let blood on the following morning, but with
slight relief. The fatal result was not anticipated. Towards evening he
became drowsy, and turning himself on his face, expired. The sudden
death of this statesman caused great grief to the nation. George I.
was exceedingly affected, and shut himself up for some hours in his
closet, inconsolable for his loss.
Knight, the treasurer of the company, was apprehended at
Tirlemont, near Liege, by one of the secretaries of Mr. Leathes, the
British resident at Brussels, and lodged in the citadel of Antwerp.
Repeated applications were made to the court of Austria to deliver

him up, but in vain. Knight threw himself upon the protection of the
states of Brabant, and demanded to be tried in that country. It was a
privilege granted to the states of Brabant by one of the articles of the
Joyeuse Entrée, that every criminal apprehended in that country
should be tried in that country. The states insisted on their privilege,
and refused to deliver Knight to the British authorities. The latter did
not cease their solicitations; but in the mean time, Knight escaped
from the citadel.

BRABANT SCREEN. 25

On the 16th of February the Committee of Secrecy made their first
report to the House. They stated that their inquiry had been attended
with numerous difficulties and embarrassments; every one they had
examined had endeavoured, as far as in him lay, to defeat the ends of
justice. In some of the books produced before them, false and
fictitious entries had been made; in others, there were entries of
money with blanks for the name of the stockholders. There were
frequent erasures and alterations, and in some of the books leaves
were torn out. They also found that some books of great importance
had been destroyed altogether, and that some had been taken away
or secreted. At the very entrance into their inquiry, they had

observed that the matters referred to them were of great variety and
extent. Many persons had been entrusted with various parts in the
execution of the law, and under colour thereof had acted in an
unwarrantable manner, in disposing of the properties of many
thousands of persons amounting to many millions of money. They
discovered that, before the South-Sea Act was passed, there was an
entry in the company’s books of the sum of 1,259,325l., upon account
of stock stated to have been sold to the amount of 574,500l. This
stock was all fictitious, and had been disposed of with a view to
promote the passing of the bill. It was noted as sold on various days,
and at various prices, from 150 to 325 per cent. Being surprised to
see so large an account disposed of at a time when the company were
not empowered to increase their capital, the Committee determined
to investigate most carefully the whole transaction. The governor,
sub-governor, and several directors were brought before them, and
examined rigidly. They found that, at the time these entries were
made, the company was not in possession of such a quantity of stock,
having in their own right only a small quantity, not exceeding thirty
thousand pounds at the utmost. Pursuing the inquiry, they found
that this amount of stock was to be esteemed as taken in or holden by
the company for the benefit of the pretended purchasers, although
no mutual agreement was made for its delivery or acceptance at any
certain time. No money was paid down, nor any deposit or security
whatever given to the company by the supposed purchasers; so that
if the stock had fallen, as might have been expected had the act not
passed, they would have sustained no loss. If, on the contrary, the
price of stock advanced (as it actually did by the success of the
scheme), the difference by the advanced price was to be made good

to them. Accordingly, after the passing of the act, the account of
stock was made up and adjusted with Mr. Knight, and the pretended
purchasers were paid the difference out of the company’s cash. This
fictitious stock, which had been chiefly at the disposal of Sir John
Blunt, Mr. Gibbon, and Mr. Knight, was distributed among several
members of the government and their connexions, by way of bribe,
to facilitate the passing of the bill. To the Earl of Sunderland was
assigned 50,000l. of this stock; to the Duchess of Kendal, 10,000l.;
to the Countess of Platen, 10,000l.; to her two nieces, 10,000l.; to
Mr. Secretary Craggs, 30,000l.; to Mr. Charles Stanhope (one of the
secretaries of the Treasury), 10,000l.; to the Sword-blade company,
50,000l. It also appeared that Mr. Stanhope had received the
enormous sum of 250,000l. as the difference in the price of some
stock, through the hands of Turner, Caswall, and Co., but that his
name had been partly erased from their books, and altered to
Stangape. Aislabie, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had made
profits still more abominable. He had an account with the same firm,
who were also South-Sea directors, to the amount of 794,451l. He
had, besides, advised the company to make their second subscription
one million and a half, instead of a million, by their own authority,
and without any warrant. The third subscription had been conducted
in a manner as disgraceful. Mr. Aislabie’s name was down for
70,000l.; Mr. Craggs, senior, for 659,000l.; the Earl of Sunderland’s
for 160,000l.; and Mr. Stanhope for 47,000l. This report was
succeeded by six others, less important. At the end of the last, the
committee declared, that the absence of Knight, who had been
principally entrusted, prevented them from carrying on their
inquiries.

The first report was ordered to be printed, and taken into
consideration on the next day but one succeeding. After a very angry
and animated debate, a series of resolutions were agreed to,
condemnatory of the conduct of the directors, of the members of the
parliament and of the administration concerned with them; and
declaring that they ought, each and all, to make satisfaction out of
their own estates for the injury they had done the public. Their
practices were declared to be corrupt, infamous, and dangerous; and
a bill was ordered to be brought in for the relief of the unhappy
sufferers.

BONFIRES ON TOWER HILL

Mr. Charles Stanhope was the first person brought to account for
his share in these transactions. He urged in his defence that, for
some years past, he had lodged all the money he was possessed of in
Mr. Knight’s hands, and whatever stock Mr. Knight had taken in for
him, he had paid a valuable consideration for it. As for the stock that
had been bought for him by Turner, Caswall, and Co., he knew
nothing about it. Whatever had been done in that matter was done

without his authority, and he could not be responsible for it. Turner
and Co. took the latter charge upon themselves; but it was notorious
to every unbiassed and unprejudiced person that Mr. Stanhope was a
gainer of the 250,000l. which lay in the hands of that firm to his
credit. He was, however, acquitted by a majority of three only. The
greatest exertions were made to screen him. Lord Stanhope, the son
of the Earl of Chesterfield, went round to the wavering members,
using all the eloquence he was possessed of to induce them either to
vote for the acquittal, or to absent themselves from the House. Many
weak-headed country gentlemen were led astray by his persuasions,
and the result was as already stated. The acquittal caused the
greatest discontent throughout the country. Mobs of a menacing
character assembled in different parts of London; fears of riots were
generally entertained, especially as the examination of a still greater
delinquent was expected by many to have a similar termination. Mr.
Aislabie, whose high office and deep responsibilities should have
kept him honest, even had native principle been insufficient, was
very justly regarded as perhaps the greatest criminal of all. His case
was entered into on the day succeeding the acquittal of Mr.
Stanhope. Great excitement prevailed, and the lobbies and avenues
of the House were beset by crowds, impatient to know the result. The
debate lasted the whole day. Mr. Aislabie found few friends: his guilt
was so apparent and so heinous that nobody had courage to stand up
in his favour. It was finally resolved, without a dissentient voice, that
Mr. Aislabie had encouraged and promoted the destructive execution
of the South-Sea scheme with a view to his own exorbitant profit,
and had combined with the directors in their pernicious practices, to
the ruin of the public trade and credit of the kingdom: that he should

for his offences be ignominiously expelled from the House of
Commons, and committed a close prisoner to the Tower of London;
that he should be restrained from going out of the kingdom for a
whole year, or till the end of the next session of Parliament; and that
he should make out a correct account of all his estate, in order that it
might be applied to the relief of those who had suffered by his malpractices.
This verdict caused the greatest joy. Though it was delivered at
half-past twelve at night, it soon spread over the city. Several persons
illuminated their houses in token of their joy. On the following day,
when Mr. Aislabie was conveyed to the Tower, the mob assembled on
Tower-hill with the intention of hooting and pelting him. Not
succeeding in this, they kindled a large bonfire, and danced around it
in the exuberance of their delight. Several bonfires were made in
other places; London presented the appearance of a holiday, and
people congratulated one another as if they had just escaped from
some great calamity. The rage upon the acquittal of Mr. Stanhope
had grown to such a height that none could tell where it would have
ended, had Mr. Aislabie met with the like indulgence.
To increase the public satisfaction, Sir George Caswall, of the firm
of Turner, Caswall, and Co., was expelled from the House on the
following day, committed to the Tower, and ordered to refund the
sum of 250,000l.

EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

That part of the report of the Committee of Secrecy which related
to the Earl of Sunderland was next taken into consideration. Every
effort was made to clear his lordship from the imputation. As the
case against him rested chiefly on the evidence extorted from Sir
John Blunt, great pains were taken to make it appear that Sir John’s
word was not to be believed, especially in a matter affecting the
honour of a peer and privy councillor. All the friends of the ministry
rallied around the earl, it being generally reported that a verdict of
guilty against him would bring a Tory ministry into power. He was
eventually acquitted by a majority of 233 against 172; but the country
was convinced of his guilt. The greatest indignation was every where
expressed, and menacing mobs again assembled in London. Happily
no disturbance took place.
This was the day on which Mr. Craggs the elder expired. The
morrow had been appointed for the consideration of his case. It was
very generally believed that he had poisoned himself. It appeared,
however, that grief for the loss of his son, one of the secretaries of the
Treasury, who had died five weeks previously of the small-pox,
preyed much on his mind. For this son, dearly beloved, he had been
amassing vast heaps of riches: he had been getting money, but not

honestly; and he for whose sake he had bartered his honour and
sullied his fame was now no more. The dread of further exposure
increased his trouble of mind, and ultimately brought on an
apoplectic fit, in which he expired. He left a fortune of a million and a
half, which was afterwards confiscated for the benefit of the sufferers
by the unhappy delusion he had been so mainly instrumental in
raising.
One by one the case of every director of the company was taken
into consideration. A sum amounting to two millions and fourteen
thousand pounds was confiscated from their estates towards
repairing the mischief they had done, each man being allowed a
certain residue in proportion to his conduct and circumstances, with
which he might begin the world anew. Sir John Blunt was only
allowed 5,000l. out of his fortune of upwards of 183,000l.; Sir John
Fellows was allowed 10,000l. out of 243,000l.; Sir Theodore
Janssen, 50,000l. out of 243,000l.; Mr. Edward Gibbon, 10,000l.
out of 106,000l.; Sir John Lambert, 5000l. out of 72,000l. Others,
less deeply involved, were treated with greater liberality. Gibbon, the
historian, whose grandfather was the Mr. Edward Gibbon so severely
mulcted, has given, in the Memoirs of his Life and Writings, an
interesting account of the proceedings in parliament at this time. He
owns that he is not an unprejudiced witness; but, as all the writers
from which it is possible to extract any notice of the proceedings of
these disastrous years were prejudiced on the other side, the
statements of the great historian become of additional value. If only
on the principle audi alteram partem, his opinion is entitled to
consideration. “In the year 1716,” he says, “my grandfather was
elected one of the directors of the South-Sea company, and his books

exhibited the proof that before his acceptance of that fatal office, he
had acquired an independent fortune of 60,000l. But his fortune was
overwhelmed in the shipwreck of the year 1720, and the labours of
thirty years were blasted in a single day. Of the use or abuse of the
South-Sea scheme, of the guilt or innocence of my grandfather and
his brother directors, I am neither a competent nor a disinterested
judge. Yet the equity of modern times must condemn the violent and
arbitrary proceedings, which would have disgraced the cause of
justice, and rendered injustice still more odious. No sooner had the
nation awakened from its golden dream, than a popular and even a
parliamentary

clamour

demanded

its

victims;

but

it

was

acknowledged on all sides, that the directors, however guilty, could
not be touched by any known laws of the land. The intemperate
notions of Lord Molesworth were not literally acted on; but a bill of
pains and penalties was introduced—a retro-active statute, to punish
the offences which did not exist at the time they were committed.
The legislature restrained the persons of the directors, imposed an
exorbitant security for their appearance, and marked their character
with a previous note of ignominy. They were compelled to deliver,
upon oath, the strict value of their estates, and were disabled from
making any transfer or alienation of any part of their property.
Against a bill of pains and penalties, it is the common right of every
subject to be heard by his counsel at the bar. They prayed to be
heard. Their prayer was refused, and their oppressors, who required
no evidence, would listen to no defence. It had been at first proposed,
that one-eighth of their respective estates should be allowed for the
future support of the directors; but it was especially urged that, in
the various shades of opulence and guilt, such a proportion would be

too light for many, and for some might possibly be too heavy. The
character and conduct of each man were separately weighed; but,
instead of the calm solemnity of a judicial inquiry, the fortune and
honour of thirty-three Englishmen were made the topics of hasty
conversation, the sport of a lawless majority; and the basest member
of the committee, by a malicious word or a silent vote, might indulge
his general spleen or personal animosity. Injury was aggravated by
insult, and insult was embittered by pleasantry. Allowances of 20l. or
1s. were facetiously moved. A vague report that a director had
formerly been concerned in another project, by which some
unknown persons had lost their money, was admitted as a proof of
his actual guilt. One man was ruined because he had dropped a
foolish speech, that his horses should feed upon gold; another,
because he was grown so proud, that one day, at the Treasury, he had
refused a civil answer to persons much above him. All were
condemned, absent and unheard, in arbitrary fines and forfeitures,
which swept away the greatest part of their substance. Such bold
oppression can scarcely be shielded by the omnipotence of
parliament. My grandfather could not expect to be treated with more
lenity than his companions. His Tory principles and connexions
rendered him obnoxious to the ruling powers. His name was
reported in a suspicious secret. His well-known abilities could not
plead the excuse of ignorance or error. In the first proceedings
against the South-Sea directors, Mr. Gibbon was one of the first
taken into custody, and in the final sentence the measure of his fine
proclaimed him eminently guilty. The total estimate, which he
delivered on oath to the House of Commons, amounted to 106,543l.
5s. 6d., exclusive of antecedent settlements. Two different allowances

of 15,000l. and of 10,000l. were moved for Mr. Gibbon; but on the
question being put, it was carried without a division for the smaller
sum. On these ruins, with the skill and credit of which parliament
had not been able to despoil him, my grandfather, at a mature age,
erected the edifice of a new fortune. The labours of sixteen years
were amply rewarded; and I have reason to believe that the second
structure was not much inferior to the first.”
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The next consideration of the legislature, after the punishment of
the directors, was to restore public credit. The scheme of Walpole
had been found insufficient, and had fallen into disrepute. A
computation was made of the whole capital stock of the South-Sea
company at the end of the year 1720. It was found to amount to
thirty-seven millions eight hundred thousand pounds, of which the
stock allotted to all the proprietors only amounted to twenty-four
millions five hundred thousand pounds. The remainder of thirteen
millions three hundred thousand pounds belonged to the company in
their corporate capacity, and was the profit they had made by the
national delusion. Upwards of eight millions of this were taken from

the company, and divided among the proprietors and subscribers
generally, making a dividend of about 33l. 6s. 8d. per cent. This was
a great relief. It was further ordered, that such persons as had
borrowed money from the South-Sea company upon stock actually
transferred and pledged at the time of borrowing to or for the use of
the company, should be free from all demands, upon payment of ten
per cent of the sums so borrowed. They had lent about eleven
millions in this manner, at a time when prices were unnaturally
raised; and they now received back one million one hundred
thousand, when prices had sunk to their ordinary level.
But it was a long time before public credit was thoroughly
restored. Enterprise, like Icarus, had soared too high, and melted the
wax of her wings; like Icarus, she had fallen into a sea, and learned,
while floundering in its waves, that her proper element was the solid
ground. She has never since attempted so high a flight.
In times of great commercial prosperity there has been a tendency
to over-speculation on several occasions since then. The success of
one project generally produces others of a similar kind. Popular
imitativeness will always, in a trading nation, seize hold of such
successes, and drag a community too anxious for profits into an
abyss from which extrication is difficult. Bubble companies, of a kind
similar to those engendered by the South-Sea project, lived their
little day in the famous year of the panic, 1825. On that occasion, as
in 1720, knavery gathered a rich harvest from cupidity, but both
suffered when the day of reckoning came. The schemes of the year
1836 threatened, at one time, results as disastrous; but they were
happily averted before it was too late. 27
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CONRAD GESNER.

THE TULIPOMANIA.
Quis furor, ô cives!—Lucan.

THE tulip,—so named, it is said, from a Turkish word, signifying a turban,—
was introduced into western Europe about the middle of the sixteenth
century. Conrad Gesner, who claims the merit of having brought it into
repute,—little dreaming of the commotion it was shortly afterwards to
make in the world,—says that he first saw it in the year 1559, in a garden at
Augsburg, belonging to the learned Counsellor Herwart, a man very
famous in his day for his collection of rare exotics. The bulbs were sent to
this gentleman by a friend at Constantinople, where the flower had long
been a favourite. In the course of ten or eleven years after this period,
tulips were much sought after by the wealthy, especially in Holland and
Germany. Rich people at Amsterdam sent for the bulbs direct to
Constantinople, and paid the most extravagant prices for them. The first
roots planted in England were brought from Vienna in 1600. Until the year
1634 the tulip annually increased in reputation, until it was deemed a proof
of bad taste in any man of fortune to be without a collection of them. Many
learned men, including Pompeius de Angelis and the celebrated Lipsius of
Leyden, the author of the treatise “De Constantia,” were passionately fond
of tulips. The rage for possessing them soon caught the middle classes of
society, and merchants and shopkeepers, even of moderate means, began
to vie with each other in the rarity of these flowers and the preposterous
prices they paid for them. A trader at Harlaem was known to pay one-half
of his fortune for a single root, not with the design of selling it again at a
profit, but to keep in his own conservatory for the admiration of his
acquaintance.

One would suppose that there must have been some great virtue in this
flower to have made it so valuable in the eyes of so prudent a people as the
Dutch; but it has neither the beauty nor the perfume of the rose—hardly
the beauty of the “sweet, sweet-pea;” neither is it as enduring as either.
Cowley, it is true, is loud in its praise. He says—
“The tulip next appeared, all over gay,
But wanton, full of pride, and full of play;
The world can’t shew a dye but here has place;
Nay, by new mixtures, she can change her face;
Purple and gold are both beneath her care,
The richest needlework she loves to wear;
Her only study is to please the eye,
And to outshine the rest in finery.”
This, though not very poetical, is the description of a poet. Beckmann, in
his History of Inventions, paints it with more fidelity, and in prose more
pleasing than Cowley’s poetry. He says, “There are few plants which
acquire, through accident, weakness, or disease, so many variegations as
the tulip. When uncultivated, and in its natural state, it is almost of one
colour, has large leaves, and an extraordinarily long stem. When it has
been weakened by cultivation, it becomes more agreeable in the eyes of the
florist. The petals are then paler, smaller, and more diversified in hue; and
the leaves acquire a softer green colour. Thus this masterpiece of culture,
the more beautiful it turns, grows so much the weaker, so that, with the
greatest skill and most careful attention, it can scarcely be transplanted, or
even kept alive.”
Many persons grow insensibly attached to that which gives them a great
deal of trouble, as a mother often loves her sick and ever-ailing child better
than her more healthy offspring. Upon the same principle we must account

for the unmerited encomia lavished upon these fragile blossoms. In 1634,
the rage among the Dutch to possess them was so great that the ordinary
industry of the country was neglected, and the population, even to its
lowest dregs, embarked in the tulip trade. As the mania increased, prices
augmented, until, in the year 1635, many persons were known to invest a
fortune of 100,000 florins in the purchase of forty roots. It then became
necessary to sell them by their weight in perits, a small weight less than a
grain. A tulip of the species called Admiral Liefken, weighing 400 perits,
was worth 4400 florins; an Admiral Van der Eyck, weighing 446 perits,
was worth 1260 florins; a Childer of 106 perits was worth 1615 florins; a
Viceroy of 400 perits, 3000 florins, and, most precious of all, a Semper
Augustus, weighing 200 perits, was thought to be very cheap at 5500
florins. The latter was much sought after, and even an inferior bulb might
command a price of 2000 florins. It is related that, at one time, early in
1636, there were only two roots of this description to be had in all Holland,
and those not of the best. One was in the possession of a dealer in
Amsterdam, and the other in Harlaem. So anxious were the speculators to
obtain them, that one person offered the fee-simple of twelve acres of
building-ground for the Harlaem tulip. That of Amsterdam was bought for
4600 florins, a new carriage, two grey horses, and a complete suit of
harness. Hunting, an industrious author of that day, who wrote a folio
volume of one thousand pages upon the tulipomania, has preserved the
folio wing list of the various articles, and their value, which were delivered
for one single root of the rare species called the Viceroy:
Two lasts of wheat
Four lasts of rye
Four fat oxen
Eight fat swine
Twelve fat sheep
Two hogsheads of wine
Four tuns of beer
Two tuns of butter

florins.
448
558
480
240
120
70
32
192

One thousand lbs. of cheese
A complete bed
A suit of clothes
A silver drinking-cup

120
100
80
60
2500

People who had been absent from Holland, and whose chance it was to
return when this folly was at its maximum, were sometimes led into
awkward dilemmas by their ignorance. There is an amusing instance of the
kind related in Blainville’s Travels. A wealthy merchant, who prided
himself not a little on his rare tulips, received upon one occasion a very
valuable consignment of merchandise from the Levant. Intelligence of its
arrival was brought him by a sailor, who presented himself for that purpose
at the counting-house, bales of goods of every description. The merchant,
to reward him for his news, munificently made him a present of a fine red
herring for his breakfast. The sailor had, it appears, a great partiality for
onions, and seeing a bulb very like an onion lying upon the counter of this
liberal trader, and thinking it, no doubt, very much out of its place among
silks and velvets, he slily seized an opportunity and slipped it into his
pocket, as a relish for his herring. He got clear off with his prize, and
proceeded to the quay to eat his breakfast. Hardly was his back turned
when the merchant missed his valuable Semper Augustus, worth three
thousand florins, or about 280l. sterling. The whole establishment was
instantly in an uproar; search was every where made for the precious root,
but it was not to be found. Great was the merchant’s distress of mind. The
search was renewed, but again without success. At last some one thought of
the sailor.
The unhappy merchant sprang into the street at the bare suggestion. His
alarmed household followed him. The sailor, simple soul! had not thought
of concealment. He was found quietly sitting on a coil of ropes, masticating
the last morsel of his “onion”. Little did he dream that he had been eating a
breakfast whose cost might have regaled a whole ship’s crew for a
twelvemonth; or, as the plundered merchant himself expressed it, “might

have sumptuously feasted the Prince of Orange and the whole court of the
Stadtholder.” Anthony caused pearls to be dissolved in wine to drink the
health of Cleopatra; Sir Richard Whittington was as foolishly magnificent
in an entertainment to King Henry V.; and Sir Thomas Gresham drank a
diamond dissolved in wine to the health of Queen Elizabeth, when she
opened the Royal Exchange; but the breakfast of this roguish Dutchman
was as splendid as either. He had an advantage, too, over his wasteful
predecessors: their gems did not improve the taste or the wholesomeness
of their wine, while his tulip was quite delicious with his red herring. The
most unfortunate part of the business for him was, that he remained in
prison for some months on a charge of felony preferred against him by the
merchant.
Another story is told of an English traveller, which is scarcely less
ludicrous. This gentleman, an amateur botanist, happened to see a tuliproot lying in the conservatory of a wealthy Dutchman. Being ignorant of its
quality, he took out his penknife, and peeled off its coats, with the view of
making experiments upon it. When it was by this means reduced to half its
size, he cut it into two equal sections, making all the time many learned
remarks on the singular appearances of the unknown bulb. Suddenly, the
owner pounced upon him, and, with fury in his eyes, asked him if he knew
what he had been doing? “Peeling a most extraordinary onion,” replied the
philosopher. “Hundert tausend duyvel!” said the Duchman; “it’s an
Admiral Van der Eyck.” “Thank you,” replied the traveller, taking out his
note-book to make a memorandum of the same; “are these admirals
common in your country?” “Death and the devil!” said the Dutchman,
seizing the astonished man of science by the collar; “come before the
syndic, and you shall see.” In spite of his remonstrances, the traveller was
led through the streets followed by a mob of persons. When brought into
the presence of the magistrate, he learned, to his consternation, that the
root upon which he had been experimentalising was worth four thousand

florins; and, notwithstanding all he could urge in extenuation, he was
lodged in prison until he found securities for the payment of this sum.
The demand for tulips of a rare species increased so much in the year
1636, that regular marts for their sale were established on the Stock
Exchange of Amsterdam, in Rotterdam, Harlaem, Leyden, Alkmar, Hoorn,
and other towns. Symptoms of gambling now became, for the first time,
apparent. The stock-jobbers, ever on the alert for a new speculation, dealt
largely in tulips, making use of all the means they so well knew how to
employ, to cause fluctuations in prices. At first, as in all these gambling
mania, confidence was at its height, and every body gained. The tulipjobbers speculated in the rise and fall of the tulip stocks, and made large
profits by buying when prices fell, and selling out when they rose. Many
individuals grew suddenly rich. A golden bait hung temptingly out before
the people, and one after the other, they rushed to the tulip-marts, like flies
around a honey-pot. Every one imagined that the passion for tulips would
last for ever, and that the wealthy from every part of the world would send
to Holland, and pay whatever prices were asked for them. The riches of
Europe would be concentrated on the shores of the Zuyder Zee, and
poverty banished from the favoured clime of Holland. Nobles, citizens,
farmers, mechanics, sea-men, footmen, maid-servants, even chimneysweeps and old clothes-women, dabbled in tulips. People of all grades
converted their property into cash, and invested it in flowers. Houses and
lands were offered for sale at ruinously low prices, or assigned in payment
of bargains made at the tulip-mart. Foreigners became smitten with the
same frenzy, and money poured into Holland from all directions. The
prices of the necessaries of life rose again by degrees: houses and lands,
horses and carriages, and luxuries of every sort, rose in value with them,
and for some months Holland seemed the very antechamber of Plutus. The
operations of the trade became so extensive and so intricate, that it was
found necessary to draw up a code of laws for the guidance of the dealers.
Notaries and clerks were also appointed, who devoted themselves

exclusively to the interests of the trade. The designation of public notary
was hardly known in some towns, that of tulip-notary usurping its place. In
the smaller towns, where there was no exchange, the principal tavern was
usually selected as the “show-place,” where high and low traded in tulips,
and confirmed their bargains over sumptuous entertainments. These
dinners were sometimes attended by two or three hundred persons, and
large vases of tulips, in full bloom, were placed at regular intervals upon
the tables and sideboards for their gratification during the repast.
At last, however, the more prudent began to see that this folly could not
last for ever. Rich people no longer bought the flowers to keep them in
their gardens, but to sell them again at cent per cent profit. It was seen that
somebody must lose fearfully in the end. As this conviction spread, prices
fell, and never rose again. Confidence was destroyed, and a universal panic
seized upon the dealers. A had agreed to purchase ten Semper Augustines
from B, at four thousand florins each, at six weeks after the signing of the
contract. B was ready with the flowers at the appointed time; but the price
had fallen to three or four hundred florins, and A refused either to pay the
difference or receive the tulips. Defaulters were announced day after day in
all the towns of Holland. Hundreds who, a few months previously, had
begun to doubt that there was such a thing as poverty in the land, suddenly
found themselves the possessors of a few bulbs, which nobody would buy,
even though they offered them at one quarter of the sums they had paid for
them. The cry of distress resounded every where, and each man accused his
neighbour. The few who had contrived to enrich themselves hid their
wealth from the knowledge of their fellow-citizens, and invested it in the
English or other funds. Many who, for a brief season, had emerged from
the humbler walks of life, were cast back into their original obscurity.
Substantial merchants were reduced almost to beggary, and many a
representative of a noble line saw the fortunes of his house ruined beyond
redemption.

When the first alarm subsided, the tulip-holders in the several towns
held public meetings to devise what measures, were best to be taken to
restore public credit. It was generally agreed, that deputies should be sent
from all parts to Amsterdam, to consult with the government upon some
remedy for the evil. The government at first refused to interfere, but
advised the tulip-holders to agree to some plan among themselves. Several
meetings were held for this purpose; but no measure could be devised
likely to give satisfaction to the deluded people, or repair even a slight
portion of the mischief that had been done. The language of complaint and
reproach was in every body’s mouth, and all the meetings were of the most
stormy character. At last, however, after much bickering and ill-will, it was
agreed, at Amsterdam, by the assembled deputies, that all contracts made
in the height of the mania, or prior to the month of November 1636, should
be declared null and void, and that, in those made after that date,
purchasers should be freed from their engagements, on paying ten per cent
to the vendor. This decision gave no satisfaction. The vendors who had
their tulips on hand were, of course, discontented, and those who had
pledged themselves to purchase, thought themselves hardly treated. Tulips
which had, at one time, been worth six thousand florins, were now to be
procured for five hundred; so that the composition of ten per cent was one
hundred florins more than the actual value. Actions for breach of contract
were threatened in all the courts of the country; but the latter refused to
take cognisance of gambling transactions.
The matter was finally referred to the Provincial Council at the Hague,
and it was confidently expected that the wisdom of this body would invent
some measure by which credit should be restored. Expectation was on the
stretch for its decision, but it never came. The members continued to
deliberate week after week, and at last, after thinking about it for three
months, declared that they could offer no final decision until they had
more information. They advised, however, that, in the mean time, every
vendor should, in the presence of witnesses, offer the tulips in natura to

the purchaser for the sums agreed upon. If the latter refused to take them,
they might be put up for sale by public auction, and the original contractor
held responsible for the difference between the actual and the stipulated
price. This was exactly the plan recommended by the deputies, and which
was already shewn to be of no avail. There was no court in Holland which
would enforce payment. The question was raised in Amsterdam, but the
judges unanimously refused to interfere, on the ground that debts
contracted in gambling were no debts in law.
Thus the matter rested. To find a remedy was beyond the power of the
government. Those who were unlucky enough to have had stores of tulips
on hand at the time of the sudden reaction were left to bear their ruin as
philosophically as they could; those who had made profits were allowed to
keep them; but the commerce of the country suffered a severe shock, from
which it was many years ere it recovered.
The example of the Dutch was imitated to some extent in England. In the
year 1636 tulips were publicly sold in the Exchange of London, and the
jobbers exerted themselves to the utmost to raise them to the fictitious
value they had acquired in Amsterdam. In Paris also the jobbers strove to
create a tulipomania. In both cities they only partially succeeded. However,
the force of example brought the flowers into great favour, and amongst a
certain class of people tulips have ever since been prized more highly than
any other flowers of the field. The Dutch are still notorious for their
partiality to them, and continue to pay higher prices for them than any
other people. As the rich Englishman boasts of his fine race-horses or his
old pictures, so does the wealthy Dutchman vaunt him of his tulips.
In England, in our day, strange as it may appear, a tulip will produce
more money than an oak. If one could be found, rara in terris, and black as
the black swan of Juvenal, its price would equal that of a dozen acres of
standing corn. In Scotland, towards the close of the seventeenth century,
the highest price for tulips, according to the authority of a writer in the
supplement to the third edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, was ten

guineas. Their value appears to have diminished from that time till the year
1769, when the two most valuable species in England were the Don
Quevedo and the Valentinier, the former of which was worth two guineas
and the latter two guineas and a half. These prices appear to have been the
minimum. In the year 1800, a common price was fifteen guineas for a
single bulb. In 1835, a bulb of the species called the Miss Fanny Kemble
was sold by public auction in London for seventy-five pounds. Still more
remarkable was the price of a tulip in the possession of a gardener in the
King’s Road, Chelsea;—in his catalogues it was labelled at two hundred
guineas.

THE ALCHYMISTS;
OR
Searchers for the Philosopher’s Stone and the Water of Life.

Mercury (loquitur). The mischief a secret any of them know, above
the consuming of coals and drawing of usquebaugh! howsoever they
may pretend, under the specious names of Geber, Arnold, Lulli, or
bombast of Hohenheim, to commit miracles in art, and treason
against nature! As if the title of philosopher, that creature of glory,
were to be fetched out of a furnace! I am their crude and their
sublimate, their precipitate and their unctions; their male and their
female, sometimes their hermaphrodite—what they list to style me!
They will calcine you a grave matron, as it might be a mother of the
maids, and spring up a young virgin out of her ashes, as fresh as a
phœnix; lay you an old courtier on the coals, like a sausage or a bloatherring, and, after they have broiled him enough, blow a soul into him
with a pair of bellows! See, they begin to muster again, and draw their
forces out against me! The genius of the place defend me!—BEN
JONSON’S Masque: Mercury vindicated from the Alchymists.

DISSATISFACTION with his lot seems to be the characteristic of man in all ages
and climates. So far, however, from being an evil, as at first might be
supposed, it has been the great civiliser of our race; and has tended, more
than any thing else, to raise us above the condition of the brutes. But the
same discontent which has been the source of all improvement, has been
the parent of no small progeny of follies and absurdities; to trace these
latter is our present object. Vast as the subject appears, it is easily reducible
within such limits as will make it comprehensive without being wearisome,
and render its study both instructive and amusing.

Three causes especially have excited the discontent of mankind; and, by
impelling us to seek for remedies for the irremediable, have bewildered us
in a maze of madness and error. These are death, toil, and ignorance of the
future—the doom of man upon this sphere, and for which he shews his
antipathy by his love of life, his longing for abundance, and his craving
curiosity to pierce the secrets of the days to come. The first has led many to
imagine that they might find means to avoid death, or failing in this, that
they might, nevertheless, so prolong existence as to reckon it by centuries
instead of units. From this sprang the search, so long continued and still
pursued, for the elixir vitæ, or water of life, which has led thousands to
pretend to it and millions to believe in it. From the second sprang the
search for the philosopher’s stone, which was to create plenty by changing
all metals into gold; and from the third, the false sciences of astrology,
divination, and their divisions of necromancy, chiromancy, augury, with all
their train of signs, portents, and omens.
In tracing the career of the erring philosophers, or the wilful cheats, who
have encouraged or preyed upon the credulity of mankind, it will simplify
and elucidate the subject, if we divide it into three classes: the first
comprising alchymists, or those in general who have devoted themselves to
the discovering of the philosopher’s stone and the water of life; the second
comprising astrologers, necromancers, sorcerers, geomancers, and all
those who pretended to discover futurity; and the third consisting of the
dealers in charms, amulets, philters, universal-panacea mongers, touchers
for the evil, seventh sons of a seventh son, sympathetic powder
compounders, homœopathists, animal magnetisers, and all the motley
tribe of quacks, empirics, and charlatans.
But in narrating the career of such men, it will be found that many of
them united several or all of the functions just mentioned; that the
alchymist was a fortune-teller, or a necromancer—that he pretended to
cure all maladies by touch or charm, and to work miracles of every kind. In
the dark and early ages of European history this is more especially the case.

Even as we advance to more recent periods, we shall find great difficulty in
separating the characters. The alchymist seldom confined himself strictly
to his pretended science—the sorcerer and necromancer to theirs, or the
medical charlatan to his. Beginning with alchymy, some confusion of these
classes is unavoidable; but the ground will clear for us as we advance.
Let us not, in the pride of our superior knowledge, turn with contempt
from the follies of our predecessors. The study of the errors into which
great minds have fallen in the pursuit of truth can never be uninstructive.
As the man looks back to the days of his childhood and his youth, and
recalls to his mind the strange notions and false opinions that swayed his
actions at that time, that he may wonder at them; so should society, for its
edification, look back to the opinions which governed the ages fled. He is
but a superficial thinker who would despise and refuse to hear of them
merely because they are absurd. No man is so wise but that he may learn
some wisdom from his past errors, either of thought or action; and no
society has made such advances as to be capable of no improvement from
the retrospect of its past folly and credulity. And not only is such a study
instructive: he who reads for amusement only will find no chapter in the
annals of the human mind more amusing than this. It opens out the whole
realm of fiction—the wild, the fantastic, and the wonderful, and all the
immense variety of things “that are not, and cannot be; but that have been
imagined and believed.”

For more than a thousand years the art of alchymy captivated many
noble spirits, and was believed in by millions. Its origin is involved in
obscurity. Some of its devotees have claimed for it an antiquity coeval with
the creation of man himself, others, again, would trace it no further back
than the time of Noah. Vincent de Beauvais argues, indeed, that all the
antediluvians must have possessed a knowledge of alchymy; and

particularly cites Noah as having been acquainted with the elixir vitæ, or
he could not have lived to so prodigious an age, and have begotten children
when upwards of five hundred. Lenglet du Fresnoy, in his History of the
Hermetic Philosophy, says, “Most of them pretended that Shem, or Chem,
the son of Noah, was an adept in the art, and thought it highly probable
that the words chemistry and alchymy are both derived from his name.”
Others say, the art was derived from the Egyptians, amongst whom it was
first founded by Hermes Trismegistus. Moses, who is looked upon as a
first-rate alchymist, gained his knowledge in Egypt; but he kept it all to
himself, and would not instruct the children of Israel in its mysteries. All
the writers upon alchymy triumphantly cite the story of the golden calf, in
the 32d chapter of Exodus, to prove that this great lawgiver was an adept,
and could make or unmake gold at his pleasure. It is recorded, that Moses
was so wrath with the Israelites for their idolatry, “that he took the calf
which they had made, and burned it in the fire, and ground it to powder,
and strewed it upon the water, and made the children of Israel drink of it.”
This, say the alchymists, he never could have done had he not been in
possession of the philosopher’s stone; by no other means could he have
made the powder of gold float upon the water. But we must leave this
knotty point for the consideration of the adepts in the art, if any such there
be, and come to more modern periods of its history. The Jesuit, Father
Martini, in his Historia Sinica, says, it was practised by the Chinese two
thousand five hundred years before the birth of Christ; but his assertion,
being unsupported, is worth nothing. It would appear, however, that
pretenders to the art of making gold and silver existed in Rome in the first
centuries after the Christian era, and that, when discovered, they were
liable to punishment as knaves and impostors. At Constantinople, in the
fourth century, the transmutation of metals was very generally believed in,
and many of the Greek ecclesiastics wrote treatises upon the subject. Their
names are preserved, and some notice of their works given, in the third
volume of Langlet du Fresnoy’s History of the Hermetic Philosophy. Their

notion appears to have been, that all metals were composed of two
substances; the one, metallic earth; and the other, a red inflammable
matter, which they called sulphur. The pure union of these substances
formed gold; but other metals were mixed with and contaminated by
various foreign ingredients. The object of the philosopher’s stone was to
dissolve or neutralise all these ingredients, by which iron, lead, copper, and
all metals would be transmuted into the original gold. Many learned and
clever men wasted their time, their health, and their energies, in this vain
pursuit; but for several centuries it took no great hold upon the
imagination of the people. The history of the delusion appears, in a
manner, lost from this time till the eighth century, when it appeared
amongst the Arabians. From this period it becomes easier to trace its
progress. A master then appeared, who was long looked upon as the father
of the science, and whose name is indissolubly connected with it.

GEBER.
Of this philosopher, who devoted his life to the study of alchymy, but few
particulars are known. He is thought to have lived in the year 730. His true
name was Abou Moussah Djafar, to which was added Al Sofi, or “The
Wise,” and he was born at Houran, in Mesopotamia. 28 Some have thought
he was a Greek, others a Spaniard, and others a prince of Hindostan; but of
all the mistakes which have been made respecting him, the most ludicrous
was that made by the French translator of Sprenger’s History of Medicine,
who thought, from the sound of his name, that he was a German, and
rendered it as the “Donnateur,” or Giver. No details of his life are known;
but it is asserted, that he wrote more than five hundred works upon the
philosopher’s stone and the water of life. He was a great enthusiast in his
art, and compared the incredulous to little children shut up in a narrow
room, without windows or aperture, who, because they saw nothing
beyond, denied the existence of the great globe itself. He thought that a

preparation of gold would cure all maladies, not only in man, but in the
inferior animals and plants. He also imagined that all the metals laboured
under disease, with the exception of gold, which was the only one in perfect
health. He affirmed, that the secret of the philosopher’s stone had been
more than once discovered; but that the ancient and wise men who had hit
upon it would never, by word or writing, communicate it to men, because
of their unworthiness and incredulity. 29 But the life of Geber, though spent
in the pursuit of this vain chimera, was not altogether useless. He stumbled
upon discoveries which he did not seek; and science is indebted to him for
the first mention of corrosive sublimate, the red oxide of mercury, nitric
acid, and the nitrate of silver. 30
For more than two hundred years after the death of Geber, the Arabian
philosophers devoted themselves to the study of alchymy, joining with it
that of astrology. Of these the most celebrated was

ALFARABI.
Alfarabi flourished at the commencement of the tenth century, and
enjoyed the reputation of being one of the most learned men of his age. He
spent his life in travelling from country to country, that he might gather the
opinions of philosophers upon the great secrets of nature. No danger
dismayed him; no toil wearied him of the pursuit. Many sovereigns
endeavoured to retain him at their courts; but he refused to rest until he
had discovered the great object of his life—the art of preserving it for
centuries, and of making gold as much as he needed. This wandering mode
of life at last proved fatal to him. He had been on a visit to Mecca, not so
much for religious as for philosophical purposes, when, returning through
Syria, he stopped at the court of the Sultan Seifeddoulet, who was
renowned as the patron of learning. He presented himself in his travelling
attire in the presence of that monarch and his courtiers; and, without
invitation, coolly sat himself down on the sofa beside the prince. The

courtiers and wise men were indignant; and the sultan, who did not know
the intruder, was at first inclined to follow their example. He turned to one
of his officers, and ordered him to eject the presumptuous stranger from
the room; but Alfarabi, without moving, dared them to lay hands upon
him; and, turning himself calmly to the prince, remarked, that he did not
know who was his guest, or he would treat him with honour, not with
violence. The sultan, instead of being still further incensed, as many
potentates would have been, admired his coolness; and, requesting him to
sit still closer to him on the sofa, entered into a long conversation with him
upon science and divine philosophy. All the court were charmed with the
stranger. Questions for discussion were propounded, on all of which he
shewed superior knowledge. He convinced every one who ventured to
dispute with him; and spoke so eloquently upon the science of alchymy,
that he was at once recognised as only second to the great Geber himself.
One of the doctors present inquired whether a man who knew so many
sciences was acquainted with music? Alfarabi made no reply, but merely
requested that a lute should be brought him. The lute was brought; and he
played such ravishing and tender melodies, that all the court were melted
into tears. He then changed his theme, and played airs so sprightly, that he
set the grave philosophers, sultan and all, dancing as fast as their legs could
carry them. He then sobered them again by a mournful strain, and made
them sob and sigh as if broken-hearted. The sultan, highly delighted with
his powers, entreated him to stay, offering him every inducement that
wealth, power, and dignity could supply; but the alchymist resolutely
refused, it being decreed, he said, that he should never repose till he had
discovered the philosopher’s stone. He set out accordingly the same
evening, and was murdered by some thieves in the deserts of Syria. His
biographers give no further particulars of his life beyond mentioning that
he wrote several valuable treatises on his art, all of which, however, have
been lost. His death happened in the year 954.

AVICENNA.
Avicenna, whose real name was Ebn Cinna, another great alchymist, was
born at Bokhara in 980. His reputation as a physician and a man skilled in
all sciences was so great, that the Sultan Magdal Douleth resolved to try his
powers in the great science of government. He was accordingly made
Grand Vizier of that prince, and ruled the state with some advantage; but
in a science still more difficult, he failed completely. He could not rule his
own passions, but gave himself up to wine and women, and led a life of
shameless debauchery. Amid the multifarious pursuits of business and
pleasure, he nevertheless found time to write seven treatises upon the
philosopher’s stone, which were for many ages looked upon as of great
value by pretenders to the art. It is rare that an eminent physician as
Avicenna appears to have been, abandons himself to sensual gratification;
but so completely did he become enthralled in the course of a few years,
that he was dismissed from his high office, and died shortly afterwards of
premature old age and a complication of maladies, brought on by
debauchery. His death took place in the year 1036. After his time few
philosophers of any note in Arabia are heard of as devoting themselves to
the study of alchymy; but it began shortly afterwards to attract greater
attention in Europe. Learned men in France, England, Spain, and Italy,
expressed their belief in the science, and many devoted their whole
energies to it. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries especially, it was
extensively pursued, and some of the brightest names of that age are
connected with it. Among the most eminent of them are

ALBERTUS MAGNUS AND THOMAS AQUINAS.
The first of these philosophers was born in the year 1193, of a noble
family at Lawingen, in the Duchy of Neuburg, on the Danube. For the first
thirty years of his life he appeared remarkably dull and stupid, and it was
feared by every one that no good could come of him. He entered a

Dominican monastery at an early age; but made so little progress in his
studies, that he was more than once upon the point of abandoning them in
despair, but he was endowed with extraordinary perseverance. As he
advanced to middle age, his mind expanded, and he learned whatever he
applied himself to with extreme facility. So remarkable a change was not in
that age to be accounted for but by a miracle. It was asserted and believed
that the Holy Virgin, touched with his great desire to become learned and
famous, took pity upon his incapacity, and appeared to him in the cloister
where he sat almost despairing, and asked him whether he wished to excel
in philosophy or divinity. He chose philosophy, to the chagrin of the Virgin,
who reproached him in mild and sorrowful accents that he had not made a
better choice. She, however, granted his request, that he should become the
most excellent philosopher of the age; but set this drawback to his
pleasure, that he should relapse, when at the height of his fame, into his
former incapacity and stupidity. Albertus never took the trouble to
contradict the story, but prosecuted his studies with such unremitting zeal,
that his reputation speedily spread over all Europe. In the year 1244, the
celebrated Thomas Aquinas placed himself under his tuition. Many
extraordinary stories are told of the master and his pupil. While they paid
all due attention to other branches of science, they never neglected the
pursuit of the philosopher’s stone and the elixir vitæ. Although they
discovered neither, it was believed that Albert had seized some portion of
the secret of life, and found means to animate a brazen statue, upon the
formation of which, under proper conjunctions of the planets, he had been
occupied many years of his life. He and Thomas Aquinas completed it
together, endowed it with the faculty of speech, and made it perform the
functions of a domestic servant. In this capacity it was exceedingly useful;
but, through some defect in the machinery, it chattered much more than
was agreeable to either philosopher. Various remedies were tried to cure it
of its garrulity, but in vain; and one day, Thomas Aquinas was so enraged
at the noise it made when he was in the midst of a mathematical problem,

that he seized a ponderous hammer and smashed it to pieces. 31 He was
sorry afterwards for what he had done, and was reproved by his master for
giving way to his anger, so unbecoming in a philosopher. They made no
attempt to re-animate the statue.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS.

Such stories as these shew the spirit of the age. Every great man who
attempted to study the secrets of nature was thought a magician; and it is
not to be wondered at that, when philosophers themselves pretended to
discover an elixir for conferring immortality, or a red stone which was to
create boundless wealth, that popular opinion should have enhanced upon
their pretensions, and have endowed them with powers still more
miraculous. It was believed of Albertus Magnus that he could even change
the course of the seasons, a feat which the many thought less difficult than
the discovery of the grand elixir. Albertus was desirous of obtaining a piece
of ground on which to build a monastery in the neighbourhood of Cologne.
The ground belonged to William Count of Holland and King of the
Romans, who for some reason or other did not wish to part with it.
Albertus is reported to have gained it by the following extraordinary
method: He invited the prince as he was passing through Cologne to a
magnificent entertainment prepared for him and all his court. The prince
accepted it, and repaired with a lordly retinue to the residence of the sage.
It was in the midst of winter, the Rhine was frozen over, and the cold was
so bitter, that the knights could not sit on horseback without running the
risk of losing their toes by the frost. Great, therefore, was their surprise, on
arriving at Albert’s house, to find that the repast was spread in his garden,
in which the snow had drifted to the depth of several feet. The earl in high

dudgeon remounted his steed, but Albert at last prevailed upon him to take
his seat at the table. He had no sooner done so, than the dark clouds rolled
away from the sky—a warm sun shone forth—the cold north wind veered
suddenly round and blew a mild breeze from the south—the snows melted
away—the ice was unbound upon the streams, and the trees put forth their
green leaves and their fruit—flowers sprang up beneath their feet, while
larks, nightingales, blackbirds, cuckoos, thrushes, and every sweet songbird sang hymns from every tree. The earl and his attendants wondered
greatly; but they ate their dinner, and in recompense for it, Albert got his
piece of ground to build a convent on. He had not, however, shewn them all
his power. Immediately that the repast was over, he gave the word, and
dark clouds obscured the sun—the snow fell in large flakes—the singingbirds fell dead—the leaves dropped from the trees, and the winds blew so
cold and howled so mournfully, that the guests wrapped themselves up in
their thick cloaks, and retreated into the house to warm themselves at the
blazing fire in Albert’s kitchen. 32
Thomas Aquinas also could work wonders as well as his master. It is
related of him that he lodged in a street at Cologne, where he was much
annoyed by the incessant clatter made by the horses’ hoofs, as they were
led through it daily to exercise by their grooms. He had entreated the latter
to select some other spot, where they might not disturb a philosopher; but
the grooms turned a deaf ear to all his solicitations. In this emergency he
had recourse to the aid of magic. He constructed a small horse of bronze,
upon which he inscribed certain cabalistic characters, and buried it at
midnight in the midst of the highway. The next morning a troop of grooms
came riding along as usual; but the horses, as they arrived at the spot
where the magic horse was buried, reared and plunged violently—their
nostrils distended with terror—their manes grew erect, and the
perspiration ran down their sides in streams. In vain the riders applied the
spur—in vain they coaxed or threatened, the animals would not pass the
spot. On the following day their success was no better. They were at length

compelled to seek another spot for their exercise, and Thomas Aquinas was
left in peace. 33
Albertus Magnus was made Bishop of Ratisbon in 1259; but he occupied
the see only four years, when he resigned, on the ground that its duties
occupied too much of the time which he was anxious to devote to
philosophy. He died in Cologne in 1280, at the advanced age of eightyseven. The Dominican writers deny that he ever sought the philosopher’s
stone, but his treatise upon minerals sufficiently proves that he did.

ARTEPHIUS.
Artephius, a name noted in the annals of alchymy, was born in the early
part of the twelfth century. He wrote two famous treatises; the one upon
the philosopher’s stone, and the other on the art of prolonging human life.
In the latter he vaunts his great qualifications for instructing mankind on
such a matter, as he was at that time in the thousand and twenty-fifth year
of his age! He had many disciples who believed in his extreme age, and who
attempted to prove that he was Apollonius of Tyana, who lived soon after
the advent of Jesus Christ, and the particulars of whose life and pretended
miracles have been so fully described by Philostratus. He took good care
never to contradict a story which so much increased the power he was
desirous of wielding over his fellow-mortals. On all convenient occasions,
he boasted of it; and having an excellent memory, a fertile imagination,
and a thorough knowledge of all existing history, he was never at a loss for
an answer when questioned as to the personal appearance, the manners, or
the character of the great men of antiquity. He also pretended to have
found the philosopher’s stone; and said that, in search of it, he had
descended to hell, and seen the devil sitting on a throne of gold, with a
legion of imps and fiends around him. His works on alchymy have been
translated into French, and were published in Paris in 1609 or 1610.

ALAIN DE LISLE.

Contemporary with Albertus Magnus was Alain de Lisle of Flanders, who
was named, from his great learning, the “universal doctor.” He was thought
to possess a knowledge of all the sciences, and, like Artephius, to have
discovered the elixir vitæ. He became one of the friars of the abbey of
Citeaux, and died in 1298, aged about one hundred and ten years. It was
said of him that he was at the point of death when in his fiftieth year, but
that the fortunate discovery of the elixir enabled him to add sixty years to
his existence. He wrote a commentary on the prophecies of Merlin.

ARNOLD DE VILLENEUVE.
This philosopher has left a much greater reputation. He was born in the
year 1245, and studied medicine with great success in the university of
Paris. He afterwards travelled for twenty years in Italy and Germany,
where he made acquaintance with Pietro d’Apone, a man of a character
akin to his own, and addicted to the same pursuits. As a physician, he was
thought, in his own lifetime, to be the most able the world had ever seen.
Like all the learned men of that day, he dabbled in astrology and alchymy,
and was thought to have made immense quantities of gold from lead and
copper. When Pietro d’Apone was arrested in Italy, and brought to trial as
a sorcerer, a similar accusation was made against Arnold; but he managed
to leave the country in time, and escape the fate of his unfortunate friend.
He lost some credit by predicting the end of the world, but afterwards
regained it. The time of his death is not exactly known; but it must have
been prior to the year 1311, when Pope Clement V. wrote a circular letter to
all the clergy of Europe who lived under his obedience, praying them to use
their utmost efforts to discover the famous treatise of Arnold on The
Practice of Medicine. The author had promised, during his lifetime, to
make a present of the work to the Holy See, but died without fulfilling it.

ARNOLD DE VILLENEUVE.

In a very curious work by Monsieur Longeville Harcouet, entitled The
History of the Persons who have lived several centuries and then grown
young again, there is a receipt, said to have been given by Arnold de
Villeneuve, by means of which any one might prolong his life for a few
hundred years or so. In the first place, say Arnold and Monsieur Harcouet,
“the person intending so to prolong his life must rub himself well, two or
three times a week, with the juice or marrow of cassia (moëlle de la casse).
Every night, upon going to bed, he must put upon his heart a plaster,
composed of a certain quantity of oriental saffron, red rose-leaves, sandalwood, aloes, and amber, liquified in oil of roses and the best white wax. In
the morning, he must take it off, and enclose it carefully in a leaden box till
the next night, when it must be again applied. If he be of a sanguine
temperament, he shall take sixteen chickens; if phlegmatic, twenty-five;
and if melancholy, thirty, which he shall put into a yard where the air and
the water are pure. Upon these he is to feed, eating one a day; but
previously the chickens are to be fattened by a peculiar method, which will
impregnate their flesh with the qualities that are to produce longevity in
the eater. Being deprived of all other nourishment till they are almost dying
of hunger, they are to be fed upon broth made of serpents and vinegar,
which broth is to be thickened with wheat and bran.” Various ceremonies
are to be performed in the cooking of this mess, which those may see in the
book of M. Harcouet who are at all interested in the matter; and the

chickens are to be fed upon it for two months. They are then fit for table,
and are to be washed down with moderate quantities of good white wine or
claret. This regimen is to be followed regularly every seven years, and any
one may live to be as old as Methuselah! It is right to state that M.
Harcouet has but little authority for attributing this precious composition
to Arnold of Villeneuve. It is not found in the collected works of that
philosopher; but was first brought to light by a M. Poirier, at the
commencement of the sixteenth century, who asserted that he had
discovered it in MS. in the undoubted writing of Arnold.

PIETRO D’APONE.
This unlucky sage was born at Apone, near Padua, in the year 1250. Like
his friend Arnold de Villeneuve, he was an eminent physician, and a
pretender to the arts of astrology and alchymy. He practised for many years
in Paris, and made great wealth by killing and curing, and telling fortunes.
In an evil day for him, he returned to his own country, with the reputation
of being a magician of the first order. It was universally believed that he
had drawn seven evil spirits from the infernal regions, whom he kept
enclosed in seven crystal vases until he required their services, when he
sent them forth to the ends of the earth to execute his pleasure. One spirit
excelled in philosophy; a second, in alchymy; a third, in astrology; a fourth,
in physic; a fifth, in poetry; a sixth, in music; and the seventh, in painting:
and whenever Pietro wished for information or instruction in any of these
arts, he had only to go to his crystal vase and liberate the presiding spirit.
Immediately all the secrets of the art were revealed to him; and he might, if
it pleased him, excel Homer in poetry, Apelles in painting, or Pythagoras
himself in philosophy. Although he could make gold out of brass, it was
said of him that he was very sparing of his powers in that respect, and kept
himself constantly supplied with money by other and less creditable
means. Whenever he disbursed gold, he muttered a certain charm, known

only to himself, and next morning the gold was safe again in his own
possession. The trader to whom he gave it might lock it in his strong box
and have it guarded by a troop of soldiers, but the charmed metal flew back
to its old master. Even if it were buried in the earth, or thrown into the sea,
the dawn of the next morning would behold it in the pockets of Pietro. Few
people, in consequence, liked to have dealings with such a personage,
especially for gold. Some, bolder than the rest, thought that his power did
not extend over silver; but, when they made the experiment, they found
themselves mistaken. Bolts and bars could not restrain it, and it sometimes
became invisible in their very hands, and was whisked through the air to
the purse of the magician. He necessarily acquired a very bad character;
and, having given utterance to some sentiments regarding religion which
were the very reverse of orthodox, he was summoned before the tribunals
of the Inquisition to answer for his crimes as a heretic and a sorcerer. He
loudly protested his innocence, even upon the rack, where he suffered
more torture than nature could support. He died in prison ere his trial was
concluded, but was afterwards found guilty. His bones were ordered to be
dug up and publicly burned. He was also burned in effigy in the streets of
Padua.

RAYMOND LULLI.

RAYMOND LULLI.

While Arnold de Villeneuve and Pietro d’Apone flourished in France and
Italy, a more celebrated adept than either appeared in Spain. This was
Raymond Lulli, a name which stands in the first rank among the
alchymists. Unlike many of his predecessors, he made no pretensions to
astrology or necromancy; but, taking Geber for his model, studied intently
the nature and composition of metals, without reference to charms,
incantations, or any foolish ceremonies. It was not, however, till late in life
that he commenced his study of the art. His early and middle age were
spent in a different manner, and his whole history is romantic in the
extreme. He was born of an illustrious family, in Majorca, in the year 1235.
When that island was taken from the Saracens by James I. king of Aragon,
in 1230, the father of Raymond, who was originally of Catalonia, settled
there, and received a considerable appointment from the crown. Raymond
married at an early age; and, being fond of pleasure, he left the solitudes of
his native isle, and passed over with his bride into Spain. He was made
Grand Seneschal at the court of King James, and led a gay life for several
years. Faithless to his wife, he was always in the pursuit of some new
beauty, till his heart was fixed at last by the lovely but unkind Ambrosia de
Castello. This lady, like her admirer, was married; but, unlike him, was
faithful to her vows, and treated all his solicitations with disdain. Raymond
was so enamoured, that repulse only increased his flame; he lingered all
night under her windows, wrote passionate verses in her praise, neglected
his affairs, and made himself the butt of all the courtiers. One day, while
watching under her lattice, he by chance caught sight of her bosom, as her
neckerchief was blown aside by the wind. The fit of inspiration came over
him, and he sat down and composed some tender stanzas upon the subject,
and sent them to the lady. The fair Ambrosia had never before
condescended to answer his letters; but she replied to this. She told him
that she could never listen to his suit; that it was unbecoming in a wise
man to fix his thoughts, as he had done, on any other than his God; and

entreated him to devote himself to a religious life, and conquer the
unworthy passion which he had suffered to consume him. She, however,
offered, if he wished it, to shew him the fair bosom which had so captivated
him. Raymond was delighted. He thought the latter part of this epistle but
ill corresponded with the former, and that Ambrosia, in spite of the good
advice she gave him, had at last relented, and would make him as happy as
he desired. He followed her about from place to place, entreating her to
fulfil her promise: but still Ambrosia was cold, and implored him with tears
to importune her no longer; for that she never could be his, and never
would, if she were free to-morrow. “What means your letter, then?” said
the despairing lover. “I will shew you!” replied Ambrosia, who immediately
uncovered her bosom, and exposed to the eyes of her horror-stricken
admirer a large cancer which had extended to both breasts. She saw that he
was shocked; and, extending her hand to him, she prayed him once more to
lead a religious life, and set his heart upon the Creator, and not upon the
creature. He went home an altered man. He threw up, on the morrow, his
valuable appointment at the court, separated from his wife, and took a
farewell of his children, after dividing one-half of his ample fortune among
them. The other half he shared among the poor. He then threw himself at
the foot of a crucifix, and devoted himself to the service of God, vowing, as
the most acceptable atonement for his errors, that he would employ the
remainder of his days in the task of converting the Mussulmans to the
Christian religion. In his dreams he saw Jesus Christ, who said to him,
“Raymond! Raymond! follow me!” The vision was three times repeated,
and Raymond was convinced that it was an intimation direct from heaven.
Having put his affairs in order, he set out on a pilgrimage to the shrine of
St. James of Compostello, and afterwards lived for ten years in solitude
amid the mountains of Aranda. Here he learned the Arabic, to qualify
himself for his mission of converting the Mahometans. He also studied
various sciences, as taught in the works of the learned men of the East, and

first made acquaintance with the writings of Geber, which were destined to
exercise so much influence over his future life.
At the end of this probation, and when he had entered his fortieth year,
he emerged from his solitude into more active life. With some remains of
his fortune, which had accumulated during his retirement, he founded a
college for the study of Arabic, which was approved of by the pope, with
many commendations upon his zeal and piety. At this time he narrowly
escaped assassination from an Arabian youth whom he had taken into his
service. Raymond had prayed to God, in some of his accesses of fanaticism,
that he might suffer martyrdom in his holy cause. His servant had
overheard him: and, being as great a fanatic as his master, he resolved to
gratify his wish, and punish him, at the same time, for the curses which he
incessantly launched against Mahomet and all who believed in him, by
stabbing him to the heart. He therefore aimed a blow at his master as he
sat one day at table; but the instinct of self-preservation being stronger
than the desire of martyrdom, Raymond grappled with his antagonist, and
overthrew him. He scorned to take his life himself; but handed him over to
the authorities of the town, by whom he was afterwards found dead in his
prison.
After this adventure Raymond travelled to Paris, where he resided for
some time, and made the acquaintance of Arnold de Villeneuve. From him
he probably received some encouragement to search for the philosopher’s
stone, as he began from that time forth to devote less of his attention to
religious matters, and more to the study of alchymy. Still he never lost sight
of the great object for which he lived—the conversion of the Mahometans—
and proceeded to Rome, to communicate personally with Pope John XXI.
on the best measures to be adopted for that end. The Pope gave him
encouragement in words, but failed to associate any other persons with
him in the enterprise which he meditated. Raymond, therefore, set out for
Tunis alone, and was kindly received by many Arabian philosophers, who
had heard of his fame as a professor of alchymy. If he had stuck to alchymy

while in their country, it would have been well for him; but he began
cursing Mahomet, and got himself into trouble. While preaching the
doctrines of Christianity in the great bazaar of Tunis, he was arrested and
thrown into prison. He was shortly afterwards brought to trial, and
sentenced to death. Some of his philosophic friends interceded hard for
him, and he was pardoned upon condition that he left Africa immediately
and never again set foot in it. If he was found there again, no matter what
his object might be, or whatever length of time might intervene, his
original sentence would be carried into execution. Raymond was not at all
solicitous of martyrdom when it came to the point, whatever he might have
been when there was no danger, and he gladly accepted his life upon these
conditions, and left Tunis with the intention of proceeding to Rome. He
afterwards changed his plan, and established himself at Milan, where, for a
length of time, he practised alchymy, and some say astrology, with great
success.
Most writers who believed in the secrets of alchymy, and who have
noticed the life of Raymond Lulli, assert, that while in Milan, he received
letters from Edward King of England, inviting him to settle in his states.
They add that Lulli gladly accepted the invitation, and had apartments
assigned for his use in the Tower of London, where he refined much gold;
superintended the coinage of “rose-nobles,” and made gold out of iron,
quicksilver, lead, and pewter, to the amount of six millions. The writers in
the Biographie Universelle, an excellent authority in general, deny that
Raymond was ever in England, and say, that in all these stories of his
wondrous powers as an alchymist, he has been mistaken for another
Raymond, a Jew of Tarragona. Naudé, in his Apologie, says, simply, “that
six millions were given by Raymond Lulli to King Edward, to make war
against the Turks and other infidels:” not that he transmuted so much
metal into gold; but, as he afterwards adds, that he advised Edward to lay a
tax upon wool, which produced that amount. To shew that Raymond went
to England, his admirers quote a work attributed to him, De

Transmutatione Animæ Metallorum, in which he expressly says that he
was in England at the intercession of the king. 34 The hermetic writers are
not agreed whether it was Edward I. or Edward II. who invited him over;
but, by fixing the date of his journey in 1312, they make it appear that it
was Edward II. Edmond Dickenson, in his work on the Quintessences of
the Philosophers, says, that Raymond worked in Westminster Abbey,
where, a long time after his departure, there was found in the cell which he
had occupied a great quantity of golden dust, of which the architects made
a great profit. In the biographical sketch of John Cremer, Abbot of
Westminster, given by Lenglet, it is said that it was chiefly through his
instrumentality that Raymond came to England. Cremer had been himself
for thirty years occupied in the vain search for the philosopher’s stone,
when he accidentally met Raymond in Italy, and endeavoured to induce
him to communicate his grand secret. Raymond told him that he must find
it for himself, as all great alchymists had done before him. Cremer, on his
return to England, spoke to King Edward in high terms of the wonderful
attainments of the philosopher, and a letter of invitation was forthwith sent
him. Robert Constantinus, in the Nomenclator Scriptorum Medicorum,
published in 1515, says, that after a great deal of research, he found that
Raymond Lulli resided for some time in London, and that he actually made
gold, by means of the philosopher’s stone, in the Tower; that he had seen
the golden pieces of his coinage, which were still named in England the
nobles of Raymond, or rose-nobles. Lulli himself appears to have boasted
that he made gold; for, in his well-known Testamentum, he states that he
converted no less than fifty thousand pounds weight of quicksilver, lead,
and pewter into that metal. 35 It seems highly probable that the English
king, believing in the extraordinary powers of the alchymist, invited him to
England to make test of them, and that he was employed in refining gold
and in coining. Camden, who is not credulous in matters like these, affords
his countenance to the story of his coinage of nobles; and there is nothing
at all wonderful in the fact of a man famous for his knowledge of metals

being employed in such a capacity. Raymond was, at this time, an old man,
in his seventy-seventh year, and somewhat in his dotage. He was willing
enough to have it believed that he had discovered the grand secret, and
supported the rumour rather than contradicted it. He did not long remain
in England, but returned to Rome to carry out the projects which were
nearer to his heart than the profession of alchymy. He had proposed them
to several successive popes with little or no success. The first was a plan for
the introduction of the oriental languages into all the monasteries of
Europe; the second, for the reduction into one of all the military orders,
that, being united, they might move more efficaciously against the
Saracens; and the third, that the sovereign pontiff should forbid the works
of Averroes to be read in the schools, as being more favourable to
Mahometanism than to Christianity. The pope did not receive the old man
with much cordiality; and, after remaining for about two years in Rome, he
proceeded once more to Africa, alone and unprotected, to preach the
Gospel of Jesus. He landed at Bona in 1314, and so irritated the
Mahometans by cursing their prophet, that they stoned him, and left him
for dead on the sea-shore. He was found some hours afterwards by a party
of Genoese merchants, who conveyed him on board their vessel, and sailed
towards Majorca. The unfortunate man still breathed, but could not
articulate. He lingered in this state for some days, and expired just as the
vessel arrived within sight of his native shores. His body was conveyed with
great pomp to the church of St. Eulalia, at Palma, where a public funeral
was instituted in his honour. Miracles were afterwards said to have been
worked at his tomb.
Thus ended the career of Raymond Lulli, one of the most extraordinary
men of his age; and, with the exception of his last boast about the six
millions of gold, the least inclined to quackery of any of the professors of
alchymy. His writings were very numerous, and include nearly five
hundred volumes, upon grammar, rhetoric, morals, theology, politics, civil
and canon law, physics, metaphysics, astronomy, medicine, and chemistry.

ROGER BACON.
The powerful delusion of alchymy seized upon a mind still greater than
that of Raymond Lulli. Roger Bacon firmly believed in the philosopher’s
stone, and spent much of his time in search of it. His example helped to
render all the learned men of the time more convinced of its practicability,
and more eager in the pursuit. He was born at Ilchester, in the county of
Somerset, in the year 1214. He studied for some time in the University of
Oxford, and afterwards in that of Paris, in which he received the degree of
doctor of divinity. Returning to England in 1240, he became a monk of the
order of St. Francis. He was by far the most learned man of his age; and his
acquirements were so much above the comprehension of his
contemporaries, that they could only account for them by supposing that
he was indebted for them to the devil. Voltaire has not inaptly designated
him “De l’or encrouté de toutes les ordures de son siècle;” but the crust of
superstition that enveloped his powerful mind, though it may have
dimmed, could not obscure the brightness of his genius. To him, and
apparently to him only, among all the inquiring spirits of the time, were
known the properties of the concave and convex lens. He also invented the
magic lantern; that pretty plaything of modern days, which acquired for
him a reputation that embittered his life. In a history of alchymy, the name
of this great man cannot be omitted, although unlike many others of whom
we shall have occasion to speak, he only made it secondary to other
pursuits. The love of universal knowledge that filled his mind, would not
allow him to neglect one branch of science, of which neither he nor the
world could yet see the absurdity. He made ample amends for his time lost
in this pursuit by his knowledge in physics and his acquaintance with
astronomy. The telescope, burning-glasses, and gunpowder, are discoveries
which may well carry his fame to the remotest time, and make the world
blind to the one spot of folly—the diagnosis of the age in which he lived,
and the circumstances by which he was surrounded. His treatise on the

Admirable Power of Art and Nature in the Production of the Philosopher’s
Stone was translated into French by Girard de Tormes, and published at
Lyons in 1557. His Mirror of Alchymy was also published in French in the
same year, and in Paris in 1612, with some additions from the works of
Raymond Lulli. A complete list of all the published treatises upon the
subject may be seen in Lenglet du Fresnoy.

POPE JOHN XXII.
This prelate is said to have been the friend and pupil of Arnold de
Villeneuve, by whom he was instructed in all the secrets of alchymy.
Tradition asserts of him, that he made great quantities of gold, and died as
rich as Crœsus. He was born at Cahors, in the province of Guienne, in the
year 1244. He was a very eloquent preacher, and soon reached high dignity
in the Church. He wrote a work on the transmutation of metals, and had a
famous laboratory at Avignon. He issued two bulls against the numerous
pretenders to the art, who had sprung up in every part of Christendom;
from which it might be inferred that he was himself free from the delusion.
The alchymists claim him, however, as one of the most distinguished and
successful professors of their art, and say that his bulls were not directed
against the real adepts, but the false pretenders. They lay particular stress
upon these words in his bull, “Spondent, quas non exhibent, divitias,
pauperes alchymistæ.” These, it is clear, they say, relate only to poor
alchymists, and therefore false ones. He died in the year 1344, leaving in
his coffers a sum of eighteen millions of florins. Popular belief alleged that
he had made, and not amassed, this treasure; and alchymists complacently
cite this as a proof that the philosopher’s stone was not such a chimera as
the incredulous pretended. They take it for granted that John really left
this money, and ask by what possible means he could have accumulated it.
Replying to their own question, they say triumphantly, “His book shews it
was by alchymy, the secrets of which he learned from Arnold de Villeneuve

and Raymond Lulli. But he was as prudent as all other hermetic
philosophers. Whoever would read his book to find out his secret, would
employ all his labour in vain; the pope took good care not to divulge it.”
Unluckily for their own credit, all these gold-makers are in the same
predicament; their great secret loses its worth most wonderfully in the
telling, and therefore they keep it snugly to themselves. Perhaps they
thought that, if everybody could transmute metals, gold would be so
plentiful that it would be no longer valuable, and that some new art would
be requisite to transmute it back again into steel and iron. If so, society is
much indebted to them for their forbearance.

JEAN DE MEUNG.
All classes of men dabbled in the art at this time; the last mentioned was
a pope, the one of whom we now speak was a poet. Jean de Meung, the
celebrated author of the Roman de la Rose, was born in the year 1279 or
1280, and was a great personage at the courts of Louis X., Philip the Long,
Charles IV., and Philip de Valois. His famous poem of the Roman de la
Rose, which treats of every subject in vogue at that day, necessarily makes
great mention of alchymy. Jean was a firm believer in the art, and wrote,
besides his Roman, two shorter poems, the one entitled The Remonstrance
of Nature to the wandering Alchymist and The Reply of the Alchymist to
Nature. Poetry and alchymy were his delight, and priests and women were
his abomination. A pleasant story is related of him and the ladies of the
court of Charles IV. He had written the following libellous couplet upon the
fair sex:

“Toutes êtes, serez, ou fûtes,
De fait ou de volonté, putains;
Et qui très bien vous chercherait,
Toutes putains vous trouverait.” 36
This naturally gave great offence; and being perceived one day in
the king’s antechamber, by some ladies who were waiting for an
audience, they resolved to punish him. To the number of ten or
twelve, they armed themselves with canes and rods, and surrounding
the unlucky poet, called upon the gentlemen present to strip him
naked, that they might wreak just vengeance upon him, and lash him
through the streets of the town. Some of the lords present were in no
wise loath, and promised themselves great sport from his
punishment. But Jean de Meung was unmoved by their threats, and
stood up calmly in the midst of them, begging them to hear him first,
and then, if not satisfied, they might do as they liked with him.
Silence being restored, he stood upon a chair, and entered on his
defence. He acknowledged that he was the author of the obnoxious
verses, but denied that they bore reference to all womankind. He
only meant to speak of the vicious and abandoned, whereas those
whom he saw around him were patterns of virtue, loveliness, and
modesty. If, however, any lady present thought herself aggrieved, he
would consent to be stripped, and she might lash him till her arms

were wearied. It is added, that by this means Jean escaped his
flogging, and that the wrath of the fair ones immediately subsided.
The gentlemen present were, however, of opinion, that if every lady
in the room whose character corresponded with the verses had taken
him at his word; the poet would in all probability have been beaten to
death. All his life long he evinced a great animosity towards the
priesthood, and his famous poem abounds with passages reflecting
upon their avarice, cruelty, and immorality. At his death he left a
large box, filled with some weighty material, which he bequeathed to
the Cordeliers, as a peace-offering, for the abuse he had lavished
upon them. As his practice of alchymy was well known, it was
thought the box was filled with gold and silver, and the Cordeliers
congratulated each other on their rich acquisition. When it came to
be opened, they found to their horror that it was filled only with
slates, scratched with hieroglyphic and cabalistic characters.
Indignant at the insult, they determined to refuse him Christian
burial, on pretence that he was a sorcerer. He was, however,
honourably buried in Paris, the whole court attending his funeral.

NICHOLAS FLAMEL.
The story of this alchymist, as handed down by tradition, and
enshrined in the pages of Lenglet da Fresnoy, is not a little
marvellous. He was born at Pontoise, of a poor but respectable
family, at the end of the thirteenth, or beginning of the fourteenth
century. Having no patrimony, he set out for Paris at an early age, to
try his fortune as a public scribe. He had received a good education,
was well skilled in the learned languages, and was an excellent
penman. He soon procured occupation as a letter-writer and copyist,

and used to sit at the corner of the Rue de Marivaux, and practise his
calling; but he hardly made profit enough to keep body and soul
together. To mend his fortunes he tried poetry; but this was a more
wretched occupation still. As a transcriber he had at least gained
bread and cheese; but his rhymes were not worth a crust. He then
tried painting with as little success; and as a last resource, began to
search for the philosopher’s stone and tell fortunes. This was a
happier idea; he soon increased in substance, and had wherewithal
to live comfortably. He therefore took unto himself his wife
Petronella, and began to save money; but continued to all outward
appearance as poor and miserable as before. In the course of a few
years, he became desperately addicted to the study of alchymy, and
thought of nothing but the philosopher’s stone, the elixir of life, and
the universal alkahest. In the year 1257, he bought by chance an old
book for two florins, which soon became his sole study. It was
written with a steel instrument upon the bark of trees, and contained
twenty-one, or as he himself always expressed it, three times seven,
leaves. The writing was very elegant and in the Latin language. Each
seventh leaf contained a picture and no writing. On the first of these
was a serpent swallowing rods; on the second, a cross with a serpent
crucified; and on the third, the representation of a desert, in the
midst of which was a fountain, with serpents crawling from side to
side. It purported to be written by no less a personage than
“Abraham, patriarch, Jew, prince, philosopher, priest, Levite, and
astrologer;” and invoked curses upon any one who should cast eyes
upon it, without being “a sacrificer or a scribe.” Nicholas Flamel
never thought it extraordinary that Abraham should have known
Latin, and was convinced that the characters on his book had been

traced by the hands of that great patriarch himself. He was at first
afraid to read it, after he became aware of the curse it contained; but
he got over that difficulty by recollecting that, although he was not a
sacrificer, he had practised as a scribe. As he read he was filled with
admiration, and found that it was a perfect treatise upon the
transmutation of metals. All the processes were clearly explained; the
vessels, the retorts, the mixtures, and the proper times and seasons
for experiment. But as ill-luck would have it, the possession of the
philosopher’s stone, or prime agent in the work, was presupposed.
This was a difficulty which was not to be got over. It was like telling a
starving man how to cook a beef-steak, instead of giving him the
money to buy one. But Nicholas did not despair, and set about
studying the hieroglyphics and allegorical representations with
which the book abounded. He soon convinced himself that it had
been one of the sacred books of the Jews, and that it was taken from
the temple of Jerusalem on its destruction by Titus. The process of
reasoning by which he arrived at this conclusion is not stated.
From some expression in the treatise, he learned that the
allegorical drawings on the fourth and fifth leaves enshrined the
secret of the philosopher’s stone, without which all the fine Latin of
the directions was utterly unavailing. He invited all the alchymists
and learned men of Paris to come and examine them, but they all
departed as wise as they came. Nobody could make any thing either
of Nicholas or his pictures; and some even went so far as to say that
his invaluable book was not worth a farthing. This was not to be
borne; and Nicholas resolved to discover the great secret by himself,
without troubling the philosophers. He found on the first page of the
fourth leaf, the picture of Mercury attacked by an old man

resembling Saturn or Time. The latter had an hour-glass on his head,
and in his hand a scythe, with which he aimed a blow at Mercury’s
feet. The reverse of the leaf represented a flower growing on a
mountain top, shaken rudely by the wind, with a blue stalk, red and
white blossoms, and leaves of pure gold. Around it were a great
number of dragons and griffins. On the first page of the fifth leaf was
a fine garden, in the midst of which was a rose-tree in full bloom,
supported against the trunk of a gigantic oak. At the foot of this there
bubbled up a fountain of milk-white water, which, forming a small
stream, flowed through the garden, and was afterwards lost in the
sands. On the second page was a king, with a sword in his hand,
superintending a number of soldiers, who, in execution of his orders,
were killing a great multitude of young children, spurning the
prayers and tears of their mothers, who tried to save them from
destruction. The blood of the children was carefully collected by
another party of soldiers, and put into a large vessel, in which two
allegorical figures of the sun and moon were bathing themselves.
For twenty-one years poor Nicholas wearied himself with the study
of these pictures, but still he could make nothing of them. His wife
Petronella at last persuaded him to find out some learned rabbi; but
there was no rabbi in Paris learned enough to be of any service to
him. The Jews met but small encouragement to fix their abode in
France, and all the chiefs of that people were located in Spain. To
Spain accordingly Nicholas Flamel repaired. He left his book in
Paris, for fear, perhaps, that he might be robbed of it on the road;
and telling his neighbours that he was going on a pilgrimage to the
shrine of St. James of Compostello, he trudged on foot towards
Madrid in search of a rabbi. He was absent two years in that country,

and made himself known to a great number of Jews, descendants of
those who had been expelled from France in the reign of Philip
Augustus. The believers in the philosopher’s stone give the following
account of his adventures: They say that at Leon he made the
acquaintance of a converted Jew, named Cauches, a very learned
physician, to whom he explained the title and nature of his little
book. The doctor was transported with joy as soon as he heard it
named, and immediately resolved to accompany Nicholas to Paris,
that he might have a sight of it. The two set out together; the doctor
on the way entertaining his companion with the history of his book,
which, if the genuine book he thought it to be, from the description
he had heard of it, was in the handwriting of Abraham himself, and
had been in the possession of personages no less distinguished than
Moses, Joshua, Solomon, and Esdras. It contained all the secrets of
alchymy and of many other sciences, and was the most valuable book
that had ever existed in this world. The doctor was himself no mean
adept, and Nicholas profited greatly by his discourse, as in the garb
of poor pilgrims they wended their way to Paris, convinced of their
power to turn every old shovel in that capital into pure gold. But,
unfortunately, when they reached Orleans, the doctor was taken
dangerously ill. Nicholas watched by his bedside, and acted the
double part of a physician and nurse to him; but he died after a few
days, lamenting with his last breath that he had not lived long
enough to see the precious volume. Nicholas rendered the last
honours to his body; and with a sorrowful heart, and not one sou in
his pocket, proceeded home to his wife Petronella. He immediately
recommenced the study of his pictures; but for two whole years he
was as far from understanding them as ever. At last, in the third year,

a glimmer of light stole over his understanding. He recalled some
expression of his friend the doctor, which had hitherto escaped his
memory, and he found that all his previous experiments had been
conducted on a wrong basis. He recommenced them now with
renewed energy, and at the end of the year had the satisfaction to see
all his toils rewarded. On the 13th January 1382, says Lenglet, he
made a projection on mercury, and had some very excellent silver.
On the 25th April following, he converted a large quantity of mercury
into gold, and the great secret was his.
Nicholas was now about eighty years of age, and still a hale and
stout old man. His friends say that by a simultaneous discovery of
the elixir of life, he found means to keep death at a distance for
another quarter of a century; and that he died in 1415, at the age of
116. In this interval he made immense quantities of gold, though to
all outward appearance he was as poor as a mouse. At an early period
of his changed fortune, he had, like a worthy man, taken counsel with
his old wife Petronella, as to the best use he could make of his
wealth. Petronella replied, that as unfortunately they had no
children, the best thing he could do, was to build hospitals and
endow churches. Nicholas thought so too, especially when he began
to find that his elixir could not keep off death, and that the grim foe
was making rapid advances upon him. He richly endowed the church
of St. Jacques de la Boucherie, near the Rue de Marivaux, where he
had all his life resided, besides seven others in different parts of the
kingdom. He also endowed fourteen hospitals, and built three
chapels.
The fame of his great wealth and his munificent benefactions soon
spread over all the country, and he was visited, among others, by the

celebrated doctors of that day, Jean Gerson, Jean de Courtecuisse,
and Pierre d’Ailli. They found him in his humble apartment, meanly
clad, and eating porridge out of an earthen vessel; and with regard to
his secret, as impenetrable as all his predecessors in alchymy. His
fame reached the ears of the king, Charles VI., who sent M. de
Cramoisi, the Master of Requests, to find out whether Nicholas had
indeed discovered the philosopher’s stone. But M. de Cramoisi took
nothing by his visit; all his attempts to sound the alchymist were
unavailing, and he returned to his royal master no wiser than he
came. It was in this year, 1414, that he lost his faithful Petronella. He
did not long survive her, but died in the following year, and was
buried with great pomp by the grateful priests of St. Jacques de la
Boucherie.
The great wealth of Nicholas Flamel is undoubted, as the records
of several churches and hospitals in France can testify. That he
practised alchymy is equally certain, as he left behind several works
upon the subject. Those who knew him well, and who were
incredulous about the philosopher’s stone, give a satisfactory
solution of the secret of his wealth. They say that he was always a
miser and a usurer; that his journey to Spain was undertaken with
very different motives from those pretended by the alchymists; that,
in fact, he went to collect debts due from Jews in that country to their
brethren in Paris, and that he charged a commission of fully cent per
cent in consideration of the difficulty of collecting and the dangers of
the road; that when he possessed thousands, he lived upon almost
nothing; and was the general money-lender, at enormous profits, to
all the dissipated young men at the French court.

Among the works written by Nicholas Flamel on the subject of
alchymy is The Philosophic Summary, a poem, reprinted in 1735, as
an appendix to the third volume of the Roman de la Rose. He also
wrote three treatises upon natural philosophy, and an alchymic
allegory, entitled Le Désir désiré. Specimens of his writing, and a facsimile of the drawings in his book of Abraham, may be seen in
Salmon’s Bibliothèque des Philosophes Chimiques. The writer of the
article Flamel in the Biographie Universelle says, that for a hundred
years after the death of Flamel, many of the adepts believed that he
was still alive, and that he would live for upwards of six hundred
years. The house he formerly occupied, at the corner of the Rue de
Marivaux, has been often taken by credulous speculators, and
ransacked from top to bottom, in the hopes that gold might be found.
A report was current in Paris, not long previous to the year 1816, that
some lodgers had found in the cellars several jars filled with a darkcoloured ponderous matter. Upon the strength of the rumour, a
believer in all the wondrous tales told of Nicholas Flamel bought the
house, and nearly pulled it to pieces in ransacking the walls and
wainscoting for hidden gold. He got nothing for his pains, however,
and had a heavy bill to pay to restore his dilapidations.

GEORGE RIPLEY.
While alchymy was thus cultivated on the continent of Europe, it
was not neglected in the isles of Britain. Since the time of Roger
Bacon, it had fascinated the imagination of many ardent men in
England. In the year 1404 an act of parliament was passed declaring
the making of gold and silver to be felony. Great alarm was felt at
that time lest any alchymist should succeed in his projects, and

perhaps bring ruin upon the state by furnishing boundless wealth to
some designing tyrant, who would make use of it to enslave his
country. This alarm appears to have soon subsided; for, in the year
1455, King Henry VI., by advice of his council and parliament,
granted four successive patents and commissions to several knights,
citizens of London, chemists, monks, mass-priests, and others, to
find out the philosopher’s stone and elixir, “to the great benefit,” said
the patent, “of the realm, and the enabling of the king to pay all the
debts of the crown in real gold and silver.” Prinn, in his Aurum
Reginæ, observes, as a note to this passage, that the king’s reason for
granting this patent to ecclesiastics was, that “they were such good
artists in transubstantiating bread and wine in the eucharist, and
therefore the more likely to be able to effect the transmutation of
baser metals into better.” No gold, of course, was ever made; and
next year the king, doubting very much of the practicability of the
thing, took further advice, and appointed a commission of ten
learned men and persons of eminence to judge and certify to him
whether the transmutation of metals were a thing practicable or no.
It does not appear whether the commission ever made any report
upon the subject.
In the succeeding reign an alchymist appeared who pretended to
have discovered the secret. This was George Ripley, the canon of
Bridlington, in Yorkshire. He studied for twenty years in the
universities of Italy, and was a great favourite with Pope Innocent
VIII., who made him one of his domestic chaplains, and master of
the ceremonies in his household. Returning to England in 1477, he
dedicated to King Edward IV. his famous work, The Compound of
Alchymy; or, the Twelve Gates leading to the Discovery of the

Philosopher’s Stone. These gates he described to be calcination,
solution, separation, conjunction, putrefaction, congelation, cibation,
sublimation, fermentation, exaltation, multiplication, and projection;
to which he might have added botheration, the most important
process of all. He was very rich, and allowed it to be believed that he
could make gold out of iron. Fuller, in his Worthies of England, says
that an English gentleman of good credit reported, that in his travels
abroad he saw a record in the island of Malta which declared that
Ripley gave yearly to the knights of that island, and of Rhodes, the
enormous sum of one hundred thousand pounds sterling to enable
them to carry on the war against the Turks. In his old age he became
an anchorite near Boston, and wrote twenty-five volumes upon the
subject of alchymy, the most important of which is the Duodecim
Portarum already mentioned. Before he died, he seems to have
acknowledged that he had mis-spent his life in this vain study, and
requested that all men, when they met with any of his books, would
burn them, or afford them no credit, as they had been written merely
from his opinion, and not from proof; and that subsequent trial had
made manifest to him that they were false and vain. 37

BASIL VALENTINE.
Germany also produced many famous alchymists in the fifteenth
century, the chief of whom are Basil Valentine, Bernard of Trèves,
and the Abbot Trithemius. Basil Valentine was born at Mayence, and
was made prior of St. Peter’s, at Erfurt, about the year 1414. It was
known, during his life, that he diligently sought the philosopher’s
stone, and that he had written some works upon the process of
transmutation. They were thought for many years to be lost, but

were, after his death, discovered enclosed in the stone-work of one of
the pillars in the Abbey. They were twenty-one in number, and are
fully set forth in the third volume of Lenglet’s History of the
Hermetic Philosophy. The alchymists asserted that heaven itself
conspired to bring to light these extraordinary works; and that the
pillar in which they were enclosed was miraculously shattered by a
thunderbolt; and that as soon as the manuscripts were liberated, the
pillar closed up again of its own accord!

BERNARD OF TREVES.
The life of this philosopher is a remarkable instance of talent and
perseverance misapplied. In the search of his chimera nothing could
daunt him. Repeated disappointment never diminished his hopes;
and from the age of fourteen to that of eighty-five he was incessantly
employed among the drugs and furnaces of his laboratory, wasting
his life with the view of prolonging it, and reducing himself to
beggary in the hopes of growing rich.
He was born at either Trèves or Padua in the year 1406. His father
is said by some to have been a physician in the latter city, and by
others to have been Count of the Marches of Trèves, and one of the
most wealthy nobles of his country. At all events, whether noble or
physician, he was a rich man, and left his son a magnificent estate. At
the age of fourteen he first became enamoured of the science of
alchymy, and read the Arabian authors in their own language. He
himself has left a most interesting record of his labours and
wanderings, from which the following particulars are chiefly
extracted. The first book which fell into his hands was that of the
Arabian philosopher Rhazes, from the reading of which he imagined

that he had discovered the means of augmenting gold a hundredfold.
For four years he worked in his laboratory, with the book of Rhazes
continually before him. At the end of that time, he found that he had
spent no less than eight hundred crowns upon his experiment, and
had got nothing but fire and smoke for his pains. He now began to
lose confidence in Rhazes, and turned to the works of Geber. He
studied him assiduously for two years; and being young, rich, and
credulous, was beset by all the alchymists of the town, who kindly
assisted him in spending his money. He did not lose his faith in
Geber, or patience with his hungry assistants, until he had lost two
thousand crowns—a very considerable sum in those days.
Among all the crowd of pretended men of science who surrounded
him, there was but one as enthusiastic and as disinterested as
himself. With this man, who was a monk of the order of St. Francis,
he contracted an intimate friendship, and spent nearly all his time.
Some obscure treatises of Rupecissa and Sacrobosco having fallen
into their hands, they were persuaded, from reading them, that
highly rectified spirits of wine was the universal alkahest, or
dissolvent, which would aid them greatly in the process of
transmutation. They rectified the alcohol thirty times, till they made
it so strong as to burst the vessels which contained it. After they had
worked three years, and spent three hundred crowns in the liquor,
they discovered that they were on the wrong track. They next tried
alum and copperas; but the great secret still escaped them. They
afterwards imagined that there was a marvellous virtue in all
excrement, especially the human, and actually employed more than
two years in experimentalising upon it with mercury, salt, and
molten lead! Again the adepts flocked around him from far and near

to aid him with their counsels. He received them all hospitably, and
divided his wealth among them so generously and unhesitatingly,
that they gave him the name of the “Good Trevisan,” by which he is
still often mentioned in works that treat on alchymy. For twelve
years he led this life, making experiments every day upon some new
substance, and praying to God night and morning that he might
discover the secret of transmutation.
In this interval he lost his friend the monk, and was joined by a
magistrate of the city of Trèves, as ardent as himself in the search.
His new acquaintance imagined that the ocean was the mother of
gold, and that sea-salt would change lead or iron into the precious
metals. Bernard resolved to try; and, transporting his laboratory to a
house on the shores of the Baltic, he worked upon salt for more than
a year, melting it, sublimating it, crystallising it, and occasionally
drinking it, for the sake of other experiments. Still the strange
enthusiast was not wholly discouraged, and his failure in one trial
only made him the more anxious to attempt another.
He was now approaching the age of fifty, and had as yet seen
nothing of the world. He therefore determined to travel through
Germany, Italy, France, and Spain. Wherever he stopped he made
inquiries whether there were any alchymists in the neighbourhood.
He invariably sought them out; and if they were poor, relieved, and if
affluent, encouraged them. At Citeaux he became acquainted with
one Geoffrey Leuvier, a monk of that place, who persuaded him that
the essence of egg-shells was a valuable ingredient. He tried,
therefore, what could be done; and was only prevented from wasting
a year or two on the experiment by the opinions of an attorney, at
Berghem, in Flanders, who said that the great secret resided in

vinegar and copperas. He was not convinced of the absurdity of this
idea until he had nearly poisoned himself. He resided in France for
about five years, when, hearing accidentally that one Master Henry,
confessor to the Emperor Frederic III., had discovered the
philosopher’s stone, he set out for Germany to pay him a visit. He
had, as usual, surrounded himself with a set of hungry dependants,
several of whom determined to accompany him. He had not heart to
refuse them, and he arrived at Vienna with five of them. Bernard sent
a polite invitation to the confessor, and gave him a sumptuous
entertainment, at which were present nearly all the alchymists of
Vienna. Master Henry frankly confessed that he had not discovered
the philosopher’s stone, but that he had all his life been employed in
searching for it, and would so continue till he found it, or died. This
was a man after Bernard’s own heart, and they vowed with each
other an eternal friendship. It was resolved, at supper, that each
alchymist present should contribute a certain sum towards raising
forty-two marks of gold, which, in five days, it was confidently
asserted by Master Henry, would increase, in his furnace, fivefold.
Bernard, being the richest man, contributed the lion’s share, ten
marks of gold, Master Henry five, and the others one or two a-piece,
except the dependants of Bernard, who were obliged to borrow their
quota from their patron. The grand experiment was duly made; the
golden marks were put into a crucible, with a quantity of salt,
copperas, aquafortis, egg-shells, mercury, lead, and dung. The
alchymists watched this precious mess with intense interest,
expecting that it would agglomerate into one lump of pure gold. At
the end of three weeks they gave up the trial, upon some excuse that
the crucible was not strong enough, or that some necessary

ingredient was wanting. Whether any thief had put his hands into
the crucible is not known, but it is alleged that the gold found therein
at the close of the experiment was worth only sixteen marks, instead
of the forty-two, which were put there at the beginning.
Bernard, though he made no gold at Vienna, made away with a
very considerable quantity. He felt the loss so acutely, that he vowed
to think no more of the philosopher’s stone. This wise resolution he
kept for two months; but he was miserable. He was in the condition
of the gambler, who cannot resist the fascination of the game while
he has a coin remaining, but plays on with the hope of retrieving
former losses, till hope forsakes him, and he can live no longer. He
returned once more to his beloved crucibles, and resolved to
prosecute his journey in search of a philosopher who had discovered
the secret, and would communicate it to so zealous and persevering
an adept as himself. From Vienna he travelled to Rome, and from
Rome to Madrid. Taking ship at Gibraltar, he proceeded to Messina;
from Messina to Cyprus; from Cyprus to Greece; from Greece to
Constantinople; and thence into Egypt, Palestine, and Persia. These
wanderings occupied him about eight years. From Persia he made
his way back to Messina, and from thence into France. He afterwards
passed over into England, still in search of his great chimera; and
this occupied four years more of his life. He was now growing both
old and poor; for he was sixty-two years of age, and had been obliged
to sell a great portion of his patrimony to provide for his expenses.
His journey to Persia had cost upwards of thirteen thousand crowns,
about one-half of which had been fairly melted in his all-devouring
furnaces; the other half was lavished upon the sycophants that he
made it his business to search out in every town he stopped at.

On his return to Trèves he found, to his sorrow, that, if not an
actual beggar, he was not much better. His relatives looked upon him
as a madman, and refused even to see him. Too proud to ask for
favours from any one, and still confident that, some day or other, he
would be the possessor of unbounded wealth, he made up his mind
to retire to the island of Rhodes, where he might, in the mean time,
hide his poverty from the eyes of the world. Here he might have lived
unknown and happy; but, as ill luck would have it, he fell in with a
monk as mad as himself upon the subject of transmutation. They
were, however, both so poor that they could not afford to buy the
proper materials to work with. They kept up each other’s spirits by
learned discourses on the hermetic philosophy, and in the reading of
all the great authors who had written upon the subject. Thus did they
nurse their folly, as the good wife of Tam O’Shanter did her wrath,
“to keep it warm.” After Bernard had resided about a year in Rhodes,
a merchant, who knew his family, advanced him the sum of eight
thousand florins, upon the security of the last-remaining acres of his
formerly large estate. Once more provided with funds, he
recommenced his labours with all the zeal and enthusiasm of a young
man. For three years he hardly stepped out of his laboratory: he ate
there, and slept there, and did not even give himself time to wash his
hands and clean his beard, so intense was his application. It is
melancholy to think that such wonderful perseverance should have
been wasted in so vain a pursuit, and that energies so unconquerable
should have had no worthier field to strive in. Even when he had
fumed away his last coin, and had nothing left in prospective to keep
his old age from starvation, hope never forsook him. He still
dreamed of ultimate success, and sat down a grey-headed man of

eighty, to read over all the authors on the hermetic mysteries, from
Geber to his own day, lest he should have misunderstood some
process, which it was not yet too late to recommence. The alchymists
say, that he succeeded at last, and discovered the secret of
transmutation in his eighty-second year. They add that he lived three
years afterwards to enjoy his wealth. He lived, it is true, to this great
age, and made a valuable discovery—more valuable than gold or
gems. He learned, as he himself informs us, just before he had
attained his eighty-third year, that the great secret of philosophy was
contentment with our lot. Happy would it have been for him if he
had discovered it sooner, and before he became decrepit, a beggar,
and an exile!
He died at Rhodes, in the year 1490, and all the alchymists of
Europe sang elegies over him, and sounded his praise as the “good
Trevisan.” He wrote several treatises upon his chimera, the chief of
which are, the Book of Chemistry, the Verbum dimissum, and an
essay De Natura Ovi.

TRITHEMIUS.
The name of this eminent man has become famous in the annals of
alchymy, although he did but little to gain so questionable an
honour. He was born in the year 1462, at the village of Trittheim, in
the electorate of Trèves. His father was John Heidenberg, a vinegrower, in easy circumstances, who, dying when his son was but
seven years old, left him to the care of his mother. The latter married
again very shortly afterwards, and neglected the poor boy, the
offspring of her first marriage. At the age of fifteen he did not even
know his letters, and was, besides, half starved, and otherwise ill-

treated by his step-father; but the love of knowledge germinated in
the breast of the unfortunate youth, and he learned to read at the
house of a neighbour. His father-in-law set him to work in the
vineyards, and thus occupied all his days; but the nights were his
own. He often stole out unheeded, when all the household were fast
asleep, poring over his studies in the fields, by the light of the moon;
and thus taught himself Latin and the rudiments of Greek. He was
subjected to so much ill-usage at home, in consequence of this love of
study, that he determined to leave it. Demanding the patrimony
which his father had left him, he proceeded to Trèves; and assuming
the name of Trithemius, from that of his native village of Trittheim,
lived there for some months under the tuition of eminent masters, by
whom he was prepared for the university. At the age of twenty, he
took it into his head that he should like to see his mother once more;
and he set out on foot from the distant university for that purpose.
On his arrival near Spannheim, late in the evening of a gloomy
winter’s day, it came on to snow so thickly, that he could not proceed
onwards to the town. He therefore took refuge for the night in a
neighbouring monastery; but the storm continued several days, the
roads became impassable, and the hospitable monks would not hear
of his departure. He was so pleased with them and their manner of
life, that he suddenly resolved to fix his abode among them, and
renounce the world. They were no less pleased with him, and gladly
received him as a brother. In the course of two years, although still so
young, he was unanimously elected their abbot. The financial affairs
of the establishment had been greatly neglected, the walls of the
building were falling into ruin, and every thing was in disorder.
Trithemius, by his good management and regularity, introduced a

reform in every branch of expenditure. The monastery was repaired,
and a yearly surplus, instead of a deficiency, rewarded him for his
pains. He did not like to see the monks idle, or occupied solely
between prayers for their business, and chess for their relaxation.
He, therefore, set them to work to copy the writings of eminent
authors. They laboured so assiduously, that, in the course of a few
years, their library, which had contained only about forty volumes,
was enriched with several hundred valuable manuscripts, comprising
many of the classical Latin authors, besides the works of the early
fathers, and the principal historians, and philosophers of more
modern date. He retained the dignity of Abbot of Spannheim for
twenty-one years, when the monks, tired of the severe discipline he
maintained, revolted against him, and chose another abbot in his
place. He was afterwards made Abbot of St. James, in Wurzburg,
where he died in 1516.
During his learned leisure at Spannheim, he wrote several works
upon the occult sciences, the chief of which are an essay on
geomancy, or divination by means of lines and circles on the ground;
another upon sorcery; a third upon alchymy; and a fourth upon the
government of the world by its presiding angels, which was
translated into English, and published by the famous William Lilly in
1647.
It has been alleged by the believers in the possibility of
transmutation, that the prosperity of the abbey of Spannheim, while
under his superintendence, was owing more to the philosopher’s
stone than to wise economy. Trithemius, in common with many
other learned men, has been accused of magic; and a marvellous
story is told of his having raised from the grave the form of Mary of

Burgundy, at the intercession of her widowed husband, the Emperor
Maximilian. His work on steganographia, or cabalistic writing, was
denounced to the Count Palatine, Frederic II., as magical and
devilish; and it was by him taken from the shelves of his library and
thrown into the fire. Trithemius is said to be the first writer who
makes mention of the wonderful story of the devil and Dr. Faustus,
the truth of which he firmly believed. He also recounts the freaks of a
spirit named Hudekin, by whom he was at times tormented. 38

THE MARECHAL DE RAYS.
One of the greatest encouragers of alchymy in the fifteenth century
was Gilles de Laval, Lord of Rays and a Marshal of France. His name
and deeds are little known; but in the annals of crime and folly, they
might claim the highest and worst pre-eminence. Fiction has never
invented any thing wilder or more horrible than his career; and were
not the details but too well authenticated by legal and other
documents which admit no doubt, the lover of romance might easily
imagine they were drawn to please him from the stores of the prolific
brain, and not from the page of history.
He was born about the year 1420, of one of the noblest families of
Brittany. His father dying when Gilles had attained his twentieth
year, he came into uncontrolled possession, at that early age, of a
fortune which the monarchs of France might have envied him. He
was a near kinsman of the Montmorencys, the Roncys, and the
Craons; possessed fifteen princely domains, and had an annual
revenue of about three hundred thousand livres. Besides this, he was
handsome, learned, and brave. He distinguished himself greatly in
the wars of Charles VII., and was rewarded by that monarch with the

dignity of a marshal of France. But he was extravagant and
magnificent in his style of living, and accustomed from his earliest
years to the gratification of every wish and passion; and this, at last,
led him from vice to vice and from crime to crime, till a blacker name
than his is not to be found in any record of human iniquity.
In his castle of Champtocé he lived with all the splendour of an
eastern caliph. He kept up a troop of two hundred horsemen to
accompany him wherever he went; and his excursions for the
purposes of hawking and hunting were the wonder of all the country
around, so magnificent were the caparisons of his steeds and the
dresses of his retainers. Day and night his castle was open all the
year round to comers of every degree. He made it a rule to regale
even the poorest beggar with wine and hippocrass. Every day an ox
was roasted whole in his spacious kitchens, besides sheep, pigs, and
poultry sufficient to feed five hundred persons. He was equally
magnificent in his devotions. His private chapel at Champtocé was
the most beautiful in France, and far surpassed any of those in the
richly-endowed cathedrals of Notre Dame in Paris, of Amiens, of
Beauvais, or of Rouen. It was hung with cloth of gold and rich velvet.
All the chandeliers were of pure gold curiously inlaid with silver. The
great crucifix over the altar was of solid silver, and the chalices and
incense-burners were of pure gold. He had besides a fine organ,
which he caused to be carried from one castle to another on the
shoulders of six men, whenever he changed his residence. He kept up
a choir of twenty-five young children of both sexes, who were
instructed in singing by the first musicians of the day. The master of
his chapel he called a bishop, who had under him his deans, arch-

deacons, and vicars, each receiving great salaries; the bishop four
hundred crowns a year, and the rest in proportion.
He also maintained a whole troop of players, including ten dancing
girls and as many ballad-singers, besides morris-dancers, jugglers,
and mountebanks of every description. The theatre on which they
performed was fitted up without any regard to expense, and they
played mysteries or danced the morris-dance every evening for the
amusement of himself and household, and such strangers as were
sharing his prodigal hospitality.
At the age of twenty-three he married Catherine, the wealthy
heiress of the house of Touars, for whom he refurnished his castle at
an expense of a hundred thousand crowns. His marriage was the
signal for new extravagance, and he launched out more madly than
ever he had done before; sending for fine singers or celebrated
dancers from foreign countries to amuse him and his spouse; and
instituting tilts and tournaments in his great court-yard almost every
week for all the knights and nobles of the province of Brittany. The
Duke of Brittany’s court was not half so splendid as that of the
Maréchal de Rays. His utter disregard for wealth was so well known,
that he was made to pay three times its value for every thing he
purchased. His castle was filled with needy parasites and panderers
to his pleasures, amongst whom he lavished rewards with an
unsparing hand. But the ordinary round of sensual gratification
ceased at last to afford him delight; he was observed to be more
abstemious in the pleasures of the table, and to neglect the beauteous
dancing girls who used formerly to occupy so much of his attention.
He was sometimes gloomy and reserved, and there was an unnatural
wildness in his eye which gave indications of incipient madness. Still

his discourse was as reasonable as ever, his urbanity to the guests
that flocked from far and near to Champtocé suffered no diminution;
and learned priests, when they conversed with him, thought to
themselves that few of the nobles of France were so well informed as
Gilles de Laval. But dark rumours spread gradually over the country;
murder, and, if possible, still more atrocious deeds were hinted at;
and it was remarked that many young children of both sexes
suddenly disappeared, and were never afterwards heard of. One or
two had been traced to the castle of Champtocé, and had never been
seen to leave it; but no one dared to accuse openly so powerful a man
as the Maréchal de Rays. Whenever the subject of the lost children
was mentioned in his presence, he manifested the greatest
astonishment at the mystery which involved their fate, and
indignation against those who might be guilty of kidnapping them.
Still the world was not wholly deceived; his name became as
formidable to young children as that of the devouring ogre in fairy
tales, and they were taught to go miles round, rather than pass under
the turrets of Champtocé.
In the course of a few years, the reckless extravagance of the
marshal drained him of all his funds, and he was obliged to put up
some of his estates for sale. The Duke of Brittany entered into a
treaty with him for the valuable seignory of Ingrande; but the heirs of
Gilles implored the interference of Charles VII. to stay the sale.
Charles immediately issued an edict, which was confirmed by the
provincial Parliament of Brittany, forbidding him to alienate his
paternal estates. Gilles had no alternative but to submit. He had
nothing to support his extravagance but his allowance as a marshal
of France, which did not cover the one-tenth of his expenses. A man

of his habits and character could not retrench his wasteful
expenditure, and live reasonably; he could not dismiss without a
pang his horsemen, his jesters, his morris-dancers, his choristers,
and his parasites, or confine his hospitality to those who really
needed it. Notwithstanding his diminished resources, he resolved to
live as he had lived before, and turn alchymist, that he might make
gold out of iron, and be still the wealthiest and most magnificent
among the nobles of Brittany.
In pursuance of this determination, he sent to Paris, Italy,
Germany, and Spain, inviting all the adepts in the science to visit him
at Champtocé. The messengers he despatched on this mission were
two of his most needy and unprincipled dependants, Gilles de Sillé
and Roger de Bricqueville. The latter, the obsequious panderer to his
most secret and abominable pleasures, he had entrusted with the
education of his motherless daughter, a child but five years of age,
with permission that he might marry her at the proper time to any
person he chose, or to himself if he liked it better. This man entered
into the new plans of his master with great zeal, and introduced to
him one Prelati, an alchymist of Padua, and a physician of Poitou,
who was addicted to the same pursuits.
The marshal caused a splendid laboratory to be fitted up for them,
and the three commenced the search for the philosopher’s stone.
They were soon afterwards joined by another pretended philosopher,
named Anthony Palermo, who aided in their operations for upwards
of a year. They all fared sumptuously at the marshal’s expense,
draining him of the ready money he possessed, and leading him on
from day to day with the hope that they would succeed in the object
of their search. From time to time new aspirants from the remotest

parts of Europe arrived at his castle, and for months he had upwards
of twenty alchymists at work, trying to transmute copper into gold;
and wasting the gold which was still his own in drugs and elixirs.
But the Lord of Rays was not a man to abide patiently their
lingering processes. Pleased with their comfortable quarters, they
jogged on from day to day, and would have done so for years, had
they been permitted. But he suddenly dismissed them all, with the
exception of the Italian Prelati, and the physician of Poitou. These he
retained to aid him to discover the secret of the philosopher’s stone
by a bolder method. The Poitousan had persuaded him that the devil
was the great depository of that and all other secrets, and that he
would raise him before Gilles, who might enter into any contract he
pleased with him. Gilles expressed his readiness, and promised to
give the devil any thing but his soul, or do any deed that the archenemy might impose upon him. Attended solely by the physician, he
proceeded at midnight to a wild-looking place in a neighbouring
forest; the physician drew a magic circle around them on the sward,
and muttered for half an hour an invocation to the evil spirit to arise
at his bidding, and disclose the secrets of alchymy. Gilles looked on
with intense interest, and expected every moment to see the earth
open, and deliver to his gaze the great enemy of mankind. At last the
eyes of the physician became fixed, his hair stood on end, and he
spoke, as if addressing the fiend. But Gilles saw nothing except his
companion. At last the physician fell down on the sward as if
insensible. Gilles looked calmly on to see the end. After a few
minutes the physician arose, and asked him if he had not seen how
angry the devil looked? Gilles replied that he had seen nothing; upon
which his companion informed him that Beelzebub had appeared in

the form of a wild leopard, growled at him savagely, and said
nothing; and that the reason why the marshal had neither seen nor
heard him was, that he hesitated in his own mind as to devoting
himself entirely to the service. De Rays owned that he had indeed
misgivings, and inquired what was to be done to make the devil
speak out, and unfold his secret? The physician replied, that some
person must go to Spain and Africa to collect certain herbs which
only grew in those countries, and offered to go himself, if De Rays
would provide the necessary funds. De Rays at once consented; and
the physician set out on the following day with all the gold that his
dupe could spare him. The marshal never saw his face again.
But the eager Lord of Champtocé could not rest. Gold was
necessary for his pleasures; and unless by supernatural aid, he had
no means of procuring any further supplies. The physician was
hardly twenty leagues on his journey, before Gilles resolved to make
another effort to force the devil to divulge the art of gold-making. He
went out alone for that purpose; but all his conjurations were of no
effect. Beelzebub was obstinate, and would not appear. Determined
to conquer him if he could, he unbosomed himself to the Italian
alchymist, Prelati. The latter offered to undertake the business, upon
condition that De Rays did not interfere in the conjurations, and
consented besides to furnish him with all the charms and talismans
that might be required. He was further to open a vein in his arm, and
sign with his blood a contract that “he would work the devil’s will in
all things,” and offer up to him a sacrifice of the heart, lungs, hands,
eyes, and blood of a young child. The grasping monomaniac made no
hesitation, but agreed at once to the disgusting terms proposed to
him. On the following night, Prelati went out alone, and after having

been absent for three or four hours, returned to Gilles, who sat
anxiously awaiting him. Prelati then informed him that he had seen
the devil in the shape of a handsome youth of twenty. He further
said, that the devil desired to be called Barron in all future
invocations; and had shewn him a great number of ingots of pure
gold, buried under a large oak in the neighbouring forest, all of
which, and as many more as he desired, should become the property
of the Maréchal de Rays if he remained firm, and broke no condition
of the contract. Prelati further shewed him a small casket of black
dust, which would turn iron into gold; but as the process was very
troublesome, he advised that they should be contented with the
ingots they found under the oak tree, and which would more than
supply all the wants that the most extravagant imagination could
desire. They were not, however, to attempt to look for the gold till a
period of seven times seven weeks, or they would find nothing but
slates and stones for their pains. Gilles expressed the utmost chagrin
and disappointment, and at once said that he could not wait for so
long a period; if the devil were not more, prompt Prelati might tell
him that the Maréchal de Rays was not to be trifled with, and would
decline all further communication with him. Prelati at last persuaded
him to wait seven times seven days. They then went at midnight with
picks and shovels to dig up the ground under the oak, where they
found nothing to reward them but a great quantity of slates, marked
with hieroglyphics. It was now Prelati’s turn to be angry; and he
loudly swore that the devil was nothing but a liar and a cheat. The
marshal joined cordially in the opinion, but was easily persuaded by
the cunning Italian to make one more trial. He promised at the same
time that he would endeavour on the following night to discover the

reason why the devil had broken his word. He went out alone
accordingly, and on his return informed his patron that he had seen
Barron, who was exceedingly angry that they had not waited the
proper time ere they looked for the ingots. Barron had also said, that
the Maréchal de Rays could hardly expect any favours from him, at a
time when he must know that he had been meditating a pilgrimage
to the Holy Land to make atonement for his sins. The Italian had
doubtless surmised this from some incautious expression of his
patron, for de Rays frankly confessed that there were times when,
sick of the world and all its pomps and vanities, he thought of
devoting himself to the service of God.
In this manner the Italian lured on from month to month his
credulous and guilty patron, extracting from him all the valuables he
possessed, and only waiting a favourable opportunity to decamp with
his plunder. But the day of retribution was at hand for both. Young
girls and boys continued to disappear in the most mysterious
manner; and the rumours against the owner of Champtocé grew so
loud and distinct, that the Church was compelled to interfere.
Representations were made by the Bishop of Nantes to the Duke of
Brittany, that it would be a public scandal if the accusations against
the Maréchal de Rays were not inquired into. He was arrested
accordingly in his own castle, along with his accomplice Prelati, and
thrown into a dungeon at Nantes to await his trial.
The judges appointed to try him were the Bishop of Nantes
Chancellor of Brittany, the Vicar of the Inquisition in France, and the
celebrated Pierre l’Hôpital, the President of the provincial
Parliament. The offences laid to his charge were, sorcery, sodomy,
and murder. Gilles, on the first day of his trial, conducted himself

with the utmost insolence. He braved the judges on the judgmentseat, calling them simoniacs and persons of impure life, and said he
would rather be hanged by the neck like a dog without trial, than
plead either guilty or not guilty before such contemptible miscreants.
But his confidence forsook him as the trial proceeded, and he was
found guilty on the clearest evidence of all the crimes laid to his
charge. It was proved that he took insane pleasure in stabbing the
victims of his lust and in observing the quivering of their flesh, and
the fading lustre of their eyes as they expired. The confession of
Prelati first made the judges acquainted with this horrid madness,
and Gilles himself confirmed it before his death. Nearly a hundred
children of the villagers around his two castles of Champtocé and
Machecoue, had been missed within three years, the greater part, if
not all, of whom were immolated to the lust or the cupidity of this
monster. He imagined that he thus made the devil his friend, and
that his recompense would be the secret of the philosopher’s stone.
Gilles and Prelati were both condemned to be burned alive. At the
place of execution they assumed the air of penitence and religion.
Gilles tenderly embraced Prelati, saying, “Farewell, friend Francis!
In this world we shall never meet again; but let us place our hopes
in God; we shall see each other in Paradise.” Out of consideration
for his high rank and connexions, the punishment of the marshal was
so far mitigated, that he was not burned alive like Prelati. He was
first strangled, and then thrown into the flames: his body, when half
consumed, was given over to his relatives for interment, while that of
the Italian was burned to ashes, and then scattered to the winds. 39

JACQUES CŒUR.

This remarkable pretender to the secret of the philosopher’s stone
was contemporary with the last mentioned. He was a great
personage at the court of Charles VII., and in the events of his reign
played a prominent part. From a very humble origin he rose to the
highest honours of the state, and amassed enormous wealth by
peculation and plunder of the country which he should have served.
It was to hide his delinquencies in this respect, and to divert
attention from the real source of his riches, that he boasted of having
discovered the art of transmuting the inferior metals into gold and
silver.
His father was a goldsmith in the city of Bourges; but so reduced in
circumstances towards the latter years of his life, that he was unable
to pay the necessary fees to procure his son’s admission into the
guild. Young Jacques became, however, a workman in the Royal
Mint of Bourges, in 1428, and behaved himself so well, and shewed
so much knowledge of metallurgy, that he attained rapid promotion
in that establishment. He had also the good fortune to make the
acquaintance of the fair Agnes Sorel, by whom he was patronised and
much esteemed. Jacques had now three things in his favour—ability,
perseverance, and the countenance of the king’s mistress. Many a
man succeeds with but one of these to help him forward; and it
would have been strange indeed if Jacques Cœur, who had them all,
should have languished in obscurity. While still a young man, he was
made master of the mint, in which he had been a journeyman, and
installed at the same time into the vacant office of grand treasurer of
the royal household.
He possessed an extensive knowledge of finance, and turned it
wonderfully to his own advantage, as soon as he became entrusted

with extensive funds. He speculated in articles of the first necessity,
and made himself popular by buying up grain, honey, wines, and
other produce, till there was a scarcity, when he sold it again at
enormous profit. Strong in the royal favour, he did not hesitate to
oppress the poor by continual acts of forestalling and monopoly. As
there is no enemy so bitter as the estranged friend, so of all the
tyrants and tramplers upon the poor, there is none so fierce and
reckless as the upstart that sprang from their ranks. The offensive
pride of Jacques Cœur to his inferiors was the theme of indignant
reproach in his own city, and his cringing humility to those above
him was as much an object of contempt to the aristocrats into whose
society he thrust himself. But Jacques did not care for the former,
and to the latter he was blind. He continued his career till he became
the richest man in France, and so useful to the king that no
important enterprise was set on foot until he had been consulted. He
was sent, in 1446, on an embassy to Genoa, and in the following year
to Pope Nicholas V. In both these missions he acquitted himself to
the satisfaction of his sovereign, and was rewarded with a lucrative
appointment, in addition to those which he already held.
In the year 1449, the English in Normandy, deprived of their great
general, the Duke of Bedford, broke the truce with the French king,
and took possession of a small town belonging to the Duke of
Brittany. This was the signal for the recommencement of a war, in
which the French regained possession of nearly the whole province.
The money for this war was advanced, for the most part, by Jacques
Cœur. When Rouen yielded to the French, and Charles made his
triumphal entry into that city, accompanied by Dunois and his most
famous generals, Jacques was among the most brilliant of his

cortège. His chariot and horses vied with those of the king in the
magnificence of their trappings; and his enemies said of him that he
publicly boasted that he alone had driven out the English, and that
the valour of the troops would have been nothing without his gold.
Dunois appears, also, to have been partly of the same opinion.
Without disparaging the courage of the army, he acknowledged the
utility of the able financier, by whose means they had been fed and
paid, and constantly afforded him his powerful protection.
When peace returned, Jacques again devoted himself to
commerce, and fitted up several galleys to trade with the Genoese.
He also bought large estates in various parts of France; the chief of
which were the baronies of St. Fargeau, Meneton, Salone,
Maubranche, Meaune, St. Gerant de Vaux, and St. Aon de Boissy; the
earldoms or counties of La Palisse, Champignelle, Beaumont, and
Villeneuve la Genêt, and the marquisate of Toucy. He also procured
for his son, Jean Cœur, who had chosen the Church for his
profession, a post no less distinguished than that of Archbishop of
Bourges.
Every body said that so much wealth could not have been honestly
acquired; and both rich and poor longed for the day that should
humble the pride of the man, whom the one class regarded as an
upstart and the other as an oppressor. Jacques was somewhat
alarmed at the rumours that were afloat respecting him, and of dark
hints that he had debased the coin of the realm and forged the king’s
seal to an important document, by which he had defrauded the state
of very considerable sums. To silence these rumours, he invited
many alchymists from foreign countries to reside with him, and
circulated a counter rumour, that he had discovered the secret of the

philosopher’s stone. He also built a magnificent house in his native
city, over the entrance of which he caused to be sculptured the
emblems of that science. Some time afterwards he built another, no
less splendid, at Montpellier, which he inscribed in a similar manner.
He also wrote a treatise upon the hermetic philosophy, in which he
pretended that he knew the secret of transmuting metals.

HOUSE OF JACQUES CŒUR, BOURGES.

But all these attempts to disguise his numerous acts of peculation
proved unavailing; and he was arrested in 1452, and brought to trial
on several charges. Upon one only, which the malice of his enemies
invented to ruin him, was he acquitted; which was, that he had been
accessory to the death, by poison, of his kind patroness, Agnes Sorel.
Upon the others he was found guilty, and sentenced to be banished
the kingdom, and to pay the enormous fine of four hundred
thousand crowns. It was proved that he had forged the king’s seal;
that in his capacity of master of the mint of Bourges, he had debased,
to a very great extent, the gold and silver coin of the realm; and that
he had not hesitated to supply the Turks with arms and money to
enable them to carry on war against their Christian neighbours, for
which service he had received the most munificent recompenses.

Charles VII. was deeply grieved at his condemnation, and believed to
the last that he was innocent. By his means the fine was reduced
within a sum which Jacques Cœur could pay. After remaining for
some time in prison, he was liberated, and left France with a large
sum of money, part of which, it was alleged, was secretly paid him by
Charles out of the produce of his confiscated estates. He retired to
Cyprus, where he died about 1460, the richest and most conspicuous
personage of the island.
The writers upon alchymy all claim Jacques Cœur as a member of
their fraternity, and treat as false and libellous the more rational
explanation of his wealth which the records of his trial afford. Pierre
Borel, in his Antiquités Gauloises, maintains the opinion that
Jacques was an honest man, and that he made his gold out of lead
and copper by means of the philosopher’s stone. The alchymic adepts
in general were of the same opinion; but they found it difficult to
persuade even his contemporaries of the fact. Posterity is still less
likely to believe it.

INFERIOR ADEPTS OF THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES.
Many other pretenders to the secrets of the philosopher’s stone
appeared in every country in Europe, during the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries. The possibility of transmutation was so generally
admitted, that every chemist was more or less an alchymist.
Germany, Holland, Italy, Spain, Poland, France, and England
produced thousands of obscure adepts, who supported themselves,
in the pursuit of their chimera, by the more profitable resources of
astrology and divination. The monarchs of Europe were no less
persuaded than their subjects of the possibility of discovering the

philosopher’s stone. Henry VI. and Edward IV. of England
encouraged alchymy. In Germany, the Emperors Maximilian,
Rudolph, and Frederic II. devoted much of their attention to it; and
every inferior potentate within their dominions imitated their
example. It was a common practice in Germany, among the nobles
and petty sovereigns, to invite an alchymist to take up his residence
among them, that they might confine him in a dungeon till he made
gold enough to pay millions for his ransom. Many poor wretches
suffered perpetual imprisonment in consequence. A similar fate
appears to have been intended by Edward II. for Raymond Lulli,
who, upon the pretence that he was thereby honoured, was
accommodated with apartments in the Tower of London. He found
out in time the trick that was about to be played him, and managed
to make his escape; some of his biographers say, by jumping into the
Thames, and swimming to a vessel that lay waiting to receive him. In
the sixteenth century, the same system was pursued, as will be shewn
more fully in the life of Seton the Cosmopolite.
The following is a catalogue of the chief authors upon alchymy,
who flourished during this epoch, and whose lives and adventures
are either unknown or are unworthy of more detailed notice. John
Dowston, an Englishman, lived in 1315, and wrote two treatises on
the philosopher’s stone. Richard, or, as some call him, Robert, also
an Englishman, lived in 1330, and wrote a work entitled
Correctorium Alchymiæ, which was much esteemed till the time of
Paracelsus. In the same year lived Peter of Lombardy, who wrote
what he called a Complete Treatise upon the Hermetic Science, an
abridgment of which was afterwards published by Lacini, a monk of
Calabria. In 1330 the most famous alchymist of Paris was one

Odomare, whose work, De Practica Magistri, was for a long time a
hand-book among the brethren of the science. John de Rupecissa, a
French monk of the order of St. Francis, flourished in 1357, and
pretended to be a prophet as well as an alchymist. Some of his
prophecies were so disagreeable to Pope Innocent VI., that the
pontiff determined to put a stop to them, by locking up the prophet
in the dungeons of the Vatican. It is generally believed that he died
there, though there is no evidence of the fact. His chief works are, the
Book of Light, the Five Essences, the Heaven of Philosophers, and
his grand work, De Confectione Lapidis. He was not thought a
shining light among the adepts. Ortholani was another pretender, of
whom nothing is known, but that he exercised the arts of alchymy
and astrology at Paris, shortly before the time of Nicholas Flamel.
His work on the practice of alchymy was written in that city in 1358.
Isaac of Holland wrote, it is supposed, about this time; and his son
also devoted himself to the science. Nothing worth repeating is
known of their lives. Boerhaave speaks with commendation of many
passages in their works, and Paracelsus esteemed them highly: the
chief are, De Triplici Ordine Elixiris et Lapidis Theoria, printed at
Berne in 1608; and Mineralia Opera, seu de Lapide Philosophico,
printed at Middleburg in 1600. They also wrote eight other works
upon the same subject. Koffstky, a Pole, wrote an alchymical treatise,
entitled The Tincture of Minerals, about the year 1488. In this list of
authors a royal name must not be forgotten. Charles VI. of France,
one of the most credulous princes of the day, whose court absolutely
swarmed with alchymists, conjurers, astrologers, and quacks of every
description, made several attempts to discover the philosopher’s
stone, and thought he knew so much about it, that he determined to

enlighten the world with a treatise; it is called the Royal Work of
Charles VI. of France, and the Treasure of Philosophy. It is said to
be the original from which Nicholas Flamel took the idea of his Désir
désiré. Lenglet du Fresnoy says it is very allegorical, and utterly
incomprehensible. For a more complete list of the hermetic
philosophers of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the reader is
referred to the third volume of Lenglet’s History, already quoted.

PROGRESS OF THE INFATUATION DURING THE
SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES.—
PRESENT STATE OF THE SCIENCE.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the search for the
philosopher’s stone was continued by thousands of the enthusiastic
and the credulous; but a great change was introduced during this
period. The eminent men who devoted themselves to the study
totally changed its aspect, and referred to the possession of their
wondrous stone and elixir, not only the conversion of the base into
the precious metals, but the solution of all the difficulties of other
sciences. They pretended that by its means man would be brought
into closer communion with his Maker; that disease and sorrow
would be banished from the world; and that “the millions of spiritual
beings who walk the earth unseen” would be rendered visible, and
become the friends, companions, and instructors of mankind. In the
seventeenth century more especially, these poetical and fantastic
doctrines excited the notice of Europe; and from Germany, where
they had been first disseminated by Rosencreutz, spread into France

and England, and ran away with the sound judgment of many clever
but too enthusiastic searchers for the truth. Paracelsus, Dee, and
many others of less note, were captivated by the grace and beauty of
the new mythology, which was arising to adorn the literature of
Europe. Most of the alchymists of the sixteenth century, although
ignorant of the Rosicrucians as a sect, were, in some degree,
tinctured with their fanciful tenets: but before we speak more fully of
these poetical visionaries, it will be necessary to resume the history
of the hermetic folly, and trace the gradual change that stole over the
dreams of the adepts. It will be seen that the infatuation increased
rather than diminished as the world grew older.

AUGURELLO.
Among the alchymists who were born in the fifteenth, and
distinguished themselves in the sixteenth century, the first in point
of date is John Aurelio Augurello. He was born at Rimini in 1441, and
became professor of the belles lettres at Venice and Trevisa. He was
early convinced of the truth of the hermetic science, and used to pray
to God that he might be happy enough to discover the philosopher’s
stone. He was continually surrounded by the paraphernalia of
chemistry, and expended all his wealth in the purchase of drugs and
metals. He was also a poet, but of less merit than pretensions. His
Chrysopeia, in which he pretended to teach the art of making gold,
he dedicated to Pope Leo X., in the hope that the pontiff would
reward him handsomely for the compliment; but the pope was too
good a judge of poetry to be pleased with the worse than mediocrity
of his poem, and too good a philosopher to approve of the strange
doctrines which it inculcated; he was, therefore, far from gratified at

the dedication. It is said, that when Augurello applied to him for a
reward, the pope, with great ceremony and much apparent kindness
and cordiality, drew an empty purse from his pocket, and presented
it to the alchymist, saying, that since he was able to make gold, the
most appropriate present that could be made him, was a purse to put
it in. This scurvy reward was all that the poor alchymist ever got
either for his poetry or his alchymy. He died in a state of extreme
poverty, in the eighty-third year of his age.

CORNELIUS AGRIPPA.
This alchymist has left a distinguished reputation. The most
extraordinary tales were told and believed of his powers. He could
turn iron into gold by his mere word. All the spirits of the air and
demons of the earth were under his command, and bound to obey
him in everything. He could raise from the dead the forms of the
great men of other days, and make them appear, “in their habit as
they lived,” to the gaze of the curious who had courage enough to
abide their presence.

CORNELIUS AGRIPPA.

He was born at Cologne in 1486, and began at an early age the
study of chemistry and philosophy. By some means or other, which
have never been very clearly explained, he managed to impress his
contemporaries with a great idea of his wonderful attainments. At
the early age of twenty, so great was his reputation as an alchymist,
that the principal adepts of Paris wrote to Cologne, inviting him to
settle in France, and aid them with his experience in discovering the
philosopher’s stone. Honours poured upon him in thick succession;
and he was highly esteemed by all the learned men of his time.
Melancthon speaks of him with respect and commendation. Erasmus
also bears testimony in his favour; and the general voice of his age
proclaimed him a light of literature and an ornament to philosophy.
Some men, by dint of excessive egotism, manage to persuade their
contemporaries that they are very great men indeed: they publish
their acquirements so loudly in people’s ears, and keep up their own
praises so incessantly, that the world’s applause is actually taken by
storm. Such seems to have been the case with Agrippa. He called
himself a sublime theologian, an excellent jurisconsult, an able
physician, a great philosopher, and a successful alchymist. The world
at last took him at his word; and thought that a man who talked so
big, must have some merit to recommend him,—that it was, indeed, a
great trumpet which sounded so obstreperous a blast. He was made
secretary to the Emperor Maximilian, who conferred upon him the
title of chevalier, and gave him the honorary command of a regiment.
He afterwards became professor of Hebrew and the belles lettres at
the University of Dôle, in France; but quarrelling with the Franciscan
monks upon some knotty points of divinity, he was obliged to quit
the town. He took refuge in London, where he taught Hebrew and

cast nativities, for about a year. From London he proceeded to Pavia,
and gave lectures upon the writings, real or supposed, of Hermes
Trismegistus; and might have lived there in peace and honour, had
he not again quarrelled with the clergy. By their means his position
became so disagreeable that he was glad to accept an offer made him
by the magistracy of Metz, to become their syndic and advocategeneral. Here, again, his love of disputation made him enemies: the
theological wiseacres of that city asserted that St. Ann had three
husbands, in which opinion they were confirmed by the popular
belief of the day. Agrippa needlessly ran foul of this opinion, or
prejudice as he called it, and thereby lost much of his influence.
Another dispute, more creditable to his character, occurred soon
after, and sank him for ever in the estimation of the Metzians.
Humanely taking the part of a young girl who was accused of
witchcraft, his enemies asserted that he was himself a sorcerer, and
raised such a storm over his head, that he was forced to fly the city.
After this he became physician to Louisa de Savoy, mother of King
Francis I. This lady was curious to know the future, and required her
physician to cast her nativity. Agrippa replied that he would not
encourage such idle curiosity. The result was, he lost her confidence,
and was forthwith dismissed. If it had been through his belief in the
worthlessness of astrology, that he had made his answer, we might
admire his honest and fearless independence; but when it is known
that, at the very same time, he was in the constant habit of divination
and fortune-telling, and that he was predicting splendid success, in
all his undertakings, to the Constable of Bourbon, we can only
wonder at his thus estranging a powerful friend through mere
petulance and perversity.

He was about this time invited, both by Henry VIII. of England,
and Margaret of Austria, governess of the Low Countries, to fix his
residence in their dominions. He chose the service of the latter, by
whose influence he was made historiographer to the Emperor
Charles V. Unfortunately for Agrippa, he never had stability enough
to remain long in one position, and offended his patrons by his
restlessness and presumption. After the death of Margaret he was
imprisoned at Brussels, on a charge of sorcery. He was released after
a year; and quitting the country, experienced many vicissitudes. He
died in great poverty in 1534, aged forty-eight years.
While in the service of Margaret of Austria, he resided principally
at Louvain, in which city he wrote his famous work on the Vanity
and Nothingness of Human Knowledge. He also wrote to please his
royal mistress, a treatise upon the Superiority of the Female Sex,
which he dedicated to her in token of his gratitude for the favours
she had heaped upon him. The reputation he left behind him in these
provinces was any thing but favourable. A great number of the
marvellous tales that are told of him relate to this period of his life. It
was said, that the gold which he paid to the traders with whom he
dealt, always looked remarkably bright, but invariably turned into
pieces of slate and stone in the course of four-and-twenty hours. Of
this spurious gold he was believed to have made large quantities by
the aid of the devil, who, it would appear from this, had but a very
superficial knowledge of alchymy, and much less than the Maréchal
de Rays gave him credit for. The Jesuit Delrio, in his book on magic
and sorcery, relates a still more extraordinary story of him. One day,
Agrippa left his house at Louvain, and intending to be absent for
some time, gave the key of his study to his wife, with strict orders

that no one should enter it during his absence. The lady herself,
strange as it may appear, had no curiosity to pry into her husband’s
secrets, and never once thought of entering the forbidden room; but
a young student, who had been accommodated with an attic in the
philosopher’s house, burned with a fierce desire to examine the
study; hoping, perchance, that he might purloin some book or
implement which would instruct him in the art of transmuting
metals. The youth, being handsome, eloquent, and, above all, highly
complimentary to the charms of the lady, she was persuaded without
much difficulty to lend him the key, but gave him strict orders not to
remove any thing. The student promised implicit obedience, and
entered Agrippa’s study. The first object that caught his attention
was a large grimoire, or book of spells, which lay open on the
philosopher’s desk. He sat himself down immediately and began to
read. At the first word he uttered, he fancied he heard a knock at the
door. He listened, but all was silent. Thinking that his imagination
had deceived him, he read on, when immediately a louder knock was
heard, which so terrified him, that he started to his feet. He tried to
say “Come in,” but his tongue refused its office, and he could not
articulate a sound. He fixed his eyes upon the door, which, slowly
opening, disclosed a stranger of majestic form, but scowling features,
who demanded sternly, why he was summoned? “I did not summon
you,” said the trembling student. “You did!” said the stranger,
advancing angrily; “and the demons are not to be invoked in vain.”
The student could make no reply; and the demon, enraged that one
of the uninitiated should have summoned him out of mere
presumption, seized him by the throat and strangled him. When
Agrippa returned, a few days afterwards, he found his house beset

with devils. Some of them were sitting on the chimney-pots, kicking
up their legs in the air; while others were playing at leapfrog on the
very edge of the parapet. His study was so filled with them, that he
found it difficult to make his way to his desk. When, at last, he had
elbowed his way through them, he found his book open, and the
student lying dead upon the floor. He saw immediately how the
mischief had been done; and dismissing all the inferior imps, asked
the principal demon how he could have been so rash as to kill the
young man. The demon replied, that he had been needlessly invoked
by an insulting youth, and could do no less than kill him for his
presumption. Agrippa reprimanded him severely, and ordered him
immediately to reanimate the dead body, and walk about with it in
the market-place for the whole of the afternoon. The demon did so;
the student revived, and putting his arm through that of his
unearthly murderer, walked very lovingly with him in sight of all the
people. At sunset, the body fell down again, cold and lifeless as
before, and was carried by the crowd to the hospital, it being the
general opinion that he had expired in a fit of apoplexy. His
conductor immediately disappeared. When the body was examined,
marks of strangulation were found on the neck, and prints of the
long claws of the demon on various parts of it. These appearances,
together with a story, which soon obtained currency, that the
companion of the young man had vanished in a cloud of flame and
smoke, opened people’s eyes to the truth. The magistrates of Louvain
instituted inquiries, and the result was, that Agrippa was obliged to
quit the town.
Other authors besides Delrio relate similar stories of this
philosopher. The world in those days was always willing enough to

believe in tales of magic and sorcery; and when, as in Agrippa’s case,
the alleged magician gave himself out for such, and claimed credit for
the wonders he worked, it is not surprising that the age should have
allowed his pretensions. It was dangerous boasting, which
sometimes led to the stake or the gallows, and therefore was thought
to be not without foundation. Paulus Jovius, in his Eulogia
Doctorum Virorum, says, that the devil, in the shape of a large black
dog, attended Agrippa wherever he went. Thomas Nash, in his
Adventures of Jack Wilton, relates, that, at the request of Lord
Surrey, Erasmus, and some other learned men, Agrippa called up
from the grave many of the great philosophers of antiquity; among
others, Tully, whom he caused to re-deliver his celebrated oration for
Roscius. He also shewed Lord Surrey, when in Germany, an exact
resemblance in a glass of his mistress, the fair Geraldine. She was
represented on a couch weeping for the absence of her lover. Lord
Surrey made a note of the exact time at which he saw this vision, and
ascertained afterwards that his mistress was actually so employed at
the very minute. To Thomas Lord Cromwell, Agrippa represented
King Henry VIII. hunting in Windsor Park, with the principal lords
of his court; and to please the Emperor Charles V. he summoned
King David and King Solomon from the tomb.
Naudé, in his “Apology for the great Men who have been falsely
suspected of Magic,” takes a great deal of pains to clear Agrippa from
the imputations cast upon him by Delrio, Paulus Jovius, and other
such ignorant and prejudiced scribblers. Such stories demanded
refutation in the days of Naudé, but they may now be safely left to
decay in their own absurdity. That they should have attached,
however, to the memory of a man who claimed the power of making

iron obey him when he told it to become gold, and who wrote such a
work as that upon magic, which goes by his name, is not at all
surprising.

PARACELSUS.
This philosopher, called by Naudé “the zenith and rising sun of all
the alchymists,” was born at Einsiedeln, near Zurich, in the year
1493. His true name was Hohenheim; to which, as he himself
informs us, were prefixed the baptismal names of Aureolus
Theophrastus Bombastes Paracelsus. The last of these he chose for
his common designation while he was yet a boy; and rendered it,
before he died, one of the most famous in the annals of his time. His
father, who was a physician, educated his son for the same pursuit.
The latter was an apt scholar, and made great progress. By chance
the work of Isaac Hollandus fell into his hands, and from that time
he became smitten with the mania of the philosopher’s stone. All his
thoughts henceforth were devoted to metallurgy; and he travelled
into Sweden that he might visit the mines of that country, and
examine the ores while they yet lay in the bowels of the earth. He
also visited Trithemius at the monastery of Spannheim, and obtained
instructions from him in the science of alchymy. Continuing his
travels, he proceeded through Prussia and Austria into Turkey,
Egypt, and Tartary, and thence returning to Constantinople, learned,
as he boasted, the art of transmutation, and became possessed of the
elixir vitæ. He then established himself as a physician in his native
Switzerland at Zurich, and commenced writing works upon alchymy
and medicine, which immediately fixed the attention of Europe.
Their great obscurity was no impediment to their fame; for the less

the author was understood, the more the demonologists, fanatics,
and philosopher’s-stone hunters seemed to appreciate him. His fame
as a physician kept pace with that which he enjoyed as an alchymist,
owing to his having effected some happy cures by means of mercury
and opium,—drugs unceremoniously condemned by his professional
brethren. In the year 1526, he was chosen professor of physics and
natural philosophy in the University of Basle, where his lectures
attracted vast numbers of students. He denounced the writings of all
former physicians as tending to mislead; and publicly burned the
works of Galen and Avicenna, as quacks and impostors. He
exclaimed, in presence of the admiring and half-bewildered crowd,
who assembled to witness the ceremony, that there was more
knowledge in his shoe-strings than in the writings of these
physicians. Continuing in the same strain, he said, all the
Universities in the world were full of ignorant quacks; but that he,
Paracelsus, overflowed with wisdom. “You will all follow my new
system,” said he, with furious gesticulations, “Avicenna, Galen,
Rhazis, Montagnana, Memé,—you will all follow me, ye professors of
Paris, Montpellier, Germany, Cologne, and Vienna! and all ye that
dwell on the Rhine and the Danube,—ye that inhabit the isles of the
sea; and ye also, Italians, Dalmatians, Athenians, Arabians, Jews,—
ye will all follow my doctrines, for I am the monarch of medicine!”

PARACELSUS.

But he did not long enjoy the esteem of the good citizens of Basle.
It is said that he indulged in wine so freely, as not unfrequently to be
seen in the streets in a state of intoxication. This was ruinous for a
physician, and his good fame decreased rapidly. His ill fame
increased in still greater proportion, especially when he assumed the
airs of a sorcerer. He boasted of the legions of spirits at his
command; and of one especially, which he kept imprisoned in the
hilt of his sword. Wetteras, who lived twenty-seven months in his
service, relates that he often threatened to invoke a whole army of
demons, and shew him the great authority which he could exercise
over them. He let it be believed that the spirit in his sword had
custody of the elixir of life, by means of which he could make any one
live to be as old as the antediluvians. He also boasted that he had a
spirit at his command, called “Azoth,” whom he kept imprisoned in a
jewel; and in many of the old portraits he is represented with a jewel,
inscribed with the word “Azoth, in his hand.”
If a sober prophet has little honour in his own country, a drunken
one has still less. Paracelsus found it at last convenient to quit Basle,
and establish himself at Strasbourg. The immediate cause of this
change of residence was as follows. A citizen lay at the point of death,
and was given over by all the physicians of the town. As a last
resource Paracelsus was called in, to whom the sick man promised a
magnificent recompense, if, by his means, he were cured. Paracelsus
gave him two small pills, which the man took, and rapidly recovered.
When he was quite well, Paracelsus sent for his fee; but the citizen
had no great opinion of the value of a cure which had been so
speedily effected. He had no notion of paying a handful of gold for

two pills, although they had saved his life, and he refused to pay
more than the usual fee for a single visit. Paracelsus brought an
action against him, and lost it. This result so exasperated him, that
he left Basle in high dudgeon. He resumed his wandering life, and
travelled in Germany and Hungary, supporting himself as he went on
the credulity and infatuation of all classes of society. He cast
nativities—told fortunes—aided those who had money to throw away
upon the experiment, to find the philosopher’s stone—prescribed
remedies for cows and pigs, and aided in the recovery of stolen
goods. After residing successively at Nuremburg, Augsburg, Vienna,
and Mindelheim, he retired in the year 1541 to Saltzbourg, and died
in a state of abject poverty in the hospital of that town.
If this strange charlatan found hundreds of admirers during his
life, he found thousands after his death. A sect of Paracelsists sprang
up in France and Germany, to perpetuate the extravagant doctrines
of their founder upon all the sciences, and upon alchymy in
particular. The chief leaders were Bodenstein and Dorneus. The
following is a summary of his doctrine, founded upon the supposed
existence of the philosopher’s stone; it is worth preserving from its
very absurdity, and is altogether unparalleled in the history of
philosophy. First of all, he maintained that the contemplation of the
perfection of the Deity sufficed to procure all wisdom and
knowledge; that the Bible was the key to the theory of all diseases,
and that it was necessary to search into the Apocalypse to know the
signification of magic medicine. The man who blindly obeyed the will
of God, and who succeeded in identifying himself with the celestial
intelligences, possessed the philosopher’s stone—he could cure all
diseases, and prolong life to as many centuries as he pleased; it being

by the very same means that Adam and the antediluvian patriarchs
prolonged theirs. Life was an emanation from the stars—the sun
governed the heart, and the moon the brain. Jupiter governed the
liver, Saturn the gall, Mercury the lungs, Mars the bile, and Venus
the loins. In the stomach of every human being there dwelt a demon,
or intelligence, that was a sort of alchymist in his way, and mixed, in
their due proportions, in his crucible, the various aliments that were
sent into that grand laboratory, the belly. 40 He was proud of the title
of magician, and boasted that he kept up a regular correspondence
with Galen from hell; and that he often summoned Avicenna from
the same regions to dispute with him on the false notions he had
promulgated respecting alchymy, and especially regarding potable
gold and the elixir of life. He imagined that gold could cure
ossification of the heart, and, in fact, all diseases, if it were gold
which had been transmuted from an inferior metal by means of the
philosopher’s stone, and if it were applied under certain conjunctions
of the planets. The mere list of the works in which he advances these
frantic imaginings, which he called a doctrine, would occupy several
pages.

GEORGE AGRICOLA.
This alchymist was born in the province of Misnia, in 1494. His
real name was Bauer, meaning a husbandman, which, in accordance
with the common fashion of his age, he latinised into Agricola. From
his early youth, he delighted in the visions of the hermetic science.
Ere he was sixteen, he longed for the great elixir which was to make
him live for seven hundred years, and for the stone which was to
procure him wealth to cheer him in his multiplicity of days. He

published a small treatise upon the subject at Cologne, in 1531, which
obtained him the patronage of the celebrated Maurice duke of
Saxony. After practising for some years as a physician at
Joachimsthal, in Bohemia, he was employed by Maurice as
superintendent of the silver mines of Chemnitz. He led a happy life
among the miners, making various experiments in alchymy while
deep in the bowels of the earth. He acquired a great knowledge of
metals, and gradually got rid of his extravagant notions about the
philosopher’s stone. The miners had no faith in alchymy; and they
converted him to their way of thinking, not only in that but in other
respects. From their legends, he became firmly convinced that the
bowels of the earth were inhabited by good and evil spirits, and that
firedamp and other explosions sprang from no other causes than the
mischievous propensities of the latter. He died in the year 1555,
leaving behind him the reputation of a very able and intelligent man.

DENIS ZACHAIRE.
Autobiography, written by a wise man who was once a fool, is not
only the most instructive, but the most delightful of reading. Denis
Zachaire, an alchymist of the sixteenth century, has performed this
task, and left a record of his folly and infatuation in pursuit of the
philosopher’s stone, which well repays perusal. He was born in the
year 1510, of an ancient family in Guienne, and was early sent to the
university of Bordeaux, under the care of a tutor to direct his studies.
Unfortunately his tutor was a searcher for the grand elixir, and soon
rendered his pupil as mad as himself upon the subject. With this
introduction, we will allow Denis Zachaire to speak for himself, and
continue his narrative in his own words: “I received from home,”

says he, “the sum of two hundred crowns for the expenses of myself
and master; but before the end of the year, all our money went away
in the smoke of our furnaces. My master, at the same time, died of a
fever, brought on by the parching heat of our laboratory, from which
he seldom or never stirred, and which was scarcely less hot than the
arsenal of Venice. His death was the more unfortunate for me, as my
parents took the opportunity of reducing my allowance, and sending
me only sufficient for my board and lodging, instead of the sum I
required to continue my operations in alchymy.
“To meet this difficulty and get out of leading-strings, I
returned home at the age of twenty-five, and mortgaged part of
my property for four hundred crowns. This sum was necessary
to perform an operation of the science, which had been
communicated to me by an Italian at Toulouse, and who, as he
said, had proved its efficacy. I retained this man in my service,
that we might see the end of the experiment. I then, by means of
strong distillations, tried to calcinate gold and silver; but all my
labour was in vain. The weight of the gold I drew out of my
furnace was diminished by one-half since I put it in, and my four
hundred crowns were very soon reduced to two hundred and
thirty. I gave twenty of these to my Italian, in order that he
might travel to Milan, where the author of the receipt resided,
and ask him the explanation of some passages which we thought
obscure. I remained at Toulouse all the winter, in the hope of his
return; but I might have remained there till this day if I had
waited for him, for I never saw his face again.
“In the succeeding summer there was a great plague, which
forced me to quit the town. I did not, however, lose sight of my

work. I went to Cahors, where I remained six months, and made
the acquaintance of an old man, who was commonly known to
the people as ‘the Philosopher;’ a name which, in country places,
is often bestowed upon people whose only merit is, that they are
less ignorant than their neighbours. I shewed him my collection
of alchymical receipts, and asked his opinion upon them. He
picked out ten or twelve of them, merely saying that they were
better than the others. When the plague ceased, I returned to
Toulouse, and recommenced my experiments in search of the
stone. I worked to such effect that my four hundred crowns were
reduced to one hundred and seventy.
“That I might continue my work on a safer method, I made
acquaintance, in 1537, with a certain abbé who resided in the
neighbourhood. He was smitten with the same mania as myself,
and told me that one of his friends, who had followed to Rome in
the retinue of the Cardinal d’Armagnac, had sent him from that
city a new receipt which could not fail to transmute iron and
copper, but which would cost two hundred crowns. I provided
half this money, and the abbé the rest; and we began to operate
at our joint expense. As we required spirits of wine for our
experiment, I bought a tun of excellent vin de Gaillac. I
extracted the spirit, and rectified it several times. We took a
quantity of this, into which we put four marks of silver and one
of gold that had been undergoing the process of calcination for a
month. We put this mixture cleverly into a sort of horn-shaped
vessel, with another to serve as a retort; and placed the whole
apparatus upon our furnace to produce congelation. This
experiment lasted a year; but, not to remain idle, we amused

ourselves with many other less important operations. We drew
quite as much profit from these as from our great work.
“The whole of the year 1537 passed over without producing
any change whatever; in fact we might have waited till
doomsday for the congelation of our spirits of wine. However,
we made a projection with it upon some heated quicksilver; but
all was in vain. Judge of our chagrin, especially of that of the
abbé, who had already boasted to all the monks of his
monastery, that they had only to bring the large pump which
stood in a corner of the cloister, and he would convert it into
gold: but this ill luck did not prevent us from persevering. I once
more mortgaged my paternal lands for four hundred crowns, the
whole of which I determined to devote to a renewal of my search
for the great secret. The abbé contributed the same sum; and
with these eight hundred crowns I proceeded to Paris, a city
more abounding with alchymists than any other in the world,
resolved never to leave it until I had either found the
philosopher’s stone or spent all my money. This journey gave
the greatest offence to all my relations and friends, who,
imagining that I was fitted to be a great lawyer, were anxious
that I should establish myself in that profession. For the sake of
quietness, I pretended, at last, that such was my object.
“After travelling for fifteen days, I arrived in Paris on the 9th
of January 1539. I remained for a month almost unknown; but I
had no sooner begun to frequent the amateurs of the science,
and visited the shops of the furnace-makers, than I had the
acquaintance of more than a hundred operative alchymists, each
of whom had a different theory and a different mode of working.

Some of them preferred cementation; others sought the
universal alkahest or dissolvent; and some of them boasted the
great efficacy of the essence of emery. Some of them
endeavoured to extract mercury from other metals, to fix it
afterwards; and, in order that each of us should be thoroughly
acquainted with the proceedings of the others, we agreed to
meet somewhere every night and report progress. We met
sometimes at the house of one, and sometimes in the garret of
another; not only on week days, but on Sundays and the great
festivals of the Church. ‘Ah!’ one used to say, ‘if I had the means
of recommencing this experiment, I should do something.’ ‘Yes,’
said another, ‘if my crucible had not cracked, I should have
succeeded before now;’ while a third exclaimed, with a sigh, ‘If I
had but had a round copper vessel of sufficient strength, I would
have fixed mercury with silver.’ There was not one among them
who had not some excuse for his failure; but I was deaf to all
their speeches. I did not want to part with my money to any of
them, remembering how often I had been the dupe of such
promises.
“A Greek at last presented himself; and with him I worked a
long time uselessly upon nails made of cinnabar or vermilion. I
was also acquainted with a foreign gentleman newly arrived in
Paris, and often accompanied him to the shops of the goldsmiths
to sell pieces of gold and silver, the produce, as he said, of his
experiments. I stuck closely to him for a long time, in the hope
that he would impart his secret. He refused for a long time, but
acceded at last on my earnest entreaty, and I found that it was
nothing more than an ingenious trick. I did not fail to inform my

friend the abbé, whom I had left at Toulouse, of all my
adventures; and sent him, among other matters, a relation of the
trick by which this gentleman pretended to turn lead into gold.
The abbé still imagined that I should succeed at last, and
advised me to remain another year in Paris, where I had made
so good a beginning. I remained there three years; but,
notwithstanding all my efforts, I had no more success than I had
had elsewhere.
“I had just got to the end of my money, when I received a
letter from the abbé, telling me to leave every thing, and join
him immediately at Toulouse. I went accordingly, and found
that he had received letters from the king of Navarre
(grandfather of Henry IV.). This prince was a great lover of
philosophy, full of curiosity, and had written to the abbé that I
should visit him at Pau; and that he would give me three or four
thousand crowns if I would communicate the secret I had
learned from the foreign gentleman. The abbé’s ears were so
tickled with the four thousand crowns, that he let me have no
peace night or day until he had fairly seen me on the road to
Pau. I arrived at that place in the month of May 1542. I worked
away, and succeeded, according to the receipt I had obtained.
When I had finished to the satisfaction of the king, he gave me
the reward that I expected. Although he was willing enough to
do me further service, he was dissuaded from it by the lords of
his court; even by many of those who had been most anxious
that I should come. He sent me then about my business, with
many thanks; saying, that if there was any thing in his kingdom
which he could give me—such as the produce of confiscations or

the like—he should be most happy. I thought I might stay long
enough for these prospective confiscations, and never get them
at last; and I therefore determined to go back to my friend the
abbé.
“I learned that, on the road between Pau and Toulouse, there
resided a monk who was very skilful in all matters of natural
philosophy. On my return, I paid him a visit. He pitied me very
much, and advised me, with much warmth and kindness of
expression, not to amuse myself any longer with such
experiments as these, which were all false and sophistical; but
that I should read the good books of the old philosophers, where
I might not only find the true matter of the science of alchymy,
but learn also the exact order of operations which ought to be
followed. I very much approved of this wise advice; but before I
acted upon it, I went back to my abbé of Toulouse, to give him
an account of the eight hundred crowns which we had had in
common, and, at the same time, share with him such reward as I
had received from the king of Navarre. If he was little satisfied
with the relation of my adventures since our first separation, he
appeared still less satisfied when I told him I had formed a
resolution to renounce the search for the philosopher’s stone.
The reason was that he thought me a good artist. Of our eight
hundred crowns, there remained but one hundred and seventysix. When I quitted the abbé, I went to my own house with the
intention of remaining there, till I had read all the old
philosophers, and of then proceeding to Paris.
“I arrived in Paris on the day after All Saints, of the year 1546,
and devoted another year to the assiduous study of great

authors. Among others, the Turba Philosophorum of the Good
Trevisan, the Remonstrance of Nature to the Wandering
Alchymist, by Jean de Meung, and several others of the best
books; but, as I had no right principles, I did not well know what
course to follow.
“At last I left my solitude, not to see my former acquaintances,
the adepts and operators, but to frequent the society of true
philosophers. Among them I fell into still greater uncertainties;
being, in fact, completely bewildered by the variety of operations
which they shewed me. Spurred on, nevertheless, by a sort of
frenzy or inspiration, I threw myself into the works of Raymond
Lulli and of Arnold de Villeneuve. The reading of these, and the
reflections I made upon them, occupied me for another year,
when I finally determined on the course I should adopt. I was
obliged to wait, however, until I had mortgaged another very
considerable portion of my patrimony. This business was not
settled until the beginning of Lent, 1549, when I commenced my
operations. I laid in a stock of all that was necessary, and began
to work the day after Easter. It was not, however, without some
disquietude and opposition from my friends who came about
me; one asking me what I was going to do, and whether I had
not already spent money enough upon such follies? Another
assured me that, if I bought so much charcoal, I should
strengthen the suspicion already existing, that I was a coiner of
base money. Another advised me to purchase some place in the
magistracy, as I was already a Doctor of Laws. My relations
spoke in terms still more annoying to me, and even threatened
that, if I continued to make such a fool of myself, they would

send a posse of police-officers into my house, and break all my
furnaces and crucibles into atoms. I was wearied almost to death
by this continued persecution; but I found comfort in my work
and in the progress of my experiment, to which I was very
attentive, and which went on bravely from day to day. About this
time, there was a dreadful plague in Paris, which interrupted all
intercourse between man and man, and left me as much to
myself as I could desire. I soon had the satisfaction to remark
the progress and succession of the three colours which,
according to the philosophers, always prognosticate the
approaching perfection of the work. I observed them distinctly,
one after the other; and next year, being Easter Sunday, 1550, I
made the great trial. Some common quicksilver, which I put into
a small crucible on the fire, was, in less than an hour, converted
into very good gold. You may judge how great was my joy, but I
took care not to boast of it. I returned thanks to God for the
favour he had shewn me, and prayed that I might only be
permitted to make such use of it as would redound to his glory.
“On the following day, I went towards Toulouse to find, the
abbé, in accordance with a mutual promise, that we should
communicate our discoveries to each other. On my way, I called
in to see the sage monk who had assisted me with his counsels;
but I had the sorrow to learn that they were both dead. After
this, I would not return to my own home, but retired to another
place, to await one of my relations whom I had left in charge of
my estate. I gave him orders to sell all that belonged to me, as
well movable as immovable—to pay my debts with the proceeds,
and divide all the rest among those in any way related to me who

might stand in need of it, in order that they might enjoy some
share of the good fortune which had befallen me. There was a
great deal of talk in the neighbourhood about my precipitate
retreat; the wisest of my acquaintance imagining that, broken
down and ruined by my mad expenses, I sold my little remaining
property, that I might go and hide my shame in distant
countries.
“My relative already spoken of rejoined me on the 1st of July,
after having performed all the business I had entrusted him
with. We took our departure together, to seek a land of liberty.
We first retired to Lausanne, in Switzerland, when, after
remaining there for some time, we resolved to pass the
remainder of our days in some of the most celebrated cities of
Germany, living quietly and without splendour.”
Thus ends the story of Denis Zachaire, as written by himself. He
has not been so candid at its conclusion as at its commencement, and
has left the world in doubt as to his real motives for pretending that
he had discovered the philosopher’s stone. It seems probable that the
sentence he puts into the mouths of his wisest acquaintances was the
true reason of his retreat; that he was, in fact, reduced to poverty,
and hid his shame in foreign countries. Nothing further is known of
his life, and his real name has never yet been discovered. He wrote a
work on alchymy, entitled The true Natural Philosophy of Metals.

DR. DEE AND EDWARD KELLY.
John Dee and Edward Kelly claim to be mentioned together,
having been so long associated in the same pursuits, and undergone

so many strange vicissitudes in each other’s society. Dee was
altogether a wonderful man, and had he lived in an age when folly
and superstition were less rife, he would, with the same powers
which he enjoyed, have left behind him a bright and enduring
reputation. He was born in London in the year 1527, and very early
manifested a love for study. At the age of fifteen he was sent to
Cambridge, and delighted so much in his books, that he passed
regularly eighteen hours every day among them. Of the other six, he
devoted four to sleep and two for refreshment. Such intense
application did not injure his health, and could not fail to make him
one of the first scholars of his time. Unfortunately, however, he
quitted the mathematics and the pursuits of true philosophy, to
indulge in the unprofitable reveries of the occult sciences. He studied
alchymy, astrology, and magic, and thereby rendered himself
obnoxious to the authorities at Cambridge. To avoid persecution, he
was at last obliged to retire to the university of Louvain; the rumours
of sorcery that were current respecting him rendering his longer stay
in England not altogether without danger. He found at Louvain
many kindred spirits who had known Cornelius Agrippa while he
resided among them, and by whom he was constantly entertained
with the wondrous deeds of that great master of the hermetic
mysteries. From their conversation he received much encouragement
to continue the search for the philosopher’s stone, which soon began
to occupy nearly all his thoughts.

DR. DEE.

He did not long remain on the Continent, but returned to England
in 1551, being at that time in the twenty-fourth year of his age. By the
influence of his friend Sir John Cheek, he was kindly received at the
court of King Edward VI., and rewarded (it is difficult to say for
what) with a pension of one hundred crowns. He continued for
several years to practise in London as an astrologer; casting
nativities, telling fortunes, and pointing out lucky and unlucky days.
During the reign of Queen Mary he got into trouble, being suspected
of heresy, and charged with attempting Mary’s life by means of
enchantments. He was tried for the latter offence, and acquitted; but
was retained in prison on the former charge, and left to the tender
mercies of Bishop Bonner. He had a very narrow escape from being
burned in Smithfield, but he somehow or other contrived to persuade
that fierce bigot that his orthodoxy was unimpeachable, and was set
at liberty in 1555.
On the accession of Elizabeth, a brighter day dawned upon him.
During her retirement at Woodstock, her servants appear to have
consulted him as to the time of Mary’s death, which circumstance no

doubt first gave rise to the serious charge for which he was brought
to trial. They now came to consult him more openly as to the
fortunes of their mistress; and Robert Dudley, the celebrated Earl of
Leicester, was sent by command of the Queen herself to know the
most auspicious day for her coronation. So great was the favour he
enjoyed, that, some years afterwards, Elizabeth condescended to pay
him a visit at his house in Mortlake, to view his museum of
curiosities, and when he was ill, sent her own physician to attend
upon him.
Astrology was the means whereby he lived, and he continued to
practise it with great assiduity; but his heart was in alchymy. The
philosopher’s stone and the elixir of life haunted his daily thoughts
and his nightly dreams. The Talmudic mysteries, which he had also
deeply studied, impressed him with the belief, that he might hold
converse with spirits and angels, and learn from them all the
mysteries of the universe. Holding the same idea as the then obscure
sect of the Rosicrucians, some of whom he had perhaps encountered
in his travels in Germany, he imagined that, by means of the
philosopher’s stone, he could summon these kindly spirits at his will.
By dint of continually brooding upon the subject, his imagination
became so diseased, that he at last persuaded himself that an angel
appeared to him, and promised to be his friend and companion as
long as he lived. He relates that, one day, in November 1582, while
he was engaged in fervent prayer, the window of his museum looking
towards the west suddenly glowed with a dazzling light, in the midst
of which, in all his glory, stood the great angel Uriel. Awe and
wonder rendered him speechless; but the angel smiling graciously
upon him, gave him a crystal, of a convex form, and told him that

whenever he wished to hold converse with the beings of another
sphere, he had only to gaze intently upon it, and they would appear
in the crystal, and unveil to him all the secrets of futurity. 41 Thus
saying, the angel disappeared. Dee found from experience of the
crystal that it was necessary that all the faculties of the soul should be
concentrated upon it, otherwise the spirits did not appear. He also
found that he could never recollect the conversations he had with the
angels. He therefore determined to communicate the secret to
another person, who might converse with the spirit while he (Dee)
sat in another part of the room, and took down in writing the
revelations which they made.

SHEW-STONE OF DR. DEE, IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM.

He had at this time in his service, as his assistant, one Edward
Kelly, who, like himself, was crazy upon the subject of the
philosopher’s stone. There was this difference, however, between
them, that, while Dee was more of an enthusiast than an impostor,
Kelly was more of an impostor than an enthusiast. In early life he
was a notary, and had the misfortune to lose both his ears for
forgery. This mutilation, degrading enough in any man, was
destructive to a philosopher; Kelly, therefore, lest his wisdom should
suffer in the world’s opinion, wore a black skull-cap, which, fitting
close to his head, and descending over both his cheeks, not only
concealed his loss, but gave him a very solemn and oracular

appearance. So well did he keep his secret, that even Dee, with whom
he lived so many years, appears never to have discovered it. Kelly,
with this character, was just the man to carry on any piece of roguery
for his own advantage, or to nurture the delusions of his master for
the same purpose. No sooner did Dee inform him of the visit he had
received from the glorious Uriel, than Kelly expressed such a fervour
of belief, that Dee’s heart glowed with delight. He set about
consulting his crystal forthwith, and on the 2d of December, 1581,
the spirits appeared, and held a very extraordinary discourse with
Kelly, which Dee took down in writing. The curious reader may see
this farrago of nonsense among the Harleian Mss. in the British
Museum. The later consultations were published in a folio volume, in
1659, by Dr. Meric Casaubon, under the title of A true and faithful
Relation of what passed between Dr. John Dee and some Spirits;
tending, had it succeeded, to a general Alteration of most States and
Kingdoms in the World. 42
The fame of these wondrous colloquies soon spread over the
country, and even reached the Continent. Dee at the same time
pretended to be in possession of the elixir vitæ, which he stated he
had found among the ruins of Glastonbury Abbey, in Somersetshire.
People flocked from far and near to his house at Mortlake to have
their nativities cast, in preference to visiting astrologers of less
renown. They also longed to see a man who, according to his own
account, would never die. Altogether, he carried on a very profitable
trade, but spent so much in drugs and metals to work out some
peculiar process of transmutation, that he never became rich.
About this time there came into England a wealthy polish
nobleman, named Albert Laski, Count Palatine of Siradz. His object

was principally, he said, to visit the court of Queen Elizabeth, the
fame of whose glory and magnificence had reached him in distant
Poland. Elizabeth received this flattering stranger with the most
splendid hospitality, and appointed her favourite Leicester to shew
him all that was worth seeing in England. He visited all the
curiosities of London and Westminster, and from thence proceeded
to Oxford and Cambridge, that he might converse with some of the
great scholars whose writings shed lustre upon the land of their
birth. He was very much disappointed at not finding Dr. Dee among
them, and told the Earl of Leicester that he would not have gone to
Oxford if he had known that Dee was not there. The earl promised to
introduce him to the great alchymist on their return to London, and
the Pole was satisfied. A few days afterwards, the earl and Laski
being in the antechamber of the Queen, awaiting an audience of her
majesty, Dr. Dee arrived on the same errand, and was introduced to
the Pole. 43 An interesting conversation ensued, which ended by the
stranger inviting himself to dine with the astrologer at his house at
Mortlake. Dee returned home in some tribulation, for he found he
had not money enough, without pawning his plate, to entertain
Count Laski and his retinue in a manner becoming their dignity. In
this emergency he sent off an express to the Earl of Leicester, stating
frankly the embarrassment he laboured under, and praying his good
offices in representing the matter to her majesty. Elizabeth
immediately sent him a present of twenty pounds.
On the appointed day Count Laski came, attended by a numerous
retinue, and expressed such open and warm admiration of the
wonderful attainments of his host, that Dee turned over in his own
mind how he could bind irretrievably to his interests a man who

seemed so well inclined to become his friend. Long acquaintance
with Kelly had imbued him with all the roguery of that personage,
and he resolved to make the Pole pay dearly for his dinner. He found
out before many days that he possessed great estates in his own
country, as well as great influence, but that an extravagant
disposition had reduced him to temporary embarrassment. He also
discovered that he was a firm believer in the philosopher’s stone and
the water of life. He was therefore just the man upon whom an
adventurer might fasten himself. Kelly thought so too; and both of
them set to work to weave a web, in the meshes of which they might
firmly entangle the rich and credulous stranger. They went very
cautiously about it; first throwing out obscure hints of the stone and
the elixir, and finally of the spirits, by means of whom they could
turn over the pages of the book of futurity, and read the awful secrets
inscribed therein. Laski eagerly implored that he might be admitted
to one of their mysterious interviews with Uriel and the angels; but
they knew human nature too well to accede at once to the request. To
the count’s entreaties they only replied by hints of the difficulty or
impropriety of summoning the spirits in the presence of a stranger,
or of one who might perchance have no other motive than the
gratification of a vain curiosity; but they only meant to whet the edge
of his appetite by this delay, and would have been sorry indeed if the
count had been discouraged. To shew how exclusively the thoughts
both of Dee and Kelly were fixed upon their dupe at this time, it is
only necessary to read the introduction to their first interview with
the spirits, related in the volume of Dr. Casaubon. The entry made by
Dee, under the date of the 25th of May, 1583, says, that when the
spirit appeared to them, “I [John Dee] and E. K. [Edward Kelly] sat

together, conversing of that noble Polonian Albertus Laski, his great
honour here with us obtained, and of his great liking among all sorts
of the people.” No doubt they were discussing how they might make
the most of the “noble Polonian,” and concocting the fine story with
which they afterwards excited his curiosity, and drew him firmly
within their toils. “Suddenly,” says Dee, as they were thus employed,
“there seemed to come out of the oratory a spiritual creature, like a
pretty girl of seven or nine years of age, attired on her head, with her
hair rolled up before and hanging down behind, with a gown of silk,
of changeable red and green, and with a train. She seemed to play up
and down, and seemed to go in and out behind the books; and as she
seemed to go between them, the books displaced themselves, and
made way for her.”
With such tales as these they lured on the Pole from day to day,
and at last persuaded him to be a witness of their mysteries. Whether
they played off any optical delusions upon him, or whether, by the
force of a strong imagination, he deluded himself, does not appear,
but certain it is that he became a complete tool in their hands, and
consented to do whatever they wished him. Kelly, at these interviews,
placed himself at a certain distance from the wondrous crystal, and
gazed intently upon it, while Dee took his place in a corner, ready to
set down the prophecies as they were uttered by the spirits. In this
manner they prophesied to the Pole that he should become the
fortunate possessor of the philosopher’s stone; that he should live for
centuries, and be chosen King of Poland, in which capacity he should
gain many great victories over the Saracens, and make his name
illustrious over all the earth. For this purpose it was necessary,
however, that Laski should leave England, and take them with him,

together with their wives and families; that he should treat them all
sumptuously, and allow them to want for nothing. Laski at once
consented; and very shortly afterwards they were all on the road to
Poland.
It took them upwards of four months to reach the count’s estates
in the neighbourhood of Cracow. In the mean time, they led a
pleasant life, and spent money with an unsparing hand. When once
established in the count’s palace, they commenced the great hermetic
operation of transmuting iron into gold. Laski provided them with all
necessary materials, and aided them himself with his knowledge of
alchymy; but, somehow or other, the experiment always failed at the
very moment it ought to have succeeded, and they were obliged to
recommence operations on a grander scale. But the hopes of Laski
were not easily extinguished. Already, in idea, the possessor of
countless millions, he was not to be cast down for fear of present
expenses. He thus continued from day to day, and from month to
month, till he was at last obliged to sell a portion of his deeplymortgaged estates to find aliment for the hungry crucibles of Dee and
Kelly, and the no less hungry stomachs of their wives and families. It
was not till ruin stared him in the face that he awoke from his dream
of infatuation, too happy, even then, to find that he had escaped utter
beggary. Thus restored to his senses, his first thought was how to rid
himself of his expensive visitors. Not wishing to quarrel with them,
he proposed that they should proceed to Prague, well furnished with
letters of recommendation to the Emperor Rudolph. Our alchymists
too plainly saw that nothing more was to be made of the almost
destitute Count Laski. Without hesitation, therefore, they accepted
the proposal, and set out forthwith to the imperial residence. They

had no difficulty, on their arrival at Prague, in obtaining an audience
of the emperor. They found him willing enough to believe that such a
thing as the philosopher’s stone existed, and flattered themselves
that they had made a favourable impression upon him; but, from
some cause or other—perhaps the look of low cunning and quackery
upon the face of Kelly—the emperor conceived no very high opinion
of their abilities. He allowed them, however, to remain for some
months at Prague, feeding themselves upon the hope that he would
employ them; but the more he saw of them, the less he liked them;
and, when the pope’s nuncio represented to him that he ought not to
countenance such heretic magicians, he gave orders that they should
quit his dominions within four-and-twenty hours. It was fortunate
for them that so little time was given them; for, had they remained
six hours longer, the nuncio had received orders to procure a
perpetual dungeon or the stake for them.
Not knowing well whither to direct their steps, they resolved to
return to Cracow, where they had still a few friends; but, by this time,
the funds they had drawn from Laski were almost exhausted, and
they were many days obliged to go dinnerless and supperless. They
had great difficulty to keep their poverty a secret from the world; but
they managed to bear privation without murmuring, from a
conviction that if the fact were known, it would militate very much
against their pretensions. Nobody would believe that they were
possessors of the philosopher’s stone, if it were once suspected that
they did not know how to procure bread for their subsistence. They
still gained a little by casting nativities, and kept starvation at arm’s
length, till a new dupe, rich enough for their purposes, dropped into
their toils, in the shape of a royal personage. Having procured an

introduction to Stephen king of Poland, they predicted to him that
the Emperor Rudolph would shortly be assassinated, and that the
Germans would look to Poland for his successor. As this prediction
was not precise enough to satisfy the king, they tried their crystal
again, and a spirit appeared who told them that the new sovereign of
Germany would be Stephen of Poland. Stephen was credulous
enough to believe them, and was once present when Kelly held his
mystic conversations with the shadows of his crystal. He also appears
to have furnished them with money to carry on their experiments in
alchymy; but he grew tired, at last, of their broken promises and
their constant drains upon his pocket, and was on the point of
discarding them with disgrace, when they met with another dupe, to
whom they eagerly transferred their services. This was Count
Rosenberg, a nobleman of large estates at Trebona in Bohemia. So
comfortable did they find themselves in the palace of this munificent
patron, that they remained nearly four years with him, faring
sumptuously, and having an almost unlimited command of his
money. The count was more ambitious than avaricious: he had
wealth enough, and did not care for the philosopher’s stone on
account of the gold, but of the length of days it would bring him.
They had their predictions, accordingly, all ready framed to suit his
character. They prophesied that he should be chosen king of Poland;
and promised, moreover, that he should live for five hundred years
to enjoy his dignity, provided always that he found them sufficient
money to carry on their experiments.
But now, while fortune smiled upon them, while they revelled in
the rewards of successful villany, retributive justice came upon them
in a shape they had not anticipated. Jealousy and mistrust sprang up

between the two confederates, and led to such violent and frequent
quarrels, that Dee was in constant fear of exposure. Kelly imagined
himself a much greater personage than Dee; measuring, most likely,
by the standard of impudent roguery; and was displeased that on all
occasions, and from all persons, Dee received the greater share of
honour and consideration. He often threatened to leave Dee to shift
for himself; and the latter, who had degenerated into the mere tool of
his more daring associate, was distressed beyond measure at the
prospect of his desertion. His mind was so deeply imbued with
superstition, that he believed the rhapsodies of Kelly to be, in a great
measure, derived from his intercourse with angels; and he knew not
where, in the whole world, to look for a man of depth and wisdom
enough to succeed him. As their quarrels every day became more and
more frequent, Dee wrote letters to Queen Elizabeth to secure a
favourable reception on his return to England, whither he intended
to proceed if Kelly forsook him. He also sent her a round piece of
silver, which he pretended he had made of a portion of brass cut out
of a warming-pan. He afterwards sent her the warming-pan also,
that she might convince herself that the piece of silver corresponded
exactly with the hole which was cut into the brass. While thus
preparing for the worst, his chief desire was to remain in Bohemia
with Count Rosenberg, who treated him well, and reposed much
confidence in him. Neither had Kelly any great objection to remain;
but a new passion had taken possession of his breast, and he was
laying deep schemes to gratify it. His own wife was ill-favoured and
ill-natured; Dee’s was comely and agreeable; and he longed to make
an exchange of partners without exciting the jealousy or shocking the
morality of Dee. This was a difficult matter; but to a man like Kelly,

who was as deficient in rectitude and right feeling as he was full of
impudence and ingenuity, the difficulty was not insurmountable. He
had also deeply studied the character and the foibles of Dee; and he
took his measures accordingly. The next time they consulted the
spirits, Kelly pretended to be shocked at their language, and refused
to tell Dee what they had said. Dee insisted, and was informed that
they were henceforth to have their wives in common. Dee, a little
startled, inquired whether the spirits might not mean that they were
to live in common harmony and good-will? Kelly tried again, with
apparent reluctance, and said the spirits insisted upon the literal
interpretation. The poor fanatic Dee resigned himself to their will;
but it suited Kelly’s purpose to appear coy a little longer. He declared
that the spirits must be spirits not of good, but of evil; and refused to
consult them any more. He thereupon took his departure, saying that
he would never return.
Dee, thus left to himself, was in sore trouble and distress of mind.
He knew not on whom to fix as the successor to Kelly for consulting
the spirits; but at last chose his son Arthur, a boy of eight years of
age. He consecrated him to this service with great ceremony, and
impressed upon the child’s mind the dignified and awful nature of
the duties he was called upon to perform; but the poor boy had
neither the imagination, the faith, nor the artifice of Kelly. He looked
intently upon the crystal as he was told; but could see nothing and
hear nothing. At last, when his eyes ached, he said he could see a
vague indistinct shadow, but nothing more. Dee was in despair. The
deception had been carried on so long, that he was never so happy as
when he fancied he was holding converse with superior beings; and
he cursed the day that had put estrangement between him and his

dear friend Kelly. This was exactly what Kelly had foreseen; and,
when he thought the doctor had grieved sufficiently for his absence,
he returned unexpectedly, and entered the room where the little
Arthur was in vain endeavouring to distinguish something in the
crystal. Dee, in entering this circumstance in his journal, ascribes
this sudden return to a “miraculous fortune” and a “divine fate;” and
goes on to record that Kelly immediately saw the spirits which had
remained invisible to little Arthur. One of these spirits reiterated the
previous command, that they should have their wives in common.
Kelly bowed his head and submitted; and Dee, in all humility,
consented to the arrangement.
This was the extreme depth of the wretched man’s degradation. In
this manner they continued to live for three or four months, when,
new quarrels breaking out, they separated once more. This time their
separation was final. Kelly, taking the elixir which he had found in
Glastonbury Abbey, proceeded to Prague, forgetful of the abrupt
mode in which he had previously been expelled from that city.
Almost immediately after his arrival, he was seized by order of the
Emperor Rudolph, and thrown into prison. He was released after
some months’ confinement, and continued for five years to lead a
vagabond life in Germany, telling fortunes at one place, and
pretending to make gold at another. He was a second time thrown
into prison, on a charge of heresy and sorcery; and he then resolved,
if ever he obtained his liberty, to return to England. He soon
discovered that there was no prospect of this, and that his
imprisonment was likely to be for life. He twisted his bed-clothes
into a rope, one stormy night in February 1595, and let himself down
from the window of his dungeon, situated at the top of a very high

tower. Being a corpulent man, the rope gave way, and he was
precipitated to the ground. He broke two of his ribs and both his
legs; and was otherwise so much injured, that he expired a few days
afterwards.
Dee, for a while, had more prosperous fortune. The warming-pan
he had sent to Queen Elizabeth was not without effect. He was
rewarded soon after Kelly had left him with an invitation to return to
England. His pride, which had been sorely humbled, sprang up again
to its pristine dimensions, and he set out from Bohemia with a train
of attendants becoming an ambassador. How he procured the money
does not appear, unless from the liberality of the rich Bohemian
Rosenberg, or perhaps from his plunder. He travelled with three
coaches for himself and family, and three wagons to carry his
baggage. Each coach had four horses, and the whole train was
protected by a guard of four and twenty soldiers. This statement may
be doubted; but it is on the authority of Dee himself, who made it on
oath before the commissioners appointed by Elizabeth to inquire
into his circumstances. On his arrival in England he had an audience
of the queen, who received him kindly as far as words went, and gave
orders that he should not be molested in his pursuits of chemistry
and philosophy. A man who boasted of the power to turn baser
metals into gold, could not, thought Elizabeth, be in want of money;
and she therefore gave him no more substantial marks of her
approbation than her countenance and protection.
Thrown thus unexpectedly upon his own resources, Dee began in
earnest the search for the philosopher’s stone. He worked incessantly
among his furnaces, retorts, and crucibles, and almost poisoned
himself with deleterious fumes. He also consulted his miraculous

crystal; but the spirits appeared not to him. He tried one
Bartholomew to supply the place of the invaluable Kelly; but he being
a man of some little probity, and of no imagination at all, the spirits
would not hold any communication with him. Dee then tried another
pretender to philosophy, of the name of Hickman, but had no better
fortune. The crystal had lost its power since the departure of its great
high priest. From this quarter, then, Dee could get no information on
the stone or elixir of the alchymists, and all his efforts to discover
them by other means were not only fruitless but expensive. He was
soon reduced to great distress, and wrote piteous letters to the queen
praying relief. He represented that, after he left England with Count
Laski, the mob had pillaged his house at Mortlake, accusing him of
being a necromancer and a wizard; and had broken all his furniture,
burned his library, consisting of four thousand rare volumes, and
destroyed all the philosophical instruments and curiosities in his
museum. For this damage he claimed compensation; and
furthermore stated, that, as he had come to England by the queen’s
command, she ought to pay the expenses of his journey. Elizabeth
sent him small sums of money at various times; but Dee still
continuing his complaints, a commission was appointed to inquire
into his circumstances. He finally obtained a small appointment as
Chancellor of St. Paul’s cathedral, which he exchanged, in 1595, for
the wardenship of the college at Manchester. He remained in this
capacity till 1602 or 1603, when, his strength and intellect beginning
to fail him, he was compelled to resign. He retired to his old dwelling
at Mortlake, in a state not far removed from actual want, supporting
himself as a common fortune-teller, and being often obliged to sell or
pawn his books to procure a dinner. James I. was often applied to on

his behalf, but he refused to do any thing for him. It may be said to
the discredit of this king, that the only reward he would grant the
indefatigable Stowe, in his days of old age and want, was the royal
permission to beg; but no one will blame him for neglecting such a
quack as John Dee. He died in 1608, in the eighty-first year of his
age, and was buried at Mortlake.

THE COSMOPOLITE.
Many disputes have arisen as to the real name of the alchymist
who wrote several works under the above designation. The general
opinion is that he was a Scotsman named Seton, and that by a fate
very common to alchymists who boasted too loudly of their powers of
transmutation, he ended his days miserably in a dungeon, into which
he was thrown by a German potentate until he made a million of gold
to pay his ransom. By some he has been confounded with Michael
Sendivog, or Sendivogius, a Pole, a professor of the same art, who
made a great noise in Europe at the commencement of the
seventeenth century. Lenglet du Fresnoy, who is in general well
informed with respect to the alchymists, inclines to the belief that
these personages were distinct; and gives the following particulars of
the Cosmopolite, extracted from George Morhoff, in his Epistola ad
Langelottum, and other writers.
About the year 1600, one Jacob Haussen, a Dutch pilot, was
shipwrecked on the coast of Scotland. A gentleman, named
Alexander Seton, put off in a boat, and saved him from drowning,
and afterwards entertained him hospitably for many weeks at his
house on the shore. Haussen saw that he was addicted to the pursuits
of chemistry, but no conversation on the subject passed between

them at the time. About a year and a half afterwards, Haussen being
then at home at Enkhuysen, in Holland, received a visit from his
former host. He endeavoured to repay the kindness that had been
shewn him; and so great a friendship arose between them that Seton,
on his departure, offered to make him acquainted with the great
secret of the philosopher’s stone. In his presence the Scotsman
transmuted a great quantity of base metal into pure gold, and gave it
him as a mark of his esteem. Seton then took leave of his friend, and
travelled into Germany. At Dresden he made no secret of his
wonderful powers, having, it is said, performed transmutation
successfully before a great assemblage of the learned men of that
city. The circumstance coming to the ears of the Duke or Elector of
Saxony, he gave orders for the arrest of the alchymist. He caused him
to be imprisoned in a high tower, and set a guard of forty men to
watch that he did not escape, and that no strangers were admitted to
his presence. The unfortunate Seton received several visits from the
elector, who used every art of persuasion to make him divulge his
secret. Seton obstinately refused either to communicate his secret, or
to make any gold for the tyrant; on which he was stretched upon the
rack, to see if the argument of torture would render him more
tractable. The result was still the same; neither hope of reward nor
fear of anguish could shake him. For several months he remained in
prison, subjected alternately to a sedative and a violent regimen, till
his health broke, and he wasted away almost to a skeleton.
There happened at that time to be in Dresden a learned Pole,
named Michael Sendivogius, who had wasted a good deal of his time
and substance in the unprofitable pursuits of alchymy. He was
touched with pity for the hard fate, and admiration for the intrepidity

of Seton; and determined, if possible, to aid him in escaping from the
clutch of his oppressor. He requested the elector’s permission to see
the alchymist, and obtained it with some difficulty. He found him in
a state of great wretchedness, shut up from the light of day in a
noisome dungeon, and with no better couch or fare than those
allotted to the worst of criminals. Seton listened eagerly to the
proposal of escape, and promised the generous Pole that he would
make him richer than an eastern monarch if by his means he were
liberated. Sendivogius immediately commenced operations; he sold
some property which he possessed near Cracow, and with the
proceeds led a merry life at Dresden. He gave the most elegant
suppers, to which he regularly invited the officers of the guard, and
especially those who did duty at the prison of the alchymist. He
insinuated himself at last into their confidence, and obtained free
ingress to his friend as often as he pleased; pretending that he was
using his utmost endeavours to conquer his obstinacy and worm his
secret out of him. When their project was ripe, a day was fixed upon
for the grand attempt; and Sendivogius was ready with a post-chariot
to convey him with all speed into Poland. By drugging some wine
which he presented to the guards of the prison, he rendered them so
drowsy that he easily found means to scale a wall unobserved, with
Seton, and effect his escape. Seton’s wife was in the chariot awaiting
him, having safely in her possession a small packet of a black
powder, which was, in fact, the philosopher’s stone, or ingredient for
the transmutation of iron and copper into gold. They all arrived in
safety at Cracow; but the frame of Seton was so wasted by torture of
body and starvation, to say nothing of the anguish of mind he had
endured, that he did not long survive. He died in Cracow, in 1603 or

1604, and was buried under the cathedral church of that city. Such is
the story related of the author of the various works which bear the
name of the Cosmopolite. A list of them may be found in the third
volume of the History of the Hermetic Philosophy.

SENDIVOGIUS.
On the death of Seton, Sendivogius married his widow, hoping to
learn from her some of the secrets of her deceased lord in the art of
transmutation. The ounce of black powder stood him, however, in
better service; for the alchymists say, that by its means he converted
great quantities of quicksilver into the purest gold. It is also said that
he performed this experiment successfully before the Emperor
Rudolph II., at Prague; and that the emperor, to commemorate the
circumstance, caused a marble tablet to be affixed to the wall of the
room in which it was performed, bearing this inscription, “Faciat hoc
quispiam alius, quod fecit Sendivogius Polonus.” M. Desnoyers,
secretary to the Princess Mary of Gonzaga, Queen of Poland, writing
from Warsaw in 1651, says that he saw this tablet, which existed at
that time, and was often visited by the curious.
The after-life of Sendivogius is related in a Latin memoir of him by
one Brodowski, his steward; and is inserted by Pierre Borel in his
Treasure of Gaulish Antiquities. The Emperor Rudolph, according to
this authority, was so well pleased with his success, that he made him
one of his councillors of state, and invited him to fill a station in the
royal household and inhabit the palace. But Sendivogius loved his
liberty, and refused to become a courtier. He preferred to reside on
his own patrimonial estate of Gravarna, where, for many years, he
exercised a princely hospitality. His philosophic powder, which, his

steward says, was red, and not black, he kept in a little box of gold;
and with one grain of it he could make five hundred ducats, or a
thousand rix-dollars. He generally made his projection upon
quicksilver. When he travelled, he gave this box to his steward, who
hung it round his neck by a gold chain next his skin. But the greatest
part of the powder he used to hide in a secret place cut into the step
of his chariot. He thought that, if attacked at any time by robbers,
they would not search such a place as that. When he anticipated any
danger, he would dress himself in his valet’s clothes, and, mounting
the coach-box, put the valet inside. He was induced to take these
precautions, because it was no secret that he possessed the
philosopher’s stone; and many unprincipled adventurers were on the
watch for an opportunity to plunder him. A German prince, whose
name Brodowski has not thought fit to chronicle, served him a scurvy
trick, which ever afterwards put him on his guard. This prince went
on his knees to Sendivogius, and entreated him in the most pressing
terms to satisfy his curiosity, by converting some quicksilver into
gold before him. Sendivogius, wearied by his importunity, consented,
upon a promise of inviolable secrecy. After his departure, the prince
called a German alchymist, named Muhlenfels, who resided in his
house, and told him all that had been done. Muhlenfels entreated
that he might have a dozen mounted horsemen at his command, that
he might instantly ride after the philosopher, and either rob him of
all his powder, or force from him the secret of making it. The prince
desired nothing better; Muhlenfels, being provided with twelve men
well mounted and armed, pursued Sendivogius in hot haste. He
came up with him at a lonely inn by the road-side, just as he was
sitting down to dinner. He at first endeavoured to persuade him to

divulge the secret; but finding this of no avail, he caused his
accomplices to strip the unfortunate Sendivogius and tie him naked
to one of the pillars of the house. He then took from him his golden
box, containing a small quantity of the powder; a manuscript book
on the philosopher’s stone; a golden medal, with its chain, presented
to him by the Emperor Rudolph; and a rich cap, ornamented with
diamonds, of the value of one hundred thousand rix-dollars. With
this booty he decamped, leaving Sendivogius still naked and firmly
bound to the pillar. His servants had been treated in a similar
manner; but the people of the inn released them all as soon as the
robbers were out of sight.
Sendivogius proceeded to Prague, and made his complaint to the
emperor. An express was instantly sent off to the prince, with orders
that he should deliver up Muhlenfels and all his plunder. The prince,
fearful of the emperor’s wrath, caused three large gallows to be
erected in his court-yard; on the highest of which he hanged
Muhlenfels, with another thief on each side of him. He thus
propitiated the emperor, and got rid of an ugly witness against
himself. He sent back, at the same time, the bejewelled hat, the
medal and chain, and the treatise upon the philosopher’s stone,
which had been stolen from Sendivogius. As regarded the powder, he
said he had not seen it, and knew nothing about it.
This adventure made Sendivogius more prudent; he would no
longer perform the process of transmutation before any strangers,
however highly recommended. He pretended also to be very poor;
and sometimes lay in bed for weeks together, that people might
believe he was suffering from some dangerous malady, and could not
therefore, by any possibility, be the owner of the philosopher’s stone.

He would occasionally coin false money, and pass it off as gold;
preferring to be esteemed a cheat rather than a successful alchymist.
Many other extraordinary tales are told of this personage by his
steward Brodowski, but they are not worth repeating. He died in
1636, aged upwards of eighty, and was buried in his own chapel at
Gravarna. Several works upon alchymy have been published under
his name.

THE ROSICRUCIANS.
It was during the time of the last-mentioned author that the sect of
the Rosicrucians first began to create a sensation in Europe. The
influence which they exercised upon opinion during their brief
career, and the permanent impression which they have left upon
European literature, claim for them especial notice. Before their
time, alchymy was but a grovelling delusion; and theirs is the merit
of having spiritualised and refined it. They also enlarged its sphere,
and supposed the possession of the philosopher’s stone to be, not
only the means of wealth, but of health and happiness, and the
instrument by which man could command the services of superior
beings, control the elements to his will, defy the obstructions of time
and space, and acquire the most intimate knowledge of all the secrets
of the universe. Wild and visionary as they were, they were not
without their uses; if it were only for having purged the superstitions
of Europe of the dark and disgusting forms with which the monks
had peopled it, and substituted, in their stead, a race of mild,
graceful, and beneficent beings.
They are said to have derived their name from Christian
Rosencreutz, or “Rose-cross,” a German philosopher, who travelled

in the Holy Land towards the close of the fourteenth century. While
dangerously ill at a place called Damcar, he was visited by some
learned Arabs, who claimed him as their brother in science, and
unfolded to him, by inspiration, all the secrets of his past life, both of
thought and of action. They restored him to health by means of the
philosopher’s stone, and afterwards instructed him in all their
mysteries. He returned to Europe in 1401, being then only twentythree years of age; and drew a chosen number of his friends around
him, whom he initiated into the new science, and bound by solemn
oaths to keep it secret for a century. He is said to have lived eightythree years after this period, and to have died in 1484.
Many have denied the existence of such a personage as
Rosencreutz, and have fixed the origin of this sect at a much later
epoch. The first dawning of it, they say, is to be found in the theories
of Paracelsus and the dreams of Dr. Dee, who, without intending it,
became the actual, though never the recognised founders of the
Rosicrucian philosophy. It is now difficult, and indeed impossible, to
determine whether Dee and Paracelsus obtained their ideas from the
then

obscure

and

unknown

Rosicrucians,

or

whether

the

Rosicrucians did but follow and improve upon them. Certain it is,
that their existence was never suspected till the year 1605, when they
began to excite attention in Germany. No sooner were their doctrines
promulgated, than all the visionaries, Paracelsists, and alchymists,
flocked around their standard, and vaunted Rosencreutz as the new
regenerator of the human race. Michael Mayer, a celebrated
physician of that day, and who had impaired his health and wasted
his fortune in searching for the philosopher’s stone, drew up a report
of the tenets and ordinances of the new fraternity, which was

published at Cologne, in the year 1615. They asserted, in the first
place, “that the meditations of their founders surpassed every thing
that had ever been imagined since the creation of the world, without
even excepting the revelations of the Deity; that they were destined
to accomplish the general peace and regeneration of man before the
end of the world arrived; that they possessed all wisdom and piety in
a supreme degree; that they possessed all the graces of nature, and
could distribute them among the rest of mankind according to their
pleasure; that they were subject to neither hunger, nor thirst, nor
disease, nor old age, nor to any other inconvenience of nature; that
they knew by inspiration, and at the first glance, every one who was
worthy to be admitted into their society; that they had the same
knowledge then which they would have possessed if they had lived
from the beginning of the world, and had been always acquiring it;
that they had a volume in which they could read all that ever was or
ever would be written in other books till the end of time; that they
could force to, and retain in their service the most powerful spirits
and demons; that, by the virtue of their songs, they could attract
pearls and precious stones from the depths of the sea or the bowels
of the earth; that God had covered them with a thick cloud, by means
of which they could shelter themselves from the malignity of their
enemies, and that they could thus render themselves invisible from
all eyes; that the first eight brethren of the ‘Rose-cross’ had power to
cure all maladies; that, by means of the fraternity, the triple diadem
of the pope would be reduced into dust; that they only admitted two
sacraments, with the ceremonies of the primitive Church, renewed
by them; that they recognised the Fourth Monarchy and the Emperor
of the Romans as their chief and the chief of all Christians; that they

would provide him with more gold, their treasures being
inexhaustible, than the King of Spain had ever drawn from the
golden regions of Eastern and Western Ind.” This was their
confession of faith. Their rules of conduct were six in number, and as
follow:
First. That, in their travels, they should gratuitously cure all
diseases.
Secondly. That they should always dress in conformity to the
fashion of the country in which they resided.
Thirdly. That they should, once every year, meet together in the
place appointed by the fraternity, or send in writing an available
excuse.
Fourthly. That every brother, whenever he felt inclined to die,
should choose a person worthy to succeed him.
Fifthly. That the words “Rose-cross” should be the marks by which
they should recognise each other.
Sixthly. That their fraternity should be kept secret for six times
twenty years.
They asserted that these laws had been found inscribed in a golden
book in the tomb of Rosencreutz, and that the six times twenty years
from his death expired in 1604. They were consequently called upon
from that time forth to promulgate their doctrine for the welfare of
mankind 44.
For eight years these enthusiasts made converts in Germany, but
they excited little or no attention in other parts of Europe. At last
they made their appearance in Paris, and threw all the learned, all
the credulous, and all the lovers of the marvellous into commotion.
In the beginning of March 1623, the good folks of that city, when

they arose one morning, were surprised to find all their walls
placarded with the following singular manifesto:
“We, the deputies of the principal College of the Brethren of
the Rose-cross, have taken up our abode, visible and invisible,
in this city, by the grace of the Most High, towards whom are
turned the hearts of the just. We shew and teach without books
or signs, and speak all sorts of languages in the countries
where we dwell, to draw mankind, our fellows, from error and
from death.”
For a long time this strange placard was the sole topic of
conversation in all public places. Some few wondered, but the greater
number only laughed at it. In the course of a few weeks two books
were published, which raised the first alarm respecting this
mysterious society, whose dwelling-place no one knew, and no
members of which had ever been seen. The first was called a history
of The frightful Compacts entered into between the Devil and the
pretended ‘Invisibles;’ with their damnable Instructions, the
deplorable Ruin of their Disciples, and their miserable end. The
other was called an Examination of the new and unknown Cabala of
the Brethren of the Rose-cross, who have lately inhabited the City of
Paris; with the History of their Manners, the Wonders worked by
them, and many other particulars.
These books sold rapidly. Every one was anxious to know
something of this dreadful and secret brotherhood. The badauds of
Paris were so alarmed that they daily expected to see the arch-enemy
walking in propria persona among them. It was said in these
volumes that the Rosicrucian society consisted of six-and-thirty

persons in all, who had renounced their baptism and hope of
resurrection. That it was not by means of good angels, as they
pretended, that they worked their prodigies; but that it was the devil
who gave them power to transport themselves from one end of the
world to the other with the rapidity of thought; to speak all
languages; to have their purses always full of money, however much
they might spend; to be invisible, and penetrate into the most secret
places, in spite of fastenings of bolts and bars; and to be able to tell
the past and future. These thirty-six brethren were divided into
bands or companies: six of them only had been sent on the mission
to Paris, six to Italy, six to Spain, six to Germany, four to Sweden,
and two into Switzerland, two into Flanders, two into Lorraine, and
two into Franche Comté. It was generally believed that the
missionaries to France resided somewhere in the Marais du Temple.
That quarter of Paris soon acquired a bad name, and people were
afraid to take houses in it, lest they should be turned out by the six
invisibles of the Rose-cross. It was believed by the populace, and by
many others whose education should have taught them better, that
persons of a mysterious aspect used to visit the inns and hotels of
Paris, and eat of the best meats and drink of the best wines, and then
suddenly melt away into thin air when the landlord came with the
reckoning. That gentle maidens, who went to bed alone, often awoke
in the night and found men in bed with them, of shape more
beautiful than the Grecian Apollo, who immediately became invisible
when an alarm was raised. It was also said that many persons found
large heaps of gold in their houses without knowing from whence
they came. All Paris was in alarm. No man thought himself secure of
his goods, no maiden of her virginity, or wife of her chastity, while

these Rosicrucians were abroad. In the midst of the commotion, a
second placard was issued to the following effect:
“If any one desires to see the brethren of the Rose-cross from
curiosity only, he will never communicate with us. But if his
will really induces him to inscribe his name in the register of
our brotherhood, we, who can judge of the thoughts of all men,
will convince him of the truth of our promises. For this reason
we do not publish to the world the place of our abode. Thought
alone, in unison with the sincere will of those who desire to
know us, is sufficient to make us known to them, and them to
us.”
Though the existence of such a society as that of the Rose-cross
was problematical, it was quite evident that somebody or other was
concerned in the promulgation of these placards, which were stuck
up on every wall in Paris. The police endeavoured in vain to find out
the offenders, and their want of success only served to increase the
perplexity of the public. The Church very soon took up the question;
and the Abbé Gaultier, a Jesuit, wrote a book to prove that, by their
enmity to the pope, they could be no other than disciples of Luther,
sent to promulgate his heresy. Their very name, he added, proved
that they were heretics; a cross surmounted by a rose being the
heraldic device of the arch-heretic Luther. One Garasse said they
were a confraternity of drunken impostors; and that their name was
derived from the garland of roses, in the form of a cross, hung over
the tables of taverns in Germany as the emblem of secrecy, and from
whence was derived the common saying, when one man
communicated a secret to another, that it was said “under the rose.”

Others interpreted the letters F. R. C. to mean, not Brethren of the
Rose-cross, but Fratres Roris Cocti, or Brothers of Boiled Dew; and
explained this appellation by alleging that they collected large
quantities of morning dew, and boiled it, in order to extract a very
valuable ingredient in the composition of the philosopher’s stone and
the water of life.
The fraternity thus attacked defended themselves as well as they
were able. They denied that they used magic of any kind, or that they
consulted the devil. They said they were all happy; that they had
lived more than a century, and expected to live many centuries more;
and that the intimate knowledge which they possessed of all nature
was communicated to them by God himself as a reward for their
piety and utter devotion to his service. Those were in error who
derived their name from a cross of roses, or called them drunkards.
To set the world right on the first point, they reiterated that they
derived their name from Christian Rosencreutz, their founder; and to
answer the latter charge, they repeated that they knew not what
thirst was, and had higher pleasures than those of the palate. They
did not desire to meddle with the politics or religion of any man or
set of men, although they could not help denying the supremacy of
the pope, and looking upon him as a tyrant. Many slanders, they
said, had been repeated respecting them, the most unjust of which
was, that they indulged in carnal appetites, and, under the cloak of
their invisibility, crept into the chambers of beautiful maidens. They
asserted, on the contrary, that the first vow they took on entering the
society was a vow of chastity, and that any one among them who
transgressed in that particular would immediately lose all the
advantages he enjoyed, and be exposed once more to hunger, woe,

disease, and death, like other men. So strongly did they feel on the
subject of chastity, that they attributed the fall of Adam solely to his
want of this virtue. Besides defending themselves in this manner,
they entered into a further confession of their faith. They discarded
for ever all the old tales of sorcery and witchcraft, and communion
with the devil. They said there were no such horrid, unnatural, and
disgusting beings as the incubi and succubi, and the innumerable
grotesque imps that men had believed in for so many ages. Man was
not surrounded with enemies like these, but with myriads of
beautiful and beneficent beings, all anxious to do him service. The air
was peopled with sylphs, the water with undines or naiads, the
bowels of the earth with gnomes, and the fire with salamanders. All
these beings were the friends of man, and desired nothing so much
as that men should purge themselves of all uncleanness, and thus be
enabled to see and converse with them. They possessed great power,
and were unrestrained by the barriers of space or the obstructions of
matter. But man was in one particular their superior. He had an
immortal soul, and they had not. They might, however, become
sharers in man’s immortality if they could inspire one of that race
with the passion of love towards them. Hence it was the constant
endeavour of the female spirits to captivate the admiration of men,
and of the male gnomes, sylphs, salamanders, and undines to be
beloved by a woman. The object of this passion, in returning their
love, imparted a portion of that celestial fire, the soul; and from that
time forth the beloved became equal to the lover, and both, when
their allotted course was run, entered together into the mansions of
felicity. These spirits, they said, watched constantly over mankind by
night and day. Dreams, omens, and presentiments were all their

works, and the means by which they gave warning of the approach of
danger. But though so well inclined to befriend man for their own
sakes, the want of a soul rendered them at times capricious and
revengeful; they took offence on slight causes, and heaped injuries
instead of benefits on the heads of those who extinguished the light
of reason that was in them by gluttony, debauchery, and other
appetites of the body.
The excitement produced in Paris by the placards of the
brotherhood and the attacks of the clergy wore itself away after a few
months. The stories circulated about them became at last too absurd
even for that age of absurdity, and men began to laugh once more at
those invisible gentlemen and their fantastic doctrines. Gabriel
Naudé at that conjuncture brought out his Avis à la France sur les
Frères de la Rose-croix, in which he very successfully exposed the
folly of the new sect. This work, though not well written, was well
timed. It quite extinguished the Rosicrucians of France; and after
that year little more was heard of them. Swindlers in different parts
of the country assumed the name at times to cloak their
depredations; and now and then one of them was caught and hanged
for his too great ingenuity in enticing pearls and precious stones
from the pockets of other people into his own, or for passing off
lumps of gilded brass for pure gold, made by the agency of the
philosopher’s stone. With these exceptions, oblivion shrouded them.
The doctrine was not confined to a sphere so narrow as France
alone; it still nourished in Germany, and drew many converts in
England. The latter countries produced two great masters in the
persons

of

Jacob

Böhmen

and

Robert

Fludd—pretended

philosophers, of whom it is difficult to say which was the more

absurd and extravagant. It would appear that the sect was divided
into two classes—the brothers Roseæ Crucis, who devoted
themselves to the wonders of this sublunary sphere, and the brothers
Aureæ Crucis, who were wholly occupied in the contemplation of
things divine. Fludd belonged to the first class, and Böhmen to the
second. Fludd may be called the father of the English Rosicrucians,
and as such merits a conspicuous niche in the temple of Folly.
He was born in the year 1574 at Milgate, in Kent, and was the son
of Sir Thomas Fludd, Treasurer of War to Queen Elizabeth. He was
originally intended for the army; but he was too fond of study, and of
a disposition too quiet and retiring, to shine in that sphere. His
father would not therefore press him to adopt a course of life for
which he was unsuited, and encouraged him in the study of
medicine, for which he early manifested a partiality. At the age of
twenty-five he proceeded to the continent; and being fond of the
abstruse, the marvellous, and the incomprehensible, he became an
ardent disciple of the school of Paracelsus, whom he looked upon as
the regenerator not only of medicine, but of philosophy. He
remained six years in Italy, France, and Germany, storing his mind
with fantastic notions, and seeking the society of enthusiasts and
visionaries. On his return to England in 1605, he received the degree
of Doctor of Medicine from the University of Oxford, and began to
practise as a physician in London.
He soon made himself conspicuous. He latinised his name from
Robert Fludd into Robertus à Fluctibus, and began the promulgation
of many strange doctrines. He avowed his belief in the philosopher’s
stone, the water of life, and the universal alkahest; and maintained
that there were but two principles of all things,—which were,

condensation, the boreal or northern virtue; and rarefaction, the
southern or austral virtue. A number of demons, he said, ruled over
the human frame, whom he arranged in their places in a rhomboid.
Every disease had its peculiar demon who produced it, which demon
could only be combated by the aid of the demon whose place was
directly opposite to his in the rhomboidal figure. Of his medical
notions we shall have further occasion to speak in another part of
this book, when we consider him in his character as one of the first
founders of the magnetic delusion, and its offshoot, animal
magnetism, which has created so much sensation in our own day.
As if the doctrines already mentioned were not wild enough, he
joined the Rosicrucians as soon as they began to make a sensation in
Europe, and succeeded in raising himself to high consideration
among them. The fraternity having been violently attacked by several
German authors, and among others by Libavius, Fludd volunteered a
reply, and published, in 1616, his defence of the Rosicrucian
philosophy, under the title of the Apologia compendiaria
Fraternitatem de Rosea-cruce suspicionis et infamiæ maculis
aspersam abluens. This work immediately procured him great
renown upon the Continent, and he was henceforth looked upon as
one of the high-priests of the sect. Of so much importance was he
considered, that Keppler and Gassendi thought it necessary to refute
him; and the latter wrote a complete examination of his doctrine.
Mersenne also, the friend of Descartes, and who had defended that
philosopher when accused of having joined the Rosicrucians,
attacked Dr. à Fluctibus, as he preferred to be called, and shewed the
absurdity of the brothers of the Rose-cross in general, and of Dr. à
Fluctibus in particular. Fluctibus wrote a long reply, in which he

called Mersenne an ignorant calumniator, and reiterated that
alchymy was a profitable science, and the Rosicrucians worthy to be
the regenerators of the world. This book was published at Frankfort,
and was entitled Summum Bonum, quod est Magiæ, Cabalæ,
Alchimiæ, Fratrum, Roseæ-Crucis verorum, et adversus Mersenium
Calumniatorem. Besides this, he wrote several other works upon
alchymy, a second answer to Libavius upon the Rosicrucians, and
many medical works. He died in London in 1637.
After his time there was some diminution of the sect in England.
They excited but little attention, and made no effort to bring
themselves into notice. Occasionally some obscure and almost
incomprehensible work made its appearance, to shew the world that
the folly was not extinguished. Eugenius Philalethes, a noted
alchymist, who has veiled his real name under this assumed one,
translated The Fame and Confession of the Brethren of the Rosie
Cross, which was published in London in 1652. A few years
afterwards, another enthusiast, named John Heydon, wrote two
works on the subject: the one entitled The Wise Man’s Crown, or the
Glory of the Rosie Cross; and the other, The Holy Guide, leading the
way to unite Art and Nature with the Rosie Crosse uncovered.
Neither of these attracted much notice. A third book was somewhat
more successful; it was called A new Method of Rosicrucian Physic;
by John Heydon, the servant of God and the Secretary of Nature. A
few extracts will shew the ideas of the English Rosicrucians about
this period. Its author was an attorney, “practising (to use his own
words) at Westminster Hall all term times as long as he lived, and in
the vacations devoting himself to alchymical and Rosicrucian
meditation.” In his preface, called by him an Apologue for an

Epilogue, he enlightens the public upon the true history and tenets of
his sect. Moses, Elias, and Ezekiel were, he says, the most ancient
masters of the Rosicrucian philosophy. Those few then existing in
England and the rest of Europe, were as the eyes and ears of the
great king of the universe, seeing and hearing all things; seraphically
illuminated; companions of the holy company of unbodied souls and
immortal angels; turning themselves, Proteus-like, into any shape,
and having the power of working miracles. The most pious and
abstracted brethren could slack the plague in cities, silence the
violent winds and tempests, calm the rage of the sea and rivers, walk
in the air, frustrate the malicious aspect of witches, cure all diseases,
and turn all metals into gold. He had known in his time two famous
brethren of the Rosie Cross, named Walfourd and Williams, who had
worked miracles in his sight, and taught him many excellent
predictions of astrology and earthquakes. “I desired one of these to
tell me,” says he, “whether my complexion were capable of the
society of my good genius. ‘When I see you again,’ said he (which was
when he pleased to come to me, for I knew not where to go to him), ‘I
will tell you.’ When I saw him afterwards, he said, ‘You should pray
to God; for a good and holy man can offer no greater or more
acceptable service to God than the oblation of himself—his soul.’ He
said also, that the good genii were the benign eyes of God, running to
and fro in the world, and with love and pity beholding the innocent
endeavours of harmless and single-hearted men, ever ready to do
them good and to help them.”
Heydon held devoutly true that dogma of the Rosicrucians which
said that neither eating nor drinking was necessary to men. He
maintained that any one might exist in the same manner as that

singular people dwelling near the source of the Ganges, of whom
mention was made in the travels of his namesake, Sir Christopher
Heydon, who had no mouths, and therefore could not eat, but lived
by the breath of their nostrils; except when they took a far journey,
and then they mended their diet with the smell of flowers. He said
that in really pure air “there was a fine foreign fatness,” with which it
was sprinkled by the sunbeams, and which was quite sufficient for
the nourishment of the generality of mankind. Those who had
enormous appetites, he had no objection to see take animal food,
since they could not do without it; but he obstinately insisted that
there was no necessity why they should eat it. If they put a plaster of
nicely-cooked meat upon their epigastrium, it would be sufficient for
the wants of the most robust and voracious! They would by that
means let in no diseases, as they did at the broad and common gate,
the mouth, as any one might see by example of drink; for all the
while a man sat in water, he was never athirst. He had known, he
said, many Rosicrucians, who by applying wine in this manner, had
fasted for years together. In fact, quoth Heydon, we may easily fast
all our life, though it be three hundred years, without any kind of
meat, and so cut off all danger of disease.
This

“sage

philosopher”

further

informed

his

wondering

contemporaries that the chiefs of the doctrine always carried about
with them to their place of meeting their symbol, called the R. C.
which was an ebony cross, flourished and decked with roses of gold;
the cross typifying Christ’s sufferings upon the cross for our sins, and
the roses of gold the glory and beauty of his Resurrection. This
symbol was carried alternately to Mecca, Mount Calvary, Mount
Sinai, Haran, and to three other places, which must have been in

mid-air, called Cascle, Apamia and Chaulateau Virissa Caunuch,
where the Rosicrucian brethren met when they pleased, and made
resolution of all their actions. They always took their pleasures in one
of these places, where they resolved all questions of whatsoever had
been done, was done, or should be done in the world, from the
beginning to the end thereof. “And these,” he concludes, “are the
men called Rosicrucians!”
Towards the end of the seventeenth century, more rational ideas
took possession of the sect, which still continued to boast of a few
members. They appear to have considered that contentment was the
true philosopher’s stone, and to have abandoned the insane search
for a mere phantom of the imagination. Addison, in The Spectator, 45
gives an account of his conversation with a Rosicrucian; from which
it may be inferred that the sect had grown wiser in their deeds,
though in their talk they were as foolish as ever. “I was once,” says
he, “engaged in discourse with a Rosicrucian about the great secret.
He talked of the secret as of a spirit which lived within an emerald,
and converted every thing that was near it to the highest perfection
that it was capable of. ‘It gives a lustre,’ says he, ‘to the sun, and
water to the diamond. It irradiates every metal, and enriches lead
with all the properties of gold. It heightens smoke into flame, flame
into light, and light into glory.’ He further added, ‘that a single ray of
it dissipates pain and care and melancholy from the person on whom
it falls. In short,’ says he, ‘its presence naturally changes every place
into a kind of heaven.’ After he had gone on for some time in this
unintelligible cant, I found that he jumbled natural and moral ideas
together into the same discourse, and that his great secret was
nothing else but content.”

JACOB BÖHMEN.
It is now time to speak of Jacob Böhmen, who thought he could
discover the secret of the transmutation of metals in the Bible, and
who invented a strange heterogeneous doctrine of mingled alchymy
and religion, and founded upon it the sect of the Aurea-crucians. He
was born at Görlitz, in Upper Lusatia, in 1575, and followed till his
thirtieth year the occupation of a shoemaker. In this obscurity he
remained, with the character of a visionary and a man of unsettled
mind, until the promulgation of the Rosicrucian philosophy in his
part of Germany, toward the year 1607 or 1608. From that time he
began to neglect his leather, and buried his brain under the rubbish
of metaphysics. The works of Paracelsus fell into his hands; and
these, with the reveries of the Rosicrucians, so completely engrossed
his attention, that he abandoned his trade altogether, sinking, at the
same time, from a state of comparative independence into poverty
and destitution. But he was nothing daunted by the miseries and
privations of the flesh; his mind was fixed upon the beings of another
sphere, and in thought he was already the new apostle of the human
race. In the year 1612, after a meditation of four years, he published
his first work, entitled Aurora, or the Rising of the Sun; embodying
the ridiculous notions of Paracelsus, and worse confounding the
confusion of that writer. The philosopher’s stone might, he
contended, be discovered by a diligent search of the Old and New
Testaments, and more especially of the Apocalypse, which alone
contained all the secrets of alchymy. He contended that the divine
grace operated by the same rules, and followed the same methods,
that the divine providence observed in the natural world; and that
the minds of men were purged from their vices and corruptions in

the very same manner that metals were purified from their dross,
namely, by fire.
Besides the sylphs, gnomes, undines, and salamanders, he
acknowledged various ranks and orders of demons. He pretended to
invisibility and absolute chastity. He also said that, if it pleased him,
he could abstain for years from meat and drink, and all the
necessities of the body. It is needless, however, to pursue his follies
any further. He was reprimanded for writing this work by the
magistrates of Görlitz, and commanded to leave the pen alone and
stick to his wax, that his family might not become chargeable to the
parish. He neglected this good advice, and continued his studies;
burning minerals and purifying metals one day, and mystifying the
Word of God on the next. He afterwards wrote three other works, as
sublimely ridiculous as the first. The one was entitled Metallurgia,
and has the slight merit of being the least obscure of his
compositions. Another was called The Temporal Mirror of Eternity;
and the last his Theosophy revealed, full of allegories and
metaphors,

“All strange and geason,
Devoid of sense and ordinary reason.”
Böhmen died in 1624, leaving behind him a considerable number
of admiring disciples. Many of them became, during the seventeenth
century, as distinguished for absurdity as their master; amongst
whom may be mentioned Gifftheil, Wendenhagen, John Jacob
Zimmermann, and Abraham Frankenberg. Their heresy rendered
them obnoxious to the Church of Rome; and many of them suffered
long imprisonment and torture for their faith. One, named
Kuhlmann, was burned alive at Moscow, in 1684, on a charge of
sorcery. Böhmen’s works were translated into English, and
published, many years afterwards, by an enthusiast named William
Law.

MORMIUS.
Peter Mormius, a notorious alchymist and contemporary of
Böhmen, endeavoured, in 1630, to introduce the Rosicrucian
philosophy into Holland. He applied to the States-General to grant
him a public audience, that he might explain the tenets of the sect,
and disclose a plan for rendering Holland the happiest and richest
country on the earth, by means of the philosopher’s stone and the
service of the elementary spirits. The States-General wisely resolved

to have nothing to do with him. He thereupon determined to shame
them by printing his book, which he did at Leyden the same year. It
was entitled The Book of the most Hidden Secrets of Nature, and was
divided into three parts; the first treating of “perpetual motion;” the
second of the “transmutation of metals;” and the third of the
“universal medicine.” He also published some German works upon
the Rosicrucian philosophy, at Frankfort, in 1617.
Poetry and romance are deeply indebted to the Rosicrucians for
many a graceful creation. The literature of England, France, and
Germany contains hundreds of sweet fictions, whose machinery has
been borrowed from their day-dreams. The “delicate Ariel” of
Shakspeare stands pre-eminent among the number. From the same
source Pope drew the airy tenants of Belinda’s dressing-room, in his
charming Rape of the Lock; and La Motte Fouqué, the beautiful and
capricious water-nymph Undine, around whom he has thrown more
grace and loveliness, and for whose imaginary woes he has excited
more sympathy, than ever were bestowed on a supernatural being.
Sir Walter Scott also endowed the White Lady of Avenel with many
of the attributes of the undines or water-sprites. German romance
and lyrical poetry teem with allusions to sylphs, gnomes, undines,
and salamanders; and the French have not been behind in
substituting them, in works of fiction, for the more cumbrous
mythology of Greece and Rome. The sylphs, more especially, have
been the favourites of the bards, and have become so familiar to the
popular mind as to be, in a manner, confounded with that other race
of ideal beings, the fairies, who can boast of an antiquity much more
venerable in the annals of superstition. Having these obligations to

the Rosicrucians, no lover of poetry can wish, however absurd they
were, that such a sect of philosophers had never existed.

BORRI.
Just at the time that Michael Mayer was making known to the
world the existence of such a body as the Rosicrucians, there was
born in Italy a man who was afterwards destined to become the most
conspicuous member of the fraternity. The alchymic mania never
called forth the ingenuity of a more consummate or more successful
impostor than Joseph Francis Borri. He was born in 1616, according
to some authorities, and in 1627 according to others, at Milan; where
his father, the Signor Branda Borri, practised as a physician. At the
age of sixteen Joseph was sent to finish his education at the Jesuits’
college in Rome, where he distinguished himself by his extraordinary
memory. He learned every thing to which he applied himself with the
utmost ease. In the most voluminous works no fact was too minute
for his retention, and no study was so abstruse but that he could
master it; but any advantages he might have derived from this facility
were neutralised by his ungovernable passions and his love of
turmoil and debauchery. He was involved in continual difficulty, as
well with the heads of the college as with the police of Rome, and
acquired so bad a character that years could not remove it. By the aid
of his friends he established himself as a physician in Rome, and also
obtained some situation in the pope’s household. In one of his fits of
studiousness he grew enamoured of alchymy, and determined to
devote his energies to the discovery of the philosopher’s stone. Of
unfortunate propensities he had quite sufficient, besides this, to
bring him to poverty. His pleasures were as expensive as his studies,

and both were of a nature to destroy his health and ruin his fair
fame. At the age of thirty-seven he found that he could not live by the
practice of medicine, and began to look about for some other
employment. He became, in 1653, private secretary to the Marquis di
Mirogli, the minister of the Archduke of Innsprück at the court of
Rome. He continued in this capacity for two years; leading, however,
the same abandoned life as heretofore, frequenting the society of
gamesters, debauchees, and loose women, involving himself in
disgraceful street quarrels, and alienating the patrons who were
desirous to befriend him.
All at once a sudden change was observed in his conduct. The
abandoned rake put on the outward sedateness of a philosopher; the
scoffing sinner proclaimed that he had forsaken his evil ways, and
would live thenceforth a model of virtue. To his friends this
reformation was as pleasing as it was unexpected; and Borri gave
obscure hints that it had been brought about by some miraculous
manifestation of a superior power. He pretended that he held
converse with beneficent spirits; that the secrets of God and nature
were revealed to him; and that he had obtained possession of the
philosopher’s stone. Like his predecessor, Jacob Böhmen, he mixed
up religious questions with his philosophical jargon, and took
measures for declaring himself the founder of a new sect. This, at
Rome itself, and in the very palace of the pope, was a hazardous
proceeding; and Borri just awoke to a sense of it in time to save
himself from the dungeons of the Castle of St. Angelo. He fled to
Innsprück, where he remained about a year, and then returned to his
native city of Milan.

INNSPRUCK.

The reputation of his great sanctity had gone before him; and he
found many persons ready to attach themselves to his fortunes. All
who were desirous of entering into the new communion took an oath
of poverty, and relinquished their possessions for the general good of
the fraternity. Borri told them that he had received from the
archangel Michael a heavenly sword, upon the hilt of which were
engraven the names of the seven celestial intelligences. “Whoever
shall refuse,” said he, “to enter into my new sheepfold shall be
destroyed by the papal armies, of whom God has predestined me to
be the chief. To those who follow me all joy shall be granted. I shall
soon bring my chemical studies to a happy conclusion, by the
discovery of the philosopher’s stone, and by this means we shall all
have as much gold as we desire. I am assured of the aid of the angelic

hosts, and more especially of the archangel Michael’s. When I began
to walk in the way of the spirit, I had a vision of the night, and was
assured by an angelic voice that I should become a prophet. In sign
of it I saw a palm-tree, surrounded with all the glory of paradise. The
angels come to me whenever I call, and reveal to me all the secrets of
the universe. The sylphs and elementary spirits obey me, and fly to
the uttermost ends of the world to serve me, and those whom I
delight to honour.” By force of continually repeating such stories as
these, Borri soon found himself at the head of a very considerable
number of adherents. As he figures in these pages as an alchymist,
and not as a religious sectarian, it will be unnecessary to repeat the
doctrines which he taught with regard to some of the dogmas of the
Church of Rome, and which exposed him to the fierce resentment of
the papal authority. They were to the full as ridiculous as his
philosophical pretensions. As the number of his followers increased,
he appears to have cherished the idea of becoming one day a new
Mahomet, and of founding, in his native city of Milan, a monarchy
and religion of which he should be the king and the prophet. He had
taken measures, in the year 1658, for seizing the guards at all the
gates of that city, and formally declaring himself the monarch of the
Milanese. Just as he thought the plan ripe for execution, it was
discovered. Twenty of his followers were arrested, and he himself
managed, with the utmost difficulty, to escape to the neutral territory
of Switzerland, where the papal displeasure could not reach him.
The trial of his followers commenced forthwith, and the whole of
them were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Borri’s trial
proceeded in his absence, and lasted for upwards of two years. He

was condemned to death as a heretic and sorcerer in 1661, and was
burned in effigy in Rome by the common hangman.
Borri, in the mean time, lived quietly in Switzerland, indulging
himself in railing at the Inquisition and its proceedings. He
afterwards went to Strasbourg, intending to fix his residence in that
town. He was received with great cordiality, as a man persecuted for
his religious opinions, and withal a great alchymist. He found that
sphere too narrow for his aspiring genius, and retired in the same
year to the more wealthy city of Amsterdam. He there hired a
magnificent house, established an equipage which eclipsed in
brilliancy those of the richest merchants, and assumed the title of
Excellency. Where he got the money to live in this expensive style
was long a secret: the adepts in alchymy easily explained it, after
their fashion. Sensible people were of opinion that he had come by it
in a less wonderful manner; for it was remembered that among his
unfortunate disciples in Milan, there were many rich men, who, in
conformity with one of the fundamental rules of the sect, had given
up all their earthly wealth into the hands of their founder. In
whatever manner the money was obtained, Borri spent it in Holland
with an unsparing hand, and was looked up to by the people with no
little respect and veneration. He performed several able cures, and
increased his reputation so much that he was vaunted as a prodigy.
He continued diligently the operations of alchymy, and was in daily
expectation that he should succeed in turning the inferior metals into
gold. This hope never abandoned him, even in the worst extremity of
his fortunes; and in his prosperity it led him into the most foolish
expenses: but he could not long continue to live so magnificently
upon the funds he had brought from Italy; and the philosopher’s

stone, though it promised all for the wants of the morrow, never
brought any thing for the necessities of to-day. He was obliged in a
few months to retrench, by giving up his large house, his gilded
coach and valuable blood-horses, his liveried domestics, and his
luxurious entertainments. With this diminution of splendour came a
diminution of renown. His cures did not appear so miraculous, when
he went out on foot to perform them, as they had seemed when “his
Excellency” had driven to a poor man’s door in his carriage with six
horses. He sank from a prodigy into an ordinary man. His great
friends shewed him the cold shoulder, and his humble flatterers
carried their incense to some other shrine. Borri now thought it high
time to change his quarters. With this view he borrowed money
wherever he could get it, and succeeded in obtaining two hundred
thousand florins from a merchant named De Meer, to aid, as he said,
in discovering the water of life. He also obtained six diamonds of
great value, on pretence that he could remove the flaws from them
without diminishing their weight. With this booty he stole away
secretly by night, and proceeded to Hamburgh.
On his arrival in that city, he found the celebrated Christina, the
ex-queen of Sweden. He procured an introduction to her, and
requested her patronage in his endeavour to discover the
philosopher’s stone. She gave him some encouragement; but Borri,
fearing that the merchants of Amsterdam, who had connexions in
Hamburgh, might expose his delinquencies if he remained in the
latter city, passed over to Copenhagen, and sought the protection of
Frederick III., the king of Denmark.
This prince was a firm believer in the transmutation of metals.
Being in want of money, he readily listened to the plans of an

adventurer who had both eloquence and ability to recommend him.
He provided Borri with the means to make experiments, and took a
great interest in the progress of his operations. He expected every
month to possess riches that would buy Peru; and, when he was
disappointed, accepted patiently the excuses of Borri, who, upon
every failure, was always ready with some plausible explanation. He
became in time much attached to him; and defended him from the
jealous attacks of his courtiers, and the indignation of those who
were grieved to see their monarch the easy dupe of a charlatan. Borri
endeavoured, by every means in his power, to find aliment for this
good opinion. His knowledge of medicine was useful to him in this
respect, and often stood between him and disgrace. He lived six years
in this manner at the court of Frederick; but that monarch dying in
1670 he was left without a protector.
As he had made more enemies than friends in Copenhagen, and
had nothing to hope from the succeeding sovereign, he sought an
asylum in another country. He went first to Saxony; but met so little
encouragement, and encountered so much danger from the
emissaries of the Inquisition, that he did not remain there many
months. Anticipating nothing but persecution in every country that
acknowledged the spiritual authority of the pope, he appears to have
taken the resolution to dwell in Turkey, and turn Mussulman. On his
arrival at the Hungarian frontier, on his way to Constantinople, he
was arrested on suspicion of being concerned in the conspiracy of the
Counts Nadasdi and Frangipani, which had just been discovered. In
vain he protested his innocence, and divulged his real name and
profession. He was detained in prison, and a letter despatched to the
Emperor Leopold, to know what should be done with him. The star

of his fortunes was on the decline. The letter reached Leopold at an
unlucky moment. The pope’s nuncio was closeted with his majesty;
and he no sooner heard the name of Joseph Francis Borri, than he
demanded him as a prisoner of the Holy See. The request was
complied with; and Borri, closely manacled, was sent under an escort
of soldiers to the prison of the Inquisition at Rome. He was too much
of an impostor to be deeply tinged with fanaticism, and was not
unwilling to make a public recantation of his heresies, if he could
thereby save his life. When the proposition was made to him, he
accepted it with eagerness. His punishment was to be commuted into
the hardly less severe one of perpetual imprisonment; but he was too
happy to escape the clutch of the executioner at any price, and he
made the amende honorable in face of the assembled multitudes of
Rome on the 27th of October 1672. He was then transferred to the
prisons of the Castle of St. Angelo, where he remained till his death,
twenty-three years afterwards. It is said that, towards the close of his
life, considerable indulgence was granted him; that he was allowed to
have a laboratory, and to cheer the solitude of his dungeon by
searching for the philosopher’s stone. Queen Christina, during her
residence at Rome, frequently visited the old man, to converse with
him upon chemistry and the doctrines of the Rosicrucians. She even
obtained permission that he should leave his prison occasionally for
a day or two, and reside in her palace, she being responsible for his
return to captivity. She encouraged him to search for the great secret
of the alchymists, and provided him with money for the purpose. It
may well be supposed that Borri benefited most by this
acquaintance, and that Christina got nothing but experience. It is not
sure that she gained even that; for until her dying day she was

convinced of the possibility of finding the philosopher’s stone, and
ready to assist any adventurer either zealous or impudent enough to
pretend to it.
After Borri had been about eleven years in confinement, a small
volume was published at Cologne, entitled The Key of the Cabinet of
the Chevalier Joseph Francis Borri, in which are contained many
curious Letters upon Chemistry and other Sciences, written by him,
together with a Memoir of his Life. This book contained a complete
exposition of the Rosicrucian philosophy, and afforded materials to
the Abbé de Villars for his interesting Count de Gabalis, which
excited so much attention at the close of the seventeenth century.
Borri lingered in the prison of St. Angelo till 1695, when he died, in
his eightieth year. Besides The Key of the Cabinet, written originally
in Copenhagen, in 1666, for the edification of King Frederick III., he
published a work upon alchymy and the secret sciences, under the
title of The Mission of Romulus to the Romans.

INFERIOR ALCHYMISTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.
Besides the pretenders to the philosopher’s stone whose lives have
been already narrated, this and the preceding century produced a
great number of writers, who inundated literature with their books
upon the subject. In fact, most of the learned men of that age had
some faith in it. Van Helmont, Borrichius, Kircher, Boerhaave, and a
score of others, though not professed alchymists, were fond of the
science, and countenanced its professors. Helvetius, the grandfather
of the celebrated philosopher of the same name, asserts that he saw
an inferior metal turned into gold by a stranger, at the Hague, in
1666. He says, that, sitting one day in his study, a man, who was

dressed as a respectable burgher of North Holland, and very modest
and simple in his appearance, called upon him, with the intention of
dispelling his doubts relative to the philosopher’s stone. He asked
Helvetius if he thought he should know that rare gem if he saw it. To
which Helvetius replied, that he certainly should not. The burgher
immediately drew from his pocket a small ivory box, containing three
pieces of metal, of the colour of brimstone, and extremely heavy; and
assured Helvetius, that of them he could make as much as twenty
tons of gold. Helvetius informs us, that he examined them very
attentively; and seeing that they were very brittle, he took the
opportunity to scrape off a small portion with his thumb-nail. He
then returned them to the stranger, with an entreaty that he would
perform the process of transmutation before him. The stranger
replied, that he was not allowed to do so, and went away. After his
departure, Helvetius procured a crucible and a portion of lead, into
which, when in a state of fusion, he threw the stolen grain from the
philosopher’s stone. He was disappointed to find that the grain
evaporated altogether, leaving the lead in its original state.
Some weeks afterwards, when he had almost forgotten the subject,
he received another visit from the stranger. He again entreated him
to explain the processes by which he pretended to transmute lead.
The stranger at last consented, and informed him, that one grain was
sufficient; but that it was necessary to envelope it in a ball of wax
before throwing it on the molten metal; otherwise its extreme
volatility would cause it to go off in vapour. They tried the
experiment, and succeeded to their heart’s content. Helvetius
repeated the experiment alone, and converted six ounces of lead into
very pure gold.

The fame of this event spread all over the Hague, and all the
notable persons of the town flocked to the study of Helvetius to
convince themselves of the fact. Helvetius performed the experiment
again, in the presence of the Prince of Orange, and several times
afterwards, until he exhausted the whole of the powder he had
received from the stranger, from whom it is necessary to state, he
never received another visit; nor did he ever discover his name or
condition. In the following year, Helvetius published his Golden
Calf, 46 in which he detailed the above circumstances.
About the same time, the celebrated Father Kircher published his
Subterranean World, in which he called the alchymists a
congregation of knaves and impostors, and their science a delusion.
He admitted that he had himself been a diligent labourer in the field,
and had only come to this conclusion after mature consideration and
repeated fruitless experiments. All the alchymists were in arms
immediately, to refute this formidable antagonist. One Solomon de
Blauenstein was the first to grapple with him, and attempted to
convict him of wilful misrepresentation, by recalling to his memory
the transmutations by Sendivogius, before the Emperor Frederick
III. and the Elector of Mayence, all performed within a recent period.
Zwelfer and Glauber also entered into the dispute, and attributed the
enmity of Father Kircher to spite and jealousy against adepts who
had been more successful than himself.
It was also pretended that Gustavus Adolphus transmuted a
quantity of quicksilver into pure gold. The learned Borrichius relates,
that he saw coins which had been struck of this gold; and Lenglet du
Fresnoy deposes to the same circumstance. In the Travels of
Monconis the story is told in the following manner: “A merchant of

Lubeck, who carried on but little trade, but who knew how to change
lead into very good gold, gave the King of Sweden a lingot which he
had made, weighing at least one hundred pounds. The king
immediately caused it to be coined into ducats; and because he knew
positively that its origin was such as had been stated to him, he had
his own arms graven upon the one side, and emblematical figures of
Mercury and Venus on the other. I (continued Monconis) have one of
these ducats in my possession; and was credibly informed that, after
the death of the Lubeck merchant, who had never appeared very rich,
a sum of no less than one million seven hundred thousand crowns
was found in his coffers.” 47
Such stories as these, confidently related by men high in station,
tended to keep up the infatuation of the alchymists in every country
of Europe. It is astonishing to see the number of works which were
written upon the subject during the seventeenth century alone, and
the number of clever men who sacrificed themselves to the delusion.
Gabriel de Castaigne, a monk of the order of St. Francis, attracted so
much notice in the reign of Louis XIII., that that monarch secured
him in his household, and made him his Grand Almoner. He
pretended to find the elixir of life, and Louis expected by his means
to have enjoyed the crown for a century. Van Helmont also
pretended to have once performed with success the process of
transmuting quicksilver, and was in consequence invited by the
Emperor Rudolph II. to fix his residence at the court of Vienna.
Glauber, the inventor of the salts which still bear his name, and who
practised as a physician at Amsterdam about the middle of the
seventeenth century, established a public school in that city for the
study of alchymy, and gave lectures himself upon the science. John

Joachim Becher of Spire acquired great reputation at the same
period, and was convinced that much gold might be made out of
flint-stones by a peculiar process, and the aid of that grand and
incomprehensible substance the philosopher’s stone. He made a
proposition to the Emperor Leopold of Austria to aid him in these
experiments; but the hope of success was too remote, and the
present expense too great, to tempt that monarch, and he therefore
gave Becher much of his praise, but none of his money. Becher
afterwards tried the States-General of Holland with no better
success.
With regard to the innumerable tricks by which impostors
persuaded the world that they had succeeded in making gold, and of
which so many stories were current about this period, a very
satisfactory report was read by M. Geoffroy the elder, at the sitting of
the Royal Academy of Sciences at Paris, on the 15th of April, 1722. As
it relates principally to the alchymic cheats of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, the following abridgment of it may not be out
of place in this portion of our history. The instances of successful
transmutation

were

so

numerous,

and

apparently

so

well

authenticated, that nothing short of so able an exposure as that of M.
Geoffroy could disabuse the public mind. The trick to which they
oftenest had recourse was to use a double-bottomed crucible, the
under surface being of iron or copper, and the upper one of wax,
painted to resemble the same metal. Between the two they placed as
much gold or silver dust as was necessary for their purpose. They
then put in their lead, quicksilver, or other ingredients, and placed
their pot upon the fire. Of course, when the experiment was
concluded, they never failed to find a lump of gold at the bottom. The

same result was produced in many other ways. Some of them used a
hollow wand, filled with gold or silver dust, and stopped at the ends
with wax or butter. With this they stirred the boiling metal in their
crucibles, taking care to accompany the operation with many
ceremonies, to divert attention from the real purpose of the
manœuvre. They also drilled holes in lumps of lead, into which they
poured molten gold, and carefully closed the aperture with the
original metal. Sometimes they washed a piece of gold with
quicksilver. When in this state, they found no difficulty in palming it
off upon the uninitiated as an inferior metal, and very easily
transmuted it into fine sonorous gold again with the aid of a little
aquafortis.
Others imposed by means of nails, half iron and half gold or silver.
They pretended that they really transmuted the precious half from
iron, by dipping it in a strong alcohol. M. Geoffroy produced several
of these nails to the Academy of Sciences, and shewed how nicely the
two parts were soldered together. The golden or silver half was
painted black to resemble iron, and the colour immediately
disappeared when the nail was dipped into aquafortis. A nail of this
description was, for a long time, in the cabinet of the Grand Duke of
Tuscany. Such also, said M. Geoffroy, was the knife presented by a
monk to Queen Elizabeth of England; the blade of which was half
gold and half steel. Nothing at one time was more common than to
see coins, half gold and half silver, which had been operated upon by
alchymists, for the same purposes of trickery. In fact, says M.
Geoffroy, in concluding his long report, there is every reason to
believe that all the famous histories which have been handed down to
us about the transmutation of metals into gold or silver, by means of

the powder of projection or philosophical elixirs, are founded upon
some successful deception of the kind above narrated. These
pretended philosophers invariably disappeared after the first or
second experiment, or their powders or elixirs have failed to produce
their effect, either because attention being excited they have found
no opportunity to renew the trick without being discovered, or
because they have not had sufficient gold dust for more than one
trial.
The disinterestedness of these would-be philosophers looked, at
first sight, extremely imposing. Instances were not rare in which they
generously abandoned all the profits of their transmutations—even
the honour of the discovery. But this apparent disinterestedness was
one of the most cunning of their manœuvres. It served to keep up the
popular expectation; it seemed to shew the possibility of discovering
the philosopher’s stone, and provided the means of future
advantages, which they were never slow to lay hold of—such as
entrances into royal households, maintenance at the public expense,
and gifts from ambitious potentates, too greedy after the gold they so
easily promised.
It now only remains to trace the progress of the delusion from the
commencement of the eighteenth century until the present day. It
will be seen that, until a very recent period, there were but slight
signs of a return to reason.

JEAN DELISLE.
In the year 1705, there was much talk in France of a blacksmith,
named Delisle, who had discovered the philosopher’s stone, and who
went about the country turning lead into gold. He was a native of

Provence, from which place his fame soon spread to the capital. His
early life is involved in obscurity; but Lenglet du Fresnoy has
industriously collected some particulars of his later career, which
possess considerable interest. He was a man without any education,
and had been servant in his youth to an alchymist, from whom he
learned many of the tricks of the fraternity. The name of his master
has never been discovered; but it is pretended that he rendered
himself in some manner obnoxious to the government of Louis XIV.,
and was obliged, in consequence, to take refuge in Switzerland.
Delisle accompanied him as far as Savoy, and there, it is said, set
upon him in a solitary mountain-pass, and murdered and robbed
him. He then disguised himself as a pilgrim, and returned to France.
At a lonely inn, by the road-side, where he stopped for the night, he
became acquainted with a woman, named Aluys; and so sudden a
passion was enkindled betwixt them, that she consented to leave all,
follow him, and share his good or evil fortune wherever he went.
They lived together for five or six years in Provence, without exciting
any attention, apparently possessed of a decent independence. At
last, in 1706, it was given out that he was the possessor of the
philosopher’s stone; and people from far and near came flocking to
his residence, at the Château de la Palu, at Sylanez, near Barjaumont,
to witness the wealth he could make out of pumps and fire-shovels.
The following account of his operations is given in a letter addressed
by M. de Cerisy, the Prior of Châteauneuf, in the Diocese of Riez, in
Provence, to the Vicar of St. Jacques du Hautpas, at Paris, and dated
the 18th of November, 1706:
“I have something to relate to you, my dear cousin, which will
be interesting to you and your friends. The philosopher’s stone,

which so many persons have looked upon as a chimera, is at last
found. It is a man named Delisle, of the parish of Sylanez, and
residing within a quarter of a league of me, that has discovered
this great secret. He turns lead into gold, and iron into silver, by
merely heating these metals red hot, and pouring upon them in
that state some oil and powder he is possessed of; so that it
would not be impossible for any man to make a million a day, if
he had sufficient of this wondrous mixture. Some of the pale
gold which he had made in this manner, he sent to the jewellers
of Lyons, to have their opinion on its quality. He also sold
twenty pounds weight of it to a merchant of Digne, named Taxis.
All the jewellers say they never saw such fine gold in their lives.
He makes nails, part gold, part iron, and part silver. He
promised to give me one of them, in a long conversation which I
had with him the other day, by order of the Bishop of Senés, who
saw his operations with his own eyes, and detailed all the
circumstances to me.
“The Baron and Baroness de Rheinwald shewed me a lingot of
gold made out of pewter before their eyes by M. Delisle. My
brother-in-law Sauveur, who has wasted fifty years of his life in
this great study, brought me the other day a nail which he had
seen changed into gold by Delisle, and fully convinced me that
all his previous experiments were founded on an erroneous
principle. This excellent workman received, a short time ago, a
very kind letter from the superintendent of the royal household,
which I read. He offered to use all his influence with the
ministers to prevent any attempts upon his liberty, which has
twice been attacked by the agents of government. It is believed

that the oil he makes use of, is gold or silver reduced to that
state. He leaves it for a long time exposed to the rays of the sun.
He told me that it generally took him six months to make all his
preparations. I told him that, apparently, the king wanted to see
him. He replied that he could not exercise his art in every place,
as a certain climate and temperature were absolutely necessary
to his success. The truth is, that this man appears to have no
ambition. He only keeps two horses and two men-servants.
Besides, he loves his liberty, has no politeness, and speaks very
bad French; but his judgment seems to be solid. He was
formerly no more than a blacksmith, but excelled in that trade
without having been taught it. All the great lords and seigneurs
from far and near come to visit him, and pay such court to him,
that it seems more like idolatry than any thing else. Happy
would France be if this man would discover his secret to the
king, to whom the superintendent has already sent some lingots!
But the happiness is too great to be hoped for; for I fear that the
workman and his secret will expire together. There is no doubt
that this discovery will make a great noise in the kingdom,
unless the character of the man, which I have just depicted to
you, prevent it. At all events, posterity will hear of him.”
In another letter to the same person, dated the 27th of January
1707, M. de Cerisy says, “My dear cousin, I spoke to you in my last
letter of the famous alchymist of Provence, M. Delisle. A good deal of
that was only hearsay, but now I am enabled to speak from my own
experience. I have in my possession a nail, half iron and half silver,
which I made myself. That great and admirable workman also
bestowed a still greater privilege upon me—he allowed me turn a

piece of lead which I had brought with me into pure gold, by means
of his wonderful oil and powder. All the country have their eyes upon
this gentleman; some deny loudly, others are incredulous; but those
who have seen acknowledge the truth. I have read the passport that
has been sent to him from court, with orders that he should present
himself at Paris early in the spring. He told me that he would go
willingly, and that it was himself who fixed the spring for his
departure; as he wanted to collect his materials, in order that,
immediately on his introduction to the king, he might make an
experiment worthy of his majesty, by converting a large quantity of
lead into the finest gold. I sincerely hope that he will not allow his
secret to die with him, but that he will communicate it to the king. As
I had the honour to dine with him on Thursday last, the 20th of this
month, being seated at his side, I told him in a whisper that he could,
if he liked, humble all the enemies of France. He did not deny it, but
began to smile. In fact, this man is the miracle of art. Sometimes he
employs the oil and powder mixed, sometimes the powder only; but
in so small a quantity that, when the lingot which I made was rubbed
all over with it, it did not shew at all.”
This soft-headed priest was by no means the only person in the
neighbourhood who lost his wits in hopes of the boundless wealth
held out by this clever impostor. Another priest, named De Lions, a
chanter in the cathedral of Grenoble, writing on the 30th January
1707, says: “M. Mesnard, the curate of Montier, has written to me,
stating that there is a man, about thirty-five years of age, named
Delisle, who turns lead and iron into gold and silver; and that this
transmutation is so veritable and so true, that the goldsmiths affirm
that his gold and silver are the purest and finest they ever saw. For

five years this man was looked upon as a madman or a cheat; but the
public mind is now disabused with respect to him. He now resides
with M. de la Palu, at the château of the same name. M. de la Palu is
not very easy in his circumstances, and wants money to portion his
daughters, who have remained single till middle age, no man being
willing to take them without a dowry. M. Delisle has promised to
make them the richest girls in the province before he goes to court,
having been sent for by the king. He has asked for a little time before
his departure, in order that he may collect powder enough to make
several quintals of gold before the eyes of his majesty, to whom he
intends to present them. The principal matter of his wonderful
powder is composed of simples, principally the herbs Lunaria major
and minor. There is a good deal of the first planted by him in the
gardens of La Palu; and he gets the other from the mountains that
stretch about two leagues from Montier. What I tell you now is not a
mere story invented for your diversion: M. Mesnard can bring
forward many witnesses to its truth; among others, the Bishop of
Senés, who saw these surprising operations performed; and M. de
Cerisy, whom you know well. Delisle transmutes his metals in public.
He rubs the lead or iron with his powder, and puts it over burning
charcoal. In a short time it changes colour; the lead becomes yellow,
and is found to be converted into excellent gold; the iron becomes
white, and is found to be pure silver. Delisle is altogether an illiterate
person. M. de St. Auban endeavoured to teach him to read and write,
but he profited very little by his lessons. He is unpolite, fantastic, and
a dreamer, and acts by fits and starts.”
Delisle, it would appear, was afraid of venturing to Paris. He knew
that his sleight of hand would be too narrowly watched in the royal

presence; and upon some pretence or other he delayed the journey
for more than two years. Desmarets, the Minister of Finance to Louis
XIV., thinking the “philosopher” dreaded foul play, twice sent him a
safe conduct under the king’s seal; but Delisle still refused. Upon
this, Desmarets wrote to the Bishop of Senés for his real opinion as
to these famous transmutations. The following was the answer of
that prelate:
“Copy of a report addressed to M. Desmarets,
Comptroller-General of the Finances to His Majesty
Louis XIV., by the Bishop of Senés, dated March 1709.
“SIR,—A twelvemonth ago, or a little more, I expressed to you
my joy at hearing of your elevation to the ministry; I have now
the honour to write you my opinion of the Sieur Delisle, who has
been working at the transmutation of metals in my diocese. I
have, during the last two years, spoken of him several times to
the Count de Pontchartrain, because he asked me; but I have not
written to you, sir, or to M. de Chamillart, because you neither of
you requested my opinion upon the subject. Now, however, that
you have given me to understand that you wish to know my
sentiments on the matter, I will unfold myself to you in all
sincerity, for the interests of the king and the glory of your
ministry.
“There are two things about the Sieur Delisle which, in my
opinion, should be examined without prejudice: the one relates
to his secret; the other, to his person; that is to say, whether his
transmutations are real, and whether his conduct has been

regular. As regards the secret of the philosopher’s stone, I
deemed it impossible, for a long time; and for more than three
years I was more mistrustful of the pretensions of this Sieur
Delisle than of any other person. During this period I afforded
him no countenance; I even aided a person, who was highly
recommended to me by an influential family of this province, to
prosecute Delisle for some offence or other which it was alleged
he had committed. But this person, in his anger against him,
having told me that he had himself been several times the bearer
of gold and silver to the goldsmiths of Nice, Aix, and Avignon,
which had been transmuted by Delisle from lead and iron, I
began to waver a little in my opinions respecting him. I
afterwards met Delisle at the house of one of my friends. To
please me, the family asked Delisle to operate before me, to
which he immediately consented. I offered him some iron nails,
which he changed into silver in the chimney-place before six or
seven credible witnesses. I took the nails thus transmuted, and
sent them by my almoner to Imbert, the jeweller of Aix, who,
having subjected them to the necessary trial, returned them to
me, saying they were very good silver. Still, however, I was not
quite satisfied. M. de Pontchartrain having hinted to me, two
years previously, that I should do a thing agreeable to his
majesty if I examined into this business of Delisle, I resolved to
do so now. I therefore summoned the alchymist to come to me
at Castellane. He came; and I had him escorted by eight or ten
vigilant men, to whom I had given notice to watch his hands
strictly. Before all of us he changed two pieces of lead into gold
and silver. I sent them both to M. de Pontchartrain; and he

afterwards informed me by a letter, now lying before me, that he
had shewn them to the most experienced goldsmiths of Paris,
who unanimously pronounced them to be gold and silver of the
very purest quality, and without alloy. My former bad opinion of
Delisle was now indeed shaken. It was much more so when he
performed transmutation five or six times before me at Senés,
and made me perform it myself before him without his putting
his hand to any thing. You have seen, sir, the letter of my
nephew, the Père Berard, of the Oratoire at Paris, on the
experiment that he performed at Castellane, and the truth of
which I hereby attest. Another nephew of mine, the Sieur
Bourget, who was here three weeks ago, performed the same
experiment in my presence, and will detail all the circumstances
to you personally at Paris. A hundred persons in my diocese
have been witnesses of these things. I confess to you, sir, that,
after the testimony of so many spectators and so many
goldsmiths, and after the repeatedly successful experiments that
I saw performed, all my prejudices vanished. My reason was
convinced by my eyes; and the phantoms of impossibility which
I had conjured up were dissipated by the work of my own hands.
“It now only remains for me to speak to you on the subject of
his person and conduct. Three suspicions have been excited
against him: the first, that he was implicated in some criminal
proceeding at Cisteron, and that he falsified the coin of the
realm; the second, that the king sent him two safe-conducts
without effect; and the third, that he still delays going to court to
operate before the king. You may see, sir, that I do not hide or
avoid any thing. As regards the business at Cisteron, the Sieur

Delisle has repeatedly assured me that there was nothing against
him which could reasonably draw him within the pale of justice,
and that he had never carried on any calling injurious to the
king’s service. It was true that, six or seven years ago, he had
been to Cisteron to gather herbs necessary for his powder, and
that he had lodged at the house of one Pelouse, whom he
thought an honest man. Pelouse was accused of clipping Louisd’ors; and as he had lodged with him, he was suspected of being
his accomplice. This mere suspicion, without any proof
whatever, had caused him to be condemned for contumacy; a
common case enough with judges, who always proceed with
much rigour against those who are absent. During my own
sojourn at Aix, it was well known that a man, named André
Aluys, had spread about reports injurious to the character of
Delisle, because he hoped thereby to avoid paying him a sum of
forty Louis that he owed him. But permit me, sir, to go further,
and to add that, even if there were well-founded suspicions
against Delisle, we should look with some little indulgence on
the faults of a man who possesses a secret so useful to the state.
As regards the two safe-conducts sent him by the king, I think I
can answer certainly that it was through no fault of his that he
paid so little attention to them. His year, strictly speaking,
consists only of the four summer months; and when by any
means he is prevented from making the proper use of them, he
loses a whole year. Thus the first safe-conduct became useless by
the irruption of the Duke of Savoy in 1707 and the second had
hardly been obtained, at the end of June 1708, when the said
Delisle was insulted by a party of armed men, pretending to act

under the authority of the Count de Grignan, to whom he wrote
several letters of complaint, without receiving any answer, or
promise that his safety would be attended to. What I have now
told you, sir, removes the third objection, and is the reason why,
at the present time, he cannot go to Paris to the king, in
fulfilment of his promises made two years ago. Two, or even
three, summers have been lost to him, owing to the continual
inquietude he has laboured under. He has, in consequence, been
unable to work, and has not collected a sufficient quantity of his
oil and powder, or brought what he has got to the necessary
degree of perfection. For this reason also he could not give the
Sieur de Bourget the portion he promised him for your
inspection. If the other day he changed some lead into gold with
a few grains of his powder, they were assuredly all he had; for he
told me that such was the fact long before he knew my nephew
was coming. Even if he had preserved this small quantity to
operate before the king, I am sure that, on second thoughts, he
would never have adventured with so little; because the slightest
obstacles in the metals (their being too hard or too soft, which is
only discovered in operating,) would have caused him to be
looked upon as an impostor, if, in case his first powder had
proved ineffectual, he had not been possessed of more to renew
the experiment and surmount the difficulty.
“Permit me, sir, in conclusion, to repeat, that such an artist as
this should not be driven to the last extremity, nor forced to seek
an asylum offered to him in other countries, but which he has
despised, as much from his own inclinations as from the advice I
have given him. You risk nothing in giving him a little time, and

in hurrying him you may lose a great deal. The genuineness of
his gold can no longer be doubted, after the testimony of so
many jewellers of Aix, Lyons, and Paris in its favour. As it is not
his fault that the previous safe-conducts sent to him have been
of no service, it will be necessary to send him another; for the
success of which I will be answerable, if you will confide the
matter to me, and trust to my zeal for the service of his majesty,
to whom I pray you to communicate this letter, that I may be
spared the just reproaches he might one day heap upon me if he
remained ignorant of the facts I have now written to you. Assure
him, if you please, that, if you send me such a safe-conduct, I
will oblige the Sieur Delisle to depose with me such precious
pledges of his fidelity as shall enable me to be responsible myself
to the king. These are my sentiments, and I submit them to your
superior knowledge; and have the honour to remain, with much
respect, &c.
“? JOHN BISHOP OF SENES.
“To M. Desmarets, Minister of State, and
Comptroller-General of the Finances, at
Paris.”
That Delisle was no ordinary impostor, but a man of consummate
cunning and address, is very evident from this letter. The bishop was
fairly taken in by his clever legerdemain, and when once his first
distrust was conquered, appeared as anxious to deceive himself as
even Delisle could have wished. His faith was so abundant that he
made the case of his protégé his own, and would not suffer the
breath of suspicion to be directed against him. Both Louis and his

minister appear to have been dazzled by the brilliant hopes he had
excited, and a third pass, or safe-conduct, was immediately sent to
the alchymist, with a command from the king that he should
forthwith present himself at Versailles, and make public trial of his
oil and powder. But this did not suit the plans of Delisle. In the
provinces he was regarded as a man of no small importance; the
servile flattery that awaited him wherever he went was so grateful to
his mind that he could not willingly relinquish it, and run upon
certain detection at the court of the monarch. Upon one pretext or
another he delayed his journey, notwithstanding the earnest
solicitations of his good friend the bishop. The latter had given his
word to the minister, and pledged his honour that he would induce
Delisle to go, and he began to be alarmed when he found he could
not subdue the obstinacy of that individual. For more than two years
he continued to remonstrate with him, and was always met by some
excuse, that there was not sufficient powder, or that it had not been
long enough exposed to the rays of the sun. At last his patience was
exhausted; and fearful that he might suffer in the royal estimation by
longer delay, he wrote to the king for a lettre de cachet, in virtue of
which the alchymist was seized at the castle of La Palu, in the month
of June 1711, and carried off to be imprisoned in the Bastille.
The gendarmes were aware that their prisoner was supposed to be
the lucky possessor of the philosopher’s stone, and on the road they
conspired to rob and murder him. One of them pretended to be
touched with pity for the misfortunes of the philosopher, and offered
to give him an opportunity of escape whenever he could divert the
attention of his companions. Delisle was profuse in his thanks, little
dreaming of the snare that was laid for him. His treacherous friend

gave notice of the success of the stratagem so far; and it was agreed
that Delisle should be allowed to struggle with and overthrow one of
them while the rest were at some distance. They were then to pursue
him and shoot him through the heart; and after robbing the corpse of
the philosopher’s stone, convey it to Paris on a cart, and tell M.
Desmarets that the prisoner had attempted to escape, and would
have succeeded if they had not fired after him and shot him through
the body. At a convenient place the scheme was executed. On a given
signal from the friendly gendarme, Delisle fled, while another
gendarme took aim and shot him through the thigh. Some peasants
arriving at the instant, they were prevented from killing him as they
intended, and he was transported to Paris, maimed and bleeding. He
was thrown into a dungeon in the Bastille, and obstinately tore away
the bandages which the surgeons applied to his wound. He never
afterwards rose from his bed.
The Bishop of Senés visited him in prison, and promised him his
liberty if he would transmute a certain quantity of lead into gold
before the king. The unhappy man had no longer the means of
carrying on the deception; he had no gold, and no double-bottomed
crucible or hollow wand to conceal it in, even if he had. He would
not, however, confess that he was an impostor; but merely said he
did not know how to make the powder of projection, but had
received a quantity from an Italian philosopher, and had used it all in
his various transmutations in Provence. He lingered for seven or
eight months in the Bastille, and died from the effects of his wound,
in the forty-first year of his age.

ALBERT ALUYS.

This pretender to the philosopher’s stone was the son, by a former
husband, of the woman Aluys, with whom Delisle became acquainted
at the commencement of his career, in the cabaret by the road-side,
and whom he afterwards married. Delisle performed the part of a
father towards him, and thought he could shew no stronger proof of
his regard, than by giving him the necessary instructions to carry on
the deception which had raised himself to such a pitch of greatness.
The young Aluys was an apt scholar, and soon mastered all the
jargon of the alchymists. He discoursed learnedly upon projections,
cimentations, sublimations, the elixir of life, and the universal
alkahest; and on the death of Delisle gave out that the secret of that
great adept had been communicated to him, and to him only. His
mother aided in the fraud, with the hope they might both fasten
themselves, in the true alchymical fashion, upon some rich dupe,
who would entertain them magnificently while the operation was in
progress. The fate of Delisle was no inducement for them to stop in
France. The Provençals, it is true, entertained as high an opinion as
ever of his skill, and were well inclined to believe the tales of the
young adept on whom his mantle had fallen; but the dungeons of the
Bastille were yawning for their prey, and Aluys and his mother
decamped with all convenient expedition. They travelled about the
Continent for several years, sponging upon credulous rich men, and
now and then performing successful transmutations by the aid of
double-bottomed crucibles and the like. In the year 1726, Aluys,
without his mother, who appears to have died in the interval, was at
Vienna, where he introduced himself to the Duke de Richelieu, at
that time ambassador from the court of France. He completely
deceived this nobleman; he turned lead into gold (apparently) on

several occasions, and even made the ambassador himself turn an
iron nail into a silver one. The duke afterwards boasted to Lenglet du
Fresnoy of his achievements as an alchymist, and regretted that he
had not been able to discover the secret of the precious powder by
which he performed them.
Aluys soon found that, although he might make a dupe of the Duke
de Richelieu, he could not get any money from him. On the contrary,
the duke expected all his pokers and fire-shovels to be made silver,
and all his pewter utensils gold; and thought the honour of his
acquaintance was reward sufficient for a roturier, who could not
want wealth since he possessed so invaluable a secret. Aluys, seeing
that so much was expected of him, bade adieu to his excellency, and
proceeded to Bohemia accompanied by a pupil, and by a young girl
who had fallen in love with him in Vienna. Some noblemen in
Bohemia received him kindly, and entertained him at their houses
for months at a time. It was his usual practice to pretend that he
possessed only a few grains of his powder, with which he would
operate in any house where he intended to fix his quarters for the
season. He would make the proprietor the present of a piece of gold
thus transmuted, and promise him millions, if he could only be
provided with leisure to gather his lunaria major and minor on their
mountain-tops, and board, lodging, and loose cash for himself, his
wife, and his pupil, in the interval.
He exhausted in this manner the patience of some dozen of people,
when, thinking that there was less danger for him in France under
the young king Louis XV. than under his old and morose
predecessor, he returned to Provence. On his arrival at Aix, he
presented himself before M. le Bret, the president of the province, a

gentleman who was much attached to the pursuits of alchymy, and
had great hopes of being himself able to find the philosopher’s stone.
M. le Bret, contrary to his expectation, received him very coolly, in
consequence of some rumours that were spread abroad respecting
him; and told him to call upon him on the morrow. Aluys did not like
the tone of the voice, or the expression of the eye of the learned
president, as that functionary looked down upon him. Suspecting
that all was not right, he left Aix secretly the same evening, and
proceeded to Marseilles. But the police were on the watch for him;
and he had not been there four-and-twenty hours, before he was
arrested on a charge of coining, and thrown into prison.
As the proofs against him were too convincing to leave him much
hope of an acquittal, he planned an escape from durance. It so
happened that the gaoler had a pretty daughter, and Aluys soon
discovered that she was tender-hearted. He endeavoured to gain her
in his favour, and succeeded. The damsel, unaware that he was a
married man, conceived and encouraged a passion for him, and
generously provided him with the means of escape. After he had
been nearly a year in prison he succeeded in getting free, leaving the
poor girl behind to learn that he was already married, and to lament
in solitude that she had given her heart to an ungrateful vagabond.
When he left Marseilles, he had not a shoe to his foot or a decent
garment to his back, but was provided with some money and clothes
by his wife in a neighbouring town. They then found their way to
Brussels, and by dint of excessive impudence, brought themselves
into notice. He took a house, fitted up a splendid laboratory, and
gave out that he knew the secret of transmutation. In vain did M.
Percel, the brother-in-law of Lenglet du Fresnoy, who resided in that

city, expose his pretensions, and hold him up to contempt as an
ignorant impostor: the world believed him not. They took the
alchymist at his word, and besieged his doors to see and wonder at
the clever legerdemain by which he turned iron nails into gold and
silver. A rich greffier paid him a large sum of money that he might be
instructed in the art, and Aluys gave him several lessons on the most
common principles of chemistry. The greffier studied hard for a
twelvemonth, and then discovered that his master was a quack. He
demanded his money back again; but Aluys was not inclined to give
it him, and the affair was brought before the civil tribunal of the
province. In the mean time, however, the greffier died suddenly;
poisoned, according to the popular rumour, by his debtor, to avoid
repayment. So great an outcry arose in the city, that Aluys, who may
have been innocent of the crime, was nevertheless afraid to remain
and brave it. He withdrew secretly in the night, and retired to Paris.
Here all trace of him is lost. He was never heard of again; but Lenglet
du Fresnoy conjectures that he ended his days in some obscure
dungeon, into which he was cast for coining or other malpractices.

THE COUNT DE ST. GERMAIN.
This adventurer was of a higher grade than the last, and played a
distinguished part at the court of Louis XV. He pretended to have
discovered the elixir of life, by means of which he could make any
one live for centuries; and allowed it to believed that his own age was
upwards of two thousand years. He entertained many of the opinions
of the Rosicrucians; boasted of his intercourse with sylphs and
salamanders; and of his power of drawing diamonds from the earth,
and pearls from the sea, by the force of his incantations. He did not

lay claim to the merit of having discovered the philosopher’s stone;
but devoted so much of his time to the operations of alchymy, that it
was very generally believed, that if such a thing as the philosopher’s
stone had ever existed, or could be called into existence, he was the
man to succeed in finding it.
It has never yet been discovered what was his real name, or in
what country he was born. Some believed, from the Jewish cast of his
handsome countenance, that he was the “wandering Jew;” others
asserted that he was the issue of an Arabian princess, and that his
father was a salamander; while others, more reasonable, affirmed
him to be the son of a Portuguese Jew established at Bourdeaux. He
first carried on his imposture in Germany, where he made
considerable sums by selling an elixir to arrest the progress of old
age. The Maréchal de Belle-Isle purchased a dose of it; and was so
captivated with the wit, learning, and good manners of the charlatan,
and so convinced of the justice of his most preposterous pretensions,
that he induced him to fix his residence in Paris. Under the marshal’s
patronage, he first appeared in the gay circles of that capital. Every
one was delighted with the mysterious stranger; who, at this period
of his life, appears to have been about seventy years of age, but did
not look more than forty-five. His easy assurance imposed upon
most people. His reading was extensive, and his memory
extraordinarily tenacious of the slightest circumstances. His
pretension to have lived for so many centuries naturally exposed him
to some puzzling questions, as to the appearance, life, and
conversation of the great men of former days; but he was never at a
loss for an answer. Many who questioned him for the purpose of
scoffing at him, refrained in perplexity, quite bewildered by his

presence of mind, his ready replies, and his astonishing accuracy on
every point mentioned in history. To increase the mystery by which
he was surrounded, he permitted no person to know how he lived.
He dressed in a style of the greatest magnificence; sported valuable
diamonds in his hat, on his fingers, and in his shoe-buckles; and
sometimes made the most costly presents to the ladies of the court. It
was suspected by many that he was a spy, in the pay of the English
ministry; but there never was a tittle of evidence to support the
charge. The king looked upon him with marked favour, was often
closeted with him for hours together, and would not suffer any body
to speak disparagingly of him. Voltaire constantly turned him into
ridicule; and, in one of his letters to the King of Prussia, mentions
him as “un comte pour rire;” and states that he pretended to have
dined with the holy fathers at the Council of Trent!
In the Memoirs of Madame du Hausset, chamber-woman to
Madame du Pompadour, there are some amusing anecdotes of this
personage. Very soon after his arrival in Paris, he had the entrée of
her dressing-room; a favour only granted to the most powerful lords
at the court of her royal lover. Madame was fond of conversing with
him; and, in her presence, he thought fit to lower his pretensions
very considerably; but he often allowed her to believe that he had
lived two or three hundred years at least. “One day,” says Madame
du Hausset, “madame said to him, in my presence, ‘What was the
personal appearance of Francis I.? He was a king I should have
liked.’ ‘He was, indeed, very captivating,’ replied St. Germain; and he
proceeded to describe his face and person, as that of a man whom he
had accurately observed. ‘It is a pity he was too ardent. I could have
given him some good advice, which would have saved him from all

his misfortunes: but he would not have followed it; for it seems as if a
fatality attended princes, forcing them to shut their ears to the wisest
counsel.’ ‘Was his court very brilliant?’ inquired Madame du
Pompadour. ‘Very,’ replied the count; ‘but those of his grandsons
surpassed it. In the time of Mary Stuart and Margaret of Valois, it
was a land of enchantment—a temple sacred to pleasures of every
kind.’ Madame said, laughing, ‘You seem to have seen all this.’ ‘I have
an excellent memory,’ said he, ‘and have read the history of France
with great care. I sometimes amuse myself, not by making, but by
letting, it be believed that I lived in old times.’
“‘But you do not tell us your age,’ said Madame du Pompadour to
him on another occasion; ‘and yet you pretend you are very old. The
Countess de Gergy, who was, I believe, ambassadress at Vienna some
fifty years ago, says she saw you there, exactly the same as you now
appear.’
“‘It is true, madame,’ replied St. Germain; ‘I knew Madame de
Gergy many years ago.’
“‘But, according to her account, you must be more than a hundred
years old?’
“‘That is not impossible,’ said he, laughing; ‘but it is much more
possible that the good lady is in her dotage.’
“‘You gave her an elixir, surprising for the effects it produced; for
she says, that during a length of time, she only appeared to be eightyfour; the age at which she took it. Why don’t you give it to the king?’
“‘Oh, madam,’ he exclaimed, ‘the physicians would have me
broken on the wheel, were I to think of drugging his majesty.’”
When the world begins to believe extraordinary things of an
individual, there is no telling where its extravagance will stop.

People, when once they have taken the start, vie with each other who
shall believe most. At this period all Paris resounded with the
wonderful adventures of the Count de St. Germain; and a company
of waggish young men tried the following experiment upon its
credulity: A clever mimic, who, on account of the amusement he
afforded, was admitted into good society, was taken by them, dressed
as the Count de St. Germain, into several houses in the Rue du
Marais. He imitated the count’s peculiarities admirably, and found
his auditors open-mouthed to believe any absurdity he chose to
utter. No fiction was too monstrous for their all-devouring credulity.
He spoke of the Saviour of the world in terms of the greatest
familiarity; said he had supped with him at the marriage in Canaan
of Galilee, where the water was miraculously turned into wine. In
fact, he said he was an intimate friend of his, and had often warned
him to be less romantic and imprudent, or he would finish his career
miserably. This infamous blasphemy, strange to say, found believers;
and ere three days had elapsed, it was currently reported that St.
Germain was born soon after the deluge, and that he would never
die!
St. Germain himself was too much a man of the world to assert any
thing so monstrous; but he took no pains to contradict the story. In
all his conversations with persons of rank and education, he
advanced his claims modestly, and as if by mere inadvertency, and
seldom pretended to a longevity beyond three hundred years, except
when he found he was in company with persons who would believe
any thing. He often spoke of Henry VIII. as if he had known him
intimately, and of the Emperor Charles V. as if that monarch had
delighted in his society. He would describe conversations which took

place with such an apparent truthfulness, and be so exceedingly
minute and particular as to the dress and appearance of the
individuals, and even the weather at the time and the furniture of the
room, that three persons out of four were generally inclined to credit
him. He had constant applications from rich old women for an elixir
to make them young again, and it would appear gained large sums in
this manner. To those whom he was pleased to call his friends he
said his mode of living and plan of diet were far superior to any
elixir, and that any body might attain a patriarchal age by refraining
from drinking at meals, and very sparingly at any other time. The
Baron de Gleichen followed this system, and took great quantities of
senna leaves, expecting to live for two hundred years. He died,
however, at seventy-three. The Duchess de Choiseul was desirous of
following the same system, but the duke her husband in much wrath
forbade her to follow any system prescribed by a man who had so
equivocal a reputation as M. de St. Germain.
Madame du Hausset says she saw St. Germain and conversed with
him several times. He appeared to her to be about fifty years of age,
was of the middle size, and had fine expressive features. His dress
was always simple, but displayed much taste. He usually wore
diamond rings of great value, and his watch and snuff-box were
ornamented with a profusion of precious stones. One day, at
Madame du Pompadour’s apartments, where the principal courtiers
were assembled, St. Germain made his appearance in diamond knee
and shoe buckles of so fine a water, that madame said she did not
think the king had any equal to them. He was entreated to pass into
the antechamber and undo them, which he did, and brought them to
madame for closer inspection. M. de Gontant, who was present, said

their value could not be less than two hundred thousand livres, or
upwards of eight thousand pounds sterling. The Baron de Gleichen,
in his Memoirs, relates that the count one day shewed him so many
diamonds, that he thought he saw before him all the treasures of
Aladdin’s lamp; and adds, that he had had great experience in
precious stones, and was convinced that all those possessed by the
count were genuine. On another occasion St. Germain shewed
Madame du Pompadour a small box, containing topazes, emeralds,
and diamonds worth half a million of livres. He affected to despise all
this wealth, to make the world more easily believe that he could, like
the Rosicrucians, draw precious stones out of the earth by the magic
of his song. He gave away a great number of these jewels to the ladies
of the court; and Madame du Pompadour was so charmed with his
generosity, that she gave him a richly enamelled snuff-box as a token
of her regard, on the lid of which was beautifully painted a portrait of
Socrates, or some other Greek sage, to whom she compared him. He
was not only lavish to the mistresses, but to the maids. Madame du
Hausset says: “The count came to see Madame du Pompadour, who
was very ill, and lay on the sofa. He shewed her diamonds enough to
furnish a king’s treasury. Madame sent for me to see all those
beautiful things. I looked at them with an air of the utmost
astonishment; but I made signs to her that I thought them all false.
The count felt for something in a pocket-book about twice as large as
a spectacle-case, and at length drew out two or three little paper
packets, which he unfolded, and exhibited a superb ruby. He threw
on the table, with a contemptuous air, a little cross of green and
white stones. I looked at it, and said it was not to be despised. I then
put it on, and admired it greatly. The count begged me to accept it; I

refused. He urged me to take it. At length he pressed so warmly, that
madame, seeing it could not be worth more than a thousand livres,
made me a sign to accept it. I took the cross, much pleased with the
count’s politeness.”
How the adventurer obtained his wealth remains a secret. He
could not have made it all by the sale of his elixir vitæ in Germany,
though no doubt some portion of it was derived from that source.
Voltaire positively says he was in the pay of foreign governments;
and in his letter to the King of Prussia, dated the 5th of April 1758,
says that he was initiated in all the secrets of Choiseul, Kaunitz, and
Pitt. Of what use he could be to any of those ministers, and to
Choiseul especially, is a mystery of mysteries.
There appears no doubt that he possessed the secret of removing
spots from diamonds; and in all probability he gained considerable
sums by buying at inferior prices such as had flaws in them, and
afterwards disposing of them at a profit of cent per cent. Madame du
Hausset relates the following anecdote on this particular: “The king,”
says she, “ordered a middling-sized diamond, which had a flaw in it,
to be brought to him. After having it weighed, his majesty said to the
count, ‘The value of this diamond as it is, and with the flaw in it, is
six thousand livres; without the flaw, it would be worth at least ten
thousand. Will you undertake to make me a gainer of four thousand
livres?’ St. Germain examined it very attentively, and said, ‘It is
possible; it may be done. I will bring it you again in a month.’ At the
time appointed the count brought back the diamond without a spot,
and gave it to the king. It was wrapped in a cloth of amianthos, which
he took off. The king had it weighed immediately, and found it very
little diminished. His majesty then sent it to his jeweller by M. de

Gontant, without telling him of any thing that had passed. The
jeweller gave nine thousand six hundred livres for it. The king,
however, sent for the diamond back again, and said he would keep it
as a curiosity. He could not overcome his surprise, and said M. de St.
Germain must be worth millions, especially if he possessed the secret
of making large diamonds out of small ones. The count neither said
that he could or could not, but positively asserted that he knew how
to make pearls grow, and give them the finest water. The king paid
him great attention, and so did Madame du Pompadour. M. du
Quesnoy once said that St. Germain was a quack, but the king
reprimanded him. In fact, his majesty appears infatuated by him,
and sometimes talks of him as if his descent were illustrious.”
St. Germain had a most amusing vagabond for a servant, to whom
he would often appeal for corroboration, when relating some
wonderful event that happened centuries before. The fellow, who was
not without ability, generally corroborated him in a most satisfactory
manner. Upon one occasion, his master was telling a party of ladies
and gentlemen, at dinner, some conversation he had had in Palestine
with King Richard I. of England, whom he described as a very
particular friend of his. Signs of astonishment and incredulity were
visible on the faces of the company; upon which St. Germain very
coolly turned to his servant, who stood behind his chair, and asked
him if he had not spoken truth? “I really cannot say,” replied the
man, without moving a muscle; “you forget, sir, I have only been five
hundred years in your service!” “Ah! true,” said his master; “I
remember now; it was a little before your time!”
Occasionally, when with men whom he could not so easily dupe, he
gave utterance to the contempt with which he could scarcely avoid

regarding such gaping credulity. “These fools of Parisians,” said he to
the Baron de Gleichen, “believe me to be more than five hundred
years old; and, since they will have it so, I confirm them in their idea.
Not but that I really am much older than I appear.”
Many other stories are related of this strange impostor; but
enough have been quoted to shew his character and pretensions. It
appears that he endeavoured to find the philosopher’s stone; but
never boasted of possessing it. The Prince of Hesse Cassel, whom he
had known years before, in Germany, wrote urgent letters to him,
entreating him to quit Paris, and reside with him. St. Germain at last
consented. Nothing further is known of his career. There were no
gossipping memoir-writers at the court of Hesse Cassel to chronicle
his sayings and doings. He died at Sleswig, under the roof of his
friend the prince, in the year 1784.

CAGLIOSTRO.
This famous charlatan, the friend and successor of St. Germain,
ran a career still more extraordinary. He was the arch-quack of his
age, the last of the great pretenders to the philosopher’s stone and
the water of life, and during his brief season of prosperity, one of the
most conspicuous characters of Europe.
His real name was Joseph Balsamo. He was born at Palermo,
about the year 1743, of humble parentage. He had the misfortune to
lose his father during his infancy, and his education was left in
consequence to some relatives of his mother, the latter being too
poor to afford him any instruction beyond mere reading and writing.
He was sent in his fifteenth year to a monastery, to be taught the
elements of chemistry and physic; but his temper was so impetuous,
his indolence so invincible, and his vicious habits so deeply rooted,
that he made no progress. After remaining some years, he left it with
the character of an uninformed and dissipated young man, with good
natural talents but a bad disposition. When he became of age, he
abandoned himself to a life of riot and debauchery, and entered
himself, in fact, into that celebrated fraternity, known in France and
Italy as the “Knights of Industry,” and in England as the “Swell
Mob.” He was far from being an idle or unwilling member of the
corps. The first way in which he distinguished himself was by forging
orders of admission to the theatres. He afterwards robbed his uncle,
and counterfeited a will. For acts like these, he paid frequent

compulsory visits to the prisons of Palermo. Somehow or other he
acquired the character of a sorcerer—of a man who had failed in
discovering the secrets of alchymy, and had sold his soul to the devil
for the gold which he was not able to make by means of
transmutation. He took no pains to disabuse the popular mind on
this particular, but rather encouraged the belief than otherwise. He
at last made use of it to cheat a silversmith named Marano, of about
sixty ounces of gold, and was in consequence obliged to leave
Palermo. He persuaded this man that he could shew him a treasure
hidden in a cave, for which service he was to receive the sixty ounces
of gold, while the silversmith was to have all the treasure for the
mere trouble of digging it up. They went together at midnight to an
excavation in the vicinity of Palermo, where Balsamo drew a magic
circle, and invoked the devil to shew his treasures. Suddenly there
appeared half a dozen fellows, the accomplices of the swindler,
dressed to represent devils, with horns on their heads, claws to their
fingers, and vomiting apparently red and blue flame. They were
armed with pitchforks, with which they belaboured poor Marano till
he was almost dead, and robbed him of his sixty ounces of gold and
all the valuables he carried about his person. They then made off,
accompanied by Balsamo, leaving the unlucky silversmith to recover
or die at his leisure. Nature chose the former course; and soon after
daylight he was restored to his senses, smarting in body from his
blows and in spirit for the deception of which he had been the victim.
His first impulse was to denounce Balsamo to the magistrates of the
town; but on further reflection he was afraid of the ridicule that a full
exposure of all the circumstances would draw upon him; he therefore
took the truly Italian resolution of being revenged on Balsamo, by

murdering him at the first convenient opportunity. Having given
utterance to this threat in the hearing of a friend of Balsamo, it was
reported to the latter, who immediately packed up his valuables and
quitted Europe.
He chose Medina, in Arabia, for his future dwelling-place, and
there became acquainted with a Greek named Altotas, a man
exceedingly well versed in all the languages of the East, and an
indefatigable student of alchymy. He possessed an invaluable
collection of Arabian manuscripts on his favourite science, and
studied them with such unremitting industry that he found he had
not sufficient time to attend to his crucibles and furnaces without
neglecting his books. He was looking about for an assistant when
Balsamo opportunely presented himself, and made so favourable an
impression that he was at once engaged in that capacity. But the
relation of master and servant did not long subsist between them;
Balsamo was too ambitious and too clever to play a secondary part,
and within fifteen days of their first acquaintance they were bound
together as friends and partners. Altotas, in the course of a long life
devoted to alchymy, had stumbled upon some valuable discoveries in
chemistry, one of which was an ingredient for improving the
manufacture of flax, and imparting to goods of that material a gloss
and softness almost equal to silk. Balsamo gave him the good advice
to leave the philosopher’s stone for the present undiscovered, and
make gold out of their flax. The advice was taken, and they
proceeded together to Alexandria to trade, with a large stock of that
article. They stayed forty days in Alexandria, and gained a
considerable sum by their venture. They afterwards visited other
cities in Egypt, and were equally successful. They also visited Turkey,

where they sold drugs and amulets. On their return to Europe, they
were driven by stress of weather into Malta, and were hospitably
received by Pinto, the Grand Master of the Knights, and a famous
alchymist. They worked in his laboratory for some months, and tried
hard to change a pewter platter into a silver one. Balsamo, having
less faith than his companions, was sooner wearied; and obtaining
from his host many letters of introduction to Rome and Naples, he
left him and Altotas to find the philosopher’s stone and transmute
the pewter platter without him.
He had long since dropped the name of Balsamo on account of the
many ugly associations that clung to it; and during his travels had
assumed at least half a score others, with titles annexed to them. He
called himself sometimes the Chevalier de Fischio, the Marquis de
Melissa, the Baron de Belmonte, de Pelligrini, d’Anna, de Fenix, de
Harat, but most commonly the Count de Cagliostro. Under the latter
title he entered Rome, and never afterwards changed it. In this city
he gave himself out as the restorer of the Rosicrucian philosophy;
said he could transmute all metals into gold; that he could render
himself invisible, cure all diseases, and administer an elixir against
old age and decay. His letters from the Grand Master Pinto procured
him an introduction into the best families. He made money rapidly
by the sale of his elixir vitæ; and, like other quacks, performed many
remarkable cures by inspiring his patients with the most complete
faith and reliance upon his powers; an advantage which the most
impudent charlatans often possess over the regular practitioner.
While thus in a fair way of making his fortune he became
acquainted with the beautiful Lorenza Feliciana, a young lady of
noble birth, but without fortune. Cagliostro soon discovered that she

possessed accomplishments that were invaluable. Besides her
ravishing beauty, she had the readiest wit, the most engaging
manners, the most fertile imagination, and the least principle of any
of the maidens of Rome. She was just the wife for Cagliostro, who
proposed himself to her, and was accepted. After their marriage, he
instructed his fair Lorenza in all the secrets of his calling—taught her
pretty lips to invoke angels, and genii, sylphs, salamanders, and
undines, and, when need required, devils and evil spirits. Lorenza
was an apt scholar; she soon learned all the jargon of the alchymists
and all the spells of the enchanters; and thus accomplished the
hopeful pair set out on their travels, to levy contributions on the
superstitious and the credulous.
They first went to Sleswig on a visit to the Count de St. Germain,
their great predecessor in the art of making dupes, and were received
by him in the most magnificent manner. They no doubt fortified
their minds for the career they had chosen by the sage discourse of
that worshipful gentleman; for immediately after they left him, they
began their operations. They travelled for three or four years in
Russia, Poland, and Germany, transmuting metals, telling fortunes,
raising spirits, and selling the elixir vitæ wherever they went; but
there is no record of their doings from whence to draw a more
particular detail. It was not until they made their appearance in
England in 1776, that the names of the Count and Countess di
Cagliostro began to acquire a European reputation. They arrived in
London in the July of that year, possessed of property, in plate,
jewels, and specie, to the amount of about three thousand pounds.
They hired apartments in Whitcombe Street, and lived for some
months quietly. In the same house there lodged a Portuguese

woman, named Blavary, who, being in necessitous circumstances,
was engaged by the count as interpreter. She was constantly
admitted into his laboratory, where he spent much of his time in
search of the philosopher’s stone. She spread abroad the fame of her
entertainer in return for his hospitality, and laboured hard to
impress every body with as full a belief in his extraordinary powers
as she felt herself; but as a female interpreter of the rank and
appearance of Madame Blavary did not exactly correspond with the
count’s notions either of dignity or decorum, he hired a person
named Vitellini, a teacher of languages, to act in that capacity.
Vitellini was a desperate gambler, a man who had tried almost every
resource to repair his ruined fortunes, including among the rest the
search for the philosopher’s stone. Immediately that he saw the
count’s operations, he was convinced that the great secret was his,
and that the golden gates of the palace of fortune were open to let
him in. With still more enthusiasm than Madame Blavary, he held
forth to his acquaintance, and in all public places, that the count was
an extraordinary man, a true adept, whose fortune was immense,
and who could transmute into pure and solid gold as much lead,
iron, and copper as he pleased. The consequence was, that the house
of Cagliostro was besieged by crowds of the idle, the credulous, and
the avaricious, all eager to obtain a sight of the “philosopher,” or to
share in the boundless wealth which he could call into existence.
Unfortunately for Cagliostro, he had fallen into evil hands. Instead
of duping the people of England, as he might have done, he became
himself the victim of a gang of swindlers, who, with the fullest
reliance on his occult powers, only sought to make money of him.
Vitellini introduced to him a ruined gambler like himself, named

Scot, whom he represented as a Scottish nobleman, attracted to
London solely by his desire to see and converse with the
extraordinary man whose fame had spread to the distant mountains
of the north. Cagliostro received him with great kindness and
cordiality; and “Lord” Scot thereupon introduced a woman named
Fry as Lady Scot, who was to act as chaperone to the Countess di
Cagliostro, and make her acquainted with all the noble families of
Britain. Thus things went swimmingly. “His lordship,” whose effects
had not arrived from Scotland, and who had no banker in London,
borrowed two hundred pounds of the count. They were lent without
scruple, so flattered was Cagliostro by the attentions they paid him,
the respect, nay veneration they pretended to feel for him, and the
complete deference with which they listened to every word that fell
from his lips.
Superstitious like all desperate gamesters, Scot had often tried
magical and cabalistic numbers, in the hope of discovering lucky
numbers in the lottery or at the roulette-tables. He had in his
possession a cabalistic manuscript, containing various arithmetical
combinations of the kind, which he submitted to Cagliostro, with an
urgent request that he would select a number. Cagliostro took the
manuscript and studied it, but, as he himself informs us, with no
confidence in its truth. He, however, predicted twenty as the
successful number for the 6th of November following. Scot ventured
a small sum upon this number out of the two hundred pounds he had
borrowed,

and

won.

Cagliostro,

incited

by

this

success,

prognosticated number twenty-five for the next drawing. Scot tried
again, and won a hundred guineas. The numbers fifty-five and fiftyseven were announced with equal success for the 18th of the same

month, to the no small astonishment and delight of Cagliostro, who
thereupon resolved to try fortune for himself, and not for others. To
all the entreaties of Scot and his lady that he would predict more
numbers for them, he turned a deaf ear, even while he still thought
him a lord and a man of honour; but when he discovered that he was
a mere swindler, and the pretended Lady Scot an artful woman of the
town, he closed his door upon them and on all their gang.
Having complete faith in the supernatural powers of the count,
they were in the deepest distress at having lost his countenance. They
tried by every means their ingenuity could suggest to propitiate him
again. They implored, they threatened, and endeavoured to bribe
him; but all was vain. Cagliostro would neither see nor correspond
with them. In the mean time they lived extravagantly, and in the
hope of future, exhausted all their present gains. They were reduced
to the last extremity, when Miss Fry obtained access to the countess,
and received a guinea from her on the representation that she was
starving. Miss Fry, not contented with this, begged her to intercede
with her husband, that for the last time he would point out a lucky
number in the lottery. The countess promised to exert her influence;
and Cagliostro, thus entreated, named the number eight, at the same
time reiterating his determination to have no more to do with any of
them. By an extraordinary hazard, which filled Cagliostro with
surprise and pleasure, number eight was the greatest prize in the
lottery. Miss Fry and her associates cleared fifteen hundred guineas
by the adventure, and became more than ever convinced of the occult
powers of Cagliostro, and strengthened in their determination never
to quit him until they had made their fortunes. Out of the proceeds
Miss Fry bought a handsome necklace at a pawnbroker’s for ninety

guineas. She then ordered a richly-chased gold box, having two
compartments, to be made at a jeweller’s, and putting the necklace in
the one, filled the other with a fine aromatic snuff. She then sought
another interview with Madame di Cagliostro, and urged her to
accept the box as a small token of her esteem and gratitude, without
mentioning the valuable necklace that was concealed in it. Madame
di Cagliostro accepted the present, and was from that hour exposed
to the most incessant persecution from all the confederates—Blavary,
Vitellini, and the pretended Lord and Lady Scot. They flattered
themselves they had regained their lost footing in the house, and
came day after day to know lucky numbers in the lottery, sometimes
forcing themselves up the stairs, and into the count’s laboratory, in
spite of the efforts of the servants to prevent them. Cagliostro,
exasperated at their pertinacity, threatened to call in the assistance
of the magistrates, and taking Miss Fry by the shoulders, pushed her
into the street.
From that time may be dated the misfortunes of Cagliostro. Miss
Fry, at the instigation of her paramour, determined on vengeance.
Her first act was to swear a debt of two hundred pounds against
Cagliostro, and to cause him to be arrested for that sum. While he
was in custody in a sponging-house, Scot, accompanied by a low
attorney, broke into his laboratory, and carried off a small box,
containing, as they believed, the powder of transmutation, and a
number of cabalistic manuscripts and treatises upon alchymy. They
also brought an action against him for the recovery of the necklace;
and Miss Fry accused both him and his countess of sorcery and
witchcraft, and of foretelling numbers in the lottery by the aid of the
Devil. This latter charge was actually heard before Mr. Justice Miller.

The action of trover for the necklace was tried before the Lord Chief
Justice of the Common Pleas, who recommended the parties to
submit to arbitration. In the mean time Cagliostro remained in
prison for several weeks, till having procured bail, he was liberated.
He was soon after waited upon by an attorney named Reynolds, also
deep in the plot, who offered to compromise all the actions upon
certain conditions. Scot, who had accompanied him, concealed
himself behind the door, and suddenly rushing out, presented a
pistol at the heart of Cagliostro, swearing he would shoot him
instantly, if he would not tell him truly the art of predicting lucky
numbers and of transmuting metals. Reynolds pretending to be very
angry, disarmed his accomplice, and entreated the count to satisfy
them by fair means, and disclose his secrets, promising that if he
would do so, they would discharge all the actions, and offer him no
further molestation. Cagliostro replied, that threats and entreaties
were alike useless; that he knew no secrets; and that the powder of
transmutation of which they had robbed him, was of no value to any
body but himself. He offered, however, if they would discharge the
actions, and return the powder and the manuscripts, to forgive them
all the money they had swindled him out of. These conditions were
refused; and Scot and Reynolds departed, swearing vengeance
against him.
Cagliostro appears to have been quite ignorant of the forms of law
in England, and to have been without a friend to advise him as to the
best course he should pursue. While he was conversing with his
countess on the difficulties that beset them, one of his bail called,
and invited him to ride in a hackney coach to the house of a person
who would see him righted. Cagliostro consented, and was driven to

the King’s Bench prison, where his friend left him. He did not
discover for several hours that he was a prisoner, or, in fact,
understand the process of being surrendered by one’s bail.
He regained his liberty in a few weeks; and the arbitrators between
him and Miss Fry made their award against him. He was ordered to
pay the two hundred pounds she had sworn against him, and to
restore the necklace and gold box which had been presented to the
countess. Cagliostro was so disgusted, that he determined to quit
England. His pretensions, besides, had been unmercifully exposed by
a Frenchman, named Morande, the editor of the Courrier de
l’Europe, published in London. To add to his distress, he was
recognised in Westminster Hall as Joseph Balsamo, the swindler of
Palermo. Such a complication of disgrace was not to be borne. He
and his countess packed up their small effects, and left England with
no more than fifty pounds, out of the three thousand they had
brought with them.
They first proceeded to Brussels, where fortune was more
auspicious. They sold considerable quantities of the elixir of life,
performed many cures, and recruited their finances. They then took
their course through Germany to Russia, and always with the same
success. Gold flowed into their coffers faster than they could count it.
They quite forgot all the woes they had endured in England, and
learned to be more circumspect in the choice of their acquaintance.
In the year 1780, they made their appearance in Strasbourg. Their
fame had reached that city before them. They took a magnificent
hotel, and invited all the principal persons of the place to their table.
Their wealth appeared to be boundless, and their hospitality equal to
it. Both the count and countess acted as physicians, and gave money,

advice, and medicine to all the necessitous and suffering of the town.
Many of the cures they performed astonished those regular
practitioners who did not make sufficient allowance for the
wonderful influence of imagination in certain cases. The countess,
who at this time was not more than five-and-twenty, and all radiant
with grace, beauty, and cheerfulness, spoke openly of her eldest son
as a fine young man of eight-and-twenty, who had been for some
years a captain in the Dutch service. The trick succeeded to
admiration. All the ugly old women in Strasbourg, and for miles
around, thronged the saloon of the countess to purchase the liquid
which was to make them as blooming as their daughters; the young
women came in equal abundance, that they might preserve their
charms, and when twice as old as Ninon de l’Enclos, be more
captivating than she; while men were not wanting who were fools
enough to imagine that they might keep off the inevitable stroke of
the grim foe by a few drops of the same incomparable elixir. The
countess, sooth to say, looked like an incarnation of immortal
loveliness, a very goddess of youth and beauty; and it is possible that
the crowds of young men and old, who at all convenient seasons
haunted the perfumed chambers of this enchantress, were attracted
less by their belief in her occult powers than from admiration of her
languishing bright eyes and sparkling conversation. But amid all the
incense that was offered at her shrine, Madame di Cagliostro was
ever faithful to her spouse. She encouraged hopes, it is true, but she
never realised them; she excited admiration, yet kept it within
bounds; and made men her slaves, without ever granting a favour of
which the vainest might boast.

In this city they made the acquaintance of many eminent persons,
and, among others, of the Cardinal Prince de Rohan, who was
destined afterwards to exercise so untoward an influence over their
fate. The cardinal, who seems to have had great faith in him as a
philosopher, persuaded him to visit Paris in his company, which he
did, but remained only thirteen days. He preferred the society of
Strasbourg, and returned thither with the intention of fixing his
residence far from the capital. But he soon found that the first
excitement of his arrival had passed away. People began to reason
with themselves, and to be ashamed of their own admiration. The
populace, among whom he had lavished his charity with a bountiful
hand, accused him of being the Antichrist, the Wandering Jew, the
man of fourteen hundred years of age, a demon in human shape, sent
to lure the ignorant to their destruction; while the more opulent and
better informed called him a spy in the pay of foreign governments,
an agent of the police, a swindler, and a man of evil life. The outcry
grew at last so strong, that he deemed it prudent to try his fortune
elsewhere.
He went first to Naples, but that city was too near Palermo; he
dreaded recognition from some of his early friends, and, after a short
stay, returned to France. He chose Bourdeaux as his next dwellingplace, and created as great a sensation there as he had done in
Strasbourg. He announced himself as the founder of a new school of
medicine and philosophy, boasted of his ability to cure all diseases,
and invited the poor and suffering to visit him, and he would relieve
the distress of the one class, and cure the ailings of the other. All day
long the street opposite his magnificent hotel was crowded by the
populace; the halt and the blind, women with sick babes in their

arms, and persons suffering under every species of human infirmity,
flocked to this wonderful doctor. The relief he afforded in money
more than counterbalanced the failure of his nostrums; and the
affluence of people from all the surrounding country became so
great, that the jurats of the city granted him a military guard, to be
stationed day and night before his door, to keep order. The
anticipations of Cagliostro were realised. The rich were struck with
admiration of his charity and benevolence, and impressed with a full
conviction of his marvellous powers. The sale of the elixir went on
admirably. His saloons were thronged with wealthy dupes who came
to purchase immortality. Beauty, that would endure for centuries,
was the attraction for the fair sex; health and strength for the same
period were the baits held out to the other. His charming countess, in
the meantime, brought grist to the mill by telling fortunes and
casting nativities, or granting attendant sylphs to any ladies who
would pay sufficiently for their services. What was still better, as
tending to keep up the credit of her husband, she gave the most
magnificent parties in Bourdeaux.
But as at Strasbourg, the popular delusion lasted for a few months
only, and burned itself out; Cagliostro forgot, in the intoxication of
success, that there was a limit to quackery which once passed
inspired distrust. When he pretended to call spirits from the tomb,
people became incredulous. He was accused of being an enemy to
religion, of denying Christ, and of being the Wandering Jew. He
despised these rumours as long as they were confined to a few; but
when they spread over the town, when he received no more fees,
when his parties were abandoned, and his acquaintance turned away

when they met him in the street, he thought it high time to shift his
quarters.

HOUSE OF CAGLIOSTRO, PARIS.

He was by this time wearied of the provinces, and turned his
thoughts to the capital. On his arrival he announced himself as the
restorer of Egyptian Freemasonry, and the founder of a new
philosophy. He immediately made his way into the best society by
means of his friend the Cardinal de Rohan. His success as a magician
was quite extraordinary: the most considerable persons of the time
visited him. He boasted of being able, like the Rosicrucians, to
converse with the elementary spirits; to invoke the mighty dead from
the grave, to transmute metals, and to discover occult things by
means of the special protection of God towards him. Like Dr. Dee, he
summoned the angels to reveal the future; and they appeared and
conversed with him in crystals and under glass bells. 48 “There was
hardly,” says the Biographie des Contemporains, “a fine lady in Paris
who would not sup with the shade of Lucretius in the apartments of
Cagliostro; a military officer who would not discuss the art of war

with Cæsar, Hannibal, or Alexander; or an advocate or counsellor
who would not argue legal points with the ghost of Cicero.” These
interviews with the departed were very expensive; for, as Cagliostro
said, the dead would not rise for nothing. The countess, as usual,
exercised all her ingenuity to support her husband’s credit. She was a
great favourite with her own sex, to many a delighted and wondering
auditory of whom she detailed the marvellous powers of Cagliostro.
She said he could render himself invisible, traverse the world with
the rapidity of thought, and be in several places at the same time. 49
He had not been long at Paris before he became involved in the
celebrated affair of the queen’s necklace. His friend the Cardinal de
Rohan, enamoured of the charms of Marie Antoinette, was in sore
distress at her coldness, and the displeasure she had so often
manifested against him. There was at that time a lady named La
Motte in the service of the queen, of whom the cardinal was foolish
enough to make a confidant. Madame de la Motte, in return,
endeavoured to make a tool of the cardinal, and succeeded but too
well in her projects. In her capacity of chamber-woman, or lady of
honour to the queen, she was present at an interview between her
majesty and M. Boehmer, a wealthy jeweller of Paris, when the latter
offered for sale a magnificent diamond necklace, valued at 1,600,000
francs, or about 64,000l. sterling. The queen admired it greatly, but
dismissed the jeweller, with the expression of her regret that she was
too poor to purchase it. Madame de la Motte formed a plan to get
this costly ornament into her own possession, and determined to
make the Cardinal de Rohan the instrument by which to effect it. She
therefore sought an interview with him, and pretending to
sympathise in his grief for the queen’s displeasure, told him she

knew a way by which he might be restored to favour. She then
mentioned the necklace, and the sorrow of the queen that she could
not afford to buy it. The cardinal, who was as wealthy as he was
foolish, immediately offered to purchase the necklace, and make a
present of it to the queen. Madame de la Motte told him by no means
to do so, as he would thereby offend her majesty. His plan would be
to induce the jeweller to give her majesty credit, and accept her
promissory note for the amount at a certain date, to be hereafter
agreed upon. The cardinal readily agreed to the proposal, and
instructed the jeweller to draw up an agreement, and he would
procure the queen’s signature. He placed this in the hands of
Madame de la Motte, who returned it shortly afterwards, with the
words, “Bon, bon—approuvé—Marie Antoinette,” written in the
margin. She told him at the same time that the queen was highly
pleased with his conduct in the matter, and would appoint a meeting
with him in the gardens of Versailles, when she would present him
with a flower, as a token of her regard. The cardinal shewed the
forged document to the jeweller, obtained the necklace, and
delivered it into the hands of Madame de la Motte. So far all was
well. Her next object was to satisfy the cardinal, who awaited
impatiently the promised interview with his royal mistress. There
was at that time in Paris a young woman named D’Oliva, noted for
her resemblance to the queen; and Madame de la Motte, on the
promise of a handsome reward, found no difficulty in persuading her
to personate Marie Antoinette, and meet the Cardinal de Rohan at
the evening twilight in the gardens of Versailles. The meeting took
place accordingly. The cardinal was deceived by the uncertain light,
the great resemblance of the counterfeit, and his own hopes; and

having received the flower from Mademoiselle D’Oliva, went home
with a lighter heart than had beat in his bosom for many a day. 50
In the course of time the forgery of the queen’s signature was
discovered. Boehmer the jeweller immediately named the Cardinal
de Rohan and Madame de la Motte as the persons with whom he had
negotiated, and they were both arrested and thrown into the Bastille.
La Motte was subjected to a rigorous examination, and the
disclosures she made implicating Cagliostro, he was seized, along
with his wife, and also sent to the Bastille. A story involving so much
scandal necessarily excited great curiosity. Nothing was to be heard
of in Paris but the queen’s necklace, with surmises of the guilt or
innocence of the several parties implicated. The husband of Madame
de la Motte escaped to England, and in the opinion of many took the
necklace with him, and there disposed of it to different jewellers in
small quantities at a time. But Madame de la Motte insisted that she
had entrusted it to Cagliostro, who had seized and taken it to pieces,
to “swell the treasures of his immense unequalled fortune.” She
spoke of him as “an empiric, a mean alchymist, a dreamer on the
philosopher’s stone, a false prophet, a profaner of the true worship,
the self-dubbed Count Cagliostro!” She further said that he originally
conceived the project of ruining the Cardinal de Rohan; that he
persuaded her, by the exercise of some magic influence over her
mind, to aid and abet the scheme; and that he was a robber, a
swindler, and a sorcerer!
After all the accused parties had remained for upwards of six
months in the Bastille, the trial commenced. The depositions of the
witnesses having been heard, Cagliostro, as the principal culprit, was
first called upon for his defence. He was listened to with the most

breathless attention. He put himself into a theatrical attitude, and
thus began:—“I am oppressed!—I am accused!—I am calumniated!
Have I deserved this fate? I descend into my conscience, and I there
find the peace that men refuse me! I have travelled a great deal—I am
known over all Europe, and a great part of Asia and Africa. I have
every where shewn myself the friend of my fellow-creatures. My
knowledge, my time, my fortune have ever been employed in the
relief of distress. I have studied and practised medicine; but I have
never degraded that most noble and most consoling of arts by
mercenary speculations of any kind. Though always giving, and
never receiving, I have preserved my independence. I have even
carried my delicacy so far as to refuse the favours of kings. I have
given gratuitously my remedies and my advice to the rich; the poor
have received from me both remedies and money. I have never
contracted any debts, and my manners are pure and uncorrupted.”
After much more self-laudation of the same kind, he went on to
complain of the great hardships he had endured in being separated
for so many months from his innocent and loving wife, who, as he
was given to understand, had been detained in the Bastille, and
perhaps chained in an unwholesome dungeon. He denied
unequivocally that he had the necklace, or that he had ever seen it;
and to silence the rumours and accusations against him, which his
own secrecy with regard to the events of his life had perhaps
originated, he expressed himself ready to satisfy the curiosity of the
public, and to give a plain and full account of his career. He then told
a romantic and incredible tale, which imposed upon no one. He said
he neither knew the place of his birth nor the name of his parents,
but that he spent his infancy in Medina, in Arabia, and was brought

up under the name of Acharat. He lived in the palace of the Great
Muphti in that city, and always had three servants to wait upon him,
besides his preceptor, named Althotas. This Althotas was very fond
of him, and told him that his father and mother, who were Christians
and nobles, died when he was three months old, and left him in the
care of the Muphti. He could never, he said, ascertain their names,
for whenever he asked Althotas the question, he was told that it
would be dangerous for him to know. Some incautious expressions
dropped by his preceptor gave him reason to think they were from
Malta. At the age of twelve he began his travels, and learned the
various languages of the East. He remained three years in Mecca,
where the cherif, or governor, shewed him so much kindness, and
spoke to him so tenderly and affectionately, that he sometimes
thought that personage was his father. He quitted this good man
with tears in his eyes, and never saw him afterwards; but he was
convinced that he was, even at that moment, indebted to his care for
all the advantages he enjoyed. Whenever he arrived in any city, either
of Europe or Asia, he found an account opened for him at the
principal bankers’ or merchants’. He could draw upon them to the
amount of thousands and hundreds of thousands; and no questions
were ever asked beyond his name. He had only to mention the word
‘Acharat,’ and all his wants were supplied. He firmly believed that the
Cherif of Mecca was the friend to whom all was owing. This was the
secret of his wealth, and he had no occasion to resort to swindling for
a livelihood. It was not worth his while to steal a diamond necklace
when he had wealth enough to purchase as many as he pleased, and
more magnificent ones than had ever been worn by a queen of
France. As to the other charges brought against him by Madame de

la Motte, he had but a short answer to give. She had called him an
empiric. He was not unfamiliar with the word. If it meant a man
who, without being a physician, had some knowledge of medicine,
and took no fees—who cured both rich and poor, and took no money
from either, he confessed that he was such a man, that he was an
empiric. She had also called him a mean alchymist. Whether he were
an alchymist or not, the epithet mean could only be applied to those
who begged and cringed, and he had never done either. As regarded
his being a dreamer about the philosopher’s stone, whatever his
opinions upon that subject might be, he had been silent, and had
never troubled the public with his dreams. Then, as to his being a
false prophet, he had not always been so; for he had prophesied to
the Cardinal de Rohan, that Madame de la Motte would prove a
dangerous woman, and the result had verified the prediction. He
denied that he was a profaner of the true worship, or that he had ever
striven to bring religion into contempt; on the contrary, he respected
every man’s religion, and never meddled with it. He also denied that
he was a Rosicrucian, or that he had ever pretended to be three
hundred years of age, or to have had one man in his service for a
hundred and fifty years. In conclusion, he said every statement that
Madame de la Motte had made regarding him was false, and that she
was mentiris impudentissime, which two words he begged her
counsel to translate for her, as it was not polite to tell her so in
French.
Such was the substance of his extraordinary answer to the charges
against him; an answer which convinced those who were before
doubtful that he was one of the most impudent impostors that had
ever run the career of deception. Counsel were then heard on behalf

of the Cardinal de Rohan and Madame de la Motte. It appearing
clearly that the cardinal was himself the dupe of a vile conspiracy,
and there being no evidence against Cagliostro, they were both
acquitted. Madame de la Motte was found guilty, and sentenced to be
publicly whipped, and branded with a hot iron on the back.
Cagliostro and his wife were then discharged from custody. On
applying to the officers of the Bastille for the papers and effects
which had been seized at his lodgings, he found that many of them
had been abstracted. He thereupon brought an action against them
for the recovery of his Mss. and a small portion of the powder of
transmutation. Before the affair could be decided, he received orders
to quit Paris within four-and-twenty hours. Fearing that if he were
once more enclosed in the dungeons of the Bastille he should never
see daylight again, he took his departure immediately and proceeded
to England. On his arrival in London he made the acquaintance of
the notorious Lord George Gordon, who espoused his cause warmly,
and inserted a letter in the public papers, animadverting upon the
conduct of the Queen of France in the affair of the necklace, and
asserting that she was really the guilty party. For this letter Lord
George was exposed to a prosecution at the instance of the French
ambassador, found guilty of libel, and sentenced to fine and a long
imprisonment.
Cagliostro and the countess afterwards travelled in Italy, where
they were arrested by the Papal government in 1789, and condemned
to death. The charges against him were, that he was a freemason, a
heretic, and a sorcerer. This unjustifiable sentence was afterwards
commuted into one of perpetual imprisonment in the Castle of St.
Angelo. His wife was allowed to escape severer punishment by

immuring herself in a nunnery. Cagliostro did not long survive. The
loss of liberty preyed upon his mind—accumulated misfortunes had
injured his health and broken his spirit, and he died early in 1790.
His fate may have been no better than he deserved, but it is
impossible not to feel that his sentence for the crimes assigned was
utterly disgraceful to the government that pronounced it.

PRESENT STATE OF ALCHYMY.
We have now finished the list of the persons who have most
distinguished themselves in this unprofitable pursuit. Among them
are men of all ranks, characters, and conditions: the truth-seeking
but erring philosopher; the ambitious prince and the needy noble,
who have believed in it; as well as the designing charlatan, who has
not believed in it, but has merely made the pretension to it the means
of cheating his fellows, and living upon their credulity. One or more
of all these classes will be found in the foregoing pages. It will be
seen, from the record of their lives, that the delusion was not
altogether without its uses. Men, in striving to gain too much, do not
always overreach themselves; if they cannot arrive at the inaccessible
mountain-top, they may perhaps get half way towards it, and pick up
some scraps of wisdom and knowledge on the road. The useful
science of chemistry is not a little indebted to its spurious brother of
alchymy. Many valuable discoveries have been made in that search
for the impossible, which might otherwise have been hidden for
centuries yet to come. Roger Bacon, in searching for the
philosopher’s

stone,

discovered

gunpowder,

a

still

more

extraordinary substance. Van Helmont, in the same pursuit,
discovered the properties of gas; Geber made discoveries in

chemistry which were equally important; and Paracelsus, amidst his
perpetual visions of the transmutation of metals, found that mercury
was a remedy for one of the most odious and excruciating of all the
diseases that afflict humanity.
In our day little mention is made in Europe of any new devotees of
the science, though it is affirmed that one or two of our most
illustrious men of science do not admit the pursuit to be so absurd
and vain as it has been commonly considered in recent times. The
belief in witchcraft, which is scarcely more absurd, still lingers in the
popular mind; but few are so credulous as to believe that any elixir
could make man live for centuries, or turn all our iron and pewter
into gold. Alchymy, in Europe, may be said to be almost wholly
exploded; but in the East it still flourishes in as great repute as ever.
Recent travellers make constant mention of it, especially in China,
Hindostan, Persia, Tartary, Egypt, and Arabia.

MODERN PROPHECIES.

AN epidemic terror of the end of the world has several
times spread over the nations. The most remarkable was that which seized
Christendom about the middle of the tenth century. Numbers of fanatics
appeared in France, Germany, and Italy at that time, preaching that the
thousand years prophesied in the Apocalypse as the term of the world’s
duration were about to expire, and that the Son of Man would appear in the
clouds to judge the godly and the ungodly. The delusion appears to have
been discouraged by the Church, but it nevertheless spread rapidly among
the people. 51
The scene of the last judgment was expected to be at Jerusalem. In the
year 999, the number of pilgrims proceeding eastward, to await the coming
of the Lord in that city, was so great that they were compared to a
desolating army. Most of them sold their goods and possessions before
they quitted Europe, and lived upon the proceeds in the Holy Land.
Buildings of every sort were suffered to fall into ruins. It was thought
useless to repair them, when the end of the world was so near. Many noble
edifices were deliberately pulled down. Even churches, usually so well

maintained, shared the general neglect. Knights, citizens, and serfs,
travelled eastwards in company, taking with them their wives and children,
singing psalms as they went, and looking with fearful eyes upon the sky,
which they expected each minute to open, to let the Son of God descend in
his glory.
During the thousandth year the number of pilgrims increased. Most of
them were smitten with terror as with a plague. Every phenomenon of
nature filled them with alarm. A thunder-storm sent them all upon their
knees in mid-march. It was the opinion that thunder was the voice of God,
announcing the day of judgment. Numbers expected the earth to open, and
give up its dead at the sound. Every meteor in the sky seen at Jerusalem
brought the whole Christian population into the streets to weep and pray.
The pilgrims on the road were in the same alarm:
“Lorsque, pendant la nuit, un globe de lumière
S’échappa quelquefois de la voûte de cieux,
Et traça dans sa chûte un long sillon de feux,
La troupe suspendit sa marche solitaire.” 52
Fanatic preachers kept up the flame of terror. Every shooting star
furnished occasion for a sermon, in which the sublimity of the approaching
judgment was the principal topic.
The appearance of comets has been often thought to foretell the speedy
dissolution of this world. Part of this belief still exists; but the comet is no
longer looked upon as the sign, but the agent of destruction. So lately as in
the year 1832 the greatest alarm spread over the continent of Europe,
especially in Germany, lest the comet, whose appearance was then foretold
by astronomers, should destroy the earth. The danger of our globe was
gravely discussed. Many persons refrained from undertaking or concluding

any business during that year, in consequence solely of their apprehension
that this terrible comet would dash us and our world to atoms.
During seasons of great pestilence, men have often believed the
prophecies of crazed fanatics, that the end of the world was come. Credulity
is always greatest in times of calamity. During the great plague, which
ravaged all Europe between the years 1345 and 1350, it was generally
considered that the end of the world was at hand. Pretended prophets were
to be found in all the principal cities of Germany, France, and Italy,
predicting that within ten years the trump of the archangel would sound,
and the Saviour appear in the clouds to call the earth to judgment.
No little consternation was created in London in 1736 by the prophecy of
the famous Whiston, that the world would be destroyed in that year, on the
13th of October. Crowds of people went out on the appointed day to
Islington, Hampstead, and the fields intervening, to see the destruction of
London, which was to be the “beginning of the end.” A satirical account of
this folly is given in Swift’s Miscellanies, vol. iii., entitled A true and
faithful Narrative of what passed in London on a Rumour of the Day of
Judgment. An authentic narrative of this delusion would be interesting;
but this solemn witticism of Pope and Gay is not to be depended upon.
In the year 1761 the citizens of London were alarmed by two shocks of an
earthquake, and the prophecy of a third, which was to destroy them
altogether. The first shock was felt on the 8th of February, and threw down
several chimneys in the neighbourhood of Limehouse and Poplar; the
second happened on the 8th of March, and was chiefly felt in the north of
London, and towards Hampstead and Highgate. It soon became the subject
of general remark, that there was exactly an interval of a month between
the shocks; and a crack-brained fellow, named Bell, a soldier in the Life
Guards, was so impressed with the idea that there would be a third in
another month, that he lost his senses altogether, and ran about the streets
predicting the destruction of London on the 5th of April. Most people
thought that the first would have been a more appropriate day; but there

were not wanting thousands who confidently believed the prediction, and
took measures to transport themselves and families from the scene of the
impending calamity. As the awful day approached, the excitement became
intense, and great numbers of credulous people resorted to all the villages
within a circuit of twenty miles, awaiting the doom of London. Islington,
Highgate, Hampstead, Harrow, and Blackheath, were crowded with panicstricken fugitives, who paid exorbitant prices for accommodation to the
housekeepers of these secure retreats. Such as could not afford to pay for
lodgings at any of those places, remained in London until two or three days
before the time, and then encamped in the surrounding fields, awaiting the
tremendous shock which was to lay their high city all level with the dust. As
happened during a similar panic in the time of Henry VIII., the fear
became contagious, and hundreds who had laughed at the prediction a
week before, packed up their goods, when they saw others doing so, and
hastened away. The river was thought to be a place of great security, and all
the merchant-vessels in the port were filled with people, who passed the
night between the 4th and 5th on board, expecting every instant to see St.
Paul’s totter, and the towers of Westminster Abbey rock in the wind and
fall amid a cloud of dust. The greater part of the fugitives returned on the
following day, convinced that the prophet was a false one; but many judged
it more prudent to allow a week to elapse before they trusted their dear
limbs in London. Bell lost all credit in a short time, and was looked upon
even by the most credulous as a mere madman. He tried some other
prophecies, but nobody was deceived by them; and, in a few months
afterwards, he was confined in a lunatic asylum.
A panic terror of the end of the world seized the good people of Leeds
and its neighbourhood in the year 1806. It arose from the following
circumstances. A hen, in a village close by, laid eggs, on which were
inscribed the words, “Christ is coming.” Great numbers visited the spot,
and examined these wondrous eggs, convinced that the day of judgment
was near at hand. Like sailors in a storm, expecting every instant to go to

the bottom, the believers suddenly became religious, prayed violently, and
flattered themselves that they repented them of their evil courses. But a
plain tale soon put them down, and quenched their religion entirely. Some
gentlemen, hearing of the matter, went one fine morning, and caught the
poor hen in the act of laying one of her miraculous eggs. They soon
ascertained beyond doubt that the egg had been inscribed with some
corrosive ink, and cruelly forced up again into the bird’s body. At this
explanation, those who had prayed, now laughed, and the world wagged as
merrily as of yore.
At the time of the plague in Milan, in 1630, of which so affecting a
description has been left us by Ripamonte, in his interesting work, De Peste
Mediolani, the people, in their distress, listened with avidity to the
predictions of astrologers and other impostors. It is singular enough that
the plague was foretold a year before it broke out. A large comet appearing
in 1628, the opinions of astrologers were divided with regard to it. Some
insisted that it was a forerunner of a bloody war; others maintained that it
predicted a great famine; but the greater number, founding their judgment
upon its pale colour, thought it portended a pestilence. The fulfilment of
their prediction brought them into great repute while the plague was
raging.
Other prophecies were current, which were asserted to have been
delivered hundreds of years previously. They had a most pernicious effect
upon the mind of the vulgar, as they induced a belief in fatalism. By taking
away the hope of recovery—that greatest balm in every malady—they
increased threefold the ravages of the disease. One singular prediction
almost drove the unhappy people mad. An ancient couplet, preserved for
ages by tradition, foretold, that in the year 1630 the devil would poison all
Milan. Early one morning in April, and before the pestilence had reached
its height, the passengers were surprised to see that all the doors in the
principal streets of the city were marked with a curious daub, or spot, as if
a sponge, filled with the purulent matter of the plague-sores, had been

pressed against them. The whole population were speedily in movement to
remark the strange appearance, and the greatest alarm spread rapidly.
Every means was taken to discover the perpetrators, but in vain. At last the
ancient prophecy was remembered, and prayers were offered up in all the
churches, that the machinations of the Evil One might be defeated. Many
persons were of opinion that the emissaries of foreign powers were
employed to spread infectious poison over the city; but by far the greater
number were convinced that the powers of hell had conspired against
them, and that the infection was spread by supernatural agencies. In the
mean time the plague increased fearfully. Distrust and alarm took
possession of every mind. Every thing was believed to have been poisoned
by the Devil; the waters of the wells, the standing corn in the fields, and the
fruit upon the trees. It was believed that all objects of touch were poisoned;
the walls of the houses, the pavements of the streets, and the very handles
of the doors. The populace were raised to a pitch of ungovernable fury. A
strict watch was kept for the Devil’s emissaries, and any man who wanted
to be rid of an enemy, had only to say that he had seen him besmearing a
door with ointment; his fate was certain death at the hands of the mob. An
old man, upwards of eighty years of age, a daily frequenter of the church of
St. Antonio, was seen, on rising from his knees, to wipe with the skirt of his
cloak the stool on which he was about to sit down. A cry was raised
immediately that he was besmearing the seat with poison. A mob of
women, by whom the church was crowded, seized hold of the feeble old
man, and dragged him out by the hair of his head, with horrid oaths and
imprecations. He was trailed in this manner through the mire to the house
of the municipal judge, that he might be put to the rack, and forced to
discover his accomplices; but he expired on the way. Many other victims
were sacrificed to the popular fury. One Mora, who appears to have been
half a chemist and half a barber, was accused of being in league with the
Devil to poison Milan. His house was surrounded, and a number of
chemical preparations were found. The poor man asserted, that they were

intended as preservatives against infection; but some physicians, to whom
they were submitted, declared they were poison, Mora was put to the rack,
where he for a long time asserted his innocence. He confessed at last, when
his courage was worn down by torture, that he was in league with the Devil
and foreign powers to poison the whole city; that he had anointed the
doors, and infected the fountains of water. He named several persons as his
accomplices, who were apprehended and put to a similar torture. They
were all found guilty, and executed. Mora’s house was rased to the ground,
and a column erected on the spot, with an inscription to commemorate his
guilt.
While the public mind was filled with these marvellous occurrences, the
plague continued to increase. The crowds that were brought together to
witness the executions spread the infection among one another. But the
fury of their passions, and the extent of their credulity, kept pace with the
violence of the plague; every wonderful and preposterous story was
believed. One, in particular, occupied them to the exclusion, for a long
time, of every other. The Devil himself had been seen. He had taken a
house in Milan, in which he prepared his poisonous unguents, and
furnished them to his emissaries for distribution. One man had brooded
over such tales till he became firmly convinced that the wild nights of his
own fancy were realities. He stationed himself in the market-place of
Milan, and related the following story to the crowds that gathered round
him. He was standing, he said, at the door of the cathedral, late in the
evening; and when there was nobody nigh, he saw a dark-coloured chariot,
drawn by six milk-white horses, stop close beside him. The chariot was
followed by a numerous train of domestics in dark liveries, mounted on
dark-coloured steeds. In the chariot there sat a tall stranger of a majestic
aspect; his long black hair floated in the wind—fire flashed from his large
black eyes, and a curl of ineffable scorn dwelt upon his lips. The look of the
stranger was so sublime that he was awed, and trembled with fear when he
gazed upon him. His complexion was much darker than that of any man he

had ever seen, and the atmosphere around him was hot and suffocating. He
perceived immediately that he was a being of another world. The stranger,
seeing his trepidation, asked him blandly, yet majestically, to mount beside
him. He had no power to refuse, and before he was well aware that he had
moved, he found himself in the chariot. Onwards they went, with the
rapidity of the wind, the stranger speaking no word, until they stopped
before a door in the high-street of Milan. There was a crowd of people in
the street, but, to his great surprise, no one seemed to notice the
extraordinary equipage and its numerous train. From this he concluded
that they were invisible. The house at which they stopped appeared to be a
shop, but the interior was like a vast half-ruined palace. He went with his
mysterious guide through several large and dimly-lighted rooms. In one of
them, surrounded by huge pillars of marble, a senate of ghosts was
assembled, debating on the progress of the plague. Other parts of the
building were enveloped in the thickest darkness, illumined at intervals by
flashes of lightning, which allowed him to distinguish a number of gibing
and chattering skeletons, running about and pursuing each other, or
playing at leap-frog over one another’s backs. At the rear of the mansion
was a wild, uncultivated plot of ground, in the midst of which arose a black
rock. Down its sides rushed with fearful noise a torrent of poisonous water,
which, insinuating itself through the soil, penetrated to all the springs of
the city, and rendered them unfit for use. After he had been shewn all this,
the stranger led him into another large chamber, filled with gold and
precious stones, all of which he offered him if he would kneel down and
worship him, and consent to smear the doors and houses of Milan with a
pestiferous salve which he held out to him. He now knew him to be the
Devil, and in that moment of temptation, prayed to God to give him
strength to resist. His prayer was heard—he refused the bribe. The stranger
scowled horribly upon him—a loud clap of thunder burst over his head—
the vivid lightning flashed in his eyes, and the next moment he found
himself standing alone at the porch of the cathedral. He repeated this

strange tale day after day, without any variation, and all the populace were
firm believers in its truth. Repeated search was made to discover the
mysterious house, but all in vain. The man pointed out several as
resembling it, which were searched by the police; but the Demon of the
Pestilence was not to be found, nor the hall of ghosts, nor the poisonous
fountain. But the minds of the people were so impressed with the idea, that
scores of witnesses, half crazed by disease, came forward to swear that they
also had seen the diabolical stranger, and had heard his chariot, drawn by
the milk-white steeds, rumbling over the streets at midnight with a sound
louder than thunder.
The number of persons who confessed that they were employed by the
Devil to distribute poison is almost incredible. An epidemic frenzy was
abroad, which seemed to be as contagious as the plague. Imagination was
as disordered as the body, and day after day persons came voluntarily
forward to accuse themselves. They generally had the marks of disease
upon them, and some died in the act of confession.
During the great plague of London, in 1665, the people listened with
similar avidity to the predictions of quacks and fanatics. Defoe says, that at
that time the people were more addicted to prophecies and astronomical
conjurations, dreams, and old wives’ tales than ever they were before or
since. Almanacs, and their predictions, frightened them terribly. Even the
year before the plague broke out, they were greatly alarmed by the comet
which then appeared, and anticipated that famine, pestilence, or fire would
follow. Enthusiasts, while yet the disease had made but little progress, ran
about the streets, predicting that in a few days London would be destroyed.
A still more singular instance of the faith in predictions occurred in
London in the year 1524. The city swarmed at that time with fortune-tellers
and astrologers, who were consulted daily by people of every class in
society on the secrets of futurity. As early as the month of June 1523,
several of them concurred in predicting that, on the 1st day of February
1524, the waters of the Thames would swell to such a height as to overflow

the whole city of London, and wash away ten thousand houses. The
prophecy met implicit belief. It was reiterated with the utmost confidence
month after month, until so much alarm was excited that many families
packed up their goods, and removed into Kent and Essex. As the time drew
nigh, the number of these emigrants increased. In January, droves of
workmen might be seen, followed by their wives and children, trudging on
foot to the villages within fifteen or twenty miles, to await the catastrophe.
People of a higher class were also to be seen in wagons and other vehicles
bound on a similar errand. By the middle of January, at least twenty
thousand persons had quitted the doomed city, leaving nothing but the
bare walls of their homes to be swept away by the impending floods. Many
of the richer sort took up their abode on the heights of Highgate,
Hampstead, and Blackheath; and some erected tents as far away as
Waltham Abbey on the north, and Croydon on the south of the Thames.
Bolton, the prior of St. Bartholomew’s, was so alarmed, that he erected, at a
very great expense, a sort of fortress at Harrow-on-the-Hill, which he
stocked with provisions for two months. On the 24th of January, a week
before the awful day which was to see the destruction of London, he
removed thither, with the brethren and officers of the priory and all his
household. A number of boats were conveyed in wagons to his fortress,
furnished abundantly with expert rowers, in case the flood, reaching so
high as Harrow, should force them to go farther for a resting-place. Many
wealthy citizens prayed to share his retreat; but the prior, with a prudent
forethought, admitted only his personal friends, and those who brought
stores of eatables for the blockade.
At last the morn, big with the fate of London, appeared in the east. The
wondering crowds were astir at an early hour to watch the rising of the
waters. The inundation, it was predicted, would be gradual, not sudden; so
that they expected to have plenty of time to escape as soon as they saw the
bosom of old Thames heave beyond the usual mark. But the majority were
too much alarmed to trust to this, and thought themselves safer ten or

twenty miles off. The Thames, unmindful of the foolish crowds upon its
banks, flowed on quietly as of yore. The tide ebbed at its usual hour, flowed
to its usual height, and then ebbed again, just as if twenty astrologers had
not pledged their words to the contrary. Blank were their faces as evening
approached, and as blank grew the faces of the citizens to think that they
had made such fools of themselves. At last night set in, and the obstinate
river would not lift its waters to sweep away even one house out of the ten
thousand. Still, however, the people were afraid to go to sleep. Many
hundreds remained up till dawn of the next day, lest the deluge should
come upon them like a thief in the night.
On the morrow, it was seriously discussed whether it would not be
advisable to duck the false prophets in the river. Luckily for them, they
thought of an expedient which allayed the popular fury. They asserted that,
by an error (a very slight one,) of a little figure, they had fixed the date of
this awful inundation a whole century too early. The stars were right after
all, and they, erring mortals, were wrong. The present generation of
cockneys was safe, and London would be washed away, not in 1524, but in
1624. At this announcement, Bolton the prior dismantled his fortress, and
the weary emigrants came back.
An eye-witness of the great fire of London, in an account preserved
among the Harleian Mss. in the British Museum, and published in the
transactions of the Royal Society of Antiquaries, relates another instance of
the credulity of the Londoners. The writer, who accompanied the Duke of
York day by day through the district included between the Fleet-bridge and
the Thames, states that, in their efforts to check the progress of the flames,
they were much impeded by the superstition of the people. Mother
Shipton, in one of her prophecies, had said that London would be reduced
to ashes, and they refused to make any efforts to prevent it. 53 A son of the
noted Sir Kenelm Digby, who was also a pretender to the gifts of prophecy,
persuaded them that no power on earth could prevent the fulfilment of the
prediction; for it was written in the great book of fate that London was to

be destroyed. Hundreds of persons, who might have rendered valuable
assistance, and saved whole parishes from devastation, folded their arms
and looked on. As many more gave themselves up, with the less
compunction, to plunder a city which they could not save. 54
The prophecies of Mother Shipton are still believed in many of the rural
districts of England. In cottages and servants’ halls her reputation is great;
and she rules, the most popular of British prophets, among all the
uneducated, or half-educated, portions of the community. She is generally
supposed to have been born at Knaresborough, in the reign of Henry VII.,
and to have sold her soul to the Devil for the power of foretelling future
events. Though during her lifetime she was looked upon as a witch, she yet
escaped the witch’s fate, and died peaceably in her bed at an extreme old
age, near Clifton in Yorkshire. A stone is said to have been erected to her
memory in the churchyard of that place, with the following epitaph:
“Here lies she who never lied,
Whose skill often has been tried:
Her prophecies shall still survive,
And ever keep her name alive.”
“Never a day passed,” says her traditionary biography, “wherein, she did
not relate something remarkable, and that required the most serious
consideration. People flocked to her from far and near, her fame was so
great. They went to her of all sorts, both old and young, rich and poor,
especially young maidens, to be resolved of their doubts relating to things
to come; and all returned wonderfully satisfied in the explanations she gave
to their questions.” Among the rest, went the Abbot of Beverley, to whom
she foretold the suppression of the monasteries by Henry VIII., his
marriage with Anne Boleyn, the fires for heretics in Smithfield, and the

execution of Mary Queen of Scots. She also foretold the accession of James
I., adding that, with him,
“From the cold North
Every evil should come forth.”
On a subsequent visit she uttered another prophecy, which, in the opinion
of her believers, still remains unfulfilled, but may be expected to be realised
during the present century:
“The time shall come when seas of blood
Shall mingle with a greater flood.
Great noise there shall be heard—great shouts and cries,
And seas shall thunder louder than the skies;
Then shall three lions fight with three and bring
Joy to a people, honour to a king.
That fiery year as soon as o’er,
Peace shall then be as before;
Plenty shall every where be found,
And men with swords shall plough the ground.”
But the most famous of all her prophecies is one relating to London.
Thousands of persons still shudder to think of the woes that are to burst
over this unhappy realm, when London and Highgate are joined by one
continuous line of houses. This junction, which, if the rage for building
lasts much longer, in the same proportion as heretofore, bids fair to be
soon accomplished, was predicted by her shortly before her death.
Revolutions—the fall of mighty monarchs, and the shedding of much blood

are to signalise that event. The very angels, afflicted by our woes, are to
turn aside their heads, and weep for hapless Britain.
But great as is the fame of Mother Shipton, she ranks but second in the
list of British prophets. Merlin, the mighty Merlin, stands alone in his high
pre-eminence—the first and greatest. As old Drayton sings, in his Polyolbion:
“Of Merlin and his skill what region doth not hear?
The world shall still be full of Merlin every year.
A thousand lingering years his prophecies have run,
And scarcely shall have end till time itself be done.”
Spenser, in his divine poem, has given us a powerful description of this
renowned seer—
“who had in magic more insight
Than ever him before, or after, living wight.
For he by words could call out of the sky
Both sun and moon, and make them him obey;
The land to sea, and sea to mainland dry,
And darksome night he eke could turn to day—
Huge hosts of men he could, alone, dismay.
And hosts of men and meanest things could frame,
Whenso him list his enemies to fray,
That to this day, for terror of his name,
The fiends do quake, when any him to them does name.
And soothe men say that he was not the sonne
Of mortal sire or other living wighte,

But wondrously begotten and begoune
By false illusion of a guileful sprite
On a faire ladye nun.”
In these verses the poet has preserved the popular belief with regard to
Merlin, who is generally supposed to have been a contemporary of
Vortigern. Opinion is divided as to whether he were a real personage, or a
mere impersonation, formed by the poetic fancy of a credulous people. It
seems most probable that such a man did exist, and that, possessing
knowledge as much above the comprehension of his age, as that possessed
by Friar Bacon was beyond the reach of his, he was endowed by the
wondering crowd with the supernatural attributes that Spenser has
enumerated.
Geoffrey of Monmouth translated Merlin’s poetical odes, or prophecies,
into Latin prose; and he was much reverenced not only by Geoffrey, but by
most of the old annalists. In a Life of Merlin, with his Prophecies and
Predictions interpreted and made good by our English Annals, by Thomas
Heywood, published in the reign of Charles I., we find several of these
pretended prophecies. They seem, however, to have been all written by
Heywood himself. They are in terms too plain and positive to allow any one
to doubt for a moment of their having been composed ex post facto.
Speaking of Richard I., he says:
“The Lion’s heart will ’gainst the Saracen rise,
And purchase from him many a glorious prize;
The rose and lily shall at first unite,
But, parting of the prey prove opposite. * * *
But while abroad these great acts shall be done,
All things at home shall to disorder run.
Cooped up and caged then shall the Lion be,

But, after sufferance, ransomed and set free.”
The simple-minded Thomas Heywood gravely goes on to inform us, that all
these things actually came to pass. Upon Richard III. he is equally
luminous. He says:
“A hunch-backed monster, who with teeth is born,
The mockery of art and nature’s scorn;
Who from the womb preposterously is hurled,
And with feet forward thrust into the world,
Shall, from the lower earth on which he stood,
Wade, every step he mounts, knee-deep in blood.
He shall to th’ height of all his hopes aspire,
And, clothed in state, his ugly shape admire;
But, when he thinks himself most safe to stand,
From foreign parts a native whelp shall land.”
Another of these prophecies after the event tells us that Henry VIII.
should take the power from Rome, “and bring it home unto his British
bower;” that he should “root out from the land all the razored skulls;” and
that he should neither spare “man in his rage nor woman in his lust;” and
that, in the time of his next successor but one, “there should come in the
fagot and the stake.” Master Heywood closes Merlin’s prophecies at his
own day, and does not give even a glimpse of what was to befall England
after his decease. Many other prophecies, besides those quoted by him,
were, he says, dispersed abroad, in his day, under the name of Merlin; but
he gives his readers a taste of one only, and that is the following:
“When hempe is ripe and ready to pull,

Then, Englishman, beware thy skull.”
This prophecy, which, one would think, ought to have put him in mind of
the gallows, at that time the not unusual fate of false prophets, he explains
thus: “In this word

HEMPE

be five letters. Now, by reckoning the five

successive princes from Henry VIII., this prophecy is easily explained: H
signifieth King Henry before-named; E, Edward, his son, the sixth of that
name; M, Mary, who succeeded him; P, Philip of Spain, who, by marrying
Queen Mary, participated with her in the English diadem; and, lastly, E
signifieth Queen Elizabeth, after whose death there was a great feare that
some troubles might have arisen about the crown.” As this did not happen,
Heywood, who was a sly rogue in a small way, gets out of the scrape by
saying, “Yet proved this augury true, though not according to the former
expectation; for, after the peaceful inauguration of King James, there was
great mortality, not in London only, but through the whole kingdom, and
from which the nation was not quite clean in seven years after.”
This is not unlike the subterfuge of Peter of Pontefract, who had
prophesied the death and deposition of King John, and who was hanged by
that monarch for his pains. A very graphic and amusing account of this
pretended prophet is given by Grafton, in his Chronicles of England. 55 “In
the meanwhile,” says he, “the priestes within England had provided them a
false and counterfeated prophet, called Peter Wakefielde, a Yorkshire man,
who was an hermite, an idle gadder about, and a pratlyng marchant. Now,
to bring this Peter in credite, and the kyng out of all credite with his people,
diverse vaine persons bruted dayly among the commons of the realme, that
Christe had twice appered unto him in the shape of a childe, betwene the
prieste’s handes, once at Yorke, another tyme at Pomfret; and that he had
breathed upon him thrice, saying, ‘Peace, peace, peace,’ and teachyng
many things, which he anon declared to the bishops, and bid the people
amend their naughtie living. Being rapt also in spirite, they sayde he

behelde the joyes of heaven and sorrowes of hell; for scant were there three
in the realme, sayde he, that lived christianly.
“This counterfeated soothsayer prophesied of King John, that he
should reigne no longer than the Ascension-day next followyng, which
was in the yere of our Lord 1211, and was the thirteenth yere from his
coronation; and this, he said, he had by revelation. Then it was of him
demanded, whether he should be slaine or be deposed, or should
voluntarily give over the crowne? He aunswered, that he could not tell;
but of this he was sure (he sayd), that neither he nor any of his stock or
lineage should reigne after that day.
“The king, hering of this, laughed much at it, and made but a scoff
thereat. ‘Tush!’ saith he, ‘it is but an ideot knave, and such an one as
lacketh his right wittes.’ But when this foolish prophet had so escaped
the daunger of the kinge’s displeasure, and that he made no more of it,
he gate him abroad, and prated thereof at large, as he was a very idle
vagabond, and used to trattle and talke more than ynough; so that they
which loved the king caused him anon after to be apprehended as a
malefactor, and to be throwen in prison, the king not yet knowing
thereof.
“Anone after the fame of this phantasticall prophet went all the
realme over, and his name was knowen every where, as foolishnesse is
much regarded of the people, where wisdome is not in place; specially
because he was then imprisoned for the matter, the rumour was the
larger, their wonderynges were the wantoner, their practises the
foolisher, their busye talkes and other idle doinges the greater.
Continually from thence, as the rude manner of people is, old gossyps
tales went abroad, new tales were invented, fables were added to
fables, and lyes grew upon lyes. So that every daye newe slanders were
laide upon the king, and not one of them true. Rumors arose,
blasphemyes were sprede, the enemyes rejoyced, and treasons by the

priestes were mainteyned; and what lykewise was surmised, or other
subtiltye practised, all was then fathered upon this foolish prophet, as
‘thus saith Peter Wakefield;’ ‘thus hath he prophesied;’ ‘and thus it
shall come to pass;’ yea, many times, when he thought nothing lesse.
And when the Ascension-day was come, which was prophecyed of
before, King John commanded his royal tent to be spread in the open
fielde, passing that day with his noble counseyle and men of honour in
the greatest solemnitie that ever he did before; solacing himself with
musickale instrumentes and songs, most in sight among his trustie
friendes. When that day was paste in all prosperitie and myrth, his
enemyes being confused, turned all into an allegorical understanding
to make the prophecie good, and sayde, ‘He is no longer king, for the
pope reigneth, and not he.’ [King John was labouring under a sentence
of excommunication at the time.]
“Then was the king by his council perswaded that this false prophet
had troubled the realme, perverted the heartes of the people, and
raysed the Commons against him; for his wordes went over the sea, by
the help of his prelates, and came to the French king’s eare, and gave
to him a great encouragement to invade the lande. He had not else
done it so sodeinely. But he was most fowly deceived, as all they are
and shall be that put their trust in such dark drowsye dreames of
hipocrites. The king therefore commended that he should be hanged
up, and his sonne also with him, lest any more false prophets should
arise of that race.”
Heywood, who was a great stickler for the truth of all sorts of prophecies,
gives a much more favourable account of this Peter of Pomfret, or
Pontefract, whose fate he would, in all probability, have shared, if he had
had the misfortune to have flourished in the same age. He says, that Peter,
who was not only a prophet, but a bard, predicted divers of King John’s
disasters, which fell out accordingly. On being taxed for a lying prophet in

having predicted that the king would be deposed before he entered into the
fifteenth year of his reign, he answered him boldly, that all he had said was
justifiable and true; for that, having given up his crown to the pope, and
paying him an annual tribute, the pope reigned, and not he. Heywood
thought this explanation to be perfectly satisfactory, and the prophet’s faith
for ever established.
But to return to Merlin. Of him even to this day it may be said, in the
words which Burns has applied to another notorious personage,
“Great was his power and great his fame;
Far kenned and noted is his name.”
His reputation is by no means confined to the land of his birth, but extends
through most of the nations of Europe. A very curious volume of his Life,
Prophecies, and Miracles, written, it is supposed, by Robert de Bosron,
was printed at Paris in 1498, which states, that the devil himself was his
father, and that he spoke the instant he was born, and assured his mother,
a very virtuous young woman, that she should not die in childbed with him,
as her ill-natured neighbours had predicted. The judge of the district,
hearing of so marvellous an occurrence, summoned both mother and child
to appear before him; and they went accordingly the same day. To put the
wisdom of the young prophet most effectually to the test, the judge asked
him if he knew his own father? To which the infant Merlin replied, in a
clear, sonorous voice, “Yes, my father is the Devil; and I have his power,
and know all things, past, present, and to come.” His worship clapped his
hands in astonishment, and took the prudent resolution of not molesting
so awful a child or its mother either.
Early tradition attributes the building of Stonehenge to the power of
Merlin. It was believed that those mighty stones were whirled through the
air, at his command, from Ireland to Salisbury Plain; and that he arranged

them in the form in which they now stand, to commemorate for ever the
unhappy fate of three hundred British chiefs, who were massacred on that
spot by the Saxons.
At Abergwylly, near Carmarthen, is still shewn the cave of the prophet
and the scene of his incantations. How beautiful is the description of it
given by Spenser in his Faerie Queene! The lines need no apology for their
repetition here, and any sketch of the great prophet of Britain would be
incomplete without them:
“There the wise Merlin, whilom wont (they say,)
To make his wonne low underneath the ground,
In a deep delve far from the view of day,
That of no living wight he mote be found,
Whenso he counselled with his sprites encompassed round.
And if thou ever happen that same way
To travel, go to see that dreadful place;
It is a hideous, hollow cave, they say,
Under a rock that lies, a little space
From the swift Barry, tumbling down apace
Amongst the woody hills of Dynevoure;
But dare thou not, I charge, in any case,
To enter into that same baleful bower,
For fear the cruel fiendes should thee unwares devour!
But, standing high aloft, low lay thine eare,
And there such ghastly noise of iron chaines
And brazen caudrons thou shalt rombling heare,
Which thousand sprites with long-enduring paines
Doe tosse, that it will stun thy feeble braines;
And often times great groans and grievous stownds,

When too huge toile and labour them constraines;
And often times loud strokes and ringing sounds
From under that deep rock most horribly rebounds.
The cause, they say, is this. A little while
Before that Merlin died, he did intend
A brazen wall in compass, to compile
About Cayr Merdin, and did it commend
Unto these sprites to bring to perfect end;
During which work the Lady of the Lake,
Whom long he loved, for him in haste did send,
Who thereby forced his workmen to forsake,
Them bound till his return their labour not to slake.
In the mean time, through that false ladie’s traine,
He was surprised, and buried under biere,
Ne ever to his work returned again;
Natheless these fiendes may not their work forbeare,
So greatly his commandement they fear,
But there doe toile and travaile day and night,
Until that brazen wall they up doe reare.” 56
Amongst other English prophets, a belief in whose power has not been
entirely effaced by the light of advancing knowledge, is Robert Nixon, the
Cheshire idiot, a contemporary of Mother Shipton. The popular accounts of
this man say, that he was born of poor parents, not far from Vale Royal, on
the edge of the forest of Delamere. He was brought up to the plough, but
was so ignorant and stupid, that nothing could be made of him. Every body
thought him irretrievably insane, and paid no attention to the strange,
unconnected discourses which he held. Many of his prophecies are believed
to have been lost in this manner. But they were not always destined to be

wasted upon dull and inattentive ears. An incident occurred which brought
him into notice, and established his fame as a prophet of the first calibre.
He was ploughing in a field when he suddenly stopped from his labour, and
with a wild look and strange gesture, exclaimed, “Now, Dick! now, Harry!
O, ill done, Dick! O, well done, Harry! Harry has gained the day!” His
fellow-labourers in the field did not know what to make of this rhapsody;
but the next day cleared up the mystery. News was brought by a messenger,
in hot haste, that at the very instant when Nixon had thus ejaculated,
Richard III. had been slain at the battle of Bosworth, and Henry VII.
proclaimed king of England.
It was not long before the fame of the new prophet reached the ears of
the king, who expressed a wish to see and converse with him. A messenger
was accordingly despatched to bring him to court; but long before he
reached Cheshire, Nixon knew and dreaded the honours that awaited him.
Indeed it was said, that at the very instant the king expressed the wish,
Nixon was, by supernatural means, made acquainted with it, and that he
ran about the town of Over in great distress of mind, calling out, like a
madman, that Henry had sent for him, and that he must go to court, and be
clammed, that is, starved to death. These expressions excited no little
wonder; but, on the third day, the messenger arrived, and carried him to
court, leaving on the minds of the good people of Cheshire an impression
that their prophet was one of the greatest ever born. On his arrival King
Henry appeared to be troubled exceedingly at the loss of a valuable
diamond, and asked Nixon if he could inform him where it was to be found.
Henry had hidden the diamond himself, with a view to test the prophet’s
skill. Great, therefore, was his surprise when Nixon answered him in the
words of the old proverb, “Those who hide can find.” From that time forth
the king implicitly believed that he had the gift of prophecy, and ordered all
his words to be taken down.
During all the time of his residence at court he was in constant fear of
being starved to death, and repeatedly told the king that such would be his

fate, if he were not allowed to depart, and return into his own country.
Henry would not suffer it, but gave strict orders to all his officers and cooks
to give him as much to eat as he wanted. He lived so well, that for some
time he seemed to be thriving like a nobleman’s steward, and growing as
fat as an alderman. One day the king went out hunting, when Nixon ran to
the palace gate, and entreated on his knees that he might not be left behind
to be starved. The king laughed, and calling an officer, told him to take
especial care of the prophet during his absence, and rode away to the
forest. After his departure, the servants of the palace began to jeer at and
insult Nixon, whom they imagined to be much better treated than he
deserved. Nixon complained to the officer, who, to prevent him from being
further molested, locked him up in the king’s own closet, and brought him
regularly his four meals a day. But it so happened that a messenger arrived
from the king to this officer, requiring his immediate presence at
Winchester, on a matter of life and death. So great was his haste to obey
the king’s command, that he mounted on the horse behind the messenger,
and rode off, without bestowing a thought upon poor Nixon. He did not
return till three days afterwards, when, remembering the prophet for the
first time, he went to the king’s closet, and found him lying upon the floor,
starved to death, as he had predicted.
Among the prophecies of his which are believed to have been fulfilled are
the following, which relate to the times of the Pretender:
“A great man shall come into England,
But the son of a king
Shall take from him the victory.”
“Crows shall drink the blood of many nobles,
And the North shall rise against the South.”

“The coek of the North shall be made to flee,
And his feather be plucked for his pride,
That he shall almost curse the day that he was born.”
All these, say his admirers, are as clear as the sun at noon-day. The first
denotes the defeat of Prince Charles Edward, at the battle of Culloden, by
the Duke of Cumberland; the second, the execution of Lords
Derwentwater, Balmerino, and Lovat; and the third, the retreat of the
Pretender from the shores of Britain. Among the prophecies that still
remain to be accomplished are the following:
“Between seven, eight, and nine,
In England wonders shall be seen;
Between nine and thirteen
All sorrow shall be done.”
“Through our own money and our men
Shall a dreadful war begin.
Between the sickle and the suck
All England shall have a pluck.”
“Foreign nations shall invade England with snow on their helmets,
and shall bring plague, famine, and murder in the skirts of their
garments.”
“The town of Nantwich shall be swept away by a flood.”
Of the two first of these no explanation has yet been attempted; but some
event or other will doubtless be twisted into such a shape as will fit them.
The third, relative to the invasion of England by a nation with snow on

their helmets, is supposed by the old women to foretell most clearly a
coming war with Russia. As to the last, there are not a few in the town
mentioned who devoutly believe that such will be its fate. Happily for their
peace of mind, the prophet said nothing of the year that was to witness the
awful calamity; so that they think it as likely to be two centuries hence as
now.
The popular biographers of Nixon conclude their account of him by
saying, that “his prophecies are by some persons thought fables; yet by
what has come to pass, it is now thought, and very plainly appears, that
most of them have proved, or will prove, true; for which we, on all
occasions, ought not only to exert our utmost might to repel by force our
enemies, but to refrain from our abandoned and wicked course of life, and
to make our continual prayer to God for protection and safety.” To this,
though a non sequitur, every one will cry, Amen!
Besides the prophets, there have been the almanac-makers Lilly, Poor
Robin, Partridge, and Francis Moore physician, in England and Matthew
Laensbergh, in France and Belgium. But great as were their pretensions,
they were modesty itself in comparison with Merlin, Shipton, and Nixon,
who fixed their minds upon higher things than the weather, and were not
so restrained as to prophesy for only one year at a time. After such
prophets the almanac-makers hardly deserve to be mentioned; not even
the renowned Partridge, whose prognostications set all England agog in
1708, and whose death while still alive was so pleasantly and satisfactorily
proved by Isaac Bickerstaff. The anti-climax would be too palpable, and
they and their doings must be left uncommemorated.
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FORTUNE-TELLING.

And men still grope t’ anticipate
The cabinet designs of Fate;
Apply to wizards to foresee
What shall and what shall never be.
Hudibras, part iii. canto 3.

IN accordance with the plan laid down, we proceed to the consideration of
the follies into which men have been led by their eager desire to pierce the
thick darkness of futurity. God himself, for his own wise purposes, has
more than once undrawn the impenetrable veil which shrouds those awful
secrets; and, for purposes just as wise, he has decreed that, except in these
instances, ignorance shall be our lot for ever. It is happy for man that he
does not know what the morrow is to bring forth; but, unaware of this great
blessing, he has, in all ages of the world, presumptuously endeavoured to
trace the events of unborn centuries, and anticipate the march of time. He
has reduced this presumption into a study. He has divided it into sciences
and systems without number, employing his whole life in the vain pursuit.
Upon no subject has it been so easy to deceive the world as upon this. In
every breast the curiosity exists in a greater or less degree, and can only be
conquered by a long course of self-examination, and a firm reliance that
the future would not be hidden from our sight, if it were right that we
should be acquainted with it.
An undue opinion of our own importance in the scale of creation is at the
bottom of all our unwarrantable notions in this respect. How flattering to
the pride of man to think that the stars in their courses watch over him,

and typify, by their movements and aspects, the joys or the sorrows that
await him! He, less in proportion to the universe than the all-but invisible
insects that feed in myriads on a summer’s leaf are to this great globe itself,
fondly imagines that eternal worlds were chiefly created to prognosticate
his fate. How we should pity the arrogance of the worm that crawls at our
feet, if we knew that it also desired to know the secrets of futurity, and
imagined that meteors shot athwart the sky to warn it that a tom-tit was
hovering near to gobble it up; that storms and earthquakes, the revolutions
of empires, or the fall of mighty monarchs, only happened to predict its
birth, its progress, and its decay! Not a whit less presuming has man shewn
himself; not a whit less arrogant are the sciences, so called, of astrology,
augury, necromancy, geomancy, palmistry, and divination of every kind.
Leaving out of view the oracles of pagan antiquity and religious
predictions in general, and confining ourselves solely to the persons who,
in modern times, have made themselves most conspicuous in foretelling
the future, we shall find that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were
the golden age of these impostors. Many of them have been already
mentioned in their character of alchymists. The union of the two
pretensions is not at all surprising. It was to be expected that those who
assumed a power so preposterous as that of prolonging the life of man for
several centuries, should pretend, at the same time, to foretell the events
which were to mark that preternatural span of existence. The world would
as readily believe that they had discovered all secrets, as that they had only
discovered one. The most celebrated astrologers of Europe, three centuries
ago, were alchymists. Agrippa, Paracelsus, Dr. Dee, and the Rosicrucians,
all laid as much stress upon their knowledge of the days to come, as upon
their pretended possession of the philosopher’s stone and the elixir of life.
In their time, ideas of the wonderful, the diabolical, and the supernatural,
were rifer than ever they were before. The devil or the stars were
universally believed to meddle constantly in the affairs of men; and both
were to be consulted with proper ceremonies. Those who were of a

melancholy and gloomy temperament betook themselves to necromancy
and sorcery; those more cheerful and aspiring devoted themselves to
astrology. The latter science was encouraged by all the monarchs and
governments of that age. In England, from the time of Elizabeth to that of
William and Mary, judicial astrology was in high repute. During that period
flourished Drs. Dee, Lamb, and Forman; with Lilly, Booker, Gadbury,
Evans, and scores of nameless impostors in every considerable town and
village in the country, who made it their business to cast nativities, aid in
the recovery of stolen goods, prognosticate happy or unhappy marriages,
predict whether journeys would be prosperous, and note lucky moments
for the commencement of any enterprise, from the setting up of a cobbler’s
shop to the marching of an army. Men who, to use the words of Butler, did
“Deal in Destiny’s dark counsel,
And sage opinion of the moon sell;
To whom all people far and near
On deep importance did repair,
When brass and pewter pots did stray,
And linen slunk out of the way.”

HENRY ANDREWS, THE ORIGINAL “FRANCIS MOORE.”

In Lilly’s Memoirs of his Life and Times, there are many notices of the
inferior quacks who then abounded, and upon whom he pretended to look
down with supreme contempt; not because they were astrologers, but

because they debased that noble art by taking fees for the recovery of stolen
property. From Butler’s Hudibras, and its curious notes, we may learn
what immense numbers of these fellows lived upon the credulity of
mankind in that age of witchcraft and diablerie. Even in our day, how great
is the reputation enjoyed by the almanac-makers, who assume the name of
Francis Moore! But in the time of Charles I. and the Commonwealth the
most learned, the most noble, and the most conspicuous characters did not
hesitate to consult astrologers in the most open manner. Lilly, whom
Butler has immortalised under the name of Sydrophel, relates, that he
proposed to write a work called An Introduction to Astrology, in which he
would satisfy the whole kingdom of the lawfulness of that art. Many of the
soldiers were for it, he says, and many of the Independent party, and
abundance of worthy men in the House of Commons, his assured friends,
and able to take his part against the Presbyterians, who would have
silenced his predictions if they could. He afterwards carried his plan into
execution, and when his book was published, went with another astrologer
named Booker to the headquarters of the parliamentary army at Windsor,
where they were welcomed and feasted in the garden where General
Fairfax lodged. They were afterwards introduced to the general, who
received them very kindly, and made allusion to some of their predictions.
He hoped their art was lawful and agreeable to God’s word; but he did not
understand it himself. He did not doubt, however, that the two astrologers
feared God, and therefore he had a good opinion of them. Lilly assured him
that the art of astrology was quite consonant to the Scriptures; and
confidently predicted from his knowledge of the stars, that the
parliamentary army would overthrow all its enemies. In Oliver’s
Protectorate, this quack informs us that he wrote freely enough. He became
an Independent, and all the soldiery were his friends. When he went to
Scotland, he saw a soldier standing in front of the army with a book of
prophecies in his hand, exclaiming to the several companies as they passed

by him, “Lo! hear what Lilly saith: you are in this month promised victory!
Fight it out, brave boys! and then read that month’s prediction!”
After the great fire of London, which Lilly said he had foretold, he was
sent for by the committee of the House of Commons appointed to inquire
into the causes of the calamity. In his Monarchy or no Monarchy,
published in 1651, he had inserted an hieroglyphical plate representing on
one side persons in winding-sheets digging graves; and on the other a large
city in flames. After the great fire, some sapient member of the legislature
bethought him of Lilly’s book, and having mentioned it in the house, it was
agreed that the astrologer should be summoned. Lilly attended
accordingly, when Sir Robert Brook told him the reason of his summons,
and called upon him to declare what he knew. This was a rare opportunity
for the vainglorious Lilly to vaunt his abilities; and he began a long speech
in praise of himself and his pretended science. He said that, after the
execution of Charles I., he was extremely desirous to know what might
from that time forth happen to the parliament and to the nation in general.
He therefore consulted the stars, and satisfied himself. The result of his
judgment he put into emblems and hieroglyphics, without any
commentary, so that the true meaning might be concealed from the vulgar,
and made manifest only to the wise; imitating in this the example of many
wise philosophers who had done the like.
“Did you foresee the year of the fire?” said a member. “No,” quoth Lilly,
“nor was I desirous. Of that I made no scrutiny.” After some further parley,
the house found they could make nothing of the astrologer, and dismissed
him with great civility.
One specimen of the explanation of a prophecy given by Lilly, and
related by him with much complacency, will be sufficient to shew the sort
of trash by which he imposed upon the million. “In the year 1588,” says he,
“there was a prophecy printed in Greek characters, exactly deciphering the
long troubles of the English nation from 1641 to 1660.” And it ended thus:
“And after him shall come a dreadful dead man, and with him a royal G, of

the best blood in the world; and he shall have the crown, and shall set
England on the right way, and put out all heresies.” The following is the
explanation of this oracular absurdity:
“Monkery being extinguished above eighty or ninety years, and the
Lord General’s name being Monk, is the dead man. The royal G or C
[it is gamma in the Greek, intending C in the Latin, being the third
letter in the alphabet] is Charles II., who for his extraction may be
said to be of the best blood of the world.”
In France and Germany astrologers met even more encouragement than
they received in England. In very early ages Charlemagne and his
successors fulminated their wrath against them in common with sorcerers.
Louis XI., that most superstitious of men, entertained great numbers of
them at his court; and Catherine de Medicis, that most superstitious of
women, hardly ever undertook any affair of importance without consulting
them. She chiefly favoured her own countrymen; and during the time she
governed France, the land was overrun by Italian conjurors, necromancers,
and fortune-tellers of every kind. But the chief astrologer of that day,
beyond all doubt, was the celebrated Nostradamus, physician to her
husband, King Henry II. He was born in 1503 at the town of St. Remi, in
Provence, where his father was a notary. He did not acquire much fame till
he was past his fiftieth year, when his famous Centuries, a collection of
verses, written in obscure and almost unintelligible language, began to
excite attention. They were so much spoken of in 1556, that Henry II.
resolved to attach so skilful a man to his service, and appointed him his
physician. In a biographical notice of him, prefixed to the edition of his
Vraies Centuries, published at Amsterdam in 1668, we are informed that
he often discoursed with his royal master on the secrets of futurity, and
received many great presents as his reward, besides his usual allowance for
medical attendance. After the death of Henry he retired to his native place,

where Charles IX. paid him a visit in 1564; and was so impressed with
veneration for his wondrous knowledge of the things that were to be, not in
France only, but in the whole world for hundreds of years to come, that he
made him a counsellor of state and his own physician, besides treating him
in other matters with a royal liberality. “In fine,” continues his biographer,
“I should be too prolix were I to tell all the honours conferred upon him,
and all the great nobles and learned men that arrived at his house from the
very ends of the earth, to see and converse with him as if he had been an
oracle. Many strangers, in fact, came to France for no other purpose than
to consult him.”

NOSTRADAMUS.—FROM THE FRONTISPIECE TO A COLLECTION OF HIS PROPHECIES,
PUBLISHED AT AMSTERDAM, A.D. 1666.

The prophecies of Nostradamus consist of upwards of a thousand
stanzas, each of four lines, and are to the full as obscure as the oracles of
old. They take so great a latitude, both as to time and space, that they are
almost sure to be fulfilled somewhere or other in the course of a few
centuries. A little ingenuity, like that evinced by Lilly in his explanation
about General Monk and the dreadful dead man, might easily make events
to fit some of them. 58

He is to this day extremely popular in France and the Walloon country of
Belgium, where old farmer-wives consult him with great confidence and
assiduity.
Catherine di Medicis was not the only member of her illustrious house
who entertained astrologers. At the beginning of the fifteenth century there
was a man, named Basil, residing in Florence, who was noted over all Italy
for his skill in piercing the darkness of futurity. It is said that he foretold to
Cosmo di Medicis, then a private citizen, that he would attain high dignity,
inasmuch as the ascendant of his nativity was adorned with the same
propitious aspects as those of Augustus Cæsar and the Emperor Charles
V. 59 Another astrologer foretold the death of Prince Alexander di Medicis;
and so very minute and particular was he in all the circumstances, that he
was suspected of being chiefly instrumental in fulfilling his own prophecy—
a very common resource with these fellows to keep up their credit. He
foretold confidently that the prince should die by the hand of his own
familiar friend, a person of a slender habit of body, a small face, a swarthy
complexion, and of most remarkable taciturnity. So it afterwards
happened, Alexander having been murdered in his chamber by his cousin
Lorenzo, who corresponded exactly with the above description. 60 The
author of Hermippus Redivivus, in relating this story, inclines to the belief
that the astrologer was guiltless of any participation in the crime, but was
employed by some friend of Prince Alexander to warn him of his danger.
A much more remarkable story is told of an astrologer who lived in
Romagna in the fifteenth century, and whose name was Antiochus
Tibertus. 61 At that time nearly all the petty sovereigns of Italy retained such
men in their service; and Tibertus, having studied the mathematics with
great success at Paris, and delivered many predictions, some of which, for
guesses, were not deficient in shrewdness, was taken into the household of
Pandolfo di Malatesta, the sovereign of Rimini. His reputation was so
great, that his study was continually thronged either with visitors who were
persons of distinction, or with clients who came to him for advice; and in a

short time he acquired a considerable fortune. Notwithstanding all these
advantages, he passed his life miserably, and ended it on the scaffold. The
following story afterwards got into circulation, and has been often
triumphantly cited by succeeding astrologers as an irrefragable proof of the
truth of their science. It was said that, long before he died, he uttered three
remarkable prophecies—one relating to himself, another to his friend, and
the third to his patron, Pandolfo di Malatesta. The first delivered was that
relating to his friend Guido di Bogni, one of the greatest captains of the
time. Guido was exceedingly desirous to know his fortune, and so
importuned Tibertus, that the latter consulted the stars and the lines on his
palm to satisfy him. He afterwards told him with a sorrowful face, that,
according to all the rules of astrology and palmistry, he should be falsely
suspected by his best friend, and should lose his life in consequence. Guido
then asked the astrologer if he could foretell his own fate; upon which
Tibertus again consulted the stars, and found that it was decreed from all
eternity that he should end his days on the scaffold. Malatesta, when he
heard these predictions, so unlikely, to all present appearance, to prove
true, desired his astrologer to predict his fate also, and to hide nothing
from him, however unfavourable it might be. Tibertus complied, and told
his patron, at that time one of the most flourishing and powerful princes of
Italy, that he should suffer great want, and die at last like a beggar in the
common hospital of Bologna. And so it happened in all three cases. Guido
di Bogni was accused by his own father-in-law, the Count di Bentivoglio, of
a treasonable design to deliver up the city of Rimini to the papal forces, and
was assassinated afterwards, by order of the tyrant Malatesta, as he sat at
the supper-table, to which he had been invited in all apparent friendship.
The astrologer was at the same time thrown into prison, as being
concerned in the treason of his friend. He attempted to escape, and had
succeeded in letting himself down from his dungeon-window into a moat,
when he was discovered by the sentinels. This being reported to Malatesta,
he gave orders for his execution on the following morning.

Malatesta had, at this time, no remembrance of the prophecy; and his
own fate gave him no uneasiness; but events were silently working its
fulfilment. A conspiracy had been formed, though Guido di Bogni was
innocent of it, to deliver up Rimini to the pope; and all the necessary
measures having been taken, the city was seized by the Count de
Valentinois. In the confusion, Malatesta had barely time to escape from his
palace in disguise. He was pursued from place to place by his enemies,
abandoned by all his former friends, and, finally, by his own children. He at
last fell ill of a languishing disease, at Bologna; and, nobody caring to
afford him shelter, he was carried to the hospital, where he died. The only
thing that detracts from the interest of this remarkable story is the fact,
that the prophecy was made after the event.
For some weeks before the birth of Louis XIV., an astrologer from
Germany, who had been sent for by the Marshal de Bassompierre and
other noblemen of the court, had taken up his residence in the palace, to be
ready, at a moment’s notice, to draw the horoscope of the future sovereign
of France. When the queen was taken in labour, he was ushered into a
contiguous apartment, that he might receive notice of the very instant the
child was born. The result of his observations were the three words, diu,
durè, feliciter; meaning, that the new-born prince should live and reign
long, with much labour, and with great glory. No prediction less favourable
could have been expected from an astrologer, who had his bread to get, and
who was at the same time a courtier. A medal was afterwards struck in
commemoration of the event; upon one side of which was figured the
nativity of the prince, representing him as driving the chariot of Apollo,
with the inscription “Ortus solis Gallici,”—the rising of the Gallic sun.
The best excuse ever made for astrology was that offered by the great
astronomer, Kepler, himself an unwilling practiser of the art.
He had many applications from his friends to cast nativities for them,
and generally gave a positive refusal to such as he was not afraid of
offending by his frankness. In other cases he accommodated himself to the

prevailing delusion. In sending a copy of his Ephemerides to Professor
Gerlach, he wrote, that they were nothing but worthless conjectures; but
he was obliged to devote himself to them, or he would have starved. “Ye
overwise philosophers,” he exclaimed, in his Tertius Interveniens; “ye
censure this daughter of astronomy beyond her deserts! Know ye not that
she must support her mother by her charms? The scanty reward of an
astronomer would not provide him with bread, if men did not entertain
hopes of reading the future in the heavens.”
NECROMANCY was, next to astrology, the pretended science most resorted
to, by those who wished to pry into the future. The earliest instance upon
record is that of the witch of Endor and the spirit of Samuel. Nearly all the
nations of antiquity believed in the possibility of summoning departed
ghosts to disclose the awful secrets that God made clear to the
disembodied. Many passages in allusion to this subject will at once suggest
themselves to the classical reader; but this art was never carried on openly
in any country. All governments looked upon it as a crime of the deepest
dye. While astrology was encouraged, and its professors courted and
rewarded, necromancers were universally condemned to the stake or the
gallows. Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, Arnold of Villeneuve, and many
others, were accused by the public opinion of many centuries, of meddling
in these unhallowed matters. So deep-rooted has always been the popular
delusion with respect to accusations of this kind, that no crime was ever
disproved with such toil and difficulty. That it met great encouragement,
nevertheless, is evident from the vast numbers of pretenders to it; who, in
spite of the danger, have existed in all ages and countries.
GEOMANCY, or the art of foretelling the future by means of lines and
circles, and other mathematical figures drawn on the earth, is still
extensively practised in Asiatic countries, but is almost unknown in
Europe.

AUGURY, from the flight or entrails of birds, so favourite a study among
the Romans, is, in like manner, exploded in Europe. Its most assiduous
professors, at the present day, are the abominable Thugs of India.
DIVINATION, of which there are many kinds, boasts a more enduring
reputation. It has held an empire over the minds of men from the earliest
periods of recorded history, and is, in all probability, coeval with time
itself. It was practised alike by the Jews, the Egyptians, the Chaldeans, the
Persians, the Greeks, and the Romans; is equally known to all modern
nations, in every part of the world; and is not unfamiliar to the untutored
tribes that roam in the wilds of Africa and America. Divination, as
practised in civilised Europe at the present day, is chiefly from cards, the
tea-cup, and the lines on the palm of the hand. Gipsies alone make a
profession of it; but there are thousands and tens of thousands of humble
families in which the good-wife, and even the good-man, resort to the
grounds at the bottom of their tea-cups, to know whether the next harvest
will be abundant, or their sow bring forth a numerous litter; and in which
the young maidens look to the same place to know when they are to be
married, and whether the man of their choice is to be dark or fair, rich or
poor, kind or cruel. Divination by cards, so great a favourite among the
moderns, is, of course, a modern science; as cards do not yet boast an
antiquity of much more than four hundred years. Divination by the palm,
so confidently believed in by half the village lasses in Europe, is of older
date, and seems to have been known to the Egyptians in the time of the
patriarchs; as well as divination by the cup, which, as we are informed in
Genesis, was practised by Joseph. Divination by the rod was also practised
by the Egyptians. In comparatively recent times, it was pretended that by
this means hidden treasures could be discovered. It now appears to be
altogether exploded in Europe. Onomancy, or the foretelling a man’s fate
by the letters of his name, and the various transpositions of which they are

capable, is a more modern sort of divination; but it reckons comparatively
few believers.
The following list of the various species of divination formerly in use, is
given by Gaule in his Magastromancer, and quoted in Hone’s Year-Book,
p. 1517.
Stereomancy, or divining by the elements.
Aeromancy, or divining by the air.
Pyromancy, by fire,
Hydromancy, by water.
Geomancy, by earth.
Theomancy, pretending to divine by the revelation of the Spirit, and
by the Scriptures, or word of God.
Demonomancy, by the aid of devils and evil spirits.
Idolomancy, by idols, images, and figures.
Psychomancy, by the soul, affections, or dispositions of men.
Anthropomancy, by the entrails of human beings.
Theriomancy, by beasts.
Ornithomancy, by birds.
Ichthyomancy, by fishes.
Botanomancy, by herbs.
Lithomancy, by stones.
Kleromancy, by lots.
Oneiromancy, by dreams.
Onomancy, by names.
Arithmancy, by numbers.
Logarithmancy, by logarithms.
Sternomancy, by the marks from the breast to the belly.
Gastromancy, by the sound of, or marks upon the belly.

Omphalomancy, by the navel.
Chiromancy, by the hands.
Podomancy, by the feet.
Onchyomancy, by the nails.
Cephaleonomancy, by asses’ heads.
Tephromancy, by ashes.
Kapnomancy, by smoke.
Knissomancy, by the burning of incense.
Ceromancy, by the melting of wax.
Lecanomancy, by basins of water.
Katoptromancy, by looking-glasses.
Chartomancy, by writing in papers, and by Valentines.
Macharomancy, by knives and swords.
Crystallomancy, by crystals.
Dactylomancy, by rings.
Koskinomancy, by sieves.
Axinomancy, by saws.
Chalcomancy, by vessels of brass, or other metal.
Spatilomancy, by skins, bones, &c.
Astromancy, by stars.
Sciomancy, by shadows.
Astragalomancy, by dice.
Oinomancy, by the lees of wine.
Sycomancy, by figs.
Tyromancy, by cheese.
Alphitomancy, by meal, flour, or bran.
Krithomancy, by corn or grain.
Alectromancy, by cocks.
Gyromancy, by circles.

Lampadomancy, by candles and lamps.
ONEIRO-CRITICISM, or the art of interpreting dreams, is a relic of the most
remote ages, which has subsisted through all the changes that moral or
physical revolutions have operated in the world. The records of five
thousand years bear abundant testimony to the universal diffusion of the
belief, that the skilful could read the future in dreams. The rules of the art,
if any existed in ancient times, are not known; but in our day, one simple
rule opens the whole secret. Dreams, say all the wiseacres in Christendom,
are to be interpreted by contraries. Thus, if you dream of filth, you will
acquire something valuable; if you dream of the dead, you will hear news of
the living; if you dream of gold and silver, you run a risk of being without
either; and if you dream you have many friends, you will be persecuted by
many enemies. The rule, however, does not hold good in all cases. It is
fortunate to dream of little pigs, but unfortunate to dream of big bullocks.
If you dream you have lost a tooth, you may be sure that you will shortly
lose a friend; and if you dream that your house is on fire, you will receive
news from a far country. If you dream of vermin, it is a sign that there will
be sickness in your family; and if you dream of serpents, you will have
friends who, in the course of time, will prove your bitterest enemies; but, of
all dreams, it is most fortunate if you dream that you are wallowing up to
your neck in mud and mire. Clear water is a sign of grief; and great
troubles, distress, and perplexity are predicted, if you dream that you stand
naked in the public streets, and know not where to find a garment to shield
you from the gaze of the multitude.
In many parts of Great Britain, and the continents of Europe and
America, there are to be found elderly women in the villages and countryplaces whose interpretations of dreams are looked upon with as much
reverence as if they were oracles. In districts remote from towns it is not
uncommon to find the members of a family regularly every morning
narrating their dreams at the breakfast-table, and becoming happy or

miserable for the day according to their interpretation. There is not a
flower that blossoms, or fruit that ripens, that, dreamed of, is not ominous
of either good or evil to such people. Every tree of the field or the forest is
endowed with a similar influence over the fate of mortals, if seen in the
night-visions. To dream of the ash, is the sign of a long journey; and of an
oak, prognosticates long life and prosperity. To dream you stript the bark
off any tree, is a sign to a maiden of an approaching loss of a character; to a
married woman, of a family bereavement; and to a man, of an accession of
fortune. To dream of a leafless tree, is a sign of great sorrow; and of a
branchless trunk, a sign of despair and suicide. The elder-tree is more
auspicious to the sleeper; while the fir-tree, better still, betokens all
manner of comfort and prosperity. The lime-tree predicts a voyage across
the ocean; while the yew and the alder are ominous of sickness to the
young and of death to the old. 62 Among the flowers and fruits charged with
messages for the future, the following is a list of the most important,
arranged from approved sources, in alphabetical order:
Asparagus, gathered and tied up in bundles, is an omen of tears. If
you see it growing in your dreams, it is a sign of good fortune.
Aloes, without a flower, betokens long life; in flower, betokens a
legacy.
Artichokes. This vegetable is a sign that you will receive, in a short
time, a favour from the hands of those from whom you would least
expect it.
Agrimony. This herb denotes that there will be sickness in your house.
Anemone predicts love.
Auriculas, in beds, denote luck; in pots, marriage; while to gather
them, foretells widowhood.
Bilberries predict a pleasant excursion.
Broom-flowers an increase of family.
Cauliflowers predict that all your friends will slight you, or that you
will fall into poverty and find no one to pity you.

Dock-leaves, a present from the country.
Daffodils. Any maiden who dreams of daffodils is warned by her good
angel to avoid going into a wood with her lover, or into any dark or
retired place where she might not be able to make people hear her if
she cried out. Alas for her if she pay no attention to the warning!
“Never again shall she put garland on;
Instead of it she’ll wear sad cypress now,
And bitter elder broken from the bough.”
Figs, if green, betoken embarrassment; if dried, money to the poor,
and mirth to the rich.
Hearts-ease betokens heart’s pain.
Lilies predict joy; water-lilies, danger from the sea.
Lemons betoken a separation.
Pomegranates predict happy wedlock to those who are single, and
reconciliation to those who are married and have disagreed.
Quinces prognosticate pleasant company.
Roses denote happy love, not unmixed with sorrow from other
sources.
Sorrel. To dream of this herb is a sign that you will shortly have
occasion to exert all your prudence to overcome some great
calamity.
Sunflowers shew that your pride will be deeply wounded.
Violets predict evil to the single, and joy to the married.
Yellow-flowers of any kind predict jealousy.
Yew-berries predict loss of character to both sexes.
It should be observed that the rules for the interpretation of dreams are
far from being universal. The cheeks of the peasant girl of England glow
with pleasure in the morning after she has dreamed of a rose, while the
paysanne of Normandy dreads disappointment and vexation for the very

same reason. The Switzer who dreams of an oak-tree does not share in the
Englishman’s joy; for he imagines that the vision was a warning to him
that, from some trifling cause, an overwhelming calamity will burst over
him. Thus do the ignorant and the credulous torment themselves; thus do
they spread their nets to catch vexation, and pass their lives between hopes
which are of no value and fears which are a positive evil.
OMENS. Among the other means of self-annoyance upon which men have
stumbled, in their vain hope of discovering the future, signs and omens
hold a conspicuous place. There is scarcely an occurrence in nature which,
happening at a certain time, is not looked upon by some persons as a
prognosticator either of good or evil. The latter are in the greatest number,
so much more ingenious are we in tormenting ourselves than in
discovering reasons for enjoyment in the things that surround us. We go
out of our course to make ourselves uncomfortable; the cup of life is not
bitter enough to our palate, and we distil superfluous poison to put into it,
or conjure up hideous things to frighten ourselves at, which would never
exist if we did not make them. “We suffer,” says Addison, 63 “as much from
trifling accidents as from real evils. I have known the shooting of a star
spoil a night’s rest, and have seen a man in love grow pale and lose his
appetite upon the plucking of a merrythought. A screech-owl at midnight
has alarmed a family more than a band of robbers; nay, the voice of a
cricket has struck more terror than the roaring of a lion. There is nothing
so inconsiderable which may not appear dreadful to an imagination that is
filled with omens and prognostics. A rusty nail or a crooked pin shoot up
into prodigies.”
The century and a quarter that has passed away since Addison wrote has
seen the fall of many errors. Many fallacies and delusions have been
crushed under the foot of Time since then; but this has been left unscathed,
to frighten the weak-minded and embitter their existence. A belief in
omens is not confined to the humble and uninformed. A general who led an

army with credit has been known to feel alarmed at a winding-sheet in the
candle; and learned men, who had honourably and fairly earned the
highest honours of literature, have been seen to gather their little ones
around them, and fear that one would be snatched away, because,
“When stole upon the time the dead of night,
And heavy sleep had closed up mortal eyes,”
a dog in the street was howling at the moon. Persons who would
acknowledge freely that the belief in omens was unworthy of a man of
sense, have yet confessed at the same time that, in spite of their reason,
they have been unable to conquer their fears of death when they heard the
harmless insect called the death-watch ticking in the wall, or saw an oblong
hollow coal fly out of the fire.
Many other evil omens besides those mentioned above alarm the vulgar
and the weak. If a sudden shivering comes over such people, they believe
that, at that instant, an enemy is treading over the spot that will one day be
their grave. If they meet a sow when they first walk abroad in the morning,
it is an omen of evil for that day. To meet an ass, is in like manner unlucky.
It is also very unfortunate to walk under a ladder; to forget to eat goose on
the festival of St. Michael; to tread upon a beetle, or to eat the twin nuts
that are sometimes found in one shell. Woe, in like manner, is predicted to
that wight who inadvertently upsets the salt; each grain that is overthrown
will bring to him a day of sorrow. If thirteen persons sit at table, one of
them will die within the year; and all of them will be unhappy. Of all evil
omens this is the worst. The facetious Dr. Kitchener used to observe that
there was one case in which he believed that it was really unlucky for
thirteen persons to sit down to dinner, and that was when there was only
dinner enough for twelve. Unfortunately for their peace of mind, the great
majority of people do not take this wise view of the matter. In almost every

country of Europe the same superstition prevails, and some carry it so far
as to look upon the number thirteen as in every way ominous of evil; and if
they find thirteen coins in their purse, cast away the odd one like a polluted
thing. The philosophic Beranger, in his exquisite song, Thirteen at Table,
has taken a poetical view of this humiliating superstition, and mingled, as
is his wont, a lesson of genuine wisdom in his lay. Being at dinner, he
overthrows the salt, and, looking round the room, discovers that he is the
thirteenth guest. While he is mourning his unhappy fate, and conjuring up
visions of disease and suffering and the grave, he is suddenly startled by
the apparition of Death herself, not in the shape of a grim foe, with
skeleton-ribs and menacing dart, but of an angel of light, who shews the
folly of tormenting ourselves with the dread of her approach, when she is
the friend, rather than the enemy, of man, and frees us from the fetters
which bind us to the dust.
If men could bring themselves to look upon death in this manner, living
well and wisely till her inevitable approach, how vast a store of grief and
vexation would they spare themselves!
Among good omens, one of the most conspicuous is to meet a piebald
horse. To meet two of these animals is still more fortunate; and if on such
an occasion you spit thrice, and form any reasonable wish, it will be
gratified within three days. It is also a sign of good fortune if you
inadvertently put on your stocking wrong side out. If you wilfully wear your
stocking in this fashion, no good will come of it. It is very lucky to sneeze
twice; but if you sneeze a third time, the omen loses its power, and your
good fortune will be nipped in the bud. If a strange dog follow you, and
fawn on you, and wish to attach itself to you, it is a sign of very great
prosperity. Just as fortunate is it if a strange male cat comes to your house
and manifests friendly intentions towards your family. If a she cat, it is an
omen, on the contrary, of very great misfortune. If a swarm of bees alight
in your garden, some very high honour and great joys await you.

Besides these glimpses of the future, you may know something of your
fate by a diligent attention to every itching that you may feel in your body.
Thus, if the eye or the nose itches, it is a sign you will be shortly vexed; if
the foot itches, you will tread upon strange ground; and if the elbow itches,
you will change your bedfellow. Itching of the right hand prognosticates
that you will soon have a sum of money; and, of the left, that you will be
called upon to disburse it.
These are but a few of the omens which are generally credited in modern
Europe. A complete list of them would fatigue from its length, and sicken
from its absurdity. It would be still more unprofitable to attempt to specify
the various delusions of the same kind which are believed among oriental
nations. Every reader will remember the comprehensive formula of cursing
preserved in Tristram Shandy—curse a man after any fashion you
remember or can invent, you will be sure to find it there. The oriental creed
of omens is not less comprehensive. Every movement of the body, every
emotion of the mind, is at certain times an omen. Every form and object in
nature, even the shape of the clouds and the changes of the weather; every
colour, every sound, whether of men or animals, or birds or insects, or
inanimate things, is an omen. Nothing is too trifling or inconsiderable to
inspire a hope which is not worth cherishing, or a fear which is sufficient to
embitter existence.
From the belief in omens springs the superstition that has, from very
early ages, set apart certain days, as more favourable than others, for
prying into the secrets of futurity. The following, copied verbatim from the
popular Dream and Omen Book of Mother Bridget, will shew the belief of
the people of England at the present day. Those who are curious as to the
ancient history of these observances, will find abundant aliment in the
Every-day Book.
“The 1st of January.—If a young maiden drink, on going to bed, a
pint of cold spring water, in which is beat up an amulet, composed of

the yolk of a pullet’s egg, the legs of a spider, and the skin of an eel
pounded, her future destiny will be revealed to her in a dream. This
charm fails of its effect if tried any other day of the year.
“Valentine Day.—Let a single woman go out of her own door very
early in the morning, and if the first person she meets be a woman, she
will not be married that year; if she meet a man she will be married
within three months.
“Lady Day.—The following charm may be tried this day with certain
success: String thirty-one nuts on a string, composed of red worsted
mixed with blue silk, and tie it round your neck on going to bed,
repeating these lines:
“Oh, I wish! oh, I wish to see
Who my true love is to be!
Shortly after midnight, you will see your lover in a dream, and be
informed at the same time of all the principal events of your future life.
“St. Swithin’s Eve.—Select three things you most wish to know;
write them down with a new pen and red ink on a sheet of fine wove
paper, from which you must previously cut off all the corners and burn
them. Fold the paper into a true lover’s knot, and wrap round it three
hairs from your head. Place the paper under your pillow for three
successive nights, and your curiosity to know the future will be
satisfied.
“St. Mark’s Eve.—Repair to the nearest churchyard as the clock
strikes twelve, and take from a grave on the south side of the church
three tufts of grass (the longer and ranker the better), and on going to
bed place them under your pillow, repeating earnestly three several
times,

‘The Eve of St. Mark by prediction is blest,
Set therefore my hopes and my fears all to rest:
Let me know my fate, whether weal or woe;
Whether my rank’s to be high or low;
Whether to live single, or be a bride,
And the destiny my star doth provide.’
Should you have no dream that night, you will be single and miserable
all your life. If you dream of thunder and lightning, your life will be
one of great difficulty and sorrow.
“Candlemas Eve.—On this night (which is the purification of the
Virgin Mary), let three, five, seven, or nine young maidens assemble
together in a square chamber. Hang in each corner a bundle of sweet
herbs, mixed with rue and rosemary. Then mix a cake of flour, oliveoil, and white sugar; every maiden having an equal share in the
making and the expense of it. Afterwards it must be cut into equal
pieces, each one marking the piece as she cuts it with the initials of her
name. It is then to be baked one hour before the fire, not a word being
spoken the whole time, and the maidens sitting with their arms and
knees across. Each piece of cake is then to be wrapped up in a sheet of
paper, on which each maiden shall write the love part of Solomon’s
Songs. If she put this under her pillow she will dream true. She will see
her future husband and every one of her children, and will know
besides whether her family will be poor or prosperous, a comfort to
her or the contrary.
“Midsummer.—Take three roses, smoke them with sulphur, and
exactly at three in the day bury one of the roses under a yew-tree; the
second in a newly-made grave, and put the third under your pillow for
three nights, and at the end of that period burn it in a fire of charcoal.
Your dreams during that time will be prophetic of your future destiny,

and, what is still more curious and valuable, says Mother Bridget, the
man whom you are to wed will enjoy no peace till he comes and visits
you. Besides this, you will perpetually haunt his dreams.
“St. John’s Eve.—Make a new pincushion of the very best black
velvet (no inferior quality will answer the purpose), and on one side
stick your name at full length with the very smallest pins that can be
bought (none other will do). On the other side make a cross with some
very large pins, and surround it with a circle. Put this into your
stocking when you take it off at night, and hang it up at the foot of the
bed. All your future life will pass before you in a dream.
“First New Moon of the year.—On the first new moon in the year
take a pint of clear spring water, and infuse into it the white of an egg
laid by a white hen, a glass of white wine, three almonds peeled white,
and a tablespoonful of white rose-water. Drink this on going to bed,
not making more nor less than three draughts of it; repeating the
following verses three several times in a clear distinct voice, but not so
loud as to be overheard by any body:
‘If I dream of water pure
Before the coming morn,
’Tis a sign I shall be poor,
And unto wealth not born.
If I dream of tasting beer,
Middling then will be my cheer—
Chequer’d with the good and bad,
Sometimes joyful, sometimes sad;
But should I dream of drinking wine,
Wealth and pleasure will be mine.
The stronger the drink, the better the cheer—
Dreams of my destiny, appear, appear!’

“Twenty-ninth of February.—This day, as it only occurs once in four
years, is peculiarly auspicious to those who desire to have a glance at
futurity, especially to young maidens burning with anxiety to know the
appearance and complexion of their future lords. The charm to be
adopted is the following: Stick twenty-seven of the smallest pins that
are made, three by three, into a tallow candle. Light it up at the wrong
end, and then place it in a candlestick made out of clay, which must be
drawn from a virgin’s grave. Place this on the chimney-place, in the
left-hand corner, exactly as the clock strikes twelve, and go to bed
immediately. When the candle is burnt out, take the pins and put them
into your left shoe; and before nine nights have elapsed your fate will
be revealed to you.”
We have now taken a hasty review of the various modes of seeking to
discover the future, especially as practised in modern times. The main
features of the folly appear essentially the same in all countries. National
character and peculiarities operate some difference of interpretation. The
mountaineer makes the natural phenomena which he most frequently
witnesses prognosticative of the future. The dweller in the plains, in a
similar manner, seeks to know his fate among the signs of the things that
surround him, and tints his superstition with the hues of his own clime.
The same spirit animates them all—the same desire to know that which
Infinite Mercy has concealed. There is but little probability that the
curiosity of mankind in this respect will ever be wholly eradicated. Death
and ill fortune are continual bugbears to the weak-minded, the irreligious,
and the ignorant; and while such exist in the world, divines will preach
upon its impiety and philosophers discourse upon its absurdity in vain.
Still it is evident that these follies have greatly diminished. Soothsayers and
prophets have lost the credit they formerly enjoyed, and skulk in secret
now where they once shewed their faces in the blaze of day. So far there is
manifest improvement.

THE MAGNETISERS.
Some deemed them wondrous wise, and some believed them mad.
Beattie’s Minstrel.

THE wonderful influence of imagination in the cure of
diseases is well known. A motion of the hand, or a glance of the eye, will
throw a weak and credulous patient into a fit; and a pill made of bread, if
taken with sufficient faith, will operate a cure better than all the drugs in
the pharmacopœia. The Prince of Orange, at the siege of Breda, in 1625,
cured all his soldiers, who were dying of the scurvy, by a philanthropic
piece of quackery, which he played upon them with the knowledge of the
physicians, when all other means had failed. 64 Many hundreds of instances,
of a similar kind, might be related, especially from the history of witchcraft.
The mummeries, strange gesticulations, and barbarous jargon of witches
and sorcerers, which frightened credulous and nervous women, brought on
all those symptoms of hysteria and other similar diseases, so well
understood now, but which were then supposed to be the work of the Devil,

not only by the victims and the public in general, but by the operators
themselves.
In the age when alchymy began to fall into some disrepute, and learning
to lift up its voice against it, a new delusion, based upon this power of
imagination, suddenly arose, and found apostles among all the alchymists.
Numbers of them, forsaking their old pursuits, made themselves
magnetisers. It appeared first in the shape of mineral, and afterwards of
animal, magnetism, under which latter name it survives to this day, and
numbers its dupes by thousands.
The mineral magnetisers claim the first notice, as the worthy
predecessors of the quacks of the present day. The honour claimed for
Paracelsus, of being the first of the Rosicrucians, has been disputed; but his
claim to be considered the first of the magnetisers can scarcely be
challenged. It has been already mentioned of him, in the part of this work
which treats of alchymy, that, like nearly all the distinguished adepts, he
was a physician; and pretended, not only to make gold and confer
immortality, but to cure all diseases. He was the first who, with the latter
view, attributed occult and miraculous powers to the magnet. Animated
apparently by a sincere conviction that the magnet was the philosopher’s
stone, which, if it could not transmute metals, could soothe all human
suffering and arrest the progress of decay, he travelled for many years in
Persia and Arabia, in search of the mountain of adamant, so famed in
oriental fables. When he practised as a physician at Basle, he called one of
his nostrums by the name of azoth—a stone or crystal, which, he said,
contained magnetic properties, and cured epilepsy, hysteria, and
spasmodic affections. He soon found imitators. His fame spread far and
near; and thus were sown the first seeds of that error which has since taken
root and flourished so widely. In spite of the denial of modern
practitioners, this must be considered the origin of magnetism; for we find
that, beginning with Paracelsus, there was a regular succession of mineral

magnetisers until Mesmer appeared, and gave a new feature to the
delusion.
Paracelsus boasted of being able to transplant diseases from the human
frame into the earth, by means of the magnet. He said there were six ways
by which this might be effected. One of them will be quite sufficient as a
specimen. “If a person suffer from disease, either local or general, let the
following remedy be tried. Take a magnet, impregnated with mummy, 65
and mixed with rich earth. In this earth sow some seeds that have a
congruity or homogeneity with the disease; then let this earth, well sifted
and mixed with mummy, be laid in an earthen vessel; and let the seeds
committed to it be watered daily with a lotion in which the diseased limb or
body has been washed. Thus will the disease be transplanted from the
human body to the seeds which are in the earth. Having done this,
transplant the seeds from the earthen vessel to the ground, and wait till
they begin to sprout into herbs; as they increase, the disease will diminish;
and when they have arrived at their full growth, it will disappear
altogether.”
Kircher the Jesuit, whose quarrel with the alchymists was the means of
exposing many of their impostures, was a firm believer in the efficacy of the
magnet. Having been applied to by a patient afflicted with hernia, he
directed the man to swallow a small magnet reduced to powder, while he
applied at the same time to the external swelling, a poultice made of filings
of iron. He expected that by this means the magnet, when it got to the
corresponding place inside, would draw in the iron, and with it the tumour;
which would thus, he said, be safely and expeditiously reduced.
As this new doctrine of magnetism spread, it was found that wounds
inflicted with any metallic substance could be cured by the magnet. In
process of time, the delusion so increased, that it was deemed sufficient to
magnetise a sword, to cure any hurt which that sword might have inflicted!
This was the origin of the celebrated “weapon-salve,” which excited so
much attention about the middle of the seventeenth century. The following

was the recipe given by Paracelsus for the cure of any wounds inflicted by a
sharp weapon, except such as had penetrated the heart, the brain, or the
arteries. “Take of moss growing on the head of a thief who has been hanged
and left in the air; of real mummy; of human blood, still warm—of each,
one ounce; of human suet, two ounces; of linseed oil, turpentine, and
Armenian bole—of each, two drachms. Mix all well in a mortar, and keep
the salve in an oblong, narrow urn.” With this salve the weapon, after being
dipped in the blood from the wound, was to be carefully anointed, and then
laid by in a cool place. In the mean time, the wound was to be duly washed
with fair clean water, covered with a clean, soft, linen rag, and opened once
a day to cleanse off purulent or other matter. Of the success of this
treatment, says the writer of the able article on Animal Magnetism, in the
twelfth volume of the Foreign Quarterly Review, there cannot be the least
doubt; “for surgeons at this moment follow exactly the same method,
except anointing the weapon!”
The weapon-salve continued to be much spoken of on the Continent, and
many eager claimants appeared for the honour of the invention. Dr. Fludd,
or A. Fluctibus, the Rosicrucian, who has been already mentioned in a
previous part of this volume, was very zealous in introducing it into
England. He tried it with great success in several cases, and no wonder, for
while he kept up the spirits of his patients by boasting of the great efficacy
of the salve, he never neglected those common, but much more important
remedies, of washing, bandaging, &c. which the experience of all ages had
declared sufficient for the purpose. Fludd moreover declared, that the
magnet was a remedy for all diseases, if properly applied; but that man
having, like the earth, a north and a south pole, magnetism could only take
place when his body was in a boreal position! In the midst of his
popularity, an attack was made upon him and his favourite remedy, the
salve; which, however, did little or nothing to diminish the belief in its
efficacy. One “Parson Foster” wrote a pamphlet, entitled Hyplocrisma
Spongus; or, a Spunge to wipe away the Weapon-Salve; in which he

declared, that it was as bad as witchcraft to use or recommend such an
unguent; that it was invented by the Devil, who, at the last day, would seize
upon every person who had given it the slightest encouragement. “In fact,”
said Parson Foster, “the Devil himself gave it to Paracelsus; Paracelsus to
the emperor; the emperor to the courtier; the courtier to Baptista Porta;
and Baptista Porta to Dr. Fludd, a doctor of physic, yet living and
practising in the famous city of London, who now stands tooth and nail for
it.” Dr. Fludd, thus assailed, took up the pen in defence of his unguent, in a
reply called The Squeezing of Parson Foster’s Spunge; wherein the
Spunge-bearer’s immodest carriage and behaviour towards his brethren
is detected; the bitter flames of his slanderous reports are, by the sharp
vinegar of truth, corrected and quite extinguished; and lastly, the
virtuous validity of his spunge in wiping away the-weapon-salve, is
crushed out and clean abolished.
Shortly after this dispute a more distinguished believer in the weaponsalve made his appearance in the person of Sir Kenelm Digby, the son of
Sir Everard Digby, who was executed for his participation in the
Gunpowder Plot. This gentleman, who, in other respects, was an
accomplished scholar and an able man, was imbued with all the
extravagant notions of the alchymists. He believed in the philosopher’s
stone, and wished to engage Descartes to devote his energies to the
discovery of the elixir of life, or some other means by which the existence of
man might be prolonged to an indefinite period. He gave his wife, the
beautiful Venetia Anastasia Stanley, a dish of capons fed upon vipers,
according to the plan supposed to have been laid down by Arnold of
Villeneuve, in the hope that she might thereby preserve her loveliness for a
century. If such a man once took up the idea of the weapon-salve, it was to
be expected that he would make the most of it. In his hands, however, it
was changed from an unguent into a powder, and was called the powder of
sympathy. He pretended that he had acquired the knowledge of it from a
Carmelite friar, who had learned it in Persia or Armenia, from an oriental

philosopher of great renown. King James, the Prince of Wales, the Duke of
Buchingham, and many other noble personages, believed in its efficacy.
The following remarkable instance of his mode of cure was read by Sir
Kenelm to a society of learned men at Montpellier. Mr. James Howell, the
well-known author of the Dendrologia, and of various letters, coming by
chance as two of his best friends were fighting a duel, rushed between them
and endeavoured to part them. He seized the sword of one of the
combatants by the hilt, while, at the same time, he grasped the other by the
blade. Being transported with fury one against the other, they struggled to
rid themselves of the hindrance caused by their friend; and in so doing, the
one whose sword was held by the blade by Mr. Howell, drew it away
roughly, and nearly cut his hand off, severing the nerves and muscles, and
penetrating to the bone. The other, almost at the same instant, disengaged
his sword, and aimed a blow at the head of his antagonist, which Mr.
Howell observing, raised his wounded hand with the rapidity of thought to
prevent the blow. The sword fell on the back of his already wounded hand,
and cut it severely. “It seemed,” said Sir Kenelm Digby, “as if some unlucky
star raged over them, that they should have both shed the blood of that
dear friend for whose life they would have given their own, if they had been
in their proper mind at the time.” Seeing Mr. Howell’s face all besmeared
with blood from his wounded hand, they both threw down their swords
and embraced him, and bound up his hand with a garter, to close the veins
which were cut and bled profusely. They then conveyed him home, and
sent for a surgeon. King James, who was much attached to Mr. Howell,
afterwards sent his own surgeon to attend him. We must continue the
narrative in the words of Sir Kenelm Digby: “It was my chance,” says he,
“to be lodged hard by him; and four or five days after, as I was making
myself ready, he came to my house, and prayed me to view his wounds.
‘For I understand,’ said he, ‘that you have extraordinary remedies on such
occasions; and my surgeons apprehend some fear that it may grow to a
gangrene, and so the hand must be cut off.’ In effect, his countenance

discovered that he was in much pain, which, he said, was insupportable in
regard of the extreme inflammation. I told him I would willingly serve him;
but if, haply, he knew the manner how I could cure him, without touching
or seeing him, it might be that he would not expose himself to my manner
of curing; because he would think it, peradventure, either ineffectual or
superstitious. He replied, ‘The many wonderful things which people have
related unto me of your way of medicinement makes me nothing doubt at
all of its efficacy; and all that I have to say unto you is comprehended in the
Spanish proverb, Hagase el milagro y hagalo Mahoma—Let the miracle
be done, though Mahomet do it.’
“I asked him then for any thing that had the blood upon it: so he
presently sent for his garter, wherewith his hand was first bound; and
as I called for a basin of water, as if I would wash my hands, I took a
handful of powder of vitriol, which I had in my study, and presently
dissolved it. As soon as the bloody garter was brought me, I put it in
the basin, observing, in the interim, what Mr. Howell did, who stood
talking with a gentleman in a corner of my chamber, not regarding at
all what I was doing. He started suddenly, as if he had found some
strange alteration in himself. I asked him what he ailed? ‘I know not
what ails me, but I find that I feel no more pain. Methinks that a
pleasing kind of freshness, as it were a wet cold napkin, did spread
over my hand, which hath taken away the inflammation that
tormented me before.’ I replied, ‘Since, then, you feel already so much
good of my medicament, I advise you to cast away all your plasters;
only keep the wound clean, and in a moderate temper betwixt heat and
cold.’ This was presently reported to the Duke of Buckingham, and, a
little after, to the king, who were both very curious to know the
circumstances of the business; which was, that after dinner I took the
garter out of the water, and put it to dry before a great fire. It was
scarce dry before Mr. Howell’s servant came running, and saying that

his master felt as much burning as ever he had done, if not more; for
the heat was such as if his hand were betwixt coals of fire. I answered
that, although that had happened at present, yet he should find ease in
a short time; for I knew the reason of this new accident, and would
provide accordingly; for his master should be free from that
inflammation, it might be before he could possibly return to him. But,
in case he found no ease, I wished him to come presently back again; if
not, he might forbear coming. Thereupon he went, and, at the instant I
did put the garter again into the water; thereupon he found his master
without any pain at all. To be brief, there was no cense of pain
afterwards; but within five or six days the wounds were sicatrised and
entirely healed.”
Such is the marvellous story of Sir Kenelm Digby. Other practitioners of
that age were not behind him in their pretensions. It was not always
thought necessary to use either the powder of sympathy, or the weaponsalve, to effect a cure. It was sufficient to magnetise the sword with the
hand (the first faint dawn of the animal theory), to relieve any pain the
same weapon had caused. They asserted, that if they stroked the sword
upwards with their fingers, the wounded person would feel immediate
relief; but if they stroked it downwards, he would feel intolerable pain. 66
Another very singular notion of the power and capabilities of magnetism
was entertained at the same time. It was believed that a sympathetic
alphabet could be made on the flesh, by means of which persons could
correspond with each other, and communicate all their ideas with the
rapidity of volition, although thousands of miles apart. From the arms of
two persons a piece of flesh was cut, and mutually transplanted, while still
warm and bleeding. The piece so severed grew to the new arm on which it
was placed; but still retained so close a sympathy with its native limb, that
its old possessor was always sensible of any injury done to it. Upon these
transplanted pieces were tatooed the letters of the alphabet; so that, when a

communication was to be made, either of the persons, though the wide
Atlantic rolled between them, had only to prick his arm with a magnetic
needle, and straightway his friend received intimation that the telegraph
was at work. Whatever letter he pricked on his own arm pained the same
letter on the arm of his correspondent.
Contemporary with Sir Kenelm Digby was the no less famous Mr.
Valentine Greatraks, who, without mentioning magnetism, or laying claim
to any theory, practised upon himself and others a deception much more
akin to the animal magnetism of the present day than the mineral
magnetism it was then so much the fashion to study. He was the son of an
Irish gentleman, of good education and property, in the county of Cork. He
fell, at an early age, into a sort of melancholy derangement. After some
time he had an impulse, or strange persuasion in his mind, which
continued to present itself, whether he were sleeping or waking, that God
had given him the power of curing the king’s evil. He mentioned this
persuasion to his wife, who very candidly told him that he was a fool. He
was not quite sure of this, notwithstanding the high authority from which it
came, and determined to make trial of the power that was in him. A few
days afterwards, he went to one William Maher, of Saltersbridge, in the
parish of Lismore, who was grievously afflicted with the king’s evil in his
eyes, cheek, and throat. Upon this man, who was of abundant faith, he laid
his hands, stroked him, and prayed fervently. He had the satisfaction to see
him heal considerably in the course of a few days; and finally, with the aid
of other remedies, to be quite cured. This success encouraged him in the
belief that he had a divine mission. Day after day he had further impulses
from on high that he was called upon to cure the ague also. In the course of
time he extended his powers to the curing of epilepsy, ulcers, aches, and
lameness. All the county of Cork was in a commotion to see this
extraordinary physician, who certainly operated some very great benefit in
cases where the disease was heightened by hypochondria and depression of
spirits. According to his own account, 67 such great multitudes resorted to

him from divers places, that he had no time to follow his own business, or
enjoy the company of his family and friends. He was obliged to set aside
three days in the week, from six in the morning till six at night, during
which time only he laid hands upon all that came. Still the crowds which
thronged around him were so great, that the neighbouring towns were not
able to accommodate them. He thereupon left his house in the country, and
went to Youghal, where the resort of sick people, not only from all parts of
Ireland, but from England, continued so great, that the magistrates were
afraid they would infect the place by their diseases. Several of these poor
credulous people no sooner saw him than they fell into fits, and he restored
them by waving his hand in their faces, and praying over them. Nay, he
affirmed that the touch of his glove had driven pains away, and, on one
occasion, cast out from a woman several devils, or evil spirits, who
tormented her day and night. “Every one of these devils,” says Greatraks,
“was like to choke her when it came up into her throat.” It is evident from
this that the woman’s complaint was nothing but hysteria.
The clergy of the diocese of Lismore, who seem to have had much clearer
notions of Greatraks’ pretensions than their parishioners, set their faces
against the new prophet and worker of miracles. He was cited to appear in
the Dean’s Court, and prohibited from laying on his hands for the future:
but he cared nothing for the Church. He imagined that he derived his
powers direct from heaven, and continued to throw people into fits, and
bring them to their senses again, as usual, almost exactly after the fashion
of modern magnetisers. His reputation became, at last, so great, that Lord
Conway sent to him from London, begging that he would come over
immediately to cure a grievous headache which his lady had suffered for
several years, and which the principal physicians of England had been
unable to relieve.
Greatraks accepted the invitation, and tried his manipulations and
prayers upon Lady Conway. He failed, however, in affording any relief. The
poor lady’s headache was excited by causes too serious to allow her any

help, even from faith and a lively imagination. He lived for some months in
Lord Conway’s house, at Ragley, in Warwickshire, operating cures similar
to those he had performed in Ireland. He afterwards removed to London,
and took a house in Lincoln’s-Inn Fields, which soon became the daily
resort of all the nervous and credulous women of the metropolis. A very
amusing account of Greatraks at this time (1665) is given in the second
volume of the Miscellanies of St. Evremond, under the title of the Irish
prophet. It is the most graphic sketch ever made of this early magnetiser.
Whether his pretensions were more or less absurd than those of some of
his successors, who have lately made their appearance among us, would be
hard to say.
“When M. de Comminges,” says St. Evremond, “was ambassador from
his most Christian majesty to the king of Great Britain, there came to
London an Irish prophet, who passed himself off as a great worker of
miracles. Some persons of quality having begged M. de Comminges to
invite him to his house, that they might be witnesses of some of his
miracles, the ambassador promised to satisfy them, as much to gratify his
own curiosity as from courtesy to his friends; and gave notice to Greatraks
that he would be glad to see him.
“A rumour of the prophet’s coming soon spread all over the town,
and the hotel of M. de Comminges was crowded by sick persons, who
came full of confidence in their speedy cure. The Irishman made them
wait a considerable time for him, but came at last, in the midst of their
impatience, with a grave and simple countenance, that showed no
signs of his being a cheat. Monsieur de Comminges prepared to
question him strictly, hoping to discourse with him on the matters that
he had read of in Van Helmont and Bodinus; but he was not able to do
so, much to his regret, for the crowd became so great, and cripples and
others pressed around so impatiently to be the first cured, that the

servants were obliged to use threats, and even force, before they could
establish order among them, or place them in proper ranks.
“The prophet affirmed that all diseases were caused by evil spirits.
Every infirmity was with him a case of diabolical possession. The first
that was presented to him was a man suffering from gout and
rheumatism, and so severely that the physicians had been unable to
cure him. ‘Ah,’ said the miracle-worker, ‘I have seen a good deal of this
sort of spirits when I was in Ireland. They are watery spirits, who bring
on cold shivering, and excite an overflow of aqueous humours in our
poor bodies.’ Then addressing the man, he said, ‘Evil spirit, who hast
quitted thy dwelling in the waters to come and afflict this miserable
body, I command thee to quit thy new abode, and to return to thine
ancient habitation!’ This said, the sick man was ordered to withdraw,
and another was brought forward in his place. This new comer said he
was tormented by the melancholy vapours. In fact, he looked like a
hypochondriac; one of those persons, diseased in imagination, and
who but too often become so in reality. ‘Aerial spirit,’ said the
Irishman, ‘return, I command thee, into the air;—exercise thy natural
vocation of raising tempests, and do not excite any more wind in this
sad unlucky body!’ This man was immediately turned away to make
room for a third patient, who, in the Irishman’s opinion, was only
tormented by a little bit of a sprite, who could not withstand his
command for an instant. He pretended that he recognised this sprite
by some marks which were invisible to the company, to whom he
turned with a smile, and said, ‘This sort of spirit does not often do
much harm, and is always very diverting.’ To hear him talk, one would
have imagined that he knew all about spirits,—their names, their rank,
their numbers, their employment, and all the functions they were
destined to; and he boasted of being much better acquainted with the
intrigues of demons than he was with the affairs of men. You can
hardly imagine what a reputation he gained in a short time. Catholics

and Protestants visited him from every part, all believing that power
from heaven was in his hands.”
After relating a rather equivocal adventure of a husband and wife, who
implored Greatraks to cast out the devil of dissension which had crept in
between them, St. Evremond thus sums up the effect he produced on the
popular mind: “So great was the confidence in him, that the blind fancied
they saw the light which they did not see—the deaf imagined that they
heard—the lame that they walked straight, and the paralytic that they had
recovered the use of their limbs. An idea of health made the sick forget for
a while their maladies; and imagination, which was not less active in those
merely drawn by curiosity than in the sick, gave a false view to the one
class, from the desire of seeing, as it operated a false cure on the other from
the strong desire of being healed. Such was the power of the Irishman over
the mind, and such was the influence of the mind upon the body. Nothing
was spoken of in London but his prodigies; and these prodigies were
supported by such great authorities, that the bewildered multitude believed
them almost without examination, while more enlightened people did not
dare to reject them from their own knowledge. The public opinion, timid
and enslaved, respected this imperious and, apparently, well-authenticated
error. Those who saw through the delusion kept their opinion to
themselves, knowing how useless it was to declare their disbelief to a
people filled with prejudice and admiration.”
About the same time that Valentine Greatraks was thus magnetising the
people of London, an Italian enthusiast, named Francisco Bagnone, was
performing the same tricks in Italy, and with as great success. He had only
to touch weak women with his hands, or sometimes (for the sake of
working more effectively upon their fanaticism) with a relic, to make them
fall into fits, and manifest all the symptoms of magnetism.
Besides these, several learned men, in different parts of Europe, directed
their attention to the study of the magnet, believing that it might be

rendered efficacious in many diseases. Van Helmont, in particular,
published a work on the effects of magnetism on the human frame; and
Balthazar Gracian, a Spaniard, rendered himself famous for the boldness of
his views on the subject. “The magnet,” said the latter, “attracts iron; iron is
found every where; every thing, therefore, is under the influence of
magnetism. It is only a modification of the general principle, which
establishes harmony or foments divisions among men. It is the same agent
that gives rise to sympathy, antipathy, and the passions.” 68
Baptista Porta, who, in the whimsical genealogy of the weapon-salve,
given by Parson Foster, in his attack upon Dr. à Fluctibus, is mentioned as
one of its fathers, had also great faith in the efficacy of the magnet, and
operated upon the imagination of his patients in a manner which was then
considered so extraordinary that he was accused of being a magician, and
prohibited from practising by the court of Rome. Among others who
distinguished themselves by their faith in magnetism, Sebastian Wirdig
and William Maxwell claim especial notice. Wirdig was professor of
medicine at the university of Rostock in Mecklenburg, and wrote a treatise
called The New Medicine of the Spirits, which he presented to the Royal
Society of London. An edition of this work was printed in 1673, in which
the author maintained that a magnetic influence took place, not only
between the celestial and terrestrial bodies, but between all living things.
The whole world, he said, was under the influence of magnetism; life was
preserved by magnetism; death was the consequence of magnetism!
Maxwell, the other enthusiast, was an admiring disciple of Paracelsus,
and boasted that he had irradiated the obscurity in which too many of the
wonder-working recipes of that great philosopher were enveloped. His
works were printed at Frankfort in 1679. It would seem, from the following
passage, that he was aware of the great influence of imagination, as well in
the production as in the cure of diseases. “If you wish to work prodigies,”
says he, “abstract from the materiality of beings—increase the sum of
spirituality in bodies—rouse the spirit from its slumbers. Unless you do one

or other of these things—unless you can bind the idea, you can never
perform any thing good or great.” Here, in fact, lies the whole secret of
magnetism, and all delusions of a similar kind: increase the spirituality—
rouse the spirit from its slumbers, or, in other words, work upon the
imagination—induce belief and blind confidence, and you may do any
thing. This passage, which is quoted with approbation by M. Dupotet 69 in a
work, as strongly corroborative of the theory now advanced by the animal
magnetists, is just the reverse. If they believe they can work all their
wonders by the means so dimly shadowed forth by Maxwell, what becomes
of the universal fluid pervading all nature, and which they pretend to pour
into weak and diseased bodies from the tips of their fingers?
Early in the eighteenth century the attention of Europe was directed to a
very remarkable instance of fanaticism, which has been claimed by the
animal magnetists as a proof of their science. The Convulsionaries of St.
Medard, as they were called, assembled in great numbers round the tomb
of their favourite saint, the Jansenist priest Paris, and taught one another
how to fall into convulsions. They believed that St. Paris would cure all
their infirmities; and the number of hysterical women and weak-minded
persons of all descriptions that flocked to the tomb from far and near was
so great as daily to block up all the avenues leading to it. Working
themselves up to a pitch of excitement, they went off one after the other
into fits, while some of them, still in apparent possession of all their
faculties, voluntarily exposed themselves to sufferings which on ordinary
occasions would have been sufficient to deprive them of life. The scenes
that occurred were a scandal to civilisation and to religion—a strange
mixture of obscenity, absurdity, and superstition. While some were praying
on bended knees at the shrine of St. Paris, others were shrieking and
making the most hideous noises. The women especially exerted
themselves. On one side of the chapel there might be seen a score of them,
all in convulsions; while at another as many more, excited to a sort of
frenzy, yielded themselves up to gross indecencies. Some of them took an

insane delight in being beaten and trampled upon. One in particular,
according to Montégre, whose account we quote, 70 was so enraptured with
this ill-usage, that nothing but the hardest blows would satisfy her. While a
fellow of Herculean strength was beating her with all his might with a
heavy bar of iron, she kept continually urging him to renewed exertion. The
harder he struck the better she liked it, exclaiming all the while, “Well
done, brother, well done! Oh, how pleasant it is! what good you are doing
me! Courage, my brother, courage; strike harder, strike harder still!”
Another of these fanatics had, if possible, a still greater love for a beating.
Carré de Montgeron, who relates the circumstance, was unable to satisfy
her with sixty blows of a large sledge-hammer. He afterwards used the
same weapon with the same degree of strength, for the sake of experiment,
and succeeded in battering a hole in a stone wall at the twenty-fifth stroke.
Another woman, named Sonnet, laid herself down on a red-hot brazier
without flinching, and acquired for herself the nickname of the
Salamander; while others, desirous of a more illustrious martyrdom,
attempted to crucify themselves. M. Deleuze, in his critical history of
Animal Magnetism, attempts to prove that this fanatical frenzy was
produced by magnetism, and that these mad enthusiasts magnetised each
other without being aware of it. As well might he insist that the fanaticism
which tempts the Hindoo bigot to keep his arms stretched in a horizontal
position till the sinews wither, or his fingers closed upon his palms till the
nails grow out of the backs of his hands, is also an effect of magnetism!
For a period of sixty or seventy years magnetism was almost wholly
confined to Germany. Men of sense and learning devoted their attention to
the properties of the loadstone; and one Father Hell, a Jesuit, and
professor of astronomy at the University of Vienna, rendered himself
famous by his magnetic cures. About the year 1771 or 1772 he invented
steel-plates of a peculiar form, which he applied to the naked body as a
cure for several diseases. In the year 1774 he communicated his system to
Anthony Mesmer. The latter improved upon the ideas of Father Hell,

constructed a new theory of his own, and became the founder of ANIMAL
MAGNETISM.
It has been the fashion among the enemies of the new delusion to decry
Mesmer as an unprincipled adventurer, while his disciples have extolled
him to the skies as a regenerator of the human race. In nearly the same
words as the Rosicrucians applied to their founders, he has been called the
discoverer of the secret which brings man into more intimate connexion
with his Creator, the deliverer of the soul from the debasing trammels of
the flesh, the man who enables us to set time at defiance, and conquer the
obstructions of space. A careful sifting of his pretensions, and examination
of the evidence brought forward to sustain them, will soon shew which
opinion is the more correct. That the writer of these pages considers him in
the light of a man who, deluding himself, was the means of deluding
others, may be inferred from his finding a place in these volumes, and
figuring among the Flamels, the Agrippas, the Borris, the Böhmens, and
the Cagliostros.
He was born in May 1734, at Mersburg, in Swabia, and studied medicine
at the University of Vienna. He took his degrees in 1766, and chose the
influence of the planets on the human body as the subject of his inaugural
dissertation. Having treated the matter quite in the style of the old
astrological physicians, he was exposed to some ridicule both then and
afterwards. Even at this early period some faint ideas of his great theory
were germinating in his mind. He maintained in his dissertation “that the
sun, moon, and fixed stars mutually affect each other in their orbits; that
they cause and direct in our earth a flux and reflux not only in the sea, but
in the atmosphere, and affect in a similar manner all organised bodies
through the medium of a subtile and mobile fluid, which pervades the
universe, and associates all things together in mutual intercourse and
harmony.” This influence, he said, was particularly exercised on the
nervous system, and produced two states, which he called intension and
remission, which seemed to him to account for the different periodical

revolutions observable in several maladies. When in after-life he met with
Father Hell, he was confirmed by that person’s observations in the truth of
many of his own ideas. Having caused Hell to make him some magnetic
plates, he determined to try experiments with them himself for his further
satisfaction.
He tried accordingly, and was astonished at his success. The faith of their
wearers operated wonders with the metallic plates. Mesmer made due
reports to Father Hell of all he had done, and the latter published them as
the results of his own happy invention, and speaking of Mesmer as a
physician whom he had employed to work under him. Mesmer took offence
at being thus treated, considering himself a far greater personage than
Father Hell. He claimed the invention as his own, accused Hell of a breach
of confidence, and stigmatised him as a mean person, anxious to turn the
discoveries of others to his own account. Hell replied, and a very pretty
quarrel was the result, which afforded small talk for months to the literati
of Vienna. Hell ultimately gained the victory. Mesmer, nothing daunted,
continued to promulgate his views till he stumbled at last upon the animal
theory.
One of his patients was a young lady, named Œsterline, who suffered
under a convulsive malady. Her attacks were periodical, and attended by a
rush of blood to the head, followed by delirium and syncope. These
symptoms he soon succeeded in reducing under his system of planetary
influence, and imagined he could foretell the periods of accession and
remission. Having thus accounted satisfactorily to himself for the origin of
the disease, the idea struck him that he could operate a certain cure if he
could ascertain beyond doubt, what he had long believed, that there existed
between the bodies which compose our globe an action equally reciprocal
and similar to that of the heavenly bodies, by means of which he could
imitate artificially the periodical revolutions of the flux and reflux before
mentioned. He soon convinced himself that this action did exist. When
trying the metallic plates of Father Hell, he thought their efficacy depended

on their form; but he found afterwards that he could produce the same
effects without using them at all, merely by passing his hands downwards
towards the feet of the patient, even when at a considerable distance.
This completed the theory of Mesmer. He wrote an account of his
discovery to all the learned societies of Europe, soliciting their
investigation. The Academy of Sciences at Berlin was the only one that
answered him, and their answer was any thing but favourable to his system
or flattering to himself. Still he was not discouraged. He maintained to all
who would listen to him that the magnetic matter, or fluid, pervaded all the
universe—that every human body contained it, and could communicate the
superabundance of it to another by an exertion of the will. Writing to a
friend from Vienna, he said, “I have observed that the magnetic is almost
the same thing as the electric fluid, and that it may be propagated in the
same manner, by means of intermediate bodies. Steel is not the only
substance adapted to this purpose. I have rendered paper, bread, wool,
silk, stones, leather, glass, wood, men, and dogs—in short, every thing I
touched, magnetic to such a degree, that these substances produced the
same effects as the loadstone on diseased persons. I have charged jars with
magnetic matter in the same way as is done with electricity.”
Mesmer did not long find his residence at Vienna as agreeable as he
wished. His pretensions were looked upon with contempt or indifference,
and the case of Mademoiselle Œsterline brought him less fame than
notoriety. He determined to change his sphere of action, and travelled into
Swabia and Switzerland. In the latter country he met with the celebrated
Father Gassner, who, like Valentine Greatraks, amused himself by casting
out devils, and healing the sick by merely laying hands upon them. At his
approach, delicate girls fell into convulsions, and hypochondriacs fancied
themselves cured. His house was daily besieged by the lame, the blind, and
the hysteric. Mesmer at once acknowledged the efficacy of his cures, and
declared that they were the obvious result of his own newly-discovered
power of magnetism. A few of the father’s patients were forthwith

subjected to the manipulations of Mesmer, and the same symptoms were
induced. He then tried his hand upon some paupers in the hospitals of
Berne and Zurich, and succeeded, according to his own account, but no
other person’s, in curing an opththalmia and a gutta serena. With
memorials of these achievements he returned to Vienna, in the hope of
silencing his enemies, or at least forcing them to respect his newlyacquired reputation, and to examine his system more attentively.
His second appearance in that capital was not more auspicious than the
first. He undertook to cure a Mademoiselle Paradis, who was quite blind,
and subject to convulsions. He magnetised her several times, and then
declared that she was cured; at least, if she was not, it was her fault and not
his. An eminent oculist of that day, named Barth, went to visit her, and
declared that she was as blind as ever; while her family said she was as
much subject to convulsions as before. Mesmer persisted that she was
cured. Like the French philosopher, he would not allow facts to interfere
with his theory. 71 He declared that there was a conspiracy against him; and
that Mademoiselle Paradis, at the instigation of her family, feigned
blindness in order to injure his reputation!
The consequences of this pretended cure taught Mesmer that Vienna was
not the sphere for him. Paris, the idle, the debauched, the pleasurehunting, the novelty-loving, was the scene for a philosopher like him, and
thither he repaired accordingly. He arrived at Paris in 1778, and began
modestly by making himself and his theory known to the principal
physicians. At first, his encouragement was but slight; he found people
more inclined to laugh at than to patronise him. But he was a man who had
great confidence in himself, and of a perseverance which no difficulties
could overcome. He hired a sumptuous apartment, which he opened to all
comers who chose to make trial of the new power of nature. M. D’Eslon, a
physician of great reputation, became a convert; and from that time,
animal magnetism, or, as some called it, mesmerism, became the fashion
in Paris. The women were quite enthusiastic about it, and their admiring

tattle wafted its fame through every grade of society. Mesmer was the rage;
and high and low, rich and poor, credulous and unbelieving, all hastened to
convince themselves of the power of this mighty magician, who made such
magnificent promises. Mesmer, who knew as well as any man living the
influence of the imagination, determined that, on that score, nothing
should be wanting to heighten the effect of the magnetic charm. In all
Paris, there was not a house so charmingly furnished as Monsieur
Mesmer’s. Richly-stained glass shed a dim religious light on his spacious
saloons, which were almost covered with mirrors. Orange-blossoms
scented all the air of his corridors; incense of the most expensive kinds
burned in antique vases on his chimney-pieces; æolian harps sighed
melodious music from distant chambers; while sometimes a sweet female
voice, from above or below, stole softly upon the mysterious silence that
was kept in the house, and insisted upon from all visitors. “Was ever any
thing so delightful!” cried all the Mrs. Wittitterleys of Paris, as they
thronged to his house in search of pleasant excitement; “So wonderful!”
said the pseudo-philosophers, who would believe anything if it were the
fashion; “So amusing!” said the worn-out debauchés, who had drained the
cup of sensuality to its dregs, and who longed to see lovely women in
convulsions, with the hope that they might gain some new emotions from
the sight.
The following was the mode of operation: In the centre of the saloon was
placed an oval vessel, about four feet in its longest diameter, and one foot
deep. In this were laid a number of wine-bottles, filled with magnetised
water, well corked-up, and disposed in radii, with their necks outwards.
Water was then poured into the vessel so as just to cover the bottles, and
filings of iron were thrown in occasionally to heighten the magnetic effect.
The vessel was then covered with an iron cover, pierced through with many
holes, and was called the baquet. From each hole issued a long movable
rod of iron, which the patients were to apply to such parts of their bodies as
were afflicted. Around this baquet the patients were directed to sit, holding

each other by the hand, and pressing their knees together as closely as
possible, to facilitate the passage of the magnetic fluid from one to the
other.
Then came in the assistant magnetisers, generally strong, handsome
young men, to pour into the patient from their finger-tips fresh streams of
the wondrous fluid. They embraced the patient between the knees, rubbed
them gently down the spine and the course of the nerves, using gentle
pressure upon the breasts of the ladies, and staring them out of
countenance to magnetise them by the eye! All this time the most rigorous
silence was maintained, with the exception of a few wild notes on the
harmonica or the piano-forte, or the melodious voice of a hidden operasinger swelling softly at long intervals. Gradually the cheeks of the ladies
began to glow, their imaginations to become inflamed; and off they went,
one after the other, in convulsive fits. Some of them sobbed and tore their
hair, others laughed till the tears ran from their eyes, while others shrieked
and screamed and yelled till they became insensible altogether.
This was the crisis of the delirium. In the midst of it, the chief actor made
his appearance, waving his wand, like Prospero, to work new wonders.
Dressed in a long robe of lilac-coloured silk richly embroidered with gold
flowers, bearing in his hand a white magnetic rod, and with a look of
dignity which would have sat well on an eastern caliph, he marched with
solemn strides into the room. He awed the still sensible by his eye, and the
violence of their symptoms diminished. He stroked the insensible with his
hands upon the eye-brows and down the spine; traced figures upon their
breast and abdomen with his long white wand, and they were restored to
consciousness. They became calm, acknowledged his power, and said they
felt streams of cold or burning vapour passing through their frames,
according as he waved his wand or his fingers before them.
“It is impossible,” says M. Dupotet, “to conceive the sensation which
Mesmer’s experiments created in Paris. No theological controversy, in the
earlier ages of the Catholic Church, was ever conducted with greater

bitterness.” His adversaries denied the discovery; some calling him a
quack, others a fool, and others again, like the Abbé Fiard, a man who had
sold himself to the Devil! His friends were as extravagant in their praise, as
his foes were in their censure. Paris was inundated with pamphlets upon
the subject, as many defending as attacking the doctrine. At court, the
queen expressed herself in favour of it, and nothing else was to be heard of
in society.
By the advice of M. D’Eslon, Mesmer challenged an examination of his
doctrine by the Faculty of Medicine. He proposed to select twenty-four
patients, twelve of whom he would treat magnetically, leaving the other
twelve to be treated by the faculty according to the old and approved
methods. He also stipulated that, to prevent disputes, the government
should nominate certain persons who were not physicians, to be present at
the experiments; and that the object of the inquiry should be, not how
these effects were produced, but whether they were really efficacious in the
cure of any disease. The faculty objected to limit the inquiry in this
manner, and the proposition fell to the ground.
Mesmer now wrote to Marie Antoinette, with the view of securing her
influence in obtaining for him the protection of government. He wished to
have a château and its lands given to him, with a handsome yearly income,
that he might be enabled to continue his experiments at leisure, untroubled
by the persecution of his enemies. He hinted the duty of governments to
support men of science, and expressed his fear, that if he met no more
encouragement, he should be compelled to carry his great discovery to
some other land more willing to appreciate him. “In the eyes of your
majesty,” said he, “four or five hundred thousand francs, applied to a good
purpose, are of no account. The welfare and happiness of your people are
every thing. My discovery ought to be received and rewarded with a
munificence worthy of the monarch to whom I shall attach myself.” The
government at last offered him a pension of twenty thousand francs, and
the cross of the order of St. Michael, if he had made any discovery in

medicine, and would communicate it to physicians nominated by the king.
The latter part of the proposition was not agreeable to Mesmer. He feared
the unfavourable report of the king’s physicians; and, breaking off the
negotiation, spoke of his disregard of money, and his wish to have his
discovery at once recognised by the government. He then retired to Spa, in
a fit of disgust, upon pretence of drinking the waters for the benefit of his
health.
After he had left Paris, the Faculty of Medicine called upon M. D’Eslon,
for the third and last time, to renounce the doctrine of animal magnetism,
or be expelled from their body. M. D’Eslon, so far from doing this, declared
that he had discovered new secrets, and solicited further examination. A
royal commission of the Faculty of Medicine was, in consequence,
appointed on the 12th of March 1784, seconded by another commission of
the Académie des Sciences, to investigate the phenomena and report upon
them. The first commission was composed of the principal physicians of
Paris; while, among the eminent men comprised in the latter, were
Benjamin Franklin, Lavoisier, and Bailly the historian of astronomy.
Mesmer was formally invited to appear before this body, but absented
himself from day to day, upon one pretence or another. M. D’Eslon was
more honest, because he thoroughly believed in the phenomena, which it is
to be questioned if Mesmer ever did, and regularly attended the sittings
and performed experiments.
Bailly has thus described the scenes of which he was a witness in the
course of this investigation. “The sick persons, arranged in great numbers
and in several rows around the baquet, receive the magnetism, by all these
means: by the iron rods which convey it to them from the baquet—by the
cords wound round their bodies—by the connexion of the thumb, which
conveys to them the magnetism of their neighbours—and by the sounds of
a piano-forte, or of an agreeable voice, diffusing the magnetism in the air.
The patients were also directly magnetised by means of the finger and
wand of the magnetiser moved slowly before their faces, above or behind

their heads, and on the diseased parts, always observing the direction of
the holes. The magnetiser acts by fixing his eyes on them. But above all,
they are magnetised by the application of his hands and the pressure of his
fingers on the hypochondres and on the regions of the abdomen; an
application often continued for a long time—sometimes for several hours.
“Meanwhile the patients in their different conditions present a very
varied picture. Some are calm, tranquil, and experience no effect.
Others cough, spit, feel slight pains, local or general heat, and have
sweatings. Others again are agitated and tormented with convulsions.
These convulsions are remarkable in regard to the number affected
with them, to their duration and force. As soon as one begins to be
convulsed, several others are affected. The commissioners have
observed some of these convulsions last more than three hours. They
are accompanied with expectorations of a muddy viscous water,
brought away by violent efforts. Sometimes streaks of blood have been
observed in this fluid. These convulsions are characterised by the
precipitous, involuntary motion of all the limbs, and of the whole
body; by the contraction of the throat—by the leaping motions of the
hypochondria and the epigastrium—by the dimness and wandering of
the eyes—by piercing shrieks, tears, sobbing, and immoderate
laughter. They are preceded or followed by a state of langour or
reverie, a kind of depression, and sometimes drowsiness. The smallest
sudden noise occasions a shuddering; and it was remarked, that the
change of measure in the airs played on the piano-forte had a great
influence on the patients. A quicker motion, a livelier melody, agitated
them more, and renewed the vivacity of their convulsions.
“Nothing is more astonishing than the spectacle of these
convulsions. One who has not seen them can form no idea of them.
The spectator is as much astonished at the profound repose of one
portion of the patients as at the agitation of the rest—at the various

accidents which are repeated, and at the sympathies which are
exhibited. Some of the patients may be seen devoting their attention
exclusively to one another, rushing towards each other with open
arms, smiling, soothing, and manifesting every symptom of
attachment and affection. All are under the power of the magnetiser; it
matters not in what state of drowsiness they may be, the sound of his
voice—a look, a motion of his hand—brings them out of it. Among the
patients in convulsions there are always observed a great many
women, and very few men.” 72
These experiments lasted for about five months. They had hardly
commenced, before Mesmer, alarmed at the loss both of fame and profit,
determined to return to Paris. Some patients of rank and fortune,
enthusiastic believers in his doctrine, had followed him to Spa. One of
them named Bergasse, proposed to open a subscription for him, of one
hundred shares, at one hundred louis each, on condition that he would
disclose his secret to the subscribers, who were to be permitted to make
whatever use they pleased of it. Mesmer readily embraced the proposal;
and such was the infatuation, that the subscription was not only filled in a
few days, but exceeded by no less a sum than one hundred and forty
thousand francs.
With this fortune he returned to Paris, and recommenced his
experiments, while the royal commission continued theirs. His admiring
pupils, who had paid him so handsomely for his instructions, spread his
fame over the country, and established in all the principal towns of France,
“Societies of Harmony,” for trying experiments and curing all diseases by
means of magnetism. Some of these societies were a scandal to morality,
being joined by profligate men of depraved appetites, who took a
disgusting delight in witnessing young girls in convulsions. Many of the
pretended magnetisers were asserted at the time to be notorious libertines,
who took that opportunity of gratifying their passions.

At last the commissioners published their report, which was drawn up by
the illustrious and unfortunate Bailly. For clearness of reasoning and strict
impartiality it has never been surpassed. After detailing the various
experiments made, and their results, they came to the conclusion that the
only proof advanced in support of animal magnetism was the effects it
produced on the human body—that those effects could be produced
without

passes

or

other

magnetic

manipulations—that

all

these

manipulations and passes and ceremonies never produce any effect at all if
employed without the patient’s knowledge; and that therefore imagination
did, and animal magnetism did not, account for the phenomena.
This report was the ruin of Mesmer’s reputation in France. He quitted
Paris shortly after, with the three hundred and forty thousand francs which
had been subscribed by his admirers, and retired to his own country, where
he died in 1815, at the advanced age of eighty-one. But the seeds he had
sown fructified of themselves, nourished and brought to maturity by the
kindly warmth of popular credulity. Imitators sprang up in France,
Germany, and England, more extravagant than their master, and claiming
powers for the new science which its founder had never dreamt of. Among
others, Cagliostro made good use of the delusion in extending his claims to
be considered a master of the occult sciences. But he made no discoveries
worthy to be compared to those of the Marquis de Puysegur and the
Chevalier Barbarin, honest men, who began by deceiving themselves before
they deceived others.
The Marquis de Puysegur, the owner of a considerable estate at Busancy,
was one of those who had entered into the subscription for Mesmer. After
that individual had quitted France, he retired to Busancy, with his brother,
to try animal magnetism upon his tenants, and cure the country people of
all manner of diseases. He was a man of great simplicity and much
benevolence, and not only magnetised but fed the sick that flocked around
him. In all the neighbourhood, and indeed within a circumference of
twenty miles, he was looked upon as endowed with a power almost divine.

His great discovery, as he called it, was made by chance. One day he had
magnetised his gardener; and observing him to fall into a deep sleep, it
occurred to him that he would address a question to him, as he would have
done to a natural somnambulist. He did so, and the man replied with much
clearness and precision. M. de Puysegur was agreeably surprised: he
continued his experiments, and found that, in this state of magnetic
somnambulism, the soul of the sleeper was enlarged, and brought into
more intimate communion with all nature, and more especially with him,
M. de Puysegur. He found that all further manipulations were
unnecessary; that, without speaking or making any sign, he could convey
his will to the patient; that he could, in fact, converse with him, soul to
soul, without the employment of any physical operation whatever!
Simultaneously with this marvellous discovery he made another, which
reflects equal credit upon his understanding. Like Valentine Greatraks, he
found it hard work to magnetise all that came—that he had not even time
to take the repose and relaxation which were necessary for his health. In
this emergency he hit upon a clever expedient. He had heard Mesmer say
that he could magnetise bits of wood: why should he not be able to
magnetise a whole tree? It was no sooner thought than done. There was a
large elm on the village green at Busancy, under which the peasant girls
used to dance on festive occasions, and the old men to sit, drinking their
vin du pays, on the fine summer evenings. M. de Puysegur proceeded to
this tree and magnetised it, by first touching it with his hands, and then
retiring a few steps from it; all the while directing streams of the magnetic
fluid from the branches toward the trunk, and from the trunk toward the
root. This done, he caused circular seats to be erected round it, and cords
suspended from it in all directions. When the patients had seated
themselves, they twisted the cords round the diseased parts of their bodies,
and held one another firmly by their thumbs to form a direct channel of
communication for the passage of the fluid.

M. de Puysegur had now two “hobbies”—the man with the enlarged soul
and the magnetic elm. The infatuation of himself and his patients cannot
be better expressed than in his own words. Writing to his brother, on the
17th of May 1784, he says, “If you do not come, my dear friend, you will not
see my extraordinary man, for his health is now almost quite restored. I
continue to make use of the happy power for which I am indebted to M.
Mesmer. Every day I bless his name; for I am very useful, and produce
many salutary effects on all the sick poor in the neighbourhood. They flock
around my tree; there were more than one hundred and thirty of them this
morning. It is the best baquet possible; not a leaf of it but communicates
health! all feel, more or less, the good effects of it. You will be delighted to
see the charming picture of humanity which this presents. I have only one
regret—it is, that I cannot touch all who come. But my magnetised man—
my intelligence—sets me at ease. He teaches me what conduct I should
adopt. According to him, it is not at all necessary that I should touch every
one; a look, a gesture, even a wish, is sufficient. And it is one of the most
ignorant peasants of the country that teaches me this! When he is in a
crisis, I know of nothing more profound, more prudent, more clearsighted
(clairvoyant) than he is.”
In another letter, describing his first experiment with the magnetic tree,
he says, “Yesterday evening I brought my first patient to it. As soon as I had
put the cord round him he gazed at the tree; and, with an air of
astonishment which I cannot describe, exclaimed, ‘What is it that I see
there?’ His head then sunk down, and he fell into a perfect fit of
somnambulism. At the end of an hour, I took him home to his house again,
when I restored him to his senses. Several men and women came to tell
him what he had been doing. He maintained it was not true; that, weak as
he was, and scarcely able to walk, it would have been scarcely possible for
him to have gone down stairs and walked to the tree. To-day I have
repeated the experiment on him, and with the same success. I own to you
that my head turns round with pleasure to think of the good I do. Madame

de Puysegur, the friends she has with her, my servants, and, in fact, all who
are near me, feel an amazement, mingled with admiration, which cannot be
described; but they do not experience the half of my sensations. Without
my tree, which gives me rest, and which will give me still more, I should be
in a state of agitation, inconsistent, I believe, with my health. I exist too
much, if I may be allowed to use the expression.”
In another letter, he descants still more poetically upon his gardener
with the enlarged soul. He says, “It is from this simple man, this tall and
stout rustic, twenty-three years of age, enfeebled by disease, or rather by
sorrow, and therefore the more predisposed to be affected by any great
natural agent,—it is from this man, I repeat, that I derive instruction and
knowledge. When in the magnetic state, he is no longer a peasant who can
hardly utter a single sentence; he is a being, to describe whom I cannot find
a name. I need not speak; I have only to think before him, when he
instantly understands and answers me. Should any body come into the
room, he sees him, if I desire it (but not else), and addresses him, and says
what I wish to say; not indeed exactly as I dictate to him, but as truth
requires. When he wants to add more than I deem it prudent strangers
should hear, I stop the flow of his ideas, and of his conversation in the
middle of a word, and give it quite a different turn!”
Among other persons attracted to Busancy by the report of these
extraordinary occurrences was M. Cloquet, the Receiver of Finance. His
appetite for the marvellous being somewhat insatiable, he readily believed
all that was told him by M. de Puysegur. He also has left a record of what
he saw, and what he credited, which throws a still clearer light upon the
progress of the delusion. 73 He says that the patients he saw in the magnetic
state had an appearance of deep sleep, during which all the physical
faculties were suspended, to the advantage of the intellectual faculties. The
eyes of the patients were closed, the sense of hearing was abolished; and
they awoke only at the voice of their magnetiser. “If any one touched a
patient during a crisis, or even the chair on which he was seated,” says M.

Cloquet, “it would cause him much pain and suffering, and throw him into
convulsions. During the crisis, they possess an extraordinary and
supernatural power, by which, on touching a patient presented to them,
they can feel what part of his body is diseased, even by merely passing their
hand over the clothes.” Another singularity was, that these sleepers who
could thus discover diseases, see into the interior of other men’s stomachs,
and point out remedies, remembered absolutely nothing after the
magnetiser thought proper to disenchant them. The time that elapsed
between their entering the crisis and their coming out of it was obliterated.
Not only had the magnetiser the power of making himself heard by the
somnambulists, but he could make them follow him by merely pointing his
finger at them from a distance, though they had their eyes the whole time
completely closed.
Such was animal magnetism under the auspices of the Marquis de
Puysegur. While he was exhibiting these phenomena around his elm-tree, a
magnetiser of another class appeared in Lyons, in the person of the
Chevalier de Barbarin. This gentleman thought the effort of the will,
without any of the paraphernalia of wands or baquets, was sufficient to
throw patients into the magnetic sleep. He tried it and succeeded. By
sitting at the bedside of his patients, and praying that they might be
magnetised, they went off into a state very similar to that of the persons
who fell under the notice of M. de Puysegur. In the course of time a very
considerable number of magnetisers, acknowledging Barbarin for their
model, and called after him Barbarinists, appeared in different parts, and
were believed to have effected some remarkable cures. In Sweden and
Germany this sect of fanatics increased rapidly, and were called
spiritualists, to distinguish them from the followers of M. de Puysegur,
who were called experimentalists. They maintained that all the effects of
animal magnetism, which Mesmer believed to be producible by a magnetic
fluid dispersed through nature, were produced by the mere effort of one
human soul acting upon another; that when a connexion had once been

established between a magnetiser and his patient, the former could
communicate his influence to the latter from any distance, even hundreds
of miles, by the will. One of them thus described the blessed state of a
magnetic patient: “In such a man animal instinct ascends to the highest
degree admissible in this world. The clairvoyant is then a pure animal,
without any admixture of matter. His observations are those of a spirit. He
is similar to God: his eye penetrates all the secrets of nature. When his
attention is fixed on any of the objects of this world—on his disease, his
death, his well-beloved, his friends, his relations, his enemies—in spirit he
sees them acting; he penetrates into the causes and the consequences of
their actions; he becomes a physician, a prophet, a divine!” 74
Let us now see what progress these mysteries made in England. In the
year 1788 Dr. Mainauduc, who had been a pupil, first of Mesmer, and
afterwards of D’Eslon, arrived in Bristol, and gave public lectures upon
magnetism. His success was quite extraordinary. People of rank and
fortune hastened from London to Bristol to be magnetised, or to place
themselves under his tuition. Dr. George Winter, in his History of Animal
Magnetism, gives the following list of them: “They amounted to one
hundred and twenty-seven, among whom there were one duke, one
duchess, one marchioness, two countesses, one earl, one baron, three
baronesses, one bishop, five right honourable gentlemen and ladies, two
baronets, seven members of parliament, one clergyman, two physicians,
seven surgeons, besides ninety-two gentlemen and ladies of respectability.”
He afterwards established himself in London, where he performed with
equal success.
He began by publishing proposals to the ladies for the formation of a
Hygeian Society. In this paper he vaunted highly the curative effects of
animal magnetism, and took great credit to himself for being the first
person to introduce it into England, and thus concluded: “As this method
of cure is not confined to sex or college education, and the fair sex being in
general the most sympathising part of the creation, and most immediately

concerned in the health and care of its offspring, I think myself bound in
gratitude to you, ladies, for the partiality you have shewn me in midwifery,
to contribute, as far as lies in my power, to render you additionally useful
and valuable to the community. With this view I propose forming my
Hygeian Society, to be incorporated with that of Paris. As soon as twenty
ladies have given in their names, the day shall be appointed for the first
meeting at my house, when they are to pay fifteen guineas, which will
include the whole expense.”
Hannah More, in a letter addressed to Horace Walpole in September
1788, speaks of the “demoniacal mummeries” of Dr. Mainauduc, and says
he was in a fair way of gaining a hundred thousand pounds by them, as
Mesmer had done by his exhibitions in Paris.
So much curiosity was excited by the subject, that, about the same time,
a man named Holloway gave a course of lectures on animal magnetism in
London, at the rate of five guineas for each pupil, and realised a
considerable fortune. Loutherbourg the painter and his wife followed the
same profitable trade; and such was the infatuation of the people to be
witnesses of their strange manipulations, that at times upwards of three
thousand persons crowded around their house at Hammersmith, unable to
gain admission. The tickets sold at prices varying from one to three
guineas. Loutherbourg performed his cures by the touch, after the manner
of Valentine Greatraks, and finally pretended to a divine mission. An
account of his miracles, as they were called, was published in 1789, entitled
A List of New Cures performed by Mr. and Mrs. de Loutherbourg, of
Hammersmith Terrace, without Medicine; by a Lover of the Lamb of God.
Dedicated to his Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury.
This “Lover of the Lamb of God” was a half-crazy old woman, named
Mary Pratt, who conceived for Mr. and Mrs. de Loutherbourg a veneration
which almost prompted her to worship them. She chose for the motto of
her pamphlet a verse in the thirteenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles:
“Behold, ye despisers, and wonder and perish! for I will work a work in

your days which ye shall not believe, though a man declare it unto you.”
Attempting to give a religious character to the cures of the painter, she
thought a woman was the proper person to make them known, since the
apostle had declared that a man should not be able to conquer the
incredulity of the people. She stated, that from Christmas 1788 to July
1789, De Loutherbourg and his wife had cured two thousand people,
“having been made proper recipients to receive divine manuductions;
which heavenly and divine influx, coming from the radix God, his Divine
Majesty had most graciously bestowed upon them to diffuse healing to all,
be they deaf, dumb, blind, lame, or halt.”
In her dedication to the Archbishop of Canterbury she implored him to
compose a new form of prayer, to be used in all churches and chapels, that
nothing might impede this inestimable gift from having its due course. She
further entreated all the magistrates and men of authority in the land to
wait on Mr. and Mrs. de Loutherbourg, to consult with them on the
immediate erection of a large hospital, with a pool of Bethesda attached to
it. All the magnetisers were scandalised at the preposterous jabber of this
old woman, and De Loutherbourg appears to have left London to avoid her,
—continuing, however, in conjunction with his wife, the fantastic tricks
which had turned the brain of this poor fanatic, and deluded many others
who pretended to more sense than she had.
From this period until 1798 magnetism excited little or no attention in
England. An attempt to revive the belief in it was made in that year, but it
was in the shape of mineral rather than of animal magnetism. One
Benjamin Douglas Perkins, an American, practising as a surgeon in
Leicester Square, invented and took out a patent for the celebrated
“Metallic Tractors.” He pretended that these tractors, which were two small
pieces of metal strongly magnetised, something resembling the steel plates
which were first brought into notice by Father Hell, would cure gout,
rheumatism, palsy, and, in fact, almost every disease the human frame was
subject to, if applied externally to the afflicted part, and moved about

gently, touching the surface only. The most wonderful stories soon
obtained general circulation, and the press groaned with pamphlets, all
vaunting the curative effects of the tractors, which were sold at five guineas
the pair. Perkins gained money rapidly. Gouty subjects forgot their pains in
the presence of this new remedy; the rheumatism fled at its approach; and
toothache, which is often cured by the mere sight of a dentist, vanished
before Perkins and his marvellous steel-plates. The benevolent Society of
Friends, of whose body he was a member, warmly patronised the
invention. Desirous that the poor, who could not afford to pay Mr. Perkins
five guineas, or even five shillings for his tractors, should also share in the
benefits of that sublime discovery, they subscribed a large sum, and built
an hospital, called the “Perkinean Institution,” in which all comers might
be magnetised free of cost. In the course of a few months they were in very
general use, and their lucky inventor in possession of five thousand
pounds.
Dr. Haygarth, an eminent physician at Bath, recollecting the influence of
imagination in the cure of disease, hit upon an expedient to try the real
value of the tractors. Perkins’s cures were too well established to be
doubted; and Dr. Haygarth, without gain-saying them, quietly, but in the
face of numerous witnesses, exposed the delusion under which people
laboured with respect to the curative medium. He suggested to Dr.
Falconer that they should make wooden tractors, paint them to resemble
the steel ones, and see if the very same effects would not be produced. Five
patients were chosen from the hospital in Bath, upon whom to operate.
Four of them suffered severely from chronic rheumatism in the ankle,
knee, wrist, and hip; and the fifth had been afflicted for several months
with the gout. On the day appointed for the experiments Dr. Haygarth and
his friends assembled at the hospital, and with much solemnity brought
forth the fictitious tractors. Four out of the five patients said their pains
were immediately relieved; and three of them said they were not only
relieved but very much benefited. One felt his knee warmer, and said he

could walk across the room. He tried and succeeded, although on the
previous day he had not been able to stir. The gouty man felt his pains
diminish rapidly, and was quite easy for nine hours, until he went to bed,
when the twitching began again. On the following day the real tractors were
applied to all the patients, when they described their symptoms in nearly
the same terms.
To make still more sure, the experiment was tried in the Bristol
infirmary, a few weeks afterwards, on a man who had a rheumatic affection
in the shoulder, so severe as to incapacitate him from lifting his hand from
his knee. The fictitious tractors were brought and applied to the afflicted
part, one of the physicians, to add solemnity to the scene, drawing a stopwatch from his pocket to calculate the time exactly, while another, with a
pen in his hand, sat down to write the change of symptoms from minute to
minute as they occurred. In less than four minutes the man felt so much
relieved, that he lifted his hand several inches without any pain in the
shoulder!
An account of these matters was published by Dr. Haygarth, in a small
volume entitled, Of the Imagination, as a Cause and Cure of Disorders,
exemplified by fictitious Tractors. The exposure was a coup de grace to the
system of Mr. Perkins. His friends and patrons, still unwilling to confess
that they had been deceived, tried the tractors upon sheep, cows, and
horses, alleging that the animals received benefit from the metallic plates,
but none at all from the wooden ones. But they found nobody to believe
them; the Perkinean institution fell into neglect; and Perkins made his exit
from England, carrying with him about ten thousand pounds, to soothe his
declining years in the good city of Pennsylvania.
Thus was magnetism laughed out of England for a time. In France the
revolution left men no leisure for studying it. The Sociétés de l’Harmonie of
Strasbourg, and other great towns lingered for a while, till sterner matters
occupying men’s attention, they were one after the other abandoned, both
by pupils and professors. The system, thus driven from the first two

nations of Europe, took refuge among the dreamy philosophers of
Germany. There the wonders of the magnetic sleep grew more and more
wonderful every day; the patients acquired the gift of prophecy; their vision
extended over all the surface of the globe; they could hear and see with
their toes and fingers, and read unknown languages, and understand them
too, by merely having the book placed on their stomachs. Ignorant
peasants, when once entranced by the grand mesmeric fluid, could spout
philosophy diviner than Plato ever wrote, descant upon the mysteries of
the mind with more eloquence and truth than the profoundest
metaphysicians the world ever saw, and solve knotty points of divinity with
as much ease as waking men could undo their shoe-buckles!
During the first twelve years of the present century little was heard of
animal magnetism in any country of Europe. Even the Germans forgot
their airy fancies, recalled to the knowledge of this every-day world by the
roar of Napoleon’s cannon and the fall or the establishment of kingdoms.
During this period a cloud of obscurity hung over the science, which was
not dispersed until M. Deleuze published, in 1813, his Histoire Critique du
Magnétisme Animal. This work gave a new impulse to the half-forgotten
fancy. Newspapers, pamphlets, and books again waged war upon each
other on the question of its truth or falsehood; and many eminent men in
the profession of medicine recommenced inquiry with an earnest design to
discover the truth.
The assertions made in the celebrated treatise of Deleuze are thus
summed up: 75 “There is a fluid continually escaping from the human
body,” and “forming an atmosphere around us,” which, as “it has no
determined current,” produces no sensible effects on surrounding
individuals. It is, however, “capable of being directed by the will;” and,
when so directed, “is sent forth in currents,” with a force corresponding to
the energy we possess. Its motion is “similar to that of the rays from
burning bodies;” “it possesses different qualities in different individuals.” It
is capable of a high degree of concentration, “and exists also in trees.” The

will of the magnetiser, “guided by a motion of the hand, several times
repeated in the same direction,” can fill a tree with this fluid. Most persons,
when this fluid is poured into them from the body and by the will of the
magnetiser, “feel a sensation of heat or cold” when he passes his hand
before them, without even touching them. Some persons, when sufficiently
charged with this fluid, fall into a state of somnambulism, or magnetic
ecstasy; and when in this state, “they see the fluid encircling the magnetiser
like a halo of light, and issuing in luminous streams from his mouth and
nostrils, his head and hands, possessing a very agreeable smell, and
communicating a particular taste to food and water.”
One would think that these “notions” were quite enough to be insisted
upon by any physician who wished to be considered sane; but they form
only a small portion of the wondrous things related by M. Deleuze. He
further said, “When magnetism produces somnambulism, the person who
is in this state acquires a prodigious extension of all his faculties. Several of
his external organs, especially those of sight and hearing, become inactive;
but the sensations which depend upon them take place internally. Seeing
and hearing are carried on by the magnetic fluid, which transmits the
impressions immediately, and without the intervention of any nerves or
organs directly to the brain. Thus the somnambulist, though his eyes and
ears are closed, not only sees and hears, but sees and hears much better
than he does when awake. In all things he feels the will of the magnetiser,
although that will be not expressed. He sees into the interior of his own
body, and the most secret organisation of the bodies of all those who may
be put en rapport, or in magnetic connexion, with him. Most commonly,
he only sees those parts which are diseased and disordered, and intuitively
prescribes a remedy for them. He has prophetic visions and sensations,
which are generally true, but sometimes erroneous. He expresses himself
with astonishing eloquence and facility. He is not free from vanity. He
becomes a more perfect being of his own accord for a certain time, if
guided wisely by the magnetiser, but wanders if he is ill-directed.”

According to M. Deleuze, any person could become a magnetiser and
produce these effects, by conforming to the following conditions, and
acting upon the following rules:
“Forget for a while all your knowledge of physics and metaphysics.
“Remove from your mind all objections that may occur.
“Imagine that it is in your power to take the malady in hand, and
throw it on one side.
“Never reason for six weeks after you have commenced the study.
“Have an active desire to do good; a firm belief in the power of
magnetism, and an entire confidence in employing it. In short, repel
all doubts; desire success, and act with simplicity and attention.”
That is to say, “be very credulous; be very persevering; reject all past
experience, and do not listen to reason,” and you are a magnetiser after M.
Deleuze’s own heart.
Having brought yourself into this edifying state, “remove from the
patient all persons who might be troublesome to you; keep with you only
the necessary witnesses—a single person if need be; desire them not to
occupy themselves in any way with the processes you employ and the
effects which result from them, but to join with you in the desire of doing
good to your patient. Arrange yourself so as neither to be too hot nor too
cold, and in such a manner that nothing may obstruct the freedom of your
motions; and take precautions to prevent interruption during the sitting.
Make your patient then sit as commodiously as possible, and place yourself
opposite to him, on a seat a little more elevated, in such a manner that his
knees may be betwixt yours, and your feet at the side of his. First, request
him to resign himself; to think of nothing; not to perplex himself by
examining the effects which may be produced; to banish all fear; to
surrender himself to hope, and not to be disturbed or discouraged if the
action of magnetism should cause in him momentary pains. After having

collected yourself, take his thumbs between your fingers in such a way that
the internal part of your thumbs may be in contact with the internal part of
his, and then fix your eyes upon him! You must remain from two to five
minutes in this situation, or until you feel an equal heat between your
thumbs and his. This done, you will withdraw your hands, removing them
to the right and left; and at the same time turning them till their internal
surface be outwards, and you will raise them to the height of the head. You
will now place them upon the two shoulders, and let them remain there
about a minute; afterwards drawing them gently along the arms to the
extremities of the fingers, touching very slightly as you go. You will renew
this pass five or six times, always turning your hands, and removing them a
little from the body before you lift them. You will then place them above
the head; and after holding them there for an instant, lower them, passing
them before the face, at the distance of one or two inches, down to the pit
of the stomach. There you will stop them two minutes also, putting your
thumbs upon the pit of the stomach and the rest of your fingers below the
ribs. You will then descend slowly along the body to the knees, or rather, if
you can do so without deranging yourself, to the extremity of the feet. You
will repeat the same processes several times during the remainder of the
sitting. You will also occasionally approach your patient, so as to place your
hands behind his shoulders, in order to descend slowly along the spine of
the back and the thighs, down to the knees or the feet. After the first
passes, you may dispense with putting your hands upon the head, and may
make the subsequent passes upon the arms, beginning at the shoulders,
and upon the body, beginning at the stomach.”
Such was the process of magnetising recommended by Deleuze. That
delicate, fanciful, and nervous women, when subjected to it, should have
worked themselves into convulsions will be readily believed by the
sturdiest opponent of animal magnetism. To sit in a constrained posture—
be stared out of countenance by a fellow who enclosed her knees between
his, while he made passes upon different parts of her body, was quite

enough to throw any weak woman into a fit, especially if she were
predisposed to hysteria, and believed in the efficacy of the treatment. It is
just as evident that those of stronger minds and healthier bodies should be
sent to sleep by the process. That these effects have been produced by these
means, there are thousands of instances to shew. But are they testimony in
favour of animal magnetism?—do they prove the existence of the magnetic
fluid? It needs neither magnetism, nor ghost from the grave, to tell us that
silence, monotony, and long recumbency in one position, must produce
sleep; or that excitement, imitation, and a strong imagination acting upon
a weak body, will bring on convulsions.
M. Deleuze’s book produced quite a sensation in France; the study was
resumed with redoubled vigour. In the following year, a journal was
established devoted exclusively to the science, under the title of Annales du
Magnétisme Animal; and shortly afterwards appeared the Bibliothèque du
Magnétisme Animal, and many others. About the same time, the Abbé
Faria, “the man of wonders,” began to magnetise; and the belief being that
he had more of the mesmeric fluid about him, and a stronger will, than
most men, he was very successful in his treatment. His experiments afford
a convincing proof that imagination can operate all, and the supposed fluid
none, of the results so confidently claimed as evidence of the new science.
He placed his patients in an arm-chair; told them to shut their eyes; and
then, in a loud commanding voice, pronounced the single word, “Sleep!”
He used no manipulations whatever—had no baquet, or conductor of the
fluid; but he nevertheless succeeded in causing sleep in hundreds of
patients. He boasted of having in his time produced five thousand
somnambulists by this method. It was often necessary to repeat the
command three or four times; and if the patient still remained awake, the
abbé got out of the difficulty by dismissing him from the chair, and
declaring that he was incapable of being acted on. And it should be
especially remarked that the magnetisers do not lay claim to universal
efficacy for their fluid; the strong and the healthy cannot be magnetised;

the incredulous cannot be magnetised; those who reason upon it cannot be
magnetised; those who firmly believe in it can be magnetised; the weak in
body can be magnetised, and the weak in mind can be magnetised. And
lest, from some cause or other, individuals of the latter classes should resist
the magnetic charm, the apostles of the science declare that there are times
when even they cannot be acted upon; the presence of one scorner or
unbeliever may weaken the potency of the fluid and destroy its efficacy. In
M. Deleuze’s instructions to a magnetiser, he expressly says, “Never
magnetise before inquisitive persons!” 76
Here we conclude the subject, as it would serve no good purpose to
extend to greater length the history of Animal Magnetism; especially at a
time when many phenomena, the reality of which it is impossible to
dispute, are daily occurring to startle and perplex the most learned,
impartial, and truth-loving of mankind. Enough, however, has been stated
to shew, that if there be some truth in magnetism, there has been much
error, misconception, and exaggeration. Taking its history from the
commencement, it can hardly be said to have been without its uses. To
quote the words of Bailly, in 1784, “Magnetism has not been altogether
unavailing to the philosophy which condemns it: it is an additional fact to
record among the errors of the human mind, and a great experiment on the
strength of the imagination.” Over that vast inquiry of the influence of
mind over matter,—an inquiry which the embodied intellect of mankind
will never be able to fathom completely,—it will at least have thrown a
feeble and imperfect light. It will have afforded an additional proof of the
strength of the unconquerable will, and the weakness of matter as
compared with it; another illustration of the words of the inspired
Psalmist, that “we are fearfully and wonderfully made.”

INFLUENCE OF POLITICS AND RELIGION
ON THE

HAIR AND BEARD.

Speak with respect and honour
Both of the beard and the beard’s owner.
Hudibras.

THE famous declaration of St. Paul, “that long hair was a shame unto a
man,” has been made the pretext for many singular enactments, both of
civil and ecclesiastical governments. The fashion of the hair and the cut of
the beard were state questions in France and England, from the
establishment of Christianity until the fifteenth century.
We find, too, that in much earlier times, men were not permitted to do as
they liked with their own hair. Alexander the Great thought that the beards
of the soldiery afforded convenient handles for the enemy to lay hold of,
preparatory to cutting off their heads; and, with a view of depriving them of
this advantage, he ordered the whole of his army to be closely shaven. His
notions of courtesy towards an enemy were quite different from those
entertained by the North American Indians, and amongst whom it is held a
point of honour to allow one “chivalrous lock” to grow, that the foe, in
taking the scalp, may have something to catch hold of.
At one time, long hair was the symbol of sovereignty in Europe. We learn
from Gregory of Tours, that, among the successors of Clovis, it was the
exclusive privilege of the royal family to have their hair long and curled.
The nobles, equal to kings in power, would not shew any inferiority in this
respect, and wore not only their hair, but their beards of an enormous

length. This fashion lasted, with but slight changes, till the time of Louis
the Debonnaire; but his successors, up to Hugh Capet, wore their hair
short, by way of distinction. Even the serfs had set all regulation at
defiance, and allowed their locks and beards to grow.
At the time of the invasion of England by William the Conqueror, the
Normans wore their hair very short. Harold, in his progress towards
Hastings, sent forward spies to view the strength and number of the
enemy. They reported, amongst other things, on their return, that “the host
did almost seem to be priests, because they had all their face and both their
lips shaven.” The fashion among the English at the time was to wear the
hair long upon the head and the upper lip, but to shave the chin. When the
haughty victors had divided the broad lands of the Saxon thanes and
franklins among them, when tyranny of every kind was employed to make
the English feel that they were indeed a subdued and broken nation, the
latter encouraged the growth of their hair, that they might resemble as
little as possible their cropped and shaven masters.
This fashion was exceedingly displeasing to the clergy, and prevailed to a
considerable extent in France and Germany. Towards the end of the
eleventh century, it was decreed by the pope, and zealously supported by
the ecclesiastical authorities all over Europe, that such persons as wore
long hair should be excommunicated while living, and not be prayed for
when dead. William of Malmesbury relates, that the famous St. Wulstan,
Bishop of Worcester, was peculiarly indignant whenever he saw a man with
long hair. He declaimed against the practice as one highly immoral,
criminal, and beastly. He continually carried a small knife in his pocket,
and whenever any body offending in this respect knelt before him to
receive his blessing, he would whip it out slily, and cut off a handful, and
then, throwing it in his face, tell him to cut off all the rest, or he would go to
hell.
But fashion, which at times it is possible to move with a wisp, stands firm
against a lever; and men preferred to run the risk of damnation to parting

with the superfluity of their hair. In the time of Henry I., Anselm,
Archbishop of Canterbury, found it necessary to republish the famous
decree of excommunication and outlawry against the offenders; but, as the
court itself had begun to patronise curls, the fulminations of the Church
were unavailing. Henry I. and his nobles wore their hair in long ringlets
down their backs and shoulders, and became a scandalum magnatum in
the eyes of the godly. One Serlo, the king’s chaplain, was so grieved in spirit
at the impiety of his master, that he preached a sermon from the wellknown text of St. Paul before the assembled court, in which he drew so
dreadful a picture of the torments that awaited them in the other world,
that several of them burst into tears, and wrung their hair, as if they would
have pulled it out by the roots. Henry himself was observed to weep. The
priest, seeing the impression he had made, determined to strike while the
iron was hot, and pulling a pair of scissors from his pocket, cut the king’s
hair in presence of them all. Several of the principal courtiers consented to
do the like, and for a short time long hair appeared to be going out of
fashion. But the courtiers thought, after the first glow of their penitence
had been cooled by reflection, that the clerical Delilah had shorn them of
their strength, and in less than six months they were as great sinners as
ever.
Anselm, the Archbishop of Canterbury, who had been a monk of Bec, in
Normandy, and who had signalised himself at Rouen by his fierce
opposition to long hair, was still anxious to work a reformation in this
matter. But his pertinacity was far from pleasing to the king, who had
finally made up his mind to wear ringlets. There were other disputes, of a
more serious nature, between them; so that when the archbishop died, the
king was so glad to be rid of him, that he allowed the see to remain vacant
for five years. Still the cause had other advocates, and every pulpit in the
land resounded with anathemas against that disobedient and long-haired
generation. But all was of no avail. Stowe, in writing of this period, asserts,
on the authority of some more ancient chronicler, “that men, forgetting

their birth, transformed themselves, by the length of their haires, into the
semblance of woman kind;” and that when their hair decayed from age, or
other causes, “they knit about their heads certain rolls and braidings of
false hair.” At last accident turned the tide of fashion. A knight of the court,
who was exceedingly proud of his beauteous locks, dreamed one night that,
as he lay in bed, the devil sprang upon him, and endeavoured to choke him
with his own hair. He started in affright, and actually found that he had a
great quantity of hair in his mouth. Sorely stricken in conscience, and
looking upon the dream as a warning from heaven, he set about the work of
reformation, and cut off his luxuriant tresses the same night. The story was
soon bruited abroad; of course it was made the most of by the clergy, and
the knight, being a man of influence and consideration, and the
acknowledged leader of the fashion, his example, aided by priestly
exhortations, was very generally imitated. Men appeared almost as decent
as St. Wulstan himself could have wished, the dream of a dandy having
proved more efficacious than the entreaties of a saint. But, as Stowe
informs us, “scarcely was one year past, when all that thought themselves
courtiers fell into the former vice, and contended with women in their long
haires.” Henry, the king, appears to have been quite uninfluenced by the
dreams of others, for even his own would not induce him a second time to
undergo a cropping from priestly shears. It is said, that he was much
troubled at this time by disagreeable visions. Having offended the Church
in this and other respects, he could get no sound, refreshing sleep, and
used to imagine that he saw all the bishops, abbots, and monks of every
degree, standing around his bed-side, and threatening to belabour him
with their pastoral staves; which sight, we are told, so frightened him, that
he often started naked out of his bed, and attacked the phantoms sword in
hand. Grimbalde, his physician, who, like most of his fraternity at that day,
was an ecclesiastic, never hinted that his dreams were the result of a bad
digestion, but told him to shave his head, be reconciled to the Church, and
reform himself with alms and prayer. But he would not take this good

advice, and it was not until he had been nearly drowned a year afterwards,
in a violent storm at sea, that he repented of his evil ways, cut his hair
short, and paid proper deference to the wishes of the clergy.
In France, the thunders of the Vatican with regard to long curly hair
were hardly more respected than in England. Louis VII., however, was
more obedient than his brother-king, and cropped himself as closely as a
monk, to the great sorrow of all the gallants of his court. His queen, the
gay, haughty, and pleasure-seeking Eleanor of Guienne, never admired him
in this trim, and continually reproached him with imitating, not only the
head-dress, but the asceticism of the monks. From this cause a coldness
arose between them. The lady proving at last unfaithful to her shaven and
indifferent lord, they were divorced, and the kings of France lost the rich
provinces of Guienne and Poitou, which were her dowry. She soon after
bestowed her hand and her possessions upon Henry Duke of Normandy,
afterwards Henry II. of England, and thus gave the English sovereigns that
strong footing in France which was for so many centuries the cause of such
long and bloody wars between the nations. When the Crusades had drawn
all the smart young fellows into Palestine, the clergy did not find it so
difficult to convince the staid burghers who remained in Europe, of the
enormity of long hair. During the absence of Richard Cœur de Lion, his
English subjects not only cut their hair close, but shaved their faces.
William Fitz-osbert, or Long-beard, the great demagogue of that day,
reintroduced among the people who claimed to be of Saxon origin the
fashion of long hair. He did this with the view of making them as unlike as
possible to the citizens and the Normans. He wore his own beard hanging
down to his waist, from whence the name by which he is best known to
posterity.
The Church never shewed itself so great an enemy to the beard as to long
hair on the head. It generally allowed fashion to take its own course, both
with regard to the chin and the upper lip. This fashion varied continually;
for we find that, in little more than a century after the time of Richard I.,

when beards were short, that they had again become so long as to be
mentioned in the famous epigram made by the Scots who visited London in
1327, when David, son of Robert Bruce, was married to Joan, the sister of
King Edward. This epigram, which was stuck on the church-door of St.
Peter Stangate, ran as follows:
“Long beards heartlesse,
Painted hoods witlesse,
Gray coats gracelesse,
Make England thriftlesse.”
When the Emperor Charles V. ascended the throne of Spain he had no
beard. It was not to be expected that the obsequious parasites who always
surround a monarch, could presume to look more virile than their master.
Immediately all the courtiers appeared beardless, with the exception of
such few grave old men as had outgrown the influence of fashion, and who
had determined to die bearded as they had lived. Sober people in general
saw this revolution with sorrow and alarm, and thought that every manly
virtue would be banished with the beard. It became at the time a common
saying,—
“Desde que no hay barba, no hay mas alma.”
We have no longer souls since we have lost our beards.
In France also the beard fell into disrepute after the death of Henry IV.,
from the mere reason that his successor was too young to have one. Some
of the more immediate friends of the great Béarnais, and his minister Sully
among the rest, refused to part with their beards, notwithstanding the jeers
of the new generation.
Who does not remember the division of England into the two great
parties of Roundheads and Cavaliers? In those days every species of vice

and iniquity was thought by the Puritans to lurk in the long curly tresses of
the monarchists, while the latter imagined that their opponents were as
destitute of wit, of wisdom, and of virtue, as they were of hair. A man’s
locks were the symbol of his creed, both in politics and religion. The more
abundant the hair, the more scant the faith; and the balder the head, the
more sincere the piety.

PETER THE GREAT.

But among all the instances of the interference of governments with
men’s hair, the most extraordinary, not only for its daring, but for its
success, is that of Peter the Great, in 1705. By this time fashion had
condemned the beard in every other country in Europe, and with a voice
more potent than popes or emperors, had banished it from civilised
society. But this only made the Russians cling more fondly to their ancient
ornament, as a mark to distinguish them from foreigners, whom they
hated. Peter, however, resolved that they should be shaven. If he had been
a man deeply read in history, he might have hesitated before he attempted
so despotic an attack upon the time-hallowed customs and prejudices of his
countrymen; but he was not. He did not know or consider the danger of the
innovation; he only listened to the promptings of his own indomitable will,
and his fiat went forth, that not only the army, but all ranks of citizens,
from the nobles to the serfs, should shave their beards. A certain time was
given, that people might get over the first throes of their repugnance, after
which every man who chose to retain his beard was to pay a tax of one
hundred roubles. The priests and the serfs were put on a lower footing, and

allowed to retain theirs upon payment of a copeck every time they passed
the gate of a city. Great discontent existed in consequence, but the dreadful
fate of the Strelitzes was too recent to be forgotten, and thousands who had
the will had not the courage to revolt. As is well remarked by a writer in the
Encyclopædia Britannica, they thought it wiser to cut off their beards than
to run the risk of incensing a man who would make no scruple in cutting
off their heads. Wiser, too, than the popes and bishops of a former age, he
did not threaten them with eternal damnation, but made them pay in hard
cash the penalty of their disobedience. For many years, a very considerable
revenue was collected from this source. The collectors gave in receipt for its
payment a small copper coin, struck expressly for the purpose, and called
the “borodováia,” or “the bearded.” On one side it bore the figure of a nose,
mouth, and moustaches, with a long bushy beard, surmounted by the
words, “Deuyee Vyeatee,” “money received;” the whole encircled by a
wreath, and stamped with the black eagle of Russia. On the reverse, it bore
the date of the year. Every man who chose to wear a beard was obliged to
produce this receipt on his entry into a town. Those who were refractory,
and refused to pay the tax, were thrown into prison.
Since that day, the rulers of modern Europe have endeavoured to
persuade, rather than to force, in all matters pertaining to fashion. The
Vatican troubles itself no more about beards or ringlets, and men may
become hairy as bears, if such is their fancy, without fear of
excommunication or deprivation of their political rights. Folly has taken a
new start, and cultivates the moustache.
Even upon this point governments will not let men alone. Religion as yet
has not meddled with it; but perhaps it will; and politics already influence
it considerably. Before the revolution of 1830, neither the French nor
Belgian citizens were remarkable for their moustaches; but, after that
event, there was hardly a shopkeeper either in Paris or Brussels whose
upper lip did not suddenly become hairy with real or mock moustaches.
During a temporary triumph gained by the Dutch soldiers over the citizens

of Louvain, in October 1830, it became a standing joke against the patriots,
that they shaved their faces clean immediately; and the wits of the Dutch
army asserted that they had gathered moustaches enough from the
denuded lips of the Belgians to stuff mattresses for all the sick and
wounded in their hospital.
The last folly of this kind is still more recent. In the German newspapers,
of August 1838, appeared an ordonnance, signed by the king of Bavaria,
forbidding civilians, on any pretence whatever, to wear moustaches, and
commanding the police and other authorities to arrest, and cause to be
shaved, the offending parties. “Strange to say,” adds Le Droit, the journal
from which this account is taken, “moustaches disappeared immediately,
like leaves from the trees in autumn; every body made haste to obey the
royal order, and not one person was arrested.”
The king of Bavaria, a rhymester of some celebrity, has taken a good
many poetical licences in his time. His licence in this matter appears
neither poetical nor reasonable. It is to be hoped that he will not take it into
his royal head to make his subjects shave theirs; nothing but that is
wanting to complete their degradation.
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Footnotes
1.

Miss Elizabeth Villiers, afterwards Countess of Orkney.
Return

2.

The wits of the day called it a sand-bank, which would wreck the vessel
of the state.
Return

3.

This anecdote, which is related in the correspondence of Madame de
Bavière, Duchess of Orleans and mother of the Regent, is discredited by
Lord John Russell in his History of the principal States of Europe from
the Peace of Utrecht; for what reason he does not inform us. There is no
doubt that Law proposed his scheme to Desmarets, and that Louis
refused to hear of it. The reason given for the refusal is quite consistent
with the character of that bigoted and tyrannical monarch.
Return

4.

From maltôte, an oppressive tax.
Return

5.

This anecdote is related by M. de la Hode, in his Life of Philippe of
Orleans. It would have looked more authentic if he had given the names
of the dishonest contractor and the still more dishonest minister. But M.
de la Hode’s book is liable to the same objection as most of the French
memoirs of that and of subsequent periods. It is sufficient with most of
them that an anecdote be ben trovato; the vero is but matter of secondary
consideration.
Return

6.

The French pronounced his name in this manner to avoid the ungallic
sound, aw. After the failure of his scheme, the wags said the nation was
lasse de lui, and proposed that he should in future be known by the name
of Monsieur Helas!
Return

7.

The curious reader may find an anecdote of the eagerness of the French
ladies to retain Law in their company, which will make him blush or smile
according as he happens to be very modest or the reverse. It is related in
the Letters of Madame Charlotte Elizabeth de Bavière, Duchess of
Orleans, vol. ii. p. 274.
Return

8.

The following squib was circulated on the occasion:
“Foin de ton zèle séraphique,
Malheureux Abbé de Tencin,
Depuis que Law est Catholique,
Tout le royaume est Capucin!”
Thus somewhat weakly and paraphrastically rendered by Justandsond,
in his translation of the Memoirs of Louis XV.:
“Tencin, a curse on thy seraphic zeal,
Which by persuasion hath contrived the means
To make the Scotchman at our altars kneel,
Since which we all are poor as Capucines!”
Return

9.

From a print in a Dutch collection of satirical prints relating to the
Mississippi Mania, entitled “Het groote Tafereel der Dwaasheid;” or, The
great picture of Folly. The print of Atlas is styled, “L’Atlas actieux de
Papier.” Law is calling in Hercules to aid him in supporting the globe.
Quoted in Wright’s England under the House of Hanover.
Return

10.

The Duke de la Force gained considerable sums, not only by jobbing in
the stocks, but in dealing in porcelain, spices, &c. It was debated for a
length of time in the parliament of Paris whether he had not, in his
quality of spice-merchant, forfeited his rank in the peerage. It was

decided in the negative. A caricature of him was made, dressed as a
street-porter, carrying a large bale of spices on his back, with the
inscription, “Admirez LA FORCE.”
Return
11.

“Lucifer’s New Row-Barge” exhibits Law in a barge, with a host of
emblematic figures representing the Mississippi follies.—From a Print in
Mr. Hawkins’ Collection.
Return

12.

Duclos, Memoires Secrets de la Régence.
Return

13.

The Duchess of Orleans gives a different version of this story; but
whichever be the true one, the manifestation of such feeling in a
legislative assembly was not very creditable. She says that the president
was so transported with joy, that he was seized with a rhyming fit, and,
returning into the hall, exclaimed to the members:
“Messieurs! Messieurs! bonne nouvelle!
Le carrosse de Lass est reduit en cannelle!”
Return

14.

Law in a car drawn by cocks; from Het groote Tofereel der Dwaasheid.
Return

15.

Neck or nothing, or downfall of the Mississippi Company.—From a
Print in Mr. Hawkins’ Collection.
Return

16.

A South-Sea Ballad; or, Merry Remarks upon Exchange-Alley
Bubbles. To a new Tune called “The Grand Elixir; or, the Philosopher’s
Stone discovered.”
Return

17.

Coxe’s Walpole, Correspondence between Mr. Secretary Craggs and
Earl Stanhope.
Return

18.

Stock-jobbing Card, or the humours of Change Alley. Copied from a
print called Bubblers’ Medley, published by Carrington Bowles.

Return
19.

Tree, surrounded by water; people climbing up the tree. One of a series
of bubble cards, copied from the Bubblers’ Medley, published by
Carrington Bowles.
Return

20.

Gay (the poet), in that disastrous year, had a present from young
Craggs of some South-Sea stock, and once supposed himself to be master
of twenty thousand pounds. His friends persuaded him to sell his share,
but he dreamed of dignity and splendour, and could not hear to obstruct
his own fortune. He was then importuned to sell as much as would
purchase a hundred a year for life, “which,” says Fenton, “will make you
sure of a clean shirt and a shoulder of mutton every day.” This counsel
was rejected; the profit and principal were lost, and Gay sunk under the
calamity so low that his life became in danger.—Johnson’s Lives of the
Poets
Return

21.

Smollett.
Return

22.

Caricature, copied from Bubblers’ Medley, published by Carrington
Bowles.
Return

23.

Britannia stript by a South-Sea Director. From Het groote Tafereel der
Dwaasheid.
Return

24.

“‘God cannot love,’ says Blunt, with tearless eyes,
‘The wretch he starves, and piously denies.’ …
Much-injur’d Blunt! why bears he Britain’s hate?
A wizard told him in these words our fate:
‘At length corruption, like a gen’ral flood,
So long by watchful ministers withstood,
Shall deluge all; and av’rice, creeping on,
Spread like a low-born mist, and blot the sun;
Statesman and patriot ply alike the stocks,
Peeress and butler share alike the box,

And judges job, and bishops bite the Town,
And mighty dukes pack cards for half-a-crown:
See Britain sunk in Lucre’s forbid charms,
And France reveng’d of Ann’s and Edward’s arms!’
’Twas no court-badge, great Scriv’ner! fir’d thy brain,
Nor lordly luxury, nor city gain:
No, ’twas thy righteous end, asham’d to see
Senates degen’rate, patriots disagree,
And nobly wishing party-rage to cease,
To buy both sides, and give thy country peace.”
Pope’s Epistle to Allen Lord Bathurst.
Return
25.

The Brabant Screen. This caricature represents the Duchess of Kendal
behind the “Brabant Screen,” supplying Mr. Knight with money to
facilitate his escape; and is copied from a rare print of the time, in the
collection of E. Hawkins, Esq. F.S.A.
Return

26.

Emblematic print of the South-Sea Scheme. By W. Hogarth.
Return

27.

The South-Sea project remained until 1845 the greatest example in
British history of the infatuation of the people for commercial gambling.
The first edition of these volumes was published some time before the
outbreak of the Great Railway Mania of that and the following year.
Return

28.

Biographie Universelle.
Return

29.

His sum “of perfection,” or instructions to students to aid them in the
laborious search for the stone and elixir, has been translated into most of
the languages of Europe. An English translation, by a great enthusiast in
alchymy, one Richard Russell, was published in London in 1686. The
preface is dated eight years previously from the house of the alchymist,
“at the Star, in Newmarket, in Wapping, near the Dock.” His design in
undertaking the translation was, as he informs us, to expose the false

pretences of the many ignorant pretenders to the science who abounded
in his day.
Return
30.

Article, Geber, Biographie Universelle.
Return

31.

Naudé, Apologie des Grands Hommes accusés de Magie, chap. xviii.
Return

32.

Lenglet, Histoire de la Philosophie Hermétique. See also Godwin’s
Lives of the Necromancers.
Return

33.

Naudé, Apologie des Grands Hommes accusés de Magie, chap. xvii.
Return

34.

Vidimus omnia ista dum ad Angliam transiimus,
intercessionem domini Regis Edoardi illustrissimi.
Return

35.

Converti una vice in aurum ad L millia pondo argenti vivi, plumbi, et
stanni.—Lullii Testamentum.
Return

36.

These verses are but a coarser expression of the slanderous line of
Pope, that “every woman is at heart a rake.”
Return

37.

Fuller’s Worthies of England.
Return

38.

Biographie Universelle.
Return

39.

For full details of this extraordinary trial, see Lobineau’s Nouvelle
Histoire de Bretagne, and D’Argentré’s work on the same subject. The
character and life of Gilles de Rays are believed to have suggested the
famous Blue Beard of the nursery tale.
Return

propter

40.

See the article “Paracelsus,” by the learned Renaudin, in the
Biographie Universelle.
Return

41.

The “crystal” alluded to appears to have been a black stone, or piece of
polished coal. The following account of it is given, in the supplement to
Granger’s Biographical History. “The black stone into which Dee used to
call his spirits was in the collection of the Earls of Peterborough, from
whence it came to Lady Elizabeth Germaine. It was next the property of
the late Duke of Argyle, and is now Mr. Walpole’s. It appears upon
examination to be nothing more than a polished piece of cannel coal; but
this is what Butler means when he says,
‘Kelly did all his feats upon
The devil’s looking-glass—a stone.’”
Return

42.

Lilly the astrologer, in his Life, written by himself, frequently tells of
prophecies delivered by the angels in a manner similar to the angels of
Dr. Dee. He says, “The prophecies were not given vocally by the angels,
but by inspection of the crystal in types and figures, or by apparition the
circular way; where, at some distance, the angels appear, representing by
forms, shapes, and creatures, what is demanded. It is very rare, yea even
in our days,” quoth that wiseacre, “for any operator or master to hear the
angels speak articulately: when they do speak, it is like, the Irish, much in
the throat!”
Return

43.

Albert Laski, son of Jaroslav, was Palatine of Siradz, and afterwards of
Sendomir, and chiefly contributed to the election of Henry of Valois, the
Third of France, to the throne of Poland, and was one of the delegates
who went to France in order to announce to the new monarch his
elevation to the sovereignty of Poland. After the deposition of Henry,
Albert Laski voted for Maximilian of Austria. In 1583 he visited England,
when Queen Elizabeth received him with great distinction. The honours
which were shewn him during his visit to Oxford, by the especial
command of the Queen, were equal to those rendered to sovereign
princes. His extraordinary prodigality rendered his enormous wealth
insufficient to defray his expenses, and he therefore became a zealous

adept in alchymy, and took from England to Poland with him two known
alchymists.—Count Valerian Krasinski’s Historical Sketch of the
Reformation in Poland.
Return
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The following legend of the tomb of Rosencreutz, written by Eustace
Budgell, appears in No. 379 of the Spectator:—“A certain person, having
occasion to dig somewhat deep in the ground where this philosopher lay
interred, met with a small door, having a wall on each side of it. His
curiosity, and the hope of finding some hidden treasure, soon prompted
him to force open the door. He was immediately surprised by a sudden
blaze of light, and discovered a very fair vault. At the upper end of it was a
statue of a man in armour, sitting by a table, and leaning on his left arm.
He held a truncheon in his right hand, and had a lamp burning before
him. The man had no sooner set one foot within the vault, than the
statue, erecting itself from its leaning posture, stood bolt upright; and,
upon the fellow’s advancing another step, lifted up the truncheon in his
right hand. The man still ventured a third step; when the statue, with a
furious blow, broke the lamp into a thousand pieces, and left his guest in
sudden darkness. Upon the report of this adventure, the country people
came with lights to the sepulchre, and discovered that the statue, which
was made of brass, was nothing more than a piece of clock-work; that the
floor of the vault was all loose, and underlaid with several springs, which,
upon any man’s entering, naturally produced that which had happened.
“Rosicreucius, say his disciples, made use of this method to shew the
world that he had re-invented the ever-burning lamps of the ancients,
though he was resolved no one should reap any advantage from the
discovery.”
Return
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No. 574. Friday, July 30th, 1714.
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46.

“Vitulus Aureus quem Mundus adorat et orat, in quo tractatur de
naturæ miraculo transmutandi metalla.” Hagæ, 1667.
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Voyages de Monconis, tome ii. p. 379.
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See the Abbé Fiard, and Anecdotes of the Reign of Louis XVI. p. 400.
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Biographie des Contemporains, article “Cagliostro.” See also Histoire
de la Magie en France, par M. Jules Garinet, p. 284.
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The enemies of the unfortunate Queen of France, when the progress of
the Revolution embittered their animosity against her, maintained that
she was really a party in this transaction; that she, and not Mademoiselle
D’Oliva, met the cardinal and rewarded him with the flower; and that the
story above related was merely concocted between her La Motte, and
others to cheat the jeweller of his 1,600,000 francs.
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See Gibbon and Voltaire for further notice of this subject.
Return

52.

Charlemagne: Poëme épique par Lucien Buonaparte.
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This prophecy seems to have been that set forth at length in the
popular Life of Mother Shipton:
“When fate to England shall restore
A king to reign as heretofore,
Great death in London shall be though,
And many houses be laid low.”
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The London Saturday Journal of March 12th, 1842, contains the
following:—“An absurd report is gaining ground among the weakminded, that London will be destroyed by an earthquake on the 17th of
March, or St. Patrick’s day. This rumour is founded on the following
ancient prophecies: one professing to be pronounced in the year 1203; the
other, by Dr. Dee the astrologer, in 1598:
“In eighteen hundred and forty-two
Four things the sun shall view;
London’s rich and famous town

Hungry earth shall swallow down.
Storm and rain in France shall be,
Till every river runs a sea.
Spain shall be rent in twain,
And famine waste the land again.
So say I, the Monk of Dree,
In the twelve hundredth year and three.”
Harleian Collection (British Museum), 800 b, fol. 319.
“The Lord have mercy on you all—
Prepare yourselves for dreadful fall
Of house and land and human soul—
The measure of your sins is full.
In the year one, eight, and forty-two,
Of the year that is so new;
In the third month of that sixteen,
It may be a day or two between—
Perhaps you’ll soon be stiff and cold.
Dear Christian, be not stout and bold—
The mighty, kingly-proud will see
This comes to pass as my name’s Dee.”
1598. Ms. in the British Museum.
The alarm of the population of London did not on this occasion extend
beyond the wide circle of the uneducated classes, but among them it
equalled that recorded in the text. It was soon afterwards stated that no
such prophecy is to be found in the Harleian Ms.
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Chronicles of England, by Richard Grafton; London, 1568, p. 106.
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Faerie Queene, b. 3, c. 3, s. 6-13.
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Although other places claim the honour(!) of Mother Shipton’s birth,
her residence is asserted, by oral tradition, to have been for many years a
cottage at Winslow-cum-Shipton, in Buckinghamshire, of which the
above is a representation. We give the contents of one of the popular
books containing her prophecies:

The Strange and Wonderful History and Prophecies of Mother
Shipton, plainly setting forth her Birth, Life, Death, and Burial. 12mo.
Newcastle. Chap. 1.—Of her birth and parentage. 2. How Mother
Shipton’s mother proved with child; how she fitted the justice, and what
happened at her delivery. 3. By what name Mother Shipton was
christened, and how her mother went into a monastery. 4. Several other
pranks play’d by Mother Shipton in revenge of such as abused her. 5.
How Ursula married a young man named Tobias Shipton, and how
strangely she discovered a thief. 6. Her prophecy against Cardinal
Wolsey. 7. Some other prophecies of Mother Shipton relating to those
times. 8. Her prophecies in verse to the Abbot of Beverly. 9. Mother
Shipton’s life, death, and burial.
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Let us try. In his second century, prediction 66, he says:
“From great dangers the captive is escaped.
A little time, great fortune changed.
In the palace the people are caught.
By good augury the city is besieged.”
“What is this,” a believer might exclaim, “but the escape of Napoleon
from Elba—his changed fortune, and the occupation of Paris by the allied
armies?”
Let us try again. In his third century, prediction 98, he says:
“Two royal brothers will make fierce war on each other;
So mortal shall be the strife between them,
That each one shall occupy a fort against the other;
For their reign and life shall be the quarrel.”
Some Lillius Redivivus would find no difficulty in this prediction. To
use a vulgar phrase, it is as clear as a pikestaff. Had not the astrologer in
view Don Miguel and Don Pedro when he penned this stanza, so much
less obscure and oracular than the rest?
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Hermippus Redivivus, p. 142.
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Jovii Elog. p. 320.
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Les Anecdotes de Florence, ou l’Histoire secrète de la Maison di
Medicis, p. 318.
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It is quite astonishing to see the great demand there is, both in England
and France, for dream-books, and other trash of the same kind. Two
books in England enjoy an extraordinary popularity, and have run
through upwards of fifty editions in as many years in London alone,
besides being reprinted in Manchester, Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Dublin.
One is Mother Bridget’s Dream-book and Oracle of Fate; the other is the
Norwood Gipsy. It is stated, on the authority of one who is curious in
these matters, that there is a demand for these works, which are sold at
sums varying from a penny to sixpence, chiefly to servant-girls and
imperfectly-educated people, all over the country, of upwards of eleven
thousand annually; and that at no period during the last thirty years has
the average number sold been less than this. The total number during this
period would thus amount to 330,000.
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Spectator, No. 7, March 8, 1710-11.
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See Van der Mye’s account of the siege of Breda. The garrison, being
afflicted with scurvy, the Prince of Orange sent the physicians two or
three small phials, containing a decoction of camomile, wormwood, and
camphor, telling them to pretend that it was a medicine of the greatest
value and extremest rarity, which had been procured with very much
danger and difficulty from the East; and so strong, that two or three drops
would impart a healing virtue to a gallon of water. The soldiers had faith
in their commander; they took the medicine with cheerful faces, and grew
well rapidly. They afterwards thronged about the prince in groups of
twenty and thirty at a time, praising his skill, and loading him with
protestations of gratitude.
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Mummies were of several kinds, and were all of great use in magnetic
medicines. Paracelsus enumerates six kinds of mummies; the first four
only differing in the composition used by different people for preserving

their dead, are the Egyptian, Arabian, Pisasphaltos, and Libyan. The fifth
mummy of peculiar power was made from criminals that had been
hanged; “for from such there is a gentle siccation, that expungeth the
watery humour, without destroying the oil and spirituall, which is
cherished by the heavenly luminaries, and strengthened continually by
the affluence and impulses of the celestial spirits; whence it may be
properly called by the name of constellated or celestial mummie.” The
sixth kind of mummy was made of corpuscles, or spiritual effluences,
radiated from the living body; though we cannot get very clear ideas on
this head, or respecting the manner in which they were caught.—
Medicina Diatastica; or, Sympathetical Mummie, abstracted from the
Works of Paracelsus, and translated out of the Latin, by Fernando
Parkhurst, Gent. London, 1653, pp. 2, 7. Quoted by the Foreign Quarterly
Review, vol. xii. p. 415.
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Reginald Scott, quoted by Sir Walter Scott, in the notes to the Lay of
the last Minstrel, c. iii. v. xxiii.
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Greatraks’ Account of himself, in a letter to the Honourable Robert
Boyle.
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Introduction to the Study of Animal Magnetism, by Baron Dupotet de
Sennevoy, p. 315.
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Introduction to the Study of Animal Magnetism, p. 318.
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Dictionaire des Sciences Médicales—Article Convulsionnaires, par
Montégre.
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An enthusiastic philosopher, of whose name we are not informed, had
constructed a very satisfactory theory on some subject or other, and was
not a little proud of it. “But the facts, my dear fellow,” said his friend, “the
facts do not agree with your theory.”—“Don’t they?” replied the

philosopher, shrugging his shoulders, “then, tant pis pour les faits;”—so
much the worse for the facts!
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Rapport des Commissaires, rédigé par M. Bailly. Paris, 1784.
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Introduction to the Study of Animal Magnetism, by Baron Dupotet, p.
73.
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See Foreign Review and Continental Miscellany, vol. v. p. 113.
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See the very clear, and dispassionate article upon the subject in the fifth
volume (1830) of The Foreign Review, p. 96 et seq.
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Histoire Critique du Magnétisme Animal, p. 60.
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The above engraving, shewing two soldiers of William the Conqueror’s
army, is taken from the celebrated Bayeux Tapestry.—See ante, p. 297.
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THE CRUSADES.

They heard, and up they sprang upon the wing
Innumerable. As when the potent rod
Of Amram’s son, in Egypt’s evil day,
Waved round the coast, up call’d a pitchy cloud
Of locusts, warping on the eastern wind
That o’er the realm of impious Pharaoh hung
Like night, and darken’d all the realm of Nile,
So numberless were they. * * * *
All in a moment through the gloom were seen
Ten thousand banners rise into the air,
With orient colours waving. With them rose
A forest huge of spears; and thronging helms
Appear’d, and serried shields, in thick array,
Of depth immeasurable.
Paradise Lost.

EVERY age has its peculiar folly; some scheme, project, or
phantasy into which it plunges, spurred on either by the love of gain, the
necessity of excitement, or the mere force of imitation. Failing in these, it
has some madness, to which it is goaded by political or religious causes, or
both combined. Every one of these causes influenced the Crusades, and
conspired to render them the most extraordinary instance upon record of
the extent to which popular enthusiasm can be carried. History in her
solemn page informs us, that the Crusaders were but ignorant and savage

men, that their motives were those of bigotry unmitigated, and that their
pathway was one of blood and tears. Romance, on the other hand, dilates
upon their piety and heroism, and portrays, in her most glowing and
impassioned hues, their virtue and magnanimity, the imperishable honour
they acquired for themselves, and the great services they rendered to
Christianity. In the following pages we shall ransack the stores of both, to
discover the true spirit that animated the motley multitude who took up
arms in the service of the cross, leaving history to vouch for facts, but not
disdaining the aid of contemporary poetry and romance, to throw light
upon feelings, motives, and opinions.
In order to understand thoroughly the state of public feeling in Europe at
the time when Peter the Hermit preached the holy war, it will be necessary
to go back for many years anterior to that event. We must make
acquaintance with the pilgrims of the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries,
and learn the tales they told of the dangers they had passed and the
wonders they had seen. Pilgrimages to the Holy Land seem at first to have
been undertaken by converted Jews, and by Christian devotees of lively
imagination, pining with a natural curiosity to visit the scenes which of all
others were most interesting in their eyes. The pious and the impious alike
flocked to Jerusalem,—the one class to feast their sight on the scenes
hallowed by the life and sufferings of their Lord, and the other, because it
soon became a generally received opinion, that such a pilgrimage was
sufficient to rub off the long score of sins, however atrocious. Another and
very numerous class of pilgrims were the idle and roving, who visited
Palestine then as the moderns visit Italy or Switzerland now, because it was
the fashion, and because they might please their vanity by retailing, on
their return, the adventures they had met with. But the really pious formed
the great majority. Every year their numbers increased, until at last they
became so numerous as to be called the “armies of the Lord.” Full of
enthusiasm, they set the dangers and difficulties of the way at defiance, and
lingered with holy rapture on every scene described by the Evangelists. To

them it was bliss indeed to drink the clear waters of the Jordan, or be
baptised in the same stream where John had baptised the Saviour. They
wandered with awe and pleasure in the purlieus of the Temple, on the
solemn Mount of Olives, or the awful Calvary, where a God had bled for
sinful men. To these pilgrims every object was precious. Relics were eagerly
sought after; flagons of water from Jordan, or panniers of mould from the
hill of the Crucifixion, were brought home, and sold at extravagant prices
to churches and monasteries. More apocryphal relics, such as the wood of
the true cross, the tears of the Virgin Mary, the hems of her garments, the
toe-nails and hair of the Apostles—even the tents that Paul had helped to
manufacture—were exhibited for sale by the knavish in Palestine, and
brought back to Europe “with wondrous cost and care.” A grove of a
hundred oaks would not have furnished all the wood sold in little morsels
as remnants of the true cross; and the tears of Mary, if collected together,
would have filled a cistern.
For upwards of two hundred years the pilgrims met with no impediment
in Palestine. The enlightened Haroun Al Reschid, and his more immediate
successors, encouraged the stream which brought so much wealth into
Syria, and treated the wayfarers with the utmost courtesy. The race of
Fatemite caliphs,—who, although in other respects as tolerant, were more
distressed for money, or more unscrupulous in obtaining it, than their
predecessors of the house of Abbas,—imposed a tax of a bezant for each
pilgrim that entered Jerusalem. This was a serious hardship upon the
poorer sort, who had begged their weary way across Europe, and arrived at
the bourne of all their hopes without a coin. A great outcry was
immediately raised, but still the tax was rigorously levied. The pilgrims
unable to pay were compelled to remain at the gate of the holy city until
some rich devotee arriving with his train, paid the tax and let them in.
Robert of Normandy, father of William the Conqueror, who, in common
with many other nobles of the highest rank, undertook the pilgrimage,

found on his arrival scores of pilgrims at the gate, anxiously expecting his
coming to pay the tax for them. Upon no occasion was such a boon refused.
The sums drawn from this source were a mine of wealth to the Moslem
governors of Palestine, imposed as the tax had been at a time when
pilgrimages had become more numerous than ever. A strange idea had
taken possession of the popular mind at the close of the tenth and
commencement of the eleventh century. It was universally believed that the
end of the world was at hand; that the thousand years of the Apocalypse
were near completion, and that Jesus Christ would descend upon
Jerusalem to judge mankind. All Christendom was in commotion. A panic
terror seized upon the weak, the credulous, and the guilty, who in those
days formed more than nineteen-twentieths of the population. Forsaking
their homes, kindred, and occupation, they crowded to Jerusalem to await
the coming of the Lord, lightened, as they imagined, of a load of sin by
their weary pilgrimage. To increase the panic, the stars were observed to
fall from heaven, earthquakes to shake the land, and violent hurricanes to
blow down the forests. All these, and more especially the meteoric
phenomena, were looked upon as the forerunners of the approaching
judgments. Not a meteor shot athwart the horizon that did not fill a district
with alarm, and send away to Jerusalem a score of pilgrims, with staff in
hand and wallet on their back, praying as they went for the remission of
their sins. Men, women, and even children, trudged in droves to the holy
city, in expectation of the day when the heavens would open, and the Son
of God descend in his glory. This extraordinary delusion, while it
augmented the numbers, increased also the hardships of the pilgrims.
Beggars became so numerous on all the highways between the west of
Europe and Constantinople, that the monks, the great almsgivers upon
these occasions, would have brought starvation within sight of their own
doors, if they had not economised their resources, and left the devotees to
shift for themselves as they could. Hundreds of them were glad to subsist

upon the berries that ripened by the road, who, before this great flux,
might have shared the bread and flesh of the monasteries.
But this was not the greatest of their difficulties. On their arrival in
Jerusalem they found that a sterner race had obtained possession of the
Holy Land. The caliphs of Bagdad had been succeeded by the harsh Turks
of the race of Seljook, who looked upon the pilgrims with contempt and
aversion. The Turks of the eleventh century were more ferocious and less
scrupulous than the Saracens of the tenth. They were annoyed at the
immense number of pilgrims who overran the country, and still more so
because they shewed no intention of quitting it. The hourly expectation of
the last judgment kept them waiting; and the Turks, apprehensive of being
at last driven from the soil by the swarms that were still arriving, heaped
up difficulties in their way. Persecution of every kind awaited them. They
were plundered, and beaten with stripes, and kept in suspense for months
at the gates of Jerusalem, unable to pay the golden bezant that was to
procure them admission.
When the first epidemic terror of the day of judgment began to subside, a
few pilgrims ventured to return to Europe, their hearts big with indignation
at the insults they had suffered. Every where as they passed they related to
a sympathising auditory the wrongs of Christendom. Strange to say, even
these recitals increased the mania for pilgrimage. The greater the dangers
of the way, the fairer chance that sins of deep dye would be atoned for.
Difficulty and suffering only heightened the merit, and fresh hordes issued
from every town and village, to win favour in the sight of heaven by a visit
to the holy sepulchre. Thus did things continue during the whole of the
eleventh century.
The train that was to explode so fearfully was now laid, and there wanted
but the hand to apply the torch. At last the man appeared upon the scene.
Like all who have ever achieved so great an end, Peter the Hermit was
exactly suited to the age; neither behind it nor in advance of it; but acute
enough to penetrate its mystery ere it was discovered by any other.

Enthusiastic, chivalrous, bigoted, and, if not insane, not far removed from
insanity, he was the very prototype of the time. True enthusiasm is always
persevering and always eloquent, and these two qualities were united in no
common degree in the person of this extraordinary preacher. He was a
monk of Amiens, and ere he assumed the hood had served as a soldier. He
is represented as having been ill favoured and low in stature, but with an
eye of surpassing brightness and intelligence. Having been seized with the
mania of the age, he visited Jerusalem, and remained there till his blood
boiled to see the cruel persecution heaped upon the devotees. On his return
home he shook the world by the eloquent story of their wrongs.
Before entering into any further details of the marvellous results of his
preaching, it will be advisable to cast a glance at the state of the mind of
Europe, that we may understand all the better the causes of his success.
First of all, there was the priesthood, which, exercising as it did the most
conspicuous influence upon the fortunes of society, claims the largest share
of attention. Religion was the ruling idea of that day, and the only civiliser
capable of taming such wolves as then constituted the flock of the faithful.
The clergy were all in all; and though they kept the popular mind in the
most slavish subjection with regard to religious matters, they furnished it
with the means of defence against all other oppression except their own. In
the ecclesiastical ranks were concentrated all the true piety, all the
learning, all the wisdom of the time; and, as a natural consequence, a great
portion of power, which their very wisdom perpetually incited them to
extend. The people knew nothing of kings and nobles, except in the way of
injuries inflicted. The first ruled for, or more properly speaking against, the
barons, and the barons only existed to brave the power of the kings, or to
trample with their iron heels upon the neck of prostrate democracy. The
latter had no friend but the clergy, and these, though they necessarily
instilled the superstition from which they themselves were not exempt, yet
taught the cheering doctrine that all men were equal in the sight of heaven.
Thus, while Feudalism told them they had no rights in this world, Religion

told them they had every right in the next. With this consolation they were
for the time content, for political ideas had as yet taken no root. When the
clergy, for other reasons, recommended the Crusade, the people joined in it
with enthusiasm. The subject of Palestine filled all minds; the pilgrims’
tales of two centuries warmed every imagination; and when their friends,
their guides, and their instructors preached a war so much in accordance
with their own prejudices and modes of thinking, the enthusiasm rose into
a frenzy.
But while religion inspired the masses, another agent was at work upon
the nobility. These were fierce and lawless; tainted with every vice,
endowed with no virtue, and redeemed by one good quality alone, that of
courage. The only religion they felt was the religion of fear. That and their
overboiling turbulence alike combined to guide them to the Holy Land.
Most of them had sins enough to answer for. They lived with their hand
against every man, and with no law but their own passions. They set at
defiance the secular power of the clergy; but their hearts quailed at the
awful denunciations of the pulpit with regard to the life to come. War was
the business and the delight of their existence; and when they were
promised remission of all their sins upon the easy condition of following
their favourite bent, it is not to be wondered at that they rushed with
enthusiasm to the onslaught, and became as zealous in the service of the
cross as the great majority of the people, who were swayed by more purely
religious motives. Fanaticism and the love of battle alike impelled them to
the war, while the kings and princes of Europe had still another motive for
encouraging their zeal. Policy opened their eyes to the great advantages
which would accrue to themselves by the absence of so many restless,
intriguing, and bloodthirsty men, whose insolence it required more than
the small power of royalty to restrain within due bounds. Thus every
motive was favourable to the Crusades. Every class of society was alike
incited to join or encourage the war: kings and the clergy by policy, the
nobles by turbulence and the love of dominion, and the people by religious

zeal and the concentrated enthusiasm of two centuries, skilfully directed by
their only instructors.
It was in Palestine itself that Peter the Hermit first conceived the grand
idea of rousing the powers of Christendom to rescue the Christians of the
East from the thraldom of the Mussulmans, and the sepulchre of Jesus
from the rude hands of the infidel. The subject engrossed his whole mind.
Even in the visions of the night he was full of it. One dream made such an
impression upon him, that he devoutly believed the Saviour of the world
himself appeared before him, and promised him aid and protection in his
holy undertaking. If his zeal had ever wavered before, this was sufficient to
fix it for ever.
Peter, after he had performed all the penances and duties of his
pilgrimage, demanded an interview with Simeon, the Patriarch of the
Greek Church at Jerusalem. Though the latter was a heretic in Peter’s eyes,
yet he was still a Christian, and felt as acutely as himself for the
persecutions heaped by the Turks upon the followers of Jesus. The good
prelate entered fully into his views, and, at his suggestion, wrote letters to
the Pope, and to the most influential monarchs of Christendom, detailing
the sorrows of the faithful, and urging them to take up arms in their
defence. Peter was not a laggard in the work. Taking an affectionate
farewell of the Patriarch, he returned in all haste to Italy. Pope Urban II.
occupied the apostolic chair. It was at that time far from being an easy seat.
His predecessor Gregory had bequeathed him a host of disputes with the
Emperor Henry IV. of Germany, and he had converted Philip I. of France
into an enemy by his strenuous opposition to an adulterous connexion
formed by that monarch. So many dangers encompassed him, that the
Vatican was no secure abode, and he had taken refuge in Apulia, under the
protection of the renowned Robert Guiscard. Thither Peter appears to have
followed him, though in what spot their meeting took place is not stated
with any precision by ancient chroniclers or modern historians. Urban
received him most kindly; read, with tears in his eyes, the epistle from the

Patriarch Simeon, and listened to the eloquent story of the Hermit with an
attention which shewed how deeply he sympathised with the woes of the
Christian Church. Enthusiasm is contagious; and the Pope appears to have
caught it instantly from one whose zeal was so unbounded. Giving the
Hermit full powers, he sent him abroad to preach the holy war to all the
nations and potentates of Christendom. The Hermit preached, and
countless thousands answered to his call. France, Germany, and Italy
started at his voice, and prepared for the deliverance of Zion. One of the
early historians of the Crusade, who was himself an eye-witness of the
rapture of Europe, 1 describes the personal appearance of the Hermit at this
time. He says, that there appeared to be something of divine in every thing
which he said or did. The people so highly reverenced him, that they
plucked hairs from the mane of his mule that they might keep them as
relics. While preaching, he wore in general a woollen tunic, with a darkcoloured mantle, which fell down to his heels. His arms and feet were bare;
and he ate neither flesh nor bread, supporting himself chiefly upon fish and
wine. “He set out,” says the chronicler, “from whence I know not; but we
saw him passing through the towns and villages, preaching every where,
and the people surrounding him in crowds, loading him with offerings, and
celebrating his sanctity with such great praises, that I never remember to
have seen such honours bestowed upon any one.” Thus he went on,
untired, inflexible, and full of devotion, communicating his own madness
to his hearers, until Europe was stirred from its very depths.
While the Hermit was appealing with such signal success to the people,
the Pope appealed with as much success to those who were to become the
chiefs and leaders of the expedition. His first step was to call a council at
Placentia, in the autumn of the year 1095. Here, in the assembly of the
clergy, the Pope debated the grand scheme, and gave audience to
emissaries who had been sent from Constantinople by the Emperor of the
East, to detail the progress made by the Turks in their design of
establishing themselves in Europe. The clergy were of course unanimous in

support of the Crusade; and the council separated, each individual member
of it being empowered to preach it to his people.
But Italy could not be expected to furnish all the aid required; and the
Pope crossed the Alps to inspire the fierce and powerful nobility and
chivalrous population of Gaul. His boldness in entering the territory, and
placing himself in the power of his foe, King Philip of France, is not the
least surprising feature of his mission. Some have imagined that cool policy
alone actuated him; while others assert that it was mere zeal, as warm and
as blind as that of Peter the Hermit. The latter opinion seems to be the true
one. Society did not calculate the consequences of what it was doing. Every
man seemed to act from impulse only; and the Pope, in throwing himself
into the heart of France, acted as much from impulse as the thousands who
responded to his call. A council was eventually summoned to meet him at
Clermont, in Auvergne, to consider the state of the Church, reform abuses,
and, above all, make preparations for the war. It was in the midst of an
extremely cold winter, and the ground was covered with snow. During
seven days the council sat with closed doors, while immense crowds from
all parts of France flocked into the town, in expectation that the Pope
himself would address the people. All the towns and villages for miles
around were filled with the multitude; even the fields were encumbered
with people, who, unable to procure lodging, pitched their tents under the
trees and by the way-side. All the neighbourhood presented the appearance
of a vast camp.

THE CATHEDRAL OF CLERMONT.

During the seven days’ deliberation, a sentence of excommunication was
passed upon King Philip for adultery with Bertrade de Montfort, Countess
of Anjou, and for disobedience to the supreme authority of the apostolic
see. This bold step impressed the people with reverence for so stern a
Church, which in the discharge of its duty shewed itself no respecter of
persons. Their love and their fear were alike increased, and they were
prepared to listen with more intense devotion to the preaching of so
righteous and inflexible a pastor. The great square before the cathedral
church of Clermont became every instant more densely crowded as the
hour drew nigh when the Pope was to address the populace. Issuing from
the church in his full canonicals, surrounded by his cardinals and bishops
in all the splendour of Romish ecclesiastical costume, the Pope stood
before the populace on a high scaffolding erected for the occasion, and
covered with scarlet cloth. A brilliant array of bishops and cardinals
surrounded him; and among them, humbler in rank, but more important
in the world’s eye, the Hermit Peter, dressed in his simple and austere
habiliments. Historians differ as to whether or not Peter addressed the
crowd, but as all agree that he was present, it seems reasonable to suppose

that he spoke. But it was the oration of the Pope that was most important.
As he lifted up his hands to ensure attention, every voice immediately
became still. He began by detailing the miseries endured by their brethren
in the Holy Land; how the plains of Palestine were desolated by the
outrageous heathen, who with the sword and the firebrand carried wailing
into the dwellings and flames into the possessions of the faithful; how
Christian wives and daughters were defiled by pagan lust; how the altars of
the true God were desecrated, and the relics of the saints trodden under
foot. “You,” continued the eloquent pontiff (and Urban II. was one of the
most eloquent men of the day), “you, who hear me, and who have received
the true faith, and been endowed by God with power, and strength, and
greatness of soul,—whose ancestors have been the prop of Christendom,
and whose kings have put a barrier against the progress of the infidel,—I
call upon you to wipe off these impurities from the face of the earth, and lift
your oppressed fellow-Christians from the depths into which they have
been trampled. The sepulchre of Christ is possessed by the heathen, the
sacred places dishonoured by their vileness. Oh, brave knights and faithful
people! offspring of invincible fathers! ye will not degenerate from your
ancient renown. Ye will not be restrained from embarking in this great
cause by the tender ties of wife or little ones, but will remember the words
of the Saviour of the world himself, ‘Whosoever loves father and mother
more than me is not worthy of me. Whosoever shall abandon for my
name’s sake his house, or his brethren, or his sisters, or his father, or his
mother, or his wife, or his children, or his lands, shall receive a
hundredfold, and shall inherit eternal life.’”
The warmth of the Pontiff communicated itself to the crowd, and the
enthusiasm of the people broke out several times ere he concluded his
address. He went on to portray, not only the spiritual but the temporal
advantages that would accrue to those who took up arms in the service of
the cross. Palestine was, he said, a land flowing with milk and honey, and
precious in the sight of God, as the scene of the grand events which had

saved mankind. That land, he promised, should be divided among them.
Moreover, they should have full pardon for all their offences, either against
God or man. “Go, then,” he added, “in expiation of your sins; and go
assured, that after this world shall have passed away, imperishable glory
shall be yours in the world which is to come.” The enthusiasm was no
longer to be restrained, and loud shouts interrupted the speaker; the
people exclaiming as if with one voice, “Dieu le veult! Dieu le veult!” With
great presence of mind Urban took advantage of the outburst, and as soon
as silence was obtained, continued: “Dear brethren, to-day is shewn forth
in you that which the Lord has said by his Evangelist, ‘When two or three
are gathered together in my name, there will I be in the midst of them to
bless them.’ If the Lord God had not been in your souls, you would not all
have pronounced the same words; or rather God himself pronounced them
by your lips, for it was he that put them in your hearts. Be they, then, your
war-cry in the combat, for those words came forth from God. Let the army
of the Lord, when it rushes upon his enemies, shout but that one cry, ‘Dieu
le veult! Dieu le veult!’ Let whoever is inclined to devote himself to this
holy cause make it a solemn engagement, and bear the cross of the Lord
either on his breast or his brow till he set out; and let him who is ready to
begin his march place the holy emblem on his shoulders, in memory of that
precept of our Saviour, ‘He who does not take up his cross and follow me is
not worthy of me.’”
The news of this council spread to the remotest parts of Europe in an
incredibly short space of time. Long before the fleetest horseman could
have brought the intelligence, it was known by the people in distant
provinces; a fact which was considered as nothing less than supernatural.
But the subject was in every body’s mouth, and the minds of men were
prepared for the result. The enthusiastic merely asserted what they wished,
and the event tallied with their prediction. This was, however, quite enough
in those days for a miracle, and as a miracle every one regarded it.

For several months after the Council of Clermont, France and Germany
presented a singular spectacle. The pious, the fanatic, the needy, the
dissolute, the young and the old, even women and children, and the halt
and lame, enrolled themselves by hundreds. In every village the clergy were
busied in keeping up the excitement, promising eternal rewards to those
who assumed the red cross, and fulminating the most awful denunciations
against all the worldly-minded who refused or even hesitated. Every debtor
who joined the Crusade was freed by the papal edict from the claims of his
creditors; outlaws of every grade were made equal with the honest upon
the same conditions. The property of those who went was placed under the
protection of the Church, and St. Paul and St. Peter themselves were
believed to descend from their high abode, to watch over the chattels of the
absent pilgrims. Signs and portents were seen in the air, to increase the
fervour of the multitude. An aurora-borealis of unusual brilliancy
appeared, and thousands of the Crusaders came out to gaze upon it,
prostrating themselves upon the earth in adoration. It was thought to be a
sure prognostic of the interposition of the Most High; and a representation
of his armies fighting with and overthrowing the infidels. Reports of
wonders were every where rife. A monk had seen two gigantic warriors on
horseback, the one representing a Christian and the other a Turk, fighting
in the sky with flaming swords, the Christian of course overcoming the
Paynim. Myriads of stars were said to have fallen from heaven, each
representing the fall of a Pagan foe. It was believed at the same time that
the Emperor Charlemagne would rise from the grave, and lead on to
victory the embattled armies of the Lord. A singular feature of the popular
madness was the enthusiasm of the women. Every where they encouraged
their lovers and husbands to forsake all things for the holy war. Many of
them burned the sign of the cross upon their breasts and arms, and
coloured the wound with a red dye, as a lasting memorial of their zeal.
Others, still more zealous, impressed the mark by the same means upon
the tender limbs of young children and infants at the breast.

Guibert de Nogent tells of a monk who made a large incision upon his
forehead in the form of a cross, which he coloured with some powerful
ingredient, telling the people that an angel had done it when he was asleep.
This monk appears to have been more of a rogue than a fool, for he
contrived to fare more sumptuously than any of his brother pilgrims, upon
the strength of his sanctity. The Crusaders every where gave him presents
of food and money, and he became quite fat ere he arrived at Jerusalem,
notwithstanding the fatigues of the way. If he had acknowledged in the first
place that he had made the wound himself, he would not have been
thought more holy than his fellows; but the story of the angel was a
clincher.
All those who had property of any description rushed to the mart to
change it into hard cash. Lands and houses could be had for a quarter of
their value, while arms and accoutrements of war rose in the same
proportion. Corn, which had been excessively dear in anticipation of a year
of scarcity, suddenly became plentiful; and such was the diminution in the
value of provisions, that seven sheep were sold for five deniers. 2 The nobles
mortgaged their estates for mere trifles to Jews and unbelievers, or
conferred charters of immunity upon the towns and communes within
their fiefs, for sums which, a few years previously, they would have rejected
with disdain. The farmer endeavoured to sell his plough, and the artisan
his tools, to purchase a sword for the deliverance of Jerusalem. Women
disposed of their trinkets for the same purpose. During the spring and
summer of this year (1096) the roads teemed with crusaders, all hastening
to the towns and villages appointed as the rendezvous of the district. Some
were on horseback, some in carts, and some came down the rivers in boats
and rafts, bringing their wives and children, all eager to go to Jerusalem.
Very few knew where Jerusalem was. Some thought it fifty thousand miles
away, and others imagined that it was but a month’s journey; while at sight
of every town or castle the children exclaimed, “Is that Jerusalem? Is that
the city?” 3 Parties of knights and nobles might be seen travelling eastward,

and amusing themselves as they went with the knightly diversion of
hawking, to lighten the fatigues of the way.
Guibert de Nogent, who did not write from hearsay, but from actual
observation, says the enthusiasm was so contagious, that when any one
heard the orders of the Pontiff, he went instantly to solicit his neighbours
and friends to join with him in “the way of God,” for so they called the
proposed expedition. The Counts Palatine were full of the desire to
undertake the journey, and all the inferior knights were animated with the
same zeal. Even the poor caught the flame so ardently, that no one paused
to think of the inadequacy of his means, or to consider whether he ought to
yield up his farm, his vineyard, or his fields. Each one set about selling his
property at as low a price as if he had been held in some horrible captivity,
and sought to pay his ransom without loss of time. Those who had not
determined upon the journey joked and laughed at those who were thus
disposing of their goods at such ruinous prices, prophesying that the
expedition would be miserable and their return worse. But they held this
language only for a day; the next they were suddenly seized with the same
frenzy as the rest. Those who had been loudest in their jeers gave up all
their property for a few crowns, and set out with those they had so laughed
at a few hours before. In most cases the laugh was turned against them; for
when it became known that a man was hesitating, his more zealous
neighbours sent him a present of a knitting-needle or a distaff, to shew
their contempt of him. There was no resisting this; so that the fear of
ridicule contributed its fair contingent to the armies of the Lord.
Another effect of the Crusade was, the religious obedience with which it
inspired the people and the nobility for that singular institution “The Truce
of God.” At the commencement of the eleventh century, the clergy of
France, sympathising for the woes of the people, but unable to diminish
them, by repressing the rapacity and insolence of the feudal chiefs,
endeavoured to promote universal good-will by the promulgation of the
famous “Peace of God.” All who conformed to it bound themselves by oath

not to take revenge for any injury, not to enjoy the fruits of property
usurped from others, nor to use deadly weapons; in reward of which they
would receive remission of all their sins. However benevolent the intention
of this “Peace,” it led to nothing but perjury, and violence reigned as
uncontrolled as before. In the year 1041, another attempt was made to
soften the angry passions of the semi-barbarous chiefs, and the “Truce of
God” was solemnly proclaimed. The truce lasted from the Wednesday
evening to the Monday morning of every week, in which interval it was
strictly forbidden to recur to violence on any pretext, or to seek revenge for
any injury. It was impossible to civilise men by these means. Few even
promised to become peaceable for so unconscionable a period as five days
a-week; or if they did, they made ample amends on the two days left open
to them. The truce was afterwards shortened from the Saturday evening to
the Monday morning; but little or no diminution of violence and bloodshed
was the consequence. At the Council of Clermont, Urban II. again solemnly
proclaimed the truce. So strong was the religious feeling, that every one
hastened to obey. All minor passions disappeared before the grand passion
of crusading. The feudal chief ceased to oppress, the robber to plunder, the
people to complain; but one idea was in all hearts, and there seemed to be
no room for any other.
The encampments of these heterogeneous multitudes offered a singular
aspect. Those vassals who ranged themselves under the banners of their
lord erected tents around his castle; while those who undertook the war on
their own account constructed booths and huts in the neighbourhood of
the towns or villages, preparatory to their joining some popular leader of
the expedition. The meadows of France were covered with tents. As the
belligerents were to have remission of all their sins on their arrival in
Palestine, hundreds of them gave themselves up to the most unbounded
licentiousness. The courtesan, with the red cross upon her shoulders, plied
her shameless trade with sensual pilgrims without scruple on either side;
the lover of good cheer gave loose rein to his appetite, and drunkenness

and debauchery flourished. Their zeal in the service of the Lord was to wipe
out all faults and follies, and they had the same surety of salvation as the
rigid anchorite. This reasoning had charms for the ignorant, and the
sounds of lewd revelry and the voice of prayer rose at the same instant
from the camp.
It is now time to speak of the leaders of the expedition. Great multitudes
ranged themselves under the command of Peter the Hermit, whom, as the
originator, they considered the most appropriate leader of the war. Others
joined the banner of a bold adventurer, whom history has dignified with no
other name than that of Gautier sans Avoir, or Walter the Pennyless, but
who is represented as having been of noble family, and well skilled in the
art of war. A third multitude from Germany flocked around the standard of
a monk named Gottschalk, of whom nothing is known except that he was a
fanatic of the deepest dye. All these bands, which together are said to have
amounted to three hundred thousand men, women, and children, were
composed of the vilest rascality of Europe. Without discipline, principle, or
true courage, they rushed through the nations like a pestilence, spreading
terror and death wherever they went. The first multitude that set forth was
led by Walter the Pennyless early in the spring of 1096, within a very few
months after the Council of Clermont. Each man of that irregular host
aspired to be his own master. Like their nominal leader, each was poor to
penury, and trusted for subsistence on his journey to the chances of the
road. Rolling through Germany like a tide, they entered Hungary, where, at
first, they were received with some degree of kindness by the people. The
latter had not yet caught sufficient of the fire of enthusiasm to join the
Crusade themselves, but were willing enough to forward the cause by
aiding those embarked in it. Unfortunately this good understanding did not
last long. The swarm were not contented with food for their necessities, but
craved for luxuries also. They attacked and plundered the dwellings of the
country people, and thought nothing of murder where resistance was
offered. On their arrival before Semlin, the outraged Hungarians collected

in large numbers, and, attacking the rear of the crusading host, slew a great
many of the stragglers, and, taking away their arms and crosses, affixed
them as trophies to the walls of the city. Walter appears to have been in no
mood or condition to make reprisals; for his army, destructive as a plague
of locusts when plunder urged them on, were useless against any regular
attack from a determined enemy. Their rear continued to be thus harassed
by the wrathful Hungarians until they were fairly out of their territory. On
his entrance into Bulgaria, Walter met with no better fate. The cities and
towns refused to let him pass; the villages denied him provisions; and the
citizens and country people uniting, slaughtered his followers by hundreds.
The progress of the army was more like a retreat than an advance; but as it
was impossible to stand still, Walter continued his course till he arrived at
Constantinople with a force which famine and the sword had diminished to
one-third of its original number.
The greater multitude, led by the enthusiastic Hermit, followed close
upon his heels, with a bulky train of baggage, and women and children
sufficient to form a host of themselves. If it were possible to find a rabble
more vile than the army of Walter the Pennyless, it was that led by Peter
the Hermit. Being better provided with means, they were not reduced to
the necessity of pillage in their progress through Hungary; and had they
taken any other route than that which led through Semlin, might perhaps
have traversed the country without molestation. On their arrival before
that city, their fury was raised at seeing the arms and red crosses of their
predecessors hanging as trophies over the gates. Their pent-up ferocity
exploded at the sight. The city was tumultuously attacked, and the
besiegers entering, not by dint of bravery, but of superior numbers, it was
given up to all the horrors which follow when victory, brutality, and
licentiousness are linked together. Every evil passion was allowed to revel
with impunity, and revenge, lust, and avarice,—each had its hundreds of
victims in unhappy Semlin. Any maniac can kindle a conflagration, but it
may require many wise men to put it out. Peter the Hermit had blown the

popular fury into a flame, but to cool it again was beyond his power. His
followers rioted unrestrained, until the fear of retaliation warned them to
desist. When the king of Hungary was informed of the disasters of Semlin,
he marched with a sufficient force to chastise the Hermit, who, at the news,
broke up his camp and retreated towards the Morava, a broad and rapid
stream that joins the Danube a few miles to the eastward of Belgrade. Here
a party of indignant Bulgarians awaited him, and so harassed him, as to
make the passage of the river a task both of difficulty and danger. Great
numbers of his infatuated followers perished in the waters, and many fell
under the swords of the Bulgarians. The ancient chronicles do not mention
the amount of the Hermit’s loss at this passage, but represent it in general
terms as very great.
At Nissa, the Duke of Bulgaria fortified himself, in fear of an assault; but
Peter, having learned a little wisdom from experience, thought it best to
avoid hostilities. He passed three nights in quietness under the walls, and
the duke, not wishing to exasperate unnecessarily so fierce and rapacious a
host, allowed the townspeople to supply them with provisions. Peter took
his departure peaceably on the following morning; but some German
vagabonds, falling behind the main body of the army, set fire to the mills
and house of a Bulgarian, with whom, it appears, they had had some
dispute on the previous evening. The citizens of Nissa, who had throughout
mistrusted the Crusaders, and were prepared for the worst, sallied out
immediately, and took signal vengeance. The spoilers were cut to pieces,
and the townspeople pursuing the Hermit, captured all the women and
children who had lagged in the rear, and a great quantity of baggage. Peter
hereupon turned round and marched back to Nissa, to demand explanation
of the Duke of Bulgaria. The latter fairly stated the provocation given, and
the Hermit could urge nothing in palliation of so gross an outrage. A
negotiation was entered into, which promised to be successful, and the
Bulgarians were about to deliver up the women and children, when a party
of undisciplined Crusaders, acting solely upon their own suggestion,

endeavoured to scale the walls and seize upon the town. Peter in vain
exerted his authority; the confusion became general, and after a short but
desperate battle, the Crusaders threw down their arms, and fled in all
directions. Their vast host was completely routed, the slaughter being so
great among them, as to be counted, not by hundreds, but by thousands.
It is said that the Hermit fled from this fatal field to a forest a few miles
from Nissa, abandoned by every human creature. It would be curious to
know whether, after so dire a reverse,
“His enpierced breast
Sharp sorrow did in thousand pieces rive,”
or whether his fiery zeal still rose superior to calamity, and pictured the
eventual triumph of his cause. He, so lately the leader of a hundred
thousand men, was now a solitary skulker in the forests, liable at every
instant to be discovered by some pursuing Bulgarian, and cut off in mid
career. Chance at last brought him within sight of an eminence, where two
or three of his bravest knights had collected five hundred of the stragglers.
These gladly received the Hermit, and a consultation having taken place, it
was resolved to gather together the scattered remnants of the army. Fires
were lighted on the hill, and scouts sent out in all directions for the
fugitives. Horns were sounded at intervals, to make known that friends
were near, and before nightfall the Hermit saw himself at the head of seven
thousand men. During the succeeding day, he was joined by twenty
thousand more, and with this miserable remnant of his force, he pursued
his route towards Constantinople. The bones of the rest mouldered in the
forests of Bulgaria.
On his arrival at Constantinople, where he found Walter the Pennyless
awaiting him, he was hospitably received by the Emperor Alexius. It might
have been expected that the sad reverses they had undergone would have

taught his followers common prudence; but, unhappily for them, their
turbulence and love of plunder was not to be restrained. Although they
were surrounded by friends, by whom all their wants were liberally
supplied, they could not refrain from rapine. In vain the Hermit exhorted
them to tranquillity; he possessed no more power over them, in subduing
their passions, than the obscurest soldier of the host. They set fire to
several public buildings in Constantinople out of pure mischief, and
stripped the lead from the roofs of the churches, which they afterwards
sold for old metal in the purlieus of the city. From this time may be dated
the aversion which the Emperor Alexius entertained for the Crusaders, and
which was afterwards manifested in all his actions, even when he had to
deal with the chivalrous and more honourable armies which arrived after
the Hermit. He seems to have imagined that the Turks themselves were
enemies less formidable to his power than these outpourings of the refuse
of Europe: he soon found a pretext to hurry them into Asia Minor. Peter
crossed the Bosphorus with Walter, but the excesses of his followers were
such, that, despairing of accomplishing any good end by remaining at their
head, he left them to themselves, and returned to Constantinople, on the
pretext of making arrangements with the government of Alexius for a
proper supply of provisions. The Crusaders, forgetting that they were in the
enemy’s country, and that union, above all things, was desirable, gave
themselves up to dissensions. Violent disputes arose between the
Lombards and Normans commanded by Walter the Pennyless, and the
Franks and Germans led out by Peter. The latter separated themselves
from the former, and, choosing for their leader one Reinaldo, or Reinhold,
marched forward, and took possession of the fortress of Exorogorgon. The
Sultan Solimaun was on the alert, with a superior force. A party of
Crusaders, which had been detached from the fort, and stationed at a little
distance as an ambuscade, were surprised and cut to pieces, and
Exorogorgon invested on all sides. The siege was protracted for eight days,
during which the Christians suffered the most acute agony from the want

of water. It is hard to say how long the hope of succour or the energy of
despair would have enabled them to hold out: their treacherous leader cut
the matter short by renouncing the Christian faith, and delivering up the
fort into the hands of the sultan. He was followed by two or three of his
officers; all the rest, refusing to become Mahometans, were ruthlessly put
to the sword. Thus perished the last wretched remnant of the vast
multitude which had traversed Europe with Peter the Hermit.
Walter the Pennyless and his multitude met as miserable a fate. On the
news of the disasters of Exorogorgon, they demanded to be led instantly
against the Turks. Walter, who only wanted good soldiers to have made a
good general, was cooler of head, and saw all the dangers of such a step.
His force was wholly insufficient to make any decisive movement in a
country where the enemy was so much superior, and where, in case of
defeat, he had no secure position to fall back upon; and he therefore
expressed his opinion against advancing until the arrival of reinforcements.
This prudent counsel found no favour: the army loudly expressed their
dissatisfaction at their chief, and prepared to march forward without him.
Upon this, the brave Walter put himself at their head, and rushed to
destruction. Proceeding towards Nice, the modern Isnik, he was
intercepted by the army of the sultan: a fierce battle ensued, in which the
Turks made fearful havoc; out of twenty-five thousand Christians, twentytwo thousand were slain, and among them Gautier himself, who fell
pierced by seven mortal wounds. The remaining three thousand retreated
upon Civitot, where they entrenched themselves.

ISNIK.

Disgusted as was Peter the Hermit at the excesses of the multitude,
who, at his call, had forsaken Europe, his heart was moved with grief
and pity at their misfortunes. All his former zeal revived: casting
himself at the feet of the Emperor Alexius, he implored him, with
tears in his eyes, to send relief to the few survivors at Civitot. The
emperor consented, and a force was sent, which arrived just in time
to save them from destruction. The Turks had beleaguered the place,
and the Crusaders were reduced to the last extremity. Negotiations
were entered into, and the last three thousand were conducted in
safety to Constantinople. Alexius had suffered too much by their
former excesses to be very desirous of retaining them in his capital:

he therefore caused them all to be disarmed, and, furnishing each
with a sum of money, he sent them back to their own country.
While these events were taking place, fresh hordes were issuing
from the woods and wilds of Germany, all bent for the Holy Land.
They were commanded by a fanatical priest, named Gottschalk, who,
like Gautier and Peter the Hermit, took his way through Hungary.
History is extremely meagre in her details of the conduct and fate of
this host, which amounted to at least one hundred thousand men.
Robbery and murder seem to have journeyed with them, and the
poor Hungarians were rendered almost desperate by their numbers
and rapacity. Karloman, the king of the country, made a bold effort
to get rid of them; for the resentment of his people had arrived at
such a height, that nothing short of the total extermination of the
Crusaders would satisfy them. Gottschalk had to pay the penalty, not
only for the ravages of his own bands, but for those of the swarms
that had come before him. He and his army were induced, by some
means or other, to lay down their arms: the savage Hungarians,
seeing them thus defenceless, set upon them, and slaughtered them
in great numbers. How many escaped their arrows we are not
informed; but not one of them reached Palestine.
Other swarms, under nameless leaders, issued from Germany and
France, more brutal and more frantic than any that had preceded
them. Their fanaticism surpassed by far the wildest freaks of the
followers of the Hermit. In bands, varying in numbers from one to
five thousand, they traversed the country in all directions, bent upon
plunder and massacre. They wore the symbol of the Crusade upon
their shoulders, but inveighed against the folly of proceeding to the
Holy Land to destroy the Turks, while they left behind them so many

Jews, the still more inveterate enemies of Christ. They swore fierce
vengeance against this unhappy race, and murdered all the Hebrews
they could lay their hands on, first subjecting them to the most
horrible mutilation. According to the testimony of Albert Aquensis,
they lived among each other in the most shameless profligacy, and
their vice was only exceeded by their superstition. Whenever they
were in search of Jews, they were preceded by a goose and goat,
which they believed to be holy, and animated with divine power to
discover the retreats of the unbelievers. In Germany alone they
slaughtered more than a thousand Jews, notwithstanding all the
efforts of the clergy to save them. So dreadful was the cruelty of their
tormentors, that great numbers of Jews committed self-destruction
to avoid falling into their hands.
Again it fell to the lot of the Hungarians to deliver Europe from
these pests. When there were no more Jews to murder, the bands
collected in one body, and took the old route to the Holy Land, a
route stained with the blood of three hundred thousand who had
gone before, and destined also to receive theirs. The number of these
swarms has never been stated; but so many of them perished in
Hungary, that contemporary writers, despairing of giving any
adequate idea of their multitudes, state that the fields were actually
heaped with their corpses, and that for miles in its course the waters
of the Danube were dyed with their blood. It was at Mersburg, on the
Danube, that the greatest slaughter took place,—a slaughter so great
as to amount almost to extermination. The Hungarians for a while
disputed the passage of the river, but the Crusaders forced their way
across, and attacking the city with the blind courage of madness,
succeeded in making a breach in the walls. At this moment of victory

an unaccountable fear came over them. Throwing down their arms,
they fled panic-stricken, no one knew why, and no one knew whither.
The Hungarians followed, sword in hand, and cut them down
without remorse, and in such numbers, that the stream of the
Danube is said to have been choked up by their unburied bodies.
This was the worst paroxysm of the madness of Europe; and this
passed, her chivalry stepped upon the scene. Men of cool heads,
mature plans, and invincible courage stood forward to lead and
direct the grand movement of Europe upon Asia. It is upon these
men that romance has lavished her most admiring epithets, leaving
to the condemnation of history the vileness and brutality of those
who went before. Of these leaders the most distinguished were
Godfrey of Bouillon duke of Lorraine, and Raymond count of
Toulouse. Four other chiefs of the royal blood of Europe also
assumed the cross, and led each his army to the Holy Land; Hugh
count of Vermandois, brother of the king of France; Robert duke of
Normandy, the elder brother of William Rufus; Robert count of
Flanders, and Bohemund prince of Tarentum, eldest son of the
celebrated Robert Guiscard. These men were all tinged with the
fanaticism of the age, but none of them acted entirely from religious
motives. They were neither utterly reckless like Gautier sans Avoir,
crazy like Peter the Hermit, nor brutal like Gottschalk the Monk, but
possessed each of these qualities in a milder form; their valour being
tempered by caution, their religious zeal by worldly views, and their
ferocity by the spirit of chivalry. They saw whither led the torrent of
the public will; and it being neither their wish nor their interest to
stem it, they allowed themselves to be carried with it, in the hope
that it would lead them at last to a haven of aggrandisement. Around

them congregated many minor chiefs, the flower of the nobility of
France and Italy, with some few from Germany, England, and Spain.
It was wisely conjectured that armies so numerous would find a
difficulty in procuring provisions if they all journeyed by the same
road. They therefore resolved to separate; Godfrey de Bouillon
proceeding through Hungary and Bulgaria, the Count of Toulouse
through Lombardy and Dalmatia, and the other leaders through
Apulia to Constantinople, where the several divisions were to
reunite. The forces under these leaders have been variously
estimated. The Princess Anna Comnena talks of them as having been
as numerous as the sands on the sea-shore, or the stars in the
firmament. Fulcher of Chartres is more satisfactory, and exaggerates
less magnificently, when he states, that all the divisions, when they
had sat down before Nice in Bithynia, amounted to one hundred
thousand horsemen, and six hundred thousand men on foot,
exclusive of the priests, women, and children. Gibbon is of opinion
that this amount is exaggerated; but thinks the actual numbers did
not fall very far short of the calculation. The Princess Anna
afterwards gives the number of those under Godfrey of Bouillon as
eighty thousand foot and horse; and supposing that each of the other
chiefs led an army as numerous, the total would be near half a
million. This must be over rather than under the mark, as the army
of Godfrey of Bouillon was confessedly the largest when it set out,
and suffered less by the way than any other.

GODFREY DE BOUILLON.

The Count of Vermandois was the first who set foot on the Grecian
territory. On his arrival at Durazzo he was received with every mark
of respect and courtesy by the agents of the emperor, and his
followers were abundantly supplied with provisions. Suddenly,
however, and without cause assigned, the count was arrested by
order of the Emperor Alexius, and conveyed a close prisoner to
Constantinople. Various motives have been assigned by different
authors as having induced the emperor to this treacherous and
imprudent proceeding. By every writer he has been condemned for
so flagrant a breach of hospitality and justice. The most probable
reason for his conduct appears to be that suggested by Guibert of
Nogent, who states that Alexius, fearful of the designs of the
Crusaders upon his throne, resorted to this extremity in order
afterwards to force the count to take the oath of allegiance to him, as
the price of his liberation. The example of a prince so eminent as the
brother of the king of France, would, he thought, be readily followed
by the other chiefs of the Crusade. In the result he was wofully

disappointed, as every man deserves to be who commits positive evil
that doubtful good may ensue. But this line of policy accorded well
enough with the narrowmindedness of the emperor, who, in the
enervating atmosphere of his highly civilised and luxurious court,
dreaded the influx of the hardy and ambitious warriors of the West,
and strove to nibble away by unworthy means the power which he
had not energy enough to confront. If danger to himself had existed
from the residence of the chiefs in his dominions, he might easily
have averted it, by the simple means of placing himself at the head of
the European movement, and directing its energies to their avowed
object, the conquest of the Holy Land. But the emperor, instead of
being, as he might have been, the lord and leader of the Crusades,
which he had himself aided in no inconsiderable degree to suscitate
by his embassies to the Pope, became the slave of men who hated
and despised him. No doubt the barbarous excesses of the followers
of Gautier and Peter the Hermit made him look upon the whole body
of them with disgust, but it was the disgust of a little mind, which is
glad of any excuse to palliate or justify its own irresolution and love
of ease.
Godfrey of Bouillon traversed Hungary in the most quiet and
orderly manner. On his arrival at Mersburg he found the country
strewed with the mangled corpses of the Jew-killers, and demanded
of the king of Hungary for what reason his people had set upon them.
The latter detailed the atrocities they had committed, and made it so
evident to Godfrey that the Hungarians had only acted in selfdefence, that the high-minded leader declared himself satisfied, and
passed on without giving or receiving molestation. On his arrival at
Philippopoli he was informed for the first time of the imprisonment

of the count of Vermandois. He immediately sent messengers to the
emperor, demanding the count’s release, and threatening, in case of
refusal, to lay waste the country with fire and sword. After waiting a
day at Philippopoli, he marched on to Adrianople, where he was met
by his messengers returning with the emperor’s refusal. Godfrey, the
bravest and most determined of the leaders of the Crusade, was not a
man to swerve from his word, and the country was given up to
pillage. Alexius here committed another blunder. No sooner did he
learn from dire experience that the Crusader was not an utterer of
idle threats, than he consented to the release of the prisoner. As he
had been unjust in the first instance, he became cowardly in the
second, and taught his enemies (for so the Crusaders were forced to
consider themselves) a lesson which they took care to remember to
his cost, that they could hope nothing from his sense of justice, but
every thing from his fears. Godfrey remained encamped for several
weeks in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, to the great
annoyance of Alexius, who sought by every means to extort from him
the homage he had extorted from Vermandois. Sometimes he acted
as if at open and declared war with the Crusaders, and sent his
troops against them. Sometimes he refused to supply them with
food, and ordered the markets to be shut against them, while at other
times he was all for peace and good-will, and sent costly presents to
Godfrey. The honest, straightforward Crusader was at last so wearied
by his false kindness, and so pestered by his attacks, that, allowing
his indignation to get the better of his judgment, he gave up the
country around Constantinople to be plundered by his soldiers. For
six days the flames of the farm-houses around struck terror into the
heart of Alexius; but, as Godfrey anticipated, they convinced him of

his error. Fearing that Constantinople itself would be the next object
of attack, he sent messengers to demand an interview with Godfrey,
offering at the same time to leave his son as a hostage for his good
faith. Godfrey agreed to meet him; and, whether to put an end to
these useless dissensions, or for some other unexplained reason, he
rendered homage to Alexius as his liege lord. He was thereupon
loaded with honours, and, according to a singular custom of that age,
underwent the ceremony of the “adoption of honour” as son to the
emperor. Godfrey and his brother Baudouin de Bouillon conducted
themselves with proper courtesy on this occasion, but were not able
to restrain the insolence of their followers, who did not conceive
themselves bound to keep any terms with a man so insincere as he
had shewn himself. One barbarous chieftain, Count Robert of Paris,
carried his insolence so far as to seat himself upon the throne; an
insult which Alexius merely resented with a sneer, but which did not
induce him to look with less mistrust upon the hordes that were still
advancing.
It is impossible, notwithstanding his treachery, to avoid feeling
some compassion for the emperor, whose life at this time was
rendered one long scene of misery by the presumption of the
Crusaders, and his not altogether groundless fears of the evil they
might inflict upon him, should any untoward circumstance force the
current of their ambition to the conquest of his empire. His daughter
Anna Comnena feelingly deplores his state of life at this time, and a
learned German 4, in a recent work, describes it, on the authority of
the princess, in the following manner:
“To avoid all occasion of offence to the Crusaders, Alexius
complied with all their whims and their (on many occasions)

unreasonable demands, even at the expense of great bodily
exertion, at a time when he was suffering severely under the
gout, which eventually brought him to his grave. No Crusader
who desired an interview with him was refused access; he
listened with the utmost patience to the long-winded harangues
which their loquacity or zeal continually wearied him with; he
endured, without expressing any impatience, the unbecoming
and haughty language which they permitted themselves to
employ towards him, and severely reprimanded his officers
when they undertook to defend the dignity of the imperial
station from these rude assaults, for he trembled with
apprehension at the slightest disputes, lest they might become
the occasion of greater evil. Though the counts often appeared
before him with trains altogether unsuitable to their dignity and
to his—sometimes with an entire troop, which completely filled
the royal apartment—the emperor held his peace. He listened to
them at all hours; he often seated himself on his throne at daybreak to attend to their wishes and requests, and the evening
twilight saw him still in the same place. Very frequently he could
not snatch time to refresh himself with meat and drink. During
many nights he could not obtain any repose, and was obliged to
indulge in an unrefreshing sleep upon his throne, with his head
resting on his hands. Even this slumber was continually
disturbed by the appearance and harangues of some newlyarrived rude knights. When all the courtiers, wearied out by the
efforts of the day and by night-watching, could no longer keep
themselves on their feet, and sank down exhausted—some upon
benches and others on the floor—Alexius still rallied his strength

to listen with seeming attention to the wearisome chatter of the
Latins, that they might have no occasion or pretext for
discontent. In such a state of fear and anxiety, how could Alexius
comport himself with dignity and like an emperor?”
Alexius, however, had himself to blame, in a great measure, for the
indignities he suffered: owing to his insincerity, the Crusaders
mistrusted him so much, that it became at last a common saying,
that the Turks and Saracens were not such inveterate foes to the
Western or Latin Christians as the Emperor Alexius and the Greeks 5.
It would be needless in this sketch, which does not profess to be so
much a history of the Crusades, as of the madness of Europe, from
which they sprang, to detail the various acts of bribery and
intimidation, cajolery and hostility, by which Alexius contrived to
make each of the leaders in succession, as they arrived, take the oath
of allegiance to him as their suzerain. One way or another he exacted
from each the barren homage on which he had set his heart, and they
were then allowed to proceed into Asia Minor. One only, Raymond
de St. Gilles count of Toulouse, obstinately refused the homage.
Their residence in Constantinople was productive of no good to the
armies of the cross. Bickerings and contentions on the one hand, and
the influence of a depraved and luxurious court on the other,
destroyed the elasticity of their spirits, and cooled the first ardour of
their enthusiasm. At one time the army of the Count of Toulouse was
on the point of disbanding itself; and, had not their leader
energetically removed them across the Bosphorus, this would have
been the result. Once in Asia, their spirits in some degree revived,
and the presence of danger and difficulty nerved them to the work

they had undertaken. The first operation of the war was the siege of
Nice, to gain possession of which all their efforts were directed.
Godfrey of Bouillon and the Count of Vermandois were joined
under its walls by each host in succession as it left Constantinople.
Among the celebrated Crusaders who fought at this siege we find,
besides the leaders already mentioned, the brave and generous
Tancred, whose name and fame have been immortalised in the
Gerusalemme Liberata, the valorous Bishop of Puy, Baldwin,
afterwards king of Jerusalem, and Peter the Hermit, now an almost
solitary soldier, shorn of all the power and influence he had formerly
possessed. Kilij Aslaun the sultan of Roum and chief of the Seljukian
Turks, whose deeds, surrounded by the false halo of romance, are
familiar to the readers of Tasso, under the name of Soliman,
marched to defend this city, but was defeated after several obstinate
engagements, in which the Christians shewed a degree of heroism
that quite astonished him. The Turkish chief had expected to find a
wild undisciplined multitude, like that under Peter the Hermit,
without leaders capable of enforcing obedience; instead of which, he
found the most experienced leaders of the age at the head of armies
that had just fanaticism enough to be ferocious, but not enough to
render them ungovernable. In these engagements, many hundreds
fell on both sides; and on both sides the most revolting barbarity was
practised: the Crusaders cut off the heads of the fallen Mussulmans,
and sent them in panniers to Constantinople, as trophies of their
victory. After the temporary defeat of Kilij Aslaun, the siege of Nice
was carried on with redoubled vigour. The Turks defended
themselves with the greatest obstinacy, and discharged showers of
poisoned arrows upon the Crusaders. When any unfortunate wretch

was killed under the walls, they let down iron hooks from above, and
drew the body up, which, after stripping and mutilating, they threw
back again at the besiegers. The latter were well supplied with
provisions, and for six-and-thirty days the siege continued without
any relaxation of the efforts on either side. Many tales are told of the
almost superhuman heroism of the Christian leaders—how one man
put a thousand to flight; and how the arrows of the faithful never
missed their mark. One anecdote of Godfrey of Bouillon, related by
Albert of Aix, is worth recording, not only as shewing the high
opinion entertained of his valour, but as shewing the contagious
credulity of the armies—a credulity which as often led them to the
very verge of defeat, as it incited them to victory. One Turk, of
gigantic stature, took his station day by day on the battlements of
Nice, and, bearing an enormous bow, committed great havoc among
the Christian host. Not a shaft he sped but bore death upon its point;
and although the Crusaders aimed repeatedly at his breast, and he
stood in the most exposed position, their arrows fell harmless at his
feet. He seemed to be invulnerable to attack; and a report was soon
spread abroad, that he was no other than the Arch Fiend himself,
and that mortal hand could not prevail against him. Godfrey of
Bouillon, who had no faith in the supernatural character of the
Mussulman, determined, if possible, to put an end to the dismay
which was rapidly paralysing the exertions of his best soldiers.
Taking a huge cross-bow, he stood forward in front of the army, to
try the steadiness of his hand against the much-dreaded archer: the
shaft was aimed directly at his heart, and took fatal effect. The
Moslem fell amid the groans of the besieged, and the shouts of Deus
adjuva! Deus adjuva! the war-cry of the besiegers.

At last the Crusaders imagined that they had overcome all
obstacles, and were preparing to take possession of the city, when, to
their great astonishment, they saw the flag of the Emperor Alexius
flying from the battlements. An emissary of the emperor, named
Faticius or Tatin, had contrived to gain admission, with a body of
Greek troops, at a point which the Crusaders had left unprotected,
and had persuaded the Turks to surrender to him rather than to the
crusading forces. The greatest indignation prevailed in the army
when this stratagem was discovered, and the soldiers were, with the
utmost difficulty, prevented from renewing the attack and besieging
the Greek emissary.
The army, however, continued its march, and, by some means or
other, was broken into two divisions; some historians say
accidentally, 6 while others affirm by mutual consent, and for the
convenience of obtaining provisions on the way. 7 The one division
was composed of the forces under Bohemund, Tancred, and the
Duke of Normandy; while the other, which took a route at some
distance on the right, was commanded by Godfrey of Bouillon and
the other chiefs. The Sultan of Roum, who, after his losses at Nice,
had been silently making great efforts to crush the Crusaders at one
blow, collected in a very short time all the multitudinous tribes that
owed him allegiance, and with an army which, according to a
moderate calculation, amounted to two hundred thousand men,
chiefly cavalry, he fell upon the first division of the Christian host in
the valley of Dorylæum. It was early in the morning of the 1st of July
1097, when the Crusaders saw the first companies of the Turkish
horsemen pouring down upon them from the hills. Bohemund had
hardly time to set himself in order, and transport his sick and

helpless to the rear, when the overwhelming force of the Orientals
was upon him. The Christian army, composed principally of men on
foot, gave way on all sides, and the hoofs of the Turkish steeds, and
the poisoned arrows of their bowmen, mowed them down by
hundreds. After having lost the flower of their chivalry, the
Christians retreated upon their baggage, when a dreadful slaughter
took place. Neither women nor children, nor the sick, were spared.
Just as they were reduced to the last extremity, Godfrey of Bouillon
and the Count of Toulouse made their appearance on the field, and
turned the tide of battle. After an obstinate engagement the Turks
fled, and their rich camp fell into the hands of the enemy. The loss of
the Crusaders amounted to about four thousand men, with several
chiefs of renown, among whom were Count Robert of Paris and
William the brother of Tancred. The loss of the Turks, which did not
exceed this number, taught them to pursue a different mode of
warfare. The sultan was far from being defeated. With his still
gigantic army, he laid waste all the country on either side of the
Crusaders. The latter, who were unaware of the tactics of the enemy,
found plenty of provisions in the Turkish camp; but so far from
economising these resources, they gave themselves up for several
days to the most unbounded extravagance. They soon paid dearly for
their heedlessness. In the ravaged country of Phrygia, through which
they advanced towards Antiochetta, they suffered dreadfully for want
of food for themselves and pasture for their cattle. Above them was a
scorching sun, almost sufficient of itself to dry up the freshness of the
land, a task which the firebrands of the sultan had but too surely
effected, and water was not to be had after the first day of their
march. The pilgrims died at the rate of five hundred a day. The

horses of the knights perished on the road, and the baggage which
they had aided to transport was either placed upon dogs, sheep, and
swine, or abandoned altogether. In some of the calamities that
afterwards befell them, the Christians gave themselves up to the
most reckless profligacy; but upon this occasion, the dissensions
which prosperity had engendered were all forgotten. Religion, often
disregarded, arose in the stern presence of misfortune, and cheered
them as they died by the promises of eternal felicity.
At length they reached Antiochetta, where they found water in
abundance, and pastures for their expiring cattle. Plenty once more
surrounded them, and here they pitched their tents. Untaught by the
bitter experience of famine, they again gave themselves up to luxury
and waste.
On the 18th of October they sat down before the strong city of
Antioch, the siege of which, and the events to which it gave rise, are
among the most extraordinary incidents of the Crusade. The city,
which is situated on an eminence, and washed by the river Orontes,
is naturally a very strong position, and the Turkish garrison were
well supplied with provisions to endure a long siege. In this respect
the Christians were also fortunate, but unluckily for themselves,
unwise. Their force amounted to three hundred thousand fighting
men; and we are informed by Raymond d’Argilles, that they had so
much provision, that they threw away the greater part of every
animal they killed, being so dainty, that they would only eat
particular parts of the beast. So insane was their extravagance, that
in less than ten days famine began to stare them in the face. After
making a fruitless attempt to gain possession of the city by a coup de
main, they, starving themselves, sat down to starve out the enemy.

But with want came a cooling of enthusiasm. The chiefs began to
grow weary of the expedition. Baldwin had previously detached
himself from the main body of the army, and, proceeding to Edessa,
had intrigued himself into the supreme power in that little
principality. The other leaders were animated with less zeal than
heretofore. Stephen of Chartres and Hugh of Vermandois began to
waver, unable to endure the privations which their own folly and
profusion had brought upon them. Even Peter the Hermit became
sick at heart ere all was over. When the famine had become so urgent
that they were reduced to eat human flesh in the extremity of their
hunger, Bohemund and Robert of Flanders set forth on an expedition
to procure a supply. They were in a slight degree successful; but the
relief they brought was not economised, and in two days they were as
destitute

as

before.

Faticius,

the

Greek

commander

and

representative of Alexius, deserted with his division under pretence
of seeking for food, and his example was followed by various bodies
of Crusaders.
Misery was rife among those who remained, and they strove to
alleviate it by a diligent attention to signs and omens. These, with
extraordinary visions seen by the enthusiastic, alternately cheered
and depressed them according as they foretold the triumph or
pictured the reverses of the cross. At one time a violent hurricane
arose, levelling great trees with the ground, and blowing down the
tents of the Christian leaders. At another time an earthquake shook
the camp, and was thought to prognosticate some great impending
evil to the cause of Christendom. But a comet which appeared shortly
afterwards raised them from the despondency into which they had
fallen; their lively imaginations making it assume the form of a

flaming cross leading them on to victory. Famine was not the least of
the evils they endured. Unwholesome food, and the impure air from
the neighbouring marshes, engendered pestilential diseases, which
carried them off more rapidly than the arrows of the enemy. A
thousand of them died in a day, and it became at last a matter of
extreme difficulty to afford them burial. To add to their misery, each
man grew suspicious of his neighbour; for the camp was infested by
Turkish spies, who conveyed daily to the besieged intelligence of the
movements and distresses of the enemy. With a ferocity, engendered
by despair, Bohemund caused two spies, whom he had detected, to
be roasted alive in presence of the army, and within sight of the
battlements of Antioch. But even this example failed to reduce their
numbers, and the Turks continued to be as well informed as the
Christians themselves of all that was passing in the camp.
The news of the arrival of a reinforcement of soldiers from Europe,
with an abundant stock of provisions, came to cheer them when
reduced to the last extremity. The welcome succour landed at St.
Simeon, the port of Antioch, and about six miles from that city.
Thitherwards the famishing Crusaders proceeded in tumultuous
bands, followed by Bohemund and the Count of Toulouse, with
strong detachments of their retainers and vassals, to escort the
supplies in safety to the camp. The garrison of Antioch, forewarned
of this arrival, was on the alert, and a corps of Turkish archers was
despatched to lie in ambuscade among the mountains and intercept
their return. Bohemund, laden with provisions, was encountered in
the rocky passes by the Turkish host. Great numbers of his followers
were slain, and he himself had just time to escape to the camp with
the news of his defeat. Godfrey of Bouillon, the Duke of Normandy,

and the other leaders had heard the rumour of this battle, and were
at that instant preparing for the rescue. The army was immediately
in motion, animated both by zeal and by hunger, and marched so
rapidly as to intercept the victorious Turks before they had time to
reach Antioch with their spoil. A fierce battle ensued, which lasted
from noon till the going down of the sun. The Christians gained and
maintained the advantage, each man fighting as if upon himself
alone had depended the fortune of the day. Hundreds of Turks
perished in the Orontes, and more than two thousand were left dead
upon the field of battle. All the provision was recaptured and brought
in safety to the camp, whither the Crusaders returned singing
Alleluia! or shouting Deus adjuva! Deus adjuva!
This relief lasted for some days, and, had it been duly economised,
would have lasted much longer; but the chiefs had no authority, and
were unable to exercise any control over its distribution. Famine
again approached with rapid strides, and Stephen count of Blois, not
liking the prospect, withdrew from the camp with four thousand of
his retainers, and established himself at Alexandretta. The moral
influence of this desertion was highly prejudicial upon those who
remained; and Bohemund, the most impatient and ambitious of the
chiefs, foresaw that, unless speedily checked, it would lead to the
utter failure of the expedition. It was necessary to act decisively; the
army murmured at the length of the siege, and the sultan was
collecting his forces to crush them. Against the efforts of the
Crusaders Antioch might have held out for months; but treason
within effected that which courage without might have striven for in
vain.

Baghasihan, the Turkish prince or emir of Antioch, had under his
command an Armenian of the name of Phirouz, whom he had
entrusted with the defence of a tower on that part of the city wall
which overlooked the passes of the mountains. Bohemund, by means
of a spy who had embraced the Christian religion, and to whom he
had given his own name at baptism, kept up a daily communication
with this captain, and made him the most magnificent promises of
reward, if he would deliver up his post to the Crusaders. Whether the
proposal was first made by Bohemund or by the Armenian is
uncertain, but that a good understanding soon existed between them
is undoubted; and a night was fixed for the execution of the project.
Bohemund communicated the scheme to Godfrey and the Count of
Toulouse, with the stipulation that, if the city were won, he, as the
soul of the enterprise, should enjoy the dignity of Prince of Antioch.
The other leaders hesitated: ambition and jealousy prompted them
to refuse their aid in furthering the views of the intriguer. More
mature consideration decided them to acquiesce, and seven hundred
of the bravest knights were chosen for the expedition, the real object
of which, for fear of spies, was kept a profound secret from the rest of
the army. When all was ready, a report was promulgated that the
seven hundred were intended to form an ambuscade for a division of
the sultan’s army, which was stated to be approaching.
Every thing favoured the treacherous project of the Armenian
captain, who, on his solitary watch-tower, received due intimation of
the approach of the Crusaders. The night was dark and stormy; not a
star was visible above, and the wind howled so furiously as to
overpower all other sounds: the rain fell in torrents, and the
watchers on the towers adjoining to that of Phirouz could not hear

the tramp of the armed knights for the wind, nor see them for the
obscurity of the night and the dismalness of the weather. When
within shot of the walls, Bohemund sent forward an interpreter to
confer with the Armenian. The latter urged them to make haste, and
seize the favourable interval, as armed men, with lighted torches,
patrolled the battlements every half hour, and at that instant they
had just passed. The chiefs were instantly at the foot of the wall:
Phirouz let down a rope; Bohemund attached it to the end of a ladder
of hides, which was then raised by the Armenian, and held while the
knights mounted. A momentary fear came over the spirits of the
adventurers, and every one hesitated. At last Bohemund, 8
encouraged by Phirouz from above, ascended a few steps on the
ladder, and was followed by Godfrey, Count Robert of Flanders, and
a number of other knights. As they advanced, others pressed
forward, until their weight became too great for the ladder, which,
breaking, precipitated about a dozen of them to the ground, where
they fell one upon the other, making a great clatter with their heavy
coats of mail. For a moment they thought that all was lost; but the
wind made so loud a howling as it swept in fierce gusts through the
mountain gorges—and the Orontes, swollen by the rain, rushed so
noisily along—that the guards heard nothing. The ladder was easily
repaired, and the knights ascended two at a time, and reached the
platform in safety. When sixty of them had thus ascended, the torch
of the coming patrol was seen to gleam at the angle of the wall.
Hiding themselves behind a buttress, they awaited his coming in
breathless silence. As soon as he arrived at arm’s length, he was
suddenly seized, and, before he could open his lips to raise an alarm,
the silence of death closed them up for ever. They next descended

rapidly the spiral staircase of the tower, and opening the portal,
admitted the whole of their companions. Raymond of Toulouse, who,
cognisant of the whole plan, had been left behind with the main body
of the army, heard at this instant the signal horn, which announced
that an entry had been effected, and, leading on his legions, the town
was attacked from within and without.
Imagination cannot conceive a scene more dreadful than that
presented by the devoted city of Antioch on that night of horror. The
Crusaders fought with a blind fury, which fanaticism and suffering
alike incited. Men, women, and children were indiscriminately
slaughtered, till the streets ran with blood. Darkness increased the
destruction, for when morning dawned the Crusaders found
themselves with their swords at the breasts of their fellow-soldiers,
whom they had mistaken for foes. The Turkish commander fled, first
to the citadel, and that becoming insecure, to the mountains, whither
he was pursued and slain, and his grey head brought back to Antioch
as a trophy. At daylight the massacre ceased, and the Crusaders gave
themselves up to plunder. They found gold, and jewels, and silks,
and velvets in abundance, but of provisions, which were of more
importance to them, they found but little of any kind. Corn was
excessively scarce, and they discovered to their sorrow that in this
respect the besieged had been but little better off than the besiegers.

SIEGE OF ANTIOCH.

Before they had time to instal themselves in their new position,
and take the necessary measures for procuring a supply, the city was
invested by the Turks. The sultan of Persia had raised an immense
army, which he entrusted to the command of Kerbogha, the emir of
Mosul, with instructions to sweep the Christian locusts from the face
of the land. The emir effected a junction with Kilij Aslaun, and the
two armies surrounded the city. Discouragement took complete
possession of the Christian host, and numbers of them contrived to
elude the vigilance of the besiegers, and escape to Count Stephen of
Blois at Alexandretta, to whom they related the most exaggerated
tales of the misery they had endured, and the utter hopelessness of
continuing the war. Stephen forthwith broke up his camp and
retreated towards Constantinople. On his way he was met by the
Emperor Alexius, at the head of a considerable force, hastening to
take possession of the conquests made by the Christians in Asia. As

soon as he heard of their woful plight, he turned back, and proceeded
with the Count of Blois to Constantinople, leaving the remnant of the
Crusaders to shift for themselves.
The news of this defection increased the discouragement at
Antioch. All the useless horses of the army had been slain and eaten,
and dogs, cats, and rats were sold at enormous prices. Even vermin
were becoming scarce. With increasing famine came a pestilence, so
that in a short time but sixty thousand remained of the three
hundred thousand that had originally invested Antioch. But this
bitter extremity, while it annihilated the energy of the host, only
served to knit the leaders more firmly together; and Bohemund,
Godfrey, and Tancred swore never to desert the cause as long as life
lasted. The former strove in vain to reanimate the courage of his
followers. They were weary and sick at heart, and his menaces and
promises were alike thrown away. Some of them had shut themselves
up in the houses, and refused to come forth. Bohemund, to drive
them to their duty, set fire to the whole quarter, and many of them
perished in the flames, while the rest of the army looked on with the
utmost indifference. Bohemund, animated himself by a worldly
spirit, did not know the true character of the Crusaders, nor
understand the religious madness which had brought them in such
shoals from Europe. A priest, more clear-sighted, devised a scheme
which restored all their confidence, and inspired them with a courage
so wonderful as to make the poor sixty thousand emaciated, sick, and
starving zealots put to flight the well-fed and six times as numerous
legions of the Sultan of Persia.
This priest, a native of Provence, was named Peter Barthelemy,
and whether he were a knave or an enthusiast, or both; a principal,

or a tool in the hands of others, will ever remain a matter of doubt.
Certain it is, however, that he was the means of raising the siege of
Antioch, and causing the eventual triumph of the armies of the cross.
When the strength of the Crusaders was completely broken by their
sufferings, and hope had fled from every bosom, Peter came to Count
Raymond of Toulouse, and demanded an interview on matters of
serious moment. He was immediately admitted. He said that, some
weeks previously, at the time the Christians were besieging Antioch,
he was reposing alone in his tent, when he was startled by the shock
of the earthquake, which had so alarmed the whole host. Through
violent terror of the shock he could only ejaculate, God help me!
when turning round he saw two men standing before him, whom he
at once recognised by the halo of glory around them as beings of
another world. One of them appeared to be an aged man, with
reddish hair sprinkled with grey, black eyes, and a long flowing grey
beard. The other was younger, larger, and handsomer, and had
something more divine in his aspect. The elderly man alone spoke,
and informed him that he was the holy apostle St. Andrew, and
desired him to seek out the Count Raymond, the Bishop of Puy, and
Raymond of Altopulto, and ask them why the bishop did not exhort
the people, and sign them with the cross which he bore. The apostle
then took him, naked in his shirt as he was, and transported him
through the air into the heart of the city of Antioch, where he led him
into the church of St. Peter, at that time a Saracen mosque. The
apostle made him stop by the pillar close to the steps by which they
ascend on the south side to the altar, where hung two lamps, which
gave out a light brighter than that of the noonday sun; the younger
man, whom he did not at that time know, standing afar off, near the

steps of the altar. The apostle then descended into the ground and
brought up a lance, which he gave into his hand, telling him that it
was the very lance that had opened the side whence had flowed the
salvation of the world. With tears of joy he held the holy lance, and
implored the apostle to allow him to take it away and deliver it into
the hands of Count Raymond. The apostle refused, and buried the
lance again in the ground, commanding him, when the city was won
from the infidels, to go with twelve chosen men, and dig it up again
in the same place. The apostle then transported him back to his tent,
and the two vanished from his sight. He had neglected, he said, to
deliver this message, afraid that his wonderful tale would not obtain
credence from men of such high rank. After some days he again saw
the holy vision, as he was gone out of the camp to look for food. This
time the divine eyes of the younger looked reproachfully upon him.
He implored the apostle to choose some one else more fitted for the
mission, but the apostle refused, and smote him with a disorder of
the eyes, as a punishment for his disobedience. With an obstinacy
unaccountable even to himself, he had still delayed. A third time the
apostle and his companion had appeared to him, as he was in a tent
with his master William at St. Simeon. On that occasion St. Andrew
told him to bear his command to the Count of Toulouse not to bathe
in the waters of the Jordan when he came to it, but to cross over in a
boat, clad in a shirt and breeches of linen, which he should sprinkle
with the sacred waters of the river. These clothes he was afterwards
to preserve along with the holy lance. His master William, although
he could not see the saint, distinctly heard the voice giving orders to
that effect. Again he neglected to execute the commission, and again
the saints appeared to him, when he was at the port of Mamistra,

about to sail for Cyprus, and St. Andrew threatened him with eternal
perdition if he refused longer. Upon this he made up his mind to
divulge all that had been revealed to him.
The Count of Toulouse, who, in all probability, concocted this tale
with the priest, appeared struck with the recital, and sent
immediately for the Bishop of Puy and Raymond of Altapulto. The
bishop at once expressed his disbelief of the whole story, and refused
to have any thing to do in the matter. The Count of Toulouse, on the
contrary, saw abundant motives, if not for believing, for pretending
to believe; and, in the end, he so impressed upon the mind of the
bishop the advantage that might be derived from it, in working up
the popular mind to its former excitement, that the latter reluctantly
agreed to make search in due form for the holy weapon. The day after
the morrow was fixed upon for the ceremony; and, in the mean time,
Peter was consigned to the care of Raymond, the count’s chaplain, in
order that no profane curiosity might have an opportunity of crossexamining him, and putting him to a nonplus.
Twelve devout men were forthwith chosen for the undertaking,
among whom were the Count of Toulouse and his chaplain. They
began digging at sunrise, and continued unwearied till near sunset,
without finding the lance; they might have dug till this day with no
better success, had not Peter himself sprung into the pit, praying to
God to bring the lance to light, for the strengthening and victory of
his people. Those who hide know where to find; and so it was with
Peter, for both he and the lance found their way into the hole at the
same time. On a sudden, he and Raymond the chaplain beheld its
point in the earth, and Raymond, drawing it forth, kissed it with
tears of joy, in sight of the multitude which had assembled in the

church. It was immediately enveloped in a rich purple cloth, already
prepared to receive it, and exhibited in this state to the faithful, who
made the building resound with their shouts of gladness.

THE HOLY LANCE.

Peter had another vision the same night, and became from that
day forth “dreamer of dreams” in general to the army. He stated on
the following day, that the Apostle Andrew and “the youth with the
divine aspect” appeared to him again, and directed that the Count of
Toulouse, as a reward for his persevering piety, should carry the Holy
Lance at the head of the army, and that the day on which it was
found should be observed as a solemn festival throughout
Christendom. St. Andrew shewed him at the same time the holes in
the feet and hands of his benign companion; and he became
convinced that he stood in the awful presence of THE REDEEMER.
Peter gained so much credit by his visions that dreaming became
contagious. Other monks beside himself were visited by the saints,
who promised victory to the host if it would valiantly hold out to the
last, and crowns of eternal glory to those who fell in the fight. Two
deserters, wearied of the fatigues and privations of the war, who had

stealthily left the camp, suddenly returned, and seeking Bohemund,
told him that they had been met by two apparitions, who, with great
anger, had commanded them to return. The one of them said, that he
recognised his brother, who had been killed in battle some months
before, and that he had a halo of glory around his head. The other,
still more hardy, asserted that the apparition which had spoken to
him was the Saviour himself, who had promised eternal happiness as
his reward if he returned to his duty, but the pains of eternal fire if he
rejected the cross. No one thought of disbelieving these men. The
courage of the army immediately revived; despondency gave way to
hope; every arm grew strong again, and the pangs of hunger were for
a time disregarded. The enthusiasm which had led them from
Europe, burned forth once more as brightly as ever, and they
demanded, with loud cries, to be led against the enemy. The leaders
were not unwilling. In a battle lay their only chance of salvation; and
although Godfrey, Bohemund, and Tancred received the story of the
lance with much suspicion, they were too wise to throw discredit
upon an imposture which bade fair to open the gates of victory.
Peter the Hermit was previously sent to the camp of Kerbogha to
propose that the quarrel between the two religions should be decided
by a chosen number of the bravest soldiers of each army. Kerbogha
turned from him with a look of contempt, and said he could agree to
no proposals from a set of such miserable beggars and robbers. With
this uncourteous answer Peter returned to Antioch. Preparations
were immediately commenced for an attack upon the enemy: the
latter continued to be perfectly well informed of all the proceedings
of the Christian camp. The citadel of Antioch, which remained in
their possession, overlooked the town, and the commander of the

fortress could distinctly see all that was passing within. On the
morning of the 28th of June, 1098, a black flag, hoisted from its
highest tower, announced to the besieging army that the Christians
were about to sally forth.
The Moslem leaders knew the sad inroads that famine and disease
had made upon the numbers of the foe; they knew that not above two
hundred of the knights had horses to ride upon, and that the foot
soldiers were sick and emaciated; but they did not know the almost
incredible valour which superstition had infused into their hearts.
The story of the lance they treated with the most supreme contempt,
and, secure of an easy victory, they gave themselves no trouble in
preparing for the onslaught. It is related that Kerbogha was playing a
game at chess, when the black flag on the citadel gave warning of the
enemy’s approach, and that, with true oriental coolness, he insisted
upon finishing the game ere he bestowed any of his attention upon a
foe so unworthy. The defeat of his advanced post of two thousand
men aroused him from his apathy.
The Crusaders, after this first victory, advanced joyfully towards
the mountains, hoping to draw the Turks to a place where their
cavalry would be unable to manœuvre. Their spirits were light and
their courage high, as, led on by the Duke of Normandy, Count
Robert of Flanders, and Hugh of Vermandois, they came within sight
of the splendid camp of the enemy. Godfrey of Bouillon and
Adhemar Bishop of Puy, followed immediately after these leaders,
the latter clad in complete armour, and bearing the Holy Lance
within sight of the whole army: Bohemund and Tancred brought up
the rear.

Kerbogha, aware at last that his enemy was not so despicable, took
vigorous measures to remedy his mistake, and, preparing himself to
meet the Christians in front, he despatched the Sultan Soliman of
Roum to attack them in the rear. To conceal this movement, he set
fire to the dried weeds and grass with which the ground was covered,
and Soliman, taking a wide circuit with his cavalry, succeeded, under
cover of the smoke, in making good his position in the rear. The
battle raged furiously in front; the arrows of the Turks fell thick as
hail, and their well-trained squadrons trod the Crusaders under their
hoofs like stubble. Still the affray was doubtful; for the Christians
had the advantage of the ground, and were rapidly gaining upon the
enemy, when the overwhelming forces of Soliman arrived in the rear.
Godfrey and Tancred flew to the rescue of Bohemund, spreading
dismay in the Turkish ranks by their fierce impetuosity. The Bishop
of Puy was left almost alone with the Provençals to oppose the
legions commanded by Kerbogha in person; but the presence of the
Holy Lance made a hero of the meanest soldier in his train. Still,
however, the numbers of the enemy seemed interminable. The
Christians, attacked on every side, began at last to give way, and the
Turks made sure of victory.
At this moment a cry was raised in the Christian host that the
saints were fighting on their side. The battle-field was clear of the
smoke from the burning weeds, which had curled away, and hung in
white clouds of fantastic shape on the brow of the distant mountains.
Some imaginative zealot, seeing this dimly through the dust of the
battle, called out to his fellows, to look at the army of saints, clothed
in white, and riding upon white horses, that were pouring over the
hills to the rescue. All eyes were immediately turned to the distant

smoke; faith was in every heart; and the old battle-cry, God wills it!
God wills it! resounded through the field, as every soldier, believing
that God was visibly sending his armies to his aid, fought with an
energy unfelt before. A panic seized the Persian and Turkish hosts,
and they gave way in all directions. In vain Kerbogha tried to rally
them. Fear is more contagious than enthusiasm, and they fled over
the mountains like deer pursued by the hounds. The two leaders,
seeing the uselessness of further efforts, fled with the rest; and that
immense army was scattered over Palestine, leaving nearly seventy
thousand of its dead upon the field of battle.
Their magnificent camp fell into the hands of the enemy, with its
rich stores of corn, and its droves of sheep and oxen. Jewels, gold,
and rich velvets in abundance were distributed among the army.
Tancred followed the fugitives over the hills, and reaped as much
plunder as those who had remained in the camp. The way, as they
fled, was covered with valuables, and horses of the finest breed of
Arabia became so plentiful that every knight of the Christians was
provided with a steed. The Crusaders, in this battle, acknowledge to
have lost nearly ten thousand men.
Their return to Antioch was one of joy indeed: the citadel was
surrendered at once, and many of the Turkish garrison embraced the
Christian faith, and the rest were suffered to depart. A solemn
thanksgiving was offered up by the Bishop of Puy, in which the whole
army joined, and the Holy Lance was visited by every soldier.
The enthusiasm lasted for some days, and the army loudly
demanded to be led forward to Jerusalem, the grand goal of all their
wishes: but none of their leaders was anxious to move;—the more
prudent among them, such as Godfrey and Tancred, for reasons of

expediency; and the more ambitious, such as the Count of Toulouse
and Bohemund, for reasons of self-interest. Violent dissensions
sprang up again between all the chiefs. Raymond of Toulouse, who
was left at Antioch to guard the town, had summoned the citadel to
surrender, as soon as he saw that there was no fear of any attack
upon the part of the Persians; and the other chiefs found, upon their
return, his banner waving on its walls. This had given great offence
to Bohemund, who had stipulated the principality of Antioch as his
reward for winning the town in the first instance. Godfrey and
Tancred supported his claim, and, after a great deal of bickering, the
flag of Raymond was lowered from the tower, and that of Bohemund
hoisted in its stead, who assumed from that time the title of Prince of
Antioch. Raymond, however, persisted in retaining possession of one
of the city gates and its adjacent towers, which he held for several
months, to the great annoyance of Bohemund and the scandal of the
army. The count became in consequence extremely unpopular,
although his ambition was not a whit more unreasonable than that of
Bohemund himself, nor of Baldwin, who had taken up his quarters at
Edessa, where he exercised the functions of a petty sovereign.
The fate of Peter Barthelemy deserves to be recorded. Honours
and consideration had come thick upon him after the affair of the
lance, and he consequently felt bound in conscience to continue the
dreams which had made him a personage of so much importance.
The mischief of it was, that, like many other liars, he had a very bad
memory, and he contrived to make his dreams contradict each other
in the most palpable manner. St. John one night appeared to him,
and told one tale; while, a week after, St. Paul told a totally different
story, and held out hopes quite incompatible with those of his

apostolic brother. The credulity of that age had a wide maw, and
Peter’s visions must have been absurd and outrageous indeed, when
the very men who had believed in the lance refused to swallow any
more of his wonders. Bohemund at last, for the purpose of annoying
the Count of Toulouse, challenged poor Peter to prove the truth of
his story of the lance by the fiery ordeal. Peter could not refuse a trial
so common in that age, and being besides encouraged by the count
and his chaplain Raymond, an early day was appointed for the
ceremony. The previous night was spent in prayer and fasting,
according to custom, and Peter came forth in the morning bearing
the lance in his hand, and walked boldly up to the fire. The whole
army gathered round, impatient for the result, many thousands still
believing that the lance was genuine, and Peter a holy man. Prayers
having been said by Raymond d’Agilles, Peter walked into the flames,
and had got nearly through, when pain caused him to lose his
presence of mind: the heat too affected his eyes, and, in his anguish,
he turned round unwittingly, and passed through the fire again,
instead of stepping out of it, as he should have done. The result was,
that he was burned so severely that he never recovered, and, after
lingering for some days, he expired in great agony.
Most of the soldiers were suffering either from wounds, disease, or
weariness; and it was resolved by Godfrey,—the tacitly acknowledged
chief of the enterprise,—that the army should have time to refresh
itself ere they advanced upon Jerusalem. It was now July, and he
proposed that they should pass the hot months of August and
September within the walls of Antioch, and march forward in
October with renewed vigour, and numbers increased by fresh
arrivals from Europe. This advice was finally adopted, although the

enthusiasts of the army continued to murmur at the delay. In the
mean time the Count of Vermandois was sent upon an embassy to
the Emperor Alexius at Constantinople, to reproach him for his base
desertion of the cause, and urge him to send the reinforcements he
had promised. The count faithfully executed his mission (of which,
by the way, Alexius took no notice whatever), and remained for some
time at Constantinople, till his zeal, never very violent, totally
evaporated. He then returned to France, sick of the Crusade, and
determined to intermeddle with it no more.
The chiefs, though they had determined to stay at Antioch for two
months, could not remain quiet for so long a time. They would, in all
probability, have fallen upon each other, had there been no Turks in
Palestine upon whom they might vent their impetuosity. Godfrey
proceeded to Edessa, to aid his brother Baldwin in expelling the
Saracens from his principality, and the other leaders carried on
separate hostilities against them as caprice or ambition dictated. At
length the impatience of the army to be led against Jerusalem
became so great that the chiefs could no longer delay, and Raymond,
Tancred, and Robert of Normandy marched forward with their
divisions, and laid siege to the small but strong town of Marah. With
their usual improvidence, they had not food enough to last a
beleaguering army for a week. They suffered great privations in
consequence, till Bohemund came to their aid and took the town by
storm. In connexion with this siege, the chronicler, Raymond
d’Agilles (the same Raymond the chaplain who figured in the affair of
the Holy Lance), relates a legend, in the truth of which he devoutly
believed, and upon which Tasso has founded one of the most
beautiful passages of his poem. It is worth preserving, as shewing the

spirit of the age and the source of the extraordinary courage
manifested by the Crusaders on occasions of extreme difficulty. “One
day,” says Raymond, “Anselme de Ribeaumont beheld young
Engelram, the son of the Count de St. Paul, who had been killed at
Marah, enter his tent. ‘How is it,’ said Anselme to him, ‘that you,
whom I saw lying dead on the field of battle, are full or life?’—‘You
must know,’ replied Engelram, ‘that those who fight for Jesus Christ
never die.’ ‘But whence,’ resumed Anselme, ‘comes that strange
brightness that surrounds you?’ Upon this Engelram pointed to the
sky, where Anselme saw a palace of diamond and crystal. ‘It is
thence,’ said he, ‘that I derive the beauty which surprises you. My
dwelling is there; a still finer one is prepared for you, and you shall
soon come to inhabit it. Farewell! we shall meet again to-morrow.’
With these words Engelram returned to heaven. Anselme, struck by
the vision, sent the next morning for the priests, received the
sacrament, and although full of health, took a last farewell of all his
friends, telling them that he was about to leave this world. A few
hours afterwards, the enemy having made a sortie, Anselme went out
against them sword in hand, and was struck on the forehead by a
stone from a Turkish sling, which sent him to heaven, to the
beautiful palace that was prepared for him.”

SHRINE OF THE NATIVITY.

New disputes arose between the Prince of Antioch and the Count
of Toulouse with regard to the capture of this town, which were with
the utmost difficulty appeased by the other chiefs. Delays also took
place in the progress of the army, especially before Archas, and the
soldiery were so exasperated that they were on the point of choosing
new leaders to conduct them to Jerusalem. Godfrey, upon this, set
fire to his camp at Archas, and marched forward. He was
immediately joined by hundreds of the Provençals of the Count of
Toulouse. The latter, seeing the turn affairs were taking, hastened
after them, and the whole host proceeded towards the holy city, so
long desired amid sorrow, and suffering, and danger. At Emmaus
they were met by a deputation from the Christians of Bethlehem,

praying for immediate aid against the oppression of the infidels. The
very name of Bethlehem, the birthplace of the Saviour, was music to
their ears, and many of them wept with joy to think they were
approaching a spot so hallowed. Albert of Aix informs us that their
hearts were so touched that sleep was banished from the camp, and
that, instead of waiting till the morning’s dawn to recommence their
march, they set out shortly after midnight, full of hope and
enthusiasm. For upwards of four hours the mail-clad legions
tramped stedfastly forward in the dark, and when the sun arose in
unclouded splendour, the towers and pinnacles of Jerusalem
gleamed upon their sight. All the tender feelings of their nature were
touched; no longer brutal fanatics, but meek and humble pilgrims,
they knelt down upon the sod, and with tears in their eyes, exclaimed
to one another “Jerusalem! Jerusalem!” Some of them kissed the
holy ground, others stretched themselves at full length upon it, in
order that their bodies might come in contact with the greatest
possible extent of it, and others prayed aloud. The women and
children who had followed the camp from Europe, and shared in all
its dangers, fatigues, and privations, were more boisterous in their
joy; the former from long-nourished enthusiasm, and the latter from
mere imitation, 9 and prayed, and wept, and laughed till they almost
put the more sober to the blush.

THE PILGRIMS AT THE FIRST SIGHT OF JERUSALEM.

The first ebullition of their gladness having subsided, the army
marched forward, and invested the city on all sides. The assault was
almost immediately begun; but after the Christians had lost some of
their bravest knights, that mode of attack was abandoned, and the
army commenced its preparations for a regular siege. Mangonels,
moveable towers, and battering-rams, together with a machine called
a sow, made of wood, and covered with raw hides, inside of which
miners worked to undermine the walls, were forthwith constructed;
and to restore the courage and discipline of the army, which had
suffered from the unworthy dissensions of the chiefs, the latter held
out the hand of friendship to each other, and Tancred and the Count
of Toulouse embraced in sight of the whole camp. The clergy aided
the cause with their powerful voice, and preached union and
goodwill to the highest and the lowest. A solemn procession was also
ordered round the city, in which the entire army joined, prayers
being offered up at every spot which gospel records had taught them
to consider as peculiarly sacred.
The Saracens upon the ramparts beheld all these manifestations
without alarm. To incense the Christians, whom they despised, they
constructed rude crosses, and fixed them upon the walls, and spat

upon and pelted them with dirt and stones. This insult to the symbol
of their faith raised the wrath of the Crusaders to that height that
bravery became ferocity, and enthusiasm madness. When all the
engines of war were completed, the attack was recommenced, and
every soldier of the Christian army fought with a vigour which the
sense of private wrong invariably inspires. Every man had been
personally outraged, and the knights worked at the battering-rams
with as much readiness as the meanest soldiers. The Saracen arrows
and balls of fire fell thick and fast among them, but the tremendous
rams still heaved against the walls, while the best marksmen of the
host were busily employed in the several floors of the moveable
towers in dealing death among the Turks upon the battlements.
Godfrey, Raymond, Tancred, and Robert of Normandy, each upon
his tower, fought for hours with unwearied energy, often repulsed,
but ever ready to renew the struggle. The Turks, no longer despising
the enemy, defended themselves with the utmost skill and bravery
till darkness brought a cessation of hostilities. Short was the sleep
that night in the Christian camp. The priests offered up solemn
prayers in the midst of the attentive soldiery for the triumph of the
cross in this last great struggle; and as soon as morning dawned,
every one was in readiness for the affray. The women and children
lent their aid, the latter running unconcerned to and fro while the
arrows fell fast around them, bearing water to the thirsty
combatants. The saints were believed to be aiding their efforts, and
the army, impressed with this idea, surmounted difficulties under
which a force thrice as numerous, but without their faith, would have
quailed and been defeated. Raymond of Toulouse at last forced his
way into the city by escalade, while at the very same moment

Tancred and Robert of Normandy succeeded in bursting open one of
the gates. The Turks flew to repair the mischief, and Godfrey of
Bouillon, seeing the battlements comparatively deserted, let down
the drawbridge of his moveable tower, and sprang forward, followed
by all the knights of his train. In an instant after, the banner of the
cross floated upon the walls of Jerusalem. The Crusaders, raising
once more their redoubtable war-cry, rushed on from every side, and
the city was taken. The battle raged in the streets for several hours,
and the Christians, remembering their insulted faith, gave no quarter
to young or old, male or female, sick or strong. Not one of the leaders
thought himself at liberty to issue orders for staying the carnage, and
if he had, he would not have been obeyed. The Saracens fled in great
numbers to the mosque of Soliman, but they had not time to fortify
themselves within it ere the Christians were upon them. Ten
thousand persons are said to have perished in that building alone.
Peter the Hermit, who had remained so long under the veil of
neglect, was repaid that day for all his zeal and all his sufferings. As
soon as the battle was over, the Christians of Jerusalem issued forth
from their hiding-places to welcome their deliverers. They instantly
recognised the Hermit as the pilgrim who, years before, had spoken
to them so eloquently of the wrongs and insults they had endured,
and promised to stir up the princes and people of Europe in their
behalf. They clung to the skirts of his garments in the fervour of their
gratitude, and vowed to remember him for ever in their prayers.
Many of them shed tears about his neck, and attributed the
deliverance of Jerusalem solely to his courage and perseverance.
Peter afterwards held some ecclesiastical office in the holy city, but
what it was, or what was his ultimate fate, history has forgotten to

inform us. Some say that he returned to France and founded a
monastery, but the story does not rest upon sufficient authority.

SIEGE OF JERUSALEM.

The grand object for which the popular swarms of Europe had
forsaken their homes was now accomplished. The Moslem mosques
of Jerusalem were converted into churches for a purer faith, and the
mount of Calvary and the sepulchre of Christ were profaned no
longer by the presence or the power of the infidel. Popular frenzy had
fulfilled its mission, and, as a natural consequence, it began to
subside from that time forth. The news of the capture of Jerusalem
brought numbers of pilgrims from Europe, and, among others,
Stephen count of Chartres and Hugh of Vermandois, to atone for
their desertion; but nothing like the former enthusiasm existed
among the nations.

Thus then ends the history of the first Crusade. For the better
understanding of the second, it will be necessary to describe the
interval between them, and to enter into a slight sketch of the history
of Jerusalem under its Latin kings, the long and fruitless wars they
continued to wage with the unvanquished Saracens, and the poor
and miserable results which sprang from so vast an expenditure of
zeal, and so deplorable a waste of human life.

JERUSALEM.

The necessity of having some recognised chief was soon felt by the
Crusaders, and Godfrey de Bouillon, less ambitious than Bohemund
or Raymond of Toulouse, gave his cold consent to wield a sceptre
which the latter chiefs would have clutched with eagerness. He was
hardly invested with the royal mantle before the Saracens menaced
his capital. With much vigour and judgment he exerted himself to
follow up the advantages he had gained, and marching out to meet
the enemy before they had time to besiege him in Jerusalem, he gave
them battle at Ascalon, and defeated them with great loss. He did
not, however, live long to enjoy his new dignity, being seized with a

fatal illness when he had only reigned nine months. To him
succeeded his brother, Baldwin of Edessa. The latter monarch did
much to improve the condition of Jerusalem and to extend its
territory, but was not able to make a firm footing for his successors.
For fifty years, in which the history of Jerusalem is full of interest to
the historical student, the Crusaders were exposed to fierce and
constant hostilities, often gaining battles and territory, and as often
losing them, but becoming every day weaker and more divided, while
the Saracens became stronger and more united to harass and root
them out. The battles of this period were of the most chivalrous
character, and deeds of heroism were done by the handful of brave
knights that remained in Syria, which have hardly their parallel in
the annals of war. In the course of time, however, the Christians
could not avoid feeling some respect for the courage, and admiration
for the polished manners and advanced civilisation of the Saracens,
so much superior to the rudeness and semi-barbarism of Europe at
that day. Difference of faith did not prevent them from forming
alliances with the dark-eyed maidens of the East. One of the first to
set the example of taking a Paynim spouse was King Baldwin
himself, and these connexions in time became not only frequent, but
almost universal, among such of the knights as had resolved to spend
their lives in Palestine. These Eastern ladies were obliged, however,
to submit to the ceremony of baptism before they could be received
to the arms of a Christian lord. These, and their offspring, naturally
looked upon the Saracens with less hatred than did the zealots who
conquered Jerusalem, and who thought it a sin deserving the wrath
of God to spare an unbeliever. We find, in consequence, that the
most obstinate battles waged during the reigns of the later kings of

Jerusalem were fought by the new and raw levies who from time to
time arrived from Europe, lured by the hope of glory or spurred by
fanaticism. The latter broke without scruple the truces established
between the original settlers and the Saracens, and drew down
severe retaliation upon many thousands of their brethren in the
faith, whose prudence was stronger than their zeal, and whose chief
desire was to live in peace.

BIBLE OF BALDWIN’S QUEEN.

Things remained in this unsatisfactory state till the close of the
year 1145, when Edessa, the strong frontier town of the Christian
kingdom, fell into the hands of the Saracens. The latter were
commanded by Zenghi, a powerful and enterprising monarch, and,
after his death, by his son Nourheddin, as powerful and enterprising
as his father. An unsuccessful attempt was made by the Count of
Edessa to regain the fortress, but Nourheddin with a large army
came to the rescue, and after defeating the count with great
slaughter, marched into Edessa and caused its fortifications to be
razed to the ground, that the town might never more be a bulwark of
defence for the kingdom of Jerusalem. The road to the capital was
now open, and consternation seized the hearts of the Christians.

Nourheddin, it was known, was only waiting for a favourable
opportunity to advance upon Jerusalem, and the armies of the cross,
weakened and divided, were not in a condition to make any available
resistance. The clergy were filled with grief and alarm, and wrote
repeated letters to the Pope and the sovereigns of Europe, urging the
expediency of a new Crusade for the relief of Jerusalem. By far the
greater number of the priests of Palestine were natives of France, and
these naturally looked first to their own country. The solicitations
they sent to Louis VII. were urgent and oft repeated, and the chivalry
of France began to talk once more of arming in defence of the
birthplace of Jesus. The kings of Europe, whose interest it had not
been to take any part in the first Crusade, began to bestir themselves
in this; and a man appeared, eloquent as Peter the Hermit, to arouse
the people as that preacher had done.
We find, however, that the enthusiasm of the second did not equal
that of the first Crusade; in fact, the mania had reached its climax in
the time of Peter the Hermit, and decreased regularly from that
period. The third Crusade was less general than the second, and the
fourth than the third, and so on, until the public enthusiasm was
quite extinct, and Jerusalem returned at last to the dominion of its
old masters without a convulsion in Christendom. Various reasons
have been assigned for this; and one very generally put forward is,
that Europe was wearied with continued struggles, and had become
sick of “precipitating itself upon Asia.” M. Guizot, in his admirable
lectures upon European civilisation, successfully combats this
opinion, and offers one of his own, which is far more satisfactory. He
says, in his eighth lecture, “It has been often repeated that Europe
was tired of continually invading Asia. This expression appears to me

exceedingly incorrect. It is not possible that human beings can be
wearied with what they have not done—that the labours of their
forefathers can fatigue them. Weariness is a personal, not an
inherited feeling. The men of the thirteenth century were not
fatigued by the Crusades of the twelfth. They were influenced by
another cause. A great change had taken place in ideas, sentiments,
and social conditions. The same desires and the same wants were no
longer felt. The same things were no longer believed. The people
refused to believe what their ancestors were persuaded of.”
This is, in fact, the secret of the change; and its truth becomes
more apparent as we advance in the history of the Crusades, and
compare the state of the public mind at the different periods when
Godfrey of Bouillon, Louis VII., and Richard I., were chiefs and
leaders of the movement. The Crusades themselves were the means
of operating a great change in national ideas, and advancing the
civilisation of Europe. In the time of Godfrey, the nobles were allpowerful and all-oppressive, and equally obnoxious to kings and
people. During their absence along with that portion of the
community the deepest sunk in ignorance and superstition, both
kings and people fortified themselves against the renewal of
aristocratic tyranny, and in proportion as they became free became
civilised. It was during this period that in France, the grand centre of
the crusading madness, the communes began to acquire strength,
and the monarch to possess a practical and not a merely theoretic
authority. Order and comfort began to take root, and, when the
second Crusade was preached, men were in consequence much less
willing to abandon their homes than they had been during the first.
Such pilgrims as had returned from the Holy Land came back with

minds more liberal and expanded than when they set out. They had
come in contact with a people more civilised than themselves; they
had seen something more of the world, and had lost some portion,
however small, of the prejudice and bigotry of ignorance. The
institution of chivalry had also exercised its humanising influence,
and coming bright and fresh through the ordeal of the Crusades, had
softened the character and improved the hearts of the aristocratic
order. The Trouvères and Troubadours, singing of love and war in
strains pleasing to every class of society, helped to root out the
gloomy superstitions which, at the first Crusade, filled the minds of
all those who were able to think. Men became in consequence less
exclusively under the mental thraldom of the priesthood, and lost
much of the credulity which formerly distinguished them.
The Crusades appear never to have excited so much attention in
England as on the continent of Europe; not because the people were
less fanatical than their neighbours, but because they were occupied
in matters of graver interest. The English were suffering too severely
from the recent successful invasion of their soil, to have much
sympathy to bestow upon the distresses of people so far away as the
Christians of Palestine; and we find that they took no part in the first
Crusade, and very little in the second. Even then those who engaged
in it were chiefly Norman knights and their vassals, and not the
Saxon franklins and population, who no doubt thought, in their
sorrow, as many wise men have thought since, that charity should
begin at home.
Germany was productive of more zeal in the cause, and her raw
uncivilised hordes continued to issue forth under the banners of the
cross in numbers apparently undiminished, when the enthusiasm

had long been on the wane in other countries. They were sunk at that
time in a deeper slough of barbarism than the livelier nations around
them, and took, in consequence, a longer period to free themselves
from their prejudices. In fact the second Crusade drew its chief
supplies of men from that quarter, where alone the expedition can be
said to have retained any portion of popularity.
Such was the state of mind of Europe when Pope Eugenius, moved
by the reiterated entreaties of the Christians of Syria, commissioned
St. Bernard to preach a new Crusade. St. Bernard was a man
eminently qualified for the mission. He was endowed with an
eloquence of the highest order, could move an auditory to tears, or
laughter, or fury, as it pleased him, and had led a life of such rigid
and self-denying virtue, that not even calumny could lift her finger
and point it at him. He had renounced high prospects in the Church,
and contented himself with the simple abbacy of Clairvaux, in order
that he might have the leisure he desired, to raise his powerful voice
against abuses wherever he found them. Vice met in him an austere
and uncompromising reprover; no man was too high for his
reproach, and none too low for his sympathy. He was just as well
suited for his age as Peter the Hermit had been for the age preceding.
He appealed more to the reason, his predecessor to the passions;
Peter the Hermit collected a mob, while St. Bernard collected an
army. Both were endowed with equal zeal and perseverance,
springing in the one from impulse, and in the other from conviction,
and a desire to increase the influence of the Church, that great body
of which he was a pillar and an ornament.

CATHEDRAL OF VEZELAI.

One of the first converts he made was in himself a host. Louis VII.
was both superstitious and tyrannical, and, in a fit of remorse for the
infamous slaughter he had authorised at the sacking of Vitry, he
made a vow to undertake the journey to the Holy Land. 10 He was in
this disposition when St. Bernard began to preach, and wanted but
little persuasion to embark in the cause. His example had great
influence upon the nobility, who, impoverished as many of them
were by the sacrifices made by their fathers in the holy wars, were
anxious to repair their ruined fortunes by conquests on a foreign
shore. These took the field with such vassals as they could command,
and in a very short time an army was raised amounting to two
hundred thousand men. At Vezelai the monarch received the cross
from the hands of St. Bernard, on a platform elevated in sight of all
the people. Several nobles, three bishops, and his queen, Eleanor of
Aquitaine, were present at this ceremony, and enrolled themselves

under the banner of the cross, St. Bernard cutting up his red
sacerdotal vestments, and making crosses of them, to be sewn on the
shoulders of the people. An exhortation from the Pope was read to
the multitude, granting remission of their sins to all who should join
the Crusade, and directing that no man on that holy pilgrimage
should encumber himself with heavy baggage and vain superfluities,
and that the nobles should not travel with dogs or falcons, to lead
them from the direct road, as had happened to so many during the
first Crusade.
The command of the army was offered to St. Bernard; but he
wisely refused to accept a station for which his habits had
unqualified him. After consecrating Louis with great solemnity, at St.
Denis, as chief of the expedition, he continued his course through the
country, stirring up the people wherever he went. So high an opinion
was entertained of his sanctity, that he was thought to be animated
by the spirit of prophecy, and to be gifted with the power of working
miracles. Many women, excited by his eloquence, and encouraged by
his predictions, forsook their husbands and children, and, clothing
themselves in male attire, hastened to the war. St. Bernard himself
wrote a letter to the Pope detailing his success, and stating, that in
several towns there did not remain a single male inhabitant capable
of bearing arms, and that every where castles and towns were to be
seen filled with women weeping for their absent husbands. But in
spite of this apparent enthusiasm, the numbers who really took up
arms were inconsiderable, and not to be compared to the swarms of
the first Crusade. A levy of no more than two hundred thousand
men, which was the utmost the number amounted to, could hardly
have depopulated a country like France, to the extent mentioned by

St. Bernard. His description of the state of the country appears,
therefore, to have been much more poetical than true.
Suger, the able minister of Louis, endeavoured to dissuade him
from undertaking so long a journey at a time when his own
dominions so much needed his presence. But the king was pricked in
his conscience by the cruelties of Vitry, and was anxious to make the
only reparation which the religion of that day considered sufficient.
He was desirous, moreover, of testifying to the world, that though he
could brave the temporal power of the Church when it encroached
upon his prerogatives, he could render all due obedience to its
spiritual decrees whenever it suited his interest or tallied with his
prejudices to do so. Suger, therefore, implored in vain, and Louis
received the pilgrim’s staff at St. Denis, and made all preparations for
his pilgrimage.
In the mean time St. Bernard passed into Germany, where similar
success attended his preaching. The renown of his sanctity had gone
before him, and he found every where an admiring audience.
Thousands of people, who could not understand a word he said,
flocked around him to catch a glimpse of so holy a man; and the
knights enrolled themselves in great numbers in the service of the
cross, each receiving from his hands the symbol of the cause. But the
people were not led away as in the days of Gottschalk. We do not find
that they rose in such tremendous masses of two and three hundred
thousand men, swarming over the country like a plague of locusts.
Still the enthusiasm was very great. The extraordinary tales that were
told and believed of the miracles worked by the preacher brought the
country people from far and near. Devils were said to vanish at his
sight, and diseases of the most malignant nature to be cured by his

touch. 11 The Emperor Conrad caught at last the contagion from his
subjects, and declared his intention to follow the cross.
The preparations were carried on so vigorously under the orders of
Conrad, that in less than three months he found himself at the head
of an army containing at least one hundred and fifty thousand
effective men, besides a great number of women who followed their
husbands and lovers to the war. One troop of them rode in the
attitude and armour of men: their chief wore gilt spurs and buskins,
and thence acquired the epithet of the golden-footed lady. Conrad
was ready to set out long before the French monarch, and in the
month of June 1147, he arrived before Constantinople, having passed
through Hungary and Bulgaria without offence to the inhabitants.

PILGRIM’S STAFF.

Manuel Comnenus, the Greek emperor, successor not only to the
throne but to the policy of Alexius, looked with alarm upon the new
levies who had come to eat up his capital and imperil its tranquillity.
Too weak to refuse them a passage through his dominions, too
distrustful of them to make them welcome when they came, and too
little assured of the advantages likely to result to himself from the
war, to feign a friendship which he did not feel, the Greek emperor

gave offence at the very outset. His subjects, in the pride of superior
civilisation, called the Germans barbarians; while the latter, who, if
semi-barbarous, were at least honest and straightforward, retorted
upon the Greeks by calling them double-faced knaves and traitors.
Disputes continually arose between them, and Conrad, who had
preserved so much good order among his followers during their
passage, was unable to restrain their indignation when they arrived
at Constantinople. For some offence or other which the Greeks had
given them, but which is rather hinted at than stated by the scanty
historians of the day, the Germans broke into the magnificent
pleasure-garden of the emperor, where he had a valuable collection
of tame animals, for which the grounds had been laid out in woods,
caverns, groves, and streams, that each might follow in captivity his
natural habits. The enraged Germans, meriting the name of
barbarians that had been bestowed upon them, laid waste this
pleasant retreat, and killed or let loose the valuable animals it
contained. Manuel, who is said to have beheld the devastation from
his palace windows without power or courage to prevent it, was
completely disgusted with his guests, and resolved, like his
predecessor Alexius, to get rid of them on the first opportunity. He
sent a message to Conrad respectfully desiring an interview, but the
German refused to trust himself within the walls of Constantinople.
The Greek emperor, on his part, thought it compatible neither with
his dignity nor his safety to seek the German, and several days were
spent in insincere negotiations. Manuel at length agreed to furnish
the crusading army with guides to conduct it through Asia Minor;
and Conrad passed over the Hellespont with his forces, the advanced

guard being commanded by himself, and the rear by the warlike
Bishop of Freysinghen.
Historians are almost unanimous in their belief that the wily Greek
gave instructions to his guides to lead the army of the German
emperor into dangers and difficulties. It is certain that, instead of
guiding them through such districts of Asia Minor as afforded water
and provisions, they led them into the wilds of Cappadocia, where
neither was to be procured, and where they were suddenly attacked
by the sultan of the Seljukian Turks, at the head of an immense force.
The guides, whose treachery is apparent from this fact alone, fled at
the first sight of the Turkish army, and the Christians were left to
wage unequal warfare with their enemy, entangled and bewildered in
desert wilds. Toiling in their heavy mail, the Germans could make
but little effective resistance to the attacks of the Turkish light horse,
who were down upon them one instant, and out of sight the next.
Now in the front and now in the rear, the agile foe showered his
arrows upon them, enticing them into swamps and hollows, from
which they could only extricate themselves after long struggles and
great losses. The Germans, confounded by this mode of warfare, lost
all conception of the direction they were pursuing, and went back
instead of forward. Suffering at the same time for want of provisions,
they fell an easy prey to their pursuers. Count Bernhard, one of the
bravest leaders of the German expedition, was surrounded, with his
whole division, not one of whom escaped the Turkish arrows. The
emperor himself had nearly fallen a victim, and was twice severely
wounded. So persevering was the enemy, and so little able were the
Germans to make even a shew of resistance, that when Conrad at last
reached the city of Nice, he found that, instead of being at the head of

an imposing force of one hundred thousand foot and seventy
thousand horse, he had but fifty or sixty thousand men, and these in
the most worn and wearied condition.
Totally ignorant of the treachery of the Greek emperor, although
he had been warned to beware of it, Louis VII. proceeded, at the head
of his army, through Worms and Ratisbon, towards Constantinople.
At Ratisbon he was met by a deputation from Manuel, bearing letters
so full of hyperbole and flattery, that Louis is reported to have
blushed when they were read to him by the Bishop of Langres. The
object of the deputation was to obtain from the French king a
promise to pass through the Grecian territories in a peaceable and
friendly manner, and to yield to the Greek emperor any conquest he
might make in Asia Minor. The first part of the proposition was
immediately acceded to, but no notice was taken of the second and
more unreasonable. Louis marched on, and, passing through
Hungary, pitched his tents in the outskirts of Constantinople.
On his arrival, Manuel sent him a friendly invitation to enter the
city at the head of a small train. Louis at once accepted it, and was
met by the emperor at the porch of his palace. The fairest promises
were made; every art that flattery could suggest was resorted to, and
every argument employed, to induce him to yield his future
conquests to the Greek. Louis obstinately refused to pledge himself,
and returned to his army convinced that the emperor was a man not
to be trusted. Negotiations were, however, continued for several
days, to the great dissatisfaction of the French army. The news that
arrived of a treaty entered into between Manuel and the Turkish
sultan changed their dissatisfaction into fury, and the leaders
demanded to be led against Constantinople, swearing that they

would raze the treacherous city to the ground. Louis did not feel
inclined to accede to this proposal, and, breaking up his camp, he
crossed over into Asia.
Here he heard, for the first time, of the mishaps of the German
emperor, whom he found in a woful plight under the walls of Nice.
The two monarchs united their forces, and marched together along
the sea-coast to Ephesus; but Conrad, jealous, it would appear, of the
superior numbers of the French, and not liking to sink into a vassal,
for the time being, of his rival, withdrew abruptly with the remnant
of his legions, and returned to Constantinople. Manuel was all smiles
and courtesy. He condoled with the German so feelingly upon his
losses, and cursed the stupidity or treachery of the guides with such
apparent heartiness, that Conrad was half inclined to believe in his
sincerity.
Louis, marching onward in the direction of Jerusalem, came up
with the enemy on the banks of the Meander. The Turks contested
the passage of the river, but the French bribed a peasant to point out
a ford lower down: crossing the river without difficulty, they attacked
the Turks with much vigour, and put them to flight. Whether the
Turks were really defeated, or merely pretended to be so, is doubtful;
but the latter supposition seems to be the true one. It is probable that
it was part of a concerted plan to draw the invaders onwards to more
unfavourable ground, where their destruction might be more certain.
If such were the scheme, it succeeded to the heart’s wish of its
projectors. The Crusaders, on the third day after their victory,
arrived at a steep mountain-pass, on the summit of which the
Turkish host lay concealed so artfully, that not the slightest vestige of
their presence could be perceived. “With labouring steps and slow,”

they toiled up the steep ascent, when suddenly a tremendous
fragment of rock came bounding down the precipices with an awful
crash, bearing dismay and death before it. At the same instant the
Turkish archers started from their hiding-places, and discharged a
shower of arrows upon the foot-soldiers, who fell by hundreds at a
time. The arrows rebounded harmlessly against the iron mail of the
knights, which the Turks observing, took aim at their steeds, and
horse and rider fell down the steep into the rapid torrent which
rushed below. Louis, who commanded the rear-guard, received the
first intimation of the onslaught from the sight of the wounded and
flying soldiers, and, not knowing the numbers of the enemy, he
pushed vigorously forward to stay, by his presence, the panic which
had taken possession of his army. All his efforts were in vain.
Immense stones continued to be hurled upon them as they advanced,
bearing men and horse before them; and those who succeeded in
forcing their way to the top were met hand-to-hand by the Turks,
and cast down headlong upon their companions. Louis himself
fought with the energy of desperation, but had great difficulty to
avoid falling into the enemy’s hands. He escaped at last under cover
of the night, with the remnant of his forces, and took up his position
before Attalia. Here he restored the discipline and the courage of his
disorganised and disheartened followers, and debated with his
captains the plan that was to be pursued. After suffering severely
both from disease and famine, it was resolved that they should
march to Antioch, which still remained an independent principality
under the successors of Bohemund of Tarentum. At this time the
sovereignty was vested in the person of Raymond, the uncle of
Eleanor of Aquitaine. This prince, presuming upon his relationship

to the French queen, endeavoured to withdraw Louis from the grand
object of the Crusade—the defence of the kingdom of Jerusalem, and
secure his co-operation in extending the limits and the power of his
principality of Antioch. The Prince of Tripoli formed a similar design;
but Louis rejected the offers of both, and marched, after a short
delay, to Jerusalem. The Emperor Conrad was there before him,
having left Constantinople with promises of assistance from Manuel
Comnenus—assistance which never arrived, and was never intended.

DAMASCUS.

A great council of the Christian princes of Palestine, and the
leaders of the Crusade, was then summoned, to discuss the future
operations of the war. It was ultimately determined that it would
further the cause of the cross in a greater degree if the united armies,
instead of proceeding to Edessa, laid siege to the city of Damascus,
and drove the Saracens from that strong position. This was a bold
scheme, and, had it been boldly followed out, would have insured, in
all probability, the success of the war. But the Christian leaders never
learned from experience the necessity of union, that very soul of
great enterprises. Though they all agreed upon the policy of the plan,
yet every one had his own notions as to the means of executing it.
The princes of Antioch and Tripoli were jealous of each other, and of

the king of Jerusalem. The Emperor Conrad was jealous of the king
of France, and the king of France was disgusted with them all. But he
had come out to Palestine in accordance with a solemn vow; his
religion, though it may be called bigotry, was sincere; and he
determined to remain to the very last moment that a chance was left
of effecting any good for the cause he had set his heart on.
The siege of Damascus was accordingly commenced, and with so
much ability and vigour that the Christians gained a considerable
advantage at the very outset. For weeks the siege was pressed, till the
shattered fortifications and diminishing resistance of the besieged
gave evidence that the city could not hold out much longer. At that
moment the insane jealousy of the leaders led to dissensions that
soon caused the utter failure, not only of the siege but of the Crusade.
A modern cookery-book, in giving a recipe for cooking a hare, says,
“first catch your hare, and then kill it”—a maxim of indisputable
wisdom. The Christian chiefs, on this occasion, had not so much
sagacity, for they began a violent dispute among themselves for the
possession of a city which was still unconquered. There being already
a prince of Antioch and a prince of Tripoli, twenty claimants started
for the principality of Damascus; and a grand council of the leaders
was held to determine the individual on whom the honour should
devolve. Many valuable days were wasted in this discussion, the
enemy in the meanwhile gaining strength from their inactivity. It was
at length, after a stormy deliberation, agreed that Count Robert of
Flanders, who had twice visited the Holy Land, should be invested
with the dignity. The other claimants refused to recognise him or to
co-operate in the siege until a more equitable arrangement had been
made. Suspicion filled the camp; the most sinister rumours of

intrigues and treachery were set afloat; and the discontented
candidates withdrew at last to the other side of the city, and
commenced operations on their own account without a probability of
success. They were soon joined by the rest of the army. The
consequence was that the weakest side of the city, and that on which
they had already made considerable progress in the work of
demolition, was left uncovered. The enemy was prompt to profit by
the mistake, and received an abundant supply of provisions, and
refortified the walls, before the Crusaders came to their senses again.
When this desirable event happened, it was too late. Saph Eddin, the
powerful emir of Mousoul, was in the neighbourhood, at the head of
a large army, advancing by forced marches to the relief of the city.
The siege was abruptly abandoned, and the foolish Crusaders
returned to Jerusalem, having done nothing to weaken the enemy,
but every thing to weaken themselves.
The freshness of enthusiasm had now completely subsided; even
the meanest soldiers were sick at heart. Conrad, from whose fierce
zeal at the outset so much might have been expected, was wearied
with reverses, and returned to Europe with the poor remnant of his
host. Louis lingered a short time longer, for very shame, but the
pressing solicitations of his minister Suger induced him to return to
France. Thus ended the second Crusade. Its history is but a chronicle
of defeats. It left the kingdom of Jerusalem in a worse state than
when it quitted Europe, and gained nothing but disgrace for its
leaders, and discouragement for all concerned.
St. Bernard, who had prophesied a result so different, fell after this
into some disrepute, and experienced, like many other prophets, the
fate of being without honour in his own country. What made the

matter worse, he could not obtain it in any other. Still, however,
there were not wanting zealous advocates to stand forward in his
behalf, and stem the tide of incredulity, which, unopposed, would
have carried away his reputation. The Bishop of Freysinghen
declared that prophets were not always able to prophesy, and that
the vices of the Crusaders drew down the wrath of heaven upon
them. But the most ingenious excuse ever made for St. Bernard is to
be found in his life by Geoffroi de Clairvaux, where he pertinaciously
insists that the Crusade was not unfortunate. St. Bernard, he says,
had prophesied a happy result, and that result could not be
considered other than happy which had peopled heaven with so
glorious an army of martyrs. Geoffroi was a cunning pleader, and, no
doubt, convinced a few of the zealous; but plain people, who were not
wanting even in those days, retained their own opinion, or, what
amounts to the same thing, “were convinced against their will.”
We now come to the consideration of the third Crusade, and of the
causes which rendered it necessary. The epidemic frenzy, which had
been cooling ever since the issue of the first expedition, was now
extinct, or very nearly so, and the nations of Europe looked with cold
indifference upon the armaments of their princes. But chivalry had
flourished in its natural element of war, and was now in all its glory.
It continued to supply armies for the Holy Land when the popular
ranks refused to deliver up their able-bodied swarms. Poetry, which,
more than religion, inspired the third Crusade, was then but “caviare
to the million,” who had other matters, of sterner import, to claim all
their attention. But the knights and their retainers listened with
delight to the martial and amatory strains of the minstrels,
minnesängers, trouvères, and troubadours, and burned to win favour

in ladies’ eyes by shewing prowess in the Holy Land. The third was
truly the romantic era of the Crusades. Men fought then, not so much
for the sepulchre of Jesus, and the maintenance of a Christian
kingdom in the East, as to gain glory for themselves in the best and
almost only field where glory could be obtained. They fought, not as
zealots, but as soldiers; not for religion, but for honour; not for the
crown of martyrdom, but for the favour of the lovely.

SEAL OF BARBAROSSA.

It is not necessary to enter into a detail of the events by which
Saladin attained the sovereignty of the East, or how, after a
succession of engagements, he planted the Moslem banner once
more upon the battlements of Jerusalem. The Christian knights and
population, including the grand orders of St. John, the Hospitallers,
and the Templars, were sunk in an abyss of vice, and, torn by
unworthy jealousies and dissensions, were unable to resist the welltrained armies which the wise and mighty Saladin brought forward
to crush them. But the news of their fall created a painful sensation
among the chivalry of Europe, whose noblest members were linked
to the dwellers in Palestine by many ties, both of blood and
friendship. The news of the great battle of Tiberias, in which Saladin
defeated the Christian host with terrible slaughter, arrived first in
Europe, and was followed in quick succession by that of the capture
of Jerusalem, Antioch, Tripoli, and other cities. Dismay seized upon

the clergy. The Pope (Urban III.) was so affected by the news that he
pined away for grief, and was scarcely seen to smile again, until he
sank into the sleep of death. 12 His successor, Gregory VIII., felt the
loss as acutely, but had better strength to bear it, and instructed all
the clergy of the Christian world to stir up the people to arms for the
recovery of the Holy Sepulchre. William Archbishop of Tyre, a
humble follower in the path of Peter the Hermit, left Palestine to
preach to the kings of Europe the miseries he had witnessed, and to
incite them to the rescue. The renowned Frederick Barbarossa, the
emperor of Germany, speedily collected an army, and passing over
into Syria with less delay than had ever before awaited a crusading
force, defeated the Saracens, and took possession of the city of
Iconium. He was unfortunately cut off in the middle of his successful
career, by imprudently bathing in the Cydnus 13 while he was
overheated, and the Duke of Suabia took the command of the
expedition. The latter did not prove so able a general, and met with
nothing but reverses, although he was enabled to maintain a footing
at Antioch until assistance arrived from Europe.

HENRY II. OF ENGLAND.

Henry II. of England and Philip Augustus of France, at the head of
their chivalry, supported the Crusade with all their influence, until
wars and dissensions nearer home estranged them from it for a time.
The two kings met at Gisors in Normandy in the month of January,
1188, accompanied by a brilliant train of knights and warriors.
William of Tyre was present, and expounded the cause of the cross
with considerable eloquence, and the whole assembly bound
themselves by oath to proceed to Jerusalem. It was agreed at the
same time that a tax, called Saladin’s tithe, and consisting of the
tenth part of all possessions, whether landed or personal, should be
enforced over Christendom, upon every one who was either unable

or unwilling to assume the cross. The lord of every feof, whether lay
or ecclesiastical, was charged to raise the tithe within his own
jurisdiction; and any one who refused to pay his quota, became by
that act the bondsman and absolute property of his lord. At the same
time the greatest indulgence was shewn to those who assumed the
cross; no man was at liberty to stay them by process of any kind,
whether for debt, or robbery, or murder. The king of Prance, at the
breaking up of the conference, summoned a parliament at Paris,
where these resolutions were solemnly confirmed, while Henry II.
did the same for his Norman possessions at Rouen, and for England
at Geddington, in Northamptonshire. To use the words of an ancient
chronicler, 14 “he held a parliament about the voyage into the Holy
Land, and troubled the whole land with the paying of tithes towards
it.”

CHATEAU OF GISORS.

PHILIP AUGUSTUS.

But it was not England alone that was “troubled” by the tax. The
people of France also looked upon it with no pleasant feelings, and
appear from that time forth to have changed their indifference for
the Crusade into aversion. Even the clergy, who were exceedingly
willing that other people should contribute half, or even all their
goods in furtherance of their favourite scheme, were not at all
anxious to contribute a single sous themselves. Millot[15] 15 relates
that several of them cried out against the impost. Among the rest, the
clergy of Rheims were called upon to pay their quota, but sent a
deputation to the king, begging him to be contented with the aid of
their prayers, as they were too poor to contribute in any other shape.
Philip Augustus knew better, and by way of giving them a lesson,
employed three nobles of the vicinity to lay waste the Church lands.
The clergy, informed of the outrage, applied to the king for redress.
“I will aid you with my prayers,” said the monarch condescendingly,
“and will entreat those gentlemen to let the Church alone.” He did as
he had promised, but in such a manner that the nobles, who
appreciated the joke, continued their devastations as before. Again
the clergy applied to the king. “What would you have of me?” he

replied, in answer to their remonstrances: “you gave me your prayers
in my necessity, and I have given you mine in yours.” The clergy
understood the argument, and thought it the wiser course to pay
their quota of Saladin’s tithe without further parley.
This anecdote shews the unpopularity of the Crusade. If the clergy
disliked to contribute, it is no wonder that the people felt still greater
antipathy. But the chivalry of Europe was eager for the affray: the
tithe was rigorously collected, and armies from England, France,
Burgundy, Italy, Flanders, and Germany, were soon in the field. The
two kings who were to have led it were, however, drawn into broils
by an aggression of Richard duke of Guienne, better known as
Richard Cœur de Lion, upon the territory of the Count of Toulouse,
and the proposed journey to Palestine was delayed. War continued to
rage between France and England, and with so little probability of a
speedy termination, that many of the nobles, bound to the Crusade,
left the two monarchs to settle the differences at their leisure, and
proceeded to Palestine without them.
Death at last stepped in and removed Henry II. from the hostility
of his foes, and the treachery and ingratitude of his children. His son
Richard immediately concluded an alliance with Philip Augustus;
and the two young, valiant, and impetuous monarchs united all their
energies to forward the Crusade. They met with a numerous and
brilliant retinue at Nonancourt in Normandy, where, in sight of their
assembled chivalry, they embraced as brothers, and swore to live as
friends and true allies, until a period of forty days after their return
from the Holy Land. With a view of purging their camp from the
follies and vices which had proved so ruinous to preceding
expeditions, they drew up a code of laws for the government of the

army. Gambling had been carried to a great extent, and proved the
fruitful source of quarrels and bloodshed; and one of their laws
prohibited any person in the army, beneath the degree of a knight,
from playing at any game for money. 16 Knights and clergymen might
play for money, but no one was permitted to lose or gain more than
twenty shillings in a day, under a penalty of one hundred shillings.
The personal attendants of the monarchs were also allowed to play to
the same extent. The penalty in their case for infraction was that they
should be whipped naked through the army for the space of three
days. Any Crusader, who struck another and drew blood, was
ordered to have his hand cut off; and whoever slew a brother
Crusader was condemned to be tied alive to the corpse of his victim,
and buried with him. No young women were allowed to follow the
army, to the great sorrow of many vicious and of many virtuous
dames, who had not courage to elude the decree by dressing in male
attire. But many high-minded and affectionate maidens and
matrons, bearing the sword or the spear, followed their husbands
and lovers to the war in spite of King Richard, and in defiance of
danger. The only women allowed to accompany the army in their
own habiliments were washerwomen of fifty years complete, and any
others of the fair sex who had reached the same age.
These rules having been promulgated, the two monarchs marched
together to Lyons, where they separated, agreeing to meet again at
Messina. Philip proceeded across the Alps to Genoa, where he took
ship, and was conveyed in safety to the place of rendezvous. Richard
turned in the direction of Marseilles, where he also took ship for
Messina. His impetuous disposition hurried him into many
squabbles by the way, and his knights and followers, for the most

part as brave and as foolish as himself, imitated him very zealously in
this particular. At Messina the Sicilians charged the most exorbitant
prices for every necessary of life. Richard’s army in vain
remonstrated. From words they came to blows, and, as a last
resource, plundered the Sicilians, since they could not trade with
them. Continual battles were the consequence, in one of which
Lebrun, the favourite attendant of Richard, lost his life. The
peasantry from far and near came flocking to the aid of the
townspeople, and the battle soon became general. Richard, irritated
at the loss of his favourite, and incited by report that Tancred, the
king of Sicily, was fighting at the head of his own people, joined the
mêlée with his boldest knights, and, beating back the Sicilians,
attacked the city sword in hand, stormed the battlements, tore down
the flag of Sicily, and planted his own in its stead. This collision gave
great offence to the king of France, who became from that time
jealous of Richard, and apprehensive that his design was not so
much to re-establish the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem, as to make
conquests for himself. He, however, exerted his influence to restore
peace between the English and Sicilians, and shortly afterwards set
sail for Acre, with distrust of his ally germinating in his heart.

THE ISLAND OF RHODES.

Richard remained behind for some weeks in a state of inactivity
quite unaccountable in one of his temperament. He appears to have
had no more squabbles with the Sicilians, but to have lived an easy,
luxurious life, forgetting, in the lap of pleasure, the objects for which
he had quitted his own dominions and the dangerous laxity he was
introducing into his army. The superstition of his soldiers recalled
him at length to a sense of his duty: a comet was seen for several
successive nights, which was thought to menace them with the
vengeance of Heaven for their delay. Shooting stars gave them
similar warning; and a fanatic, of the name of Joachim, with his
drawn sword in his hand, and his long hair streaming wildly over his
shoulders, went through the camp, howling all night long, and
predicting plague, famine, and every other calamity, if they did not
set out immediately. Richard did not deem it prudent to neglect the
intimations; and, after doing humble penance for his remissness, he
set sail for Acre.

A violent storm dispersed his fleet, but he arrived safely at Rhodes
with the principal part of the armament. Here he learned that three
of his ships had been stranded on the rocky coasts of Cyprus, and
that the ruler of the island, Isaac Comnenus, had permitted his
people to pillage the unfortunate crews, and had refused shelter to
his betrothed bride, the Princess Berengaria, and his sister, who, in
one of the vessels, had been driven by stress of weather into the port
of Limisso. The fiery monarch swore to be revenged, and, collecting
all his vessels, sailed back to Limisso. Isaac Comnenus refused to
apologise or explain, and Richard, in no mood to be trifled with,
landed on the island, routed with great loss the forces sent to oppose
him, and laid the whole country under contribution.

RICHARD I. AND BERENGARIA.

On his arrival at Acre he found the whole of the chivalry of Europe
there before him. Guy of Lusignan, the king of Jerusalem, had long
before collected the bold Knights of the Temple, the Hospital, and St.

John, and had laid siege to Acre, which was resolutely defended by
the Sultan Saladin, with an army magnificent both for its numbers
and its discipline. For nearly two years the Crusaders had pushed the
siege, and made efforts almost superhuman to dislodge the enemy.
Various battles had taken place in the open fields with no decisive
advantage to either party, and Guy of Lusignan had begun to despair
of taking that strong position without aid from Europe. His joy was
extreme on the arrival of Philip with all his chivalry, and he only
awaited the coming of Cœur de Lion to make one last decisive attack
upon the town. When the fleet of England was first seen approaching
the shores of Syria, a universal shout arose from the Christian camp;
and when Richard landed with his train, one louder still pierced to
the very mountains of the south, where Saladin lay with all his army.
It may be remarked as characteristic of this Crusade, that the
Christians and the Moslems no longer looked upon each other as
barbarians, to whom mercy was a crime. Each host entertained the
highest admiration for the bravery and magnanimity of the other,
and, in their occasional truces, met upon the most friendly terms.
The Moslem warriors were full of courtesy to the Christian knights,
and had no other regret than to think that such fine fellows were not
Mahomedans. The Christians, with a feeling precisely similar,
extolled to the skies the nobleness of the Saracens, and sighed to
think that such generosity and valour should be sullied by disbelief in
the Gospel of Jesus. But when the strife began, all these feelings
disappeared, and the struggle became mortal.
The jealousy excited in the mind of Philip by the events of Messina
still rankled, and the two monarchs refused to act in concert. Instead
of making a joint attack upon the town, the French monarch assailed

it alone, and was repulsed. Richard did the same, and with the same
result. Philip tried to seduce the soldiers of Richard from their
allegiance by the offer of three gold pieces per month to every knight
who would forsake the banners of England for those of France.
Richard endeavoured to neutralise the offer by a larger one, and
promised four pieces to every French knight who should join the
Lion of England. In this unworthy rivalry their time was wasted, to
the great detriment of the discipline and efficiency of their followers.
Some good was nevertheless effected; for the mere presence of two
such armies prevented the besieged city from receiving supplies, and
the inhabitants were reduced by famine to the most woful straits.
Saladin did not deem it prudent to risk a general engagement by
coming to their relief, but preferred to wait till dissension had
weakened his enemy, and made him an easy prey. Perhaps if he had
been aware of the real extent of the extremity in Acre, he would have
changed his plan; but, cut off from the town, he did not know its
misery till it was too late. After a short truce the city capitulated upon
terms so severe that Saladin afterwards refused to ratify them. The
chief conditions were, that the precious wood of the true cross,
captured by the Moslems in Jerusalem, should be restored; that a
sum of two hundred thousand gold pieces should be paid; and that
all the Christian prisoners in Acre should be released, together with
two hundred knights and a thousand soldiers detained in captivity by
Saladin. The eastern monarch, as may be well conceived, did not set
much store on the wood of the cross, but was nevertheless anxious to
keep it, as he knew its possession by the Christians would do more
than a victory to restore their courage. He refused, therefore, to
deliver it up, or to accede to any of the conditions; and Richard, as he

had previously threatened, barbarously ordered all the Saracen
prisoners in his power to be put to death.
The possession of the city only caused new and unhappy
dissensions between the Christian leaders. The Archduke of Austria
unjustifiably hoisted his flag on one of the towers of Acre, which
Richard no sooner saw than he tore it down with his own hands, and
trampled it under his feet. Philip, though he did not sympathise with
the archduke, was piqued at the assumption of Richard, and the
breach between the two monarchs became wider than ever. A foolish
dispute arose at the same time between Guy of Lusignan and Conrad
of Montferrat for the crown of Jerusalem. The inferior knights were
not slow to imitate the pernicious example, and jealousy, distrust,
and ill-will reigned in the Christian camp. In the midst of this
confusion the king of France suddenly announced his intention to
return to his own country. Richard was filled with indignation, and
exclaimed, “Eternal shame light on him, and on all France, if, for any
cause, he leave this work unfinished!” But Philip was not to be
stayed. His health had suffered by his residence in the East; and,
ambitious of playing a first part, he preferred to play none at all than
to play second to King Richard. Leaving a small detachment of
Burgundians behind, he returned to France with the remainder of his
army; and Cœur de Lion, without feeling, in the multitude of his
rivals, that he had lost the greatest, became painfully convinced that
the right arm of the enterprise was lopped off.
After his departure, Richard re-fortified Acre, restored the
Christian worship in the churches, and, leaving a Christian garrison
to protect it, marched along the sea-coast towards Ascalon. Saladin
was on the alert, and sent his light horse to attack the rear of the

Christian army, while he himself, miscalculating their weakness
since the defection of Philip, endeavoured to force them to a general
engagement. The rival armies met near Azotus. A fierce battle
ensued, in which Saladin was defeated and put to flight, and the road
to Jerusalem left free for the Crusaders.
Again discord exerted its baleful influence, and prevented Richard
from following up his victory. His opinion was constantly opposed by
the other leaders, all jealous of his bravery and influence; and the
army, instead of marching to Jerusalem, or even to Ascalon, as was
first intended, proceeded to Jaffa, and remained in idleness until
Saladin was again in a condition to wage war against them.

BETHLEHEM.

Many months were spent in fruitless hostilities and as fruitless
negotiations. Richard’s wish was to recapture Jerusalem; but there
were difficulties in the way, which even his bold spirit could not
conquer. His own intolerable pride was not the least cause of the evil;
for it estranged many a generous spirit, who would have been willing
to co-operate with him in all cordiality. At length it was agreed to
march to the Holy City; but the progress made was so slow and
painful, that the soldiers murmured, and the leaders meditated

retreat. The weather was hot and dry, and there was little water to be
procured. Saladin had choked up the wells and cisterns on the route,
and the army had not zeal enough to push forward amid such
privation. At Bethlehem a council was held, to debate whether they
should retreat or advance. Retreat was decided upon, and
immediately commenced. It is said, that Richard was first led to a
hill, whence he could obtain a sight of the towers of Jerusalem, and
that he was so affected at being so near it, and so unable to relieve it,
that he hid his face behind his shield, and sobbed aloud.
The army separated into two divisions, the smaller falling back
upon Jaffa, and the larger, commanded by Richard and the Duke of
Burgundy, returning to Acre. Before the English monarch had made
all his preparations for his return to Europe, a messenger reached
Acre with the intelligence that Jaffa was besieged by Saladin, and
that, unless relieved immediately, the city would be taken. The
French, under the Duke of Burgundy, were so wearied with the war,
that they refused to aid their brethren in Jaffa. Richard, blushing
with shame at their pusillanimity, called his English to the rescue,
and arrived just in time to save the city. His very name put the
Saracens to flight, so great was their dread of his prowess. Saladin
regarded him with the warmest admiration, and when Richard, after
his victory, demanded peace, willingly acceded. A truce was
concluded for three years and eight months, during which Christian
pilgrims were to enjoy the liberty of visiting Jerusalem without
hindrance or payment of any tax. The Crusaders were allowed to
retain the cities of Tyre and Jaffa, with the country intervening.
Saladin, with a princely generosity, invited many of the Christians to
visit Jerusalem; and several of the leaders took advantage of his offer

to feast their eyes upon a spot which all considered so sacred. Many
of them were entertained for days in the sultan’s own palace, from
which they returned with their tongues laden with the praises of the
noble infidel. Richard and Saladin never met, though the impression
that they did will remain on many minds, who have been dazzled by
the glorious fiction of Sir Walter Scott. But each admired the prowess
and nobleness of soul of his rival, and agreed to terms far less
onerous than either would have accepted, had this mutual
admiration not existed. 17
The king of England no longer delayed his departure, for
messengers from his own country brought imperative news that his
presence was required to defeat the intrigues that were fomenting
against his crown. His long imprisonment in the Austrian dominions
and final ransom are too well known to be dwelt upon. And thus
ended the third Crusade, less destructive of human life than the two
first, but quite as useless.
The flame of popular enthusiasm now burned pale indeed, and all
the efforts of popes and potentates were insufficient to rekindle it. At
last, after flickering unsteadily, like a lamp expiring in the socket, it
burned up brightly for one final instant, and was extinguished for
ever.
The fourth Crusade, as connected with popular feeling, requires
little or no notice. At the death of Saladin, which happened a year
after the conclusion of his truce with Richard of England, his vast
empire fell to pieces. His brother Saif Eddin, or Saphaddin, seized
upon Syria, in the possession of which he was troubled by the sons of
Saladin. When this intelligence reached Europe, the Pope, Celestine
III., judged the moment favourable for preaching a new Crusade. But

every nation in Europe was unwilling and cold towards it. The people
had no ardour, and kings were occupied with more weighty matters
at home. The only monarch of Europe who encouraged it was the
Emperor Henry of Germany, under whose auspices the Dukes of
Saxony and Bavaria took the field at the head of a considerable force.
They landed in Palestine, and found any thing but a welcome from
the Christian inhabitants. Under the mild sway of Saladin, they had
enjoyed repose and toleration, and both were endangered by the
arrival of the Germans. They looked upon them in consequence as
over-officious intruders, and gave them no encouragement in the
warfare against Saphaddin. The result of this Crusade was even more
disastrous than the last; for the Germans contrived not only to
embitter the Saracens against the Christians of Judea, but to lose the
strong city of Jaffa, and cause the destruction of nine-tenths of the
army with which they had quitted Europe. And so ended the fourth
Crusade.
The fifth was more important, and had a result which its projectors
never dreamed of—no less than the sacking of Constantinople, and
the placing of a French dynasty upon the imperial throne of the
eastern Cæsars. Each succeeding pope, however much he may have
differed from his predecessors on other points, zealously agreed in
one, that of maintaining by every possible means the papal
ascendency. No scheme was so likely to aid in this endeavour as the
Crusades. As long as they could persuade the kings and nobles of
Europe to fight and die in Syria, their own sway was secured over the
minds of men at home. Such being their object, they never inquired
whether a Crusade was or was not likely to be successful, whether the
time were well or ill chosen, or whether men and money could be

procured in sufficient abundance. Pope Innocent III. would have
been proud if he could have bent the refractory monarchs of England
and France into so much submission. But John and Philip Augustus
were both engaged. Both had deeply offended the Church, and had
been laid under her ban, and both were occupied in important
reforms at home; Philip in bestowing immunities upon his subjects,
and John in having them forced from him. The emissaries of the
pope therefore plied them in vain; but as in the first and second
Crusades, the eloquence of a powerful preacher incited the nobility,
and through them a certain portion of the people; Foulque bishop of
Neuilly, an ambitious and enterprising prelate, entered fully into the
views of the court of Rome, and preached the Crusade wherever he
could find an audience. Chance favoured him to a degree he did not
himself expect, for he had in general found but few proselytes, and
those few but cold in the cause. Theobald count of Champagne had
instituted a grand tournament, to which he had invited all the nobles
from far and near. Upwards of two thousand knights were present
with their retainers, besides a vast concourse of people to witness the
sports. In the midst of the festivities Foulque arrived upon the spot,
and conceiving the opportunity to be a favourable one, he addressed
the multitude in eloquent language, and passionately called upon
them to enrol themselves for the new Crusade. The Count de
Champagne, young, ardent, and easily excited, received the cross at
his hands. The enthusiasm spread rapidly. Charles count of Blois
followed the example, and of the two thousand knights present,
scarcely one hundred and fifty refused. The popular phrensy seemed
on the point of breaking out as in the days of yore. The Count of
Flanders, the Count of Bar, the Duke of Burgundy, and the Marquis

of Montferrat, brought all their vassals to swell the train, and in a
very short space of time an effective army was on foot and ready to
march to Palestine.
The dangers of an overland journey were too well understood, and
the Crusaders endeavoured to make a contract with some of the
Italian states to convey them over in their vessels. Dandolo, the aged
doge of Venice, offered them the galleys of the Republic; but the
Crusaders, on their arrival in that city, found themselves too poor to
pay even half the sum demanded. Every means was tried to raise
money; the Crusaders melted down their plate, and ladies gave up
their trinkets. Contributions were solicited from the faithful, but
came in so slowly as to make it evident to all concerned, that the
faithful of Europe were outnumbered by the prudent. As a last
resource, Dandolo offered to convey them to Palestine at the expense
of the Republic, if they would previously aid in the recapture of the
city of Zara, which had been seized from the Venetians a short time
previously by the king of Hungary. The Crusaders consented, much
to the displeasure of the pope, who threatened excommunication
upon all who should be turned aside from the voyage to Jerusalem.
But notwithstanding the fulminations of the Church, the expedition
never reached Palestine. The siege of Zara was speedily undertaken.
After a long and brave defence, the city surrendered at discretion,
and the Crusaders were free, if they had so chosen it, to use their
swords against the Saracens. But the ambition of the chiefs had been
directed, by unforeseen circumstances, elsewhere.
After the death of Manuel Comnenus, the Greek empire had fallen
a prey to intestine divisions. His son Alexius II. had succeeded him,
but was murdered after a short reign by his uncle Andronicus, who

seized upon the throne. His reign also was but of short duration.
Isaac Angelus, a member of the same family, took up arms against
the usurper, and having defeated and captured him in a pitched
battle, had him put to death. He also mounted the throne only to be
cast down from it. His brother Alexius deposed him, and to
incapacitate him from reigning, put out his eyes, and shut him up in
a dungeon. Neither was Alexius III. allowed to remain in peaceable
possession of the throne; the son of the unhappy Isaac, whose name
also was Alexius, fled from Constantinople, and hearing that the
Crusaders had undertaken the siege of Zara, made them the most
magnificent offers if they would afterwards aid him in deposing his
uncle. His offers were, that if by their means he was re-established in
his father’s dominions, he would place the Greek Church under the
authority of the Pope of Rome, lend the whole force of the Greek
empire to the conquest of Palestine, and distribute two hundred
thousand marks of silver among the crusading army. The offer was
accepted, with a proviso on the part of some of the leaders, that they
should be free to abandon the design, if it met with the disapproval
of the pope. But this was not to be feared. The submission of the
schismatic Greeks to the See of Rome was a greater bribe to the
Pontiff than the utter annihilation of the Saracen power in Palestine
would have been.
The Crusaders were soon in movement for the imperial city. Their
operations were skilfully and courageously directed, and spread such
dismay as to paralyse the efforts of the usurper to retain possession
of his throne. After a vain resistance, he abandoned the city to its
fate, and fled no one knew whither. The aged and blind Isaac was
taken from his dungeon by his subjects, and placed upon the throne

ere the Crusaders were apprised of the flight of his rival. His son
Alexius IV. was afterwards associated with him in the sovereignty.
But the conditions of the treaty gave offence to the Grecian people,
whose prelates refused to place themselves under the dominion of
the See of Rome. Alexius at first endeavoured to persuade his
subjects to admission, and prayed the Crusaders to remain in
Constantinople until they had fortified him in the possession of a
throne which was yet far from secure. He soon became unpopular
with his subjects; and breaking faith with regard to the subsidies, he
offended the Crusaders. War was at length declared upon him by
both parties; by his people for his tyranny, and by his former friends
for his treachery. He was seized in his palace by his own guards and
thrown into prison, while the Crusaders were making ready to
besiege his capital. The Greeks immediately proceeded to the
election of a new monarch; and looking about for a man of courage,
energy, and perseverance, they fixed upon Alexius Ducas, who, with
almost every bad quality, was possessed of the virtues they needed.
He ascended the throne under the name of Murzuphlis. One of his
first acts was to rid himself of his youngest predecessor—a broken
heart had already removed the blind old Isaac, no longer a
stumbling-block in his way—and the young Alexius was soon after
put to death in his prison.

CONSTANTINOPLE.

War to the knife was now declared between the Greeks and the
Franks; and early in the spring of the year 1204, preparations were
commenced for an assault upon Constantinople. The French and
Venetians entered into a treaty for the division of the spoils among
their soldiery; for so confident were they of success, that failure
never once entered into their calculations. This confidence led them
on to victory; while the Greeks, cowardly as treacherous people
always are, were paralysed by a foreboding of evil. It has been a
matter of astonishment to all historians, that Murzuphlis, with the
reputation for courage which he had acquired, and the immense
resources at his disposal, took no better measures to repel the onset
of the Crusaders. Their numbers were as a mere handful in
comparison with those which he could have brought against them;
and if they had the hopes of plunder to lead them on, the Greeks had
their homes to fight for, and their very existence as a nation to
protect. After an impetuous assault, repulsed for one day, but
renewed with double impetuosity on another, the Crusaders lashed
their vessels against the walls, slew every man who opposed them,
and, with little loss to themselves, entered the city. Murzuphlis fled,
and Constantinople was given over to be pillaged by the victors. The
wealth they found was enormous. In money alone there was
sufficient to distribute twenty marks of silver to each knight, ten to
each squire or servant at arms, and five to each archer. Jewels,
velvets, silks, and every luxury of attire, with rare wines and fruits,
and valuable merchandise of every description, also fell into their
hands, and were bought by the trading Venetians, and the proceeds
distributed among the army. Two thousand persons were put to the

sword; but had there been less plunder to take up the attention of the
victors, the slaughter would in all probability have been much
greater.
In many of the bloody wars which defile the page of history, we
find that soldiers, utterly reckless of the works of God, will destroy
his masterpiece, man, with unsparing brutality, but linger with
respect round the beautiful works of art. They will slaughter women
and children, but spare a picture; will hew down the sick, the
helpless, and the hoary-headed, but refrain from injuring a fine piece
of sculpture. The Latins, on their entrance into Constantinople,
respected neither the works of God nor man, but vented their brutal
ferocity upon the one, and satisfied their avarice upon the other.
Many beautiful bronze statues, above all price as works of art, were
broken into pieces to be sold as old metal. The finely-chiselled
marble, which could be put to no such vile uses, was also destroyed
with a recklessness, if possible, still more atrocious. 18
The carnage being over, and the spoil distributed, six persons were
chosen from among the Franks and six from among the Venetians,
who were to meet and elect an emperor, previously binding
themselves by oath to select the individual best qualified among the
candidates. The choice wavered between Baldwin count of Flanders
and Boniface marquis of Montferrat, but fell eventually upon the
former. He was straightway robed in the imperial purple, and
became the founder of a new dynasty. He did not live long to enjoy
his power, or to consolidate it for his successors, who, in their turn,
were soon swept away. In less than sixty years the rule of the Franks
at Constantinople was brought to as sudden and disastrous a

termination as the reign of Murzuphlis: and this was the grand result
of the fifth Crusade.
Pope Innocent III., although he had looked with no very
unfavourable eye upon these proceedings, regretted that nothing had
been done for the relief of the Holy Land; still, upon every
convenient occasion, he enforced the necessity of a new Crusade.
Until the year 1213, his exhortations had no other effect than to keep
the subject in the mind of Europe. Every spring and summer
detachments of pilgrims continued to set out for Palestine to the aid
of their brethren, but not in sufficient numbers to be of much service.
These periodical passages were called the passagium Martii, or the
passage of March, and the passagium Johannis, or the passage of the
festival of St. John. These did not consist entirely of soldiers, armed
against the Saracen, but of pilgrims led by devotion, and in
performance of their vows, bearing nothing with them but their staff
and their wallet. Early in the spring of 1213 a more extraordinary
body of Crusaders was raised in France and Germany. An immense
number of boys and girls, amounting, according to some accounts, to
thirty thousand, were incited by the persuasion of two monks to
undertake the journey to Palestine. They were no doubt composed of
the idle and deserted children who generally swarm in great cities,
nurtured in vice and daring, and ready for any thing. The object of
the monks seems to have been the atrocious one of inveigling them
into slave-ships, on pretence of sending them to Syria, and selling
them for slaves on the coast of Africa. 19 Great numbers of these poor
victims were shipped at Marseilles; but the vessels, with the
exception of two or three, were wrecked on the shores of Italy, and
every soul perished. The remainder arrived safely in Africa, and were

bought up as slaves, and sent off into the interior of the country.
Another detachment arrived at Genoa; but the accomplices in this
horrid plot having taken no measures at that port, expecting them all
at Marseilles, they were induced to return to their homes by the
Genoese.
Fuller, in his quaint history of the Holy Warre, says that this
Crusade was done by the instinct of the devil; and he adds a reason,
which may provoke mirth now, but which was put forth by the
worthy historian in all soberness and sincerity. He says, “the devil,
being cloyed with the murdering of men, desired a cordial of
children’s blood to comfort his weak stomach;” as epicures, when
tired of mutton, resort to lamb for a change.
It appears from other authors that the preaching of the vile monks
had such an effect upon these deluded children that they ran about
the country, exclaiming, “O Lord Jesus, restore thy cross to us!” and
that neither bolts nor bars, the fear of fathers, nor the love of
mothers, was sufficient to restrain them from journeying to
Jerusalem.
The details of these strange proceedings are exceedingly meagre
and confused, and none of the contemporary writers who mention
the subject have thought it worth while to state the names of the
monks who originated the scheme, or the fate they met for their
wickedness. Two merchants of Marseilles, who were to have shared
in the profits, were, it is said, brought to justice for some other crime,
and suffered death; but we are not informed whether they divulged
any circumstances relating to this matter.
Pope Innocent III. does not seem to have been aware that the
causes of this juvenile Crusade were such as have been stated, for,

upon being informed that numbers of them had taken the cross, and
were marching to the Holy Land, he exclaimed, “These children are
awake while we sleep!” He imagined, apparently, that the mind of
Europe was still bent on the recovery of Palestine, and that the zeal
of these children implied a sort of reproach upon his own
lukewarmness. Very soon afterwards, he bestirred himself with more
activity, and sent an encyclical letter to the clergy of Christendom,
urging them to preach a new Crusade. As usual, a number of
adventurous nobles, who had nothing else to do, enrolled themselves
with their retainers. At a Council of Lateran, which was held while
these bands were collecting, Innocent announced that he himself
would take the Cross, and lead the armies of Christ to the defence of
his sepulchre. In all probability he would have done so, for he was
zealous enough; but death stepped in, and destroyed his project ere it
was ripe. His successor encouraged the Crusade, though he refused
to accompany it; and the armament continued in France, England,
and Germany. No leaders of any importance joined it from the
former countries. Andrew king of Hungary was the only monarch
who had leisure or inclination to leave his dominions. The Dukes of
Austria and Bavaria joined him with a considerable army of
Germans, and marching to Spalatro, took ship for Cyprus, and from
thence to Acre.
The whole conduct of the king of Hungary was marked by
pusillanimity and irresolution. He found himself in the Holy Land at
the head of a very efficient army; the Saracens were taken by
surprise, and were for some weeks unprepared to offer any resistance
to his arms. He defeated the first body sent to oppose him, and
marched towards Mount Tabor with the intention of seizing upon an

important fortress which the Saracens had recently constructed. He
arrived without impediment at the mount, and might have easily
taken it; but a sudden fit of cowardice came over him, and he
returned to Acre without striking a blow. He very soon afterwards
abandoned the enterprise altogether, and returned to his own
country.
Tardy reinforcements arrived at intervals from Europe; and the
Duke of Austria, now the chief leader of the expedition, had still
sufficient forces at his command to trouble the Saracens very
seriously. It was resolved by him, in council with the other chiefs,
that the whole energy of the Crusade should be directed upon Egypt,
the seat of the Saracen power in its relationship to Palestine, and
from whence were drawn the continual levies that were brought
against them by the sultan. Damietta, which commanded the river
Nile, and was one of the most important cities of Egypt, was chosen
as the first point of attack. The siege was forthwith commenced, and
carried on with considerable energy, until the Crusaders gained
possession of a tower, which projected into the middle of the stream,
and was looked upon as the very key of the city.
While congratulating themselves upon this success, and wasting in
revelry the time which should have been employed in turning it to
further advantage, they received the news of the death of the wise
Sultan Saphaddin. His two sons, Camhel and Cohreddin, divided his
empire between them. Syria and Palestine fell to the share of
Cohreddin, while Egypt was consigned to the other brother, who had
for some time exercised the functions of lieutenant of that country.
Being unpopular among the Egyptians, they revolted against him,
giving the Crusaders a finer opportunity for making a conquest than

they had ever enjoyed before. But, quarrelsome and licentious as
they had been from time immemorial, they did not see that the
favourable moment had come; or seeing, could not profit by it. While
they were revelling or fighting among themselves, under the walls of
Damietta, the revolt was suppressed, and Camhel firmly established
on the throne of Egypt. In conjunction with his brother Cohreddin,
his next care was to drive the Christians from Damietta, and for
upwards of three months they bent all their efforts to throw in
supplies to the besieged, or draw on the besiegers to a general
engagement. In neither were they successful; and the famine in
Damietta became so dreadful that vermin of every description were
thought luxuries, and sold for exorbitant prices. A dead dog became
more valuable than a live ox in time of prosperity. Unwholesome
food brought on disease, and the city could hold out no longer for
absolute want of men to defend the walls.
Cohreddin and Camhel were alike interested in the preservation of
so important a position, and, convinced of the certain fate of the city,
they opened a conference with the crusading chiefs, offering to yield
the whole of Palestine to the Christians upon the sole condition of
the evacuation of Egypt. With a blindness and wrong-headedness
almost incredible, these advantageous terms were refused, chiefly
through the persuasion of Cardinal Pelagius, an ignorant and
obstinate fanatic, who urged upon the Duke of Austria and the
French and English leaders, that infidels never kept their word; that
their offers were deceptive, and merely intended to betray. The
conferences were brought to an abrupt termination by the Crusaders,
and a last attack made upon the walls of Damietta. The besieged
made but slight resistance, for they had no hope, and the Christians

entered the city, and found, out of seventy thousand people, but
three thousand remaining: so fearful had been the ravages of the
twin fiends, plague and famine.
Several months were spent in Damietta. The climate either
weakened the frames or obscured the understandings of the
Christians; for, after their conquest, they lost all energy, and
abandoned themselves more unscrupulously than ever to riot and
debauchery. John of Brienne, who, by right of his wife, was the
nominal sovereign of Jerusalem, was so disgusted with the
pusillanimity, arrogance, and dissensions of the chiefs, that he
withdrew entirely from them and retired to Acre. Large bodies also
returned to Europe, and Cardinal Pelagius was left at liberty to blast
the whole enterprise whenever it pleased him. He managed to
conciliate John of Brienne, and marched forward with these
combined forces to attack Cairo. It was only when he had approached
within a few hours’ march of that city that he discovered the
inadequacy of his army. He turned back immediately; but the Nile
had risen since his departure; the sluices were opened, and there was
no means of reaching Damietta. In this strait, he sued for the peace
he had formerly spurned, and, happily for himself, found the
generous brothers Camhel and Cohreddin still willing to grant it.
Damietta was soon afterwards given up, and the cardinal returned to
Europe. John of Brienne retired to Acre, to mourn the loss of his
kingdom, embittered against the folly of his pretended friends, who
had ruined where they should have aided him. And thus ended the
sixth Crusade.
The seventh was more successful. Frederic II., emperor of
Germany, had often vowed to lead his armies to the defence of

Palestine, but was as often deterred from the journey by matters of
more pressing importance. Cohreddin was a mild and enlightened
monarch, and the Christians of Syria enjoyed repose and toleration
under his rule: but John of Brienne was not willing to lose his
kingdom without an effort; and the popes in Europe were ever
willing to embroil the nations for the sake of extending their own
power. No monarch of that age was capable of rendering more
effective assistance than Frederic of Germany. To inspire him with
more zeal, it was proposed that he should wed the young Princess
Violante, daughter of John of Brienne, and heiress of the kingdom of
Jerusalem. Frederic consented with joy and eagerness. The princess
was brought from Acre to Rome without delay, and her marriage
celebrated on a scale of great magnificence. Her father, John of
Brienne, abdicated all his rights in favour of his son-in-law, and
Jerusalem had once more a king, who had not only the will, but the
power, to enforce his claims. Preparations for the new Crusade were
immediately commenced, and in the course of six months the
emperor was at the head of a well-disciplined army of sixty thousand
men. Matthew Paris informs us, that an army of the same amount
was gathered in England; and most of the writers upon the Crusades
adopt his statement. When John of Brienne was in England, before
his daughter’s marriage with the emperor was thought of, praying for
the aid of Henry III. and his nobles to recover his lost kingdom, he
did not meet with much encouragement. Grafton, in his Chronicle,
says, “he departed again without any great comfort.” But when a man
of more influence in European politics appeared upon the scene, the
English nobles were as ready to sacrifice themselves in the cause as
they had been in the time of Cœur de Lion.

The army of Frederic encamped at Brundusium; but a pestilential
disease having made its appearance among them, their departure
was delayed for several months. In the mean time the Empress
Violante died in childbed. John of Brienne, who had already
repented of his abdication, and was besides incensed against
Frederic for many acts of neglect and insult, no sooner saw the only
tie which bound them severed by the death of his daughter, than he
began to bestir himself, and make interest with the pope to undo
what he had done, and regain the honorary crown he had renounced.
Pope Gregory IX., a man of a proud, unconciliating, and revengeful
character, owed the emperor a grudge for many an act of
disobedience to his authority, and encouraged the overtures of John
of Brienne more than he should have done. Frederic, however,
despised them both, and, as soon as his army was convalescent, set
sail for Acre. He had not been many days at sea when he was himself
attacked with the malady, and obliged to return to Otranto, the
nearest port. Gregory, who had by this time decided in the interest of
John of Brienne, excommunicated the emperor for returning from so
holy an expedition on any pretext whatever. Frederic at first treated
the excommunication with supreme contempt; but when he got well,
he gave his holiness to understand that he was not to be outraged
with impunity, and sent some of his troops to ravage the papal
territories. This, however, only made the matter worse, and Gregory
despatched messengers to Palestine forbidding the faithful, under
severe pains and penalties, to hold any intercourse with the
excommunicated emperor. Thus between them both, the scheme
which they had so much at heart bade fair to be as effectually ruined
as even the Saracens could have wished. Frederic still continued his

zeal in the Crusade, for he was now king of Jerusalem, and fought for
himself, and not for Christendom, or its representative, Pope
Gregory. Hearing that John of Brienne was preparing to leave
Europe, he lost no time in taking his own departure, and arrived
safely at Acre. It was here that he first experienced the evil effects of
excommunication. The Christians of Palestine refused to aid him in
any way, and looked with distrust, if not with abhorrence, upon him.
The Templars, Hospitallers, and other knights, shared at first the
general feeling; but they were not men to yield a blind obedience to a
distant potentate, especially when it compromised their own
interests. When, therefore, Frederic prepared to march upon
Jerusalem without them, they joined his banners to a man.

TEMPLAR AND HOSPITALLER.

It is said that, previous to quitting Europe, the German emperor
had commenced a negotiation with the Sultan Camhel for the
restoration of the Holy Land, and that Camhel, who was jealous of
the ambition of his brother Cohreddin, was willing to stipulate to
that effect, on condition of being secured by Frederic in the
possession of the more important territory of Egypt. But before the
Crusaders reached Palestine, Camhel was relieved from all fears by
the death of his brother. He nevertheless did not think it worth while
to contest with the Crusaders the barren corner of the earth which
had already been dyed with so much Christian and Saracen blood,
and proposed a truce of three years, only stipulating, in addition,
that the Moslems should be allowed to worship freely in the temple

of Jerusalem. This happy termination did not satisfy the bigoted
Christians of Palestine. The tolerance they sought for themselves,
they were not willing to extend to others, and they complained
bitterly of the privilege of free worship allowed to their opponents.
Unmerited good fortune had made them insolent, and they contested
the right of the emperor to become a party to any treaty, as long as he
remained under the ecclesiastical ban. Frederic was disgusted with
his new subjects; but, as the Templars and Hospitallers remained
true to him, he marched to Jerusalem to be crowned. All the
churches were shut against him, and he could not even find a priest
to officiate at his coronation. He had despised the papal authority too
long to quail at it now, when it was so unjustifiably exerted, and, as
there was nobody to crown him, he very wisely crowned himself. He
took the royal diadem from the altar with his own hands, and boldly
and proudly placed it on his brow. No shouts of an applauding
populace made the welkin ring; no hymns of praise and triumph
resounded from the ministers of religion; but a thousand swords
started from their scabbards to testify that their owners would
defend the new monarch to the death.
It was hardly to be expected that he would renounce for any long
period the dominion of his native land for the uneasy crown and
barren soil of Palestine. He had seen quite enough of his new
subjects before he was six months among them, and more important
interests called him home. John of Brienne, openly leagued with
Pope Gregory against him, was actually employed in ravaging his
territories at the head of a papal army. This intelligence decided his
return. As a preliminary step, he made those who had contemned his
authority feel, to their sorrow, that he was their master. He then set

sail, loaded with the curses of Palestine. And thus ended the seventh
Crusade, which, in spite of every obstacle and disadvantage, had
been productive of more real service to the Holy Land than any that
had gone before; a result solely attributable to the bravery of
Frederic and the generosity of the Sultan Camhel.
Soon after the emperor’s departure a new claimant started for the
throne of Jerusalem, in the person of Alice queen of Cyprus, and
half-sister of the Mary who, by her marriage, had transferred her
right to John of Brienne. The grand military orders, however, clung
to Frederic, and Alice was obliged to withdraw.
So peaceful a termination to the Crusade did not give unmixed
pleasure in Europe. The chivalry of France and England were unable
to rest, and long before the conclusion of the truce, were collecting
their armies for an eighth expedition. In Palestine also the
contentment was far from universal. Many petty Mahomedan states
in the immediate vicinity were not parties to the truce, and harassed
the frontier towns incessantly. The Templars, ever turbulent, waged
bitter war with the sultan of Aleppo, and in the end were almost
exterminated. So great was the slaughter among them that Europe
resounded with the sad story of their fate, and many a noble knight
took arms to prevent the total destruction of an order associated with
so many high and inspiring remembrances. Camhel, seeing the
preparations that were making, thought that his generosity had been
sufficiently shewn, and the very day the truce was at an end assumed
the offensive, and marching forward to Jerusalem, took possession of
it, after routing the scanty forces of the Christians. Before this
intelligence reached Europe a large body of Crusaders was on the
march, headed by the king of Navarre, the Duke of Burgundy, the

Count de Bretagne, and other leaders. On their arrival, they learned
that Jerusalem had been taken, but that the sultan was dead, and his
kingdom torn by rival claimants to the supreme power. The
dissensions of their foes ought to have made them united, but as in
all previous Crusades, each feudal chief was master of his own host,
and acted upon his own responsibility, and without reference to any
general plan. The consequence was that nothing could be done. A
temporary advantage was gained by one leader, who had no means of
improving it; while another was defeated, without means of
retrieving himself. Thus the war lingered till the battle of Gaza, when
the king of Navarre was defeated with great loss, and compelled to
save himself from total destruction by entering into a hard and
oppressive treaty with the emir of Karac.
At this crisis aid arrived from England, commanded by Richard
earl of Cornwall, the namesake of Cœur de Lion, and inheritor of his
valour. His army was strong and full of hope. They had confidence in
themselves and in their leader, and looked like men accustomed to
victory. Their coming changed the aspect of affairs. The new sultan of
Egypt was at war with the sultan of Damascus, and had not forces to
oppose two enemies so powerful. He therefore sent messengers to
meet the English earl, offering an exchange of prisoners and the
complete cession of the Holy Land. Richard, who had not come to
fight for the mere sake of fighting, agreed at once to terms so
advantageous, and became the deliverer of Palestine without striking
a blow. The sultan of Egypt then turned his whole force against his
Moslem enemies, and the Earl of Cornwall returned to Europe. Thus
ended the eighth Crusade, the most beneficial of all. Christendom
had no further pretence for sending her fierce levies to the East. To

all appearance the holy wars were at an end: the Christians had
entire possession of Jerusalem, Tripoli, Antioch, Edessa, Acre, Jaffa,
and, in fact, of nearly all Judea; and, could they have been at peace
among themselves, they might have overcome, without great
difficulty, the jealousy and hostility of their neighbours. A
circumstance, as unforeseen as it was disastrous, blasted this fair
prospect, and reillumed, for the last time, the fervour and fury of the
Crusades.
Gengis Khan and his successors had swept over Asia like a tropical
storm, overturning in their progress the landmarks of ages. Kingdom
after kingdom was cast down as they issued, innumerable, from the
far recesses of the North and East, and, among others, the empire of
Korasmin was overrun by these all-conquering hordes. The
Korasmins, a fierce, uncivilised race, thus driven from their homes,
spread themselves, in their turn, over the south of Asia with fire and
sword, in search of a resting-place. In their impetuous course they
directed themselves towards Egypt, whose sultan, unable to
withstand the swarm that had cast their longing eyes on the fertile
valleys of the Nile, endeavoured to turn them from their course. For
this purpose, he sent emissaries to Barbaquan, their leader, inviting
them to settle in Palestine; and the offer being accepted by the wild
horde, they entered the country before the Christians received the
slightest intimation of their coming. It was as sudden as it was
overwhelming. Onwards, like the simoom, they came, burning and
slaying, and were at the walls of Jerusalem before the inhabitants
had time to look round them. They spared neither life nor property;
they slew women and children, and priests at the altar, and profaned
even the graves of those who had slept for ages. They tore down

every vestige of the Christian faith, and committed horrors
unparalleled in the history of warfare. About seven thousand of the
inhabitants of Jerusalem sought safety in retreat; but before they
were out of sight, the banner of the cross was hoisted upon the walls
by the savage foe to decoy them back. The artifice was but too
successful. The poor fugitives imagined that help had arrived from
another direction, and turned back to regain their homes. Nearly the
whole of them were massacred, and the streets of Jerusalem ran with
blood.

JAFFA.

The Templars, Hospitallers, and Teutonic knights forgot their long
and bitter animosities, and joined hand in hand to rout out this
desolating foe. They entrenched themselves in Jaffa with all the
chivalry of Palestine that yet remained, and endeavoured to engage
the sultans of Emissa and Damascus to assist them against the
common enemy. The aid obtained from the Moslems amounted at
first to only four thousand men, but with these reinforcements
Walter of Brienne, the lord of Jaffa, resolved to give battle to the
Korasmins. The conflict was as deadly as despair on the one side, and
unmitigated ferocity on the other, could make it. It lasted with

varying fortune for two days, when the sultan of Emissa fled to his
fortifications, and Walter of Brienne fell into the enemy’s hands. The
brave knight was suspended by the arms to a cross in sight of the
walls of Jaffa, and the Korasminian leader declared that he should
remain in that position until the city surrendered. Walter raised his
feeble voice, not to advise surrender, but to command his soldiers to
hold out to the last. But his gallantry was unavailing. So great had
been the slaughter, that out of the grand array of knights, there now
remained but sixteen Hospitallers, thirty-three Templars, and three
Teutonic cavaliers. These with the sad remnant of the army fled to
Acre, and the Korasmins were masters of Palestine.
The sultans of Syria preferred the Christians to this fierce horde
for their neighbours. Even the sultan of Egypt began to regret the aid
he had given to such barbarous foes, and united with those of Emissa
and Damascus to root them from the land. The Korasmins amounted
to but twenty thousand men, and were unable to resist the
determined hostility which encompassed them on every side. The
sultans defeated them in several engagements, and the peasantry
rose up in masses to take vengeance upon them. Gradually their
numbers were diminished. No mercy was shewn them in defeat.
Barbaquan their leader was slain; and after five years of desperate
struggles, they were finally extirpated, and Palestine became once
more the territory of the Mussulmans.

WILLIAM LONGSWORD.

A short time previous to this devastating eruption, Louis IX. fell
sick in Paris, and dreamed in the delirium of his fever that he saw the
Christian and Moslem host fighting before Jerusalem, and the
Christians defeated with great slaughter. The dream made a great
impression on his superstitious mind, and he made a solemn vow,
that if ever he recovered his health, he would take a pilgrimage to the
Holy Land. When the news of the misfortunes of Palestine, and the
awful massacres at Jerusalem and Jaffa, arrived in Europe, St. Louis
remembered him of his dream. More persuaded than ever that it was
an intimation direct from heaven, he prepared to take the cross at
the head of his armies, and march to the deliverance of the Holy
Sepulchre. From that moment he doffed the royal mantle of purple
and ermine, and dressed in the sober serge becoming a pilgrim. All
his thoughts were directed to the fulfilment of his design, and
although his kingdom could but ill spare him, he made every
preparation to leave it. Pope Innocent IV. applauded his zeal and
afforded him every assistance. He wrote to Henry III. of England to
forward the cause in his dominions, and called upon the clergy and

laity all over Europe to contribute towards it. William Longsword,
the celebrated Earl of Salisbury, took the cross at the head of a great
number of valiant knights and soldiers. But the fanaticism of the
people was not to be awakened either in France or England. Great
armies were raised, but the masses no longer sympathised. Taxation
had been the great cooler of zeal. It was no longer a disgrace even to
a knight if he refused to take the cross. Rutebeuf, a French minstrel,
who flourished about this time (1250), composed a dialogue between
a Crusader and a non-Crusader, which the reader will find translated
in Way’s Fabliaux. The Crusader uses every argument to persuade
the non-Crusader to take up arms, and forsake every thing, in the
holy cause; but it is evident from the greater force of the arguments
used by the non-Crusader, that he was the favourite of the minstrel.
To a most urgent solicitation of his friend the Crusader, he replies:
“I read thee right, thou holdest good
To this same land I straight should hie,
And win it back with mickle blood,
Nor gaine one foot of soil thereby;
While here dejected and forlorn
My wife and babes are left to mourn;
My goodly mansion rudely marred,
All trusted to my dogs to guard.
But I, fair comrade, well I wot
An ancient saw of pregnant wit
Doth bid us keep what we have got;
And troth I mean to follow it.”

This being the general feeling, it is not to be wondered at that Louis
IX. was occupied fully three years in organising his forces, and in
making the necessary preparations for his departure. When all was
ready he set sail for Cyprus, accompanied by his queen, his two
brothers, the Counts d’Anjou and d’Artois, and a long train of the
noblest chivalry of France. His third brother, the Count de Poitiers,
remained behind to collect another corps of Crusaders, and followed
him in a few months afterwards. The army united at Cyprus, and
amounted to fifty thousand men, exclusive of the English Crusaders
under William Longsword. Again, a pestilential disease made its
appearance, to which many hundreds fell victims. It was in
consequence found necessary to remain in Cyprus until the spring.
Louis then embarked for Egypt with his whole host; but a violent
tempest separated his fleet, and he arrived before Damietta with only
a few thousand men. They were, however, impetuous and full of
hope; and although the Sultan Melick Shah was drawn up on the
shore with a force infinitely superior, it was resolved to attempt a
landing without waiting the arrival of the rest of the army. Louis
himself, in wild impatience, sprang from his boat, and waded on
shore; while his army, inspired by his enthusiastic bravery, followed,
shouting the old war-cry of the first Crusaders, Dieu le veut! Dieu le
veut! A panic seized the Turks. A body of their cavalry attempted to
bear down upon the Crusaders, but the knights fixed their large
shields deep in the sands of the shore, and rested their lances upon
them, so that they projected above, and formed a barrier so
imposing, that the Turks, afraid to breast it, turned round and fairly
took to flight. At the moment of this panic, a false report was spread
in the Saracen host, that the sultan had been slain. The confusion

immediately became general—the deroute was complete: Damietta
itself was abandoned, and the same night the victorious Crusaders
fixed their head-quarters in that city. The soldiers who had been
separated from their chief by the tempest arrived shortly afterwards;
and Louis was in a position to justify the hope, not only of the
conquest of Palestine, but of Egypt itself.
But too much confidence proved the bane of his army. They
thought, as they had accomplished so much, that nothing more
remained to be done, and gave themselves up to ease and luxury.
When, by the command of Louis, they marched towards Cairo, they
were no longer the same men; success, instead of inspiring, had
unnerved them; debauchery had brought on disease, and disease was
aggravated by the heat of a climate to which none of them were
accustomed. Their progress towards Massoura, on the road to Cairo,
was checked by the Thanisian canal, on the banks of which the
Saracens were drawn up to dispute the passage. Louis gave orders
that a bridge should be thrown across: and the operations
commenced under cover of two cat-castles, or high movable towers.
The Saracens soon destroyed them by throwing quantities of Greek
fire, the artillery of that day, upon them, and Louis was forced to
think of some other means of effecting his design. A peasant agreed,
for a considerable bribe, to point out a ford where the army might
wade across, and the Count d’Artois was despatched with fourteen
hundred men to attempt it, while Louis remained to face the
Saracens with the main body of the army. The Count d’Artois got
safely over, and defeated the detachment that had been sent to
oppose his landing. Flushed with the victory, the brave count forgot
the inferiority of his numbers, and pursued the panic-stricken enemy

into Massoura. He was now completely cut off from the aid of his
brother Crusaders, which the Moslems perceiving, took courage and
returned upon him, with a force swollen by the garrison of Massoura,
and by reinforcements from the surrounding districts. The battle
now became hand to hand. The Christians fought with the energy of
desperate men, but the continually increasing numbers of the foe
surrounded them completely, and cut off all hope, either of victory or
escape. The Count d’Artois was among the foremost of the slain; and
when Louis arrived to the rescue, the brave advanced-guard was
nearly cut to pieces. Of the fourteen hundred but three hundred
remained. The fury of the battle was now increased threefold. The
French king and his troops performed prodigies of valour, and the
Saracens, under the command of the Emir Ceccidun, fought as if they
were determined to exterminate, in one last decisive effort, the new
European swarm that had settled upon their coast. At the fall of the
evening dews the Christians were masters of the field of Massoura,
and flattered themselves that they were the victors. Self-love would
not suffer them to confess that the Saracens had withdrawn, and not
retreated; but their leaders were too wofully convinced that that fatal
field had completed the disorganisation of the Christian army, and
that all hopes of future conquest were at an end.
Impressed with this truth, the Crusaders sued for peace. The
sultan insisted upon the immediate evacuation of Damietta, and that
Louis himself should be delivered as hostage for the fulfilment of the
condition. His army at once refused, and the negotiations were
broken off. It was now resolved to attempt a retreat; but the agile
Saracens, now in the front and now in the rear, rendered it a matter
of extreme difficulty, and cut off the stragglers in great numbers.

Hundreds of them were drowned in the Nile; and sickness and
famine worked sad ravages upon those who escaped all other
casualties. Louis himself was so weakened by disease, fatigue, and
discouragement, that he was hardly able to sit upon his horse. In the
confusion of the flight he was separated from his attendants, and left
a total stranger upon the sands of Egypt, sick, weary, and almost
friendless. One knight, Geffry de Sergines, alone attended him, and
led him to a miserable hut in a small village, where for several days
he lay in the hourly expectation of death. He was at last discovered
and taken prisoner by the Saracens, who treated him with all the
honour due to his rank and all the pity due to his misfortunes. Under
their care his health rapidly improved, and the next consideration
was that of his ransom.
The Saracens demanded, besides money, the cession of Acre,
Tripoli, and other cities of Palestine. Louis unhesitatingly refused,
and conducted himself with so much pride and courage that the
sultan declared he was the proudest infidel he had ever beheld. After
a good deal of haggling, the sultan agreed to waive these conditions,
and a treaty was finally concluded. The city of Damietta was
restored; a truce of ten years agreed upon, and ten thousand golden
bezants paid for the release of Louis and the liberation of all the
captives. Louis then withdrew to Jaffa, and spent two years in
putting that city, and Cesarea, with the other possessions of the
Christians in Palestine, into a proper state of defence. He then
returned to his own country, with great reputation as a saint, but
very little as a soldier.
Matthew Paris informs us that, in the year 1250, while Louis was
in Egypt, “thousands of the English were resolved to go to the holy

war, had not the king strictly guarded his ports and kept his people
from running out of doors.” When the news arrived of the reverses
and captivity of the French king, their ardour cooled; and the
Crusade was sung of only, but not spoken of.
In France, a very different feeling was the result. The news of the
king’s capture spread consternation through the country. A fanatic
monk of Citeaux suddenly appeared in the villages, preaching to the
people, and announcing that the Holy Virgin, accompanied by a
whole army of saints and martyrs, had appeared to him, and
commanded him to stir up the shepherds and farm-labourers to the
defence of the cross. To them only was his discourse addressed; and
his eloquence was such, that thousands flocked around him, ready to
follow wherever he should lead. The pastures and the corn-fields
were deserted, and the shepherds, or pastoureaux, as they were
termed, became at last so numerous as to amount to upwards of fifty
thousand,—Millot says one hundred thousand men. 20 The Queen
Blanche, who governed as regent during the absence of the king,
encouraged at first the armies of the pastoureaux; but they soon gave
way to such vile excesses that the peaceably disposed were driven to
resistance. Robbery, murder, and violation marked their path; and
all good men, assisted by the government, united in putting them
down. They were finally dispersed, but not before three thousand of
them had been massacred. Many authors say that the slaughter was
still greater.
The ten years’ truce concluded in 1264, and St. Louis was urged by
two powerful motives to undertake a second expedition for the relief
of Palestine. These were, fanaticism on the one hand, and a desire of
retrieving his military fame on the other, which had suffered more

than his parasites liked to remind him of. The pope, of course,
encouraged his design, and once more the chivalry of Europe began
to bestir themselves. In 1268, Edward, the heir of the English
monarchy, announced his determination to join the Crusade; and the
pope (Clement IV.) wrote to the prelates and clergy to aid the cause
by their persuasions and their revenues. In England, they agreed to
contribute a tenth of their possessions; and by a parliamentary order,
a twentieth was taken from the corn and movables of all the laity at
Michaelmas.
In spite of the remonstrances of the few clear-headed statesmen
who surrounded him, urging the ruin that might in consequence fall
upon his then prosperous kingdom, Louis made every preparation
for his departure. The warlike nobility were nothing loath; and in the
spring of 1270, the king set sail with an army of sixty thousand men.
He was driven by stress of weather into Sardinia, and while there, a
change in his plans took place. Instead of proceeding to Acre, as he
originally intended, he shaped his course for Tunis, on the African
coast. The king of Tunis had some time previously expressed himself
favourably disposed towards the Christians and their religion, and
Louis, it appears, had hopes of converting him, and securing his aid
against the sultan of Egypt. “What honour would be mine,” he used
to say, “if I could become godfather to this Mussulman king!” Filled
with this idea he landed in Africa, near the site of the city of
Carthage, but found that he had reckoned without his host. The king
of Tunis had no thoughts of renouncing his religion, nor intention of
aiding the Crusaders in any way. On the contrary, he opposed their
landing with all the forces that could be collected on so sudden an
emergency. The French, however, made good their first position, and

defeated the Moslems with considerable loss. They also gained some
advantage over the reinforcements that were sent to oppose them;
but an infectious flux appeared in the army, and put a stop to all
future victories. The soldiers died at the rate of a hundred in a day.
The enemy, at the same time, made as great havoc as the plague. St.
Louis himself was one of the first attacked by the disease. His
constitution had been weakened by fatigues, and even before he left
France he was unable to bear the full weight of his armour. It was
soon evident to his sorrowing soldiers that their beloved monarch
could not long survive. He lingered for some days, and died in
Carthage in the fifty-sixth year of his age, deeply regretted by his
army and his subjects, and leaving behind him one of the most
singular reputations in history. He is the model-king of ecclesiastical
writers, in whose eyes his very defects became virtues, because they
were manifested in furtherance of their cause. More unprejudiced
historians, while they condemn his fanaticism, admit that he was
endowed with many high and rare qualities; that he was in no one
point behind his age, and in many in advance of it.
His brother, Charles of Anjou, in consequence of a revolution in
Sicily, had become king of that country. Before he heard of the death
of Louis, he had sailed from Messina with large reinforcements. On
his landing near Carthage, he advanced at the head of his army, amid
the martial music of drums and trumpets. He was soon informed
how inopportune was his rejoicing, and shed tears before his whole
army, such as no warrior would have been ashamed to shed. A peace
was speedily agreed upon with the king of Tunis, and the armies of
France and Sicily returned to their homes.

SEAL OF EDWARD I.

So little favour had the Crusade found in England, that even the
exertions of the heir to the throne had only collected a small force of
fifteen hundred men. With these few Prince Edward sailed from
Dover to Bourdeaux, in the expectation that he would find the
French king in that city. St. Louis, however, had left a few weeks
previously; upon which Edward followed him to Sardinia, and
afterwards to Tunis. Before his arrival in Africa, St. Louis was no
more, and peace had been concluded between France and Tunis. He
determined, however, not to relinquish the Crusade. Returning to
Sicily, he passed the winter in that country, and endeavoured to
augment his little army. In the spring he set sail for Palestine, and
arrived in safety at Acre. The Christians were torn, as usual, by
mutual jealousies and animosities. The two great military orders
were as virulent and as intractable as ever; opposed to each other,
and to all the world. The arrival of Edward had the effect of causing
them to lay aside their unworthy contention, and of uniting heart to
heart in one last effort for the deliverance of their adopted country. A
force of six thousand effective warriors was soon formed to join those
of the English prince, and preparations were made for the renewal of
hostilities. The Sultan Bibars or Bendocdar, 21 a fierce Mamluke, who
had been placed on the throne by a bloody revolution, was at war

with all his neighbours, and unable, for that reason, to concentrate
his whole strength against them. Edward took advantage of this, and
marching boldly forward to Nazareth, defeated the Turks and gained
possession of that city. This was the whole amount of his successes.
The hot weather engendered disease among his troops, and he
himself, the life and soul of the expedition, fell sick among the first.
He had been ill for some time, and was slowly recovering, when a
messenger desired to speak with him on important matters, and to
deliver some despatches into his own hand. While the prince was
occupied in examining them, the traitorous messenger drew a dagger
from his belt and stabbed him in the breast. The wound fortunately
was not deep, and Edward had regained a portion of his strength. He
struggled with the assassin, and put him to death with his own
dagger, at the same time calling loudly for assistance. 22 His
attendants came at his call, and found him bleeding profusely, and
ascertained on inspection that the dagger was poisoned. Means were
instantly taken to purify the wound, and an antidote was sent by the
Grand Master of the Templars which removed all danger from the
effects of the poison. Camden, in his history, has adopted the more
popular, and certainly more beautiful version of this story, which
says that the Princess Eleonora, in her love for her gallant husband,
sucked the poison from his wound at the risk of her own life: to use
the words of old Fuller, “it is a pity so pretty a story should not be
true; and that so sovereign a remedy as a woman’s tongue, anointed
with the virtue of loving affection,” should not have performed the
good deed.
Edward suspected, and doubtless not without reason, that the
assassin was employed by the sultan of Egypt. But it amounted to

suspicion only; and by the sudden death of the assassin the principal
clue to the discovery of the truth was lost for ever. Edward, on his
recovery, prepared to resume the offensive; but the sultan,
embarrassed by the defence of interests which, for the time being, he
considered of more importance, made offers of peace to the
Crusaders. This proof of weakness on the part of the enemy was
calculated to render a man of Edward’s temperament more anxious
to prosecute the war; but he had also other interests to defend. News
arrived in Palestine of the death of his father, King Henry III.; and
his presence being necessary in England, he agreed to the terms of
the sultan. These were, that the Christians should be allowed to
retain their possessions in the Holy Land, and that a truce of ten
years should be proclaimed. Edward then set sail for England; and
thus ended the last Crusade.
The after-fate of the Holy Land may be told in a few words. The
Christians, unmindful of their past sufferings and of the jealous
neighbours they had to deal with, first broke the truce by plundering
some Egyptian traders near Margat. The sultan immediately
revenged the outrage by taking possession of Margat, and war once
more raged between the nations. Margat made a gallant defence, but
no reinforcements arrived from Europe to prevent its fall. Tripoli was
the next, and other cities in succession, until at last Acre was the only
city of Palestine that remained in possession of the Christians.

TOMB OF QUEEN ELEANOR.

The Grand Master of the Templars collected together his small and
devoted band, and, with the trifling aid afforded by the King of
Cyprus, prepared to defend to the death the last possession of his
order. Europe was deaf to his cry for aid, the numbers of the foe were
overwhelming, and devoted bravery was of no avail. In that
disastrous siege the Christians were all but exterminated. The king of
Cyprus fled when he saw that resistance was vain, and the Grand
Master fell at the head of his knights, pierced with a hundred
wounds. Seven Templars, and as many Hospitallers, alone escaped
from the dreadful carnage. The victorious Moslems then set fire to
the city, and the rule of the Christians in Palestine was brought to a
close for ever.
This intelligence spread alarm and sorrow among the clergy of
Europe, who endeavoured to rouse once more the energy and
enthusiasm of the nations in the cause of the Holy Land. But the
popular mania had run its career; the spark of zeal had burned its
appointed time, and was never again to be re-illumined. Here and
there a solitary knight announced his determination to take up arms,
and now and then a king gave cold encouragement to the scheme;

but it dropped almost as soon as spoken of, to be renewed again, still
more feebly, at some longer interval.
Now what was the grand result of all these struggles? Europe
expended millions of her treasures, and the blood of two millions of
her children; and a handful of quarrelsome knights retained
possession of Palestine for about one hundred years! Even had
Christendom retained it to this day, the advantage, if confined to
that, would have been too dearly purchased. But notwithstanding the
fanaticism that originated, and the folly that conducted them, the
Crusades were not productive of unmitigated evil. The feudal chiefs
became better members of society by coming in contact, in Asia, with
a civilisation superior to their own; the people secured some small
instalments of their rights; kings, no longer at war with their nobility,
had time to pass some good laws; the human mind learned some
little wisdom from hard experience, and, casting off the slough of
superstition in which the Roman clergy had so long enveloped it,
became prepared to receive the seeds of the approaching
Reformation. Thus did the all-wise Disposer of events bring good out
of evil, and advance the civilisation and ultimate happiness of the
nations of the West by means of the very fanaticism that had led
them against the East. But the whole subject is one of absorbing
interest, and, if carried fully out in all its bearings, would consume
more space than the plan of this work will allow. The philosophic
student will draw his own conclusions; and he can have no better
field for the exercise of his powers than this European madness—its
advantages and disadvantages, its causes and results.

ARRAS.

THE WITCH MANIA.

What wrath of gods, or wicked influence
Of tears, conspiring wretched men t’ afflict,
Hath pour’d on earth this noyous pestilence
That mortal minds doth inwardly infect
With love of blindness and of ignorance?
Spencer’s Tears of the Muses.
Countrymen. Hang her! beat her! kill her!
Justice. How now? Forbear this violence!
Mother Sawyer. A crew of villains—a knot of bloody hangmen! set to
torment me! I know not why.
Justice. Alas, neighbour Banks! are you a ringleader in mischief? Fie! to
abuse an aged woman!
Banks. Woman! a she hell-cat, a witch! To prove her one, we no sooner set
fire on the thatch of her house, but in she came running, as if the devil
had sent her in a barrel of gunpowder.
Ford’s Witch of Edmonton.

THE belief that disembodied spirits may be permitted to revisit this world
has its foundation upon that sublime hope of immortality which is at once
the chief solace and greatest triumph of our reason. Even if revelation did
not teach us, we feel that we have that within us which shall never die; and
all our experience of this life but makes us cling the more fondly to that one
repaying hope. But in the early days of “little knowledge” this grand belief
became the source of a whole train of superstitions, which, in their turn,
became the fount from whence flowed a deluge of blood and horror.
Europe, for a period of two centuries and a half, brooded upon the idea, not
only that parted spirits walked the earth to meddle in the affairs of men,
but that men had power to summon evil spirits to their aid to work woe

upon their fellows. An epidemic terror seized upon the nations; no man
thought himself secure, either in his person or possessions, from the
machinations of the devil and his agents. Every calamity that befell him he
attributed to a witch. If a storm arose and blew down his barn, it was
witchcraft; if his cattle died of a murrain—if disease fastened upon his
limbs, or death entered suddenly and snatched a beloved face from his
hearth—they were not visitations of Providence, but the works of some
neighbouring hag, whose wretchedness or insanity caused the ignorant to
raise their finger and point at her as a witch. The word was upon every
body’s tongue. France, Italy, Germany, England, Scotland, and the far
north successively ran mad upon this subject, and for a long series of years
furnished their tribunals with so many trials for witchcraft, that other
crimes were seldom or never spoken of. Thousands upon thousands of
unhappy persons fell victims to this cruel and absurd delusion. In many
cities of Germany, as will be shewn more fully in its due place hereafter, the
average number of executions for this pretended crime was six hundred
annually, or two every day, if we leave out the Sundays, when it is to be
supposed that even this madness refrained from its work.
A misunderstanding of the famous text of the Mosaic law, “Thou shalt
not suffer a witch to live,” no doubt led many conscientious men astray,
whose superstition, warm enough before, wanted but a little corroboration
to blaze out with desolating fury. In all ages of the world men have tried to
hold converse with superior beings, and to pierce by their means the
secrets of futurity. In the time of Moses, it is evident that there were
impostors who trafficked upon the credulity of mankind, and insulted the
supreme majesty of the true God by pretending to the power of divination.
Hence the law which Moses, by Divine command, promulgated against
these criminals; but it did not follow, as the superstitious monomaniacs of
the middle ages imagined, that the Bible established the existence of the
power of divination by its edicts against those who pretended to it. From
the best authorities, it appears that the Hebrew word, which has been

rendered venefica and witch, means a poisoner and divineress, a dabbler
in spells, or fortune-teller. The modern witch was a very different
character, and joined to her pretended power of foretelling future events
that of working evil upon the life, limbs, and possessions of mankind. This
power was only to be acquired by an express compact, signed in blood, with
the devil himself, by which the wizard or witch renounced baptism, and
sold his or her immortal soul to the evil one, without any saving clause of
redemption.
There are so many wondrous appearances in nature for which science
and philosophy cannot even now account, that it is not surprising that,
when natural laws were still less understood, men should have attributed
to supernatural agency every appearance which they could not otherwise
explain. The merest tyro now understands various phenomena which the
wisest of old could not fathom. The schoolboy knows why, upon high
mountains, there should on certain occasions appear three or four suns in
the firmament at once, and why the figure of a traveller upon one eminence
should be reproduced, inverted and of a gigantic stature, upon another. We
all know the strange pranks which imagination can play in certain diseases;
that the hypochondriac can see visions and spectres; and that there have
been cases in which men were perfectly persuaded that they were teapots.
Science has lifted up the veil, and rolled away all the fantastic horrors in
which our forefathers shrouded these and similar cases. The man who now
imagines himself a wolf is sent to the hospital instead of to the stake, as in
the days of the witch mania; and earth, air, and sea are unpeopled of the
grotesque spirits that were once believed to haunt them.
Before entering further into the history of Witchcraft, it may be as well if
we consider the absurd impersonation of the evil principle formed by the
monks in their legends. We must make acquaintance with the primum
mobile, and understand what sort of a personage it was who gave the
witches, in exchange for their souls, the power to torment their fellowcreatures. The popular notion of the devil was, that he was a large, ill-

formed, hairy sprite, with horns, a long tail, cloven feet, and dragon’s
wings. In this shape he was constantly brought on the stage by the monks
in their early “miracles” and “mysteries.” In these representations he was
an important personage, and answered the purpose of the clown in the
modern pantomime. The great fun for the people was to see him well
belaboured by the saints with clubs or cudgels, and to hear him howl with
pain as he limped off, maimed by the blow of some vigorous anchorite. St.
Dunstan generally served him the glorious trick for which he is renowned,
catching hold of his nose with a pair of red-hot pincers, till
“Rocks and distant dells resounded with his cries.”
Some of the saints spat in his face, to his very great annoyance; and others
chopped pieces off of his tail, which, however, always grew on again. This
was paying him in his own coin, and amused the populace mightily, for
they all remembered the scurvy tricks he had played them and their
forefathers. It was believed that he endeavoured to trip people up by laying
his long invisible tail in their way, and giving it a sudden whisk when their
legs were over it;—that he used to get drunk, and swear like a trooper, and
be so mischievous in his cups as to raise tempests and earthquakes, to
destroy the fruits of the earth, and the barns and homesteads of true
believers;—that he used to run invisible spits into people by way of
amusing himself in the long winter evenings, and to proceed to taverns and
regale himself with the best, offering in payment pieces of gold which, on
the dawn of the following morning, invariably turned into slates.
Sometimes, disguised as a large drake, he used to lurk among the
bulrushes, and frighten the weary traveller out of his wits by his awful
quack. The reader will remember the lines of Burns in his address to the
“De’il,” which so well express the popular notion on this point:
“Ae dreary, windy, winter night,

The stars shot down wi’ sklentin light,
Wi’ you mysel, I got a fright
Ayont the lough;
Ye, like a rash-bush, stood in sight
Wi’ waving sough.
The cudgel in my nieve did shake,
Each bristled hair stood like a stake,
When wi’ an eldritch stour, ‘quaick! quaick!’
Among the springs
Awa’ ye squattered, like a drake,
On whistling wings.”
In all the stories circulated and believed about him, he was represented
as an ugly, petty, mischievous spirit, who rejoiced in playing off all manner
of fantastic tricks upon poor humanity. Milton seems to have been the first
who succeeded in giving any but a ludicrous description of him. The
sublime pride, which is the quintessence of evil, was unconceived before
his time. All other limners made him merely grotesque, but Milton made
him awful. In this the monks shewed themselves but miserable romancers;
for their object undoubtedly was to represent the fiend as terrible as
possible. But there was nothing grand about their Satan; on the contrary,
he was a low, mean devil, whom it was easy to circumvent, and fine fun to
play tricks with. But, as is well and eloquently remarked by a modern
writer, 23 the subject has also its serious side. An Indian deity, with its wild
distorted shape and grotesque attitude, appears merely ridiculous when
separated from its accessories and viewed by daylight in a museum; but
restore it to the darkness of its own hideous temple, bring back to our
recollection the victims that have bled upon its altar or been crushed
beneath its car, and our sense of the ridiculous subsides into aversion and
horror. So, while the superstitious dreams of former times are regarded as

mere speculative insanities, we may be for a moment amused with the wild
incoherencies of the patients; but when we reflect that out of these hideous
misconceptions of the principle of evil arose the belief in witchcraft—that
this was no dead faith, but one operating on the whole being of society,
urging on the wisest and the mildest to deeds of murder, or cruelties
scarcely less than murder—that the learned and the beautiful, young and
old, male and female, were devoted by its influence to the stake and the
scaffold—every feeling disappears, except that of astonishment that such
things could be, and humiliation at the thought that the delusion was as
lasting as it was universal.
Besides this chief personage, there was an infinite number of inferior
demons, who played conspicuous parts in the creed of witchcraft. The
pages of Bekker, Leloyer, Bodin, Delrio, and De Lancre, abound with
descriptions of the qualities of these imps, and the functions which were
assigned them. From these authors,—three of whom were commissioners
for the trial of witches, and who wrote from the confessions made by the
supposed criminals and the evidence delivered against them,—and from
the more recent work of M. Jules Garinet, the following summary of the
creed has been, with great pains, extracted. The student who is desirous of
knowing more is referred to the works in question; he will find enough in
every leaf to make his blood curdle with shame and horror: but the purity
of these pages shall not be soiled by any thing so ineffably humiliating and
disgusting as a complete exposition of them; what is here culled will be a
sufficient sample of the popular belief, and the reader would but lose time
who should seek in the writings of the demonologists for more ample
details. He will gain nothing by lifting the veil which covers their
unutterable obscenities, unless, like Sterne, he wishes to gather fresh
evidence of “what a beast man is.” In that case, he will find plenty there to
convince him that the beast would be libelled by the comparison.
It was thought that the earth swarmed with millions of demons of both
sexes, many of whom, like the human race, traced their lineage up to

Adam, who after the fall was led astray by devils, assuming the forms of
beautiful women to deceive him. These demons “increased and multiplied”
among themselves with the most extraordinary rapidity. Their bodies were
of the thin air, and they could pass through the hardest substances with the
greatest ease. They had no fixed residence or abiding place, but were tossed
to and fro in the immensity of space. When thrown together in great
multitudes, they excited whirlwinds in the air and tempests in the waters,
and took delight in destroying the beauty of nature and the monuments of
the industry of man. Although they increased among themselves like
ordinary creatures, their numbers were daily augmented by the souls of
wicked men, of children still-born, of women who died in childbed, and of
persons killed in duels. The whole air was supposed to be full of them, and
many unfortunate men and women drew them by thousands into their
mouths and nostrils at every inspiration; and the demons, lodging in their
bowels or other parts of their bodies, tormented them with pains and
diseases of every kind, and sent them frightful dreams. St. Gregory of Nice
relates a story of a nun who forgot to say her benedicite and make the sign
of the cross before she sat down to supper, and who in consequence
swallowed a demon concealed among the leaves of a lettuce. Most persons
said the number of these demons was so great that they could not be
counted, but Wierus asserted that they amounted to no more than seven
millions four hundred and five thousand nine hundred and twenty-six; and
that they were divided into seventy-two companies or battalions, to each of
which there was a prince or captain. They could assume any shape they
pleased. When they were male, they were called incubi; and when female,
succubi. They sometimes made themselves hideous; and at other times
they assumed shapes of such transcendent loveliness, that mortal eyes
never saw beauty to compete with theirs.
Although the devil and his legions could appear to mankind at any time,
it was generally understood that he preferred the night between Friday and
Saturday. If Satan himself appeared in human shape, he was never

perfectly and in all respects like a man. He was either too black or too
white, too large or too small, or some of his limbs were out of proportion to
the rest of his body. Most commonly his feet were deformed, and he was
obliged to curl up and conceal his tail in some part of his habiliments; for,
take what shape he would, he could not get rid of that encumbrance. He
sometimes changed himself into a tree or a river; and upon one occasion he
transformed himself into a barrister, as we learn from Wierus, book iv.
chapter 9. In the reign of Philippe le Bel, he appeared to a monk in the
shape of a dark man riding a tall black horse, then as a friar, afterwards as
an ass and finally as a coach-wheel. Instances are not rare in which both he
and his inferior demons have taken the form of handsome young men, and,
successfully concealing their tails, have married beautiful young women,
who have had children by them. Such children were easily recognisable by
their continual shrieking, by their requiring five nurses to suckle them, and
by their never growing fat.
All these demons were at the command of any individual who would give
up his immortal soul to the prince of evil for the privilege of enjoying their
services for a stated period. The wizard or witch could send them to
execute the most difficult missions: whatever the witch commanded was
performed, except it was a good action, in which case the order was
disobeyed, and evil worked upon herself instead.
At intervals, according to the pleasure of Satan, there was a general
meeting of the demons and all the witches. This meeting was called the
Sabbath, from its taking place on the Saturday, or immediately after
midnight on Fridays. These sabbaths were sometimes held for one district,
sometimes for another, and once at least every year it was held on the
Brocken, or among other high mountains, as a general sabbath of the
fiends for the whole of Christendom.
The devil generally chose a place where four roads met as the scene of
this assembly, or if that was not convenient, the neighbourhood of a lake.
Upon this spot nothing would ever afterwards grow, as the hot feet of the

demons and witches burnt the principle of fecundity from the earth, and
rendered it barren for ever. When orders had been once issued for the
meeting of the sabbath, all the wizards and witches who failed to attend it
were lashed by demons with a rod made of serpents or scorpions, as a
punishment for their inattention or want of punctuality.
In France and England the witches were supposed to ride uniformly
upon broomsticks; but in Italy and Spain, the devil himself, in the shape of
a goat, used to transport them on his back, which lengthened or shortened
according to the number of witches he was desirous of accommodating. No
witch, when proceeding to the sabbath, could get out by a door or window,
were she to try ever so much. Their general mode of ingress was by the
keyhole, and of egress by the chimney, up which they flew, broom and all,
with the greatest ease. To prevent the absence of the witches from being
noticed by their neighbours, some inferior demon was commanded to
assume their shapes and lie in their beds, feigning illness, until the sabbath
was over.
When all the wizards and witches had arrived at the place of rendezvous,
the infernal ceremonies of the sabbath began. Satan, having assumed his
favourite shape of a large he-goat, with a face in front and another in his
haunches, took his seat upon a throne; and all present, in succession, paid
their respects to him, and kissed him in his face behind. This done, he
appointed a master of the ceremonies, in company with whom he made a
personal examination of all the wizards and witches, to see whether they
had the secret mark about them by which they were stamped as the devil’s
own. This mark was always insensible to pain. Those who had not yet been
marked, received the mark from the master of the ceremonies, the devil at
the same time bestowing nicknames upon them. This done, they all began
to sing and dance in the most furious manner, until some one arrived who
was anxious to be admitted into their society. They were then silent for a
while, until the new-comer had denied his salvation, kissed the devil, spat

upon the Bible, and sworn obedience to him in all things. They then began
dancing again with all their might, and singing these words,
“Alegremos, Alegremos!
Que gente va tenemos!”
In the course of an hour or two they generally became wearied of this
violent exercise, and then they all sat down and recounted the evil deeds
they had done since their last meeting. Those who had not been malicious
and mischievous enough towards their fellow-creatures, received personal
chastisement from Satan himself, who flogged them with thorns or
scorpions till they were covered with blood, and unable to sit or stand.
When this ceremony was concluded, they were all amused by a dance of
toads. Thousands of these creatures sprang out of the earth, and standing
on their hind legs, danced, while the devil played the bagpipes or the
trumpet. These toads were all endowed with the faculty of speech, and
entreated the witches to reward them with the flesh of unbaptised babes for
their exertions to give them pleasure. The witches promised compliance.
The devil bade them remember to keep their word; and then stamping his
foot, caused all the toads to sink into the earth in an instant. The place
being thus cleared, preparation was made for the banquet, where all
manner of disgusting things were served up and greedily devoured by the
demons and witches; although the latter were sometimes regaled with
choice meats and expensive wines from golden plates and crystal goblets;
but they were never thus favoured unless they had done an extraordinary
number of evil deeds since the last period of meeting.
After the feast, they began dancing again; but such as had no relish for
any more exercise in that way, amused themselves by mocking the holy
sacrament of baptism. For this purpose, the toads were again called up,
and sprinkled with filthy water; the devil making the sign of the cross, and

all the witches calling out, “In nomine Patricâ, Aragueaco Petrica, agora!
agora! Valentia, jouando goure gaits goustia!” which meant, “In the name
of Patrick, Petrick of Aragon, now, now, all our ills are over!”
When the devil wished to be particularly amused, he made the witches
strip off their clothes and dance before him, each with a cat tied round her
neck, and another dangling from her body in form of a tail. When the cock
crew, they all disappeared, and the sabbath was ended.
This is a summary of the belief which prevailed for many centuries
nearly all over Europe, and which is far from eradicated even at this day. It
was varied in some respects in several countries, but the main points were
the same in France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and the far North
of Europe.
The early annals of France abound with stories of supposed sorcery, but
it was not until the time of Charlemagne that the crime acquired any great
importance. “This monarch,” says M. Jules Garinet, 24 “had several times
given orders that all necromancers, astrologers, and witches should be
driven from his states; but as the number of criminals augmented daily, he
found it necessary at last to resort to severer measures. In consequence, he
published several edicts, which may be found at length in the Capitulaire
de Baluse. By these, every sort of magic, enchantment, and witchcraft was
forbidden; and the punishment of death decreed against those who in any
way evoked the devil, compounded love-philters, afflicted either man or
woman with barrenness, troubled the atmosphere, excited tempests,
destroyed the fruits of the earth, dried up the milk of cows, or tormented
their fellow-creatures with sores and diseases. All persons found guilty of
exercising these execrable arts were to be executed immediately upon
conviction, that the earth might be rid of the burden and curse of their
presence; and those even who consulted them might also be punished with
death.” 25
After this time, prosecutions for witchcraft are continually mentioned,
especially by the French historians. It was a crime imputed with so much

ease, and repelled with so much difficulty, that the powerful, whenever
they wanted to ruin the weak, and could fix no other imputation upon
them, had only to accuse them of witchcraft to ensure their destruction.
Instances in which this crime was made the pretext for the most violent
persecution, both of individuals and of communities, whose real offences
were purely political or religious, must be familiar to every reader. The
extermination of the Stedinger in 1234, of the Templars from 1307 to 1313,
the execution of Joan of Arc in 1429, and the unhappy scenes of Arras in
1459, are the most prominent. The first of these is perhaps the least known,
but is not among the least remarkable. The following account, from Dr.
Kortüm’s interesting history

26

of the republican confederacies of the

middle ages, will shew the horrible convenience of imputations of
witchcraft when royal or priestly wolves wanted a pretext for a quarrel with
the sheep.
The Frieslanders, inhabiting the district from the Weser to the
Zuydersee, had long been celebrated for their attachment to freedom, and
their successful struggles in its defence. As early as the eleventh century
they had formed a general confederacy against the encroachments of the
Normans and the Saxons, which was divided into seven seelands, holding
annually a diet under a large oak-tree at Aurich, near the Upstalboom.
Here they managed their own affairs, without the control of the clergy and
ambitious nobles who surrounded them, to the great scandal of the latter.
They already had true notions of a representative government. The
deputies of the people levied the necessary taxes, deliberated on the affairs
of the community, and performed, in their simple and patriarchal manner,
nearly all the functions of the representative assemblies of the present day.
Finally, the Archbishop of Bremen, together with the Count of Oldenburg
and other neighbouring potentates, formed a league against that section of
the Frieslanders known by the name of the Stedinger, and succeeded, after
harassing them and sowing dissensions among them for many years, in
bringing them under the yoke. But the Stedinger, devotedly attached to

their ancient laws, by which they had attained a degree of civil and
religious liberty very uncommon in that age, did not submit without a
violent struggle. They arose in insurrection in the year 1204, in defence of
the ancient customs of their country, refused to pay taxes to the feudal
chiefs or tithes to the clergy—who had forced themselves into their peaceful
retreats—and drove out many of their oppressors. For a period of eightand-twenty years the brave Stedinger continued the struggle single-handed
against the forces of the Archbishops of Bremen and the Counts of
Oldenburg, and destroyed, in the year 1232, the strong castle of
Slutterberg, near Delmenhorst, built by the latter nobleman as a position
from which he could send out his marauders to plunder and destroy the
possessions of the peasantry.
The invincible courage of these poor people proving too strong for their
oppressors to cope with by the ordinary means of warfare, the Archbishop
of Bremen applied to Pope Gregory IX. for his spiritual aid against them.
That prelate entered cordially into the cause, and launching forth his
anathema against the Stedinger as heretics and witches, encouraged all
true believers to assist in their extermination. A large body of thieves and
fanatics broke into their country in the year 1233, killing and burning
wherever they went, and not sparing either women or children, the sick or
the aged, in their rage. The Stedinger, however, rallied in great force,
routed their invaders, and killed in battle their leader, Count Burckhardt of
Oldenburg, with many inferior chieftains.
Again the pope was applied to, and a crusade against the Stedinger was
preached in all that part of Germany. The pope wrote to all the bishops and
leaders of the faithful an exhortation to arm, to root out from the land
those abominable witches and wizards. “The Stedinger,” said his holiness,
“seduced by the devil, have abjured all the laws of God and man, slandered
the Church, insulted the holy sacraments, consulted witches to raise evil
spirits, shed blood like water, taken the lives of priests, and concocted an
infernal scheme to propagate the worship of the devil, whom they adore

under the name of Asmodi. The devil appears to them in different shapes,—
sometimes as a goose or a duck, and at others in the figure of a pale blackeyed youth, with a melancholy aspect, whose embrace fills their hearts with
eternal hatred against the holy Church of Christ. This devil presides at their
sabbaths, when they all kiss him and dance around him. He then envelopes
them in total darkness, and they all, male and female, give themselves up
to the grossest and most disgusting debauchery.”
In consequence of these letters of the pope, the emperor of Germany,
Frederic II., also pronounced his ban against them. The Bishops of
Ratzebourg, Lubeck, Osnabrück, Munster, and Minden took up arms to
exterminate them, aided by the Duke of Brabant, the Counts of Holland, of
Clêves, of the Mark, of Oldenburg, of Egmond, of Diest, and many other
powerful nobles. An army of forty thousand men was soon collected, which
marched, under the command of the Duke of Brabant, into the country of
the Stedinger. The latter mustered vigorously in defence of their lives and
liberties, but could raise no greater force, including every man capable of
bearing arms, than eleven thousand men to cope against the overwhelming
numbers of their foe. They fought with the energy of despair, but all in
vain. Eight thousand of them were slain on the field of battle; the whole
race was exterminated; and the enraged conquerors scoured the country in
all directions, slew the women and children and old men, drove away the
cattle, fired the woods and cottages, and made a total waste of the land.

PHILIP IV.

Just as absurd and effectual was the charge brought against the
Templars in 1307, when they had rendered themselves obnoxious to the
potentates and prelacy of Christendom. Their wealth, their power, their
pride, and their insolence had raised up enemies on every side; and every
sort of accusation was made against them, but failed to work their
overthrow, until the terrible cry of witchcraft was let loose upon them. This
effected its object, and the Templars were extirpated. They were accused of
having sold their souls to the devil, and of celebrating all the infernal
mysteries of the witches’ sabbath. It was pretended that, when they
admitted a novice into their order, they forced him to renounce his
salvation and curse Jesus Christ; that they then made him submit to many
unholy and disgusting ceremonies, and forced him to kiss the superior on
the cheek, the navel, and the breech, and spit three times upon a crucifix;
that all the members were forbidden to have connexion with women, but
might give themselves up without restraint to every species of
unmentionable debauchery; that when by any mischance a Templar
infringed this order, and a child was born, the whole order met, and tossed
it about like a shuttlecock from one to the other until it expired; that they
then roasted it by a slow fire, and with the fat which trickled from it
anointed the hair and beard of a large image of the devil. It was also said
that when one of the knights died, his body was burnt into a powder, and
then mixed with wine and drunk by every member of the order. Philip IV.,
who, to exercise his own implacable hatred, invented, in all probability, the
greater part of these charges, issued orders for the immediate arrest of all
the Templars in his dominions. The pope afterwards took up the cause with
almost as much fervour as the king of France; and in every part of Europe
the Templars were thrown into prison, and their goods and estates
confiscated. Hundreds of them, when put to the rack, confessed even the
most preposterous of the charges against them, and by so doing increased
the popular clamour and the hopes of their enemies. It is true that, when
removed from the rack, they denied all they had previously confessed; but

this circumstance only increased the outcry, and was numbered as an
additional crime against them. They were considered in a worse light than
before, and condemned forthwith to the flames as relapsed heretics. Fiftynine of these unfortunate victims were all burned together by a slow fire in
a field in the suburbs of Paris, protesting to the very last moment of their
lives their innocence of the crimes imputed to them, and refusing to accept
of pardon upon condition of acknowledging themselves guilty. Similar
scenes were enacted in the provinces; and for four years hardly a month
passed without witnessing the execution of one or more of these unhappy
men. Finally, in 1313, the last scene of this tragedy closed by the burning of
the Grand-Master, Jacques de Molay, and his companion Guy, the
commander of Normandy. Any thing more atrocious it is impossible to
conceive,—disgraceful alike to the monarch who originated, the pope who
supported, and the age which tolerated the monstrous iniquity. That the
malice of a few could invent such a charge is a humiliating thought for the
lover of his species; but that millions of mankind should credit it is still
more so.
The execution of Joan of Arc is the next most notorious example which
history affords us of the imputation of witchcraft against a political enemy.
Instances of similar persecution, in which this crime was made the pretext
for the gratification of political or religious hatred, might be multiplied to a
great extent. But it is better to proceed at once to the consideration of the
bull of Pope Innocent, the torch that set fire to the long-laid train, and
caused so fearful an explosion over the Christian world. It will be
necessary, however, to go back for some years anterior to that event, the
better to understand the motives that influenced the Church in the
promulgation of that fearful document.
Towards the close of the fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth
century, many witches were burned in different parts of Europe. As a
natural consequence of the severe persecution, the crime, or the pretenders
to it, increased. Those who found themselves accused and threatened with

the penalties, if they happened to be persons of a bad and malicious
disposition, wished they had the power imputed to them, that they might
be revenged upon their persecutors. Numerous instances are upon record
of half-crazed persons being found muttering the spells which were
supposed to raise the evil one. When religion and law alike recognised the
crime, it is no wonder that the weak in reason and the strong in
imagination, especially when they were of a nervous temperament, fancied
themselves endued with the terrible powers of which all the world was
speaking. The belief of their neighbours did not lag behind their own, and
execution was the speedy consequence.

JOAN OF ARC.

As the fear of witchcraft increased, the Catholic clergy strove to fix the
imputation of it upon those religious sects, the pioneers of the
Reformation, who began about this time to be formidable to the Church of
Rome. If a charge of heresy could not ensure their destruction, that of
sorcery and witchcraft never failed. In the year 1459, a devoted
congregation of the Waldenses at Arras, who used to repair at night to
worship God in their own manner in solitary places, fell victims to an
accusation of sorcery. It was rumoured in Arras that in the desert places to
which they retired the devil appeared before them in human form, and
read from a large book his laws and ordinances, to which they all promised
obedience; that he then distributed money and food among them, to bind
them to his service, which done, they gave themselves up to every species
of lewdness and debauchery. Upon these rumours several creditable
persons in Arras were seized and imprisoned, together with a number of

decrepit and idiotic old women. The rack, that convenient instrument for
making the accused confess any thing, was of course put in requisition.
Monstrelet, in his chronicle, says that they were tortured until some of
them admitted the truth of the whole accusations, and said, besides, that
they had seen and recognised in their nocturnal assemblies many persons
of rank; many prelates, seigneurs, governors of bailliages, and mayors of
cities, being such names as the examiners had themselves suggested to the
victims. Several who had been thus informed against were thrown into
prison, and so horribly tortured, that reason fled, and in their ravings of
pain they also confessed their midnight meetings with the devil, and the
oaths they had taken to serve him. Upon these confessions judgment was
pronounced. The poor old women, as usual in such cases, were hanged and
burned in the market-place; the more wealthy delinquents were allowed to
escape upon payment of large sums. It was soon after universally
recognised that these trials had been conducted in the most odious
manner, and that the judges had motives of private vengeance against
many of the more influential persons who had been implicated. The
parliament of Paris afterwards declared the sentence illegal, and the judges
iniquitous; but its arrêt was too late to be of service even to those who had
paid the fine, or to punish the authorities who had misconducted
themselves, for it was not delivered until thirty-two years after the
executions had taken place.
In the mean time, accusations of witchcraft spread rapidly in France,
Italy, and Germany. Strange to say, that although in the first instance
chiefly directed against heretics, the latter were as firm believers in the
crime as even the Catholics themselves. In after times we also find that the
Lutherans and Calvinists became greater witch-burners than ever the
Romanists had been, so deeply was the prejudice rooted. Every other point
of belief was in dispute, but that was considered by every sect to be as well
established as the authenticity of the Scriptures or the existence of a God.

But at this early period of the epidemic the persecutions were directed by
the heads of the Catholic Church. The spread of heresy betokened, it was
thought, the coming of Antichrist. Florimond, in his work concerning
Antichrist, exposed the secret of these prosecutions. He says: “All who have
afforded us some signs of the approach of Antichrist agree that the increase
of sorcery and witchcraft is to distinguish the melancholy period of his
advent; and was ever age so afflicted as ours? The seats destined for
criminals in our courts of justice are blackened with persons accused of this
guilt. There are not judges enough to try them. Our dungeons are gorged
with them. No day passes that we do not render our tribunals bloody by the
dooms which we pronounce, or in which we do not return to our homes
discountenanced and terrified at the horrible confessions which we have
heard. And the devil is accounted so good a master, that we cannot commit
so great a number of his slaves to the flames but what there shall arise from
their ashes a sufficient number to supply their place.”
Florimond here spoke the general opinion of the Church of Rome; but it
never suggested itself to the mind of any person engaged in these trials,
that if it were indeed a devil who raised up so many new witches to fill the
places of those consumed, it was no other than one in their own employ—
the devil of persecution. But so it was. The more they burned, the more
they found to burn, until it became a common prayer with women in the
humbler walks of life, that they might never live to grow old. It was
sufficient to be aged, poor, and half-crazed, to ensure death at the stake or
the scaffold.

GATE OF CONSTANCE.

In the year 1487 there was a severe storm in Switzerland, which laid
waste the country for four miles around Constance. Two wretched old
women, whom the popular voice had long accused of witchcraft, were
arrested on the preposterous charge of having raised the tempest. The rack
was displayed, and the two poor creatures were extended upon it. In reply
to various questions from their tormentors, they owned in their agony that
they were in the constant habit of meeting the devil; that they had sold
their souls to him; and that at their command he had raised the tempest.
Upon this insane and blasphemous charge they were condemned to die. In
the criminal registers of Constance there stands against the name of each
the simple but significant phrase, “convicta et combusta.”
This case and hundreds of others were duly reported to the ecclesiastical
powers. There happened at that time to be a pontiff at the head of the
Church who had given much of his attention to the subject of witchcraft,
and who, with the intention of rooting out the supposed crime, did more to
increase it than any other man that ever lived. John Baptist Cibo, elected to
the papacy in 1485, under the designation of Innocent VIII., was sincerely
alarmed at the number of witches, and launched forth his terrible
manifesto against them. In his celebrated bull of 1488, he called the
nations of Europe to the rescue of the Church of Christ upon earth,
imperilled by the arts of Satan, and set forth the horrors that had reached

his ears; how that numbers of both sexes had intercourse with the infernal
fiends; how by their sorceries they afflicted both man and beast; how they
blighted the marriage-bed, destroyed the births of women and the increase
of cattle; and how they blasted the corn on the ground, the grapes of the
vineyard, the fruits of the trees, and the herbs of the field. In order that
criminals so atrocious might no longer pollute the earth, he appointed
inquisitors in every country, armed with the apostolic power to convict and
punish.
It was now that the Witch Mania, properly so called, may be said to have
fairly commenced. Immediately a class of men sprang up in Europe, who
made it the sole business of their lives to discover and burn the witches.
Sprenger, in Germany, was the most celebrated of these national scourges.
In his notorious work, the Malleus Maleficarum, he laid down a regular
form of trial, and appointed a course of examination by which the
inquisitors in other countries might best discover the guilty. The questions,
which were always enforced by torture, were of the most absurd and
disgusting nature. The inquisitors were required to ask the suspected
whether they had midnight meetings with the devil? whether they attended
the witches’ sabbath on the Brocken? whether they had their familiar
spirits? whether they could raise whirlwinds and call down the lightning?
and whether they had had sexual intercourse with Satan?
Straightway the inquisitors set to work: Cumanus, in Italy, burned fortyone poor women in one province alone; and Sprenger, in Germany, burned
a number which can never be ascertained correctly, but which, it is agreed
on all hands, amounted to more than five hundred in a year. The great
resemblance between the confessions of the unhappy victims was regarded
as a new proof of the existence of the crime. But this is not astonishing. The
same questions from the Malleus Maleficarum were put to them all, and
torture never failed to educe the answer required by the inquisitor.
Numbers of people, whose imaginations were filled with these horrors,
went further in the way of confession than even their tormentors

anticipated, in the hope that they would thereby be saved from the rack,
and put out of their misery at once. Some confessed that they had had
children by the devil; but no one who had ever been a mother gave
utterance to such a frantic imagining, even in the extremity of her anguish.
The childless only confessed it, and were burned instanter as unworthy to
live.
For fear the zeal of the enemies of Satan should cool, successive popes
appointed new commissions. One was appointed by Alexander VI. in 1494,
another by Leo X. in 1521, and a third by Adrian VI. in 1522. They were all
armed with the same powers to hunt out and destroy, and executed their
fearful functions but too rigidly. In Geneva alone five hundred persons
were burned in the years 1515 and 1516, under the title of Protestant
witches. It would appear that their chief crime was heresy, and their
witchcraft merely an aggravation. Bartolomeo de Spina has a list still more
fearful. He informs us that in the year 1524 no less than a thousand
persons suffered death for witchcraft in the district of Como, and that for
several years afterwards the average number of victims exceeded a
hundred annually. One inquisitor, Remigius, took great credit to himself
for having, during fifteen years, convicted and burned nine hundred.
In France, about the year 1520, fires for the execution of witches blazed
in almost every town. Danæus, in his Dialogues of Witches, says they were
so numerous that it would be next to impossible to tell the number of them.
So deep was the thraldom of the human mind, that the friends and
relatives of the accused parties looked on and approved. The wife or sister
of a murderer might sympathise in his fate, but the wives and husbands of
sorcerers and witches had no pity. The truth is that pity was dangerous, for
it was thought no one could have compassion on the sufferings of a witch
who was not a dabbler in sorcery: to have wept for a witch would have
insured the stake. In some districts, however, the exasperation of the
people broke out, in spite of superstition. The inquisitor of a rural township
in Piedmont burned the victims so plentifully and so fast, that there was

not a family in the place which did not lose a member. The people at last
arose, and the inquisitor was but too happy to escape from the country with
whole limbs. The archbishop of the diocese proceeded afterwards to the
trial of such as the inquisitor had left in prison.
Some of the charges were so utterly preposterous that the poor wretches
were at once liberated; others met a harder, but the usual fate. Some of
them were accused of having joined the witches’ dance at midnight under a
blasted oak, where they had been seen by creditable people. The husbands
of several of these women (two of whom were young and beautiful) swore
positively that at the time stated their wives were comfortably asleep in
their arms; but it was all in vain. Their word was taken, but the archbishop
told them they had been deceived by the devil and their own senses. It was
true they might have had the semblance of their wives in their beds, but the
originals were far away at the devil’s dance under the oak. The honest
fellows were confounded, and their wives burned forthwith.

CHARLES IX.

In the year 1561, five poor women of Verneuil were accused of
transforming themselves into cats, and in that shape attending the
sabbath of the fiends—prowling around Satan, who presided over
them in the form of a goat, and dancing, to amuse him, upon his
back. They were found guilty, and burned. 27
In 1564, three wizards and a witch appeared before the Presidents
Salvert and D’Avanton: they confessed, when extended on the rack,
that they anointed the sheep-pens with infernal unguents to kill the
sheep; that they attended the sabbath, where they saw a great black
goat, which spoke to them, and made them kiss him, each holding a
lighted candle in his hand while he performed the ceremony. They
were all executed at Poitiers.

In 1571 the celebrated sorcerer Trois Echelles was burned in the
Place de Grève in Paris. He confessed, in the presence of Charles IX.,
and of the Marshals de Montmorency, De Retz, and the Sieur du
Mazille, physician to the king, that he could perform the most
wonderful things by the aid of a devil to whom he had sold himself.
He described at great length the saturnalia of the fiends, the
sacrifices which they offered up, the debaucheries they committed
with the young and handsome witches, and the various modes of
preparing the infernal unguent for blighting cattle. He said he had
upwards of twelve hundred accomplices in the crime of witchcraft in
various parts of France, whom he named to the king, and many of
whom were afterwards arrested and suffered execution.
At Dôle, two years afterwards, Gilles Garnier, a native of Lyons,
was indicted for being a loup-garou, or man-wolf, and for prowling
in that shape about the country at night to devour little children. The
indictment against him, as read by Henri Camus, doctor of laws and
counsellor of the king, was to the effect that he, Gilles Garnier, had
seized upon a little girl, twelve years of age, whom he drew into a
vineyard and there killed, partly with his teeth and partly with his
hands, seeming like wolf’s paws; that from thence he trailed her
bleeding body along the ground with his teeth into the wood of La
Serre, where he ate the greatest portion of her at one meal, and
carried the remainder home to his wife; that upon another occasion,
eight days before the festival of All Saints, he was seen to seize
another child in his teeth, and would have devoured her had she not
been rescued by the country people, and that the said child died a
few days afterwards of the injuries he had inflicted; that fifteen days
after the same festival of All Saints, being again in the shape of a

wolf, he devoured a boy thirteen years of age, having previously torn
off his leg and thigh with his teeth, and hid them away for his
breakfast on the morrow. He was furthermore indicted for giving
way to the same diabolical and unnatural propensities even in his
shape of a man; and that he had strangled a boy in a wood with the
intention of eating him, which crime he would have effected if he had
not been seen by the neighbours and prevented.
Gilles Garnier was put to the rack after fifty witnesses had deposed
against him. He confessed every thing that was laid to his charge. He
was thereupon brought back into the presence of his judges, when
Dr. Camus, in the name of the parliament of Dôle, pronounced the
following sentence:
“Seeing that Gilles Garnier has, by the testimony of credible
witnesses, and by his own spontaneous confession, been proved
guilty of the abominable crimes of lycanthropy and witchcraft,
this court condemns him, the said Gilles, to be this day taken in
a cart from this spot to the place of execution, accompanied by
the executioner (maître exécuteur de la haute justice), where he,
by the said executioner, shall be tied to a stake and burned alive,
and that his ashes be then scattered to the winds. The court
further condemns him, the said Gilles, to the costs of this
prosecution.”
“Given at Dôle, this 18th day of January, 1573.”
In 1578, the parliament of Paris was occupied for several days with
the trial of a man named Jacques Rollet. He also was found guilty of
being a loup-garou, and in that shape devouring a little boy. He was
burnt alive in the Place de Grève.

In 1579, so much alarm was excited in the neighbourhood of
Melun by the increase of witches and loup-garous, that a council was
held to devise some measures to stay the evil. A decree was passed
that all witches and consulters with witches should be punished with
death; and not only those, but fortune-tellers and conjurors of every
kind. The parliament of Rouen took up the same question in the
following year, and decreed that the possession of a grimoire, or
book of spells, was sufficient evidence of witchcraft, and that all
persons on whom such books were found should be burned alive.
Three councils were held in different parts of France in the year
1583, all in relation to the same subject. The parliament of
Bourdeaux issued strict injunctions to all curates and clergy
whatever to use redoubled efforts to root out the crime of witchcraft.
The parliament of Tours was equally peremptory, and feared the
judgments of an offended God if all these dealers with the devil were
not swept from the face of the land. The parliament of Rheims was
particularly severe against the noueurs d’aiguillette, or “tyers of the
knot”—people of both sexes who took pleasure in preventing the
consummation of marriage, that they might counteract the command
of God to our first parents to increase and multiply. This parliament
held it to be sinful to wear amulets to preserve from witchcraft; and
that this practice might not be continued within its jurisdiction, drew
up a form of exorcism, which would more effectually defeat the
agents of the devil, and put them to flight.
A case of witchcraft, which created a great sensation in its day,
occurred in 1588, at a village in the mountains of Auvergne, about
two leagues from Apchon. A gentleman of that place being at his
window, there passed a friend of his who had been out hunting, and

who was then returning to his own house. The gentleman asked his
friend what sport he had had; upon which the latter informed him
that he had been attacked in the plain by a large and savage wolf,
which he had shot at without wounding, and that he had then drawn
out his hunting-knife and cut off the animal’s fore-paw as it sprang
upon his neck to devour him. The huntsman upon this put his hand
into his bag to pull out the paw, but was shocked to find that it was a
woman’s hand, with a wedding-ring on the finger. The gentleman
immediately recognised his wife’s ring, “which,” says the indictment
against her, “made him begin to suspect some evil of her.” He
immediately went in search of her, and found her sitting by the fire
in the kitchen, with her arm hidden underneath her apron. He tore
off her apron with great vehemence, and found that she had no hand,
and that the stump was even then bleeding. She was given into
custody, and burnt at Riom in presence of some thousands of
spectators. 28
In the midst of these executions, rare were the gleams of mercy.
Few instances are upon record of any acquittal taking place when the
crime was witchcraft. The discharge of fourteen persons by the
parliament of Paris, in the year 1589, is almost a solitary example of
a return to reason. Fourteen persons condemned to death for
witchcraft appealed against the judgment to the parliament of Paris,
which for political reasons had been exiled to Tours. The parliament
named four commissioners—Pierre Pigray, the king’s surgeon, and
Messieurs Leroi, Renard, and Falaiseau, the king’s physicians—to
visit and examine these witches, and see whether they had the mark
of the devil upon them. Pigray, who relates the circumstance in his
work on Surgery (book vii. chap. 10), says the visit was made in

presence of two counsellors of the court. The witches were all
stripped naked, and the physicians examined their bodies very
diligently, pricking them in all the marks they could find to see
whether they were insensible to pain, which was always considered a
certain proof of guilt. They were, however, very sensible of the
pricking, and some of them called out very lustily when the pins were
driven into them. “We found them,” continues Pierre Pigray, “to be
very poor, stupid people, and some of them insane. Many of them
were quite indifferent about life, and one or two of them desired
death as a relief for their sufferings. Our opinion was, that they stood
more in need of medicine than of punishment; and so we reported to
the parliament. Their case was thereupon taken into further
consideration; and the parliament, after mature counsel amongst all
the members, ordered the poor creatures to be sent to their homes,
without inflicting any punishment upon them.”
Such was the dreadful state of Italy, Germany, and France during
the sixteenth century, which was far from being the worst crisis of
the popular madness with regard to witchcraft. Let us see what was
the state of England during the same period. The Reformation, which
in its progress had rooted out so many errors, stopped short at this,
the greatest error of all. Luther and Calvin were as firm believers in
witchcraft as Pope Innocent himself; and their followers shewed
themselves more zealous persecutors than the Romanists. Dr.
Hutchinson, in his work on Witchcraft, asserts that the mania
manifested itself later in England, and raged with less virulence than
on the continent. The first assertion only is true; for though the
persecution began later both in England and Scotland, its progress
was as fearful as elsewhere.

It was not until more than fifty years after the issuing of the bull of
Innocent VIII. that the legislature of England thought fit to make any
more severe enactments against sorcery than those already in
operation. The statute of 1541 was the first that specified the
particular crime of witchcraft. At a much earlier period many
persons had suffered death for sorcery, in addition to other offences;
but no executions took place for attending the witches’ sabbath,
raising tempests, afflicting cattle with barrenness, and all the
fantastic trumpery of the continent. Two statutes were passed in
1551: the first relating to false prophecies, caused mainly, no doubt,
by the impositions of Elizabeth Barton, the holy maid of Kent, in
1534; and the second against conjuration, witchcraft, and sorcery.
But even this enactment did not consider witchcraft as penal in itself,
and only condemned to death those who, by means of spells,
incantations, or contracts with the devil, attempted the lives of their
neighbours. The statute of Elizabeth, in 1562, at last recognised
witchcraft as a crime of the highest magnitude, whether exerted or
not to the injury of the lives, limbs, and possessions of the
community. From that date the persecution may be fairly said to
have commenced in England. It reached its climax in the early part
of the seventeenth century, which was the hottest period of the
mania all over Europe.
A few cases of witch persecution in the sixteenth century will
enable the reader to form a more accurate idea of the progress of this
great error than if he plunged at once into that busy period of its
history when Matthew Hopkins and his coadjutors exercised their
infernal calling. Several instances occur in England during the latter
years of the reign of Elizabeth. At this time the public mind had

become pretty familiar with the details of the crime. Bishop Jewell,
in his sermons before her majesty, used constantly to conclude them
by a fervent prayer that she might be preserved from witches. Upon
one occasion, in 1598, his words were, “It may please your grace to
understand that witches and sorcerers within these last four years
are marvellously increased within this your grace’s realm. Your
grace’s subjects pine away even unto the death; their colour fadeth—
their flesh rotteth—their speech is benumbed—their senses are
bereft! I pray God they may never practise further than upon the
subject!”

JEWELL.

By degrees, an epidemic terror of witchcraft spread into the
villages. In proportion as the doctrine of the Puritans took root, this
dread increased, and, of course, brought persecution in its train. The
Church of England has claimed, and is entitled to the merit, of
having been less influenced in these matters than any other sect of
Christians; but still they were tainted with the superstition of the age.
One of the most flagrant instances of cruelty and delusion upon
record was consummated under the authority of the Church, and
commemorated till a very late period by an annual lecture at the
University of Cambridge.

This is the celebrated case of the witches of Warbois, who were
executed about thirty-two years after the passing of the statute of
Elizabeth. Although in the interval but few trials are recorded, there
is, unfortunately, but too much evidence to shew the extreme length
to which the popular prejudice was carried. Many women lost their
lives in every part of England without being brought to trial at all,
from the injuries received at the hands of the people. The number of
these can never be ascertained.
The case of the witches of Warbois merits to be detailed at length,
not only from the importance attached to it for so many years by the
learned of the University, but from the singular absurdity of the
evidence upon which men, sensible in all other respects, could
condemn their fellow-creatures to the scaffold.
The principal actors in this strange drama were the families of Sir
Samuel Cromwell and a Mr. Throgmorton, both gentlemen of landed
property near Warbois in the county of Huntingdon. Mr.
Throgmorton had several daughters, the eldest of whom, Mistress
Joan, was an imaginative and melancholy girl, whose head was filled
with stories of ghosts and witches. Upon one occasion she chanced to
pass the cottage of one Mrs., or, as she was called, Mother Samuel, a
very aged, a very poor, and a very ugly woman. Mother Samuel was
sitting at her door knitting, with a black cap upon her head, when
this silly young lady passed, and taking her eyes from her work she
looked stedfastly at her. Mistress Joan immediately fancied that she
felt sudden pains in all her limbs, and from that day forth never
ceased to tell her sisters, and every body about her, that Mother
Samuel had bewitched her. The other children took up the cry, and

actually frightened themselves into fits whenever they passed within
sight of this terrible old woman.
Mr. and Mrs. Throgmorton, not a whit wiser than their children,
believed all the absurd tales they had been told; and Lady Cromwell,
a gossip of Mrs. Throgmorton, made herself very active in the
business, and determined to bring the witch to the ordeal. The
sapient Sir Samuel joined in the scheme; and the children, thus
encouraged, gave loose reins to their imaginations, which seem to
have been of the liveliest. They soon invented a whole host of evil
spirits, and names for them besides, which they said were sent by
Mother Samuel to torment them continually. Seven spirits especially,
they said, were raised from hell by this wicked woman to throw them
into fits; and as the children were actually subject to fits, their
mother and her commeres gave the more credit to the story. The
names of these spirits were, “First Smack,” “Second Smack,” “Third
Smack,” “Blue,” “Catch,” “Hardname,” and “Pluck.”
Throgmorton, the father, was so pestered by these idle fancies, and
yet so well inclined to believe them, that he marched valiantly forth
to the hut where Mother Samuel resided with her husband and
daughter, and dragged her forcibly into his own grounds. Lady
Cromwell, Mrs. Throgmorton, and the girls were in waiting, armed
with long pins to prick the witch, and see if they could draw blood
from her. Lady Cromwell, who seems to have been the most violent
of the party, tore the old woman’s cap off her head, and plucking out
a handful of her grey hair, gave it to Mrs. Throgmorton to burn, as a
charm which would preserve them all from her future machinations.
It was no wonder that the poor creature, subjected to this rough
usage, should give vent to an involuntary curse upon her tormentors.

She did so, and her curse was never forgotten. Her hair, however,
was supposed to be a grand specific, and she was allowed to depart,
half dead with terror and ill-usage. For more than a year the families
of Cromwell and Throgmorton continued to persecute her, and to
assert that her imps afflicted them with pains and fits, turned the
milk sour in their pans, and prevented their cows and ewes from
bearing. In the midst of these fooleries, Lady Cromwell was taken ill
and died. It was then remembered that her death had taken place
exactly a year and a quarter since she was cursed by Mother Samuel,
and that on several occasions she had dreamed of the witch and a
black cat, the latter being of course the arch-enemy of mankind
himself.
Sir Samuel Cromwell now conceived himself bound to take more
energetic measures against the sorceress, since he had lost his wife
by her means. The year and a quarter and the black cat were proofs
positive. All the neighbours had taken up the cry of witchcraft against
Mother Samuel; and her personal appearance, unfortunately for her,
the very ideal of what a witch ought to be, increased the popular
suspicion. It would appear that at last the poor woman believed, even
to her own disadvantage, that she was what every body represented
her to be. Being forcibly brought into Mr. Throgmorton’s house,
when his daughter Joan was in one of her customary fits, she was
commanded by him and Sir Samuel Cromwell to expel the devil from
the young lady. She was told to repeat her exorcism, and to add, “as I
am a witch, and the causer of Lady Cromwell’s death, I charge thee,
fiend, to come out of her!” She did as was required of her; and
moreover confessed that her husband and daughter were leagued
with her in witchcraft, and had, like her, sold their souls to the devil.

The whole family were immediately arrested, and sent to
Huntingdon to prison.
The trial was instituted shortly afterwards before Mr. Justice
Fenner, when all the crazy girls of Mr. Throgmorton’s family gave
evidence against Mother Samuel and her family. They were all three
put to the torture. The old woman confessed in her anguish that she
was a witch; that she had cast her spells upon the young ladies; and
that she had caused the death of Lady Cromwell. The father and
daughter, stronger in mind than their unfortunate wife and parent,
refused to confess any thing, and asserted their innocence to the last.
They were all three condemned to be hanged, and their bodies
burned. The daughter, who was young and good-looking, excited the
pity of many persons, and she was advised to plead pregnancy, that
she might gain at least a respite from death. The poor girl refused
proudly, on the ground that she would not be accounted both a witch
and a strumpet. Her half-witted old mother caught at the idea of a
few weeks’ longer life, and asserted that she was pregnant. The court
was convulsed with laughter, in which the wretched victim herself
joined; and this was accounted an additional proof that she was a
witch. The whole family were executed on the 7th of April, 1593.
Sir Samuel Cromwell, as lord of the manor, received the sum of
40l. out of the confiscated property of the Samuels, which he turned
into a rent-charge of 40s. yearly, for the endowment of an annual
sermon or lecture upon the enormity of witchcraft, and this case in
particular, to be preached by a doctor or bachelor of divinity of
Queen’s College, Cambridge. I have not been able to ascertain the
exact date at which this annual lecture was discontinued; but it

appears to have been preached so late as 1718, when Dr. Hutchinson
published his work upon witchcraft.
To carry on in proper chronological order the history of the witch
delusion in the British isles, it will be necessary to examine into what
was taking place in Scotland during all that part of the sixteenth
century anterior to the accession of James VI. to the crown of
England. We naturally expect that the Scotch—a people renowned
from the earliest times for their powers of imagination—should be
more deeply imbued with this gloomy superstition than their
neighbours of the south. The nature of their soil and climate tended
to encourage the dreams of early ignorance. Ghosts, goblins, wraiths,
kelpies, and a whole host of spiritual beings, were familiar to the
dwellers by the misty glens of the Highlands and the romantic
streams of the Lowlands. Their deeds, whether of good or ill, were
enshrined in song, and took a greater hold upon the imagination
because “verse had sanctified them.” But it was not till the religious
reformers began the practice of straining Scripture to the severest
extremes that the arm of the law was called upon to punish
witchcraft as a crime per se. What Pope Innocent VIII. had done for
Germany and France, the preachers of the Reformation did for the
Scottish people. Witchcraft, instead of being a mere article of faith,
became enrolled in the statute-book; and all good subjects and true
Christians were called upon to take arms against it. The ninth
parliament of Queen Mary passed an act in 1563, which decreed the
punishment of death against witches and consulters with witches,
and immediately the whole bulk of the people were smitten with an
epidemic fear of the devil and his mortal agents. Persons in the
highest ranks of life shared and encouraged the delusion of the

vulgar. Many were themselves accused of witchcraft; and noble
ladies were shewn to have dabbled in mystic arts, and proved to the
world that if they were not witches, it was not for want of the will.
Among the dames who became notorious for endeavouring to
effect their wicked ends by the devil’s aid may be mentioned the
celebrated Lady Buccleugh of Branxholme (familiar to all the readers
of Sir Walter Scott), the Countess of Lothian, the Countess of Angus,
the Countess of Athol, Lady Kerr, the Countess of Huntley,
Euphemia Macalzean (the daughter of Lord Cliftonhall), and Lady
Fowlis. Among the celebrated of the other sex who were accused of
wizardism was Sir Lewis Ballantyne, the Lord Justice-Clerk for
Scotland, who, if we may believe Scot of Scotstarvet, “dealt by
curiosity with a warlock called Richard Grahame,” and prayed him to
raise the devil. The warlock consented, and raised him in propriâ
personâ in the yard of his house in the Canongate, “at sight of whom
the Lord Justice-Clerk was so terrified, that he took sickness and
thereof died.” By such idle reports as these did the envious ruin the
reputation of those they hated; though it would appear in this case
that Sir Lewis had been fool enough to make the attempt of which he
was accused, and that the success of the experiment was the only
apocryphal part of the story.

JOHN KNOX.

The enemies of John Knox invented a similar tale, which found
ready credence among the Roman Catholics, glad to attach any
stigma to that grand scourge of the vices of their Church. It was
reported that he and his secretary went into the churchyard of St.
Andrew’s with the intent to raise “some sanctes;” but that, by a
mistake in their conjurations, they raised the great fiend himself
instead of the saints they wished to consult. The popular rumour
added, that Knox’s secretary was so frightened at the great horns,
goggle eyes, and long tail of Satan, that he went mad, and shortly
afterwards died. Knox himself was built of sterner stuff, and was not
to be frightened.
The first name that occurs in the records of the High Court of
Justiciary of persons tried or executed for witchcraft, is that of Janet
Bowman in 1572, nine years after the passing of the act of Mary. No
particulars of her crimes are given, and against her name there only
stands the words, “convict and brynt.” It is not, however, to be
inferred, that in this interval no trials or executions took place; for it
appears, on the authority of documents of unquestioned authenticity
in the Advocates’ Library at Edinburgh, 29 that the Privy Council
made a practice of granting commissions to resident gentlemen and
ministers in every part of Scotland to examine, try, and execute
witches within their own parishes. No records of those who suffered
from the sentence of these tribunals have been preserved; but if
popular tradition may be believed even to the amount of one-fourth
of its assertions, their number was fearful. After the year 1572, the
entries of executions for witchcraft in the records of the High Court
become more frequent, but do not average more than one per
annum,—another proof that trials for this offence were in general

entrusted to the local magistracy. The latter appear to have ordered
witches to the stake with as little compunction, and after as summary
a mode, as modern justices of the peace order a poacher to the
stocks.
As James VI. advanced in manhood, he took great interest in the
witch trials. One of them especially—that of Gellie Duncan, Dr. Fian,
and their accomplices, in the year 1591—engrossed his whole
attention, and no doubt suggested in some degree the famous work
on Demonology, which he wrote shortly afterwards. As these witches
had made an attempt upon his own life, it is not surprising, with his
habits, that he should have watched the case closely, or become
strengthened in his prejudice and superstition by its singular details.
No other trial that could be selected would give so fair an idea of the
delusions of the Scottish people as this. Whether we consider the
number of victims, the absurdity of the evidence, and the real villany
of some of the persons implicated, it is equally extraordinary.
Gellie Duncan, the prime witch in these proceedings, was servant
to the deputy bailiff of Tranent, a small town in Haddingtonshire,
about ten miles from Edinburgh. Though neither old nor ugly (as
witches usually were), but young and good-looking, her neighbours,
from some suspicious parts of her behaviour, had long considered
her a witch. She had, it appears, some pretensions to the healing art.
Some cures which she effected were so sudden, that the worthy
bailiff, her master, who, like his neighbours, mistrusted her,
considered them no less than miraculous. In order to discover the
truth, he put her to the torture; but she obstinately refused to confess
that she had dealings with the devil. It was the popular belief that no
witch would confess as long as the mark which Satan had put upon

her remained undiscovered upon her body. Somebody present
reminded the torturing bailie of this fact, and on examination, the
devil’s mark was found upon the throat of poor Gellie. She was put to
the torture again, and her fortitude giving way under the extremity of
her anguish, she confessed that she was indeed a witch—that she had
sold her soul to the devil, and effected all her cures by his aid. This
was something new in the witch creed, according to which, the devil
delighted more in laying diseases on than in taking them off; but
Gellie Duncan fared no better on that account. The torture was still
applied, until she had named all her accomplices, among whom were
one Cunningham, a reputed wizard, known by the name of Dr. Fian;
a grave and matron-like witch, named Agnes Sampson; Euphemia
Macalzean, the daughter of Lord Cliftonhall, already mentioned, and
nearly forty other persons, some of whom were the wives of
respectable individuals in the city of Edinburgh. Every one of these
persons was arrested, and the whole realm of Scotland thrown into
commotion by the extraordinary nature of the disclosures which
were anticipated.
About two years previous to this time, James had suddenly left his
kingdom, and proceeded gallantly to Denmark, to fetch over his
bride, the Princess of Denmark, who had been detained by contrary
weather in the harbour of Upslo. After remaining for some months in
Copenhagen, he set sail with his young bride, and arrived safely in
Leith, on the 1st of May 1590, having experienced a most boisterous
passage, and been nearly wrecked. As soon as the arrest of Gellie
Duncan and Fian became known in Scotland, it was reported by
every body who pretended to be well-informed, that these witches
and their associates had, by the devil’s means, raised the storms

which had endangered the lives of the king and queen. Gellie, in her
torture, had confessed that such was the fact, and the whole kingdom
waited aghast and open-mouthed for the corroboration about to be
furnished by the trial.
Agnes Sampson, the “grave and matron-like” witch implicated by
Gellie Duncan, was put to the horrible torture of the pilliewinkis. She
laid bare all the secrets of the sisterhood before she had suffered an
hour, and confessed that Gellie Duncan, Dr. Fian, Marian Lincup,
Euphemia Macalzean, herself, and upwards of two hundred witches
and warlocks, used to assemble at midnight in the kirk of North
Berwick, where they met the devil; that they had plotted there to
attempt the king’s life; that they were incited to this by the old fiend
himself, who had asserted with a thundering oath that James was the
greatest enemy he ever had, and that there would be no peace for the
devil’s children upon earth until he were got rid of; that the devil
upon these occasions always liked to have a little music, and that
Gellie Duncan used to play a reel before him on a trump or Jew’s
harp, to which all the witches danced.
James was highly flattered at the idea that the devil should have
said that he was the greatest enemy he ever had. He sent for Gellie
Duncan to the palace, and made her play before him the same reel
which she had played at the witches’ dance in the kirk.

TORTURE OF THE BOOTS.

Dr. Fian, or rather Cunningham, a petty schoolmaster of Tranent,
was put to the torture among the rest. He was a man who had led an
infamous life, was a compounder of and dealer in poisons, and a
pretender to magic. Though not guilty of the preposterous crimes
laid to his charge, there is no doubt that he was a sorcerer in will,
though not in deed, and that he deserved all the misery he endured.
When put on the rack, he would confess nothing, and held out so
long unmoved, that the severe torture of the boots was resolved
upon. He endured this till exhausted nature could bear no longer,
when insensibility kindly stepped in to his aid. When it was seen that
he was utterly powerless, and that his tongue cleaved to the roof of
his mouth, he was released. Restoratives were administered; and
during the first faint gleam of returning consciousness, he was
prevailed upon to sign, ere he well knew what he was about, a full
confession, in strict accordance with those of Gellie Duncan and
Agnes Sampson. He was then remanded to his prison, from which,
after two days, he managed, some how or other, to escape. He was
soon recaptured, and brought before the Court of Justiciary, James
himself being present. Fian now denied all the circumstances of the
written confession which he had signed; whereupon the king,
enraged at his “stubborn wilfulness,” ordered him once more to the
torture. His finger nails were riven out with pincers, and long needles
thrust up to the eye into the quick; but he did not wince. He was then
consigned again to the boots, in which, to quote a pamphlet
published at the time, 30 he continued “so long, and abode so many
blows in them, that his legs were crushed and beaten together as
small as might be, and the bones and flesh so bruised, that the blood

and marrow spouted forth in great abundance, whereby they were
made unserviceable for ever.”
The astonishing similarity of the confessions of all the persons
implicated in these proceedings has often been remarked. It would
appear that they actually endeavoured to cause the king’s death by
their spells and sorceries. Fian, who was acquainted with all the
usual tricks of his profession, deceived them with pretended
apparitions, so that many of them were really convinced that they
had seen the devil. The sum of their confessions was to the following
effect:
Satan, who was, of course, a great foe of the reformed religion, was
alarmed that King James should marry a Protestant princess. To
avert the consequences to the realms of evil, he had determined to
put an end to the king and his bride by raising a storm on their
voyage home. Satan, first of all, sent a thick mist over the waters, in
the hope that the king’s vessel might be stranded on the coast amid
the darkness. This failing, Dr. Fian, who, from his superior
scholarship, was advanced to the dignity of the devil’s secretary, was
commanded to summon all the witches to meet their master, each
one sailing on a sieve on the high seas.
On All Hallowmas Eve, they assembled to the number of upwards
of two hundred, including Gellie Duncan, Agnes Sampson, Euphemia
Macalzean, one Barbara Napier, and several warlocks; and each
embarking in a riddle or sieve, they sailed “over the ocean very
substantially.” After cruising about for some time, they met with the
fiend, bearing in his claws a cat, which had been previously drawn
nine times through the fire. This he delivered to one of the warlocks,
telling him to cast it into the sea and cry “Hola!” This was done with

all solemnity, and immediately the ocean became convulsed, the
waters hissed loudly, and the waves rose mountains high,
“Twisting their arms to the dun-coloured heaven.”
The witches sailed gallantly through the tempest they had raised, and
landing on the coast of Scotland, took their sieves in their hands and
marched on in procession to the haunted kirk of North Berwick,
where the devil had resolved to hold a preaching. Gellie Duncan, the
musician of the party, tripped on before, playing on her Jew’s harp
and singing,
“Cummer, go ye before, cummer, go ye;
Gif ye will not go before, cummer, let me!”
Arrived at the kirk, they paced around it withershins, that is, in
reverse of the apparent motion of the sun. Dr. Fian then blew into
the keyhole of the door, which opened immediately, and all the
witches entered. As it was pitch dark, Fian blew with his mouth upon
the candles, which immediately lighted, and the devil was seen
occupying the pulpit. He was attired in a black gown and hat, and the
witches saluted him by crying “All hail, master!” His body was hard,
like iron; his face terrible; his nose, like the beak of an eagle; he had
great burning eyes; his hands and legs were hairy; and he had long
claws upon his hands and feet, and spake with an exceedingly gruff
voice. Before commencing his sermon he called over the names of his
congregation, demanding whether they had been good servants, and

what success had attended their operations against the life of the
king and his bride.
Gray Meill, a crazy old warlock, who acted as beadle or doorkeeper, was silly enough to answer “that nothing ailed the king yet,
God be thanked;” upon which the devil, in a rage, stepped down from
the pulpit and boxed his ears for him. He then remounted and
commenced the preaching, commanding them to be dutiful servants
to him and do all the evil they could. Euphemia Macalzean and
Agnes Sampson, bolder than the rest, asked him whether he had
brought the image or picture of King James, that they might, by
pricking it, cause pains and diseases to fall upon him. “The father of
lies” spoke truth for once, and confessed that he had forgotten it;
upon which Euphemia Macalzean upbraided him loudly for his
carelessness. The devil, however, took it all in good part, although
Agnes Sampson and several other women let loose their tongues at
him immediately. When they had done scolding, he invited them all
to a grand entertainment. A newly buried corpse was dug up and
divided among them, which was all they had in the way of edibles.
He was more liberal in the matter of drink, and gave them so much
excellent wine that they soon became jolly. Gellie Duncan then
played the old tune upon her trump, and the devil himself led off the
dance with Euphemia Macalzean. Thus they kept up the sport till the
cock crew.

JAMES THE DEMONOLOGIST.

Agnes Sampson, the wise woman of Keith, as she was called, added
some other particulars in her confession. She stated, that on a
previous occasion, she had raised an awful tempest in the sea by
throwing a cat into it, with four joints of men tied to its feet. She said
also, that on their grand attempt to drown King James, they did not
meet with the devil after cruising about, but that he had
accompanied them from the first, and that she had seen him dimly in
the distance, rolling himself before them over the great waves, in
shape and size not unlike a huge haystack. They met with a foreign
ship richly laden with wines and other good things, which they
boarded, and sunk after they had drunk all the wine and made
themselves quite merry.
Some of these disclosures were too much even for the abundant
faith of King James, and he more than once exclaimed, that the
witches were like their master, “extreme lyars.” But they confessed
many other things of a less preposterous nature, and of which they
were no doubt really guilty. Agnes Sampson said she was to have
taken the king’s life by anointing his linen with a strong poison.
Gellie Duncan used to threaten her neighbours by saying she would
send the devil after them; and many persons of weaker minds than
usual were frightened into fits by her, and rendered subject to them

for the remainder of their lives. Dr. Fian also made no scruple in
aiding and abetting murder, and would rid any person of an enemy
by means of poison, who could pay him his fee for it. Euphemia
Macalzean also was far from being pure. There is no doubt that she
meditated the king’s death, and used such means to compass it as the
superstition of the age directed. She was a devoted partisan of
Bothwell, who was accused by many of the witches as having
consulted them on the period of the king’s death. They were all found
guilty, and sentenced to be hanged and burned. Barbara Napier,
though found guilty upon other counts, was acquitted upon the
charge of having been present at the great witch meeting in Berwick
kirk. The king was highly displeased, and threatened to have the jury
indicted for a wilful error upon an assize. They accordingly
reconsidered their verdict, and threw themselves upon the king’s
mercy for the fault they had committed. James was satisfied, and
Barbara Napier was hanged along with Gellie Duncan, Agnes
Sampson,

Dr.

Fian,

and

five-and-twenty

others.

Euphemia

Macalzean met a harder fate. Her connexion with the bold and
obnoxious Bothwell, and her share in poisoning one or two
individuals who had stood in her way, were thought deserving of the
severest punishment the law could inflict. Instead of the ordinary
sentence, directing the criminal to be first strangled and then
burned, the wretched woman was doomed “to be bound to a stake,
and burned in ashes, quick to the death.” This cruel sentence was
executed on the 25th of June, 1591.
These trials had the most pernicious consequences all over
Scotland. The lairds and ministers in their districts, armed with due
power from the privy council, tried and condemned old women after

the most summary fashion. Those who still clung to the ancient faith
of Rome were the severest sufferers, as it was thought, after the
disclosures of the fierce enmity borne by the devil towards a
Protestant king and his Protestant wife, that all the Catholics were
leagued with the powers of evil to work woe on the realm of Scotland.
Upon a very moderate calculation, it is presumed that from the
passing of the act of Queen Mary till the accession of James to the
throne of England, a period of thirty-nine years, the average number
of executions for witchcraft in Scotland was two hundred annually,
or upwards of seventeen thousand altogether. For the first nine years
the number was not one quarter so great; but towards the years 1590
to 1593, the number must have been more than four hundred. The
case last cited was one of an extraordinary character. The general
aspect of the trials will be better seen from that of Isabel Gowdie,
which, as it would be both wearisome and disgusting to go through
them all, is given as a fair specimen, although it took place at a date
somewhat later than the reign of James. This woman, wearied of her
life by the persecutions of her neighbours, voluntarily gave herself up
to justice, and made a confession, embodying the whole witch-creed
of the period. She was undoubtedly a monomaniac of the most
extraordinary kind. She said that she deserved to be stretched upon
an iron rack, and that her crimes could never be atoned for, even if
she were to be drawn asunder by wild horses. She named a long list
of her associates, including nearly fifty women and a few warlocks.
They dug up the graves of unchristened infants, whose limbs were
serviceable in their enchantments. When they wanted to destroy the
crops of an enemy, they yoked toads to his plough, and on the
following night Satan himself ploughed the land with his team, and

blasted it for the season. The witches had power to assume almost
any shape; but they generally chose either that of a cat or a hare,
oftenest the latter. Isabel said, that on one occasion, when she was in
this disguise, she was sore pressed by a pack of hounds, and had a
very narrow escape with her life. She reached her own door at last,
feeling the hot breath of the pursuing dogs at her haunches. She
managed, however, to hide herself behind a chest, and got time to
pronounce the magic words that could alone restore her to her
proper shape. They were:
“Hare! hare!
God send thee care!
I am in a hare’s likeness now;
But I shall be a woman e’en now!
Hare! hare!
God send thee care!”
If witches, when in this shape, were bitten by the dogs, they always
retained the marks in their human form; but she had never heard
that any witch had been bitten to death. When the devil appointed
any general meeting of the witches, the custom was that they should
proceed through the air mounted on broomsticks, or on corn or
bean-straws, pronouncing as they went:
“Horse and pattock, horse and go,
Horse and pellats, ho! ho! ho!”

They generally left behind them a broom or a three-legged stool,
which, when placed in their beds and duly charmed, assumed the
human shape till their return. This was done that the neighbours
might not know when they were absent.
She added that the devil furnished his favourite witches with
servant imps to attend upon them. These imps were called, “The
Roaring Lion,” “Thief of Hell,” “Wait-upon-Herself,” “Ranting
Roarer,” “Care-for-Naught,” &c., and were known by their liveries,
which were generally yellow, sad-dun, sea-green, pea-green, or
grass-green. Satan never called the witches by the names they had
received at baptism; neither were they allowed, in his presence, so to
designate each other. Such a breach of the infernal etiquette
assuredly drew down his most severe displeasure. But as some
designation was necessary, he re-baptised them in their own blood
by the names of “Able-and-Stout,” “Over-the-dike-with-it,” “Raisethe-wind,” “Pickle-nearest-the-wind,” “Batter-them-down-Maggy,”
“Blow-Kale,” and such like. The devil himself was not very particular
what name they called him, so that it was not “Black John.” If any
witch was unthinking enough to utter these words, he would rush out
upon her and beat and buffet her unmercifully, or tear her flesh with
a wool-card. Other names he did not care about; and once gave
instructions to a noted warlock that whenever he wanted his aid, he
was to strike the ground three times and exclaim, “Rise up, foul
thief!”

SIR G. MACKENZIE.

Upon this confession many persons were executed. So strong was
the popular feeling, that no one once accused of witchcraft was
acquitted; at least acquittals did not average one in a hundred trials.
Witch-finding, or witch-pricking, became a trade, and a set of
mercenary vagabonds roamed about the country provided with long
pins to run into the flesh of supposed criminals. It was no unusual
thing then, nor is it now, that in aged persons there should be some
spot on the body totally devoid of feeling. It was the object of the
witch-pricker to discover this spot, and the unhappy wight who did
not bleed when pricked upon it was doomed to the death. If not
immediately cast into prison, her life was rendered miserable by the
persecution of her neighbours. It is recorded of many poor women,
that the annoyances they endured in this way were so excessive, that
they preferred death. Sir George Mackenzie, the Lord Advocate, at
the time when witch trials were so frequent, and himself a devout

believer in the crime, relates, in his Criminal Law, first published in
1678, some remarkable instances of it. He says, “I went, when I was a
justice-depute, to examine some women who had confessed
judicially; and one of them, who was a silly creature, told me, under
secrecy, that she had not confessed because she was guilty, but being
a poor creature, who wrought for her meat, and being defamed for a
witch, she knew she should starve, for no person thereafter would
either give her meat or lodging, and that all men would beat her and
set dogs at her, and that, therefore, she desired to be out of the
world; whereupon she wept most bitterly, and upon her knees called
God to witness to what she said.” Sir George, though not wholly
elevated above the prejudices of his age upon this subject, was clearsighted enough to see the danger to society of the undue
encouragement given to the witch prosecutions. He was convinced
that three-fourths of them were unjust and unfounded. He says, in
the work already quoted, that the persons who were in general
accused of this crime were poor ignorant men and women who did
not understand the nature of the accusation, and who mistook their
own superstitious fears for witchcraft. One poor wretch, a weaver,
confessed that he was a warlock, and, being asked why, he replied,
because “he had seen the devil dancing, like a fly, about the candle!”
A simple woman, who, because she was called a witch, believed that
she was, asked the judge upon the bench whether a person might be
a witch and not know it? Sir George adds, that all the supposed
criminals were subjected to severe torture in prison from their
gaolers, who thought they did God good service by vexing and
tormenting them; “and I know,” says this humane and enlightened
magistrate, “that this usage was the ground of all their confession;

and albeit, the poor miscreants cannot prove this usage, the actors in
it being the only witnesses; yet the judge should be jealous of it, as
that which did at first elicit the confession, and for fear of which they
dare not retract it.” Another author, 31 also a firm believer in
witchcraft, gives a still more lamentable instance of a woman who
preferred execution as a witch to live on under the imputation. This
woman, who knew that three others were to be strangled and burned
on an early day, sent for the minister of the parish, and confessed
that she had sold her soul to Satan. “Whereupon being called before
the judges, she was condemned to die with the rest. Being carried
forth to the place of execution, she remained silent during the first,
second, and third prayer, and then, perceiving that there remained
no more but to rise and go to the stake, she lifted up her body, and,
with a loud voice, cried out, ‘Now all you that see me this day, know
that I am now to die as a witch, by my own confession; and I free all
men, especially the ministers and magistrates, of the guilt of my
blood. I take it wholly upon myself. My blood be upon my own head.
And, as I must make answer to the God of heaven presently, I declare
I am as free of witchcraft as any child. But, being delated by a
malicious woman, and put in prison under the name of a witch,
disowned by my husband and friends, and seeing no ground of hope
of ever coming out again, I made up that confession to destroy my
own life, being weary of it, and choosing rather to die than to live.’”
As a proof of the singular obstinacy and blindness of the believers in
witches, it may be stated that the minister who relates this story only
saw in the dying speech of the unhappy woman an additional proof
that she was a witch. True, indeed is it, that “none are so blind as
those who will not see.”

It is time, however, to return to James VI., who is fairly entitled to
share with Pope Innocent, Sprenger, Bodinus, and Matthew Hopkins
the glory or the odium of being at the same time a chief enemy and
chief encourager of witchcraft. Towards the close of the sixteenth
century, many learned men, both on the continent and in the isles of
Britain, had endeavoured to disabuse the public mind on this
subject. The most celebrated were Wierus, in Germany; Pietro
d’Apone, in Italy; and Reginald Scot, in England. Their works excited
the attention of the zealous James, who, mindful of the involuntary
compliment which his merits had extorted from the devil, was
ambitious to deserve it by still continuing “his greatest enemie.” In
the year 1597, he published in Edinburgh his famous treatise on
Demonology. Its design may be gathered from the following passage
in the introduction: “The fearful abounding,” says the king, “at this
time and in this country of these detestable slaves of the devil, the
witches or enchanters, hath moved me, beloved reader, to despatch
in post this following treatise of mine, not in any wise, as I protest, to
serve for a show of mine own learning and ingene [ingenuity], but
only (moved of conscience) to press thereby, so far as I can, to
resolve the doubting hearts of many, both that such assaults of Satan
are most certainly practised, and that the instrument thereof merits
most severely to be punished, against the damnable opinions of two,
principally in our age; whereof the one called Scot, an Englishman, is
not ashamed in public print to deny that there can be such thing as
witchcraft, and so maintains the old error of the Sadducees in
denying of spirits. The other, called Wierus, a German physician, sets
out a public apology for all these crafts-folks, whereby procuring for
them impunity, he plainly betrays himself to have been one of that

profession.” In other parts of this treatise, which the author had put
into the form of a dialogue, to “make it more pleasant and facile,” he
says: “Witches ought to be put to death, according to the law of God,
the civil and imperial law, and the municipal law of all Christian
nations: yea, to spare the life, and not strike whom God bids strike
and so severely punish in so odious a treason against God, is not only
unlawful, but doubtless as great a sin in the magistrate as was Saul’s
sparing Agag.” He says also that the crime is so abominable, that it
may be proved by evidence which would not be received against any
other offenders,—young children, who knew not the nature of an
oath, and persons of an infamous character, being sufficient
witnesses against them; but lest the innocent should be accused of a
crime so difficult to be acquitted of, he recommends that in all cases
the ordeal should be resorted to. He says, “Two good helps may be
used: the one is the finding of their mark, and the trying the
insensibleness thereof; the other is their floating on the water,—for,
as in a secret murther, if the dead carcass be at any time thereafter
handled by the murtherer, it will gush out of blood, as if the blood
were crying to Heaven for revenge of the murtherer (God having
appointed that secret supernatural sign for trial of that secret
unnatural crime), so that it appears that God hath appointed (for a
supernatural sign of the monstrous impiety of witches) that the water
shall refuse to receive them in her bosom that have shaken off them
the sacred water of baptism, and wilfully refused the benefit thereof;
—no, not so much as their eyes are able to shed tears (threaten and
torture them as you please), while first they repent (God not
permitting them to dissemble their obstinacy in so horrible a crime);
albeit, the womenkind especially, be able otherwise to shed tears at

every light occasion when they will, yea, although it were dissembling
like the crocodiles.”

PIETRO D’APONE.

When such doctrines as these were openly promulgated by the
highest authority in the realm, and who, in promulgating them,
flattered, but did not force the public opinion, it is not surprising that
the sad delusion should have increased and multiplied until the race
of wizards and witches replenished the earth. The reputation which
he lost by being afraid of a naked sword, he more than regained by
his courage in combating the devil. The Kirk shewed itself a most
zealous coadjutor, especially during those halcyon days when it was
not at issue with the king upon other matters of doctrine and
prerogative.
On his accession to the throne of England in 1603, James came
amongst a people who had heard with admiration of his glorious
deeds against the witches. He himself left no part of his ancient
prejudices behind him; and his advent was the signal for the
persecution to burst forth in England with a fury equal to that in
Scotland. It had languished a little during the latter years of the reign
of Elizabeth; but the very first parliament of King James brought

forward the subject. James was flattered by their promptitude, and
the act passed in 1604. On the second reading in the House of Lords,
the bill passed into a committee, in which were twelve bishops. By it
was enacted, “That if any person shall use, practise, or exercise any
conjuration of any wicked or evil spirit, or shall consult, covenant
with, or feed any such spirit, the first offence to be imprisonment for
a year, and standing in the pillory once a quarter; the second offence
to be death.”
The minor punishment seems but rarely to have been inflicted.
Every record that has been preserved mentions that the witches were
hanged and burned, or burned, without the previous strangling,
“alive and quick.” During the whole of James’s reign, amid the civil
wars of his successor, the sway of the Long Parliament, the
usurpation of Cromwell, and the reign of Charles II., there was no
abatement of the persecution. If at any time it raged with less
virulence, it was when Cromwell and the Independents were
masters. Dr. Zachary Grey, the editor of an edition of “Hudibras,”
informs us, in a note to that work, that he himself perused a list of
three thousand witches who were executed in the time of the Long
Parliament alone. During the first eighty years of the seventeenth
century, the number executed has been estimated at five hundred
annually, making the frightful total of forty thousand. Some of these
cases deserve to be cited. The great majority resemble closely those
already mentioned; but two or three of them let in a new light upon
the popular superstition.
Every one has heard of the “Lancashire witches,” a phrase now
used to compliment the ladies of that county for their bewitching
beauty; but it is not every one who has heard the story in which it

originated. A villanous boy, named Robinson, was the chief actor in
the tragedy. He confessed many years afterwards that he had been
suborned by his father and other persons to give false evidence
against the unhappy witches whom he brought to the stake. The time
of this famous trial was about the year 1634. This boy Robinson,
whose father was a wood-cutter, residing on the borders of Pendle
Forest, in Lancashire, spread abroad many rumours against one
Mother Dickenson, whom he accused of being a witch. These
rumours coming to the ears of the local magistracy, the boy was sent
for and strictly examined. He told the following extraordinary story
without hesitation or prevarication, and apparently in so open and
honest a manner, that no one who heard him doubted the truth of it.
He said, that as he was roaming about in one of the glades of the
forest, amusing himself by gathering blackberries, he saw two
greyhounds before him, which he thought at the time belonged to
some gentleman of the neighbourhood. Being fond of sport, he
proposed to have a course; and a hare being started, he incited the
hounds to run. Neither of them would stir. Angry at the beasts, he
seized hold of a switch, with which he was about to punish them,
when one of them suddenly started up in the form of a woman, and
the other of a little boy. He at once recognised the woman to be the
witch Mother Dickenson. She offered him some money to induce him
to sell his soul to the devil; but he refused. Upon this she took a
bridle out of her pocket, and shaking it over the head of the other
little boy, he was instantly turned into a horse. Mother Dickenson
then seized him in her arms, sprang upon the horse, and placing him
before her, rode with the swiftness of the wind over forests, fields,
bogs, and rivers, until they came to a large barn. The witch alighted

at the door, and, taking him by the hand, led him inside. There he
saw seven old women pulling at seven halters which hung from the
roof. As they pulled, large pieces of meat, lumps of butter, loaves of
bread, basins of milk, hot puddings, black puddings, and other rural
dainties, fell from the halters on to the floor. While engaged in this
charm, they made such ugly faces, and looked so fiendish, that he
was quite frightened. After they had pulled in this manner enough
for an ample feast, they set-to, and shewed, whatever might be said
of the way in which their supper was procured, that their epicurism
was a little more refined than that of the Scottish witches, who,
according to Gellie Duncan’s confession, feasted upon dead men’s
flesh in the old kirk of Berwick. The boy added, that as soon as
supper was ready, many other witches came to partake of it, several
of whom he named.
In consequence of this story, many persons were arrested, and the
boy Robinson was led about from church to church, in order that he
might point out to the officers by whom he was accompanied the
hags he had seen in the barn. Altogether, about twenty persons were
thrown into prison; eight of them were condemned to die, including
Mother Dickenson, upon this evidence alone, and executed
accordingly. Among the wretches who concocted this notable story,
not one was ever brought to justice for his perjury; and Robinson, the
father, gained considerable sums by threatening persons who were
rich enough to buy off exposure.
Among the ill-weeds which flourished amid the long dissensions of
the civil war, Matthew Hopkins, the witch-finder, stands eminent in
his sphere. This vulgar fellow resided, in the year 1644, at the town of
Manningtree, in Essex, and made himself very conspicuous in

discovering the devil’s marks upon several unhappy witches. The
credit he gained by his skill in this instance seems to have inspired
him to renewed exertions. In the course of a very short time,
whenever a witch was spoken of in Essex, Matthew Hopkins was sure
to be present, aiding the judges with his knowledge of “such cattle,”
as he called them. As his reputation increased, he assumed the title
of “Witch-finder General,” and travelled through the counties of
Norfolk, Essex, Huntingdon, and Sussex, for the sole purpose of
finding out witches. In one year he brought sixty poor creatures to
the stake. The test he commonly adopted was that of swimming, so
highly recommended by King James in his Demonologie. The hands
and feet of the suspected persons were tied together crosswise, the
thumb of the right hand to the toe of the left foot, and vice versa.
They were then wrapped up in a large sheet or blanket, and laid upon
their backs in a pond or river. If they sank, their friends and relatives
had the poor consolation of knowing they were innocent; but there
was an end of them: if they floated, which, when laid carefully on the
water, was generally the case, there was also an end of them; for they
were deemed guilty of witchcraft, and burned accordingly.
Another test was to make them repeat the Lord’s prayer and creed.
It was affirmed that no witch could do so correctly. If she missed a
word, or even pronounced one incoherently, which in her trepidation
it was most probable she would, she was accounted guilty. It was
thought that witches could not weep more than three tears, and
those only from the left eye. Thus the conscious innocence of many
persons, which gave them fortitude to bear unmerited torture
without flinching, was construed by their unmerciful tormentors into
proofs of guilt. In some districts the test resorted to was to weigh the

culprit against the church Bible. If the suspected witch proved
heavier than the Bible, she was set at liberty. This mode was far too
humane for the witch-finders by profession. Hopkins always
maintained that the most legitimate modes were pricking and
swimming.
Hopkins used to travel through his counties like a man of
consideration, attended by his two assistants, always putting up at
the chief inn of the place, and always at the cost of the authorities.
His charges were twenty shillings a town, his expenses of living while
there, and his carriage thither and back. This he claimed whether he
found witches or not. If he found any, he claimed twenty shillings a
head in addition when they were brought to execution. For about
three years he carried on this infamous trade, success making him so
insolent and rapacious that high and low became his enemies. The
Rev. Mr. Gaul, a clergyman of Houghton, in Huntingdonshire, wrote
a pamphlet impugning his pretensions, and accusing him of being a
common nuisance. Hopkins replied in an angry letter to the
functionaries of Houghton, stating his intention to visit their town;
but desiring to know whether it afforded many such sticklers for
witchcraft as Mr. Gaul, and whether they were willing to receive and
entertain him with the customary hospitality, if he so far honoured
them. He added, by way of threat, that in case he did not receive a
satisfactory reply, “he would waive their shire altogether, and betake
himself to such places where he might do and punish, not only
without control, but with thanks and recompense.” The authorities of
Houghton were not much alarmed at this awful threat of letting them
alone. They very wisely took no notice either of him or his letter.

Mr. Gaul describes in his pamphlet one of the modes employed by
Hopkins, which was sure to swell his revenues very considerably. It
was a proof even more atrocious than the swimming. He says, that
the “Witch-finder General” used to take the suspected witch and
place her in the middle of a room, upon a stool or table, cross-legged,
or in some other uneasy posture. If she refused to sit in this manner,
she was bound with strong cords. Hopkins then placed persons to
watch her for four-and-twenty hours, during which time she was to
be kept without meat or drink. It was supposed that one of her imps
would come during that interval and suck her blood. As the imp
might come in the shape of a wasp, a moth, a fly, or other insect, a
hole was made in the door or window to let it enter. The watchers
were ordered to keep a sharp look out, and endeavour to kill any
insect that appeared in the room. If any fly escaped, and they could
not kill it, the woman was guilty; the fly was her imp, and she was
sentenced to be burned, and twenty shillings went into the pockets of
Master Hopkins. In this manner he made one old woman confess,
because four flies had appeared in the room, that she was attended
by four imps, named “Ilemazar,” “Pye-wackett,” “Peck-in-thecrown,” and “Grizel-Greedigut.”
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It is consoling to think that this impostor perished in his own
snare. Mr. Gaul’s exposure and his own rapacity weakened his
influence among the magistrates; and the populace, who began to
find that not even the most virtuous and innocent were secure from
his persecution, looked upon him with undisguised aversion. He was
beset by a mob at a village in Suffolk, and accused of being himself a
wizard. An old reproach was brought against him, that he had, by
means of sorcery, cheated the devil out of a certain memorandumbook, in which he, Satan, had entered the names of all the witches in
England. “Thus,” said the populace, “you find out witches, not by
God’s aid, but by the devil’s.” In vain he denied his guilt. The
populace longed to put him to his own test. He was speedily stripped,
and his thumbs and toes tied together. He was then placed in a
blanket, and cast into a pond. Some say that he floated, and that he
was taken out, tried, and executed upon no other proof of his guilt.

Others assert that he was drowned. This much is positive, that there
was an end of him. As no judicial entry of his trial and execution is to
be found in any register, it appears most probable that he expired by
the hands of the mob. Butler has immortalised this scamp in the
following lines of his Hudibras:
“Hath not this present Parliament
A lieger to the devil sent,
Fully empower’d to treat about
Finding revolted witches out?
And has he not within a year
Hang’d threescore of them in one shire?
Some only for not being drown’d,
And some for sitting above ground
Whole days and nights upon their breeches,
And feeling pain, were hang’d for witches;
And some for putting knavish tricks
Upon green geese or turkey chicks;
Or pigs that suddenly deceased
Of griefs unnatural, as he guessed;
Who proved himself at length a witch,
And made a rod for his own breech.”
In Scotland also witch-finding became a trade. They were known
under the designation of “common prickers,” and, like Hopkins,
received a fee for each witch they discovered. At the trial of Janet
Peaston, in 1646, the magistrates of Dalkeith “caused John Kincaid
of Tranent, the common pricker, to exercise his craft upon her. He

found two marks of the devil’s making; for she could not feel the pin
when it was put into either of the said marks, nor did the marks
bleed when the pin was taken out again. When she was asked where
she thought the pins were put in her, she pointed to a part of her
body distant from the real place. They were pins of three inches in
length.” 33
These common prickers became at last so numerous that they were
considered nuisances. The judges refused to take their evidence; and
in 1678 the privy council of Scotland condescended to hear the
complaint of an honest woman who had been indecently exposed by
one of them, and expressed their opinion that common prickers were
common cheats.
But such an opinion was not formed in high places before
hundreds of innocent persons had fallen victims. The parliaments
had encouraged the delusion both in England and Scotland; and by
arming these fellows with a sort of authority, had in a manner forced
the magistrates and ministers to receive their evidence. The fate of
one poor old gentleman, who fell a victim to the arts of Hopkins in
1646, deserves to be recorded. Mr. Louis, a venerable clergyman,
upwards of seventy years of age, and who had been rector of
Framlingham, in Suffolk, for fifty years, excited suspicion that he was
a wizard. Being a violent royalist, he was likely to meet with no
sympathy at that time; and even his own parishioners, whom he had
served so long and so faithfully, turned their backs upon him as soon
as he was accused. Placed under the hands of Hopkins, who knew so
well how to bring the refractory to confession, the old man, the light
of whose intellect had become somewhat dimmed from age,
confessed that he was a wizard. He said he had two imps that

continually excited him to do evil; and that one day, when he was
walking on the sea-coast, one of them prompted him to express a
wish that a ship, whose sails were just visible in the distance, might
sink. He consented, and saw the vessel sink before his eyes. He was,
upon this confession, tried and condemned. On his trial, the flame of
reason burned up as brightly as ever. He denied all that had been
alleged against him, and cross-examined Hopkins with great tact and
severity. After his condemnation, he begged that the funeral service
of the Church might be read for him. The request was refused, and he
repeated it for himself from memory as he was led to the scaffold.
A poor woman in Scotland was executed upon evidence even less
strong than this. John Bain, a common pricker, swore that, as he
passed her door, he heard her talking to the devil. She said, in
defence, that it was a foolish practice she had of talking to herself,
and several of her neighbours corroborated her statement; but the
evidence of the pricker was received. He swore that none ever talked
to themselves who were not witches. The devil’s mark being found
upon her, the additional testimony of her guilt was deemed
conclusive, and she was “convict and brynt.”
From the year 1652 to 1682, these trials diminished annually in
number, and acquittals were by no means so rare as they had been.
To doubt in witchcraft was no longer dangerous. Before country
justices, condemnations on the most absurd evidence still continued;
but when the judges of the land had to charge the jury, they took a
more humane and philosophical view. By degrees, the educated
classes (comprised in those days within very narrow limits) openly
expressed their unbelief of modern witchcraft, although they were
not bold enough to deny its existence altogether. Between them and

the believers in the old doctrine fierce arguments ensued, and the
sceptics were designated Sadducees. To convince them, the learned
and Reverend Joseph Glanvil wrote his well-known work,
Sadducismus Triumphatus, and The Collection of Relations; the first
part intended as a philosophical inquiry into witchcraft, and the
power of the devil “to assume a mortal shape:” the latter containing
what he considered a multitude of well-authenticated modern
instances.

SIR MATTHEW HALE.

But though progress was made, it was slow. In 1664, the venerable
Sir Matthew Hale condemned two women, named Amy Duny and
Rose Cullender, to the stake at St. Edmondsbury, upon evidence the
most ridiculous. These two old women, whose ugliness gave their
neighbours the first idea that they were witches, went to a shop to
purchase herrings, and were refused. Indignant at the prejudice
against them, they were not sparing of their abuse. Shortly afterward,
the daughter of the herring-dealer fell sick, and a cry was raised that
she was bewitched by the old women who had been refused the
herrings. This girl was subject to epileptic fits. To discover the guilt
of Amy Duny and Rose Cullender, the girl’s eyes were blinded closely
with a shawl, and the witches were commanded to touch her. They

did so, and she was immediately seized with a fit. Upon this evidence
they were sent to prison. The girl was afterwards touched by an
indifferent person, and the force of her imagination was so great,
that, thinking it was again the witches, she fell down in a violent fit as
before. This, however, was not received in favour of the accused.
The following extract, from the published reports of the trial, will
shew the sort of evidence which was received:
“Samuel Pacey, of Leystoff (a good, sober man), being sworn,
said that, on Thursday the 10th of October last, his younger
daughter, Deborah, about nine years old, was suddenly taken so
lame that she could not stand on her legs, and so continued till
the 17th of the same month, when the child desired to be carried
to a bank on the east side of the house, looking towards the sea;
and, while she was sitting there, Amy Duny came to this
examinant’s house to buy some herrings, but was denied. Then
she came twice more, but, being as often denied, she went away
discontented and grumbling. At this instant of time, the child
was taken with terrible fits, complaining of a pain in her
stomach, as if she was pricked with pins, shrieking out with a
voice like a whelp, and thus continued till the 30th of the same
month. This examinant further saith, that Amy Duny, having
long had the reputation of a witch, and his child having, in the
intervals of her fits, constantly cried out on her as the cause of
her disorder, saying, that the said Amy did appear to her and
fright her; he himself did suspect the said Amy to be a witch, and
charged her with being the cause of his child’s illness, and set
her in the stocks. Two days after, his daughter Elizabeth was
taken with such strange fits, that they could not force open her

mouth without a tap; and the younger child being in the same
condition, they used to her the same remedy. Both children
grievously complained that Amy Duny and another woman,
whose habit and looks they described, did appear to them and
torment them, and would cry out, ‘There stands Amy Duny!
There stands Rose Cullender!’ the other person who afflicted
them. Their fits were not alike. Sometimes they were lame on
the right side; sometimes on the left; and sometimes so sore,
that they could not bear to be touched. Sometimes they were
perfectly well in other respects, but they could not hear; at other
times they could not see. Sometimes they lost their speech for
one, two, and once for eight days together. At times they had
swooning fits, and, when they could speak, were taken with a fit
of coughing, and vomited phlegm and crooked pins; and once a
great twopenny nail, with above forty pins; which nail he, the
examinant, saw vomited up, with many of the pins. The nail and
pins were produced in the court. Thus the children continued for
two months, during which time the examinant often made them
read in the New Testament, and observed, when they came to
the words Lord Jesus, or Christ, they could not pronounce them,
but fell into a fit. When they came to the word Satan, or devil,
they would point, and say, ‘This bites, but makes me speak right
well.’ Finding his children thus tormented without hopes of
recovery, he sent them to his sister, Margaret Arnold, at
Yarmouth, being willing to try whether change of air would help
them.
“Margaret Arnold was the next witness. Being sworn, she said,
that about the 30th of November, Elizabeth and Deborah Pacey

came to her house, with her brother, who told her what had
happened, and that he thought his children bewitched. She, this
examinant, did not much regard it, supposing the children had
played tricks, and put the pins into their mouths themselves.
She therefore took all the pins from their clothes, sewing them
with thread instead of pinning them. But, notwithstanding, they
raised, at times, at least thirty pins in her presence, and had
terrible fits; in which fits they would cry out upon Amy Duny
and Rose Cullender, saying, that they saw them and heard them
threatening, as before; that they saw things like mice running
about the house; and one of them catched one, and threw it into
the fire, which made a noise like a rat. Another time the younger
child, being out of doors, a thing like a bee would have forced
itself into her mouth, at which the child ran screaming into the
house, and before this examinant could come at her, fell into a
fit, and vomited a twopenny nail, with a broad head. After that,
this examinant asked the child how she came by this nail, when
she answered, ‘The bee brought the nail, and forced it into my
mouth.’ At other times, the eldest child told this examinant that
she saw flies bring her crooked pins. She would then fall into a
fit, and vomit such pins. One time the said child said she saw a
mouse, and crept under the table to look for it; and afterwards,
the child seemed to put something into her apron, saying, ‘She
had caught it.’ She then ran to the fire, and threw it in, on which
there did appear to this examinant something like a flash of
gunpowder, although she does own she saw nothing in the
child’s hand. Once the child, being speechless, but otherwise
very sensible, ran up and down the house, crying, ‘Hush! hush!’

as if she had seen poultry; but this examinant saw nothing. At
last the child catched at something, and threw it into the fire.
Afterwards, when the child could speak, this examinant asked
her what she saw at the time? She answered that she saw a duck.
Another time the youngest child said, after a fit, that Amy Duny
had been with her, and tempted her to drown herself, or cut her
throat, or otherwise destroy herself. Another time they both
cried out upon Amy Duny and Rose Cullender, saying, ‘Why
don’t you come yourselves? Why do you send your imps to
torment us?’”

SIR THOMAS BROWN.

The celebrated Sir Thomas Brown, the author of Vulgar Errors,
was also examined as a witness upon the trial. Being desired to give
his opinion of the three persons in court, he said he was clearly of
opinion that they were bewitched. He said there had lately been a
discovery of witches in Denmark, who used the same way of
tormenting persons, by conveying crooked pins, needles, and nails
into their bodies. That he thought, in such cases, the devil acted upon
human bodies by natural means, namely, by exciting and stirring up
the superabundant humours; he did afflict them in a more surprising
manner by the same diseases their bodies were usually subject to;

that these fits might be natural, only raised to a great degree by the
subtlety of the devil, co-operating with the malice of these witches.
The evidence being concluded, Sir Matthew Hale addressed the
jury. He said, he would waive repeating the evidence, to prevent any
mistake, and told the jury there were two things they had to inquire
into. First, Whether or not these children were bewitched; secondly,
Whether these women did bewitch them. He said, he did not in the
least doubt there were witches; first, Because the Scriptures affirmed
it; secondly, Because the wisdom of all nations, particularly our own,
had provided laws against witchcraft, which implied their belief of
such a crime. He desired them strictly to observe the evidence, and
begged of God to direct their hearts in the weighty concern they had
in hand, since, to condemn the innocent and let the guilty go free are
both an abomination to the Lord.
The jury then retired, and in about half an hour returned a verdict
of guilty upon all the indictments, being thirteen in number. The
next morning the children came with their father to the lodgings of
Sir Matthew Hale, very well, and quite restored to their usual health.
Mr. Pacey, being asked at what time their health began to improve,
replied, that they were quite well in half an hour after the conviction
of the prisoners.
Many attempts were made to induce the unfortunate women to
confess their guilt; but in vain, and they were both hanged.
Eleven trials were instituted before Chief Justice Holt for
witchcraft, between the years 1694 and 1701. The evidence was of the
usual character; but Holt appealed so successfully in each case to the
common sense of the jury, that they were every one acquitted. A
general feeling seemed to pervade the country that blood enough had

been shed upon these absurd charges. Now and then, the flame of
persecution burnt up in a remote district; but these instances were
no longer looked upon as mere matters of course. They appear, on
the contrary, to have excited much attention; a sure proof, if no other
were to be obtained, that they were becoming unfrequent.
A case of witchcraft was tried in 1711, before Lord Chief Justice
Powell; in which, however, the jury persisted in a verdict of guilty,
though the evidence was of the usual absurd and contradictory
character, and the enlightened judge did all in his power to bring
them to a right conclusion. The accused person was one Jane
Wenham, better known as the Witch of Walkerne; and the persons
who were alleged to have suffered from her witchcraft were two
young women, named Thorne and Street. A witness, named Mr.
Arthur Chauncy, deposed, that he had seen Ann Thorne in several of
her fits, and that she always recovered upon prayers being said, or if
Jane Wenham came to her. He related, that he had pricked the
prisoner several times in the arms, but could never fetch any blood
from her; that he had seen her vomit pins, when there were none in
her clothes or within her reach; and that he had preserved several of
them, which he was ready to produce. The judge, however, told him
that was needless, as he supposed they were crooked pins.
Mr. Francis Bragge, another witness, deposed, that strange “cakes”
of bewitched feathers having been taken from Ann Thorne’s pillow,
he was anxious to see them. He went into a room where some of
these feathers were, and took two of the cakes, and compared them
together. They were both of a circular figure, something larger than a
crown piece; and he observed that the small feathers were placed in a
nice and curious order, at equal distances from each other, making

so many radii of the circle, in the centre of which the quill-ends of the
feathers met. He counted the number of these feathers, and found
them to be exactly thirty-two in each cake. He afterwards
endeavoured to pull off two or three of them, and observed that they
were all fastened together by a sort of viscous matter, which would
stretch seven or eight times in a thread before it broke. Having taken
off several of these feathers, he removed the viscous matter with his
fingers, and found under it, in the centre, some short hairs, black and
grey, matted together, which he verily believed to be cat’s hair. He
also said, that Jane Wenham confessed to him that she had
bewitched the pillow, and had practised witchcraft for sixteen years.
The judge interrupted the witness at this stage, and said, he should
very much like to see an enchanted feather, and seemed to wonder
when he was told that none of these strange cakes had been
preserved. His lordship asked the witness why he did not keep one or
two of them, and was informed that they had all been burnt, in order
to relieve the bewitched person of the pains she suffered, which
could not be so well effected by any other means.
A man, named Thomas Ireland, deposed, that hearing several
times a great noise of cats crying and screaming about his house, he
went out and frightened them away, and they all ran towards the
cottage of Jane Wenham. One of them he swore positively had a face
very like Jane Wenham’s. Another man, named Burville, gave similar
evidence, and swore that he had often seen a cat with Jane
Wenham’s face. Upon one occasion he was in Ann Thorne’s chamber,
when several cats came in, and among them the cat above stated.
This witness would have favoured the court with a much longer

statement, but was stopped by the judge, who said he had heard
quite enough.
The prisoner, in her defence, said nothing, but that “she was a
clear woman.” The learned judge then summed up, leaving it to the
jury to determine whether such evidence as they had heard was
sufficient to take away the prisoner’s life upon the indictment. After a
long deliberation they brought in their verdict, that she was guilty
upon the evidence. The judge then asked them whether they found
her guilty upon the indictment of conversing with the devil in the
shape of a cat? The sapient foreman very gravely answered, “We find
her guilty of that.” The learned judge then very reluctantly proceeded
to pass sentence of death; but, by his persevering exertions, a pardon
was at last obtained, and the wretched old woman was set at liberty.
In the year 1716, a woman and her daughter—the latter only nine
years of age—were hanged at Huntingdon for selling their souls to
the devil, and raising a storm by pulling off their stockings and
making a lather of soap. This appears to have been the last judicial
execution in England. From that time to the year 1736, the populace
raised at intervals the old cry, and more than once endangered the
lives of poor women by dragging them through ponds on suspicion;
but the philosophy of those who, from their position, sooner or later
give the tone to the opinions and morals of the poor, was silently
working a cure for the evil. The fear of witches ceased to be epidemic,
and became individual, lingering only in minds fettered by inveterate
prejudice or brutalising superstition. In the year 1736, the penal
statute of James I. was finally blotted from the statute-book, and
suffered no longer to disgrace the advancing intelligence of the
country. Pretenders to witchcraft, fortune-tellers, conjurors, and all

their train, were liable only to the common punishment of rogues
and impostors—imprisonment and the pillory.
In Scotland, the delusion also assumed the same phases, and was
gradually extinguished in the light of civilisation. As in England, the
progress of improvement was slow. Up to the year 1665, little or no
diminution of the mania was perceptible. In 1643, the General
Assembly recommended that the privy council should institute a
standing commission, composed of any “understanding gentlemen
or magistrates,” to try the witches, who were stated to have increased
enormously of late years. In 1649, an act was passed, confirmatory of
the original statute of Queen Mary, explaining some points of the
latter which were doubtful, and enacting severe penalties, not only
against witches themselves, but against all who covenanted with
them, or sought by their means to pry into the secrets of futurity, or
cause any evil to the life, lands, or limbs of their neighbours. For the
next ten years, the popular madness upon this subject was perhaps
more furious than ever; upwards of four thousand persons suffered
for the crime during that interval. This was the consequence of the
act of parliament and the unparalleled severity of the magistrates;
the latter frequently complained that for two witches they burned
one day, there were ten to burn the next: they never thought that
they themselves were the cause of the increase. In a single circuit,
held at Glasgow, Ayr, and Stirling, in 1659, seventeen unhappy
creatures were burned by judicial sentence for trafficking with Satan.
In one day (November 7, 1661), the privy council issued no less than
fourteen commissions for trials in the provinces. Next year, the
violence of the persecution seems to have abated. From 1662 to 1668,
although “the understanding gentlemen and magistrates” already

mentioned, continued to try and condemn, the High Court of
Justiciary had but one offender of this class to deal with, and she was
acquitted. James Welsh, a common pricker, was ordered to be
publicly whipped through the streets of Edinburgh for falsely
accusing a woman of witchcraft; a fact which alone proves that the
superior court sifted the evidence in these cases with much more
care and severity than it had done a few years previously. The
enlightened Sir George Mackenzie, styled by Dryden “the noble wit of
Scotland,” laboured hard to introduce this rule into court, that the
confessions of the witches should be held of little worth, and that the
evidence of the prickers and other interested persons should be
received with distrust and jealousy. This was reversing the old
practice, and saved many innocent lives. Though a firm believer both
in ancient and modern witchcraft, he could not shut his eyes to the
atrocities daily committed under the name of justice. In his work on
the Criminal Law of Scotland, published in 1678, he says, “From the
horridness of this crime, I do conclude that, of all others, it requires
the clearest relevancy and most convincing probature; and I
condemn, next to the witches themselves, those cruel and too
forward judges who burn persons by thousands as guilty of this
crime.” In the same year, Sir John Clerk plumply refused to serve as
a commissioner on trials for witchcraft, alleging, by way of excuse,
“that he was not himself good conjuror enough to be duly qualified.”
The views entertained by Sir George Mackenzie were so favourably
received by the Lords of Session, that he was deputed, in 1680, to
report to them on the cases of a number of poor women who were
then in prison awaiting their trial. Sir George stated that there was
no evidence against them whatever but their own confessions, which

were absurd and contradictory, and drawn from them by severe
torture. They were immediately discharged.
For the next sixteen years the Lords of Session were unoccupied
with trials for witchcraft. Not one is entered upon the record. But in
1697 a case occurred which equalled in absurdity any of those that
signalised the dark reign of King James. A girl named Christiana
Shaw, eleven years of age, the daughter of John Shaw of Bargarran,
was subject to fits; and being of a spiteful temper, she accused her
maid-servant, with whom she had frequent quarrels, of bewitching
her. Her story unfortunately was believed. Encouraged to tell all the
persecutions of the devil which the maid had sent to torment her, she
in the end concocted a romance that involved twenty-one persons.
There was no other evidence against them but the fancies of this
lying child, and the confessions which pain had extorted from them;
but upon this no less than five women were condemned before Lord
Blantyre and the rest of the commissioners, appointed specially by
the privy council to try this case. They were burned on the Green at
Paisley. The warlock of the party, one John Reed, who was also
condemned, hanged himself in prison. It was the general belief in
Paisley that the devil had strangled him lest he should have revealed
in his last moments too many of the unholy secrets of witchcraft.
This trial excited considerable disgust in Scotland. The Rev. Mr. Bell,
a contemporary writer, observed that, in this business, “persons of
more goodness and esteem than most of their calumniators were
defamed for witches.” He adds, that the persons chiefly to blame
were “certain ministers of too much forwardness and absurd
credulity, and some topping professors in and about Glasgow.” 34

After this trial, there again occurs a lapse of seven years, when the
subject was painfully forced upon public attention by the brutal
cruelty of the mob at Pittenween. Two women were accused of
having bewitched a strolling beggar who was subject to fits, or who
pretended to be so, for the purpose of exciting commiseration. They
were cast into prison, and tortured until they confessed. One of
them, named Janet Cornfoot, contrived to escape, but was brought
back to Pittenween next day by a party of soldiers. On her approach
to the town she was unfortunately met by a furious mob, composed
principally of fishermen and their wives, who seized upon her with
the intention of swimming her. They forced her away to the seashore, and tying a rope around her body, secured the end of it to the
mast of a fishing-boat lying alongside. In this manner they ducked
her several times. When she was half dead, a sailor in the boat cut
away the rope, and the mob dragged her through the sea to the
beach. Here, as she lay quite insensible, a brawny ruffian took down
the door of his hut, close by, and placed it on her back. The mob
gathered large stones from the beach and piled them upon her till the
wretched woman was pressed to death. No magistrate made the
slightest attempt to interfere; and the soldiers looked on, delighted
spectators. A great outcry was raised against this culpable
remissness, but no judicial inquiry was set on foot. This happened in
1704.
The next case we hear of is that of Elspeth Rule, found guilty of
witchcraft before Lord Anstruther, at the Dumfries circuit, in 1708.
She was sentenced to be marked in the cheek with a red-hot iron,
and banished the realm of Scotland for life.

Again there is a long interval. In 1718, the remote county of
Caithness, where the delusion remained in all its pristine vigour for
years after it had ceased elsewhere, was startled from its propriety by
the cry of witchcraft. A silly fellow, named William Montgomery, a
carpenter, had a mortal antipathy to cats; and somehow or other
these animals generally chose his back-yard as the scene of their
catterwaulings. He puzzled his brains for a long time to know why
he, above all his neighbours, should be so pestered. At last he came
to the sage conclusion that his tormentors were no cats, but witches.
In this opinion he was supported by his maid-servant, who swore a
round oath that she had often heard the aforesaid cats talking
together in human voices. The next time the unlucky tabbies
assembled in his back-yard, the valiant carpenter was on the alert.
Arming himself with an axe, a dirk, and a broadsword, he rushed out
among them. One of them he wounded in the back, a second in the
hip, and the leg of a third he maimed with his axe; but he could not
capture any of them. A few days afterwards, two old women of the
parish died; and it was said, that when their bodies were laid out,
there appeared upon the back of one the mark as of a recent wound,
and a similar scar upon the hip of the other. The carpenter and his
maid were convinced that they were the very cats, and the whole
county repeated the same story. Every one was upon the look-out for
proofs corroborative; a very remarkable one was soon discovered.
Nanny Gilbert, a wretched old creature of upwards of seventy years
of age, was found in bed with her leg broken. As she was ugly enough
for a witch, it was asserted that she also was one of the cats that had
fared so ill at the hands of the carpenter. The latter, when informed
of the popular suspicion, asserted that he distinctly remembered to

have struck one of the cats a blow with the back of his broadsword,
which ought to have broken her leg. Nanny was immediately dragged
from her bed and thrown into prison. Before she was put to the
torture, she explained in a very natural and intelligible manner how
she had broken her limb; but this account did not give satisfaction.
The professional persuasions of the torturer made her tell a different
tale, and she confessed that she was indeed a witch, and had been
wounded by Montgomery on the night stated; that the two old
women recently deceased were witches also, besides about a score of
others whom she named. The poor creature suffered so much by the
removal from her own home, and the tortures inflicted upon her,
that she died the next day in prison. Happily for the persons she had
named in her confession, Dundas of Arniston, at that time the king’s
advocate-general, wrote to the sheriff-depute, one Captain Ross of
Littledean, cautioning him not to proceed to trial, the “thing being of
too great difficulty, and beyond the jurisdiction of an inferior court.”
Dundas himself examined the precognition with great care, and was
so convinced of the utter folly of the whole case, that he quashed all
further proceedings.
We find this same sheriff-depute of Caithness very active four
years afterwards in another trial for witchcraft. In spite of the
warning he had received that all such cases were to be tried in future
by the superior courts, he condemned to death an old woman at
Dornoch, upon the charge of bewitching the cows and pigs of her
neighbours. This poor creature was insane, and actually laughed and
clapped her hands at sight of “the bonnie fire” that was to consume
her. She had a daughter who was lame both of her hands and feet,
and one of the charges brought against her was, that she had used

this daughter as a pony in her excursions to join the devil’s sabbath,
and that the devil himself had shod her, and produced lameness.
This was the last execution that took place in Scotland for
witchcraft. The penal statutes were repealed in 1736; and, as in
England, whipping, the pillory, or imprisonment, were declared the
future punishments of all pretenders to magic or witchcraft.
Still for many years after this the superstition lingered both in
England and Scotland, and in some districts is far from being extinct
even at this day. But before we proceed to trace it any further than to
its legal extinction, we have yet to see the frightful havoc it made in
continental Europe from the commencement of the seventeenth to
the middle of the eighteenth century. France, Germany, and
Switzerland were the countries which suffered most from the
epidemic. The number of victims in these countries during the
sixteenth century has already been mentioned; but at the early part
of the seventeenth, the numbers are so great, especially in Germany,
that were they not to be found in the official records of the tribunals,
it would be almost impossible to believe that mankind could ever
have been so maddened and deluded. To use the words of the
learned and indefatigable Horst, 35 “the world seemed to be like a
large madhouse for witches and devils to play their antics in.” Satan
was believed to be at every body’s call to raise the whirlwind, draw
down the lightning, blight the productions of the earth, or destroy
the health and paralyse the limbs of man. This belief, so insulting to
the majesty and beneficence of the Creator, was shared by the most
pious ministers of religion. Those who in their morning and evening
prayers acknowledged the one true God, and praised him for the
blessings of the seed-time and the harvest, were convinced that frail

humanity could enter into a compact with the spirits of hell to
subvert his laws and thwart all his merciful intentions. Successive
popes, from Innocent VIII. downwards, promulgated this degrading
doctrine, which spread so rapidly, that society seemed to be divided
into two great factions, the bewitching and the bewitched.
The commissioners named by Innocent VIII. to prosecute the
witch-trials in Germany were, Jacob Sprenger, so notorious for his
work on demonology, entitled the Malleus Maleficarum, or Hammer
to knock down Witches; Henry Institor, a learned jurisconsult; and
the Bishop of Strasburgh. Bamberg, Trèves, Cologne, Paderborn, and
Würzburg, were the chief seats of the commissioners, who, during
their lives alone, condemned to the stake, on a very moderate
calculation, upwards of three thousand victims. The number of
witches so increased, that new commissioners were continually
appointed in Germany, France, and Switzerland. In Spain and
Portugal the Inquisition alone took cognisance of the crime. It is
impossible to search the records of those dark, but now happily nonexisting tribunals; but the mind recoils with affright even to form a
guess of the multitudes who perished.
The mode of trial in the other countries is more easily ascertained.
Sprenger in Germany, and Bodinus and Delrio in France, have left
but too ample a record of the atrocities committed in the muchabused names of justice and religion. Bodinus, of great repute and
authority in the seventeenth century, says, “The trial of this offence
must not be conducted like other crimes. Whoever adheres to the
ordinary course of justice perverts the spirit of the law, both divine
and human. He who is accused of sorcery should never be acquitted,
unless the malice of the prosecutor be clearer than the sun; for it is

so difficult to bring full proof of this secret crime, that out of a
million of witches not one would be convicted if the usual course
were followed!” Henri Boguet, a witch-finder, who styled himself
“The Grand Judge of Witches for the Territory of St. Claude,” drew
up a code for the guidance of all persons engaged in the witch-trials,
consisting of seventy articles, quite as cruel as the code of Bodinus.
In this document he affirms, that a mere suspicion of witchcraft
justifies the immediate arrest and torture of the suspected person. If
the prisoner muttered, looked on the ground, and did not shed any
tears, all these were proofs positive of guilt! In all cases of witchcraft,
the evidence of the child ought to be taken against its parent; and
persons of notoriously bad character, although not to be believed
upon their oaths on the ordinary occasions of dispute that might
arise between man and man, were to be believed, if they swore that
any person had bewitched them! Who, when he hears that this
diabolical doctrine was the universally received opinion of the
ecclesiastical and civil authorities, can wonder that thousands upon
thousands of unhappy persons should be brought to the stake? that
Cologne should for many years burn its three hundred witches
annually? the district of Bamberg its four hundred? Nuremberg,
Geneva, Paris, Toulouse, Lyons, and other cities, their two hundred?
A few of these trials may be cited, taking them in the order of
priority, as they occurred in different parts of the Continent. In 1595,
an old woman residing in a village near Constance, angry at not
being invited to share the sports of the country people on a day of
public rejoicing, was heard to mutter something to herself, and was
afterwards seen to proceed through the fields towards a hill, where
she was lost sight of. A violent thunder-storm arose about two hours

afterwards, which wet the dancers to the skin, and did considerable
damage to the plantations. This woman, suspected before of
witchcraft, was seized and imprisoned, and accused of having raised
the storm, by filling a hole with wine, and stirring it about with a
stick. She was tortured till she confessed, and was burned alive the
next evening.

CITY OF LYONS.

About the same time two sorcerers in Toulouse were accused of
having dragged a crucifix about the streets at midnight, stopping at
times to spit upon and kick it, and uttering at intervals an exorcism
to raise the devil. The next day a hail-storm did considerable damage
to the crops; and a girl, the daughter of a shoemaker in the town,
remembered to have heard in the night the execrations of the
wizards. Her story led to their arrest. The usual means to produce
confession were resorted to. The wizards owned that they could raise
tempests whenever they pleased, and named several persons who
possessed similar powers. They were hanged, and then burned in the
market-place, and seven of the persons they had mentioned shared
the same fate.

Hoppo and Stadlin, two noted wizards of Germany, were executed
in 1599. They implicated twenty or thirty witches, who went about
causing women to miscarry, bringing down the lightning of heaven,
and making maidens bring forth toads. To this latter fact several girls
were found to swear most positively! Stadlin confessed that he had
killed seven infants in the womb of one woman.
Bodinus highly praises the exertions of a witch-finder named
Nider, in France, who prosecuted so many that he could not calculate
them. Some of these witches could, by a single word, cause people to
fall down dead; others made women go with child three years instead
of nine months; while others, by certain invocations and ceremonies,
could turn the faces of their enemies upside down, or twist them
round to their backs. Although no witness was ever procured who
saw persons in this horrible state, the witches confessed that they
had the power and exercised it. Nothing more was wanting to ensure
the stake.
At Amsterdam a crazy girl confessed that she could cause sterility
in cattle, and bewitch pigs and poultry by merely repeating the magic
words Turius und Shurius Inturius! She was hanged and burned.
Another woman in the same city, named Kornelis van Purmerund,
was arrested in consequence of some disclosures the former had
made. A witness came forward and swore that she one day looked
through the window of her hut, and saw Kornelis sitting before a fire
muttering something to the devil. She was sure it was to the devil,
because she heard him answer her. Shortly afterwards twelve black
cats ascended out of the floor, and danced on their hind legs around
the witch for the space of about half an hour. They then vanished

with a horrid noise, and leaving a disagreeable smell behind them.
She also was hanged and burned.
At Bamberg, in Bavaria, the executions from the year 1610 to 1640
were at the rate of about a hundred annually. One woman, suspected
of witchcraft, was seized because, having immoderately praised the
beauty of a child, it had shortly afterwards fallen ill and died. She
confessed upon the rack that the devil had given her the power to
work evil upon those she hated, by speaking words in their praise. If
she said with unwonted fervour, “What a strong man!” “What a
lovely woman!” “What a sweet child!” the devil understood her, and
afflicted them with diseases immediately. It is quite unnecessary to
state the end of this poor creature. Many women were executed for
causing strange substances to lodge in the bodies of those who
offended them. Bits of wood, nails, hair, egg-shells, bits of glass,
shreds of linen and woollen cloth, pebbles, and even hot cinders and
knives, were the articles generally chosen. These were believed to
remain in the body till the witches confessed or were executed, when
they were voided from the bowels, or by the mouth, nostrils, or ears.
Modern physicians have often had cases of a similar description
under their care, where girls have swallowed needles, which have
been voided on the arms, legs, and other parts of the body. But the
science of that day could not account for these phenomena otherwise
than by the power of the devil; and every needle swallowed by a
servant-maid cost an old woman her life. Nay, if no more than one
suffered in consequence, the district might think itself fortunate. The
commissioners seldom stopped short at one victim. The revelations
of the rack in most cases implicated half a score.

BAMBERG.

Of all the records of the witch-trials preserved for the wonder of
succeeding ages, that of Würzburg, from 1627 to 1629, is the most
frightful. Hauber, who has preserved this list in his Acta et Scripta
Magica, says, in a note at the end, that it is far from complete, and
that there were a great many other burnings too numerous to specify.
This record, which relates to the city only, and not to the province of
Würzburg, contains the names of one hundred and fifty-seven
persons who were burned in two years in twenty-nine burnings,
averaging from five to six at a time. The list comprises three playactors, four innkeepers, three common councilmen of Würzburg,
fourteen vicars of the cathedral, the burgomaster’s lady, an
apothecary’s wife and daughter, two choristers of the cathedral,
Göbel Babelin, the prettiest girl in the town, and the wife, the two
little sons and the daughter of the councillor Stolzenberg. Rich and
poor, young and old, suffered alike. At the seventh of these recorded
burnings, the victims are described as a wandering boy, twelve years
of age, and four strange men and women found sleeping in the

market-place. Thirty-two of the whole number appear to have been
vagrants, of both sexes, who, failing to give a satisfactory account of
themselves, were accused and found guilty of witchcraft. The number
of children on the list is horrible to think upon. The thirteenth and
fourteenth burnings comprised four persons, who are stated to have
been a little maiden nine years of age, a maiden still less, her sister,
their mother, and their aunt, a pretty young woman of twenty-four.
At the eighteenth burning the victims were two boys of twelve, and a
girl of fifteen; at the nineteenth, the young heir of the noble house of
Rotenhahn, aged nine, and two other boys, one aged ten, and the
other twelve. Among other entries appear the names of Baunach, the
fattest, and Steinacher, the richest burgher in Würzburg. What
tended to keep up the delusion in this unhappy city, and, indeed, all
over Europe, was the number of hypochondriac and diseased
persons who came voluntarily forward and made confession of
witchcraft. Several of the victims in the foregoing list had only
themselves to blame for their fate. Many again, including the
apothecary’s wife and daughter already mentioned, pretended to
sorcery, and sold poisons, or attempted by means of charms and
incantations to raise the devil. But throughout all this fearful period
the delusion of the criminals was as great as that of the judges.
Depraved persons who in ordinary times would have been thieves or
murderers, added the desire of sorcery to their depravity, sometimes
with the hope of acquiring power over their fellows, and sometimes
with the hope of securing impunity in this world by the protection of
Satan. One of the persons executed at the first burning, a prostitute,
was heard repeating the exorcism which was supposed to have the
power of raising the arch enemy in the form of a goat. This precious

specimen of human folly has been preserved by Horst in his
Zauberbibliothek. It ran as follows, and was to be repeated slowly,
with many ceremonies and wavings of the hand:
“Lalle, Bachera, Magotte, Baphia, Dajam,
Vagoth Heneche Ammi Nagaz, Adomator
Raphael Immanuel Christus, Tetragrammaton
Agra Jod Loi. König! König!”
The two last words were uttered quickly, and with a sort of scream,
and were supposed to be highly agreeable to Satan, who loved to be
called a king. If he did not appear immediately, it was necessary to
repeat a further exorcism. The one in greatest repute was as follows,
and was to be read backwards, with the exception of the last two
words:
“Anion, Lalle, Sabolos, Sado, Pater, Aziel
Adonai Sado Vagoth Agra, Jod,
Baphra! Komm! Komm!”
When the witch wanted to get rid of the devil, who was sometimes in
the habit of prolonging his visits to an unconscionable length, she
had only to repeat the following, also backwards, when he generally
disappeared, leaving behind him a suffocating smell:
“Zellianelle Heotti Bonus Vagotha
Plisos sother osech unicus Beelzebub

Dax! Komm! Komm!”
This nonsensical jargon soon became known to all the idle and
foolish boys of Germany. Many an unhappy urchin, who in a youthful
frolic had repeated it, paid for his folly the penalty of his life. Three,
whose ages varied from ten to fifteen, were burned alive at Würzburg
for no other offence. Of course every other boy in the city became still
more convinced of the power of the charm. One boy confessed that
he would willingly have sold himself to the devil, if he could have
raised him, for a good dinner and cakes every day of his life, and a
pony to ride upon. This luxurious youngster, instead of being
horsewhipped for his folly, was hanged and burned.
The small district of Lindheim was, if possible, even more
notorious than Würzburg for the number of its witch-burnings. In
the year 1633 a famous witch, named Pomp Anna, who could cause
her foes to fall sick by merely looking at them, was discovered and
burned, along with three of her companions. Every year in this
parish, consisting at most of a thousand persons, the average
number of executions was five. Between the years 1660 and 1664, the
number consumed was thirty. If the executions all over Germany had
been in this frightful proportion, hardly a family could have escaped
losing one of its members.
In 1627, a ballad entitled the Druten Zeitung, or the Witches’
Gazette, was very popular in Germany. It detailed, according to the
title-page of a copy printed at Smalcald in 1627, “An account of the
remarkable events which took place in Franconia, Bamberg, and
Würzburg, with those wretches who from avarice or ambition have
sold themselves to the devil, and how they had their reward at last:

set to music, and to be sung to the tune of Dorothea.” The sufferings
of the witches at the stake are explained in it with great minuteness,
the poet waxing extremely witty when he describes the horrible
contortions of pain upon their countenances, and the shrieks that
rent the air when any one of more than common guilt was burned
alive. A trick resorted to in order to force one witch to confess, is told
in this doggrel as an excellent joke. As she obstinately refused to own
that she was in league with the powers of evil, the commissioners
suggested that the hangman should dress himself in a bear’s skin,
with the horns, tail, and all the et-ceteras, and in this form penetrate
into her dungeon. The woman, in the darkness of her cell, could not
detect the imposture, aided as it was by her own superstitious fears.
She thought she was actually in the presence of the prince of hell;
and when she was told to keep up her courage, and that she should
be relieved from the power of her enemies, she fell on her knees
before the supposed devil, and swore to dedicate herself hereafter,
body and soul, to his service. Germany is, perhaps, the only country
in Europe where the delusion was so great as to have made such
detestable verses as these the favourites of the people:
“Man shickt ein Henkersknecht
Zu ihr in Gefängniss n’unter,
Den man hat kleidet recht,
Mit einer Bärnhaute,
Als wenns der Teufel wär;
Als ihm die Drut anschaute
Meints ihr Buhl kam daher.

Sie sprach zu ihm behende,
Wie lässt du mich so lang
In der Obrigkeit Hände?
Hilf mir aus ihren Zwang,
Wie du mir hast verheissen,
Ich bin ja eben dein,
Thu mich aus der Angst entreissen
O liebster Buhle mein!” 36
This rare poet adds, that in making such an appeal to the
hangman, the witch never imagined the roast that was to be made of
her, and puts in, by way of parenthesis, “was not that fine fun!—was
das war für ein Spiel!” As feathers thrown into the air shew how the
wind blows, so this trumpery ballad serves to shew the current of
popular feeling at the time of its composition.
All readers of history are familiar with the celebrated trial of the
Maréchale d’Ancre, who was executed in Paris in the year 1617.
Although witchcraft was one of the accusations brought against her,
the real crime for which she suffered was her ascendency over the
mind of Mary of Medicis, and the consequent influence she exercised
indirectly over the unworthy king, Louis XIII. Her coachman gave
evidence that she had sacrificed a cock at midnight in one of the
churches, and others swore they had seen her go secretly into the
house of a noted witch named Isabella. When asked by what means
she had acquired so extraordinary an influence over the mind of the
Queen Mother, she replied boldly that she exercised no other power
over her than that which a strong mind can always exercise over the
weak. She died with great firmness.

In two years afterwards, scenes far more horrible than any that
had yet taken place in France were enacted at Labourt, at the foot of
the Pyrenees. The parliament of Bourdeaux, scandalised at the
number of witches who were said to infest Labourt and its
neighbourhood, deputed one of its own members, the noted Pierre
de l’Ancre, and its president, Espaignel, to inquire into the matter,
with full powers to punish the offenders. They arrived at Labourt in
May, 1619. De l’Ancre wrote a book setting forth all his great deeds in
this battle against the powers of evil. It is full of obscenity and
absurdity, but the facts may be relied on as far as they relate to the
number of trials and executions, and the strange confessions which
torture forced from the unhappy criminals.
De l’Ancre states as a reason why so many witches were to be
found at Labourt, that the country was mountainous and sterile! He
discovered many of them from their partiality to smoking tobacco. It
may be inferred from this that he was of the opinion of King James,
that tobacco was the “devil’s weed.” When the commission first sat,
the number of persons brought to trial was about forty a day. The
acquittals did not average so many as five per cent. All the witches
confessed that they had been present at the great Domdaniel, or
Sabbath. At these saturnalia the devil sat upon a large gilded throne,
sometimes in the form of a goat; sometimes as a gentleman, dressed
all in black, with boots, spurs, and sword; and very often as a
shapeless mass, resembling the trunk of a blasted tree, seen
indistinctly amid the darkness. They generally proceeded to the
Domdaniel, riding on spits, pitchforks, or broomsticks, and on their
arrival indulged with the fiends in every species of debauchery. Upon
one occasion they had had the audacity to celebrate this festival in

the very heart of the city of Bourdeaux. The throne of the arch fiend
was placed in the middle of the Place de Gallienne, and the whole
space was covered with the multitude of witches and wizards who
flocked to it from far and near, some arriving even from distant
Scotland.
After two hundred poor wretches had been hanged and burned,
there seemed no diminution in the number of criminals to be tried.
Many of the latter were asked upon the rack what Satan had said
when he found that the commissioners were proceeding with such
severity? The general reply was, that he did not seem to care much
about it. Some of them asserted that they had boldly reproached him
for suffering the execution of their friends, saying, “Out upon thee,
false fiend! thy promise was that they should not die! Look, how
thou hast kept thy word! They have been burned, and are a heap of
ashes!” Upon these occasions he was never offended: he would give
orders that the sports of the Domdaniel should cease, and producing
illusory fires that did not burn, he encouraged them to walk through,
assuring them that the fires lighted by the executioner gave no more
pain than those. They would then ask him, where their friends were,
since they had not suffered; to which the “Father of Lies” invariably
replied, that they were happy in a far country, and could see and hear
all that was then passing; and that, if they called by name those they
wished to converse with, they might hear their voices in reply. Satan
then imitated the voices of the defunct witches so successfully that
they were all deceived. Having answered all objections, the orgies
recommenced and lasted till the cock crew.
De l’Ancre was also very zealous in the trial of unhappy
monomaniacs for the crime of lycanthropy. Several who were

arrested confessed, without being tortured, that they were weirwolves, and that at night they rushed out among the flocks and herds
killing and devouring. One young man at Besançon, with the full
consciousness of the awful fate that awaited him, voluntarily gave
himself up to the commissioner Espaignel, and confessed that he was
the servant of a strong fiend, who was known by the name of “Lord of
the Forests:” by his power he was transformed into the likeness of a
wolf. The “Lord of the Forests” assumed the same shape; but was
much larger, fiercer, and stronger. They prowled about the pastures
together at midnight, strangling the watch-dogs that defended the
folds, and killing more sheep than they could devour. He felt, he said,
a fierce pleasure in these excursions, and howled in excess of joy as
he tore with his fangs the warm flesh of the sheep asunder. This
youth was not alone in this horrid confession; many others
voluntarily owned that they were weir-wolves, and many more were
forced by torture to make the same avowal. Such criminals were
thought to be too atrocious to be hanged first and then burned: they
were generally sentenced to be burned alive, and their ashes to be
scattered to the winds. Grave and learned doctors of divinity openly
sustained the possibility of these transformations, relying mainly
upon the history of Nebuchadnezzar. They could not imagine why, if
he had been an ox, modern men could not become wolves by Divine
permission and the power of the devil. They also contended that, if
men should confess, it was evidence enough, if there had been no
other. Delrio mentions that one gentleman accused of lycanthropy
was put to the torture no less than twenty times; but still he would
not confess. An intoxicating draught was then given him, and under
its influence he confessed that he was a weir-wolf. Delrio cites this to

shew the extreme equity of the commissioners. They never burned
any body till he confessed; and if one course of torture would not
suffice, their patience was not exhausted, and they tried him again
and again, even to the twentieth time! Well may we exclaim, when
such atrocities have been committed in the name of religion,
“Quel lion, quel tigre égale en cruauté,
Une injuste fureur qu’arme la piété?”
The trial of the unhappy Urbain Grandier, the curate of Loudun,
for bewitching a number of girls in the convent of the Ursulines in
that town, was, like that of the Maréchale d’Ancre, an accusation
resorted to by his enemies to ruin one against whom no other charge
could be brought so readily. This noted affair, which kept France in
commotion for months, and the true character of which was known
even at that time, merits no more than a passing notice in this place.
It did not spring from the epidemic dread of sorcery then so
prevalent, but was carried on by wretched intriguers, who had sworn
to have the life of their foe. Such a charge could not be refuted in
1634: the accused could not, as Bodinus expresses it, “make the
malice of the prosecutors more clear than the sun;” and his own
denial, however intelligible, honest, and straightforward, was held as
nothing in refutation of the testimony of the crazy women who
imagined themselves bewitched. The more absurd and contradictory
their assertions, the stronger the argument employed by his enemies
that the devil was in them. He was burned alive, under circumstances
of great cruelty. 37

A singular instance of the epidemic fear of witchcraft occurred at
Lille, in 1639. A pious but not very sane lady, named Antoinette
Bourignon, founded a school, or hospice, in that city. One day, on
entering the schoolroom, she imagined that she saw a great number
of little black angels flying about the heads of the children. In great
alarm she told her pupils of what she had seen, warning them to
beware of the devil whose imps were hovering about them. The
foolish woman continued daily to repeat the same story, and Satan
and his power became the only subject of conversation, not only
between the girls themselves, but between them and their
instructors. One of them at this time ran away from the school. On
being brought back and interrogated, she said she had not run away,
but had been carried away by the devil; she was a witch, and had
been one since the age of seven. Some other little girls in the school
went into fits at this announcement, and, on their recovery,
confessed that they also were witches. At last the whole of them, to
the number of fifty, worked upon each other’s imaginations to such a
degree that they also confessed that they were witches—that they
attended the Domdaniel, or meeting of the fiends—that they could
ride through the air on broom-sticks, feast on infants’ flesh, or creep
through a key-hole.
The citizens of Lille were astounded at these disclosures. The
clergy hastened to investigate the matter; many of them, to their
credit, openly expressed their opinion that the whole affair was an
imposture—not so the majority; they strenuously insisted that the
confessions of the children were valid, and that it was necessary to
make an example by burning them all for witches. The poor parents,
alarmed for their offspring, implored the examining Capuchins with

tears in their eyes to save their young lives, insisting that they were
bewitched, and not bewitching. This opinion also gained ground in
the town. Antoinette Bourignon, who had put these absurd notions
into the heads of the children, was accused of witchcraft, and
examined before the council. The circumstances of the case seemed
so unfavourable towards her that she would not stay for a second
examination. Disguising herself as she best could, she hastened out
of Lille and escaped pursuit. If she had remained four hours longer,
she would have been burned by judicial sentence as a witch and a
heretic. It is to be hoped that, wherever she went, she learned the
danger of tampering with youthful minds, and was never again
entrusted with the management of children.
The Duke of Brunswick and the Elector of Menz were struck with
the great cruelty exercised in the torture of suspected persons, and
convinced, at the same time, that no righteous judge would consider
a confession extorted by pain, and contradictory in itself, as
sufficient evidence to justify the execution of any accused person. It
is related of the Duke of Brunswick that he invited two learned
Jesuits to his house, who were known to entertain strong opinions
upon the subject of witchcraft, with a view of shewing them the
cruelty and absurdity of such practices. A woman lay in the dungeon
of the city accused of witchcraft, and the duke, having given previous
instructions to the officiating torturers, went with the two Jesuits to
hear her confession. By a series of artful leading questions the poor
creature, in the extremity of her anguish, was induced to confess that
she had often attended the sabbath of the fiends upon the Brocken;
that she had seen two Jesuits there, who had made themselves
notorious, even among witches, for their abominations; that she had

seen them assume the form of goats, wolves, and other animals; and
that many noted witches had borne them five, six, and seven children
at a birth, who had heads like toads, and legs like spiders. Being
asked if the Jesuits were far from her, she replied that they were in
the room beside her. The Duke of Brunswick led his astounded
friends away, and explained the stratagem. This was convincing
proof to both of them that thousands of persons had suffered
unjustly; they knew their own innocence, and shuddered to think
what their fate might have been if an enemy instead of a friend had
put such a confession into the mouth of a criminal. One of these
Jesuits was Frederick Spee, the author of the Cautio Criminalis,
published in 1631. This work, exposing the horrors of the witchtrials, had a most salutary effect in Germany: Schonbrunn,
Archbishop and Elector of Menz, abolished the torture entirely
within his dominions, and his example was imitated by the Duke of
Brunswick and other potentates. The number of supposed witches
immediately diminished, and the violence of the mania began to
subside. The Elector of Brandenburg issued a rescript, in 1654, with
respect to the case of Anna of Ellerbrock, a supposed witch,
forbidding the use of torture, and stigmatising the swimming of
witches as an unjust, cruel, and deceitful test.
This was the beginning of the dawn after the long-protracted
darkness. The tribunals no longer condemned witches to execution
by hundreds in a year. Würzburg, the grand theatre of the burnings,
burned but one where, forty years previously, it had burned three
score. From 1660 to 1670 the electoral chambers, in all parts of
Germany, constantly commuted the sentence of death passed by the

provincial tribunals into imprisonment for life, or burning on the
cheek.

ROUEN.

A truer philosophy had gradually disabused the public mind.
Learned men freed themselves from the trammels of a debasing
superstition, and governments, both civil and ecclesiastical,
repressed the popular delusion they had so long encouraged. The
parliament of Normandy condemned a number of women to death,
in the year 1670, on the old charge of riding on broomsticks to the
Domdaniel; but Louis XIV. commuted the sentence into banishment
for life. The parliament remonstrated, and sent the king the
following remarkable request. The reader will perhaps be glad to see
this document at length. It is of importance, as the last effort of a
legislative assembly to uphold this great error; and the arguments
they used and the instances they quoted are in the highest degree
curious. It reflects honour upon the memory of Louis XIV. that he
was not swayed by it.
“REQUEST OF THE PARLIAMENT OF ROUEN TO THE KING, IN 1670.

“SIRE,—Emboldened by the authority which your majesty has
committed into our hands in the province of Normandy, to try

and punish offences, and more particularly those offences of the
nature of witchcraft, which tend to the destruction of religion
and the ruin of nations, we, your parliament, remonstrate
humbly with your majesty upon certain cases of this kind which
have been lately brought before us. We cannot permit the letter
addressed by your majesty’s command to the attorney-general of
this district, for the reprieve of certain persons condemned to
death for witchcraft, and for the staying of proceedings in
several other cases, to remain unnoticed, and without remarking
upon the consequences which may ensue. There is also a letter
from your secretary of state, declaring your majesty’s intention
to commute the punishment of these criminals into one of
perpetual banishment, and to submit to the opinion of the
procureur-general, and of the most learned members of the
parliament of Paris, whether, in the matter of witchcraft, the
jurisprudence of the parliament of Rouen is to be followed in
preference to that of the parliament of Paris, and of the other
parliaments of the kingdom which judge differently.
“Although by the ordinances of the kings your predecessors,
parliaments have been forbidden to pay any attention to lettres
de cachet; we, nevertheless, from the knowledge which we have,
in common with the whole kingdom, of the care bestowed by
your majesty for the good of your subjects, and from the
submission and obedience to your commandments which we
have always manifested, have stayed all proceedings, in
conformity to your orders; hoping that your majesty,
considering the importance of the crime of witchcraft, and the
consequences likely to ensue from its impunity, will be

graciously pleased to grant us once more your permission to
continue the trials, and execute judgment upon those found
guilty. And as, since we received the letter of your secretary of
state,

we

have

also

been

made

acquainted

with

the

determination of your majesty, not only to commute the
sentence of death passed upon these witches into one of
perpetual banishment from the province, but to re-establish
them in the possession of their goods and chattels, and of their
good fame and character, your parliament have thought it their
duty, on occasion of these crimes, the greatest which men can
commit, to make you acquainted with the general and uniform
feelings of the people of this province with regard to them; it
being, moreover, a question in which are concerned the glory of
God and the relief of your suffering subjects, who groan under
their fears from the threats and menaces of this sort of persons,
and who feel the effects of them every day in the mortal and
extraordinary maladies which attack them, and the surprising
damage and loss of their possessions.
“Your majesty knows well that there is no crime so opposed to
the commands of God as witchcraft, which destroys the very
foundation of religion, and draws strange abominations after it.
It is for this reason, sire, that the Scriptures pronounce the
punishment of death against offenders, and that the Church and
the holy fathers have fulminated their anathemas, and that
canonical decisions have one and all decreed the most severe
punishments, to deter from this crime; and that the Church of
France, animated by the piety of the kings your predecessors,
has expressed so great a horror at it, that, not judging the

punishment of perpetual imprisonment, the highest it has the
power to inflict, sufficiently severe, it has left such criminals to
be dealt with by the secular power.
“It has been the general feeling of all nations that such
criminals ought to be condemned to death, and all the ancients
were of the same opinion. The law of the ‘Twelve Tables,’ which
was the principal of the Roman laws, ordains the same
punishment. All juris-consults agreed in it, as well as the
constitutions of the emperors, and more especially those of
Constantine and Theodosius, who, enlightened by the Gospel,
not only renewed the same punishment, but also deprived,
expressly, all persons found guilty of witchcraft of the right of
appeal, and declared them to be unworthy of a prince’s mercy.
And Charles VIII., sire, inspired by the same sentiments, passed
that beautiful and severe ordinance (cette belle et sévère
ordonnance), which enjoined the judges to punish witches
according to the exigencies of the case, under a penalty of being
themselves fined or imprisoned, or dismissed from their office;
and decreed, at the same time, that all persons who refused to
denounce a witch, should be punished as accomplices; and that
all, on the contrary, who gave evidence against one should be
rewarded.
“From these considerations, sire, and in the execution of so
holy an ordinance, your parliaments, by their decrees,
proportion their punishments to the guilt of the offenders; and
your parliament of Normandy has never, until the present time,
found that its practice was different from that of other courts;
for all the books which treat upon this matter cite an infinite

number of decrees condemning witches to be burnt, or broken
on the wheel, or to other punishments. The following are
examples:—In the time of Chilperic, as may be seen in Gregory
of Tours, b. vi. c. 35 of his History of France; all the decrees of
the parliament of Paris passed according to, and in conformity
with, this ancient jurisprudence of the kingdom, cited by Imbert,
in his Judicial Practice; all those cited by Monstrelet, in 1459,
against the witches of Artois; the decrees of the same
parliament, of the 13th of October 1573, against Mary Le Fief,
native of Saumur; of the 21st of October 1596, against the Sieur
de Beaumont, who pleaded, in his defence, that he had only
sought the aid of the devil for the purpose of unbewitching the
afflicted and of curing diseases; of the 4th of July 1606, against
Francis du Bose; of the 20th of July 1582, against Abel de la
Rue, native of Coulommiers; of the 2d of October 1593, against
Rousseau and his daughter; of 1608, against another Rousseau
and one Peley, for witchcraft and adoration of the devil at the
Sabbath, under the figure of a he-goat, as confessed by them; the
decree of 4th of February 1615, against Leclerc, who appealed
from the sentence of the parliament of Orleans, and who was
condemned for having attended the Sabbath, and confessed, as
well as two of his accomplices, who died in prison, that he had
adored the devil, renounced his baptism and his faith in God,
danced the witches’ dance, and offered up unholy sacrifices; the
decrees of the 6th of May 1616, against a man named Leger, on a
similar accusation; the pardon granted by Charles IX. to Trois
Echelles, upon condition of revealing his accomplices, but
afterwards revoked for renewed sorcery on his part; the decree

of the parliament of Paris, cited by Mornac in 1595; the
judgments passed in consequence of the commission given by
Henry IV. to the Sieur de l’Ancre, councillor of the parliament of
Bourdeaux; of the 20th of March 1619, against Etienne Audibert;
those passed by the chamber of Nerac, on the 26th of June 1620,
against several witches; those passed by the parliament of
Toulouse in 1577, as cited by Gregory Tolosanus, against four
hundred persons accused of this crime, and who were all
marked with the sign of the devil. Besides all these, we might
recal to your majesty’s recollection the various decrees of the
parliament of Provence, especially in the case of Gaufrédy in
1611; the decrees of the parliament of Dijon, and those of the
parliament of Rennes, following the example of the
condemnation of the Marshal de Rays, who was burned in 1441,
for the crime of witchcraft, in presence of the Duke of Brittany;—
all these examples, sire, prove that the accusation of witchcraft
has always been punished with death by the parliaments of your
kingdom, and justify the uniformity of their practice.
“These, sire, are the motives upon which your parliament of
Normandy has acted in decreeing the punishment of death
against the persons lately brought before it for this crime. If it
has happened that, on any occasion, these parliaments, and the
parliament of Normandy among the rest, have condemned the
guilty to a less punishment than that of death, it was for the
reason that their guilt was not of the deepest dye; your majesty,
and the kings your predecessors, having left full liberty to the
various tribunals to whom they delegated the administration of

justice, to decree such punishment as was warranted by the
evidence brought before them.
“After so many authorities, and punishments ordained by
human and divine laws, we humbly supplicate your majesty to
reflect once more upon the extraordinary results which proceed
from the malevolence of this sort of people; on the deaths from
unknown diseases, which are often the consequences of their
menaces, on the loss of the goods and chattels of your subjects,
on the proofs of guilt continually afforded by the insensibility of
the marks upon the accused, on the sudden transportation of
bodies from one place to another, on the sacrifices and
nocturnal assemblies, and other facts, corroborated by the
testimony of ancient and modern authors, and verified by so
many eye-witnesses, composed partly of accomplices, and partly
of people who had no interest in the trials beyond the love of
truth, and confirmed, moreover, by the confessions of the
accused parties themselves; and that, sire, with so much
agreement and conformity between the different cases, that the
most ignorant persons convicted of this crime have spoken to
the same circumstances, and in nearly the same words, as the
most celebrated authors who have written about it, all of which
may be easily proved to your majesty’s satisfaction by the
records of various trials before your parliaments.
“These, sire, are truths so intimately bound up with the
principles of our religion, that, extraordinary although they be,
no person has been able to this time to call them in question. If
some have cited, in opposition to these truths, the pretended
canon of the Council of Ancyre, and a passage from St. Augustin,

in a treatise upon the Spirit and the Soul, it has been without
foundation; and it would be easy to convince your majesty that
neither the one nor the other ought to be accounted of any
authority; and, besides that, the canon, in this sense, would be
contrary to the opinion of all succeeding councils of the Church,
Cardinal Baronius, and all learned commentators agree that it is
not to be found in any old edition. In effect, in those editions
wherein it is found, it is in another language, and is in direct
contradiction to the twenty-third canon of the same council,
which

condemns

sorcery,

according

to

all

preceding

constitutions. Even supposing that this canon was really
promulgated by the Council of Ancyre, we must observe that it
was issued in the second century, when the principal attention
of the Church was directed to the destruction of paganism. For
this reason, it condemns that class of women who said they
could pass through the air, and over immense regions, with
Diana and Herodias, and enjoins all preachers to teach the
falsehood of such an opinion, in order to deter people from the
worship of these false divinities; but it does not question the
power of the devil over the human body, which is, in fact, proved
by the holy Gospel of Jesus Christ himself. And with regard, sire,
to the pretended passage of St. Augustin, everybody knows that
it was not written by him, because the writer, whoever he was,
cites Bœtius, who died more than eighty years after the time of
St. Augustin. Besides, there is still more convincing proof in the
fact, that the same father establishes the truth of witchcraft in all
his writings, and more particularly in his City of God; and in his
first volume, question the 25th, wherein he states that sorcery is

a communion between man and the devil, which all good
Christians ought to look upon with horror.
“Taking all these things into consideration, sire, the officers of
your parliament hope, from the justice of your majesty, that you
will be graciously pleased to receive the humble remonstrances
they have taken the liberty to make. They are compelled, for the
acquittal of their own consciences and in discharge of their duty,
to make known to your majesty, that the decrees they passed
against the sorcerers and witches brought before them, were
passed after a mature deliberation on the part of all the judges
present, and that nothing has been done therein which is not
conformable to the universal jurisprudence of the kingdom, and
for the general welfare of your majesty’s subjects, of whom there
is not one who can say that he is secure from the malevolence of
such criminals. We therefore supplicate your majesty to suffer
us to carry into effect the sentences we passed, and to proceed
with the trial of the other persons accused of the same crime;
and that the piety of your majesty will not suffer to be
introduced during your reign an opinion contrary to the
principles of that holy religion for which you have always
employed so gloriously both your cares and your arms.”
Louis, as we have already mentioned, paid no attention to this
appeal. The lives of the old women were spared, and prosecutions for
mere witchcraft, unconnected with other offences, were discontinued
throughout France. In 1680 an act was passed for the punishment,
not of witches, but of pretenders to witchcraft, fortune-tellers,
divineresses, and poisoners.

Thus the light broke in upon Germany, France, England, and
Scotland about the same time, gradually growing clearer and clearer
till the middle of the eighteenth century, when witchcraft was finally
reckoned amongst exploded doctrines, and the belief in it confined to
the uttermost vulgar. Twice, however, did the madness burst forth
again as furious, while it lasted, as ever it had been. The first time in
Sweden, in 1669, and the second in Germany so late as 1749. Both
these instances merit particular mention. The first is one of the most
extraordinary upon record, and for atrocity and absurdity is
unsurpassed in the annals of any nation.

LOUIS XIV.

It having been reported to the king of Sweden that the little village
of Mohra, in the province of Dalecarlia, was troubled exceedingly
with witches, he appointed a commission of clergy and laymen to
trace the rumour to its source, with full powers to punish the guilty.
On the 12th of August 1669, the commissioners arrived in the
bewitched village, to the great joy of the credulous inhabitants. On
the following day the whole population, amounting to three
thousand persons, assembled in the church. A sermon was preached,
“declaring the miserable case of those people that suffered

themselves to be deluded by the devil,” and fervent prayer was
offered up that God would remove the scourge from among them.
The whole assembly then adjourned to the rector’s house, filling all
the street before it, when the king’s commission was read, charging
every person who knew any thing of the witchery, to come forward
and declare the truth. A passion of tears seized upon the multitude;
men, women, and children began to weep and sob, and all promised
to divulge what they had heard or knew. In this frame of mind they
were dismissed to their homes. On the following day they were again
called together, when the depositions of several persons were taken
publicly before them all. The result was that seventy persons,
including fifteen children, were taken into custody. Numbers also
were arrested in the neighbouring district of Elfdale. Being put to the
torture, they all confessed their guilt. They said they used to go to a
gravel-pit, that lay hard by the cross-way, where they put a vest upon
their heads, and danced “round and round and round about.” They
then went to the cross-way, and called three times upon the devil; the
first time in a low still voice; the second, somewhat louder; and the
third, very loudly, with these words, “Antecessor, come, and carry us
to Blockula!” This invocation never failed to bring him to their view.
He generally appeared as a little old man, in a grey coat, with red and
blue stockings, with exceedingly long garters. He had besides a very
high-crowned hat, with bands of many-coloured linen enfolded
about it, and a long red beard that hung down to his middle.
The first question he put to them was, whether they would serve
him soul and body? On their answering in the affirmative, he told
them to make ready for the journey to Blockula. It was necessary to
procure, in the first place, “some scrapings of altars and filings of

church clocks.” Antecessor then gave them a horn with some salve in
it, wherewith they anointed themselves. These preparations ended,
he brought beasts for them to ride upon,—horses, asses, goats, and
monkeys; and giving them a saddle, a hammer, and a nail, uttered
the word of command, and away they went. Nothing stopped them.
They flew over churches, high walls, rocks, and mountains, until they
came to the green meadow where Blockula was situated. Upon these
occasions they carried as many children with them as they could; for
the devil, they said, “did plague and whip them if they did not
procure him children, insomuch that they had no peace or quiet for
him.”
Many parents corroborated a part of this evidence, stating that
their children had repeatedly told them that they had been carried
away in the night to Blockula, where the devil had beaten them black
and blue. They had seen the marks in the morning, but they soon
disappeared. One little girl was examined, who swore positively that
she was carried through the air by the witches, and when at a great
height she uttered the holy name of Jesus. She immediately fell to
the ground, and made a great hole in her side. “The devil, however,
picked her up, healed her side, and carried her away to Blockula.”
She added (and her mother confirmed her statement), that she had
till that day “an exceeding great pain in her side.” This was a
clencher, and the nail of conviction was driven home to the hearts of
the judges.
The place called Blockula, whither they were carried, was a large
house, with a gate to it, “in a delicate meadow, whereof they could
see no end.” There was a very long table in it, at which the witches sat

down; and in other rooms “there were very lovely and delicate beds
for them to sleep upon.”
After a number of ceremonies had been performed, by which they
bound themselves body and soul to the service of Antecessor, they
sat down to a feast composed of broth, made of colworts and bacon,
oatmeal, bread and butter, milk and cheese. The devil always took
the chair, and sometimes played to them on the harp or the fiddle
while they were eating. After dinner they danced in a ring,
sometimes naked, and sometimes in their clothes, cursing and
swearing all the time. Some of the women added particulars too
horrible and too obscene for repetition.
Once the devil pretended to be dead, that he might see whether his
people regretted him. They instantly set up a loud wail, and wept
three tears each for him; at which he was so pleased, that he jumped
up among them, and hugged in his arms those who had been most
obstreperous in their sorrow.
Such were the principal details given by the children, and
corroborated by the confessions of the full-grown witches. Any thing
more absurd was never before stated in a court of justice. Many of
the accused contradicted themselves most palpably; but the
commissioners gave no heed to discrepancies. One of them, the
parson of the district, stated in the course of the inquiry, that on a
particular night, which he mentioned, he had been afflicted with a
headache so agonising, that he could not account for it otherwise
than by supposing he was bewitched. In fact, he thought a score of
witches must have been dancing on the crown of his head. This
announcement excited great horror among the pious dames of the
auditory, who loudly expressed their wonder that the devil should

have power to hurt so good a man. One poor witch, who lay in the
very jaws of death, confessed that she knew too well the cause of the
minister’s headache. The devil had sent her with a sledge hammer
and a large nail to drive into the good man’s skull. She had
hammered at it for some time, but the skull was so enormously thick,
that she made no impression upon it. Every hand was held up in
astonishment. The pious minister blessed God that his skull was so
solid, and he became renowned for his thick head all the days of his
life. Whether the witch intended a joke does not appear, but she was
looked upon as a criminal more than usually atrocious. Seventy
persons were condemned to death on these so awful, yet so
ridiculous confessions. Twenty-three of them were burned together
in one fire in the village of Mohra, in the presence of thousands of
delighted spectators. On the following day fifteen children were
murdered in the same manner, offered up in sacrifice to the bloody
Moloch of superstition. The remaining thirty-two were executed at
the neighbouring town of Fahluna. Besides these, fifty-six children
were found guilty of witchcraft in a minor degree, and sentenced to
various punishments, such as running the gauntlet, imprisonment,
and public whipping once a week for a twelvemonth.
Long after the occurrence of this case, it was cited as one of the
most convincing proofs upon record of the prevalence of witchcraft.
When men wish to construct or support a theory, how they torture
facts into their service! The lying whimsies of a few sick children,
encouraged by foolish parents, and drawn out by superstitious
neighbours, were sufficient to set a country in a flame. If, instead of
commissioners as deeply sunk in the slough of ignorance as the
people they were sent amongst, there had been deputed a few men

firm in courage and clear in understanding, how different would
have been the result! Some of the poor children who were burned
would have been sent to an infirmary; others would have been well
flogged; the credulity of the parents would have been laughed at; and
the lives of seventy persons spared. The belief in witchcraft remains
in Sweden to this day; but happily the annals of that country present
no more such instances of lamentable aberration of intellect as the
one just cited.
In New England, about the same time, the colonists were scared by
similar stories of the antics of the devil. All at once a fear seized upon
the multitude, and supposed criminals were arrested day after day in
such numbers, that the prisons were found too small to contain
them. A girl named Goodwin, the daughter of a mason, who was
hypochondriac and subject to fits, imagined that an old Irish woman,
named Glover, had bewitched her. Her two brothers, in whose
constitutions there was apparently a predisposition to similar fits,
went off in the same way, crying out that the devil and Dame Glover
were tormenting them. At times their joints were so stiff that they
could not be moved; while at others, said the neighbours, they were
so flexible, that the bones appeared softened into sinews. The
supposed witch was seized, and as she could not repeat the Lord’s
Prayer without making a mistake in it, she was condemned and
executed.
But the popular excitement was not allayed. One victim was not
enough; the people waited agape for new disclosures. Suddenly two
hysteric girls in another family fell into fits daily, and the cry of
witchcraft resounded from one end of the colony to the other. The
feeling of suffocation in the throat, so common in cases of hysteria,

was said by the patients to be caused by the devil himself, who had
stuck balls in the windpipe to choke them. They felt the pricking of
thorns in every part of the body, and one of them vomited needles.
The case of these girls, who were the daughter and niece of a Mr.
Parvis, the minister of a Calvinist chapel, excited so much attention,
that all the weak women in the colony began to fancy themselves
similarly afflicted. The more they brooded on it, the more convinced
they became. The contagion of this mental disease was as great as if
it had been a pestilence. One after the other the women fainted away,
asserting on their recovery that they had seen the spectres of witches.
Where there were three or four girls in a family, they so worked each
upon the diseased imagination of the other, that they fell into fits five
or six times in a day. Some related that the devil himself appeared to
them, bearing in his hand a parchment-roll, and promising that if
they would sign an agreement, transferring to him their immortal
souls, they should be immediately relieved from fits and all the ills of
the flesh. Others asserted that they saw witches only, who made
them similar promises, threatening that they should never be free
from aches and pains till they had agreed to become the devil’s.
When they refused, the witches pinched, or bit, or pricked them with
long pins and needles. More than two hundred persons named by
these mischievous visionaries were thrown into prison. They were of
all ages and conditions of life, and many of them of exemplary
character. No less than nineteen were condemned and executed
before reason returned to the minds of the colonists. The most
horrible part of this lamentable history is, that among the victims
there was a little child only five years old. Some women swore that
they had seen it repeatedly in company with the devil, and that it had

bitten them often with its little teeth for refusing to sign a compact
with the evil one. It can hardly increase our feelings of disgust and
abhorrence when we learn that this insane community actually tried
and executed a dog for the same offence!
One man, named Cory, stoutly refused to plead to the
preposterous indictment against him. As was the practice in such
cases, he was pressed to death. It is told of the Sheriff of New
England, who superintended the execution, that when this unhappy
man thrust out his tongue in his mortal agony, he seized hold of a
cane, and crammed it back again into the mouth. If ever there were a
fiend in human form, it was this sheriff: a man who, if the truth were
known, perhaps plumed himself upon his piety—thought he was
doing God good service, and
“Hoped to merit heaven by making earth a hell!”
Arguing still in the firm belief of witchcraft, the bereaved people
began to inquire, when they saw their dearest friends snatched away
from them by these wide-spreading accusations, whether the whole
proceedings were not carried on by the agency of the devil. Might not
the great enemy have put false testimony into the mouths of the
witnesses, or might not the witnesses be witches themselves? Every
man who was in danger of losing his wife, his child, or his sister,
embraced this doctrine with avidity. The revulsion was as sudden as
the first frenzy. All at once, the colonists were convinced of their
error. The judges put a stop to the prosecutions, even of those who
had confessed their guilt. The latter were no sooner at liberty than
they retracted all they had said, and the greater number hardly
remembered the avowals which agony had extorted from them. Eight

persons, who had been tried and condemned, were set free; and
gradually girls ceased to have fits and to talk of the persecutions of
the devil. The judge who had condemned the first criminal executed
on this charge, was so smitten with sorrow and humiliation at his
folly, that he set apart the anniversary of that day as one of solemn
penitence and fasting. He still clung to the belief in witchcraft; no
new light had broken in upon him on that subject, but, happily for
the community, the delusion had taken a merciful turn. The whole
colony shared the feeling; the jurors on the different trials openly
expressed their penitence in the churches; and those who had
suffered were regarded as the victims, and not as the accomplices of
Satan.
It is related that the Indian tribes in New England were sorely
puzzled at the infatuation of the settlers, and thought them either a
race inferior to, or more sinful than the French colonists in the
vicinity, amongst whom, as they remarked, “the Great Spirit sent no
witches.”
Returning again to the continent of Europe, we find that, after the
year 1680, men became still wiser upon this subject. For twenty
years the populace were left to their belief, but governments in
general gave it no aliment in the shape of executions. The edict of
Louis XIV. gave a blow to the superstition, from which it never
recovered. The last execution in the Protestant cantons of
Switzerland was at Geneva, in 1652. The various potentates of
Germany, although they could not stay the trials, invariably
commuted the sentence into imprisonment, in all cases where the
pretended witch was accused of pure witchcraft, unconnected with
any other crime. In the year 1701, Thomasius, the learned professor

at the University of Halle, delivered his inaugural thesis, De Crimine
Magiæ which struck another blow at the falling monster of popular
error. But a faith so strong as that in witchcraft was not to be
eradicated at once: the arguments of learned men did not penetrate
to the villages and hamlets; but still they achieved great things; they
rendered the belief an unworking faith, and prevented the supply of
victims, on which for so many ages it had battened and grown strong.
Once more the delusion broke out; like a wild beast wounded to
the death, it collected all its remaining energies for the final
convulsion, which was to shew how mighty it had once been.
Germany, which had nursed the frightful error in its cradle, tended it
on its death-bed, and Würzburg, the scene of so many murders on
the same pretext, was destined to be the scene of the last. That it
might lose no portion of its bad renown, the last murder was as
atrocious as the first. This case offers a great resemblance to that of
the witches of Mohra and New England, except in the number of its
victims. It happened so late as the year 1749, to the astonishment
and disgust of the rest of Europe.

VIEW IN WÜRZBURG.

A number of young women in a convent at Würzburg fancied
themselves bewitched; they felt, like all hysteric subjects, a sense of
suffocation in the throat. They went into fits repeatedly; and one of
them, who had swallowed needles, evacuated them at abscesses,
which formed in different parts of the body. The cry of sorcery was
raised, and a young woman, named Maria Renata Sänger, was
arrested on the charge of having leagued with the devil, to bewitch
five of the young ladies. It was sworn on the trial that Maria had been
frequently seen to clamber over the convent walls in the shape of a

pig—that, proceeding to the cellar, she used to drink the best wine till
she was intoxicated; and then start suddenly up in her own form.
Other girls asserted that she used to prowl about the roof like a cat,
and often penetrate into their chamber, and frighten them by her
dreadful howlings. It was also said that she had been seen in the
shape of a hare, milking the cows dry in the meadows belonging to
the convent; that she used to perform as an actress on the boards of
Drury Lane theatre in London, and, on the very same night, return
upon a broomstick to Würzburg, and afflict the young ladies with
pains in all their limbs. Upon this evidence she was condemned, and
burned alive in the market-place of Würzburg.
Here ends this frightful catalogue of murder and superstition.
Since that day, the belief in witchcraft has fled from the populous
abodes of men, and taken refuge in remote villages and districts too
wild, rugged, and inhospitable to afford a resting-place for the foot of
civilisation. Rude fishers and uneducated labourers still attribute
every phenomenon of nature which they cannot account for, to the
devil and witches. Catalepsy, that wondrous disease, is still thought
by ignorant gossips to be the work of Satan; and hypochondriacs,
uninformed by science of the nature of their malady, devoutly believe
in the reality of their visions. The reader would hardly credit the
extent of the delusion upon this subject in the very heart of England
at this day. Many an old woman leads a life of misery from the
unfeeling insults of her neighbours, who raise the scornful finger and
hooting voice at her, because in her decrepitude she is ugly, spiteful,
perhaps insane, and realises in her personal appearance the
description preserved by tradition of the witches of yore. Even in the
neighbourhood of great towns the taint remains of this once widely-

spread contagion. If no victims fall beneath it, the enlightenment of
the law is all that prevents a recurrence of scenes as horrid as those
of the seventeenth century. Hundreds upon hundreds of witnesses
could be found to swear to absurdities as great as those asserted by
the infamous Matthew Hopkins.
In the Annual Register for 1760, an instance of the belief in
witchcraft is related, which shews how superstition lingers. A dispute
arose in the little village of Glen, in Leicestershire, between two old
women, each of whom vehemently accused the other of witchcraft.
The quarrel at last ran so high that a challenge ensued, and they both
agreed to be tried by the ordeal of swimming. They accordingly
stripped to their shifts—procured some men, who tied their thumbs
and great toes together, cross-wise, and then, with a cart-rope about
their middle, suffered themselves to be thrown into a pool of water.
One of them sank immediately, but the other continued struggling a
short time upon the surface of the water, which the mob deeming an
infallible sign of her guilt, pulled her out, and insisted that she
should immediately impeach all her accomplices in the craft. She
accordingly told them that, in the neighbouring village of Burton,
there were several old women as “much witches as she was.” Happily
for her, this negative information was deemed sufficient, and a
student in astrology, or “white-witch,” coming up at the time, the
mob, by his direction, proceeded forthwith to Burton in search of all
the delinquents. After a little consultation on their arrival, they went
to the old woman’s house on whom they had fixed the strongest
suspicion. The poor old creature on their approach locked the outer
door, and from the window of an upstairs room asked what they
wanted. They informed her that she was charged with being guilty of

witchcraft, and that they were come to duck her; remonstrating with
her at the same time upon the necessity of submission to the ordeal,
that, if she were innocent, all the world might know it. Upon her
persisting in a positive refusal to come down, they broke open the
door and carried her out by force, to a deep gravel-pit full of water.
They tied her thumbs and toes together and threw her into the water,
where they kept her for several minutes, drawing her out and in two
or three times by the rope round her middle. Not being able to satisfy
themselves whether she were a witch or no, they at last let her go, or,
more properly speaking, they left her on the bank to walk home by
herself, if she ever recovered. Next day, they tried the same
experiment upon another woman, and afterwards upon a third; but,
fortunately, neither of the victims lost her life from this brutality.
Many of the ringleaders in the outrage were apprehended during the
week, and tried before the justices at quarter-sessions. Two of them
were sentenced to stand in the pillory and to be imprisoned for a
month; and as many as twenty more were fined in small sums for the
assault, and bound over to keep the peace for a twelvemonth.
“So late as the year 1785,” says Arnot, in his collection and
abridgment of Criminal Trials in Scotland, “it was the custom
among the sect of Seceders to read from the pulpit an annual
confession of sins, national and personal; amongst the former of
which was particularly mentioned the ‘Repeal by parliament of the
penal statute against witches, contrary to the express laws of God.’”

LADY HATTON’S HOUSE, CROSS STREET, HATTON GARDEN.

Many houses are still to be found in England with the horse-shoe
(the grand preservative against witchcraft) nailed against the
threshold. If any over-wise philosopher should attempt to remove
them, the chances are that he would have more broken bones than
thanks for his interference. Let any man walk into Cross Street,
Hatton Garden, and from thence into Bleeding-heart Yard, and learn
the tales still told and believed of one house in that neighbourhood,
and he will ask himself in astonishment if such things can be in the
nineteenth century. The witchcraft of Lady Hatton, the wife of the
famous Sir Christopher, so renowned for his elegant dancing in the
days of Elizabeth, is as devoutly believed as the Gospels. The room is
to be seen where the devil seized her after the expiration of the
contract he had made with her, and bore her away bodily to the pit of
Tophet: the pump against which he dashed her is still pointed out,
and the spot where her heart was found, after he had torn it out of
her bosom with his iron claws, has received the name of Bleedingheart Yard, in confirmation of the story. Whether the horse-shoe still
remains upon the door of the haunted house, to keep away other
witches, is uncertain. A former inmate relates that, “about twenty
years ago, more than one old woman begged for admittance

repeatedly, to satisfy themselves that it was in its proper place. One
poor creature, apparently insane, and clothed in rags, came to the
door with a tremendous double-knock, as loud as that of a
fashionable footman, and walked straight along the passage to the
horse-shoe. Great was the wonderment of the inmates, especially
when the woman spat upon the horse-shoe, and expressed her
sorrow that she could do no harm while it remained there. After
spitting upon, and kicking it again and again, she coolly turned
round and left the house, without saying a word to any body. This
poor creature perhaps intended a joke, but the probability is that she
imagined herself a witch. In Saffron Hill, where she resided, her
ignorant neighbours gave her that character, and looked upon her
with no little fear and aversion.”
More than one example of the popular belief in witchcraft occurred
in the neighbourhood of Hastings so lately as the year 1830. An aged
woman, who resided in the Rope-walk of that town, was so repulsive
in her appearance, that she was invariably accused of being a witch
by all the ignorant people who knew her. She was bent completely
double; and though very old, her eye was unusually bright and
malignant. She wore a red cloak, and supported herself on a crutch:
she was, to all outward appearance, the very beau ideal of a witch. So
dear is power to the human heart, that this old woman actually
encouraged the popular superstition; she took no pains to remove
the ill impression, but seemed to delight that she, old and miserable
as she was, could keep in awe so many happier and stronger fellowcreatures. Timid girls crouched with fear when they met her, and
many would go a mile out of their way to avoid her. Like the witches
of the olden time, she was not sparing of her curses against those

who offended her. The child of a woman who resided within two
doors of her was afflicted with lameness, and the mother constantly
asserted that the old woman had bewitched her. All the neighbours
credited the tale. It was believed, too, that she could assume the form
of a cat. Many a harmless puss has been hunted almost to the death
by mobs of men and boys, upon the supposition that the animal
would start up before them in the true shape of Mother ——.
In the same town there resided a fisherman, who was the object of
unceasing persecution, because it was said that he had sold himself
to the devil. It was currently reported that he could creep through a
keyhole, and that he had made a witch of his daughter, in order that
he might have the more power over his fellows. It was also believed
that he could sit on the points of pins and needles and feel no pain.
His brother fishermen put him to this test whenever they had an
opportunity. In the alehouses which he frequented, they often placed
long needles in the cushions of the chairs in such a manner that he
could not fail to pierce himself when he sat down. The result of these
experiments tended to confirm their faith in his supernatural
powers. It was asserted that he never flinched. Such was the popular
feeling in the fashionable town of Hastings a few years ago; very
probably it is the same now.
In the north of England, the superstition lingers to an almost
inconceivable extent. Lancashire abounds with witch-doctors, a set
of quacks who pretend to cure diseases inflicted by the devil. The
practices of these worthies may be judged of by the following case,
reported in the Hertford Reformer of the 23d of June 1838. The
witch-doctor alluded to is better known by the name of the cunning
man, and has a large practice in the counties of Lincoln and

Nottingham. According to the writer in the Reformer, the dupe,
whose name is not mentioned, had been for about two years afflicted
with a painful abscess, and had been prescribed for without relief by
more than one medical gentleman. He was urged by some of his
friends, not only in his own village but in neighbouring ones, to
consult the witch-doctor, as they were convinced he was under some
evil influence. He agreed, and sent his wife to the cunning man, who
lived in New St. Swithin’s, in Lincoln. She was informed by this
ignorant impostor that her husband’s disorder was an infliction of
the devil, occasioned by his next-door neighbours, who had made use
of certain charms for that purpose. From the description he gave of
the process, it appears to be the same as that employed by Dr. Fian
and Gellie Duncan to work woe upon King James. He stated that the
neighbours, instigated by a witch, whom he pointed out, took some
wax and moulded it before the fire into the form of her husband, as
near as they could represent him; they then pierced the image with
pins on all sides, repeated the Lord’s Prayer backwards, and offered
prayers to the devil that he would fix his stings into the person whom
that figure represented, in like manner as they pierced it with pins.
To counteract the effects of this diabolical process, the witch-doctor
prescribed a certain medicine, and a charm to be worn next the body,
on that part where the disease principally lay. The patient was to
repeat the 109th and 119th Psalms every day, or the cure would not
be effectual. The fee which he claimed for this advice was a guinea.
So efficacious is faith in the cure of any malady, that the patient
actually felt much better after a three weeks’ course of this
prescription. The notable charm which the quack had given was

afterwards opened, and found to be a piece of parchment covered
with some cabalistic characters and signs of the planets.
The next-door neighbours were in great alarm that the witchdoctor would, on the solicitation of the recovering patient, employ
some means to punish them for their pretended witchcraft. To
escape the infliction, they feed another cunning man, in
Nottinghamshire, who told them of a similar charm, which would
preserve them from all the malice of their enemies. The writer
concludes by saying, that “the doctor, not long after he had been thus
consulted, wrote to say, that he had discovered that his patient was
not afflicted by Satan, as he had imagined, but by God, and would
continue more or less in the same state till his life’s end.”
An impostor carried on a similar trade in the neighbourhood of
Tunbridge Wells about the year 1830. He had been in practice for
several years, and charged enormous fees for his advice. This fellow
pretended to be the seventh son of a seventh son, and to be endowed
in consequence with miraculous powers for the cure of all diseases,
but especially of those resulting from witchcraft. It was not only the
poor who employed him, but ladies who rode in their carriages. He
was often sent for from a distance of sixty or seventy miles by these
people, who paid all his expenses to and fro, besides rewarding him
handsomely. He was about eighty years of age, and his extremely
venerable appearance aided his imposition in no slight degree. His
name was Okey or Oakley.
In France, the superstition at this day is even more prevalent than
it is in England. Garinet, in his history of Magic and Sorcery in that
country, cites upwards of twenty instances which occurred between
the years 1805 and 1818. In the latter year no less than three

tribunals were occupied with trials originating in this humiliating
belief: we shall cite only one of them. Julian Desbourdes, aged fiftythree, a mason, and inhabitant of the village of Thilouze, near
Bourdeaux, was taken suddenly ill, in the month of January 1818. As
he did not know how to account for his malady, he suspected at last
that he was bewitched. He communicated this suspicion to his sonin-law Bridier, and they both went to consult a sort of idiot, named
Baudouin, who passed for a conjuror or white-witch. This man told
them that Desbourdes was certainly bewitched, and offered to
accompany them to the house of an old man named Renard, who, he
said, was undoubtedly the criminal. On the night of the 23d of
January all three proceeded stealthily to the dwelling of Renard, and
accused him of afflicting persons with diseases by the aid of the devil.
Desbourdes fell on his knees and earnestly entreated to be restored
to his former health, promising that he would take no measures
against him for the evil he had done. The old man denied in the
strongest terms that he was a wizard; and when Desbourdes still
pressed him to remove the spell from him, he said he knew nothing
about the spell, and refused to remove it. The idiot Baudouin, the
white-witch, now interfered, and told his companions that no relief
for the malady could ever be procured until the old man confessed
his guilt. To force him to confession they lighted some sticks of
sulphur which they had brought with them for the purpose, and
placed them under the old man’s nose. In a few moments he fell
down suffocated and apparently lifeless. They were all greatly
alarmed; and thinking that they had killed the man, they carried him
out and threw him into a neighbouring pond, hoping to make it
appear that he had fallen in accidentally. The pond, however, was not

very deep, and the coolness of the water reviving the old man, he
opened his eyes and sat up. Desbourdes and Bridier, who were still
waiting on the bank, were now more alarmed than before, lest he
should recover and inform against them. They therefore waded into
the pond, seized their victim by the hair of the head, beat him
severely, and then held him under water till he was drowned.
They were all three apprehended on the charge of murder a few
days afterwards. Desbourdes and Bridier were found guilty of
aggravated manslaughter only, and sentenced to be burnt on the
back, and to work in the galleys for life. The white-witch Baudouin
was acquitted on the ground of insanity.
M. Garinet further informs us that France, at the time he wrote
(1818), was overrun by a race of fellows who made a trade of casting
out devils and finding out witches. He adds also, that many of the
priests in the rural districts encouraged the superstition of their
parishioners by resorting frequently to exorcisms whenever any
foolish persons took it into their heads that a spell had been thrown
over them. He recommended, as a remedy for the evil, that all these
exorcists, whether lay or clerical, should be sent to the galleys, and
felt assured that the number of witches would then very sensibly
diminish.
Many other instances of this lingering belief might be cited both in
France and Great Britain, and indeed in every other country in
Europe. So deeply rooted are some errors, that ages cannot remove
them. The poisonous tree that once overshadowed the land may be
cut down by the sturdy efforts of sages and philosophers; the sun
may shine clearly upon spots where venomous things once nestled in
security and shade; but still the entangled roots are stretched

beneath the surface, and may be found by those who dig. Another
king like James I. might make them vegetate again; and, more
mischievous still, another pope like Innocent VIII. might raise the
decaying roots to strength and verdure. Still it is consoling to think
that the delirium has passed away; that the raging madness has given
place to a milder folly; and that we may now count by units the
votaries of a superstition which in former ages numbered its victims
by tens of thousands, and its votaries by millions.

FLOATING A WITCH.

PLACE DE GREVE.

THE SLOW POISONERS.

Pescara. The like was never read of.
Stephano. In my judgment,
To all that shall but hear it, ’twill appear
A most impossible fable.
Pescara. Troth, I’ll tell you,
And briefly as I can, by what degrees
They fell into this madness.—Duke of Milan.

THE atrocious system of poisoning by poisons so slow in their operation as
to make the victim appear, to ordinary observers, as if dying from a gradual
decay of nature, has been practised in all ages. Those who are curious in
the matter may refer to Beckmann on secret poisons, in his History of
Inventions, in which he has collected several instances of it from the Greek
and Roman writers. Early in the sixteenth century the crime seems to have
gradually increased, till in the seventeenth it spread over Europe like a
pestilence. It was often exercised by pretended witches and sorcerers, and
finally became a branch of education amongst all who laid any claim to
magical and supernatural arts. In the twenty-first year of Henry VIII. an
act was passed rendering it high treason. Those found guilty of it were to be
boiled to death.
One of the first in point of date, and hardly second to any in point of
atrocity, is the murder by this means of Sir Thomas Overbury; which
disgraced the court of James I. in the year 1613. A slight sketch of it will be
a fitting introduction to the history of the poisoning mania, which was so
prevalent in France and Italy fifty years later.

Robert Kerr, a Scottish youth, was early taken notice of by James I., and
loaded with honours, for no other reason that the world could ever discover
than the beauty of his person. James, even in his own day, was suspected of
being addicted to the most abominable of all offences; and the more we
examine his history now, the stronger the suspicion becomes. However
that may be, the handsome Kerr, lending his smooth cheek even in public
to the disgusting kisses of his royal master, rose rapidly in favour. In the
year 1613, he was made Lord High Treasurer of Scotland, and created an
English peer by the style and title of Viscount Rochester. Still further
honours were in store for him.
In this rapid promotion he had not been without a friend. Sir Thomas
Overbury, the king’s secretary—who appears, from some threats in his own
letters, to have been no better than a pander to the vices of the king, and
privy to his dangerous secrets—exerted all his backstair influence to
forward the promotion of Kerr, by whom he was doubtless repaid in some
way or other. Overbury did not confine his friendship to this—if friendship
ever could exist between two such men—but acted the part of an
entremetteur, and assisted Rochester to carry on an adulterous intrigue
with the Lady Frances Howard, the wife of the Earl of Essex. This woman
was a person of violent passions, and lost to all sense of shame. Her
husband was in her way, and to be freed from him she instituted
proceedings for a divorce, on grounds which a woman of any modesty or
delicacy of feeling would die rather than avow. Her scandalous suit was
successful, and was no sooner decided than preparations on a scale of the
greatest magnificence were made for her marriage with Lord Rochester.
Sir Thomas Overbury, who had willingly assisted his patron to intrigue
with the Countess of Essex, seems to have imagined that his marriage with
so vile a woman might retard his advancement. He accordingly employed
all his influence to dissuade him from it; but Rochester was bent on the
match, and his passions were as violent as those of the countess. On one
occasion, when Overbury and the viscount were walking in the gallery of

Whitehall, Overbury was overheard to say, “Well, my lord, if you do marry
that base woman, you will utterly ruin your honour and yourself. You shall
never do it with my advice or consent; and if you do, you had best look to
stand fast.” Rochester flung from him in a rage, exclaiming with an oath, “I
will be even with you for this.” These words were the death-warrant of the
unfortunate Overbury. He had mortally wounded the pride of Rochester in
insinuating that by his (Overbury’s) means he might be lowered in the
king’s favour; and he had endeavoured to curb the burning passions of a
heartless, dissolute, and reckless man.
Overbury’s imprudent remonstrances were reported to the countess; and
from that moment she also vowed the most deadly vengeance against him.
With a fiendish hypocrisy, however, they both concealed their intentions;
and Overbury, at the solicitation of Rochester, was appointed ambassador
to the court of Russia. This apparent favour was but the first step in a deep
and deadly plot. Rochester, pretending to be warmly attached to the
interests of Overbury, advised him to refuse the embassy, which he said
was but a trick to get him out of the way. He promised, at the same time, to
stand between him and any evil consequences which might result from his
refusal. Overbury fell into the snare, and declined the embassy. James,
offended, immediately ordered his committal to the Tower.
He was now in safe custody, and his enemies had opportunity to
commence the work of vengeance. The first thing Rochester did was to
procure, by his influence at court, the dismissal of the Lieutenant of the
Tower, and the appointment of Sir Jervis Elwes, one of his creatures, to the
vacant post. This man was but one instrument; and another being
necessary, was found in Richard Weston, a fellow who had formerly been
shopman to a druggist. He was installed in the office of under-keeper, and
as such had the direct custody of Overbury. So far all was favourable to the
designs of the conspirators.
In the mean time the insidious Rochester wrote the most friendly letters
to Overbury, requesting him to bear his ill-fortune patiently, and promising

that his imprisonment should not be of long duration; for that his friends
were exerting themselves to soften the king’s displeasure. Still pretending
the extreme of sympathy for him, he followed up the letters by presents of
pastry and other delicacies, which could not be procured in the Tower.
These articles were all poisoned. Occasionally, presents of a similar
description were sent to Sir Jervis Elwes, with the understanding that these
articles were not poisoned, when they were unaccompanied by letters: of
these the unfortunate prisoner never tasted. A woman named Turner, who
had formerly kept a house of ill-fame, and who had more than once lent it
to further the guilty intercourse of Rochester and Lady Essex, was the
agent employed to procure the poisons. They were prepared by Dr.
Forman, a pretended fortune-teller of Lambeth, assisted by an apothecary
named Franklin. Both these persons knew for what purposes the poisons
were needed, and employed their skill in mixing them in the pastry and
other edibles, in such small quantities as gradually to wear out the
constitution of their victim. Mrs. Turner regularly furnished the poisoned
articles to the under-keeper, who placed them before Overbury. Not only
his food but his drink was poisoned. Arsenic was mixed with the salt he ate,
and cantharides with the pepper. All this time his health declined sensibly.
Daily he grew weaker and weaker; and with a sickly appetite craved for
sweets and jellies. Rochester continued to condole with him, and
anticipated all his wants in this respect, sending him abundance of pastry,
and occasionally partridges and other game, and young pigs. With the
sauce for the game, Mrs. Turner mixed a quantity of cantharides, and
poisoned the pork with lunar-caustic. As stated on the trial, Overbury took
in this manner poison enough to have poisoned twenty men; but his
constitution was strong, and he still lingered. Franklin, the apothecary,
confessed that he prepared with Dr. Forman seven different sorts of
poisons, viz. aquafortis, arsenic, mercury, powder of diamonds, lunar
caustic, great spiders, and cantharides. Overbury held out so long that
Rochester became impatient, and in a letter to Lady Essex, expressed his

wonder that things were not sooner despatched. Orders were immediately
sent by Lady Essex to the keeper to finish with the victim at once. Overbury
had not been all this time without suspicion of treachery, although he
appears to have had no idea of poison. He merely suspected that it was
intended to confine him for life, and to set the king still more bitterly
against him. In one of his letters he threatened Rochester that unless he
were speedily liberated, he would expose his villany to the world. He says,
“You and I, ere it be long, will come to a public trial of another nature.”
* * * “Drive me not to extremities, lest I should say something that both
you and I should repent.” * * * “Whether I live or die, your shame shall
never die, but ever remain to the world, to make you the most odious man
living.” * * * “I wonder much you should neglect him to whom such secrets
of all kinds have passed.” * * * “Be these the fruits of common secrets,
common dangers?”

SIR THOMAS OVERBURY.

All these remonstrances, and hints as to the dangerous secrets in his
keeping, were ill calculated to serve him with a man so reckless as Lord
Rochester: they were more likely to cause him to be sacrificed than to be
saved. Rochester appears to have acted as if he thought so. He doubtless
employed the murderer’s reasoning, that “dead men tell no tales,” when,
after receiving letters of this description, he complained to his paramour of

the delay. Weston was spurred on to consummate the atrocity; and the
patience of all parties being exhausted, a dose of corrosive sublimate was
administered to him in October 1613, which put an end to his sufferings,
after he had been for six months in their hands. On the very day of his
death, and before his body was cold, he was wrapped up carelessly in a
sheet, and buried without any funeral ceremony in a pit within the
precincts of the Tower.
Sir Anthony Weldon, in his Court and Character of James I., gives a
somewhat different account of the closing scene of this tragedy. He says,
“Franklin and Weston came into Overbury’s chamber, and found him in
infinite torment, with contention between the strength of nature and the
working of the poison; and it being very like that nature had gotten the
better in this contention, by the thrusting out of boils, blotches, and blains,
they, fearing it might come to light by the judgment of physicians, the foul
play that had been offered him, consented to stifle him with the bedclothes,
which accordingly was performed; and so ended his miserable life, with the
assurance of the conspirators that he died by the poison; none thinking
otherwise than these two murderers.”
The sudden death, the indecent haste of the funeral, and the non-holding
of an inquest upon the body, strengthened the suspicions that were afloat.
Rumour, instead of whispering, began to speak out; and the relatives of the
deceased openly expressed their belief that their kinsman had been
murdered. But Rochester was still all powerful at court, and no one dared
to utter a word to his discredit. Shortly afterwards, his marriage with the
Countess of Essex was celebrated with the utmost splendour, the king
himself being present at the ceremony.
It would seem that Overbury’s knowledge of James’s character was
deeper than Rochester had given him credit for, and that he had been a
true prophet when he predicted that his marriage would eventually
estrange James from his minion. At this time, however, Rochester stood
higher than ever in the royal favour; but it did not last long—conscience,

that busy monitor, was at work. The tongue of rumour was never still; and
Rochester, who had long been a guilty, became at last a wretched man. His
cheeks lost their colour—his eyes grew dim; and he became moody,
careless, and melancholy. The king, seeing him thus, took at length no
pleasure in his society, and began to look about for another favourite.
George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, was the man to his mind: quickwitted, handsome, and unscrupulous. The two latter qualities alone were
sufficient to recommend him to James I. In proportion as the influence of
Rochester declined, that of Buckingham increased. A falling favourite has
no friends; and rumour wagged her tongue against Rochester louder and
more pertinaciously than ever. A new favourite, too, generally endeavours
to hasten by a kick the fall of the old one; and Buckingham, anxious to
work the complete ruin of his forerunner in the king’s good graces,
encouraged the relatives of Sir Thomas Overbury to prosecute their
inquiries into the strange death of their kinsman.
James was rigorous enough in the punishment of offences when he was
not himself involved. He piqued himself, moreover, on his dexterity in
unravelling mysteries. The affair of Sir Thomas Overbury found him
congenial occupation. He set to work by ordering the arrest of Sir Jervis
Elwes. James, at this early stage of the proceedings, does not seem to have
been aware that Rochester was so deeply implicated. Struck with horror at
the atrocious system of slow poisoning, the king sent for all the judges.
According to Sir Anthony Weldon, he knelt down in the midst of them, and
said, “My lords the judges, it is lately come to my hearing that you have
now in examination a business of poisoning. Lord! in what a miserable
condition shall this kingdom be (the only famous nation for hospitality in
the world) if our tables should become such a snare, as that none could eat
without danger of life, and that Italian custom should be introduced among
us! Therefore, my lords, I charge you, as you will answer it at that great and
dreadful day of judgment, that you examine it strictly, without favour,
affection, or partiality. And if you shall spare any guilty of this crime, God’s

curse light on you and your posterity! and if I spare any that are guilty,
God’s curse light on me and my posterity for ever!”

DUKE OF BUCKINGHAM.

The imprecation fell but too surely upon the devoted house of Stuart.
The solemn oath was broken, and God’s curse did light upon him and his
posterity!
The next person arrested after Sir Jervis Elwes, was Weston, the underkeeper; then Franklin and Mrs. Turner; and lastly, the Earl and Countess of
Somerset, to which dignity Rochester had been advanced since the death of
Overbury.
Weston was first brought to trial. Public curiosity was on the stretch.
Nothing else was talked of, and the court on the day of trial was crowded to
suffocation. The State Trials report, that Lord Chief Justice Coke “laid
open to the jury the baseness and cowardliness of poisoners, who attempt
that secretly against which there is no means of preservation or defence for
a man’s life; and how rare it was to hear of any poisoning in England, so
detestable it was to our nation. But the devil had taught divers to be
cunning in it, so that they can poison in what distance of space they please,
by consuming the nativum calidum, or humidum radicale, in one month,
two or three, or more, as they list, which they four manner of ways do
execute, viz. haustu, gustu, odore, and contactu.”

LORD COKE.

When the indictment was read over, Weston made no other reply than
“Lord have mercy upon me! Lord have mercy upon me!” On being asked
how he would be tried, he refused to throw himself upon a jury of his
country, and declared that he would be tried by God alone. In this he
persisted for some time. The fear of the dreadful punishment for
contumacy 38 induced him at length to plead “Not guilty,” and take his trial
in due course of law.
All the circumstances against him were fully proved, and he was found
guilty and executed at Tyburn. Mrs. Turner, Franklin, and Sir Jervis Elwes
were also brought to trial, found guilty, and executed between the 19th of
October and the 4th of December 1615; but the grand trial of the Earl and
Countess of Somerset did not take place till the month of May following.
On the trial of Sir Jervis Elwes, circumstances had transpired, shewing a
guilty knowledge of the poisoning on the part of the Earl of Northampton,
the uncle of Lady Somerset, and the chief falconer Sir Thomas Monson.
The former was dead; but Sir Thomas Monson was arrested and brought to
trial. It appeared, however, that he was too dangerous a man to be brought
to the scaffold. He knew too many of the odious secrets of James I., and his
dying speech might contain disclosures which would compromise the king.
To conceal old guilt it was necessary to incur new: the trial of Sir Thomas
Monson was brought to an abrupt conclusion, and himself set at liberty.

THE EARL OF SOMERSET.

Already James had broken his oath. He now began to fear that he had
been rash in engaging so zealously to bring the poisoners to punishment.
That Somerset would be declared guilty there was no doubt, and that he
looked for pardon and impunity was equally evident to the king. Somerset,
while in the Tower, asserted confidently that James would not dare to
bring him to trial. In this he was mistaken; but James was in an agony.
What the secret was between them will now never be known with certainty;
but it may be surmised. Some have imagined it to be the vice to which the
king was addicted; while others have asserted that it related to the death of
Prince Henry, a virtuous young man, who had held Somerset in especial
abhorrence. This prince died early, unlamented by his father, and, as
public opinion whispered at the time, poisoned by Somerset. Probably
some crime or other lay heavy upon the soul of the king; and Somerset, his
accomplice, could not be brought to public execution with safety. Hence
the dreadful tortures of James when he discovered that his favourite was so
deeply implicated in the murder of Overbury. Every means was taken by
the agonised king to bring the prisoner into what was called a safe frame of
mind. He was secretly advised to plead guilty, and trust to the clemency of
the king. The same advice was conveyed to the countess. Bacon was
instructed by the king to draw up a paper of all the points of “mercy and
favour” to Somerset which might result from the evidence; and Somerset
was again recommended to plead guilty, and promised that no evil should
ensue to him.
The countess was first tried. She trembled and shed tears during the
reading of the indictment, and, in a low voice, pleaded guilty. On being

asked why sentence of death should not be passed against her, she replied
meekly, “I can much aggravate, but nothing extenuate my fault. I desire
mercy, and that the lords will intercede for me with the king.” Sentence of
death was passed upon her.
Next day the earl was brought to trial. He appears to have mistrusted the
promises of James, and he pleaded not guilty. With a self-possession and
confidence which he felt, probably, from his knowledge of the king’s
character, he rigorously cross-examined the witnesses, and made a
stubborn defence. After a trial which lasted eleven hours he was found
guilty, and condemned to the felon’s death.

THE COUNTESS OF SOMERSET.

Whatever may have been the secrets between the criminal and the king,
the latter, notwithstanding his terrific oath, was afraid to sign the deathwarrant. It might, perchance, have been his own. The earl and countess
were committed to the Tower, where they remained for nearly five years. At
the end of this period, to the surprise and scandal of the community, and
the disgrace of its chief magistrate, they both received the royal pardon, but
were ordered to reside at a distance from the court. Having been found
guilty of felony, the estates of the earl had become forfeited; but James
granted him out of their revenues an income of 4000l. per annum!
Shamelessness could go no further.
Of the after-life of these criminals nothing is known, except that the love
they had formerly borne each other was changed into aversion, and that
they lived under the same roof for months together without the
interchange of a word.

The exposure of their atrocities did not put a stop to the practice of
poisoning. On the contrary, as we shall see hereafter, it engendered that
insane imitation which is so strange a feature of the human character.
James himself is supposed, with great probability, to have fallen a victim to
it. In the notes to Harris’s Life and Writings of James I., there is a good
deal of information on the subject. The guilt of Buckingham, although not
fully established, rests upon circumstances of suspicion stronger than have
been sufficient to lead hundreds to the scaffold. His motives for
committing the crime are stated to have been a desire of revenge for the
coldness with which the king, in the latter years of his reign, began to
regard him; his fear that James intended to degrade him; and his hope that
the great influence he possessed over the mind of the heir-apparent would
last through a new reign, if the old one were brought to a close.
In the second volume of the Harleian Miscellany, there is a tract,
entitled the Forerunner of Revenge, written by George Eglisham, doctor of
medicine, and one of the physicians to King James. Harris, in quoting it,
says that it is full of rancour and prejudice. It is evidently exaggerated, but
forms nevertheless a link in the chain of evidence. Eglisham says, “The king
being sick of an ague, the duke took this opportunity, when all the king’s
doctors of physic were at dinner, and offered to him a white powder to
take, the which he a long time refused; but, overcome with his flattering
importunity, he took it in wine, and immediately became worse and worse,
falling into many swoonings and pains, and violent fluxes of the belly, so
tormented, that his majesty cried out aloud of this white powder, ‘Would to
God I had never taken it!’” He then tells us “of the Countess of Buckingham
(the duke’s mother) applying the plaister to the king’s heart and breast,
whereupon he grew faint and short-breathed, and in agony; that the
physicians exclaimed that the king was poisoned; that Buckingham
commanded them out of the room, and committed one of them close
prisoner to his own chamber, and another to be removed from court; and
that, after his majesty’s death, his body and head swelled above measure;

his hair, with the skin of his head, stuck to his pillow, and his nails became
loose on his fingers and toes.” Clarendon, who, by the way, was a partisan
of the duke’s, gives a totally different account of James’s death. He says, “It
was occasioned by an ague (after a short indisposition by the gout), which,
meeting many humours in a fat unwieldy body of fifty-eight years old, in
four or five fits carried him out of the world,—after whose death many
scandalous and libellous discourses were raised, without the least colour or
ground, as appeared upon the strictest and most malicious examination
that could be made, long after, in a time of license, when nobody was afraid
of offending majesty, and when prosecuting the highest reproaches and
contumelies against the royal family was held very meritorious.”
Notwithstanding this confident declaration, the world will hardly be
persuaded that there was not some truth in the rumours that were abroad.
The inquiries which were instituted were not strict, as he asserts, and all
the unconstitutional influence of the powerful favourite was exerted to
defeat them. In the celebrated accusations brought against Buckingham by
the Earl of Bristol, the poisoning of King James was placed last on the list;
and the pages of history bear evidence of the summary mode in which they
were, for the time, got rid of.
The man from whom Buckingham is said to have procured his poisons
was one Dr. Lamb, a conjuror and empiric, who, besides dealing in
poisons, pretended to be a fortune-teller. The popular fury, which broke
with comparative harmlessness against his patron, was directed against
this man, until he could not appear with safety in the streets of London.
His fate was melancholy. Walking one day in Cheapside, disguised, as he
thought, from all observers, he was recognised by some idle boys, who
began to hoot and pelt him with stones, calling out, “The poisoner! the
poisoner! Down with the wizard! down with him!” A mob very soon
collected, and the doctor took to his heels and ran for his life. He was
pursued and seized in Wood Street, and from thence dragged by the hair

through the mire to St. Paul’s Cross; the mob beating him with sticks and
stones, and calling out, “Kill the wizard! kill the poisoner!”

PAUL’S CROSS; SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

Charles I., on hearing of the riot, rode from Whitehall to quell it; but he
arrived too late to save the victim. Every bone in his body was broken, and
he was quite dead. Charles was excessively indignant, and fined the city six
hundred pounds for its inability to deliver up the ring-leaders to justice.
But it was in Italy that poisoning was most prevalent. From a very early
period, it seems to have been looked upon in that country as a perfectly
justifiable means of getting rid of an enemy. The Italians of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries poisoned their opponents with as little
compunction as an Englishman of the present day brings an action at law
against any one who has done him an injury. The writings of contemporary
authors inform us that, when La Spara and La Tophania carried on their
infernal trade, ladies put poison-bottles on their dressing-tables as openly,
and used them with as little scruple upon others, as modern dames use Eau
de Cologne or lavender-water upon themselves. So powerful is the
influence of fashion, it can even cause murder to be regarded as a venial
peccadillo.
In the memoirs of the last Duke of Guise, who made a Quixotic attempt,
in 1648, to seize upon the government of Naples, we find some curious
particulars relative to the popular feeling with regard to poisoning. A man
named Gennaro Annese, who, after the short and extraordinary career of
Masaniello the fisherman, had established himself as a sort of captain-

general of the populace, rendered himself so obnoxious to the Duke of
Guise, that the adherents of the latter determined to murder him. The
captain of the guard, as the duke himself very coolly informs us, was
requested to undertake this office. It was suggested to him that the poniard
would be the most effectual instrument, but the man turned up his eyes
with pious horror at the proposition. He was ready to poison Gennaro
Annese whenever he might be called upon to do so; but to poniard him, he
said, would be disgraceful, and unbecoming an officer of the guards! At
last, poison was agreed upon, and Augustino Molla, an attorney in the
duke’s confidence, brought the bottle containing the liquid to shew it to his
master. The following is the Duke’s own account:
“Augustino came to me at night, and told me: ‘I have brought you
something which will free you from Gennaro. He deserves death, and
it is no great matter after what fashion justice is done upon him. Look
at this vial, full of clear and beautiful water: in four days’ time, it will
punish all his treasons. The captain of the guard has undertaken to
give it him; and as it has no taste at all, Gennaro will suspect nothing.’”
The duke further informs us that the dose was duly administered; but
that Gennaro, fortunately for himself, ate nothing for dinner that day but
cabbage dressed with oil, which acting as an antidote, caused him to vomit
profusely, and saved his life. He was exceedingly ill for five days, but never
suspected that he had been poisoned.
In process of time, poison-vending became a profitable trade. Eleven
years after this period, it was carried on at Rome to such an extent, that the
sluggish government was roused to interference. Beckmann, in his History
of Inventions, and Lebret, in his Magazin zum Gebrauche der Staaten
Kirche Geschichte, or Magazine of Materials for a History of a State
Church, relates that, in the year 1659, it was made known to Pope
Alexander VII. that great numbers of young women had avowed in the

confessional that they had poisoned their husbands with slow poisons. The
Catholic clergy, who in general hold the secrets of the confessional so
sacred, were shocked and alarmed at the extraordinary prevalence of the
crime. Although they refrained from revealing the names of the penitents,
they conceived themselves bound to apprise the head of the Church of the
enormities that were practised. It was also the subject of general
conversation in Rome that young widows were unusually abundant. It was
remarked, too, that if any couple lived unhappily together, the husband
soon took ill and died. The papal authorities, when once they began to
inquire, soon learned that a society of young wives had been formed, and
met nightly, for some mysterious purpose, at the house of an old woman
named Hieronyma Spara. This hag was a reputed witch and fortune-teller,
and acted as president of the young viragos, several of whom, it was
afterwards ascertained, belonged to the first families of Rome.
In order to have positive evidence of the practices of this female
conclave, a lady was employed by the government to seek an interview with
them. She dressed herself out in the most magnificent style; and having
been amply provided with money, she found but little difficulty, when she
had stated her object, of procuring an audience of La Spara and her
sisterhood. She pretended to be in extreme distress of mind on account of
the infidelities and ill-treatment of her husband, and implored La Spara to
furnish her with a few drops of the wonderful elixir, the efficacy of which in
sending cruel husbands to “their last long sleep” was so much vaunted by
the ladies of Rome. La Spara fell into the snare, and sold her some of her
“drops” at a price commensurate with the supposed wealth of the
purchaser.
The liquor thus obtained was subjected to an analysis, and found to be,
as was suspected, a slow poison; clear, tasteless, and limpid, like that
spoken of by the Duke of Guise. Upon this evidence, the house was
surrounded by the police, and La Spara and her companions taken into
custody. La Spara, who is described as having been a little ugly old woman,

was put to the torture, but obstinately refused to confess her guilt. Another
of the women, named La Gratiosa, had less firmness, and laid bare all the
secrets of the infernal sisterhood. Taking a confession extorted by anguish
on the rack at its true value (nothing at all), there is still sufficient evidence
to warrant posterity in the belief of their guilt. They were found guilty, and
condemned, according to their degrees of culpability, to various
punishments. La Spara, Gratiosa, and three young women, who had
poisoned their husbands, were hanged together at Rome. Upwards of thirty
women were whipped publicly through the streets; and several, whose high
rank screened them from more degrading punishment, were banished from
the country, and mulcted in heavy fines. In a few months afterwards, nine
women more were hanged for poisoning; and another bevy, including
many young and beautiful girls, were whipped half naked through the
streets of Rome.
This severity did not put a stop to the practice, and jealous women and
avaricious men, anxious to step into the inheritance of fathers, uncles, or
brothers, resorted to poison. As it was quite free from taste, colour, and
smell, it was administered without exciting suspicion. The skilful vendors
compounded it of different degrees of strength, so that the poisoners had
only to say whether they wanted their victims to die in a week, a month, or
six months, and they were suited with corresponding doses. The vendors
were chiefly women, of whom the most celebrated was a hag named
Tophania, who was in this way accessory to the death of upwards of six
hundred persons. This woman appears to have been a dealer in poisons
from her girlhood, and resided first at Palermo and then at Naples. That
entertaining traveller, Father Lebat, has given, in his letters from Italy,
many curious particulars relating to her. When he was at Civita Vecchia, in
1719, the Viceroy of Naples discovered that poison was extensively sold in
the latter city, and that it went by the name of aqueta, or little-water. On
making further inquiry, he ascertained that Tophania (who was by this
time near seventy years of age, and who seems to have begun her evil

courses very soon after the execution of La Spara,) sent large quantities of
it to all parts of Italy in small vials, with the inscription, “Manna of St.
Nicholas of Barri.”
The tomb of St. Nicholas of Barri was celebrated throughout Italy. A
miraculous oil was said to ooze from it, which cured nearly all the maladies
that flesh is heir to, provided the recipient made use of it with the due
degree of faith. La Tophania artfully gave this name to her poison to elude
the vigilance of the custom-house officers, who, in common with every
body else, had a pious respect for St. Nicholas de Barri and his wonderful
oil.
The poison was similar to that manufactured by La Spara. Hahnemann
the physician, and father of the homœopathic doctrine, writing upon this
subject, says it was compounded of arsenical neutral salts, occasioning in
the victim a gradual loss of appetite, faintness, gnawing pains in the
stomach, loss of strength, and wasting of the lungs. The Abbé Gagliardi
says, that a few drops of it were generally poured into tea, chocolate, or
soup, and its effects were slow, and almost imperceptible. Garelli,
physician to the Emperor of Austria, in a letter to Hoffmann, says it was
crystallised arsenic, dissolved in a large quantity of water by decoction,
with the addition (for some unexplained purpose) of the herb cymbalaria.
The Neapolitans called it Aqua Toffnina; and it became notorious all over
Europe under the name of Aqua Tophania.
Although this woman carried on her infamous traffic so extensively, it
was extremely difficult to meet with her. She lived in continual dread of
discovery. She constantly changed her name and residence; and pretending
to be a person of great godliness, resided in monasteries for months
together. Whenever she was more than usually apprehensive of detection
she sought ecclesiastical protection. She was soon apprised of the search
made for her by the Viceroy of Naples, and, according to her practice, took
refuge in a monastery. Either the search after her was not very rigid, or her
measures were exceedingly well taken; for she contrived to elude the

vigilance of the authorities for several years. What is still more
extraordinary, as shewing the ramifications of her system, her trade was
still carried on to as great an extent as before. Lebat informs us that she
had so great a sympathy for poor wives who hated their husbands and
wanted to get rid of them, but could not afford to buy her wonderful aqua,
that she made them presents of it.
She was not allowed, however, to play at this game for ever; she was at
length discovered in a nunnery, and her retreat cut off. The viceroy made
several representations to the superior to deliver her up, but without effect.
The abbess, supported by the archbishop of the diocese, constantly refused.
The public curiosity was in consequence so much excited at the additional
importance thus thrust upon the criminal, that thousands of persons
visited the nunnery in order to catch a glimpse of her.
The patience of the viceroy appears to have been exhausted by these
delays. Being a man of sense, and not a very zealous Catholic, he
determined that even the Church should not shield a criminal so atrocious.
Setting the privileges of the nunnery at defiance, he sent a troop of soldiers,
who broke over the walls, and carried her away vi et armis. The
archbishop, Cardinal Pignatelli, was highly indignant, and threatened to
excommunicate and lay the whole city under interdict. All the inferior
clergy, animated by the esprit du corps, took up the question, and so
worked upon the superstitious and bigoted people, that they were ready to
rise in a mass to storm the palace of the viceroy and rescue the prisoner.
These were serious difficulties; but the viceroy was not a man to be
daunted. Indeed, he seems to have acted throughout with a rare union of
astuteness, coolness, and energy. To avoid the evil consequences of the
threatened excommunication, he placed a guard round the palace of the
archbishop, judging that the latter would not be so foolish as to launch out
an anathema which would cause the city to be starved, and himself in it.
The market-people would not have dared to come to the city with
provisions so long as it remained under the ban. There would have been

too much inconvenience to himself and his ghostly brethren in such a
measure; and, as the viceroy anticipated, the good cardinal reserved his
thunders for some other occasion.
Still there was the populace. To quiet their clamour and avert the
impending insurrection, the agents of the government adroitly mingled
with the people, and spread abroad a report that Tophania had poisoned all
the wells and fountains of the city. This was enough. The popular feeling
was turned against her immediately. Those who, but a moment before, had
looked upon her as a saint, now reviled her as a devil, and were as eager for
her punishment as they had before been for her escape. Tophania was then
put to the torture. She confessed the long catalogue of her crimes, and
named all the persons who had employed her. She was shortly afterwards
strangled, and her corpse thrown over the wall into the garden of the
convent from whence she had been taken. This appears to have been done
to conciliate the clergy, by allowing them, at least, the burial of one who
had taken refuge within their precincts.
After her death the mania for poisoning seems to have abated; but we
have yet to see what hold it took upon the French people at a somewhat
earlier period. So rooted had it become in France between the years 1670
and 1680, that Madame de Sevigné, in one of her letters, expresses her fear
that Frenchman and poisoner would become synonymous terms.
As in Italy, the first notice the government received of the prevalence of
this crime was given by the clergy, to whom females of high rank, and some
among the middle and lower classes, had avowed in the confessional that
they had poisoned their husbands. In consequence of these disclosures,
two Italians, named Exili and Glaser, were arrested, and thrown into the
Bastille, on the charge of compounding and selling the drugs used for these
murders. Glaser died in prison, but Exili remained without trial for several
months; and there, shortly afterwards, he made the acquaintance of
another prisoner, named Sainte Croix, by whose example the crime was
still further disseminated among the French people.

The most notorious of the poisoners that derived their pernicious
knowledge from this man was Madame de Brinvilliers, a young woman
connected both by birth and marriage with some of the noblest families of
France. She seems, from her very earliest years, to have been heartless and
depraved; and, if we may believe her own confession, was steeped in
wickedness ere she had well entered her teens. She was, however, beautiful
and accomplished; and, in the eye of the world, seemed exemplary and
kind. Guyot de Pitaval, in the Causes Célèbres, and Madame de Sevigné, in
her letters, represent her as mild and agreeable in her manners, and
offering no traces on her countenance of the evil soul within. She was
married in 1651 to the Marquis de Brinvilliers, with whom she lived
unhappily for some years. He was a loose, dissipated character, and was
the means of introducing Sainte Croix to his wife, a man who cast a blight
upon her life, and dragged her on from crime to crime, till her offences
became so great that the mind shudders to dwell upon them. For this man
she conceived a guilty passion, to gratify which she plunged at once into the
gulf of sin. She was drawn to its most loathsome depths ere retribution
overtook her.
She had as yet shewn a fair outside to the world, and found but little
difficulty in effecting a legal separation from her husband, who had not the
art to conceal his vices. The proceeding gave great offence to her family.
She appears, after this, to have thrown off the mask completely, and
carried on her intrigues so openly with her lover, Sainte Croix, that her
father, M. D’Aubray, scandalised at her conduct, procured a lettre de
cachet, and had him imprisoned in the Bastille for a twelvemonth.

THE BASTILLE.

Sainte Croix, who had been in Italy, was a dabbler in poisons. He knew
something of the secrets of the detestable La Spara, and improved himself
in them from the instructions of Exili, with whom he speedily contracted a
sort of friendship. By him he was shewn how to prepare, not only the liquid
poisons employed in Italy, but that known as succession powder, which
afterwards became so celebrated in France. Like his mistress, he appeared
amiable, witty, and intelligent, and shewed no signs to the world of the two
fierce passions, revenge and avarice, which were gnawing at his heart. Both
these passions were to be sated on the unfortunate family of D’Aubray; his
revenge, because they had imprisoned him; and his avarice, because they
were rich. Reckless and extravagant, he was always in want of money, and
he had no one to supply him but Madame de Brinvilliers, whose own
portion was far from sufficient to satisfy his need. Groaning to think that
any impediment should stand between him and wealth, he conceived the
horrid idea of poisoning M. D’Aubray her father, and her two brothers, that
she might inherit the property. Three murders were nothing to such a
villain. He communicated his plan to Madame de Brinvilliers; and she,
without the slightest scruple, agreed to aid him: he undertook to compound
the poisons, and she to administer them. The zeal and alacrity with which
she set to work seem hardly credible. Sainte Croix found her an apt scholar;
and she soon became as expert as himself in the manufacture of poisons.

To try the strength of the first doses, she used to administer them to dogs,
rabbits, and pigeons. Afterwards, wishing to be more certain of their
effects, she went round to the hospitals, and administered them to the sick
poor in the soups which she brought in apparent charity. 39 None of the
poisons were intended to kill at the first dose; so that she could try them
once upon an individual without fear of murder. She tried the same
atrocious experiment upon the guests at her father’s table, by poisoning a
pigeon-pie! To be more certain still, she next poisoned herself! When
convinced by this desperate essay of the potency of the draught, she
procured an antidote from Sainte Croix, and all doubts being removed,
commenced operations upon her grey-headed father. She administered the
first dose with her own hands, in his chocolate. The poison worked well.
The old man was taken ill, and his daughter, apparently full of tenderness
and anxiety, watched by his bedside. The next day she gave him some
broth, which she recommended as highly nourishing. This also was
poisoned. In this manner she gradually wore out his frame, and in less than
ten days he was a corpse! His death seemed so much the result of disease,
that no suspicions were excited.
When the two brothers arrived from the provinces to render the last sad
duties to their sire, they found their sister as grieved, to all outward
appearance, as even filial affection could desire: but the young men only
came to perish. They stood between Sainte Croix and the already halfclutched gold, and their doom was sealed. A man, named La Chaussée, was
hired by Sainte Croix to aid in administering the poisons; and, in less than
six weeks time, they had both gone to their long home.
Suspicion was now excited; but so cautiously had all been done, that it
found no one upon whom to attach itself. The marquise had a sister, and
she was entitled, by the death of her relatives, to half the property. Less
than the whole would not satisfy Sainte Croix, and he determined that she
should die the same death as her father and brothers. She was too

distrustful, however; and, by quitting Paris, she escaped the destruction
that was lurking for her.
The marquise had undertaken these murders to please her lover. She was
now anxious to perpetrate another on her own account. She wished to
marry Sainte Croix; but, though separated from her husband, she was not
divorced. She thought it would be easier to poison him than to apply to the
tribunals for a divorce, which might, perhaps, be refused. But Sainte Croix
had no longer any love for his guilty instrument. Bad men do not admire
others who are as bad as themselves. Though a villain himself, he had no
desire to marry one, and was not at all anxious for the death of the
marquis. He seemed, however, to enter into the plot, and supplied her with
poison for her husband; but he took care to provide a remedy. La
Brinvilliers poisoned him one day, and Sainte Croix gave him an antidote
the next. In this manner he was buffeted about between them for some
time, and finally escaped, with a ruined constitution and a broken heart.
But the day of retribution was at hand, and a terrible mischance brought
the murders to light. The nature of the poisons compounded by Sainte
Croix was so deadly, that, when working in his laboratory, he was obliged
to wear a mask, to preserve himself from suffocation. One day, the mask
slipped off, and the miserable wretch perished in his crimes. His corpse
was found, on the following morning, in the obscure lodging where he had
fitted up his laboratory. As he appeared to be without friends or relatives,
the police took possession of his effects. Among other things, was found a
small box, to which was affixed the following singular document:
“I humbly beg, that those into whose hands this box may fall, will do
me the favour to deliver it into the hands only of the Marchioness de
Brinvilliers, who resides in the Rue Neuve St. Paul, as every thing it
contains concerns her, and belongs to her alone; and as, besides, there
is nothing in it that can be of use to any person but her. In case she
shall be dead before me, it is my wish that it be burned, with every

thing it contains, without opening or altering any thing. In order that
no one may plead ignorance, I swear by the God that I adore, and by
all that is held most sacred, that I assert nothing but the truth: and if
my intentions, just and reasonable as they are, be thwarted in this
point by any persons, I charge their consciences with it, both in this
world and that which is to come, in order that I may unload mine. I
protest that this is my last will. Done at Paris, May 25, 1672.
(Signed) SAINTE CROIX.”
This earnest solicitation, instead of insuring respect, as was intended,
excited curiosity. The box was opened, and found to contain some papers,
and several vials and powders. The latter were handed to a chemist for
analysis, and the documents were retained by the police, and opened.
Among them was found a promissory note of the Marchioness de
Brinvilliers, for thirty thousand francs, to the order of Sainte Croix. The
other papers were of greater importance, as they implicated both her and
her servant, La Chaussée, in the recent murders. As soon as she was
informed of the death of Sainte Croix, she made an attempt to gain
possession of his papers and the box; but, being refused, she saw that there
was no time to be lost, and immediately quitted. Next morning the police
were on her trail; but she succeeded in escaping to England. La Chaussée
was not so fortunate. Altogether ignorant of the fatal mischance which had
brought his villanies to light, he did not dream of danger. He was arrested
and brought to trial: being put to the torture, he confessed that he had
administered poison to the Messieurs d’Aubray, and that he had received a
hundred pistoles, and the promise of an annuity for life, from Sainte Croix
and Madame de Brinvilliers, for the job. He was condemned to be broken
alive on the wheel, and the marchioness was, by default, sentenced to be
beheaded. He was executed accordingly, in March 1673, on the Place de
Grève, in Paris.

La Brinvilliers appears to have resided for nearly three years in England.
Early in 1676, thinking that the rigour of pursuit was over, and that she
might venture to return to the Continent, she proceeded secretly to Liège.
Notwithstanding her care, the French authorities were soon apprised of her
return; and arrangements were promptly made with the municipality of
that city to permit the agents of the French police to arrest her within the
limits of their jurisdiction. Desgrais, an officer of the maréchaussée,
accordingly left Paris for that purpose. On his arrival in Liège, he found
that she had sought shelter within the walls of a convent. Here the arm of
the law, long as it is said to be, could not reach her: but Desgrais was not a
man to be baffled, and he resorted to stratagem to accomplish what force
could not. Having disguised himself as a priest, he sought admission to the
convent, and obtained an interview with La Brinvilliers. He said, that being
a Frenchman, and passing through Liège, he could not leave that city
without paying a visit to a lady whose beauty and misfortunes were so
celebrated. Her vanity was flattered by the compliment. Desgrais saw, to
use a vulgar but forcible expression, “that he had got on the blind side of
her;” and he adroitly continued to pour out the language of love and
admiration till the deluded marchioness was thrown completely off her
guard. She agreed, without much solicitation, to meet him outside the walls
of the convent, where their amorous intrigue might be carried on more
conveniently than within. Faithful to her appointment with her supposed
new lover, she came, and found herself, not in the embrace of a gallant, but
in the custody of a policeman.
Her trial was not long delayed. The proofs against her were abundant.
The dying declaration of La Chaussée would have been alone enough to
convict her; but besides that, there were the mysterious document attached
to the box of St. Croix, her flight from France, and, stronger and more
damning proof than all, a paper, in her own handwriting, found among the
effects of St. Croix, in which she detailed to him the misdeeds of her life,
and spoke of the murder of her father and brothers in terms that left no

doubt of her guilt. During the trial, all Paris was in commotion. La
Brinvilliers was the only subject of conversation. All the details of her
crimes were published, and greedily devoured; and the idea of secret
poisoning first put into the heads of hundreds, who afterwards became
guilty of it.
On the 16th of July, 1676, the Superior Criminal Court of Paris
pronounced a verdict of guilty against her, for the murder of her father and
brothers, and the attempt upon the life of her sister. She was condemned to
be drawn on a hurdle, with her feet bare, a rope about her neck, and a
burning torch in her hand, to the great entrance of the cathedral of Notre
Dame, where she was to make the amende honorable in sight of all the
people; to be taken from thence to the Place de Grève, and there to be
beheaded. Her body was afterwards to be burned, and her ashes scattered
to the winds.
After her sentence, she made a full confession of her guilt. She seems to
have looked upon death without fear; but it was recklessness, not courage,
that supported her. Madame de Sevigné says, that when on the hurdle, on
her way to the scaffold, she entreated her confessor to exert his influence
with the executioner to place himself next to her, that his body might hide
from her view “that scoundrel Desgrais, who had entrapped her.” She also
asked the ladies, who had been drawn to their windows to witness the
procession, what they were looking at? adding, “a pretty sight you have
come to see, truly!” She laughed when on the scaffold, dying as she had
lived, impenitent and heartless. On the morrow, the populace came in
crowds to collect her ashes to preserve them as relics. She was regarded as
a martyred saint, and her ashes were supposed to be endowed, by divine
grace, with the power of curing all diseases. Popular folly has often
canonised persons whose pretensions to sanctity were extremely equivocal;
but the disgusting folly of the multitude, in this instance, has never been
surpassed.

Before her death, proceedings were instituted against M. de Penautier,
treasurer of the province of Languedoc, and receiver-general for the clergy,
who was accused by a lady, named St. Laurent, of having poisoned her
husband, the late receiver-general, in order to obtain his appointment. The
circumstances of this case were never divulged, and the greatest influence
was exerted to prevent it from going to trial. He was known to have been
intimate with Sainte Croix and Madame de Brinvilliers, and was thought to
have procured his poisons from them. The latter, however, refused to say
any thing which might implicate him. The inquiry was eventually stifled,
after Penautier had been several months in the Bastille.
The Cardinal de Bonzy was accused by the gossips of the day of being an
accomplice of Penautier. The cardinal’s estates were burdened with the
payment of several heavy annuities; but, about the time that poisoning
became so fashionable, all the annuitants died off, one after the other. The
cardinal, in talking of these annuitants, afterwards used to say, “Thanks to
my star, I have outlived them all!” A wit, seeing him and Penautier riding
in the same carriage, cried out, in allusion to this expression, “There go the
Cardinal de Bonzy and his star!”
It was now that the mania for poisoning began to take hold of the
popular mind. From this time until the year 1682, the prisons of France
teemed with persons accused of this crime; and it is very singular that
other offences decreased in a similar proportion. We have already seen the
extent to which it was carried in Italy. It was, if possible, surpassed in
France. The diabolical ease with which these murders could be effected, by
means of these scentless and tasteless poisons, enticed the evil-minded.
Jealousy, revenge, avarice, even petty spite, alike resorted to them. Those
who would have been deterred, by fear of detection, from using the pistol
or the dagger, or even strong doses of poison, which kill at once, employed
slow poisons without dread. The corrupt government of the day, although
it could wink at the atrocities of a wealthy and influential courtier like
Penautier, was scandalised to see the crime spreading among the people.

Disgrace was, in fact, entailed, in the eyes of Europe, upon the name of
Frenchman. Louis XIV., to put a stop to the evil, instituted what was called
the Chambre Ardente, or Burning Chamber, with extensive powers for the
trial and punishment of the prisoners.
Two women, especially, made themselves notorious at this time, and
were instrumental to the deaths of hundreds of individuals. They both
resided in Paris, and were named Lavoisin and Lavigoreux. Like Spara and
Tophania, of whom they were imitators, they chiefly sold their poisons to
women who wanted to get rid of their husbands; and, in some few
instances, to husbands who wanted to get rid of their wives. Their
ostensible occupation was that of midwives. They also pretended to be
fortune-tellers, and were visited by persons of every class of society. The
rich and poor thronged alike to their mansardes to learn the secrets of the
future. Their prophecies were principally of death. They foretold to women
the approaching dissolution of husbands, and to needy heirs the end of rich
relatives, who had made them, as Byron expresses it, “wait too, too long
already.” They generally took care to be instrumental in fulfilling their own
predictions. They used to tell their wretched employers that some sign of
the approaching death would take place in the house, such as the breaking
of glass or china; and they paid servants considerable fees to cause a
breakage, as if by accident, exactly at the appointed time. Their occupation
as midwives made them acquainted with the secrets of many families,
which they afterwards turned to dreadful account.
It is not known how long they had carried on this awful trade before they
were discovered. Detection finally overtook them at the close of the year
1679. They were both tried, found guilty, and burned alive on the Place de
Grève, on the 22d of February, 1680, after their hands had been bored
through with a red-hot iron, and then cut off. Their numerous accomplices
in Paris and in the provinces were also discovered and brought to trial.
According to some authors, thirty, and to others, fifty of them, chiefly
women, were hanged in the principal cities.

Lavoisin kept a list of the visitors who came to her house to purchase
poisons. This paper was seized by the police on her arrest, and examined by
the tribunals. Among the names were found those of the Marshal de
Luxembourg, the Countess de Soissons, and the Duchess de Bouillon. The
marshal seems only to have been guilty of a piece of discreditable folly in
visiting a woman of this description, but the popular voice at the time
imputed to him something more than folly. The author of the Memoirs of
the Affairs of Europe since the Peace of Utrecht, says, “The miserable gang
who dealt in poison and prophecy alleged that he had sold himself to the
devil, and that a young girl of the name of Dupin had been poisoned by his
means. Among other stories, they said he had made a contract with the
devil, in order to marry his son to the daughter of the Marquis of Louvois.
To this atrocious and absurd accusation the marshal, who had surrendered
himself at the Bastille on the first accusation against him, replied with the
mingled sentiment of pride and innocence, ‘When Mathieu de
Montmorenci, my ancestor, married the widow of Louis le Gros, he did not
have recourse to the devil, but to the states-general, in order to obtain for
the minor king the support of the house of Montmorenci.’ This brave man
was imprisoned in a cell six feet and a half long, and his trial, which was
interrupted for several weeks, lasted altogether fourteen months. No
judgment was pronounced upon him.”
The Countess of Soissons fled to Brussels, rather than undergo the risk of
a trial; and was never able to clear herself from the stigma that attached to
her, of having made an attempt to poison the Queen of Spain by doses of
succession-powder. The Duchess of Bouillon was arrested, and tried by the
Chambre Ardente. It would appear, however, that she had nothing to do
with the slow poisons, but had merely endeavoured to pry into the secrets
of futurity, and gratify her curiosity with a sight of the devil. One of the
presidents of the Chambre, La Reynie, an ugly little old man, very seriously
asked her whether she had really seen the devil; to which the lady replied,
looking him full in the face, “Oh, yes! I see him now. He is in the form of a

little ugly old man, exceedingly illnatured, and is dressed in the robes of a
Counsellor of State.” M. la Reynie prudently refrained from asking any
more questions of a lady with so sharp and ready a tongue. The duchess
was imprisoned for several months in the Bastille; and nothing being
proved against her, she was released at the intercession of her powerful
friends. The severe punishment of criminals of this note might have helped
to abate the fever of imitation among the vulgar;—their comparative
impunity had a contrary tendency. The escape of Penautier, and the
wealthy Cardinal de Bonzy his employer, had the most pernicious effect.
For two years longer the crime continued to rage, and was not finally
suppressed till the stake had blazed, or the noose dangled, for upwards of a
hundred individuals. 40

PALACE OF WOODSTOCK.

HAUNTED HOUSES.
Here’s a knocking indeed!… Knock! knock! knock!… Who’s there, i’
the name o’ Beelzebub?… Who’s there, i’ the devil’s name? Knock!
knock! knock!—Never at quiet?—Macbeth.

WHO has not either seen or heard of some house, shut up and
uninhabitable, fallen into decay, and looking dusty and dreary, from which,
at midnight, strange sounds have been heard to issue—aerial knockings—
the rattling of chains, and the groaning of perturbed spirits?—a house that
people have thought it unsafe to pass after dark, and which has remained
for years without a tenant, and which no tenant would occupy, even were
he paid to do so? There are hundreds of such houses in England at the
present day; hundreds in France, Germany, and almost every country of
Europe, which are marked with the mark of fear—places for the timid to
avoid, and the pious to bless themselves at, and ask protection from, as
they pass—the abodes of ghosts and evil spirits. There are many such
houses in London; and if any vain boaster of the march of intellect would
but take the trouble to find them out and count them, he would be
convinced that intellect must yet make some enormous strides before such
old superstitions can be eradicated.
The idea that such houses exist is a remnant of the witch creed, which
merits separate notice from its comparative harmlessness, and from its
being not so much a madness as a folly of the people. Unlike other notions
that sprang from the belief in witchcraft, and which we have already dwelt
upon at sufficient length, it has sent no wretches to the stake or the gibbet,
and but a few to the pillory only.
Many houses have been condemned as haunted, and avoided by the
weak and credulous, from circumstances the most trifling in themselves,

and which only wanted a vigorous mind to clear up, at once, and dissipate
all alarm. A house in Aix-la-Chapelle, a large desolate-looking building,
remained uninhabited for five years, on account of the mysterious
knockings that there were heard within it at all hours of the day and night.
Nobody could account for the noises; and the fear became at last so
excessive, that the persons who inhabited the houses on either side
relinquished their tenancy, and went to reside in other quarters of the
town, where there was less chance of interruption from evil spirits. From
being so long without an inhabitant, the house at last grew so ruinous, so
dingy, and so miserable in its outward appearance, and so like the place
that ghosts might be supposed to haunt, that few persons cared to go past it
after sunset. The knocking that was heard in one of the upper rooms was
not very loud, but it was very regular. The gossips of the neighbourhood
asserted that they often heard groans from the cellars, and saw lights
moved about from one window to another immediately after the midnight
bell had tolled. Spectres in white habiliments were reported to have gibed
and chattered from the windows; but all these stories could bear no
investigation. The knocking, however, was a fact which no one could
dispute, and several ineffectual attempts were made by the proprietor to
discover the cause. The rooms were sprinkled with holy water; the evil
spirits were commanded in due form, by a priest, to depart thence to the
Red Sea; but the knockings still continued, in spite of all that could be done
in that way. Accident at last discovered the cause, and restored tranquillity
to the neighbourhood. The proprietor, who suffered not only in his mind
but in his pocket, had sold the building at a ruinously small price, to get rid
of all future annoyance. The new proprietor was standing in a room on the
first floor when he heard the door driven to at the bottom with a
considerable noise, and then fly open immediately, about two inches and
no more. He stood still a minute and watched, and the same thing occurred
a second and a third time. He examined the door attentively, and all the
mystery was unravelled. The latch of the door was broken, so that it could

not be fastened, and it swung chiefly upon the bottom hinge. Immediately
opposite was a window, in which one pane of glass was broken; and when
the wind was in a certain quarter, the draught of air was so strong that it
blew the door to with some violence. There being no latch, it swung open
again; and when there was a fresh gust, was again blown to. The new
proprietor lost no time in sending for a glazier, and the mysterious noises
ceased for ever. The house was replastered and repainted, and once more
regained its lost good name. It was not before two or three years, however,
that it was thoroughly established in popular favour; and many persons,
even then, would always avoid passing it, if they could reach their
destination by any other street.
A similar story is narrated by Sir Walter Scott, in his Letters on
Demonology and Witchcraft, the hero of which was a gentleman of birth
and distinction, well known in the political world. Shortly after he
succeeded to his title and estates, there was a rumour among the servants
concerning a strange noise that used to be heard at night in the family
mansion, and the cause of which no one could ascertain. The gentleman
resolved to discover it himself, and to watch for that purpose with a
domestic who had grown old in the family, and who, like the rest, had
whispered strange things about the knocking having begun immediately
upon the death of his old master. These two watched until the noise was
heard, and at last traced it to a small store-room, used as a place for
keeping provisions of various kinds for the family, and of which the old
butler had the key. They entered this place, and remained for some time
without hearing the noises which they had traced thither. At length the
sound was heard, but much lower than it seemed to be while they were
farther off, and their imaginations were more excited. They then
discovered the cause without difficulty. A rat, caught in an old-fashioned
trap, had occasioned the noise by its efforts to escape, in which it was able
to raise the trap-door of its prison to a certain height, but was then obliged
to drop it. The noise of the fall resounding through the house had

occasioned the mysterious rumours, which, but for the investigation of the
proprietor, would, in all probability, have acquired so bad a name for the
dwelling that no servants would have inhabited it. The circumstance was
told to Sir Walter Scott by the gentleman to whom it happened.

SAINT LOUIS.

But, in general, houses that have acquired this character have been more
indebted for it to the roguery of living men than to accidents like these. Six
monks played off a clever trick of the kind upon that worthy king, Louis,
whose piety has procured him in the annals of his own country the
designation of “the Saint.” Having heard his confessor speak in terms of
warm eulogy of the goodness and learning of the monks of the order of St.
Bruno, he expressed his wish to establish a community of them near Paris.
Bernard de la Tour, the superior, sent six of the brethren, and the king gave
them a handsome house to live in in the village of Chantilly. It so happened
that from their windows they had a very fine view of the ancient palace of
Vauvert, which had been built for a royal residence by King Robert, but
deserted for many years. The worthy monks thought the palace would just
suit them; but their modesty was so excessive that they were ashamed to
ask the king for a grant of it in due form. This difficulty was not to be
overcome, and the monks set their ingenuity to work to discover another
plan. The palace of Vauvert had never laboured under any imputation upon

its character until they became its neighbours; but, somehow or other, it
almost immediately afterwards began to acquire a bad name. Frightful
shrieks were heard to proceed from it at night; blue, red, and green lights
were suddenly seen to glimmer from the windows, and as suddenly to
disappear; the clanking of chains was heard, and the howling as of persons
in great pain. These disturbances continued for several months, to the
great terror of all the country round, and even of the pious King Louis, to
whom, at Paris, all the rumours were regularly carried with whole heaps of
additions that accumulated on the way. At last a great spectre, clothed all
in pea-green, with a long white beard and a serpent’s tail, took his station
regularly at midnight in the principal window of the palace, and howled
fearfully, and shook his fists at the passengers. The six monks at Chantilly,
to whom all these things were duly narrated, were exceedingly wrath that
the devil should play such antics right opposite their dwelling, and hinted
to the commissioners sent down by Saint Louis to investigate the matter,
that if they were allowed to inhabit the palace, they would very soon make
a clearance of the evil spirits. The king was quite charmed with their piety,
and expressed to them how grateful he felt for their disinterestedness. A
deed was forthwith drawn up, the royal sign-manual was affixed to it, and
the palace of Vauvert became the property of the monks of St. Bruno. The
deed is dated 1259. The disturbances ceased immediately, the lights
disappeared, and the green ghost (so said the monks) was laid at rest for
ever under the waves of the Red Sea. 41
In the year 1580, one Gilles Blacre had taken the lease of a house in the
suburbs of Tours, but repenting him of his bargain with the landlord, Peter
Piquet, he endeavoured to prevail upon him to cancel the agreement. Peter,
however, was satisfied with his tenant and his terms, and would listen to
no compromise. Very shortly afterwards, the rumour was spread all over
Tours that the house of Gilles Blacre was haunted. Gilles himself asserted
that he verily believed his house to be the general rendezvous of all the
witches and evil spirits of France. The noise they made was awful, and

quite prevented him from sleeping. They knocked against the wall, howled
in the chimneys, broke his window-glass, scattered his pots and pans all
over his kitchen, and set his chairs and tables a dancing the whole night
through. Crowds of persons assembled round the house to hear the
mysterious noises: and the bricks were observed to detach themselves from
the wall, and fall into the streets upon the heads of those who had not said
their paternoster before coming out in the morning. These things having
continued for some time, Gilles Blacre made his complaint to the Civil
Court of Tours, and Peter Piquet was summoned to shew cause why the
lease should not be annulled. Poor Peter could make no defence, and the
court unanimously agreed that no lease could hold good under such
circumstances, and annulled it accordingly, condemning the unlucky
owner to all the expenses of the suit. Peter appealed to the parliament of
Paris; and after a long examination, the parliament confirmed the lease.
“Not,” said the judge, “because it has not been fully and satisfactorily
proved that the house is troubled by evil spirits, but that there was an
informality in the proceedings before the Civil Court of Tours, that
rendered its decision null and of no effect.”
A similar cause was tried before the Parliament of Bourdeaux, in the year
1595, relative to a house in that city which was sorely troubled by evil
spirits. The parliament appointed certain ecclesiastics to examine and
report to them, and on their report in the affirmative that the house was
haunted, the lease was annulled, and the tenant absolved from all payment
of rent and taxes. 42
One of the best stories of a haunted house is that of the royal palace of
Woodstock, in the year 1649, when the commissioners sent from London
by the Long Parliament to take possession of it, and efface all the emblems
of royalty about it, were fairly driven out by their fear of the devil, and the
annoyances they suffered from a roguish cavalier, who played the imp to
admiration. The commissioners, dreading at that time no devil, arrived at
Woodstock on the 13th of October, 1649. They took up their lodgings in the

late king’s apartments—turned the beautiful bedrooms and withdrawingrooms into kitchens and sculleries—the council-hall into a brew-house, and
made the dining-room a place to keep firewood in. They pulled down all
the insignia of royal state, and treated with the utmost indignity every
thing that recalled to their memory the name or the majesty of Charles
Stuart. One Giles Sharp accompanied them in the capacity of clerk, and
seconded their efforts, apparently with the greatest zeal. He aided them to
uproot a noble old tree, merely because it was called the King’s Oak, and
tossed the fragments into the dining-room to make cheerful fires for the
commissioners. During the first two days, they heard some strange noises
about the house, but they paid no great attention to them. On the third,
however, they began to suspect they had got into bad company; for they
heard, as they thought, a supernatural dog under their bed, which gnawed
their bed-clothes. On the next day, the chairs and tables began to dance,
apparently of their own accord. On the fifth day, something came into the
bedchamber and walked up and down; and fetching the warming-pan out
of the withdrawing-room, made so much noise with it that they thought
five church-bells were ringing in their ears. On the sixth day, the plates and
dishes were thrown up and down the dining-room. On the seventh, they
penetrated into the bedroom in company with several logs of wood, and
usurped the soft pillows intended for the commissioners. On the eighth and
ninth nights, there was a cessation of hostilities; but on the tenth, the
bricks in the chimneys became locomotive, and rattled and danced about
the floors, and round the heads of the commissioners, all the night long. On
the eleventh, the demon ran away with their breeches; and on the twelfth
filled their beds so full of pewter platters that they could not get into them.
On the thirteenth night, the glass became unaccountably seized with a fit of
cracking, and fell into shivers in all parts of the house. On the fourteenth,
there was a noise as if forty pieces of artillery had been fired off, and a
shower of pebble-stones, which so alarmed the commissioners that, “struck
with great horror, they cried out to one another for help.”

They first of all tried the efficacy of prayers to drive away the evil spirits;
but these proving unavailing, they began seriously to reflect whether it
would not be much better to leave the place altogether to the devils that
inhabited it. They ultimately resolved, however, to try it a little longer; and
having craved forgiveness of all their sins, betook themselves to bed. That
night they slept in tolerable comfort, but it was merely a trick of their
tormentor to lull them into false security. When, on the succeeding night,
they heard no noises, they began to flatter themselves that the devil was
driven out, and prepared accordingly to take up their quarters for the
whole winter in the palace. These symptoms on their part became the
signal for renewed uproar among the fiends. On the 1st of November, they
heard something walking with a slow and solemn pace up and down the
withdrawing-room, and immediately afterwards a shower of stones, bricks,
mortar, and broken glass pelted about their ears. On the 2d the steps were
again heard in the withdrawing-room, sounding to their fancy very much
like the treading of an enormous bear, which continued for about a quarter
of an hour. This noise having ceased, a large warming-pan was thrown
violently upon the table, followed by a number of stones and the jawbone
of a horse. Some of the boldest walked valiantly into the withdrawingroom, armed with swords and pistols; but could discover nothing. They
were afraid that night to go to sleep, and sat up, making fires in every
room, and burning candles and lamps in great abundance; thinking that, as
the fiends loved darkness, they would not disturb a company surrounded
with so much light. They were deceived, however: buckets of water came
down the chimneys and extinguished the fires; and the candles were blown
out, they knew not how. Some of the servants who had betaken themselves
to bed were drenched with putrid ditch-water as they lay, and arose in
great fright, muttering incoherent prayers, and exposing to the wondering
eyes of the commissioners their linen all dripping with green moisture, and
their knuckles red with the blows they had at the same time received from
some invisible tormentors. While they were still speaking, there was a

noise like the loudest thunder, or the firing of a whole park of artillery,
upon which they all fell down upon their knees and implored the protection
of the Almighty. One of the commissioners then arose, the others still
kneeling, and asked in a courageous voice, and in the name of God, who
was there, and what they had done that they should be troubled in that
manner. No answer was returned, and the noises ceased for a while. At
length, however, as the commissioners said, “the devil came again, and
brought with it seven devils worse than itself.” Being again in darkness,
they lighted a candle and placed it in the doorway, that it might throw a
light upon the two chambers at once; but it was suddenly blown out, and
one commissioner said that he had “seen the similitude of a horse’s hoof
striking the candle and candlestick into the middle of the chamber, and
afterwards making three scrapes on the snuff to put it out.” Upon this, the
same person was so bold as to draw his sword; but he asserted positively
that he had hardly withdrawn it from the scabbard before an invisible hand
seized hold of it and tugged with him for it, and prevailing, struck him so
violent a blow with the pommel that he was quite stunned. Then the noises
began again; upon which, with one accord, they all retired into the
presence-chamber, where they passed the night, praying and singing
psalms.
They were by this time convinced that it was useless to struggle any
longer with the powers of evil that seemed determined to make Woodstock
their own. These things happened on the Saturday night; and being
repeated on the Sunday, they determined to leave the place immediately,
and return to London. By Tuesday morning early, all their preparations
were completed; and, shaking the dust off their feet, and devoting
Woodstock and all its inhabitants to the infernal gods, they finally took
their departure. 43
Many years elapsed before the true cause of these disturbances was
discovered. It was ascertained at the Restoration, that the whole was the
work of Giles Sharp, the trusty clerk of the commissioners. This man,

whose real name was Joseph Collins, was a concealed royalist, and had
passed his early life within the bowers of Woodstock; so that he knew every
hole and corner of the place, and the numerous trap-doors and secret
passages that abounded in the building. The commissioners, never
suspecting the true state of his opinions, but believing him to be
revolutionary to the back-bone, placed the utmost reliance upon him; a
confidence which he abused in the manner above detailed, to his own great
amusement and that of the few cavaliers whom he let into the secret.
Quite as extraordinary and as cleverly managed was the trick played off
at Tedworth, in 1661, at the house of Mr. Mompesson, and which is so
circumstantially narrated by the Rev. Joseph Glanvil, under the title of The
Demon of Tedworth, and appended, among other proofs of witchcraft, to
his noted work called Sadducismus Triumphatus. About the middle of
April, in the year above mentioned, Mr. Mompesson, having returned to
his house at Tedworth from a journey he had taken to London, was
informed by his wife, that during his absence they had been troubled with
the most extraordinary noises. Three nights afterwards he heard the noise
himself; and it appeared to him to be that of “a great knocking at his doors,
and on the outside of his walls.” He immediately arose, dressed himself,
took down a pair of pistols, and walked valiantly forth to discover the
disturber, under the impression that it must be a robber; but, as he went,
the noise seemed to travel before or behind him; and when he arrived at
the door from which he thought it proceeded, he saw nothing, but still
heard “a strange hollow sound.” He puzzled his brains for a long time, and
searched every corner of the house; but discovering nothing, he went to
bed again. He was no sooner snug under the clothes than the noise began
again more furiously than ever, sounding very much like a “thumping and
drumming on the top of his house, and then by degrees going off into the
air.”
These things continued for several nights, when it came to the
recollection of Mr. Mompesson that some time before he had given orders

for the arrest and imprisonment of a wandering drummer, who went about
the country with a large drum, disturbing quiet people and soliciting alms,
and that he had detained the man’s drum, and that probably the drummer
was a wizard, and had sent evil spirits to haunt his house to be revenged of
him. He became strengthened in his opinion every day, especially when the
noises assumed, to his fancy, a resemblance to the beating of a drum, “like
that at the breaking up of a guard.” Mrs. Mompesson being brought to bed,
the devil, or the drummer, very kindly and considerately refrained from
making the usual riot; but, as soon as she recovered strength, began again
“in a ruder manner than before, following and vexing the young children,
and beating their bedsteads with so much violence that every one expected
they would fall in pieces.” For an hour together, as the worthy Mr.
Mompesson repeated to his wondering neighbours, this infernal drummer
“would beat ‘Roundheads and Cuckolds,’ the ‘Tat-too,’ and several other
points of war, as cleverly as any soldier.” When this had lasted long
enough, he changed his tactics, and scratched with his iron talons under
the children’s bed. “On the 5th of November,” says the Rev. Joseph Glanvil,
“it made a mighty noise; and a servant observing two boards in the
children’s room seeming to move, he bid it give him one of them. Upon
which the board came (nothing moving it that he saw) within a yard of him.
The man added, ‘Nay, let me have it in my hand;’ upon which the spirit,
devil, or drummer pushed it towards him so close that he might touch it.”
“This,” continues Glanvil, “was in the day-time, and was seen by a whole
room full of people. That morning it left a sulphureous smell behind it,
which was very offensive. At night the minister, one Mr. Cragg, and several
of the neighbours came to the house on a visit. Mr. Cragg went to prayers
with them, kneeling at the children’s bedside, where it then became very
troublesome and loud. During prayer-time, the spirit withdrew into the
cock-loft, but returned as soon as prayers were done; and then, in sight of
the company, the chairs walked about the room of themselves, the
children’s shoes were hurled over their heads, and every loose thing moved

about the chamber. At the same time, a bed-staff was thrown at the
minister, which hit him on the leg, but so favourably, that a lock of wool
could not have fallen more softly.” On another occasion, the blacksmith of
the village, a fellow who cared neither for ghost nor devil, slept with John
the footman, that he also might hear the disturbances and be cured of his
incredulity, when there “came a noise in the room as if one had been
shoeing a horse, and somewhat came, as it were, with a pair of pincers,”
snipping and snapping at the poor blacksmith’s nose the greater part of the
night. Next day it came panting like a dog out of breath; upon which some
woman present took a bed-staff to knock at it, “which was caught suddenly
out of her hand and thrown away; and company coming up, the room was
presently filled with a bloomy noisome smell, and was very hot, though
without fire, in a very sharp and severe winter. It continued in the bed,
panting and scratching for an hour and a half, and then went into the next
room, where it knocked a little, and seemed to rattle a chain.”
The rumour of these wonderful occurrences soon spread all over the
country, and people from far and near flocked to the haunted house of
Tedworth, to believe or doubt as their natures led them, but all filled with
intense curiosity. It appears, too, that the fame of these events reached the
royal ear, and that some gentlemen were sent by the king to investigate the
circumstances, and draw up a report of what they saw or heard. Whether
the royal commissioners were more sensible men than the neighbours of
Mr. Mompesson, and required more clear and positive evidence than they,
or whether the powers with which they were armed to punish any body
who might be found carrying on this deception frightened the evil-doers, is
not certain; but Glanvil himself reluctantly confesses that all the time they
were in the house the noises ceased, and nothing was heard or seen.
“However,” says he, “as to the quiet of the house when the courtiers were
there, the intermission may have been accidental, or perhaps the demon
was not willing to give so public a testimony of those transactions which

might possibly convince those who he had rather should continue in
unbelief of his existence.”
As soon as the royal commissioners took their departure, the infernal
drummer recommenced his antics, and hundreds of persons were daily
present to hear and wonder. Mr. Mompesson’s servant was so fortunate as
not only to hear, but to see this pertinacious demon, for it came and stood
at the foot of his bed. “The exact shape and proportion of it he could not
discover; but he saw a great body, with two red and glaring eyes, which, for
some time, were fixed steadily on him, and at length disappeared.”
Innumerable were the antics it played. Once it purred like a cat; beat the
children’s legs black and blue; put a long spike into Mr. Mompesson’s bed,
and a knife into his mother’s; filled the porringers with ashes; hid a Bible
under the grate; and turned the money black in people’s pockets. “One
night,” said Mr. Mompesson, in a letter to Mr. Glanvil, “there were seven or
eight of these devils in the shape of men, who, as soon as a gun was fired,
would shuffle away into an arbour;” a circumstance which might have
convinced Mr. Mompesson of the mortal nature of his persecutors, if he
had not been of the number of those worse than blind, who shut their eyes
and refuse to see.
In the mean time the drummer, the supposed cause of all the mischief,
passed his time in Gloucester gaol, whither he had been committed as a
rogue and a vagabond. Being visited one day by some person from the
neighbourhood of Tedworth, he asked what was the news in Wiltshire, and
whether people did not talk a great deal about a drumming in a
gentleman’s house there? The visitor replied that he heard of nothing else;
upon which the drummer observed, “I have done it; I have thus plagued
him; and he shall never be quiet until he hath made me satisfaction for
taking away my drum.” No doubt the fellow, who seems to have been a
gipsy, spoke the truth, and that the gang of which he was a member knew
more about the noises at Mr. Mompesson’s house than any body else. Upon
these words, however, he was brought to trial at Salisbury for witchcraft;

and, being found guilty, was sentenced to transportation; a sentence which,
for its leniency, excited no little wonder in that age, when such an
accusation, whether proved or not, generally insured the stake or the
gibbet. Glanvil says that the noises ceased immediately the drummer was
sent beyond the seas; but that, somehow or other, he managed to return
from transportation; “by raising storms and affrighting the seamen, it was
said;” when the disturbances were forthwith renewed, and continued at
intervals for several years. Certainly, if the confederates of this roving gipsy
were so pertinacious in tormenting poor weak Mr. Mompesson, their
pertinacity is a most extraordinary instance of what revenge is capable of.
It was believed by many, at the time, that Mr. Mompesson himself was
privy to the whole matter, and permitted and encouraged these tricks in his
house for the sake of notoriety; but it seems more probable that the gipsies
were the real delinquents, and that Mr. Mompesson was as much alarmed
and bewildered as his credulous neighbours, whose excited imaginations
conjured up no small portion of these stories,
“Which rolled, and as they rolled grew larger visibly.”
Many instances of a similar kind, during the seventeenth century, might
be gleaned from Glanvil and other writers of that period; but they do not
differ sufficiently from these to justify a detail of them. The most famous of
all haunted houses acquired its notoriety much nearer our own time; and
the circumstances connected with it are so curious, and afford so fair a
specimen of the easy credulity even of well-informed and sensible people,
as to merit a little notice in this chapter. The Cock-Lane Ghost, as it was
called, kept London in commotion for a considerable time, and was the
theme of conversation among the learned and the illiterate, and in every
circle, from that of the prince to that of the peasant.

THE HAUNTED HOUSE IN COCK LANE.

At the commencement of the year 1760, there resided in Cock Lane, near
West Smithfield, in the house of one Parsons, the parish clerk of St.
Sepulchre’s, a stockbroker, named Kent. The wife of this gentleman had
died in child-bed during the previous year, and his sister-in-law, Miss
Fanny, had arrived from Norfolk to keep his house for him. They soon
conceived a mutual affection, and each of them made a will in the other’s
favour. They lived some months in the house of Parsons, who, being a
needy man, borrowed money of his lodger. Some difference arose betwixt
them, and Mr. Kent left the house, and instituted legal proceedings against
the parish-clerk for the recovery of his money.
While this matter was yet pending, Miss Fanny was suddenly taken ill of
the small-pox; and, notwithstanding every care and attention, she died in a
few days, and was buried in a vault under Clerkenwell church. Parsons now
began to hint that the poor lady had come unfairly by her death, and that
Mr. Kent was accessory to it, from his too great eagerness to enter into
possession of the property she had bequeathed him. Nothing further was
said for nearly two years; but it would appear that Parsons was of so
revengeful a character, that he had never forgotten or forgiven his
differences with Mr. Kent, and the indignity of having been sued for the
borrowed money. The strong passions of pride and avarice were silently at
work during all that interval, hatching schemes of revenge, but dismissing

them one after the other as impracticable, until, at last, a notable one
suggested itself. About the beginning of the year 1762, the alarm was
spread over all the neighbourhood of Cock Lane, that the house of Parsons
was haunted by the ghost of poor Fanny, and that the daughter of Parsons,
a girl about twelve years of age, had several times seen and conversed with
the spirit, who had, moreover, informed her, that she had not died of the
small-pox, as was currently reported, but of poison, administered by Mr.
Kent. Parsons, who originated, took good care to countenance these
reports; and, in answer to numerous inquiries, said his house was every
night, and had been for two years, in fact, ever since the death of Fanny,
troubled by a loud knocking at the doors and in the walls. Having thus
prepared the ignorant and credulous neighbours to believe or exaggerate
for themselves what he had told them, he sent for a gentleman of a higher
class in life, to come and witness these extraordinary occurrences. The
gentleman came accordingly, and found the daughter of Parsons, to whom
the spirit alone appeared, and whom alone it answered, in bed, trembling
violently, having just seen the ghost, and been again informed that she had
died from poison. A loud knocking was also heard from every part of the
chamber, which so mystified the not very clear understanding of the
visitor, that he departed, afraid to doubt and ashamed to believe, but with a
promise to bring the clergyman of the parish and several other gentlemen
on the following day, to report upon the mystery.
On the following night he returned, bringing with him three clergymen,
and about twenty other persons, including two negroes, when, upon a
consultation with Parsons, they resolved to sit up the whole night, and
await the ghost’s arrival. It was then explained by Parsons, that although
the ghost would never render itself visible to any body but his daughter, it
had no objection to answer the questions that might be put to it, by any
person present, and that it expressed an affirmation by one knock, a
negative by two, and its displeasure by a kind of scratching. The child was
then put into bed along with her sister, and the clergymen examined the

bed and bed-clothes to satisfy themselves that no trick was played, by
knocking upon any substance concealed among the clothes. As on the
previous night, the bed was observed to shake violently.
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After some hours, during which they all waited with exemplary patience,
the mysterious knocking was heard in the wall, and the child declared that
she saw the ghost of poor Fanny. The following questions were then gravely
put by the clergyman, through the medium of one Mary Frazer, the servant
of Parsons, and to whom it was said the deceased lady had been much
attached. The answers were in the usual fashion, by a knock or knocks:
“Do you make this disturbance on account of the ill-usage you
received from Mr. Kent?”—“Yes.”
“Were you brought to an untimely end by poison?”—“Yes.”
“How was the poison administered, in beer or purl?”—“In purl.”
“How long was that before your death?”—“About three hours.”
“Can your former servant, Carrots, give any information about the
poison?”—“Yes.”
“Are you Kent’s wife’s sister?”—“Yes.”
“Were you married to Kent after your sister’s death?”—“No.”
“Was any body
murder?”—“No.”

else,

besides

Kent,

concerned

in

your

“Can you, if you like, appear visibly to any one?”—“Yes.”
“Will you do so?”—“Yes.”
“Can you go out of this house?”—“Yes.”
“Is it your intention to follow this child about every where?”—“Yes.”

“Are you pleased in being asked these questions?”—“Yes.”
“Does it ease your troubled soul?”—“Yes.”
[Here there was heard a mysterious noise, which some wiseacre
present compared to the fluttering of wings.]
“How long before your death did you tell your servant, Carrots, that
you were poisoned? An hour?”—“Yes.”
[Carrots, who was present, was appealed to; but she stated positively
that such was not the fact, as the deceased was quite speechless an
hour before her death. This shook the faith of some of the spectators,
but the examination was allowed to continue.]
“How long did Carrots live with you?”—“Three or four days.”
[Carrots was again appealed to, and said that this was true.]
“If Mr. Kent is arrested for this murder, will he confess?”—“Yes.”
“Would your soul be at rest if he were hanged for it?”—“Yes.”
“Will he be hanged for it?”—“Yes.”
“How long a time first?”—“Three years.”
“How many clergymen are there in this room?”—“Three.”
“How many negroes?”—“Two.”
“Is this watch (held up by one of the clergymen) white?”—“No.”
“Is it yellow?”—“No.”
“Is it blue?”—“No.”
“Is it black?”—“Yes.”
[The watch was in a black shagreen case.]
“At what time this morning will you take your departure?”
The answer to this question was four knocks, very distinctly heard by
every person present; and accordingly, at four o’clock precisely the ghost
took its departure to the Wheatsheaf public-house close by, where it
frightened mine host and his lady almost out of their wits, by knocking in
the ceiling right above their bed.

The rumour of these occurrences very soon spread over London, and
every day Cock Lane was rendered impassable by the crowds of people who
assembled around the house of the parish clerk, in expectation of either
seeing the ghost or of hearing the mysterious knocks. It was at last found
necessary, so clamorous were they for admission within the haunted
precincts, to admit those only who would pay a certain fee, an arrangement
which was very convenient to the needy and money-loving Mr. Parsons.
Indeed, things had taken a turn greatly to his satisfaction; he not only had
his revenge, but he made a profit out of it. The ghost, in consequence,
played its antics every night, to the great amusement of many hundreds of
people and the great perplexity of a still greater number.
Unhappily, however, for the parish clerk, the ghost was induced to make
some promises which were the means of utterly destroying its reputation.
It promised, in answer to the questions of the Rev. Mr. Aldritch of
Clerkenwell, that it would not only follow the little Miss Parsons wherever
she went, but would also attend him, or any other gentleman, into the vault
under St. John’s Church, where the body of the murdered woman was
deposited, and would there give notice of its presence by a distinct knock
upon the coffin. As a preliminary, the girl was conveyed to the house of Mr.
Aldritch near the church, where a large party of ladies and gentlemen,
eminent for their acquirements, their rank, or their wealth, had assembled.
About ten o’clock on the night of the first of February, the girl having been
brought from Cock Lane in a coach, was put to bed by several ladies in the
house of Mr. Aldritch; a strict examination having been previously made
that nothing was hidden in the bed-clothes. While the gentlemen in an
adjoining chamber were deliberating whether they should proceed in a
body to the vault, they were summoned into the bedroom by the ladies,
who affirmed, in great alarm, that the ghost was come, and that they heard
the knocks and scratches. The gentlemen entered accordingly, with a
determination to suffer no deception. The little girl, on being asked
whether she saw the ghost, replied, “No; but she felt it on her back like a

mouse.” She was then required to put her hands out of bed, and they being
held by some of the ladies, the spirit was summoned in the usual manner to
answer, if it were in the room. The question was several times put with
great solemnity; but the customary knock was not heard in reply in the
walls, neither was there any scratching. The ghost was then asked to render
itself visible, but it did not choose to grant the request. It was next solicited
to give some token of its presence by a sound of any sort, or by touching the
hand or cheek of any lady or gentleman in the room; but even with this
request the ghost would not comply.
There was now a considerable pause, and one of the clergymen went
down stairs to interrogate the father of the girl, who was waiting the result
of the experiment. He positively denied that there was any deception, and
even went so far as to say that he himself, upon one occasion, had seen and
conversed with the awful ghost. This having been communicated to the
company, it was unanimously resolved to give the ghost another trial; and
the clergyman called out in a loud voice to the supposed spirit, that the
gentleman to whom it had promised to appear in the vault was about to
repair to that place, where he claimed the fulfilment of its promise. At one
hour after midnight they all proceeded to the church, and the gentleman in
question, with another, entered the vault alone, and took up their position
alongside of the coffin of poor Fanny. The ghost was then summoned to
appear, but it appeared not; it was summoned to knock, but it knocked not;
it was summoned to scratch, but it scratched not; and the two retired from
the vault, with a firm belief that the whole business was a deception
practised by Parsons and his daughter. There were others, however, who
did not wish to jump so hastily to a conclusion, and who suggested that
they were perhaps trifling with this awful and supernatural being, which,
being offended with them for their presumption, would not condescend to
answer them. Again, after serious consultation, it was agreed on all hands
that if the ghost answered any body at all, it would answer Mr. Kent, the
supposed murderer; and he was accordingly requested to go down into the

vault. He went with several others, and summoned the ghost to answer
whether he had indeed poisoned her. There being no answer, the question
was put by Mr. Aldritch, who conjured it, if it were indeed a spirit, to end
their doubts, make a sign of its presence, and point out the guilty person.
There being still no answer for the space of half an hour, during which time
all these boobies waited with the most praiseworthy perseverance, they
returned to the house of Mr. Aldritch, and ordered the girl to get up and
dress herself. She was strictly examined, but persisted in her statement
that she used no deception, and that the ghost had really appeared to her.
So many persons had, by their openly expressed belief of the reality of
the visitation, identified themselves with it, that Parsons and his family
were far from being the only persons interested in the continuance of the
delusion. The result of the experiment convinced most people; but these
were not to be convinced by any evidence, however positive, and they
therefore spread abroad the rumour, that the ghost had not appeared in the
vault because Mr. Kent had taken care beforehand to have the coffin
removed. That gentleman, whose position was a very painful one,
immediately procured competent witnesses, in whose presence the vault
was entered, and the coffin of poor Fanny opened. Their depositions were
then published; and Mr. Kent indicted Parsons and his wife, his daughter,
Mary Frazer the servant, the Rev. Mr. Moor, and a tradesman, two of the
most prominent patrons of the deception, for a conspiracy. The trial came
on in the Court of King’s Bench, on the 10th of July, before Lord ChiefJustice Mansfield, when, after an investigation which lasted twelve hours,
the whole of the conspirators were found guilty. The Rev. Mr. Moor and his
friend were severely reprimanded in open court, and recommended to
make some pecuniary compensation to the prosecutor for the aspersions
they had been instrumental in throwing upon his character. Parsons was
sentenced to stand three times in the pillory, and to be imprisoned for two
years; his wife to one year’s, and his servant to six months’ imprisonment
in the Bridewell. A printer, who had been employed by them to publish an

account of the proceedings for their profit, was also fined fifty pounds, and
discharged.
The precise manner in which the deception was carried on has never
been explained. The knocking in the wall appears to have been the work of
Parsons’ wife, while the scratching part of the business was left to the little
girl. That any contrivance so clumsy could have deceived any body cannot
fail to excite our wonder. But thus it always is. If two or three persons can
only be found to take the lead in any absurdity, however great, there is sure
to be plenty of imitators. Like sheep in a field, if one clears the stile, the rest
will follow.
About ten years afterwards, London was again alarmed by the story of a
haunted house. Stockwell, near Vauxhall, the scene of the antics of this new
ghost, became almost as celebrated in the annals of superstition as Cock
Lane. Mrs. Golding, an elderly lady, who resided alone with her servant,
Anne Robinson, was sorely surprised on the evening of Twelfth-Day, 1772,
to observe a most extraordinary commotion among her crockery. Cups and
saucers rattled down the chimney—pots and pans were whirled down
stairs, or through the windows; and hams, cheeses, and loaves of bread
disported themselves upon the floor as if the devil were in them. This, at
least, was the conclusion that Mrs. Golding came to; and being greatly
alarmed, she invited some of her neighbours to stay with her, and protect
her from the evil one. Their presence, however, did not put a stop to the
insurrection of china, and every room in the house was in a short time
strewed with the fragments. The chairs and tables joined, at last, in the
tumult, and things looked altogether so serious and inexplicable, that the
neighbours, dreading that the house itself would next be seized with a fit of
motion, and tumble about their ears, left poor Mrs. Golding to bear the
brunt of it by herself. The ghost in this case was solemnly remonstrated
with, and urged to take its departure; but the demolition continuing as
great as before, Mrs. Golding finally made up her mind to quit the house
altogether. She took refuge with Anne Robinson in the house of a

neighbour; but his glass and crockery being immediately subjected to the
same persecution, he was reluctantly compelled to give her notice to quit.
The old lady thus forced back to her own house, endured the disturbance
for some days longer, when suspecting that Anne Robinson was the cause
of all the mischief, she dismissed her from her service. The extraordinary
appearances immediately ceased, and were never afterwards renewed; a
fact which is of itself sufficient to point out the real disturber. A long time
afterwards, Anne Robinson confessed the whole matter to the Reverend
Mr. Brayfield. This gentleman confided the story to Mr. Hone, who has
published an explanation of the mystery. Anne, it appears, was anxious to
have a clear house, to carry on an intrigue with her lover, and resorted to
this trick to effect her purpose. She placed the china on the shelves in such
a manner that it fell on the slightest motion, and attached horse-hairs to
other articles, so that she could jerk them down from an adjoining room
without being perceived by any one. She was exceedingly dexterous at this
sort of work, and would have proved a formidable rival to many a juggler
by profession. A full explanation of the whole affair may be found in the
Every-day Book.
The latest instance of the popular panic occasioned by a house supposed
to be haunted, occurred in Scotland, in the winter of the year 1838. On the
5th of December, the inmates of the farm-house of Baldarroch, in the
district of Banchory, Aberdeenshire, were alarmed by observing a great
number of sticks, pebble-stones, and clods of earth flying about their yard
and premises. They endeavoured, but in vain, to discover who was the
delinquent; and the shower of stones continuing for five days in succession,
they came at last to the conclusion that the devil and his imps were alone
the cause of it. The rumour soon spread over all that part of the country,
and hundreds of persons came from far and near to witness the antics of
the devils of Baldarroch. After the fifth day, the shower of clods and stones
ceased on the outside of the premises, and the scene shifted to the interior.
Spoons, knives, plates, mustard-pots, rolling-pins, and flat-irons appeared

suddenly endued with the power of self-motion, and were whirled from
room to room, and rattled down the chimneys in a manner which nobody
could account for. The lid of a mustard-pot was put into a cupboard by the
servant-girl in the presence of scores of people, and in a few minutes
afterwards came bouncing down the chimney, to the consternation of every
body. There was also a tremendous knocking at the doors and on the roof,
and pieces of stick and pebble-stones rattled against the windows and
broke them. The whole neighbourhood was a scene of alarm; and not only
the vulgar, but persons of education, respectable farmers, within a circle of
twenty miles, expressed their belief in the supernatural character of these
events, and offered up devout prayers to be preserved from the
machinations of the Evil One. The note of fear being once sounded, the
visitors, as is generally the case in all tales of wonder, strove with each
other who should witness the most extraordinary occurrences; and within a
week, it was generally believed in the parishes of Banchory-Ternan,
Drumoak, Durris, Kincardine-O’Neil, and all the circumjacent districts of
Mearns and Aberdeenshire, that the devil had been seen in the act of
hammering upon the house-top of Baldarroch. One old man asserted
positively that, one night, after having been to see the strange gambols of
the knives and mustard-pots, he met the phantom of a great black man,
“who wheeled round his head with a whizzing noise, making a wind about
his ears that almost blew his bonnet off,” and that he was haunted by him
in this manner for three miles. It was also affirmed and believed, that all
horses and dogs that approached this enchanted ground were immediately
affected; that a gentleman, slow of faith, had been cured of his incredulity
by meeting the butter-churn jumping in at the door as he himself was going
out; that the roofs of houses had been torn off, and that several ricks in the
corn-yard had danced a quadrille together, to the sound of the devil’s
bagpipes re-echoing from the mountain-tops. The women in the family of
the persecuted farmer of Baldarroch also kept their tongues in perpetual
motion; swelling with their strange stories the tide of popular wonder. The

goodwife herself, and all her servants, said that, whenever they went to
bed, they were attacked with stones and other missiles, some of which
came below the blankets and gently tapped their toes. One evening, a shoe
suddenly darted across a garret where some labourers were sitting, and one
of the men, who attempted to catch it, swore positively that it was so hot
and heavy he was unable to hold it. It was also said that the bearbeater (a
sort of mortar used to bruise barley in)—an object of such weight that it
requires several men to move it—spontaneously left the barn and flew over
the house-top, alighting at the feet of one of the servant-maids, and hitting
her, but without hurting her in the least, or even causing her any alarm; it
being a fact well known to her, that all objects thus thrown about by the
devil lost their specific gravity, and could harm nobody, even though they
fell upon a person’s head.
Among the persons drawn to Baldarroch by these occurrences were the
heritor, the minister, and all the elders of the Kirk, under whose
superintendence an investigation was immediately commenced. Their
proceedings were not promulgated for some days; and, in the mean time,
rumour continued to travel through all the Highlands, magnifying each
mysterious incident the farther it got from home. It was said, that when the
goodwife put her potato-pot on the fire, each potato, as the water boiled,
changed into a demon, and grinned horribly at her as she lifted the lid; that
not only chairs and tables, but carrots and turnips, skipped along the floor
in the merriest manner imaginable; that shoes and boots went through all
the evolutions of the Highland fling without any visible wearers directing
their motions; and that a piece of meat detached itself from the hook on
which it hung in the pantry, and placed itself before the fire, whence all the
efforts of the people of the house were unable to remove it until it was
thoroughly roasted; and that it then flew up the chimney with a
tremendous bang. At Baldarroch itself the belief was not quite so
extravagant; but the farmer was so convinced that the devil and his imps
were alone the cause of all the disturbance, that he travelled a distance of

forty miles to an old conjuror, named Willie Foreman, to induce him, for a
handsome fee, to remove the enchantment from his property. There were,
of course, some sensible and educated people, who, after stripping the
stories circulated of their exaggeration, attributed all the rest to one or
other of two causes; first, that some gipsies, or strolling mendicants,
hidden in the neighbouring plantation, were amusing themselves by
working on the credulity of the country people; or, secondly, that the
inmates of Baldarroch carried on this deception themselves, for some
reason or other, which was not very clear to any body. The last opinion
gained but few believers, as the farmer and his family were much
respected; and so many persons had, in the most open manner, expressed
their belief in the supernatural agency, that they did not like to stultify
themselves by confessing that they had been deceived.
At last, after a fortnight’s continuance of the noises, the whole trick was
discovered. The two servant lasses were strictly examined, and then
committed to prison. It appeared that they were alone at the bottom of the
whole affair, and that the extraordinary alarm and credulity of their master
and mistress, in the first instance, and of the neighbours and country
people afterwards, made their task comparatively easy. A little common
dexterity was all they had used; and, being themselves unsuspected, they
swelled the alarm by the wonderful stories they invented. It was they who
loosened the bricks in the chimneys, and placed the dishes in such a
manner on the shelves, that they fell on the slightest motion. In short, they
played the same tricks as those used by the servant girl at Stockwell, with
the same results, and for the same purpose—the gratification of a love of
mischief. They were no sooner secured in the county gaol than the noises
ceased, and most people were convinced that human agency alone had
worked all the wonder. Some few of the most devoutly superstitious still
held out in their first belief, and refused to listen to any explanation.
These tales of haunted houses, especially those of the last and present
century, however they may make us blush for popular folly, are yet

gratifying in their results; for they shew that society has made a vast
improvement. Had Parsons and his wife, and the other contrivers of the
Cock Lane deception, lived two hundred years earlier, they would not
perhaps have found a greater number of dupes, but they would have been
hanged as witches, instead of being imprisoned as vagabonds. The
ingenious Anne Robinson and the sly lasses of Baldarroch would doubtless
have met a similar fate. Thus it is pleasant to reflect, that though there may
be as much folly and credulity in the world as ever in one class of society,
there is more wisdom and mercy in another than ever were known before.
Lawgivers, by blotting from the statute-book the absurd or sanguinary
enactments of their predecessors, have made one step towards teaching the
people. It is to be hoped that the day is not far distant when lawgivers will
teach the people by some more direct means, and prevent the recurrence of
delusions like these, and many worse, which might be cited, by securing to
every child born within their dominions an education in accordance with
the advancing state of civilisation. If ghosts and witches are not yet
altogether exploded, it is the fault, not so much of the ignorant people, as of
the law and the government that have neglected to enlighten them.

POPULAR FOLLIES OF GREAT CITIES.
La faridondaine—la faridondon,
Vive la faridondaine!—Beranger.

THE popular humours of a great city are a never-failing
source of amusement to the man whose sympathies are hospitable
enough to embrace all his kind, and who, refined though he may be
himself, will not sneer at the humble wit or grotesque peculiarities of
the boozing mechanic, the squalid beggar, the vicious urchin, and all
the motley group of the idle, the reckless, and the imitative that
swarm in the alleys and broadways of a metropolis. He who walks
through a great city to find subjects for weeping, may find plenty at
every corner to wring his heart; but let such a man walk on his
course, and enjoy his grief alone—we are not of those who would
accompany him. The miseries of us poor earth-dwellers gain no
alleviation from the sympathy of those who merely hunt them out to
be pathetic over them. The weeping philosopher too often impairs
his eyesight by his woe, and becomes unable from his tears to see the
remedies for the evils which he deplores. Thus it will often be found

that the man of no tears is the truest philanthropist, as he is the best
physician who wears a cheerful face, even in the worst of cases.
So many pens have been employed to point out the miseries, and
so many to condemn the crimes and vices, and more serious follies of
the multitude, that ours shall not increase the number, at least in this
chapter. Our present task shall be less ungracious, and wandering
through the busy haunts of great cities, we shall seek only for
amusement, and note as we pass a few of the harmless follies and
whimsies of the poor.
And, first of all, walk where we will, we cannot help hearing from
every side a phrase repeated with delight, and received with laughter,
by men with hard hands and dirty faces, by saucy butcher lads and
errand-boys, by loose women, by hackney coachmen, cabrioletdrivers, and idle fellows who loiter at the corners of streets. Not one
utters this phrase without producing a laugh from all within hearing.
It seems applicable to every circumstance, and is the universal
answer to every question; in short, it is the favourite slang phrase of
the day, a phrase that, while its brief season of popularity lasts,
throws a dash of fun and frolicsomeness over the existence of squalid
poverty and ill-requited labour, and gives them reason to laugh as
well as their more fortunate fellows in a higher stage of society.
London is peculiarly fertile in this sort of phrases, which spring up
suddenly, no one knows exactly in what spot, and pervade the whole
population in a few hours, no one knows how. Many years ago the
favourite phrase (for, though but a monosyllable, it was a phrase in
itself) was Quoz. This odd word took the fancy of the multitude in an
extraordinary degree, and very soon acquired an almost boundless
meaning. When vulgar wit wished to mark its incredulity, and raise a

laugh at the same time, there was no resource so sure as this popular
piece of slang. When a man was asked a favour which he did not
choose to grant, he marked his sense of the suitor’s unparalleled
presumption by exclaiming Quoz! When a mischievous urchin
wished to annoy a passenger, and create mirth for his comrades, he
looked him in the face, and cried out Quoz! and the exclamation
never failed in its object. When a disputant was desirous of throwing
a doubt upon the veracity of his opponent, and getting summarily rid
of an argument which he could not overturn, he uttered the word
Quoz, with a contemptuous curl of his lip, and an impatient shrug of
his shoulders. The universal monosyllable conveyed all his meaning,
and not only told his opponent that he lied, but that he erred
egregiously if he thought that any one was such a nincompoop as to
believe him. Every alehouse resounded with Quoz; every streetcorner was noisy with it, and every wall for miles around was chalked
with it.
But, like all other earthly things, Quoz had its season, and passed
away as suddenly as it arose, never again to be the pet and the idol of
the populace. A new claimant drove it from its place, and held
undisputed sway till, in its turn, it was hurled from its pre-eminence,
and a successor appointed in its stead.
“What a shocking bad hat!” was the phrase that was next in vogue.
No sooner had it become universal, than thousands of idle but sharp
eyes were on the watch for the passenger whose hat shewed any
signs, however slight, of ancient service. Immediately the cry arose,
and, like the war-whoop of the Indians, was repeated by a hundred
discordant throats. He was a wise man who, finding himself under
these circumstances “the observed of all observers,” bore his honours

meekly. He who shewed symptoms of ill-feeling at the imputations
cast upon his hat, only brought upon himself redoubled notice. The
mob soon perceive whether a man is irritable, and, if of their own
class, they love to make sport of him. When such a man, and with
such a hat, passed in those days through a crowded neighbourhood,
he might think himself fortunate if his annoyances were confined to
the shouts and cries of the populace. The obnoxious hat was often
snatched from his head and thrown into the gutter by some practical
joker, and then raised, covered with mud, upon the end of a stick, for
the admiration of the spectators, who held their sides with laughter,
and exclaimed, in the pauses of their mirth, “Oh, what a shocking
bad hat!” “What a shocking bad hat!” Many a nervous poor man,
whose purse could but ill spare the outlay, doubtless purchased a
new hat before the time, in order to avoid exposure in this manner.
The origin of this singular saying, which made fun for the
metropolis for months, is not involved in the same obscurity as that
which shrouds the origin of Quoz and some others. There had been a
hotly contested election for the borough of Southwark, and one of the
candidates was an eminent hatter. This gentleman, in canvassing the
electors, adopted a somewhat professional mode of conciliating their
good-will, and of bribing them without letting them perceive that
they were bribed. Whenever he called upon or met a voter whose hat
was not of the best material, or, being so, had seen its best days, he
invariably said, “What a shocking bad hat you have got; call at my
warehouse, and you shall have a new one!” Upon the day of election
this circumstance was remembered, and his opponents made the
most of it, by inciting the crowd to keep up an incessant cry of “What
a shocking bad hat!” all the time the honourable candidate was

addressing them. From Southwark the phrase spread over all
London, and reigned for a time the supreme slang of the season.
Hookey Walker, derived from the chorus of a popular ballad, was
also high in favour at one time, and served, like its predecessor Quoz,
to answer all questions. In the course of time, the latter word alone
became the favourite, and was uttered with a peculiar drawl upon the
first syllable, and a sharp turn upon the last. If a lively servant girl
was importuned for a kiss by a fellow she did not care about, she
cocked her little nose, and cried “Walker!” If a dustman asked his
friend for the loan of a shilling, and his friend was either unable or
unwilling to accommodate him, the probable answer he would
receive was, “Walker!” If a drunken man was reeling about the
streets, and a boy pulled his coat-tails, or a man knocked his hat over
his eyes to make fun of him, the joke was always accompanied by the
same exclamation. This lasted for two or three months, and
“Walker!” walked off the stage, never more to be revived for the
entertainment of that or any future generation.
The next phrase was a most preposterous one. Who invented it,
how it arose, or where it was first heard, are alike unknown. Nothing
about it is certain, but that for months it was the slang par excellence
of the Londoners, and afforded them a vast gratification. “There he
goes with his eye out!” or “There she goes with her eye out!” as the
sex of the party alluded to might be, was in the mouth of every body
who knew the town. The sober part of the community were as much
puzzled by this unaccountable saying as the vulgar were delighted
with it. The wise thought it very foolish, but the many thought it very
funny, and the idle amused themselves by chalking it upon walls, or
scribbling it upon monuments. But “all that’s bright must fade,” even

in slang. The people grew tired of their hobby, and “There he goes
with his eye out!” was heard no more in its accustomed haunts.
Another very odd phrase came into repute in a brief space
afterwards, in the form of the impertinent and not universally
apposite query, “Has your mother sold her mangle?” But its
popularity was not of that boisterous and cordial kind which ensures
a long continuance of favour. What tended to impede its progress
was, that it could not be well applied to the older portions of society.
It consequently ran but a brief career, and then sank into oblivion.
Its successor enjoyed a more extended fame, and laid its foundations
so deep, that years and changing fashions have not sufficed to
eradicate it. This phrase was “Flare up!” and it is, even now, a
colloquialism in common use. It took its rise in the time of the
Reform riots, when Bristol was nearly half burned by the infuriated
populace. The flames were said to have flared up in the devoted city.
Whether there was any thing peculiarly captivating in the sound, or
in the idea of these words, is hard to say; but whatever was the
reason, it tickled the mob-fancy mightily, and drove all other slang
out of the field before it. Nothing was to be heard all over London but
“flare up!” It answered all questions, settled all disputes, was applied
to all persons, all things, and all circumstances, and became
suddenly the most comprehensive phrase in the English language.
The man who had overstepped the bounds of decorum in his speech
was said to have flared up; he who had paid visits too repeated to the
gin-shop, and got damaged in consequence, had flared up. To put
one’s self into a passion; to stroll out on a nocturnal frolic, and alarm
a neighbourhood, or to create a disturbance in any shape, was to
flare up. A lovers’ quarrel was a flare up; so was a boxing-match

between two blackguards in the streets; and the preachers of sedition
and revolution recommended the English nation to flare up, like the
French. So great a favourite was the word, that people loved to repeat
it for its very sound. They delighted apparently in hearing their own
organs articulate it; and labouring men, when none who could
respond to the call were within hearing, would often startle the
aristocratic echoes of the West by the well-known slang phrase of the
East. Even in the dead hours of the night, the ears of those who
watched late, or who could not sleep, were saluted with the same
sound. The drunkard reeling home shewed that he was still a man
and a citizen, by calling “flare up!” in the pauses of his hiccough.
Drink had deprived him of the power of arranging all other ideas; his
intellect was sunk to the level of the brute’s; but he clung to
humanity by the one last link of the popular cry. While he could
vociferate that sound, he had rights as an Englishman, and would not
sleep in a gutter, like a dog! Onwards he went, disturbing quiet
streets and comfortable people by his whoop, till exhausted nature
could support him no more, and he rolled powerless into the road.
When, in due time afterwards, the policeman stumbled upon him as
he lay, that guardian of the peace turned the full light of his lantern
on his face, and exclaimed, “Here’s a poor devil who has been flaring
up!” Then came the stretcher, on which the victim of deep potations
was carried to the watch-house, and pitched into a dirty cell, among a
score of wretches about as far gone as himself, who saluted their new
comrade by a loud, long shout of flare up!
So universal was this phrase, and so enduring seemed its
popularity, that a speculator, who knew not the evanescence of slang,
established a weekly newspaper under its name. But he was like the

man who built his house upon the sand; his foundation gave way
under him, and the phrase and the newspaper were washed into the
mighty sea of the things that were. The people grew at last weary of
the monotony, and “flare up” became vulgar even among them.
Gradually it was left to little boys who did not know the world, and in
process of time sank altogether into neglect. It is now heard no more
as a piece of popular slang; but the words are still used to signify any
sudden outburst either of fire, disturbance, or ill-nature.
The next phrase that enjoyed the favour of the million was less
concise, and seems to have been originally aimed against precocious
youths who gave themselves the airs of manhood before their time.
“Does your mother know you’re out?” was the provoking query
addressed to young men of more than reasonable swagger, who
smoked cigars in the streets, and wore false whiskers to look
irresistible. We have seen many a conceited fellow who could not
suffer a woman to pass him without staring her out of countenance,
reduced at once into his natural insignificance by the mere utterance
of this phrase. Apprentice lads and shopmen in their Sunday clothes
held the words in abhorrence, and looked fierce when they were
applied to them. Altogether the phrase had a very salutary effect, and
in a thousand instances shewed young Vanity that it was not half so
pretty and engaging as it thought itself. What rendered it so
provoking was the doubt it implied as to the capability of selfguidance possessed by the individual to whom it was addressed.
“Does your mother know you’re out?” was a query of mock concern
and solicitude, implying regret and concern that one so young and
inexperienced in the ways of a great city should be allowed to wander
abroad without the guidance of a parent. Hence the great wrath of

those who verged on manhood, but had not reached it, whenever
they were made the subject of it. Even older heads did not like it; and
the heir of a ducal house, and inheritor of a warrior’s name, to whom
they were applied by a cabriolet-driver who was ignorant of his rank,
was so indignant at the affront, that he summoned the offender
before the magisterial bench. The fellow had wished to impose upon
his lordship by asking double the fare he was entitled to; and when
his lordship resisted the demand, he was insultingly asked “if his
mother knew he was out?” All the drivers on the stand joined in the
query, and his lordship was fain to escape their laughter by walking
away with as much haste as his dignity would allow. The man
pleaded ignorance that his customer was a lord, but offended justice
fined him for his mistake.
When this phrase had numbered its appointed days, it died away
like its predecessors, and “Who are you?” reigned in its stead. This
new favourite, like a mushroom, seems to have sprung up in a night,
or, like a frog in Cheapside, to have come down in a sudden shower.
One day it was unheard, unknown, uninvented; the next it pervaded
London. Every alley resounded with it; every highway was musical
with it,
“And street to street, and lane to lane flung back
The one unvarying cry.”
The phrase was uttered quickly, and with a sharp sound upon the
first and last words, leaving the middle one little more than an
aspiration. Like all its compeers which had been extensively popular,
it was applicable to almost every variety of circumstance. The lovers

of a plain answer to a plain question did not like it at all. Insolence
made use of it to give offence; ignorance to avoid exposing itself; and
waggery to create laughter. Every new comer into an alehouse taproom was asked unceremoniously, “Who are you?” and if he looked
foolish, scratched his head, and did not know what to reply, shouts of
boisterous merriment resounded on every side. An authoritative
disputant was not unfrequently put down, and presumption of every
kind checked by the same query. When its popularity was at its
height, a gentleman, feeling the hand of a thief in his pocket, turned
suddenly round and caught him in the act, exclaiming, “Who are
you?” The mob which gathered round applauded to the very echo,
and thought it the most capital joke they had ever heard, the very
acmé of wit, the very essence of humour. Another circumstance of a
similar kind gave an additional fillip to the phrase, and infused new
life and vigour into it just as it was dying away. The scene occurred in
the chief criminal court of the kingdom. A prisoner stood at the bar;
the offence with which he had been charged was clearly proved
against him; his counsel had been heard, not in his defence, but in
extenuation, insisting upon his previous good life and character as
reasons for the lenity of the court. “And where are your witnesses?”
inquired the learned judge who presided. “Please you, my lord, I
knows the prisoner at the bar, and a more honester feller never
breathed,” said a rough voice in the gallery. The officers of the court
looked aghast, and the strangers tittered with ill-suppressed
laughter. “Who are you?” said the judge, looking suddenly up, but
with imperturbable gravity. The court was convulsed; the titter broke
out into a laugh; and it was several minutes before silence and
decorum could be restored. When the ushers recovered their self-

possession, they made diligent search for the profane transgressor;
but he was not to be found. Nobody knew him; nobody had seen him.
After a while the business of the court again proceeded. The next
prisoner brought up for trial augured favourably of his prospects
when he learned that the solemn lips of the representative of justice
had uttered the popular phrase as if he felt and appreciated it. There
was no fear that such a judge would use undue severity. His heart
was with the people; he understood their language and their
manners, and would make allowances for the temptations which
drove them into crime. So thought many of the prisoners, if we may
infer it from the fact that the learned judge suddenly acquired an
immense increase of popularity. The praise of his wit was in every
mouth, and “Who are you?” renewed its lease, and remained in
possession of public favour for another term in consequence.
But it must not be supposed that there were no interregna between
the dominion of one slang phrase and another. They did not arise in
one long line of unbroken succession, but shared with song the
possession of popular favour. Thus, when the people were in the
mood for music, slang advanced its claims to no purpose; and when
they were inclined for slang, the sweet voice of music wooed them in
vain. About thirty years ago London resounded with one chorus, with
the love of which every body seemed to be smitten. Girls and boys,
young men and old, maidens and wives and widows, were all alike
musical. There was an absolute mania for singing; and the worst of it
was, that, like good Father Philip in the romance of The Monastery,
they seemed utterly unable to change their tune. “Cherry ripe!”
“Cherry ripe!” was the universal cry of all the idle in the town. Every
unmelodious voice gave utterance to it; every crazy fiddle, every

cracked flute, every wheezy pipe, every street-organ was heard in the
same strain, until studious and quiet men stopped their ears in
desperation, or fled miles away into the fields or woodlands to be at
peace. This plague lasted for a twelvemonth, until the very name of
cherries became an abomination in the land. At last the excitement
wore itself away, and the tide of favour set in a new direction.
Whether it was another song or a slang phrase is difficult to
determine at this distance of time; but certain it is, that very shortly
afterwards people went mad upon a dramatic subject, and nothing
was to be heard of but “Tommy and Jerry.” Verbal wit had amused
the multitude long enough, and they became more practical in their
recreation. Every youth on the town was seized with the fierce desire
of distinguishing himself by knocking down the “charlies,” being
locked up all night in a watch-house, or kicking up a row among
loose women and blackguard men in the low dens of St. Giles’s.
Imitative boys vied with their elders in similar exploits, until this
unworthy passion (for such it was) had lasted, like other follies, its
appointed time, and the town became merry after another fashion. It
was next thought the height of vulgar wit to answer all questions by
placing the point of the thumb upon the tip of the nose, and twirling
the fingers in the air. If one man wished to insult or annoy another,
he had only to make use of this cabalistic sign in his face, and his
object was accomplished. At every street-corner where a group was
assembled, the spectator who was curious enough to observe their
movements would be sure to see the fingers of some of them at their
noses, either as a mark of incredulity, surprise, refusal, or mockery,
before he had watched two minutes. There is some remnant of this

absurd custom to be seen to this day; but it is thought low even
among the vulgar.
About

sixteen

years

ago,

London

became

again

most

preposterously musical. The vox populi wore itself hoarse by singing
the praises of “The Sea, the Sea!” If a stranger (and a philosopher)
had walked through London, and listened to the universal chorus, he
might have constructed a very pretty theory upon the love of the
English for the sea-service, and our acknowledged superiority over
all other nations upon that element. “No wonder,” he might have
said, “that this people is invincible upon the ocean. The love of it
mixes with their daily thoughts; they celebrate it even in the marketplace; their street-minstrels excite charity by it; and high and low,
young and old, male and female, chant lo pæans in its praise. Love is
not honoured in the national songs of this warlike race—Bacchus is
no god to them; they are men of sterner mould, and think only of ‘the
Sea, the Sea!’ and the means of conquering upon it.”
Such would, doubtless, have been his impression if he had taken
the evidence only of his ears. Alas, in those days for the refined ears
that were musical! great was their torture when discord, with its
thousand diversities of tone, struck up this appalling anthem—there
was no escape from it. The migratory minstrels of Savoy caught the
strain, and pealed it down the long vistas of quiet streets, till their
innermost and snuggest apartments re-echoed with the sound. Men
were obliged to endure this crying evil for full six months, wearied to
desperation, and made sea-sick on the dry land.
Several other songs sprang up in due succession, afterwards, but
none of them, with the exception of one, entitled “All round my Hat,”
enjoyed any extraordinary share of favour, until an American actor

introduced a vile song called “Jim Crow.” The singer sang his verses
in appropriate costume, with grotesque gesticulations, and a sudden
whirl of his body at the close of each verse. It took the taste of the
town immediately, and for months the ears of orderly people were
stunned by the senseless chorus—
“Turn about and wheel about,
And do just so—
Turn about and wheel about,
And jump, Jim Crow!”
Street-minstrels blackened their faces in order to give proper effect
to the verses; and fatherless urchins, who had to choose between
thieving and singing for their livelihood, took the latter course, as
likely to be the more profitable, as long as the public taste remained
in that direction. The uncouth dance, its accompaniment, might be
seen in its full perfection on market nights in any great thoroughfare;
and the words of the song might be heard, piercing above all the din
and buzz of the ever-moving multitude. He, the calm observer, who
during the hey-day popularity of this doggrel,
“Sate beside the public way,
Thick strewn with summer dust, and saw the stream
Of people there was hurrying to and fro,
Numerous as gnats upon the evening gleam,”
might have exclaimed with Shelley, that

“The million, with fierce song and maniac dance,
Did rage around.”
The philosophic theorist we have already supposed soliloquising
upon the English character, and forming his opinion of it from their
exceeding love for a sea-song, might, if he had again dropped
suddenly into London, have formed another very plausible theory to
account for our unremitting efforts for the abolition of the slavetrade. “Benevolent people!” he might have said, “how unbounded are
your sympathies! Your unhappy brethren of Africa, differing from
you only in the colour of their skins, are so dear to you, and you
begrudge so little the twenty millions you have paid on their behalf,
that you love to have a memento of them continually in your sight.
Jim Crow is the representative of that injured race, and as such is the
idol of your populace! See how they all sing his praises! how they
imitate his peculiarities! how they repeat his name in their moments
of leisure and relaxation! They even carve images of him to adorn
their hearths, that his cause and his sufferings may never be
forgotten! Oh, philanthropic England! oh, vanguard of civilisation!”
Such are a few of the peculiarities of the London multitude, when
no riot, no execution, no murder, no balloon, disturbs the even
current of their thoughts. These are the whimsies of the mass—the
harmless follies by which they unconsciously endeavour to lighten
the load of care which presses upon their existence. The wise man,
even though he smile at them, will not altogether withhold his
sympathy, and will say, “Let them enjoy their slang phrases and their
choruses if they will; and if they cannot be happy, at least let them be
merry.” To the Englishman, as well as to the Frenchman of whom

Beranger sings, there may be some comfort in so small a thing as a
song, and we may own with him that
“Au peuple attristé
Ce qui rendra la gaîté,
C’est la GAUDRIOLE!
O gué!
C’est la GAUDRIOLE!”

SHERWOOD FOREST.

POPULAR ADMIRATION OF GREAT THIEVES.
Jack. Where shall we find such another set of practical philosophers, who,
to a man, are above the fear of death!
Wat. Sound men and true!
Robin. Of tried courage and indefatigable industry!
Ned. Who is there here that would not die for his friend?
Harry. Who is there here that would betray him for his interest?
Mat. Shew me a gang of courtiers that could say as much!
Dialogue of Thieves in the Beggar’s Opera.

WHETHER it be that the multitude, feeling the pangs of poverty, sympathise
with the daring and ingenious depredators who take away the rich man’s
superfluity, or whether it be the interest that mankind in general feel for
the records of perilous adventure, it is certain that the populace of all
countries look with admiration upon great and successful thieves. Perhaps
both these causes combine to invest their career with charms in the
popular eye. Almost every country in Europe has its traditional thief, whose
exploits are recorded with all the graces of poetry, and whose trespasses
“Are cited up in rhymes,
And sung by children in succeeding tunes.” 45
Those travellers who have made national manners and characteristics
their peculiar study, have often observed and remarked upon this feeling.
The learned Abbé le Blanc, who resided for some time in England at the
commencement of the eighteenth century, says, in his amusing letters on
the English and French nations, that he continually met with Englishmen

who were not less vain in boasting of the success of their highwaymen than
of the bravery of their troops. Tales of their address, their cunning, or their
generosity, were in the mouths of every body, and a noted thief was a kind
of hero in high repute. He adds that the mob, in all countries, being easily
moved, look in general with concern upon criminals going to the gallows;
but an English mob looked upon such scenes with extraordinary interest:
they delighted to see them go through their last trials with resolution, and
applauded those who were insensible enough to die as they had lived,
braving the justice both of God and men: such, he might have added, as the
noted robber Macpherson, of whom the old ballad says:
“Sae rantingly, sae wantonly,
Sae dauntingly gaed he:
He played a spring, and danced it round
Beneath the gallows tree.”
Among these traditional thieves the most noted in England, or perhaps
in any country, is Robin Hood, a name which popular affection has
encircled with a peculiar halo. “He robbed the rich to give to the poor;” and
his reward has been an immortality of fame, a tithe of which would be
thought more than sufficient to recompense a benefactor of his species.
Romance and poetry have been emulous to make him all their own; and
the forest of Sherwood, in which he roamed with his merry men, armed
with their long bows, and clad in Lincoln green, has become the resort of
pilgrims, and a classic spot sacred to his memory. The few virtues he had,
which would have ensured him no praise if he had been an honest man,
have been blazoned forth by popular renown during seven successive
centuries, and will never be forgotten while the English tongue endures.
His charity to the poor, and his gallantry and respect for women, have
made him the pre-eminent thief of all the world.

Among English thieves of a later date, who has not heard of Claude
Duval, Dick Turpin, Jonathan Wild, and Jack Sheppard, those knights of
the road and of the town, whose peculiar chivalry formed at once the dread
and the delight of England during the eighteenth century? Turpin’s fame is
unknown to no portion of the male population of England after they have
attained the age of ten. His wondrous ride from London to York has
endeared him to the imagination of millions; his cruelty in placing an old
woman upon a fire, to force her to tell him where she had hidden her
money, is regarded as a good joke; and his proud bearing upon the scaffold
is looked upon as a virtuous action. The Abbé le Blanc, writing in 1737, says
he was continually entertained with stories of Turpin—how, when he
robbed gentlemen, he would generously leave them enough to continue
their journey, and exact a pledge from them never to inform against him,
and how scrupulous such gentlemen were in keeping their word. He was
one day told a story with which the relator was in the highest degree
delighted. Turpin, or some other noted robber, stopped a man whom he
knew to be very rich, with the usual salutation—“Your money or your life!”
but not finding more than five or six guineas about him, he took the liberty
of entreating him, in the most affable manner, never to come out so ill
provided; adding that, if he fell in with him, and he had no more than such
a paltry sum, he would give him a good licking. Another story, told by one
of Turpin’s admirers, was of a robbery he had committed upon a Mr. C.
near Cambridge. He took from this gentleman his watch, his snuff-box, and
all his money but two shillings, and, before he left him, required his word
of honour that he would not cause him to be pursued or brought before a
justice. The promise being given, they both parted very courteously. They
afterwards met at Newmarket, and renewed their acquaintance. Mr. C.
kept his word religiously; he not only refrained from giving Turpin into
custody, but made a boast that he had fairly won some of his money back
again in an honest way. Turpin offered to bet with him on some favourite
horse, and Mr. C. accepted the wager with as good a grace as he could have

done from the best gentleman in England. Turpin lost his bet and paid it
immediately, and was so smitten with the generous behaviour of Mr. C.,
that he told him how deeply he regretted that the trifling affair which had
happened between them did not permit them to drink together. The
narrator of this anecdote was quite proud that England was the birthplace
of such a highwayman. 46
Not less familiar to the people of England is the career of Jack Sheppard,
as brutal a ruffian as ever disgraced his country, but who has claims upon
the popular admiration which are very generally acknowledged. He did not,
like Robin Hood, plunder the rich to relieve the poor, nor rob with an
uncouth sort of courtesy, like Turpin; but he escaped from Newgate with
the fetters on his limbs. This achievement, more than once repeated, has
encircled his felon brow with the wreath of immortality, and made him
quite a pattern thief among the populace. He was no more than twentythree years of age at the time of his execution, and he died much pitied by
the crowd. His adventures were the sole topics of conversation for months;
the print-shops were filled with his effigies, and a fine painting of him was
made by Sir Richard Thornhill. The following complimentary verses to the
artist appeared in the British Journal of November 28th, 1724:
“Thornhill! ’tis thine to gild with fame
Th’ obscure, and raise the humble name;
To make the form elude the grave,
And Sheppard from oblivion save!
Apelles Alexander drew—
Cæsar is to Aurelius due;
Cromwell in Lilly’s works doth shine,
And Sheppard, Thornhill, lives in thine!”

This was a very equivocal sort of compliment, and might have meant,
that if Apelles were worthy to paint a monarch, Thornhill was worthy to
paint a thief. But the artist did not view it in that light, nor did the public;
for they considered the verses to be very neat, pointed, and flattering. So
high was Jack’s fame, that he was thought a very fit subject for the stage;
and a pantomime entertainment, called “Harlequin Jack Sheppard,” was
devised by one Thurmond, and brought out with considerable success at
Drury Lane Theatre. All the scenes were painted from nature, including the
public-house that the robber frequented in Clare Market, and the
condemned cell from which he had made his escape in Newgate. 47
The Rev. Mr. Villette, the editor of the Annals of Newgate, published in
1754, relates a curious sermon, which he says a friend of his heard
delivered by a street-preacher about the time of Jack’s execution. The
orator, after animadverting on the great care men took of their bodies, and
the little care they bestowed upon their souls, continued as follows, by way
of exemplifying the position:—“We have a remarkable instance of this in a
notorious malefactor, well known by the name of Jack Sheppard. What
amazing difficulties has he overcome! what astonishing things has he
performed! and all for the sake of a stinking, miserable carcass, hardly
worth the hanging! How dexterously did he pick the chain of his padlock
with a crooked nail! how manfully he burst his fetters asunder, climb up
the chimney, wrench out an iron bar, break his way through a stone wall,
make the strong door of a dark entry fly before him, till he got upon the
leads of the prison, then, fixing a blanket to the wall with a spike, he stole
out of the chapel! How intrepidly did he descend to the top of the turner’s
house! how cautiously pass down the stair, and make his escape to the
street-door!
“Oh, that ye were all like Jack Sheppard! Mistake me not, my
brethren—I don’t mean in a carnal, but in a spiritual sense; for I
propose to spiritualise these things. What a shame it would be if we

should not think it worth our while to take as much pains, and employ
as many deep thoughts to save our souls as he has done to preserve his
body!
“Let me exhort ye, then, to open the locks of your hearts with the
nail of repentance! Burst asunder the fetters of your beloved lusts,
mount the chimney of hope, take from thence the bar of good
resolution, break through the stone wall of despair, and all the
strongholds in the dark entry of the valley of the shadow of death!
Raise yourselves to the leads of divine meditation, fix the blanket of
faith with the spike of the Church, let yourselves down to the turner’s
house of resignation, and descend the stairs of humility! So shall you
come to the door of deliverance from the prison of iniquity, and escape
the clutches of that old executioner the devil!”
Jonathan Wild, whose name has been immortalised by Fielding, was no
favourite with the people. He had none of the virtues which, combined with
crimes, make up the character of the great thief. He was a pitiful fellow,
who informed against his comrades, and was afraid of death. This
meanness was not to be forgiven by the crowd; and they pelted him with
dirt and stones on his way to Tyburn, and expressed their contempt by
every possible means. How different was their conduct to Turpin and Jack
Sheppard, who died in their neatest attire, with nosegays in their buttonholes, and with the courage that a crowd expects. It was anticipated that
the body of Turpin would have been delivered up to the surgeons for
dissection; and the people seeing some men very busily employed in
removing it, suddenly set upon them, rescued the body, bore it about the
town in triumph, and then buried it in a very deep grave, filled with
quicklime, to hasten the progress of decomposition. They would not suffer
the corpse of their hero—of the man who had ridden from London to York
in four-and-twenty hours—to be mangled by the rude hands of unmannerly
surgeons.

The death of Claude Duval would appear to have been no less
triumphant. Claude was a gentlemanly thief. According to Butler, in the
famous ode to his memory, he
“Taught the wild Arabs of the road
To rob in a more gentle mode;
Take prizes more obligingly than those
Who never had been bred filous;
And how to hang in a more graceful fashion
Than e’er was known before to the dull English nation.”
In fact, he was the pink of politeness, and his gallantry to the fair sex was
proverbial. When he was caught at last, pent in “stone walls and chains and
iron grates,” their grief was in proportion to his rare merits and his great
fame. Butler says, that to his dungeon
“Came ladies from all parts,
To offer up close prisoners their hearts.
Which he received as tribute due—
*

*

*

*

Never did bold knight to relieve
Distressed dames, such dreadful feats achieve,
As feeble damsels for his sake
Would have been proud to undertake,
And, bravely ambitious to redeem
The world’s loss and their own,
Strove who should have the honour to lay down,
And change a life with him.”

Among the noted thieves of France, there is none to compare with the
famous Aimerigot Têtenoire, who flourished in the reign of Charles VI.
This fellow was at the head of four or five hundred men, and possessed two
very strong castles in Limousin and Auvergne. There was a good deal of the
feudal baron about him, although he possessed no revenues but such as the
road afforded him. At his death he left a singular will. “I give and
bequeath,” said the robber, “one thousand five hundred francs to St.
George’s Chapel, for such repairs as it may need; to my sweet girl, who so
loyally loved me, I give two thousand five hundred; and the surplus I give
to my companions. I hope they will all live as brothers, and divide it
amicably among them. If they cannot agree, and the devil of contention
gets among them, it is no fault of mine; and I advise them to get a good
strong sharp axe, and break open my strong box. Let them scramble for
what it contains, and the devil seize the hindmost.” The people of Auvergne
still recount with admiration the daring feats of this brigand.
Of later years, the French thieves have been such unmitigated scoundrels
as to have left but little room for popular admiration. The famous
Cartouche, whose name has become synonymous with ruffian in their
language, had none of the generosity, courtesy, and devoted bravery which
are so requisite to make a robber-hero. He was born at Paris, towards the
end of the seventeenth century, and broken alive on the wheel in November
1727. He was, however, sufficiently popular to have been pitied at his
death, and afterwards to have formed the subject of a much-admired
drama, which bore his name, and was played with great success in all the
theatres of France during the years 1734, 5, and 6. In our own day the
French have been more fortunate in a robber; Vidocq bids fair to rival the
fame of Turpin and Jack Sheppard. Already he has become the hero of
many an apocryphal tale—already his compatriots boast of his manifold
achievements, and express their doubts whether any other country in
Europe could produce a thief so clever, so accomplished, so gentlemanly, as
Vidocq.

Germany has its Schinderhannes, Hungary its Schubry, and Italy and
Spain a whole host of brigands, whose names and exploits are familiar as
household words in the mouths of the children and populace of those
countries.
The Italian banditti are renowned over the world; and many of them are
not only very religious (after a fashion) but very charitable. Charity from
such a source is so unexpected, that the people doat upon them for it. One
of them, when he fell into the hands of the police, exclaimed, as they led
him away, “Ho fatto più carità!”—“I have given away more in charity than
any three convents in these provinces.” And the fellow spoke truth.
In Lombardy, the people cherish the memory of two notorious robbers,
who flourished about two centuries ago under the Spanish government.
Their story, according to Macfarlane, is contained in a little book well
known to all the children of the province, and read by them with much
more gusto than their Bibles.
Schinderhannes, the robber of the Rhine, is a great favourite on the
banks of the river which he so long kept in awe. Many amusing stories are
related by the peasantry 48 of the scurvy tricks he played off upon rich Jews,
or too-presuming officers of justice—of his princely generosity, and
undaunted courage. In short, they are proud of him, and would no more
consent to have the memory of his achievements dissociated from their
river than they would have the rock of Ehrenbreitstein blown to atoms by
gunpowder.
There is another robber-hero, of whose character and exploits the people
of Germany speak admiringly. Mausch Nadel was captain of a considerable
band that infested the Rhine, Switzerland, Alsatia, and Lorraine, during the
years 1824, 5, and 6. Like Jack Sheppard, he endeared himself to the
populace by his most hazardous escape from prison. Being confined at
Bremen, in a dungeon on the third story of the prison of that town, he
contrived to let himself down without exciting the vigilance of the
sentinels, and to swim across the Weser, though heavily laden with irons.

When about half-way over, he was espied by a sentinel, who fired at him,
and shot him in the calf of the leg: but the undaunted robber struck out
manfully, reached the shore, and was out of sight before the officers of
justice could get ready their boats to follow him. He was captured again in
1826, tried at Mayence, and sentenced to death. He was a tall, strong,
handsome man, and his fate, villain as he was, excited much sympathy all
over Germany. The ladies especially were loud in their regret that nothing
could be done to save a hero so good-looking, and of adventures so
romantic, from the knife of the headsman.
Mr. Charles Macfarlane, in speaking of Italian banditti, remarks, that the
abuses of the Catholic religion, with its confessions and absolutions, have
tended to promote crime of this description. But he adds more truly, that
priests and monks have not done half the mischief which has been
perpetrated by ballad-mongers and story-tellers. If he had said playwrights
also, the list would have been complete. In fact, the theatre, which can only
expect to prosper, in a pecuniary sense, by pandering to the tastes of the
people, continually recurs to the annals of thieves and banditti for its most
favourite heroes. These theatrical robbers, with their picturesque attire,
wild haunts, jolly, reckless, devil-may-care manners, take a wonderful hold
upon the imagination, and whatever their advocates may say to the
contrary, exercise a very pernicious influence upon public morals. In the
Memoirs of the Duke of Guise upon the Revolution of Naples in 1647 and
1648, it is stated, that the manners, dress, and mode of life of the
Neapolitan banditti were rendered so captivating upon the stage, that the
authorities found it absolutely necessary to forbid the representation of
dramas in which they figured, and even to prohibit their costume at the
masquerades. So numerous were the banditti at this time, that the duke
found no difficulty in raising an army of them, to aid him in his endeavours
to seize on the throne of Naples. He thus describes them: 49 “They were
three thousand five hundred men, of whom the oldest came short of fiveand-forty years, and the youngest was above twenty. They were all tall and

well made, with long black hair, for the most part curled; coats of black
Spanish leather, with sleeves of velvet, or cloth of gold; cloth breeches with
gold lace, most of them scarlet; girdles of velvet, laced with gold, with two
pistols on each side; a cutlass hanging at a belt, suitably trimmed, three
fingers broad and two feet long; a hawking-bag at their girdle, and a
powder-flask hung about their neck with a great silk riband. Some of them
carried firelocks, and others blunderbusses; they had all good shoes, with
silk stockings, and every one a cap of cloth of gold, or cloth of silver, of
different colours, on his head, which was very delightful to the eye.”
The Beggar’s Opera, in our own country, is another instance of the
admiration that thieves excite upon the stage. Of the extraordinary success
of this piece, when first produced, the following account is given in the
notes to The Dunciad, and quoted by Johnson in his Lives of the Poets:
“This piece was received with greater applause than was ever known.
Besides being acted in London sixty-three days without interruption, and
renewed the next season with equal applause, it spread into all the great
towns of England; was played in many places to the thirtieth and fortieth
time; at Bath and Bristol, &c. fifty. It made its progress into Wales,
Scotland, and Ireland, where it was performed twenty-four days
successively. The ladies carried about with them the favourite songs of it in
fans, and houses were furnished with it in screens. The fame of it was not
confined to the author only. The person who acted Polly, till then obscure,
became all at once the favourite of the town; 50 her pictures were engraved
and sold in great numbers; her life written, books of letters and verses to
her published, and pamphlets made even of her sayings and jests.
Furthermore, it drove out of England, for that season, the Italian Opera,
which had carried all before it for ten years.” Dr. Johnson, in his life of the
author, says, that Herring, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, censured
the opera, as giving encouragement, not only to vice, but to crimes, by
making the highwayman the hero, and dismissing him at last unpunished;
and adds, that it was even said, that after the exhibition the gangs of

robbers were evidently multiplied. The Doctor doubts the assertion, giving
as his reason that highwaymen and housebreakers seldom frequent the
playhouse, and that it was not possible for any one to imagine that he
might rob with safety, because he saw Macheath reprieved upon the stage.
But if Johnson had wished to be convinced, he might very easily have
discovered that highwaymen and housebreakers did frequent the theatre,
and that nothing was more probable than that a laughable representation
of successful villany should induce the young and the already vicious to
imitate it. Besides, there is the weighty authority of Sir John Fielding, the
chief magistrate of Bow Street, who asserted positively, and proved his
assertion by the records of his office, that the number of thieves was greatly
increased at the time when that opera was so popular.
We have another instance of the same result much nearer our own times.
Schiller’s Räuber, that wonderful play, written by a green youth, perverted
the taste and imagination of all the young men in Germany. An
accomplished critic of our own country (Hazlitt), speaking of this play, says
it was the first he ever read, and such was the effect it produced on him,
that “it stunned him, like a blow.” After the lapse of five-and-twenty years,
he could not forget it; it was still, to use his own words, “an old dweller in
the chambers of his brain,” and he had not even then recovered enough
from it to describe how it was. The high-minded, metaphysical thief, its
hero, was so warmly admired, that several raw students, longing to imitate
a character they thought so noble, actually abandoned their homes and
their colleges, and betook themselves to the forests and the wilds to levy
contributions upon travellers. They thought they would, like Moor, plunder
the rich, and deliver eloquent soliloquies to the setting sun or the rising
moon; relieve the poor when they met them, and drink flasks of Rhenish
with their free companions in rugged mountain passes, or in tents in the
thicknesses of the forests. But a little experience wonderfully cooled their
courage; they found that real, everyday robbers were very unlike the
conventional banditti of the stage, and that three months in prison, with

bread and water for their fare, and damp straw to lie upon, was very well to
read about by their own firesides, but not very agreeable to undergo in
their own proper persons.
Lord Byron, with his soliloquising, high-souled thieves, has, in a slight
degree, perverted the taste of the juvenile rhymers of his country. As yet,
however, they have shewn more good sense than their fellows of Germany,
and have not taken to the woods or the highways. Much as they admire
Conrad the Corsair, they will not go to sea, and hoist the black flag for him.
By words only, and not by deeds, they testify their admiration, and deluge
the periodicals and music-shops of the land with verses describing pirates’
and bandits’ brides, and robber adventures of every kind.
But it is the playwright who does most harm; and Byron has fewer sins of
this nature to answer for than Gay or Schiller. With the aid of scenery, fine
dresses and music, and the very false notions they convey, they vitiate the
public taste, not knowing,
“Vulgaires rimeurs!
Quelle force ont les arts pour demolir les mœurs.”
In the penny theatres that abound in the poor and populous districts of
London, and which are chiefly frequented by striplings of idle and dissolute
habits, tales of thieves and murderers are more admired, and draw more
crowded audiences, than any other species of representation. There the
footpad, the burglar, and the highwayman are portrayed in their natural
colours, and give pleasant lessons in crime to their delighted listeners.
There the deepest tragedy and the broadest farce are represented in the
career of the murderer and the thief, and are applauded in proportion to
their depth and their breadth. There, whenever a crime of unusual atrocity
is committed, it is brought out afresh, with all its disgusting incidents

copied from the life, for the amusement of those who will one day become
its imitators.
With the mere reader the case is widely different; and most people have
a partiality for knowing the adventures of noted rogues. Even in fiction
they are delightful: witness the eventful story of Gil Blas de Santillane, and
of that great rascal Don Guzman d’Alfarache. Here there is no fear of
imitation. Poets, too, without doing mischief, may sing of such heroes
when they please, wakening our sympathies for the sad fate of Jemmy
Dawson, or Gilderoy, or Macpherson the Dauntless; or celebrating in
undying verse the wrongs and the revenge of the great thief of Scotland,
Rob Roy. If, by the music of their sweet rhymes, they can convince the
world that such heroes are but mistaken philosophers, born a few ages too
late, and having both a theoretical and practical love for
“The good old rule, the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
That they should keep who can;”
the world may perhaps become wiser, and consent to some better
distribution of its good things, by means of which thieves may become
reconciled to the age, and the age to them. The probability, however, seems
to be, that the charmers will charm in vain, charm they ever so wisely.

FIGHT BETWEEN DU GUESCLIN AND TROUSSEL.

DUELS AND ORDEALS.

There was an ancient sage philosopher,
Who swore the world, as he could prove,
Was mad of fighting.—Hudibras.

MOST writers, in accounting for the origin of duelling, derive it from the
warlike habits of those barbarous nations who overran Europe in the early
centuries of the Christian era, and who knew no mode so effectual for
settling their differences as the point of the sword. In fact, duelling, taken
in its primitive and broadest sense, means nothing more than combating,
and is the universal resort of all wild animals, including man, to gain or
defend their possessions, or avenge their insults. Two dogs who tear each
other for a bone, or two bantams fighting on a dunghill for the love of some
beautiful hen, or two fools on Wimbledon Common, shooting at each other
to satisfy the laws of offended honour, stand on the same footing in this
respect, and are each and all mere duellists. As civilisation advanced, the
best-informed men naturally grew ashamed of such a mode of adjusting
disputes, and the promulgation of some sort of laws for obtaining redress
for injuries was the consequence. Still there were many cases in which the
allegations of an accuser could not be rebutted by any positive proof on the
part of the accused; and in all these, which must have been exceedingly
numerous in the early stages of European society, the combat was resorted
to. From its decision there was no appeal. God was supposed to nerve the
arm of the combatant whose cause was just, and to grant him the victory
over his opponent. As Montesquieu well remarks, 51 this belief was not
unnatural among a people just emerging from barbarism. Their manners

being wholly warlike, the man deficient in courage, the prime virtue of his
fellows, was not unreasonably suspected of other vices besides cowardice,
which is generally found to be co-existent with treachery. He, therefore,
who shewed himself most valiant in the encounter was absolved by public
opinion from any crime with which he might be charged. As a necessary
consequence, society would have been reduced to its original elements, if
the men of thought, as distinguished from the men of action, had not
devised some means for taming the unruly passions of their fellows. With
this view, governments commenced by restricting within the narrowest
possible limits the cases in which it was lawful to prove or deny guilt by the
single combat. By the law of Gondebaldus king of the Burgundians, passed
in the year 501, the proof by combat was allowed in all legal proceedings in
lieu of swearing. In the time of Charlemagne, the Burgundian practice had
spread over the empire of the Francs, and not only the suitors for justice,
but the witnesses, and even the judges, were obliged to defend their cause,
their evidence, or their decision at the point of the sword. Louis the
Debonnaire, his successor, endeavoured to remedy the growing evil by
permitting the duel only in appeals of felony, in civil cases, or issue joined
in a writ of right, and in cases of the court of chivalry, or attacks upon a
man’s knighthood. None were exempt from these trials but women, the
sick and the maimed, and persons under fifteen or above sixty years of age.
Ecclesiastics were allowed to produce champions in their stead. This
practice in the course of time extended to all trials of civil and criminal
cases, which had to be decided by battle.
The clergy, whose dominion was an intellectual one, never approved of a
system of jurisprudence which tended so much to bring all things under
the rule of the strongest arm. From the first they set their faces against
duelling, and endeavoured, as far as the prejudices of their age would allow
them, to curb the warlike spirit, so alien from the principles of religion. In
the Council of Valentia, and afterwards in the Council of Trent, they
excommunicated all persons engaged in duelling; and not only them, but

even the assistants and spectators, declaring the custom to be hellish and
detestable, and introduced by the devil for the destruction both of body and
soul. They added also, that princes who connived at duels should be
deprived of all temporal power, jurisdiction, and dominion over the places
where they had permitted them to be fought. It will be seen hereafter that
this clause only encouraged the practice which it was intended to prevent.
But it was the blasphemous error of these early ages to expect that the
Almighty, whenever he was called upon, would work a miracle in favour of
a person unjustly accused. The priesthood, in condemning the duel, did not
condemn the principle on which it was founded. They still encouraged the
popular belief of divine interference in all the disputes or differences that
might arise among nations or individuals. It was the very same principle
that regulated the ordeals, which with all their influence they supported
against the duel. By the former, the power of deciding the guilt or
innocence was vested wholly in their hands; while by the latter they
enjoyed no power or privilege at all. It is not to be wondered at that, for this
reason, if for no other, they should have endeavoured to settle all
differences by the peaceful mode. While that prevailed, they were, as they
wished to be, the first party in the state; but while the strong arm of
individual prowess was allowed to be the judge in all doubtful cases, their
power and influence became secondary to those of the nobility.
Thus it was not the mere hatred of bloodshed which induced them to
launch the thunderbolts of excommunication against the combatants: it
was a desire to retain the power, which, to do them justice, they were in
those times the persons best qualified to wield. The germs of knowledge
and civilisation lay within the bounds of their order; for they were the
representatives of the intellectual, as the nobility were of the physical
power of man. To centralise this power in the Church, and make it the
judge of the last resort in all appeals, both in civil and criminal cases, they
instituted five modes of trial, the management of which lay wholly in their
hands. These were, the oath upon the evangelists; the ordeal of the cross

and the fire ordeal, for persons in the higher ranks; the water ordeal, for
the humbler classes; and, lastly, the corsned, or bread and cheese ordeal,
for members of their own body.
The oath upon the evangelists was taken in the following manner. The
accused who was received to this proof, says Paul Hay, Count du Chastelet,
in his Memoirs of Bertrand du Guesclin, swore upon a copy of the New
Testament, and on the relics of the holy martyrs, or on their tombs, that he
was innocent of the crime imputed to him. He was also obliged to find
twelve persons of acknowledged probity who should take oath at the same
time that they believed him innocent. This mode of trial led to very great
abuses, especially in cases of disputed inheritance, where the hardest
swearer was certain of the victory. This abuse was one of the principal
causes which led to the preference given to the trial by battle. It is not at all
surprising that a feudal baron, or captain of the early ages, should have
preferred the chances of a fair fight with his opponent to a mode by which
firm perjury would always be successful.
The trial by, or judgment of, the cross, which Charlemagne begged his
sons to have recourse to, in case of disputes arising between them, was
performed thus:—When a person accused of any crime had declared his
innocence upon oath, and appealed to the cross for its judgment in his
favour, he was brought into the church, before the altar. The priests
previously prepared two sticks exactly like one another, upon one of which
was carved a figure of the cross. They were both wrapped up with great
care and many ceremonies, in a quantity of fine wool, and laid upon the
altar, or on the relics of the saints. A solemn prayer was then offered up to
God, that he would be pleased to discover, by the judgment of his holy
cross, whether the accused person were innocent or guilty. A priest then
approached the altar, and took up one of the sticks, and the assistants
unswathed it reverently. If it was marked with the cross, the accused
person was innocent; if unmarked, he was guilty. It would be unjust to
assert, that the judgments thus delivered were, in all cases, erroneous; and

it would be absurd to believe that they were left altogether to chance. Many
true judgments were doubtless given, and, in all probability, most
conscientiously; for we cannot but believe that the priests endeavoured
beforehand to convince themselves by secret inquiry and a strict
examination of the circumstances, whether the appellant were innocent or
guilty, and that they took up the crossed or uncrossed stick accordingly.
Although, to all other observers, the sticks, as enfolded in the wool, might
appear exactly similar, those who enwrapped them could, without any
difficulty, distinguish the one from the other.
By the fire-ordeal the power of deciding was just as unequivocally left in
their hands. It was generally believed that fire would not burn the
innocent, and the clergy, of course, took care that the innocent, or such as
it was their pleasure or interest to declare so, should be so warned before
undergoing the ordeal, as to preserve themselves without any difficulty
from the fire. One mode of ordeal was to place red-hot ploughshares on the
ground at certain distances, and then, blindfolding the accused person,
make him walk barefooted over them. If he stepped regularly in the vacant
spaces, avoiding the fire, he was adjudged innocent; if he burned himself,
he was declared guilty. As none but the clergy interfered with the
arrangement of the ploughshares, they could always calculate beforehand
the result of the ordeal. To find a person guilty, they had only to place them
at irregular distances, and the accused was sure to tread upon one of them.
When Emma, the wife of King Ethelred, and mother of Edward the
Confessor, was accused of a guilty familiarity with Alwyn Bishop of
Winchester, she cleared her character in this manner. The reputation, not
only of their order, but of a queen, being at stake, a verdict of guilty was not
to be apprehended from any ploughshares which priests had the heating of.
This ordeal was called the Judicium Dei, and sometimes the Vulgaris
Purgatio, and might also be tried by several other methods. One was to
hold in the hand, unhurt, a piece of red-hot iron, of the weight of one, two,
or three pounds. When we read not only that men with hard hands, but

women of softer and more delicate skin, could do this with impunity, we
must be convinced that the hands were previously rubbed with some
preservative, or that the apparently hot iron was merely cold iron painted
red. Another mode was to plunge the naked arm into a caldron of boiling
water. The priests then enveloped it in several folds of linen and flannel,
and kept the patient confined within the church, and under their exclusive
care, for three days. If, at the end of that time, the arm appeared without a
scar, the innocence of the accused person was firmly established. 52
As regards the water-ordeal, the same trouble was not taken. It was a
trial only for the poor and humble, and, whether they sank or swam, was
thought of very little consequence. Like the witches of more modern times,
the accused were thrown into a pond or river; if they sank, and were
drowned, their surviving friends had the consolation of knowing that they
were innocent; if they swam, they were guilty. In either case society was rid
of them.
But of all the ordeals, that which the clergy reserved for themselves was
the one least likely to cause any member of their corps to be declared
guilty. The most culpable monster in existence came off clear when tried by
this method. It was called the Corsned, and was thus performed. A piece of
barley bread and a piece of cheese were laid upon the altar, and the accused
priest, in his full canonicals, and surrounded by all the pompous adjuncts
of Roman ceremony, pronounced certain conjurations, and prayed with
great fervency for several minutes. The burden of the prayer was, that if he
were guilty of the crime laid to his charge, God would send his angel
Gabriel to stop his throat, that he might not be able to swallow the bread
and cheese. There is no instance upon record of a priest having been
choked in this manner. 53
When, under Pope Gregory VII., it was debated whether the Gregorian
chant should be introduced into Castile, instead of the Musarabic, given by
St. Isidore of Seville to the churches of that kingdom, very much ill feeling
was excited. The churches refused to receive the novelty, and it was

proposed that the affair should be decided by a battle between two
champions, one chosen from each side. The clergy would not consent to a
mode of settlement which they considered impious, but had no objection to
try the merits of each chant by the fire-ordeal. A great fire was accordingly
made, and a book of the Gregorian and one of the Musarabic chant were
thrown into it, that the flames might decide which was most agreeable to
God by refusing to burn it. Cardinal Baronius, who says he was an eyewitness of the miracle, relates, that the book of the Gregorian chant was no
sooner laid upon the fire, than it leaped out uninjured, visibly, and with a
great noise. Every one present thought that the saints had decided in
favour of Pope Gregory. After a slight interval, the fire was extinguished;
but, wonderful to relate! the other book of St. Isidore was found covered
with ashes, but not injured in the slightest degree. The flames had not even
warmed it. Upon this it was resolved, that both were alike agreeable to
God, and that they should be used by turns in all the churches of Seville. 54
If the ordeals had been confined to questions like this, the laity would
have had little or no objection to them; but when they were introduced as
decisive in all the disputes that might arise between man and man, the
opposition of all those whose prime virtue was personal bravery, was
necessarily excited. In fact, the nobility, from a very early period, began to
look with jealous eyes upon them. They were not slow to perceive their true
purport, which was no other than to make the Church the last court of
appeal in all cases, both civil and criminal: and not only did the nobility
prefer the ancient mode of single combat from this cause, in itself a
sufficient one, but they clung to it because an acquittal gained by those
displays of courage and address which the battle afforded, was more
creditable in the eyes of their compeers, than one which it required but
little or none of either to accomplish. To these causes may be added
another, which was perhaps more potent than either in raising the credit of
the judicial combat at the expense of the ordeal. The noble institution of
chivalry was beginning to take root, and, notwithstanding the clamours of

the clergy, war was made the sole business of life, and the only elegant
pursuit of the aristocracy. The fine spirit of honour was introduced, any
attack upon which was only to be avenged in the lists, within sight of
applauding crowds, whose verdict of approbation was far more gratifying
than the cold and formal acquittal of the ordeal. Lothaire, the son of Louis
I., abolished that by fire and the trial of the cross within his dominions; but
in England they were allowed so late as the time of Henry III., in the early
part of whose reign they were prohibited by an order of council. In the
mean time, the Crusades had brought the institution of chivalry to the full
height of perfection. The chivalric spirit soon achieved the downfall of the
ordeal system, and established the judicial combat on a basis too firm to be
shaken. It is true that with the fall of chivalry, as an institution, fell the
tournament and the encounter in the lists; but the duel, their offspring, has
survived to this day, defying the efforts of sages and philosophers to
eradicate it. Among all the errors bequeathed to us by a barbarous age, it
has proved the most pertinacious. It has put variance between men’s
reason and their honour; put the man of sense on a level with the fool, and
made thousands who condemn it submit to it or practise it.
Those who are curious to see the manner in which these combats were
regulated, may consult the learned Montesquieu, where they will find a
copious summary of the code of ancient duelling. 55 Truly does he remark,
in speaking of the clearness and excellence of the arrangements, that, as
there were many wise matters which were conducted in a very foolish
manner, so there were many foolish matters conducted very wisely. No
greater exemplification of it could be given than the wise and religious
rules of the absurd and blasphemous trial by battle.
In the ages that intervened between the Crusades and the new era that
was opened out by the invention of gunpowder and printing, a more
rational system of legislation took root. The inhabitants of cities, engaged
in the pursuits of trade and industry, were content to acquiesce in the
decisions of their judges and magistrates whenever any differences arose

among them. Unlike the class above them, their habits and manners did
not lead them to seek the battle-field on every slight occasion. A dispute as
to the price of a sack of corn, a bale of broad-cloth, or a cow, could be more
satisfactorily adjusted before the mayor or bailiff of their district. Even the
martial knights and nobles, quarrelsome as they were, began to see that the
trial by battle would lose its dignity and splendour if too frequently
resorted to. Governments also shared this opinion, and on several
occasions restricted the cases in which it was legal to proceed to this
extremity. In France, before the time of Louis IX., duels were permitted
only in cases of lèse majesté, rape, incendiarism, assassination, and
burglary. Louis IX., by taking off all restriction, made them legal in civil
cases. This was not found to work well, and, in 1303, Philip the Fair judged
it necessary to confine them, in criminal matters, to state offences, rape,
and incendiarism; and in civil cases, to questions of disputed inheritance.
Knighthood was allowed to be the best judge of its own honour, and might
defend or avenge it as often as occasion arose.
Among the earliest duels upon record, is a very singular one that took
place in the reign of Louis II. (A. D. 878). Ingelgerius count of Gastinois was
one morning discovered by his countess dead in bed at her side. Gontran, a
relation of the count, accused the countess of having murdered her
husband, to whom, he asserted, she had long been unfaithful, and
challenged her to produce a champion to do battle in her behalf, that he
might establish her guilt by killing him. 56 All the friends and relatives of the
countess believed in her innocence; but Gontran was so stout and bold and
renowned a warrior that no one dared to meet him, for which, as Brantôme
quaintly says, “mauvais et poltrons parens estaient.” The unhappy countess
began to despair, when a champion suddenly appeared in the person of
Ingelgerius count of Anjou, a boy of sixteen years of age, who had been
held by the countess on the baptismal font, and received her husband’s
name. He tenderly loved his godmother, and offered to do battle in her
cause against any and every opponent. The king endeavoured to persuade

the generous boy from his enterprise, urging the great strength, tried skill,
and invincible courage of the challenger; but he persisted in his resolution,
to the great sorrow of all the court, who said it was a cruel thing to permit
so brave and beautiful a child to rush to such butchery and death.

DUEL BETWEEN INGELGERIUS AND GONTRAN.

When the lists were prepared, the countess duly acknowledged her
champion, and the combatants commenced the onset. Gontran rode so
fiercely at his antagonist, and hit him on the shield with such impetuosity,
that he lost his own balance and rolled to the ground. The young count, as
Gontran fell, passed his lance through his body, and then dismounting, cut
off his head, which, Brantôme says, “he presented to the king, who received
it most graciously, and was very joyful, as much so as if any one had made
him a present of a city.” The innocence of the countess was then
proclaimed with great rejoicings; and she kissed her godson, and wept over
his neck with joy, in the presence of all the assembly.
When the Earl of Essex was accused, by Robert de Montfort, before King
Henry II., in 1162, of having traitorously suffered the royal standard of
England to fall from his hands in a skirmish with the Welsh at Coleshill,
five years previously, the latter offered to prove the truth of the charge by

single combat. The Earl of Essex accepted the challenge, and the lists were
prepared near Reading. An immense concourse of persons assembled to
witness the battle. Essex at first fought stoutly, but, losing his temper and
self-command, he gave an advantage to his opponent which soon decided
the struggle. He was unhorsed, and so severely wounded, that all present
thought he was dead. At the solicitation of his relatives, the monks of the
Abbey of Reading were allowed to remove the body for interment, and
Montfort was declared the victor. Essex, however, was not dead, but
stunned only, and, under the care of the monks, recovered in a few weeks
from his bodily injuries. The wounds of his mind were not so easily healed.
Though a loyal and brave subject, the whole realm believed him a traitor
and a coward because he had been vanquished. He could not brook to
return to the world deprived of the good opinion of his fellows; he therefore
made himself a monk, and passed the remainder of his days within the
walls of the abbey.
Du Chastelet relates a singular duel that was proposed in Spain. 57 A
Christian gentleman of Seville sent a challenge to a Moorish cavalier,
offering to prove against him, with whatever weapons he might choose,
that the religion of Jesus Christ was holy and divine, and that of Mahomet
impious and damnable. The Spanish prelates did not choose that
Christianity should be compromised within their jurisdiction by the result
of any such combat; the Moorish cavalier might, perchance, have proved to
be the stronger, and they commanded the knight, under pain of
excommunication, to withdraw the challenge.
The same author relates that, under Otho I., a question arose among
jurisconsults, viz. whether grandchildren, who had lost their father, should
share equally with their uncles in the property of their grandfather, at the
death of the latter. The difficulty of this question was found so
insurmountable, that none of the lawyers of that day could resolve it. It was
at last decreed that it should be decided by single combat. Two champions
were accordingly chosen; one for, and the other against, the claims of the

little ones. After a long struggle, the champion of the uncles was unhorsed
and slain; and it was therefore decided that the right of the grandchildren
was established, and that they should enjoy the same portion of their
grandfather’s possessions that their father would have done had he been
alive.
Upon pretexts just as strange, and often more frivolous that these, duels
continued to be fought in most of the countries of Europe during the whole
of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. A memorable instance of the
slightness of the pretext on which a man could be forced to fight a duel to
the death, occurs in the Memoirs of the brave Constable, Du Guesclin. The
advantage he had obtained, in a skirmish before Rennes, against William
Brembre, an English captain, so preyed on the spirits of William Troussel,
the chosen friend and companion of the latter, that nothing would satisfy
him but a mortal combat with the Constable. The Duke of Lancaster, to
whom Troussel applied for permission to fight the great Frenchman,
forbade the battle, as not warranted by the circumstances. Troussel
nevertheless burned with a fierce desire to cross his weapon with Du
Guesclin, and sought every occasion to pick a quarrel with him. Having so
good a will for it, of course he found a way. A relative of his had been taken
prisoner by the Constable, in whose hands he remained till he was able to
pay his ransom. Troussel resolved to make a quarrel out of this, and
despatched a messenger to Du Guesclin, demanding the release of his
prisoner, and offering a bond, at a distant date, for the payment of the
ransom. Du Guesclin, who had received intimation of the hostile purposes
of the Englishman, sent back word that he would not accept his bond,
neither would he release his prisoner until the full amount of his ransom
was paid. As soon as this answer was received, Troussel sent a challenge to
the Constable, demanding reparation for the injury he had done his
honour, by refusing his bond, and offering a mortal combat, to be fought
three strokes with the lance, three with the sword, and three with the
dagger. Du Guesclin, although ill in bed with the ague, accepted the

challenge, and gave notice to the Marshal d’Andreghem, the king’s
lieutenant-general in Lower Normandy, that he might fix the day and the
place of combat. The marshal made all necessary arrangements, upon
condition that he who was beaten should pay a hundred florins of gold to
feast the nobles and gentlemen who were witnesses of the encounter.
The Duke of Lancaster was very angry with his captain, and told him that
it would be a shame to his knighthood and his nation if he forced on a
combat with the brave Du Guesclin at a time when he was enfeebled by
disease

and

stretched

on

the

couch

of

suffering.

Upon

these

representations, Troussel, ashamed of himself, sent notice to Du Guesclin
that he was willing to postpone the duel until such time as he should be
perfectly recovered. Du Guesclin replied, that he could not think of
postponing the combat after all the nobility had received notice of it; that
he had sufficient strength left not only to meet, but to conquer such an
opponent as he was; and that if he did not make his appearance in the lists
at the time appointed, he would publish him every where as a man
unworthy to be called a knight, or to wear an honourable sword by his side.
Troussel carried this haughty message to the Duke of Lancaster, who
immediately gave permission for the battle.
On the day appointed, the two combatants appeared in the lists, in the
presence of several thousand spectators. Du Guesclin was attended by the
flower of the French nobility, including the Marshal de Beaumanoir,
Olivier de Mauny, Bertrand de Saint Pern, and the Viscount de la Bellière;
while the Englishman appeared with no more than the customary retinue
of two seconds, two squires, two coutilliers or daggermen, and two
trumpeters. The first onset was unfavourable to the Constable. He received
so heavy a blow on his shield-arm, that he fell forward to the left upon his
horse’s neck; and being weakened by his fever, was nearly thrown to the
ground. All his friends thought he could never recover himself, and began
to deplore his ill fortune; but Du Guesclin collected his energies for a
decisive effort, and at the second charge aimed a blow at the shoulder of his

enemy, which felled him to the earth, mortally wounded. He then sprang
from his horse, sword in hand, with the intention of cutting off the head of
his fallen foe, when the Marshal d’Andreghem threw a golden wand into
the arena as a signal that hostilities should cease. Du Guesclin was
proclaimed the victor amid the joyous acclamations of the crowd, and
retiring, left the field to the meaner combatants, who were afterwards to
make sport for the people. Four English and as many French squires fought
for some time with pointless lances, when the French gaining the
advantage, the sports were declared at an end.
In the time of Charles VI., about the beginning of the fifteenth century, a
famous duel was ordered by the parliament of Paris. The Sieur de
Carrouges being absent in the Holy Land, his lady was violated by the Sieur
Legris. Carrouges, on his return, challenged Legris to mortal combat for
the twofold crime of violation and slander, inasmuch as he had denied his
guilt by asserting that the lady was a willing party. The lady’s asseverations
of innocence were held to be no evidence by the parliament, and the duel
was commanded, with all the ceremonies. “On the day appointed,” says
Brantôme, 58 “the lady came to witness the spectacle in her chariot; but the
king made her descend, judging her unworthy, because she was criminal in
his eyes till her innocence was proved, and caused her to stand upon a
scaffold to await the mercy of God and this judgment by the battle. After a
short struggle, the Sieur de Carrouges overthrew his enemy, and made him
confess both the rape and the slander. He was then taken to the gallows
and hanged in the presence of the multitude; while the innocence of the
lady was proclaimed by the heralds, and recognised by her husband, the
king, and all the spectators.”
Numerous battles of a similar description constantly took place, until the
unfortunate issue of one encounter of the kind led the French king, Henry
II., to declare solemnly that he would never again permit any such
encounter, whether it related to a civil or criminal case, or the honour of a
gentleman.

This memorable combat was fought in the year 1547. François de
Vivonne, lord of La Chataigneraie, and Guy de Chabot, lord of Jarnac, had
been friends from their early youth, and were noted at the court of Francis
I. for the gallantry of their bearing and the magnificence of their retinue.
Chataigneraie, who knew that his friend’s means were not very ample,
asked him one day in confidence how it was that he contrived to be so well
provided? Jarnac replied, that his father had married a young and beautiful
woman, who, loving the son far better than the sire, supplied him with as
much money as he desired. La Chataigneraie betrayed the base secret to
the dauphin, the dauphin to the king, the king to his courtiers, and the
courtiers to all their acquaintance. In a short time it reached the ears of the
old Lord de Jarnac, who immediately sent for his son, and demanded to
know in what manner the report had originated, and whether he had been
vile enough not only to carry on such a connexion, but to boast of it? De
Jarnac indignantly denied that he had ever said so, or given reason to the
world to say so, and requested his father to accompany him to court and
confront him with his accuser, that he might see the manner in which he
would confound him. They went accordingly; and the younger De Jarnac,
entering a room where the dauphin, La Chataigneraie, and several
courtiers were present, exclaimed aloud, “That whoever had asserted that
he maintained a criminal connexion with his mother-in-law was a liar and
a coward!” Every eye was turned to the dauphin and La Chataigneraie,
when the latter stood forward and asserted, that De Jarnac had himself
avowed that such was the fact, and he would extort from his lips another
confession of it. A case like this could not be met or rebutted by any legal
proof, and the royal council ordered that it should be decided by single
combat. The king, however, set his face against the duel, 59 and forbade
them both, under pain of his high displeasure, to proceed any further in the
matter. But Francis died in the following year, and the dauphin, now Henry
II., who was himself compromised, resolved that the combat should take
place.

The lists were prepared in the court-yard of the chateau of St. Germainen-Laye, and the 10th of July, 1547, was appointed for the encounter. The
cartels of the combatants, which are preserved in the Mémoires de
Castelnau, were as follow:
“Cartel of François de Vivonne, lord of la Chataigneraie.
“SIRE,
“Having learned that Guy Chabot de Jarnac, being lately at
Compiegne, asserted that whoever had said that he boasted of having
criminal intercourse with his mother-in-law was wicked and a wretch,
I, sire, with your good will and pleasure, do answer that he has
wickedly lied, and will lie as many times as he denies having said that
which I affirm he did say; for I repeat, that he told me several times,
and boasted of it, that he had slept with his mother-in-law.
“FRANÇOIS DE VIVONNE.”
To this cartel De Jarnac replied:
“SIRE,
“With your good will and permission, I say, that François de
Vivonne has lied in the imputation which he has cast upon me, and of
which I spoke to you at Compiegne. I therefore entreat you, sire, most
humbly, that you be pleased to grant us a fair field, that we may fight
this battle to the death.
“GUY CHABOT.”
The preparations were conducted on a scale of the greatest magnificence,
the king having intimated his intention of being present. La Chataigneraie
made sure of the victory, and invited the king and a hundred and fifty of
the principal personages of the court to sup with him in the evening, after

the battle, in a splendid tent which he had prepared at the extremity of the
lists. De Jarnac was not so confident, though perhaps more desperate. At
noon, on the day appointed, the combatants met, and each took the
customary oath that he bore no charms or amulets about him, or made use
of any magic, to aid him against his antagonist. They then attacked each
other, sword in hand. La Chataigneraie was a strong robust man, and over
confident; De Jarnac was nimble, supple, and prepared for the worst. The
combat lasted for some time doubtful, until De Jarnac, overpowered by the
heavy blows of his opponent, covered his head with his shield, and,
stooping down, endeavoured to make amends by his agility for his
deficiency of strength. In this crouching posture he aimed two blows at the
left thigh of La Chataigneraie, who had left it uncovered, that the motion of
his leg might not be impeded. Each blow was successful, and, amid the
astonishment of all the spectators, and to the great regret of the king, La
Chataigneraie rolled over upon the sand. He seized his dagger, and made a
last effort to strike De Jarnac: but he was unable to support himself, and
fell powerless into the arms of the assistants. The officers now interfered,
and De Jarnac being declared the victor, fell down upon his knees,
uncovered his head, and, clasping his hands together, exclaimed: “O
Domine, non sum dignus!” La Chataigneraie was so mortified by the result
of the encounter, that he resolutely refused to have his wounds dressed. He
tore off the bandages which the surgeons applied, and expired two days
afterwards. Ever since that time, any sly and unforeseen attack has been
called by the French a coup de Jarnac. Henry was so grieved at the loss of
his favourite, that he made the solemn oath already alluded to, that he
would never again, so long as he lived, permit a duel. Some writers have
asserted, and among others, Mezerai, that he issued a royal edict
forbidding them. This has been doubted by others, and as there appears no
registry of the edict in any of the courts, it seems most probable that it was
never issued. This opinion is strengthened by the fact, that, two years
afterwards, the council ordered another duel to be fought with similar

forms, but with less magnificence, on account of the inferior rank of the
combatants. It is not anywhere stated that Henry interfered to prevent it,
notwithstanding his solemn oath; but that, on the contrary, he encouraged
it, and appointed the Marshal de la Marque to see that it was conducted
according to the rules of chivalry. The disputants were Fendille and
D’Aguerre, two gentlemen of the household, who, quarrelling in the king’s
chamber, had proceeded from words to blows. The council, being informed
of the matter, decreed that it could only be decided in the lists. Marshal de
la Marque, with the king’s permission, appointed the city of Sedan as the
place of combat. Fendille, who was a bad swordsman, was anxious to avoid
an encounter with D’Aguerre, who was one of the most expert men of the
age; but the council authoritatively commanded that he should fight, or be
degraded from all his honours. D’Aguerre appeared in the field attended by
François de Vendôme, Count de Chartres, while Fendille was accompanied
by the Duke of Nevers. Fendille appears to have been not only an inexpert
swordsman, but a thorough coward; one who, like Cowley, might have
heaped curses on the man,
“(Death’s factor sure), who brought
Dire swords into this peaceful world.”
On the very first encounter he was thrown from his horse, and, confessing
on the ground all that his victor required of him, slunk away ignominiously
from the arena.
One is tempted to look upon the death of Henry II. as a judgment upon
him for his perjury in the matter of duelling. In a grand tournament
instituted on the occasion of the marriage of his daughter, he broke several
lances in encounters with some of the bravest knights of the time.
Ambitious of still further renown, he would not rest satisfied until he had
also engaged the young Count de Montgommeri. He received a wound in

the eye from the lance of his antagonist, and died from its effects shortly
afterwards, in the forty-first year of his age.
In the succeeding reigns of Francis II., Charles IX., and Henry III., the
practice of duelling increased to an alarming extent. Duels were not rare in
the other countries of Europe at the same period; but in France they were
so frequent, that historians, in speaking of that age, designate it as
“l’époque de la fureur des duels.” The parliament of Paris endeavoured, as
far as in its power lay, to discourage the practice. By a decree dated the
26th of June 1559, it declared all persons who should be present at duels,
or aiding and abetting in them, to be rebels to the king, transgressors of the
law, and disturbers of the public peace.
When Henry III. was assassinated at St. Cloud in 1589, a young
gentleman, named L’Isle-Marivaut, who had been much beloved by him,
took his death so much to heart, that he resolved not to survive him. Not
thinking suicide an honourable death, and wishing, as he said, to die
gloriously in revenging his king and master, he publicly expressed his
readiness to fight any body to the death, who should assert that Henry’s
assassination was not a great misfortune to the community. Another youth,
of a fiery temper and tried courage, named Marolles, took him at his word,
and the day and place of the combat were forthwith appointed. When the
hour had come, and all were ready, Marolles turned to his second, and
asked whether his opponent had a casque or helmet only, or whether he
wore a sallade, or headpiece. Being answered a helmet only, he said gaily,
“So much the better; for, sir my second, you shall repute me the wickedest
man in all the world, if I do not thrust my lance right through the middle of
his head and kill him.” Truth to say, he did so at the very first onset, and
the unhappy L’Isle-Marivaut expired without a groan. Brantôme, who
relates this story, adds, that the victor might have done as he pleased with
the body, cut off the head, dragged it out of the camp, or exposed it upon
an ass; but that being a wise and very courteous gentleman, he left it to the
relatives of the deceased to be honourably buried, contenting himself with

the glory of his triumph, by which he gained no little renown and honour
among the ladies of Paris.

HENRY IV.

On the accession of Henry IV. that monarch determined to set his face
against duelling; but such was the influence of early education and the
prejudices of society upon him, that he never could find it in his heart to
punish a man for this offence. He thought it tended to foster a warlike
spirit among his people. When the chivalrous Créqui demanded his
permission to fight Don Philippe de Savoire, he is reported to have said,
“Go, and if I were not a king, I would be your second.” It is no wonder that
when such was known to be the king’s disposition, his edicts attracted but
small attention. A calculation was made by M. de Lomenie, in the year
1607, that since the accession of Henry, in 1589, no less than four thousand
French gentlemen had lost their lives in these conflicts; which, for the
eighteen years, would have been at the rate of four or five in a week, or
eighteen per month! Sully, who reports this fact in his Memoirs, does not
throw the slightest doubt upon its exactness; and adds, that it was chiefly
owing to the facility and ill-advised good-nature of his royal master that the
bad example had so empoisoned the court, the city, and the whole country.
This wise minister devoted much of his time and attention to the subject;
for the rage, he says, was such as to cause him a thousand pangs, and the
king also. There was hardly a man moving in what was called good society,
who had not been engaged in a duel either as principal or second; and if
there were such a man, his chief desire was to free himself from the
imputation of non-duelling, by picking a quarrel with somebody. Sully

constantly wrote letters to the king, in which he prayed him to renew the
edicts against this barbarous custom, to aggravate the punishment against
offenders, and never, in any instance, to grant a pardon, even to a person
who had wounded another in a duel, much less to any one who had taken
away life. He also advised, that some sort of tribunal, or court of honour,
should be established, to take cognisance of injurious and slanderous
language, and of all such matters as usually led to duels; and that the
justice to be administered by this court should be sufficiently prompt and
severe to appease the complainant, and make the offender repent of his
aggression.

GALLERY AT FONTAINEBLEAU.

Henry, being so warmly pressed by his friend and minister, called
together an extraordinary council in the gallery of the palace of
Fontainebleau, to take the matter into consideration. When all the
members were assembled, his majesty requested that some person
conversant with the subject would make a report to him on the origin,
progress, and different forms of the duel. Sully complacently remarks, that
none of the councillors gave the king any great reason to felicitate them on
their erudition. In fact, they all remained silent. Sully held his peace with
the rest; but he looked so knowing, that the king turned towards him, and
said:—“Great master! by your face I conjecture that you know more of this
matter than you would have us believe. I pray you, and indeed I command,
that you tell us what you think and what you know.” The coy minister

refused, as he says, out of mere politeness to his more ignorant colleagues;
but, being again pressed by the king, he entered into a history of duelling
both in ancient and modern times. He has not preserved this history in his
Memoirs; and, as none of the ministers or councillors present thought
proper to do so, the world is deprived of a discourse which was, no doubt, a
learned and remarkable one. The result was, that a royal edict was issued,
which Sully lost no time in transmitting to the most distant provinces, with
a distinct notification to all parties concerned that the king was in earnest,
and would exert the full rigour of the law in punishment of the offenders.
Sully himself does not inform us what were the provisions of the new law;
but Father Matthias has been more explicit, and from him we learn, that
the marshals of France were created judges of a court of chivalry, for the
hearing of all causes wherein the honour of a noble or gentleman was
concerned, and that such as resorted to duelling should be punished by
death and confiscation of property, and that the seconds and assistants
should lose their rank, dignity, or offices, and be banished from the court of
their sovereign. 60
But so strong a hold had the education and prejudice of his age upon the
mind of the king, that though his reason condemned, his sympathies
approved the duel. Notwithstanding this threatened severity, the number
of duels did not diminish, and the wise Sully had still to lament the
prevalence of an evil which menaced society with utter disorganisation. In
the succeeding reign the practice prevailed, if possible, to a still greater
extent, until the Cardinal de Richelieu, better able to grapple with it than
Sully had been, made some severe examples in the very highest classes.
Lord Herbert, the English ambassador at the court of Louis XIII., repeats,
in his letters, an observation that had been previously made in the reign of
Henry IV., that it was rare to find a Frenchman moving in good society who
had not killed his man in a duel. The Abbé Millot says of this period, that
the duel madness made the most terrible ravages. Men had actually a
frenzy for combating. Caprice and vanity, as well as the excitement of

passion, imposed the necessity of fighting. Friends were obliged to enter
into the quarrels of their friends, or be themselves called out for their
refusal, and revenge became hereditary in many families. It was reckoned
that in twenty years eight thousand letters of pardon had been issued to
persons who had killed others in single combat. 61
Other writers confirm this statement. Amelot de Houssaye, in his
Memoirs, says, upon this subject, that duels were so common in the first
years of the reign of Louis XIII., that the ordinary conversation of persons
when they met in the morning was, “Do you know who fought yesterday?”
and after dinner, “Do you know who fought this morning?” The most
infamous duellist at that period was De Bouteville. It was not at all
necessary to quarrel with this assassin, to be forced to fight a duel with
him. When he heard that any one was very brave, he would go to him, and
say, “People tell me that you are brave; you and I must fight together!”
Every morning the most notorious bravos and duellists used to assemble at
his house, to take a breakfast of bread and wine, and practise fencing. M.
de Valençay, who was afterwards elevated to the rank of a cardinal, stood
very high in the estimation of De Bouteville and his gang. Hardly a day
passed but what he was engaged in some duel or other, either as principal
or second; and he once challenged De Bouteville himself, his best friend,
because De Bouteville had fought a duel without inviting him to become his
second. This quarrel was only appeased on the promise of De Bouteville
that, in his next encounter, he would not fail to avail himself of his services.
For that purpose he went out the same day, and picked a quarrel with the
Marquis des Portes. M. de Valençay, according to agreement, had the
pleasure of serving as his second, and of running through the body M. de
Cavois, the second of the Marquis des Portes, a man who had never done
him any injury, and whom he afterwards acknowledged he had never seen
before.
Cardinal Richelieu devoted much attention to this lamentable state of
public morals, and seems to have concurred with his great predecessor

Sully, that nothing but the most rigorous severity could put a stop to the
evil. The subject indeed was painfully forced upon him by his enemies. The
Marquis de Themines, to whom Richelieu, then Bishop of Luçon, had given
offence by some representations he had made to Mary of Medicis,
determined, since he could not challenge an ecclesiastic, to challenge his
brother. An opportunity was soon found. Themines, accosting the Marquis
de Richelieu, complained, in an insulting tone, that the Bishop of Luçon
had broken his faith. The Marquis resented both the manner and matter of
his speech, and readily accepted a challenge. They met in the Rue
d’Angoulême, and the unfortunate Richelieu was stabbed to the heart, and
instantly expired. From that moment the bishop became the steady foe of
the practice of duelling. Reason and the impulse of brotherly love alike
combined to make him detest it, and when his power in France was firmly
established, he set vigorously about repressing it. In his Testament
Politique, he has collected his thoughts upon the subject, in the chapter
entitled “Des moyens d’arrêter les Duels.” In spite of the edicts that he
published, the members of the nobility persisted in fighting upon the most
trivial and absurd pretences. At last Richelieu made a terrible example. The
infamous De Bouteville challenged and fought the Marquis de Beuvron;
and although the duel itself was not fatal to either, its consequences were
fatal to both. High as they were, Richelieu resolved that the law should
reach them both, and they were both tried, found guilty, and beheaded.
Thus did society get rid of one of the most bloodthirsty scoundrels that ever
polluted it.

SULLY.

In 1632 two noblemen fought a duel in which they were both
killed. The officers of justice had notice of the breach of the law, and
arrived at the scene of combat before the friends of the parties had
time to remove the bodies. In conformity with the cardinal’s severe
code upon the subject, the bodies were ignominiously stripped and
hanged upon a gallows with their heads downwards, for several
hours, within sight of all the people. 62 This severity sobered the
frenzy of the nation for a time; but it was soon forgotten. Men’s
minds were too deeply imbued with a false notion of honour to be
brought to a right way of thinking: by such examples, however
striking, Richelieu was unable to persuade them to walk in the right
path, though he could punish them for choosing the wrong one. He
had with all his acuteness, miscalculated the spirit of duelling. It was
not death that a duellist feared; it was shame, and the contempt of
his fellows. As Addison remarked more than eighty years afterwards,

“Death was not sufficient to deter men who made it their glory to
despise it; but if every one who fought a duel were to stand in the
pillory, it would quickly diminish the number of those imaginary
men of honour, and put an end to so absurd a practice.” Richelieu
never thought of this.
Sully says, that in his time the Germans were also much addicted
to duelling. There were three places where it was legal to fight;
Witzburg in Franconia, and Uspach and Halle in Swabia. Thither of
course, vast numbers repaired, and murdered each other under
sanction of the law. At an earlier period in Germany, it was held
highly disgraceful to refuse to fight. Any one who surrendered to his
adversary for a simple wound that did not disable him, was reputed
infamous, and could neither cut his beard, bear arms, mount on
horseback, or hold any office in the state. He who fell in a duel was
buried with great pomp and splendour.
In the year 1652, just after Louis XIV. had attained his majority, a
desperate duel was fought between the Dukes de Beaufort and De
Nemours, each attended by four gentlemen. Although brothers-inlaw, they had long been enemies, and their constant dissensions had
introduced much disorganisation among the troops which they
severally commanded. Each had long sought an opportunity for
combat, which at last arose on a misunderstanding relative to the
places they were to occupy at the council-board. They fought with
pistols, and, at the first discharge, the Duke de Nemours was shot
through the body, and almost instantly expired. Upon this the
Marquis de Villars, who seconded Nemours, challenged Héricourt,
the second of the Duke de Beaufort, a man whom he had never
before seen; and the challenge being accepted, they fought even more

desperately than their principals. This combat, being with swords,
lasted longer than the first, and was more exciting to the six
remaining gentlemen who stayed to witness it. The result was fatal to
Héricourt, who fell pierced to the heart by the sword of De Villars.
Any thing more savage than this can hardly be imagined. Voltaire
says such duels were frequent, and the compiler of the Dictionnaire
d’Anecdotes informs us that the number of seconds was not fixed. As
many as ten, or twelve, or twenty, were not unfrequent, and they
often fought together after their principals were disabled. The
highest mark of friendship one man could manifest towards another,
was to choose him for his second; and many gentlemen were so
desirous of serving in this capacity, that they endeavoured to raise
every slight misunderstanding into a quarrel, that they might have
the pleasure of being engaged in it. The Count de Bussy-Rabutin
relates an instance of this in his Memoirs. He says, that as he was
one evening coming out of the theatre, a gentleman named Bruc,
whom he had not before known, stopped him very politely, and,
drawing him aside, asked him if it was true that the Count de
Thianges had called him (Bruc) a drunkard? Bussy replied that he
really did not know, for he saw the count very seldom. “Oh, he is your
uncle!” replied Bruc; “and, as I cannot have satisfaction from him,
because he lives so far off in the country, I apply to you.” “I see what
you are at,” replied Bussy, “and, since you wish to put me in my
uncle’s place, I answer, that whoever asserted that he called you a
drunkard, told a lie!” “My brother said so,” replied Bruc, “and he is a
child.” “Horsewhip him, then, for his falsehood,” returned De Bussy.
“I will not have my brother called, a liar,” returned Bruc, determined
to quarrel with him; “so draw, and defend yourself!” They both drew

their swords in the public street, but were separated by the
spectators. They agreed, however, to fight on a future occasion, and
with all the regular forms of the duello. A few days afterwards, a
gentleman, whom De Bussy had never before seen, and whom he did
not know even by name, called upon him and asked if he might have
the privilege of serving as his second. He added, that he neither knew
him nor Bruc, except by reputation, but having made up his mind to
be second of one of them, he had decided upon accompanying De
Bussy as the braver man of the two. De Bussy thanked him very
sincerely for his politeness, but begged to be excused, as he had
already engaged four seconds to accompany him, and he was afraid
that if he took any more the affair would become a battle instead of a
duel.
When such quarrels as these were looked upon as mere matters of
course, the state of society must have been indeed awful. Louis XIV.
very early saw the evil, and as early determined to remedy it. It was
not, however, till the year 1679, when he instituted the “Chambre
Ardente,” for the trial of the slow poisoners and pretenders to
sorcery, that he published any edict against duelling. In that year his
famous edict was promulgated, in which he reiterated and confirmed
the severe enactments of his predecessors Henry IV. and Louis XIII.,
and expressed his determination never to pardon any offender. By
this celebrated ordinance a supreme court of honour was established,
composed of the marshals of France. They were bound, on taking the
office, to give to every one who brought a well-founded complaint
before them, such reparation as would satisfy the justice of the case.
Should any gentleman against whom complaint was made refuse to
obey the mandate of the court of honour, he might be punished by

fine and imprisonment; and when that was not possible, by reason of
his absenting himself from the kingdom, his estates might be
confiscated till his return.
Every man who sent a challenge, be the cause of offence what it
might, was deprived of all redress from the court of honour—
suspended three years from the exercise of any office in the state—
was further imprisoned for two years, and sentenced to pay a fine of
half his yearly income.
He who accepted a challenge was subject to the same punishment.
Any servant or other person, who knowingly became the bearer of a
challenge, was, if found guilty, sentenced to stand in the pillory and
be publicly whipped for the first offence; and for the second, sent for
three years to the galleys.
Any person who actually fought, was to be held guilty of murder,
even though death did not ensue, and was to be punished
accordingly. Persons in the higher ranks of life were to be beheaded,
and those of the middle class hanged upon a gallows, and their
bodies refused Christian burial.
At the same time that Louis published this severe edict, he exacted
a promise from his principal nobility that they would never engage in
a duel on any pretence whatever. He never swerved from his
resolution to pursue all duellists with the utmost rigour, and many
were executed in various parts of the country. A slight abatement of
the evil was the consequence, and in the course of a few years one
duel was not fought where twelve had been fought previously. A
medal was struck to commemorate the circumstance, by the express
command of the king. So much had he this object at heart, that, in
his will, he particularly recommended to his successor the care of his

edict against duelling, and warned him against any ill-judged lenity
to those who disobeyed it.
A singular law formerly existed in Malta with regard to duelling.
By this law it was permitted, but only upon condition that the parties
should fight in one particular street. If they presumed to settle their
quarrel elsewhere, they were held guilty of murder, and punished
accordingly. What was also very singular, they were bound, under
heavy penalties, to put up their swords when requested to do so by a
priest, a knight, or a woman. It does not appear, however, that the
ladies or the knights exercised this mild and beneficent privilege to
any great extent; the former were too often themselves the cause of
duels, and the latter sympathised too much in the wounded honour
of the combatants to attempt to separate them. The priests alone
were the great peacemakers. Brydone says, that a cross was always
painted on the wall opposite to the spot where a knight had been
killed, and that in the “street of duels” he counted about twenty of
them. 63
In England the private duel was also practised to a scandalous
extent, towards the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the
seventeenth centuries. The judicial combat now began to be more
rare, but several instances of it are mentioned in history. One was
instituted in the reign of Elizabeth, and another so late as the time of
Charles I. Sir Henry Spelman gives an account of that which took
place in Elizabeth’s reign, which is curious, perhaps the more so
when we consider that it was perfectly legal, and that similar
combats remained so till the year 1819. A proceeding having been
instituted in the Court of Common Pleas for the recovery of certain
manorial rights in the county of Kent, the defendant offered to prove

by single combat his right to retain possession. The plaintiff accepted
the challenge, and the Court having no power to stay the
proceedings, agreed to the champions who were to fight in lieu of the
principals. The queen commanded the parties to compromise; but it
being represented to her majesty that they were justified by law in
the course they were pursuing, she allowed them to proceed. On the
day appointed, the justices of the Common Pleas, and all the counsel
engaged in the cause, appeared as umpires of the combat, at a place
in Tothill-fields, where the lists had been prepared. The champions
were ready for the encounter, and the plaintiff and defendant were
publicly called to come forward and acknowledge them. The
defendant answered to his name, and recognised his champion with
the due formalities, but the plaintiff did not appear. Without his
presence and authority the combat could not take place; and his
absence being considered an abandonment of his claim, he was
declared to be non-suited, and barred for ever from renewing his suit
before any other tribunal whatever.

LORD BACON.

The queen appears to have disapproved personally of this mode of
settling a disputed claim, but her judges and legal advisers made no
attempt to alter the barbarous law. The practice of private duelling
excited more indignation, from its being of every-day occurrence. In
the time of James I. the English were so infected with the French

madness, that Bacon, when he was attorney-general, lent the aid of
his powerful eloquence to effect a reformation of the evil.
Informations were exhibited in the Star Chamber against two
persons, named Priest and Wright, for being engaged, as principal
and second, in a duel, on which occasion he delivered a charge that
was so highly approved of by the Lords of the Council, that they
ordered it to be printed and circulated over the country, as a thing
“very meet and worthy to be remembered and made known unto the
world.” He began by considering the nature and greatness of the
mischief of duelling. “It troubleth peace—it disfurnisheth war—it
bringeth calamity upon private men, peril upon the state, and
contempt upon the law. Touching the cause of it,” he observed, “that
the first motive of it, no doubt, is a false and erroneous imagination
of honour and credit; but then, the seed of this mischief being such,
it is nourished by vain discourses and green and unripe conceits.
Hereunto may be added, that men have almost lost the true notion
and

understanding

of

fortitude

and

valour.

For

fortitude

distinguisheth of the grounds of quarrel whether they be just; and
not only so, but whether they be worthy, and setteth a better price
upon men’s lives than to bestow them idly. Nay, it is weakness and
disesteem of a man’s self to put a man’s life upon such liedger
performances. A man’s life is not to be trifled with; it is to be offered
up and sacrificed to honourable services, public merits, good causes,
and noble adventures. It is in expense of blood as it is in expense of
money. It is no liberality to make a profusion of money upon every
vain occasion, neither is it fortitude to make effusion of blood, except
the cause of it be worth.” 64

The most remarkable event connected with duelling in this reign
was that between Lord Sanquir, a Scotch nobleman, and one Turner,
a fencing-master. In a trial of skill between them, his lordship’s eye
was accidentally thrust out by the point of Turner’s sword. Turner
expressed great regret at the circumstance, and Lord Sanquir bore
his loss with as much philosophy as he was master of, and forgave his
antagonist. Three years afterwards, Lord Sanquir was at Paris, where
he was a constant visitor at the court of Henry IV. One day, in the
course of conversation, the affable monarch inquired how he had lost
his eye. Sanquir, who prided himself on being the most expert
swordsman of the age, blushed as he replied that it was inflicted by
the sword of a fencing-master. Henry, forgetting his assumed
character of an anti-duellist, carelessly, and as a mere matter of
course, inquired whether the man lived? Nothing more was said; but
the query sank deep into the proud heart of the Scotch baron, who
returned shortly afterwards to England, burning for revenge. His
first intent was to challenge the fencing-master to single combat; but,
on further consideration, he deemed it inconsistent with his dignity
to meet him as an equal in fair and open fight. He therefore hired
two bravos, who set upon the fencing-master, and murdered him in
his own house at Whitefriars. The assassins were taken and executed,
and a reward of one thousand pounds offered for the apprehension
of their employer. Lord Sanquir concealed himself for several days,
and then surrendered to take his trial, in the hope (happily false) that
Justice would belie her name, and be lenient to a murderer because
he was a nobleman, who on a false point of honour had thought fit to
take revenge into his own hands. The most powerful intercessions
were employed in his favour, but James, to his credit, was deaf to

them all. Bacon, in his character of attorney-general, prosecuted the
prisoner to conviction; and he died the felon’s death on the 29th of
June, 1612, on a gibbet erected in front of the gate of Westminster
Hall.
With regard to the public duel, or trial by battle, demanded under
the sanction of the law, to terminate a quarrel which the ordinary
course of justice could with difficulty decide, Bacon was equally
opposed to it, and thought that in no case should it be granted. He
suggested that there should be declared a constant and settled
resolution in the state to abolish it altogether; that care should be
taken that the evil be no more cockered, nor the humour of it fed, but
that all persons found guilty should be rigorously punished by the
Star Chamber, and those of eminent quality banished from the court.
In the succeeding reign, when Donald Mackay, the first Lord Reay,
accused David Ramsay of treason, in being concerned with the
Marquis of Hamilton in a design upon the crown of Scotland, he was
challenged by the latter to make good his assertion by single
combat. 65 It had been at first the intention of the government to try
the case by the common law, but Ramsay thought he would stand a
better chance of escape by recurring to the old and almost exploded
custom, but which was still the right of every man in appeals of
treason. Lord Reay readily accepted the challenge, and both were
confined in the Tower until they found security that they would
appear on a certain day appointed by the court to determine the
question. The management of the affair was delegated to the
Marischal Court of Westminster, and the Earl of Lindsay was created
Lord Constable of England for the purpose. Shortly before the day
appointed, Ramsay confessed in substance all that Lord Reay had

laid to his charge, upon which Charles I. put a stop to the
proceedings.
But in England, about this period, sterner disputes arose among
men than those mere individual matters which generate duels. The
men of the Commonwealth encouraged no practice of the kind, and
the subdued aristocracy carried their habits and prejudices
elsewhere, and fought their duels at foreign courts. Cromwell’s
parliament, however—although the evil at that time was not so crying
—published an order in 1654 for the prevention of duels, and the
punishment of all concerned in them. Charles II., on his restoration,
also issued a proclamation upon the subject. In his reign an infamous
duel was fought—infamous not only from its own circumstances, but
from the lenity that was shewn to the principal offenders.
The worthless Duke of Buckingham, having debauched the
Countess of Shrewsbury, was challenged by her husband to mortal
combat in January 1668. Charles II. endeavoured to prevent the
duel, not from any regard to public morality, but from fear for the life
of his favourite. He gave commands to the Duke of Albemarle to
confine Buckingham to his house, or take some other measures to
prevent him from fighting. Albemarle neglected the order, thinking
that the king himself might prevent the combat by some surer
means. The meeting took place at Barn Elms; the injured
Shrewsbury being attended by Sir John Talbot, his relative, and Lord
Bernard Howard, son of the Earl of Arundel. Buckingham was
accompanied by two of his dependents, Captain Holmes and Sir
John Jenkins. According to the barbarous custom of the age, not only
the principals, but the seconds engaged each other. Jenkins was
pierced to the heart, and left dead upon the field, and Sir John Talbot

severely wounded in both arms. Buckingham himself escaping with
slight wounds, ran his unfortunate antagonist through the body, and
then left the field with the wretched woman, the cause of all the
mischief, who, in the dress of a page, awaited the issue of the conflict
in a neighbouring wood, holding her paramour’s horse to avoid
suspicion. Great influence was exerted to save the guilty parties from
punishment, and the master, as base as the favourite, made little
difficulty in granting a free pardon to all concerned. In a royal
proclamation issued shortly afterwards, Charles II. formally
pardoned the murderers, but declared his intention never to extend
in future any mercy to such offenders. It would be hard, after this, to
say who was the most infamous, the king, the favourite, or the
courtesan.
In the reign of Queen Anne, repeated complaints were made of the
prevalence of duelling. Addison, Swift, Steele, and other writers
employed their powerful pens in reprobation of it. Steele especially,
in the Tatler and Guardian, exposed its impiety and absurdity, and
endeavoured both by argument and by ridicule to bring his
countrymen to a right way of thinking. 66 His comedy of The
Conscious Lovers contains an admirable exposure of the abuse of the
word honour, which led men into an error so lamentable. Swift,
writing upon the subject, remarked that he could see no harm in
rogues and fools shooting each other. Addison and Steele took higher
ground; and the latter, in the Guardian, summed up nearly all that
could be said upon the subject in the following impressive words:
—“A Christian and a gentleman are made inconsistent appellations
of the same person. You are not to expect eternal life if you do not
forgive injuries, and your mortal life is rendered uncomfortable if

you are not ready to commit a murder in resentment of an affront;
for good sense, as well as religion, is so utterly banished the world,
that men glory in their very passions, and pursue trifles with the
utmost vengeance, so little do they know that to forgive is the most
arduous pitch human nature can arrive at. A coward has often
fought, a coward has often conquered; but a coward never forgave.”
Steele also published a pamphlet, in which he gave a detailed account
of the edict of Louis XIV., and the measures taken by that monarch
to cure his subjects of their murderous folly.
On the 8th of May, 1711, Sir Cholmely Deering, M.P. for the county
of Kent, was slain in a duel by Mr. Richard Thornhill, also a member
of the House of Commons. Three days afterwards, Sir Peter King
brought the subject under the notice of the legislature; and after
dwelling at considerable length on the alarming increase of the
practice, obtained leave to bring in a bill for the prevention and
punishment of duelling. It was read a first time that day, and ordered
for a second reading in the ensuing week.
About the same time, the attention of the Upper House of
Parliament was also drawn to the subject in the most painful
manner. Two of its most noted members would have fought had it
not been that Queen Anne received notice of their intention, and
exacted a pledge that they would desist; while a few months
afterwards two other of its members lost their lives in one of the
most remarkable duels upon record. The first affair, which happily
terminated without a meeting, was between the Duke of
Marlborough and the Earl Pawlet; the latter and fatal encounter was
between the Duke of Hamilton and Lord Mohun.

The first arose out of a debate in the Lords upon the conduct of the
Duke of Ormond in refusing to hazard a general engagement with the
enemy, in which Earl Pawlet remarked that nobody could doubt the
courage of the Duke of Ormond. “He was not like a certain general,
who led troops to the slaughter, to cause great numbers of officers to
be knocked on the head in a battle, or against stone walls, in order to
fill his pockets by disposing of their commissions.” Every one felt
that the remark was aimed at the Duke of Marlborough, but he
remained silent, though evidently suffering in mind. Soon after the
House broke up, the Earl Pawlet received a visit from Lord Mohun,
who told him that the Duke of Marlborough was anxious to come to
an explanation with him relative to some expressions he had made
use of in that day’s debate, and therefore prayed him to “go and take
a little air in the country.” Earl Pawlet did not affect to
misunderstand the hint, but asked him in plain terms whether he
brought a challenge from the duke. Lord Mohun said his message
needed no explanation, and that he [Lord Mohun] would accompany
the Duke of Marlborough. He then took his leave, and Earl Pawlet
returned home and told his lady that he was going out to fight a duel
with the Duke of Marlborough. His lady, alarmed for her lord’s
safety, gave notice of his intention to the Earl of Dartmouth, who
immediately, in the queen’s name, sent to the Duke of Marlborough,
and commanded him not to stir abroad. He also caused Earl Pawlet’s
house to be guarded by two sentinels; and having taken these
precautions, informed the queen of the whole affair. Her Majesty
sent at once for the duke, expressed her abhorrence of the custom of
duelling, and required his word of honour that he would proceed no

further. The duke pledged his word accordingly, and the affair
terminated.
The lamentable duel between the Duke of Hamilton and Lord
Mohun took place in November 1712, and sprang from the following
circumstances. A lawsuit had been pending for eleven years between
these two noblemen, and they looked upon each other in
consequence with a certain degree of coldness. They met together on
the 13th of November in the chambers of Mr. Orlebar, a master in
Chancery, when, in the course of conversation, the Duke of Hamilton
reflected upon the conduct of one of the witnesses in the cause,
saying that he was a person who had neither truth nor justice in him.
Lord Mohun, somewhat nettled at this remark applied to a witness
favourable to his side, made answer hastily, that Mr. Whiteworth, the
person alluded to, had quite as much truth and justice in him as the
Duke of Hamilton. The duke made no reply, and no one present
imagined that he took offence at what was said; and when he went
out of the room he made a low and courteous salute to the Lord
Mohun. In the evening, General Macartney called twice upon the
duke with a challenge from Lord Mohun, and failing in seeing him,
sought him a third time at a tavern, where he found him, and
delivered his message. The duke accepted the challenge, and the day
after the morrow, which was Sunday, the 15th of November, at seven
in the morning, was appointed for the meeting.
At that hour they assembled in Hyde Park, the duke being
attended by his relative Colonel Hamilton, and the Lord Mohun by
General Macartney. They jumped over a ditch into a place called the
Nursery, and prepared for the combat. The Duke of Hamilton,
turning to General Macartney, said, “Sir, you are the cause of this,

let the event be what it will.” Lord Mohun did not wish that the
seconds should engage, but the duke insisted that “Macartney
should have a share in the dance.” All being ready, the two
principals took up their positions, and fought with swords so
desperately, that after a short time they both fell down mortally
wounded. The Lord Mohun expired upon the spot, and the Duke of
Hamilton in the arms of his servants as they were carrying him to his
coach.
This unhappy termination caused the greatest excitement not only
in the metropolis, but all over the country. The Tories, grieved at the
loss of the Duke of Hamilton, charged the fatal combat on the Whig
party, whose leader, the Duke of Marlborough, had so recently set
the example of political duels. They called Lord Mohun the bully of
the Whig faction (he had already killed three men in duels, and been
twice tried for murder), and asserted openly that the quarrel was
concocted between him and General Macartney to rob the country of
the services of the Duke of Hamilton by murdering him. It was also
asserted that the wound of which the duke died was not inflicted by
Lord Mohun, but by Macartney; and every means was used to
propagate this belief. Colonel Hamilton, against whom and
Macartney the coroner’s jury had returned a verdict of wilful murder,
surrendered a few days afterwards, and was examined before a privy
council sitting at the house of Lord Dartmouth. He then deposed,
that seeing Lord Mohun fall, and the duke upon him, he ran to the
duke’s assistance; and that he might with the more ease help him, he
flung down both their swords, and as he was raising the duke up, he
saw Macartney make a push at him. Upon this deposition, a royal
proclamation was immediately issued, offering a reward of 500l. for

the apprehension of Macartney, to which the Duchess of Hamilton
afterwards added a reward of 300l.
Upon the further examination of Colonel Hamilton, it was found
that reliance could not be placed on all his statements, and that he
contradicted himself in several important particulars. He was
arraigned at the old Bailey for the murder of Lord Mohun, the whole
political circles of London being in a fever of excitement for the
result. All the Tory party prayed for his acquittal, and a Tory mob
surrounded the doors and all the avenues leading to the court of
justice for many hours before the trial began. The examination of
witnesses lasted seven hours. The criminal still persisted in accusing
General Macartney of the murder of the Duke of Hamilton, but in
other respects, say the newspapers of the day, prevaricated foully. He
was found guilty of manslaughter. This favourable verdict was
received with universal applause, “not only from the court and all the
gentlemen present, but the common people shewed a mighty
satisfaction, which they testified by loud and repeated huzzas.” 67
As the popular delirium subsided, and men began to reason coolly
upon the subject, they disbelieved the assertions of Colonel Hamilton
that Macartney had stabbed the duke, although it was universally
admitted that he had been much too busy and presuming. Hamilton
was shunned by all his former companions, and his life rendered so
irksome to him, that he sold out of the Guards and retired to private
life, in which he died heart-broken four years afterwards.
General Macartney surrendered about the same time, and was
tried for murder in the Court of King’s Bench. He was, however,
found guilty of manslaughter only.

At the opening of the session of Parliament of 1713, the queen
made pointed allusion in her speech to the frequency of duelling, and
recommended to the legislature to devise some speedy and effectual
remedy for it. A bill to that effect was brought forward, but thrown
out on the second reading, to the very great regret of all the sensible
portion of the community.
A famous duel was fought in 1765 between Lord Byron and Mr.
Chaworth. The dispute arose at a club-dinner, and was relative to
which of the two had the largest quantity of game on his estates.
Infuriated by wine and passion, they retired instantly into an
adjoining room, and fought with swords across a table, by the feeble
glimmer of a tallow candle. Mr. Chaworth, who was the more expert
swordsman of the two, received a mortal wound, and shortly
afterwards expired. Lord Byron was brought to trial for the murder
before the House of Lords; and it appearing clearly that the duel was
not premeditated, but fought at once, and in the heat of passion, he
was found guilty of manslaughter only, and ordered to be discharged
upon payment of his fees. This was a very bad example for the
country, and duelling of course fell into no disrepute after such a
verdict.
In France more severity was exercised. In the year 1769, the
Parliament of Grenoble took cognisance of the delinquency of the
Sieur Duchelas, one of its members, who challenged and killed in a
duel a captain of the Flemish legion. The servant of Duchelas
officiated as second, and was arraigned with his master for the
murder of the captain. They were both found guilty. Duchelas was
broken alive on the wheel, and the servant condemned to the galleys
for life.

A barbarous and fiercely-contested duel was fought in November
1778, between two foreign adventurers, at Bath, named Count Rice
and the Vicomte du Barri. Some dispute arose relative to a gambling
transaction, in the course of which Du Barri contradicted an
assertion of the other, by saying “That is not true!” Count Rice
immediately asked him if he knew the very disagreeable meaning of
the words he had employed. Du Barri said he was perfectly well
aware of their meaning, and that Rice might interpret them just as he
pleased. A challenge was immediately given and accepted. Seconds
were sent for, who, arriving with but little delay, the whole party,
though it was not long after midnight, proceeded to a place called
Claverton Down, where they remained with a surgeon until daylight.
They then prepared for the encounter, each being armed with two
pistols and a sword. The ground having been marked out by the
seconds, Du Barri fired first, and wounded his opponent in the thigh.
Count Rice then levelled his pistol, and shot Du Barri mortally in the
breast. So angry were the combatants, that they refused to desist;
both stepped back a few paces, and then rushing forward, discharged
their second pistols at each other. Neither shot took effect, and both
throwing away their pistols, prepared to finish the sanguinary
struggle by the sword. They took their places, and were advancing
towards each other, when the Vicomte du Barri suddenly staggered,
grew pale, and, falling on the ground, exclaimed, “Je vous demande
ma vie.” His opponent had but just time to answer, that he granted
it, when the unfortunate Du Barri turned upon the grass, and expired
with a heavy groan. The survivor of this savage conflict was then
removed to his lodgings, where he lay for some weeks in a dangerous
state. The coroner’s jury, in the mean while, sat upon the body of Du

Barri, and disgraced themselves by returning a verdict of
manslaughter only. Count Rice, upon his recovery, was indicted for
the murder notwithstanding this verdict. On his trial he entered into
a long defence of his conduct, pleading the fairness of the duel, and
its unpremeditated nature; and, at the same time, expressing his
deep regret for the unfortunate death of Du Barri, with whom for
many years he had been bound in ties of the strictest friendship.
These considerations appear to have weighed with the jury, and this
fierce duellist was again found guilty of manslaughter only, and
escaped with a merely nominal punishment.
A duel, less remarkable from its circumstances, but more so from
the rank of the parties, took place in 1789. The combatants on this
occasion were the Duke of York and Colonel Lenox, the nephew and
heir of the Duke of Richmond. The cause of offence was given by the
Duke of York, who had said in presence of several officers of the
Guards, that words had been used to Colonel Lenox at Daubigny’s to
which no gentleman ought to have submitted. Colonel Lenox went up
to the duke on parade, and asked him publicly whether he had made
such an assertion. The Duke of York, without answering his question,
coldly ordered him to his post. When parade was over, he took an
opportunity of saying publicly in the orderly-room before Colonel
Lenox, that he desired no protection from his rank as a prince and
his station as commanding officer; adding that, when he was off duty
he wore a plain brown coat like a private gentleman, and was ready
as such to give satisfaction. Colonel Lenox desired nothing better
than satisfaction; that is to say, to run the chance of shooting the
duke through the body, or being himself shot. He accordingly
challenged his Royal Highness, and they met on Wimbledon

Common. Colonel Lenox fired first, and the ball whizzed past the
head of his opponent, so near to it as to graze his projecting curl. The
duke refused to return the fire, and the seconds interfering, the affair
terminated.
Colonel Lenox was very shortly afterwards engaged in another
duel arising out of this. A Mr. Swift wrote a pamphlet in reference to
the dispute between him and the Duke of York, at some expressions
in which he took so much offence, as to imagine that nothing but a
shot at the writer could atone for them. They met on the Uxbridge
Road, but no damage was done to either party.
The Irish were for a long time renowned for their love of duelling.
The slightest offence which it is possible to imagine that one man
could offer to another was sufficient to provoke a challenge. Sir
Jonah Barrington relates, in his Memoirs, that, previous to the
Union, during the time of a disputed election in Dublin, it was no
unusual thing for three-and-twenty duels to be fought in a day. Even
in times of less excitement, they were so common as to be deemed
unworthy of note by the regular chroniclers of events, except in cases
where one or both of the combatants were killed.
In those days, in Ireland, it was not only the man of the military,
but of every profession, who had to work his way to eminence with
the sword or the pistol. Each political party had its regular corps of
bullies, or fire-eaters, as they were called, who qualified themselves
for being the pests of society by spending all their spare time in firing
at targets. They boasted that they could hit an opponent in any part
of his body they pleased, and made up their minds before the
encounter began whether they should kill him, disable, or disfigure

him for life—lay him on a bed of suffering for a twelvemonth, or
merely graze a limb.
The evil had reached an alarming height, when, in the year 1808,
an opportunity was offered to King George III. of shewing in a
striking manner his detestation of the practice, and of setting an
example to the Irish that such murders were not to be committed
with impunity. A dispute arose, in the month of June 1807, between
Major Campbell and Captain Boyd, officers of the 21st regiment,
stationed in Ireland, about the proper manner of giving the word of
command on parade. Hot words ensued on this slight occasion, and
the result was a challenge from Campbell to Boyd. They retired into
the mess-room shortly afterwards, and each stationed himself at a
corner, the distance obliquely being but seven paces. Here, without
friends or seconds being present, they fired at each other, and
Captain Boyd fell mortally wounded between the fourth and fifth
ribs. A surgeon, who came in shortly, found him sitting in a chair,
vomiting and suffering great agony. He was led into another room,
Major Campbell following, in great distress and perturbation of
mind. Boyd survived but eighteen hours, and just before his death,
said, in reply to a question from his opponent, that the duel was not
fair, and added, “You hurried me, Campbell—you’re a bad
man.”—“Good God!” replied Campbell, “will you mention before
these gentlemen, was not every thing fair? Did you not say that you
were ready?” Boyd answered faintly, “Oh, no! you know I wanted you
to wait and have friends.” On being again asked whether all was fair,
the dying man faintly murmured, “Yes:” but in a minute after, he
said, “You’re a bad man!” Campbell was now in great agitation, and
ringing his hands convulsively, he exclaimed, “Oh, Boyd! you are the

happiest man of the two! Do you forgive me?” Boyd replied, “I
forgive you—I feel for you, as I know you do for me.” He shortly
afterwards expired, and Major Campbell made his escape from
Ireland, and lived for some months with his family under an
assumed name, in the neighbourhood of Chelsea. He was, however,
apprehended, and brought to trial at Armagh, in August 1808. He
said while in prison, that, if found guilty of murder, he should suffer
as an example to duellists in Ireland; but he endeavoured to buoy
himself up with the hope that the jury would only convict him of
manslaughter. It was proved in evidence upon the trial, that the duel
was not fought immediately after the offence was given, but that
Major Campbell went home and drank tea with his family before he
sought Boyd for the fatal encounter. The jury returned a verdict of
wilful murder against him, but recommended him to mercy on the
ground that the duel had been a fair one. He was condemned to die
on the Monday following, but was afterwards respited for a few days
longer. In the mean time the greatest exertions were made in his
behalf. His unfortunate wife went upon her knees before the Prince
of Wales, to move him to use his influence with the king in favour of
her unhappy husband. Every thing a fond wife and a courageous
woman could do she tried, to gain the royal clemency; but George III.
was inflexible, in consequence of the representations of the Irish
viceroy that an example was necessary. The law was therefore
allowed to take its course, and the victim of a false spirit of honour
died the death of a felon.
The most inveterate duellists of the present day are the students in
the Universities of Germany. They fight on the most frivolous
pretences, and settle with swords and pistols the schoolboy disputes

which in other countries are arranged by the more harmless medium
of the fisticuffs. It was at one time the custom among these savage
youths to prefer the sword-combat, for the facility it gave them of
cutting off the noses of their opponents. To disfigure them in this
manner was an object of ambition, and the German duellists
reckoned the number of these disgusting trophies which they had
borne away, with as much satisfaction as a successful general the
provinces he had reduced or the cities he had taken.
But it would be wearisome to enter into the minute detail of all the
duels of modern times. If an examination were made into the general
causes which produced them, it would be found that in every case
they had been either of the most trivial or the most unworthy nature.
Parliamentary duels were at one time very common, and amongst
the names of those who have soiled a great reputation by conforming
to the practice, may be mentioned those of Warren Hastings, Sir
Philip Francis, Wilkes, Pitt, Fox, Grattan, Curran, Tierney, and
Canning. So difficult is it even for the superior mind to free itself
from the trammels with which foolish opinion has enswathed it—not
one of these celebrated persons who did not in his secret soul
condemn the folly to which he lent himself. The bonds of reason,
though iron-strong, are easily burst through; but those of folly,
though lithe and frail as the rushes by a stream, defy the stoutest
heart to snap them asunder. Colonel Thomas, an officer in the
Guards, who was killed in a duel, added the following clause to his
will the night before he died:—“In the first place, I commit my soul to
Almighty God, in hope of his mercy and pardon for the irreligious
step I now (in compliance with the unwarrantable customs of this
wicked world) put myself under the necessity of taking.” How many

have been in the same state of mind as this wise, foolish man! He
knew his error, and abhorred it, but could not resist it for fear of the
opinion of the prejudiced and unthinking. No other could have
blamed him for refusing to fight a duel.
The list of duels that have sprung from the most degrading causes
might be stretched out to an almost indefinite extent. Sterne’s father
fought a duel about a goose; and the great Raleigh about a tavernbill. 68 Scores of duels (many of them fatal) have been fought from
disputes at cards, or a place at a theatre; while hundreds of
challenges, given and accepted over-night, in a fit of drunkenness,
have been fought out the next morning to the death of one or both of
the antagonists.
Two of the most notorious duels of modern times had their origin
in causes no more worthy than the quarrel of a dog and the favour of
a prostitute: that between Macnamara and Montgomery arising from
the former; and that between Best and Lord Camelford from the
latter. The dog of Montgomery attacked a dog belonging to
Macnamara, and each master interfering in behalf of his own animal,
high words ensued. The result was the giving and accepting a
challenge to mortal combat. The parties met on the following day,
when Montgomery was shot dead, and his antagonist severely
wounded. The affair created a great sensation at the time, and
Heaviside, the surgeon who attended at the fatal field to render his
assistance if necessary, was arrested as an accessory to the murder,
and committed to Newgate.
In the duel between Best and Lord Camelford, two pistols were
used which were considered to be the best in England. One of them
was thought slightly superior to the other, and it was agreed that the

belligerents should toss up a piece of money to decide the choice of
weapons. Best gained it, and at the first discharge, Lord Camelford
fell mortally wounded. But little sympathy was expressed for his fate;
he was a confirmed duellist, had been engaged in many meetings of
the kind, and the blood of more than one fellow-creature lay at his
door. As he had sowed, so did he reap; and the violent man met an
appropriate death.
It now only remains to notice the means that have been taken to
stay the prevalence of this madness of false honour in the various
countries of the civilised world. The efforts of the governments of
France and England have already been mentioned, and their want of
success is but too well known. The same efforts have been attended
with the same results elsewhere. In despotic countries, where the will
of the monarch has been strongly expressed and vigorously
supported, a diminution of the evil has for a time resulted, but only
to be increased again, when death relaxed the iron grasp, and a
successor appeared of less decided opinions on the subject. This was
the case in Prussia, under the great Frederick, of whose aversion to
duelling a popular anecdote is recorded. It is stated of him that he
permitted duelling in his army, but only upon the condition that the
combatants should fight in presence of a whole battalion of infantry,
drawn up on purpose to see fair play. The latter received strict
orders, when one of the belligerents fell, to shoot the other
immediately. It is added, that the known determination of the king
effectually put a stop to the practice.
The Emperor Joseph II. of Austria was as firm as Frederick,
although the measures he adopted were not so singular. The
following letter explains his views on the subject:

“TO GENERAL *

*

*

*

*

“MY GENERAL,
“You will immediately arrest the Count of K. and Captain W.
The count is young, passionate, and influenced by wrong notions
of birth and a false spirit of honour. Captain W. is an old soldier,
who will adjust every dispute with the sword and pistol, and who
has received the challenge of the young count with unbecoming
warmth.
“I will suffer no duelling in my army. I despise the principles
of those who attempt to justify the practice, and who would run
each other through the body in cold blood.
“When I have officers who bravely expose themselves to every
danger in facing the enemy—who at all times exhibit courage,
valour, and resolution in attack and defence, I esteem them
highly. The coolness with which they meet death on such
occasions is serviceable to their country, and at the same time
redounds to their own honour; but should there be men
amongst them who are ready to sacrifice every thing to their
vengeance and hatred, I despise them. I consider such a man as
no better than a Roman gladiator.
“Order a court-martial to try the two officers. Investigate the
subject of their dispute with that impartiality which I demand
from every judge; and he that is guilty, let him be a sacrifice to
his fate and the laws.
“Such a barbarous custom, which suits the age of the
Tamerlanes and Bajazets, and which has often had such
melancholy effects on single families, I will have suppressed and

punished, even if it should deprive me of one half of my officers.
There are still men who know how to unite the character of a
hero with that of a good subject; and he only can be so who
respects the laws.
“August, 1771. JOSEPH .” 69
In the United States of America the code varies considerably. In
one or two of the still wild and simple states of the far West, where
no duel has yet been fought, there is no specific law upon the subject
beyond that in the Decalogue, which says, “Thou shalt do no
murder;” but duelling every where follows the steps of modern
civilisation; and by the time the backwoodsman is transformed into
the citizen, he has imbibed the false notions of honour which are
prevalent in Europe and around him, and is ready, like his
progenitors, to settle his differences with the pistol. In the majority
of the States the punishment for challenging, fighting, or acting as
second, is solitary imprisonment and hard labour for any period less
than a year, and disqualification for serving any public office for
twenty years. In Vermont the punishment is total disqualification for
office, deprivation of the rights of citizenship, and a fine; in fatal
cases, the same punishment as that of murderers. In Rhode Island,
the combatant, though death does not ensue, is liable to be carted to
the gallows, with a rope about his neck, and to sit in this trim for an
hour exposed to the peltings of the mob. He may be further
imprisoned for a year, at the option of the magistrate. In Connecticut
the punishment is total disqualification for office or employ, and a
fine varying from one hundred to a thousand dollars. The laws of
Illinois require certain officers of the state to make oath, previous to

their instalment, that they have never been, nor ever will be,
concerned in a duel. 70
Amongst the edicts against duelling, promulgated at various times
in Europe, may be mentioned that of Augustus King of Poland, in
1712, which decreed the punishment of death against principals and
seconds, and minor punishments against the bearers of a challenge.
An edict was also published at Munich, in 1773, according to which
both principals and seconds, even in duels where no one was either
killed or wounded, should be hanged, and their bodies buried at the
foot of the gallows.
The king of Naples issued an ordinance against duelling in 1838, in
which the punishment of death is decreed against all concerned in a
fatal duel. The bodies of those killed, and of those who may be
executed in consequence, are to be buried in unconsecrated ground,
and without any religious ceremony; nor is any monument to be
erected on the spot. The punishment for duels in which either, or
both, are wounded, and for those in which no damage whatever is
done, varies according to the case, and consists of fine,
imprisonment, loss of rank and honours, and incapacity for filling
any public situation. Bearers of challenges may also be punished with
fine and imprisonment.
It might be imagined that enactments so severe all over the
civilised world would finally eradicate a custom, the prevalence of
which every wise and good man must deplore. But the frowns of the
law never yet have taught, and never will teach, men to desist from
this practice, as long as it is felt that the lawgiver sympathises with it
in his heart. The stern judge upon the bench may say to the
unfortunate wight who has been called a liar by some unmannerly

opponent, “If you challenge him, you meditate murder, and are guilty
of murder!” but the same judge, divested of his robes of state, and
mixing in the world with other men, would say, “If you do not
challenge him, if you do not run the risk of making yourself a
murderer, you will be looked upon as a mean-spirited wretch, unfit
to associate with your fellows, and deserving nothing but their scorn
and their contempt!” It is society, and not the duellist, who is to
blame. Female influence too, which is so powerful in leading men
either to good or to evil, takes in this case the evil part. Mere animal
bravery has, unfortunately, such charms in the female eye, that a
successful duellist is but too often regarded as a sort of hero; and the
man who refuses to fight, though of truer courage, is thought a
poltroon, who may be trampled on. Mr. Graves, a member of the
American legislature, who, early in 1838, killed a Mr. Cilley in a duel,
truly and eloquently said, on the floor of the House of
Representatives, when lamenting the unfortunate issue of that
encounter, that society was more to blame than he was. “Public
opinion,” said the repentant orator, “is practically the paramount law
of the land. Every other law, both human and divine, ceases to be
observed; yea, withers and perishes in contact with it. It was this
paramount law of this nation and of this House that forced me,
under the penalty of dishonour, to subject myself to the code, which
impelled me unwillingly into this tragical affair. Upon the heads of
this nation, and at the doors of this House, rests the blood with
which my unfortunate hands have been stained!”
As long as society is in this mood; as long as it thinks that the man
who refuses to resent an insult, deserved that insult, and should be
scouted accordingly; so long, it is to be feared, will duelling exist,

however severe the laws may be. Men must have redress for injuries
inflicted; and when those injuries are of such a nature that no
tribunal will take cognisance of them, the injured will take the law
into their own hands, and right themselves in the opinion of their
fellows, at the hazard of their lives. Much as the sage may affect to
despise the opinion of the world, there are few who would not rather
expose their lives a hundred times than be condemned to live on, in
society, but not of it—a by-word of reproach to all who know their
history, and a mark for scorn to point his finger at.
The only practicable means for diminishing the force of a custom
which is the disgrace of civilisation, seems to be the establishment of
a court of honour, which should take cognisance of all those delicate
and almost intangible offences which yet wound so deeply. The court
established by Louis XIV. might be taken as a model. No man now
fights a duel when a fit apology has been offered; and it should be the
duty of this court to weigh dispassionately the complaint of every
man injured in his honour, either by word or deed, and to force the
offender to make a public apology. If he refused the apology, he
would be the breaker of a second law; an offender against a high
court, as well as against the man he had injured, and might be
punished with fine and imprisonment, the latter to last until he saw
the error of his conduct, and made the concession which the court
demanded.
If, after the establishment of this tribunal, men should be found of
a nature so bloodthirsty as not to be satisfied with its peaceful
decisions, and should resort to the old and barbarous mode of an
appeal to the pistol, some means might be found of dealing with
them. To hang them as murderers would be of no avail; for to such

men death would have few terrors. Shame alone would bring them to
reason. Transportation, the tread-wheel, or a public whipping, would
perhaps be sufficient.

RELICS.

A fouth o’ auld knick-knackets,
Rusty airn caps and jinglin’ jackets,
Wad hand the Lothians three, in tackets,
A towmond guid;
An’ parritch pats, and auld saut backets,
Afore the flood.
BURNS.

THE love for relics is one which will never be eradicated as
long as feeling and affection are denizens of the heart. It is a love which is
most easily excited in the best and kindliest natures, and which few are
callous enough to scoff at. Who would not treasure the lock of hair that
once adorned the brow of the faithful wife now cold in death, or that hung
down the neck of a beloved infant now sleeping under the sward? Not one!
They are home-relics, whose sacred worth is intelligible to all: spoils
rescued from the devouring grave, which to the affectionate are beyond all
price. How dear to a forlorn survivor the book over whose pages he has
pored with one departed! How much greater its value, if that hand, now
cold, had written a thought, an opinion, or a name, upon the leaf! Besides
these sweet domestic relics, there are others which no one can condemn:
relics sanctified by that admiration of greatness and goodness which is akin
to love; such as the copy of Montaigne’s Florio, with the name of

Shakspeare upon the leaf, written by the poet of all time himself; the chair
preserved at Antwerp, in which Rubens sat when he painted the immortal
Descent from the Cross; or the telescope, preserved in the Museum of
Florence, which aided Galileo in his sublime discoveries. Who would not
look with veneration upon the undoubted arrow of William Tell—the
swords of Wallace or of Hampden—or the Bible whose leaves were turned
by some stern old father of the faith?
Thus the principle of reliquism is hallowed and enshrined by love. But
from this germ of purity how numerous the progeny of errors and
superstitions! Men, in their admiration of the great, and of all that
appertained to them, have forgotten that goodness is a component part of
true greatness, and have made fools of themselves for the jawbone of a
saint, the toe-nail of an apostle, the handkerchief a king blew his nose in, or
the rope that hanged a criminal. Desiring to rescue some slight token from
the graves of their predecessors, they have confounded the famous and the
infamous, the renowned and the notorious. Great saints, great sinners;
great philosophers, great quacks; great conquerors, great murderers; great
ministers, great thieves; each and all have had their admirers, ready to
ransack earth, from the equator to either pole, to find a relic of them.
The reliquism of modern times dates its origin from the centuries
immediately preceding the Crusades. The first pilgrims to the Holy Land
brought back to Europe thousands of apocryphal relics, in the purchase of
which they had expended all their store. The greatest favourite was the
wood of the true cross, which, like the oil of the widow, never diminished.
It is generally asserted, in the traditions of the Romish Church, that the
Empress Helen, the mother of Constantine the Great, first discovered the
veritable “true cross” in her pilgrimage to Jerusalem. The Emperor
Theodosius made a present of the greater part of it to St. Ambrose, Bishop
of Milan, by whom it was studded with precious stones, and deposited in
the principal church of that city. It was carried away by the Huns, by whom
it was burnt, after they had extracted the valuable jewels it contained.

Fragments, purporting to have been cut from it, were, in the eleventh and
twelfth centuries, to be found in almost every church in Europe, and would,
if collected together in one place, have been almost sufficient to have built a
cathedral. Happy was the sinner who could get a sight of one of them;
happier he who possessed one! To obtain them the greatest dangers were
cheerfully braved. They were thought to preserve from all evils, and to cure
the most inveterate diseases. Annual pilgrimages were made to the shrines
that contained them, and considerable revenues collected from the
devotees.
Next in renown were those precious relics, the tears of the Saviour. By
whom and in what manner they were preserved, the pilgrims did not
inquire. Their genuineness was vouched by the Christians of the Holy
Land, and that was sufficient. Tears of the Virgin Mary, and tears of St.
Peter, were also to be had, carefully enclosed in little caskets, which the
pious might wear in their bosoms. After the tears the next most precious
relics were drops of the blood of Jesus and the martyrs, and the milk of the
Virgin Mary. Hair and toe-nails were also in great repute, and were sold at
extravagant prices. Thousands of pilgrims annually visited Palestine in the
eleventh and twelfth centuries, to purchase pretended relics for the home
market. The majority of them had no other means of subsistence than the
profits thus obtained. Many a nail, cut from the filthy foot of some
unscrupulous ecclesiastic, was sold at a diamond’s price, within six months
after its severance from its parent toe, upon the supposition that it had
once belonged to a saint or an apostle. Peter’s toes were uncommonly
prolific, for there were nails enough in Europe, at the time of the Council of
Clermont, to have filled a sack, all of which were devoutly believed to have
grown on the sacred feet of that great apostle. Some of them are still shewn
in the cathedral of Aix-la-Chapelle. The pious come from a distance of a
hundred German miles to feast their eyes upon them.
At Port Royal, in Paris, is kept with great care a thorn, which the priests
of that seminary assert to be one of the identical thorns that bound the holy

head of the Son of God. How it came there, and by whom it was preserved,
has never been explained. This is the famous thorn, celebrated in the long
dissensions of the Jansenists and the Molenists, and which worked the
miraculous cure upon Mademoiselle Perrier: by merely kissing it she was
cured of a disease of the eyes of long standing. 71
What traveller is unacquainted with the Santa Scala, or Holy Stairs, at
Rome? They were brought from Jerusalem along with the true cross, by the
Empress Helen, and were taken from the house which, according to
popular tradition, was inhabited by Pontius Pilate. They are said to be the
steps which Jesus ascended and descended when brought into the presence
of the Roman governor. They are held in the greatest veneration at Rome:
it is sacrilegious to walk upon them. The knees of the faithful must alone
touch them in ascending or descending, and that only after the pilgrims
have reverentially kissed them.
Europe still swarms with these religious relics. There is hardly a Roman
Catholic church in Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, or Belgium, without one
or more of them. Even the poorly endowed churches of the villages boast
the possession of miraculous thigh-bones of the innumerable saints of the
Romish calendar. Aix-la-Chapelle is proud of the veritable châsse, or thighbone of Charlemagne, which cures lameness. Halle has a thigh-bone of the
Virgin Mary; Spain has seven or eight, all said to be undoubted relics.
Brussels at one time preserved, and perhaps does now, the teeth of St.
Gudule. The faithful, who suffered from the toothache, had only to pray,
look at them, and be cured. Some of these holy bones have been buried in
different parts of the Continent. After a certain lapse of time, water is said
to ooze from them, which soon forms a spring, and cures all the diseases of
the faithful.
It is curious to remark the avidity manifested in all ages, and in all
countries, to obtain possession of some relic of any persons who have been
much spoken of, even for their crimes. When William Longbeard, leader of
the populace of London in the reign of Richard I., was hanged at

Smithfield, the utmost eagerness was shewn to obtain a hair from his head,
or a shred from his garments. Women came from Essex, Kent, Suffolk,
Sussex, and all the surrounding counties, to collect the mould at the foot of
his gallows. A hair of his beard was believed to preserve from evil spirits,
and a piece of his clothes from aches and pains.
In more modern days, a similar avidity was shewn to obtain a relic of the
luckless Masaniello, the fisherman of Naples. After he had been raised by
mob favour to a height of power more despotic than monarch ever wielded,
he was shot by the same populace in the streets, as if he had been a mad
dog. His headless trunk was dragged through the mire for several hours,
and cast at night-fall into the city ditch. On the morrow the tide of popular
feeling turned once more in his favour. His corpse was sought, arrayed in
royal robes, and buried magnificently by torch-light in the cathedral, ten
thousand armed men, and as many mourners, attending at the ceremony.
The fisherman’s dress which he had worn was rent into shreds by the
crowd, to be preserved as relics; the door of his hut was pulled off its hinges
by a mob of women, and eagerly cut up into small pieces, to be made into
images, caskets, and other mementos. The scanty furniture of his poor
abode became of more value than the adornments of a palace; the ground
he had walked upon was considered sacred, and, being collected in small
phials, was sold at its weight in gold, and worn in the bosom as an amulet.
Almost as extraordinary was the frenzy manifested by the populace of
Paris on the execution of the atrocious Marchioness de Brinvilliers. There
were grounds for the popular wonder in the case of Masaniello, who was
unstained with personal crimes. But the career of Madame de Brinvilliers
was of a nature to excite no other feelings than disgust and abhorrence. She
was convicted of poisoning several persons, and sentenced to be burned in
the Place de Grève, and to have her ashes scattered to the winds. On the
day of her execution, the populace, struck by her gracefulness and beauty,
inveighed against the severity of her sentence. Their pity soon increased to
admiration, and, ere evening, she was considered a saint. Her ashes were

industriously collected; even the charred wood, which had aided to
consume her, was eagerly purchased by the populace. Her ashes were
thought to preserve from witchcraft.
In England many persons have a singular love for the relics of thieves
and murderers, or other great criminals. The ropes with which they have
been hanged are very often bought by collectors at a guinea per foot. Great
sums were paid for the rope which hanged Dr. Dodd, and for those more
recently which did justice upon Mr. Fauntleroy for forgery, and on Thurtell
for the murder of Mr. Weare. The murder of Maria Marten, by Corder, in
the year 1828, excited the greatest interest all over the country. People
came from Wales and Scotland, and even from Ireland, to visit the barn
where the body of the murdered woman was buried. Every one of them was
anxious to carry away some memorial of his visit. Pieces of the barn-door,
tiles from the roof, and, above all, the clothes of the poor victim, were
eagerly sought after. A lock of her hair was sold for two guineas, and the
purchaser thought himself fortunate in getting it so cheaply.
So great was the concourse of people to visit the house in Camberwell
Lane, where Greenacre murdered Hannah Brown, in 1837, that it was
found necessary to station a strong detachment of police on the spot. The
crowd was so eager to obtain a relic of the house of this atrocious criminal,
that the police were obliged to employ force to prevent the tables and
chairs, and even the doors, from being carried away.
In earlier times, a singular superstition was attached to the hand of a
criminal who had suffered execution. It was thought that by merely
rubbing the dead hand on the body, the patient afflicted with the king’s evil
would be instantly cured. The executioner at Newgate formerly derived no
inconsiderable revenue from this foolish practice. The possession of the
hand was thought to be of still greater efficacy in the cure of diseases and
the prevention of misfortunes. In the time of Charles II., as much as ten
guineas was thought a small price for one of these disgusting relics.

When the maniac, Thom, or Courtenay, was shot, in the spring of 1838,
the relic-hunters were immediately in motion to obtain a memento of so
extraordinary an individual. His long black beard and hair, which were cut
off by the surgeons, fell into the hands of his disciples, by whom they were
treasured with the utmost reverence. A lock of his hair commanded a great
price, not only amongst his followers, but among the more wealthy
inhabitants of Canterbury and its neighbourhood. The tree against which
he fell when he was shot, was stripped of all its bark by the curious; while a
letter, with his signature to it, was paid for in gold coins; and his favourite
horse became as celebrated as its master. Parties of ladies and gentlemen
went to Boughton from a distance of a hundred and fifty miles, to visit the
scene of that fatal affray, and stroke on the back the horse of the “mad
knight of Malta.” If a strict watch had not been kept over his grave for
months, the body would have been disinterred, and the bones carried away
as memorials.
Among the Chinese no relics are more valued than the boots which have
been worn by an upright magistrate. In Davis’s interesting description of
the empire of China, we are informed, that whenever a judge of unusual
integrity resigns his situation, the people all congregate to do him honour.
If he leaves the city where he has presided, the crowd accompany him from
his residence to the gates, where his boots are drawn off with great
ceremony, to be preserved in the hall of justice. Their place is immediately
supplied by a new pair, which, in their turn, are drawn off to make room
for others before he has worn them five minutes, it being considered
sufficient to consecrate them that he should have merely drawn them on.
Among the most favourite relics of modern times, in Europe, are
Shakspeare’s mulberry-tree, Napoleon’s willow, and the table at Waterloo
on which the emperor wrote his despatches. Snuff-boxes of Shakspeare’s
mulberry-tree are comparatively rare, though there are doubtless more of
them in the market than were ever made of the wood planted by the great
bard. Many a piece of alien wood passes under this name. The same may be

said of Napoleon’s table at Waterloo. The original has long since been
destroyed, and a round dozen of counterfeits along with it. Many preserve
the simple stick of wood; others have them cut into brooches and every
variety of ornament; but by far the greater number prefer them as snuffboxes. In France they are made into bonbonnières, and are much esteemed
by the many thousands whose cheeks still glow and whose eyes still sparkle
at the name of Napoleon.
Bullets from the field of Waterloo, and buttons from the coats of the
soldiers who fell in the fight, are still favourite relics in Europe. But the
same ingenuity which found new tables after the old one was destroyed,
has cast new bullets for the curious. Many a one who thinks himself the
possessor of a bullet which aided in giving peace to the world on that
memorable day, is the owner of a dump, first extracted from the ore a
dozen years afterwards. Let all lovers of genuine relics look well to their
money before they part with it to the ciceroni that swarm in the village of
Waterloo!
Few travellers stopped at the lonely isle of St. Helena without cutting a
twig from the willow that drooped over the grave of Napoleon, prior to the
removal of the body by the government of Louis Philippe. Many of them
have since been planted in different parts of Europe, and have grown into
trees as large as their parent. Relic-hunters, who are unable to procure a
twig of the original, are content with one from these. Several of them are
growing in the neighbourhood of London.
But in relics, as in every thing else, there is the use and the abuse. The
undoubted relics of great men, or great events, will always possess
attractions for the thinking and refined. There are few who would not join
with Cowley in the extravagant wish introduced in his lines “written while
sitting in a chair made of the remains of the ship in which Sir Francis
Drake sailed round the world:”

And I myself, who now love quiet too,
Almost as much, as any chair can do,
Would yet a journey take
An old wheel of that chariot to see,
Which Phaeton so rashly brake.
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Lane was buried in the crypt or cloister of St. John, Clerkenwell.
The vault is composed of two aisles, that on the south being
much narrower than the other,—it was here she was deposited.
About seven years since, I was sketching a picturesque trefoilheaded door leading into this part of the vault; and the place
being at that time in great confusion with coffins, remains of

bodies, some of which were dried like mummies, &c., I could
find no better seat than one of the coffins. The sexton’s boy, who
held my light, informed me this was the coffin of Scratching
Fanny, which recalled the Cock Lane story to my mind. I got off
the lid of the coffin, and saw the face of a handsome woman,
with an aquiline nose; this feature remaining perfect, an
uncommon case, for the cartilage mostly gives way. The remains
had become adipocere, and were perfectly preserved. She was
said to have been poisoned by deleterious punch, but this was
legally disproved; and, if I remember rightly, she was otherwise
declared to have died of small-pox; of this disease there was not
the least sign; but as some mineral poisons tend to render
bodies adipocere, here was some evidence in support of the
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time the vault has been set in order, and the above-mentioned
coffin, with others, put away.
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King, who holds the premises, informs me that her family has
had the house about eighty years.—J. W. ARCHER.
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The Abbé, in the second volume, in the letter No. 79,
addressed to Monsieur de Buffon, gives the following curious

particulars of the robbers of 1737, which are not without interest
at this day, if it were only to shew the vast improvement which
has taken place since that period. “It is usual in travelling to put
ten or a dozen guineas in a separate pocket, as a tribute to the
first that comes to demand them the right of passport, which
custom has established here in favour of the robbers, who are
almost the only highway surveyors in England, has made this
necessary; and accordingly the English call these fellows the
‘Gentlemen of the Road,’ the government letting them exercise
their jurisdiction upon travellers without giving them any great
molestation. To say the truth, they content themselves with only
taking the money of those who obey without disputing; but
notwithstanding their boasted humanity, the lives of those who
endeavour to get away are not always safe. They are very strict
and severe in levying their impost; and if a man has not
wherewithal to pay them, he may run the chance of getting
himself knocked on the head for his poverty.
“About fifteen years ago, these robbers, with the view of
maintaining their rights, fixed up papers at the doors of rich
people about London, expressly forbidding all persons, of
whatsoever quality or condition, from going out of town
without ten guineas and a watch about them, on pain of
death. In bad times, when there is little or nothing to be got
on the roads, these fellows assemble in gangs, to raise
contributions even in London itself, and the watchmen
seldom trouble themselves to interfere with them in their
vocation.”
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Since the publication of the first edition of this volume, Jack
Sheppard’s adventures have been revived. A novel upon the real
or fabulous history of the burglar has afforded, by its
extraordinary popularity, a further exemplification of the
allegations in the text. The Sixth Report of the Inspector of
Prisons for the Northern Districts of England contains a mass
of information upon the pernicious effect of such romances, and
of the dramas founded upon them. The Inspector examined
several boys attending the prison school in the New Bailey at
Manchester, from whose evidence the following passages
bearing upon the subject are extracted:
“J. L. (aged 14). The first time I was ever at the theatre
was to see Jack Sheppard. There were two or three boys
near to the house who were going, and they asked me. I
took sixpence from the money I used to lay up weekly for
clothes. The next time I went, which was the week after, I
borrowed the money from a boy; I returned it to him the
Saturday after. I then went many times. I took the money
from my mother out of her pocket as she was sitting down,
and I beside her. There was more than sixpence in her
pocket. I got a great love for the theatre, and stole from
people often to get there. I thought this Jack Sheppard was
a clever fellow for making his escape and robbing his
master. If I could get out of gaol, I think I should be as
clever as him: but, after all his exploits, he got done at last. I
have had the book out of a library at Dole Field. I had paid
two-pence a book for three volumes. I also got Richard

Turpin, in two volumes, and paid the same. I have seen
Oliver Twist, and think the Artful Dodger is very like some
of the boys here. I am here for picking a pocket of 25l.
“H. C. (aged 15). When we came to Manchester, I went to
the play, and saw Jack Sheppard the first night it came out.
There were pictures of him about the streets on boards and
on the walls; one of them was his picking a pocket in the
church. I liked Jack Sheppard much. I had not been in
prison there. I was employed in a warehouse at 6s. 6d. aweek, and was allowed 6d. out of it for myself, and with that
I went regularly to the play. I saw Jack Sheppard
afterwards four times in one week. I got the money out of
my money-bag by stealth, and without my master’s
knowledge. I once borrowed 10s. in my mother’s name from
Mrs. ——, a shopkeeper, with whom she used to deal; I went
to the play with it.
“J. M’D. (aged 15). I have heard of Jack Sheppard: a lad
whom I know told me of it, who had seen it, and said it was
rare fun to see him break out of prison.
“J. L. (aged 11). Has been to the play twice, and seen Jack
Sheppard. Went with his brother the first time, and by
himself the second. I took the money to go a second time
out of mother’s house, off the chimney-piece, where she had
left a sixpence. It was the first night Jack Sheppard was
played. There was great talk about it, and there were nice
pictures about it all over the walls. I thought him a very
clever fellow; but Blueskin made the most fun. I first went
to the markets, and begun by stealing apples. I also knew a

lad, ——, who has been transported, and went with him two
or three times. The most I ever got was 10s. out of a till.”
The Inspector’s Report on Juvenile Delinquency at Liverpool
contains much matter of the same kind; but sufficient has been
already quoted to shew the injurious effects of the deification of
great thieves by thoughtless novelists.
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Return

49.

See also Foreign Quarterly Review, vol. iv. p. 398.
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Esprit des Loix, liv. xxviii. chap. xvii.
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52.

Very similar to this is the fire-ordeal of the modern Hindoos,
which is thus described in Forbes’s Oriental Memoirs, vol. i. c.
xi.:—“When a man, accused of a capital crime, chooses to
undergo the ordeal trial, he is closely confined for several days;
his right hand and arm are covered with thick wax-cloth, tied up
and sealed, in the presence of proper officers, to prevent deceit.
In the English districts the covering was always sealed with the
Company’s arms, and the prisoner placed under an European
guard. At the time fixed for the ordeal, a caldron of oil is placed
over a fire; when it boils, a piece of money is dropped into the
vessel; the prisoner’s arm is unsealed and washed in the

presence of his judges and accusers. During this part of the
ceremony the attendant Brahmins supplicate the Deity. On
receiving their benediction, the accused plunges his hand into
the boiling fluid, and takes out the coin. The arm is afterwards
again sealed up until the time appointed for a re-examination.
The seal is then broken; if no blemish appears, the prisoner is
declared innocent; if the contrary, he suffers the punishment
due to his crime.”… On this trial the accused thus addresses the
element before plunging his hand into the boiling oil:—“Thou, O
fire! pervadest all things. O cause of purity! who givest evidence
of virtue and of sin, declare the truth in this my hand!” If no
juggling were practised, the decisions by this ordeal would be all
the same way; but as some are by this means declared guilty,
and others innocent, it is clear that the Brahmins, like the
Christian priests of the middle ages, practise some deception in
saving those whom they wish to be thought guiltless.
Return

53.

An ordeal very like this is still practised in India. Consecrated
rice is the article chosen, instead of bread and cheese. Instances
are not rare in which, through the force of imagination, guilty
persons are not able to swallow a single grain. Conscious of their
crime, and fearful of the punishment of Heaven, they feel a
suffocating sensation in their throat when they attempt it, and
they fall on their knees, and confess all that is laid to their
charge. The same thing, no doubt, would have happened with
the bread and cheese of the Roman Church, if it had been
applied to any others but ecclesiastics. The latter had too much
wisdom to be caught in a trap of their own setting.
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Histoire de Messire Bertrand du Guesclin, par Paul Hay du
Chastelet, liv. i. ch. xix.
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Esprit des Loix, liv. xxviii. ch. xxv.
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Mémoires de Brantôme touchant les Duels.
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Histoire de Messire Bertrand du Guesclin, liv. i. ch. xix.
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Mémoires de Brantôme touchant les Duels.
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59.

Although Francis shewed himself in this case an enemy to
duelling, yet in his own case he had not the same objection.
Every reader of history must remember his answer to the
challenge of the Emperor Charles V. The Emperor wrote that he
had failed in his word, and that he would sustain their quarrel
single-handed against him. Francis replied, that he lied—qu’il en
avait menti par la gorge, and that he was ready to meet him in
single combat whenever and wherever he pleased.
Return

60.

Le Père Matthias, tome ii. livre iv.
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61.

Elémens de l’Histoire de France, vol. iii. p. 219.
Return

62.

Mercure de France, vol. xiii.
Return

63.

Brydone’s Tour in Malta, 1772.
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64.

See Life and Character of Lord Bacon, by Thomas Martin,
Barrister-at-Law.
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65.

See History of the House and Clan of Mackay.
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66.

See Spectator, Nos. 84, 97, and 99; and Tatler, Nos. 25, 26,
29, 31, 38, and 39; and Guardian, No. 20.
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67.

Post-Boy, December 13th, 1712.
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68.

Raleigh at one period of his life appeared to be an inveterate
duellist, and it was said of him that he had been engaged in
more encounters of the kind than any man of note among his
contemporaries. More than one fellow-creature he had deprived
of life; but he lived long enough to be convinced of the sinfulness
of his conduct, and made a solemn vow never to fight another
duel. The following anecdote of his forbearance is well known,
but it will bear repetition:
A dispute arose in a coffee-house between him and a
young man on some trivial point, and the latter, losing his
temper, impertinently spat in the face of the veteran. Sir
Walter, instead of running him through the body, as many
would have done, or challenging him to mortal combat,
coolly took out his handkerchief, wiped his face, and said,
“Young man, if I could as easily wipe from my conscience
the stain of killing you, as I can this spittle from my face,
you should not live another minute.” The young man
immediately begged his pardon.
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69.

Vide the Letters of Joseph II. to distinguished Princes and
Statesmen, published for the first time in England in The
Pamphleteer for 1821. They were originally published in
Germany a few years previously, and throw a great light upon
the character of that monarch and the events of his reign.
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Encyclopedia Americana, art. Duelling.
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Voltaire, Siècle de Louis XIV.
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Abraham, Noah, and Moses said to have been alchymists, i. 95,
114.
Acre besieged in the Third Crusade, ii. 69;
its surrender to the Christians, 71.
Addison’s account of a Rosicrucian, i. 177;
his opinion on duelling, ii. 281.
Agricola, George, the alchymist, memoir of, i. 145.
Agrippa, Cornelius, memoir, and portrait of, i. 138;
his power of raising the dead and the absent, 142.
Aislabie, Mr., Chancellor of the Exchequer, his participation in
the South-Sea fraud, i. 73, 78;
rejoicings on his committal to the Tower, 79.
Alain Delisle. (See Delisle.)
Albertus Magnus, his studies in alchymy, i. 99;
portrait of, 100;
his animated brazen statue destroyed by Thomas
Aquinas, 100;
his power to change the course of the seasons, 101.

ALCHYMISTS, the, or Searches for the Philosopher’s Stone and the
Water of Life, i. 94-220;
natural origin of the study of Alchymy, its connexion with
astrology, &c., i. 94;
alleged antiquity of the study, 95;
its early history, 96;
Memoirs of Geber, 96;
Alfarabi, 97;
Avicenna, 98;
Albertus Magnus, with portrait, Thomas Aquinas, 99;
Artephius, 102;
Alain Delisle, 102;
Arnold de Villeneuve, with portrait, 103;
receipt for the elixir vitæ ascribed to him, 103;
Pietro d’Apone, 104;
Raymond Lulli, with portrait, 105;
Roger Bacon, 110;
Pope John XXII., 111;
Jean de Meung, 112;
Nicholas Flamel, 113;
George Ripley, 118;
Basil Valentine, 119;
Bernard of Treves, 119;
Trithemius, 124;
Maréchal de Rays, 125;
Jacques Cœur, 132;
inferior adepts of the 14th and 15th centuries, 135;

progress of the infatuation in the 16th and 17th centuries,
137-189;
Augurello, 137;
Cornelius Agrippa, with portrait, 138;
Paracelsus, with portrait, 142;
George Agricola, 145;
Denis Zachaire, 146;
Dr. Dee, with portrait, and Edward Kelly, 152;
Dr. Dee’s “Shewstone” (engraving), 154;
the Cosmopolite, 163;
the Rosicrucians, 167;
Jacob Böhmen, 177;
+ Mormius, 178;
Borri, 179;
inferior Alchymists of the 17th century, 185;
their impositions, 188;
Alchymy since that period, 189-220;
Jean Delisle, 189;
Albert Aluys, 197;
the Count de St. Germain, 200;
Cagliostro, 206;
present state of Alchymy, 220.
Alexius I., Emperor, his treatment of the Crusaders, ii. 17-19;
imprisons the Count of Vermandois, 23;
is compelled to release him, 24;
his fear of the Crusaders, 25;
his treachery at Nice, 28;

neglects the Crusaders at Antioch, 35, 42.
Alexius III., usurping the Greek empire, is expelled by the
Crusaders, ii. 77.
Alexius IV. made Emperor of the Greeks by the aid of the
Crusaders, ii. 77;
his deposition and murder, 78.
Alexius Ducas (Murzuphlis) chosen Emperor instead of Alexius
IV., ii. 78;
defeated by the French and Venetians, 79.
Alfarabi, the Alchymist, memoir of, i. 97.
Almanac-makers: Lilly, Poor Robin, Partridge, Francis Moore,
Matthew Laensbergh, i. 240.
Aluys, Albert, the Alchymist, memoir of, i. 97.
American laws against duelling, ii. 299.
Amsterdam, witches burnt at, ii. 160.
Animal Magnetism. (See Magnetism.)
Andrews, Henry, the original of “Francis Moore,” portrait, i.
244.
Anna Comnena, her notices of the Crusaders, ii. 22, 25.
Anne, Queen, duels in her reign, ii. 289;
her efforts to suppress them, 292.
Antioch, besieged by the Crusaders, ii. 29;
is taken by treachery, 32;
sufferings of the Crusaders from famine and pestilence,
35;
pretended discovery of the Holy Lance (engraving), 37;
battle, and defeat of the Turks, 38;
retaken by Saladin, 63.
Aquinas, Thomas, his studies in Alchymy, i. 99;
he destroys an animated brazen statue, 100;

his magical performances, 101.
Arabia, the chief seat of the Alchymists, i. 96.
Arnold de Villeneuve. (See De Villeneuve.)
Arras, view of the Town-hall, ii. 101;
persecution of the Waldenses at, 115.
Art, works of, destroyed by the Crusaders at Constantinople, ii.
79.
Artephius, his extravagant pretensions as an Alchymist, i. 102.
Astrology, its prevalence in England, i. 243;
account of Lilly’s prophecies, 244;
its connexion with Alchymy.
(See the Alchymists, Dr. Dee, &c.)
Augurello the Alchymist, memoir of, i. 137.
Augury, an almost exploded study, i. 272.
Aurea-crucians, a sect founded by Jacob Böhmen, i. 177.
Avicenna the Alchymist, memoir of, i. 98.
Bacon, Lord, portrait of, ii. 286;
his opposition to duelling, 285, 287.
Bacon, Roger, his pursuit of Alchymy, i. 110;
his scientific discoveries, 111.
Bagnone, Francisco, the magnetiser, i. 272.
Bailly, M., his account of Mesmer’s experiments, i. 281, 293.
Baldarroch Farm-house, “haunted,” ii. 235;
investigation by the elders of the kirk; the noises caused
by servant-girls, 237.
Baldwin (King of Jerusalem), joins the Crusaders at Nice, ii. 27;
becomes prince of Edessa, 30, 41;
succeeds Godfrey as King of Jerusalem, 48;
bible of his queen (engraving), 50.

Baldwin, Count of Flanders, chosen Emperor of the Greeks, ii.
80.
Ballads. (See Songs.)
Bamberg, view in; witches executed there, ii. 162.
Banditti in Italy, ii. 256.
Banking schemes of John Law, i. 4.
Bank of England, its competition with the South-Sea Company,
i. 48, 66.
Baptism mocked in the witches’ “Sabbaths,” ii. 109.
Barbarin, Chevalier de, his experiments in animal magnetism, i.
286.
Barbarossa, the Emperor, commences the Third Crusade; his
death, ii. 63, 64.
Barthelemy, Peter, his pretended vision and discovery of the
“holy lance;” its effect on the Crusaders; battle of Antioch, the
Turks defeated, ii. 35-40;
charged with falsehood, subjected to the fiery ordeal, and
burnt to death, 41.
Bastille, the. (See Paris.)
Bavaria, ordinance against moustaches, i. 302.
Beards forbidden to be worn; religious and political prejudices,
i. 296-303.
(See Hair.)
Beckmann’s remarks on the tulip, i. 86.
“Beggar’s Opera,” its popularity and immoral influence, ii. 258.
Beranger’s Song, “Thirteen at Table,” i. 257.
Bernard of Treves, the Alchymist, memoir of, i. 119.
Best and Lord Camelford, their fatal duel, ii. 297.
Bethlehem, Shrine of the Nativity (engraving), ii. 43;
Richard I. arrives there; view of the city, ii. 73.

Bible of the Queen of Baldwin, King of Jerusalem, (engraving),
ii. 50.
“Blue Beard,” the Maréchal de Rays his supposed prototype, i.
132.
Blunt, Sir John, Chairman of the South-Sea Bubble, his share in
the fraud, i. 63, 74, 77;
his examination by Parliament, 75;
his property confiscated, 81;
Pope’s sketch of him, 74.
Bodinus, his persecution of witches, ii. 159.
Boerhave, his belief in Alchymy, i. 185.
Bohemund, his courage displayed in the Crusades, ii. 21, 28, 30,
31, 35, 38, 39;
takes Antioch, by treachery in the garrison, 32;
is made Prince of Antioch, 32, 41.
Böhmen, Jacob, the Alchymist, memoir of, i. 177.
Bonfires on Tower Hill, on the committal of the South-Sea
schemers, i. 79.
Booker, an astrologer, notice of, i. 244.
Boots, torture of the (engraving), ii. 131.
Borri, the Alchymist, memoir of, i. 179.
Bourdeaux, haunted house at, ii. 221.
Bourges, house of Jaques Cœur (engraving), i. 134.
Boyd, Captain, killed in a duel, ii. 293.
“Brabant Screen,” the, a caricature of the South-Sea Bubble, i.
76.
Breda, siege of, i. 270.
Bremen, Nadel’s escape from prison, ii. 257.
Brinvilliers, Madame de, her atrocious murders; escape from
France; subsequent trial and execution, ii. 208-214;

relics of her fate anxiously sought after, 305.
Brown, Sir Thomas, portrait of; his belief in witchcraft, ii. 151.
Bubble Companies, contemporaneously with the South-Sea
Scheme, their extravagant character, i. 52;
profits of the promoters, 53;
declared unlawful, 55, 86;
companies dissolved, 57.
“Bubble Cards,” or Caricatures, i. 60, 61.
Buckingham, Villiers, Duke of, his rise in the favour of James I.,
ii. 197;
portrait of, 198;
suspected to have poisoned the king, 201.
Byron, Lord, his trial for the murder of Mr. Chaworth in a duel,
ii. 292.
Byron, Lord, his poetical villains, ii. 259.
Cagliostro, memoir of, i. 206;
his adventures in London, 209;
view of his house, 215;
implicated in the theft of the diamond necklace, tried and
acquitted, 216-220;
again in London, imprisonment and death at Rome, 220.
Cagliostro, the Countess, i. 208;
his accomplice; her wit, beauty, and ingenuity, 213-216.
Cambridge University, annual sermon against witchcraft, ii. 127.
Camelford, Lord, killed in a duel, ii. 297.
Camhel, Sultan, his generosity to the Christians, ii. 84, 85.
Campbell, Major, his duel with Capt. Boyd, and execution, ii.
293.
Candlemas Eve, superstitious customs, i. 258.

Cant phrases. (See Popular follies.)
Cards. (See Fortune-telling.)
Caricatures, referring to the Mississippi Scheme (four
engravings), i. 25, 29, 37, 40, 44.
Caricatures of the South-Sea Bubble (seven engravings), i. 60,
61, 68, 70, 76, 82, 84.
Casaubon, his account of Dr. Dee’s intercourse with spirits, i.
155.
“Chambre Ardente,” instituted by Louis XIV. for the trial of
poisoners, ii. 214, 283.
Change Alley during the South-Sea Bubble (engraving), i. 60.
Charlemagne, his edicts against witches, ii. 109.
Charles I. prevents a duel, ii. 287.
Charles II., his disgraceful conduct in reference to a duel, ii. 288.
Charles VI. of France, his studies in Alchymy, i. 117;
his work on that subject, 136.
Charles IX. of France, his patronage of Nostradamus, i. 246;
portrait of, ii. 119;
his belief in witchcraft, 120.
Chaworth, Mr., killed by Lord Byron in a duel, ii. 292.
Chemistry, its connexion with Alchymy; valuable discoveries of
the Alchymists, i. 207, 221.
Children in the Crusades; their personal bravery, ii. 45;
are sold to slavery, 81.
Children executed for witchcraft, ii. 163, 179, 181.
Christina, Queen of Sweden, her patronage of Alchymy, i. 183,
185.
Clermont, Urban II. preaches the Crusade there; cathedral of
(engraving), ii. 9.

Cock-Lane Ghost, history of the deception; views of the
“haunted house,” ii. 228, 230.
Cœur, Jaques, memoir of, i. 132;
his house at Bourges (engraving), 132.
Cohreddin, Sultan, his generosity to the Christians, ii. 84, 85.
Coke, Chief Justice, portrait of, ii. 199;
the poisoners of Sir Thomas Overbury tried by him, 198.
Collins, Joseph, contriver of mysterious noises at Woodstock
Palace, ii. 224.
Comets regarded as omens, i. 223, 225;
actually dangerous, 228.
Conrad, Emperor of Germany, joins the Crusades, ii. 56;
reaches Jerusalem, 60;
returns to Europe, 62.
Constance, view of the town gate, ii. 116;
witches executed there, 117, 160.
Constantinople during the Crusades, ii. 17, 23-26, 56, 77-80;
view of, 78.
Contumacy (refusing to plead to a criminal charge); its severe
punishment, ii. 199.
Cornhill at the time of the South-Sea Bubble (engraving), i. 51.
Cosmopolite, the, an anonymous alchymist, memoir of, i. 163.
Cowley’s poetical description of the tulip, i. 86;
his lines on relics of great men, ii. 308.
Craggs, Mr. Secretary, portrait of, i. 64;
his participation in the South-Sea Bubble, 64, 71, 73, 77,
78;
his death, 80.
Craggs, Mr., father of the above, his participation in the fraud;
his death, i. 80.
Criminals, anxiety to possess relics of their crimes, ii. 306.

(See Thieves.)
Cromwell, Sir Samuel, his persecution of “The Witches of
Warbois,” ii. 126.
Cross, trial or ordeal of the, ii. 264.
Cross, the true. (See Relics.)
CRUSADES, The, ii. 1-100;
differently represented in history and in romance;
pilgrimages before the Crusades, ii. 2;
encouraged by Haron al Reschid; pilgrims taxed by the
Fatemite caliphs; increase of pilgrimages in
anticipation of the millenium, 3;
oppressions of the Turks; consequent indignation of the
pilgrims, 4;
Peter the Hermit espouses their cause; state of the public
mind in Europe, 5;
motives leading to the Crusades, 6;
Peter the Hermit stimulates the Pope; his personal
appearance, 7;
council at Placentia, 8;
the Pope preaches the Crusade at Clermont, 9;
enthusiasm of the people, 10;
increased by signs and portents, 11;
zeal of the women, 12;
crowds of Crusaders, 13;
“The truce of God” proclaimed; dissipation of the
Crusaders, 14;
popular leaders; Walter the Penniless, and Gottschalk, 15;
conflicts with the Hungarians, 15, 16;
Peter the Hermit defeated; arrives at Constantinople, 17;

the Emperor Alexius; dissensions and reverses of the first
Crusaders, 18;
Peter the Hermit assisted by Alexius, 19;
fresh hordes from Germany and France; their cruelty to
the Jews, 20;
defeated in Hungary; fresh leaders; Godfrey of Bouillon,
Hugh count of Vermandois, Robert duke of Normandy,
Robert count of Flanders and Bohemund, 21;
the immense number of their forces; Hugh of
Vermandois imprisoned, 23;
his release obtained by Godfrey of Bouillon, 24;
insolence of Count Robert of Paris; weakness of Alexius,
25;
the siege of Nice, 26;
barbarity of the Crusaders and Musselmen; anecdote of
Godfrey of Bouillon, 27;
Nice surrenders to Alexius; battle of Dorylœum, 28;
improvidence and sufferings of the Crusaders, 29, 30;
the siege of Antioch, 29, 31;
Crusaders reduced to famine, 30;
Antioch taken by treachery in the garrison (engraving),
32;
the city invested by the Turks, 34;
increasing famine and desertion, 35;
Peter Barthelemy, his pretended vision, and discovery of
the “Holy Lance” (engraving), 35-37, 40;
revival of enthusiasm, 38;
battle of Antioch, and defeat of the Turks, 38;
dissensions, 40;
fate of Peter Barthelemy, 41;

Marah taken by storm, 42;
shrine of the nativity at Bethlehem, (engraving), 43;
first sight of Jerusalem (engraving), 44;
the city besieged and taken, 45;
Peter the Hermit’s fame revives, 46;
Jerusalem under its Christian kings, 48;
Godfrey of Bouillon succeeded by Baldwin; continual
conflicts with the Saracens; Edessa taken by them, 50.
Second Crusade:—Society in Europe at its
commencement, 52;
St. Bernard’s preaching; Louis VII. joins the
Crusaders, 53-55;
receives the cross at Vezelai (engraving), 54;
is joined by Conrad emperor of Germany and a
large army, 56;
their reception by Manuel Comnenus, 57;
losses of the German army, 58;
progress to Nice, and thence to Jerusalem, 60;
jealousies of the leaders; siege of Damascus, 61;
further dissensions; the siege abandoned, 62.
Third Crusade:—Progress of chivalry, 62;
successes of Saladin, 63;
Barbarossa defeats the Saracens, 64;
Crusade joined by Henry II. and Philip Augustus,
64;
they meet at Gisors (engraving), 65;
the Crusade unpopular, 66;
delayed by war between France and England,
death of Henry II.; Richard and Philip proceed
to Palestine, 67;

Richard attacks the Sicilians, 68;
arrives at Acre, 69;
siege and surrender of the city, 71;
dissensions, Philip returns to France, Saladin
defeated at Azotus, 72;
Crusaders reach Bethlehem (engraving), retreat
agreed on, 73;
Jaffa attacked by Saladin and rescued by Richard,
peace concluded, Richard’s imprisonment and
ransom, 74.
Fourth Crusade, undertaken by the Germans; its failure,
75.
Fifth Crusade:—Foulque, Bishop of Neuilly, enlists the
chivalry of France; assisted by the Venetians; siege of
Zara, 76;
Crusaders expel Alexius III. from Constantinople,
77;
Alexius IV. deposed, 78;
Murzuphlis defeated by the Crusaders and
Venetians, 79;
Baldwin count of Flanders, elected emperor;
Pilgrimages to Jerusalem; children undertaking
the Crusade are betrayed to slavery, 80.
Sixth Crusade, prompted by the Pope, 81;
undertaken by the King of Hungary; pursued in
Egypt; Damietta taken, 82;
Cardinal Pelagius and John of Brienne, 83;
dissensions and reverses; Damietta abandoned,
84.
Seventh Crusade:—Undertaken by Frederick II. of
Germany, 84;
intrigues against him; he is excommunicated, 85;

crowns himself King of Jerusalem, 86;
supported by the Templars and Hospitallers
(engraving), 86;
returns to Germany, 87.
Eighth Crusade, commenced in France, 87:
battle of Gaza; Richard earl of Cornwall; truce
agreed on; the Korasmins take Jerusalem, 88;
they subdue the Templars, but are extirpated by
the Syrian sultans, 90.
Ninth Crusade, began by Louis IX., 90;
joined by William Longsword (engraving), 91;
the Crusade unpopular in England, 91-97;
Damietta taken, 93;
battle of Massoura; Louis taken prisoner by the
Saracens; his ransom and return, 94;
excitement in France, 95.
Tenth Crusade, by Louis IX. and Prince Edward of
England, 95;
Louis dies at Carthage, 96;
Edward arrives at Acre, 97;
defeats the Turks at Nazereth; is treacherously
wounded; the legend of Queen Eleanor, 98;
her tomb at Westminster (engraving); a truce
concluded; Edward returns to England;
subsequent fate of the Holy Land, 99;
civilising influence of the Crusades, 100.
Currency in France, the Mississippi scheme, i. 4.
D’Aguesseau, Chancellor of France, his opposition to the
Mississippi scheme, i. 11;
portrait of; his financial measures, 33.
Damascus, besieged by the Crusaders (engraving), ii. 61.

Damietta besieged by the Crusaders, ii. 83, 93.
Dances of witches and toads, ii. 108, 109.
D’Ancre, the Maréchale, executed for witchcraft, ii. 166.
Dandolo, Doge of Venice, his encouragement of the Crusaders,
ii. 76.
D’Apone, Pietro, his studies in alchymy; his command of money;
charged with heresy, is tortured, and dies in prison, i. 104;
portrait of, ii. 140.
D’Argenson, French minister of finance, a supporter of the
Mississippi scheme, i. 11, 42;
portrait of, 42.
Dead, the. (See Raising the Dead.)
De Bouteville, a famous duellist, temp. Louis XIII., ii. 280;
beheaded by the justice of Richelieu, 281.
Dee, Dr., memoir and portrait of, i. 152;
his “shew-stone” in the British Museum (engraving), 154.
De Jarnac and La Chataigneraie, their famous duel, ii. 273.
Deleuze, M., his absurd theories on animal magnetism, i. 291.
Delisle, Alain, an alchymist, i. 102.
Delisle, Jean, the alchymist, memoir of, i. 189;
his success in transmuting metals, attested by the Bishop
of Senes, 193;
his imprisonment and death, 197.
Delrio, his persecution of witches, ii. 159.
De Meung, Jean, author of the Roman de la Rose, his study of
alchymy, his libel on the fair sex, i. 112.
Demons, popular belief in, ii. 105;
their powers and propensities, 106, 107;
their meetings or “Sabbaths,” 107.
(See Witchcraft and the Alchymists.)

De Nogent, his description of Peter the Hermit, ii. 7;
of the enthusiasm of the first Crusaders, 12, 23.
De Rays, Maréchale, the alchymist, memoir of, i. 125.
De Rohan, Cardinal, his patronage of Cagliostro, i. 213-215;
his connexion with Marie Antoinette and the diamond
necklace, 216-220.
D’Eslon, a pupil of Mesmer, i. 276, 280.
Desmarets, Minister of France, his belief in alchymy, i. 192.
Devil, the, old popular notions of, ii. 103;
various forms assumed by him, 106, 107;
presided at the witches’ “Sabbath,” 108;
his appearance to De Rays and Agrippa, i. 129, 142.
De Villeneuve, Arnold, his skill as a physician, astrologer and
alchymist (with portrait), i. 103.
D’Horn, Count, murders a broker, and steals his Mississippi
bonds (engraving), i. 21;
efforts to save his life, inflexibility of the Regent, his
execution, 22, 23.
Diamond, famous, purchased by the Regent Orleans, i. 27.
Diamond Necklace of Marie Antoinette, history of the theft, i.
206-220.
Diamonds worn by the Count St. Germain, i. 203;
his power of removing flaws in, 204.
Digby, Sir Kenelm, a believer in the virtues of “weapon-salve,” i.
265.
Diseases cured by imagination, i. 262, 272;
pretended influence of magnetism, 262.
(See the MAGNETISERS.)
Divination, its popularity; by cards, the tea-cup, the palm of the
hand, the rod, and other modes, i. 251.
“Domdaniel,” or Witches’ Sabbath. (See Witchcraft.)

Dorylæum, battle of, ii. 28.
Dowston, John, an English alchymist, i. 136.
Dramas on the adventures of thieves; their popularity and evil
influence, ii. 253, 257-260.
Dreams, interpretation of, i. 253.
Dreams on particular nights, i. 258.
Dream-books, their extensive sale, i. 254.
Du Pompadour, Madame, and the Count de St. Germain, i. 201.
Dupotet, M., his account of Mesmer’s experiments, i. 279, 285.
Drummer of Tedworth. (See Haunted Houses.)
Du Barri, Vicomte, killed in a duel at Bath, ii. 293.
DUELS AND ORDEALS, ii. 261-301;
the ordeal by combat, or trial by battle, its natural origin;
authorised by law, 262;
discouraged by the clergy, 263;
the oath upon the Evangelists, 264;
judgment by the cross, 264;
fire-ordeal, 265;
ordeals used by modern Hindoos, 265;
water ordeal, 265;
the corsned, or bread and cheese ordeal, 266;
ordeals superseded by judicial combats, 267;
duels of Ingelgerius and Gontran (engraving), 269;
De Montfort and the Earl of Essex, 270;
Du Guesclin and Troussel (engraving), 261, 271;
Carrouges and Legris, 272;
La Chataigneraie and De Jarnac, 273;
L’Isle-Marivaut and Marolles, 276;

the Dukes de Beaufort and de Nemours, 282;
Count de Bussy and Bruc, 282;
frivolous causes of duels, 270, 271, 276, 282, 292, 296;
their prevalence in France, 276, 277, 279, 280, 282;
the custom opposed by Sully and Henry IV.; council at
Fontainebleau (engraving), and royal edict, 277-279;
efforts of Richelieu to suppress duelling, 280;
De Bouteville, a famous duellist, beheaded by the justice
of Richelieu; opinion of Addison on duelling, 281;
duels in Germany, 282;
severe edict by Louis XIV., 283;
singular laws of Malta, 284;
judicial combat in the reign of Queen Elizabeth; Lord
Bacon opposes duelling, 285;
Lord Sanquir’s duel with Turner; his execution for
murder; combat between Lord Reay and David Ramsay
prevented by Charles I., 287;
Orders of the Commonwealth and Charles II. against the
practice; Duke of Buckingham’s duel with Earl
Shrewsbury; disgraceful conduct of Charles II., 288;
practice of seconds in duels fighting as well as principals,
280, 288;
arguments of Addison, Steele, and Swift, 288;
duels in England; Sir C. Deering and Mr. Thornhill; Duke
of Marlborough and Earl Pawlet; Duke of Hamilton
and Lord Mohun; trial of General Macartney, 289-292;
Wilson killed by John Law, i. 3;
Mr. Chaworth killed by Lord Byron, ii. 292;
Vicomte Du Barri by Count Rice, the Duke of York and
Colonel Lennox, 293;

Irish duels, 294;
Major Campbell executed for the death of Captain Boyd,
296;
Macnamara and Montgomery; duels of German students,
297;
Best and Lord Camelford, 297;
Frederick the Great and Joseph II. of Austria opposed to
duelling, 298;
other European edicts; laws of America, 299;
general reflections, 300.
Du Guesclin and Troussel, their duel (engraving,) ii. 261, 271.
Du Fresnoy’s history of the Hermetic Philosophy, i. 95, 96.
Duncan, Gellie, and her accomplices tried for witchcraft; their
absurd confessions, ii. 129-135.
Duval, Claude, popular admiration of; Butler’s ode to his
memory, ii. 255.
Earthquakes prophesied in London, i. 224, 230.
Edessa taken by the Crusaders, ii. 30;
retaken by the Saracens, 50.
Edward I., his great seal (engraving), ii. 97.
Edward II. joins the last Crusade, ii. 95;
arrives at Acre, 97;
treacherously wounded, 98;
his patronage of Raymond Lulli the alchymist, i. 108;
its supposed motive, 135.
Edward IV., his encouragement of alchymy, i. 135.
Edward VI., his patronage of Dr. Dee, i. 152.
Egypt, the Crusaders in, ii. 83, 84, 90, 92, 93.
Elias claimed as a Rosicrucian, i. 175.

Elixir Vitæ. (See Alchymists.)
Eleanor, Queen of Edward II., her tomb at Westminster
(engraving), ii. 99.
Elizabeth, Queen, her patronage of Dr. Dee, i. 153, 162.
Elwes, Sir Jervis, his participation in the poisoning of Sir
Thomas Overbury, his execution, ii. 194, 197, 199.
End of the world prophesied in the year 999, i. 222;
by Whiston in 1736, 223.
Epigrams on John Law and the Mississippi Scheme, i. 24, 37.
Essex, Countess of, afterwards Countess of Somerset. (See
Somerset.)
Executions for witchcraft. (See Witchcraft.)
Ezekiel claimed as a Rosicrucian, i. 175.

Falling stars regarded as omens, i. 223;
falling stars and other meteors before the Crusades, ii. 11.
Faria, the Abbé, the magnetiser, i. 294.
Fashion of short and long hair, beards, and moustaches, i. 296303.
Female Crusaders. (See Women.)
Feudalism at the commencement of the Crusades, ii. 5.
Fian, Dr., tortured for witchcraft, ii. 131.
Finance in France; the Mississippi scheme, i. 2, 6.
Fire-ordeal. (See Duels and Ordeals.)
Flamel, Nicholas, the alchymist, memoir of i. 113.
Florimond on the prevalence of witchcraft, ii. 115.
Flowers, fruits, and trees, their significance in dreams, i. 254.
Fludd, Robert, the father of the English Rosicrucians, memoir
of, i. 173;
introduces “weapon-salve” in England, 265.
Follies of great cities; cant, or slang phrases, ii. 239-248.
Fontainebleau, council held by Henry IV. and edict against
duelling (engraving), ii. 278.
Food, its necessity denied by the Rosicrucians, i. 176.
Forman, Dr., his participation in the poisoning of Sir Thomas
Overbury, ii. 194.

FORTUNE-TELLING, i. 242-258;
presumption of man; his anxiety to penetrate futurity,
242.
Judicial astrologers: Lilly, 243.
Astrology in France, Louis XI., Catherine de Medicis,
Nostradamus (portrait), 246;
the Medici family, 247;
Antiochus Tibertus, 247;
horoscope of Louis XIV. 249;
Kepler’s excuse for astrology, 249.
Necromancy, Geomancy, Augury, Divination, 250;
various kinds of divination; cards, the palm, the rod, &c.,
251;
interpretation of dreams, 253.
Foulque, Bishop of Neuilly, promoter of the fifth Crusade, ii. 76.
France, its finances in the eighteenth century; the Mississippi
scheme, i. 5, 6;
the Crusade preached there, ii. 8;
the cathedral of Clermont (engraving), ii. 9;
executions for witchcraft, ii. 119, 122, 174;
existing belief in witchcraft there, ii. 189;
the slow poisoners in, ii. 208;
immense rage for duelling in France, 276, 277, 279, 280;
alchymy in France. (See the Alchymists, Paris, Tours, &c.)
Franklin, an apothecary, his participation in the murder of Sir
Thomas Overbury, ii. 195, 198, 199.
Frederick the Great, his opposition to duelling, ii. 298.
Frederick II., Emperor of Germany, undertakes the Crusade, ii.
84;
crowns himself king at Jerusalem, 86;

returns to Germany, 87.
Frederick III. of Denmark, his patronage of alchymy, i. 183.
Gambling speculations. (See Mississippi Scheme and South-Sea
Bubble.)
Garinet, Jules, his Histoire de la Magie en France, ii. 105, 109,
122, 189, 221.
Gateway of Merchant-Tailors’ Hall, with South-Sea speculators
(engraving), i. 62.
Gay, the poet, his shares in the South-Sea Company, i. 65.
Geber, the alchymist, memoir of, i. 96;
his scientific discoveries; English translation of his work,
97.
Geomancy described, i. 250.
Geoffrey, M., his exposure of the tricks of alchymists, i. 188.
George I., his speeches and proclamation on the South-Sea
Bubble, i. 47-55, 69;
his grief on the death of the Earl of Stanhope, i. 75.
George III. refuses to pardon Major Campbell for the death of
Capt. Boyd in a duel, ii. 294.
Germany, executions for witchcraft, ii. 118;
duelling in, 282, 298;
alchymy in, encouraged by the emperors, i. 119, 135, 158;
the Rosicrucians in, 178;
animal magnetism in, 290.
Gesner, Conrad, the first tulip cultivator, portrait of, i. 85.
Ghosts. (See Haunted Houses.)
Gibbon, Edward, grandfather of the historian, his participation
in the South-Sea fraud, i. 73, 77;
heavily fined, 81;
his grandson’s account of the proceedings, 81.

Gisors, meeting there of Henry II. and Philip Augustus
(engraving), ii. 65.
Glanvill, Rev. J., his work on witchcraft, ii. 148, 224.
Glauber, an alchymist, i. 187.
Glen, Lincolnshire, belief in witches there, ii. 185.
Gnomes. (See the Rosicrucians.)
Godfrey of Bouillon, his achievements in Palestine (engraving),
ii. 21-24, 26, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 38, 39, 42, 46, 48.
Gold, sought by the Alchymists. (See Alchymists.)
Gottschalk, a leader of the Crusaders, ii. 15, 20.
Gowdie, Isabel, her confession of witchcraft, ii. 136.
Grafton’s Chronicle, account of Peter of Pontefract, i. 235.
Greatraks, Valentine, his wonderful cures, i. 269-272.
Great Seal of Edward I. (engraving), ii. 97.
Gregorian chant, its merit tested by the ordeal of fire, ii. 266.
Guise, the Duke of, his attempt to poison Gennaro Annese, ii.
202.
Guizot, M., his remarks on the Crusades, ii. 51.
Gustavus Adolphus an alchymist, i. 187.
Guy of Lusignan, King of Jerusalem, besieges Acre, ii. 69.
Hair, its length influenced by religious and political prejudices;
legislative enactments, i. 296;
short hair of the Normans (engraving), i. 297, 303;
St. Wulstan’s antipathy to long hair, 297;
Serlo cuts off the hair of Henry I. (engraving), 296, 298;
Louis VII. and his queen, 299;
William “Longbeard,” 300;
Roundheads and Cavaliers, 301;

Peter the Great taxes beards, 301.
Hale, Sir Matthew, portrait of, ii. 148;
his belief in witchcraft, 157.
Hamilton, Duke of, his duel with Lord Mohun, ii. 290.
Harcouet, his receipt for the Elixir Vitæ, i. 103.
Harley, Earl of Oxford, the originator of the South-Sea
Company, portrait of, i. 46.
Haroun al Reschid, the Caliph, his encouragement of Christian
pilgrims, ii. 3.
Hastings, recent belief in witchcraft there, ii. 187.
Hatton, Lady, her reputation for witchcraft; her house in Hatton
Garden, (engraving), ii. 186.
“HAUNTED HOUSES,” popular belief in, ii. 217-238;
a house at Aix la Chapelle, cause of the noises discovered,
ii. 218;
alarm caused by a rat, 219;
the monks of St. Bruno, their trick to obtain the haunted
palace of Vauvert, 220;
houses at Tours and Bordeaux, 221;
the story of Woodstock Palace, 222;
Mr. Mompesson’s house at Tedworth, 224;
the “Cock Lane Ghost,” history of the deception; believed
in by the learned (engravings), 228;
the Stockwell ghost, 234;
Baldarroch farm-house, 235;
effect of education and civilisation, 238.
Hawkins, Mr., engravings from his Collection of Caricatures, i.
29, 44.
Haygarth, Dr., his exposure of Perkins’s “Metallic Tractors,” i.
289.

Hell, Father, his magnetic cures; his connexion with Mesmer, i.
283.
Henry I., his hair cut short by Serlo, his chaplain (engraving), i.
262, 264.
Henry II. joins the third crusade (engraving), ii. 64.
Henry VI. issues patents to encourage alchymy, i. 118, 135.
Henry VIII., his invitation to Cornelius Agrippa, i. 140.
Henry, Prince, son of James I. suspected to have been poisoned,
ii. 200.
Henry II. of France, his patronage of Nostradamus, i. 246;
said to have prohibited duelling, ii. 273, 275;
his death in the lists, 276.
Henry IV. of France, portrait of, ii. 277;
his opposition to duelling, 277, 279.
Hermes Trismegistus, the founder of alchymy, i. 95.
Hermetic Philosophy. (See the Alchymists.)
Heydon, John, an English Rosicrucian, i. 175.
Heywood, his life and prophecies of Merlin, i. 233.
Highwaymen. (See Thieves.)
Hogarth’s caricature of the South-Sea Bubble (engraving), i. 82.
Holland, the tulip mania. (See Tulip Mania.)
Holloway’s lectures on animal magnetism, i. 287.
Holt, Chief Justice, his opposition to the belief in witchcraft, ii.
152.
“Holy Lance,” the, its pretended discovery (engraving), ii. 37.
Hopkins, Matthew, the “witch-finder general,” his cruelty and
retributive fate, (engraving), ii. 143-146.
Horoscope of Louis XIV., i. 249.

Hugh count of Vermandois imprisoned at Constantinople, ii. 21,
23;
at the siege of Nice, 26;
quits the Crusaders, 42.
Human remains ingredients in charms and nostrums, i. 272.
Hungary plundered by the Crusaders, ii. 15, 16, 20, 21.
Hutchinson, Dr., his work on witchcraft, ii. 123.
Imps in the service of witches. (See Demons and Witchcraft.)
Ingelgerius count of Anjou, his duel with Gontran (engraving),
ii. 269.
Innocent III. and IV., promoters of the Crusades, ii. 75, 80, 81.
Innocent VIII., his bull against witchcraft, ii. 117.
Innspruck, view of (engraving), i. 181.
Invisibility pretended by the Rosicrucians, i. 169, 178.
Isaac Comnenus attacked by Richard I., ii. 69.
Isaac of Holland, an alchymist, i. 136.
Isnik, the Crusaders defeated at (with view of Isnik), ii. 19.
Italy, slow poisoning in (see Poisoning);
the banditti of, ii. 256.
Jaques Cœur the alchymist, memoir of, i. 132.
Jaffa besieged by Saladin, and saved by Richard I., ii. 74;
view of, ii. 89;
defended by the Templars against the Korasmins, ii. 90.
James I., his belief in the virtue of “weapon salve,” i. 266;
portrait of, ii. 134;
charges Gellie Duncan and others with witchcraft, 129;
their trial, confessions and execution, 129-135;
his work on “Demonology,” 139;

his supposed secret vices; his favoritism to the Earl of
Somerset, the poisoner of Sir Thomas Overbury;
himself thought to have died by poison, 193-202;
his severity against duelling, 287.
Jean De Meung. (See De Meung.)
Jerusalem (and see Crusades), engravings, ii. 44, 47, 49;
first pilgrims to, ii. 2;
besieged and taken by the Crusaders, 45;
its state under the Christian kings, 48, 49;
council of the second Crusade there, 60;
captured by Saladin, 63.
Jewell, Bishop, his exclamations against witchcraft, ii. 124.
Jews plundered and murdered by the Crusaders, ii. 20.
Joan of Arc, her execution (engraving), ii. 114.
John XXII. (Pope), his study of Alchymy, i. 111.
Johnson, Dr., on the “Beggar’s Opera,” ii. 258.
Joseph II. of Austria, his opposition to duelling, ii. 298.
Judicial astrology. (See Astrology.)
Judicial combats. (See Duels.)
Karloman, King of Hungary, his contest with the Crusaders, ii.
20.
Kelly, Edward, the Alchymist, memoir of, i. 152.
Kendal, Duchess of, her participation in the South-Sea fraud, i.
76, 77.
Kent, Mr., accused of murder by the “Cock Lane Ghost,” ii. 229.
Kepler, his excuse for astrology, i. 250.
Kerbogha, leader of the Turks defeated at Antioch, ii. 34, 38, 39.
Kerr, Robert, afterwards Earl of Somerset. (See Somerset.)

Kircher abandons his belief in alchymy, i. 185, 183;
his belief in magnetism as a remedy for disease, 264.
Knight, ——, Treasurer of the South-Sea Company, his
apprehension and escape, i. 76.
Knox, John, portrait of; accused of witchcraft, ii. 128.
Koffstky, a Polish alchymist, i. 136.
Labourt, France, 200 witches executed, ii. 166.
La Chataigneraie and De Jarnac, their famous duel, ii. 273.
La Chaussée, the accomplice of Madame de Brinvilliers, his
execution, ii. 212.
Lady-day, superstitions on, i. 258.
Lamb, Dr., the poisoner, attacked and killed in the streets
(engraving), ii. 202.
“Lancashire witches” executed, ii. 141.
Laski, Count Albert, his reception by Queen Elizabeth, his
studies in alchymy, i. 155;
is victimised by Dee and Kelly, 157.
Lavigoreux and Lavoisin, the French poisoners executed, ii. 215.
Law, J., projector of the Mississippi scheme, his romantic
history, i. 1;
his house in the Rue de Quincampoix, Paris (engraving),
i. 13.
Law, Wm., his participation in the Mississippi scheme, i. 9, 42.
Le Blanc, the Abbé, on the popularity of Great Thieves, ii. 251.
Lennox, Col., his duel with the Duke of York, ii. 293.
Liège, Madame de Brinvilliers arrested there, ii. 213.
Lille, singular charges of witchcraft at, ii. 169.
Lilly, the astrologer, account of, i. 243.
Lipsius, his passion for tulips, i. 86.

London, the plague of 1665, i. 228;
inundation prophesied in 1524, i. 228;
the Great Fire, 230.
(See also Cagliostro, Change Alley, Cornhill, Merchant
Taylors’ Hall, Tower, Westminster.)
Longbeard, William, cause of his name, i. 300.
Longsword, William (engraving), joins the ninth Crusade, ii. 91.
Loudun, the curate of, executed for witchcraft, ii. 168.
Louis VII. cuts short his hair, and loses his queen, i. 299;
joins the Crusaders, ii. 53;
is consecrated at St. Denis, 55;
reaches Constantinople and Nice, 58;
his conflicts with the Saracens, 59;
arrival at Jerusalem, 60;
his sincerity as a Crusader, 61;
returns to France, 62.
Louis IX. undertakes the ninth Crusade, ii. 90;
his valour at the battle of Massoura, 94;
taken prisoner, 94;
his ransom and return, 94;
his second Crusade, 95;
effigy of (engraving), 220.
Louis XI., his encouragement of astrologers, i. 246.
Louis XIII., prevalence of duelling in his reign, ii. 280.
Louis XIV., his bigotry and extravagance, i. 5, 6;
remonstrated with by his Parliament on his leniency to
supposed witches, ii. 171;
portrait of, 177;

establishes the “chambre ardente” for the trial of
poisoners, 214, 283;
his horoscope, 249;
his severe edict against duelling, 283.
Louis XV., his patronage of the Court St. Germain, i. 201, 204.
“Loup-garou” executed in France, ii. 120.
Loutherbourg, the painter, his alleged cures by animal
magnetism, i. 288.
Lulli, Raymond, a famous alchymist, his romantic history, with
portrait, i. 105;
his treatment by Edward II., 135.
Lyons, view of, ii. 160.
Macartney, General, second to Lord Mohun, his trial for murder,
ii. 292.
Mackenzie, Sir George, portrait of, ii. 138;
his enlightened views on witchcraft, 137.
Macnamara and Montgomery, frivolous cause of their fatal duel,
ii. 297.
MAGNETISERS, the, i. 262-295;
effect of imagination in the cure of diseases, i. 262, 272.
Mineral Magnetism: Paracelsus its first professor, 263;
diseases transplanted to the earth; Kircher; “weaponsalve,” 264;
controversy on its merits, 265;
Sir Kenelm Digby’s “powder of sympathy,” 266;
other delusions, 268.
Animal Magnetism: wonderful cures by Valentine
Greatraks, i. 269-272;
Francisco Bagnoni, Van Helmont, Gracian, Baptista
Porta, &c., 272;

Wirdig, Maxwell, 273;
the convulsionaires of St. Medard, i. 273;
Father Hell, 274;
Anthony Mesmer, his history and theory, 275;
Mesmer, 276-283;
D’Eslon adopts his views, 278, 280, 281;
encouragement to depravity afforded by his experiments,
282, 293;
exposures by MM. Dupotet and Bailly, 279, 281;
Marquis de Puysegur, 283;
Chevalier de Barbarin, 286;
Mainauduc, Holloway, Loutherbourg, 287, 288;
Perkins’s “Metallic Tractors” exposed by Dr. Haygarth,
289;
absurd theories of Deleuze, 291;
the Abbé Faria, fallacies of the theory of, 294.
Mainauduc, Dr., his experiments in animal magnetism, i. 287.
Malta, its singular laws on duelling, ii. 284.
Mansfield, Lord, trial of the “Cock-lane Ghost” conspirators
before him, ii. 234.
Manuel Comnenus, his treatment of the Crusaders, ii. 56, 58, 59.
Marie Antoinette, history of the diamond necklace, i. 216-220.
Marlborough, Duke of, his duel with Earl Pawlet, ii. 289.
Massaniello, relics of his fate treasured by the populace, ii. 305.
Massoura, battle of, the Saracens defeated, ii. 94.
Mayer, Michael, his report on the Rosicrucian doctrines, i. 168.
Maxwell, William, the magnetiser, i. 273.
Medicis, Catherine di, her encouragement of astrologers, i. 246.

Medici family, predictions respecting them, i. 247.
Merchant Taylors’ Hall, view of gateway, i. 62.
Merlin, his pretended prophecies, i. 232;
his miraculous birth, 236;
Spenser’s description of his cave, 237.
Mesmer, Anthony, the founder of animal magnetism, his history
and theory, i. 275;
his theory and practice, 276;
elegance of his house at Paris, 278;
infatuation of his disciples, 282.
Metals, transmutation of. (See Alchymists.)
Meteoric phenomena, their effect in inciting to the Crusades, ii.
3, 11.
Meteors regarded as omens, i. 223.
Milan, plague of 1630 prophesied, i. 225;
fear of poisoners, Mora and others executed, 226;
appearance of the devil, 227.
Millenium, the, universally expected at the end of the tenth
century, ii. 3.
MISSISSIPPI SCHEME, the, its history, i. 1-44;
financial difficulties in France, expedients of the Regent
Orleans, i. 6;
official peculation and corruption, 7;
John Law’s propositions; his French cognomen, “Lass;”
his bank established, 9;
his notes at a premium; branch banks established;
Mississippi trading company established; bank made a
public institution; extensive issue of notes, 10;
opposition of the Parliament, 11;
the Regent uses coercion; Mississippi shares rise, 12;

the Company of the Indies formed; magnificent promises;
immense excitement and applications for shares; Law’s
house in the Rue de Quincampoix (engraving), 13;
hunchback used as a writing-desk (engraving), 15;
enormous gains of individuals, 14, 16, 19, 20, 26;
Law’s removal to the Place Vendôme, 14;
continued excitement, 15;
removal to the Hotel de Soissons (engraving), 15;
noble and fashionable speculators, 17;
ingenious schemes to obtain shares (engraving), 18;
avarice and ambition of the speculators; robberies and
murders, 20;
a broker murdered by Count d’Horn, and robbed of
shares (engraving), 21;
temporary stimulus to trade, and illusive prosperity; Law
purchases estates, and turns Catholic, 24;
his charity and modesty, 25;
caricatures of him, as Atlas, 25;
“Lucifer’s new row barge,” 29;
in a car drawn by cocks, 40;
increase of luxury in Paris, 26;
the Regent purchases the great diamond, 27;
symptoms of distrust; coin further depreciated, 28;
use of specie forbidden, at Law’s suggestion, 29;
popular hatred excited, 30;
fall of shares, 31;
conscription for the Mississippi gold mines (engraving),
31;

further issue of notes, and increased distrust and distress,
32;
payment stopped, and Law dismissed from the ministry,
33;
his danger from the populace, 33, 35, 38;
D’Aguesseau’s measures to restore credit (portrait), 34;
run on the Bank, 34;
fatal accidents in the crowd, 34;
the Mississippi and India companies deprived of their
privileges, 39;
Law leaves France, 40;
D’Argenson’s dismissal and unpopularity, 42;
Law’s subsequent history and death, 43;
caricatures of the scheme in its success and failure, 25,
29, 37, 40, 44.
Modern prophecies, i. 222-241.
Mohra, in Sweden, absurd charges of witchcraft, and numerous
executions, ii. 177.
Mohun, Lord, his duel with the Duke of Hamilton, ii. 290.
Mompesson, Mr., his “haunted house” at Tedworth, ii. 224.
Money Mania. (See the Mississippi Scheme and South-Sea
Bubble.)
Montesquieu “Esprit des Loix,” ii. 262-267.
Montgomery and Macnamara, frivolous cause of their fatal duel,
ii. 297.
More, Hannah, on animal magnetism, i. 287.
Mormius, the alchymist, memoir of, i. 178.
Mortlake, Dr. Dee’s house at, i. 153, 162.
Moses cited by alchymists as an adept, i. 95;

claimed as a Rosicrucian, 175.
Moustaches, fashion of wearing, i. 302.
Mummies, an ingredient in charms and nostrums, i. 271.
Munting’s history of the tulip mania, i. 87.
Nadel, Mausch, a German robber, ii. 257.
Naiades. (See the Rosicrucians.)
Nantwich, Nixon’s prophecy of its fate, i. 240.
Naples, arrest and execution of La Tophania, the slow poisoner,
ii. 207.
Napoleon’s willow at St. Helena and other relics, ii. 307.
Naudé, Gabriel, his exposure of the Rosicrucians, i. 173.
Necromancy, its connexion with alchymy, i. 129;
danger of its practice, 250.
New England, women, a child, and a dog, executed as witches, ii.
180.
Nice besieged by the Crusaders, ii. 26.
Nixon, Robert, the Cheshire prophet, i. 238.
Noah, the patriarch, a successful alchymist, i. 95.
Noises. (See Haunted Houses.)
Normandy, witches in, ii. 172.
Nostradamus, the astrologer; his prophecies (portrait), i. 246.
Oath on the Evangelists and holy relics, a test of innocence, ii.
264.
Odomare, a French alchymist, i. 136.
Official peculation in France under the Regent Orleans, i. 7.
Omens: winding-sheets, howling dogs, death-watch, “coffins,”
shivering, walking under ladders, upsetting salt, thirteen at

table, piebald horses, sneezing, dogs, cats, bees, itching;
Oriental belief in omens, i. 255.
(See Comets, Falling Stars, and Meteors.)
Oneiro-criticism; interpreting dreams. (See Dreams.)
Ordeals. (See Duels and Ordeals.)
Orleans, Duke of. (Regent of France) portrait of; his patronage
of the Mississippi Scheme, i. 5;
his financial errors, 10, 12, 33, 41;
enforces the execution of Count D’Horn for murder, 23;
his purchase of the celebrated diamond, 27;
his ill-treatment of Law, 33.
Orleans, Duchess of, her remarks on the Mississippi scheme, i.
5, 19, 24, 35, 36.
Ortholani, a French alchymist, i 136.
Overbury, Sir Thomas, portrait of, ii. 195;
poisoned by the Earl and Countess of Somerset and their
accomplices, 193-201.

Palestine. (See the Crusades.)
Palmistry. (See Fortune-Telling.)
Paper currency, introduced in France by John Law, i. 4.
Paracelsus, memoir and portrait of, i. 142;
his singular doctrines, 145;
the first of the magnetisers, 262.
Paris, the Palais Royal (engraving), i. 12;
John Law’s house, Rue de Quincampoix (engraving), 13;
Hotel de Soissons (engraving), 16;
incidents of the Mississippi scheme (four engravings), i.
15, 18, 21, 31;
the Place de Grêve (engraving), ii. 192;
the Bastile (engraving), ii. 209;
house of Nicholas Flamel, in the rue de Marivaux, i. 118;
the Rosicrucians in, i. 170-173;
Mesmer’s house; his experiments, 278.
Parsons and his family, concoctors of the “Cock Lane Ghost”
deception, ii. 228.
Paul’s Cross, Dr. Lamb, the poisoner, attacked and killed there
(engraving), ii. 202.
Persecution of alleged witches. (See Witches.)
Peter the Great taxes beards (portrait), i. 267.

Peter the Hermit. (See the Crusades.)
Peter of Lombardy, an alchymist, i. 136.
Peter of Pontefract, his false prophecies described by Grafton, i.
234.
Petronella, the wife of Nicholas Flamel, i. 116.
Philalethes, Eugenius, a Rosicrucian, i. 175.
Philip I. excommunicated, ii. 8.
Philip Augustus joins the third crusade (engraving), ii. 64, 66;
his jealousy of Richard I., 69, 71;
returns to France, 72.
Philip IV., portrait of, ii. 112;
his persecution of the Templars, ii. 113.
Philosopher’s stone, searchers for the. (See Alchymists.)
Pietro D’Apone. (See D’Apone.)
Pigray on witchcraft in France, ii. 122.
Pilgrimages to Jerusalem before the Crusades, ii. 2.
Pilgrim’s staff (engraving), ii. 56.
Place de Grêve (engraving), ii. 192;
Madame de Brinvilliers; La Chaussée and others executed
there for poisoning, 212, 213, 215.
Plague at Milan prophesied, i. 225.
Plays on the adventures of thieves, their evil influence, ii. 253,
257.
POISONING, in Greece and Rome; its spread in Europe in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; declared high treason in
England, ii. 192;
Sir Thomas Overbury poisoned; full history of his case,
with portraits of Overbury, the Earl and Countess of
Somerset, Lord Coke, and Villiers, Duke of
Buckingham, 193-201;
suspicious death of Prince Henry, son of James I., 200;

Buckingham said to have poisoned James I., 201;
fate of Dr. Lamb, the poisoner (engraving), 202;
slow poisoning in Italy, its general prevalence; employed
by the Duke of Guise; much used by Roman ladies to
poison husbands, 203;
trial and execution of La Spara and others; other women
punished, 204;
atrocious crimes of La Tophania; the nature of her
poison; protected in sanctuary by the clergy of Naples;
seized by the viceroy, tried, and executed, 206-208.
In France: Exili, Glaser, and Sainte Croix, the first
criminals, 208;
Madame de Brinvilliers and Sainte Croix; their crimes
and punishment, 208-214;
M. de Penautier charged with poisoning; popular mania
for the crime, 214;
Lavoisin and Lavigoreux executed, 215;
charges against the Marshal de Luxembourg and the
Countess of Soissons; recent revival of the crime in
England, 216.
Pope, his sketch of Sir John Blunt, Chairman of the South-Sea
Company, i. 74.
POPULAR FOLLIES OF GREAT CITIES, ii. 239-248.
Cant or slang phrases:
“Quoz,” 240;
“What a shocking bad hat,” 240;
“Hookey Walker,” 241;
“There he goes with his eye out,” 242;
“Has your mother sold her mangle?” 242;
“Flare up,” 242;
“Does your mother know you’re out?” 244;

“Who are you?” 244.
Songs:

“Cherry ripe,” 246;
“The Sea,” 247;
“Jim Crow,” 247.

PORTRAITS.—John Law, i. 1;
the Regent Orleans, 5;
D’Aguesseau, 34;
D’Argenson, 42;
Earl of Sunderland, 80;
Harley Earl of Oxford, 46;
Sir Robert Walpole, 49;
Mr. Secretary Craggs, 64;
Conrad Gesner, the first tulip cultivator, 85;
Albertus Magnus, 100;
Arnold de Villeneuve, 103;
Raymond Lulli, 105;
Cornelius Agrippa, 138;
Panacelsus, 142;
Dr. Dee, 152;
Philip IV., ii. 112;
Charles IX., 119;
John Knox, 128;
James I., 134;
Sir George Mackenzie, 138;
Pietro d’Apone, 140;
Sir Matthew Hale, 148;

Sir Thomas Brown, 151;
Louis XIV., 177;
Henry Andrews, the original of “Francis Moore,” i. 244;
Nostradamus, 246;
Peter the Great, 267;
Sir Thomas Overbury, ii. 195;
Villiers duke of Buckingham, 198;
Lord Chief Justice Coke, 199;
Earl and Countess of Somerset, 200, 201;
Henry IV. of France, 277;
Lord Bacon, 286.
Political prejudices and enactments against long hair and
beards, i. 296-303.
Poetry and romance, their obligations to the Rosicrucians, i. 179.
Powell, Chief Justice, his opposition to the belief in witchcraft, ii.
152.
PROPHECIES: Plague of Milan, i. 225;
plague of London, 1665, inundation of London, 1528,
228;
great fire, 1666; earthquake, 1842, 230;
Mother Shipton, with view of her cottage, 232, 241;
Merlin, 232-238;
Peter of Pontefract, 234;
Robert Nixon the Cheshire prophet, 238;
almanac-makers, 240 (see Fortune-Telling);
end of the world, 222, 224;
earthquakes, 224.

(See Modern Prophecies, the Crusades, Peter Barthelemy,
&c.)
Puysegur, the Marquis de, his discovery of clairvoyance; his
magnetic elm, i. 283-286.
Raising the dead and absent, a power ascribed to Cornelius
Agrippa, i. 142;
and Cagliostro, 217.
Raleigh, Sir Walter, an inveterate duellist, abandons the custom,
ii. 297.
Raymond of Toulouse, a leader of the first crusade, ii. 21, 26, 29,
31, 34, 45, 46;
his supposed collusion with Peter Barthelemy, 35, 37, 41;
at the siege of Jerusalem, 46.
Raymond Lulli. (See Lulli.)
Reinaldo, a leader of the first crusade, ii. 18.
RELICS, brought by the early pilgrims from Palestine, ii. 2;
swearing on, a test of innocence, 264;
fragments of the true cross; bones of saints; tears of the
Saviour; tears and milk of the Virgin; Santa Scala at
Rome; relics of Longbeard, Massaniello, La Brinvilliers,
Dr. Dodd, Fauntleroy, Thurtell, Corder, Greenacre,
Thom, Shakspere, Napoleon, Waterloo, 302-308.
Religious prejudices and ordinances against long hair and
beards, i. 296-303.
Rhodes, Richard I. at (engraving), ii. 69.
Rice, Count, tried for killing Du Barri in a duel, ii. 293.
Richard I. sets out for Palestine, ii. 67;
attacks the Sicilians, 68;
arrives at Rhodes (engraving), 69;
his queen Berengaria (engraving), 70;
captures Acre, 71;

reaches Bethlehem (engraving), 73;
his concern on being obliged to retreat, 74;
his reputation in Palestine, 74.
Richelieu an alchymist, i. 198;
his opposition to duelling, ii. 279, 280.
Ripley, George, the alchymist, memoir of, i. 118.
Robert duke of Normandy, a leader of the Crusades, ii. 21, 31,
39, 46.
Robert count of Flanders, a leader of the first Crusade, ii. 21, 30,
31.
Robert of Paris (Count), his insolence to the Emperor Alexius, ii.
25;
killed at the battle of Dorylæum, 29.
Robin Hood, popular admiration of, ii. 250.
Robinson, Ann, the Stockwell “Ghost,” ii. 234.
Rochester, Viscount, afterwards Earl of Somerset. (See
Somerset.)
Roger Bacon. (See Bacon.)
Romance and poetry, their obligations to the Rosicrucians, i.
179.
Rosenberg (Count), a patron of Dr. Dee, i. 159.
Rosicrucians, the, their romantic doctrines; history of their
progress, i. 167;
their poetical doctrines, sylphs, naiades, gnomes, and
salamanders, 172, 179.
Rouen, view in, ii. 171;
the Parliament remonstrate with Louis XIV. on his
leniency to suspected witches, 172.
Rudolph (I. and II.), Emperors, their encouragement of
alchymy, i. 158, 165.
Rupecissa, John de, a French alchymist, i. 136.

Russia, tax on beards imposed by Peter the Great, i. 301.
“Sabbaths,” or meetings of witches and demons, ii. 107, 133.
(See Witchcraft.)
Sainte Croix, the slow poisoner in France, his crimes and death,
ii. 208, 211.
Saints, relics of, ii. 304.
Saladin, his military successes, ii. 63;
his defence of Acre, 69, 71;
defeated at Azotus, 72;
and at Jaffa, 74.
“Saladin’s tithe,” a tax enforced by the Crusaders, ii. 65.
Salamanders. (See the Rosicrucians.)
Santa Scala, or Holy Stairs, at Rome, ii. 304.
Schinderhannes, the German robber, ii. 256.
Scotland, witchcraft in. (See Witchcraft.)
Scott, Sir Walter, his anachronisms on the Crusades, ii. 74, 98.
“Scratching Fanny,” or the Cock Lane Ghost; her remains
in the vault of St. John’s Church, Clerkenwell, ii. 230.
Seal of Edward I. (engraving), ii. 97.
Seifeddoulet, the Sultan, his reception of Alfarabi, the alchymist,
i. 98.
Semlin attacked by the Crusaders, ii. 15.
Sendivogius, a Polish alchymist, i. 164, 165.
Senés, Bishop of, his report on Jean Delisle’s success in alchymy,
i. 193.
Serlo cuts off the hair of Henry I. (engraving), i. 296, 298.
Seton, the Cosmopolite, an alchymist; memoir of, i. 163.
Sevigné, Madame, her account of Madame de Brinvilliers, ii.
208, 213.

Shakespere’s Mulberry-tree, ii. 307.
Sharp, Giles, contriver of mysterious noises at Woodstock
Palace, ii. 224.
Shem, the son of Noah, an alchymist, i. 95.
Sheppard, Jack, his popularity—lines on his portrait by
Thornhill, ii. 252;
evil effect of a novel and melo-dramas representing his
career, 253.
Sherwood Forest, and Robin Hood (engraving), ii. 249, 250.
Shipton, Mother, her prophecy of the fire of London, i. 230;
her popularity, 231;
view of her cottage, 241.
Simeon, the Patriarch, a promoter of the Crusades, ii. 7.
Slang phrases. (See Popular Follies.)
Slow Poisoners, the. (See Poisoning.)
Smollett, on history and the South-Sea Bubble, i. 67.
Soliman the Sultan, his conflict with the Crusaders, ii. 18.
Somerset, the Earl of (poisoner of Sir Thos. Overbury), portrait
of, ii. 200;
his origin and rise at court; supposed vicious connexion
with James I.; his intrigue and marriage with the
Countess of Essex; the murder of Overbury; the earl’s
trial and sentence, 193-201.
Somerset, the Countess of, her participation in the murder of Sir
Thos. Overbury, with portrait, ii. 201.
Songs:

on the Mississippi scheme, i. 36;
on the South-Sea Bubble, 50;
on famous thieves, ii. 260;
on witchcraft, popular in Germany, 165;
popularity of “Cherry Ripe,” “The Sea,” “Jim Crow,” 246.

Songs, Beranger’s “Thirteen at Table,” i. 257.
Songs of the Rosicrucians, i. 168, 204.
Sorcery. (See Witchcraft and Alchemy.)
Sorel, Agnes, her patronage of Jacques Cœur, the alchymist, i.
132.
SOUTH-SEA BUBBLE, history of, i. 45-84;
the Company originated by Harley, Earl of Oxford; its
primary object, 45;
visionary ideas of South-Sea trade; restrictions imposed
by Spanish Government, 46;
proposals to Parliament to reduce the debt; capital
increased to twelve millions; success of the Company,
47;
its application to take the whole state debt; counter
application by the Bank of England; the former
adopted by Parliament; stock rises from 130 to 300,
48;
Sir R. Walpole’s warning; directors’ exertions to raise the
prices, 49;
bill passed; great demand for shares, 50;
other bubble schemes started and encouraged, 51, 52;
eighty-six of them dissolved, 55, 57;
shares at 400; fall to 290, but raised by the directors’
schemes, 51;
dividend declared; increased excitement, 52;
Swift’ lines on Change Alley; extent of the delusion;
frauds of schemers, 54;
fears of the judicious; bubble companies proclaimed
unlawful, 55;
continued excitement; stock at 1000, 62, 63;

Sir John Blunt, the chairman, sells out; stock falls;
meeting of the company; Mr. Secretary Craggs supports
directors, 63;
increased panic; negociation with Bank of England, 64,
65;
they agree to circulate the company’s bonds, 66;
total failure of the company; social and moral evils of the
scheme, 67;
arrogance of the directors; petitions for vengeance on
them; King’s speech to Parliament, 69;
debates thereon, 69, 71;
punishment resolved on, 70;
Walpole’s plan to restore credit; officers of the company
forbidden to leave England, 71;
ministers proved to have been bribed by shares, 73, 77;
directors apprehended; treasurer absconds, 73;
measures to arrest him, 73, 74;
directors expelled from Parliament, 74;
chairman’s examination, 75;
treasurer imprisoned at Antwerp, but escapes, 76;
reports on the details of the fraud, 76;
Mr. Stanhope, Secretary to Treasury, charged but
acquitted; dissatisfaction thereon, 78;
Mr. Aislabie, Chancellor of the Exchequer, committed to
the Tower, and consequent rejoicings (engraving), 79;
Sir George Caswall punished; the Earl of Sunderland
acquitted; death of Mr. Secretary Craggs, and his
father, participators in the fraud, 80;
heavy fines on the directors; account of these proceedings
by Gibbon the historian, 81;

measures adopted to restore credit, 83;
caricatures by Hogarth and others (seven engravings),
60, 61, 68, 70, 76, 82, 84.
South-Sea House, view of, i. 45.
Spara, Hieronyma, the slow poisoner of Rome, her trial and
execution, ii. 205.
Speculations. (See Money Mania, the Mississippi Scheme,
South-Sea Bubble, and Bubble Schemes.)
Spenser, his description of Merlin and his cave, i. 232, 237.
Spirits. (See Demons, Witchcraft, Cornelius Agrippa, Paracelsus,
&c.)
Sprenger, a German witch-finder; his persecutions, ii. 118-159.
St. Bernard preaches the second Crusade, ii. 53, 55;
his miracles, 56;
failure of his prophecies, 62.
St. Dunstan and the devil, ii. 103.
St. Evremond, his account of the impositions of Valentine
Greatraks, i. 270.
St. Germain (Count de), the alchymist, memoir of, i. 200;
his profusion of jewels, 203;
his pretensions to long life, 205.
St. John’s Eve, St. Mark’s Eve, St. Swithin’s Eve, superstitious
customs, i. 258.
Stanhope, Earl, supports the proposition to punish the directors
of the South-Sea Company, i. 72, 73;
is stigmatised in Parliament, and dies suddenly, 75.
Stanhope, Charles, secretary to Treasury;
his participation in the South-Sea fraud, i. 77, 78;
his acquittal by parliament, and consequent disturbances,
78.

Stedinger, the, a section of the Frieslanders; their independence;
accused of witchcraft by the Pope, and exterminated by the
German nobles, ii. 110, 111.
Stephen, king of Poland, his credulity and superstition, i. 159.
Stock jobbing. (See South-Sea Bubble.)
“Stock Jobbing Cards,” or caricatures of the South-Sea
Bubble (two engravings), i. 60, 61.
Stonehenge ascribed to Merlin, i. 237.
Suger dissuades Louis VII. from the Crusade, ii. 55-62.
Sully, his wise opposition to duelling, ii. 279
Sunderland, Earl of, portrait of, i. 80;
his participation in the South-Sea Bubble, i. 50, 77, 78;
discontent at his acquittal, 80.
Superstitions on the 1st of January, Valentine Day, Lady Day, St.
Swithin’s Eve, St. Mark’s Eve, Candlemas Eve, Midsummer,
St. John’s Eve, 29th February, 258.
Surrey and the fair Geraldine; the vision shewn by Cornelius
Agrippa, i. 142.
Sweden, executions for witchcraft, ii. 177.
Sylphs. (See the Rosicrucians.)
Syria. (See the Crusades.)
Tancred, his achievements in the first Crusade, ii. 26, 35, 38, 39,
45.
Tax on beards imposed by Peter the Great, i. 301.
Tedworth, Wiltshire, the “haunted house” there; narrative of the
deception, ii. 224.
Tempests caused by witches, ii. 102, 106, 133, 134.
Templars, Knights, subdued by Saladin, ii. 63;
support Frederick II. in the seventh Crusade, 86;
their subsequent reverses, 87, 90, 99;

accused of witchcraft, 112;
persecuted by Philip IV.; the grand master burnt, 113.
Têtenoire, a famous French thief, ii. 255.
Theatrical productions, on the lives of robbers; their pernicious
influence, ii. 253-257.
THIEVES, POPULAR ADMIRATION OF GREAT, ii. 249-260;
Robin Hood, ii. 250;
Dick Turpin, 251;
Jack Sheppard, 252;
Jonathan Wild, 254;
Claude Duval, 255;
Aimerigot Têtenoire, 255;
Cartouche; Vidocq, 256;
Italian banditti, 256, 257;
Schinderhannes and Nadel, 257;
evil influence of the “Beggars’ Opera” and other plays on
the subject of thieves 253, 257, 258;
Lord Byron’s “Corsair” and Schiller’s “Robber,” 259.
Thomas Aquinas. (See Aquinas.)
Tiberias, battle of, ii. 63.
Tibertus, Antiochus, his wonderful prophecies, i. 248.
Toads dancing at the witches’ “Sabbaths,” ii. 108.
Tophania, La, a famous poisoner in Italy, her crimes and
execution; the nature of her potions, ii. 206.
Torture, its cruelty exposed by the Duke of Brunswick, ii. 170.
(See Witchcraft.)
Toulouse, witches burnt at, ii. 160.
Tournaments and judicial combats. (See Duels.)

Tours, haunted house at, ii. 221.
Tower Hill, bonfires on the committal of participators in the
South-Sea Bubble (engraving), i. 79.
Tower of London, Raymond Lulli the alchymist said to have
practised there, i. 109;
poisoning of Sir Thomas Overbury, ii. 195.
Transmutation of metals. (See Alchymists.)
Trees, their significance in dreams, i. 254;
susceptible of magnetic influence, 284.
Trial by Battle. (See Duels and Ordeals.)
Trithemius, the alchymist, memoir of, i. 124.
Trois-Echelles executed for witchcraft, ii. 120.
Troussel, William, his duel with the Constable Du Guesclin
(engraving), ii. 261, 271.
“Truce of God,” the, proclaimed by the first Crusaders, ii. 14.
“True Cross,” fragments of the, ii. 3, 71.
(See Relics.)
TULIP MANIA;
the flower first introduced into Europe by Gesner,
portrait of Gesner, i. 85;
great demand for plants in Holland and Germany,
introduced in England from Vienna, the flower
described and eulogised by Beckmann and Cowley, 86;
rage for bulbs in Holland and their enormous prices, 87;
amusing errors of the uninitiated, 88;
marts for the sale of bulbs, jobbing and gambling, ruinous
extent of the mania and immense profits of speculators,
89;
“tulip-notaries” appointed, sudden loss of confidence and
fall of prices, meetings, deputation to the government,
90;

unfulfilled bargains repudiated by the law courts, 91;
the mania in England and France, 91;
subsisting value of choice bulbs, 92.
Tunis invaded by the Crusaders, ii. 96.
Tunbridge Wells, a witch doctor there in 1830, ii. 189.
Turner, Mrs. her participation in the poisoning of Sir Thomas
Overbury, ii. 194, 198, 199.
Turpin, Dick, popular admiration of, ii. 251.
Undines. (See the Rosicrucians.)
Urban II. preaches the Crusade (frontispiece), ii. 7.
Valentine, Basil, the alchymist, memoir of, i. 119.
Valentine’s Day superstitions, i. 258.
Vauvert, the ruined palace at, haunted, ii. 220.
Vezelais, cathedral of (engraving), ii. 54.
Villars, Marshal, his opposition to the Mississippi scheme, i. 16.
Vulgar phrases. (See Popular Follies.)
Visions, pretended. (See Barthelemy, Agrippa, and Dr. Dee.)
Waldenses, the, persecuted and burnt at Arras, ii. 115.
Walpole, Sir Robert, his warning of the evils of the South-Sea
bubble, portrait of him, i. 49-55;
his measures to restore credit, 70, 71.
Walter the Penniless, a leader of the first Crusade, ii. 15, 18.
Warbois, the witches of, absurd charges against them, their
execution, ii. 125.
“Water of Life,” searchers for. (See Alchymists.)
Water ordeal. (See Duels and Ordeals.)
“Weapon-salve,” controversy respecting, i. 265.

“Wehr-wolves” executed, ii. 120, 168.
Westminster Abbey, Raymond Lulli, the alchymist, said to have
practised there, i. 109;
tomb of Queen Eleanor (engraving), ii. 99.
Weston, Richard, an accomplice in the poisoning of Sir Thomas
Overbury, ii. 194, 198, 199.
Wharton, Duke of, his speeches on the South-Sea Bubble, i. 50,
75.
Whiston, his prophecy of the end of the world, i. 223.
William of Tyre preaches the Crusade, ii. 63, 65.
Wilson, ——, killed in a duel by John Law, i. 3.
Wirdig, Sebastian, the magnetiser, i. 273.
WITCHCRAFT:—Account of the witch mania, ii. 101-191;
popular belief in witches, ii. 102;
their supposed compacts with the devil; popular notions
of the devil and demons, 103;
witches could secure their services, 107;
their meetings or “Sabbaths,” 107, 133, 166, 169, 171;
frequent persecution on the pretext of witchcraft, 110;
the Stedinger, a section of the Frieslanders, exterminated
on that charge, 110;
the Templars accused of witchcraft; the Grand Master
and others burnt; execution of Joan of Arc
(engraving), 113;
combined with heresy as a charge against religious
reformers, 114;
the Waldenses persecuted at Arras; their confessions
under torture; belief common to Catholics and
Reformers; Florimond on the prevalence of witchcraft,
115;

witches executed at Constance; Bull of Pope Innocent
VIII.; general crusade against witches, 117;
Sprenger’s activity in Germany; Papal commissions, 118;
executions in France; sanctioned by Charles IX., 119, 122;
Trois Echelles, his confessions and execution, 120;
“men-wolves,” executed, 121;
English statutes against witchcraft, 123;
Bishop Jewell’s exclamations, 124;
the witches of Warbois; absurd charges and execution of
the victims, 125;
annual sermon at Cambridge, ii. 127;
popular belief and statutes in Scotland, 127, 154;
charges against the higher classes; against John Knox,
128;
numerous executions; trial of Gellie Duncan and others,
129;
James I., his interest in the subject; Dr. Fian tortured
(engraving), 131;
confessions of the accused, 132;
their execution; further persecution, 135;
case of Isabel Gowdie, 136;
opinions of Sir George Mackenzie (portrait), 136, 155;
death preferred to the imputation of witchcraft, 137, 139;
King James’s “Demonology,” 139;
the “Lancashire witches” executed, 141;
Matthew Hopkins, the “witch-finder general”
(engraving), 143;
his impositions, cruelty, and retributive fate, 148;
“common prickers” in Scotland, 146;

Mr. Louis, a clergyman, executed, 147;
Glanville’s Sadducismus Triumphatus, 148;
witches tried before Sir Matthew Hale (portrait); Sir
Thomas Brown’s evidence (portrait); conviction and
execution, 148-152;
trials before Chief Justices Holt and Powell, 152, 153;
the last execution in England, in 1716, 153;
Scotch laws on the subject, 154;
various trials in Scotland 155-158;
last execution in Scotland, in 1722, 158;
proceedings of Sprenger in Germany, Bodinus and Delrio
in France, 159;
executions at Constance, Toulouse, Amsterdam, and
Bamberg, 160-162;
numerous executions at Wurtzburg, including many
children, 163;
others at Lendheim, 164;
the “Witches’ Gazette,” a German ballad, 165;
the Maréchale D’Anere executed, 166;
200 executions at Labourt, 166;
“weir-wolves,” belief in, 168;
Urbain Grandier, curate of Loudun, executed, 169;
singular cases at Lisle, 169;
the Duke of Brunswick’s exposure of the cruelty of
torture, 170;
diminution of charges in Germany, 171;
singular remonstrance from the French Parliament to
Louis XIV. on his leniency to witches, 171;
executions at Mohra, in Sweden, 177;

atrocities in New England; a child and a dog executed,
180;
the last execution in Switzerland in 1652, 182;
the latest on record, in 1749, at Wurtzburg, 184;
witches ducked in 1760, 185;
Lady Hatton’s reputation for witchcraft; her house in
Cross Street, Hatton Garden, (engraving), 186;
the horse-shoe a protection against witches, 187;
belief in witchcraft recently and still existing, 187;
witch-doctors still practising, 189;
prevalence of the superstition in France, 189;
“floating a witch” (engraving), 191.
Women accompanying the Crusades in arms, ii. 12, 57, 67.
Woodstock Palace a “haunted house;” account of the noises, and
their cause, ii. 222;
view of, 217.
Wulstan, Bishop, his antipathy to long hair, i. 297.
Wurtzburg, numerous executions for witchcraft, ii. 162, 184;
view in, 183.
York, Duke of, his duel with Col. Lennox, ii. 293.
Zara besieged by the Crusaders, ii. 76.
Zachaire, Denis, the Alchymist, his interesting memoir of
himself, i. 146.
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PREFACE
Within recent years there have been three lines of advance in psychology
which are of notable significance for teaching. The first is the new point of
view concerning the general process of learning. We now understand that
learning is essentially the formation of connections or bonds between
situations and responses, that the satisfyingness of the result is the chief
force that forms them, and that habit rules in the realm of thought as truly
and as fully as in the realm of action.
The second is the great increase in knowledge of the amount, rate, and
conditions of improvement in those organized groups or hierarchies of
habits which we call abilities, such as ability to add or ability to read.
Practice and improvement are no longer vague generalities, but concern
changes which are definable and measurable by standard tests and scales.
The third is the better understanding of the so-called "higher processes"
of analysis, abstraction, the formation of general notions, and reasoning.
The older view of a mental chemistry whereby sensations were
compounded into percepts, percepts were duplicated by images, percepts
and images were amalgamated into abstractions and concepts, and these
were manipulated by reasoning, has given way to the understanding of the
laws of response to elements or aspects of situations and to many situations
or elements thereof in combination. James' view of reasoning as "selection
of essentials" and "thinking things together" in a revised and clarified form
has important applications in the teaching of all the school subjects.
This book presents the applications of this newer dynamic psychology to
the teaching of arithmetic. Its contents are substantially what have been
included in a course of lectures on the psychology of the elementary school
subjects given by the author for some years to students of elementary
education at Teachers College. Many of these former students, now in
supervisory charge of elementary schools, have urged that these lectures be
made available to teachers in general. So they are now published in spite of

the author's desire to clarify and reinforce certain matters by further
researches.
A word of explanation is necessary concerning the exercises and
problems cited to illustrate various matters, especially erroneous pedagogy.
These are all genuine, having their source in actual textbooks, courses of
study, state examinations, and the like. To avoid any possibility of invidious
comparisons they are not quotations, but equivalent problems such as
represent accurately the spirit and intent of the originals.
I take pleasure in acknowledging the courtesy of Mr. S. A. Courtis, Ginn
and Company, D. C. Heath and Company, The Macmillan Company, The
Oxford University Press, Rand, McNally and Company, Dr. C. W. Stone,
The Teachers College Bureau of Publications, and The World Book
Company, in permitting various quotations.
EDWARD L. THORNDIKE.
TEACHERS COLLEGE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
April 1, 1920
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL SUBJECTS
The psychology of the elementary school subjects is concerned with the
connections whereby a child is able to respond to the sight of printed words
by thoughts of their meanings, to the thought of "six and eight" by thinking
"fourteen," to certain sorts of stories, poems, songs, and pictures by
appreciation thereof, to certain situations by acts of skill, to certain others
by acts of courtesy and justice, and so on and on through the series of
situations and responses which are provided by the systematic training of
the school subjects and the less systematic training of school life during
their study. The aims of elementary education, when fully defined, will be
found to be the production of changes in human nature represented by an
almost countless list of connections or bonds whereby the pupil thinks or
feels or acts in certain ways in response to the situations the school has
organized and is influenced to think and feel and act similarly to similar
situations when life outside of school confronts him with them.
We are not at present able to define the work of the elementary school in
detail as the formation of such and such bonds between certain detached
situations and certain specified responses. As elsewhere in human learning,
we are at present forced to think somewhat vaguely in terms of mental
functions, like "ability to read the vernacular," "ability to spell common
words," "ability to add, subtract, multiply, and divide with integers,"
"knowledge of the history of the United States," "honesty in examinations,"
and "appreciation of good music," defined by some general results obtained
rather than by the elementary bonds which constitute them.
The psychology of the school subjects begins where our common sense
knowledge of these functions leaves off and tries to define the knowledge,
interest, power, skill, or ideal in question more adequately, to measure
improvement in it, to analyze it into its constituent bonds, to decide what
bonds need to be formed and in what order as means to the most

economical attainment of the desired improvement, to survey the original
tendencies and the tendencies already acquired before entrance to school
which help or hinder progress in the elementary school subjects, to examine
the motives that are or may be used to make the desired connections
satisfying, to examine any other special conditions of improvement, and to
note any facts concerning individual differences that are of special
importance to the conduct of elementary school work.
Put in terms of problems, the task of the psychology of the elementary
school subjects is, in each case:—
(1) What is the function? For example, just what is "ability to read"? Just
what does "the understanding of decimal notation" mean? Just what are "the
moral effects to be sought from the teaching of literature"?
(2) How are degrees of ability or attainment, and degrees of progress or
improvement in the function or a part of the function measured? For
example, how can we determine how well a pupil should write, or how hard
words we expect him to spell, or what good taste we expect him to show?
How can we define to ourselves what knowledge of the meaning of a
fraction we shall try to secure in grade 4?
(3) What can be done toward reducing the function to terms of particular
situation-response connections, whose formation can be more surely and
easily controlled? For example, how far does ability to spell involve the
formation one by one of bonds between the thought of almost every word in
the language and the thought of that word's letters in their correct order; and
how far does, say, the bond leading from the situation of the sound of ceive
in receive and deceive to their correct spelling insure the correct spelling of
that part of perceive? Does "ability to add" involve special bonds leading
from "27 and 4" to "31," from "27 and 5" to "32," and "27 and 6" to "33"; or
will the bonds leading from "7 and 4" to "11," "7 and 5" to "12" and "7 and
6" to "13" (each plus a simple inference) serve as well? What are the
situations and responses that represent in actual behavior the quality that we
call school patriotism?
(4) In almost every case a certain desired change of knowledge or skill or
power can be attained by any one of several sets of bonds. Which of them is
the best? What are the advantages of each? For example, learning to add

may include the bonds "0 and 0 are 0," "0 and 1 are 1," "0 and 2 are 2," "1
and 0 are 1," "2 and 0 are 2," etc.; or these may be all left unformed, the
pupil being taught the habits of entering 0 as the sum of a column that is
composed of zeros and otherwise neglecting 0 in addition. Are the rules of
usage worth teaching as a means toward correct speech, or is the time better
spent in detailed practice in correct speech itself?
(5) A bond to be formed may be formed in any one of many degrees of
strength. Which of these is, at any given stage of learning the subject, the
most desirable, all things considered? For example, shall the dates of all the
early settlements of North America be learned so that the exact year will be
remembered for ten years, or so that the exact date will be remembered for
ten minutes and the date with an error plus or minus of ten years will be
remembered for a year or two? Shall the tables of inches, feet, and yards,
and pints, quarts, and gallons be learned at their first appearance so as to be
remembered for a year, or shall they be learned only well enough to be
usable in the work of that week, which in turn fixes them to last for a month
or so? Should a pupil in the first year of study of French have such perfect
connections between the sounds of French words and their meanings that he
can understand simple sentences containing them spoken at an ordinary rate
of speaking? Or is slow speech permissible, and even imperative, on the
part of the teacher, with gradual increase of rate?
(6) In almost every case, any set of bonds may produce the desired
change when presented in any one of several orders. Which is the best
order? What are the advantages of each? Certain systems for teaching
handwriting perfect the elementary movements one at a time and then teach
their combination in words and sentences. Others begin and continue with
the complex movement-series that actual words require. What do the latter
lose and gain? The bonds constituting knowledge of the metric system are
now formed late in the pupil's course. Would it be better if they were
formed early as a means of facilitating knowledge of decimal fractions?
(7) What are the original tendencies and pre-school acquisitions upon
which the connection-forming of the elementary school may be based or
which it has to counteract? For example, if a pupil knows the meaning of a
heard word, he may read it understandingly from getting its sound, as by
phonic reconstruction. What words does the average beginner so know?

What are the individual differences in this respect? What do the instincts of
gregariousness, attention-getting, approval, and helpfulness recommend
concerning group-work versus individual-work, and concerning the size of
a group that is most desirable? The original tendency of the eyes is certainly
not to move along a line from left to right of a page, then back in one sweep
and along the next line. What is their original tendency when confronted
with the printed page, and what must we do with it in teaching reading?
(8) What armament of satisfiers and annoyers, of positive and negative
interests and motives, stands ready for use in the formation of the
intrinsically uninteresting connections between black marks and meanings,
numerical exercises and their answers, words and their spelling, and the
like? School practice has tried, more or less at random, incentives and
deterrents from quasi-physical pain to the most sentimental fondling, from
sheer cajolery to philosophical argument, from appeals to assumed savage
and primitive traits to appeals to the interest in automobiles, flyingmachines, and wireless telegraphy. Can not psychology give some rules for
guidance, or at least limit experimentation to its more hopeful fields?
(9) The general conditions of efficient learning are described in manuals
of educational psychology. How do these apply in the case of each task of
the elementary school? For example, the arrangement of school drills in
addition and in short division in the form of practice experiments has been
found very effective in producing interest in the work and in improvement
at it. In what other arithmetical functions may we expect the same?
(10) Beside the general principles concerning the nature and causation
of individual differences, there must obviously be, in existence or obtainable
as a possible result of proper investigation, a great fund of knowledge of
special differences relevant to the learning of reading, spelling, geography,
arithmetic, and the like. What are the facts as far as known? What are the
means of learning more of them? Courtis finds that a child may be specially
strong in addition and yet be specially weak in subtraction in comparison
with others of his age and grade. It even seems that such subtle and intricate
tendencies are inherited. How far is such specialization the rule? Is it, for
example, the case that a child may have a special gift for spelling certain
sorts of words, for drawing faces rather than flowers, for learning ancient
history rather than modern?

Such are our problems: this volume discusses them in the case of
arithmetic. The student who wishes to relate the discussion to the general
pedagogy of arithmetic may profitably read, in connection with this
volume: The Teaching of Elementary Mathematics, by D. E. Smith ['01],
The Teaching of Primary Arithmetic, by H. Suzzallo ['11], How to Teach
Arithmetic, by J. C. Brown and L. D. Coffman ['14], The Teaching of
Arithmetic, by Paul Klapper ['16], and The New Methods in Arithmetic, by
the author ['21].
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CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF ARITHMETICAL
ABILITIES
According to common sense, the task of the elementary school is to
teach:—(1) the meanings of numbers, (2) the nature of our system of
decimal notation, (3) the meanings of addition, subtraction, multiplication,
and division, and (4) the nature and relations of certain common measures;
to secure (5) the ability to add, subtract, multiply, and divide with integers,
common and decimal fractions, and denominate numbers, (6) the ability to
apply the knowledge and power represented by (1) to (5) in solving
problems, and (7) certain specific abilities to solve problems concerning
percentage, interest, and other common occurrences in business life.
This statement of the functions to be developed and improved is sound
and useful so far as it goes, but it does not go far enough to make the task
entirely clear. If teachers had nothing but the statement above as a guide to
what changes they were to make in their pupils, they would often leave out
important features of arithmetical training, and put in forms of training that
a wise educational plan would not tolerate. It is also the case that different
leaders in arithmetical teaching, though they might all subscribe to the
general statement of the previous paragraph, certainly do not in practice
have identical notions of what arithmetic should be for the elementary
school pupil.
The ordinary view of the nature of arithmetical learning is obscure or
inadequate in four respects. It does not define what 'knowledge of the
meanings of numbers' is; it does not take account of the very large amount
of teaching of language which is done and should be done as a part of the
teaching of arithmetic; it does not distinguish between the ability to meet
certain quantitative problems as life offers them and the ability to meet the
problems provided by textbooks and courses of study; it leaves 'the ability
to apply arithmetical knowledge and power' as a rather mystical general

faculty to be improved by some educational magic. The four necessary
amendments may be discussed briefly.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE MEANINGS OF NUMBERS
Knowledge of the meanings of the numbers from one to ten may mean
knowledge that 'one' means a single thing of the sort named, that two means
one more than one, that three means one more than two, and so on. This we
may call the series meaning. To know the meaning of 'six' in this sense is to
know that it is one more than five and one less than seven—that it is
between five and seven in the number series. Or we may mean by
knowledge of the meanings of numbers, knowledge that two fits a
collection of two units, that three fits a collection of three units, and so on,
each number being a name for a certain sized collection of discrete things,
such as apples, pennies, boys, balls, fingers, and the other customary
objects of enumeration in the primary school. This we may call the
collection meaning. To know the meaning of six in this sense is to be able to
name correctly any collection of six separate, easily distinguishable
individual objects. In the third place, knowledge of the numbers from one to
ten may mean knowledge that two is twice whatever is called one, that three
is three times whatever is one, and so on. This is, of course, the ratio
meaning. To know the meaning of six in this sense is to know that if
_________ is one, a line half a foot long is six, that if [ __ ] is one, [
____________ ] is about six, while if [ _ ] is one, [ ______ ] is about six,
and the like. In the fourth place, the meaning of a number may be a smaller
or larger fraction of its implications—its numerical relations, facts about it.
To know six in this sense is to know that it is more than five or four, less
than seven or eight, twice three, three times two, the sum of five and one, or
of four and two, or of three and three, two less than eight—that with four it
makes ten, that it is half of twelve, and the like. This we may call the
'nucleus of facts' or relational meaning of a number.
Ordinary school practice has commonly accepted the second meaning as
that which it is the task of the school to teach beginners, but each of the
other meanings has been alleged to be the essential one—the series idea by
Phillips ['97], the ratio idea by McLellan and Dewey ['95] and Speer ['97],
and the relational idea by Grube and his followers.

This diversity of views concerning what the function is that is to be
improved in the case of learning the meanings of the numbers one to ten is
not a trifling matter of definition, but produces very great differences in
school practice. Consider, for example, the predominant value assigned to
counting by Phillips in the passage quoted below, and the samples of the
sort of work at which children were kept employed for months by too
ardent followers of Speer and Grube.
THE SERIES IDEA OVEREMPHASIZED
"This is essentially the counting period, and any words that can be arranged into a series furnish all
that is necessary. Counting is fundamental, and counting that is spontaneous, free from sensible
observation, and from the strain of reason. A study of these original methods shows that
multiplication was developed out of counting, and not from addition as nearly all textbooks treat it.
Multiplication is counting. When children count by 4's, etc., they accent the same as counting
gymnastics or music. When a child now counts on its fingers it simply reproduces a stage in the
growth of the civilization of all nations.
I would emphasize again that during the counting period there is a somewhat spontaneous
development of the number series-idea which Preyer has discussed in his Arithmogenesis; that an
immense momentum is given by a systematic series of names; and that these names are generally
first learned and applied to objects later. A lady teacher told me that the Superintendent did not wish
the teachers to allow the children to count on their fingers, but she failed to see why counting with
horse-chestnuts was any better. Her children could hardly avoid using their fingers in counting other
objects yet they followed the series to 100 without hesitation or reference to their fingers. This
spontaneous counting period, or naming and following the series, should precede its application to
objects." [D.E. Phillips, '97, p. 238.]

THE RATIO IDEA OVEREMPHASIZED

FIG. 1.

"Ratios.—1. Select solids having the relation, or ratio, of a, b, c, d, o, e.
2. Name the solids, a, b, c, d, o, e.
The means of expressing must be as freely supplied as the means of discovery. The pupil is not
expected to invent terms.
3. Tell all you can about the relation of these units.
4. Unite units and tell what the sum equals.
5. Make statements like this: o less e equals b.
6. c can be separated into how many d's? into how many b's?
7. c can be separated into how many b's? What is the name of the largest unit that can be found in
both c and d an exact number of times?
8. Each of the other units equals what part of c?
9. If b is 1, what is each of the other units?
10. If a is 1, what is each of the other units?
11. If b is 1, how many 1's are there in each of the other units?
12. If d is 1, how many 1's and parts of 1 in each of the other units?
13. 2 is the relation of what units?
14. 3 is the relation of what units?
15. 1⁄2 is the relation of what units?
16. 2⁄3 is the relation of what units?
17. Which units have the relation 3⁄2?
18. Which unit is 3 times as large as 1⁄2 of b?
19. c equals 6 times 1⁄3 of what unit?
20. 1⁄3 of what unit equals 1⁄6 of c?
21. What equals 1⁄2 of c? d equals how many sixths of c?
22. o equals 5 times 1⁄3 of what unit?
23. 1⁄3 of what unit equals 1⁄5 of o?
24. 2⁄3 of d equals what unit? b equals how many thirds of d?

25. 2 is the ratio of d to 1⁄3 of what unit? 3 is the ratio of d to 1⁄2 of what unit?
26. d equals 3⁄4 of what unit? 3⁄4 is the ratio of what units?" [Speer, '97, p. 9f.]

THE RELATIONAL IDEA OVEREMPHASIZED
An inspection of books of the eighties which followed the "Grube method" (for example, the New
Elementary Arithmetic by E.E. White ['83]) will show undue emphasis on the relational ideas. There
will be over a hundred and fifty successive tasks all, or nearly all, on + 7 and − 7. There will be much
written work of the sort shown below:
Add:

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
——

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
1
——

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
——

which must have sorely tried the eyes of all concerned. Pupils are taught to "give the analysis and
synthesis of each of the nine digits." Yet the author states that he does not carry the principle of the
Grube method "to the extreme of useless repetition and mechanism."

It should be obvious that all four meanings have claims upon the
attention of the elementary school. Four is the thing between three and five

in the number series; it is the name for a certain sized collection of discrete
objects; it is also the name for a continuous magnitude equal to four units—
for four quarts of milk in a gallon pail as truly as for four separate quartpails of milk; it is also, if we know it well, the thing got by adding one to
three or subtracting six from ten or taking two two's or half of eight. To
know the meaning of a number means to know somewhat about it in all of
these respects. The difficulty has been the narrow vision of the extremists.
A child must not be left interminably counting; in fact the one-more-ness of
the number series can almost be had as a by-product. A child must not be
restricted to exercises with collections objectified as in Fig. 2 or stated in
words as so many apples, oranges, hats, pens, etc., when work with
measurement of continuous quantities with varying units—inches, feet,
yards, glassfuls, pints, quarts, seconds, minutes, hours, and the like—is so
easy and so significant. On the other hand, the elaboration of artificial
problems with fictitious units of measure just to have relative magnitudes as
in the exercises on page 5 is a wasteful sacrifice. Similarly, special drills
emphasizing the fact that eighteen is eleven and seven, twelve and six, three
less than twenty-one, and the like, are simply idolatrous; these facts about
eighteen, so far as they are needed, are better learned in the course of actual
column-addition and -subtraction.

FIG. 2.
ARITHMETICAL LANGUAGE

The second improvement to be made in the ordinary notion of what the
functions to be improved are in the case of arithmetic is to include among
these functions the knowledge of certain words. The understanding of such
words as both, all, in all, together, less, difference, sum, whole, part, equal,
buy, sell, have left, measure, is contained in, and the like, is necessary in
arithmetic as truly as is the understanding of numbers themselves. It must
be provided for by the school; for pre-school and extra-school training does
not furnish it, or furnishes it too late. It can be provided for much better in
connection with the teaching of arithmetic than in connection with the
teaching of English.
It has not been provided for. An examination of the first fifty pages of
eight recent textbooks for beginners in arithmetic reveals very slight
attention to this matter at the best and no attention at all in some cases.
Three of the books do not even use the word sum, and one uses it only once
in the fifty pages. In all the four hundred pages the word difference occurs
only twenty times. When the words are used, no great ingenuity or care
appears in the means of making sure that their meanings are understood.
The chief reason why it has not been provided for is precisely that the
common notion of what the functions are that arithmetic is to develop has
left out of account this function of intelligent response to quantitative terms,
other than the names of the numbers and processes.
Knowledge of language over a much wider range is a necessary element
in arithmetical ability in so far as the latter includes ability to solve verbally
stated problems. As arithmetic is now taught, it does include that ability,
and a large part of the time of wise teaching is given to improving the
function 'knowing what a problem states and what it asks for.' Since,
however, this understanding of verbally stated problems may not be an
absolutely necessary element of arithmetic, it is best to defer its
consideration until we have seen what the general function of problemsolving is.
PROBLEM-SOLVING
The third respect in which the function, 'ability in arithmetic,' needs
clearer definition, is this 'problem-solving.' The aim of the elementary

school is to provide for correct and economical response to genuine
problems, such as knowing the total due for certain real quantities at certain
real prices, knowing the correct change to give or get, keeping household
accounts, calculating wages due, computing areas, percentages, and
discounts, estimating quantities needed of certain materials to make certain
household or shop products, and the like. Life brings these problems usually
either with a real situation (as when one buys and counts the cost and his
change), or with a situation that one imagines or describes to himself (as
when one figures out how much money he must save per week to be able to
buy a forty-dollar bicycle before a certain date). Sometimes, however, the
problem is described in words to the person who must solve it by another
person (as when a life insurance agent says, 'You pay only 25 cents a week
from now till—and you get $250 then'; or when an employer says, 'Your
wages would be 9 dollars a week, with luncheon furnished and bonuses of
such and such amounts'). Sometimes also the problem is described in
printed or written words to the person who must solve it (as in an
advertisement or in the letter of a customer asking for an estimate on this or
that). The problem may be in part real, in part imagined or described to
oneself, and in part described to one orally or in printed or written words (as
when the proposed articles for purchase lie before one, the amount of
money one has in the bank is imagined, the shopkeeper offers 10 percent
discount, and the printed price list is there to be read).
To fit pupils to solve these real, personally imagined, or self-described
problems, and 'described-by-another' problems, schools have relied almost
exclusively on training with problems of the last sort only. The following
page taken almost at random from one of the best recent textbooks could be
paralleled by thousands of others; and the oral problems put by teachers
have, as a rule, no real situation supporting them.

1. At 70 cents per 100 pounds, what will be the amount of duty on an invoice of 3622 steel rails, each rail being 27 feet long and weighing 60 pounds
to the yard?
2. A man had property valued at $6500. What will be his taxes at the rate of $10.80 per $1000?
3. Multiply seventy thousand fourteen hundred-thousandths by one hundred nine millionths, and divide the product by five hundred forty-five.
4. What number multiplied by 43¾ will produce 2655⁄8?
5. What decimal of a bushel is 3 quarts?
6. A man sells 5⁄8 of an acre of land for $93.75. What would be the value of his farm of 150¾ acres at the same rate?
7. A coal dealer buys 375 tons coal at $4.25 per ton of 2240 pounds. He sells it at $4.50 per ton of 2000 pounds. What is his profit?
8. Bought 60 yards of cloth at the rate of 2 yards for $5, and 80 yards more at the rate of 4 yards for $9. I immediately sold the whole of it at the rate of
5 yards for $12. How much did I gain?
9. A man purchased 40 bushels of apples at $1.50 per bushel. Twenty-five hundredths of them were damaged, and he sold them at 20 cents per peck.
He sold the remainder at 50 cents per peck. How much did he gain or lose?
10. If oranges are 37½ cents per dozen, how many boxes, each containing 480, can be bought for $60?
11. A man can do a piece of work in 18¾ days. What part of it can he do in 62⁄3 days?
12. How old to-day is a boy that was born Oct. 29, 1896? [Walsh, '06, Part I, p. 165.]

As a result, teachers and textbook writers have come to think of the functions of solving arithmetical problems
as identical with the function of solving the described problems which they give in school in books, examination
papers, and the like. If they do not think explicitly that this is so, they still act in training and in testing pupils as if
it were so.
It is not. Problems should be solved in school to the end that pupils may solve the problems which life offers. To
know what change one should receive after a given real purchase, to keep one's accounts accurately, to adapt a
recipe for six so as to make enough of the article for four persons, to estimate the amount of seed required for a
plot of a given size from the statement of the amount required per acre, to make with surety the applications that
the household, small stores, and ordinary trades require—such is the ability that the elementary school should
develop. Other things being equal, the school should set problems in arithmetic which life then and later will set,
should favor the situations which life itself offers and the responses which life itself demands.
Other things are not always equal. The same amount of time and effort will often be more productive toward the
final end if directed during school to 'made-up' problems. The keeping of personal financial accounts as a school
exercise is usually impracticable, partly because some of the children have no earnings or allowance—no accounts
to keep, and partly because the task of supervising work when each child has a different problem is too great for
the teacher. The use of real household and shop problems will be easy only when the school program includes the
household arts and industrial education, and when these subjects themselves are taught so as to improve the
functions used by real life. Very often the most efficient course is to make sure that arithmetical procedures are
applied to the real and personally initiated problems which they fit, by having a certain number of such problems
arise and be solved; then to make sure that the similarity between these real problems and certain described
problems of the textbook or teacher's giving is appreciated; and then to give the needed drill work with described
problems. In many cases the school practice is fairly well justified in assuming that solving described problems
will prepare the pupil to solve the corresponding real problems actually much better than the same amount of time
spent on the real problems themselves.
All this is true, yet the general principle remains that, other things being equal, the school should favor real
situations, should present issues as life will present them.
Where other things make the use of verbally described problems of the ordinary type desirable, these should be
chosen so as to give a maximum of preparation for the real applications of arithmetic in life. We should not, for
example, carelessly use any problem that comes to mind in applying a certain principle, but should stop to consider
just what the situations of life really require and show clearly the application of that principle. For example,
contrast these two problems applying cancellation:—

A. A man sold 24 lambs at $18 apiece on each of six days, and bought 8 pounds of metal with the proceeds. How much did he pay per ounce for the
metal?
B. How tall must a rectangular tank 16" long by 8" wide be to hold as much as a rectangular tank 24" by 18" by 6"?

The first problem not only presents a situation that would rarely or never occur, but also takes a way to find the
answer that would not, in that situation, be taken since the price set by another would determine the amount.
Much thought and ingenuity should in the future be expended in eliminating problems whose solution does not
improve the real function to be improved by applied arithmetic, or improves it at too great cost, and in devising
problems which prepare directly for life's demands and still can fit into a curriculum that can be administered by
one teacher in charge of thirty or forty pupils, under the limitations of school life.
The following illustrations will to some extent show concretely what the ability to apply the knowledge and
power represented by abstract or pure arithmetic—the so-called fundamentals—in solving problems should mean
and what it should not mean.
Samples of Desirable Applications of Arithmetic in Problems where the Situation is
Actually Present to Sense in Whole or in Part
Keeping the scores and deciding which side beat and by how much in appropriate classroom games, spelling
matches, and the like.
Computing costs, making and inspecting change, taking inventories, and the like with a real or play store.
Mapping the school garden, dividing it into allotments, planning for the purchase of seeds, and the like.
Measuring one's own achievement and progress in tests of word-knowledge, spelling, addition, subtraction,
speed of writing, and the like. Measuring the rate of improvement per hour of practice or per week of school life,
and the like.
Estimating costs of food cooked in the school kitchen, articles made in the school shops, and the like.
Computing the cost of telegrams, postage, expressage, for a real message or package, from the published tariffs.
Computing costs from mail order catalogues and the like.
Samples of Desirable Applications of Arithmetic where the Situation is Not Present to
Sense
The samples given here all concern the subtraction of fractions. Samples concerning any other arithmetical
principle may be found in the appropriate pages of any text which contains problem-material selected with
consideration of life's needs.
A
1. Dora is making jelly. The recipe calls for 24 cups of sugar and she has only 21½. She has no time to go to the store so she has to borrow the sugar
from a neighbor. How much must she get?
Subtract

24
21½
———
2½

Think "½ and ½ = 1." Write ½.
Think "2 and 2 = 4." Write the 2.

2. A box full of soap weighs 29½ lb. The empty box weighs 3½ lb. How much does the soap alone weigh?
3. On July 1, Mr. Lewis bought a 50-lb. bag of ice-cream salt. On July 15 there were just 11½ lb. left. How much had he used in the two weeks?

4. Grace promised to pick 30 qt. blueberries for her mother. So far she has picked 18½ qt. How many more quarts must she pick?

B
This table of numbers tells what Nell's baby sister Mary weighed every two months from the time she was born till she was a year old.

Weight of Mary
Adams
73⁄8 lb.
When born
2 months old

111⁄4 lb.

4 months old

141⁄8 lb.

6 months old

153⁄4 lb.

8 months old

175⁄8 lb.

10 months old

191⁄2 lb.

12 months old

213⁄8 lb.

1. How much did the Adams baby gain in the first two months?
2. How much did the Adams baby gain in the second two months?
3. In the third two months?
4. In the fourth two months?
5. From the time it was 8 months old till it was 10 months old?
6. In the last two months?
7. From the time it was born till it was 6 months old?

C
1. Helen's exact average for December was 871⁄3. Kate's was 841⁄2. How much higher was Helen's than Kate's?

871⁄3
841⁄2
———
How do you think of 1⁄2 and 1⁄3?
How do you think of 12⁄6?
How do you change the 4?
2. Find the exact average for each girl in the following list. Write the answers clearly so that you can see them easily. You will use them in solving
problems 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.

Reading
Language
Arithmetic
Spelling
Geography
Writing

Alice
91
88
89
90
91
90

Dora
87
78
85
79
87
88

Emma
83
82
79
75
83
75

Grace
81
79
75
80
75
72

Louise
79
73
84
82
78
93

Mary
77
78
87
91
85
92

3. Which girl had the highest average?
4. How much higher was her average than the next highest?
5. How much difference was there between the highest and the lowest girl?
6. Was Emma's average higher or lower than Louise's? How much?
7. How much difference was there between Alice's average and Dora's?
8. How much difference was there between Mary's average and Nell's?
9. Write five other problems about these averages, and solve each of them.

Samples of Undesirable Applications of Arithmetic[1]
Will has XXI marbles, XII jackstones, XXXVI pieces of string. How many things had he?
George's kite rose CDXXXV feet and Tom's went LXIII feet higher. How high did Tom's kite rise?
If from DCIV we take CCIV the result will be a number IV times as large as the number of dollars Mr. Dane paid for his horse. How much did he pay
for his horse?
Hannah has 5⁄8 of a dollar, Susie 7⁄25, Nellie 3⁄4, Norah 13⁄16. How much money have they all together?
A man saves 317⁄80 dollars a week. How much does he save in a year?
A tree fell and was broken into 4 pieces, 131⁄6 feet, 103⁄7 feet, 81⁄2 feet, and 716⁄21 feet long. How tall was the tree?
Annie's father gave her 20 apples to divide among her friends. She gave each one 22⁄9 apples apiece. How many playmates had she?
John had 172⁄5 apples. He divided his whole apples into fifths. How many pieces had he in all?
A landlady has 33⁄7 pies to be divided among her 8 boarders. How much will each boarder receive?
There are twenty columns of spelling words in Mary's lesson and 16 words in each column. How many words are in her lesson?
There are 9 nuts in a pint. How many pints in a pile of 5,888,673 nuts?
The Adams school contains eight rooms; each room contains 48 pupils; if each pupil has eight cents, how much have they together?
A pile of wood in the form of a cube contains 15½ cords. What are the dimensions to the nearest inch?
A man 6 ft. high weighs 175 lb. How tall is his wife who is of similar build, and weighs 125 lb.?
A stick of timber is in the shape of the frustum of a square pyramid, the lower base being 22 in. square and the upper 14 in. square. How many cubic
feet in the log, if it is 22 ft. long?
Mr. Ames, being asked his age, replied: "If you cube one half of my age and add 41,472 to the result, the sum will be one half the cube of my age.
How old am I?"

These samples, just given, of the kind of problem-solving that should not be emphasized in school training refer
in some cases to books of forty years back, but the following represent the results of a collection made in 1910
from books then in excellent repute. It required only about an hour to collect them; and I am confident that a
thousand such problems describing situations that the pupil will never encounter in real life, or putting questions
that he will never be asked in real life, could easily be found in any ten textbooks of the decade from 1900 to 1910.
If there are 250 kernels of corn on one ear, how many are there on 24 ears of corn the same size?
Maud is four times as old as her sister, who is 4 years old. What is the sum of their ages?
If the first century began with the year 1, with what year does it end?
Every spider has 8 compound eyes. How many eyes have 21 spiders?
A nail 4 inches long is driven through a board so that it projects 1.695 inches on one side and 1.428 on the other. How thick is the board?
Find the perimeter of an envelope 5 in. by 3¼ in.
How many minutes in 5⁄9 of 9⁄4 of an hour?
Mrs. Knox is 3⁄4 as old as Mr. Knox, who is 48 years old. Their son Edward is 4⁄9 as old as his mother. How old is Edward?
Suppose a pie to be exactly round and 10½ miles in diameter. If it were cut into 6 equal pieces, how long would the curved edge of each piece be?

81⁄3% of a class of 36 boys were absent on a rainy day. 331⁄3% of those present went out of the room to the school yard. How many were left in the
room?
Just after a ton of hay was weighed in market, a horse ate one pound of it. What was the ratio of what he ate to what was left?
If a fan having 15 rays opens out so that the outer rays form a straight line, how many degrees are there between any two adjacent rays?
One half of the distance between St. Louis and New Orleans is 280 miles more than 1⁄10 of the distance; what is the distance between these places?
If the pressure of the atmosphere is 14.7 lb. per square inch what is the pressure on the top of a table 1¼ yd. long and 2⁄3 yd. wide?
13⁄ of the total acreage of barley in 1900 was 100,000 acres; what was the total acreage?
28
What is the least number of bananas that a mother can exactly divide between her 2 sons, or among her 4 daughters, or among all her children?
If Alice were two years older than four times her actual age she would be as old as her aunt, who is 38 years old. How old is Alice?
Three men walk around a circular island, the circumference of which is 360 miles. A walks 15 miles a day, B 18 miles a day, and C 24 miles a day. If
they start together and walk in the same direction, how many days will elapse before they will be together again?

With only thirty or forty dollars a year to spend on a pupil's education, of which perhaps eight dollars are spent
on improving his arithmetical abilities, the immediate guidance of his responses to real situations and personally
initiated problems has to be supplemented largely by guidance of his responses to problems described in words,
diagrams, pictures, and the like. Of these latter, words will be used most often. As a consequence the
understanding of the words used in these descriptions becomes a part of the ability required in arithmetic. Such
word knowledge is also required in so far as the problems to be solved in real life are at times described, as in
advertisements, business letters, and the like.
This is recognized by everybody in the case of words like remainder, profit, loss, gain, interest, cubic capacity,
gross, net, and discount, but holds equally of let, suppose, balance, average, total, borrowed, retained, and many
such semi-technical words, and may hold also of hundreds of other words unless the textbook and teacher are
careful to use only words and sentence structures which daily life and the class work in English have made well
known to the pupils. To apply arithmetic to a problem a pupil must understand what the problem is; problemsolving depends on problem-reading. In actual school practice training in problem-reading will be less and less
necessary as we get rid of problems to be solved simply for the sake of solving them, unnecessarily unreal
problems, and clumsy descriptions, but it will remain to some extent as an important joint task for the 'arithmetic'
and 'reading' of the elementary school.
ARITHMETICAL REASONING
The last respect in which the nature of arithmetical abilities requires definition concerns arithmetical reasoning.
An adequate treatment of the reasoning that may be expected of pupils in the elementary school and of the most
efficient ways to encourage and improve it cannot be given until we have studied the formation of habits. For
reasoning is essentially the organization and control of habits of thought. Certain matters may, however, be decided
here. The first concerns the use of computation and problems merely for discipline,—that is, the emphasis on
training in reasoning regardless of whether the problem is otherwise worth reasoning about. It used to be thought
that the mind was a set of faculties or abilities or powers which grew strong and competent by being exercised in a
certain way, no matter on what they were exercised. Problems that could not occur in life, and were entirely devoid
of any worthy interest, save the intellectual interest in solving them, were supposed to be nearly or quite as useful
in training the mind to reason as the genuine problems of the home, shop, or trade. Anything that gave the mind a
chance to reason would do; and pupils labored to find when the minute hand and hour hand would be together, or
how many sheep a shepherd had if half of what he had plus ten was one third of twice what he had!
We now know that the training depends largely on the particular data used, so that efficient discipline in
reasoning requires that the pupil reason about matters of real importance. There is no magic essence or faculty of
reasoning that works in general and irrespective of the particular facts and relations reasoned about. So we should
try to find problems which not only stimulate the pupil to reason, but also direct his reasoning in useful channels
and reward it by results that are of real significance. We should replace the purely disciplinary problems by
problems that are also valuable as special training for important particular situations of life. Reasoning sought for
reasoning's sake alone is too wasteful an expenditure of time and is also likely to be inferior as reasoning.

The second matter concerns the relative merits of 'catch' problems, where the pupil has to go against some
customary habit of thinking, and what we may call 'routine' problems, where the regular ways of thinking that have
served him in the past will, except for some blunder, guide him rightly.
Consider, for example, these four problems:
1. "A man bought ten dozen eggs for $2.50 and sold them for 30 cents a dozen. How many cents did he lose?"
2. "I went into Smith's store at 9 A.M. and remained until 10 A.M. I bought six yards of gingham at 40 cents a yard and three yards of muslin at 20
cents a yard and gave a $5.00 bill. How long was I in the store?"
3. "What must you divide 48 by to get half of twice 6?"
4. "What must you add to 19 to get 30?"

The 'catch' problem is now in disrepute, the wise teacher feeling by a sort of intuition that to willfully require a
pupil to reason to a result sharply contrary to that to which previous habits lead him is risky. The four illustrations
just given show, however, that mere 'catchiness' or 'contra-previous-habit-ness' in a problem is not enough to
condemn it. The fourth problem is a catch problem, but so useful a one that it has been adopted in many modern
books as a routine drill! The first problem, on the contrary, all, save those who demand no higher criterion for a
problem than that it make the pupil 'think,' would reject. It demands the reversal of fixed habits to no valid
purpose; for in life the question in such case would never (or almost never) be 'How many cents did he lose?' but
'What was the result?' or simply 'What of it?' This problem weakens without excuse the child's confidence in the
training he has had. Problems like (2) are given by teachers of excellent reputation, but probably do more harm
than good. If a pupil should interrupt his teacher during the recitation in arithmetic by saying, "I got up at 7 o'clock
to multiply 9 by 2¾ and got 24¾ for my answer; was that the right time to get up?" the teacher would not thank
fortune for the stimulus to thought but would think the child a fool. Such catch questions may be fairly useful as an
object lesson on the value of search for the essential element in a situation if a great variety of them are given one
after another with routine problems intermixed and with warning of the general nature of the exercise at the
beginning. Even so, it should be remembered that reasoning should be chiefly a force organizing habits, not
opposing them; and also that there are enough bad habits to be opposed to give all necessary training. Fabricated
puzzle situations wherein a peculiar hidden element of the situation makes the good habits called up by the
situation misleading are useful therefore rather as a relief and amusing variation in arithmetical work than as
stimuli to thought.
Problems like the third quoted above we might call puzzling rather than 'catch' problems. They have value as
drills in analysis of a situation into its elements that will amuse the gifted children, and as tests of certain abilities.
They also require that of many confusing habits, the right one be chosen, rather than that ordinary habits be set
aside by some hidden element in the situation. Not enough is known about their effect to enable us to decide
whether or not the elementary school should include special facility with them as one of the arithmetical functions
that it specially trains.
The fourth 'catch' quoted above, which all would admit is a good problem, is good because it opposes a good
habit for the sake of another good habit, forces the analysis of an element whose analysis life very much requires,
and does it with no obvious waste. It is not safe to leave a child with the one habit of responding to 'add, 19, 30' by
49, for in life the 'have 19, must get .... to have 30' situation is very frequent and important.
On the whole, the ordinary problems which ordinary life proffers seem to be the sort that should be reasoned
out, though the elementary school may include the less noxious forms of pure mental gymnastics for those pupils
who like them.
SUMMARY
These discussions of the meanings of numbers, the linguistic demands of arithmetic, the distinction between
scholastic and real applications of arithmetic, and the possible restrictions of training in reasoning,—may serve as
illustrations of the significance of the question, "What are the functions that the elementary school tries to improve
in its teaching of arithmetic?" Other matters might well be considered in this connection, but the main outline of
the work of the elementary school is now fairly clear. The arithmetical functions or abilities which it seeks to
improve are, we may say:—

(1) Working knowledge of the meanings of numbers as names for certain sized collections, for certain relative
magnitudes, the magnitude of unity being known, and for certain centers or nuclei of relations to other numbers.
(2) Working knowledge of the system of decimal notation.
(3) Working knowledge of the meanings of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.
(4) Working knowledge of the nature and relations of certain common measures.
(5) Working ability to add, subtract, multiply, and divide with integers, common and decimal fractions, and
denominate numbers, all being real positive numbers.
(6) Working knowledge of words, symbols, diagrams, and the like as required by life's simpler arithmetical
demands or by economical preparation therefor.
(7) The ability to apply all the above as required by life's simpler arithmetical demands or by economical
preparation therefor, including (7 a) certain specific abilities to solve problems concerning areas of rectangles,
volumes of rectangular solids, percents, interest, and certain other common occurrences in household, factory, and
business life.
THE SOCIOLOGY OF ARITHMETIC
The phrase 'life's simpler arithmetical demands' is necessarily left vague. Just what use is being made of arithmetic in this country in 1920 by each
person therein, we know only very roughly. What may be called a 'sociology' of arithmetic is very much needed to investigate this matter. For rare or
difficult demands the elementary school should not prepare; there are too many other desirable abilities that it should improve.
A most interesting beginning at such an inventory of the actual uses of arithmetic has been made by Wilson ['19] and Mitchell.[2] Although their
studies need to be much extended and checked by other methods of inquiry, two main facts seem fairly certain.
First, the great majority of people in the great majority of their doings use only very elementary arithmetical processes. In 1737 cases of addition
reported by Wilson, seven eighths were of five numbers or less. Over half of the multipliers reported were one-figure numbers. Over 95 per cent of the
fractions operated with were included in this list: 1⁄2 1⁄4 3⁄4 1⁄3 2⁄3 1⁄8 3⁄8 1⁄5 2⁄5 4⁄5. Three fourths of all the cases reported were simple one-step
computations with integers or United States money.
Second, they often use these very elementary processes, not because such are the quickest and most convenient, but because they have lost, or maybe
never had, mastery of the more advanced processes which would do the work better. The 5 and 10 cent stores, the counter with "Anything on this counter
for 25¢," and the arrangements for payments on the installment plan are familiar instances of human avoidance of arithmetic. Wilson found very slight
use of decimals; and Mitchell found men computing with 49ths as common fractions when the use of decimals would have been more efficient. If given
120 seconds to do a test like that shown below, leading lawyers, physicians, manufacturers, and business men and their wives will, according to my
experience, get only about half the work right. Many women, finding on their meat bill "73⁄8 lb. roast beef $2.36," will spend time and money to
telephone the butcher asking how much roast beef was per pound, because they have no sure power in dividing by a mixed number.
Test
Perform the operations indicated. Express all fractions in answers in lowest terms.
Add:

4 yr. 6 mo.
1 yr. 2 mo.
6 yr. 9 mo.
3 yr. 6 mo.
4 yr. 5 mo.

3⁄ + 1⁄ + .25
4
6

Subtract:

8.6 − 6.05007

7⁄ − 2⁄ =
8
3

57⁄16 − 23⁄16 =

Multiply:

29 ft.

7 × 8 × 4½ =
Divide:
4½ ÷ 7 =

6 in.
8

It seems probable that the school training in arithmetic of the past has not given enough attention to perfecting the more elementary abilities. And we
shall later find further evidence of this. On the other hand, the fact that people in general do not at present use a process may not mean that they ought not
to use it.
Life's simpler arithmetical demands certainly do not include matters like the rules for finding cube root or true discount, which no sensible person
uses. They should not include matters like computing the lateral surface or volume of pyramids and cones, or knowing the customs of plasterers and
paper hangers, which are used only by highly specialized trades. They should not include matters like interest on call loans, usury, exact interest, and the
rediscounting of notes, which concern only brokers, bank clerks, and rich men. They should not include the technique of customs which are vanishing
from efficient practice, such as simple interest on amount for times longer than a year, days of grace, or extremes and means in proportions. They should
not include any elaborate practice with very large numbers, or decimals beyond thousandths, or the addition and subtraction of fractions which not one
person in a hundred has to add or subtract oftener than once a year.
When we have an adequate sociology of arithmetic, stating accurately just who should use each arithmetical ability and how often, we shall be able to
define the task of the elementary school in this respect. For the present, we may proceed by common sense, guided by two limiting rules. The first is,
—"It is no more desirable for the elementary school to teach all the facts of arithmetic than to teach all the words in the English language, or all the
topography of the globe, or all the details of human physiology." The second is,—"It is not desirable to eliminate any element of arithmetical training
until you have something better to put in its place."

CHAPTER II

THE MEASUREMENT OF ARITHMETICAL ABILITIES
One of the best ways to clear up notions of what the functions are which schools should develop and improve is
to get measures of them. If any given knowledge or skill or power or ideal exists, it exists in some amount. A
series of amounts of it, varying from less to more, defines the ability itself in a way that no general verbal
description can do. Thus, a series of weights, 1 lb., 2 lb., 3 lb., 4 lb., etc., helps to tell us what we mean by weight.
By finding a series of words like only, smoke, another, pretty, answer, tailor, circus, telephone, saucy, and
beginning, which are spelled correctly by known and decreasing percentages of children of the same age, or of the
same school grade, we know better what we mean by 'spelling-difficulty.' Indeed, until we can measure the
efficiency and improvement of a function, we are likely to be vague and loose in our ideas of what the function is.
A SAMPLE MEASUREMENT OF AN ARITHMETICAL ABILITY: THE ABILITY
TO ADD INTEGERS
Consider first, as a sample, the measurement of ability to add integers.
The following were the examples used in the measurements made by Stone ['08]:

2375
4052
6354
260
5041
1543
———

596
428
94
75
304
645
984
897
———

4695
872
7948
6786
567
858
9447
7499
———

The scoring was as follows: Credit of 1 for each column added correctly. Stone combined measures of other
abilities with this in a total score for amount done correctly in 12 minutes. Stone also scored the correctness of the
additions in certain work in multiplication.
Courtis uses a sheet of twenty-four tasks or 'examples,' each consisting of the addition of nine three-place
numbers as shown below. Eight minutes is allowed. He scores the amount done by the number of examples, and
also scores the number of examples done correctly, but does not suggest any combination of these two into a
general-efficiency score.
927
379
756
837
924
110
854
965
344
———
The author long ago proposed that pupils be measured also with series like a to g shown below, in which the
difficulty increases step by step.

a.

3
2
4
—

2
3
2
—

2
1
3
—

3
2
3
—

2
4
3
—

2
5
2
—

1
5
2
—

2
1
2
—

b.

21
23
24
—

32
12
25
—

12
52
15
—

24
31
14
—

34
33
32
—

34
12
23
—

22
23
43
—

12
13
61
—

c.

22
3
38
—

3
31
45
—

4
3
52
—

35
2
52
—

32
33
2
—

83
11
4
—

22
3
33
—

3
21
64
—

d.

30
20
40
—

20
50
17
—

10
40
24
—

22
43
13
—

10
30
40
—

20
4
23
—

52
6
30
—

12
22
44
—

20
10
20
20
—

4
30
30
2
20
—

5
3
20
40
10
—

20
40
4
23
11
—

12
4
1
40
20
—

12
11
23
11
22
—

20
20
7
10
30
—

10
20
2
30
25
—

14
9
17
26
—

2
14
23
29
—

19
19
13
13
18
—

9
24
12
15
19
—

9
13
15
25
—

4
13
34
28
—

9
13
9
12
18
—

14
25
39
—

e.

f.

g.
13
9
19
26
16
—

23
28
29
—

9
13
29
14
19
—

19
26
15
—

13
12
9
9
8
19
—

14
12
9
8
17
—

9
14
13
29
19
—

24
21
23
22
—

Woody ['16] has constructed his well-known tests on this principle, though he uses only one example at each
step of difficulty instead of eight or ten as suggested above. His test, so far as addition of integers goes, is:—
SERIES A.

ADDITION SCALE (in part)
By Clifford Woody

(1)
2
3
—
(10)
21
33
35
—
(19)

$ .75
1.25
.49
——

(2)
2
4
3
—
(11)
32
59
17
—
(20)

$12.50
16.75
15.75
——

(3)
17
2
—
(12)
43
1
2
13
—
(21)
$8.00
5.75
2.33
4.16
.94
6.32
——

(4)

(5)

53
45
—
(13)
23
25
16
—

72
26
—
(14)
25 + 42
=

(6)
60
37
—
(15)
100
33
45
201
46
—

(7)

(8)

3+1=

2+5+1
=

(16)

(17)

9
24
12
15
19
—

199
194
295
156
——

(22)
547
197
685
678
456
393
525
240
152
——

In his original report, Woody gives no scheme for scoring an individual, wisely assuming that, with so few
samples at each degree of difficulty, a pupil's score would be too unreliable for individual diagnosis. The test is
reliable for a class; and for a class Woody used the degree of difficulty such that a stated fraction of the class can
do the work correctly, if twenty minutes is allowed for the thirty-eight examples of the entire test.
The measurement of even so simple a matter as the efficiency of a pupil's responses to these tests in adding
integers is really rather complex. There is first of all the problem of combining speed and accuracy into some
single estimate. Stone gives no credit for a column unless it is correctly added. Courtis evades the difficulty by
reporting both number done and number correct. The author's scheme, which gives specified weights to speed and
accuracy at each step of the series, involves a rather intricate computation.
This difficulty of equating speed and accuracy in adding means precisely that we have inadequate notions of
what the ability is that the elementary school should improve. Until, for example, we have decided whether, for a
given group of pupils, fifteen Courtis attempts with ten right, is or is not a better achievement than ten Courtis

attempts with nine right, we have not decided just what the business of the teacher of addition is, in the case of that
group of pupils.
There is also the difficulty of comparing results when short and long columns are used. Correctness with a short
column, say of five figures, testifies to knowledge of the process and to the power to do four successive single
additions without error. Correctness with a long column, say of ten digits, testifies to knowledge of the process and
to the power to do nine successive single additions without error. Now if a pupil's precision was such that on the
average he made one mistake in eight single additions, he would get about half of his five-digit columns right and
almost none of his ten-digit columns right. (He would do this, that is, if he added in the customary way. If he were
taught to check results by repeated addition, by adding in half-columns and the like, his percentages of accurate
answers might be greatly increased in both cases and be made approximately equal.) Length of column in a test of
addition under ordinary conditions thus automatically overweights precision in the single additions as compared
with knowledge of the process, and ability at carrying.
Further, in the case of a column of whatever size, the result as ordinarily scored does not distinguish between
one, two, three, or more (up to the limit) errors in the single additions. Yet, obviously, a pupil who, adding with
ten-digit columns, has half of his answer-figures wrong, probably often makes two or more errors within a column,
whereas a pupil who has only one column-answer in ten wrong, probably almost never makes more than one error
within a column. A short-column test is then advisable as a means of interpreting the results of a long-column test.
Finally, the choice of a short-column or of a long-column test is indicative of the measurer's notion of the kind
of efficiency the world properly demands of the school. Twenty years ago the author would have been readier to
accept a long-column test than he now is. In the world at large, long-column addition is being more and more done
by machine, though it persists still in great frequency in the bookkeeping of weekly and monthly accounts in local
groceries, butcher shops, and the like.
The search for a measure of ability to add thus puts the problem of speed versus precision, and of short-column
versus long-column additions clearly before us. The latter problem has hardly been realized at all by the ordinary
definitions of ability to add.
It may be said further that the measurement of ability to add gives the scientific student a shock by the lack of
precision found everywhere in schools. Of what value is it to a graduate of the elementary school to be able to add
with examples like those of the Courtis test, getting only eight out of ten right? Nobody would pay a computer for
that ability. The pupil could not keep his own accounts with it. The supposed disciplinary value of habits of
precision runs the risk of turning negative in such a case. It appears, at least to the author, imperative that checking
should be taught and required until a pupil can add single columns of ten digits with not over one wrong answer in
twenty columns. Speed is useful, especially indirectly as an indication of control of the separate higher-decade
additions, but the social demand for addition below a certain standard of precision is nil, and its disciplinary value
is nil or negative. This will be made a matter of further study later.
MEASUREMENTS OF ABILITIES IN COMPUTATION
Measurements of these abilities may be of two sorts—(1) of the speed and accuracy shown in doing one same
sort of task, as illustrated by the Courtis test for addition shown on page 28; and (2) of how hard a task can be done
perfectly (or with some specified precision) within a certain assigned time or less, as illustrated by the author's
rough test for addition shown on pages 28 and 29, and by the Woody tests, when extended to include alternative
forms.
The Courtis tests, originated as an improvement on the Stone tests and since elaborated by the persistent
devotion of their author, are a standard instrument of the first sort for measuring the so-called 'fundamental'
arithmetical abilities with integers. They are shown on this and the following page.
Tests of the second sort are the Woody tests, which include operations with integers, common and decimal
fractions, and denominate numbers, the Ballou test for common fractions ['16], and the "Ladder" exercises of the
Thorndike arithmetics. Some of these are shown on pages 36 to 41.
Courtis Test

Arithmetic.

Test No. 1.

Addition

Series B
You will be given eight minutes to find the answers to as many of these addition examples as possible. Write the answers on this paper directly
underneath the examples. You are not expected to be able to do them all. You will be marked for both speed and accuracy, but it is more important to
have your answers right than to try a great many examples.

927
379
756
837
924
110
854
965
344
——

297
925
473
983
315
661
794
177
124
——

136
340
988
386
353
904
547
192
439
——

486
765
524
140
812
466
355
834
567
——

384
477
881
266
679
241
796
850
733
——

176
783
697
200
366
851
535
323
229
——

277
445
682
594
481
778
849
157
953
——

837
882
959
603
118
781
756
222
525
——

and sixteen more addition examples of nine three-place numbers.

Courtis Test
Arithmetic.

Test No. 2.

Subtraction

Series B
You will be given four minutes to find the answers to as many of these subtraction examples as possible. Write the answers on this paper directly
underneath the examples. You are not expected to be able to do them all. You will be marked for both speed and accuracy, but it is more important to
have your answers right than to try a great many examples.

107795491
77197029
—————

75088824
57406394
—————

91500053
19901563
—————

87939983
72207316
—————

and twenty more tasks of the same sort.

Courtis Test
Arithmetic.

Test No. 3.

Multiplication

Series B
You will be given six minutes to work as many of these multiplication examples as possible. You are not expected to be able to do them all. Do your
work directly on this paper; use no other. You will be marked for both speed and accuracy, but it is more important to get correct answers than to try a
large number of examples.

8246
29
——

7843
702
——

4837
83
——

and twenty more multiplication examples of the same sort.

Courtis Test

3478
15
——

6482
46
——

Arithmetic.

Test No. 4.

Division

Series B
You will be given eight minutes to work as many of these division examples as possible. You are not expected to be able to do them all. Do your work
directly on this paper; use no other. You will be marked for both speed and accuracy, but it is more important to get correct answers than to try a large
number of examples.

25 ) 6775

94 ) 85352

37 ) 9990

86 ) 80066

and twenty more division examples of the same sort.

SERIES B.

MULTIPLICATION SCALE
By Clifford Woody

(1)

(3)

(4)

3×7=

2×3=

4×8=

(8)
50
3
—

(9)
254
6
—

(11)
1036
8
—

(12)
5096
6
—

(13)
8754
8
——

(16)
7898
9
——

(18)
24
234
——

(20)
287
.05
——

(24)
16
25⁄8
——

(26)
9742
59
——

(27)
6.25
3.2
——

(29)

(33)

(35)
987¾
25
———

2½ × 3½ =

(5)
23
3
—

1⁄
8

(37)

(38)
.09631⁄8
.084
——

2¼ × 4½ × 1½ =

SERIES B. DIVISION SCALE
By Clifford Woody
(1)
3)6

(2)
9 ) 27

(7)
4÷2=

(11)
2 ) 13

(14)
8 ) 5856

(15)
¼ of 128 =

(23)
23 ) 469

7⁄
8

(19)
248 ÷ 7 =

(27)
of 624 =

×2=

(8)
9)0
(17)
50 ÷ 7 =
(28)
.003 ) .0936

(30)
÷5=

(34)
62.50 ÷ 1¼ =

3⁄
4

(36)
9 ) 69 lbs. 9 oz.
Ballou Test
Addition of Fractions

Test 1

Test 2
(2)

(1) ¼
¼
—

3⁄
14
1⁄
14

(1)

—

1⁄
3
1⁄
6

3⁄
5
11⁄
15

(2)

5⁄
6
1⁄
2

(1)

—

1⁄
7
9⁄
10

—

(2)

—

Test 5
1⁄
10
1⁄
6

—
Test 4

—
(1)

2⁄
7
3⁄
14

—

Test 3
(1)

(2)

7⁄
9
1⁄
4

—
Test 6

(2)

4⁄
9
5⁄
12

9⁄
10

5⁄
6
3⁄
8

—

—

—

(1)

1⁄
6

(2)

An Addition Ladder [Thorndike, '17, III, 5]
Begin at the bottom of the ladder. See if you can climb to the top without making a mistake. Be sure to copy the
numbers correctly.
Step 6.

a. Add 11⁄3 yd., 7⁄8 yd., 1¼ yd., 3⁄4 yd., 7⁄8 yd., and 1½ yd.
b. Add 62½¢, 662⁄3¢, 56¼¢, 60¢, and 62½¢.
c. Add 15⁄16, 19⁄32, 13⁄8, 111⁄32, and 17⁄16.
d. Add 11⁄3 yd., 1¼ yd., 1½ yd., 2 yd., 3⁄4 yd., and 2⁄3 yd.

Step 5.

a. Add 4 ft. 6½ in., 53¼ in., 5 ft. ½ in., 56¾ in., and 5 ft.
b. Add 7 lb., 6 lb. 11 oz., 7½ lb., 6 lb. 4½ oz., and 8½ lb.
c. Add 1 hr. 6 min. 20 sec., 58 min. 15 sec., 1 hr. 4 min., and 55 min.
d. Add 7 dollars, 13 half dollars, 21 quarters, 17 dimes, and 19 nickels.

Step 4.

a. Add .05½, .06, .04¾, .02¾, and .05¼.
b. Add .331⁄3, .12½, .18, .162⁄3, .081⁄3 and .15.
c. Add .081⁄3, .06¼, .21, .03¾, and .162⁄3.
d. Add .62, .64½, .662⁄3, .10¼, and .68.

Step 3.

a. Add 7¼, 6½, 83⁄8, 5¾, 95⁄8 and 37⁄8.
b. Add 45⁄8, 12, 7½, 8¾, 6 and 5¼.
c. Add 9¾, 57⁄8, 41⁄8, 6½, 7, 35⁄8.
d. Add 12, 8½, 71⁄3, 5, 62⁄3, and 9½.

Step 2.

a. Add 12.04, .96, 4.7, 9.625, 3.25, and 20.
b. Add .58, 6.03, .079, 4.206, 2.75, and 10.4.
c. Add 52, 29.8, 41.07, 1.913, 2.6, and 110.
d. Add 29.7, 315, 26.75, 19.004, 8.793, and 20.05.

Step 1.

a. Add 103⁄5, 111⁄5, 104⁄5, 11, 112⁄5, 103⁄5, and 11.
b. Add 73⁄8, 65⁄8, 8, 91⁄8, 77⁄8, 53⁄8, and 81⁄8.
c. Add 21½, 18¾, 31½, 19¼, 17¼, 22, and 16½.
d. Add 145⁄12, 127⁄12, 911⁄12, 61⁄12, and 5.
A Subtraction Ladder [Thorndike, '17, III, 11]

Step 9.
a. 2.16 mi. − 1¾ mi.
c. 2 min. 10½ sec. − 93.4 sec.
e. 10 gal. 2½ qt. − 4.623 gal.
Step 8.

Step 7.

Step 6.

Step 5.

a
257⁄12
123⁄4
———

b
101⁄4
71⁄3
———

a

b

283⁄4
161⁄8
———

401⁄2
143⁄8
———

a

b
101⁄3
42⁄3

71⁄4
23⁄4

———

———

a

b

584⁄5
521⁄5
———

662⁄3
331⁄3
———

b. 5.72 ft. − 5 ft. 3 in.
d. 30.28 A. − 101⁄5 A.

c
95⁄16
63⁄8
———
c
101⁄4
61⁄2
———
c
151⁄8
63⁄8
———
c
287⁄8
75⁄8
———

d

e

57⁄16
23⁄4
———

42⁄3
13⁄4
———

d

e

241⁄3
111⁄2
———

371⁄2
143⁄4
———

d

e
121⁄5
114⁄5

———

41⁄16
27⁄16
———

d

e
62½
37½
——

97⁄12
45⁄12
——

Step 4.
a. 4 hr. − 2 hr. 17 min.
c. 1 lb. 5 oz. − 13 oz.
e. 1 bu. − 1 pk.
Step 3.

b. 4 lb. 7 oz. − 2 lb. 11 oz.
d. 7 ft. − 2 ft. 8 in.

a
92 mi.
84.15 mi.
————

b
6735 mi.
6689 mi.
————

Step 2.

a
$25.00
9.36
———

Step 1.

a
$18.64

c
$3 − 89¢
————

d
28.4 mi.
18.04 mi.
————

e
$508.40
208.62
————

b
$100.00
71.28
———

c
$750.00
736.50
———

d
6124 sq. mi.
2494 sq. mi.
—————

e
7846 sq. mi.
2789 sq. mi.
—————

b
$25.39

c
$56.70

d
819.4 mi.

e
67.55 mi.

7.40
———

13.37
———

45.60
———

209.2 mi.
————

36.14 mi.
————

An Average Ladder [Thorndike, '17, III, 132]
Find the average of the quantities on each line. Begin with Step 1. Climb to the top without making a mistake.
Be sure to copy the numbers correctly. Extend the division to two decimal places if necessary.
Step 6.

a. 22⁄3, 17⁄8, 2¾, 4¼, 35⁄8, 3½
b. 62½¢, 662⁄3¢, 40¢, 831⁄3¢, $1.75, $2.25
c. 311⁄16, 39⁄32, 33⁄8, 317⁄32, 37⁄16
d. .17, 19, .162⁄3, .15½, .23¼, .18

Step 5.

a. 5 ft. 3½ in., 61¼ in., 58¾ in., 4 ft. 11 in.
b. 6 lb. 9 oz., 6 lb. 11 oz., 7¼ lb., 73⁄8 lb.
c. 1 hr. 4 min. 40 sec., 58 min. 35 sec., 1¼ hr.
d. 2.8 miles, 3½ miles, 2.72 miles

Step 4.

a. .03½, .06, .04¾, .05½, .05¼
b. .043, .045, .049, .047, .046, .045
c. 2.20, .87½, 1.18, .93¾, 1.2925, .80
d. .14½, .12½, .331⁄3, .162⁄3, .15, .17

Step 3.

a. 5¼, 4½, 83⁄8, 7¾, 65⁄8, 93⁄8
b. 95⁄8, 12, 8½, 8¾, 6, 5¼, 9
c. 93⁄8, 5¾, 41⁄8, 7½, 6
d. 11, 9½, 101⁄3, 13, 162⁄3, 9½

Step 2.

a. 13.05, .97, 4.8, 10.625, 3.37
b. 1.48, 7.02, .93, 5.307, 4.1, 7, 10.4
c. 68, 71.4, 59.8, 112, 96.1, 79.8
d. 2.079, 3.908, 4.165, 2.74

Step 1.

a. 4, 9½, 6, 5, 7½, 8, 10, 9
b. 6, 5, 3.9, 7.1, 8
c. 1086, 1141, 1059, 1302, 1284
d. $100.82, $206.49, $317.25, $244.73

As such tests are widened to cover the whole task of the elementary school in respect to arithmetic, and accepted
by competent authorities as adequate measures of achievement in computing, they will give, as has been said, a
working definition of the task. The reader will observe, for example, that work such as the following, though still
found in many textbooks and classrooms, does not, in general, appear in the modern tests and scales.
Reduce the following improper fractions to mixed numbers:—
19⁄
13

43⁄
21

176⁄
25

198⁄
14

Reduce to integral or mixed numbers:—
61381⁄
37

Simplify:—

2134⁄
67

413⁄
413

697⁄
225

3⁄
4

of

8⁄
9

of

3⁄
5

of

15⁄
22

Reduce to lowest terms:—
357⁄
527

264⁄
312

492⁄
779

418⁄
874

854⁄
1769

30⁄
735

44⁄
242

77⁄
847

18⁄
243

17⁄
18

25⁄
30

96⁄
224

Find differences:—
62⁄7
31⁄14
——

85⁄11
51⁄7
——

84⁄13
37⁄13
——

51⁄4
211⁄14
——

71⁄8
21⁄7
——

15⁄
16

19⁄
20

Square:—
2⁄
3

4⁄
5

5⁄
7

6⁄
9

10⁄
11

12⁄
13

2⁄
7

41⁄
53

Multiply:—
2⁄
11

× 33

32 × 3⁄14
39 × 2⁄13
60 × 11⁄28
8
3
54 × ⁄45
65 × ⁄13
34416⁄21

77 × 4⁄11
4322⁄7

63 × 2⁄27

MEASUREMENTS OF ABILITY IN APPLIED ARITHMETIC: THE SOLUTION
OF PROBLEMS
Stone ['08] measured achievement with the following problems, fifteen minutes being the time allowed.
"Solve as many of the following problems as you have time for; work them in order as numbered:
1. If you buy 2 tablets at 7 cents each and a book for 65 cents, how much change should you receive from a two-dollar bill?
2. John sold 4 Saturday Evening Posts at 5 cents each. He kept 1⁄2 the money and with the other 1⁄2 he bought Sunday papers at 2 cents each. How
many did he buy?
3. If James had 4 times as much money as George, he would have $16. How much money has George?
4. How many pencils can you buy for 50 cents at the rate of 2 for 5 cents? '
5. The uniforms for a baseball nine cost $2.50 each. The shoes cost $2 a pair. What was the total cost of uniforms and shoes for the nine?
6. In the schools of a certain city there are 2200 pupils; 1⁄2 are in the primary grades, 1⁄4 in the grammar grades, 1⁄8 in the high school, and the rest in
the night school. How many pupils are there in the night school?
7. If 3½ tons of coal cost $21, what will 5½ tons cost?
8. A news dealer bought some magazines for $1. He sold them for $1.20, gaining 5 cents on each magazine. How many magazines were there?
9. A girl spent 1⁄8 of her money for car fare, and three times as much for clothes. Half of what she had left was 80 cents. How much money did she
have at first?
10. Two girls receive $2.10 for making buttonholes. One makes 42, the other 28. How shall they divide the money?
11. Mr. Brown paid one third of the cost of a building; Mr. Johnson paid 1⁄2 the cost. Mr. Johnson received $500 more annual rent than Mr. Brown.
How much did each receive?
12. A freight train left Albany for New York at 6 o'clock. An express left on the same track at 8 o'clock. It went at the rate of 40 miles an hour. At what
time of day will it overtake the freight train if the freight train stops after it has gone 56 miles?"

The criteria he had in mind in selecting the problems were as follows:—
"The main purpose of the reasoning test is the determination of the ability of VI A children to reason in
arithmetic. To this end, the problems, as selected and arranged, are meant to embody the following conditions:—
1. Situations equally concrete to all VI A children.
2. Graduated difficulties.
a. As to arithmetical thinking.

b. As to familiarity with the situation presented.
3. The omission of
a. Large numbers.
b. Particular memory requirements.
c. Catch problems.
d. All subject matter except whole numbers, fractions, and United States money.

The test is purposely so long that only very rarely did any pupil fully complete it in the fifteen minute limit."
Credits were given of 1, for each of the first five problems, 1.4, 1.2, and 1.6 respectively for problems 6, 7, and
8, and of 2 for each of the others.
Courtis sought to improve the Stone test of problem-solving, replacing it by the two tests reproduced below.
ARITHMETIC—Test No. 6.

Speed Test—Reasoning

Do not work the following examples. Read each example through, make up your mind what operation you would use if you were going to work it,
then write the name of the operation selected in the blank space after the example. Use the following abbreviations:—"Add." for addition, "Sub." for
subtraction, "Mul." for multiplication, and "Div." for division.

OPERATION
1. A girl brought a collection of 37 colored postal cards to school one day, and gave
away 19 cards to her friends. How many cards did she have left to take home?
2. Five boys played marbles. When the game was over, each boy had the same number
of marbles. If there were 45 marbles altogether, how many did each boy have?
3. A girl, watching from a window, saw 27 automobiles pass the school the first hour,
and 33 the second. How many autos passed by the school in the two hours?
4. In a certain school there were eight rooms and each room had seats for 50 children.
When all the places were taken, how many children were there in the school?
5. A club of boys sent their treasurer to buy baseballs. They gave him $3.15 to spend.
How many balls did they expect him to buy, if the balls cost 45¢. apiece?
6. A teacher weighed all the girls in a certain grade. If one girl weighed 79 pounds and
another 110 pounds, how many pounds heavier was one girl than the other?
7. A girl wanted to buy a 5-pound box of candy to give as a present to a friend. She
decided to get the kind worth 35¢. a pound. What did she pay for the present?
8. One day in vacation a boy went on a fishing trip and caught 12 fish in the morning,
and 7 in the afternoon. How many fish did he catch altogether?
9. A boy lived 15 blocks east of a school; his chum lived on the same street, but 11
blocks west of the school. How many blocks apart were the two boys' houses?
10. A girl was 5 times as strong as her small sister. If the little girl could lift a weight of
20 pounds, how large a weight could the older girl lift?
11. The children of a school gave a sleigh-ride party. There were 270 children to go on
the ride and each sleigh held 30 children. How many sleighs were needed?
12. In September there were 43 children in the eighth grade of a certain school; by June
there were 59. How many children entered the grade during the year?
13. A girl who lived 17 blocks away walked to school and back twice a day. What was
the total number of blocks the girl walked each day in going to and from school?
14. A boy who made 67¢. a day carrying papers, was hired to run on a long errand for
which he received 50¢. What was the total amount the boy earned that day?
Total Right
(Two more similar problems follow.)
Test 6 and Test 8 are from the Courtis Standard Test. Used by permission of S. A. Courtis.

ARITHMETIC—Test No. 8.

Reasoning

In the blank space below, work as many of the following examples as possible in the time allowed.
Work them in order as numbered, entering each answer in the "answer" column before commencing a
new example. Do not work on any other paper.

ANSWER
1. The children in a certain school gave a
Christmas party. One of the presents was a box of
candy. In filling the boxes, one grade used 16
pounds of candy, another 17 pounds, a third 12
pounds, and a fourth 13 pounds. What did the
candy cost at 26¢. a pound?
2. A school in a certain city used 2516 pieces of
chalk in 37 school days. Three new rooms were
opened, each room holding 50 children, and the
school was then found to use 84 sticks of chalk per
day. How many more sticks of chalk were used
per day than at first?
3. Several boys went on a bicycle trip of 1500
miles. The first week they rode 374 miles, the
second week 264 miles, the third 423 miles, the
fourth 401 miles. They finished the trip the next
week. How many miles did they ride the last
week?
4. Forty-five boys were hired to pick apples from
15 trees in an apple orchard. In 50 minutes each
boy had picked 48 choice apples. If all the apples
picked were packed away carefully in 8 boxes of
equal size, how many apples were put in each
box?
5. In a certain school 216 children gave a sleighride party. They rented 7 sleighs at a cost of
$30.00 and paid $24.00 for the refreshments. The
party travelled 15 miles in 2½ hours and had a
very pleasant time. What was each child's share of
the expense?
6. A girl found, by careful counting, that there

were 2400 letters on one page of her history, and
only 2295 letters on a page of her reader. How
many more letters had she read in one book than
in the other if she had read 47 pages in each of the
books?
7. Each of 59 rooms in the schools of a certain city
contributed 25 presents to a Christmas
entertainment for poor children. The stores of the
city gave 1986 other articles for presents. What
was the total number of presents given away at the
entertainment?
8. Forty-eight children from a certain school paid
10¢. apiece to ride 7 miles on the cars to a woods.
There in a few hours they gathered 2765 nuts. 605
of these were bad, but the rest were shared equally
among the children. How many good nuts did
each one get?
Total
These proposed measures of ability to apply arithmetic illustrate very
nicely the differences of opinion concerning what applied arithmetic and
arithmetical reasoning should be. The thinker who emphasizes the fact that
in life out of school the situation demanding quantitative treatment is
usually real rather than described, will condemn a test all of whose
constituents are described problems. Unless we are excessively hopeful
concerning the transfer of ideas of method and procedure from one mental
function to another we shall protest against the artificiality of No. 3 of the
Stone series, and of the entire Courtis Test 8 except No. 4. The Courtis
speed-reasoning test (No. 6) is a striking example of the mixture of ability
to understand quantitative relations with the ability to understand words.
Consider these five, for example, in comparison with the revised versions
attached.[3]
1. The children of a school gave a sleigh-ride party. There were 9 sleighs, and each sleigh held 30
children. How many children were there in the party?
REVISION. If one sleigh holds 30 children, 9 sleighs hold .... children.

2. Two school-girls played a number-game. The score of the girl that lost was 57 points and she
was beaten by 16 points. What was the score of the girl that won?
REVISION. Mary and Nell played a game. Mary had a score of 57. Nell beat Mary by 16. Nell had a
score of ....
3. A girl counted the automobiles that passed a school. The total was 60 in two hours. If the girl
saw 27 pass the first hour how many did she see the second?
REVISION. In two hours a girl saw 60 automobiles. She saw 27 the first hour. She saw .... the second
hour.
4. On a playground there were five equal groups of children each playing a different game. If there
were 75 children all together, how many were there in each group?
REVISION. 75 pounds of salt just filled five boxes. The boxes were exactly alike. There were ....
pounds in a box.
5. A teacher weighed all the children in a certain grade. One girl weighed 70 pounds. Her older
sister was 49 pounds heavier. How many pounds did the sister weigh?
REVISION. Mary weighs 70 lb. Jane weighs 49 pounds more than Mary. Jane weighs .... pounds.

The distinction between a problem described as clearly and simply as
possible and the same problem put awkwardly or in ill-known words or
willfully obscured should be regarded; and as a rule measurements of
ability to apply arithmetic should eschew all needless obscurity or purely
linguistic difficulty. For example,
A boy bought a two-cent stamp. He gave the man in the
store 10 cents. The right change was .... cents.
is better as a test than
If a boy, purchasing a two-cent stamp, gave a ten-cent
stamp in payment, what change should he be expected to
receive in return?
The distinction between the description of a bona fide problem that a
human being might be called on to solve out of school and the description
of imaginary possibilities or puzzles should also be considered. Nos. 3 and
9 of Stone are bad because to frame the problems one must first know the
answers, so that in reality there could never be any point in solving them. It
is probably safe to say that nobody in the world ever did or ever will or ever
should find the number of apples in a box by the task of No. 4 of the
Courtis Test 8.

This attaches no blame to Dr. Stone or to Mr. Courtis. Until very recently
we were all so used to the artificial problems of the traditional sort that we
did not expect anything better; and so blind to the language demands of
described problems that we did not see their very great influence. Courtis
himself has been active in reform and has pointed out ('13, p. 4 f.) the
defects in his Tests 6 and 8.
"Tests Nos. 6 and 8, the so-called reasoning tests, have proved the least
satisfactory of the series. The judgments of various teachers and
superintendents as to the inequalities of the units in any one test, and of the
differences between the different editions of the same test, have proved the
need of investigating these questions. Tests of adults in many lines of
commercial work have yielded in many cases lower scores than those of the
average eighth grade children. At the same time the scores of certain
individuals of marked ability have been high, and there appears to be a
general relation between ability in these tests and accuracy in the abstract
work. The most significant facts, however, have been the difficulties
experienced by teachers in attempting to remedy the defects in reasoning. It
is certain that the tests measure abilities of value but the abilities are
probably not what they seem to be. In an attempt to measure the value of
different units, for instance, as many problems as possible were constructed
based upon a single situation. Twenty-one varieties were secured by varying
the relative form of the question and the relative position of the different
phrases. One of these proved nineteen times as hard as another as measured
by the number of mistakes made by the children; yet the cause of the
difference was merely the changes in the phrasing. This and other facts of
the same kind seem to show that Tests 6 and 8 measure mainly the ability to
read."
The scientific measurement of the abilities and achievements concerned
with applied arithmetic or problem-solving is thus a matter for the future. In
the case of described problems a beginning has been made in the series
which form a part of the National Intelligence Tests ['20], one of which is
shown on page 49 f. In the case of problems with real situations, nothing in
systematic form is yet available.
Systematic tests and scales, besides defining the abilities we are to
establish and improve, are of very great service in measuring the status and

improvement of individuals and of classes, and the effects of various
methods of instruction and of study. They are thus helpful to pupils,
teachers, supervisors, and scientific investigators; and are being more and
more widely used every year. Information concerning the merits of the
different tests, the procedure to follow in giving and scoring them, the age
and grade standards to be used in interpreting results, and the like, is
available in the manuals of Educational Measurement, such as Courtis,
Manual of Instructions for Giving and Scoring the Courtis Standard Tests in
the Three R's ['14]; Starch, Educational Measurements ['16]; Chapman and
Rush, Scientific Measurement of Classroom Products ['17]; Monroe,
DeVoss, and Kelly, Educational Tests and Measurements ['17]; Wilson and
Hoke, How to Measure ['20]; and McCall, How to Measure in Education
['21].
National Intelligence Tests.
Scale A. Form 1, Edition 1

TEST 1
Find the answers as quickly as you can.
Write the answers on the dotted lines.
Use the side of the page to figure on.
Begin here
1
2
3
4
5

Five cents make 1 nickel. How many nickels
make a dime?
John paid 5 dollars for a watch and 3 dollars
for a chain. How many dollars did he pay for
the watch and chain?
Nell is 13 years old. Mary is 9 years old. How
much younger is Mary than Nell?
One quart of ice cream is enough for 5 persons.
How many quarts of ice cream are needed for
25 persons?
John's grandmother is 86 years old. If she
lives, in how many years will she be 100 years
old?

Answer......
Answer......
Answer......
Answer......
Answer......

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15

16

If a man gets $2.50 a day, what will he be paid
for six days' work?
How many inches are there in a foot and a
half?
What is the cost of 12 cakes at 6 for 5 cents?
The uniforms for a baseball team of nine boys
cost $2.50 each. The shoes cost $2 a pair. What
was the total cost of uniforms and shoes for the
nine?
A train that usually arrives at half-past ten was
17 minutes late. When did it arrive?
At 10¢ a yard, what is the cost of a piece 10½
ft. long?
A man earns $6 a day half the time, $4.50 a
day one fourth of the time, and nothing on the
remaining days for a total period of 40 days.
What did he earn in all in the 40 days?
What per cent of $800 is 4% of $1000?
If 60 men need 1500 lb. flour per month, what
is the requirement per man per day counting a
month as 30 days?
A car goes at the rate of a mile a minute. A
truck goes 20 miles an hour. How many times
as far will the car go as the truck in 10
seconds?
The area of the base (inside measure) of a
cylindrical tank is 90 square feet. How tall
must it be to hold 100 cubic yards?

Answer......
Answer......
Answer......
Answer......
Answer......
Answer......
Answer......
Answer......
Answer......

Answer......

Answer......

From National Intelligence Tests by National Research Council.
Copyright, 1920, by The World Book Company, Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York.
Used by permission of the publishers.

CHAPTER III
THE CONSTITUTION OF ARITHMETICAL
ABILITIES
THE ELEMENTARY FUNCTIONS OF
ARITHMETICAL LEARNING
It would be a useful work for some one to try to analyze arithmetical
learning into the unitary abilities which compose it, showing just what, in
detail, the mind has to do in order to be prepared to pass a thorough test on
the whole of arithmetic. These unitary abilities would make a very long list.
Examination of a well-planned textbook will show that such an ability as
multiplication is treated as a composite of the following: knowledge of the
multiplications up to 9 × 9; ability to multiply two (or more)-place numbers
by 2, 3, and 4 when 'carrying' is not required and no zeros occur in the
multiplicand; ability to multiply by 2, 3, ... 9, with carrying; the ability to
handle zeros in the multiplicand; the ability to multiply with two-place
numbers not ending in zero; the ability to handle zero in the multiplier as
last number; the ability to multiply with three (or more)-place numbers not
including a zero; the ability to multiply with three- and four-place numbers
with zero in second or third, or second and third, as well as in last place; the
ability to save time by annexing zeros; and so on and on through a long list
of further abilities required to multiply with United States money, decimal
fractions, common fractions, mixed numbers, and denominate numbers.
The units or 'steps' thus recognized by careful teaching would make a
long list, but it is probable that a still more careful study of arithmetical
ability as a hierarchy of mental habits or connections would greatly increase
the list. Consider, for example, ordinary column addition. The majority of
teachers probably treat this as a simple application of the knowledge of the

additions to 9 + 9, plus understanding of 'carrying.' On the contrary there
are at least seven processes or minor functions involved in two-place
column addition, each of which is psychologically distinct and requires
distinct educational treatment.
These are:—
A. Learning to keep one's place in the column as one adds.
B. Learning to keep in mind the result of each addition until the next
number is added to it.
C. Learning to add a seen to a thought-of number.
D. Learning to neglect an empty space in the columns.
E. Learning to neglect 0s in the columns.
F. Learning the application of the combinations to higher decades may for
the less gifted pupils involve as much time and labor as learning all
the original addition tables. And even for the most gifted child the
formation of the connection '8 and 7 = 15' probably never quite
insures the presence of the connections '38 and 7 = 45' and '18 + 7 =
25.'
G. Learning to write the figure signifying units rather than the total sum of a
column. In particular, learning to write 0 in the cases where the sum
of the column is 10, 20, etc. Learning to 'carry' also involves in itself
at least two distinct processes, by whatever way it is taught.
We find evidence of such specialization of functions in the results with
such tests as Woody's. For example, 2 + 5 + 1 = .... surely involves abilities
in part different from
2
4
3
—
because only 77 percent of children in grade 3 do the former correctly,
whereas 95 percent of children in that grade do the latter correctly. In grade

2 the difference is even more marked. In the case of subtraction
4
4
—
involves abilities different from those involved in
9
3
—,
being much less often solved correctly in grades 2 and 4.
6
0
—
is much harder than either of the above.
43
1
2
13
—

is much harder than

21
33
35.
—

It may be said that these differences in difficulty are due to different
amounts of practice. This is probably not true, but if it were, it would not
change the argument; if the two abilities were identical, the practice of one
would improve the other equally.
I shall not undertake here this task of listing and describing the
elementary functions which constitute arithmetical learning, partly because
what they are is not fully known, partly because in many cases a final
ability may be constituted in several different ways whose descriptions
become necessarily tedious, and partly because an adequate statement of
what is known would far outrun the space limits of this chapter. Instead, I
shall illustrate the results by some samples.

KNOWLEDGE OF THE MEANING OF A FRACTION
As a first sample, consider knowledge of the meaning of a fraction. Is the
ability in question simply to understand that a fraction is a statement of the
number of parts, each of a certain size, the upper number or numerator
telling how many parts are taken and the lower number or denominator
telling what fraction of unity each part is? And is the educational treatment
required simply to describe and illustrate such a statement and have the
pupils apply it to the recognition of fractions and the interpretation of each
of them? And is the learning process (1) the formation of the notions of
part, size of part, number of part, (2) relating the last two to the numbers in
a fraction, and, as a necessary consequence, (3) applying these notions
adequately whenever one encounters a fraction in operation?
Precisely this was the notion a few generations ago. The nature of
fractions was taught as one principle, in one step, and the habits of dealing
with fractions were supposed to be deduced from the general law of a
fraction's nature. As a result the subject of fractions had to be long delayed,
was studied at great cost of time and effort, and, even so, remained a
mystery to all save gifted pupils. These gifted pupils probably of their own
accord built up the ability piecemeal out of constituent insights and habits.
At all events, scientific teaching now does build up the total ability as a
fusion or organization of lesser abilities. What these are will be seen best by
examining the means taken to get them. (1) First comes the association of ½
of a pie, ½ of a cake, ½ of an apple, and such like with their concrete
meanings so that a pupil can properly name a clearly designated half of an
obvious unit like an orange, pear, or piece of chalk. The same degree of
understanding of 1⁄4, 1⁄8, 1⁄3, 1⁄6, and 1⁄5 is secured. The pupil is taught that 1
pie = 2 1⁄2s, 3 1⁄3s, 4 1⁄4s, 5 1⁄5s, 6 1⁄6s, and 8 1⁄8s; similarly for 1 cake, 1
apple, and the like.
So far he understands 1⁄x of y in the sense of certain simple parts of
obviously unitary ys.
(2) Next comes the association with ½ of an inch, ½ of a foot, ½ of a
glassful and other cases where y is not so obviously a unitary object whose
pieces still show their derivation from it. Similarly for 1⁄4, 1⁄3, etc.

(3) Next comes the association with 1⁄2 of a collection of eight pieces of
candy, 1⁄3 of a dozen eggs, 1⁄5 of a squad of ten soldiers, etc., until 1⁄2, 1⁄3, 1⁄4,
1⁄ , 1⁄ , and 1⁄ are understood as names of certain parts of a collection of
5
6
8
objects.
(4) Next comes the similar association when the nature of the collection
is left undefined, the pupil responding to
1⁄ of 6 is ..., 1⁄ of 8 is ..., 2 is 1⁄ of ...,
2
4
5
1⁄ of 6 is ..., 1⁄ of 9 is ..., 2 is 1⁄ of ..., and the like.
3
3
3
Each of these abilities is justified in teaching by its intrinsic merits,
irrespective of its later service in helping to constitute the general
understanding of the meaning of a fraction. The habits thus formed in
grades 3 or 4 are of constant service then and thereafter in and out of
school.
(5) With these comes the use of 1⁄5 of 10, 15, 20, etc., 1⁄6 of 12, 18, 42,
etc., as a useful variety of drill on the division tables, valuable in itself, and
a means of making the notion of a unit fraction more general by adding 1⁄7
and 1⁄9 to the scheme.
(6) Next comes the connection of 3⁄4, 2⁄5, 3⁄5, 4⁄5, 2⁄3, 1⁄6, 5⁄6, 3⁄8, 5⁄8, 7⁄8, 3⁄10,
7⁄ , and 9⁄ , each with its meaning as a certain part of some conveniently
10
10
divisible unit, and, (7) and (8), connections between these fractions and
their meanings as parts of certain magnitudes (7) and collections (8) of
convenient size, and (9) connections between these fractions and their
meanings when the nature of the magnitude or collection is unstated, as in
4⁄ of 15 = ..., 5⁄ of 32 = ....
5
8
(10) That the relation is general is shown by using it with numbers
requiring written division and multiplication, such as 7⁄8 of 1736 = ..., and
with United States money.
Elements (6) to (10) again are useful even if the pupil never goes farther
in arithmetic. One of the commonest uses of fractions is in calculating the

cost of fractions of yards of cloth, and fractions of pounds of meat, cheese,
etc.
The next step (11) is to understand to some extent the principle that the
value of any of these fractions is unaltered by multiplying or dividing the
numerator and denominator by the same number. The drills in expressing
fractions in lower and higher terms which accomplish this are paralleled by
(12) and (13) simple exercises in adding and subtracting fractions to show
that fractions are quantities that can be operated on like any quantities, and
by (14) simple work with mixed numbers (addition and subtraction and
reductions), and (15) improper fractions. All that is done with improper
fractions is (a) to have the pupil use a few of them as he would any
fractions and (b) to note their equivalent mixed numbers. In (12), (13), and
(14) only fractions of the same denominators are added or subtracted, and in
(12) (13), (14), and (15) only fractions with 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, or 10 in the
denominator are used. As hitherto, the work of (11) to (15) is useful in and
of itself. (16) Definitions are given of the following type:—
Numbers like 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 20, 36, 140, 921 are called whole numbers.
Numbers like 7⁄8, 1⁄5, 2⁄3, 3⁄4, 11⁄8, 7⁄6, 1⁄3, 4⁄3, 1⁄8, 1⁄6 are called fractions.
Numbers like 5¼, 73⁄8, 9½, 164⁄5, 3157⁄8, 11⁄3, 12⁄3 are called mixed numbers.
(17) The terms numerator and denominator are connected with the upper
and lower numbers composing a fraction.
Building this somewhat elaborate series of minor abilities seems to be a
very roundabout way of getting knowledge of the meaning of a fraction,
and is, if we take no account of what is got along with this knowledge.
Taking account of the intrinsically useful habits that are built up, one might
retort that the pupil gets his knowledge of the meaning of a fraction at zero
cost.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBTRACTION AND
DIVISION TABLES

Consider next the knowledge of the subtraction and division 'Tables.' The
usual treatment presupposes that learning them consists of forming
independently the bonds:—
3−1=2
3−2=1
4−1=3
.
.
.
18 − 9 = 9

4÷2=2
6÷2=3
6÷3=2
.
.
.
81 ÷ 9 = 9

In fact, however, these 126 bonds are not formed independently. Except
perhaps in the case of the dullest twentieth of pupils, they are somewhat
facilitated by the already learned additions and multiplications. And by
proper arrangement of the learning they may be enormously facilitated
thereby. Indeed, we may replace the independent memorizing of these facts
by a set of instructive exercises wherein the pupil derives the subtractions
from the corresponding additions by simple acts of reasoning or selective
thinking. As soon as the additions giving sums of 9 or less are learned, let
the pupil attack an exercise like the following:—
Write the missing numbers:—
A
3 and ... are
5.
3 and ... are
9.
4 and ... are
7.
5 and ... are
7.
6 and ... are
8.
4 and ... are
6.

B
5 and ... are
8.
3 and ... are
6.
4 and ... are
9.
2 and ... = 6.
5 and ... = 9.
2 and ... = 7.

C
4 and ... are
5.
5 and ... are
6.
6 and ... are
9.
1 and ... are
8.
3 and ... are
7.

D
4 and ... are
8.
1 and ... are
7.
6 and ... are
7.
8 and ... are
9.

1 + ... are 3.

7 + ... are 8.

3 + ... are 4.

2 and ... are
5.
2 and ... = 8.
3 and ... = 6.
6 and ... = 9.
4 and ... = 6.
4 and ... = 7.

3 and ... = 8.

1 + ... are 5.

4 + ... are 9.

1 and ...
2 and ...
3 and ...
6 and ...
2 and ...

4
7
2
3
4

2
1
3
5
1

=
=
=
=
=

4.
4.
8.
7.
5.

+
+
+
+
+

... are 8.
... are 9.
... = 4.
... = 8.
... = 5.

+
+
+
+
+

... are 3.
... are 9.
... = 6.
... = 9.
... = 3.

The task for reasoning is only to try, one after another, numbers that seem
promising and to select the right one when found. With a little stimulus and
direction children can thus derive the subtractions up to those with 9 as the
larger number. Let them then be taught to do the same with the printed
forms:—
Subtract
9
3
—

7
5
—

8
6
—

5
2
—

8
2
—

6
4
—

etc.

and 9 − 7 = ..., 9 − 5 = ..., 7 − 5 = ..., etc.
In the case of the divisions, suppose that the pupil has learned his first
table and gained surety in such exercises as:—
4 5s = ....
8 5s = ....
3 5s = ....
7 5s = ....

6 × 5 = ....
4 × 5 = ....
2 × 5 = ....
9 × 5 = ....

9 nickels = .... cents.
6 "
= .... "
5 "
= .... "
7 "
= .... "

If one ball costs 5 cents,
two balls cost .... cents,
three balls cost .... cents, etc.
He may then be set at once to work at the answers to exercises like the
following:—
Write the answers and the missing numbers:—

A
.... 5s = 15
.... 5s = 20
.... 5s = 40
.... 5s = 25
.... 5s = 30
.... 5s = 35

B
40 = .... 5s
20 = .... 5s
15 = .... 5s
45 = .... 5s
50 = .... 5s
25 = .... 5s

C
D
.... × 5 = 25
20 cents = .... nickels.
.... × 5 = 50
30 cents = .... nickels.
.... × 5 = 35
15 cents = .... nickels.
.... × 5 = 10
40 cents = .... nickels.
.... × 5 = 40
.... × 5 = 45
E
For 5 cents you can buy 1 small loaf of bread.
For 10 cents you can buy 2 small loaves of bread.
For 25 cents you can buy .... small loaves of bread.
For 45 cents you can buy .... small loaves of bread.
For 35 cents you can buy .... small loaves of bread.
F
5 cents pays 1 car fare.
15 cents pays .... car fares.
10 cents pays .... car fares.
20 cents pays .... car fares.
G
How many 5 cent balls can you buy with 30 cents? ....
How many 5 cent balls can you buy with 35 cents? ....
How many 5 cent balls can you buy with 25 cents? ....
How many 5 cent balls can you buy with 15 cents? ....

In the case of the meaning of a fraction, the ability, and so the learning, is
much more elaborate than common practice has assumed; in the case of the
subtraction and division tables the learning is much less so. In neither case
is the learning either mere memorizing of facts or the mere understanding
of a principle in abstracto followed by its application to concrete cases. It is
(and this we shall find true of almost all efficient learning in arithmetic) the
formation of connections and their use in such an order that each helps the
others to the maximum degree, and so that each will do the maximum
amount for arithmetical abilities other than the one specially concerned, and
for the general competence of the learner.
LEARNING THE PROCESSES OF COMPUTATION

As another instructive topic in the constitution of arithmetical abilities,
we may take the case of the reasoning involved in understanding the
manipulations of figures in two (or more)-place addition and subtraction,
multiplication and division involving a two (or more)-place number, and the
manipulations of decimals in all four operations. The psychology of these is
of special interest and importance. For there are two opposite explanations
possible here, leading to two opposite theories of teaching.
The common explanation is that these methods of manipulation, if
understood at all, are understood as deductions from the properties of our
system of decimal notation. The other is that they are understood partly as
inductions from the experience that they always give the right answer. The
first explanation leads to the common preliminary deductive explanations of
the textbooks. The other leads to explanations by verification; e.g., of
addition by counting, of subtraction by addition, of multiplication by
addition, of division by multiplication. Samples of these two sorts of
explanation are given below.
SHORT MULTIPLICATION WITHOUT CARRYING: DEDUCTIVE EXPLANATION
MULTIPLICATION is the process of taking one number as many times as there are units in another
number.
The PRODUCT is the result of the multiplication.
The MULTIPLICAND is the number to be taken.
The MULTIPLIER is the number denoting how many times the multiplicand is to be taken.
The multiplier and multiplicand are the FACTORS.

Multiply 623 by 3
OPERATION
Multiplicand
Multiplier
Product

623
3
1869

EXPLANATION.—For convenience we write the multiplier under the multiplicand, and begin with
units to multiply. 3 times 3 units are 9 units. We write the nine units in units' place in the product. 3
times 2 tens are 6 tens. We write the 6 tens in tens' place in the product. 3 times 6 hundreds are 18
hundreds, or 1 thousand and 8 hundreds. The 1 thousand we write in thousands' place and the 8

hundreds in hundreds' place in the product. Therefore, the product is 1 thousand 8 hundreds, 6 tens
and 9 units, or 1869.
SHORT MULTIPLICATION WITHOUT CARRYING: INDUCTIVE EXPLANATION
1. The children of the third grade are to have a picnic. 32 are going. How many sandwiches will
they need if each of the 32 children has four sandwiches?

32
4

Here is a quick way to find out:—
Think "4 × 2," write 8 under the 2 in the ones column.
Think "4 × 3," write 12 under the 3 in the tens column.

2. How many bananas will they need if each of the 32 children has two bananas? 32 × 2 or 2 × 32
will give the answer.
3. How many little cakes will they need if each child has three cakes? 32 × 3 or 3 × 32 will give
the answer.

32
3

3 × 2 = .... Where do you write the 6?
3 × 3 = .... Where do you write the 9?

4. Prove that 128, 64, and 96 are right by adding four 32s, two 32s, and three 32s.

32
32
32
32

32
32
32

32
32

Multiplication
You multiply when you find the answers to questions like

How many are 9 × 3?
How many are 3 × 32?
How many are 8 × 5?
How many are 4 × 42?
1. Read these lines. Say the right numbers where the dots are:
If you add 3 to 32, you have .... 35 is the sum.
If you subtract 3 from 32, the result is .... 29 is the difference or remainder.
If you multiply 3 by 32 or 32 by 3, you have .... 96 is the product.
Find the products. Check your answers to the first line by adding.

2.
41
3

3.
33
2

4.
42
4

5.
44
2

6.
53
3

7.
43
2

8.
34
2

9.
24
2

10.
43
3

11.
52
3

12.
32
3

13.
23
3

14.
41
2

15.
51
4

16.
14
2

17.
Write the 9 in the ones
column.
213
Write the 6 in the
3
hundreds column.
Write the 3 in the tens
column.
18.
19.
20.
214
312
432
2
3
2

Check your answer
by adding.
21.
231
3

22.
132
3

23.
314
2

Add
213
213
213
24.
243
2

SHORT DIVISION: DEDUCTIVE EXPLANATION
Divide 1825 by 4
Divisor 4 | 1825 Dividend
456¼
Quotient
EXPLANATION.—For convenience we write the divisor at the left of the dividend, and the quotient
below it, and begin at the left to divide. 4 is not contained in 1 thousand any thousand times,
therefore the quotient contains no unit of any order higher than hundreds. Consequently we find how
many times 4 is contained in the hundreds of the dividend. 1 thousand and 8 hundreds are 18
hundreds. 4 is contained in 18 hundreds 4 hundred times and 2 hundreds remaining. We write the 4
hundreds in the quotient. The 2 hundreds we consider as united with the 2 tens, making 22 tens. 4 is
contained in 22 tens 5 tens times, and 2 tens remaining. We write the 5 tens in the quotient, and the
remaining 2 tens we consider as united with the 5 units, making 25 units. 4 is contained in 25 units 6
units times and 1 unit remaining. We write the 6 units in the quotient and indicate the division of the
remainder, 1 unit, by the divisor 4.
Therefore the quotient of 1825 divided by 4 is 456¼, or 456 and 1 remainder.
SHORT DIVISION: INDUCTIVE EXPLANATION
Dividing Large Numbers
1. Tom, Dick, Will, and Fred put in 2 cents each to buy an eight-cent bag of marbles. There are 128
marbles in it. How many should each boy have, if they divide the marbles equally among the four
boys?
4 | 128
Think "12 = three 4s." Write the 3 over the 2 in the tens column.

Think "8 = two 4s." Write the 2 over the 8 in the ones column.
32 is right, because 4 × 32 = 128.
2. Mary, Nell, and Alice are going to buy a book as a present for their Sunday-school teacher. The
present costs 69 cents. How much should each girl pay, if they divide the cost equally among the
three girls?
3 | 69
Think "6 = .... 3s." Write the 2 over the 6 in the tens column.
Think "9 = .... 3s." Write the 3 over the 9 in the ones column.
23 is right, for 3 × 23 = 69.
3. Divide the cost of a 96-cent present equally among three girls. How much should each girl pay?
girls. How much should each girl pay? 3 | 96
4. Divide the cost of an 84-cent present equally among 4 girls. How much should each girl pay?
5. Learn this: (Read ÷ as "divided by.")

12 + 4 = 16.
12 − 4 = 8.
12 × 4 = 48.
12 ÷ 4 = 3.

16 is the sum.
8 is the difference or remainder.
48 is the product.
3 is the quotient.

6. Find the quotients. Check your answers by multiplying.

3 | 99

2 | 86

5 | 155

6 | 246

4 | 168

3 | 219

[Uneven division is taught by the same general plan, extended.]
LONG DIVISION: DEDUCTIVE EXPLANATION
To Divide by Long Division
1. Let it be required to divide 34531 by 15.
Operation

Divisor

Divided
15 ) 34531 (
30
45
45
31
30
1
Remainder

23021⁄15

Quotient

For convenience we write the divisor at the left and the quotient at the right of the dividend, and
begin to divide as in Short Division.
15 is contained in 3 ten-thousands 0 ten-thousands times; therefore, there will be 0 ten-thousands
in the quotient. Take 34 thousands; 15 is contained in 34 thousands 2 thousands times; we write the 2
thousands in the quotient. 15 × 2 thousands = 30 thousands, which, subtracted from 34 thousands,
leaves 4 thousands = 40 hundreds. Adding the 5 hundreds, we have 45 hundreds.
15 in 45 hundreds 3 hundreds times; we write the 3 hundreds in the quotient. 15 × 3 hundreds = 45
hundreds, which subtracted from 45 hundreds, leaves nothing. Adding the 3 tens, we have 3 tens.
15 in 3 tens 0 tens times; we write 0 tens in the quotient. Adding to the three tens, which equal 30
units, the 1 unit, we have 31 units.
15 in 31 units 2 units times; we write the 2 units in the quotient. 15 × 2 units = 30 units, which,
subtracted from 31 units, leaves 1 unit as a remainder. Indicating the division of the 1 unit, we annex
the fractional expression, 1⁄15 unit, to the integral part of the quotient.
Therefore, 34531 divided by 15 is equal to 23021⁄15.
[B. Greenleaf, Practical Arithmetic, '73, p. 49.]
LONG DIVISION: INDUCTIVE EXPLANATION
Dividing by Large Numbers
1. Just before Christmas Frank's father sent 360 oranges to be divided among the children in
Frank's class. There are 29 children. How many oranges should each child receive? How many
oranges will be left over?
Here is the best way to find out:

12
29|360
29
70
58
12

and 12
remainder

Think how many 29s there are in 36. 1 is
right.
Write 1 over the 6 of 36. Multiply 29 by 1.
Write the 29 under the 36. Subtract 29 from
36.
Write the 0 of 360 after the 7.
Think how many 29s there are in 70. 2 is
right.
Write 2 over the 0 of 360. Multiply 29 by 2.
Write the 58 under 70. Subtract 58 from 70.
There is 12 remainder.
Each child gets 12 oranges, and there are
12 left over. This is right, for 12 multiplied
by 29 = 348, and 348 + 12 = 360.

8.
31 |
99,587
9.
22 |
253

In No. 8, keep on dividing by 31 until you have
used the 5, the 8, and the 7, and have four figures
in the quotient.
10.
11.
12.
13.
22 |
21 |
22 |
32 |
2895
8891
290
16,368

Check your results for 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13.

1. The boys and girls of the Welfare Club plan to earn money to buy a victrola. There are 23 boys
and girls. They can get a good second-hand victrola for $5.75. How much must each earn if they
divide the cost equally?
Here is the best way to find out:

$.25
23|$5.75
46
115
115

Think how many 23s there are in 57. 2 is right.
Write 2 over the 7 of 57. Multiply 23 by 2.
Write 46 under 57 and subtract. Write the 5 of 575 after
the 11.
Think how many 23s there are in 115. 5 is right.
Write 5 over the 5 of 575. Multiply 23 by 5.
Write the 115 under the 115 that is there and subtract.
There is no remainder.
Put $ and the decimal point where they belong.
Each child must earn 25 cents. This is right, for $.25
multiplied by 23 = $5.75.

2. Divide $71.76 equally among 23 persons. How much is each person's share?
3. Check your result for No. 2 by multiplying the quotient by the divisor.
Find the quotients. Check each quotient by multiplying it by the divisor.

4.
23 |
$99.13

5.
25 |
$18.50

6.
21 |
$129.15

7.
13 |
$29.25

1 bushel = 32 qt.
9. How many bushels are there in 288 qt.?

10. In 192 qt.?

11. In 416 qt.?

8.
32 |
$73.92

Crucial experiments are lacking, but there are several lines of wellattested evidence. First of all, there can be no doubt that the great majority
of pupils learn these manipulations at the start from the placing of units
under units, tens under tens, etc., in adding, to the placing of the decimal
point in division with decimals, by imitation and blind following of specific
instructions, and that a very large proportion of the pupils do not to the end,
that is to the fifth school-year, understand them as necessary deductions
from decimal notation. It also seems probable that this proportion would not
be much reduced no matter how ingeniously and carefully the deductions
were explained by textbooks and teachers. Evidence of this fact will appear
abundantly to any one who will observe schoolroom life. It also appears in
the fact that after the properties of the decimal notation have been thus used
again and again; e.g., for deducing 'carrying' in addition, 'borrowing' in
subtraction, 'carrying' in multiplication, the value of the digits in the partial
product, the value of each remainder in short division, the value of the
quotient figures in division, the addition, subtraction, multiplication, and
division of United States money, and the placing of the decimal point in
multiplication, no competent teacher dares to rely upon the pupil, even
though he now has four or more years' experience with decimal notation, to
deduce the placing of the decimal point in division with decimals. It may be
an illusion, but one seems to sense in the better textbooks a recognition of
the futility of the attempt to secure deductive derivations of those
manipulations. I refer to the brevity of the explanations and their insertion
in such a form that they will influence the pupils' thinking as little as
possible. At any rate the fact is sure that most pupils do not learn the
manipulations by deductive reasoning, or understand them as necessary
consequences of abstract principles.
It is a common opinion that the only alternative is knowing them by rote.
This, of course, is one common alternative, but the other explanation
suggests that understanding the manipulations by inductive reasoning from
their results is another and an important alternative. The manipulations of
'long' multiplication, for instance, learned by imitation or mechanical drill,
are found to give for 25 × A a result about twice as large as for 13 × A, for
38 or 39 × A a result about three times as large; for 115 × A a result about
ten times as large as for 11 × A. With even the very dull pupils the
procedure is verified at least to the extent that it gives a result which the

scientific expert in the case—the teacher—calls right. With even the very
bright pupils, who can appreciate the relation of the procedure to decimal
notation, this relation may be used not as the sole deduction of the
procedure beforehand, but as one partial means of verifying it afterward. Or
there may be the condition of half-appreciation of the relation in which the
pupil uses knowledge of the decimal notation to convince himself that the
procedure does, but not that it must give the right answer, the answer being
'right' because the teacher, the answer-list, and collateral evidence assure
him of it.
I have taken the manipulation of the partial products as an illustration
because it is one of the least favored cases for the explanation I am
presenting. If we take the first case where a manipulation may be deduced
from decimal notation, known merely by rote, or verified inductively,
namely, the addition of two-place numbers, it seems sure that the mental
processes just described are almost the universal rule.
Surely in our schools at present children add the 3 of 23 to the 3 of 53
and the 2 of 23 to the 5 of 53 at the start, in nine cases out of ten because
they see the teacher do so and are told to do so. They are protected from
adding 3 + 3 + 2 + 5 not by any deduction of any sort but because they do
not know how to add 8 and 5, because they have been taught the habit of
adding figures that stand one above the other, or with a + between them;
and because they are shown or told what they are to do. They are protected
from adding 3 + 5 and 2 + 3, again, by no deductive reasoning but for the
second and third reasons just given. In nine cases out of ten they do not
even think of the possibility of adding in any other way than the '3 + 3, 2 +
5' way, much less do they select that way on account of the facts that 53 =
50 + 3 and 23 = 20 + 3, that 50 + 20 = 70, that 3 + 3 = 6, and that (a + b) +
(c + d) = (a + c) + (b + d)!
Just as surely all but the very dullest twentieth or so of children come in
the end to something more than rote knowledge,—to understand, to know
that the procedure in question is right.
Whether they know why 76 is right depends upon what is meant by why.
If it means that 76 is the result which competent people agree upon, they
do. If it means that 76 is the result which would come from accurate

counting they perhaps know why as well as they would have, had they been
given full explanations of the relation of the procedure in two-place
addition to decimal notation. If why means because 53 = 50 + 3, 23 = 20 +
3, 50 + 20 = 70, and (a + b) + (c + d) = (a + c) + (b + d), they do not. Nor, I
am tempted to add, would most of them by any sort of teaching whatever.
I conclude, therefore, that school children may and do reason about and
understand the manipulations of numbers in this inductive, verifying way
without being able to, or at least without, under present conditions, finding
it profitable to derive them deductively. I believe, in fact, that pure
arithmetic as it is learned and known is largely an inductive science. At one
extreme is a minority to whom it is a series of deductions from principles;
at the other extreme is a minority to whom it is a series of blind habits;
between the two is the great majority, representing every gradation but
centering about the type of the inductive thinker.

CHAPTER IV
THE CONSTITUTION OF ARITHMETICAL
ABILITIES (CONTINUED): THE SELECTION
OF THE BONDS TO BE FORMED
When the analysis of the mental functions involved in arithmetical
learning is made thorough it turns into the question, 'What are the
elementary bonds or connections that constitute these functions?' and when
the problem of teaching arithmetic is regarded, as it should be in the light of
present psychology, as a problem in the development of a hierarchy of
intellectual habits, it becomes in large measure a problem of the choice of
the bonds to be formed and of the discovery of the best order in which to
form them and the best means of forming each in that order.
THE IMPORTANCE OF HABIT-FORMATION
The importance of habit-formation or connection-making has been
grossly underestimated by the majority of teachers and writers of textbooks.
For, in the first place, mastery by deductive reasoning of such matters as
'carrying' in addition, 'borrowing' in subtraction, the value of the digits in
the partial products in multiplication, the manipulation of the figures in
division, the placing of the decimal point after multiplication or division
with decimals, or the manipulation of the figures in the multiplication and
division of fractions, is impossible or extremely unlikely in the case of
children of the ages and experience in question. They do not as a rule
deduce the method of manipulation from their knowledge of decimal
notation. Rather they learn about decimal notation by carrying, borrowing,
writing the last figure of each partial product under the multiplier which
gives that product, etc. They learn the method of manipulating numbers by

seeing them employed, and by more or less blindly acquiring them as
associative habits.
In the second place, we, who have already formed and long used the right
habits and are thereby protected against the casual misleadings of
unfortunate mental connections, can hardly realize the force of mere
association. When a child writes sixteen as 61, or finds 428 as the sum of
15
19
16
18
or gives 642 as an answer to 27 × 36, or says that 4 divided by ¼ = 1, we
are tempted to consider him mentally perverse, forgetting or perhaps never
having understood that he goes wrong for exactly the same general reason
that we go right; namely, the general law of habit-formation. If we study the
cases of 61 for 16, we shall find them occurring in the work of pupils who
after having been drilled in writing 26, 36, 46, 62, 63, and so on, in which
the order of the six in writing is the same as it is in speech, return to writing
the 'teen numbers. If our language said onety-one for eleven and onety-six
for sixteen, we should probably never find such errors except as 'lapses' or
as the results of misperception or lack of memory. They would then be
more frequent before the 20s, 30s, etc., were learned.
If pupils are given much drill on written single column addition involving
the higher decades (each time writing the two-figure sum), they are forming
a habit of writing 28 after the sum of 8, 6, 9, and 5 is reached; and it should
not surprise us if the pupil still occasionally writes the two-figure sum for
the first column though a second column is to be added also. On the
contrary, unless some counter force influences him, he is absolutely sure to
make this mistake.
The last mistake quoted (4 ÷ ¼ = 1) is interesting because here we have
possibly one of the cases where deduction from psychology alone can give
constructive aid to teaching. Multiplication and division by fractions have
been notorious for their difficulty. The former is now alleviated by using of
instead of × until the new habit is fixed. The latter is still approached with

elaborate caution and with various means of showing why one must 'invert
and multiply' or 'multiply by the reciprocal.'
But in the author's opinion it seems clear that the difficulty in multiplying
and dividing by a fraction was not that children felt any logical objections
to canceling or inverting. I fancy that the majority of them would cheerfully
invert any fraction three times over or cancel numbers at random in a
column if they were shown how to do so. But if you are a youngster
inexperienced in numerical abstractions and if you have had divide
connected with 'make smaller' three thousand times and never once
connected with 'make bigger,' you are sure to be somewhat impelled to
make the number smaller the three thousand and first time you are asked to
divide it. Some of my readers will probably confess that even now they feel
a slight irritation or doubt in saying or writing that 16⁄1 ÷ 1⁄8 = 128.
The habits that have been confirmed by every multiplication and division
by integers are, in this particular of 'the ratio of result to number operated
upon,' directly opposed to the formation of the habits required with
fractions. And that is, I believe, the main cause of the difficulty. Its
treatment then becomes easy, as will be shown later.
These illustrations could be added to almost indefinitely, especially in the
case of the responses made to the so-called 'catch' problems. The fact is that
the learner rarely can, and almost never does, survey and analyze an
arithmetical situation and justify what he is going to do by articulate
deductions from principles. He usually feels the situation more or less
vaguely and responds to it as he has responded to it or some situation like it
in the past. Arithmetic is to him not a logical doctrine which he applies to
various special instances, but a set of rather specialized habits of behavior
toward certain sorts of quantities and relations. And in so far as he does
come to know the doctrine it is chiefly by doing the will of the master. This
is true even with the clearest expositions, the wisest use of objective aids,
and full encouragement of originality on the pupil's part.
Lest the last few paragraphs be misunderstood, I hasten to add that the
psychologists of to-day do not wish to make the learning of arithmetic a
mere matter of acquiring thousands of disconnected habits, nor to decrease
by one jot the pupil's genuine comprehension of its general truths. They

wish him to reason not less than he has in the past, but more. They find,
however, that you do not secure reasoning in a pupil by demanding it, and
that his learning of a general truth without the proper development of
organized habits back of it is likely to be, not a rational learning of that
general truth, but only a mechanical memorizing of a verbal statement of it.
They have come to know that reasoning is not a magic force working in
independence of ordinary habits of thought, but an organization and
coöperation of those very habits on a higher level.
The older pedagogy of arithmetic stated a general law or truth or
principle, ordered the pupil to learn it, and gave him tasks to do which he
could not do profitably unless he understood the principle. It left him to
build up himself the particular habits needed to give him understanding and
mastery of the principle. The newer pedagogy is careful to help him build
up these connections or bonds ahead of and along with the general truth or
principle, so that he can understand it better. The older pedagogy
commanded the pupil to reason and let him suffer the penalty of small profit
from the work if he did not. The newer provides instructive experiences
with numbers which will stimulate the pupil to reason so far as he has the
capacity, but will still be profitable to him in concrete knowledge and skill,
even if he lacks the ability to develop the experiences into a general
understanding of the principles of numbers. The newer pedagogy secures
more reasoning in reality by not pretending to secure so much.
The newer pedagogy of arithmetic, then, scrutinizes every element of
knowledge, every connection made in the mind of the learner, so as to
choose those which provide the most instructive experiences, those which
will grow together into an orderly, rational system of thinking about
numbers and quantitative facts. It is not enough for a problem to be a test of
understanding of a principle; it must also be helpful in and of itself. It is not
enough for an example to be a case of some rule; it must help review and
consolidate habits already acquired or lead up to and facilitate habits to be
acquired. Every detail of the pupil's work must do the maximum service in
arithmetical learning.
DESIRABLE BONDS NOW OFTEN NEGLECTED

As hitherto, I shall not try to list completely the elementary bonds that
the course of study in arithmetic should provide for. The best means of
preparing the student of this topic for sound criticism and helpful invention
is to let him examine representative cases of bonds now often neglected
which should be formed and representative cases of useless, or even
harmful, bonds now often formed at considerable waste of time and effort.
(1) Numbers as measures of continuous quantities.—The numbers one,
two, three, 1, 2, 3, etc., should be connected soon after the beginning of
arithmetic each with the appropriate amount of some continuous quantity
like length or volume or weight, as well as with the appropriate sized
collection of apples, counters, blocks, and the like. Lines should be labeled
1 foot, 2 feet, 3 feet, etc.; one inch, two inches, three inches, etc.; weights
should be lifted and called one pound, two pounds, etc.; things should be
measured in glassfuls, handfuls, pints, and quarts. Otherwise the pupil is
likely to limit the meaning of, say, four to four sensibly discrete things and
to have difficulty in multiplication and division. Measuring, or counting by
insensibly marked off repetitions of a unit, binds each number name to its
meaning as —— times whatever 1 is, more surely than mere counting of the
units in a collection can, and should reënforce the latter.
(2) Additions in the higher decades.—In the case of all save the very
gifted children, the additions with higher decades—that is, the bonds, 16 +
7 = 23, 26 + 7 = 33, 36 + 7 = 43, 14 + 8 = 22, 24 + 8 = 32, and the like—
need to be specifically practiced until the tendency becomes generalized.
'Counting' by 2s beginning with 1, and with 2, counting by 3s beginning
with 1, with 2, and with 3, counting by 4s beginning with 1, with 2, with 3,
and with 4, and so on, make easy beginnings in the formation of the decade
connections. Practice with isolated bonds should soon be added to get freer
use of the bonds. The work of column addition should be checked for
accuracy so that a pupil will continually get beneficial practice rather than
'practice in error.'
(3) The uneven divisions.—The quotients with remainders for the
divisions of every number to 19 by 2, every number to 29 by 3, every
number to 39 by 4, and so on should be taught as well as the even divisions.
A table like the following will be found a convenient means of making
these connections:—

10 = .... 2s
10 = .... 3s and .... rem.
10 = .... 4s and .... rem.
10 = .... 5s
11 = .... 2s and .... rem.
11 = .... 3s and .... rem.
.
.
.
89 = .... 9s and .... rem.
These bonds must be formed before short division can be efficient, are useful as
a partial help toward selection of the proper quotient figures in long division, and
are the chief instruments for one of the important problem series in applied
arithmetic,—"How many xs can I buy for y cents at z cents per x and how much
will I have left?" That these bonds are at present sadly neglected is shown by
Kirby ['13], who found that pupils in the last half of grade 3 and the first half of
grade 4 could do only about four such examples per minute (in a ten-minute test),
and even at that rate made far from perfect records, though they had been taught
the regular division tables. Sixty minutes of practice resulted in a gain of nearly 75
percent in number done per minute, with an increase in accuracy as well.
(4) The equation form.—The equation form with an unknown quantity to be
determined, or a missing number to be found, should be connected with its
meaning and with the problem attitude long before a pupil begins algebra, and in
the minds of pupils who never will study algebra.
Children who have just barely learned to add and subtract learn easily to do such
work as the following:—
Write the missing numbers:—
4 + 8 = ....
5 + .... = 14
.... + 3 = 11
.... = 5 + 2
16 = 7 + ....
12 = .... + 5
The equation form is the simplest uniform way yet devised to state a
quantitative issue. It is capable of indefinite extension if certain easily understood
conventions about parentheses and fraction signs are learned. It should be

employed widely in accounting and the treatment of commercial problems, and
would be except for outworn conventions. It is a leading contribution of algebra to
business and industrial life. Arithmetic can make it nearly as well. It saves more
time in the case of drills on reducing fractions to higher and lower terms alone than
is required to learn its meaning and use. To rewrite a quantitative problem as an
equation and then make the easy selection of the necessary technique to solve the
equation is one of the most universally useful intellectual devices known to man.
The words 'equals,' 'equal,' 'is,' 'are,' 'makes,' 'make,' 'gives,' 'give,' and their rarer
equivalents should therefore early give way on many occasions to the '=' which so
far surpasses them in ultimate convenience and simplicity.
(5) Addition and subtraction facts in the case of fractions.—In the case of
adding and subtracting fractions, certain specific bonds—between the situation of
halves and thirds to be added and the responses of thinking of the numbers as
equal to so many sixths, between the situation thirds and fourths to be added and
thinking of them as so many twelfths, between fourths and eighths to be added and
thinking of them as eighths, and the like—should be formed separately. The
general rule of thinking of fractions as their equivalents with some convenient
denominator should come as an organization and extension of such special habits,
not as an edict from the textbook or teacher.
(6) Fractional equivalents.—Efficiency requires that in the end the much used
reductions should be firmly connected with the situations where they are needed.
They may as well, therefore, be so connected from the beginning, with the gain of
making the general process far easier for the dull pupils to master. We shall see
later that, for all save the very gifted pupils, the economical way to get an
understanding of arithmetical principles is not, usually, to learn a rule and then
apply it, but to perform instructive operations and, in the course of performing
them, to get insight into the principles.
(7) Protective habits in multiplying and dividing with fractions.—In multiplying
and dividing with fractions special bonds should be formed to counteract the now
harmful influence of the 'multiply = get a larger number' and 'divide = get a smaller
number' bonds which all work with integers has been reënforcing.
For example, at the beginning of the systematic work with multiplication by a
fraction, let the following be printed clearly at the top of every relevant page of the
textbook and displayed on the blackboard:—
When you multiply a number by anything more than 1 the result is larger than
the number.
When you multiply a number by 1 the result is the same as the number.

When you multiply a number by anything less than 1 the result is smaller than
the number.
Let the pupils establish the new habit by many such exercises as:—
18 × 4 = ....
4 × 4 = ....
2 × 4 = ....
1 × 4 = ....
1⁄ × 4 = ....
2
1⁄ × 4 = ....
4
1⁄ × 4 = ....
8

9 × 2 = ....
6 × 2 = ....
3 × 2 = ....
1 × 2 = ....
1⁄ × 2 = ....
3
1⁄ × 2 = ....
6
1⁄ × 2 = ....
9

In the case of division by a fraction the old harmful habit should be counteracted
and refined by similar rules and exercises as follows:—
When you divide a number by anything more than 1 the result is smaller than
the number.
When you divide a number by 1 the result is the same as the number.
When you divide a number by anything less than 1 the result is larger than the
number.
State the missing numbers:—
8 = .... 4s
8 = .... 2s
8 = .... 1s
8 = .... 1⁄2s

12 = .... 6s
12 = .... 4s
12 = .... 3s
12 = .... 2s

9 = .... 9s
9 = .... 3s
9 = .... 1s
9 = .... 1⁄3s

8 = .... 1⁄4s

12 = .... 1s

9 = .... 1⁄9s

8 = .... 1⁄8s

12 = .... 1⁄2s
12 = .... 1⁄3s

16 ÷ 16
=
16 ÷ 8
=
16 ÷ 4
=

12 = .... 1⁄4s
9÷9
10 ÷ 10
=
=
9÷3
10 ÷ 5
=
=
9÷1
10 ÷ 1
=
=

12 ÷ 6
=
12 ÷ 4
=
12 ÷ 3
=

16 ÷ 2
=
16 ÷ 1
=

9 ÷ 1⁄3
=
9 ÷ 1⁄9
=

10 ÷ 1⁄5
=
10 ÷ 1⁄10
=

16 ÷ 1⁄2
=
16 ÷ 1⁄4
=
16 ÷ 1⁄8
=

12 ÷ 2
=
12 ÷ 1
=
12 ÷ 1⁄2
=
12 ÷ 1⁄3
=
12 ÷ 1⁄4
=
12 ÷ 1⁄6
=

(8) '% of' means 'hundredths times.'—In the case of percentage a series of bonds
like the following should be formed:—
5
20
6
25
12
3

percent
" "
" "
%
%
%

of
"
"
"
"
"

= .05 times
= .20 "
= .06 "
= .25 ×
= .12 ×
= .03 ×

Four five-minute drills on such connections between 'x percent of' and 'its
decimal equivalent times' are worth an hour's study of verbal definitions of the
meaning of percent as per hundred or the like. The only use of the study of such
definitions is to facilitate the later formation of the bonds, and, with all save the
brighter pupils, the bonds are more needed for an understanding of the definitions
than the definitions are needed for the formation of the bonds.
(9) Habits of verifying results.—Bonds should early be formed between certain
manipulations of numbers and certain means of checking, or verifying the
correctness of, the manipulation in question. The additions to 9 + 9 and the
subtractions to 18 − 9 should be verified by objective addition and subtraction and
counting until the pupil has sure command; the multiplications to 9 × 9 should be
verified by objective multiplication and counting of the result (in piles of tens and
a pile of ones) eight or ten times,[4] and by addition eight or ten times;[4] the
divisions to 81 ÷ 9 should be verified by multiplication and occasionally
objectively until the pupil has sure command; column addition should be checked

by adding the columns separately and adding the sums so obtained, and by making
two shorter tasks of the given task and adding the two sums; 'short' multiplication
should be verified eight or ten times by addition; 'long' multiplication should be
checked by reversing multiplier and multiplicand and in other ways; 'short' and
'long' division should be verified by multiplication.
These habits of testing an obtained result are of threefold value. They enable the
pupil to find his own errors, and to maintain a standard of accuracy by himself.
They give him a sense of the relations of the processes and the reasons why the
right ways of adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing are right, such as only
the very bright pupils can get from verbal explanations. They put his acquisition of
a certain power, say multiplication, to a real and intelligible use, in checking the
results of his practice of a new power, and so instill a respect for arithmetical
power and skill in general. The time spent in such verification produces these
results at little cost; for the practice in adding to verify multiplications, in
multiplying to verify divisions, and the like is nearly as good for general drill and
review of the addition and multiplication themselves as practice devised for that
special purpose.
Early work in adding, subtracting, and reducing fractions should be verified by
objective aids in the shape of lines and areas divided in suitable fractional parts.
Early work with decimal fractions should be verified by the use of the equivalent
common fractions for .25, .75, .125, .375, and the like. Multiplication and division
with fractions, both common and decimal, should in the early stages be verified by
objective aids. The placing of the decimal point in multiplication and division with
decimal fractions should be verified by such exercises as:—
20
1.23 ) 24.60
246

It cannot be 200; for 200 × 1.23 is much more than 24.6.
It cannot be 2; for 2 × 1.23 is much less than 24.6.

The establishment of habits of verifying results and their use is very greatly
needed. The percentage of wrong answers in arithmetical work in schools is now
so high that the pupils are often being practiced in error. In many cases they can
feel no genuine and effective confidence in the processes, since their own use of
the processes brings wrong answers as often as right. In solving problems they
often cannot decide whether they have done the right thing or the wrong, since
even if they have done the right thing, they may have done it inaccurately. A
wrong answer to a problem is therefore too often ambiguous and uninstructive to
them.[5]

These illustrations of the last few pages are samples of the procedures
recommended by a consideration of all the bonds that one might form and of the
contribution that each would make toward the abilities that the study of arithmetic
should develop and improve. It is by doing more or less at haphazard what
psychology teaches us to do deliberately and systematically in this respect that
many of the past advances in the teaching of arithmetic have been made.
WASTEFUL AND HARMFUL BONDS
A scrutiny of the bonds now formed in the teaching of arithmetic with questions
concerning the exact service of each, results in a list of bonds of small value or
even no value, so far as a psychologist can determine. I present here samples of
such psychologically unjustifiable bonds with some of the reasons for their
deficiencies.
(1) Arbitrary units.—In drills intended to improve the ability to see and use the
meanings of numbers as names for ratios or relative magnitudes, it is unwise to
employ entirely arbitrary units. The procedure in II (on page 84) is better than that
in I. Inches, half-inches, feet, and centimeters are better as units of length than
arbitrary As. Square inches, square centimeters, and square feet are better for
areas. Ounces and pounds should be lifted rather than arbitrary weights. Pints,
quarts, glassfuls, cupfuls, handfuls, and cubic inches are better for volume.
All the real merit in the drills on relative magnitude advocated by Speer,
McLellan and Dewey, and others can be secured without spending time in relating
magnitudes for the sake of relative magnitude alone. The use of units of measure
in drills which will never be used in bona fide measuring is like the use of fractions
like sevenths, elevenths, and thirteenths. A very little of it is perhaps desirable to
test the appreciation of certain general principles, but for regular training it should
give place to the use of units of practical significance.

FIG. 3.
I. If A is 1 which line is 2? Which line is 4? Which line is 3? A and C together equal what line? A and B
together equal what line? How much longer is B than A? How much longer is B than C? How much longer is
D than A?

FIG. 4.
II. A is 1 inch long. Which line is 2 inches long? Which line is 4 inches long? Which line is 3 inches long? A
and C together make ... inches? A and B together make ... inches? B is ... ... longer than A? B is ... ... longer
than C? D is ... ... longer than A?

(2) Multiples of 11.—The multiplications of 2 to 12 by 11 and 12 as single
connections should be left for the pupil to acquire by himself as he needs them.
These connections interfere with the process of learning two-place multiplication.
The manipulations of numbers there required can be learned much more easily if
11 and 12 are used as multipliers in just the same way that 78 or 96 would be.
Later the 12 × 2, 12 × 3, etc., may be taught. There is less reason for knowing the
multiples of 11 than for knowing the multiples of 15, 16, or 25.
(3) Abstract and concrete numbers.—The elaborate emphasis of the supposed
fact that we cannot multiply 726 by 8 dollars and the still more elaborate
explanations of why nevertheless we find the cost of 726 articles at $8 each by
multiplying 726 by 8 and calling the answer dollars are wasteful. The same holds
of the corresponding pedantry about division. These imaginary difficulties should
not be raised at all. The pupil should not think of multiplying or dividing men or
dollars, but simply of the necessary equation and of the sort of thing that the
missing number represents. "8 × 726 = .... Answer is dollars," or "8, 726, multiply.
Answer is dollars," is all that he needs to think, and is in the best form for his
thought. Concerning the distinction between abstract and concrete numbers, both

logic and common sense as well as psychology support the contention of
McDougle ['14, p. 206f.], who writes:—
"The most elementary counting, even that stage when the counts were not
carried in the mind, but merely in notches on a stick or by DeMorgan's stones in a
pot, requires some thought; and the most advanced counting implies memory of
things. The terms, therefore, abstract and concrete number, have long since ceased
to be used by thinking people.
"Recently the writer visited an arithmetic class in a State Normal School and
saw a group of practically adult students confused about this very question
concerning abstract and concrete numbers, according to their previous training in
the conventionalities of the textbook. Their teacher diverted the work of the hour
and she and the class spent almost the whole period in reëstablishing the
requirements 'that the product must always be the same kind of unit as the
multiplicand,' and 'addends must all be alike to be added.' This is not an
exceptional case. Throughout the whole range of teaching arithmetic in the public
schools pupils are obfuscated by the philosophical encumbrances which have been
imposed upon the simplest processes of numerical work. The time is surely ripe,
now that we are readjusting our ideas of the subject of arithmetic, to revise some of
these wasteful and disheartening practices. Algebra historically grew out of
arithmetic, yet it has not been laden with this distinction. No pupil in algebra lets x
equal the horses; he lets x equal the number of horses, and proceeds to drop the
idea of horses out of his consideration. He multiplies, divides, and extracts the root
of the number, sometimes handling fractions in the process, and finally interprets
the result according to the conditions of his problem. Of course, in the early
number work there have been the sense-objects from which number has been
perceived, but the mind retreats naturally from objectivity to the pure conception
of number, and then to the number symbol. The following is taken from the
appendix to Horn's thesis, where a seventh grade girl gets the population of the
United States in 1820:—
7,862,166
233,634
1,538,022
9,633,822

whites
free negroes
slaves

In this problem three different kinds of addends are combined, if we accept the
usual distinction. Some may say that this is a mistake,—that the pupil transformed
the 'whites,' 'free negroes,' and 'slaves' into a common unit, such as 'people' of
'population' and then added these common units. But this 'explanation' is entirely
gratuitous, as one will find if he questions the pupil about the process. It will be

found that the child simply added the figures as numbers only and then interpreted
the result, according to the statement of the problem, without so much mental
gymnastics. The writer has questioned hundreds of students in Normal School
work on this point, and he believes that the ordinary mind-movement is correctly
set forth here, no matter how well one may maintain as an academic proposition
that this is not logical. Many classes in the Eastern Kentucky State Normal have
been given this problem to solve, and they invariably get the same result:—
'In a garden on the Summit are as many cabbage-heads as the total number of
ladies and gentlemen in this class. How many cabbage-heads in the garden?'
And the blackboard solution looks like this each time:—
29
15
44

ladies
gentlemen
cabbage-heads

So, also, one may say: I have 6 times as many sheep as you have cows. If you have
5 cows, how many sheep have I? Here we would multiply the number of cows,
which is 5, by 6 and call the result 30, which must be linked with the idea of sheep
because the conditions imposed by the problem demand it. The mind naturally in
this work separates the pure number from its situation, as in algebra, handles it
according to the laws governing arithmetical combinations, and labels the result as
the statement of the problem demands. This is expressed in the following, which is
tacitly accepted in algebra, and should be accepted equally in arithmetic:
'In all computations and operations in arithmetic, all numbers are essentially
abstract and should be so treated. They are concrete only in the thought process
that attends the operation and interprets the result.'"
(4) Least common multiple.—The whole set of bonds involved in learning 'least
common multiple' should be left out. In adding and subtracting fractions the pupil
should not find the least common multiple of their denominators but should find
any common multiple that he can find quickly and correctly. No intelligent person
would ever waste time in searching for the least common multiple of sixths, thirds,
and halves except for the unfortunate traditions of an oversystematized arithmetic,
but would think of their equivalents in sixths or twelfths or twenty-fourths or any
other convenient common multiple. The process of finding the least common
multiple is of such exceedingly rare application in science or business or life
generally that the textbooks have to resort to purely fantastic problems to give drill
in its use.

(5) Greatest common divisor.—The whole set of bonds involved in learning
'greatest common divisor' should also be left out. In reducing fractions to lowest
terms the pupil should divide by anything that he sees that he can divide by,
favoring large divisors, and continue doing so until he gets the fraction in terms
suitable for the purpose in hand. The reader probably never has had occasion to
compute a greatest common divisor since he left school. If he has computed any,
the chances are that he would have saved time by solving the problem in some
other way!
The following problems are taken at random from those given by one of the best
of the textbooks that make the attempt to apply the facts of Greatest Common
Divisor and Least Common Multiple to problems.[6] Most of these problems are
fantastic. The others are trivial, or are better solved by trial and adaptation.
1. A certain school consists of 132 pupils in the high school, 154 in the grammar, and 198 in the primary
grades. If each group is divided into sections of the same number containing as many pupils as possible, how
many pupils will there be in each section?
2. A farmer has 240 bu. of wheat and 920 bu. of oats, which he desires to put into the least number of boxes
of the same capacity, without mixing the two kinds of grain. Find how many bushels each box must hold.
3. Four bells toll at intervals of 3, 7, 12, and 14 seconds respectively, and begin to toll at the same instant.
When will they next toll together?
4. A, B, C, and D start together, and travel the same way around an island which is 600 mi. in circuit. A
goes 20 mi. per day, B 30, C 25, and D 40. How long must their journeying continue, in order that they may all
come together again?
5. The periods of three planets which move uniformly in circular orbits round the sun, are respectively 200,
250, and 300 da. Supposing their positions relatively to each other and the sun to be given at any moment,
determine how many da. must elapse before they again have exactly the same relative positions.

(6) Rare and unimportant words.—The bonds between rare or unimportant
words and their meanings should not be formed for the mere sake of verbal variety
in the problems of the textbook. A pupil should not be expected to solve a problem
that he cannot read. He should not be expected in grades 2 and 3, or even in grade
4, to read words that he has rarely or never seen before. He should not be given
elaborate drill in reading during the time devoted to the treatment of quantitative
facts and relations.
All this is so obvious that it may seem needless to relate. It is not. With many
textbooks it is now necessary to give definite drill in reading the words in the
printed problems intended for grades 2, 3, and 4, or to replace them by oral
statements, or to leave the pupils in confusion concerning what the problems are
that they are to solve. Many good teachers make a regular reading-lesson out of

every page of problems before having them solved. There should be no such
necessity.
To define rare and unimportant concretely, I will say that for pupils up to the
middle of grade 3, such words as the following are rare and unimportant (though
each of them occurs in the very first fifty pages of some well-known beginner's
book in arithmetic).
absentees
account
Adele
admitted
Agnes
agreed
Albany
Allen
allowed
alternate
Andrew
Arkansas
arrived
assembly
automobile
baking
powder
balance
barley
beggar
Bertie
Bessie
bin
Boston
bouquet
bronze
buckwheat
Byron
camphor
Carl
Carrie
Cecil
Charlotte

department
deposited
dictation
discharged
discover
discovery
dish-water
drug
due
Edgar
Eddie
Edwin
election
electric
Ella
Emily
enrolled
entertainment
envelope
Esther
Ethel
exceeds
explanation
expression
generally
gentlemen
Gilbert
Grace
grading
Graham
grammar
Harold
hatchet

lettuceplant
library
Lottie
Lula
margin
Martha
Matthew
Maud
meadow
mentally
mercury
mineral
Missouri
molasses
Morton
movements
muslin
Nellie
nieces
Oakland
observing
obtained
offered
office
onions
opposite
original
package
packet
palm
Patrick
Paul

respectively
Robert
Roger
Ruth
rye
Samuel
San
Francisco
seldom
sheared
shingles
skyrockets
sloop
solve
speckled
sponges
sprout
stack
Stephen
strap
successfully
suggested
sunny
supply
Susan
Susie's
syllable
talcum
term
test
thermometer
Thomas
torpedoes

charity
Chicago
cinnamon
Clara
clothespins
collect
comma
committee
concert
confectioner
cranberries
crane
currants
dairyman
Daniel
David
dealer
debt
delivered
Denver

Heralds
hesitation
Horace Mann
impossible
income
indicated
inmost
inserts
installments
instantly
insurance
Iowa
Jack
Jennie
Johnny
Joseph
journey
Julia
Katherine

payments
peep
Peter
perch
phaeton
photograph
piano
pigeons
Pilgrims
preserving
proprietor
purchased
Rachel
Ralph
rapidity
rather
readily
receipts
register
remanded

trader
transaction
treasury
tricycle
tube
two-seated
united
usually
vacant
various
vase
velocipede
votes
walnuts
Walter
Washington
watched
whistle
woodland
worsted

(7) Misleading facts and procedures.—Bonds should not be formed between
articles of commerce and grossly inaccurate prices therefor, between events and
grossly improbable consequences, or causes or accompaniments thereof, nor
between things, qualities, and events which have no important connections one
with another in the real world. In general, things should not be put together in the
pupil's mind that do not belong together.
If the reader doubts the need of this warning let him examine problems 1 to 5,
all from reputable books that are in common use, or have been within a few years,
and consider how addition, subtraction, and the habits belonging with each are
confused by exercise 6.
1. If a duck flying 3⁄5 as fast as a hawk flies 90 miles in an hour, how fast does the hawk fly?
2. At 5⁄8 of a cent apiece how many eggs can I buy for $60?
3. At $.68 a pair how many pairs of overshoes can you buy for $816?
4. At $.13 a dozen how many dozen bananas can you buy for $3.12?
5. How many pecks of beans can be put into a box that will hold just 21 bushels?
6. Write answers:

537
365
?
36
1000
a.

Beginning at the bottom say 11, 18, and 2 (writing it in its place)
are 20. 5, 11, 14, and 6 (writing it) are 20, 5, 10. The number,
omitted, is 62.
581
97
364
?
1758

b.

625
?
90
417
2050

c.

752
414
130
?
2460

d.

314
429
?
76
1000

e.

?
845
223
95
2367

(8) Trivialities and absurdities.—Bonds should not be formed between
insignificant or foolish questions and the labor of answering them, nor between the
general arithmetical work of the school and such insignificant or foolish questions.
The following are samples from recent textbooks of excellent standing:—
On one side of George's slate there are 32 words, and on the other side 26 words. If he erases 6 words from
one side, and 8 from the other, how many words remain on his slate?
A certain school has 14 rooms, and an average of 40 children in a room. If every one in the school should
make 500 straight marks on each side of his slate, how many would be made in all?
8 times the number of stripes in our flag is the number of years from 1800 until Roosevelt was elected
President. In what year was he elected President?
From the Declaration of Independence to the World's Fair in Chicago was 9 times as many years as there are
stripes in the flag. How many years was it?

(9) Useless methods.—Bonds should not be formed between a described
situation and a method of treating the situation which would not be a useful one to
follow in the case of the real situation. For example, "If I set 96 trees in rows,
sixteen trees in a row, how many rows will I have?" forms the habit of treating by
division a problem that in reality would be solved by counting the rows. So also "I
wish to give 25 cents to each of a group of boys and find that it will require $2.75.
How many boys are in the group?" forms the habit of answering a question by
division whose answer must already have been present to give the data of the
problem.
(10) Problems whose answers would, in real life, be already known.—The
custom of giving problems in textbooks which could not occur in reality because
the answer has to be known to frame the problem is a natural result of the lazy
author's tendency to work out a problem to fit a certain process and a certain
answer. Such bogus problems are very, very common. In a random sampling of a

dozen pages of "General Review" problems in one of the most widely used of
recent textbooks, I find that about 6 percent of the problems are of this sort.
Among the problems extemporized by teachers these bogus problems are probably
still more frequent. Such are:—
A clerk in an office addressed letters according to a given list. After she had addressed 2500, 4⁄9 of the
names on the list had not been used; how many names were in the entire list?
The Canadian power canal at Sault Ste. Marie furnished 20,000 horse power. The canal on the Michigan
side furnished 2½ times as much. How many horse power does the latter furnish?

It may be asserted that the ideal of giving as described problems only problems
that might occur and demand the same sort of process for solution with a real
situation, is too exacting. If a problem is comprehensible and serves to illustrate a
principle or give useful drill, that is enough, teachers may say. For really scientific
teaching it is not enough. Moreover, if problems are given merely as tests of
knowledge of a principle or as means to make some fact or principle clear or
emphatic, and are not expected to be of direct service in the quantitative work of
life, it is better to let the fact be known. For example, "I am thinking of a number.
Half of this number is twice six. What is the number?" is better than "A man left
his wife a certain sum of money. Half of what he left her was twice as much as he
left to his son, who receives $6000. How much did he leave his wife?" The former
is better because it makes no false pretenses.
(11) Needless linguistic difficulties.—It should be unnecessary to add that bonds
should not be formed between the pupil's general attitude toward arithmetic and
needless, useless difficulty in language or needless, useless, wrong reasoning. Our
teaching is, however, still tainted by both of these unfortunate connections, which
dispose the pupil to think of arithmetic as a mystery and folly.
Consider, for example, the profitless linguistic difficulty of problems 1-6, whose
quantitative difficulties are simply those of:—
1. 5 + 8 + 3 + 7
2. 64 ÷ 8, and knowledge that 1 peck = 8 quarts
3. 12 ÷ 4
4. 6 ÷ 2
5. 3 × 2
6. 4 × 4
1. What amount should you obtain by putting together 5 cents, 8 cents, 3 cents, and 7 cents? Did you find
this result by adding or multiplying?
2. How many times must you empty a peck measure to fill a basket holding 64 quarts of beans?

3. If a girl commits to memory 4 pages of history in one day, in how many days will she commit to memory
12 pages?
4. If Fred had 6 chickens how many times could he give away 2 chickens to his companions?
5. If a croquet-player drove a ball through 2 arches at each stroke, through how many arches will he drive it
by 3 strokes?
6. If mamma cut the pie into 4 pieces and gave each person a piece, how many persons did she have for
dinner if she used 4 whole pies for dessert?

Arithmetically this work belongs in the first or second years of learning. But
children of grades 2 and 3, save a few, would be utterly at a loss to understand the
language.
We are not yet free from the follies illustrated in the lessons of pages 96 to 99,
which mystified our parents.

FIG. 5.

LESSON I
1. In this picture, how many girls are in the swing?
2. How many girls are pulling the swing?
3. If you count both girls together, how many are they?
One girl and one other girl are how many?
4. How many kittens do you see on the stump?
5. How many on the ground?
6. How many kittens are in the picture? One kitten and one other kitten are how many?
7. If you should ask me how many girls are in the swing, or how many kittens are on the stump, I could
answer aloud, One; or I could write One; or thus, 1.
8. If I write One, this is called the word One.
9. This, 1, is named a figure One, because it means the same as the word One, and stands for One.
10. Write 1. What is this named? Why?
11. A figure 1 may stand for one girl, one kitten, or one anything.
12. When children first attend school, what do they begin to learn? Ans. Letters and words.
13. Could you read or write before you had learned either letters or words?
14. If we have all the letters together, they are named the Alphabet.
15. If we write or speak words, they are named Language.
16. You are commencing to study Arithmetic; and you can read and write in Arithmetic only as you learn
the Alphabet and Language of Arithmetic. But little time will be required for this purpose.

FIG. 6.
LESSON II
1. If we speak or write words, what do we name them, when taken together?
2. What are you commencing to study? Ans. Arithmetic.
3. What Language must you now learn?
4. What do we name this, 1? Why?
5. This figure, 1, is part of the Language of Arithmetic.
6. If I should write something to stand for Two—two girls, two kittens, or two things of any kind—what do
you think we would name it?
7. A figure Two is written thus: 2. Make a figure two.
8. Why do we name this a figure two?
9. This figure two (2) is part of the Language of Arithmetic.
10. In this picture one boy is sitting, playing a flageolet. What is the other boy doing? If the boy standing
should sit down by the other, how many boys would be sitting together? One boy and one other boy are how

many boys?
11. You see a flageolet and a violin. They are musical instruments. One musical instrument and one other
musical instrument are how many?
12. I will write thus: 1 1 2. We say that 1 boy and 1 other boy, counted together, are 2 boys; or are equal to 2
boys. We will now write something to show that the first 1 and the other 1 are to be counted together.

13. We name a line drawn thus,—, a horizontal line. Draw such a line. Name it.
14. A line drawn thus, | , we name a vertical line. Draw such a line. Name it.
15. Now I will put two such lines together; thus, +. What kind of a line do we name the first (—)? And what
do we name the last? (|)? Are these lines long or short? Where do they cross each other?
16. Each of you write thus: —, | , +.
17. This, +, is named Plus. Plus means more; and + also means more.
18. I will write.
One and One More Equal Two.
19. Now I will write part of this in the Language of Arithmetic. I write the first One thus, 1; then the other
One thus, 1. Afterward I write, for the word More, thus, +, placing the + between 1 and 1, so that the whole
stands thus: 1 + 1. As I write, I say, One and One more.
20. Each of you write 1 + 1. Read what you have written.
21. This +, when written between the 1s, shows that they are to be put together, or counted together, so as to
make 2.
22. Because + shows what is to be done, it is called a Sign. If we take its name, Plus, and the word Sign, and
put both words together, we have Sign Plus, or Plus Sign. In speaking of this we may call it Sign Plus, or Plus
Sign, or Plus.
23. 1, 2, +, are part of the Language of Arithmetic.
Write the following in the Language of Arithmetic:

24. One and one more.
25. One and two more.
26. Two and one more.

(12) Ambiguities and falsities.—Consider the ambiguities and false reasoning of
these problems.
1. If you can earn 4 cents a day, how much can you earn in 6 weeks? (Are Sundays counted? Should a child
who earns 4 cents some day expect to repeat the feat daily?)
2. How many lines must you make to draw ten triangles and five squares? (I can do this with 8 lines, though
the answer the book requires is 50.)
3. A runner ran twice around an 1⁄8 mile track in two minutes. What distance did he run in 2⁄3 of a minute?
(I do not know, but I do know that, save by chance, he did not run exactly 2⁄3 of 1⁄8 mile.)
4. John earned $4.35 in a week, and Henry earned $1.93. They put their money together and bought a gun.
What did it cost? (Maybe $5, maybe $10. Did they pay for the whole of it? Did they use all their earnings, or
less, or more?)
5. Richard has 12 nickels in his purse. How much more than 50 cents would you give him for them? (Would
a wise child give 60 cents to a boy who wanted to swap 12 nickels therefor, or would he suspect a trick and
hold on to his own coins?)
6. If a horse trots 10 miles in one hour how far will he travel in 9 hours?
7. If a girl can pick 3 quarts of berries in 1 hour how many quarts can she pick in 3 hours?
(These last two, with a teacher insisting on the 90 and 9, might well deprive a matterof-fact boy of respect for arithmetic for weeks thereafter.)
The economics and physics of the next four problems speak for themselves.
8. I lost $15 by selling a horse for $85. What was the value of the horse?
9. If floating ice has 7 times as much of it under the surface of the water as above it, what part is above
water? If an iceberg is 50 ft. above water, what is the entire height of the iceberg? How high above water
would an iceberg 300 ft. high have to be?
10. A man's salary is $1000 a year and his expenses $625. How many years will elapse before he is worth
$10,000 if he is worth $2500 at the present time?
11. Sound travels 1120 ft. a second. How long after a cannon is fired in New York will the report be heard in
Philadelphia, a distance of 90 miles?

GUIDING PRINCIPLES
The reader may be wearied of these special details concerning bonds now
neglected that should be formed and useless or harmful bonds formed for no valid
reason. Any one of them by itself is perhaps a minor matter, but when we have
cured all our faults in this respect and found all the possibilities for wiser selection

of bonds, we shall have enormously improved the teaching of arithmetic. The ideal
is such choice of bonds (and, as will be shown later, such arrangement of them) as
will most improve the functions in question at the least cost of time and effort. The
guiding principles may be kept in mind in the form of seven simple but golden
rules:—
1. Consider the situation the pupil faces.
2. Consider the response you wish to connect with it.
3. Form the bond; do not expect it to come by a miracle.
4. Other things being equal, form no bond that will have to be broken.
5. Other things being equal, do not form two or three bonds when one will serve.
6. Other things being equal, form bonds in the way that they are required later to
act.
7. Favor, therefore, the situations which life itself will offer, and the responses
which life itself will demand.

CHAPTER V
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DRILL IN ARITHMETIC:
THE STRENGTH OF BONDS
An inventory of the bonds to be formed in learning arithmetic should be
accompanied by a statement of how strong each bond is to be made and kept year
by year. Since, however, the inventory itself has been presented here only in
samples, the detailed statement of desired strength for each bond cannot be made.
Only certain general facts will be noted here.
THE NEED OF STRONGER ELEMENTARY BONDS
The constituent bonds involved in the fundamental operations with numbers
need to be much stronger than they now are. Inaccuracy in these operations means
weakness of the constituent bonds. Inaccuracy exists, and to a degree that deprives
the subject of much of its possible disciplinary value, makes the pupil's
achievements of slight value for use in business or industry, and prevents the pupil
from verifying his work with new processes by some previously acquired process.
The inaccuracy that exists may be seen in the measurements made by the many
investigators who have used arithmetical tasks as tests of fatigue, practice,
individual differences and the like, and in the special studies of arithmetical
achievements for their own sake made by Courtis and others.
Burgerstein ['91], using such examples as

28704516938276546397
+ 35869427359163827263
and similar long numbers to be multiplied by 2 or by 3 or by 4 or by 5 or by 6, found 851 errors in 28,267 answerfigures, or 3 per hundred answer-figures, or 3⁄5 of an error per example. The children were 9½ to 15 years old.
Laser ['94], using the same sort of addition and multiplication, found somewhat over 3 errors per hundred answerfigures in the case of boys and girls averaging 11½ years, during the period of their most accurate work. Holmes
['95], using addition of the sort just described, found 346 errors in 23,713 answer-figures or about 1½ per hundred.
The children were from all grades from the third to the eighth. In Laser's work, 21, 19, 13, and 10 answer-figures
were obtained per minute. Friedrich ['97] with similar examples, giving the very long time of 20 minutes for
obtaining about 200 answer-figures, found from 1 to 2 per hundred wrong. King ['07] had children in grade 5 do
sums, each consisting of 5 two-place numbers. In the most accurate work-period, they made 1 error per 20
columns. In multiplying a four-place by a four-place number they had less than one total answer right out of three.
In New York City Courtis found ['11-'12] with his Test 7 that in 12 minutes the average achievement of fourthgrade children is 8.8 units attempted with 4.2 right. In grade 5 the facts are 10.9 attempts with 5.8 right; in grade 6,
12.5 attempts with 7.0 right; in grade 7, 15 attempts with 8.5 right; in grade 8, 15.7 attempts with 10.1 right. These
results are near enough to those obtained from the country at large to serve as a text here.
The following were set as official standards, in an excellent school system, Courtis Series B being used:—

Addition

8
7
6
5
4

SPEED
ATTEMPTS.
12
11
10
9
8

Subtraction

8
7
6
5
4

12
11
10
9
7

90
90
90
80
80

Multiplication

8
7
6
5
4

11
10
9
7
6

80
80
80
70
60

Division

8
7
6
5
4

11
10
8
6
4

90
90
80
70
60

GRADE.

PERCENT OF
CORRECT ANSWERS.
80
80
70
70
70

Kirby ['13, pp. 16 ff. and 55 ff.] found that, in adding columns like those printed below, children in grade 4 got
on the average less than 80 percent of correct answers. Their average speed was about 2 columns per minute. In
doing division of the sort printed below children of grades 3 B and 4 A got less than 95 percent of correct answers,
the average speed being 4 divisions per minute. In both cases the slower computers were no more accurate than the
faster ones. Practice improved the speed very rapidly, but the accuracy remained substantially unchanged. Brown
['11 and '12] found a similar low status of ability and notable improvement from a moderate amount of special
practice.
3

5

6

2

3

8

9

7

4

9

7
3
8
2
6
9
3
6
8
—

9
4
8
2
9
6
3
8
4
—

6
7
4
4
5
4
7
9
6
—

5
8
8
7
7
2
9
6
9
—

5
7
2
6
8
7
9
4
9
—

6
3
6
9
5
2
9
7
2
—

4
7
8
8
2
9
2
7
6
—

5
9
2
5
3
4
8
9
9
—

8
3
9
6
2
4
9
2
8
—

2
7
8
2
4
5
7
4
9
—

20 = .... 5s
56 = .... 9s and .... r.
30 = .... 7s and .... r.
89 = .... 9s and .... r.
20 = .... 8s and .... r.
56 = .... 6s and .... r.
31 = .... 4s and .... r.
86 = .... 9s and .... r.
It is clear that numerical work as inaccurate as this has little or no commercial or industrial value. If clerks got
only six answers out of ten right as in the Courtis tests, one would need to have at least four clerks make each
computation and would even then have to check many of their discrepancies by the work of still other clerks, if he
wanted his accounts to show less than one error per hundred accounting units of the Courtis size.
It is also clear that the "habits of ... absolute accuracy, and satisfaction in truth as a result" which arithmetic is
supposed to further must be largely mythical in pupils who get right answers only from three to nine times out of
ten!
EARLY MASTERY
The bonds in question clearly must be made far stronger than they now are. They should in fact be strong
enough to abolish errors in computation, except for those due to temporary lapses. It is much better for a child to
know half of the multiplication tables, and to know that he does not know the rest, than to half-know them all; and
this holds good of all the elementary bonds required for computation. Any bond should be made to work perfectly,
though slowly, very soon after its formation is begun. Speed can easily be added by proper practice.
The chief reasons why this is not done now seem to be the following: (1) Certain important bonds (like the
additions with higher decades) are not given enough attention when they are first used. (2) The special training
necessary when a bond is used in a different connection (as when the multiplications to 9 × 9 are used in examples
like
729
8
where the pupil has also to choose the right number to multiply, keep in mind what is carried, use it properly, and
write the right figure in the right place, and carry a figure, or remember that he carries none) is neglected. (3) The
pupil is not taught to check his work. (4) He is not made responsible for substantially accurate results.
Furthermore, the requirement of (4) without the training of (1), (2), and (3) will involve either a fruitless failure on
the part of many pupils, or an utterly unjust requirement of time. The common error of supposing that the task of
computation with integers consists merely in learning the additions to 9 + 9, the subtractions to 18 − 9, the
multiplications to 8 × 9, and the divisions to 81 ÷ 9, and in applying this knowledge in connection with the
principles of decimal notation, has had a large share in permitting the gross inaccuracy of arithmetical work. The
bonds involved in 'knowing the tables' do not make up one fourth of the bonds involved in real adding, subtracting,
multiplying, and dividing (with integers alone).

It should be noted that if the training mentioned in (1) and (2) is well cared for, the checking of results as
recommended in (3) becomes enormously more valuable than it is under present conditions, though even now it is
one of our soundest practices. If a child knows the additions to higher decades so that he can add a seen one-place
number to a thought-of two-place number in three seconds or less with a correct answer 199 times out of 200, there
is only an infinitesimal chance that a ten-figure column twice added (once up, once down) a few minutes apart
with identical answers will be wrong. Suppose that, in long multiplication, a pupil can multiply to 9 × 9 while
keeping his place and keeping track of what he is 'carrying' and of where to write the figure he writes, and can add
what he carries without losing track of what he is to add it to, where he is to write the unit figure, what he is to
multiply next and by what, and what he will then have to carry, in each case to a surety of 99 percent of correct
responses. Then two identical answers got by multiplying one three-place number by another a few minutes apart,
and with reversal of the numbers, will not be wrong more than twice in his entire school career. Checks approach
proofs when the constituent bonds are strong.
If, on the contrary, the fundamental bonds are so weak that they do not work accurately, checking becomes
much less trustworthy and also very much more laborious. In fact, it is possible to show that below a certain point
of strength of the fundamental bonds, the time required for checking is so great that part of it might better be spent
in improving the fundamental bonds.
For example, suppose that a pupil has to find the sum of five numbers like $2.49, $5.25, $6.50, $7.89, and $3.75.
Counting each act of holding in mind the number to be carried and each writing of a column's result as equivalent
in difficulty to one addition, such a sum equals nineteen single additions. On this basis and with certain additional
estimates[7] we can compute the practical consequences for a pupil's use of addition in life according to the
mastery of it that he has gained in school.
I have so computed the amount of checking a pupil will have to do to reach two agreeing numbers (out of two,
or three, or four, or five, or whatever the number before he gets two that are alike), according to his mastery of the
elementary processes. The facts appear in Table 1.
It is obvious that a pupil whose mastery of the elements is that denoted by getting them right 96 times out of 100
will require so much time for checking that, even if he were never to use this ability for anything save a few
thousand sums in addition, he would do well to improve this ability before he tried to do the sums. An ability of
199 out of 200, or 995 out of 1000, seems likely to save much more time than would be taken to acquire it, and a
reasonable defense could be made for requiring 996 or 997 out of 1000.
A precision of from 995 to 997 out of 1000 being required, and ordinary sagacity being used in the teaching,
speed will substantially take care of itself. Counting on the fingers or in words will not give that precision. Slow
recourse to memory of serial addition tables will not give that precision. Nothing save sure memory of the facts
operating under the conditions of actual examples will give it. And such memories will operate with sufficient
speed.
TABLE 1
THE EFFECT OF MASTERY OF THE ELEMENTARY FACTS OF ADDITION UPON THE LABOR REQUIRED TO SECURE TWO AGREEING
ANSWERS WHEN ADDING FIVE THREE-FIGURE NUMBERS
MASTERY OF
THE

ELEMENTARY
ADDITIONS
TIMES
RIGHT IN
1000

APPROXIMATE
NUMBER OF
WRONG
ANSWERS IN
SUMS OF 5
THREE-PLACE
NUMBERS PER
1000

APPROXIMATE
NUMBER OF
AGREEING
ANSWERS,
AFTER ONE
CHECKING,
PER 1000

APPROXIMATE
NUMBER OF
AGREEING
ANSWERS,
AFTER A

CHECKING OF
THE FIRST
DISCREPANCIES

APPROXIMATE
NUMBER OF
CHECKINGS
REQUIRED
(OVER AND
ABOVE THE

FIRST
GENERAL
CHECKING OF
THE 100
SUMS) TO
SECURE TWO

960
980
990
995
996
997
998
999

700
380
190
95
76
54
38
19

90
384
656
819
854
895
925
962

216
676
906
975
984
992
996
999

AGREEING
RESULTS
4500
1200
470
210
165
115
80
40

There is one intelligent objection to the special practice necessary to establish arithmetical connections so fully
as to give the accuracy which both utilitarian and disciplinary aims require. It may be said that the pupils in grades
3, 4, and 5 cannot appreciate the need and that consequently the work will be dull, barren, and alien, without close
personal appropriation by the pupil's nature. It is true that no vehement life-purpose is directly involved by the
problem of perfecting one's power to add 7 to 28 in grade 2, or by the problem of multiplying 253 by 8 accurately
in grade 3 or by precise subtraction in long division in grade 4. It is also true, however, that the most humanly
interesting of problems—one that the pupil attacks most whole-heartedly—will not be solved correctly unless the
pupil has the necessary associative mechanisms in order; and the surer he is of them, the freer he is to think out the
problem as such. Further, computation is not dull if the pupil can compute. He does not himself object to its
barrenness of vital meaning, so long as the barrenness of failure is prevented. We must not forget that pupils like to
learn. In teaching excessively dull individuals, who has not often observed the great interest which they display in
anything that they are enabled to master? There is pathos in their joy in learning to recognize parts of speech,
perform algebraic simplifications, or translate Latin sentences, and in other accomplishments equally meaningless
to all their interests save the universal human interest in success and recognition. Still further, it is not very hard to
show to pupils the imperative need of accuracy in scoring games, in the shop, in the store, and in the office.
Finally, the argument that accurate work of this sort is alien to the pupil in these grades is still stronger against
inaccurate work of the same sort. If we are to teach computation with two- and three- and four-place numbers at
all, it should be taught as a reliable instrument, not as a combination of vague memories and faith. The author is
ready to cut computation with numbers above 10 out of the curriculum of grades 1-6 as soon as more valuable
educational instruments are offered in its place, but he is convinced that nothing in child-nature makes a large
variety of inaccurate computing more interesting or educative or germane to felt needs, than a smaller variety of
accurate computing!
THE STRENGTH OF BONDS FOR TEMPORARY SERVICE
The second general fact is that certain bonds are of service for only a limited time and so need to be formed only
to a limited and slight degree of strength. The data of problems set to illustrate a principle or improve some habit
of computation are, of course, the clearest cases. The pupil needs to remember that John bought 3 loaves of bread
and that they were 5-cent loaves and that he gave 25 cents to the baker only long enough to use the data to decide
what change John should receive. The connections between the total described situation and the answer obtained,
supposing some considerable computation to intervene, is a bond that we let expire almost as soon as it is born.
It is sometimes assumed that the bond between a certain group of features which make a problem a 'Buy a
things at b per thing, find total cost' problem or a 'Buy a things at b per thing, what change from c' problem or a
'What gain on buying for a and selling for b' problem or a 'How many things at a each can I buy for b cents'
problem—it is assumed that the bond between these essential defining features and the operation or operations
required for solution is as temporary as the bonds with the name of the buyer or the price of the thing. It is
assumed that all problems are and should be solved by some pure act of reasoning without help or hindrance from
bonds with the particular verbal structure and vocabulary of the problems. Whether or not they should be, they are
not. Every time that a pupil solves a 'bought-sold' problem by subtraction he strengthens the tendency to respond to
any problem whatsoever that contains the words 'bought for' and 'sold for' by subtraction; and he will by no means
surely stop and survey every such problem in all its elements to make sure that no other feature makes inapplicable
the tendency to subtract which the 'bought sold' evokes.

To prevent pupils from responding to the form of statement rather than the essential facts, we should then not
teach them to forget the form of statement, but rather give them all the common forms of statement to which the
response in question is an appropriate response, and only such. If a certain form of statement does in life always
signify a certain arithmetical procedure, the bond between it and that procedure may properly be made very strong.
Another case of the formation of bonds to only a slight degree of strength concerns the use of so-called
'crutches' such as writing +, −, and × in copying problems like those below:—
Add
23
61
—

Subtract
79
24
—

Multiply
32
3
—

or altering the figures when 'borrowing' in subtraction, and the like. Since it is undesirable that the pupil should
regard the 'crutch' response as essential to the total procedure, or become so used to having it that he will be
disturbed by its absence later, it is supposed that the bond between the situation and the crutch should not be fully
formed. There is a better way out of the difficulty, in case crutches are used at all. This is to associate the crutch
with a special 'set,' and its non-use with the general set which is to be the permanent one. For example, children
may be taught from the start never to write the crutch sign or crutch figure unless the work is accompanied by
"Write ... to help you to...."
Write - to help you to remember that
you must subtract in this row.

Find the differences:—
39
67
78
56
23
44
36
26

45
24

Remember that you must subtract
in this row.

Find the differences:—
85
27
96
38
63
14
51
45

78
32

The bond evoking the use of the crutch may then be formed thoroughly enough so that there is no hesitation,
insecurity, or error, without interfering to any harmful extent with the more general bond from the situation to
work without the crutch.
THE STRENGTH OF BONDS WITH TECHNICAL FACTS AND TERMS
Another instructive case concerns the bonds between certain words and their meanings, and between certain
situations of commerce, industry, or agriculture and useful facts about these situations. Illustrations of the former
are the bonds between cube root, hectare, brokerage, commission, indorsement, vertex, adjacent, nonagon, sector,
draft, bill of exchange, and their meanings. Illustrations of the latter are the bonds from "Money being lent 'with
interest' at no specified rate, what rate is charged?" to "The legal rate of the state," from "$X per M as a rate for
lumber" to "Means $X per thousand board feet, a board foot being 1 ft. by 1 ft. by 1 in."
It is argued by many that such bonds are valuable for a short time; namely, while arithmetical procedures in
connection with which they serve are learned, but that their value is only to serve as a means for learning these
procedures and that thereafter they may be forgotten. "They are formed only as accessory means to certain more
purely arithmetical knowledge or discipline; after this is acquired they may be forgotten. Everybody does in fact
forget them, relearning them later if life requires." So runs the argument.
In some cases learning such words and facts only to use them in solving a certain sort of problems and then
forget them may be profitable. The practice is, however, exceedingly risky. It is true that everybody does in fact
forget many such meanings and facts, but this commonly means either that they should not have been learned at all
at the time that they were learned, or that they should have been learned more permanently, or that details should
have been learned with the expectation that they themselves would be forgotten but that a general fact or attitude
would remain. For example, duodecagon should not be learned at all in the elementary school; indorsement should
either not be learned at all there, or be learned for permanence of a year or more; the details of the metric system
should be so taught as to leave for several years at least knowledge of the facts that there is a system so named that
is important, whose tables go by tens, hundreds, or thousands, and a tendency (not necessarily strong) to connect

meter, kilogram, and liter with measurement by the metric system and with approximate estimates of their several
magnitudes.
If an arithmetical procedure seems to require accessory bonds which are to be forgotten, once the procedure is
mastered, we should be suspicious of the value of the procedure itself. If pupils forget what compound interest is,
we may be sure that they will usually also have forgotten how to compute it. Surely there is waste if they have
learned what it is only to learn how to compute it only to forget how to compute it!
THE STRENGTH OF BONDS CONCERNING THE REASONS FOR
ARITHMETICAL PROCESSES
The next case of the formation of bonds to slight strength is the problematic one of forming the bonds involved
in understanding the reasons for certain processes only to forget them after the process has become a habit. Should
a pupil, that is, learn why he inverts and multiplies, only to forget it as soon as he can be trusted to divide by a
fraction? Should he learn why he puts the units figure of each partial product in multiplication under the figure that
he multiplies by, only to forget the reason as soon as he has command of the process? Should he learn why he gets
the number of square inches in a rectangle by multiplying the length by the width, both being expressed in linear
inches, and forget why as soon as he is competent to make computations of the areas of rectangles?
On general psychological grounds we should be suspicious of forming bonds only to let them die of starvation
later, and tend to expect that elaborate explanations learned only to be forgotten either should not be learned at all,
or should be learned at such a time and in such a way that they would not be forgotten. Especially we should
expect that the general principles of arithmetic, the whys and wherefores of its fundamental ways of manipulating
numbers, ought to be the last bonds of all to be forgotten. Details of how you arranged numbers to multiply might
vanish, but the general reasons for the placing would be expected to persist and enable one to invent the detailed
manipulations that had been forgotten.
This suspicion is, I think, justified by facts. The doctrine that the customary deductive explanations of why we
invert and multiply, or place the partial products as we do before adding, may be allowed to be forgotten once the
actual habits are in working order, has a suspicious source. It arose to meet the criticism that so much time and
effort were required to keep these deductive explanations in memory. The fact was that the pupil learned to
compute correctly irrespective of the deductive explanations. They were only an added burden. His inductive
learning that the procedure gave the right answer really taught him. So he wisely shuffled off the extra burden of
facts about the consequences of the nature of a fraction or the place values of our decimal notation. The bonds
weakened because they were not used. They were not used because they were not useful in the shape and at the
time that they were formed, or because the pupil was unable to understand the explanations so as to form them at
all.
The criticism was valid and should have been met in part by replacing the deductive explanations by inductive
verifications, and in part by using the deductive reasoning as a check after the process itself is mastered. The very
same discussions of place-value which are futile as proof that you must do a certain thing before you have done it,
often become instructive as an explanation of why the thing that you have learned to do and are familiar with and
have verified by other tests works as well as it does. The general deductive theory of arithmetic should not be
learned only to be forgotten. Much of it should, by most pupils, not be learned at all. What is learned should be
learned much later than now, as a synthesis and rationale of habits, not as their creator. What is learned of such
deductive theory should rank among the most rather than least permanent of a pupil's stock of arithmetical
knowledge and power. There are bonds which are formed only to be lost, and bonds formed only to be lost in their
first form, being used in a new organization as material for bonds of a higher order; but the bonds involved in
deductive explanations of why certain processes are right are not such: they are not to be formed just to be
forgotten, nor as mere propædeutics to routine manipulations.
PROPÆDEUTIC BONDS
The formation of bonds to a limited strength because they are to be lost in their first form, being worked over in
different ways in other bonds to which they are propædeutic or contributing is the most important case of low
strength, or rather low permanence, in bonds.

The bond between four 5s in a column to be added and the response of thinking '10, 15, 20' is worth forming,
but it is displaced later by the multiplication bond or direct connection of 'four 5s to be added' with '20.' Counting
by 2s from 2, 3s from 3, 4s from 4, 5s from 5, etc., forms serial bonds which as series might well be left to
disappear. Their separate steps are kept as permanent bonds for use in column addition, but their serial nature is
changed from 2 (and 2) 4, (and 2) 6, (and 2) 8, etc., to two 2s = 4, three 2s = 6, four 2s = 8, etc.; after playing their
part in producing the bonds whereby any multiple of 2 by 2 to 9, can be got, the original serial bonds are, as series,
needed no longer. The verbal response of saying 'and' in adding, after helping to establish the bonds whereby the
general set of the mind toward adding coöperates with the numbers seen or thought of to produce their sum, should
disappear; or remain so slurred in inner speech as to offer no bar to speed.
The rule for such bonds is, of course, to form them strongly enough so that they work quickly and accurately for
the time being and facilitate the bonds that are to replace them, but not to overlearn them. There is a difference
between learning something to be held for a short time, and the same amount of energy spent in learning for long
retention. The former sort of learning is, of course, appropriate with many of these propædeutic bonds.
The bonds mentioned as illustrations are not purely propædeutic, nor formed only to be transmuted into
something else. Even the saying of 'and' in addition has some genuine, intrinsic value in distinguishing the process
of addition, and may perhaps be usefully reviewed for a brief space during the first steps in adding common
fractions. Some such propædeutic bonds may be worth while apart from their value in preparing for other bonds.
Consider, for example, exercises like those shown below which are propædeutic to long division, giving the pupil
some basis in experience for his selection of the quotient figures. These multiplications are intrinsically worth
doing, especially the 12s and 25s. Whatever the pupil remembers of them will be to his advantage.
1. Count by 11s to 132, beginning 11, 22, 33.
2. Count by 12s to 144, beginning 12, 24, 36.
3. Count by 25s to 300, beginning 25, 50, 75.
4. State the missing numbers:—

A.
3 11s =
4 12s =
5 12s =
6 11s =
9 11s =
7 12s =
8 12s =
11 11s =

B.
5 11s =
3 12s =
6 12s =
12 11s =
2 12s =
9 12s =
7 11s =
12 12s =

C.
8 ft. = .... in.
10 ft. = .... in.
7 ft. = .... in.
4 ft. = .... in.
6 ft. = .... in.
9 ft. = .... in.
11 ft. = .... in.
5 ft. = .... in.

D.
2 dozen =
4 dozen =
10 dozen =
5 dozen =
7 dozen =
12 dozen =
9 dozen =
6 dozen =

5. Count by 25s to $2.50, saying, "25 cents, 50 cents, 75 cents, one dollar," and so on.
6. Count by 15s to $1.50.
7. Find the products. Do not use pencil. Think what they are.

A.
2 × 25
3 × 25
5 × 25
10 × 25
4 × 25
6 × 25
8 × 25
7 × 25
9 × 25

B.
3 × 15
10 × 15
4 × 15
2 × 15
7 × 15
9 × 15
5 × 15
8 × 15
6 × 15

C.
2 × 12
2 × 15
2 × 25
2 × 11
3 × 25
3 × 15
3 × 11
3 × 12
8 × 12

D.
4 × 11
4 × 15
4 × 12
4 × 25
5 × 11
5 × 12
5 × 15
5 × 25
9 × 12

E.
6 × 25
6 × 15
6 × 12
6 × 11
7 × 12
7 × 15
7 × 25
7 × 11
8 × 25

State the missing numbers:—

A. 36 = .... 12s
60 = .... 12s

B. 44 = .... 11s
88 = .... 11s

C. 50 = .... 25s
125 = .... 25s

24 = .... 12s
48 = .... 12s
144 = .... 12s
108 = .... 12s
72 = .... 12s
96 = .... 12s
84 = .... 12s

77 = .... 11s
55 = .... 11s
99 = .... 11s
110 = .... 11s
33 = .... 11s
66 = .... 11s
22 = .... 11s

75 = .... 25s
200 = .... 25s
250 = .... 25s
175 = .... 25s
225 = .... 25s
150 = .... 25s
100 = .... 25s

Find the quotients and remainders. If you need to use paper and pencil to find them, you may. But find as many as you can without pencil and paper.
Do Row A first. Then do Row B. Then Row C, etc.

Row A.
Row B.
Row C.
Row D.
Row E.
Row F.
Row G.
Row H.
Row I.
Row J.

11|45
25|55
12|60
12|75
11|100
11|96
25|105
12|64
11|80
25|200

12|45
11|55
25|60
11|75
12|100
12|96
11|105
15|64
12|80
30|200

25|45
12|55
15|60
15|75
25|100
25|96
15|105
25|64
15|80
75|200

15|45
15|55
11|60
25|75
15|100
15|96
12|105
11|64
25|80
63|200

21|45
22|55
30|60
30|75
30|100
30|96
22|105
22|64
35|80
65|200

22|45
30|55
21|60
35|75
22|100
22|96
35|105
21|64
21|80
66|200

Do this section again. Do all the first column first. Then do the second column, then the third, and so on.

Consider, from the same point of view, exercises like (3 × 4) + 2, (7 × 6) + 5, (9 × 4) + 6, given as a preparation
for written multiplication. The work of
48
3

68
7

47
9

and the like is facilitated if the pupil has easy control of the process of getting a product, and keeping it in mind
while he adds a one-place number to it. The practice with (3 × 4) + 2 and the like is also good practice intrinsically.
So some teachers provide systematic preparatory drills of this type just before or along with the beginning of short
multiplication.
In some cases the bonds are purely propædeutic or are formed only for later reconstruction. They then differ
little from 'crutches.' The typical crutch forms a habit which has actually to be broken, whereas the purely
propædeutic bond forms a habit which is left to rust out from disuse.
For example, as an introduction to long division, a pupil may be given exercises using one-figure divisors in the
long form, as:—
773
7 ) 5416
49
51
49
26
21
5

and 5 remainder

The important recommendation concerning these purely propædeutic bonds, and bonds formed only for later
reconstruction, is to be very critical of them, and not indulge in them when, by the exercise of enough ingenuity,
some bond worthy of a permanent place in the individual's equipment can be devised which will do the work as
well. Arithmetical teaching has done very well in this respect, tending to err by leaving out really valuable
preparatory drills rather than by inserting uneconomical ones. It is in the teaching of reading that we find the
formation of propædeutic bonds of dubious value (with letters, phonograms, diacritical marks, and the like) often
carried to demonstrably wasteful extremes.

CHAPTER VI
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DRILL IN ARITHMETIC: THE AMOUNT OF
PRACTICE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF ABILITIES
THE AMOUNT OF PRACTICE
It will be instructive if the reader will perform the following experiment as an introduction to the discussion of
this chapter, before reading any of the discussion.
Suppose that a pupil does all the work, oral and written, computation and problem-solving, presented for grades
1 to 6 inclusive (that is, in the first two books of a three-book series) in the average textbook now used in the
elementary school. How many times will he have exercised each of the various bonds involved in the four
operations with integers shown below? That is, how many times will he have thought, "1 and 1 are 2," "1 and 2 are
3," etc.? Every case of the action of each bond is to be counted.
THE FUNDAMENTAL BONDS

1+1
1+2
1+3
1+4
1+5
1+6
1+7
1+8
1+9

2−1
2−2

3−1
3−2
3−3

11 (or 21 or 31, etc.) + 1
11
"
+2
11
"
+3
11
"
+4
11
"
+5
11
"
+6
11
"
+7
11
"
+8
11
"
+9

4−1
4−2
4−3
4−4

5−1
5−2
5−3
5−4
5−5
6−1
6−2
6−3
6−4
6−5
6−6

2+1
2+2
2+3
2+4
2+5
2+6
2+7
2+8
2+9

12 (or 22 or 32, etc.) + 1
12
"
+2
and so on to
9+9
19 (or 29 or 39, etc.) + 9

7−1
7−2
7−3
7−4
7−5
7−6
7−7
and so on
to 18 − 9

1×1
2×1
3×1
4×1
5×1
6×1
7×1
8×1
9×1

1×2
2×2
3×2
4×2
5×2
6×2
7×2
8×2
9×2
1×3
2×3
3×3
4×3
5×3
6×3
7×3
8×3
9×3

1×4
2×4
and so on
to 9 × 9

2÷1
2÷2

3÷1
3÷2
3÷3

4÷1
4÷2
4÷3
4÷4

5÷1
5÷2
5÷3
5÷4
5÷5
6÷1
6÷2
6÷3
6÷4
6÷5
6÷6

7÷1
7÷2
7÷3
7÷4
7÷5
7÷6
7÷7
and so on to
82 ÷ 9 83 ÷ 9, etc.

If estimating for the entire series is too long a task, it will be sufficient to use eight or ten from each, say:—
3+2
" 3
" 4
" 5
" 6
" 7
" 8
" 9

13, 23, etc. + 2
"
3
"
4
"
5
"
6
"
7
"
8
"
9

7+2
" 3
" 4
" 5
" 6
" 7
" 8
" 9

17, 27, etc. + 2
"
3
"
4
"
5
"
6
"
7
"
8
"
9

3−3
4 "

7−7
8 "

9×7
7×9

63 ÷ 9
64 "

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"

8×6
6×8

65
66
67
68
69
70
71

"
"
"
"
"
"
"

TABLE 2
ESTIMATES OF THE AMOUNT OF PRACTICE PROVIDED IN BOOKS I AND II OF THE AVERAGE THREE-BOOK TEXT IN
ARITHMETIC; BY 50 EXPERIENCED TEACHERS

ARITHMETICAL
FACT

LOWEST
ESTIMATE

MEDIAN
ESTIMATE

HIGHEST
ESTIMATE

RANGE
REQUIRED TO
INCLUDE HALF
OF

3 or 13 or 23, etc. + 2
"
"
3
"
"
4
"
"
5
"
"
6
"
"
7
"
"
8
"
"
9

25
24
23
22
21
21
20
20

1500
1450
1150
1400
1350
1500
1400
1150

1,000,000
80,000
50,000
44,000
41,000
37,000
33,000
28,000

ESTIMATES
800-5000
475-5000
750-5000
700-5000
700-4500
600-4000
550-4100
650-4500

7 or 17 or 27, etc. + 2
"
"
3
"
"
4
"
"
5
"
"
6
"
"
7
"
"
8
"
"
9

20
19
18
17
16
15
13
10

1250
1100
1000
1300
1100
1100
1100
1275

2,000,000
1,000,000
80,000
80,000
29,000
25,000
21,000
17,000

600-5000
650-4900
650-4900
650-4400
650-4500
500-4500
650-3800
500-4000

3−3
4−3
5−3
6−3
7−3
8−3
9−3
10 − 3
11 − 3
12 − 3

25
20
20
10
22
21
21
20
20
18

1000
1050
1100
1050
1100
1075
1000
1000
1000
1000

100,000
500,000
2,500,000
21,000
15,000
15,000
15,000
20,000
15,000
15,000

500-4000
525-3000
650-4200
650-3250
550-3050
650-3000
700-2600
600-2500
465-2550
650-2100

7−7
8−7
9−7
10 − 7
11 − 7

10
15
15
15
10

1000
1000
950
950
900

18,000
18,000
18,000
18,000
18,000

425-3000
413-3100
550-3000
600-3950
550-3000

THE

12 − 7
13 − 7
14 − 7
15 − 7
16 − 7

10
10
10
10
10

925
900
900
925
875

18,000
18,000
18,000
18,000
18,000

525-3100
500-2600
500-3100
500-3000
500-2500

9×7
7×9
8×6
6×8

10
10
10
9

700
700
750
700

20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000

500-2000
500-1750
500-2500
500-2500

63 ÷ 9
64 ÷ 9
65 ÷ 9
66 ÷ 9
67 ÷ 9
68 ÷ 9
69 ÷ 9
70 ÷ 9
71 ÷ 9

9
9
8
7
7
6
6
5
5

500
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200

4,500
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000
4,000

300-2500
100- 700
100- 600
100- 550
75- 450
87- 575
87- 450
75- 575
75- 700

XX
XO
XXX
XXO
XOO
XOX

40
20
15
25
15
10

550
500
450
400
400
400

1,000,000
11,500
12,000
15,000
5,000
10,000

300-2000
150-2000
100-1000
150-1000
100-1000
100- 975

Having made his estimates the reader should compare them first with similar estimates made by experienced
teachers (shown on page 124 f.), and then with the results of actual counts for representative textbooks in
arithmetic (shown on pages 126 to 132).
It will be observed in Table 2 that even experienced teachers vary enormously in their estimates of the amount
of practice given by an average textbook in arithmetic, and that most of them are in serious error by overestimating
the amount of practice. In general it is the fact that we use textbooks in arithmetic with very vague and erroneous
ideas of what is in them, and think they give much more practice than they do.
The authors of the textbooks as a rule also probably had only very vague and erroneous ideas of what was in
them. If they had known, they would almost certainly have revised their books. Surely no author would
intentionally provide nearly four times as much practice on 2 + 2 as on 8 + 8, or eight times as much practice on 2
× 2 as on 9 × 8, or eleven times as much practice on 2 − 2 as on 17 − 8, or over forty times as much practice on 2 ÷
2 as on 75 ÷ 8 and 75 ÷ 9, both together. Surely no author would have provided intentionally only twenty to thirty
occurrences each of 16 − 7, 16 − 8, 16 − 9, 17 − 8, 17 − 9, and 18 − 9 for the entire course through grade 6; or have
left the practice on 60 ÷ 7, 60 ÷ 8, 60 ÷ 9, 61 ÷ 7, 61 ÷ 8, 61 ÷ 9, and the like to occur only about once a year!
TABLE 3
AMOUNT OF PRACTICE: ADDITION BONDS IN A RECENT TEXTBOOK (A) OF EXCELLENT REPUTE. BOOKS I AND II, ALL SAVE
FOUR SECTIONS OF SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL, TO BE USED AT THE TEACHER'S DISCRETION
The Table reads: 2 + 2 was used 226 times, 12 + 2 was used 74 times, 22 + 2, 32 + 2, 42 + 2, and so on were used 50 times.

2

2
226

3
154

4
162

5
150

6

7
97

8
87

TOTA

9
66

45

12
22,
etc.

74

53

76

46

51

37

36

33

50

60

68

63

42

50

38

26

3
13
23,
etc.

216
43

141
43

127
60

89
70

82
52

54
30

58
22

40
18

15

30

51

50

42

32

29

30

7
17
27,
etc.

85
35

90
25

103
42

103
32

84
35

81
21

61
29

47
16

30

23

32

29

24

23

25

28

8
18
28,
etc.

185
28

112
35

146
52

99
46

75
28

71
29

73
24

61
14

53

36

34

38

23

36

27

27

9
19
29,
etc.

104
13

81
11

112
31

96
38

63
25

74
14

58
22

57
11

19

17

27

20

32

32

19

18

350

277

306

260

190

174

140

104

1

274

214

230

209

176

116

109

88

1

148

138

187

164

141

125

115

91

1

266

183

232

185

126

136

124

102

1

136

109

170

154

120

120

99

86

1164

921

1125

972

753

671

687

471

2, 12,
22,
etc.
3, 13,
23,
etc.
7, 17,
27,
etc.
8, 18,
28,
etc.
9, 19,
29,
etc.
Totals

TABLE 4
AMOUNT OF PRACTICE: SUBTRACTION BONDS IN A RECENT TEXTBOOK (A) OF EXCELLENT REPUTE. BOOKS I
SAVE FOUR SECTIONS OF SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL, TO BE USED AT THE TEACHER'S DISCRETION

AND

II, ALL

SUBTRAHENDS
MINUENDS
1

1
372

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

214
136
146
171
80
106
73
71
261

311
149
142
91
59
57
50
75
84

11
12
13
14
15

189
103
92
69
55
50
54
63

48

205
164
71
67
75
74
100

31
48

50
77
35

136
81
59
50
48
193
36
57
22
25

192
156
62
55
83

80
48
55
57

152
124
124

41
51
40
37
33

32
35
29
36
19

46
80
35
49
48

16

36
27

327

569

16
17
18
Total
excluding
1 − 1, 2 − 2,
etc.

1258

755

565

713

571

558

TABLE 5
FREQUENCIES OF SUBTRACTIONS NOT INCLUDED IN TABLE 4
These are cases where the pupil would, by reason of his stage of advancement, probably operate 35 − 30, 46 − 46, etc., as one bond.

10, 20, 30, 40, etc.
11, 21, 31, 41, etc.
12, 22, 32, 42, etc.
13, 23, 33, 43, etc.
14, 24, 34, 44, etc.
15, 25, 35, 45, etc.
16, 26, 36, 46, etc.
17, 27, 37, 47, etc.
18, 28, 38, 48, etc.
19, 29, 39, etc.

1
11
21
etc.
11
42
47
7
8
21
5
5
2
5

2
12
22
etc.
29
14
97
40
28
28
18
9
16
7

3
13
23
etc.
16
22
5
7
14
29
12
12
10
7

4
14
24
etc.
52
32
13
14
58
54
27
40
23
10

SUBTRAHENDS
5
6
15
16
25
26
etc.
etc.
32
51
12
26
9
21
15
13
13
16
51
15
35
69
32
54
22
36
13
28

7
17
27
etc.
7
19
11
19
14
21
13
24
18
14

8
18
28
etc.
30
52
24
19
26
12
17
12
47
23

9
19
29
etc.
22
17
19
22
19
24
19
12
16
16

10
20
etc.
60
10
17
3
7
8
2
1
0
0

Totals

153

286

134

323

234

160

262

186

108

MINUENDS

TABLE 6

329

AMOUNT OF PRACTICE: MULTIPLICATION BONDS IN ANOTHER RECENT TEXTBOOK (B) OF EXCELLENT REPUTE. BOOKS I AND
II
MULTIPLICANDS
MULTIPLIERS
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

0
299
350
280
186
268
180
135
137
71

1
534
644
487
375
359
284
283
272
173

2
472
668
509
398
393
265
277
292
140

3
271
480
388
242
234
199
176
175
122

4
310
458
318
203
263
196
187
192
97

5
293
377
302
265
243
191
158
164
102

6
261
332
247
197
217
168
155
158
101

7
178
238
199
163
192
169
121
157
100

Totals

1906

3411

3414

2287

2224

2095

1836

1517

TABLE 7
AMOUNT OF PRACTICE: DIVISIONS WITHOUT REMAINDER IN TEXTBOOK B, PARTS I AND II
DIVISORS
DIVIDENDS
Integral
multiples of 2
to 9
in sequence;
i.e.,
4 ÷ 2 occurred
397 times,
6 ÷ 2 occurred
256 times,
6 ÷ 3, 224
times,
9 ÷ 3, 124
times.
Totals

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

397

224

250

130

93

44

98

23

256

124

152

79

28

43

61

25

318

123

130

65

50

19

39

19

258

98

86

105

25

24

34

20

198

49

76

27

22

30

33

16

77
180
69

54
91
46

36
50
37

31
38
24

28
17
12

27
13
17

16
22
16

9
16
15

1753

809

817

499

275

217

319

142

TABLE 8
DIVISION BONDS, WITH AND WITHOUT REMAINDERS. BOOK B
All work through grade 6, except estimates of quotient figures in long division.

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences
Dividend

2
1

2

3
1

2

3

4
1

2

3

4

5
1

2

3

41

386

27

189

240

26

397

66

185

23

136

43

6

7

Divisor
Number of
Occurrences
Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences
Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

21

256

224

68

43

83

23

72

55

38

46

32

8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
1

2

3

4

17

318

30

250

22

28

39

91

19

50

124

49

3

4

5

10
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

11
2

258

38

46

120

19

9

24

24

32

21

16

3

12
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

13
2

3

4

5

198

123

152

29

93

9

16

7

45

16

15

11

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

14
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

15
2

3

4

5

77

20

13

5

8

44

8

6

69

98

16

79

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

16
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

17
2

3

4

5

180

19

130

14

6

9

98

3

61

9

15

14

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

18
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

19
2

3

4

5

69

49

13

6

28

7

7

23

21

6

10

5

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

20
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

21
3

4

5

6

7

24

86

65

11

3

23

5

54

12

8

5

43

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

22
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

23
3

4

5

6

7

17

16

15

8

13

6

15

7

8

11

8

6

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

24
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

25
3

4

5

6

7

91

76

18

50

5

61

1

11

13

105

5

6

Dividend
Divisor
Number of

26
3
5

9
3

27
3
46

4
8

5
10

6
4

7
2

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

4
6

5
3

6
3

7
4

8
6

Occurrences
Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

28
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

29
3

4

5

6

7

4

36

8

3

19

3

7

6

8

0

5

11

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

30
4

5

6

7

8

9

31
4

5

6

7

8

9

21

27

25

6

7

13

4

3

1

1

4

2

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

32
4

5

6

7

8

9

33
4

5

6

7

8

9

50

11

3

6

39

5

8

7

7

2

6

1

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

34
4

5

6

7

8

9

35
4

5

6

7

8

9

8

3

5

2

1

1

10

31

5

24

5

3

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

36
4

5

6

7

8

9

37
4

5

6

7

8

9

37

16

22

2

6

19

12

8

7

5

3

9

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

38
4

5

6

7

8

9

39
4

5

6

7

8

9

7

8

7

1

1

5

4

3

7

4

3

1

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

40
5

6

7

8

9

41
5

6

7

8

9

42
5

6

38

9

2

34

2

6

6

3

7

5

7

28

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

43
5

6

7

8

9

44
5

6

7

8

9

45
5

6

7

5

10

3

2

7

6

4

5

0

24

6

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

46
5

6

7

8

9

47
5

6

7

8

9

48
5

6

3

3

2

2

2

6

2

2

0

3

7

17

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

49
5

6

7

8

9

50
6

7

8

9

51
6

7

8

4

7

27

9

2

4

6

3

8

2

3

1

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

53
6

7

8

9

54
6

7

8

9

55
6

7

8

9

4

3

2

2

12

5

1

16

5

3

4

2

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

57
6

7

8

9

58
6

7

8

9

59
6

7

8

9

0

3

1

3

2

2

3

1

2

3

0

3

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

62
7

8

9

63
7

8

9

64
7

8

9

65
7

8

9

4

6

1

17

5

9

5

22

0

1

10

1

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

68
7

8

9

69
7

8

9

70
8

9

71
8

9

72
8

9

1

3

2

0

6

1

6

2

1

0

16

10

Dividend
Divisor
Number of
Occurrences

76
8

9

77
8

9

78
8

9

79
8

9

80
9

81
9

82
9

83
9

3

2

3

0

4

1

0

2

4

15

2

4

Tables 3 to 8 show that even gifted authors make instruments for instruction in arithmetic which contain much
less practice on certain elementary facts than teachers suppose; and which contain relatively much more practice
on the more easily learned facts than on those which are harder to learn.
How much practice should be given in arithmetic? How should it be divided among the different bonds to be
formed? Below a certain amount there is waste because, as has been shown in Chapter VI, the pupil will need
more time to detect and correct his errors than would have been required to give him mastery. Above a certain
amount there is waste because of unproductive overlearning. If 668 is just enough for 2 × 2, 82 is not enough for 9
× 8. If 82 is just enough for 9 × 8, 668 is too much for 2 × 2.
It is possible to find the answers to these questions for the pupil of median ability (or any stated ability) by
suitable experiments. The amount of practice will, of course, vary according to the ability of the pupil. It will also
vary according to the interest aroused in him and the satisfaction he feels in progress and mastery. It will also vary
according to the amount of practice of other related bonds; 7 + 7 = 14 and 60 ÷ 7 = 8 and 4 remainder will help the
formation of 7 + 8 = 15 and 61 ÷ 7 = 8 and 5 remainder. It will also, of course, vary with the general difficulty of
the bond, 17 − 8 = 9 being under ordinary conditions of teaching harder to form than 7 − 2 = 5.
Until suitable experiments are at hand we may estimate for the fundamental bonds as follows, assuming that by
the end of grade 6 a strength of 199 correct out of 200 is to be had, and that the teaching is by an intelligent person
working in accord with psychological principles as to both ability and interest.
For one of the easier bonds, most facilitated by other bonds (such as 2 × 5 = 10, or 10 − 2 = 8, or the double
bond 7 = two 3s and 1 remainder) in the case of the median or average pupil, twelve practices in the week of first
learning, supported by twenty-five practices during the two months following, and maintained by thirty practices
well spread over the later periods should be enough. For the more gifted pupils lesser amounts down to six, twelve,
and fifteen may suffice. For the less gifted pupils more may be required up to thirty, fifty, and a hundred. It is to be
doubted, however, whether pupils requiring nearly two hundred repetitions of each of these easy bonds should be
taught arithmetic beyond a few matters of practical necessity.

For bonds of ordinary difficulty, with average facilitation from other
bonds (such as 11 − 3, 4 × 7, or 48 ÷ 8 = 6) in the case of the median or
average pupil, we may estimate twenty practices in the week of first
learning, supported by thirty, and maintained by fifty practices well spread
over the later periods. Gifted pupils may gain and keep mastery with twelve,
fifteen, and twenty practices respectively. Pupils dull at arithmetic may need
up to twenty, sixty, and two hundred. Here, again, it is to be doubted whether
a pupil for whom arithmetical facts, well taught and made interesting, are so
hard to acquire as this, should learn many of them.
For bonds of greater difficulty, less facilitated by other bonds (such as 17
− 9, 8 × 7, or 12½% of = 1⁄8 of), the practice may be from ten to a hundred
percent more than the above.
UNDERLEARNING AND OVERLEARNING
If we accept the above provisional estimates as reasonable, we may
consider the harm done by giving less and by giving more than these
reasonable amounts. Giving less is indefensible. The pupil's time is wasted
in excessive checking to find his errors. He is in danger of being practiced in
error. His attention is diverted from the learning of new facts and processes
by the necessity of thinking out these supposedly mastered facts. All new
bonds are harder to learn than they should be because the bonds which
should facilitate them are not strong enough to do so. Giving more does
harm to some extent by using up time that could be spent better for other
purposes, and (though not necessarily) by detracting from the pupil's interest
in arithmetic. In certain cases, however, such excess practice and
overlearning are actually desirable. Three cases are of special importance.
The first is the case of a bond operating under a changed mental set or
adjustment. A pupil may know 7 × 8 adequately as a thing by itself, but need
more practice to operate it in
285
7
——

where he has to remember that 3 is to be added to the 56 when he obtains it,
and that only the 9 is to be written down, the 5 to be held in mind for later
use. The practice required to operate the bond efficiently in this new set is
desirable, even though it is excess from a narrower point of view, and causes
the straightforward 'seven eights are fifty-six' to be overlearned. So also a
pupil's work with 24, 34, 44, etc., + 9 may react to give what would be
excess practice from the point of view of 4 + 9 alone; his work in estimating
approximate quotient figures in long division may give excess practice on
the division tables. There are many such cases. Even adding the 5 and 7 in
5⁄ + 7⁄ is not quite the same task as adding 5 and 7 undisturbed by the fact
12
12
that they are twelfths. We know far too little about the amount of practice
needed to adapt arithmetical bonds to efficient operation in these more
complicated conditions to estimate even approximately the allowances to be
made. But some allowance, and often a rather large allowance, must be
made.
The second is the case where the computation in general should be made
very easy and sure for the pupil except for some one new element that is
being learned. For example, in teaching the meaning and uses of 'Averages'
and of uneven division, we may deliberately use 2, 3, and 4 as divisors rather
than 7 and 9, so as to let all the pupil's energy be spent in learning the new
facts, and so that the fraction in the quotient may be something easily
understood, real, and significant. In teaching the addition of mixed numbers,
we may use, in the early steps,
11½
13½
24
——

rather than

79½
98½
67
——

so as to save attention for the new process itself. In cancellation, we may
give excess practice to divisions by 2, 3, 4, and 5 in order to make the
transfer to the new habits of considering two numbers together from the
point of view of their divisibility by some number. In introducing trade
discount, we may give excess practice on '5% of' and '10% of' deliberately,
so that the meaning of discount may not be obscured by difficulties in the
computation itself. Excess practice on, and overlearning of, certain bonds is
thus very often justifiable.

The third case concerns bonds whose importance for practical uses in life
or as notable facilitators of other bonds is so great that they may profitably
be brought to a greater strength than 199 correct out of 200 at a speed of 2
sec. or less, or be brought to that degree of strength very early. Examples of
bonds of such special practical use are the subtractions from 10, ½ + ½, ½ +
¼, ½ of 60, ¼ of 60, and the fractional parts of 12 and of $1.00. Examples of
notable facilitating bonds are ten 10s = 100, ten 100s = 1000, additions like
2 + 2, 3 + 3, and 4 + 4, and all the multiplication tables to 9 × 9.
In consideration of these three modifying cases or principles, a volume
could well be written concerning just how much practice to give to each
bond, in each of the types of complex situations where it has to operate.
There is evidently need for much experimentation to expose the facts, and
for much sagacity and inventiveness in making sure of effective learning
without wasteful overlearning.
The facts of primary importance are:—
(1) The textbook or other instrument of instruction which is a teacher's
general guide may give far too little practice on certain bonds.
(2) It may divide the practice given in ways that are apparently
unjustifiable.
(3) The teacher needs therefore to know how much practice it does give,
where to supplement it, and what to omit.
(4) The omissions, on grounds of apparent excess practice, should be
made only after careful consideration of the third principle described
above.
(5) The amount of practice should always be considered in the light of its
interest and appeal to the pupil's tendency to work with full power and
zeal. Mere repetition of bonds when the learner does not care whether
he is improving is rarely justifiable on any grounds.
(6) Practice that is actually in excess is not a very grave defect if it is
enjoyed and improves the pupil's attitude toward arithmetic. Not much
time is lost; a hundred practices for each of a thousand bonds after

mastery to 199 in 200 at 2 seconds will use up less than 60 hours, or
15 hours per year in grades 3 to 6.
(7) By the proper division of practice among bonds, the arrangement of
learning so that each bond helps the others, the adroit shifting of
practice of a bond to each new type of situation requiring it to operate
under changed conditions, and the elimination of excess practice
where nothing substantial is gained, notable improvements over the
past hit-and-miss customs may be expected.
(8) Unless the material for practice is adequate, well balanced and
sufficiently motivated, the teacher must keep close account of the
learning of pupils. Otherwise disastrous underlearning of many bonds
is almost sure to occur and retard the pupil's development.
THE ORGANIZATION OF ABILITIES
There is danger that the need of brevity and simplicity which has made us
speak so often of a bond or an ability, and of the amount of practice it
requires, may mislead the reader into thinking that these bonds and abilities
are to be formed each by itself alone and kept so. They should rarely be
formed so and never kept so. This we have indicated from time to time by
references to the importance of forming a bond in the way in which it is to
be used, to the action of bonds in changed situations, to facilitation of one
bond by others, to the coöperation of abilities, and to their integration into a
total arithmetical ability.
As a matter of fact, only a small part of drill work in arithmetic should be
the formation of isolated bonds. Even the very young pupil learning 5 and 3
are 8 should learn it with '5 and 5 = 10,' '5 and 2 = 7,' at the back of his mind,
so to speak. Even so early, 5 + 3 = 8 should be part of an organized,
coöperating system of bonds. Later 50 + 30 = 80 should become allied to it.
Each bond should be considered, not simply as a separate tool to be put in a
compartment until needed, but also as an improvement of one total tool or
machine, arithmetical ability.
There are differences of course. Knowledge of square root can be
regarded somewhat as a separate tool to be sharpened, polished, and used by

itself, whereas knowledge of the multiplication tables cannot. Yet even
square root is probably best made more closely a part of the total ability,
being taught as a special case of dividing where divisor is to be the same as
quotient, the process being one of estimating and correcting.
In general we do not wish the pupil to be a repository of separated
abilities, each of which may operate only if you ask him the sort of questions
which the teacher used to ask him, or otherwise indicate to him which
particular arithmetical tool he is to use. Rather he is to be an effective
organization of abilities, coöperating in useful ways to meet the quantitative
problems life offers. He should not as a rule have to think in such fashion as:
"Is this interest or discount? Is it simple interest or compound interest? What
did I do in compound interest? How do I multiply by 2 percent?" The
situation that calls up interest should also call up the kind of interest that is
appropriate, and the technique of operating with percents should be so
welded together with interest in his mind that the right coöperation will
occur almost without supervision by him.
As each new ability is acquired, then, we seek to have it take its place as
an improvement of a thinking being, as a coöperative member of a total
organization, as a soldier fighting together with others, as an element in an
educated personality. Such an organization of bonds will not form itself any
more than any one bond will create itself. If the elements of arithmetical
ability are to act together as a total organized unified force they must be
made to act together in the course of learning. What we wish to have work
together we must put together and give practice in teamwork.
We can do much to secure such coöperative action when and where and as
it is needed by a very simple expedient; namely, to give practice with
computation and problems such as life provides, instead of making up drills
and problems merely to apply each fact or principle by itself. Though a pupil
has solved scores of problems reading, "A triangle has a base of a feet and
an altitude of b feet, what is its area?" he may still be practically helpless in
finding the area of a triangular plot of ground; still more helpless in using the
formula for a triangle which is one of two into which a trapezoid is divided.
Though a pupil has learned to solve problems in trade discount, simple
interest, compound interest, and bank discount one at a time, stated in a few
set forms, he may be practically helpless before the actual series of problems
confronting him in starting in business, and may take money out of the

savings bank when he ought to borrow on a time loan, or delay payment on
his bills when by paying cash he could save money as well as improve his
standing with the wholesaler.
Instead of making up problems to fit the abilities given by school
instruction, we should preferably modify school instruction so that
arithmetical abilities will be organized into an effective total ability to meet
the problems that life will offer. Still more generally, every bond formed
should be formed with due consideration of every other bond that has been
or will be formed; every ability should be practiced in the most effective
possible relations with other abilities.

CHAPTER VII
THE SEQUENCE OF TOPICS: THE ORDER OF
FORMATION OF BONDS
The bonds to be formed having been chosen, the next step is to arrange for
their most economical order of formation—to arrange to have each help the
others as much as possible—to arrange for the maximum of facilitation and
the minimum of inhibition.
The principle is obvious enough and would probably be admitted in
theory by any intelligent teacher, but in practice we are still wedded to
conventional usages which arose long before the psychology of arithmetic
was studied. For example, we inherit the convention of studying addition of
integers thoroughly, and then subtraction, and then multiplication, and then
division, and many of us follow it though nobody has ever given a proof that
this is the best order for arithmetical learning. We inherit also the opposite
convention of studying in a so-called "spiral" plan, a little addition,
subtraction, multiplication, and division, and then some more of each, and
then some more, and many of us follow this custom, with an unreasoned
faith that changing about from one process to another is per se helpful.
Such conventions are very strong, illustrating our common tendency to
cherish most those customs which we cannot justify! The reductions of
denominate numbers ascending and descending were, until recently, in most
courses of study, kept until grade 4 or grade 5 was reached, although this
material is of far greater value for drills on the multiplication and division
tables than the customary problems about apples, eggs, oranges, tablets, and
penholders. By some historical accident or for good reasons the general
treatment of denominate numbers was put late; by our naïve notions of order
and system we felt that any use of denominate numbers before this time was
heretical; we thus became blind to the advantages of quarts and pints for the
tables of 2s; yards and feet for the tables of 3s; gallons and quarts for the

tables of 4s; nickels and cents for the 5s; weeks and days for the 7s; pecks
and quarts for the 8s; and square yards and square feet for the 9s. Problems
like 5 yards = __ feet or 15 feet = __ yards have not only the advantages of
brevity, clearness, practical use, real reference, and ready variation, but also
the very great advantage that part of the data have to be thought of in a
useful way instead of read off from the page. In life, when a person has
twenty cents with which to buy tablets of a certain sort, he thinks of the price
in making his purchase, asking it of the clerk only in case he does not know
it, and in planning his purchases beforehand he thinks of prices as a rule. In
spite of these and other advantages, not one textbook in ten up to 1900 made
early use of these exercises with denominate numbers. So strong is mere use
and wont.
Besides these conventional customs, there has been, in those responsible
for arithmetical instruction, an admiration for an arrangement of topics that
is easy for a person, after he knows the subject, to use in thinking of its
constituent parts and their relations. Such arrangements are often called
'logical' arrangements of subject matter, though they are often far from
logical in any useful sense. Now the easiest order in which to think of a
hierarchy of habits after you have formed them all may be an extremely
difficult order in which to form them. The criticism of other orders as
'scrappy,' or 'unsystematic,' valid enough if the course of study is thought of
as an object of contemplation, may be foolish if the course of study is
regarded as a working instrument for furthering arithmetical learning.
We must remember that all our systematizing and labeling is largely
without meaning to the pupils. They cannot at any point appreciate the
system as a progression from that point toward this and that, since they have
no knowledge of the 'this or that.' They do not as a rule think of their work in
grade 4 as an outcome of their work in grade 3 with extensions of a to a1,
and additions of b2 and b3 to b and b1, and refinements of c and d by c4 and
d5. They could give only the vaguest account of what they did in grade 3,
much less of why it should have been done then. They are not much
disturbed by a lack of so-called 'system' and 'logical' progression for the
same reason that they are not much helped by their presence. What they need
and can use is a dynamically effective system or order, one that they can
learn easily and retain long by, regardless of how it would look in a museum
of arithmetical systems. Unless their actual arithmetical habits are usefully

related it does no good to see the so-called logical relations; and if their
habits are usefully related, it does not very much matter whether or not they
do see these; finally, they can be brought to see them best by first acquiring
the right habits in a dynamically effective order.
DECREASING INTERFERENCE AND INCREASING
FACILITATION
Psychology offers no single, easy, royal road to discovering this
dynamically best order. It can only survey the bonds, think what each
demands as prerequisite and offers as future help, recommend certain orders
for trial, and measure the efficiency of each order as a means of attaining the
ends desired. The ingenious thought and careful experimentation of many
able workers will be required for many years to come.
Psychology can, however, even now, give solid constructive help in many
instances, either by recommending orders that seem almost certainly better
than those in vogue, or by proposing orders for trial which can be justified or
rejected by crucial tests.
Consider, for example, the situation, 'a column of one-place numbers to be
added, whose sum is over 9,' and the response 'writing down the sum.' This
bond is commonly firmly fixed before addition with two-place numbers is
undertaken. As a result the pupil has fixed a habit that he has to break when
he learns two-place addition. If oral answers only are given with such single
columns until two-place addition is well under way, the interference is
avoided.
In many courses of study the order of systematic formation of the
multiplication table bonds is : 1 × 1, 2 × 1, etc., 1 × 2, 2 × 2, etc., 1 × 3, 2 ×
3, etc., 1 × 9, 2 × 9, etc. This is probably wrong in two respects. There is
abundant reason to believe that the × 5s should be learned first, since they
are easier to learn than the 1s or the 2s, and give the idea of multiplying
more emphatically and clearly. There is also abundant reason to believe that
the 1 × 5, 1 × 2, 1 × 3, etc., should be put very late—after at least three or
four tables are learned, since the question "What is 1 times 2?" (or 3 or 5) is
unnecessary until we come to multiplication of two- and three-place
numbers, seems a foolish question until then, and obscures the notion of

multiplication if put early. Also the facts are best learned once for all as the
habits "1 times k is the same as k," and "k times 1 is the same as k."[8]
In another connection it was recommended that the divisions to 81 ÷ 9 be
learned by selective thinking or reasoning from the multiplications. This
determines the order of bonds so far as to place the formation of the division
bonds soon after the learning of the multiplications. For other reasons it is
well to make the proximity close.
One of the arbitrary systematizations of the order of formation of bonds
restricts operations at first to the numbers 1 to 10, then to numbers under
100, then to numbers under 1000, then to numbers under 10,000. Apart from
the avoidance of unreal and pedantic problems in applied arithmetic to
which work with large numbers in low grades does somewhat predispose a
teacher, there is little merit in this restriction of the order of formation of
bonds. Its demerits are many. For example, when the pupil is learning to
'carry' in addition he can be given better practice by soon including tasks
with sums above 100, and can get a valuable sense of the general use of the
process by being given a few examples with three- and four-place numbers
to be added. The same holds for subtraction. Indeed, there is something to be
said in favor of using six- or seven-place numbers in subtraction, enforcing
the 'borrowing' process by having it done again and again in the same
example, and putting it under control by having the decision between
'borrowing' and 'not borrowing' made again and again in the same example.
When the multiplication tables are learned the most important use for them
is not in tedious reviews or trivial problems with answers under 100, but in
regular 'short' multiplication of two- and three- and even four-place numbers.
Just as the addition combinations function mainly in the higher-decade
modifications of them, so the multiplication combinations function chiefly in
the cases where the bond has to operate while the added tasks of keeping
one's place, adding what has been carried, writing down the right figure in
the right place, and holding the right number for later addition, are also taken
care of. It seems best to introduce such short multiplication as soon as the ×
5s, × 2s, × 3s, and × 4s are learned and to put the × 6s, × 7s, and the rest to
work in such short multiplication as soon as each is learned.
Still surer is the need for four-, five-, and six-place numbers when twoplace numbers are used in multiplying. When the process with a two-place

multiplier is learned, multiplications by three-place numbers should soon
follow. They are not more difficult then than later. On the contrary, if the
pupil gets used to multiplying only as one does with two-place multipliers,
he will suffer more by the resulting interference than he does from getting
six- or seven-place answers whose meaning he cannot exactly realize. They
teach the rationale and the manipulations of long multiplication with especial
economy because the principles and the procedures are used two or three
times over and the contrasts between the values which the partial products
have in adding become three instead of one.
The entire matter of long multiplication with integers and United States
money should be treated as a teaching unit and the bonds formed in close
organization, even though numbers as large as 900,000 are occasionally
involved. The reason is not that it is more logical, or less scrappy, but that
each of the bonds in question thus gets much help from, and gives much help
to, the others.
In sharp contrast to a topic like 'long multiplication' stands a topic like
denominate numbers. It most certainly should not be treated as a large
teaching unit, and all the bonds involved in adding, subtracting, multiplying,
and dividing with all the ordinary sorts of measures should certainly not be
formed in close sequence. The reductions ascending and descending for
many of the measures should be taught as drills on the appropriate
multiplication and division tables. The reduction of feet and inches to inches,
yards and feet to yards, gallons and quarts to quarts, and the like are
admirable exercises in connection with the (a × b) + c = .... problems,—the
'Bought 3 lbs. of sugar at 7 cents and 5 cents worth of matches' problems.
The reductions of inches to feet and inches and the like are admirable
exercises in the d = (.... × b) + c or 'making change' problem, which in its
small-number forms is an excellent preparatory step for short division. They
are also of great service in early work with fractions. The feet-mile, squarefoot-square-inch, and other simple relations give a genuine and intelligible
demand for multiplication with large numbers.
Knowledge of the metric system for linear and square measure would
perhaps, as an introduction to decimal fractions, more than save the time
spent to learn it. It would even perhaps be worth while to invent a measure
(call it the twoqua) midway between the quart and gallon and teach carrying
in addition and borrowing in subtraction by teaching first the addition and

subtraction of 'gallon, twoqua, quart, and pint' series! Many of the bonds
which a system-made tradition huddled together uselessly in a chapter on
denominate numbers should thus be formed as helpful preparations for and
applications of other bonds all the way from the first to the eighth half-year
of instruction in arithmetic.
The bonds involved in the ability to respond correctly to the series:—
5 = .... 2s and .... remainder
5 = .... 3s and .... remainder
88 = .... 9s and .... remainder
should be formed before, not during, the training in short division. They are
admirable at that point as practice on the division tables; are of practical
service in the making-change problems of the small purchase and the like;
and simplify the otherwise intricate task of keeping one's place, choosing the
quotient figure, multiplying by it, subtracting and holding in mind the new
number to be divided, which is composed half of the remainder and half of a
figure in the written dividend. This change of order is a good illustration of
the nearly general rule that "When the practice or review required to perfect
or hold certain bonds can, by an inexpensive modification, be turned into a
useful preparation for new bonds, that modification should be made."
The bonds involved in the four operations with United States money
should be formed in grades 3 and 4 along with or very soon after the
corresponding bonds with three-place and four-place integers. This
statement would have seemed preposterous to the pedagogues of fifty years
ago. "United States money," they would have said, "is an application of
decimals. How can it be learned until the essentials of decimal fractions are
known? How will the child understand when multiplying $.75 by 3 that 3
times 5 cents is 1 dime and 5 cents, or that 3 times 70 cents is 2 dollars and 1
dime? Why perplex the young pupils with the difficulties of placing the
decimal point? Why disturb the learning of the four operations with integers
by adding at each step a second 'procedure with United States money'?"
The case illustrates very well the error of the older oversystematic
treatment of the order of topics and the still more important error of
confusing the logic of proof with the psychology of learning. To prove that 3
× $.75 = $2.25 to the satisfaction of certain arithmeticians, you may need to

know the theory of decimal fractions; but to do such multiplication all a
child needs is to do just what he has been doing with integers and then "Put a
$ before the answer to show that it means dollars and cents, and put a
decimal point in the answer to show which figures mean dollars and which
figures mean cents." And this is general. The ability to operate with integers
plus the two habits of prefixing $ and separating dollars from cents in the
result will enable him to operate with United States money.
Consequently good practice came to use United States money not as a
consequence of decimal fractions, learned by their aid, but as an introduction
to decimal fractions which aids the pupil to learn them. So it has gradually
pushed work with United States money further and further back, though
somewhat timidly.
We need not be timid. The pupil will have no difficulty in adding,
subtracting, multiplying, and dividing with United States money—unless we
create it by our explanations! If we simply form the two bonds described
above and show by proper verification that the procedure always gives the
right answer, the early teaching of the four operations with United States
money will in fact actually show a learning profit! It will save more time in
the work with integers than was spent in teaching it! For, in the first place, it
will help to make work with four-place and five-place numbers more
intelligible and vital. A pupil can understand $16.75 or $28.79 more easily
than 1675 or 2879. The former may be the prices of a suit or sewing machine
or bicycle. In the second place, it permits the use of a large stock of genuine
problems about spending, saving, sharing, and the like with advertisements
and catalogues and school enterprises. In the third place, it permits the use of
common-sense checks. A boy may find one fourth of 3000 as 7050 or 75 and
not be disturbed, but he will much more easily realize that one fourth of
$30.00 is not over $70 or less than $1. Even the decimal point of which we
used to be so afraid may actually help the eye to keep its place in adding.
INTEREST
So far, the illustrations of improvements in the order of bonds so as to get
less interference and more facilitation than the customary orders secure have
sought chiefly to improve the mechanical organization of the bonds. Any
gain in interest which the changes described effected would be largely due to

the greater achievement itself. Dewey and others have emphasized a very
different principle of improving the order of formation of bonds—the
principle of determination of the bonds to be formed by some vital, engaging
problem which arouses interest enough to lighten the labor and which goes
beyond or even against cut-and-dried plans for sequences in order to get
effective problems. For example, the work of the first month in grade 2B
might sacrifice facilitations of the mechanical sort in order to put arithmetic
to use in deciding what dimensions a rabbit's cage should have to give him
12 square feet of floor space, how much bread he should have per meal to
get 6 ounces a day, how long a ten-cent loaf would last, how many loaves
should be bought per week, how much it costs to feed the rabbit, how much
he has gained in weight since he was brought to the school, and so on.
Such sacrifices of the optimal order if interest were equal, in order to get
greater interest or a healthier interest, are justifiable. Vital problems as nuclei
around which to organize arithmetical learning are of prime importance. It is
even safe probably to insist that some genuine problem-situation requiring a
new process, such as addition with carrying, multiplication by two-place
numbers, or division with decimals, be provided in every case as a part of
the introduction to that process. The sacrifice should not be too great,
however; the search for vital problems that fit an economical order of subject
matter is as much needed as the amendment of that order to fit known
interests; and the assurance that a problem helps the pupil to learn arithmetic
is as important as the assurance that arithmetic is used to help the pupil solve
his personal problems.
Much ingenuity and experimentation will be required to find the order that
is satisfactory in both quality and quantity of interest or motive and
helpfulness of the bonds one to another. The difficulty of organizing
arithmetic around attractive problems is much increased by the fact of class
instruction. For any one pupil vital, personal problems or projects could be
found to provide for many arithmetical abilities; and any necessary
knowledge and technique which these projects did not develop could be
somehow fitted in along with them. But thirty children, half boys and half
girls, varying by five years in age, coming from different homes, with
different native capacities, will not, in September, 1920, unanimously feel a
vital need to solve any one problem, and then conveniently feel another on,
say, October 15! In the mechanical laws of learning children are much alike,

and the gain we may hope to make from reducing inhibitions and increasing
facilitations is, for ordinary class-teaching, probably greater than that to be
made from the discovery of attractive central problems. We should, however,
get as much as possible of both.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The reader may by now feel rather helpless before the problem of the
arrangement of arithmetical subject matter. "Sometimes you complete a
topic, sometimes you take it piecemeal months or years apart, often you
make queer twists and shifts to get a strategic advantage over the enemy," he
may think, "but are there no guiding principles, no general rules?" There is
only one that is absolutely general, to take the order that works best for
arithmetical learning. There are particular rules, but there are so many and
they are so limited by an 'other things being equal' clause, that probably a
general eagerness to think out the pros and cons for any given proposal is
better than a stiff attempt to adhere to these rules. I will state and illustrate
some of them, and let the reader judge.
Other things being equal, one new sort of bonds should not be started
until the previous set is fairly established, and two different sets should not
be started at once. Thus, multiplication of two- and three-place numbers by
2, 3, 4, and 5 will first use numbers such that no carrying is required, and no
zero difficulties are encountered, then introduce carrying, then introduce
multiplicands like 206 and 320. If other things were equal, the carrying
would be split into two steps—first drills with (4 × 6) + 2, (3 × 7) + 3, (5 ×
4) + 1, and the like, and second the actual use of these habits in the
multiplication. The objection to this separation of the double habit is that the
first part of it in isolation is too artificial—that it may be better to suffer the
extra difficulty of forming the two together than to teach so rarely used
habits as the (a × b) + c series. Experimental tests are needed to decide this
point.
Other things being equal, bonds should be formed in such order that none
will have to be broken later. For example, there is a strong argument for
teaching long division first, or very early, with remainders, letting the case of
zero remainder come in as one of many. If the pupils have been familiarized
with the remainder notion by the drills recommended as preparation for short

division,[9] the use of remainders in long division will offer little difficulty.
The exclusive use of examples without remainders may form the habit of not
being exact in computation, of trusting to 'coming out even' as a sole check,
and even of writing down a number to fit the final number to be divided
instead of obtaining it by honest multiplication.
For similar reasons additions with 2 and 3 as well as 1 to be 'carried' have
much to recommend them in the very first stages of column addition with
carrying. There is here the added advantage that a pupil will be more likely
to remember to carry if he has to think what to carry. The present common
practice of using small numbers for ease in the addition itself teaches many
children to think of carrying as adding one.
Other things being equal, arrange to have variety. Thus it is probably,
though not surely, wise to interrupt the monotony of learning the
multiplication and division tables, by teaching the fundamentals of 'short'
multiplication and perhaps of division after the 5s, 2s, 3s, and 4s are learned.
This makes a break of several weeks. The facts for the 6s, 7s, 8s, and 9s can
then be put to varied use as fast as learned. It is almost certainly wise to
interrupt the first half-year's work with addition and subtraction, by teaching
2 × 2, 2 × 3, 3 × 2, 2 × 4, 4 × 2, 2 × 5, later by 2 × 10, 3 × 10, 4 × 10, 5 × 10,
later by ½ + ½, 1½ + ½, ½ of 2, ½ of 4, ½ of 6, and at some time by certain
profitable exercises wherein a pupil tells all he knows about certain numbers
which may be made nuclei of important facts (say, 5, 8, 10, 12, 15, and 20).
Other things being equal, use objective aids to verify an arithmetical
process or inference after it is made, as well as to provoke it. It is well at
times to let pupils do everything that they can with relations abstractly
conceived, testing their results by objective counting, measuring, adding,
and the like. For example, an early step in adding should be to show three
things, put them under a book, show two more, put these under the book, and
then ask how many there are under the book, letting the objective counting
come later as the test of the correctness of the addition.
Other things being equal, reserve all explanations of why a process must
be right until the pupils can use the process accurately, and have verified the
fact that it is right. Except for the very gifted pupils, the ordinary
preliminary deductive explanations of what must be done are probably
useless as means of teaching the pupils what to do. They use up much time

and are of so little permanent effect that, as we have seen, the very
arithmeticians who advocate making them, admit that after a pupil has
mastered the process he may be allowed to forget the reasons for it. I am not
sure that the deductive proofs of why we place the decimal point as we do in
division by a decimal, or invert and multiply in dividing by a fraction, and
the like, are worth teaching at all. If they are to be taught at all, the time to
teach them is (except for the very gifted) after the pupil has mastered the
process and has confidence in it. He then at least knows what process he is to
prove is right, and that it is right, and has had some chance of seeing why it
is right from his experience with it.
One more principle may be mentioned without illustration. Arrange the
order of bonds with due regard for the aims of the other studies of the
curriculum and the practical needs of the pupil outside of school. Arithmetic
is not a book or a closed system of exercises. It is the quantitative work of
the pupils in the elementary school. No narrower view of it is adequate.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DISTRIBUTION OF PRACTICE
THE PROBLEM
The same amount of practice may be distributed in various ways. Figures
7 to 10, for example, show 200 practices with division by a fraction
distributed over three and a half years of 10 months in four different ways.
In Fig. 7, practice is somewhat equally distributed over the whole period. In
Fig. 8 the practice is distributed at haphazard. In Fig. 9 there is a first main
learning period, a review after about ten weeks, a review at the beginning of
the seventh grade, another review at the beginning of the eighth grade, and
some casual practice rather at random. In Fig. 10 there is a main learning
period, with reviews diminishing in length and separated by wider and wider
intervals, with occasional practice thereafter to keep the ability alive and
healthy.
Plans I and II are obviously inferior to Plans III and IV; and Plan IV gives
promise of being more effective than Plan III, since there seems danger that
the pupil working by Plan III might in the ten weeks lose too much of what
he had gained in the initial practice, and so again in the next ten weeks.

FIG. 7.—Plan I. 200 practices distributed somewhat evenly over 3½
years of 10 months. In Figs. 7, 8, 9, and 10, each tenth of an inch
along the base line represents one month. Each hundredth of a
square inch represents four practices, a little square 1⁄20 of an
inch wide and 1⁄20 inch high representing one practice.

FIG. 8.—Plan II. 200 practices distributed haphazard over 3½ years of
10 months.

FIG. 9.—Plan III. A learning period, three reviews, and incidental
practice.
It is not wise, however, to try now to make close decisions in the case of
practice with division by a fraction; or to determine what the best
distribution of practice is for that or any other ability to be improved. The
facts of psychology are as yet not adequate for very close decisions, nor are
the types of distribution of practice that are best adapted to different abilities
even approximately worked out.

FIG. 10.—Plan IV. A learning period with reviews of decreasing length at
increasing intervals.

SAMPLE DISTRIBUTIONS
Let us rather examine some actual cases of distribution of practice found
in school work and consider, not the attainment of the best possible
distribution, but simply the avoidance of gross blunders and the attainment
of reasonable, defensible procedures in this regard.
Figures 11 to 18 show the distribution of examples in multiplication with
multipliers of various sorts. X stands for any digit except zero. O stands for
0. XXO thus means a multiplier like 350 or 270 or 160; XOX means
multipliers like 407, 905, or 206; XX means multipliers like 25, 17, 38. Each
of these diagrams covers approximately 3½ years of school work, or from
about the middle of grade 3 to the end of grade 6. They are made from
counts of four textbooks (A, B, C, and D), the count being taken for each
successive 8 pages.[10] Each tenth of an inch along the base line equals 8
pages of the text in question. Each .01 sq. in. equals one example. The
books, it will be observed, differ in the amount of practice given, as well as
in the way in which it is distributed.

FIG. 11.—Distribution of practise with multipliers of the XX type in the
first two books of the three-book text A.

FIG. 12.—Same as Fig. 11, but for text B. Following this period come
certain pages of computation to be used by the teacher at her
discretion, containing 24 XX multiplications.
These distributions are worthy of careful study; we shall note only a few
salient facts about them here. Of the distributions of multiplications with
multipliers of the XX type, that of book D (Fig. 14) is perhaps the best. A

(Fig. 11) has too much of the practice too late; B (Fig. 12) gives too little
practice in the first learning; C (Fig. 13) gives too much in the first learning
and in grade 6. Among the distributions of multiplication with multipliers of
the XOX type, that of book D (Fig. 18) is again probably the best. A, B, and
C (Figs. 15, 16, and 17) have too much practice early and too long intervals
between reviews. Book C (Fig. 17) by a careless oversight has one case of
this very difficult process, without any explanation, weeks before the process
is taught!

FIG. 13.—Same as Fig. 11, but for text C.

FIG. 14.—Same as Fig. 11, but for text D.

FIG. 15.—Distribution of practice with multipliers of the XOX type in
the first two books of the three-book text A.

FIG. 16.—Same as Fig. 15, but for text B. Following this period come
certain pages of computation to be used by the teacher at her
discretion, containing 17 XOX multiplications.

FIG. 17.—Same as Fig. 16, but for text C.

FIG. 18.—Same as Fig. 16, but for text D.
Figures 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23 all concern the first two books of the threebook text E.
Figure 19 shows the distribution of practice on 5 × 5 in the first two books
of text E. The plan is the same as in Figs. 11 to 18, except that each tenth of
an inch along the base line represents ten pages. Figure 20 shows the
distribution of practice on 7 × 7; Fig. 21 shows it for 6 × 7 and 7 × 6

together. In Figs. 20 and 21 also, 0.1 inch along the base line equals ten
pages.
Figures 22 and 23 show the distribution of practice on the divisions of 72,
73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, and 79 by either 8 or 9, and on the divisions of 81, 82
... 89 by 9. Each tenth of an inch along the base line represents ten pages
here also.

FIG. 19.—Distribution of practice with 5 × 5 in the first two books of the
three-book text E.
Figures 19 to 23 show no consistent plan for distributing practice. With 5
× 5 (Fig. 19) the amount of practice increases from the first treatment in
grade 3 to the end of grade 6, so that the distribution would be better if the
pupil began at the end and went backward! With 7 × 7 (Fig. 20) the practice
is distributed rather evenly and in small doses. With 6 × 7 and 7 × 6 (Fig. 21)
much of it is in very large doses. With the divisions (Figs. 22 and 23) the
practice is distributed more suitably, though in Fig. 23 there is too much of it
given at one time in the middle of the period.

FIG. 20.—Distribution of practice with 7 × 7 in the first two books of text
E.

FIG. 21.—Distribution of practice with 6 × 7 or 7 × 6 in the first two
books of text E.

FIG. 22.—Distribution of practice with 72, 73 ... 79 ÷ 8 or 9 in the first
two books of text E.

FIG. 23.—Distribution of practice with 81, 82 ... 89 ÷ 9 in the first two
books of text E.
POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS
Even if we knew what the best distribution of practice was for each ability
of the many to be inculcated by arithmetical instruction, we could perhaps
not provide it for all of them. For, in the first place, the allotments for some
of them might interfere with those for others. In the second place, there are
many other considerations of importance in the ordering of topics besides
giving the optimal distribution of practice to each ability. Such are
considerations of interest, of welding separate abilities into an integrated
total ability, and of the limitations due to the school schedule with its
Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, and vacations.

Improvement can, however, be made over present practice in many
respects. A scientific examination of the teaching of almost any class for a
year, or of many of our standard instruments of instruction, will reveal
opportunities for improving the distribution of practice with no sacrifice of
interest, and with an actual gain in integrated functioning arithmetical power.
In particular it will reveal cases where an ability is given practice and then,
never being used again, left to die of inactivity. It will reveal cases where an
ability is given practice and then left so long without practice that the first
effect is nearly lost. There will be cases where practice is given and reviews
are given, but all in such isolation from everything else in arithmetic that the
ability, though existent, does not become a part of the pupil's general
working equipment. There will be cases where more practice is given in the
late than the earlier periods for no apparent extrinsic advantage; and cases
where the practice is put where it is for no reason that is observable save that
the teacher or author in question has decided to have some drill work at that
time!
Each ability has its peculiar needs in this matter, and no set rules are at
present of much value. It will be enough for the present if we are aroused to
the problem of distribution, avoid obvious follies like those just noted, and
exercise what ingenuity we have.

CHAPTER IX
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING:
ABSTRACT IDEAS AND GENERAL NOTIONS
IN ARITHMETIC[11]
RESPONSES TO ELEMENTS AND CLASSES
The plate which you see, the egg before you at the breakfast table, and this
page are concrete things, but whiteness, whether of plate, egg, or paper, is,
we say, an abstract quality. To be able to think of whiteness irrespective of
any concrete white object is to be able to have an abstract idea or notion of
white; to be able to respond to whiteness, irrespective of whether it is a part
of china, eggshell, paper or whatever object, is to be able to respond to the
abstract element of whiteness.
Learning arithmetic involves the formation of very many such ideas, the
acquisition of very many such powers of response to elements regardless of
the gross total situations in which they appear. To appreciate the fiveness of
five boys, five pencils, five inches, five rings of a bell; to understand the
division into eight equal parts of 40 cents, 32 feet, 64 minutes, or 16 ones; to
respond correctly to the fraction relation in 2⁄3, 5⁄6, 3⁄4, 7⁄12, 1⁄8, or any other;
to be sensitive to the common element of 9 = 3 × 3, 16 = 4 × 4, 625 = 25 ×
25, .04 = .2 × .2, ¼ = ½ × ½,—these are obvious illustrations. All the
numbers which the pupil learns to understand and manipulate are in fact
abstractions; all the operations are abstractions; percent, discount, interest,
height, length, area, volume, are abstractions; sum, difference, product,
quotient, remainder, average, are facts that concern elements or aspects
which may appear with countless different concrete surroundings or
concomitants.

Towser is a particular dog; your house lot on Elm Street is a particular
rectangle; Mr. and Mrs. I.S. Peterson and their daughter Louise are a
particular family of three. In contrast to these particulars, we mean by a dog,
a rectangle, and a family of three, any specimens of these classes of facts.
The idea of a dog, of rectangles in general, of any family of three is a general
notion, a concept or idea of a class or species. The ability to respond to any
dog, or rectangle, or family of three, regardless of which particular one it
may be, is the general notion in action.
Learning arithmetic involves the formation of very many such general
notions, such powers of response to any member of a certain class. Thus a
hundred different sized lots may all be responded to as rectangles; 9⁄18, 12⁄27,
15⁄ , and 27⁄
24
36 may all be responded to as members of the class, 'both
members divisible by 3.' The same fact may be responded to in different
ways according to the class to which it is assigned. Thus 4 in 3⁄4, 4⁄5, 45, 54,
and 405 is classed respectively as 'a certain sized part of unity,' 'a certain
number of parts of the size shown by the 5,' 'a certain number of tens,' 'a
certain number of ones,' and 'a certain number of hundreds.' Each abstract
quality may become the basis of a class of facts. So fourness as a quality
corresponds to the class 'things four in number or size'; the fractional quality
or relation corresponds to the class 'fractions.' The bonds formed with
classes of facts and with elements or features by which one whole class of
facts is distinguished from another, are in fact, a chief concern of
arithmetical learning.[12]
FACILITATING THE ANALYSIS OF ELEMENTS
Abstractions and generalizations then depend upon analysis and upon
bonds formed with more or less subtle elements rather than with gross total
concrete situations. The process involved is most easily understood by
considering the means employed to facilitate it.
The first of these is having the learner respond to the total situations
containing the element in question with the attitude of piecemeal
examination, and with attentiveness to one element after another, especially
to so near an approximation to the element in question as he can already
select for attentive examination. This attentiveness to one element after

another serves to emphasize whatever appropriate minor bonds from the
element in question the learner already possesses. Thus, in teaching children
to respond to the 'fiveness' of various collections, we show five boys or five
girls or five pencils, and say, "See how many boys are standing up. Is Jack
the only boy that is standing here? Are there more than two boys standing?
Name the boys while I point at them and count them. (Jack) is one, and
(Fred) is one more, and (Henry) is one more. Jack and Fred make (two)
boys. Jack and Fred and Henry make (three) boys." (And so on with the
attentive counting.) The mental set or attitude is directed toward favoring the
partial and predominant activity of 'how-many-ness' as far as may be; and
the useful bonds that the 'fiveness,' the 'one and one and one and one and
one-ness,' already have, are emphasized as far as may be.
The second of the means used to facilitate analysis is having the learner
respond to many situations each containing the element in question (call it
A), but with varying concomitants (call these V. C.) his response being so
directed as, so far as may be, to separate each total response into an element
bound to the A and an element bound to the V. C.
Thus the child is led to associate the responses—'Five boys,' 'Five girls,'
'Five pencils,' 'Five inches,' 'Five feet,' 'Five books,' 'He walked five steps,' 'I
hit my desk five times,' and the like—each with its appropriate situation. The
'Five' element of the response is thus bound over and over again to the
'fiveness' element of the situation, the mental set being 'How many?,' but is
bound only once to any one of the concomitants. These concomitants are
also such as have preferred minor bonds of their own (the sight of a row of
boys per se tends strongly to call up the 'Boys' element of the response). The
other elements of the responses (boys, girls, pencils, etc.) have each only a
slight connection with the 'fiveness' element of the situations. These slight
connections also in large part[13] counteract each other, leaving the field
clear for whatever uninhibited bond the 'fiveness' has.
The third means used to facilitate analysis is having the learner respond to
situations which, pair by pair, present the element in a certain context and
present that same context with the opposite of the element in question, or
with something at least very unlike the element. Thus, a child who is being
taught to respond to 'one fifth' is not only led to respond to 'one fifth of a
cake,' 'one fifth of a pie,' 'one fifth of an apple,' 'one fifth of ten inches,' 'one

fifth of an army of twenty soldiers,' and the like; he is also led to respond to
each of these in contrast with 'five cakes,' 'five pies,' 'five apples,' 'five times
ten inches,' 'five armies of twenty soldiers.' Similarly the 'place values' of
tenths, hundredths, and the rest are taught by contrast with the tens,
hundreds, and thousands.
These means utilize the laws of connection-forming to disengage a
response element from gross total responses and attach it to some situation
element. The forces of use, disuse, satisfaction, and discomfort are so
maneuvered that an element which never exists by itself in nature can
influence man almost as if it did so exist, bonds being formed with it that act
almost or quite irrespective of the gross total situation in which it inheres.
What happens can be most conveniently put in a general statement by using
symbols.
Denote by a + b, a + g, a + l, a + q, a + v, and a + B certain situations
alike in the element a and different in all else. Suppose that, by original
nature or training, a child responds to these situations respectively by r1 + r2,
r1 + r7, r1 + r12, r1 + r17, r1 + r22, r1 + r27. Suppose that man's neurones are
capable of such action that r1, r2, r7, r12, r22, and r27, can each be made
singly.
Case I. Varying Concomitants
Suppose that a + b, a + g, a + l, etc., occur once each.
We
have

a+
b
a+
g
a+l
a+
q
a+
v
a+
B

responded to
by

r1 + r2,

"

"

r1 + r7,

"

"

r1 + r12,

"

"

r1 + r17,

"

"

r1 + r22, and

"

"

r1 + r27, as shown in Scheme
I.

Scheme I
r1
r2
r7
r12
r17
r22
r27

a
6
1
1
1
1
1
1

b
1
1

g
1

l
1

q
1

v
1

B
1

1
1
1
1
1

a is thus responded to by r1 (that is, connected with r1) each time, or six in
all, but only once each with b, g, l, q, v, and B. b, g, l, q, v, and B are
connected once each with r1 and once respectively with r2, r7, r12, etc. The
bond from a to r1, has had six times as much exercise as the bond from a to
r2, or from a to r7, etc. In any new gross situation, a 0, a will be more
predominant in determining response than it would otherwise have been; and
r1 will be more likely to be made than r2, r7, r12, etc., the other previous
associates in the response to a situation containing a. That is, the bond from
the element a to the response r1 has been notably strengthened.
Case II. Contrasting Concomitants
Now suppose that b and g are very dissimilar elements (e.g., white and
black), that l and q are very dissimilar (e.g., long and short), and that v and B
are also very dissimilar. To be very dissimilar means to be responded to very
differently, so that r7, the response to g, will be very unlike r2, the response
to b. So r7 may be thought of as rnot 2 or r-2. In the same way r12 may be
thought of as rnot 12 or r-12, and r27 may be called rnot 22 or r-22.
Then, if the situations a b, a g, a l, a q, a v, and a B are responded to, each
once, we have:—
a+b
a+g
a+l

responded to by
"
"
"
"

r1 + r2,
r1 + rnot 2,

a+q
a+v
a+B

"
"
"

r1 + r12,
r1 + rnot 12,
r1 + r22, and
r1 + rnot 22, as shown in Scheme II.

"
"
"

Scheme II

r1
rnot 1
r2
rnot 2
r12
rnot
12

r22
rnot
22

a

b

6

1

1
1
1

1

1
1

g
(opp. of
b)
1

l

1

q
(opp. of
l)
1

v

1

B
(opp. of
v)
1

1
1
1
1

1

1

r1 is connected to a by 6 repetitions. r2 and rnot 2 are each connected to a by
1 repetition, but since they interfere, canceling each other so to speak, the net
result is for a to have zero tendency to call up r2 or rnot 2. r12 and rnot 12 are
each connected to a by 1 repetition, but they interfere with or cancel each
other with the net result that a has zero tendency to call up r12 or rnot 12. So
with r22 and rnot 22. Here then the net result of the six connections of a b, a g,
a l, a q, a v, and a B is to connect a with r, and with nothing else.
Case III. Contrasting Concomitants and Contrasting Element
Suppose now that the facts are as in Case II, but with the addition of six
experiences where a certain element which is the opposite of, or very
dissimilar to, a is connected with the response rnot 1, or r-1 which is opposite
to, or very dissimilar to r1. Call this opposite of a, − a.

That is, we have not only
a+b
a+g
a+l
a+q
a+v
a+B

r1 + r2,
r1 + rnot 2,
r1 + r12,
r1 + rnot 12,
r1 + r22, and
r1 + rnot 22,

responded to by
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"

but also
−a+b
−a+g
−a+l
−a+q
−a+v
−a+B

responded to by
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"

rnot 1 + r2,
rnot 1 + rnot 2,
rnot 1 + r12,
rnot 1 + rnot 12,
rnot 1 + r22, and
rnot 1 + rnot 22, as shown in Scheme III.
Scheme III

a
r1
rnot 1
r2
rnot 2
r12
rnot 12
r22
rnot 22

opp.
of a

6
1
1
1
1
1
1

6
1
1
1
1
1
1

b
g
(opp. of b)
1
1
1
1
2
2

l
q
(opp. of l)
1
1
1
1

v
B
(opp. of v)
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

In this series of twelve experiences a connects with r1 six times and the
opposite of a connects with rnot 1 six times. a connects equally often with
three pairs of mutual destructives r2 and rnot 2, r12 and rnot 12, r22 and rnot 22,

and so has zero tendency to call them up. − a has also zero tendency to call
up any of these responses except its opposite, rnot 1. b, g, l, q, v, and B are
made to connect equally often with r1 and rnot 1. So, of these elements, a is
the only one left with a tendency to call up r1.
Thus, by the mere action of frequency of connection, r1 is connected with
a; the bonds from a to anything except r1 are being counteracted, and the
slight bonds from anything except a to r1 are being counteracted. The
element a becomes predominant in situations containing it; and its bond
toward r1 becomes relatively enormously strengthened and freed from
competition.
These three processes occur in a similar, but more complicated, form if
the situations a + b, a + g, etc., are replaced by a + b + c + d + e + f, a + g +
h + i + j + k, etc., and the responses r1 + r2, r1 + r7, r1 + r12, etc., are replaced
by r1 + r2 + r3 + r4 + r5 + r6, r1 + r7 + r8 + r9 + r10 + r11, etc.—provided the
r1, r2, r3, r4, etc., can be made singly. In so far as any one of the responses is
necessarily co-active with any one of the others (so that, for example, r13
always brings r26 with it and vice versa), the exact relations of the numbers
recorded in schemes like schemes I, II, and III on pages 172 to 174 will
change; but, unless r1 has such an inevitable co-actor, the general results of
schemes I, II, and III will hold good. If r1 does have such an inseparable coactor, say r2, then, of course, a can never acquire bonds with r1 alone, but
everywhere that r1 or r2 appears in the preceding schemes the other element
must appear also. r1 r2 would then have to be used as a unit in analysis.
The 'a + b,' 'a + g,' 'a + l,' ... 'a + B' situations may occur unequal numbers
of times, altering the exact numerical relations of the connections formed
and presented in schemes I, II, and III; but the process in general remains the
same.
So much for the effect of use and disuse in attaching appropriate response
elements to certain subtle elements of situations. There are three main series
of effects of satisfaction and discomfort. They serve, first, to emphasize,
from the start, the desired bonds leading to the responses r1 + r2, r1 + r7, etc.,
to the total situations, and to weed out the undesirable ones. They also act to

emphasize, in such comparisons and contrasts as have been described, every
action of the bond from a to r1; and to eliminate every tendency of a to
connect with aught save r1, and of aught save a to connect with r1. Their
third service is to strengthen the bonds produced of appropriate responses to
a wherever it occurs, whether or not any formal comparisons and contrasts
take place.
The process of learning to respond to the difference of pitch in tones from
whatever instrument, to the 'square-root-ness' of whatever number, to
triangularity in whatever size or combination of lines, to equality of
whatever pairs, or to honesty in whatever person or instance, is thus a
consequence of associative learning, requiring no other forces than those of
use, disuse, satisfaction, and discomfort. "What happens in such cases is that
the response, by being connected with many situations alike in the presence
of the element in question and different in other respects, is bound firmly to
that element and loosely to each of its concomitants. Conversely any element
is bound firmly to any one response that is made to all situations containing
it and very, very loosely to each of those responses that are made to only a
few of the situations containing it. The element of triangularity, for example,
is bound firmly to the response of saying or thinking 'triangle' but only very
loosely to the response of saying or thinking white, red, blue, large, small,
iron, steel, wood, paper, and the like. A situation thus acquires bonds not
only with some response to it as a gross total, but also with responses to any
of its elements that have appeared in any other gross totals. Appropriate
response to an element regardless of its concomitants is a necessary
consequence of the laws of exercise and effect if an animal learns to make
that response to the gross total situations that contain the element and not to
make it to those that do not. Such prepotent determination of the response by
one or another element of the situation is no transcendental mystery, but,
given the circumstances, a general rule of all learning." Such are at bottom
only extreme cases of the same learning as a cat exhibits that depresses a
platform in a certain box whether it faces north or south, whether the
temperature is 50 or 80 degrees, whether one or two persons are in sight,
whether she is exceedingly or moderately hungry, whether fish or milk is
outside the box. All learning is analytic, representing the activity of elements
within a total situation. In man, by virtue of certain instincts and the course
of his training, very subtle elements of situations can so operate.

Learning by analysis does not often proceed in the carefully organized
way represented by the most ingenious marshaling of comparing and
contrasting activities. The associations with gross totals, whereby in the end
an element is elevated to independent power to determine response, may
come in a haphazard order over a long interval of time. Thus a gifted threeyear-old boy will have the response element of 'saying or thinking two,'
bound to the 'two-ness' element of very many situations in connection with
the 'how-many' mental set; and he will have made this analysis without any
formal, systematic training. An imperfect and inadequate analysis already
made is indeed usually the starting point for whatever systematic abstraction
the schools direct. Thus the kindergarten exercises in analyzing out number,
color, size, and shape commonly assume that 'one-ness' versus 'more-thanone-ness,' black and white, big and little, round and not round are, at least
vaguely, active as elements responded to in some independence of their
contexts. Moreover, the tests of actual trial and success in further undirected
exercises usually coöperate to confirm and extend and refine what the
systematic drills have given. Thus the ordinary child in school is left, by the
drills on decimal notation, with only imperfect power of response to the
'place-values.' He continues to learn to respond properly to them by finding
that 4 × 40 = 160, 4 × 400 = 1600, 800 − 80 = 720, 800 − 8 = 792, 800 − 800
= 0, 42 × 48 = 2016, 24 × 48 = 1152, and the like, are satisfying; while 4 ×
40 = 16, 23 × 48 = 832, 800 − 8 = 0, and the like, are not. The process of
analysis is the same in such casual, unsystematized formation of connections
with elements as in the deliberately managed, piecemeal inspection,
comparison, and contrast described above.
SYSTEMATIC AND OPPORTUNISTIC STIMULI TO
ANALYSIS
The arrangement of a pupil's experiences so as to direct his attention to an
element, vary its concomitants instructively, stimulate comparison, and
throw the element into relief by contrast may be by fixed, formal, systematic
exercises. Or it may be by much less formal exercises, spread over a longer
time, and done more or less incidentally in other connections. We may call
these two extremes the 'systematic' and 'opportunistic,' since the chief feature

of the former is that it systematically provides experiences designed to build
up the power of correct response to the element, whereas the chief feature of
the latter is that it uses especially such opportunities as occur by reason of
the pupil's activities and interests.
Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. The systematic
method chooses experiences that are specially designed to stimulate the
analysis; it provides these at a certain fixed time so that they may work
together; it can then and there test the pupils to ascertain whether they really
have the power to respond to the element or aspect or feature in question. Its
disadvantages are, first, that many of the pupils will feel no need for and
attach no interest or motive to these formal exercises; second, that some of
the pupils may memorize the answers as a verbal task instead of acquiring
insight into the facts; third, that the ability to respond to the element may
remain restricted to the special cases devised for the systematic training, and
not be available for the genuine uses of arithmetic.
The opportunistic method is strong just where the systematic is weak.
Since it seizes upon opportunities created by the pupil's abilities and
interests, it has the attitude of interest more often. Since it builds up the
experiences less formally and over a wider space of time, the pupils are less
likely to learn verbal answers. Since its material comes more from the
genuine uses of life, the power acquired is more likely to be applicable to
life.
Its disadvantage is that it is harder to manage. More thought and
experimentation are required to find the best experiences; greater care is
required to keep track of the development of an abstraction which is taught
not in two days, but over two months; and one may forget to test the pupils
at the end. In so far as the textbook and teacher are able to overcome these
disadvantages by ingenuity and care, the opportunistic method is better.
ADAPTATIONS TO ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PUPILS
We may expect much improvement in the formation of abstract and
general ideas in arithmetic from the application of three principles in
addition to those already described. They are: (1) Provide enough actual
experiences before asking the pupil to understand and use an abstract or

general idea. (2) Develop such ideas gradually, not attempting to give
complete and perfect ideas all at once. (3) Develop such ideas so far as
possible from experiences which will be valuable to the pupil in and of
themselves, quite apart from their merit as aids in developing the abstraction
or general notion. Consider these three principles in order.
Children, especially the less gifted intellectually, need more experiences
as a basis for and as applications of an arithmetical abstraction or concept
than are usually given them. For example, in paving the way for the
principle, "Any number times 0 equals 0," it is not safe to say, "John worked
8 days for 0 minutes per day. How many minutes did he work?" and "How
much is 0 times 4 cents?" It will be much better to spend ten or fifteen
minutes as follows:[14] "What does zero mean? (Not any. No.) How many
feet are there in eight yards? In 5 yards? In 3 yards? In 2 yards? In 1 yard? In
0 yard? How many inches are there in 4 ft.? In 2 ft.? In 0 ft.? 7 pk. = .... qt. 5
pk. = .... qt. 0 pk. = .... qt. A boy receives 60 cents an hour when he works.
How much does he receive when he works 3 hr.? 8 hr.? 6 hr.? 0 hr.? A boy
received 60 cents a day for 0 days. How much did he receive? How much is
0 times $600? How much is 0 times $5000? How much is 0 times a million
dollars? 0 times any number equals....
232
30
——
6960

(At the blackboard.) 0 time 232 equals what?
I write 0 under the 0.[15] 3 times 232 equals what?
Continue at the blackboard with
734
321
312
41
20
40
30
60
——
——
——
——

etc."

Pupils in the elementary school, except the most gifted, should not be
expected to gain mastery over such concepts as common fraction, decimal
fraction, factor, and root quickly. They can learn a definition quickly and
learn to use it in very easy cases, where even a vague and imperfect
understanding of it will guide response correctly. But complete and exact
understanding commonly requires them to take, not one intellectual step, but
many; and mastery in use commonly comes only as a slow growth. For
example, suppose that pupils are taught that .1, .2, .3, etc., mean 1⁄10, 2⁄10,

3⁄ ,
10

etc., that .01, .02, .03, etc., mean 1⁄100, 2⁄100, 3⁄100, etc., that .001, .002,
.003, etc., mean 1⁄1000, 2⁄1000, 3⁄1000, etc., and that .1, .02, .001, etc., are
decimal fractions. They may then respond correctly when asked to write a
decimal fraction, or to state which of these,—1⁄4, .4, 3⁄8, .07, .002, 5⁄6,—are
common fractions and which are decimal fractions. They may be able,
though by no means all of them will be, to write decimal fractions which
equal 1⁄2 and 1⁄5, and the common fractions which equal .1 and .09. Most of
them will not, however, be able to respond correctly to "Write a decimal
mixed number"; or to state which of these,—1⁄100 .4½, .007⁄350, $.25,—are
common fractions, and which are decimals; or to write the decimal fractions
which equal 3⁄4 and 1⁄3.
If now the teacher had given all at once the additional experiences needed
to provide the ability to handle these more intricate and subtle features of
decimal-fraction-ness, the result would have been confusion for most pupils.
The general meaning of .32, .14, .99, and the like requires some
understanding of .30, .10, .90, and .02, .04, .08; but it is not desirable to
disturb the child with .30 while he is trying to master 2.3, 4.3, 6.3, and the
like. Decimals in general require connection with place value and the
contrasts of .41 with 41, 410, 4.1, and the like, but if the relation to place
values in general is taught in the same lesson with the relation to ⁄10s, ⁄100s,
⁄1000s, the mind will suffer from violent indigestion.
A wise pedagogy in fact will break up the process of learning the meaning
and use of decimal fractions into many teaching units, for example, as
follows:—
(1) Such familiarity with fractions with large denominators as is desirable
for pupils to have, as by an exercise in reducing to lowest terms, 8⁄10, 36⁄64,
20⁄ , 18⁄ , 24⁄ , 21⁄ , 25⁄ , 40⁄ , and the like. This is good as a review of
25
24
32
30
100
100
cancellation, and as an extension of the idea of a fraction.
(2) Objective work, showing 1⁄10 sq. ft., 1⁄50 sq. ft., 1⁄100 sq. ft., and 1⁄1000
sq. ft., and having these identified and the forms 1⁄10 sq. ft., 1⁄100 sq. ft., and
1⁄
1
1
1000 sq. ft. learned. Finding how many feet = ⁄10 mile and ⁄100 mile.

(3) Familiarity with ⁄100s and ⁄1000s by reductions of 750⁄1000, 50⁄100, etc.,
to lowest terms and by writing the missing numerators in 500⁄1000 = ⁄100 = ⁄10
and the like, and by finding 1⁄10, 1⁄100, and 1⁄1000 of 3000, 6000, 9000, etc.
(4) Writing 1⁄10 as .1 and 1⁄100 as .01, 11⁄100, 12⁄100, 13⁄100, etc., as .11, .12,
.13. United States money is used as the introduction. Application is made to
miles.
(5) Mixed numbers with a first decimal place. The cyclometer or
speedometer. Adding numbers like 9.1, 14.7, 11.4, etc.
(6) Place value in general from thousands to hundredths.
(7) Review of (1) to (6).
(8) Tenths and hundredths of a mile, subtraction when both numbers
extend to hundredths, using a railroad table of distances.
(9) Thousandths. The names 'decimal fractions or decimals,' and 'decimal
mixed numbers or decimals.' Drill in reading any number to thousandths.
The work will continue with gradual extension and refinement of the
understanding of decimals by learning how to operate with them in various
ways.
Such may seem a slow progress, but in fact it is not, and many of these
exercises whereby the pupil acquires his mastery of decimals are useful as
organizations and applications of other arithmetical facts.
That, it will be remembered, was the third principle:—"Develop abstract
and general ideas by experiences which will be intrinsically valuable." The
reason is that, even with the best of teaching, some pupils will not, within
any reasonable limits of time expended, acquire ideas that are fully
complete, rigorous when they should be, flexible when they should be, and
absolutely exact. Many children (and adults, for that matter) could not within
any reasonable limits of time be so taught the nature of a fraction that they
could decide unerringly in original exercises like:—
Is 2.75⁄25 a common fraction?
Is $.25 a decimal fraction?

Is one xth of y a fraction?
Can the same words mean both a common fraction and a decimal
fraction?
Express 1 as a common fraction.
Express 1 as a decimal fraction.
These same children can, however, be taught to operate correctly with
fractions in the ordinary uses thereof. And that is the chief value of
arithmetic to them. They should not be deprived of it because they cannot
master its subtler principles. So we seek to provide experiences that will
teach all pupils something of value, while stimulating in those who have the
ability the growth of abstract ideas and general principles.
Finally, we should bear in mind that working with qualities and relations
that are only partly understood or even misunderstood does under certain
conditions give control over them. The general process of analytic learning
in life is to respond as well as one can; to get a clearer idea thereby; to
respond better the next time; and so on. For instance, one gets some sort of
notion of what 1⁄5 means; he then answers such questions as 1⁄5 of 10 = ? 1⁄5
of 5 = ? 1⁄5 of 20 = ?; by being told when he is right and when he is wrong,
he gets from these experiences a better idea of 1⁄5; again he does his best
with 1⁄5 = ⁄10, 1⁄5 = ⁄15, etc., and as before refines and enlarges his concept of
1⁄ . He adds 1⁄ to 2⁄ , etc., 1⁄ to 3⁄ , etc., 1⁄ to 1⁄ , etc., and thereby gains still
5
5
5
5
10
5
2
further, and so on.
What begins as a blind habit of manipulation started by imitation may thus
grow into the power of correct response to the essential element. The pupil
who has at the start no notion at all of 'multiplying' may learn what
multiplying is by his experience that '4 6 multiplying gives 24'; '3 9
multiplying gives 27,' etc. If the pupil keeps on doing something with
numbers and differentiates right results, he will often reach in the end the
abstractions which he is supposed to need in the beginning. It may even be
the case with some of the abstractions required in arithmetic that elaborate
provision for comprehension beforehand is not so efficient as the same
amount of energy devoted partly to provision for analysis itself beforehand

and partly to practice in response to the element in question without full
comprehension.
It certainly is not the best psychology and not the best educational theory
to think that the pupil first masters a principle and then merely applies it—
first does some thinking and then computes by mere routine. On the
contrary, the applications should help to establish, extend, and refine the
principle—the work a pupil does with numbers should be a main means of
increasing his understanding of the principles of arithmetic as a science.

CHAPTER X
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING:
REASONING IN ARITHMETIC
THE ESSENTIALS OF ARITHMETICAL
REASONING
We distinguish aimless reverie, as when a child dreams of a vacation trip,
from purposive thinking, as when he tries to work out the answer to "How
many weeks of vacation can a family have for $120 if the cost is $22 a week
for board, $2.25 a week for laundry, and $1.75 a week for incidental
expenses, and if the railroad fares for the round trip are $12?" We distinguish
the process of response to familiar situations, such as five integral numbers
to be added, from the process of response to novel situations, such as (for a
child who has not been trained with similar problems):—"A man has four
pieces of wire. The lengths are 120 yd., 132 meters, 160 feet, and 1⁄8 mile.
How much more does he need to have 1000 yd. in all?" We distinguish
'thinking things together,' as when a diagram or problem or proof is
understood, from thinking of one thing after another as when a number of
words are spelled or a poem in an unknown tongue is learned. In proportion
as thinking is purposive, with selection from the ideas that come up, and in
proportion as it deals with novel problems for which no ready-made habitual
response is available, and in proportion as many bonds act together in an
organized way to produce response, we call it reasoning.
When the conclusion is reached as the effect of many particular
experiences, the reasoning is called inductive. When some principle already
established leads to another principle or to a conclusion about some
particular fact, the reasoning is called deductive. In both cases the process
involves the analysis of facts into their elements, the selection of the
elements that are deemed significant for the question at hand, the attachment

of a certain amount of importance or weight to each of them, and their use in
the right relations. Thought may fail because it has not suitable facts, or does
not select from them the right ones, or does not attach the right amount of
weight to each, or does not put them together properly.
In the world at large, many of our failures in thinking are due to not
having suitable facts. Some of my readers, for example, cannot solve the
problem—"What are the chances that in drawing a card from an ordinary
pack of playing-cards four times in succession, the same card will be drawn
each time?" And it will be probably because they do not know certain facts
about the theory of probabilities. The good thinkers among such would look
the matter up in a suitable book. Similarly, if a person did not happen to
know that there were fifty-two cards in all and that no two were alike, he
could not reason out the answer, no matter what his mastery of the theory of
probabilities. If a competent thinker, he would first ask about the size and
nature of the pack. In the actual practice of reasoning, that is, we have to
survey our facts to see if we lack any that are necessary. If we do, the first
task of reasoning is to acquire those facts.
This is specially true of the reasoning about arithmetical facts in life.
"Will 3½ yards of this be enough for a dress?" Reason directs you to learn
how wide it is, what style of dress you intend to make of it, how much
material that style normally calls for, whether you are a careful or a wasteful
cutter, and how big the person is for whom the dress is to be made. "How
much cheaper as a diet is bread alone, than bread with butter added to the
extent of 10% of the weight of the bread?" Reason directs you to learn the
cost of bread, the cost of butter, the nutritive value of bread, and the nutritive
value of butter.
In the arithmetic of the school this feature of reasoning appears in cases
where some fact about common measures must be brought to bear, or some
table of prices or discounts must be consulted, or some business custom
must be remembered or looked up.
Thus "How many badges, each 9 inches long, can be made from 2½ yd.
ribbon?" cannot be solved without getting into mind 1 yd. = 36 inches. "At
Jones' prices, which costs more, 3¾ lb. butter or 6½ lb. lard? How much
more?" is a problem which directs the thinker to ascertain Jones' prices.

It may be noted that such problems are, other things being equal,
somewhat better training in thinking than problems where all the data are
given in the problem itself (e.g., "Which costs more, 3¾ lb. butter at 48¢ per
lb. or 6½ lb. lard at 27¢ per lb.? How much more?"). At least it is unwise to
have so many problems of the latter sort that the pupil may come to think of
a problem in applied arithmetic as a problem where everything is given and
he has only to manipulate the data. Life does not present its problems so.
The process of selecting the right elements and attaching proper weight to
them may be illustrated by the following problem:—"Which of these offers
would you take, supposing that you wish a D.C.K. upright piano, have $50
saved, can save a little over $20 per month, and can borrow from your father
at 6% interest?"

A
A Reliable Piano. The Famous D.C.K. Upright. You pay $50 cash down and $21 a month for only a year and a half. No interest to pay. We
ask you to pay only for the piano and allow you plenty of time.
B
We offer the well-known D.C.K. Piano for $390. $50 cash and $20 a month thereafter. Regular interest at 6%. The interest soon is reduced
to less than $1 a month.
C
The D.C.K. Piano. Special Offer, $375, cash. Compare our prices with those of any reliable firm.

If you consider chiefly the "only," "No interest to pay," "only," and "plenty of time" in offer A,
attaching much weight to them and little to the thought, "How much will $50 plus (18 × $21) be?", you
will probably decide wrongly.
The situations of life are often complicated by many elements of little or even of no relevance to the
correct solution. The offerer of A may belong to your church; your dearest friend may urge you to accept
offer B; you may dislike to talk with the dealer who makes offer C; you may have a prejudice against
owing money to a relative; that prejudice may be wise or foolish; you may have a suspicion that the B
piano is shopworn; that suspicion may be well-founded or groundless; the salesman for C says, "You
don't want your friends to say that you bought on the installment plan. Only low-class persons do that,"
etc. The statement of arithmetical problems in school usually assists the pupil to the extent of ruling out
all save definitely quantitative elements, and of ruling out all quantitative elements except those which
should be considered. The first of the two simplifications is very beneficial, on the whole, since otherwise
there might be different correct solutions to a problem according to the nature and circumstances of the
persons involved. The second simplification is often desirable, since it will often produce greater
improvement in the pupils, per hour of time spent, than would be produced by the problems requiring
more selection. It should not, however, be a universal custom; for in that case the pupils are tempted to
think that in every problem they must use all the quantities given, as one must use all the pieces in a
puzzle picture.
It is obvious that the elements selected must not only be right but also be in the right relations to one
another. For example, in the problems below, the 6 must be thought of in relation to a dozen and as being
half of a dozen, and also as being 6 times 1. 1 must be mentally tied to "each." The 6 as half of a dozen
must be related to the $1.00, $1.60, etc. The 6 as 6 times 1 must be related to the $.09, $.14, etc.
Buying in Quantity
These are a grocer's prices for certain things by the dozen and for a single one. He sells a half dozen at half the price of a dozen. Find out
how much you save by buying 6 all at one time instead of buying them one at a time.

1. Evaporated Milk
2. Puffed Rice
3. Puffed Wheat
4. Canned Soup
5. Sardines
6. Beans (No. 2 cans)
7. Pork and Beans
8. Peas (No. 2 cans)
9. Tomatoes (extra cans)
10. Ripe olives (qt. cans)

Doz.
$1.00
1.60
1.10
1.90
1.80
1.50
1.70
1.40
3.20
7.20

Each
$.09
.14
.10
.17
.16
.13
.15
.12
.28
.65

It is obvious also that in such arithmetical work as we have been describing, the pupil, to be successful,
must 'think things together.' Many bonds must coöperate to determine his final response.
As a preface to reasoning about a problem we often have the discovery of the problem and the
classification of just what it is, and as a postscript we have the critical inspection of the answer obtained
to make sure that it is verified by experiment or is consistent with known facts. During the process of
searching for, selecting, and weighting facts, there may be similar inspection and validation, item by
item.
REASONING AS THE COÖPERATION OF ORGANIZED HABITS
The pedagogy of the past made two notable errors in practice based on two errors about the
psychology of reasoning. It considered reasoning as a somewhat magical power or essence which acted to
counteract and overrule the ordinary laws of habit in man; and it separated too sharply the 'understanding
of principles' by reasoning from the 'mechanical' work of computation, reading problems, remembering
facts and the like, done by 'mere' habit and memory.
Reasoning or selective, inferential thinking is not at all opposed to, or independent of, the laws of
habit, but really is their necessary result under the conditions imposed by man's nature and training. A
closer examination of selective thinking will show that no principles beyond the laws of readiness,
exercise, and effect are needed to explain it; that it is only an extreme case of what goes on in associative
learning as described under the 'piecemeal' activity of situations; and that attributing certain features of
learning to mysterious faculties of abstraction or reasoning gives no real help toward understanding or
controlling them.
It is true that man's behavior in meeting novel problems goes beyond, or even against, the habits
represented by bonds leading from gross total situations and customarily abstracted elements thereof. One
of the two reasons therefor, however, is simply that the finer, subtle, preferential bonds with subtler and
less often abstracted elements go beyond, and at times against, the grosser and more usual bonds. One set
is as much due to exercise and effect as the other. The other reason is that in meeting novel problems the
mental set or attitude is likely to be one which rejects one after another response as their unfitness to
satisfy a certain desideratum appears. What remains as the apparent course of thought includes only a few
of the many bonds which did operate, but which, for the most part, were unsatisfying to the ruling
attitude or adjustment.
Successful responses to novel data, associations by similarity and purposive behavior are in only
apparent opposition to the fundamental laws of associative learning. Really they are beautiful examples
of it. Man's successful responses to novel data—as when he argues that the diagonal on a right triangle of
796.278 mm. base and 137.294 mm. altitude will be 808.022 mm., or that Mary Jones, born this morning,
will sometime die—are due to habits, notably the habits of response to certain elements or features, under
the laws of piecemeal activity and assimilation.
Nothing is less like the mysterious operations of a faculty of reasoning transcending the laws of
connection-forming, than the behavior of men in response to novel situations. Let children who have
hitherto confronted only such arithmetical tasks, in addition and subtraction with one- and two-place
numbers and multiplication with one-place numbers, as those exemplified in the first line below, be told
to do the examples shown in the second line.
ADD
8
5
—

ADD
37
24
—

ADD
35
68
23

SUBT.
8
5
—

SUBT.
37
24
—

MULTIPLY
8
5
—

MULTIPLY
9
7
—

MULTIPLY
6
3
—

19
—
MULTIPLY
32
23
—

MULTIPLY
43
22
—

MULTIPLY
34
26
—

They will add the numbers, or subtract the lower from the upper number, or multiply 3 × 2 and 2 × 3,
etc., getting 66, 86, and 624, or respond to the element of 'Multiply' attached to the two-place numbers by
"I can't" or "I don't know what to do," or the like; or, if one is a child of great ability, he may consider the
'Multiply' element and the bigness of the numbers, be reminded by these two aspects of the situation of
the fact that
'9
9 multiply'
—
gave only 81, and that
'10
10 multiply'
——
gave only 100, or the like; and so may report an intelligent and justified "I can't," or reject the plan of
3 × 2 and 2 × 3, with 66, 86, and 624 for answers, as unsatisfactory. What the children will do will, in
every case, be a product of the elements in the situation that are potent with them, the responses which
these evoke, and the further associates which these responses in turn evoke. If the child were one of
sufficient genius, he might infer the procedure to be followed as a result of his knowledge of the
principles of decimal notation and the meaning of 'Multiply,' responding correctly to the 'place-value'
element of each digit and adding his 6 tens and 9 tens, 20 twos and 3 thirties; but if he did thus invent the
shorthand addition of a collection of twenty-three collections, each of 32 units, he would still do it by the
operation of bonds, subtle but real.
Association by similarity is, as James showed long ago, simply the tendency of an element to provoke
the responses which have been bound to it. abcde leads to vwxyz because a has been bound to vwxyz by
original nature, exercise, or effect.
Purposive behavior is the most important case of the influence of the attitude or set or adjustment of an
organism in determining (1) which bonds shall act, and (2) which results shall satisfy. James early
described the former fact, showing that the mechanism of habit can give the directedness or
purposefulness in thought's products, provided that mechanism includes something paralleling the
problem, the aim, or need, in question.
The second fact, that the set or attitude of the man helps to determine which bonds shall satisfy, and
which shall annoy, has commonly been somewhat obscured by vague assertions that the selection and
retention is of what is "in point," or is "the right one," or is "appropriate," or the like. It is thus asserted, or
at least hinted, that "the will," "the voluntary attention," "the consciousness of the problem," and other
such entities are endowed with magic power to decide what is the "right" or "useful" bond and to kill off
the others. The facts are that in purposive thinking and action, as everywhere else, bonds are selected and
retained by the satisfyingness, and are killed off by the discomfort, which they produce; and that the
potency of the man's set or attitude to make this satisfy and that annoy—to put certain conduction-units in
readiness to act and others in unreadiness—is in every way as important as its potency to set certain
conduction-units in actual operation.

Reasoning is not a radically different sort of force operating against habit but the organization and
coöperation of many habits, thinking facts together. Reasoning is not the negation of ordinary bonds, but
the action of many of them, especially of bonds with subtle elements of the situation. Some outside
power does not enter to select and criticize; the pupil's own total repertory of bonds relevant to the
problem is what selects and rejects. An unsuitable idea is not killed off by some actus purus of intellect,
but by the ideas which it itself calls up, in connection with the total set of mind of the pupil, and which
show it to be inadequate.
Almost nothing in arithmetic need be taught as a matter of mere unreasoning habit or memory, nor
need anything, first taught as a principle, ever become a matter of mere habit or memory. 5 × 4 = 20
should not be learned as an isolated fact, nor remembered as we remember that Jones' telephone number
is 648 J 2. Almost everything in arithmetic should be taught as a habit that has connections with habits
already acquired and will work in an organization with other habits to come. The use of this organized
hierarchy of habits to solve novel problems is reasoning.

CHAPTER XI
ORIGINAL TENDENCIES AND ACQUISITIONS BEFORE
SCHOOL
THE UTILIZATION OF INSTINCTIVE INTERESTS
The activities essential to acquiring ability in arithmetic can rely on little in man's instinctive
equipment beyond the purely intellectual tendencies of curiosity and the satisfyingness of thought for
thought's sake, and the general enjoyment of success rather than failure in an enterprise to which one sets
oneself. It is only by a certain amount of artifice that we can enlist other vehement inborn interests of
childhood in the service of arithmetical knowledge and skill. When this can be done at no cost the gain is
great. For example, marching in files of two, in files of three, in files of four, etc., raising the arms once,
two times, three times, showing a foot, a yard, an inch with the hands, and the like are admirable because
learning the meanings of numbers thus acquires some of the zest of the passion for physical action. Even
in late grades chances to make pictures showing the relations of fractional parts, to cut strips, to fold
paper, and the like will be useful.
Various social instincts can be utilized in matches after the pattern of the spelling match, contests
between rows, certain number games, and the like. The scoring of both the play and the work of the
classroom is a useful field for control by the teacher of arithmetic.
Hunt ['12] has noted the more important games which have some considerable amount of arithmetical
training as a by-product and which are more or less suitable for class use. Flynn ['12] has described
games, most of them for home use, which give very definite arithmetical drill, though in many cases the
drills are rather behind the needs of children old enough to understand and like the game itself.
It is possible to utilize the interests in mystery, tricks, and puzzles so as to arouse a certain form of
respect for arithmetic and also to get computational work done. I quote one simple case from Miss
Selkin's admirable collection ['12, p. 69 f.]:—
I. ADDITION
"We must admit that there is nothing particularly interesting in a long column of numbers to be added. Let the teacher, however, suggest
that he can write the answer at sight, and the task will assume a totally different aspect.
"A very simple number trick of this kind can be performed by making use of the principle of complementary addition. The arithmetical
complement of a number with respect to a larger number is the difference between these two numbers. Most interesting results can be
obtained by using complements with respect to 9.
"The children may be called upon to suggest several numbers of two, three, or more digits. Below these write an equal number of addends
and immediately announce the answer. The children, impressed by this apparently rapid addition, will set to work enthusiastically to test the
results of this lightning calculation.
"Example:—

357
682
793

}

A

999
×3
2997

642
317
206

}

B

"Explanation:—The addends in group A are written down at random or suggested by the class. Those in group B are their complements.
To write the first number in group B we look at the first number in group A and, starting at the left write 6, the complement of 3 with respect
to 9; 4, the complement of 5; 2, the complement of 7. The second and third addends in group B are derived in the same way. Since we have
three addends in each group, the problem reduces itself to multiplying 999 by 3, or to taking 3000 − 3. Any number of addends may be used
and each addend may consist of any number of digits."

Respect for arithmetic as a source of tricks and magic is very much less important than respect for its
everyday services; and computation to test such tricks is likely to be undertaken zealously only by the
abler pupils. Consequently this source of interest should probably be used only sparingly, and perhaps the
teacher should give such exhibitions only as a reward for efficiency in the regular work. For example, if
the work for a week is well done in four days the fifth day might be given up to some semi-arithmetical
entertainment, such as the demonstration of an adding machine, the story of primitive methods of
counting, team races in computation, an exhibition of lightning calculation and intellectual sleight-ofhand by the teacher, or the voluntary study of arithmetical puzzles.
The interest in achievement, in success, mentioned above is stronger in children than is often realized
and makes advisable the systematic use of the practice experiment as a method of teaching much of
arithmetic. Children who thus compete with their own past records, keeping an exact score from week to
week, make notable progress and enjoy hard work in making it.
THE ORDER OF DEVELOPMENT OF ORIGINAL TENDENCIES
Negatively the difficulty of the work that pupils should be expected to do is conditioned by the gradual
maturing of their capacities. Other things being equal, the common custom of reserving hard things for
late in the elementary school course is, of course, sound. It seems probable that little is gained by using
any of the child's time for arithmetic before grade 2, though there are many arithmetical facts that he can
learn in grade 1. Postponement of systematic work in arithmetic to grade 3 or even grade 4 is allowable if
better things are offered. With proper textbooks and oral and written exercises, however, a child in grades
2 and 3 can spend time profitably on arithmetical work. When all children can be held in school through
the eighth grade it does not much matter whether arithmetic is begun early or late. If, however, many
children are to leave in grades 5 and 6 as now, we may think it wise to provide somehow that certain
minima of arithmetical ability be given them.
There are, so far as is known, no special times and seasons at which the human animal by inner growth
is specially ripe for one or another section or aspect of arithmetic, except in so far as the general inner
growth of intellectual powers makes the more abstruse and complex tasks suitable to later and later years.
Indeed, very few of even the most enthusiastic devotees of the recapitulation theory or culture-epoch
theory have attempted to apply either to the learning of arithmetic, and Branford is the only
mathematician, so far as I know, who has advocated such application, even tempered by elaborate
shiftings and reversals of the racial order. He says:—
"Thus, for each age of the individual life—infancy, childhood, school, college—may be selected from the racial history the most
appropriate form in which mathematical experience can be assimilated. Thus the capacity of the infant and early childhood is comparable
with the capacity of animal consciousness and primitive man. The mathematics suitable to later childhood and boyhood (and, of course,
girlhood) is comparable with Archæan mathematics passing on through Greek and Hindu to mediæval European mathematics; while the
student is become sufficiently mature to begin the assimilation of modern and highly abstract European thought. The filling in of details
must necessarily be left to the individual teacher, and also, within some such broadly marked limits, the precise order of the marshalling of
the material for each age. For, though, on the whole, mathematical development has gone forward, yet there have been lapses from advances

already made. Witness the practical world-loss of much valuable Hindu thought, and, for long centuries, the neglect of Greek thought:
witness the world-loss of the invention by the Babylonians of the Zero, until re-invented by the Hindus, passed on by them to the Arabs, and
by these to Europe.
"Moreover, many blunders and false starts and false principles have marked the whole course of development. In a phrase, rivers have
their backwaters. But it is precisely the teacher's function to avoid such racial mistakes, to take short cuts ultimately discovered, and to guide
the young along the road ultimately found most accessible with such halts and retracings—returns up side-cuts—as the mental peculiarities
of the pupils demand.
"All this, the practical realization of the spirit of the principle, is to be wisely left to the mathematical teacher, familiar with the history of
mathematical science and with the particular limitations of his pupils and himself." ['08, p. 245.]

The latitude of modification suggested by Branford reduces the guidance to be derived from racial
history to almost nil. Also it is apparent that the racial history in the case of arithmetical achievement is
entirely a matter of acquisition and social transmission. Man's original nature is destitute of all
arithmetical ideas. The human germs do not know even that one and one make two!
INVENTORIES OF ARITHMETICAL KNOWLEDGE AND SKILL
A scientific plan for teaching arithmetic would begin with an exact inventory of the knowledge and
skill which the pupils already possessed. Our ordinary notions of what a child knows at entrance to grade
1, or grade 2, or grade 3, and of what a first-grade child or second-grade child can do, are not adequate. If
they were, we should not find reputable textbooks arranging to teach elaborately facts already sufficiently
well known to over three quarters of the pupils when they enter school. Nor should we find other
textbooks presupposing in their first fifty pages a knowledge of words which not half of the children can
read even at the end of the 2 B grade.
We do find just such evidence that ordinary ideas about the abilities of children at the beginning of
systematic school training in arithmetic may be in gross error. For example, a reputable and in many
ways admirable recent book has fourteen pages of exercises to teach the meaning of two and the fact that
one and one make two! As an example of the reverse error, consider putting all these words in the first
twenty-five pages of a beginner's book:—absentees, attendance, blanks, continue, copy, during,
examples, grouped, memorize, perfect, similar, splints, therefore, total!
Little, almost nothing, has been done toward providing an exact inventory compared with what needs
to be done. We may note here (1) the facts relevant to arithmetic found by Stanley Hall, Hartmann, and
others in their general investigations of the knowledge possessed by children at entrance to school, (2) the
facts concerning the power of children to perceive differences in length, area, size of collection, and
organization within a collection such as is shown in Fig. 24, and certain facts and theories about early
awareness of number.
In the Berlin inquiry of 1869, knowledge of the meaning of two, three, and four appeared in 74, 74,
and 73 percent of the children upon entrance to school. Some of those recorded as ignorant probably
really knew, but failed to understand that they were expected to reply or were shy. Only 85 percent were
recorded as knowing their fathers' names. Seven eighths as many children knew the meanings of two,
three, and four as knew their fathers' names. In a similar but more careful experiment with Boston
children in September, 1880, Stanley Hall found that 92 percent knew three, 83 percent knew four, and
71½ percent knew five. Three was known about as well as the color red; four was known about as well as
the color blue or yellow or green. Hartmann ['90] found that two thirds of the children entering school in
Annaberg could count from one to ten. This is about as many as knew money, or the familiar objects of
the town, or could repeat words spoken to them.

FIG. 24.—Objective presentation.
In the Stanford form of the Binet tests counting four pennies is given as an ability of the typical fouryear-old. Counting 13 pennies correctly in at least one out of two trials, and knowing three of the four
coins,—penny, nickel, dime, and quarter,—are given as abilities of the typical six-year-old.
THE PERCEPTION OF NUMBER AND QUANTITY
We know that educated adults can tell how many lines or dots, etc., they see in a single glance (with an
exposure too short for the eye to move) up to four or more, according to the clearness of the objects and
their grouping. For example, Nanu ['04] reports that when a number of bright circles on a dark
background are shown to educated adults for only .033 second, ten can be counted when arranged to form
a parallelogram, but only five when arranged in a row. With certain groupings, of course, their
'perception' involves much inference, even conscious addition and multiplication. Similarly they can tell,
up to twenty and beyond, the number of taps, notes, or other sounds in a series too rapid for single
counting if the sounds are grouped in a convenient rhythm.
These abilities are, however, the product of a long and elaborate learning, including the learning of
arithmetic itself. Elementary psychology and common experience teach us that the mere observation of
groups or quantities, no matter how clear their number quality appears to the person who already knows
the meanings of numbers, does not of itself create the knowledge of the meanings of numbers in one who
does not. The experiments of Messenger ['03] and Burnett ['06] showed that there is no direct intuitive
apprehension even of two as distinct from one. We have to learn to feel the two touches or see the two
dots or lines as two.

We do not know by exact measurements the growth in children of this ability to count or infer the
number of elements in a collection seen or series heard. Still less do we know what the growth would be
without the influence of school training in counting, grouping, adding, and multiplying. Many textbooks
and teachers seem to overestimate it greatly. Not all educated adults can, apart from measurement, decide
with surety which of these lines is the longer, or which of these areas is the larger, or whether this is a
ninth or a tenth or an eleventh of a circle.

Children upon entering school have not been tested carefully in respect to judgments of length and
area, but we know from such studies as Gilbert's ['94] that the difference required in their case is probably
over twice that required for children of 13 or 14. In judging weights, for example, a difference of 6 is
perceived as easily by children 13 to 15 years of age as a difference of 15 by six-year-olds.
A teacher who has adult powers of estimating length or area or weight and who also knows already
which of the two is longer or larger or heavier, may use two lines to illustrate a difference which they
really hide from the child. It is unlikely, for example, that the first of these lines ______________
________________ would be recognized as shorter than the second by every child in a fourth-grade
class, and it is extremely unlikely that it would be recognized as being 7⁄8 of the length of the latter, rather
than 3⁄4 of it or 5⁄6 of it or 9⁄10 of it or 11⁄12 of it. If the two were shown to a second grade, with the
question, "The first line is 7. How long is the other line?" there would be very many answers of 7 or 9;
and these might be entirely correct arithmetically, the pupils' errors being all due to their inability to
compare the lengths accurately.
The quantities used should be such that their mere discrimination offers no difficulty even to a child of
blunted sense powers. If 7⁄8 and 1 are to be compared, A and B are not allowable. C, D, and E are much
better.
Teachers probably often underestimate or neglect the sensory difficulties of the tasks they assign and of
the material they use to illustrate absolute and relative magnitudes. The result may be more pernicious
when the pupils answer correctly than when they fail. For their correct answering may be due to their
divination of what the teacher wants; and they may call a thing an inch larger to suit her which does not
really seem larger to them at all. This, of course, is utterly destructive of their respect for arithmetic as an
exact and matter-of-fact instrument. For example, if a teacher drew a series of lines 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,

and 25 inches long on the blackboard in this form— _____ ________ and asked, "This is 20 inches long,
how long is this?" she might, after some errors and correction thereof, finally secure successful response
to all the lines by all the children. But their appreciation of the numbers 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 would
be actually damaged by the exercise.
THE EARLY AWARENESS OF NUMBER
There has been some disagreement concerning the origin of awareness of number in the individual, in
particular concerning the relative importance of the perception of how-many-ness and that of how-muchness, of the perception of a defined aggregate and the perception of a defined ratio. (See McLellan and
Dewey ['95], Phillips ['97 and '98], and Decroly and Degand ['12].)
The chief facts of significance for practice seem to be these: (1) Children with rare exceptions hear the
names one, two, three, four, half, twice, two times, more, less, as many as, again, first, second, and third,
long before they have analyzed out the qualities and relations to which these words refer so as to feel
them at all clearly. (2) Their knowledge of the qualities and relations is developed in the main in close
association with the use of these words to the child and by the child. (3) The ordinary experiences of the
first five years so develop in the child awareness of the 'how many somethings' in various groups, of the
relative magnitudes of two groups or quantities of any sort, and of groups and magnitudes as related to
others in a series. For instance, if fairly gifted, a child comes, by the age of five, to see that a row of four
cakes is an aggregate of four, seeing each cake as a part of the four and the four as the sum of its parts, to
know that two of them are as many as the other two, that half of them would be two, and to think, when it
is useful for him to do so, of four as a step beyond three on the way to five, or to think of hot as a step
from warm on the way to very hot. The degree of development of these abilities depends upon the
activity of the law of analysis in the individual and the character of his experiences.
(4) He gets certain bad habits of response from the ambiguity of common usage of 2, 3, 4, etc., for
second, third, fourth. Thus he sees or hears his parents or older children or others count pennies or rolls or
eggs by saying one, two, three, four, and so on. He himself is perhaps misled into so counting. Thus the
names properly belonging to a series of aggregations varying in amount come to be to him the names of
the positions of the parts in a counted whole. This happens especially with numbers above 3 or 4, where
the correct experience of the number as a name for the group has rarely been present. This attaching to
the cardinal numbers above three or four the meanings of the ordinal numbers seems to affect many
children on entrance to school. The numbering of pages in books, houses, streets, etc., and bad teaching
of counting often prolong this error.
(5) He also gets the habit, not necessarily bad, but often indirectly so, of using many names such as
eight, nine, ten, eleven, fifteen, a hundred, a million, without any meaning.
(6) The experiences of half, twice, three times as many, three times as long, etc., are rarer; even if they
were not, they would still be less easily productive of the analysis of the proper abstract element than are
the experiences of two, three, four, etc., in connection with aggregates of things each of which is usually
called one, such as boys, girls, balls, apples. Experiences of the names, two, three, and four, in connection
with two twos, two threes, two fours, are very rare.
Hence, the names, two, three, etc., mean to these children in the main, "one something and one
something," "one something usually called one, and one something usually called one, and another
something usually called one," and more rarely and imperfectly "two times anything," "three times
anything," etc.
With respect to Mr. Phillips' emphasis of the importance of the series-idea in children's minds, the
matters of importance are: first, that the knowledge of a series of number names in order is of very little
consequence to the teaching of arithmetic and of still less to the origin of awareness of number. Second,

the habit of applying this series of words in counting in such a way that 8 is associated with the eighth
thing, 9 with the ninth thing, etc., is of consequence because it does so much mischief. Third, the really
valuable idea of the number series, the idea of a series of groups or of magnitudes varying by steps, is
acquired later, as a result, not a cause, of awareness of numbers.
With respect to the McLellan-Dewey doctrine, the ratio aspect of numbers should be emphasized in
schools, not because it is the main origin of the child's awareness of number, but because it is not, and
because the ordinary practical issues of child life do not adequately stimulate its action. It also seems both
more economical and more scientific to introduce it through multiplication, division, and fractions rather
than to insist that 4 and 5 shall from the start mean 4 or 5 times anything that is called 1, for instance, that
8 inches shall be called 4 two-inches, or 10 cents, 5 two-cents. If I interpret Professor Dewey's writings
correctly, he would agree that the use of inch, foot, yard, pint, quart, ounce, pound, glassful, cupful,
handful, spoonful, cent, nickel, dime, and dollar gives a sufficient range of units for the first two school
years. Teaching the meanings of ½ of 4, ½ of 6, ½ of 8, ½ of 10, ½ of 20, 1⁄3 of 6, 1⁄3 of 9, 1⁄3 of 30, ¼ of
8, two 2s, five 2s, and the like, in early grades, each in connection with many different units of measure,
provides a sufficient assurance that numbers will connect with relationships as well as with collections.

CHAPTER XII
INTEREST IN ARITHMETIC
CENSUSES OF PUPILS' INTERESTS
Arithmetic, although it makes little or no appeal to collecting, muscular manipulation, sensory
curiosity, or the potent original interests in things and their mechanisms and people and their passions, is
fairly well liked by children. The censuses of pupils' likes and dislikes that have been made are not
models of scientific investigation, and the resulting percentages should not be used uncritically. They are,
however, probably not on the average over-favorable to arithmetic in any unfair way. Some of their
results are summarized below. In general they show arithmetic to be surpassed in interest clearly by only
the manual arts (shopwork and manual training for boys, cooking and sewing for girls), drawing, certain
forms of gymnastics, and history. It is about on a level with reading and science. It clearly surpasses
grammar, language, spelling, geography, and religion.
Lobsien ['03], who asked one hundred children in each of the first five grades (Stufen) of the
elementary schools of Kiel, "Which part of the school work (literally, 'which instruction period') do you
like best?" found arithmetic led only by drawing and gymnastics in the case of the boys, and only by
handwork in the case of the girls.
This is an exaggerated picture of the facts, since no count is made of those who especially dislike
arithmetic. Arithmetic is as unpopular with some as it is popular with others. When full allowance is
made for this, arithmetic still has popularity above the average. Stern ['05] asked, "Which subject do you
like most?" and "Which subject do you like least?" The balance was greatly in favor of gymnastics for
boys (28-1), handwork for girls (32-1½), and drawing for both (16½-6). Writing (6½-4), arithmetic
(14½-13), history (9-6½), reading (8½-8), and singing (6-7½) come next. Religion, nature study,
physiology, geography, geometry, chemistry, language, and grammar are low.
McKnight ['07] found with boys and girls in grades 7 and 8 of certain American cities that arithmetic
was liked better than any of the school subjects except gymnastics and manual training. The vote as
compared with history was:—
Arithmetic
History

327 liked greatly,
164 liked greatly,

96 disliked greatly.
113 disliked greatly.

In a later study Lobsien ['09] had 6248 pupils from 9 to 15 years old representing all grades of the
elementary school report, so far as they could, the subject most disliked, the subject most liked, the
subject next most liked, and the subject next in order. No child was forced to report all of these four
judgments, or even any of them. Lobsien counts the likes and the dislikes for each subject. Gymnastics,
handwork, and cooking are by far the most popular. History and drawing are next, followed by arithmetic
and reading. Below these are geography, writing, singing, nature study, biblical history, catechism, and
three minor subjects.
Lewis ['13] secured records from English children in elementary schools of the order of preference of
all the studies listed below. He reports the results in the following table of percents:
TOP THIRD

MIDDLE THIRD

LOWEST THIRD

OF

Drawing
Manual
Subjects
History
Reading
Singing
Drill
Arithmetic
Science
Nature
Study
Dictation
Composition
Scripture
Recitation
Geography
Grammar

STUDIES FOR
INTEREST
78

OF

STUDIES FOR
INTEREST
20

OF

STUDIES FOR
INTEREST
2

66

26

8

64
53
32
20
16
23

24
38
48
55
53
37

12
9
20
25
31
40

16

36

48

4
18
4
9
4
—

57
28
38
23
24
6

39
54
58
68
72
94

Brandell ['13] obtained data from 2137 Swedish children in Stockholm (327), Norrköping (870), and
Gothenburg (940).
In general he found, as others have, that handwork, shopwork for boys and household work for girls,
and drawing were reported as much better liked than arithmetic. So also was history, and (in this he
differs from most students of this matter) so were reading and nature study. Gymnastics he finds less
liked than arithmetic. Religion, geography, language, spelling, and writing are, as in other studies, much
less popular than arithmetic.
Other studies are by Lilius ['11] in Finland, Walsemann ['07], Wiederkehr ['07], Pommer ['14], Seekel
['14], and Stern ['13 and '14], in Germany. They confirm the general results stated.
The reasons for the good showing that arithmetic makes are probably the strength of its appeal to the
interest in definite achievement, success, doing what one attempts to do; and of its appeal, in grades 5 to
8, to the practical interest of getting on in the world, acquiring abilities that the world pays for. Of these,
the former is in my opinion much the more potent interest. Arithmetic satisfies it especially well,
because, more than any other of the 'intellectual' studies of the elementary school, it permits the pupil to
see his own progress and determine his own success or failure.
The most important applications of the psychology of satisfiers and annoyers to arithmetic will
therefore be in the direction of utilizing still more effectively this interest in achievement. Next in
importance come the plans to attach to arithmetical learning the satisfyingness of bodily action, play,
sociability, cheerfulness, and the like, and of significance as a means of securing other desired ends than
arithmetical abilities themselves. Next come plans to relieve arithmetical learning from certain
discomforts such as the eyestrain of some computations and excessive copying of figures. These will be
discussed here in the inverse order.
RELIEVING EYESTRAIN
At present arithmetical work is, hour for hour, probably more of a tax upon the eyes than reading. The
task of copying numbers from a book to a sheet of paper is one of the very hardest tasks that the eyes of a

pupil in the elementary schools have to perform. A certain amount of such work is desirable to teach a
child to write numbers, to copy exactly, and to organize material in shape for computation. But beyond
that, there is no more reason for a pupil to copy every number with which he is to compute than for him
to copy every word he is to read. The meaningless drudgery of copying figures should be mitigated by
arranging much work in the form of exercises like those shown on pages 216, 217, and 218, and by
having many of the textbook examples in addition, subtraction, and multiplication done with a slip of
paper laid below the numbers, the answers being written on it. There is not only a resulting gain in
interest, but also a very great saving of time for the pupil (very often copying an example more than
quadruples the time required to get its answer), and a much greater efficiency in supervision. Arithmetical
errors are not confused with errors of copying,[16] and the teacher's task of following a pupil's work on
the page is reduced to a minimum, each pupil having put the same part of the day's work in just the same
place. The use of well-printed and well-spaced pages of exercises relieves the eyestrain of working with
badly made gray figures, unevenly and too closely or too widely spaced. I reproduce in Fig. 25 specimens
taken at random from one hundred random samples of arithmetical work by pupils in grade 8. Contrast
the task of the eyes in working with these and their task in working with pages 216 to 218. The
customary method of always copying the numbers to be used in computation from blackboard or book to
a sheet of paper is an utterly unjustifiable cruelty and waste.

FIG. 25a.—Specimens taken at random from the computation work of eighth-grade pupils. This
computation occurred in a genuine test. In the original gray of the pencil marks the work is still
harder to make out.

FIG. 25b.—Specimens taken at random from the computation work of eighth-grade pupils. This
computation occurred in a genuine test. In the original gray of the pencil marks the work is still
harder to make out.
Write the products:—
A. 3 4s =

B. 5 7s =

C. 9 2s =

5 2s =
7 2s =
16 =
13 =
3 7s =
4 1s =
6 8s =
9 8s =
4 3s =
2 4s =
2 2s =
8 7s =

8 3s =
4 2s =
4 5s =
4 7s =
5 9s =
7 5s =
7 1s =
6 3s =
4 9s =
3 5s =
9 6s =
2 5s =

4 4s =
2 7s =
6 4s =
5 5s =
3 6s =
3 2s =
3 9s =
5 1s =
8 6s =
8 4s =
8 5s =
7 9s =

5 8s =
5 4s =
7 6s =
8 2s =
7 3s =
8 9s =
D. 4 20s =
E. 9 60s =
4 200s =
9 600s =
6 30s =
5 30s =
6 300s =
5 300s =
7 × 50 =
8 × 20 =
7 × 500 =
8 × 200 =
3 × 40 =
2 × 70 =
3 × 400 =
2 × 700 =

6 2s =
7 4s =
9 3s =
F. 40 × 2 = 80
20 × 2 =
30 × 2 =
40 × 2 =
20 × 3 =
30 × 3 =
300 × 3 = 900
300 × 2 =

Write the missing numbers: (r stands for remainder.)
25 = .... 3s and .... r.
25 = .... 4s " .... r.
25 = .... 5s " .... r.
25 = .... 6s " .... r.
25 = .... 7s " .... r.
25 = .... 8s " .... r.
25 = .... 9s " .... r.

30 = .... 4s and .... r.
30 = .... 5s " .... r.
30 = .... 6s " .... r.
30 = .... 7s " .... r.
30 = .... 8s " .... r.
30 = .... 9s " .... r.

26 = .... 3s and .... r.
26 = .... 4s " .... r.
26 = .... 5s " .... r.
26 = .... 6s " .... r.
26 = .... 7s " .... r.
26 = .... 8s " .... r.
26 = .... 9s " .... r.

31 = .... 4s and .... r.
31 = .... 5s " .... r.
31 = .... 6s " .... r.
31 = .... 7s " .... r.
31 = .... 8s " .... r.
31 = .... 9s " .... r.

Write the whole numbers or mixed numbers which these fractions equal:—
5
4
7
4
8
4
11
4

4
3
5
3
6
3
7
5

9
5
11
8
9
8
13
8

4
2
3
2
9
4
8
5

7
3
8
8
16
8
6
6

Write the missing figures:—
6
8

=

4

2
4

=

8
10

2

=

5

1
5

=

2
3

10

=

Write the missing numerators:—
1
2
1
3
1

=
=
=

12

8

10

4

16

6

14

12

9

18

6

15

24

21

4
1
5
2
3
3
4

=
=
=

12

16

8

24

20

28

32

10

20

15

25

40

35

30

12

18

21

6

15

24

9

8

16

12

20

24

32

28

Find the products. Cancel when you can:—
5
16
7
12

11
12
8
5

×4=
×8=

×3=
× 15 =

2
3
1
6

×5=
×8=

SIGNIFICANCE FOR RELATED ACTIVITIES
The use of bodily action, social games, and the like was discussed in the section on original tendencies.
"Significance as a means of securing other desired ends than arithmetical learning itself" is therefore our next
topic. Such significance can be given to arithmetical work by using that work as a means to present and future
success in problems of sports, housekeeping, shopwork, dressmaking, self-management, other school studies than
arithmetic, and general school life and affairs. Significance as a means to future ends alone can also be more
clearly and extensively attached to it than it now is.
Whatever is done to supply greater strength of motive in studying arithmetic must be carefully devised so as not
to get a strong but wrong motive, so as not to get abundant interest but in something other than arithmetic, and so
as not to kill the goose that after all lays the golden eggs—the interest in intellectual activity and achievement
itself. It is easy to secure an interest in laying out a baseball diamond, measuring ingredients for a cake, making a
balloon of a certain capacity, or deciding the added cost of an extra trimming of ribbon for one's dress. The
problem is to attach that interest to arithmetical learning. Nor should a teacher be satisfied with attaching the
interest as a mere tail that steers the kite, so long as it stays on, or as a sugar-coating that deceives the pupil into
swallowing the pill, or as an anodyne whose dose must be increased and increased if it is to retain its power. Until
the interest permeates the arithmetical activity itself our task is only partly done, and perhaps is made harder for
the next time.
One important means of really interfusing the arithmetical learning itself with these derived interests is to lead
the pupil to seek the help of arithmetic himself—to lead him, in Dewey's phrase, to 'feel the need'—to take the
'problem' attitude—and thus appreciate the technique which he actively hunts for to satisfy the need. In so far as
arithmetical learning is organized to satisfy the practical demands of the pupil's life at the time, he should, so to
speak, come part way to get its help.
Even if we do not make the most skillful use possible of these interests derived from the quantitative problems
of sports, housekeeping, shopwork, dressmaking, self-management, other school studies, and school life and
affairs, the gain will still be considerable. To have them in mind will certainly preserve us from giving to children
of grades 3 and 4 problems so devoid of relation to their interests as those shown below, all found (in 1910) in
thirty successive pages of a book of excellent repute:—
A chair has 4 legs. How many legs have 8 chairs? 5 chairs?
A fly has 6 legs. How many legs have 3 flies? 9 flies? 7 flies?
(Eight more of the same sort.)
In 1890 New York had 1,513,501 inhabitants, Milwaukee had 206,308, Boston had 447,720, San Francisco 297,990. How many had these cities
together?
(Five more of the same sort.)
Milton was born in 1608 and died in 1674. How many years did he live?
(Several others of the same sort.)

The population of a certain city was 35,629 in 1880 and 106,670 in 1890. Find the increase.
(Several others of this sort.)
A number of others about the words in various inaugural addresses and the Psalms in the Bible.

It also seems probable that with enough care other systematic plans of textbooks can be much improved in this
respect. From every point of view, for example, the early work in arithmetic should be adapted to some extent to
the healthy childish interests in home affairs, the behavior of other children, and the activities of material things,
animals, and plants.
TABLE 9
FREQUENCY OF APPEARANCE OF CERTAIN WORDS ABOUT FAMILY LIFE, PLAY, AND ACTION IN EIGHT ELEMENTARY
TEXTBOOKS IN ARITHMETIC, pp. 1-50.
A
baby
brother
family
father
help
home
mother
sister
fork
knife
plate
spoon
doll
game
jump
marbles
play
run
sing
tag
toy
car
cut
dig
flower
grow
plant
seed
string
wheel

B

2

6
2
3

1
2
4

C

2

4

2

10
1

1

10

4

4
9
1

10

D
2
1

E
1
2

5
4
5
2

F
4

2
2

H

2

1
4
1

2
5
9

7
1
1

1
7
1

5

9
5
4

2

1

6
3

10

10
1

G

10

1
3
1

3

1
2
10
1

4

4
1

6

2
2

1

1

3

1
8

2
2

2
3
1
5

10
10

1
1

1

The words used by textbooks give some indication of how far this aim is being realized, or rather of how far
short we are of realizing it. Consider, for example, the words home, mother, father, brother, sister, help, plate,
knife, fork, spoon, play, game, toy, tag, marbles, doll, run, jump, sing, plant, seed, grow, flower, car, wheel, string,
cut, dig. The frequency of appearance in the first fifty pages of eight beginners' arithmetics was as shown in Table

9. The eight columns refer to the eight books (the first fifty pages of each). The numbers refer to the number of
times the word in question appeared, the number 10 meaning 10 or more times in the fifty pages. Plurals, past
tenses, and the like were counted. Help, fork, knife, spoon, jump, sing, and tag did not appear at all! Toy and grow
appeared each once in the 400 pages! Play, run, dig, plant, and seed appeared once in a hundred or more pages.
Baby did not appear as often as buggy. Family appeared no oftener than fence or Friday. Father appears about a
third as often as farmer.
Book A shows only 10 of these thirty words in the fifty pages; book B only 4; book C only 12; and books D, E,
F, G, and H only 13, 8, 14, 13, 10, respectively. The total number of appearances (counting the 10s as only 10 in
each case) is 40 for A, 9 for B, 60 for C, 42 for D, 25 for E, 62 for F, 30 for G, and 37 for H. The five words—
apple, egg, Mary, milk, and orange—are used oftener than all these thirty together.
If it appeared that this apparent neglect of childish affairs and interests was deliberate to provide for a more
systematic treatment of pure arithmetic, a better gradation of problems, and a better preparation for later genuine
use than could be attained if the author of the textbook were tied to the child's apron strings, the neglect could be
defended. It is not at all certain that children in grade 2 get much more enjoyment or ability from adding the costs
of purchases for Christmas or Fourth of July, or multiplying the number of cakes each child is to have at a party by
the number of children who are to be there, than from adding gravestones or multiplying the number of hairs of
bald-headed men. When, however, there is nothing gained by substituting remote facts for those of familiar
concern to children, the safe policy is surely to favor the latter. In general, the neglect of childish data does not
seem to be due to provision for some other end, but to the same inertia of tradition which has carried over the
problems of laying walls and digging wells into city schools whose children never saw a stone wall or dug well.

I shall not go into details concerning the arrangement of courses of study, textbooks, and lesson-plans to make
desirable connections between arithmetical learning and sports, housework, shopwork, and the rest. It may be
worth while, however, to explain the term self-management, since this source of genuine problems of real concern
to the pupils has been overlooked by most writers.
By self-management is meant the pupil's use of his time, his abilities, his knowledge, and the like. By the time
he reaches grade 5, and to some extent before then, a boy should keep some account of himself, of how long it
takes him to do specified tasks, of how much he gets done in a specified time at a certain sort of work and with
how many errors, of how much improvement he makes month by month, of which things he can do best, and the
like. Such objective, matter-of-fact, quantitative study of one's behavior is not a stimulus to morbid introspection
or egotism; it is one of the best preventives of these. To treat oneself impersonally is one of the essential elements
of mental balance and health. It need not, and should not, encourage priggishness. On the contrary, this matter-offact study of what one is and does may well replace a certain amount of the exhortations and admonitions
concerning what one ought to do and be. All this is still truer for a girl.
The demands which such an accounting of one's own activities make of arithmetic have the special value of
connecting directly with the advanced work in computation. They involve the use of large numbers, decimals,
averaging, percentages, approximations, and other facts and processes which the pupil has to learn for later life,
but to which his childish activities as wage-earner, buyer and seller, or shopworker from 10 to 14 do not lead.
Children have little money, but they have time in thousands of units! They do not get discounts or bonuses from
commercial houses, but they can discount their quantity of examples done for the errors made, and credit
themselves with bonuses of all sorts for extra achievements.
INTRINSIC INTEREST IN ARITHMETICAL LEARNING
There remains the most important increase of interest in arithmetical learning—an increase in the interest
directly bound to achievement and success in arithmetic itself. "Arithmetic," says David Eugene Smith, "is a game
and all boys and girls are players." It should not be a mere game for them and they should not merely play, but their
unpractical interest in doing it because they can do it and can see how well they do do it is one of the school's most
precious assets. Any healthy means to give this interest more and better stimulus should therefore be eagerly
sought and cherished.

Two such means have been suggested in other connections. The first is the extension of training in checking and
verifying work so that the pupil may work to a standard of approximately 100% success, and may know how
nearly he is attaining it. The second is the use of standardized practice material and tests, whereby the pupil may
measure himself against his own past, and have a clear, vivid, and trustworthy idea of just how much better or
faster he can do the same tasks than he could do a month or a year ago, and of just how much harder things he can
do now than then.
Another means of stimulating the essential interest in quantitative thinking itself is the arrangement of the work
so that real arithmetical thinking is encouraged more than mere imitation and assiduity. This means the avoidance
of long series of applied problems all of one type to be solved in the same way, the avoidance of miscellaneous
series and review series which are almost verbatim repetitions of past problems, and in general the avoidance of
excessive repetition of any one problem-situation. Stimulation to real arithmetical thinking is weak when a whole
day's problem work requires no choice of methods, or when a review simply repeats without any step of
organization or progress, or when a pupil meets a situation (say the 'buy x things at y per thing, how much pay'
situation) for the five-hundredth time.
Another matter worthy of attention in this connection is the unwise tendency to omit or present in diluted form
some of the topics that appeal most to real intellectual interests, just because they are hard. The best illustration,
perhaps, is the problem of ratio or "How many times as large (long, heavy, expensive, etc.) as x is y?" Mastery of
the 'times as' relation is hard to acquire, but it is well worth acquiring, not only because of its strong intellectual
appeal, but also because of its prime importance in the applications of arithmetic to science. In the older
arithmetics it was confused by pedantries and verbal difficulties and penalized by unreal problems about fractions
of men doing parts of a job in strange and devious times. Freed from these, it should be reinstated, beginning as
early as grade 5 with such simple exercises as those shown below and progressing to the problems of food values,
nutritive ratios, gears, speeds, and the like in grade 8.
John is 4 years old.
Fred is 6 years old.
Mary is 8 years old.
Nell is 10 years old.
Alice is 12 years old.
Bert is 15 years old.
Who is twice as old as John?
Who is half as old as Alice?
Who is three times as old as John?
Who is one and one half times as old as Nell?
Who is two thirds as old as Fred?
etc., etc., etc.
Alice is .... times as old as John.
John is .... as old as Mary.
Fred is .... times as old as John.
Alice is .... times as old as Fred.
Fred is .... as old as Mary.
etc., etc., etc.
Finally it should be remembered that all improvements in making arithmetic worth learning and helping the
pupil to learn it will in the long run add to its interest. Pupils like to learn, to achieve, to gain mastery. Success is
interesting. If the measures recommended in the previous chapters are carried out, there will be little need to entice
pupils to take arithmetic or to sugar-coat it with illegitimate attractions.

CHAPTER XIII
THE CONDITIONS OF LEARNING
We shall consider in this chapter the influence of time of day, size of class, and amount of time devoted to
arithmetic in the school program, the hygiene of the eyes in arithmetical work, the use of concrete objects, and the
use of sounds, sights, and thoughts as situations and of speech and writing and thought as responses.[17]
EXTERNAL CONDITIONS
Computation of one or another sort has been used by several investigators as a test of efficiency at different
times in the day. When freed from the effects of practice on the one hand and lack of interest due to repetition on
the other, the results uniformly show an increase in speed late in the school session with a falling off in accuracy
that about balances it.[18] There is no wisdom in putting arithmetic early in the session because of its difficulty.
Lively and sociable exercises in mental arithmetic with oral answers in fact seem to be admirably fitted for use late
in the session. Except for the general principles (1) of starting the day with work that will set a good standard of
cheerful, efficient production and (2) of getting the least interesting features of the day's work done fairly early in
the day, psychology permits practical exigencies to rule the program, so far as present knowledge extends.
Adequate measurements of the effect of time of day on improvement have not been made, but there is no reason to
believe that any one time between 9 A.M. and 4 P.M. is appreciably more favorable to arithmetical learning than to
learning geography, history, spelling, and the like.
The influence of size of class upon progress in school studies is very difficult to measure because (1) within the
same city system the average of the six (or more) sizes of class that a pupil has experienced will tend to
approximate closely to the corresponding average for any other child; because further (2) there may be a tendency
of supervisory officers to assign more pupils to the better teachers; and because (3) separate systems which differ
in respect to size of class probably differ in other respects also so that their differences in achievement may be
referable to totally different differences.
Elliott ['14] has made a beginning by noting size of class during the year of test in connection with his own
measures of the achievements of seventeen hundred pupils, supplemented by records from over four hundred other
classes. As might be expected from the facts just stated, he finds no appreciable difference between classes of
different sizes within the same school system, the effect of the few months in a small class being swamped by the
antecedents or concomitants thereof.
The effect of the amount of time devoted to arithmetic in the school program has been studied extensively by
Rice ['02 and '03] and Stone ['08].
Dr. Rice ['02] measured the arithmetical ability of some 6000 children in 18 different schools in 7 different
cities. The results of these measurements are summarized in Table 10. This table "gives two averages for each
grade as well as for each school as a whole. Thus, the school at the top shows averages of 80.0 and 83.1, and the
one at the bottom, 25.3 and 31.5. The first represents the percentage of answers which were absolutely correct; the
second shows what per cent of the problems were correct in principle, i.e. the average that would have been
received if no mechanical errors had been made."
The facts of Dr. Rice's table show that there is a positive relation between the general standing of a school
system in the tests and the amount of time devoted to arithmetic by its program. The relation is not close, however,
being that expressed by a correlation coefficient of .36½. Within any one school system there is no relation
between the standing of a particular school and the amount of time devoted to arithmetic in that school's program.
It must be kept in mind that the amount of time given in the school program may be counterbalanced by
emphasizing work at home and during study periods, or, on the other hand, may be a symptom of correspondingly
small or great emphasis on arithmetic in work set for the study periods at home.

A still more elaborate investigation of this same topic was made by Stone ['08]. I quote somewhat fully from it,
since it is an instructive sample of the sort of studies that will doubtless soon be made in the case of every
elementary school subject. He found that school systems differed notably in the achievements made by their sixthgrade pupils in his tests of computation (the so-called 'fundamentals') and of the solution of verbally described
problems (the so-called 'reasoning'). The facts were as shown in Table 11.
TABLE 10
AVERAGES FOR INDIVIDUAL SCHOOLS IN ARITHMETIC
6TH YEAR
CITY

SCHOOL

III
I
I
I
I
II
III
IV
IV
IV
IV
V
VI
VI
VI
VII
VII
VII

1
1
2
3
4
1
2
1
2
3
4
1
1
2
3
1
2
3

7TH YEAR

8TH YEAR

Result

Principle

Result

Principle

Result

Principle

Result

79.3
80.4
80.9
72.2
69.9
71.2
43.7
58.9
59.8
54.9
42.3
44.1
68.3
46.1
34.5
35.2
35.2
27.6

80.3
81.5
83.4
74.0
72.2
75.3
45.0
60.4
63.1
58.1
45.1
48.7
71.3
49.5
36.4
37.7
38.7
33.7

81.1
64.2
43.5
63.5
54.6
33.6
53.9
31.2
—
35.2
16.1
29.2
33.5
19.5
30.5
29.1
15.0
8.9

82.3
67.2
50.9
66.2
57.8
35.7
56.7
34.1
—
38.6
19.2
32.5
36.6
24.2
35.1
32.5
16.4
10.1

91.7
80.9
72.7
74.5
66.5
36.8
51.1
41.6
22.5
43.5
48.7
51.1
26.9
30.2
23.3
25.1
19.6
11.3

93.9
82.8
79.1
76.6
69.1
40.0
53.1
43.5
22.5
45.0
48.7
58.3
30.7
40.6
24.1
27.2
21.2
11.3

80.0
76.6
69.3
67.8
64.3
60.2
54.5
55.1
53.9
51.5
42.8
45.9
39.0
36.5
36.0
40.5
36.5
25.3

SCHOOL AVERAGE
Percent of
Principle
Mechanical
Errors

83.1
80.3
75.1
72.2
70.3
64.8
58.9
58.4
58.8
57.6
48.2
51.3
42.9
43.6
42.5
45.9
40.6
31.5

3.7
4.6
7.7
6.1
8.5
7.1
7.4
5.6
8.3
10.5
11.2
10.5
9.0
16.2
15.2
11.7
10.1
19.6

High achievement by a system in computation went with high achievement in solving the problems, the
correlation being about .50; and the system that scored high in addition or subtraction or multiplication or division
usually showed closely similar excellence in the other three, the correlations being about .90.
TABLE 11
SCORES MADE BY THE SIXTH-GRADE PUPILS OF EACH OF TWENTY-SIX SCHOOL SYSTEMS
SYSTEM
23
24
17
4
25
22
16
20
18
15
3

SCORE IN TESTS
PROBLEMS
356
429
444
464
464
468
469
491
509
532
533

WITH

SCORE IN TESTS
IN COMPUTING
1841
3513
3042
3563
2167
2311
3707
2168
3758
2779
2845

8
6
1
10
2
21
13
14
9
7
12
11
26
19
5

538
550
552
601
615
627
636
661
691
734
736
759
791
848
914

2747
3173
2935
2749
2958
2951
3049
3561
3404
3782
3410
3261
3682
4099
3569

Of the conditions under which arithmetical learning took place, the one most elaborately studied was the amount
of time devoted to arithmetic. On the basis of replies by principals of schools to certain questions, he gave each of
the twenty-six school systems a measure for the probable time spent on arithmetic up through grade 6. Leaving
home study out of account, there seems to be little or no correlation between the amount of time a system devotes
to arithmetic and its score in problem-solving, and not much more between time expenditure and score in
computation. With home study included there is little relation to the achievement of the system in solving
problems, but there is a clear effect on achievement in computation. The facts as given by Stone are:—
TABLE 12
CORRELATION OF TIME EXPENDITURES WITH ABILITIES

Without Home Study

{
Including Home Study

{

Reasoning and Time Expenditure
Fundamentals and Time
Expenditure

−.01

Reasoning and Time Expenditure
Fundamentals and Time
Expenditure

.13

.09

.49

These correlations, it should be borne in mind, are for school systems, not
for individual pupils. It might be that, though the system which devoted the
most time to arithmetic did not show corresponding superiority in the
product over the system devoting only half as much time, the pupils within
the system did achieve in exact proportion to the time they gave to study.
Neither correlation would permit inference concerning the effect of different
amounts of time spent by the same pupil.
Stone considered also the printed announcements of the courses of study
in arithmetic in these twenty-six systems. Nineteen judges rated these
announced courses of study for excellence according to the instructions
quoted below:—
CONCERNING THE RATING OF COURSES OF
STUDY
Judges please read before scoring
I. Some Factors Determining Relative Excellence.
(N. B. The following enumeration is meant to be suggestive rather than
complete or exclusive. And each scorer is urged to rely primarily on his own
judgment.)
1. Helpfulness to the teacher in teaching the subject matter outlined.
2. Social value or concreteness of sources of problems.
3. The arrangement of subject matter.
4. The provision made for adequate drill.
5. A reasonable minimum requirement with suggestions for valuable additional work.

6. The relative values of any predominating so-called methods—such as Speer, Grube, etc.
7. The place of oral or so-called mental arithmetic.
8. The merit of textbook references.

II. Cautions and Directions.
(Judges please follow as implicitly as possible.)
1. Include references to textbooks as parts of the Course of Study.
This necessitates judging the parts of the texts referred to.
2. As far as possible become equally familiar with all courses before scoring any.
3. When you are ready to begin to score, (1) arrange in serial order according to excellence, (2)
starting with the middle one score it 50, then score above and below 50 according as
courses are better or poorer, indicating relative differences in excellence by relative
differences in scores, i.e. in so far as you find that the courses differ by about equal steps,
score those better than the middle one 51, 52, etc., and those poorer 49, 48, etc., but if you
find that the courses differ by unequal steps show these inequalities by omitting numbers.
4. Write ratings on the slip of paper attached to each course.

The systems whose courses of study were thus rated highest did not
manifest any greater achievement in Stone's tests than the rest. The thirteen
with the most approved announcements of courses of study were in fact a
little inferior in achievement to the other thirteen, and the correlation
coefficients were slightly negative.
Stone also compared eighteen systems where there was supervision of the
work by superintendents or supervisors as well as by principals with four
systems where the principals and teachers had no such help. The scores in
his tests were very much lower in the four latter cities.
THE HYGIENE OF THE EYES IN ARITHMETIC

FIG. 26.—Type too large.
We have already noted that the task of reading and copying numbers is
one of the hardest that the eyes have to perform in the elementary school,
and that it should be alleviated by arranging much of the work so that only
answers need be written by the pupil. The figures to be read and copied
should obviously be in type of suitable size and style, so arranged and
spaced on the page or blackboard as to cause a minimum of effort and strain.

FIG. 27.—12-point, 11-point, and 10-point type.
Size.—Type may be too large as well as too small, though the latter is the
commoner error. If it is too large, as in Fig. 26, which is a duplicate of type
actually used in a form of practice pad, the eye has to make too many
fixations to take in a given content. All things considered, 12-point type in

grades 3 and 4, 11-point in grades 5 and 6, and 10-point in grades 7 and 8
seem the most desirable sizes. These are shown in Fig. 27. Too small type
occurs oftenest in fractions and in the dimension-numbers or scale numbers
of drawings. Figures 28, 29, and 30 are samples from actual school practice.
Samples of the desirable size are shown in Figs. 31 and 32. The technique of
modern typesetting makes it very difficult and expensive to make fractions
of the horizontal type
(

1
4

,

3
8

,

5
6

)

large enough without making the whole-number figures with which they are
mingled too large or giving an uncouth appearance to the total. Consequently
fractions somewhat smaller than are desirable may have to be used
occasionally in textbooks.[19] There is no valid excuse, however, for the
excessively small fractions which often are made in blackboard work.

FIG. 28.—Type of measurements too small.

This is a picture of Mary's garden.
How many feet is it around the garden?

FIG. 29.—Type too small.

FIG. 30.—Numbers too small and badly designed.

FIG. 31.—Figure 28 with suitable numbers.

FIG. 32.—Figure 30 with suitable numbers.
Style.—The ordinary type forms often have 3 and 8 so made as to require
strain to distinguish them. 5 is sometimes easily confused with 3 and even
with 8. 1, 4, and 7 may be less easily distinguishable than is desirable. Figure
33 shows a specially good type in which each figure is represented by its
essential[20] features without any distracting shading or knobs or turns.
Figure 34 shows some of the types in common use. There are no
demonstrably great differences amongst these. In fractions there is a notable
gain from using the slant form (2⁄3, 3⁄4) for exercises in addition and
subtraction, and for almost all mixed numbers. This appears clearly to the
eye in the comparison of Fig. 35 below, where the same fractions all in 10point type are displayed in horizontal and in slant form. The figures in the
slant form are in general larger and the space between them and the fractionline is wider. Also the slant form makes it easier for the eye to examine the
denominators to see whether reductions are necessary. Except for a few

cases to show that the operations can be done just as truly with the horizontal
forms, the book and the blackboard should display mixed numbers and
fractions to be added or subtracted in the slant form. The slant line should be
at an angle of approximately 45 degrees. Pupils should be taught to use this
form in their own work of this sort.

FIG. 33.—Block type; a very desirable type except that it is somewhat
too heavy.

FIG. 34.—Common styles of printed numbers.
When script figures are presented they should be of simple design,
showing clearly the essential features of the figure, the line being
everywhere of equal or nearly equal width (that is, without shading, and
without ornamentation or eccentricity of any sort). The opening of the 3
should be wide to prevent confusion with 8; the top of the 3 should be
curved to aid its differentiation from 5; the down stroke of the 9 should be
almost or quite straight; the 1, 4, 7, and 9 should be clearly distinguishable.
There are many ways of distinguishing them clearly, the best probably being
to use the straight line for 1, the open 4 with clear angularity, a wide top to
the 7, and a clearly closed curve for the top of the 9.

FIG. 35.—Diagonal and horizontal fractions compared.

FIG. 36.—Good vertical spacing.

FIG. 37.—Bad vertical spacing.

FIGS. 38 (above) and 39 (below).—Good and bad left-right spacing.
The pupil's writing of figures should be clear. He will thereby be saved
eyestrain and errors in his school work as well as given a valuable ability for
life. Handwriting of figures is used enormously in spite of the development
of typewriters; illegible figures are commonly more harmful than illegible
letters or words, since the context far less often tells what the figure is
intended to be; the habit of making clear figures is not so hard to acquire,
since they are written unjoined and require only the automatic action of ten
minor acts of skill. The schools have missed a great opportunity in this
respect. Whereas the hand writing of words is often better than it needs to be

for life's purposes, the writing of figures is usually much worse. The figures
presented in books on penmanship are also commonly bad, showing neglect
or misunderstanding of the matter on the part of leaders in penmanship.
Spacing.—Spacing up and down the column is rarely too wide, but very
often too narrow. The specimens shown in Figs. 36 and 37 show good
practice contrasted with the common fault.
Spacing from right to left is generally fairly satisfactory in books, though
there is a bad tendency to adopt some one routine throughout and so to miss
chances to use reductions and increases of spacing so as to help the eye and
the mind in special cases. Specimens of good and bad spacing are shown in
Figs. 38 and 39. In the work of the pupils, the spacing from right to left is
often too narrow. This crowding of letters, together with unevenness of
spacing, adds notably to the task of eye and mind.
The composition or make-up of the page.—Other things being equal, that
arrangement of the page is best which helps a child most to keep his place on
a page and to find it after having looked away to work on the paper on which
he computes, or for other good reasons. A good page and a bad page in this
respect are shown in Figs. 40 and 41.

FIG. 40.—A page well made up to suit the action of the eye.

FIG. 41.—The same matter as in Fig. 40, much less well made up.
Objective presentations.—Pictures, diagrams,
presentations should not tax the eye unduly,

maps,

and

other

(a) by requiring too fine distinctions, or
(b) by inconvenient arrangement of the data, preventing easy
counting, measuring, comparison, or whatever the
task is, or
(c) by putting too many facts in one picture so that the eye
and mind, when trying to make out any one, are
confused by the others.
Illustrations of bad practices in these respects are shown in Figs. 42 to 52.
A few specimens of work well arranged for the eye are shown in Figs. 53 to
56.
Good rules to remember are:—

Other things being equal, make distinctions by the clearest method, fit
material to the tendency of the eye to see an 'eyeful' at a time (roughly 1½
inch by ½ inch in a book; 1½ ft. by ½ ft. on the blackboard), and let one
picture teach only one fact or relation, or such facts and relations as do not
interfere in perception.
The general conditions of seating, illumination, paper, and the like are
even more important when the eyes are used with numbers than when they
are used with words.

FIG. 42.—Try to count the rungs on the ladder, or the shocks in the
wagon.

FIG. 43.—How many oars do you see? How many birds? How many
fish?

FIG. 44.—Count the birds in each of the three flocks of birds.

FIG. 45.—Note the lack of clear division of the hundreds. Consider the
difficulty of counting one of these columns of dots.

FIG. 46.—What do you suppose these pictures are intended to show?

FIG. 47.—Would a beginner know that after THIRTEEN he was to
switch around and begin at the other end? Could you read the
SIX of TWENTY-SIX if you did not already know what it ought
to be? What meaning would all the brackets have for a little
child in grade 2? Does this picture illustrate or obfuscate?

FIG. 48.—How long did it take you to find out what these pictures mean?

FIG. 49.—Count the figures in the first row, using your eyes alone; have
some one make lines of 10, 11, 12, 13, and more repetitions of this
figure spaced closely as here. Count 20 or 30 such lines, using the
eye unaided by fingers, pencil, etc.

FIG. 50.—Can you answer the question without measuring? Could a
child of seven or eight?

FIG. 51.—What are these drawings intended to show? Why do they show
the facts only obscurely and dubiously?

FIG. 52.—What are these drawings intended to show? What simple
change would make them show the facts much more clearly?

FIG. 53.—Arranged in convenient "eye-fulls."

FIG. 54.—Clear, simple, and easy of comparison.

Tell which bar has—
1. About 5 percent of its length black.
2. About 10 percent of its length black.
3. About 25 percent of its length black.
4. About 75 percent of its length black.
5. About 90 percent of its length black.
6. About 95 percent of its length black.

FIG. 55.—Clear, simple, and well spaced.

FIG. 56.—Well arranged, though a little wider spacing between the
squares would make it even better.

THE USE OF CONCRETE OBJECTS IN
ARITHMETIC
We mean by concrete objects actual things, events, and relations presented
to sense, in contrast to words and numbers and symbols which mean or stand
for these objects or for more abstract qualities and relations. Blocks, toothpicks, coins, foot rules, squared paper, quart measures, bank books, and
checks are such concrete things. A foot rule put successively along the three
thirds of a yard rule, a bell rung five times, and a pound weight balancing
sixteen ounce weights are such concrete events. A pint beside a quart, an
inch beside a foot, an apple shown cut in halves display such concrete
relations to a pupil who is attentive to the issue.
Concrete presentations are obviously useful in arithmetic to teach
meanings under the general law that a word or number or sign or symbol
acquires meaning by being connected with actual things, events, qualities,
and relations. We have also noted their usefulness as means to verifying the
results of thinking and computing, as when a pupil, having solved, "How
many badges each 5 inches long can be made from 31⁄3 yd. of ribbon?" by
using 10 × 12⁄5, draws a line 31⁄3 yd. long and divides it into 5-inch lengths.
Concrete experiences are useful whenever the meaning of a number, like 9
or 7⁄8 or .004, or of an operation, like multiplying or dividing or cubing, or of
some term, like rectangle or hypothenuse or discount, or some procedure,
like voting or insuring property against fire or borrowing money from a
bank, is absent or incomplete or faulty. Concrete work thus is by no means
confined to the primary grades but may be appropriate at all stages when
new facts, relations, and procedures are to be taught.
How much concrete material shall be presented will depend upon the fact
or relation or procedure which is to be made intelligible, and the ability and
knowledge of the pupil. Thus 'one half' will in general require less concrete
illustration than 'five sixths'; and five sixths will require less in the case of a
bright child who already knows 2⁄3, 3⁄4, 3⁄8, 5⁄8, 7⁄8, 2⁄5, 3⁄5, and 4⁄5 than in the
case of a dull child or one who only knows 2⁄3 and 3⁄4. As a general rule the
same topic will require less concrete material the later it appears in the
school course. If the meanings of the numbers are taught in grade 2 instead
of grade 1, there will be less need of blocks, counters, splints, beans, and the

like. If 1½ + ½ = 2 is taught early in grade 3, there will be more gain from
the use of 1½ inches and ½ inch on the foot rule than if the same relations
were taught in connection with the general addition of like fractions late in
grade 4. Sometimes the understanding can be had either by connecting the
idea with the reality directly, or by connecting the two indirectly via some
other idea. The amount of concrete material to be used will depend on its
relative advantage per unit of time spent. Thus it might be more economical
to connect 5⁄12, 7⁄12, and 11⁄12 with real meanings indirectly by calling up the
resemblance to the 2⁄3, 3⁄4, 3⁄8, 5⁄8, 7⁄8, 2⁄5, 3⁄5, 4⁄5, and 5⁄6 already studied, than
by showing 5⁄12 of an apple, 7⁄12 of a yard, 11⁄12 of a foot, and the like.
In general the economical course is to test the understanding of the matter
from time to time, using more concrete material if it is needed, but being
careful to encourage pupils to proceed to the abstract ideas and general
principles as fast as they can. It is wearisome and debauching to pupils'
intellects for them to be put through elaborate concrete experiences to get a
meaning which they could have got themselves by pure thought. We should
also remember that the new idea, say of the meaning of decimal fractions,
will be improved and clarified by using it (see page 183 f.), so that the
attainment of a perfect conception of decimal fractions before doing
anything with them is unnecessary and probably very wasteful.
A few illustrations may make these principles more instructive.
(a) Very large numbers, such as 1000, 10,000, 100,000, and 1,000,000,
need more concrete aids than are commonly given. Guessing contests about
the value in dollars of the school building and other buildings, the area of the
schoolroom floor and other surfaces in square inches, the number of minutes
in a week, and year, and the like, together with proper computations and
measurements, are very useful to reënforce the concrete presentations and
supply genuine problems in multiplication and subtraction with large
numbers.
(b) Numbers very much smaller than one, such as 1⁄32, 1⁄64, .04, and .002,
also need some concrete aids. A diagram like that of Fig. 57 is useful.
(c) Majority and plurality should be understood by every citizen. They can
be understood without concrete aid, but an actual vote is well worth while

for the gain in vividness and surety.

FIG. 57.—Concrete aid to understanding fractions with large
denominators.
1
1
A = ⁄1000 sq. ft.; B = ⁄100 sq. ft.; C = 1⁄50 sq. ft.; D = 1⁄10 sq. ft.
(d) Insurance against loss by fire can be taught by explanation and
analogy alone, but it will be economical to have some actual insuring and
payment of premiums and a genuine loss which is reimbursed.
(e) Four play banks in the corners of the room, receiving deposits, cashing
checks, and later discounting notes will give good educational value for the
time spent.
(f) Trade discount, on the contrary, hardly requires more concrete
illustration than is found in the very problems to which it is applied.

(g) The process of finding the number of square units in a rectangle by
multiplying with the appropriate numbers representing length and width is
probably rather hindered than helped by the ordinary objective presentation
as an introduction. The usual form of objective introduction is as follows:—

FIG. 58.
How long is this rectangle? How large is each square? How many square inches are there in the top
row? How many rows are there? How many square inches are there in the whole rectangle? Since
there are three rows each containing 4 square inches, we have 3 × 4 square inches = 12 square inches.
Draw a rectangle 7 inches long and 2 inches wide. If you divide it into inch squares how many rows
will there be? How many inch squares will there be in each row? How many square inches are there in
the rectangle?

FIG. 59.
It is better actually to hide the individual square units as in Fig. 59. There
are four reasons: (1) The concrete rows and columns rather distract attention
from the essential thing to be learned. This is not that "x rows one square
wide, y squares in a row will make xy squares in all," but that "by using
proper units and the proper operation the area of any rectangle can be found
from its length and width." (2) Children have little difficulty in learning to
multiply rather than add, subtract, or divide when computing area. (3) The
habit so formed holds good for areas like 12⁄3 by 4½, with fractional
dimensions, in which any effort to count up the areas of rows is very
troublesome and confusing. (4) The notion that a square inch is an area 1' by
1' rather than ½' by 2' or 1⁄3 in. by 3 in. or 1½ in. by 2⁄3 in. is likely to be
formed too emphatically if much time is spent upon the sort of concrete
presentation shown above. It is then better to use concrete counting of rows
of small areas as a means of verification after the procedure is learned, than
as a means of deriving it.
There has been, especially in Germany, much argument concerning what
sort of number-pictures (that is, arrangement of dots, lines, or the like, as

shown in Fig. 60) is best for use in connection with the number names in the
early years of the teaching of arithmetic.
Lay ['98 and '07], Walsemann ['07], Freeman ['10], Howell ['14], and
others have measured the accuracy of children in estimating the number of
dots in arrangements of one or more of these different types.[21] Many
writers interpret a difference in favor of estimating, say, the square
arrangements of Born or Lay as meaning that such is the best arrangement to
use in teaching. The inference is, however, unjustified. That certain numberpictures are easier to estimate numerically does not necessarily mean that
they are more instructive in learning. One set may be easier to estimate just
because they are more familiar, having been oftener experienced. Even if the
favored set was so after equal experience with all sets, accuracy of
estimation would be a sign of superiority for use in instruction only if all
other things were equal (or in favor of the arrangement in question).
Obviously the way to decide which of these is best to use in teaching is by
using them in teaching and measuring all relevant results, not by merely
recording which of them are most accurately estimated in certain time
exposures.

FIG. 60.—Various proposed arrangements of dots for use in teaching the
meanings of the numbers 1 to 10.

It may be noted that the Born, Lay, and Freeman pictures have claims for
special consideration on grounds of probable instructiveness. Since they are
also superior in the tests in respect to accuracy of estimate, choice should
probably be made from these three by any teacher who wishes to connect
one set of number-pictures systematically with the number names, as by
drills with the blackboard or with cards.
Such drills are probably useful if undertaken with zeal, and if kept as
supplementary to more realistic objective work with play money, children
marching, material to be distributed, garden-plot lengths to be measured, and
the like, and if so administered that the pupils soon get the generalized
abstract meaning of the numbers freed from dependence on an inner picture
of any sort. This freedom is so important that it may make the use of many
types of number-pictures advisable rather than the use of the one which in
and of itself is best.
As Meumann says: "Perceptual reckoning can be overdone. It had its chief
significance for the surety and clearness of the first foundation of
arithmetical instruction. If, however, it is continued after the first operations
become familiar to the child, and extended to operations which develop from
these elementary ones, it necessarily works as a retarding force and holds
back the natural development of arithmetic. This moves on to work with
abstract number and with mechanical association and reproduction." ['07,
Vol. 2, p. 357.]
Such drills are commonly overdone by those who make use of them,
being given too often, and continued after their instructiveness has waned,
and used instead of more significant, interesting, and varied work in
counting and estimating and measuring real things. Consequently, there is
now rather a prejudice against them in our better schools. They should
probably be reinstated but to a moderate and judicious use.
ORAL, MENTAL, AND WRITTEN ARITHMETIC
There has been much dispute over the relative merits of oral and written
work in arithmetic—a question which is much confused by the different
meanings of 'oral' and 'written.' Oral has meant (1) work where the situations
are presented orally and the pupil's final responses are given orally, or (2)

work where the situations are presented orally and the pupils' final responses
are written or partly written and partly oral, or (3) work where the situations
are presented in writing or print and the final responses are oral. Written has
meant (1) work where the situations are presented in writing or print and the
final responses are made in writing, or (2) work where also many of the
intermediate responses are written, or (3) work where the situations are
presented orally but the final responses and a large percentage of the
intermediate computational responses are written. There are other meanings
than these.
It is better to drop these very ambiguous terms and ask clearly what are
the merits and demerits, in the case of any specified arithmetical work, of
auditory and of visual presentation of the situations, and of saying and of
writing each specified step in the response.
The disputes over mental versus written arithmetic are also confused by
ambiguities in the use of 'mental.' Mental has been used to mean "done
without pencil and paper" and also "done with few overt responses, either
written or spoken, between the setting of the task and the announcement of
the answer." In neither case is the word mental specially appropriate as a
description of the total fact. As before, we should ask clearly, "What are the
merits and demerits of making certain specified intermediate responses in
inner speech or imaged sounds or visual images or imageless thought—that
is, without actual writing or overt speech?"
It may be said at the outset that oral, written, and inner presentations of
initial situations, oral, written, and inner announcements of final responses,
and oral, written, and inner management of intermediate processes have
varying degrees of merit according to the particular arithmetical exercise,
pupil, and context. Devotion to oralness or mentalness as such is simply
fanatical. Various combinations, such as the written presentation of the
situation with inner management of the intermediate responses and oral
announcement of the final response have their special merits for particular
cases.
These merits the reader can evaluate for himself for any given sort of
work for a given class by considering: (1) The amount of practice received
by the class per hour spent; (2) the ease of correction of the work; (3) the
ease of understanding the tasks; (4) the prevention of cheating; (5) the

cheerfulness and sociability of the work; (6) the freedom from eyestrain, and
other less important desiderata.
It should be noted that the stock schemes A, B, C, and D below are only a
few of the many that are possible and that schemes E, F, G, and H have
special merits.
The common practice of either having no use made of pencil and paper or
having all computations and even much verbal analysis written out
elaborately for examination is unfavorable for learning. The demands which
life itself will make of arithmetical knowledge and skill will range from
tasks done with every percentage of written work from zero up to the case
where every main result obtained by thought is recorded for later use by
further thought. In school the best way is that which, for the pupils in
question, has the best total effect upon quality of product, speed, and ease of
production, reënforcement of training already given, and preparation for
training to be given. There is nothing intellectually criminal about using a
pencil as well as inner thought; on the other hand there is no magical value
in writing out for the teacher's inspection figures that the pupil does not need
in order to attain, preserve, verify, or correct his result.
PRESENTATION
OF INITIAL
SITUATION

MANAGEMENT
OF

A. Printed or written

INTERMEDIATE
PROCESSES
Written

B.

Inner

"

"

C. Oral (by teacher)

Written

D.

Inner

"

"

E. As in A or C
F. The real situation
itself, in part at least
G. Both read by the
pupil and put orally

ANNOUNCEMENT
OF FINAL
RESPONSE
Written
Oral by one pupil,
inner by the rest
Written
Oral by one pupil,
inner by the rest

A mixture, the
pupil writing what
he needs

As in A or B or H

As in E

As in A or B or H

As in E

As in A or B or H

by the teacher
H. As in A or C or G

As in E

Written by all
pupils, announced
orally by one pupil

The common practice of having the final responses of all easy tasks given
orally has no sure justification. On the contrary, the great advantage of
having all pupils really do the work should be secured in the easy work more
than anywhere else. If the time cost of copying the figures is eliminated by
the simple plan of having them printed, and if the supervision cost of
examining the papers is eliminated by having the pupils correct each other's
work in these easy tasks, written answers are often superior to oral except for
the elements of sociability and 'go' and freedom from eyestrain of the oral
exercise. Such written work provides the gifted pupils with from two to ten
times as much practice as they would get in an oral drill on the same
material, supposing them to give inner answers to every exercise done by the
class as a whole; it makes sure that the dull pupils who would rarely get an
inner answer at the rate demanded by the oral exercise, do as much as they
are able to do.
Two arguments often made for the oral statement of problems by the
teacher are that problems so put are better understood, especially in the
grades up through the fifth, and that the problems are more likely to be
genuine and related to the life the pupils know. When these statements are
true, the first is a still better argument for having the pupils read the
problems aided by the teacher's oral statement of them. For the difficulty is
largely that the pupils cannot read well enough; and it is better to help them
to surmount the difficulty rather than simply evade it. The second is not an
argument for oralness versus writtenness, but for good problems versus bad;
the teacher who makes up such good problems should, in fact, take special
care to write them down for later use, which may be by voice or by the
blackboard or by printed sheet, as is best.

CHAPTER XIV
THE CONDITIONS OF LEARNING: THE
PROBLEM ATTITUDE
Dewey, and others following him, have emphasized the desirability of
having pupils do their work as active seekers, conscious of problems whose
solution satisfies some real need of their own natures. Other things being
equal, it is unwise, they argue, for pupils to be led along blindfold as it were
by the teacher and textbook, not knowing where they are going or why they
are going there. They ought rather to have some living purpose, and be
zealous for its attainment.
This doctrine is in general sound, as we shall see, but it is often misused
as a defense of practices which neglect the formation of fundamental habits,
or as a recommendation to practices which are quite unworkable under
ordinary classroom conditions. So it seems probable that its nature and
limitations are not thoroughly known, even to its followers, and that a rather
detailed treatment of it should be given here.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
Consider first some cases where time spent in making pupils understand
the end to be attained before attacking the task by which it is attained, or
care about attaining the end (well or ill understood) is well spent.
It is well for a pupil who has learned (1) the meanings of the numbers one
to ten, (2) how to count a collection of ten or less, and (3) how to measure in
inches a magnitude of ten, nine, eight inches, etc., to be confronted with the
problem of true adding without counting or measuring, as in 'hidden'
addition and measurement by inference. For example, the teacher has three
pencils counted and put under a book; has two more counted and put under

the book; and asks, "How many pencils are there under the book?" Answers,
when obtained, are verified or refuted by actual counting and measuring.
The time here is well spent because the children can do the necessary
thinking if the tasks are well chosen; because they are thereby prevented
from beginning their study of addition by the bad habit of pseudo-adding by
looking at the two groups of objects and counting their number instead of
real adding, that is, thinking of the two numbers and inferring their sum; and
further, because facing the problem of adding as a real problem is in the end
more economical for learning arithmetic and for intellectual training in
general than being enticed into adding by objective or other processes which
conceal the difficulty while helping the pupil to master it.
The manipulation of short multiplication may be introduced by
confronting the pupils with such problems as, "How to tell how many
Uneeda biscuit there are in four boxes, by opening only one box." Correct
solutions by addition should be accepted. Correct solutions by
multiplication, if any gifted children think of this way, should be accepted,
even if the children cannot justify their procedure. (Inferring the
manipulation from the place-values of numbers is beyond all save the most
gifted and probably beyond them.) Correct solution by multiplication by
some child who happens to have learned it elsewhere should be accepted.
Let the main proof of the trustworthiness of the manipulation be by
measurement and by addition. Proof by the stock arguments from the placevalues of numbers may also be used. If no child hits on the manipulation in
question, the problem of finding the length without adding may be set. If
they still fail, the problem may be made easier by being put as "4 times 22
gives the answer. Write down what you think 4 times 22 will be." Other
reductions of the difficulty of the problem may be made, or the teacher may
give the answer without very great harm being done. The important
requirement is that the pupils should be aware of the problem and treat the
manipulation as a solution of it, not as a form of educational ceremonial
which they learn to satisfy the whims of parents and teachers. In the case of
any particular class a situation that is more appealing to the pupils' practical
interests than the situation used here can probably be devised.
The time spent in this way is well spent (1) because all but the very dull
pupils can solve the problem in some way, (2) because the significance of
the manipulation as an economy over addition is worth bringing out, and (3)

because there is no way of beginning training in short multiplication that is
much better.
In the same fashion multiplication by two-place numbers may be
introduced by confronting pupils with the problem of the number of sheets
of paper in 72 pads, or pieces of chalk in 24 boxes, or square inches in 35
square feet, or the number of days in 32 years, or whatever similar problem
can be brought up so as to be felt as a problem.
Suppose that it is the 35 square feet. Solutions by (5 × 144) + (30 × 144),
however arranged, or by (10 × 144) + (10 × 144) + (10 × 144) + (5 × 144),
or by 3500 + (35 × 40) + (35 × 4), or by 7 × (5 × 144), however arranged,
should all be listed for verification or rejection. The pupils need not be
required to justify their procedures by a verbal statement. Answers like
432,720, or 720,432, or 1152, or 4220, or 3220 should be listed for
verification or rejection. Verification may be by a mixture of short
multiplication and objective work, or by a mixture of short multiplication
and addition, or by addition abbreviated by taking ten 144s as 1440, or even
(for very stupid pupils) by the authority of the teacher. Or the manipulation
in cases like 53 × 9 or 84 × 7 may be verified by the reverse short
multiplication. The deductive proof of the correctness of the manipulation
may be given in whole or in part in connection with exercises like

10 × 2 =
10 × 3 =
10 × 4 =
10 × 14 =
10 × 44 =
10 × 144
=
20 × 2 =
20 × 3 =
30 × 3 =
30 × 4 =

30 × 14 =
3 × 44 =
30 × 44 =
3 × 144 =
20 × 144 =
40 × 144 =
30 × 144 =
5 × 144 =
35 = 30 + ....
30 × 144 added to 5 × 144
=

3 × 14 =
Certain wrong answers may be shown to be wrong in many ways; e.g.,
432,720 is too big, for 35 times a thousand square inches is only 35,000;
1152 is too small, for 35 times a hundred square inches would be 3500, or
more than 1152.
The time spent in realizing the problem here is fairly well spent because
(1) any successful original manipulation in this case represents an excellent
exercise of thought, because (2) failures show that it is useless to juggle the
figures at random, and because (3) the previous experience with short
multiplication makes it possible for the pupils to realize the problem in a
very few minutes. It may, however, be still better to give the pupils the right
method just as soon as the problem is realized, without having them spend
more time in trying to solve it. Thus:—
1 square foot has 144 square inches. How many square inches are there in
35 square feet (marked out in chalk on the floor as a piece 10 ft. × 3 ft. plus a
piece 5 ft. × 1 ft.)?
1 yard = 36 inches. How many inches long is this wall (found by measure
to be 13 yards)?
Here is a quick way to find the answers:—
144
35

——
720
432
——
5040 sq. inches in 35 sq. ft.
36
13
——
108
36
——
468 inches in 13 yd.
Consider now the following introduction to dividing by a decimal:—
Dividing by a Decimal
1. How many minutes will it take a motorcycle, to go 12.675 miles at the rate of .75 mi. per minute?

16.9
.75 | 12.675
75
5 17
4 50
675
675
2. Check by multiplying 16.9 by .75.
3. How do you know that the quotient cannot be as little as 1.69?
4. How do you know that the quotient cannot be as large as 169?
5. Find the quotient for 3.75 ÷ 1.5.
6. Check your result by multiplying the quotient by the divisor.
7. How do you know that the quotient cannot be .25 or 25 ?
8. Look at this problem.

.25|7.5

How do you know that 3.0 is wrong for the quotient?
How do you know that 300 is wrong for the quotient?
State which quotient is right for each of these:—
9.

.021 or .21 or 2.1 or 21 or 210
1.8|3.78

10. .021 or .21 or 21 or 210
1.8|37.8
11. .03 or .3 or 3 or 30 or 300
1.25|37.5
12. .03 or .3 or 3 or 30 or 300
12.5|37.5
13. .05 or .5 or 5 or 50 or 500
1.25|6.25
14. .05 or .5 or 5 or 50 or 500
12.5|6.25
15. Is this rule true? If it is true, learn it.
In a correct result, the number of decimal places in the divisor and quotient
together equals the number of decimal places in the dividend.

These and similar exercises excite the problem attitude in children who
have a general interest in getting right answers. Such a series carefully
arranged is a desirable introduction to a statement of the rule for placing the
decimal point in division with decimals. For it attracts attention to the
general principle (divisor × quotient should equal dividend), which is more
important than the rule for convenient location of the decimal point, and it
gives training in placing the point by inspection of the divisor, quotient, and
dividend, which suffices for nineteen out of twenty cases that the pupil will
ever encounter outside of school. He is likely to remember this method by
inspection long after he has forgotten the fixed rule.
It is well for the pupil to be introduced to many arithmetical facts by way
of problems about their common uses. The clockface, the railroad distance
table in hundredths of a mile, the cyclometer and speedometer, the recipe,
and the like offer problems which enlist his interest and energy and also
connect the resulting arithmetical learning with the activities where it is
needed. There is no time cost, but a time-saving, for the learning as a means
to the solution of the problems is quicker than the mere learning of the

arithmetical facts by themselves alone. A few samples of such procedure are
shown below:—
GRADE 3
To be Done at Home
Look at a watch. Has it any hands besides the hour hand and the minute hand?
Find out all that you can about how a watch tells seconds, how long a second is,
and how many seconds make a minute.
GRADE 5
Measuring Rainfall

Rainfall per Week
(cu. in. per sq. in. of area)
June
1-7
1.056
8-14
1.103
15-21
1.040
22-28
.960
29-July 5
.915
July
6-12
.782
13-19
.790
20-26
.670
27-Aug. 2
.503
Aug.
3-9
.512
10-16
.240
17-23
.215
24-30
.811
1. In which weeks was the rainfall 1 or more?
2. Which week of August had the largest rainfall for that month?
3. Which was the driest week of the summer? (Driest means with the least
rainfall.)
4. Which week was the next to the driest?
5. In which weeks was the rainfall between .800 and 1.000?
6. Look down the table and estimate whether the average rainfall for one week
was about .5, or about .6, or about .7, or about .8, or about .9.
Dairy Records

Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June

Record of Star Elsie
Butter-Fat
Pounds of
per Pound
Milk
of Milk
1742
.0461
1690
.0485
1574
.0504
1226
.0490
1202
.0466
1251
.0481

Read this record of the milk given by the cow Star Elsie. The first column tells
the number of pounds of milk given by Star Elsie each month. The second
column tells what fraction of a pound of butter-fat each pound of milk contained.
1. Read the first line, saying, "In January this cow gave 1742 pounds of milk.
There were 461 ten thousandths of a pound of butter-fat per pound of milk." Read
the other lines in the same way.
2. How many pounds of butter-fat did the cow produce in Jan.? 3. In Feb.? 4. In
Mar.? 5. In Apr.? 6. In May? 7. In June?
GRADE 5 OR LATER
Using Recipes to Make Larger or Smaller Quantities
I. State how much you would use of each material in the following recipes: (a)
To make double the quantity. (b) To make half the quantity. (c) To make 1½ times
the quantity. You may use pencil and paper when you cannot find the right
amount mentally.

1. PEANUT
PENUCHE
1 tablespoon
butter
2 cups brown
sugar
1⁄ cup milk or
3
cream
¾ cup chopped
peanuts
1⁄ teaspoon salt
3

2. MOLASSES
CANDY
½ cup butter
2 cups sugar
1 cup molasses
1½ cups boiling
water

3. RAISIN OPERA
CARAMELS
2 cups light
brown sugar
7⁄ cup thin
8
cream

4. WALNUT
MOLASSES SQUARES
2 tablespoons
butter

½ cup raisins

1⁄ cup sugar
3
½ cup walnut
meats

5. RECEPTION
ROLLS
1 cup scalded
milk
1½ tablespoons
sugar
1 teaspoon salt

6. GRAHAM RAISED
LOAF

¼ cup lard
1 yeast cake
¼ cup lukewarm
water
White of 1 egg
3½ cups flour

1 cup molasses

2 cups milk
6 tablespoons
molasses
1½ teaspoons salt
1⁄ yeast cake
3
¼ cup lukewarm
water
2 cups sifted
Graham flour
½ cup Graham
bran
¾ cup flour (to
knead)

II. How much would you use of each material in the following recipes: (a) To
make 2⁄3 as large a quantity? (b) To make 11⁄3 times as much? (c) To make 2½
times as much?

1. ENGLISH
DUMPLINGS
½ pound beef
suet

2. WHITE MOUNTAIN
ANGEL CAKE
1½ cups egg whites

1¼ cups flour
3 teaspoons
baking powder
1 teaspoon salt
½ teaspoon
pepper
1 teaspoon
minced parsley
¼ cup cold
water

1½ cups sugar
1 teaspoon cream
of tartar
1 cup bread flour
¼ teaspoon salt
1 teaspoon vanilla

In many cases arithmetical facts and principles can be well taught in
connection with some problem or project which is not arithmetical, but
which has special potency to arouse an intellectual activity in the pupil
which by some ingenuity can be directed to arithmetical learning. Playing
store is the most fundamental case. Planning for a party, seeing who wins a
game of bean bag, understanding the calendar for a month, selecting
Christmas presents, planning a picnic, arranging a garden, the clock, the
watch with second hand, and drawing very simple maps are situations
suggesting problems which may bring a living purpose into arithmetical
learning in grade 2. These are all available under ordinary conditions of class
instruction. A sample of such problems for a higher grade (6) is shown
below.
Estimating Areas
The children in the geography class had a contest in estimating the areas of different surfaces. Each
child wrote his estimates for each of these maps, A, B, C, D, and E. (Only C and D are shown here.) In
the arithmetic class they learned how to find the exact areas. Then they compared their estimates with
the exact areas to find who came nearest.

Write your estimates for A, B, C, D, and E. Then study the next 6 pages and learn how to find the
exact areas.
(The next 6 pages comprise training in the mensuration of parallelograms and triangles.)

In some cases the affairs of individual pupils include problems which may
be used to guide the individual in question to a zealous study of arithmetic as
a means of achieving his purpose—of making a canoe, surveying an island,
keeping the accounts of a Girls' Canning Club, or the like. It requires much
time and very great skill to direct the work of thirty or more pupils each busy
with a special type of his own, so as to make the work instructive for each,
but in some cases the expense of time and skill is justified.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
In general what should be meant when one says that it is desirable to have
pupils in the problem-attitude when they are studying arithmetic is
substantially as follows:—
First.—Information that comes as an answer to questions is better
attended to, understood, and remembered than information that just comes.
Second.—Similarly, movements that come as a step toward achieving an
end that the pupil has in view are better connected with their appropriate
situations, and such connections are longer retained, than is the case with
movements that just happen.

Third.—The more the pupil is set toward getting the question answered or
getting the end achieved, the greater is the satisfyingness attached to the
bonds of knowledge or skill which mean progress thereto.
Fourth.—It is bad policy to rely exclusively on the purely intellectualistic
problems of "How can I do this?" "How can I get the right answer?" "What
is the reason for this?" "Is there a better way to do that?" and the like. It is
bad policy to supplement these intellectualistic problems by only the remote
problems of "How can I be fitted to earn a higher wage?" "How can I make
sure of graduating?" "How can I please my parents?" and the like. The
purely intellectualistic problems have too weak an appeal for many pupils;
the remote problems are weak so long as they are remote and, what is worse,
may be deprived of the strength that they would have in due time if we
attempt to use them too soon. It is the extreme of bad policy to neglect those
personal and practical problems furnished by life outside the class in
arithmetic the solution of which can really be furthered by arithmetic then
and there. It is good policy to spend time in establishing certain mental sets
—stimulating, or even creating, certain needs—setting up problems
themselves—when the time so spent brings a sufficient improvement in the
quality and quantity of the pupils' interest in arithmetical learning.
Fifth.—It would be still worse policy to rely exclusively on problems
arising outside arithmetic. To learn arithmetic is itself a series of problems of
intrinsic interest and worth to healthy-minded children. The need for ability
to multiply with United States money or to add fractions or to compute
percents may be as truly vital and engaging as the need for skill to make a
party dress or for money to buy it or for time to play baseball. The
intellectualistic needs and problems should be considered along with all
others, and given whatever weight their educational value deserves.
DIFFICULTY AND SUCCESS AS STIMULI
There are certain misconceptions of the doctrine of the problem-attitude.
The most noteworthy is that difficulty—temporary failure—an inadequacy
of already existing bonds—is the essential and necessary stimulus to
thinking and learning. Dewey himself does not, as I understand him, mean
this, but he has been interpreted as meaning it by some of his followers.[22]

Difficulty—temporary failure, inadequacy of existing bonds—on the
contrary does nothing whatsoever in and of itself; and what is done by the
annoying lack of success which sometimes accompanies difficulty
sometimes hinders thinking and learning.
Mere difficulty, mere failure, mere inadequacy of existing bonds, does
nothing. It is hard for me to add three eight-place numbers at a glance; I have
failed to find as effective illustrations for pages 276 to 277 as I wished; my
existing sensori-motor connections are inadequate to playing a golf course in
65. But these events and conditions have done nothing to stimulate me in
respect to the behavior in question. In the first of the three there is no
annoying lack and no dynamic influence at all; in the second there was to
some degree an annoying lack—a slight irritation at not getting just what I
wanted,—and this might have impelled me to further thinking (though it did
not, and getting one tiptop illustration would as a rule stimulate me to hunt
for others more than failing to get such). In the third case the lack of the 65
does not annoy me or have any noteworthy dynamic effect. The lack of 90
instead of 95-100 is annoying and is at times a stimulus to further learning,
though not nearly so strong a stimulus as the attainment of the 90 would be!
At other times this annoying lack is distinctly inhibitory—a stimulus to
ceasing to learn. In the intellectual life the inhibitory effect seems far the
commoner of the two. Not getting answers seems as a rule to make us stop
trying to get them. The annoying lack of success with a theoretical problem
most often makes us desert it for problems to whose solution the existing
bonds promise to be more adequate.
The real issue in all this concerns the relative strength, in the pupil's
intellectual life, of the "negative reaction" of behavior in general. An animal
whose life processes are interfered with so that an annoying state of affairs is
set up, changes his behavior, making one after another responses as his
instincts and learned tendencies prescribe, until the annoying state of affairs
is terminated, or the animal dies, or suffers the annoyance as less than the
alternatives which his responses have produced. When the annoying state of
affairs is characterized by the failure of things as they are to minister to a
craving—as in cases of hunger, loneliness, sex-pursuit, and the like,—we
have stimulus to action by an annoying lack or need, with relief from action
by the satisfaction of the need.

Such is in some measure true of man's intellectual life. In recalling a
forgotten name, in solving certain puzzles, or in simplifying an algebraic
complex, there is an annoying lack of the name, solution, or factor, a trial of
one after another response, until the annoyance is relieved by success or
made less potent by fatigue or distraction. Even here the difficulty does not
do anything—but only the annoying interference with our intellectual peace
by the problem. Further, although for the particular problem, the annoying
lack stimulates, and the successful attainment stops thinking, the later and
more important general effect on thinking is the reverse. Successful
attainment stops our thinking on that problem but makes us more
predisposed later to thinking in general.
Overt negative reaction, however, plays a relatively small part in man's
intellectual life. Filling intellectual voids or relieving intellectual strains in
this way is much less frequent than being stimulated positively by things
seen, words read, and past connections acting under modified circumstances.
The notion of thinking as coming to a lack, filling it, meeting an obstacle,
dodging it, being held up by a difficulty and overcoming it, is so one-sided
as to verge on phantasy. The overt lacks, strains, and difficulties come
perhaps once in five hours of smooth straightforward use and adaptation of
existing connections, and they might as truly be called hindrances to thought
—barriers which past successes help the thinker to surmount. Problems
themselves come more often as cherished issues which new facts reveal, and
whose contemplation the thinker enjoys, than as strains or lacks or 'problems
which I need to solve.' It is just as true that the thinker gets many of his
problems as results from, or bonuses along with, his information, as that he
gets much of his information as results of his efforts to solve problems.
As between difficulty and success, success is in the long run more
productive of thinking. Necessity is not the mother of invention. Knowledge
of previous inventions is the mother; original ability is the father. The
solutions of previous problems are more potent in producing both new
problems and their solutions than is the mere awareness of problems and
desire to have them solved.
In the case of arithmetic, learning to cancel instead of getting the product
of the dividends and the product of the divisors and dividing the former by
the latter, is a clear case of very valuable learning, with ease emphasized
rather than difficulty, with the adequacy of existing bonds (when slightly

redirected) as the prime feature of the process rather than their inadequacy,
and with no sense of failure or lack or conflict. It would be absurd to spend
time in arousing in the pupil, before beginning cancellation, a sense of a
difficulty—viz., that the full multiplying and dividing takes longer than one
would like. A pupil in grade 4 or 5 might well contemplate that difficulty for
years to no advantage. He should at once begin to cancel and prove by
checking that errorless cancellation always gives the right answer. To
emphasize before teaching cancellation the inadequacy of the old full
multiplying and dividing would, moreover, not only be uneconomical as a
means to teaching cancellation; it would amount to casting needless slurs on
valuable past acquisitions, and it would, scientifically, be false. For, until a
pupil has learned to cancel, the old full multiplying is not inadequate; it is
admirable in every respect. The issue of its inadequacy does not truly appear
until the new method is found. It is the best way until the better way is
mastered.
In the same way it is unwise to spend time in making pupils aware of the
annoying lacks to be supplied by the multiplication tables, the division
tables, the casting out of nines, or the use of the product of the length and
breadth of a rectangle as its area, the unit being changed to the square
erected on the linear unit as base. The annoying lack will be unproductive,
while the learning takes place readily as a modification of existing habits,
and is sufficiently appreciated as soon as it does take place. The
multiplication tables come when instead of merely counting by 7s from 0 up
saying "7, 14, 21," etc., the pupil counts by 7s from 0 up saying "Two sevens
make 14, three sevens make 21, four sevens make 28," etc. The division
tables come as easy selections from the known multiplications; the casting
out of nines comes as an easy device. The computation of the area of a
rectangle is best facilitated, not by awareness of the lack of a process for
doing it, but by awareness of the success of the process as verified
objectively.
In all these cases, too, the pupil would be misled if we aroused first a
sense of the inadequacy of counting, adding, and objective division, an
awareness of the difficulties which the multiplication and division tables and
nines device and area theorem relieve. The displaced processes are
admirable and no unnecessary fault should be found with them, and they are
not inadequate until the shorter ways have been learned.

FALSE INFERENCES
One false inference about the problem-attitude is that the pupil should
always understand the aim or issue before beginning to form the bonds
which give the method or process that provides the solution. On the contrary,
he will often get the process more easily and value it more highly if he is
taught what it is for gradually while he is learning it. The system of decimal
notation, for example, may better be taken first as a mere fact, just as we
teach a child to talk without trying first to have him understand the value of
verbal intercourse, or to keep clean without trying first to have him
understand the bacteriological consequences of filth.
A second inference—that the pupil should always be taught to care about
an issue and crave a process for managing it before beginning to learn the
process—is equally false. On the contrary, the best way to become interested
in certain issues and the ways of handling them is to learn the process—even
to learn it by sheer habituation—and then note what it does for us. Such is
the case with ".16662⁄3 × = divide by 6," ".3331⁄3 × = divide by 3," "multiply
by .875 = divide the number by 8 and subtract the quotient from the
number."
A third unwise tendency is to degrade the mere giving of information—to
belittle the value of facts acquired in any other way than in the course of
deliberate effort by the pupil to relieve a problem or conflict or difficulty. As
a protest against merely verbal knowledge, and merely memoriter
knowledge, and neglect of the active, questioning search for knowledge, this
tendency to belittle mere facts has been healthy, but as a general doctrine it
is itself equally one-sided. Mere facts not got by the pupil's thinking are
often of enormous value. They may stimulate to active thinking just as truly
as that may stimulate to the reception of facts. In arithmetic, for example, the
names of the numbers, the use of the fractional form to signify that the upper
number is divided by the lower number, the early use of the decimal point in
U. S. money to distinguish dollars from cents, and the meanings of "each,"
"whole," "part," "together," "in all," "sum," "difference," "product,"
"quotient," and the like are self-justifying facts.
A fourth false inference is that whatever teaching makes the pupil face a
question and think out its answer is thereby justified. This is not necessarily

so unless the question is a worthy one and the answer that is thought out an
intrinsically valuable one and the process of thinking used one that is
appropriate for that pupil for that question. Merely to think may be of little
value. To rely much on formal discipline is just as pernicious here as
elsewhere. The tendency to emphasize the methods of learning arithmetic at
the expense of what is learned is likely to lead to abuses different in nature
but as bad in effect as that to which the emphasis on disciplinary rather than
content value has led in the study of languages and grammar, or in the old
puzzle problems of arithmetic.
The last false inference that I shall discuss here is the inference that most
of the problems by which arithmetical learning is stimulated had better be
external to arithmetic itself—problems about Noah's Ark or Easter Flowers
or the Merry Go Round or A Trip down the Rhine.
Outside interests should be kept in mind, as has been abundantly
illustrated in this volume, but it is folly to neglect the power, even for very
young or for very stupid children, of the problem "How can I get the right
answer?" Children do have intellectual interests. They do like dominoes,
checkers, anagrams, and riddles as truly as playing tag, picking flowers, and
baking cake. With carefully graded work that is within their powers they like
to learn to add, subtract, multiply, and divide with integers, fractions, and
decimals, and to work out quantitative relations.
In some measure, learning arithmetic is like learning to typewrite. The
learner of the latter has little desire to present attractive-looking excuses for
being late, or to save expense for paper. He has no desire to hoard copies of
such and such literary gems. He may gain zeal from the fact that a school
party is to be given and invitations are to be sent out, but the problem "To
typewrite better" is after all his main problem. Learning arithmetic is in
some measure a game whose moves are motivated by the general set of the
mind toward victory—winning right answers. As a ball-player learns to
throw the ball accurately to first-base, not primarily because of any
particular problem concerning getting rid of the ball, or having the man at
first-base possess it, or putting out an opponent against whom he has a
grudge, but because that skill is required by the game as a whole, so the
pupil, in some measure, learns the technique of arithmetic, not because of
particular concrete problems whose solutions it furnishes, but because that

technique is required by the game of arithmetic—a game that has intrinsic
worth and many general recommendations.

CHAPTER XV
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
The general facts concerning individual variations in abilities—that the
variations are large, that they are continuous, and that for children of the
same age they usually cluster around one typical or modal ability, becoming
less and less frequent as we pass to very high or very low degrees of the
ability—are all well illustrated by arithmetical abilities.
NATURE AND AMOUNT
The surfaces of frequency shown in Figs. 61, 62, and 63 are samples. In
these diagrams each space along the baseline represents a certain score or
degree of ability, and the height of the surface above it represents the number
of individuals obtaining that score. Thus in Fig. 61, 63 out of 1000 soldiers
had no correct answer, 36 out of 1000 had one correct answer, 49 had two,
55 had three, 67 had four, and so on, in a test with problems (stated in
words).
Figure 61 shows that these adults varied from no problems solved
correctly to eighteen, around eight as a central tendency. Figure 62 shows
that children of the same year-age (they were also from the same
neighborhood and in the same school) varied from under 40 to over 200
figures correct. Figure 63 shows that even among children who have all
reached the same school grade and so had rather similar educational
opportunities in arithmetic, the variation is still very great. It requires a range
from 15 to over 30 examples right to include even nine tenths of them.

FIG. 61.—The scores of 1000 soldiers in the National Army born in
English-speaking countries, in Test 2 of the Army Alpha. The
score is the number of correct answers obtained in five minutes.
Probably 10 to 15 percent of these men were unable to read or
able to read only very easy sentences at a very slow rate. Data
furnished by the Division of Psychology in the office of the
Surgeon General.
It should, however, be noted that if each individual had been scored by the
average of his work on eight or ten different days instead of by his work in
just one test, the variability would have been somewhat less than appears in
Figs. 61, 62, and 63.

FIG. 62.—The scores of 100 11-year-old pupils in a test of computation.
Estimated from the data given by Burt ['17, p. 68] for 10-, 11-,
and 12-year-olds. The score equals the number of correct figures.
It is also the case that if each individual had been scored, not in problemsolving alone or division alone, but in an elaborate examination on the whole
field of arithmetic, the variability would have been somewhat less than
appears in Figs. 61, 62, and 63. On the other hand, if the officers and the
soldiers rejected for feeblemindedness had been included in Fig. 61, if the
11-year-olds in special classes for the very dull had been included in Fig. 62,

and if all children who had been to school six years had been included in
Fig. 63, no matter what grade they had reached, the effect would have been
to increase the variability.

FIG. 63.—The scores of pupils in grade 6 in city schools in the Woody
Division Test A. The score is the number of correct answers
obtained in 20 minutes. From Woody ['16, p. 61].
In spite of the effort by school officers to collect in any one school grade
those somewhat equal in ability or in achievement or in a mixture of the two,
the population of the same grades in the same school system shows a very
wide range in any arithmetical ability. This is partly because promotion is on
a more general basis than arithmetical ability so that some very able
arithmeticians are deliberately held back on account of other deficiencies,
and some very incompetent arithmeticians are advanced on account of other
excellencies. It is partly because of general inaccuracy in classifying and
promoting pupils.
In a composite score made up of the sum of the scores in Woody tests,—
Add. A, Subt. A, Mult. A, and Div. A, and two tests in problem-solving (ten
and six graded problems, with maximum attainable credits of 30 and 18),
Kruse ['18] found facts from which I compute those of Table 13, and Figs.
64 to 66, for pupils all having the training of the same city system, one
which sought to grade its pupils very carefully.

FIGS. 64, 65, and 66.—The scores of pupils in grade 6 (Fig. 64), grade 7
(Fig. 65), and grade 8 (Fig. 66) in a composite of tests in
computation and problem-solving. The time was about 120
minutes. The maximum score attainable was 196.
The overlapping of grade upon grade should be noted. Of the pupils in
grade 6 about 18 percent do better than the average pupil in grade 7, and
about 7 percent do better than the average pupil in grade 8. Of the pupils in

grade 8 about 33 percent do worse than the average pupil in grade 7 and
about 12 percent do worse than the average pupil in grade 6.
TABLE 13
RELATIVE FREQUENCIES OF SCORES IN AN EXTENSIVE TEAM OF ARITHMETICAL
TESTS.[23] IN PERCENTS
SCORE
70 to 79
80 " 89
90 " 99
100 " 109
110 " 119
120 " 129
130 " 139
140 " 149
150 " 159
160 " 169
170 " 179

GRADE
6
1.3
5.5
10.6
19.4
19.8
23.5
12.6
4.6
1.7
1.2

GRADE
7
.9
2.3
4.3
5.2
18.5
16.2
17.5
13.9
13.6
4.8
2.5

GRADE
8
.4
.4
2.9
4.4
5.8
16.8
16.8
22.9
17.1
9.4
3.3

DIFFERENCES WITHIN ONE CLASS
The variation within a single class for which a single teacher has to
provide is great. Even when teaching is departmental and promotion is by
subjects, and when also the school is a large one and classification within a
grade is by ability—there may be a wide range for any given special
component ability. Under ordinary circumstances the range is so great as to
be one of the chief limiting conditions for the teaching of arithmetic. Many
methods appropriate to the top quarter of the class will be almost useless for
the bottom quarter, and vice versa.

FIG. 67.

FIG. 68.
FIGS. 67 and 68.—The scores of ten 6 B classes in a 12-minute test in
computation with integers (the Courtis Test 7). The score is the
number of units done. Certain long tasks are counted as two
units.

Figures 67 and 68 show the scores of ten classes taken at random from
ninety 6 B classes in one city by Courtis ['13, p. 64] in amount of
computation done in 12 minutes. Observe the very wide variation present in
the case of every class. The variation within a class would be somewhat
reduced if each pupil were measured by his average in eight or ten such tests
given on different days. If a rather generous allowance is made for this we
still have a variation in speed as great as that shown in Fig. 69, as the fact to
be expected for a class of thirty-two 6 B pupils.

FIG. 69.—A conservative estimate of the amount of variation to be
expected within a single class of 32 pupils in grade 6, in the
number of units done in Courtis Test 7 when all chance
variations are eliminated.
The variations within a class in respect to what processes are understood
so as to be done with only occasional errors may be illustrated further as
follows:—A teacher in grade 4 at or near the middle of the year in a city
doing the customary work in arithmetic will probably find some pupil in her
class who cannot do column addition even without carrying, or the easiest
written subtraction

(

8
5

9
3

or

78
37

),

who does not know his multiplication tables or how to derive them, or
understand the meanings of + − × and ÷, or have any useful ideas whatever
about division.

There will probably be some child in the class who can do such work as
that shown below, and with very few errors.
Add
3⁄
8

+

5⁄
8

+

7⁄
8

+

2½
63⁄8
3¾

1⁄
8

1⁄
6

+ 3⁄8

Subtract
10.00
3.49

4 yd. 1 ft. 6 in.
2 yd. 2 ft. 3 in.

Multiply
1¼ × 8

16
25⁄8
——

145
206
——

Divide
2 ) 13.50

25 ) 9750

The invention of means of teaching thirty so different children at once
with the maximum help and minimum hindrance from their different
capacities and acquisitions is one of the great opportunities for applied
science.
Courtis, emphasizing the social demand for a certain moderate
arithmetical attainment in the case of nearly all elementary school children
of, say, grade 6, has urged that definite special means be taken to bring the
deficient children up to certain standards, without causing undesirable
'overlearning' by the more gifted children. Certain experimental work to this
end has been carried out by him and others, but probably much more must
be done before an authoritative program for securing certain minimum
standards for all or nearly all pupils can be arranged.
THE CAUSES OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

The differences found among children of the same grade in the same city
are due in large measure to inborn differences in their original natures. If, by
a miracle, the children studied by Courtis, or by Woody, or by Kruse had all
received exactly the same nurture from birth to date, they would still have
varied greatly in arithmetical ability, perhaps almost as much as they now do
vary.
The evidence for this is the general evidence that variation in original
nature is responsible for much of the eventual variation found in intellectual
and moral traits, plus certain special evidence in the case of arithmetical
abilities themselves.
Thorndike found ['05] that in tests with addition and multiplication twins
were very much more alike than siblings[24] two or three years apart in age,
though the resemblance in home and school training in arithmetic should be
nearly as great for the latter as for the former. Also the young twins (9-11)
showed as close a resemblance in addition and multiplication as the older
twins (12-15), although the similarities of training in arithmetic have had
twice as long to operate in the latter case.
If the differences found, say among children in grade 6 in addition, were
due to differences in the quantity and quality of training in addition which
they have had, then by giving each of them 200 minutes of additional
identical training the differences should be reduced. For the 200 minutes of
identical training is a step toward equalizing training. It has been found in
many investigations of the matter that when we make training in arithmetic
more nearly equal for any group the variation within the group is not
reduced.
On the contrary, equalizing training seems rather to increase differences.
The superior individual seems to have attained his superiority by his own
superiority of nature rather than by superior past training, for, during a
period of equal training for all, he increases his lead. For example, compare
the gains of different individuals due to about 300 minutes of practice in
mental multiplication of a three-place number by a three-place number
shown in Table 14 below, from data obtained by the author ['08].[25]
TABLE 14

THE EFFECT OF EQUAL AMOUNTS OF PRACTICE UPON INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE IN
THE MULTIPLICATION OF THREE-PLACE NUMBERS

AMOUNT

Initially highest five
individuals
next five "
next six "
next six "
next six "

PERCENTAGE OF
CORRECT FIGURES
Initial
Gain
Score

Initial
Score

Gain

85

61

70

18

56
46
38
29

51
22
8
24

68
74
58
56

10
8
12
14

THE INTERRELATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
Achievement in arithmetic depends upon a number of different abilities. For example, accuracy in copying
numbers depends upon eyesight, ability to perceive visual details, and short-term memory for these. Long column
addition depends chiefly upon great strength of the addition combinations especially in higher decades, 'carrying,'
and keeping one's place in the column. The solution of problems framed in words requires understanding of
language, the analysis of the situation described into its elements, the selection of the right elements for use at each
step and their use in the right relations.
Since the abilities which together constitute arithmetic ability are thus specialized, the individual who is the best
of a thousand of his age or grade in respect to, say, adding integers, may occupy different stations, perhaps from
1st to 600th, in multiplying with integers, placing the decimal point in division with decimals, solving novel
problems, copying figures, etc., etc. Such specialization is in part due to his having had, relatively to the others in
the thousand, more or better training in certain of these abilities than in others, and to various circumstances of life
which have caused him to have, relatively to the others in the thousand, greater interest in certain of these
achievements than in others. The specialization is not wholly due thereto, however. Certain inborn characteristics
of an individual predispose him to different degrees of superiority or inferiority to other men in different features
of arithmetic.
We measure the extent to which ability of one sort goes with or fails to go with ability of some other sort by the
coefficient of correlation between the two. If every individual keeps the same rank in the second ability—if the
individual who is the best of the thousand in one is the best of the group in the other, and so on down the list—the
correlation is 1.00. In proportion as the ranks of individuals vary in the two abilities the coefficient drops from
1.00, a coefficient of 0 meaning that the best individual in ability A is no more likely to be in first place in ability
B than to be in any other rank.
The meanings of coefficients of correlation of .90, .70, .50, and 0 are shown by Tables 15, 16, 17 and 18.[26]
TABLE 15
DISTRIBUTION OF ARRAYS IN SUCCESSIVE TENTHS OF THE GROUP WHEN r = .90
10TH
1st
tenth
2d
tenth
3d
tenth
4th
tenth
5th
tenth

.1

9TH

8TH

7TH

6TH

5TH

4TH

3

.1

.4

1.8

6

.1

.4

1.4

4.7

11.5

2

.1

.5

2.1

5.8

12.8

21.1

2

.4

2.1

6.4

12.8

20.1

23.8

2

1.4

5.8

12.8

19.3

22.6

20.1

1

6th
tenth
7th
tenth
8th
tenth
9th
tenth
10th
tenth

10TH

9TH

8TH

7TH

6TH

5TH

4TH

3

.4

4.7

12.8

20.1

22.6

19.3

12.8

5

1.8

11.5

21.2

23.8

20.1

12.8

6.4

2

6.6

23.5

27.4

21.1

12.8

5.8

2.1

22.4

36.0

23.5

11.5

4.7

1.4

.4

68.7

22.4

6.6

1.8

.4

.1

TABLE 16
DISTRIBUTION OF ARRAYS IN SUCCESSIVE TENTHS OF THE GROUP WHEN r = .70
10TH
1st
tenth
2d
tenth
3d
tenth
4th
tenth
5th
tenth
6th
tenth
7th
tenth
8th
tenth
9th
tenth
10th
tenth

9TH

8TH

7TH

6TH

5TH

4TH

3

.2

.7

1.5

2.8

4.8

8.0

1

.2

1.2

2.6

4.5

7.0

9.8

13.4

1

.7

2.6

5.0

7.3

10.0

12.5

14.9

1

1.5

4.5

7.3

9.8

12.0

13.7

14.8

1

2.8

7.0

10.0

12.0

13.4

14.0

13.7

1

4.8

9.8

12.5

13.7

14.0

13.4

12.0

1

8.0

13.4

14.9

14.8

13.7

12.0

9.8

7

13.0

17.3

16.7

14.9

12.5

10.0

7.3

5

22.3

21.7

17.3

13.4

9.8

7.0

4.5

2

46.7

22.3

13.0

8.0

4.8

2.8

1.5

TABLE 17
DISTRIBUTION OF ARRAYS OF SUCCESSIVE TENTHS OF THE GROUP WHEN r = .50
1st
tenth
2d
tenth
3d
tenth
4th
tenth

10TH

9TH

8TH

7TH

6TH

5TH

4TH

3

.8

2.0

3.2

4.6

6.2

8.1

10.5

1

2.0

4.1

5.7

7.3

8.8

10.5

12.2

1

3.2

5.7

7.4

8.9

10.0

11.2

12.3

1

4.6

7.3

8.8

9.9

10.8

11.6

12.0

1

5th
tenth
6th
tenth
7th
tenth
8th
tenth
9th
tenth
10th
tenth

10TH

9TH

8TH

7TH

6TH

5TH

4TH

3

6.2

8.8

10.0

10.8

11.3

11.5

11.6

1

8.1

10.5

11.2

11.6

11.5

11.3

10.8

1

10.5

12.2

12.3

12.0

11.6

10.8

9.9

8

13.9

14.1

13.3

12.3

11.2

10.0

8.8

7

18.9

16.4

14.1

12.2

10.5

8.8

7.3

5

31.8

18.9

13.9

10.5

8.1

6.2

4.6

3

3

TABLE 18
DISTRIBUTION OF ARRAYS, IN SUCCESSIVE TENTHS OF THE GROUP WHEN r = .0
1st
tenth
2d
tenth
3d
tenth
4th
tenth
5th
tenth
6th
tenth
7th
tenth
8th
tenth
9th
tenth
10th
tenth

10TH

9TH

8TH

7TH

6TH

5TH

4TH

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

The significance of any coefficient of correlation depends upon the group of individuals for which it is
determined. A correlation of .40 between computation and problem-solving in eighth-grade pupils of 14 years
would mean a much closer real relation than a correlation of .40 in all 14-year-olds, and a very, very much closer
relation than a correlation of .40 for all children 8 to 15.
Unless the individuals concerned are very elaborately tested on several days, the correlations obtained are
"attenuated" toward 0 by the "accidental" errors in the original measurements. This effect was not known until
1904; consequently the correlations in the earlier studies of arithmetic are all too low.
In general, the correlation between ability in any one important feature of computation and ability in any other
important feature of computation is high. If we make enough tests to measure each individual exactly in:—
(A) Subtraction with integers and decimals,

(B) Multiplication with integers and decimals,
(C) Division with integers and decimals,
(D) Multiplication and division with common fractions, and
(E) Computing with percents,
we shall probably find the intercorrelations for a thousand 14-year-olds to be near .90. Addition of integers (F)
will, however, correlate less closely with any of the above, being apparently dependent on simpler and more
isolated abilities.
The correlation between problem-solving (G) and computation will be very much less, probably not over .60.
It should be noted that even when the correlation is as high as .90, there will be some individuals very high in
one ability and very low in the other. Such disparities are to some extent, as Courtis ['13, pp. 67-75] and Cobb ['17]
have argued, due to inborn characteristics of the individual in question which predispose him to very special sorts
of strength and weakness. They are often due, however, to defects in his learning whereby he has acquired more
ability than he needs in one line of work or has failed to acquire some needed ability which was well within his
capacity.
In general, all correlations between an individual's divergence from the common type or average of his age for
one arithmetical function, and his divergences from the average for any other arithmetical function, are positive.
The correlation due to original capacity more than counterbalances the effects that robbing Peter to pay Paul may
have.
Speed and accuracy are thus positively correlated. The individuals who do the most work in ten minutes will be
above the average in a test of accuracy. The common notion that speed is opposed to accuracy is correct when it
means that the same person will tend to make more errors if he works at too rapid a rate; but it is entirely wrong
when it means that the kind of person who works more rapidly than the average person is likely to be less accurate
than the average person.
Interest in arithmetic and ability at arithmetic are probably correlated positively in the sense that the pupil who
has more interest than other pupils of his age tends in the long run to have more ability than they. They are
certainly correlated in the sense that the pupil who 'likes' arithmetic better than geography or history tends to have
relatively more ability in arithmetic, or, in other words, that the pupil who is more gifted at arithmetic than at
drawing or English tends also to like it better than he likes these. These correlations are high.
It is correct then to think of mathematical ability as, in a sense, a unitary ability of which any one individual may
have much or little, most individuals possessing a moderate amount of it. This is consistent, however, with the
occasional appearance of individuals possessed of very great talents for this or that particular feature of
mathematical ability and equally notable deficiencies in other features.
Finally it may be noted that ability in arithmetic, though occasionally found in men otherwise very stupid, is
usually associated with superior intelligence in dealing with ideas and symbols of all sorts, and is one of the best
early indications thereof.

FOOTNOTES
[1] The following and later problems are taken from actual textbooks or courses of study or state examinations; to avoid
invidious comparisons, they are not exact quotations, but are equivalents in principle and form, as stated in the preface.
[2] The work of Mitchell has not been published, but the author has had the privilege of examining it.
[3] The form of Test 6 quoted here is that given by Courtis ['11-'12, p. 20]. This differs a little from the other series of
Test 6, shown on pages 43 and 44.
[4] Eight or ten times in all, not eight or ten times for each fact of the tables.

[5] The facts concerning the present inaccuracy of school work in arithmetic will be found on pages 102 to 105.
[6] McLellan and Ames, Public School Arithmetic [1900].
[7] These concern allowances for two errors occurring in the same example and for the same wrong answer being
obtained in both original work and check work.
[8] The very early learning of 2 × 2, 2 × 3, 3 × 2, 2 × 4, 4 × 2, 3 × 3, and perhaps a few more multiplications is not
considered here. It is advisable. The treatment of 0 × 0, 0 × 1, 1 × 0, etc., is not considered here. It is probably best to
defer the '× 0' bonds until after all the others are formed and are being used in short multiplication, and to form them in
close connection with their use in short multiplication. The '0 ×' bonds may well be deferred until they are needed in 'long'
multiplication, 0 × 0 coming last of all.
[9] See page 76.
[10] At the end of a volume or part, the count may be from as few as 5 or as many as 12 pages.
[11] Certain paragraphs in this and the following chapter are taken from the author's Educational Psychology, with
slight modifications.
[12] It should be noted that just as concretes give rise to abstractions, so these in turn give rise to still more abstract
abstractions. Thus fourness, fiveness, twentyness, and the like give rise to 'integral-number-ness.' Similarly just as
individuals are grouped into general classes, so classes are grouped into still more general classes. Half, quarter, sixth, and
tenth are general notions, but 'one ...th' is more general; and 'fraction' is still more general.
[13] They may, of course, also result in a fusion or an alternation of responses, but only rarely.
[14] The more gifted children may be put to work using the principle after the first minute or two.
[15] If desired this form may be used, with the appropriate difference in the form of the questions and statements.

232
30
000
696
6960
[16] Courtis finds in the case of addition that "of all the individuals making mistakes at any given time in a class, at
least one third, and usually two thirds, will be making mistakes in carrying or copying."
[17] Facts concerning the conditions of learning in general will be found in the author's Educational Psychology, Vol. 2,
Chapter 8, or in the Educational Psychology, Briefer Course, Chapter 15.
[18] See Thorndike ['00], King ['07], and Heck ['13].
[19] A special type could be constructed that would use a large type body, say 14 point, with integers in 10 or 12 point
and fractions much larger than now.
[20] It will be still better if the 4 is replaced by an open-top 4.
[21] For an account in English of their main findings see Howell ['14], pp. 149-251.
[22] In his How We Think.
[23] Compiled from data on p. 89 of Kruse ['18].
[24] Siblings is used for children of the same parents.
[25] Similar results have been obtained in the case of arithmetical and other abilities by Thorndike ['08, '10, '15, '16],
Whitley ['11], Starch ['11], Wells ['12], Kirby ['13], Donovan and Thorndike ['13], Hahn and Thorndike ['14], and on a
very large scale by Race in a study as yet unpublished.
[26] Unless he has a thorough understanding of the underlying theory, the student should be very cautious in making
inferences from coefficients of correlation.
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